THE ASIATIC REVIEW
JANUARY, 1933

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SINO-JAPANESE FRIENDSHIP

By Tatsuiro Tani
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Before my departure from Japan for London, I called one day in June this year on the Minister of War, General Araki, to ask his opinion on China. To which he replied in substance:

The task of maintaining and developing the civilization of the Far East chiefly devolves upon the Chinese and Japanese. There are many cultured and influential Chinese who believe in the sincerity of our co-operation for this end. But it is deplorable that others, taken up with their own selfish ambitions, have obstinately refused to join hands.

The Japanese nation is united in its desire to promote Sino-Japanese solidarity, but it appears that this is unfortunately not the case with our neighbour, as mentioned above. Troubles such as we have today may arise out of this lack of co-operation. I am, however, still hopeful of seeing the day when it will come home to every Chinese that our goal is nothing but the mutual advancement of our civilization.

General Araki continued:

"Japan has repeatedly declared that she is absolutely free from any territorial ambition, and our only desire is to join hands for mutual prosperity and welfare. This is why we want to assure the peaceful activity of our nation. We hope that our neighbour will one day realize our sincerity. The present controversy is to be deplored, but if China can see through it our ultimate aim to elevate the Far Eastern civilization and to establish Sino-Japanese solidarity, the ordeal may not be without its benefit."

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Sino-Japanese Friendship

statement of General Araki is borne out by past history. Willingness for cultural co-operation can best be illustrated by the sympathy and assistance rendered by us to Chinese students political refugees. Our victorious emergence from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 acted as a stimulus to many men of ingenuity in China, who thought it wise to follow the footsteps of Japanese evolution from the feudal to the modern state. Consequently, they sent their young men to Japan in great numbers to study. The Japanese willingly admitted them into their school, not excluding the Military and Naval Cadet Colleges. During the days of the Chinese revolutionary movement, Dr. Sun Yat Sen and Huang Hsing sought refuge in Japan, and their progressive ideas attracted many followers among the Chinese students then in Japan. Revolutionary headquarters were established in Japan, and their movement received moral and material assistance from influential Japanese. The revolution was eventually successful, and the assistance of some of its sympathizers in Japan cannot be overlooked. Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, the present Chief of the National Government, himself once resided in Japan. Other similar instances abound. We have invariably shown our sympathy and done all we could for them.

During the last quarter of a century the central idea underlying Japanese policy towards China has always been “True friendship with China.” In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, Japan saved Korea and Manchuria from the encroachment of Imperial Russia. The sacrifices made by Japan were tremendous, but she averted a menace which threatened her national existence and won security for her economic development. Thenceforth not only the policy of the Government but also the sentiment of the people has loyally subscribed to the principle of true friendship with China. This deliberate policy, amply confirmed by subsequent actions, was, after all, the outcome of Japan’s earnest desire for some permanent means of promoting her own interest and security as well as that of her neighbour; of furthering the progress of civilization in the East, and thereby contributing towards world peace. Japan took this task as a mission, the attainment of which, in her contention, could not fail to benefit both herself and the Chinese.
Our policy of conciliation and friendship towards China had its explicit expression at the Washington Conference, and concrete embodiment in various treaties concluded there, especially in the Nine Power Treaty relative to China. Japan, true to the spirit of the treaty and hopeful of the future in China, wholeheartedly embarked on a policy calculated to promote the interest of China, especially in the direction of the eventual abolition of extra-territorial rights and the establishment of autonomous tariffs.

In this respect the statement made by Mr. Hioki, the Chief Japanese Delegate at the plenary session of the Special Conference on Chinese Customs held in Peking in 1925, may be cited as the outspoken expression of our sincerity and sympathy towards China.

Mr. Hioki spoke with regard to the fundamental attitude towards questions to be discussed at the Conference:

"Japan has always watched with keen and abiding interest every effort made by the Chinese people for the realization of their legitimate national aspirations. She has herself been subject in the past to unilateral restrictions upon her freedom of action in matters of fiscal and judicial administration. The present struggle of the Chinese people to be relieved of these restrictions has had its counterpart in Japan.

"China is still following the path that we once pursued. The difficulties, the embarrassments and the perplexities that confront China today were once ours. The Japanese delegation will approach the problems before this Conference with sympathy and an intimate understanding of the Chinese position."

The policy of the Foreign Office, as outlined above, was spontaneously shared by the whole nation, which was convinced of the fact that the prosperity of the country was intimately connected with the welfare of China and her people.

It is exceedingly regrettable that this voluntary expression of goodwill on our part has not met with the response it deserved. In fact, there are unmistakable indications that a section of the Chinese people took this as a sign of diplomatic weakness, of which advantage should be taken.

For instance, the surrender by Japan of the former German
concession and the Tsingtau and Shantung Railways, in accordance with the agreement at Washington, only resulted in the renewal of a violent campaign for the return of Port Arthur, Dairen and the South Manchuria Railway.

The exhibition of goodwill by other foreign powers was similarly misconstrued as a sign of weakness. In 1927, in the Hankao incident, the conciliatory attitude of the British marines and volunteer corps was met with the forcible seizure of the concession at the hands of a crowd of intractable and relentless Chinese. Soon afterwards the British concession at Kiukiang met with the same fate.

In 1927 an express train bound for Peking was captured at Lincheng by bandits, who demanded ransom and during the outrage murdered a British subject. As the result a proposal was made to place the Chinese railways under international supervision. Again in the same year the anti-foreign agitation then raging culminated in a sudden and ruthless attack on all foreign consulates and commercial firms in Nanking, involving British, American, French and Italian citizens on the casualty list. Nor did the Japanese Consulate escape, and our countrymen suffered untold insults and outrages. Later a proposal was mooted to station an international force at strategic points on the Yangtse River to secure foreign lives and property. In both cases Japan showed China the greatest degree of sympathy and conciliation and refrained from concurring in or encouraging these proposals.

All hopes of an early restoration of unity and peace in China have been shattered as conditions have taken a turn not for the better but for the worse. To the national revolutionary movement was added the agitation of the Chinese Communist Party—a far more destructive force and one more hostile to the so-called "Imperialist Powers," which virtually meant all the foreign countries that have any relations with China.

The influence of Communism in China has varied from time to time; but anti-foreignism and the violent measures peculiar to this revolutionary doctrine permeated deep into every stratum of the Chinese Government.

The erstwhile Canton Government is now the National Govern-
ment at Nanking. Although it is asserted that Communism has been discarded in principle the practice of the National Government has not revealed any change in its attitude towards foreign powers. Nay, it has increased the severity of anti-foreign activities and extended its scope. The Manchurian Government under the young war-lord Chang Hsueh-liang, came under the influence of the National Government, a fact hitherto unprecedented, the Manchu having been always either independent or else dominant in China. The series of injustices, petty provocations and annoyances done in the name of Communism is simply appalling.

Although anti-foreignism in China owes much to the Kuomintang's idea of nationalism—the repudiation of the right of foreign powers and the assertion of its own, and the communistic hatred of capitalist powers—it dates back, in fact, to the days of closed doors. If we recall past incidents, such as the Boxer Disturbance of 1900 or the Lincheng affair of 1923, and many other similar incidents that occurred during the span of half a century, they demonstrate clearly and indubitably that many of the Chinese people have not yet emerged from the old mentality whereby all foreigners were held in contempt and looked upon as barbarians and outsiders.

This anti-foreignism lingering in the mind of the Chinese nation has been exploited to the extreme by the Kuomintang and by numerous military factions dispersed in all parts of China.

Thus we have witnessed a brisk and vigorous revival of anti-foreign movements following the despatch of Japanese troops to Shantung in 1927 for the protection of the Japanese residents there against the Revolutionary Army then sweeping northward, or on the occasion of the Shanghai incident of May 13, 1925, when a clash took place between a group of students and the municipal police; in the latter case the movement was directed exclusively against Great Britain.

Hatred of foreign powers has been inculcated in the susceptible minds of the young, chiefly by the use of textbooks specially edited for the purpose; national holidays with the ominous name of "National Humiliation Days," hardly betraying the holiday spirit, have been instituted by order of the National Government.
On such days scholars, from primary school to university, are mobilized to demonstrate in processions, their young minds a prey to mass agitation and mob psychology.

Thus the Chinese people have been jealously debarred from cultivating a spirit of international co-operation, greatly to the detriment of smoother understanding between themselves and other nations.

The Japanese nation, deeply disappointed as it was with the inconsiderate attitude of its neighbour and the resulting turn of events, still clung to a hope that one day its patience and forbearance might be rewarded. But numerous outrages perpetrated one after another, culminating in the death of Major Nakamura by regular Chinese troops, and other acts of insult to the Japanese Army, including the wrecking of the South Manchuria Railway track that was under the protection of the Japanese garrison, proved the last straw.

It has often been inferred, in some cases ignorantly and in others malignantly, that the Manchurian incident was engineered by the militarists in Japan with the subsequent approval of public opinion. This is definitely not the case.

With the enormous expansion of population in a mountainous island and the arable land almost reaching the limit of diminishing returns on the one hand, and her natural resources hardly to be spoken of in respect of modern industry on the other, Japan had to preserve peace and her legitimate activities on the Continent, for on these her national existence depends. Nothing more than the assurance of these is desired by Japan. But these she can never forgo.

Japan was obliged to resort to action for self-defence only because her legitimate interests in Manchuria and elsewhere were so ruthlessly trampled underfoot—the dearly purchased reward of her struggles against the forces disturbing to peace in the Far East, and, in the eyes of every Japanese, the results of the shedding of their brothers' and fathers' blood. There was no visible means of redress. In fact, any other method that presented itself for this end might have taken many years before the grave injustice done to us would be rectified. In considering the
Japanese action in regard to Manchuria, attention must be called
to the fact that it is solely to the actions of a section of political
and military circles in China that the Japanese take exception.
Towards the Chinese people in general Japan remains as friendly
as ever.

In all her dealings with China the policy of Japan has been
consistently directed towards securing her peaceful and legitimate
activities. In order to carry out this principle we came to the
conclusion that friendly co-operation only would attain the desired
result. This view was generally accepted in Japan, and Baron
Shidehara, the protagonist of this idea, infused this spirit into
Sino-Japanese diplomacy. "Shidehara Doctrine" has become a
synonym for the cultivation of friendlier relationship with China.

As has been stated above, we are determined to safeguard our
peaceful activities and legitimate interests. To this end, however,
China's friendly attitude towards us should be a foregone con-
clusion. Japan is intimately connected with China and her
people. Geographical propinquity, similarity of culture, inter-
relationship of the two nations' history and, last but not least,
economic necessity make Sino-Japanese friendship so imperative
that, if it be lacking, the national existence of either is seriously
threatened.

Japan has waited patiently for the day when China will realize
that she loses nothing and gains everything by being friendly
with Japan. She will continue to do so. Meanwhile the excite-
ment aroused in Japan by the feeling that her policy of friendship
and goodwill has been betrayed will cool down. Thus remaining
steadfast in these unfortunate and difficult days, we firmly believe
that the day will come when our real spirit of friendliness is
brought home to the neighbouring nation.
THE LYTON REPORT: A CHINESE VIEW

BY C. KUANGSON YOUNG
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Mr. William Martin, one of the best-known European writers on international politics and foreign editor of the *Journal de Genève*, in a leader appearing in that journal on October 4, immediately after the publication of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, which, with Lord Lytton as its Chairman, had been sent out to the Far East to study the Sino-Japanese dispute on the spot, said:

"If the *Journal de Genève* had had any doubts about the editorial policy it has followed during the last year in the Sino-Japanese conflict; if it had had some hesitation regarding the verification of certain facts it has mentioned, its worries would have entirely disappeared today, because the Lytton Report confirms the thesis we have supported in a more startling manner than we had ever dared to hope."

Shorn of its diplomatic language, and taking into consideration the intention and desire of the Commission to afford a face-saving exit for Japan, the whole Report is a vindication of China's case pure and simple. The Japanese thesis, with its ramifications, supporting the invasion, occupation, and subsequent "independence," has been answered, practically point by point, more effectively than it had been hitherto. It is at once a document of condemnation of Japan, of support for the League, of encouragement for China, and of conciliation—at the expense to a certain extent of China—for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute.

Public opinion in Great Britain, after the explosion in Manchuria, had been continuously and consistently urged by many leaders to defer judgment while the matter was still *sub judice*. There is no longer any ground for further postponement. Of the impartiality of the Lytton Commission and of the integrity of Lord Lytton there can be not the slightest doubt. The pronouncements and findings of this Commission must be relied on as the fundamental basis for passing that just and fair judgment, so necessary in the present order of international life, on an issue
which is no longer a dispute between two Far Eastern countries, but has become a question of peace and security for the whole world.

It may be recalled that the Commission of Enquiry originated from a Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, adopted in Paris on December 10, 1931. To this Resolution Japan gave her consent. When the personnel of the Commission was made known, in Chinese quarters there were certain misgivings, due to the fact that only the Great Powers were represented and that three of the five members proposed had had previous colonial experience. It was then felt that if there were any bias at all it would be in Japan's favour. The composition of the Commission was entirely acceptable to the Japanese Government.

The Japanese decision, therefore, to oppose at the present moment both the findings and proposals of the Lytton Report has been most unexpected.

I

The whole Japanese case for invading Manchuria rests on the principal point of provocation and self-defence. The Japanese had alleged that the Chinese troops on September 18, at about 10.30 p.m., had deliberately destroyed with dynamite a section of the South Manchuria Railway. The explosion was the immediate cause of Japan's military measures, and they were undertaken for self-defence.

On this vital point the Commission, in its Report, on pages 70 and 71, says:

"Appreciating the tense situation and high feeling which had preceded this incident, and realizing the discrepancies which are bound to occur in accounts of interested persons, especially with regard to an event which took place at night, the Commission, during its stay in the Far East, interviewed as many as possible of the representative foreigners who had been in Mukden at the time of the occurrences or soon after, including newspaper correspondents and other persons who had visited the scene of conflict shortly after the event, and to whom the first official Japanese account had been given. After a thorough consideration of such opinions, as well as of the accounts of the interested parties, and after a mature study of the considerable quantity of written material and a careful weighing of the great mass of evidence
which was presented or collected, the Commission has come to
the following conclusions:

"Tense feeling undoubtedly existed between the Japanese and
Chinese military forces. The Japanese, as was explained to the
Commission in evidence, had a carefully prepared plan to meet
the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese.
On the night of September 18-19, this plan was put into operation
with swiftness and precision. The Chinese, in accordance with
the instructions referred to on page 69, had no plan of attacking
the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives or property of
Japanese nationals at this particular time or place. They made no
concerted or authorized attack on the Japanese forces, and were
surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. An
explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between
10 and 10.30 p.m. on September 18, but the damage, if any, to the
railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-
bound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient to
justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese
troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot
be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence."

II

First of all, Japan points to the existing conditions in China as a
justification for her military aggression. The conditions in China,
as elsewhere, are perhaps far from what her citizens and friends
desire them to be; nevertheless, it is extremely improbable, if not
impossible, that any nation would subscribe to the thesis that the
domestic conditions of one country are open to question by
another, and that, when judged unilaterally unsatisfactory, they
furnish in international law a ground for military invasion. At
any rate, the opinion of the Lytton Commission on the conditions
in China and the prospect of her future is radically different from
that thesis, and the Lytton Commission is composed of members
of unquestionable character, representing five Great Powers of the
world.

The present condition of China and her efforts for reconstruc-
tion are related by the Lytton Report thus:

"Although the spectacle of China’s transitional period, with its
unavoidable political, social, intellectual, and moral disorder, is
disappointing to her impatient friends and has created enmities
which have become a danger to peace, it is nevertheless true that, in spite of difficulties, delays, and failures, considerable progress has in fact been made. . . . Although, at present, the Central Government's authority is still weak in a number of provinces, the central authority is not, at least openly, repudiated, and there is reason to hope that, if the Central Government as such can be maintained, provincial administration, military forces, and finance will acquire an increasingly national character. Those, among others, were doubtless the reasons which induced the Assembly of the League of Nations last September to elect China to the Council.

"The present Government has tried to balance its current receipts and expenditure and to adhere to sound financial principles. Various taxes have been consolidated and simplified. In default of a proper budgetary system, an annual statement has been issued by the Ministry of Finance. A Central Bank has been established. A National Financial Committee has been appointed, which includes among its members influential representatives of banking and commercial interests. The Ministry of Finance is also trying to supervise the finances of the provinces, where the methods of raising taxes are often still highly unsatisfactory. For all these measures the Government is entitled to credit. . . . In many things, no doubt, the Government has failed, but it has already accomplished much."

III

One of the arguments that has been put forward is that of the Chinese boycott. It has been made, with skill and repetition, to appear that Japan's military measures against China are a form of reprisal against Chinese boycott of Japanese goods. The truth is: Japanese aggression is the horse and Chinese boycott is the cart; and there has never been a moment when the cart leads the horse. It is the horse that has brought injury upon itself from the force and velocity of the trailing cart. This is the observation made by the Lytton Commission:

"If these boycotts are studied in detail it will be found that each of them can be traced back to a definite fact, event, or incident, generally of a political nature and interpreted by China as directed against her material interests or detrimental to her national prestige. Thus, the boycott of 1931 was started as a direct sequel
to the massacre in Korea [of Chinese] in July, following the Wanpaoshan incident in June of that year, and has been accentuated by the events at Mukden in September and at Shanghai in January, 1932. Each boycott has its own immediately traceable cause . . . " (p. 115).

Thus we cannot doubt the Chinese argument that the boycott is purely a measure of self-defence; a reprisal against Japanese aggression. There would have been no wreckage had there been no horse. There would have been no boycott had there been no aggression.

Viewed in this light, the Commission, on the one hand, stated that "we do not suggest that there is anything improper in the fact that Government Departments should support the boycott movement" (p. 120); and, on the other, that:

"No one can deny the right of the individual Chinese to refuse to buy Japanese goods, use Japanese banks or ships, or to work for Japanese employers, to sell commodities to Japanese, or to maintain social relations with Japanese. Nor is it possible to deny that the Chinese, acting individually or even in organized bodies, are entitled to make propaganda on behalf of these ideas, always subject to the condition, of course, that the methods do not infringe the laws of the land" (p. 120).

IV

On January 21, 1932, the Manchester Guardian, in a leader entitled "Soldiers and Bandits," said:

"The Japanese troops (in Manchuria) seem to have been troubled by parties of bandits, occasionally several thousands strong. This raises a new conundrum: When is a soldier not a soldier? One answer seems to be: When he is a Chinaman who has neglected to take the technical precaution of declaring war on you. He then becomes merely a low 'bandit'? But, in the light of what we know even now, the world should be able to decide quite easily who are the real 'bandits' in Manchuria today."

In accepting the Council Resolution of December 10, 1931, Mr. Yoshizawa made a reservation, stating that he accepted it on behalf of the Japanese Government "on the understanding that this paragraph (paragraph 2, urging abstention from any initiative which may lead to further fighting, and from all other action likely to aggravate the situation) was not intended to preclude the
Japanese forces from taking such action as might be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria."

The fact that Japan had to make the above reservation unilaterally indicates that the other Powers on the Council find it impossible to countenance the Japanese thesis that one nation may despatch military forces into the territory of another for the purpose of suppressing bandits. There is no such doctrine in international law. Any semblance given to the Japanese claim would create a precedent the effects of which would be too dangerous and disturbing to prophesy.

Let us now proceed from the question of law to the question of fact. What has actually happened in Manchuria since the invasion by Japan?

On page 109 of the Lytton Report we find this:

"Since September 18, 1931, there has been an unparalleled growth of banditry and lawlessness in the countryside, partly due to disbanded soldiery and partly due to farmers who, having been ruined by bandits, have to take to banditry themselves for a living."

After having carefully studied the prevailing conditions in Manchuria, the Commission has drawn the following conclusions. First, the Report states (p. 83):

"Many of the present bandits are believed to have been peaceful citizens who, on account of the complete loss of their property, were induced to take up their present occupation. Given the opportunity of resuming the occupation of farming, it is hoped that they will return to their former peaceful mode of life."

Secondly, aside from Chinese peaceful citizens who have lost all their property as a consequence of the Japanese invasion, the remnants of the Chinese forces are called by Japan "bandits." On page 81 the Report says:

"It has been the practice of the Japanese to describe indiscriminately as ' bandits ' all the forces now opposed to them."

These and other extraneous and untenable arguments have been muddying the water for the last year and more. None has taken into consideration the new order of international relationship
which has as its foundation the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Anti-War Pact, and the Nine Power Treaty, to all of which Japan has solemnly attached her signature. Article 12 of the Covenant stipulates that "the Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council. . . ." Why did Japan substitute military invasion of Chinese territory for submission of the question to the League? The world asks Japan the same question which has been put by the London Times on November 14, 1931: "If Japan has justice on her side, what reason has she to avoid a far closer co-operation with the League than she has shown any readiness yet to accept?"

Article I. of the Paris Pact says that: "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relation with one another"; and Article II. states that: "The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means." Japan may continue to insist that she has not technically declared war on China; she cannot, however, describe her military measures both in Shanghai and in Manchuria as pacific means.

Article I. of the Nine Power Treaty provides that the "Contracting Powers, other than China, agree to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

Japanese economic rights are adequately recognized by the Lytton Report. Valid rights have always been recognized by the Chinese Government. On the other hand, it cannot, naturally, accept without murmur rights which are either disputed or imaginary. The proper course is to seek a solution as provided by the post-war peace instruments.

The Lytton Report, on page 97, says, in the most unequivocal terms, that the so-called independence movement in Manchuria was "conceived, organized, and carried through" by "a group of Japanese civil and military officials, both active and retired." Further, it states that "the evidence received from all sources has
satisfied the Commission that, while there were a number of factors which contributed to the creation of the ‘Manchukuo,’ the two which, in combination, were most effective, and without which, in our judgment, the new State could not have been formed, were the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials, both civil and military.” “In the ‘Government of Manchukuo,’ Japanese officials are prominent, and Japanese advisers are attached to all important Departments” (p. 99). “As regards the ‘Government’ and the Public Services, although the titular heads of the Departments are Chinese residents in Manchuria, the main political administrative power rests in the hands of Japanese officials and advisers” (p. 107). “The Chinese businessmen and bankers who were interviewed by us were hostile to ‘Manchukuo’” (p. 108). The Commission accepts the statement of the witnesses that “the Chinese farmers, who constitute the overwhelming mass of the population of Manchuria, suffer from and dislike the new régime, and that their attitude is one of passive hostility” (p. 100). “Generally speaking, the attitude of the town population is a mixture of passive acquiescence and hostility” (p. 110).

In Geneva there is now a veritable impasse. On one side, one finds China, resting on the solid foundation of the League of Nations, its Covenant and the findings of its Commission, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Nine Power Treaty; and, on the other, there is Japan. On the vital issue of whether the new order of international life shall survive or perish, there can be no conciliation—there can be no compromise. It is either life or death for the League of Nations. It is either the road to peace and international security or that which will eventually lead to conflict and war. It is up to loyal members of the League of Nations to decide that vital issue. Neither procrastination nor evasion will help matters, for we have already seen what this combination has done during the last fourteen months. Because of the delay, the Japanese have attempted to create a new interpretation of the principle of fait accompli, just as they have tried to re-define the principle of self-defence. In the case of self-defence, as the civilized world knows it, the danger must be real and imminent. And, as we understand it, the meaning of fait accompli cannot be stretched to cover acts done subsequent to the acceptance by both parties of a proposed settlement. Japan ac-
cepted the Resolution of September 30, 1931; the accomplished fact indicates the situation on that date. Any action taken contrary to the Resolution and not for the liquidation of that situation cannot produce any *fait accompli*. To stand firm on the question of the puppet Manchukuo, and to say that the League cannot touch it because it is a *fait accompli*, is the antithesis of logic, reason, and law.

The Committee of nineteen of the Assembly has adjourned to meet again on January 19, 1933. Japan opposes the participation of Russia and the United States of America. Japan opposes the principal suggestions made by the Lytton Commission for a satisfactory solution, for the principal suggestions state that any modification of the government in Manchuria must be consistent "with the sovereignty and administrative integrity of China" (p. 130), and that internal order should be secured by a local gendarmerie force and "security against external aggression should be provided by the withdrawal of all armed forces" (p. 130), which means evacuation by the Japanese army of occupation. No solution will be accepted by China which in any way infringes upon her sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity, as guaranteed her by the Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Nine Power Treaty.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

THE CHANGING FRONTIER: FROM RED SHIRTS TO REFORMS

By F. G. R. Peterson
(Special Correspondent of The Times in India)

It was early on an April morning more than three years ago and I was driving into Peshawar along the road that leads from Charsadda. Those of you who know and who love the memory of your Frontier may picture the scene—the men working deliberately, unhurriedly in the fields; the womenfolk with their bundles balanced on their heads swinging along in single file by the roadside; the dust and the creaking of a slow-moving buffalo cart. Then, beyond, the orchards that cast a dark green girdle around Peshawar and the morning haze that still lay above the river; above the chequered board of the plains, and above those soul-stirring mountains whose ramparts rise in a barrier to meet the sky.

It all seemed very peaceful; yet to the stranger on the Frontier there was that unspeakable thrill in the air that seems to add salt to life the moment that you cross the Attock Bridge. Suddenly from the outskirts of a village two or three hundred yards ahead there came sounds of music, the beat of a drum and the dust of marching men. At first I imagined that I had run into an Indian battalion out on an early morning route march. But even among all the strange sounds that linger in your ear after you have left the Shiny, there is none quite like the music of a “phoo-phoo” band, and long before the straggling column was upon me I realized that these were no regular troops. At their head was borne aloft the green flag of Islam. The leaders wore kalpakas, red tunics, badges of rank on their shoulder straps, and crude imitations of Sam Browne belts. The rank and file were a motley crowd, wearing the usual loose shirt of the Pathan dyed in various
shades of red varying from claret to pale pink. Most of them carried lathis. Here and there was a sinister-looking banner that bore the crossed hammer and sickle and the legend "Workers and Peasants of the World Unite." They shouted slogans and snatches of songs as they went by. As they passed my car they were pleased to make what is usually and politely referred to as "a hostile demonstration." It was the first time I had seen a sight that was to become very familiar in the three years that followed—the Red Shirt army on the march.

There is an inevitable, I might say a conventional, impulse to begin a talk such as the one that I am privileged to give to your Association today on a note of apology—apology for presuming to discuss the story of the North-West Frontier with many who have devoted a lifetime to its service, some who perhaps are able to look back upon the inestimable privilege of having spent as many years beyond the Indus as I have spent weeks. I do not, however, propose to make such an apology. Rather would I hasten to define very clearly the limited scope of this address. It is, I hope, bounded by the conveniently alliterative subtitle "From Red Shirts to Reforms." In fact, it pretends to be no more than a personal narrative of my experiences as a Special Correspondent on the Frontier during those critical years between the beginning of 1930 and the present day—that is to say, between the moment when the long-smouldering Red Shirt movement burst into such a flame as threatened to consume not only the city of Peshawar but the villages that lay beyond it and that scene last April when His Excellency the Viceroy read to the assembled people a message from their King-Emperor proclaiming the reforms granted to them, while from outside came the thunder of guns in honour of the new Province that had been born that day. My story therefore will be a diary rather than a disquisition; it has no ambitions of pointing morals or adorning tales.

**The Red Shirts**

As a convenient jumping off point let me take you back to the end of May, 1930. Before I go on it is well to do a little definition and to give you some conception of that strange, that disciplined,
and that peculiarly dangerous force, the Red Shirts. Who were they? Where did they come from? What were the inspirations of their fanaticism? There was a definite tendency at the time of which I speak to jump to the conclusion that the Red Shirts were essentially a Communist movement, inspired, perhaps even subsidized, by Soviet Russia, and that once again the shadow of the bear—although a bear of a very different breed—lay across the Khyber. There seemed to be all the outward signs. There was the colour of their uniforms, there was the badge of the hammer and the sickle, there were the same slogans and the same catch phrases. At least one of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's lieutenants, probably more, had served his apprenticeship in that college which the Soviet had established at Tashkent near Samarkand for the training of propagandists to spread as much mischief as possible in the East. As time went on, however, the suggestion of Russian influence became less and less apparent; the hammer and the sickle were very soon dropped from the Red Shirt uniform, frankly because they meant nothing to the Pathan. No—my firm conviction after three years' observation (and early in the game I wrote it as emphatically as I could) is that the assumption of Soviet emblems and what I might call Soviet stage effects were imitative rather than inspired. They were the attempts of an angry, and not particularly intelligent, gang to adopt the panoply and the symbols of a force whom they knew to be fiercely opposed to the British rule and everything that was British.

May I quote you one or two parallel instances in my own experience of the East. Immediately after the murder of Sir Lee Stack in Cairo and the mutiny of the Sudanese infantry at Khartum there was a spot of trouble in Palestine, and I journeyed from Cairo to Jerusalem. There, pasted on the walls of Arab houses, I saw inflammatory pictures of the dead Sudanese Askaris—gallant soldiers misled by effendis from Cairo into laying down their lives, just as many a good Pathan has met an unnecessary, a fruitless, death, and all because he listened to the whisperings of some Hindu babu from the plains. Still more strange, in the Zionist quarter of the town, little Jew boys were marching in procession shouting "Vive Zaghlul!" There was not a single point
in common between either the mutiny at Khartum or the political upheaval in Cairo with the Jew-Arab excitement in Jerusalem, and yet both Arab and Zionist hurried to make capital out of those outward manifestations of hostility which they knew were directed against the British. Let me take you far nearer the Frontier, both geographically and politically, for another example of this mischievous form of mimicry. It was on Christmas Day in 1929 and I stood on the walls of the Kotwali in Lahore looking down on the dense crowds that lined the streets to welcome Jawaharlal Nehru, President of Congress. The star turn of the day was the first appearance on parade of the so-called Youth Army, which had been flattered to regard itself as the spear-point of Congress militant. Heaven knows that the situation was serious enough, but I could not help laughing as I looked down on this ludicrous rabble of undersized youths, drawn from what are euphemistically styled the non-martial races, headed by a drum and sife band dressed in the green, white, and orange of the Irish Free State, and—again as an imitative gesture of defiance—playing "The Wearin' o' the Green." One sadly needs an occasional laugh in India these days, and I remember with gratitude a photograph of Nehru published in a devout Congress newspaper a few days later under which the caption "Our Outgoing President" had, by the inspiration of a printer's error, been altered to "Our Outraging President."

**Inspiration of the Movement**

To return to my point, I think it has now been established that all this hammer-and-sickle business was the uncomprehending adoption of a suggestion which, I am quite prepared to admit, came from those who had been tarred with the Tashkent brush. Very definitely, however, it was not the real inspiration of the Red Shirt movement. I would prefer to write down that movement as an agricultural revolt that was essentially local in character, and the product of political hysteria grafted on to what in many cases was a genuine sense of grievance. For the nearest standard of comparison I would suggest to you the *jacquerie* in France or our own peasant revolts of the Middle Ages. Here it was that Congress seized its opportunity, found a ready soil where-
in to sow the seeds of mischief; a type of convert who from a physical, may I say from a military, point of view, was much more likely to be a menace to the British Raj than what the Hindu Press itself describes as the "monkey army" of Bombay.

The Red Shirt army already had its own leader in Abdul Ghaffar Khan—a curious, woolly minded, blundering, and yet not altogether unlikeable man with the physical stature which counts so much in leadership, whether British or Pathan, upon the Frontier. To him they sent advisers and staff officers, trained in the intensive schools of Allahabad or Lahore; men who had as much right to speak for the Pathan as a London prentice would have had to a place in the front rank among the Highland clans at Culloden Moor. They went from village to village talking to the younger men, inventing new grievances, embroidering old ones. The Kissakhani, the street of the story-tellers in Peshawar, suddenly became full of new tales—stories of the British Raj that was about to go and the new Raj that was to take its place. And in a few short months, a few short weeks, a new political movement—almost religious in its fanaticism—had been added to our worries on the North-West.

It is no use being critical at this stage, but I am afraid that the powers that be scarcely realized its seriousness until too late. No one yields to me in my admiration of a service that during the last few years has fought a battle in India against almost insuperable odds. There are, however, one or two weak joints in its armour; one is its pathetic failure to meet propaganda with counter-propaganda; another is its lack of liaison when it comes to intelligence from danger spots. Sometimes the district officer may be a first-class man at handling a situation, but not so good when it comes to writing an appreciation of it. Nearly always he is much too busy to sit back at the end of the day and settle down to composing a long telegram in cypher. Farther up the line there are men who are inclined to sit on the safety valve lest they should give appearance of "having wind up." And there are others who are over-ready to listen to what in America would be called the "yes-men," the people who abide by the time-honoured tradition of the East and make it their business to agree with everything that
their superior officer says and tell him exactly the story that they think he wants to hear.

I still remember an illuminating report on Mr. Gandhi's march through Gujerat to Dandi, which asserted that the outstanding feature was the apathy of the villagers, who did not even stop their work in the fields to watch the little man go by, and who only attended his meetings because they were unusual events in the monotony of the hot weather, of no more significance than the landing of an aeroplane. Two days later I was down myself in Gujerat and found a countryside swept with religious fervour, where the people of the villages on the line of march came rushing to prostrate themselves before the man they regarded as saint and pilgrim, and where villages in distant parts of the Presidency were denuded of their inhabitants who had hastened across country to receive *darshan*. And when I thought back to that pious document in Simla, which even went the length of claiming that Mr. Gandhi was making himself an object of ridicule, I began to understand what had completely defeated me up till that moment—why the Government of India had ever allowed Mr. Gandhi to march three hundred miles across country for the express and avowed purpose of breaking the King-Emperor's law while a whole nation looked on.

**The 1930 Riots**

That, however, is getting a long way from the Frontier, and it is time that I hurried back across the Attock Bridge. I said that so far as a record of events was concerned this talk would be a dispassionate diary, and in the short space of time available I propose to make that diary as concise as possible. After all, to those of you who are interested in the Frontier the events of the past three years are recent and familiar history. I shall begin with the riots of April, 1930, and the troubled times that followed. I have been in a good many rough-houses in India during the past three years. I have seen the grim aftermath both of Cawnpore and of Sholapur; I have seen the Royal Irish Fusiliers driving the crowd before them while the shops in the Bendhi bazaar blazed to the communal torch. I have watched while the jungles up-stream
from Chittagong were combed out for terrorists, and waited outside the gaol at Lahore while a crowd shrieked its execrations at the sentence of death passed on Bhagat Singh. But never have I sensed such an atmosphere of sullen thunder as that of the Peshawar bazaar during those desperate days in May and June of 1930.

Early in June we had the diversion of the Afridi raid on Peshawar, when late at night the rattle of rifle fire down the Bara road told us that the lashkar had got right on the perimeter wire. I well remember that night in the Peshawar club, a marvellous place where neither wars nor the rumours of wars are allowed to spoil the cheerful atmosphere. I remember one moment in particular, because, once again, it provided us with one of our few good laughs when all around the air was full of a certain grimness. The few women left in Peshawar for the hot weather had been parked in the club for safety with an infantry guard around them. The billiard-room had been transformed into a dormitory. Up came a senior officer to the harassed secretary. "I say," he said, "it's a bit thick putting a colonel's wife with all these other women in the billiard-room. Couldn't you at least give her the bridge-room to herself?"

There followed an anxious hot weather. The tribes were stirring uneasily, and that naughty old man the Haji of Turangzai, with his son Badshah Gul, were doing their utmost to raise a jehad. Each day the Royal Air Force kept up its unceasing vigil over the hills; there were skirmishes in a score of villages; there were the violent deaths of British officers, both military and police. There was the amazing work done by the Army in building roads of war that in time will become equally valuable as roads of peace across the Kajuri plain. There was the equally valuable service rendered by the Royal Air Force literally going out before breakfast and stopping wars fifty and a hundred miles from Peshawar.

**Effect of Delhi Pact**

Then came the Delhi Pact, which, whatever it did for the rest of India, had a deplorable effect upon the Frontier. I had the unusual privilege of watching the scene from beyond the Khyber, and
I know how the Afghans gazed at each other in bewilderment, asking whether India was ruled by the British or by Congress. The day that I motored back from Kabul to Peshawar I saw a platoon of Sikhs marching down one side of the road to Jamrud, while on the other side a party of Red Shirts, secure in their immunity, mimicked the soldiers, shouted singularly obscene words of command at them, and made the rude noises of naughty schoolboys. I have seen crowds of Red Shirts standing around the police lines at Shabkadr and, again safely entrenched behind the Pact, jeering at the loyal, the sorely tried, the magnificent constabulary. But the Pact had been signed, and although Red Shirts and Congresswallahs between Nowshera and Dera Ismail Khan dishonoured it day by day, there was not a Government officer, not a soldier, who did not abide by its word.

So the days went on until we came to that stark tragedy at Nathiagali, where Sir Steuart Pears, as kindly and as gallant a gentleman as ever served his Frontier, fell to his death down the mountain-side. Colonel Griffith, at that time Resident of Waziristan, was on the spot and was appointed Acting Commissioner. Surely never a man went up the ladder of promotion at a more breathless rate. In a few weeks the Acting Chief Commissioner had been confirmed in his appointment. In a few months Sir Ralph Griffith, first Governor of the new Frontier Province, took the oath before the Viceroy. There are some who say that he has been lucky. Perhaps he has, but so is the company officer who happens to be at the right hand of his C.O. when the latter is killed in action and who takes over temporary command of the battalion. And when that company officer has seen his battalion through a particularly bad show, when he has shown the genius for inspiring confidence among his officers, affection from his men, and a wholesome respect from the gentlemen on the opposite side of the wire, surely then the good fortune is not with him but with the unit under his command.

**A Governor's Province**

I realize that all these scraps from my diary read like the successive stages of a peculiarly disjointed scenario. So, in fact,
they were. With December came the return of Mr. Gandhi from London and the rapid spread of disaffection among the Red Shirts once again. They had seen Gandhi leading Abdul Ghaffar Khan around the country like a large performing bear: from Lahore to Karachi, from Karachi to Delhi, from Delhi to Bombay. Now they asked themselves uneasily what they were going to get as the price of falling in behind a bunch of extremist Hindus. Everywhere the situation looked ominous and full of trouble in store. Then Colonel Griffith struck and struck hard. Pact or no pact, the peace of the Frontier had to be maintained, and even before Gandhi had walked down the gangway at Ballard pier Abdul Ghaffar Khan was in gaol. The pessimists nodded their heads and spoke dismoally of the trouble that most indubitably would follow, but it often happens in India that the longer one speaks of trouble the less formidable it is when it actually arrives. The Chief Commissioner and his officers—stout-hearted men like Caroe in Peshawar and Searle in Mardan—did their work ruthlessly and did it well. There was a minimum amount of trouble; unbelievably few casualties on either side.

The result was that in spite of the Red Shirts, and not because of them, the way to the grant of reforms was cleared. The Reforms Department worked overtime to produce a new skeleton constitution from its cupboard, and within four months of the Prime Minister’s promise it was possible to carry his pledge into effect. Talk of a disjointed scenario, it was bewildering to an observer who only a few weeks after writing of young battles in Bannu and bombing-raids just over the line was compelled to turn his pen to the description of polling booths and ballot boxes and all the other paraphernalia of an election. To judge by the low percentage of voters in certain areas, it was somewhat bewildering to the people themselves. On the whole, however, save in certain areas such as Mardan, the elections passed off quietly. I make special mention of Mardan because this wasps’ nest provided convincing proof that, although the Red Shirts have been smoked out, they are still very much alive. Between dusk of the night before the elections and dawn that day 30,000 of them had cast a beleaguring army round the district to prevent voters coming in. The effect may be judged
from the fact that in one village alone only 65 voters out of 1,251 on the roll put in an appearance. Of the elections themselves it is not necessary to say much—there was little electioneering and party distinctions were vague. If a line had to be drawn it would be between the vakils from the towns on the one hand and the nominees of the khanates on the other—that is to say between the glib urban intelligentsia and the old Tory squires. For many reasons which time does not permit to discourse upon, the result was a clear-cut and a welcome victory for the squires.

Last scene of all: Again it is early on an April morning, but this time in the Victoria Hall at Peshawar. On the dais are the Viceroy and his staff in full-dress uniform. Before him, standing with bowed head in a shaft of sunlight, stands the new Governor—the tried servant of the Frontier who was so strangely destined to become its Lat Sahib. The hall is crowded with officials, with military officers, and with durbaris and notables from every district in the Province. Most of them are elderly men wearing the gold kula and pale blue puggri of the Frontier; many of them proudly display the unfamiliar ribbons of long-forgotten wars. The short ceremony over, the crowd streams out into the morning sunshine to watch the troops marching away—regiments with great names on the North-West: the Gordon Highlanders, the Guides, and the Ghurkas. And the members of the new Council, perhaps a little self-conscious, shake hands with each other and discuss the coming season at Abbottabad.

Here for the moment we must leave them, because it is early yet, and he would be a bold man who would prophesy too much at this stage. At the beginning of this narrative I promised that I would not attempt to point a moral, but the detached observer who has watched the strange sequence of events during the past three years may be permitted at least two fervent hopes.

THE RED SHIRTS AND THE TRIBES

The first is that, however successfully the new reforms work in the early stages, there should be no question of relaxing that firm grip which Lord Willingdon and Sir Ralph Griffith between them got upon the Red Shirt movement with the beginning of the
present year. Already the rank and file who received short sentences are out of gaol; but their leaders are still under restraint, and it is well that they should remain so. For the sudden resurrection of a disciplined Red Shirt army (deprived as it was of its high command) around Mardan during the elections proved that it still exists as a terribly dangerous force, and disaster was only averted by the efficiency and the personal courage of our men on the spot.

I have said that I discounted the present menace of any connection between the Red Shirts and influences outside India; I would make bold to prophesy that the unnatural and artificial alliance between politically-minded Pathans and the Hindus of the south will die an early death. But there is one supreme danger to be faced, and that is the link between the Red Shirts and the tribes. It may seem strange that I have said so little about the tribesmen, who must as ever make themselves heard as a kind of Greek chorus to any epic of the Frontier. But the tribesmen qua tribesmen enter little into the scope of this talk. Theirs is a familiar story to you; all that I can say is that the story remains unchanged. The Mohmand still sits behind his rock, lovingly polishing the barrel of his rifle, gazing down on our line of block-houses and dreaming of the loot of the bazaars. I cannot believe that he is greatly concerned with the results of elections or the difference between Dominion status and purna swaraj. What does concern him very much, however, is the prospect of political tumult and general badmashery in the towns that lie only a few miles from his caves and which would give him the Heaven-sent opportunity of starting a row while our hands were embarrassingly full already. The Red Shirts know this well, and it is the big card that they keep up their sleeves. Conversely, in the unfortunate event of trouble with the tribes themselves, the Red Shirts would seize their opportunity and try to stab us in the back, so that from a military point of view we would find ourselves under the disastrous necessity of facing two fronts. Therefore let us encourage the politician to push on with his reforms so long as he doesn’t push too hard or too far; but don’t let us condemn our soldiers and our police to try and carry on with an enemy at large within our gates. It seems in-
credible that there should still be people in this country who confuse the double duty of speeding up reforms and keeping the King-Emperor's peace; people who regard zeal for the former as a palliation of murderous offences against the latter. There is only one way of dealing with men who consider political killing (or attempted killing) as no murder, and it makes no difference whether they are Pathans from Peshawar or terrorists in Calcutta whose spiritual home is neither in the polling booth nor the Assembly, but somewhere in the Andaman Islands.

My second hope is based on my Frontier experience, but here again its moral goes beyond the Indus and across the whole of India. For weeks and months the political leaders of Peshawar and elsewhere had expressed derision and contempt at our proposals for reform; had indicated as plainly as possible that they would boycott the elections and turn their backs upon the Assembly. The franchise was determined, the elections were held, the Assembly came into being, and these very men were almost indecent in their haste to announce themselves as candidates and get in on the ground floor. Surely the moral is plain. India is a land of bargains, and it is playing into the hands of the bargainers to make a fetish of endless parleyings and that hardy annual the Round-Table Conference. Fortunately the way ahead seems clear. I suggest to you that if, after the most careful consideration of whatever the Indian leaders may still have to say, we then announce our last word, offer them the beginnings of their constitution so that they may take them or leave them, we will find reasonable men in India with the courage and the good sense to co-operate, and so at last to achieve that share in the government of their own nation which reasonable men in this country desire no less than they themselves.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W.1, on Tuesday, October 4, 1932, at which a paper, entitled “The Changing Frontier: From Red Shirts to Reforms,” was read by Mr. F. G. R. Peterson. Sir Hamilton Grant, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:


The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—We are fortunate in having many objects of national pride, perhaps of national veneration; not least among these is the London Times, which still holds, as it always has held, a unique position among the newspapers of the world. We may hope that the new Roman type, which it adopted for the first time yesterday, will tend further to confirm it in its unassailable position.

We who are interested in India and in Indian affairs have reason especially
to be grateful to *The Times* for the messages which it has given us from its India Correspondent during the past years of trouble and turmoil in India. Those messages have not only supplied us with the most accurate and up-to-date information, but they have as a rule contained some commentary or appreciation of the situation which has enabled us to understand the more easily the real trend of events.

We are about to have the great privilege of hearing the author of those messages give us an address upon recent developments on the North-West Frontier. To have a first-hand address from the person who has been and who, I hope, in the future will still be *The Times* Correspondent in India is indeed a great occasion.

I dare say I could say a great deal more about Mr. Peterson's attainments, but I do not propose to detain you or to waste time, as I think you will all be anxious to get to the real business, and the introduction which I have given you to Mr. Peterson should be, I am sure, sufficient to secure your eager attention.

(The lecturer then read his paper.)

The Chairman: Unfortunately Professor Coatman, who was to have spoken today, is unable to attend and has sent a message of regret. I am glad to say he has accompanied it with a written copy of the speech he had meant to make, and it will now be read by the Honorary Secretary.

Professor Coatman wrote:

I think Mr. Peterson has done us all a good service in drawing our attention in such an interesting fashion to one of the most important of all the problems which face us in India. He has given us a very good descriptive account of the Red Shirt Movement, and none of us can quarrel with his exposition of its origins and bases as far as it goes. But I, personally, see in the Red Shirt Movement something much wider and deeper than Mr. Peterson suggests. He is quite right when he says that the assumption by the Movement, of Soviet emblems, is imitative rather than inspired. Nevertheless, at one stage Communist influence was very important in inspiring Red Shirt activities and is still not to be neglected. But this inspiration is indirect rather than direct.

As far as I know, there has not, at any rate within the last few years, been any direct connection between Abdul Ghaffur Khan and Soviet agents and propaganda. But it must be remembered that the outlying parts of the Soviet Republic in Russian Turkestan are not such a very long distance from the North-West Frontier, and, of course, there is constant communication between the two places via the medium of traders and travellers. Now, the agriculturists of the North-West Frontier, when the appalling slump in agricultural prices began to hit them really hard, were not unaware of the state of things among their peers in Russian Turkestan. In that country there is no money economy, and so the circumstances of the peasantry do not degenerate as they do in countries under what we may conveniently term the capitalist régime. Thus a certain driving force was added to the Red Shirt Movement in its early days by the constant comparison between the suddenly depressed condition of the peasantry of the North-West Frontier and the more stable, and thus apparently better, con-
dition of the agriculturists under the Soviet Government. This point of view ought always to be borne in mind because it refers to a state of affairs which is capable at any time of exercising serious influence.

But this is, so to speak, an accidental factor in the Movement. The real explanation of it, I firmly believe, is that it is just a new manifestation of the old Islamic anti-kafir movement which has been in existence on the Frontier since the early days of the Hindustani fanatics 110 years ago. This anti-kafir movement was acute in the days when the Sikhs held part of the present North-West Frontier Province, and, of course, we have been up against it in very violent form from time to time. Two of the most serious campaigns which we ever fought on the Frontier—namely, the old Ambeyla campaign of 1863, and the Tirah campaign of 1897—assumed the aspect of something like a war of liberation of the Islamic peoples of the Frontier from non-Islamic rule. The Ambeyla campaign was directly due to the activities of the Hindustani fanatics. It is a pity that the Indian Government have never published the extraordinarily interesting account written by Major Parsons, of the Punjab Police, of his enquiry into the ramifications of the Hindustani fanatic movement throughout India. He was put on special duty for this purpose after the Ambeyla campaign, and he revealed to an astounded Government how the fanatics had their agents and their organization right through India, as far away as furthest parts of Bengal. Some of the agents were actually in the Indian Army in the old Commissariat Department. Since then, the activities and the ubiquity of the fanatics have been enormously curtailed, but Sir Hamilton Grant will remember the disturbing revelations of their activities in certain parts of the Frontier Province during the Khilafat agitation of 1920. In my own district, Hazara, I found that certain of the tribes in the hills, away near Nathia Gali, paid regular tribute to the fanatics, and so did some of the tribes in the Rawalpindi district. The Hindustani fanatics are only one element in this perennial anti-kafir movement on the Frontier, and again our Chairman will remember how brief the Hindu-Muslim entente was during the Khilafat days, and how the Khilafat volunteers wore a specifically Islamic uniform and regarded themselves as ghazis.

The Red Shirt Movement thus is, to my mind, another ebullition of this undying movement and sentiment, and this explains one or two features with regard to it which may have puzzled observers. One of these features was the neutrality, if not actual friendliness, with which the Red Shirt Movement was at first regarded by Muslims who were undoubtedly well-affected towards the Government. Another feature was the spontaneous outburst of indignation throughout Muslim India over the vigorous suppression of the Red Shirt Movement, of which one incident was the skilful arrest of Abdul Ghaffur Khan by the Frontier authorities a few months ago. A special meeting of the All-India Muslim League condemned the suppression and a strong agitation was carried on by Indian Muslims for some time, even by those of the most moderate political complexion and undoubted loyalty to the British connection. Abdul Ghaffur Khan used Mr. Gandhi's influence and the organisation of the Congress very skilfully, but in the absence of the British there cannot be a moment's doubt that any
connection between this militant Muslim movement and the mainly Hindu Congress would dissolve as quickly as a wreath of mist in the hot sun.

I think it just as well to make these points explicit, because we are undoubtedly going to hear more about the Red Shirt Movement on the Frontier, and the Muslim troubles in Kashmir are all part of an undoubtedly Muslim forward move, and are by no means over yet.

The Chairman: We have also had messages of regret at their inability to be present from Lord Lamington, Sir William Barton, and General Sir Andrew Skeen.

I think I shall be voicing the feelings of all here present when I say that we have listened with immense pleasure and with great interest to Mr. Peterson's address. He has given us a picturesque and vivid account of a most interesting movement. He has put before us the series of events leading from the beginning of the Red Shirt Movement until the day when the North-West Frontier Province was elevated with all pomp and ceremony to the status of a Governor's Province.

What he has said about the connection between the Soviet and the Red Shirt army is of especial interest, particularly when read in the light of what Mr. Coatman has said in his paper. For myself I am inclined to agree with Mr. Peterson that Soviet influence in regard to this movement is practically negligible. Soviet signs and Soviet colours have been adopted simply because it is known that the Soviet are hostile to us, but there is no real underlying Soviet influence at work in the matter.

I feel considerable diffidence in speaking at all to-day, as a great deal of water has run under the Attock Bridge since I was in personal touch with the Frontier, and I cannot believe that anyone here present wants to hear the ruminations of a back number. My excuse must be that the old Frontier remains in many respects much the same in spite of all its changes and chances.

It is confronted with the same three problems that have always been the bane of its administrators. In the first place, the problem of administering the virile people who live in the settled districts; secondly, the problem of controlling the tribes, those hereditary robbers who inhabit the highlands that lie between British India and Afghanistan; and, thirdly, the problem of our relations with Afghanistan and the Great Beyond.

These problems have varied from time to time in relative importance, but they have always been intimately interconnected.

At one time the menace of Imperial Russia was the bugbear not only of India but of our whole Imperial policy, and our whole thoughts were concentrated upon the danger of Russian aggression in that quarter. With the fall of Imperial Russia my belief is that at any rate for the present that danger ceased to be, and that as a militant force on the North-West Frontier, or even as an intriguing force, the Soviet Government are of little or no importance. They must not, of course, be disregarded, but I think that the fear of them can very easily be exaggerated.

As regard the tribes, they, like the poor, are always with us, and they are always troublesome, but apart from their normal lawlessness there are times when that lawlessness becomes intolerable. Those times are when
one of two things happen. Either the Ameer, whose influence over our tribes is predominant, chooses to egg them on to give us trouble; or, on the other hand, when within our own districts there is political agitation of a serious kind.

It has been my own experience in the Frontier, and that, I think, of most officers who have been intimately connected with the administration of the Frontier, that there is an almost mathematical maxim that political agitation within our settled districts reacts at once, immediately and proportionately, in the neighbouring tribal area: when these small political disturbances occur, a few extra sheep are stolen; but serious political agitation, giving the idea that the British Raj is tottering, leads at once to overt acts of hostility and possibly to war.

I should like to tell you one little story about what happened to Professor Coatman and myself just before I left India. In 1920 the whole Frontier was suffering from the aftermath of the Great War, and still more from the aftermath of the third Afghan War, that idiotic, crazy war that came on, one does not quite know why, but which I was very glad to be the humble instrument of settling. While the whole border was in more or less of a turmoil, there was a curious movement known as the Hifrat. The idea was that every good Muhammadan Indian in India should shake the dust of that unholy country off his feet and go and live over the border in Afghanistan. In an unguarded moment the Ameer said they would be welcome. In consequence, some twenty or thirty thousand of those poor benighted people sold their all and moved across the Frontier, with most disastrous results. They died like flies of hunger and thirst, and the roads were strewn with their dead. The survivors drifted back, ruined and disillusioned men.

Meanwhile, in the Hazara district, two mullahs, very much in the Red Shirt manner, had raised the flag of revolution. They said the British Raj was falling. They set up a provisional Government. I forget whom they appointed Chief Commissioner, but I am sure he was a person infinitely more capable than myself. Various Chief Court Judges and so on were appointed by them, and the whole thing was started on regular revolutionary lines.

I hurried from duties elsewhere to Abbotabad, and on to the seat of the trouble, Manschra, usually as peaceful as a village green on Sunday. I found it filled with armed men. We drove through the village up to the Rest House, and there I had a confabulation—police officers, various military officers, and myself—and I decided that the only thing to do was to have these two mullahs arrested as soon as might be. It was known that they would be in Manschra that night, so I arranged that they should be arrested the next day at 11 a.m., the time they would least expect it. They were to be put in cars and hurried to Abbotabad. The telegraph lines were to be stopped so that no news could reach Abbotabad before I had made arrangements there. Abbotabad was depleted of troops, who had gone to the Black Mountain, which had risen in response to the prompting of these two mullahs—and in accordance with the maxim I have quoted.

The next day at 11 o'clock I suddenly noticed that there was some excite-
ment in the town. Then Mr. Coatman himself appeared and said, "We have got the mullahs all right. They have been taken to the Gurkha quarter yard for safety. We have a guard on them and everything is all right."

I asked, "How long have you been here?"
He said, "I have come straight to you."
"Then how is it," I asked, "that an hour ago there was a crowd of people moving about?"
"I don't know," he replied. "News in India travels very quickly."

In a very few minutes a crowd began to collect in the Municipal Gardens outside the Chief Commissioner's house where I was staying. This crowd began to get bigger and bigger. In the house were my wife, my sister-in-law, and myself, with about four orderlies and seven or eight constables, as no troops were available.

I realized that it was a very serious situation, and asked Mr. Coatman what he could do. He thought he could get thirty policemen from the lines, so I told him to get them as soon as possible.

The noise from the crowd was fierce and fanatical, like the noise at Ephesus when the multitude shouted, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians."

Mr. Coatman in an incredibly short time returned with the thirty police, and I said to him, "You have to break up this gathering, but I do not want you to fire if you can possibly avoid it. The butt of a rifle is as good as its other end in most cases. If you can possibly manage it, do it without firing a shot."

Coatman and his men, with unquestioning courage, went off at the double into this crowd—one man to fifty, or perhaps a hundred. After a few tense minutes I saw them beginning to come out like hares through the hedges. Within half an hour the place was cleared. There was a curious dead lull in the town. Coatman and his men had done their work both bravely and humanely.

The next day the City Fathers came to me and said, "We want to thank you and your officers. You might quite well have taken a different view and begun shooting and killing and so on, and that would have left a legacy of hate. As it is, we are all friends again."

I think in India, if you could only as a rule deal in the first instance with riots on those lines—break a rib or two rather than shoot a child or two by mistake—it would be a better way of doing it. (Applause.)

Doctor COLLIN DAVIES: Before making my brief contribution to this discussion, I should like to congratulate Mr. Peterson upon his interesting and very vivid account of his recent experiences on the North-West Frontier.

Mr. Peterson has raised the question as to how far the Frontier tribes across the border have been affected by Congress propaganda. It seems to me that there has been a much closer connection between the various disturbances than is sometimes imagined. I believe I am correct in stating that the Red Shirt Movement coincided with disturbances elsewhere. It is a significant fact that the leader of the Red Shirt Movement, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, is a relation by marriage to the Haji of Turangzai.

There can be no doubt that Congress agitators had been active across the
border in the Afridi country, for, when the Afridis came in to negotiate for a settlement, they put forward two preposterous demands: in the first place, the release of Mr. Gandhi; and, in the second place, the repeal of the Special Ordinances in India.

This is not the first time that the Frontier tribes have been incited by intrigues from inside India.

Professor Coetman has already referred to the Hindustani fanatics who caused us so much trouble in the Ambela campaign of 1863 and afterwards. They were reinforced by a steady stream of recruits from Bengal and elsewhere. In 1897 there was contact between the Frontier mullahs and those of Delhi. But in the recent disturbances on the Frontier we have perhaps the most notorious example of anti-British intrigues originating in British India, and I submit that the solution to the problem is not to fight the tribesmen in their mountain fastnesses, but to crush the organization which disseminates this anti-British propaganda.

The disturbances during the last three years have had two very alarming symptoms. In the first place, the Afridis have been affected, and that is always a potential source of danger, because, as the late Sir George Roos-Keppel pointed out, the other tribes are always ready to follow where the Afridis lead.

Another alarming symptom is that the Khattaks have become discontented. Hitherto they have been law-abiding agriculturists, and it seems to be very unfair, almost incredible, that they should alter, because they owe all their wealth and prosperity to the protection of the British Raj.

Lastly, I was glad to see that Mr. Peterton did not indulge in prophecy, for one of the greatest of Frontier statesmen, the late Lord Curzon, has aptly remarked that no man who has read a page of Indian history will ever prophesy about the Frontier.

Sir Louis D'Arc: I suppose the reason I have been asked to say a few words on this occasion is that once for my sins I was rather closely connected with the area in which this extraordinary movement of these wild men of the Frontier known as the Red Shirt Movement began. It was my pleasant, or unpleasant, duty to make a settlement of the Peshawar district in 1892. I was recalled from leave to carry out this settlement because it was so unpleasant that no officer in India at the time would undertake it, and when I got there I found that the reputation of the Settlement had in no way belied its difficulties. The most troublesome part of the whole district of Peshawar was this tract of Hashtnagar, which Mr. Peterton mentioned to you, where these wild men were formed. This tract is settled by a section of Pathans, the Muhammadzai, who entered that country about the sixteenth century, and they have always been one of the most troublesome sections of the tribes in the Peshawar district.

A new canal had been made in their country and the value of cultivation had been increased by about 300 per cent., and they were aware that some increase in their rent was pretty certain to arise from this great increase of prosperity, so they immediately proceeded to start a movement against the settlement. In fact, it was a No Rent movement, that you hear so much of with Mr. Gandhi.
To sugar the very bitter pill of my reassessment, I tried to start a certain amount of beneficent measures, canals and roads. In fact, I was responsible for the road which paved the way to Mr. Peterson's opening remarks. If it had not been for me, he could not have driven along that road fromCharsadda, because there was no road there.

The Muhammadzai employed various machinations to try to get the whole population of Yusafzai to unite against the settlement. Fortunately I had very good friends amongst them, and they would not join. Finally they prepared a gigantic memorial to the Secretary of State against the wickedness of the settlement officer—all this before any settlement had been made at all or any rates proposed.

This was circulated freely and looked rather serious; in fact, the Commissioner of the Division at the time told me he thought things would be rather bad. Fortunately I said nothing. We went on with our work, and nobody could be found to bell the cat; that is to say, that none of the big men of the district would be the first to sign the memorial to the Secretary of State. Eventually they fell out amongst themselves, and a gentleman one night rushed into my tent about 10.30. He fumbled in his clothes, produced a large paper, and said, "Read that."

I saw it was addressed to the Secretary of State. I said, "You have to send this to the Commissioner, not to me."

He said, "You had better read it. It has all fallen through." I saw a list of all the various men of the district who were to sign, but nobody would be the first to sign, so that flopped and came to nothing.

I mention that personal experience to show that there is nothing new about Hashtnagar and its people. They were always prepared to start any intrigue or anything against the Government which they thought might give them some profit or amusement.

When people were complaining, "Why should these Red Shirt men appear suddenly in Peshawar?" to me it was perfectly plain. It so happened that just about two years before this movement began, it was decided to revise my assessment, which was first proposed for twelve years, and then for twenty, and eventually lasted for thirty-five years, and immediately there was an agitation against the assessments, beginning in Hashtnagar. The Congress movement was another stick with which to beat the British Government, so naturally they joined that in, and used the Soviet banners to fan the fires of revolt against settlements and constituted authority.

How far they were influenced by the Soviets across the border it is impossible to say, but I can only tell you this, that the Bazaar of Peshawar is one of the greatest whispering galleries of the East, and its whispers do sometimes result in great explosions.

In 1893, I remember, the Turks had defeated the Greeks in a short war. The whole frontier was buzzing with this, that the day of Muhammadans had come and they were going to govern the whole country. My own khidmatgar said to my wife's maid, one of the Untouchables, that it was no use her serving the lady. In a few days she would have to turn Muhammadan, who would rule. The maid was a woman of some spirit, and said,
"Suppose they do, what good would it do you? You would still be only a khidmatgar." I thought that was a very good answer, which would be widely applicable at present.

The fact that the Turks had defeated the Greeks did give the people in the Peshawar district and all around the Frontier an idea that the day of the European was passing, and very largely conduced to the general movement on the Frontier which began at the Malakand in 1895 and extended into the Tochi and Waziristan, and finally ended up with the Tirah campaign in 1897-98.

The same sort of thing happened after the Great War. They got the idea that we were down and out, and immediately the same agitation spread all the way down the Frontier and culminated in the unfortunate 1919 proceedings. The defeat of the Greeks in Asia Minor by the Turks led to fresh disturbances, which have carried on to the present times. There is no doubt there are emissaries who do come across the Frontier from Russia, and have done it for years. There are often Asiatic traders coming down by all sorts of routes. The consequence is that when there is anything that tends to show that the European is not invincible and that the Muhammadan is going to have a chance, you will always find the bees on the Frontier buzzing, not making honey, but preparing to sting anybody that will come their way. One cannot safely prophesy about the Frontier, but history has a way of repeating itself there, and one should always remember what has happened before as it will probably happen again. Thus the Red Shirt Movement in Charsadda and Yusafzai is only a repetition in a slightly altered form of what has occurred there several times before. In those days there was a strong administration and the trouble was promptly checked. Latterly, for various reasons, the administration has not been so strong and effective, and the trouble was allowed to spread until it assumed its present dimensions.

Professor Gangulee: I desire to make a few observations on the address we have just listened to. I visited the North-West Frontier Province on two occasions to find out the economic conditions of the people. Mr. Peterson has referred to the fact that the Red Shirt Movement is the product of agricultural revolt, and Professor Coatman's note had a reference to the agricultural aspect of the problem also.

It seems to me that the discussion has, I fear, turned more to criticism of the Congress and its political activities rather than focussing on the real problem of the Frontier in all its proper aspects. To my mind, the problem is fundamentally economic.

Of course, it is very refreshing to hear the views of those who are not actively engaged in the political game of constitution-making, and particularly from the Correspondent of The Times, and I listened to the paper with great attention.

You will remember, sir, that in 1922 a Committee reported on the question of constitution for N.W.F.P., and I find this is the conclusion of the majority report: "If the Pathan nationality is allowed self-determination and given scope for self-development within the Indian Empire under the Reform schemes, after which it is now striving, we are assured that, with
a contented Frontier population, India can face with calm resolution the future that the Frontier has in store for her."

That was in 1922, about ten years ago, and so the Reform recently inaugurated has not been done in a hurry, as the speaker seems to think. It took the Government ten years to come to a definite conclusion.

But there is one phrase in that paragraph that I should like to point out to you, "this contented Frontier population." The question repeatedly comes to my mind, "Can we make these people contented by giving them votes, polling booths, and so on?" Can we really change the colour of Red Shirts by mere Constitutional Reforms? These people are solely dependent on agriculture; and there is no special industry or manufacture in the Province. There are nearly 2,800,000 acres cultivable waste which may be brought to cultivation. The irrigation facilities are inadequate. The entire structure of rural economy requires overhauling. The Government has done a great deal, yet a great deal could be done still in order to remove those economic and social disabilities which impede progress. The Government of India's attention was not riveted chiefly on most pressing economic problems; instead of that they give the Province reforms.

Of course, the reforms may be necessary. I am not depreciating this present act of the Government; but what I want to emphasize is this—that the introduction of reforms must be accompanied by necessary measures of economic reforms.

A similar case has occurred very recently in Spain. The Spanish authorities found a stormy, discontented peasantry in Catalonia. How did they solve the difficulty? Not by giving them reforms alone. They accompanied the reforms with a very drastic measure of Land Reform. That is the point to which I beg to draw your attention.

There has been so much talk about the welfare of the peasantry in India that even the North-West Frontier writers recognize the vital claims of the rural population. I find in my notebook one very instructive remark from a Civil Service man called Crooke, who wrote a book on the Frontier. In it he says: "The peasant, with his pair of lean oxen and rude plough, is the pillar of the Empire, and our task in India is only half done as long as we neglect any feasible methods of advancing his interests."

I fear in this turmoil of politics we forget these essential conditions. Perhaps, to all the existing social and economic problems, the introduction of reforms may have added further complexities such as arise from a nascent democracy.

Mr. Edward Villiers: It was not my intention to speak this afternoon, but I welcome this opportunity of thanking Mr. Peterson very sincerely for an extremely interesting and lucid address on that picturesque, if somewhat bloodthirsty, problem with which we have been faced on the North-West Frontier in India.

Mr. Peterson made it clear that he did not intend either to point a moral or adorn a tale. I would suggest, however, that at all events there is a quite definite moral to be pointed by Mr. Peterson's exposition, whether he would wish to do so or not.

He has made it abundantly clear, and that has been substantiated both
by Sir Hamilton Grant and Sir Louis Dane and other speakers, that the infectiousness of trouble, particularly when it reaches the frontiers of India, is very marked, and the trouble, once it gets out of hand, is liable to have repercussions beyond that which one might normally expect in other parts of the world.

In India recently, as Mr. Peterson pointed out, we have, in fact, been faced with two foci of trouble—one on the North-West Frontier and the other in Bengal. He went on to suggest that it should be very clear that political assassinations are very definitely murder, and must be dealt with as such. Although I was up on the Frontier during the Afghan War of 1879, most of my time in India was spent in Bengal. There we have one of the most difficult focal points of trouble that we have to deal with today.

My point is this. Unless and until we do find means of dealing with the systematized and organized troubles, until we can definitely get topsides of these outbreaks against the King’s law and against the maintenance of law and order, we have no right at all in ordinary common fairness to thrust on the Indians resident in those parts the onus of trying to rule where we would appear, at all events, to have failed. Unless and until in these places—such as Bengal at the present time—we can get topsides of this problem, we have possibly to face up to the very serious step of withholding the gift of autonomy therefrom. I am one of those who all along have maintained that the sooner we can give provincial autonomy to India the better, and I still maintain it. But that does not invalidate the argument that, whether it be on the North-West Frontier or in Bengal, we have no right to put on their shoulders the onus of self-government until we can give them a fair and square start under normal, reasonably peaceful conditions.

Mr. Peterson mentioned, and I entirely agree with him, that the real spiritual home of some of these gentry is not in the legislatures of the Provinces, but in the Andamans. That is a thesis I have maintained for a very long time, although I may remind you I have been booed and hissed on stage and platform by my own fellow-countrymen in India for being too liberal. I would, however, like to ask Mr. Peterson one question before I stop. Does he intend, or does he suggest, that this spiritual home is only for those who call political assassinations murder, or would he not—and if not, why not—include therein all those elements which are really at the back of these subversive movements in India?

Mr. Peterson, in reply, said: To Mr. Villiers’ question—though I cannot help feeling that it is a long way from the Frontier—I would answer by saying most indubitably I would include the detenus. It is no use waiting until a man has done the mischief. That, however, is a question that must be determined by individual instances.

To Professor Gangulee I must say that I agree most wholeheartedly with him when he says that the first need of the Frontier is not better constitution and votes and polling booths, but agricultural reform. I only wish there were a few more of his distinguished countrymen who would realize the same thing and would turn from political agitation to the first need of their nation.
Very shortly to our Chairman, to Sir Louis Dane, and the others who spoke, I would thank them most heartily for what they have said about my paper. I think it is most extraordinarily interesting the way each one of them has cited his own graphic experiences in words that I might have sent home in despatches myself last year. Substitute other names and you could really have read an account of any of the disturbances in the Red Shirt Movement in 1930.

Professor Coatman, in his absence, I would thank for his most scholarly note on the Hindustani fanatics, but suggest that, at any rate in the more recent stages of their movement, they have been borne by the tide rather than helped the tide along.

The one criticism I would offer is that I do not think that Abdul Ghaffar Khan was ever clever enough to use Gandhi. Gandhi used him, yes, over and over again for eighteen months; but I question whether Abdul Ghaffar Khan was ever in a position to use Mr. Gandhi.

Sir John Kerr: I am sure, before you go, you will wish to record a very hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Peterson for his talk this afternoon.

Those of us who, like Professor Gangulee and myself, only know the Frontier Province from visits with Commissions of Enquiry, realize nevertheless that it has a charm and magnetism of its own such as is not found in any other part of India; such as is found, I imagine, in very few parts of the world. It is a place where great things are done, where men and women are doing work that is well worth doing; very largely, perhaps, because they are doing it among men and races whose good qualities they can understand and admire. That charm and magnetism Mr. Peterson has recalled to us this afternoon, and so have the Chairman and Sir Louis Dane. I am sure, therefore, that you will all wish to support the vote of thanks to the Chairman and to the lecturer this afternoon. (Applause.)
REFORMS IN INDIA AND THE DEPRESSED CLASSES

By Professor J. Coatman, C.I.E.

Mr. Gandhi's recent fast and its outcome together represent a dramatic and highly important phase in the development of the problem presented by the Depressed Classes in India. Nevertheless, it is only one phase of that development. It is, at any rate, arguable that the most important part of this evolution in our time was the establishment, a few years ago, of an annual conference of the Depressed Classes on the lines of the annual conference of the All-India National Congress, the Muslim League, the All-India Liberal Federation, and so on. For this annual conference means that the Depressed Classes have become actively conscious of the disabilities under which they live, and have themselves taken the first steps to forge the political instruments which shall make this consciousness effective.

A long, slow process of evolution in thought, opinion, and conditions of life among the Depressed Classes must have preceded the first stages of organized political activity. The chief motive forces of this unfolding have been, first of all, the application to British India, nearly a hundred years ago, of the characteristic English doctrine of the equality of all citizens before the law. The effects and implications of this doctrine were bound to reach down ultimately to the lowest and most helpless strata of the population. The second motive force was the progress of education among the Depressed Classes. The action of these two forces has been materially helped by the work of many enlightened members of the higher Hindu castes, and especially by the work of such bodies as the Servants of India Society, founded by the late Mr. Gokhale and by the Arya Samaj. To both these organizations the Depressed Classes owe a great debt of gratitude, since they have not only brought material resources and philanthropic efforts to bear upon the work of uplift, but they have done very valuable work in arousing the conscience of caste Hindus in regard to the disabilities suffered by their helpless, outcaste fellows.
The Salvation Army is taking as great a part as any organization, Hindu or other, in the uplift of the Depressed Classes.

The conditions of life among the Depressed Classes and the vitally human necessity of ameliorating them would have been brought to the forefront of the world's attention well over a century ago had methods of publicity been as ubiquitous and as well developed technically as they are today. For the earlier Christian missionaries in India not only discovered a boundless field of work among the Depressed Classes, but were diligent in making their plight known in the foreign countries from which they came. Had the monumental work of the Abbé Dubois on Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies been first published in the second decade of the twentieth century instead of the nineteenth, what he writes about the Pariahs, or outcasts, as he calls them, would have produced probably an even greater sensation than was produced in a different field by Miss Katherine Mayo's *Mother India* a few years back. As it is, the reprint of the book by the Oxford University Press is read, for the most part, as a work of hardly more than antiquarian interest, although many of the conditions which it portrays are still in existence today. From the point of view of the Depressed Classes, therefore, it may be that the chief value of Mr. Gandhi's recent action will be found to lie in the force with which it has brought their problem to the attention of India and of the world in general.

**Numerical Strength**

It is surprisingly difficult for even those with long and extensive first-hand knowledge of India to give any satisfactory definition of the criteria to be applied to settle the question of whether any particular class or section of the Indian population is to be counted among the Depressed Classes or not. Indeed, the very numbers of the Depressed Classes have formed the subject of acute controversy both inside and outside the Indian Legislature within the last few years. The forthcoming report on the Indian Census of 1931 will no doubt devote particular attention to this matter, but the Census Report of 1921 certainly left it in a good deal of obscurity. The Census Commissioner gave the figure as 52,000,000
for British India, but stated generally that for the whole of India it was somewhere between 55,000,000 and 60,000,000. Taking as their criterion of untouchability the pollution of a caste Hindu by touch or approach, the Simon Commission estimated the number of the Depressed Classes, or the Untouchables, as they may interchangeably be called, as 43,600,000. Speaking in the Legislative Assembly on February 23, 1928, the official spokesman of the Government of India in this matter said that this Department had had special calculations made of the numbers of Untouchables in British India, excluding Burma and Assam, as the result of which the figure was found to be 28½ millions. If the Untouchables in the two excluded provinces are added, this would bring the figure up to probably 30,000,000.

There are thus enormous differences in the estimates of the numbers of Untouchables made by important authorities. My own opinion is that the Government of India’s calculations were on much too narrow a basis. The number of Untouchables, according to the tests of pollution by contact and approach, and of social and religious disabilities, is almost certainly not less than the figure given by the Simon Commission, and, in all probability, is a good deal higher. As it is, the Simon Commission estimate represents 30 per cent. of the Hindu population, and as this is a convenient round figure, it might be borne in mind as fairly representing the proportion which the Untouchable section of the Hindus bears to the whole community. There is no need for one to repeat the familiar story of the restrictions on access to wells, schools, rights of progress on public roads, and so on, which are applied to the Depressed Classes. They form an intolerable disability, and the curious may read the latest statement of them in the Report of the Depressed Classes and Aboriginal Tribes Committee of the Bombay Presidency, published in 1930.

UNTUCHABILITY

The characteristic tests of membership of the Depressed Classes, then, centre in untouchability by the higher castes, and these tests are primarily religious. The disability arising out of untouchability, which is uppermost in the caste Hindu’s mind as he thinks
of it, is a religious disability. But social, economic, and political rights and status are all involved. The progress of education among the Untouchables, and the consequent emancipation of large numbers of them from the res angustae domi, as we have seen, have already begun to work powerfully on all but their religious disabilities. These latter, however, are absolutely intractable, and it is impossible to say when they will begin to be ameliorated. The mere entry to Hindus' temples has been barred to Untouchables through the whole of India. Indeed, in that province where untouchability is at its worst—namely, Madras—there are many temples still barred to all but the very highest castes, as a famous political leader from Northern India, himself of a good caste, discovered to his chagrin a few years ago when he went to Madras on a political mission. In this matter of access to temples, Mr. Gandhi himself has been able to effect no improvement, although he has devoted his attention to it for many years.

Before high caste Hindus will allow Untouchables to marry into their families, obviously the most fundamental alterations in the whole structure of Hinduism must take place. For today we see the ranks of the Untouchables filled very largely with people of aboriginal origin or persons professing the most menial and degrading occupations. It is true that there are also many Untouchable castes of artisans, agricultural labourers, and even independent cultivators, but these are not the characteristic Untouchables or Depressed Classes. You will notice that I talk about "castes of Untouchables," and you may wonder why I do so. The reason is that inside the Untouchable community itself there is a hierarchy of lower and higher castes, and, at any rate in Southern India, there are Untouchables who themselves can be polluted by the touch or the too-near approach of others of their community. I think that no good end is to be served by trying to account for the origin of the Depressed Classes. Their status is very ancient, since they are mentioned in the earliest Purāṇas, but their disabilities have obviously become both more general and more clearly defined with the passage of time.
Government Service

As far as the Governments in India, Central and Provincial, are concerned, there is theoretically no reason why Untouchables should not be employed in any office in any of their departments. Many of the public services, including the educational services, now include Untouchables in their cadre. I well remember, within a few months of my first arrival in India, meeting in the house of a missionary in a Punjab district the headmaster of an important secondary school (as we would call it in this country), who was the son of a sweeper in a neighbouring village. The sweepers represent perhaps the lowest degree of submergence of all the Untouchable classes, yet the headmaster was a man of culture and education, speaking beautiful English and obviously possessing a first-class intellect, combined with great force of character. This is by no means a rare example, and I mention it to bring to your notice the wealth of human material which is present among the Untouchables and which, properly cultivated, will make them into what their numbers entitle them to be—namely, one of the strongest political forces in the whole country.

Although Untouchables have found their way so largely into Government services within the last generation, they are still almost entirely debarred from the two key services of the Army and the Police. Indeed, regarding the Army, Government policy in India has been steadily retrograde. For, from our earliest days in India and until very recently indeed, Untouchables were recruited for military service fairly freely, but successive Army reorganizations have weeded them out. In the Police services their numbers were never more than negligible, and it will be long enough before conditions are such as to allow them to enter that service at all freely. Nevertheless, the Alice-in-Wonderland character of much of our present administration in India makes it possible for a man of the Depressed Classes to enter the highest grades of the Police service by open competitive examination, while it would not admit him as a constable.
Occasions

Outside the Government service the way of the Depressed Classes is very rough indeed. They are bound to their hereditary occupations, and it is not easy to see how they are to be absorbed in the higher ranks of industry, commerce, finance, and so on, unless certain changes in ideas, of which there are at present no signs, take place in India. The rougher and coarser operations of factory industries will provide some scope—indeed, an increasing scope—for numbers of the Depressed Classes. With increasing education and higher capacity for higher employment, they are bound to press against existing restrictions in the economic sphere, and the dissatisfaction thus engendered will inevitably give weight and point to the political development which is now going on in the community.

It is not generally realized how rapidly the number of children of the Depressed Classes under instruction is growing. According to enquiries made some time ago by the Government of India, the number of Depressed Classes scholars in recognized institutions in 1917 was 296,000. At the end of 1929 the number exceeded a million. This figure is not large compared with the total numbers of the Depressed Classes; nevertheless the rate of growth is significant.

Leadership

We may take it, then, that the Depressed Classes are beginning to be politically conscious, and that the disabilities of all kinds under which they labour at present will ensure that the transformation of political consciousness into political action proceeds apace. In Dr. Ambedkar they have found a leader whose character and quality are fully adequate to the difficult task which lies ahead of him. I think we may accept Dr. Ambedkar as the most important leader and accredited spokesman of the Depressed Classes. None of the local leaders have either his education, forensic ability, or pugnacity, and his recent conduct during Mr. Gandhi's fast, and the extraordinarily favourable agreement which he exacted from Hindu negotiators, reveal him as a political
tactician of quality. In asking ourselves, therefore, what it is that the Depressed Classes want from the next reforms in India we shall be on safe ground if we accept Dr. Ambedkar as our guide. He represented his community at the Round-Table Conference, together with one colleague, Mr. Srinivasan, from Madras, and the latter was not in disagreement with Dr. Ambedkar on any material point.

Perhaps the first point that Dr. Ambedkar makes is that his community should be taken out of tutelage and put into a position in which they will be able to acquire political education and look after their own interests. Thus he has all through insisted first that the representation of the Depressed Classes in the various Legislatures should no longer be by nomination but by election, and that they should elect as their representatives men whom they trust and of their own choice. This means that his demand is for a separate electorate for his community. He fought this demand with the utmost stubbornness in the Round-Table Conference, and since, and he has retained the essence of the separate electorate in the recent Poona agreement.

ELECTORATES

In this demand for separate representation of the Depressed Classes, Dr. Ambedkar has run counter to the great majority of Hindus, and, in particular, to the views of Mr. Gandhi. Perhaps one of the most dramatic episodes of the whole Round-Table Conference was the way in which Dr. Ambedkar openly withstood Mr. Gandhi in this matter and denied his right in any way to speak for the Depressed Classes. The Untouchables, in Mr. Gandhi’s opinion, needed protection from social and religious persecution far more than they needed election to the Legislatures, and, according to him, the best thing that could be done was to pass drastic legislation designed to put an end to further persecution of all kinds. On the whole, this is the view of most caste Hindus.

A very interesting middle course in this connection was proposed in a Report of a Committee of the Royal Empire Society, presided over by Sir John Kerr, to discuss the Simon Report.
Sir Henry Lawrence, who was a member of that Committee, suggested that it might be a good thing to apply the so-called mukhi, or spokesman system, to the representation of the Depressed Classes. According to this suggestion, they would be divided all over British India into groups of a number to be determined, and each group would choose one spokesman to vote for them at elections. The list of spokesmen would be drawn up like the list of voters qualified to vote in their own right, and by this means all the adult members of the Depressed Classes would be given some voice in the choice of the popular representatives in the Legislatures.

A small sub-committee of Sir John Kerr’s Committee was appointed to enquire into the suggestion and reported favourably on it. The Marquis of Zetland took it up in the Franchise Committee of the Round-Table Conference, and its reception was favourable enough to lead Lord Lothian’s Franchise Committee to give it serious attention. However, the weight of opinion in India, both official and non-official, was against it, and it was dropped. I mention this not merely as a matter of historical interest, but because it may still be found useful at some later stage in the political development of the Depressed Classes, and also because it may be possible to apply it to the representation of the community in local urban and rural bodies. But, as far as the Legislatures are concerned, the die has been thrown. The representation of the Depressed Classes is to be by direct election, and thus one of Dr. Ambedkar’s demands is met. It may be mentioned that at the second session of the Round-Table Conference Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Srinivasan demanded, generally, representation of the Depressed Classes in each province in proportion to the estimate of their numbers made by the Simon Commission, whilst in the Central Legislature their representation in both houses should also be in proportion to their total numbers all over India.

The scene next shifts to the Report of Lord Lothian’s Franchise Committee. After examining alternative possibilities of enfranchisement and various suggestions, the Committee thought that in Madras, Bombay, and the Central Provinces the village
servant qualification should be adopted as the basis of the franchise. As regards other provinces, the Committee thought that the best plan would be for local provincial governments to examine in detail the various possible schemes of enfranchisement of the Depressed Classes and adopt that one which they thought most suitable for the province concerned. But, in any case, the Committee believed that in all provinces every effort should be made to bring the Depressed Classes electorate up to their population ratio, or, in any event, as near as possible to 10 per cent. of their population strength, except in Bihar and Orissa, where the general proportion of enfranchisement is only 9 per cent. of the total population. These proposals represent a very liberal measure of enfranchisement.

THE COMMUNAL AWARD

It will be remembered that at the second session of the Round-Table Conference, the Prime Minister announced that the progress of political reforms in India could not be allowed to be held up by the failure of the communities to settle their various disputes among themselves, and that, if necessary, he and his Government would have to settle them for the communities. As is well known, His Majesty's Government made good its promise in August last. According to the Award, members of the Depressed Classes qualified to vote would vote in a general constituency. But since these classes would be unlikely to secure adequate representation in the Legislature for some time to come through general constituencies, a number of special seats was allotted to them in the Provincial Legislatures. Altogether they were provisionally allotted 71, ranging from 18 in Madras to none in the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, and Sind. But the exact allocation of seats in Bengal was not settled. A footnote in the White Paper explained that a number of seats, not exceeding 10 altogether, would be given to the Depressed Classes in this province. All these seats were to be filled by election from special constituencies in which only members of the Depressed Classes, electorally qualified, would be entitled to vote.
The Poona Agreement

It was the extension of the system of separate electorates to the Depressed Classes, though in the modified form of special constituencies supplementing participation in general constituencies, which aroused Mr. Gandhi's objections. But it is difficult to see how the agreement reached between the leaders of the Depressed Classes and certain Hindu representatives has made any vital breach in this principle. The Poona Agreement, by which Mr. Gandhi's fast was ended, provides that there shall be seats reserved for the Depressed Classes out of the general electorate seats in the various provinces. Although election to these seats is to be by joint electorates, all members of the Depressed Classes registered in the electoral roll of a constituency are to form an electoral college. This college will then proceed to elect a panel of four candidates—who must be members of the Depressed Classes—for each of the reserved seats. The method of voting shall be the single vote, and the four persons getting the highest number of votes in these primary elections are to be the candidates for election by the general electorate.

One feature of the Poona Agreement is truly astounding. We saw that the number of seats to be reserved for the Depressed Classes in the Provincial Legislatures, according to the British Government's decision, was not more than 71. By the Poona Agreement the total is raised to 148. The numbers go up in every province: In Madras, from 18 to 30; in the Central Provinces, from 10 to 20; in Bengal, from 10 to 30. The Punjab, which was to have no special electorates for the Depressed Classes, now has 8 seats so reserved. And so it goes on. It may be of some interest to note the percentage of seats in each Provincial Legislature which will fall under the Poona Agreement to the Depressed Classes, given in the table on the following page.

The Poona Agreement also extended to the Central Legislature, in which it provided that no less than 18 per cent. of the seats allotted to the general electorate for British India should be reserved for the Depressed Classes, election to these 18 per cent. of seats to be carried out as in the case of the Provincial Councils.
The franchise for both Central and Provincial Legislatures for the Depressed Classes should be as indicated in the Lothian Committee Report, and the system set up by the Poona Agreement was to continue until ended by mutual agreement between the communities concerned. But provincial arrangements only came within the scope of acceptance of the compromise by H.M. Government.

**Allotment of Seats**

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<td>Madras</td>
<td>215</td>
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<td>Bombay with Sind</td>
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<td>Punjab</td>
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<td>Bihar and Orissa</td>
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<td>Central Provinces</td>
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<td>Assam</td>
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<td>Bengal</td>
<td>250</td>
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<td>United Provinces</td>
<td>228</td>
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**Hindu Misgivings**

The position of the Depressed Classes has, on paper at any rate, been immensely improved by the Poona Agreement, but whether this will stand the test of time is another matter. Already there are considerable signs of uneasiness in influential Hindu quarters, notably in the Hindu Mahasabha, and it cannot be denied that in some provinces, at any rate, the position of the caste Hindus is not such as they can contemplate with equanimity. Take the two extreme cases, Bengal and the Punjab. In the former, out of a total number of seats in the Provincial Council of 250, only 50 are now left in the general constituencies. The caste Hindus will no doubt get a few more out of the seats allotted to commerce and industry, landholders, and universities, but this is not very much consolation to them. In the Punjab presumably 35 seats will be left in the general constituencies out of a total of 175. Thus, in both Bengal and the Punjab, the percentage which the number of general seats bears to the total seats is only 20. In other provinces the position is not so difficult.
Already the Hindu attack on the Poona settlement has begun, as may be seen, for example, in the proceedings of the Bombay Legislative Council on October 19. Twenty Hindu members, including the Deputy President of the Council, left the Chamber in protest against a resolution moved by the Depressed Classes' representative, Dr. Solanki, urging the reduction of the discretionary grant to schools or dispensaries which did not give equal treatment to the Depressed Classes on the grounds of caste, religion, or orthodoxy of Hindus.

**The Outlook**

It is a particularly ungracious proceeding to predict further intercommunal trouble in India, but the careful student must, I think, be driven to the conclusion that the Poona Agreement may become the cause of increasing dissensions between the caste Hindus and the Depressed Classes. It is clear that a great deal of tact and statesmanship on both sides will be needed if the Poona Agreement is not to go the same way as the old Bengal and Lucknow pacts between the Hindus and Muslims. These were never really implemented, and after giving rise to a good deal of misunderstanding and bickering, they were finally abandoned.

Another consideration is that it is going to be very difficult indeed for the Depressed Classes to produce the numbers of suitable candidates from their ranks which will be required to fill the seats allotted in the Legislatures and the hundreds of local bodies all over the country. This point must be borne in mind when considering the value of the Poona Agreement to the future political development of the Depressed Classes. On the whole, therefore, the most useful thing that can be said about the Agreement is that, while it satisfies the leaders of one party to the bargain, only time will show whether the terms can be fully implemented, and if they are, whether they will, in fact, bring that benefit to the Depressed Classes and that degree of unity between them and the caste Hindus for which we all hope.
A DISTINCT COMMUNITY

We have now passed in broad survey the main features, at any rate, of the political position of the Depressed Classes under the forthcoming reforms, so far as they can be seen at present. In spite of Mr. Gandhi's insistence that they should not have separate electorates, the net effect of recent developments is to make them a separate community. And the objectives to which their political leaders are bound to direct their attention in the years immediately ahead of us are such as to strengthen and make more definite the forces which have been at work to give the Depressed Classes a separate and distinct communal individuality.

Their battle is only beginning. These political concessions will be worthless unless they lead to concessions in social, economic, and religious relationships. It is precisely in these relationships that the Depressed Classes will encounter the strongest resistance to their further advance, for they will find themselves up against ancient and all but irremovable ideas and prejudices which are outside the realm of logic and reason. Nevertheless, they have definitely entered on a fight in respect of these things, to which there can only be one outcome. It seems to me that their new political powers will be devoted first, and almost entirely, to the attainment of these wider objectives. We may expect a process of consolidation within the Depressed Classes, accompanied by the emergence of a definite policy of social and religious reforms.

The work of their leaders will be long and arduous, and it depends on the statesmanship which the caste Hindus bring to bear in this matter whether, in their inevitable search for allies, the Depressed Classes should turn to them, to the other minority communities, or to the growing organization of labour in India, which is perhaps destined ultimately to cut across most of the communal differences and antagonisms. We are witnessing now the emergence of a new Indian community in the political arena with unique interests and objectives of its own. This community, new in the political sense, has on paper been given instruments and machinery which, if rightly used, will be very effective.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Friday, November 4, 1932, at which a paper, entitled "The New Constitution and the Depressed Classes," was read by Professor John Coatman, c.i.e. Sir James Crerar, k.c.s.i., c.i.e., was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

Sir John Kerr, k.c.s.i., k.c.i.e., the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, g.c.i.e., k.c.s.i., and the Kumar of Burdwan, Sir Louis Dane, g.c.i.e., c.s.i., Sir James Walker, k.c.i.e., Sir Charles Armstrong, Sir William Ovens Clark, Sir James MacKenna, Sir Alfred Chatterton, Colonel Nawab Sir Umur Hayat Khan, k.c.i.e., m.v.o., c.b.e., Sir John Thompson, k.c.s.i., k.c.i.e., Sir John Cumming, k.c.i.e., c.s.i., Sir Patrick Fagan, k.c.i.e., c.s.i., General Sir George Barrow, g.c.b., k.c.m.g., Sir Hugh McPherson, k.c.i.e., c.s.i., Sir Manubhai Mehta, k.c.s.i., and Miss Mehta, Sir Benjamin Robertson, k.c.s.i., k.c.m.g., c.i.e., Sir Henry Lawrence, k.c.s.i., Sir Philip Hartog, k.b.e., c.i.e., Sir Daniel and Lady Hamilton, Lady Maxwell, Lady Scott Moncrieff, Mr. C. M. Baker, c.i.e., Mr. J. R. Martin, c.i.e., Mr. V. H. Boalth, c.b.e., Sardar Bahadur Sardar Shiv Dev Singh Uberoi, Mr. Stanley P. Rice, Mr. P. K. Dutt, Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Colonel W. G. Hamilton, Mr. H. R. H. Wilkinson, Mr. J. J. Nolan, Mrs. Weir, Miss C. K. Cumming, Mr. E. F. Harris, Mr. and Mrs. H. M. Willmott, Miss Pim, Mr. C. P. Caspersz, Mr. W. Stenhouse Lamb, Mr. A. E. Rushworth, Miss Curteis, Mrs. Coatman, Mr. C. A. Mehta, Mr. E. M. Souter, Colonel A. G. Hamilton, Commissioner Arthur Blowers, Rev. Dr. W. Stanton, Mrs. Herron, Mr. P. B. Haigh, Mr. A. C. Cottell, Mr. K. K. Pillai, Mr. M. M. Pearson, Mr. J. W. Chatterjee, Miss L. Sorabji, Miss Watson, Miss Thomas, Mrs. Lawra, Mr. H. K. Sadler, Miss Hughes, Mrs. W. Alexander, Mr. Ayana Angadi, Mr. and Mrs. E. C. Wrench, Miss Bell, Lieut.-Colonel E. B. Lathbury, Miss Hopley, Miss Mainwaring, Miss M. Gravatt, Mr. H. Murphy, and Mr. F. H. Brown, c.i.e., Hon. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN: Professor Coatman is much less in need of an introduction to the East India Association, I feel, than I am. Nor is he in need of any introduction to anyone who has devoted any close attention to the important political and administrative problems which have arisen in India during the last few years.

At this stage, therefore, I shall only express my own very great pleasure and gratification in having the privilege of presiding on this occasion, when an old friend and colleague of mine, most eminently qualified to deal with this question, will open and provide the basis for a discussion of one of the most difficult and most complicated of the many difficult and complicated problems which confront us in matters relating to India at this present juncture.
Professor Coatman then read his paper.

The Chairman, after announcing that messages had been received from Lord Irwin and from the Under-Secretary of State for India, regretting their inability to be present, said:

We have had opened before us an extraordinarily interesting and important subject for discussion. Professor Coatman has brought to it two, I think, very notable qualifications. He was for many years closely associated with an important, indeed crucial, branch of the Indian administration; and as a member of that distinguished body of men, the Indian Police Service, he will, I am sure, not impute it to me for unrighteousness if I say one word in parenthesis—what deserves much more than a parenthetical reference—to express my great admiration of the manner in which that body of men and all those who served with and under them have discharged their duty, especially during late years in India, under circumstances of the greatest difficulty and frequently of the most imminent personal peril.

But that reference is by no means irrelevant to the matter which is before us this evening, because, among other things, it has been among the duties of the Police Service, as Professor Coatman himself has recalled, to take part in one important administrative endeavour to rectify and ameliorate the lot of one branch at least of the Depressed Classes—namely, the Criminal Tribes Settlement work, in which the British police officer has been associated with many non-official agencies like the Salvation Army, the appreciative reference to which made by Professor Coatman I should like very strongly to endorse.

That is an aspect of the administration directly impinging upon the problem of the Depressed Classes, though only upon one aspect of it, and Professor Coatman has brought to the task the further qualification of a very recent and very close association with the even wider issues of Indian political development, in the context of which it must be our endeavour to place it.

For, while it is an extremely difficult problem in itself, it is especially important that we should examine it very carefully at the juncture in this light, when political developments are taking place in which it must inevitably be a very important factor.

We are very grateful to Professor Coatman for his very illuminating lecture. I think he was well advised in declining to attempt any historical examination of the origins, as it is important that we should consider the position as it stands and the remedies which the political reforms may conceivably offer.

But I think that, before we dismiss that aspect of the question, we ought to remember this, that, however grave the responsibilities of the caste Hindu may be, it would be unjust on our part to forget that he, as well as the Depressed Class Hindu, has inherited a sound system and organization, of which the existing generation of Hindus—whether caste Hindus or non-caste Hindus—cannot suddenly and entirely divest themselves.

I say that because some high-caste Hindus among my friends have said to me that they realize very clearly, among other aspects of this difficult question, that it is in respect of the past attitude of the caste Hindu that
they are now reaping what they were very frankly prepared to call a just Nemesis. It is not our business, however, at the present time to talk of Nemesis, whether just or unjust, but to consider the position as it presents itself and to endeavour to set our minds in order as to what the prospects are.

Mr. Coatman pointed out that whatever other influences had been at work, two causes alone would have been sufficient to ensure that the problem of the Depressed Classes and their treatment, whether social or political, as a practical issue of urgency, must emerge—i.e., the application of British law and legal principles and now the extended application of British political principles. Those were quite sufficient in themselves, but the present position, even if we try to regard it purely as an immediate practical problem, is very bewildering.

We cannot, for example, give a precise and definite answer to the fundamental question, Who are the Depressed Classes and how many of them are there? Professor Coatman pointed out that various authorities had arrived at very different estimates on the subject. He quoted an estimate which was given in the Legislative Assembly in 1928. I remember that estimate as being communicated in reply to some very pertinent questions asked by the late Lala Lajpatrai. If I remember rightly, the endeavour then was to answer the specific question, “Roughly speaking, can you tell us how many of the Depressed Class there are who, though actually living within or in contact with some existing Hindu community, are subject to all the strictest ritual and social taboos of the Untouchables?”

You will observe that the answer to the question put in that form excludes the aboriginal tribes such as the Bhils and Gonds, who live apart in the jungles and who do not come into close and immediate and daily contact with the difficulties of Hindu taboos, and perhaps, in accordance with the great variations in local custom that exist, other important sections. That may explain how one estimate may differ from another simply because the basis of the estimate is different.

Moreover, the question of the Depressed Classes is a dynamic question, not a static question. The actual content of the Depressed Classes, even if you could find a definite formula, must be constantly varying and changing. I can recall in my own experience, for example, in the large irrigational projects which have been set on foot in the Punjab and in Sind, that very great social changes have been effected which impinge directly upon this problem.

There is more than one member here present who will agree with me that it was not outside our personal experience that a sweeper from Jullundur, say, became a yeoman proprietor and a “wearer of white clothes” outside his own district or his own province. I am speaking particularly of Sind, and, as illustrating the difficulties of the problem, I may say that an applicant once came to me to ask for employment on the ground that he was a member of a Depressed Class and was entitled to that special protection and consideration which the Government in India extended toward the Depressed Classes. That applicant was a Brahmin.

It is quite obvious that the handling of this problem is going to raise
four or five very great and profound issues. Take the political issue alone. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the manner in which the various questions presented by the status and the position of the depressed caste Hindu in the polity of India are answered will be one of the most searching and most critical trials of democracy in India.

Another aspect of the question from the political point of view is, how are parties going to be evolved in India? Are they going to follow purely lines of communities and of castes, or are they to take some other line of division? If they do not take some other line of division, it would be safe to prophesy that the introduction of a more extended system of Parliamentary institution will present even greater problems than a reasonably sanguine observer must already envisage. But what is the most recent development with regard to the Depressed Classes going to effect in that direction? Is it going to lead us in India on to some better ground as regards the sane and healthy formation of political parties, or is it only going to complicate the communal problem?

I myself am inclined to agree with Professor Coatman in taking a rather more hopeful view than the mere posing of the question might appear to suggest. It appears to me that the peculiar characteristics of the Depressed Class problem may possibly compel a solution in a direction very different from that of a water-tight communal compartment. In other words, one of the other four big factors involved may come in possibly to give a wider and a more comprehensive development, and that is the economic aspect of the question.

Dr. Mann is eminently qualified to inform us more particularly on the economic aspect of the question, and I hope he will agree with me that that, which is, of course, one of the most fundamental factors in the problem of advancing the condition of the Depressed Classes, may give a definite turn and trend away from, rather than in the direction of complicating, the specifically communal aspect of the question.

Then there are the social and religious aspects. These political changes, whatever the status accorded to, or agreed on behalf of the caste Hindu for, the members of the Depressed Classes, whatever they may be, obviously cannot be restricted to purely political relations. They must invade the social organism. And what is the effect going to be? It seemed very significant to me when I read in the newspaper the other day that two important public men in the Punjab, themselves Hindus, expressed very emphatically the view that the caste Hindus who agreed to what is commonly known as the Poona Agreement would be compelled, if they pursued the basis of their agreement to a logical conclusion, to contemplate the abolition of all the restrictions incidental to the position of the Depressed Classes, including intermarriage.

That is a very big proposition, but it is perfectly plain that the caste Hindu cannot have it both ways. No one who is in touch with the very elements of the political problem will fail to recognize the very real basis for the apprehensions expressed from a political point of view by several Hindu politicians regarding the effect of separate electorates for the Depressed Classes. It is represented as a danger to the solidarity of the whole
Hindu social organism. It is represented with much less justice as a deliberate and Machiavellian attempt to destroy that organism.

But you cannot have it both ways. That is to say, you cannot claim the political support of the Depressed Classes as an integral part of the Hindu social organism, for such claims and demands as the Hindu community may legitimately enough make in its own interest, and at the same time keep them in their present position. That is a dilemma which will have to be faced by both the caste Hindus and the Depressed Classes. We can only look on benevolently and hope that they will find a solution, but it is essential that a solution should be found.

These are only a few broad aspects of a very great problem. What our attitude towards the whole question ought to be, I think, will require very little reflection for us to give at any rate one or two affirmative answers. However much we may differ with regard to details, I do not think there is anyone here who would be prepared to question that where there is a great, an undeniable, and an intolerable grievance, those who demand the removal of that grievance should have our fullest sympathy and support; that where demands made are legitimately due, they ought to be conceded; and that for a solution of all these difficult and intricate problems, we must look forward with hope and courage, not only in the interest of the welfare and the prosperity of India, but as things vital to the security and solidarity of the British Commonwealth.

Sir Manubhai Mehta: You will all agree with me that we have heard a very interesting and instructive discourse from Professor Coatman. When Mr. Brown asked me to speak this afternoon I hesitated to do so, because I had very little new to add; at the same time, I can justify my speaking on two grounds. First, I come from the Indian States, and therefore I can tell you something of what the Indian States have been doing. Secondly, I am a high-caste Hindu, and therefore can tell you what I feel on the subject.

I can well understand how it is that up till now very little has been done in British India for the regeneration of these Depressed Classes. The British Government, from their policy of religious neutrality, toleration, and non-interference in religious matters, have declined to move in the matter hitherto. In Indian States it was not so; the ruler makes the law and makes the religion. So he has vast opportunities, more ample than the British Government had. I will give you one instance, Baroda.

I have had association with Baroda for about thirty years. Therefore I know what the present Gaekwar has done; and I can tell you that long before this question had been given any practical importance in British India, it was a live question in Baroda. His Highness passed laws that nobody could refuse to allow these Depressed Classes to drink from public wells, and if any village refused to allow them to take drinking water from any well, all the contributions from the Government to that community were stopped. Similarly as to admissions into schools. The Depressed Classes were anxious to learn. We passed a compulsory Education Act, and they were under the same obligation to learn as the higher classes. When they came to the schools nobody could bar the way. If any school
refused admission its grant was stopped. So the higher class Hindus could see that they could not go against the wishes of the ruler.

If these Depressed Classes had to give evidence in Courts, they had full access, and nobody could object to their coming. They were employed as officers, as clerks, and ultimately they were elected to the Legislative Assembly of Baroda. All this could be done by a ruler of an Indian State only if he was so minded—and there comes the rub.

I can say, as Professor Coatman has said, that this Poona Agreement has in a way obsessed our minds by giving more importance to the political aspect of the question than the social and educational. It is the latter which deserve greater sympathy and support. The political aspect has assumed importance only in the last twenty years, since the time of the Morley-Minto Reforms and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. A desire arose amongst the Depressed Classes for separate representation, but the educational work had not progressed much. Still they have not fitted themselves by education to go to the Legislature and to take part and rub shoulders with the higher castes. As Professor Coatman said, if 18 per cent. of the seats in the Central Legislature are to go to the Depressed Classes out of 450, will there be sufficient educated men amongst these Depressed Classes to send 80 men to the Legislature? I am very doubtful whether people can come up to that standard.

You will all be interested to learn that Dr. Ambedkar, who really deserves credit for his yeoman service to his countrymen and to the Depressed Classes, was sent by Baroda for education abroad. I take a little pride because I selected him myself. I was Minister of Baroda at the time, and I sent Dr. Ambedkar to America. After his return I offered him employment in Baroda, but his difficulty was social. Nobody would rent a house to him; he could not get any house in Baroda. I said, “I can provide you with a bungalow, but I cannot force the people to take you into their houses unless I pass a law.” To the advantage of his own people he has now come to the forefront.

The Poona Agreement has in a way obscured or thrown into the background the social and educational work. The political work alone is not equally important with the work of social elevation. They are called the Depressed Classes. Some people call them the Suppressed Classes. They are neither depressed, nor oppressed, nor suppressed, nor repressed; but they are unregenerate classes. I am now talking as a high-caste Hindu. I claim to have very exclusive blue blood; but, at the same time, I know that these distinctions cannot very well subsist. So I say that religiously; if you look to our old scriptures you will find authority for coming to the conclusion that these Depressed Classes are only not Dwijas—twice born, twice baked. We Brahmins are twice born: once at our birth, and secondly when we get our second thread after seven years. According to Hindu scriptures, a man is not Shudra (untouchable) by birth; it is only by his deeds and merit that he becomes or ceases to become untouchable. I merely call them unregenerate classes, and our work ought to be to lift them educationally as well as socially.

Mr. Gandhi’s fast brought to the forefront this aspect of the question,
but I am afraid it was only enthusiasm of the moment, a temporary spate of the flood that certain temples were thrown open. It will not be permanent. These classes are conscious of their own inferiority. In Madras, of course, it is the greatest evil. In Travancore they cannot come with assurance to the public road. If they come they have to cry out, "I am coming," in order to warn any Brahmin so that their shadow should not fall upon them. They have to carry certain vessels, as spitoons tied to their breast, so that they may not pollute the high road. All these indignities the high-caste Hindus ought to be ashamed of, but up to now we have never cared for the Untouchables. We have neglected them. Hundreds and hundreds of them are being converted by missionaries. We did not care, but lately simply because they wanted political rights, we cried out that Hinduism was in danger. We have allowed hundreds of them to be converted to Christianity. Mr. Gandhi says that Hinduism will be annihilated if they are given separate electorates. I do not understand why there was such an uproar against this. It seems to me that the raising of the issue has served one useful purpose—it has brought the question of the Depressed Classes to the forefront; but I wish the educational and social aspects were considered more important than merely the political aspect.

Dr. Harold Mann: I am extremely pleased that this question has come to the forefront as it has done during the last two months. If we can thank Mr. Gandhi for nothing more, we can thank him intensely for having brought to the knowledge of the world the problem of the Depressed Classes. But I am afraid sometimes in England we do not realize, as our Chairman said this afternoon, that the whole problem is essentially a dynamic one. No one who has been in as close touch as I have with the Depressed Classes in one part of India for twenty years could fail to realize the revolution that has taken place in that time.

When I first knew them and came into intimate contact with the leaders, they were a poor, depressed people who dare not raise their voice in public, who even in the presence of middle-class Hindus hardly dare speak. The situation is entirely different now. They stand—I do not say that this has gone as far in the villages—but in the towns they stand absolutely on their own feet, and they care little who is present when they speak.

This in itself is an enormous revolution, and it has been produced very largely, as far as I can see, by two things. It has been produced, in the first place, by a change in the economic status. I am very glad that our Chairman mentioned that fact today, because there is no doubt that the economic position of the Depressed Classes as a whole has changed very greatly, at any rate in Western India, in the last twenty years. They have almost monopolized certain industries. If you want a motor-car driver in Western India, the chances are at least five or six to one that the man you will get will be a member of the Depressed Classes. A Brahmin once said to me, "I know that my son could get more money as a motor-car driver, but I prefer that he should get Rs. 20 as a B.A." That is the present actual situation. Not only have they gone into one industry like that, but they have gone into quite a number of industries and gained a substantial
position. That has changed their outlook on life, changed their outlook on
their whole position in the Indian community.

Secondly, in spite of all Sir Manubhai Mehta has said, their education
has already advanced to an enormous extent. I remember a very intimate
friend of mine was the first member of the Depressed Classes who passed
the matriculation examination in Western India. He was looked upon as
an absolute phenomenon. Now those who have passed the matriculation
examination are as common as gooseberries. There are any amount of
them, and, as in the case of Dr. Ambedkar himself, they have reached a
position of very high education, a position which commands the respect of
the most highly educated communities in the country.

At the same time, I do think that, in the matter of education, the com-

munity have a very serious grievance against our British authorities. To
this day, once you get outside the big cities, it is very difficult for a boy
or a girl of the Depressed Classes to get the same education as anybody else.

I know in dozens of village schools always the Depressed Classes, boys
and girls, were separated from the rest, always they were put in the most
ill-lighted part of the schoolroom, and very often outside the schoolroom
altogether, where they could only hear the voice of the teacher through the
window. And this occurred in schools which are subsidized, if not sup-
ported, by the British Government. I felt very strongly in the year 1921,
when the Depressed Classes of Western India were very anxious—and I
acted as their spokesman—that they should have, at least in the town,
educational hostels provided for their boys, that little was done. They said,
"We can get admission to the schools, but cannot get any place to live."
The result of that was that we had one solitary hostel for the Depressed
Classes established in the whole of the Bombay Presidency!

It has been exceedingly difficult for them to get anything more than the
most elementary education. I think that the British authorities might have
done a tremendous lot more for the Depressed Classes than they have done,
and I only hope that in the future—I think the Depressed Classes them-
selves will see to it—these difficulties will tend gradually, if not suddenly,
to be removed.

But the change in economic status, to which I have referred, will make
them a very important part of the Labour Movement in India. When that
comes, they will, I think, gradually tend to disappear as a communal unit,
and the communal feeling as a depressed community will gradually tend
to fall into the background—but they will become a very important part of
an active proletariat.

Hence you will see that I have a good deal of confidence in the future.
When I first had anything to do with them I was very anxious to create
a communal spirit. At that time it did not exist; or, at any rate, if it
existed it was so suppressed that it could hardly be said to exist. Hence
we established at that time Depressed Classes schools, meetings, and con-
ferences, everything to create a self-conscious community. But I felt—
and I think the leaders of the Depressed Classes feel, too—that that stage
of becoming a section—a definite, distinct section and an important section
—of the population is only a stage, and I fancy that Dr. Ambedkar and his
friends of the Depressed Classes look forward to the time when they will not be a separate section, but when they will form, just like the middle classes, a definite section and a respected section of the Hindu community.

I do not agree with Professor Coatman in regard to the importance of the Poona Agreement. I look upon the Poona Agreement as being an immense improvement on the original communal settlement. And for this reason. While I want—and I am speaking on behalf of some of my correspondents among the Depressed Classes—while I want that communal spirit to develop even further than it has done at present, so that the Depressed Classes will be able to command a position in India and among the Indian communities which they have never had in the past, I should be very sorry to see that communal feeling permanent. I want the caste system itself to be modified in the future, and I want the Depressed Classes as part of that caste system gradually to develop into an integral portion of the Hindu community as a whole.

The Maharaja of Burdwan: We have had just now almost a fanatical enthusiasm about the raising of the Depressed Classes. I am rather inclined to agree with my friend, Sir Munubhai Mehta. Although I am a high-caste Hindu myself, I feel that the position of the Depressed Classes has got to be considered by the higher-caste Hindu, not from the point of view of political influence or political parties, but from the point of view of gaining strength to the Hindu community itself by educating them and giving them better social amenities.

I am glad in one sense that Professor Coatman has only touched on the political aspect of the future position of the Depressed Classes. We have heard so much in the past of Mr. Gandhi’s treaties and agreements that one wonders what is behind Mr. Gandhi’s mind in this agreement; for although Professor Coatman in his recent book on India has paid high tribute to some of the qualities that Mr. Gandhi possesses, he has, I think, rightly said that in politics Mr. Gandhi is a big sham. The point is this, if Mr. Gandhi’s intention be to put off the evil day when the higher-caste Hindu may have to come into the groups with the lower-caste Hindu, then perhaps he may partially succeed in what he has done. But in raising hopes in the minds of the Depressed Classes in the political field, we may easily be playing with a form of dynamite dangerous both to the British Government in India and to the communities concerned.

You hear every day mentioned the oppressions of the Brahminical community. If the Brahmans are at the top of the Hindu caste system of hierarchy, it is because their hereditary inherent qualities of superiority in the system of Hinduism have put them there, for they are only 14 million in number, and if the so-called Chamaras, who, I believe, number about 11 million in the whole of India, were to assert their positions tomorrow, I wonder where the Brahmin would be. In consequence you have got, reading between the lines of Professor Coatman’s paper, to pay more attention to what he has said in the latter portion of his address, where he mentions the Hindu misgivings. In doing so you must also bear in mind that before the Depressed Classes can ask the higher-class Hindus to raise them from
the position that they are in socially, they must themselves get over the
difficulties that one Depressed Class has with another Depressed Class as an Untouchable.

For instance, as you know, the Mochi, who goes to throw the carcasses of
animals in places that we in Bengal call Bhagars, cannot intermarry with the Chamar, nor can the Dhobi, who is an Untouchable, marry into the family of a barber, who is also an Untouchable. Therefore I say that before you expect the higher-class Hindus to join in the social or religious fields with the Depressed Classes, it is better to focus our attention on the political side, but not to give too much importance to it, but on the other hand to give these Depressed Classes every facility for education and social uplift.

I myself am all for improving their position, and I am sure my friend, Sir Manubhai Mehta, is of the same opinion. All I say is, let this movement come from within and not from without, for I am sure the British themselves will not be thanked by the communities in India for forcing the pace.

Commissioner Arthur Blowes (Salvation Army): I fear my words will be very different from all the other speakers inasmuch as I am no politician; moreover, the Salvation Army as a whole does not mix up in politics. I speak therefore as an ordinary individual with some knowledge of the people of India. Let me first say that I very much appreciate Professor Coatman's references to the work of the Salvation Army in India.

I was privileged to be associated with the late Commissioner Booth Tucker, who had so much to do with the criminal tribes and the Depressed Classes of that great country. I have been a Salvation Army officer for forty-six years, nearly forty of which I spent in India, and have therefore some little knowledge of the people. I have lived in Northern India and know something of the Depressed Classes in the United Provinces and the Punjab, also in Western India—i.e., the Deccan and in Gujerat. In the Madras Presidency I have been very closely associated with them and spent many years in North and South Travancore. Now, in London my work still links me very much with India, to which country I proceed again next month.

Therefore, though I do not enter into the political arena, and am not able
to express any opinion in that connection, but having lived in their villages, lived in their very huts for months at a time, eaten their food, and entered into the daily routine of their lives, I feel I know something of their difficulties and their sorrows.

Most of us here know very much about India, and I imagine that, whilst we are all interested in the country and the people, and whilst there may be a great deal of divergence in our views concerning the Depressed Classes, we are all agreed that something is necessary for their uplift.

It is difficult for me to agree with Sir Manubhai Mehta that these people should not be referred to as depressed or even oppressed, for, as far as my observations go, I have seen a great deal of their suffering, which is the direct result of oppression, and very cruel oppression at that. Shall we then call them the unprivileged, for certainly they have not the privileges that would seem to be the common right of humanity? I have known villages,
especially in Travancore, low-caste villages, to be set on fire and burnt to the ground because of some feeling of ill-will towards the lower caste. I have seen men who have been thrashed to almost within an inch of their lives for apparently no reason whatever, and I have seen them handcuffed and dragged along by the police under false charges.

It is for that reason that I desire something more should be done for their uplift, to give them a better social standing and relationship with the other castes of India.

Sir Manubhai Mehta referred, I think very rightly, to some of the Government decisions initiated in Baroda, that children might have free access to the common schools, that they might take their place in the schoolroom and class as the higher castes do. That is perfectly true in theory, but it does not work out in practice. I know children of the Depressed Classes who have sought under Government authority to be allowed to enter the schools and take their places as Government orders entitle them to, but they are absolutely forbidden by the tyranny of the teacher in charge of the school. In saying this I say nothing against the Government; I am all in favour of it because they have made the decision, but in practice it does not work out.

I was very interested in what Professor Coatman said about the caste Untouchables. I think we have almost as much difficulty between the grades and the castes of the Depressed or Untouchable peoples as we have between the depressed and higher castes. For instance, you cannot get the Malas and the Madigars to meet. Not only will they not intermarry nor take food with one another, but they are bitterly opposed to each other, just as much as the caste man is under certain conditions opposed to the lower class. The same applies to the Mahars and the Mangs. I have never seen anybody treated worse than the Puliaris of Travancore by their fellow low-caste countrymen.

One of the thoughts that come to me is the question of the trusteeship that has come to our land in connection with India. I have sometimes wondered how the British came to have this, and, personally, I cannot help but feel and regard it as being one of the great providential purposes and plans of Almighty God. Great Britain has made mistakes. No one would gainsay that for a moment; notwithstanding the splendid set of men on the whole that the Civil Service has possessed, individuals among them have made many mistakes. But this does not alter the main fact that Great Britain and the Indian Government have sought to do well for India, and, I believe, are still seeking to do well for the people of that country, and if one were to take a consensus of opinion in that land, the majority of the people would still say, “Well, the British Government has been a good Ma-Bap to our land.”

Coming to the question of enfranchisement of the Depressed Classes, I am of the opinion that in the long run it will be for India’s good. But I would specially stress the fact that to thousands of them Christianity has already given them a vote—of another kind—a vote which has brought them a very real kind of freedom, a freedom which has its roots in self-respect without revolution or without force. And I would like to add my
quota of appreciation of the greatly changed attitude of many of the high-
caste people and their leaders towards the oppressed and Depressed Classes.
I have seen a vast change in the mentality of the higher caste towards the
lower caste since 1887, when I first went out to India. It has been so great,
it is almost difficult to understand the change.

I stand for the poor people, for the low caste, because I have lived and
worked amongst them; but I do want to say that I greatly appreciate the
changed attitude of many of the high-caste people towards them. I long
for the day when forced labour, fear, and cringing shall be things of the
past. As Dr. Mann has so rightly said, there is a wonderful change in the
cities in this respect: but when you get to the villages you do not see much
change, and there is still fear and cringing and the spirit of oppression.
Good and sound legislation will help, but I would say that the liberating
force of Christianity and the spirit of Christ is going to be the great
factor in bringing about the desired change amongst these people.

Sir Henry Lawrence: We have had a wonderful wealth of problems pre-

cented for our consideration this afternoon, and I will just pick out one or
two plums. First, in regard to Mr. Coatman's opening remarks with
reference to the anomaly of the position of the Depressed Classes in the
Army. That is a subject which, I think, requires the very grave attention
of the military authorities in India; for if we look back on the earlier history
of the armies in India we know that the recruitment, certainly in the
Bombay and Madras armies, was very largely from the Depressed Classes.

Some fifty years ago the recruitment was restricted to the Madras Pioneers
and the Bombay Pioneers; but even that very small opening to talent,
energy, and courage was of remarkable value as an outlet to the more
vigorous members of the community. I have known many men who, after
having risen to be officers in their battalions, were subsequently appointed
by the Government to be members of benches of justices, honorary magis-
trates; and I know that many of these men, in spite of their difficulties of
early education, were able to hold their own with the Brahmin pleaders
who appeared in their Courts, and brought into the dispatch of their magis-
terial business a degree of efficiency and vigour that was often lacking on
the part of the more highly educated magistrates.

That point is of value when you consider the problem which Mr. Coat-
man has put, and some other people have supported, whether this com-
munity will be able to produce political leaders in the future. I feel con-
vinced that there will be no lack of the necessary talent and ability and
courage in political situations on the part of leaders of this community.

It is not merely on the slender basis of the magistracy which I mentioned
that I base these hopes for the future of this community in India. I have
known these people at close quarters in the terrible tragedies of plague
epidemics, and I have learnt to admire not only their courage but also their
discipline and their sense of obedience to leaders of character and good
sound sense.

Mr. Coatman has done what I think is ample justice to the efforts which
Mr. Gandhi has made on their behalf. A year ago, when Mr. Gandhi, by
his intransigence at the Round-Table Conference, had driven all the
minorities into the compact for separate electorates, he came to see me at my home, and I advised him that the only solution of his difficulties lay in the adoption of adult suffrage with secondary elections, and that this system overcame the obstacle of general illiteracy and was specially suitable to the Depressed Classes. As many of you may perhaps know, Mr. Gandhi has a very delightful characteristic of listening to any views that may be put before him with remarkable courtesy, but after listening he always acts the other way. I myself agree with Dr. Ambedkar in not placing Mr. Gandhi’s efforts, his advocacy of these Depressed Classes, amongst the highest achievements in the pursuit of truth. It is easy to see that if heads are to be counted in a polling booth, no political leader can afford to throw away a claim to speak on behalf of 40 millions of the outcaste and inarticulate masses. It is easy to see that if later on armed conflict should unfortunately develop, these 40 millions would be very useful as vicarious victims for the support of the theocratic system of Hinduism.

Mr. Gandhi recently proposed to fast unto death in furtherance of his political ambitions. Such fasting is well known to the Indian Penal Code as an offence against the State. It is there called the method of sitting dharna, and it is no novelty in Indian life. The British Government and the outcaste leaders agreed in holding that this method should not be admitted in the building of the new Indian Constitution.

There is one point on which I differ from Mr. Coatman and our distinguished Chairman. That is where it is said that it is not worth while to enquire into the origin of the Depressed Classes. I suggest, on the contrary, that such investigations as those of Dr. Gilbert Slater in Madras on the Dravidian element in India’s culture are of the highest value. It would greatly assist the rise of these people to equality of modern citizenship if, after the degradation to which they have been subjected for thousands of years, they could establish their claim to the civilization and artistic culture which are now being revealed by the researches of archaeological explorers. Who were the people who built Mohanjo Daro Harappa before the Aryan invasions? Is it fanciful to believe that the people who speak the same dialect in the mountains of Baluchistan and in the jungles of Central India were driven out of these great cities by the Aryan invaders until they were gradually deprived of their knowledge of their history and of all arts?

Let me remind you of one conclusion to which Dr. Slater came in this very learned book of his to which I have referred. Dr. Slater wrote: “In everything that relates to the status, education, and activities of women, Dravida is far in advance of the rest of India.” This conclusion, I think, certainly encourages the belief that adult suffrage for both men and women, even though that has to be administered through the system of secondary electorates, is the only sure foundation for peace and contentment in the future politics of India.

Professor Coatman in discussing this scheme of indirect elections points out that the weight of opinion, both official and unofficial, was against it. Well, of course it was. When have you ever heard of a radical change of system that on first presentation was in favour either with the officials or with the non-official public? Speaking for the officials, I think the
Chairman will agree with me that the first duty of an official is to oppose.

But in spite of that, Mr. Coatman with, I think, commendable audacity, makes a forecast that this system "may still be found useful at some later stage of the political development of the Depressed Classes, and that it may be possible to apply it to the representation of the community on local urban and rural bodies." That is a very great advance if that can be done at once. I should like to see the Government of India go the whole hog, but I have never yet known them do so. But the important point to know is that Lord Lothian's Committee, though they rejected secondary electorates on the plausible ground of the official and non-official opposition and rejected the scheme without discussion of the arguments, yet reported their conclusion, after taking evidence, that these secondary electorates were working successfully in four Oriental countries—Iraq, Egypt, Persia, and Syria—where there exists the same grave obstacle of general illiteracy.

I do not suppose that anyone here has read that monumental report without a shuddering realization of their complete misconception of their principal aim. This estimable Committee held that the primary purpose of the vote was to teach political values to the masses of the people of India. That reminds me of a recruiting rally in India during the Great War, when the chairman made an impassioned speech and appealed to the students of a university to come forward and enlist. And he said, "What is the first duty of a soldier?" and he supplied the answer in proper sepulchral tones, "The first duty of a soldier is to die." (Laughter.) That meeting brought forward no recruits!

The first purpose of the vote in India is not a course of mental improvement, or even of spiritual uplift, so dear to many of our sentimental friends. It is something far more vital. It is the protection of the homes and families of the voters from tyranny and oppression, often of the most grinding and degrading character. I suggest that no one needs that protection more than the Depressed Classes of India, unless indeed it be the women of India of all castes. (Applause.)

The Chairman: I regret very much that time will not permit of a continuation of this extremely interesting and valuable discussion. I hope that those present who had proposed to speak will be good enough to record their opinions and send them to the Honorary Secretary for the record of the Society.

Professor Coatman: I shall not detain you by a detailed reply at this late hour. We have had a number of most important addresses by members of the audience, each one of which contributed something most material. But if I may say so, I think it is entirely fitting that the debate should have been closed by Sir Henry Lawrence. He never speaks without taking us into the widest horizon and continually drenching us with the douche of cold common sense. It is worth while having read the paper if only to have heard Sir Henry Lawrence's remarks.

As regards what he said about secondary electorates and the official and non-official opinion in India, of course I am entirely with him because I was one of the smaller fry who sat on that sub-Committee to which I have referred, which discussed Sir Henry Lawrence's scheme.
The last thing I should like to say is this. Dr. Mann certainly made out a case against the necessity of communalism for the Depressed Classes. He did not convince me. I hate communalism as much as anybody. It has done infinite harm to the public life of India. It is holding up the development of nationality in India. But as far as the Depressed Classes are concerned, I am convinced it is a stage they have to go through. The tasks immediately ahead of them will make them into a community as definite, distinct, and as politically-minded as any of the other communities. That is the fact I would start with, and all I wanted to do was to point out that certain terrifically potent weapons have been put into the hands of people who will certainly learn to use them, and who will use them in the first place as a separate community, whatever anybody else thinks.

On the motion of Sir John Kerr a hearty vote of thanks was given to the Chairman and the Lecturer.

General Sir George Barrow, in reply to a question addressed to him at the meeting, writes:

Of late years we have enlisted Depressed Classes in pioneer battalions and sapper and miner companies, because in these units there was work to be done and certain "trades" which only members of the Depressed Classes would perform. With the abolition of the pioneer battalions the Depressed Classes will disappear from the Army in all but the sapper and miner companies. The same anomaly exists therefore in the Army as in the police—viz., the commissioned ranks are open while the other ranks are closed to the Depressed Classes. But the anomaly as far as the Army is concerned is theoretical only and does not exist in practice. Every candidate for Sandhurst (England or India) before nomination has to undergo a thorough examination as regards his family position, antecedents and social status, first by the civil authorities of his province and afterwards by Army headquarters, before he is permitted to present himself for examination. It is unlikely that a member of the Depressed Classes would pass this test for the reasons that (a) the other classes would not readily follow or be commanded by a member of the Depressed Classes; (b) officers drawn from the Depressed Classes would not, except in rare cases, make good leaders, possessing as they would the inheritance of an agelong inferiority complex.

Sardar Shivdev Singh Uboi writes:

The question of the Depressed Classes has become very important during the course of making a new constitution for India. At present the representatives of this class are nominated on different Councils, but in the new constitution they have been considered as a separate important minority, and, according to the direction of the Prime Minister, they were to be given separate representation by separate electorates in Legislatures. This threatened the entire separation of this portion from the Hindu community. It was Manu, the great law maker, who divided the Hindu community in four classes: firstly, the Brahmans, the religious teachers and spiritual leaders; secondly, the Khatrias, the warrior class; thirdly, the Baishas—that is, the trading classes; and, fourthly, the Shudras—that is, the menial classes. The Depressed Classes belong to the last category, and by their profession
and by their demoralization they began to be considered as Untouchables by the high-class Hindus. In law every human being is equal in status, but different callings make a distinction between different classes. There is no denying the fact that the high-class Hindus have not given fair treatment to the low class. It was the height of autocracy when they began to consider that the shadow of the low-caste men polluted them. There is now a reaction against this most objectionable attitude of the high-class Hindus. During the last decade the low-class Hindus and the Untouchables have developed class consciousness, and they demand their full share in the political activities of the country. The British Government accepted them as an important entity, but the method of election by separate electorates appeared to be creating a permanent gulf between the high-class and low-class Hindus. At this point Mahatma Gandhi found it a call of conscience to attempt the modification of these arrangements at the risk of his life. He has succeeded in this to a very great extent, and the mutual arrangements arrived at between the two sections of the community have been accepted by Government. No provision was made for the representation of the Depressed Classes in the Punjab by the Premier because this class is not untouchable in that province. This is due to the influence of the Sikh religion. This religion raised the Depressed Classes into the warrior class who served in the Indian Army and won a splendid record of military success. They are still in the Indian Army in some battalions. The lecturer said that the political evolution in India was a very complicated affair on account of so many different communities having to be separately represented in the Councils, and he did not feel confident of the harmonious working of the constitution. I wish to point out that the majority of politically-minded Indians do not want so many different compartments in the constitution, and there is still a great desire that separate compartments should be abolished and the general electorate established. But it is in the power of the British Government to accept it or reject it. My personal view is that the rejection of this principle will not help the future Government of India to run very smoothly, for there will be parties based on religion rather than on politics. It has also been said by the Chairman that it would not be easy for the Depressed Classes to send a sufficient number of their representatives to the Central Legislature, but in my opinion suitable members will be forthcoming who will be able to discharge their functions properly.

Sir Philip Hartog writes:

The speakers at the discussion on Professor Coatsman’s valuable paper seem to me to have done a good deal less than justice to the efforts made by provincial governments for the education of the Depressed Classes, as a reference to Chapter X. of the Report of the Education Committee of the Indian Statutory Commission will very clearly show.* The percentage of the Depressed Classes under instruction is still, it is true, considerably below that of the total population in all provinces, except Bengal, where

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the two percentages in question are 4·3 and 4·9. But, except in the Central Provinces, there has been a rapid growth in the numbers of the Depressed Classes at school. During the decennium 1917-1927 the number increased in Madras from 157,000 to 228,000, and in Bengal from 96,000 to 344,000. The last and remarkable figure is due, it is true, in part to an increase in the number of tribes or classes placed on the list of educationally backward. But in Bengal I have never heard of an objection to Depressed Classes being taught with the others. Even in Madras, where the difficulties are greatest, though only 16,000 of the Depressed Classes were reported in 1927 to be reading in the ordinary schools, over 70,000 pupils who do not belong to the Depressed Classes were reading in special schools mainly provided for those classes.

Much has been done by Government by making provision for special schools; but I regard as still more useful their efforts to open the general schools to all alike in Madras, Bombay, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces. The interesting Report of the Depressed Classes and Aboriginal Tribes Committee, Bombay Presidency, of March, 1930, discusses the question of "Separate Schools versus Common Schools" (loc. cit., p. 15), and endorses the opinion of the Education Committee of the Simon Commission that the policy of the mixed school is the right one. I feel sure that if Government will persist in this policy they will be able gradually to enforce it throughout India. Social ostracism outside the school is far harder to deal with.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND ITS FUNCTIONS UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION

By Sir Wilberforce Ross Barker, K.C.I.E., C.B.

My subject this afternoon is the Public Service Commission, and closely allied with that question is the question of the British civilians now serving or serving at some future time in India. Perhaps at the outset and to avoid any misunderstanding I ought to explain my own attitude. To my mind the time has passed when we can usefully ask whether it is wise to establish a self-governing India. That is inevitable. The path is beset with perils, and, with my limited knowledge, I find it difficult to understand how those perils are to be surmounted; but that we have to tread that path I have no doubt.

At the risk of being tedious I should first explain the origin and functions of the Commission. The Government of India Act, 1919, directed the establishment of a Public Service Commission to discharge in regard to the recruitment and control of the public services in India such functions as might be assigned thereto by rules made by the Secretary of State in Council. I should invite your attention at the outset to the words "public services" and "control." The public services in India consist of the All-India Services, such as the Indian Civil Service, the Forest Service, the Police Service and the Educational Service, the Central Services such as the Railways, the Customs, and the Post Office, and the Provincial Services, which are recruited on a purely provincial basis and consist predominantly of Indians. Lastly, both at headquarters and in the provinces, there are subordinate services mainly clerical. The functions ultimately assigned to the Public Service Commission granted them no such "control" over the Services as the Act of Parliament contemplated, since the Commission is a purely advisory body, and among the services I have mentioned
the functions of the Commission have been confined almost entirely to the Central Services and the All-India Services.

The Lee Commission explained very clearly why a Public Service Commission was necessary for India:

"Wherever democratic institutions exist, experience has shown that to secure an efficient Civil Service it is essential to protect it so far as possible from political or personal influences and to give it that position of stability and security which is vital to its successful working as the impartial and efficient instrument by which Governments, of whatever political complexión, may give effect to their policies. In countries where this principle has been neglected, and where the 'spoils system' has taken its place, an inefficient and disorganized Civil Service has been the inevitable result and corruption has been rampant."

The Report pointed out that such Commissions have been established both in the Dominions and the United States, and it might have added that in no country were the dangers to which it alludes so much to be apprehended as in India.

The Secretary of State showed no unseemly haste in obeying the injunctions of Parliament. Nearly four years were occupied in correspondence as to the functions of the body without any result whatever. The Lee Commission reported in March, 1924, and advised that the Commission should be set up "without delay" and trusted that effect would be given to its recommendations "as soon as practicable." Notwithstanding this urgent advice, it was not till two and a half years later, in the autumn of 1926, that the Commission came into operation, no less than seven years after Parliament had ordered its formation. In my opinion, this inexcusable delay, this total inability to do the right thing at the right time, has in this, as in many other matters, been productive of the most mischievous results. The Commission was intended to be an integral part of the new Constitution of 1919 and was ordained as a protection against certain evil influences which threatened that tender plant. In the interval the evil influences took root and flourished exceedingly: and they were powerful enough to prevent the Commission from occupying the place which the Act of 1919 had assigned to it.

The Commission when constituted consisted of five persons, of whom two must have been ten years in the service of the Crown
in India. In practice the Commission consisted usually of three Europeans, a Hindu, and a Muslim. According to another classification it usually consists of a member of an All-India Service, a member of a provincial service, a member of academic experience and a person of legal experience. The Lee Commission recommended that its members should be

"men of the highest public standing who will appreciate the intimate relationship which should exist between the State and its servants. These Commissioners should be detached so far as practicable from all political associations and should possess in the case of two of their number at least high judicial or other legal qualifications."

**DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION**

The Commission is an extremely expensive body having regard to the work assigned to it. Till recently the salaries of its members amounted to over £17,000 a year, and in addition there was a considerable bill for secretarial and office expenses and travelling allowances. Its functions are in the main threefold. First, it is an examining body conducting examinations in India for entry into the All-India Services and one or two provincial services. As an appendage to this work, it selects candidates, not appointed by examination, for superior posts generally of a specialist character under the Government of India. Secondly, it is a disciplinary body. Broadly speaking, it must be consulted either *ab initio* or on appeal before punishment is meted out to a member of an All-India Service. Thirdly, it is a consultative body which may be consulted on all service questions by the Government of India. It follows that its members should have very diverse qualifications. Each of them should have a wide knowledge of Civil Service conditions, an experience of examinations and academic matters, and great legal experience in weighing evidence. It is not easy to find these three very different types of experience combined in one man, and for that and other reasons into which I need not enter it has always been very difficult to staff the Commission. It has generally been particularly weak on the legal side. I am inclined to think that the basis of the Commission is faulty and that one
body should deal exclusively with disciplinary matters, while another body which would be practically self-supporting should deal with the conduct of examinations.

Of the three functions I have mentioned the task of conducting examinations is far the heaviest in bulk and much the least difficult. It is absurd to have a very expensive Commission for this purpose, especially as several of its members usually have no acquaintance with academic matters. Disciplinary cases are comparatively rare, and most of them present no difficulty because there is no room for doubt about the culpability of the accused and little room for doubt about the appropriate penalty. The residue in which there is a serious doubt as to guilt or innocence are often extremely difficult and call for great judicial acumen and experience in the weighing of evidence. In the six and a half years during which I served on the Commission there were not more than ten such cases; and it is the height of extravagance to maintain a permanent body of five men to deal with about two cases a year, especially as a majority of them can have no pretensions to the peculiar kind of legal experience which is necessary. On the third branch of their work—that is to say, advice on general Service questions—the Commission have little to do, because they only deal with matters submitted by Government to them, and the Government have, in fact, referred very few questions to them. This branch of their work is susceptible of great expansion.

The result of this situation was that the Retrenchment Committee of the Legislative Assembly decided that the Commission was unduly expensive, an opinion with which I heartily agreed. There were two remedies, the first to increase its work and assign to it the functions which the Lee Commission contemplated; the second was to reduce its membership. The Secretary of State adopted the second alternative by reducing the membership to four and curtailing the salary of the Chairman: but even so the Commission will continue to be an unduly expensive body unless the first alternative is also adopted and further duties assigned to it. A peculiar difficulty attaches to the present arrangement, since the Commission now consists of two Europeans and two Indians, and there is an obvious danger that contentious matters
will be decided by the casting vote of the Chairman, a thing which is very undesirable.

Before concluding this description of the functions of the Commission, I desire to emphasize three points. First, the Commission is purely advisory, and in every branch of its work, even those branches which are peculiarly its own, such as the arrangements for examinations, the Government of India can and has overruled it. Secondly, the Commission has no control over the Services as contemplated by Act of Parliament, and has no power of initiating or tendering advice even in matters which clearly require amendment. In fact, it is seldom consulted on Service questions at all. No question could more vitally concern the Services than the recent 10 per cent. cut in salaries. I am not saying that some sort of cut was not justified. I do say that it is inexcusable to set up a Commission, which is supposed to be specially concerned with the interests of the Services, and to fail to consult it on the apportionment of the reduction among the various classes of officers. Thirdly, the Commission covers only a fraction of the ground covered by the phrase "Public Services in India" contained in the Act of Parliament. With a very few exceptions, it has nothing at all to do with the vast army of officers in the Provincial Services and nothing to do with those Services which are not superior.

**Rights of European Officers**

In entering into these particulars I have been thinking of the future and not of the past, and wondering what the Public Service Commission can do to help European officers in the difficult position which they will occupy under the new Constitution. There are several thousands of Europeans serving the Government of India, and in spite of reassuring utterances they are seriously alarmed as to their prospects. For the most part they came out to India at about the age of twenty-two with every prospect of a settled career, receiving salaries increasing by annual increments. At the end of their service, at about the age of fifty-five, by means of a pension or provident fund they were assured of a provision not very ample for the rest of their lives. Some of them in the
event of death are entitled to provision for their families. What is the source of their apprehensions? Perhaps the main ground of alarm is due to the long period which must elapse before their expectations are realized. It is not enough to say that their rights are secure in 1932 or 1934. It is necessary to look to a far more distant future. The officer who has recently joined the Service will not ordinarily leave till 1960, and the pension rights of himself or his family may survive till the end of the century. It would be a bold man who would hazard a prediction that the pensionary and provident fund obligations, for the most part unsecured by any fund, will continue to be discharged by the Government of India for that period of time amidst all the financial and political stress to which that Government will be subject.

It is not, however, my purpose to discuss the question how these remote liabilities of the Government of India can be safeguarded. I prefer to deal with the conditions of service during the actual period of service. What during that period does the European officer demand? First, security of tenure subject to good conduct; secondly, pay at scales not lower than those current when he entered the Service; thirdly, normal opportunities for promotion; fourthly, a continuance or no considerable reduction of the ordinary amenities hitherto enjoyed by a European in India; fifthly, and by no means least important, a self-respecting and honourable career, a sense that the work of the labourer is not entirely fruitless.

What is likely to be the attitude of the Indian Minister to these fundamentals? I wish to describe it without comment either by way of criticism or praise. It is largely the result of history, and it is inevitable that his point of view should differ widely from that of the existing rulers of India. Security of tenure: He is apt to regard the presence of the European officer in India as a regrettable necessity, or as a thing which if necessary once has now ceased or nearly ceased to be necessary. He naturally desires to reduce the European element in the Services, and even if he had no such desire the electorate which stands behind him in a country where the passion for Government employment has
attained extravagant dimensions would not be slow to force this policy on him. Salaries: He thinks that the salary scales and emoluments of European officers are extravagant, and especially objects to overseas pay. He is unwilling to honour the commitments in respect of salary which are embodied in the various Service rules—rules in the making of which he had no part and some of which he vehemently resisted.

This attitude of mind will be encouraged partly by financial necessity and partly by the Government of India Act of 1919. I say that Act because section 96 B, by safeguarding the existing and accruing rights of persons appointed before that Act, implicitly deprived of this protection those appointed after; in other words, nearly half the officers now in service. Promotion: An able European officer naturally looks to enjoy not merely the timescale of his appointment, but also hopes to attain some of those higher posts which carry with them additional remuneration. In fact, a European officer cannot regard his career as entirely successful unless he has done so. It is unquestionable that under a new Constitution the number of such posts will be greatly diminished. Apart from this there will inevitably be a tendency to confer as many of these posts as possible on Indians. Amenities of life: These depend to a great extent on the points I have previously mentioned. Perhaps the most important amenity of life in India is the opportunity of enjoying the society of one's fellow-countrymen. With the reduction of the European element in the Services these amenities will diminish and in some cases disappear. Among these matters I should mention the importance the European officer attaches to obtaining European medical treatment, if not for himself, at any rate for his family. Lastly, there is the question of an honourable and self-respecting career. It is the business of a servant of Government to obey without question the orders he receives, but if those orders appear to be detrimental to the interests of India or to involve injustice, a point may arise at which he must resign, in order to preserve his self-respect.

Now I have observed in the press a number of optimistic and confident predictions as to the future of the European in India
under the new Government, and a denial that these gloomy anticipations are justified, and I have observed that the most sanguine are those who are most remote from the burden of the day: the officer of the central Government more hopeful than the officer in the district and the statesman in Whitehall more hopeful than the officer of the central Government. It appears to me to be quite idle to suppose that a self-governing India will not desire to reduce the numbers of European officers, to curtail their emoluments, and to do the other disagreeable things I have mentioned. Such a policy would be quite unnatural and contrary to the views Indian politicians have often expressed.

**Statutory Safeguards**

What then is to prevent them if prevented they should be? The European official can look first to Parliament, and any future Act will no doubt contain what are called safeguards. I do not think it is generally understood how narrow must be the sphere of these safeguards. Administration is a day-to-day affair, largely opportunist and governed by the exigencies of the moment. It would be a matter of extreme difficulty for Parliament to pass any Act which guaranteed a certain proportion of Europeans in the Services, assured them of certain salaries, prevented the reduction or abolition of any officers, and safeguarded the interests of the European in matters of promotion. The experience of the last two years has shown that administration must be elastic in order to meet unexpected emergencies. Apart from this, looking to a future which is not at all distant, it is difficult to believe that an Indian Government will be willing to be shackled by Parliamentary restrictions, in a matter which so intimately concerns them as the employment of their own servants, and it is not easy to imagine how Parliament will be able to enforce any injunctions it may give. I do not say Parliamentary protection will be useless. I think that its value will be greatly limited.

The next line of defence is the Secretary of State in Council. He suffers from the same disadvantage as Parliament in that it will be extremely difficult for him to coerce a defiant Government. His position and that of the Viceroy will be unenviable
in the extreme. There can be little doubt that the area of disagreement between the authorities at home and the Government of India threatens to be very extensive; and if the new Constitution is to work at all it is all-important to reduce that area to the smallest dimensions. In other words the need to insist on big things will make it more difficult for the Secretary of State to insist on small things. He will furthermore be at the disadvantage that he will be to a great extent cut off from the sources of information he at present possesses; and will not have the knowledge which will enable him to enforce his opinions in small matters of administration. If the Indian Government proposes that this or that post shall be abolished, that some scale of salaries shall be revised, that there shall be a cut or supercut in emoluments, or that A shall be promoted instead of B, they will be proposing things which have been frequently done in the past by the Secretary of State on the advice of the Government of India and things for which there is ample precedent. The Secretary of State will not usually in the future have sufficient knowledge of personnel or of the details of administration to justify him in taking the grave step of overruling the advice of the responsible Government which he has established. It seems clear that under the new Constitution the need for some body in India which will not only protect European officers, but will also secure the efficiency of the Services, will be even greater than it was when the Act of 1919 ordered the establishment of a Public Service Commission.

THE ROUND-TABLE AND THE SERVICES

The eighth Sub-Committee of the 1930 Round-Table Conference recognized this need and recommended the appointment of a Central Public Service Commission and a separate Provincial Public Service Commission in every province. I cannot but regard this report as disappointing. It emanated from thirty-four persons, not one of whom to the best of my knowledge had any acquaintance with the existing Public Service Commission, or had made any inquiry as to the particular problems it had encountered. So far from solving those problems, it seemed to be unaware that any
problems existed. Its terms are so vague that it is difficult to know what answer it gives to any important question, and it does not touch the crux of the question—namely, what is to be done if the central and provincial Governments decide to ignore the recommendations of the Commission, and fail to consult the Commission on matters which vitally affect the well-being and efficiency of the Services, central and provincial, European and Indian.

Before I left India, people often said to me that the Public Service Commission under the new Constitution will be a stout shield to protect the European officer. I am afraid I must record my conviction that unless its position is drastically altered it will be entirely powerless to do anything of the kind. The Commission is entirely an advisory body. Its advice has been frequently disregarded in the past and is likely to be disregarded in the future. An Indian Government can quote ample precedents for overruling it. Even if its advice were binding on the Government, its sphere is so limited that it is entirely unable to touch the greater number of the matters in which the interests of the European officer may be adversely affected. I acknowledge the difficulty of setting up the Commission as an imperium in imperio; but there is no question as to the need of a body to protect European officials, and I cannot see what body can perform this work other than a Public Service Commission. It cannot, as the Secretary of State acknowledged at a meeting of the Round-Table Conference, in any case do the whole of the work which requires to be done, but its powers should be extended as far as is possible consistently with obvious constitutional limitations. The directions in which that can be done require careful study, and I have no knowledge that the problem has been studied at all.

**Provincial Commissions**

A word about Local Public Service Commissions. The original idea was that the Central Public Service Commission should operate generally for the public services throughout India, but the Government of India actually approved the principle of Provincial Service Commissions before the Central Commission had been
established. The Lee Commission contemplated a link between the Central Commission and the local recruiting agency. The Government of India disregarded this, and a commission has been established for Madras which has no connection with the Central Commission. I regard this as regrettable, and I have little hope that the Provincial Commissions will justify their existence. By way of obeisance to the Baal of provincial autonomy, it is seriously proposed to have a local Commission in every province in India. The main objections to this are first, that in most provinces the Commissioners cannot possibly have enough work to do to justify the heavy expenditure which the Commissions will undoubtedly entail, and, secondly, that the problem of manning them and preserving their complete independence of the Government is almost insuperable. A good Public Service Commission may become a powerful instrument for good, but the experience of other countries shows that a bad Commission may become a peculiarly noisome example of the whitened sepulchre. In saying this I am anxious to make it clear that I am casting no aspersions on the existing Commission in Madras. As far as my knowledge goes, it has so far done very well during the short period for which it has operated.

I am afraid that in the course of this address I have spoken much of difficulties which will arise and of dangers to be apprehended, and I have propounded no solution because whatever solution there may be depends on matters outside my cognizance. My object is not to decry the constitutional advance which is at present contemplated, because I regard such an advance as very necessary, but to call attention to matters which require very serious study. If on the great adventure on which we are embarking perils are to be encountered, the wise course is to take every possible step to guard against them beforehand. The foolish course is to pretend that they do not exist.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A meeting of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W.1, on Tuesday, December 13, 1932, when a paper was read by Sir Wilberforce Ross Barker, K.C.I.E., C.B., on "The Public Service Commission and its Functions under the New Constitution." Sir John Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:


The Chairman: The lecturer this afternoon is well known personally to many of those present, but it is necessary to give him a formal introduction to the East India Association, which I believe he has never addressed before. Sir Ross Barker, as some of you know, after a distinguished career at Oxford was employed for many years as legal adviser to one of the Government Offices in Whitehall. In 1926 he was appointed Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the first Chairman we had, and he has been there ever since until last August, when he retired.

Our Secretary is generally extraordinarily skilful in getting us men to lecture here of outstanding position in regard to Indian affairs, but I do not know that he very frequently succeeds in doing as he has done this afternoon, in getting for us the man of all others who is in a position to speak on the subject of his choice.

Sir Charles Fawcett (Hon. Secretary, I.C.S. [Retired] Association): We are much indebted to Sir Ross Barker for the interesting and authoritative paper he has read. It gives information which is particularly useful at the present juncture, when the new Constitution for India is on the anvil; and his views on the utility and proper functioning of Public Service Commissions in India necessarily carry great weight.

Sir Samuel Hoare is reported in The Times of December 3, 1932, to have said that, "in regard to the Services, more than a Public Service Commission was required: they must make sure of a fair deal." The paper gives strong support to this view, and it can be unhesitatingly asserted that British officers serving under the new régime will not have adequate security from the mere protection of such Commissions. This was recognized in the Simon Commission Report. It no doubt regards the establishment of Public Service Commissions as essential for the maintenance of an efficient and loyal
Civil Service, but this was supplementary to the proposal that the safeguards in the Government of India Act and the statutory rules thereunder should be maintained. It says (p. 292): "Our whole purpose...is to leave unchanged the rights and privileges of the present members of the Services and to keep the control of these rights and privileges in the hands of a body which enjoys their confidence"—i.e., the Secretary of State in Council.

It seems to me in fact that, in the changed conditions that will prevail under the proposed Federal Constitution, a Public Service Commission will be a "broken reed" to rely on, as a body likely to provide adequate security for the Services in question. Sir Ross Barker has, in my opinion, pointed out good grounds for this view. I would summarize the reasons under three main heads:

1. The cost of these Commissions, which the Simon Report recognizes "may be a not inconsiderable burden upon the revenues of the lesser provinces," will lead to constant clamour for their removal or reduction. And this is a demand that financial exigencies might make practically irresistible. Thus in Australia the Commonwealth and Public Service Commission has been reduced from a body of three members to one Commissioner, plus an Assistant. It would probably not be long before some of these Commissions ceased to operate in India.

2. Even if they are maintained, the ministers will be tempted to ignore them, in regard to their protective and consultative functions, as Sir Ross Barker has pointed out. The Simon Commission took the view that the establishment of provincial Public Service Commissions would be welcomed by ministers themselves, who would thus be freed from liability to be charged with using their position to promote family or communal interests at the expense of efficiency, as well as from embarrassing demands of their supporters. I think that those who have had real experience of India will fail to share this optimism, which is opposed to what is only human nature—viz., the natural desire to confer favours on friends and relatives.

3. There are special difficulties about the constitution of these Commissions in India which are of importance. If they are to have the confidence of British officers, there must be a strong proportion of the British element in their composition. This will enhance their cost and probably be a constant bone of contention in the Legislative Councils. Then there will be additional contest over the representation of Hindu, Muslim, Anglo-Indian, and other communal interests. There will be probable friction in the Commissions themselves on racial or communal lines. These difficulties do not exist, at any rate on anything like the same scale, in the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and South Africa, which are cited as examples by the Simon Commission. Their populations are more homogeneous, and a Public Service Commission can give impartial consideration to questions affecting the Public Services.

There is one point on which I venture to differ from Sir Ross Barker. As I understand him, he deprecates the insertion of statutory provisions to protect the Services, because they may turn out to be too rigid to meet unexpected emergencies. But it must be remembered that such provisions
are only of transitory effect. Their object is to afford protection to officers who entered the Service when the conditions were different to what they will be under the new Constitution. When those officers have all retired, they will cease to operate. Their propriety was recognized by Parliament in 1919, when section 96 B was passed, and the Joint Select Committee made remarks in favour of that enactment which are cited in para. 293 of Vol. I. of the Simon Commission Report, and which are as pertinent today as they were then. They are justified, not only as necessary for the protection of the officers concerned, but also as contributing to efficiency of service and thus promoting the interests of India, and I believe I am right in saying that influential Indian delegates to the Round-Table Conference recognize their legitimacy and do not oppose them. Again, such safeguards are an ordinary provision in a change of Constitution, and not an unprecedented one. Thus the Act establishing the Constitution of South Africa contains a section 144 regarding the tenure of officers retained in the Public Service, securing "all their existing and accruing rights" and the pensionary prospects to which they would have been entitled "if the Union had not been established."

If this involves some restriction on the freedom of the Federal Government and Legislature to abolish offices or reduce salaries, it is one which is entailed by the needs of the situation, and which is only for a limited time. Even with this protection, the Services will not have the secure conditions that have hitherto prevailed.

In Australia provision is also made for arbitration on questions where there is a difference of opinion between the Federal Government and the Service Associations in regard to salaries, rates of pay, and conditions of service. This might perhaps furnish a more promising line of security and one that will not be so expensive as the proposed establishment of Public Service Commissions; but its scope would be limited to proposed alterations of service, salaries, and conditions, and existing officers will probably prefer that the final decision in such cases should rest with the Secretary of State and Council.

In making these remarks I must not be taken as objecting to the utility of such Commissions for recruitment and examination purposes. It is only in respect of their protective functions that I venture to criticize their efficacy, and I am glad to find that I have the high authority of Sir Ross Barker to support me in so doing.

Sir Philip Hartog: I think that we all of us must feel a debt of gratitude to Sir Ross Barker for having brought before us questions of such importance to the future as those raised in his paper. It is not surprising that with different antecedents I look forward to a different future for the Commission and see things in a somewhat different perspective. That does not mean, however, that I am not in agreement with a great deal that has been said by the speaker.

Before I touch on questions of detail I turn to one important question of principle which has been raised by Sir Charles Fawcett, but to which Sir Ross Barker himself has not alluded. That is the question of the fair and impartial treatment of the members of all the communities of India, not only
of Europeans. Our Commission was a young Commission; and no doubt it made its mistakes, as even the wisest of bodies must do; but I think there is one reproach that has never been levelled against us—namely, that we were partial to Muslim, or Hindu, or Sikh, or European, or Anglo-Indian. If, while we were dealing with some disciplinary or other contentious personal matter, our proceedings had been broadcast by a magic microphone, capable of suppressing differences of accent, and characteristics of names, you would not have known the nationality of any member speaking on a particular case, or whether the person under discussion was a Hindu, a Muslim, or a European. I believe that, under the chairmanship of Sir Ross Barker, the Commission earned an unblemished reputation for impartiality in matters of that kind. (Applause.) I think that was a very great service to render to India, and, for my part, I hope that the Public Service Commission will continue to render that kind of service. 

Sir Charles Fawcett has said that those who know India will find it difficult to believe that ministers can like to be relieved of their powers of patronage. I can assure him that I have been told by more than one minister how much he had welcomed the transference of his powers of patronage to the Public Service Commission. You have to remember that when a minister obliges a single friend he may create fifty enemies. His political gain may be far outweighed by his political loss. The whole question of appointment by selection has not been stressed by Sir Ross Barker as I myself should stress it. He regards it as an “appendage” to the work of examination. I regard it as one of the most important functions of the Commission. I do not know whether, if the functions of the Commission were divided between two bodies, he would allocate this particular one to his Legal Commission or his Examining Commission.

(Sir Ross Barker: Examining.)

Sir Ross Barker thinks, then, that the Commission charged with the function of making selection appointments, as well as of conducting examinations, need not be an expensive one. I dissent. I think that the members must be raised above all suspicion of being liable to influence from the outside; and I should like to say that I was never approached by any member of an Executive Council or minister during my own tenure of office. Because the Commission charged with appointments should, in my opinion, be an expensive Commission, and for other reasons, I am in favour of maintaining one Commission instead of creating two, as the speaker has proposed, and I think that the recommendations of the Lee Commission in the matter ought to be carried out more strictly in the future than in the past. Sir Ross Barker quoted a passage from the Lee Report stating that two members of the Commission, at least, should possess “high judicial or other legal qualifications.” The passage continues: “They [i.e., all the members of the Commission] should, we suggest, be whole-time officers.

* I should consider it a disaster if the Public Service Commission were regarded as the special guardians of the interests of European officers and not the guardians of those of all communities alike.
and their emoluments should not be less than those of High Court judges." Sir Ross Barker has said, I think by pure oversight, that the Public Service Commission usually included "a person of legal experience." So far as I know, during the whole period of its existence, the Commission has included not only one person of legal experience, but never less than two. That is part of what the Lee Commission wanted.

I am now going to say something which I hope will not be misunderstood. I feel very strongly that in dealing with disciplinary cases what is required is not what may be called the narrow legal point of view, but justice; the justice of persons who are experts, if possible, in the subjects which come before them, and who are actuated by common sense. I remember perfectly well being told when I went out to India that in dealing with Service cases of hardship, and disciplinary cases, what was wanted was not legal decisions but just decisions. The Lee Commission did not insist on a legal majority; they did, however, insist on "high judicial or other legal qualifications." I interpret that phrase, taken with the context I have quoted, to mean that the legal representatives should be persons who have acted as High Court judges or whose qualifications would have justified their appointment as High Court judges. I think it is only from lawyers with these qualifications that one can normally expect the breadth of view required to deal competently with these matters. There are, no doubt, exceptions.

This leads me to another point. There is one safeguard which has not been applied in the case of the Public Service Commission but which exists in the courts of justice. I mean the safeguard of publicity. I think the Public Service Commission would have had an easier time, and would have worked with greater efficiency, if it had had the power to make its recommendations and its decisions public. I disagree entirely with the rule which enables the Chairman to suppress a dissenting minute, and even the fact that there has been dissent in a particular case. It must not be supposed that I am accusing the former Chairman of wishing to suppress minutes of dissent. But I regard the policy as a mistaken one. I think that, especially in the future contemplated by the speaker, it would immensely increase the value of the Public Service Commission, and that it would be a great safeguard in securing justice not only for European officials, but for Hindus, Muslims, and those of all other communities in the Public Services, if the members of the Commission had the power (and perhaps the duty) of making their views public; and not only the views of the majority but also of any minority.

* The Rule reads as follows:

Whenever under these rules the Commission is required to give advice, or to submit proposals to, or to be consulted by, any authority, the decision of the Committee shall be communicated in a letter signed by the Secretary, and in a case where the decision is not unanimous, neither the fact of nor the ground for dissent shall be communicated unless the Chairman so directs (Rule 24 of the Public Service Commission [Functions] Rules, 1926 [Statutory Rules and Orders, 1926, No. 1202]).
The Commission needs further to be strengthened in other ways. The tenure of the members should not be limited to five years.* They should be appointed with the same kind of status as that of a High Court judge. Their position is of such importance in the State that their stability should be assured.

I may just add that I agree with Sir Ross Barker in regarding the system of Provincial Public Service Commissions as extravagant, and in thinking that a more economical system might be devised. I conclude by expressing once more my sense of obligation to him for having brought forward these weighty matters, and by expressing the hope that Government will consult not only him, but also other former members of the Commission, as well as the Government of India, before the rules for any future Public Service Commissions are drawn up.

SARDAR SHIV DEV SINGH UBEROI: Sir Ross Barker speaks from first-hand knowledge of the past working of the Public Service Commission, and the highest value should be put on his words.

I would simply comment on the apprehensions which have been expressed in the paper as to the future, and would assure him that those who are working for the future constitutional advance of India are wise enough to give their best consideration to this part of the new Constitution, to safeguard the interests of the present European portion of the Services, and also for the future recruitment. They are not careless of this most vital point. His fears are quite natural at a time when the power is being devolved on other parties.

Every lady and gentleman knows the same difference of opinion exists between the politicians of India and those of Great Britain, but it must be recognized that it has been decided to devolve power upon Indians for the future government of India to a very great extent, and the details are being worked out.

Future members of the Government, the ministers, will be alive to the interests of their electorate, but will not be so unwise as to entirely dissociate themselves from the benefit of the services of those who have been administering the affairs of the country for many years. They will not be so unwise as with one stroke of the pen to dispense with the present European element in the Public Services in India. It will take a long time to replace them by Indians, though it is the natural desire in every country that the sons of the soil should be in charge of the Government. So far this principle has been recognized by the present British Government, and not only recognized, but within certain limits acted upon, and the Indian portion of the Services is being recruited to a very great extent.

A change of mentality will be required so that a British official may consider himself more a servant of the country than a master, just as in this country. Another change of vision will be required when India is considered to be an equal partner in the British Empire. But the interests of India will be not of India alone, but of the Empire as a whole.

* I think it quite right that the tenure should have been limited during the first and experimental period.
Sir Ross Barker said that it will be very expensive to have Public Service Commissions in each Province. I dare say this difficulty could be solved by having one Public Service Commission to deal with two neighbouring Provinces. I cannot help remarking that the Public Service Commission so far has done very impartial work except at moments when the policy of the Government was to provide for the minority communities by nomination. If this system is entirely abolished, the power of selection should certainly lie in the hands of the members of the Public Service Commission. He has expressed another fear, that is of the social connections on account of the reduction of the British element in the Services. I admit that there will be a natural desire of the future ministers to provide for their own countrymen if they are fit enough, and this principle is followed even now. But if an Indian can stand shoulder to shoulder with a Britisher in the War, if an Indian can come and play with a Britisher here, if an Indian can come and enjoy the social gatherings of Englishmen in London, there will be no reasonable ground why Indians and Englishmen should not meet each other quite congenially on social grounds in India.

Reference has been made to medical aid. I recognize a European would prefer to have a European doctor, but when I see that there are seventy or eighty Indian doctors practising in London, there seems no reason why the Indian doctor should not be trusted in future to handle the case of European men in the Service in India.

Anyhow, what I meant to say is this, that the angle of vision has changed, and if the Indians are considered fit to hold the reins of government in their hands, to be able to come into the society of the Europeans, there will be no difficulty. There are already clubs in India used by Indians and Europeans, and they enjoy each other’s company. There are one or two clubs which do not admit Indians, even as guests of the European members of the club, but still there are many clubs where Indians and Europeans meet on equal terms, sit together, eat together, play together. So there will not be much difficulty in the future.

One point made by Sir Philip Hartog is that of impartiality. It is quite right that Europeans can claim that they are impartial when there are Hindus, Muhammadans, Sikhs, and very many different castes. But I venture to say that when Indians are showing impartiality in other spheres, it will be perhaps an imaginary fear that Indians put in the Public Service Commission will not be able to be impartial.

Sir Philip Hartog: May I say that it was not my view that the Hindu and Muhammadan members of the Commission were any less impartial than the Europeans.

The Sardar: I misunderstood. What I meant to dwell on was that the fears are more imaginary than real.

Mr. George Pilcher: I should like to emphasize the last speaker’s comment on the effect of delay in intensifying this problem. I am afraid, with whatever impartiality one regards the position, one cannot but feel that to some extent at least Nemesis has overtaken the Services themselves or one of the great Services. I was very much struck in reading Mr. O’Malley’s excel-
lent book on the Civil Service by the long account of delay after delay, from Lord Dufferin's time right down to the appointment of the Chamberlain Commission in 1914, in dealing with the questions of the infiltration of the British Services, as they then were, with Indians. I cannot help thinking that if that had been done when it was first recommended in the early eighties, the whole complexion of the Indian problem would have been different.

I think the bearing on the present problem of that delay is this—and I think we have had an instance in the Sardar's speech which he has just made—the result has been this, that for forty or fifty years the racial constitution of the Service has become, so to speak, the theatre for a great controversy over the reparation of racial disadvantages, with the result that today we have even influential, experienced, and thoughtful Indians supposing that in some way the formation of democracy by India is intimately connected with and part and parcel of this problem of giving Indians a greater share in the Services.

Parliaments have absolutely nothing to do with the Public Services. Public Services should be run, and are run, in all well-governed countries, as distinct entities with their own code of behaviour and discipline and everything of the sort, and the democracy ought not to interfere with the constitution of the Services if it is to be a sensibly run democracy. Whether, and how and when, we shall get the mass of Indian voters back to the proper position of realizing that if the Services are properly run, with their own code of rules and with the aid of some disciplinary head, they are not concerned with details of the appointments to the Services, I do not know. But I cannot think things will go right until that is achieved.

The second point is with regard to Indian opinion. I think Sir Ross Barker was a little on the pessimistic side about Indian opinion in regard to the European element in the Services—that is to say, Indian opinion of the future. I well remember hearing Sir Alexander Muddiman tell a story, a true story, at the time when the resignations from the Services were at their height. The Indian Police Service had a British element of some 700 officers, and during, I think it was a single twelve months, under the Proportionate Pensions Rule, 95 of those officers retired and went home—one-seventh of the whole British strength of the Police Service. At that time, before Lord Birkenhead and Mr. Baldwin began their recruitment in the Public Schools here, you could not get candidates for any of the Indian Services, and a very eminent Indian political leader—whom everyone in this room knows, and whom Mr. Lloyd George once described as one of the six finest orators of the English language—was talking to Sir Alexander Muddiman and taking a grave view of this. Sir Alexander Muddiman said to this leader: "You know, Mr. So-and-so" (I will not mention his name), "if the Indian political leaders do not give a better lead on this Services matter, and use their influence to prevent persecution and restore a sane outlook, this problem will solve itself. You will find one day you have none of these indispensable Britshers in the Services." This eminent man said: "Sir Alexander, in my opinion if that ever happens and India is put
on the road to democracy without them, it will be like putting a baby in a perambulator on one side of Trafalgar Square and telling the baby to get to the other side as best it can."

That was the opinion of a very respected Indian leader, and I do believe that, apart from this controversy about the racial proportions in the Services, the majority of the responsible Indian political leaders realize today that they have got to have British in the Public Services guiding them for some years to come. If some of the technical details are grappled with boldly, I think there is occasion for rather more optimism than Sir Ross Barker thinks. That is my opinion of the future, as one who has been for the best part of twenty years a rather close student of this problem.

With regard to the suggested solutions, the speaker has alluded to the serious expense of one Public Service Commission and a fortiori the prohibitive expense of a large number of these Commissions in ten or twelve Provinces. I am receiving week by week, from extremely responsible people in India, letters showing how opinion moves there, and we know how opinion is moving in London. Every letter I get from anywhere near the top in any one of the Provinces tells me that the real dismay in regard to the Reforms is on the ground of expense. It is absolutely impossible for India, engaged as her Government already is in wielding the axe of economy, to adopt all these innumerable courts and commissions and all the most extravagant paraphernalia of administration that a Government of any country has ever been invested with. The whole Reforms scheme, the Indian standard of livelihood and income being what it is, will have to be very greatly modified before it ever gets into real operation. Even if you could afford the money, you would not find the staff to man a dozen Service Commissions. It is quite impracticable, and I think we shall come back to this: The Viceroy is to be given special powers from London, and one of the special powers he is going to have, I should think almost certainly, is to safeguard the Services. There may be one Commission. I do not know whether anybody here has studied the practice in France, whereby you have a vast body administering law, to which all the administrators in France are amenable, with a court concerned solely with the administration of that law and with the treating of all cases regarding the Civil Service; that body is called the Conseil d'État. In India with the existing volume of Service rules, with the administration by the Secretariats of all cases of discipline for 100 to 150 years past, surely Sir John Kerr or some experienced administrator could tell us whether it is not the fact that all you need is a visible disciplinary apex in the shape of a Conseil d'État, such as we thought the Public Service Commission was going to be when it was first recommended in 1919. It looks to me as if the thing could be done very easily. It would be very unwise to scrap all this accumulated experience, and with the Viceroy at the apex protecting the Public Service, and possibly a small Commission or a small body of a quasi-judicial character at the top, you will have very nearly done what is needed to secure rational recruitment and treatment for the Services.

There is one other little point in regard to one of the great Services. A
great deal could be done, and ought to be done, before the Reforms come into existence. Something has to be done about ensuring an adequate Police Service in the India of the future, or it is clear that the whole Police Service will buckle. It cannot stand the superimposition suddenly of the weight of total responsibility to ten ministers in the Provinces. That is impossible at one stroke. I would submit if a Royal Commission were appointed in advance of the operation of the Reforms to decide the police strength in all the Provinces, and possibly the minimum expenditure for a period of ten years in each Province, you would at least have done something to ensure the strength and security of that particular Service.

Mr. G. P. Pillai (Political Secretary, Travancore): The topic of the lecture is of absorbing interest to us in Travancore at the present moment, when the Government of His Highness the Maharaja have instituted a committee to explore the possibilities of inaugurating a Public Service Commission in Travancore. And I must express my gratitude to the East India Association for allowing me an opportunity to listen to a most interesting debate covering various aspects of the problem. We do fully recognize that a good Public Service Commission may become a powerful instrument for good, and I have no doubt that, if ever the Government of Travancore decide upon a Public Service Commission for the State, they will take care that it does not become "the noisome example of the whitened sepulchre" referred to by Sir Wilberforce.

Having regard to the conditions in the South of India, particularly of the Madras Province and the progressive South Indian States of Mysore, Travancore, and Cochin, one cannot fail to appreciate the importance of a Public Service Commission which will at once secure the maximum of efficiency while recognizing the legitimate claims of the various communities for adequate representation in the Public Service.

The problem before us has both a political and an economic background; for there has been a tendency in recent times to look upon Public Service as a source of employment which yields a steady income. In Travancore, for instance, we have a population of over 5 millions (next only to Hyderabad and Mysore) with the highest percentage of literacy in all India. Public administration is being carried on in close association with the people's representatives in the Legislative Council and the Popular Assembly.

It was only very recently—barely five weeks ago—that His Highness the Maharaja was pleased to promulgate a scheme of constitutional reforms under which the Assembly and the Council have been remodelled with enlarged functions and powers. They form two Chambers of a bi-cameral body. The Assembly is composed of over 83 per cent. of non-officials, and in the Council nearly 75 per cent. of the members are non-officials. The Legislature exercises very wide powers in the field of legislation and finance, and influences very largely the administrative policy of the Government. Almost every department of public activity is thrown open for discussion by the Legislature, the only important reservations being matters affecting the Ruling Family and the relations with the Paramount Power. Supplies are to be voted by the Popular House when the annual Budget is presented.
to it. The Popular House is constituted on a very low franchise, and men and women possess equal rights of voting. The elections are invariably keenly contested, and a very high percentage among both men and women attend the polls. Naturally, therefore, the Legislature is really representative of the various castes, sects, and classes of the population; and, in the exercise of political power by the people, recruitment to Public Service, which has its own economic value in these days of depression, is bound to attract greater attention than hitherto. In fact, the plea for the recognition of the principle of communal representation in State Service is becoming more and more insistent as economic depression is becoming more and more marked.

Every well-ordered government should be very anxious to uphold and maintain unimpaired the maximum of efficiency in Public Service. It is, however, sometimes urged by the advocates of communal representation that, to secure their full quota in proportion to the population of particular communities, recruitment to Public Service ought to be on the principle of minimum educational qualifications. It is difficult to reconcile these points of view. No government, particularly no government whose policy is largely influenced by a popular legislature, can afford to encourage the impression—erroneous though it be—that the just demands of any section of the people are not being adequately recognized; but at the same time, no government worth the name can throw efficiency to the winds in order to placate any section of the people. It follows that unless a method of recruitment is devised which, while satisfying the legitimate demands of all communities, will at the same time uphold and maintain the highest degree of efficiency, the tone and morale of the Public Service will undoubtedly deteriorate to the lasting prejudice of the best interests of the governed. It is because this question is a live issue in our country—an issue in the satisfactory solution of which depends to a very large extent intercommunal amity and the recognition of truly national ideals—that I have ventured to make these few observations this evening; and I believe that a Public Service Commission, properly constituted and worked on proper lines, furnishes a satisfactory solution of this vexed problem.

The Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen, we have had a good debate on the paper which Sir Ross has read to us. I have served in India since the Public Service Commission was first appointed, and I entirely agree with what Sir Philip Hartog has said, that there has never been a breath of suspicion against its reputation for impartiality.

I do not find myself able to agree altogether with all that Sir Ross has said. I think there are two main points to be considered. The first is what amount and what kind of protection the Services are entitled to; and the second is, where should the right to give that protection reside.

As regards the second of these points, the choice is between the Public Service Commission and the Executive Government, with whom the power at present resides. I am not sure that I find myself in agreement with Sir Ross when he says that it was definitely the intention that powers of control should be given to the Public Service Commission. What I mean is this. What the Act says is that a Public Service Commission shall be appointed,
which shall discharge such functions in connection with the recruitment and control of the Services as may be assigned to it by rules made by the Secretary of State. In other words, it seems to me that that section lays down the possible limits of the field, but it is for the Secretary of State to say how much of that field shall be occupied. So far as I can recollect, it was not suggested in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, nor during the meetings of the Joint Committee, nor in the Report of the Simon Commission that powers of control over the Services should actually be given, and I feel pretty certain that anyone who wanted to confer powers of actual control on the Public Service Commission in India would find himself up against a fairly heavy weight of opposition. So far as control is concerned, I doubt whether the Public Service Commission can be brought into the picture at all, except for the important but essentially subsidiary purpose in certain cases of advising the Executive Government as to the manner in which it should exercise its powers.

The other point that I want you to consider is this—the question of what amount of protection men in the Services have the right to expect. Obviously they cannot expect more protection than they have at the present moment. Sir Ross has told us the particular points which he considered the members of the Services had a right to demand. The first was security of tenure. Not absolute, I think, but absolute except with the consent of the authority that appoints them. A service that no power on earth could reduce or retrench would surely be unique.

Secondly, pay at scales not lower than those current when the recruit enters the Service. This must be subject to the same condition. Last year the Services had their pay reduced by Act of Parliament as a measure of retrenchment, and what has been done once can be done again.

Thirdly, normal opportunities for promotion. Most of the Services are now on a time-scale until the selection appointments are reached, and every officer should, of course, have a right of appeal against the withholding of normal increments. The position in regard to what are called selection appointments above the time-scale is different. Take, for example, commissionships. At present, as I understand the rules, the remedy open to a member of the I.C.S. who is passed over for a commissionship is by way of memorial, not by way of appeal, but I doubt if anyone ever gets any change out of such a memorial. The overwhelming factor must always be the opinion of the Governor who has to make the selection, and I take it that, even in future, every one of such appointments will still be made by the Governor as the guardian of the Services. If so, the position should be nearly as secure as at present.

Fourthly, continuation of amenities. Neither the Public Service Commission nor the Government can secure the continuance of the amenities of life as we have known them in the past, and the lecturer has fully recognized that. But I quite agree with what he has said in regard to the importance attached by European officers to obtaining the services of European doctors for their families. The continuance of the diminished facilities that are still available is a matter for the Government.
Sardar Shiv Dev Singh Uberoi mentioned that there are a small number of Indian medical practitioners in London. I feel some doubt how far it is possible to build on that fact in the present connection.

Lastly, the self-respecting and honourable career. By this I take it that Sir Ross Barker means that it should not be made too difficult for an officer to retire if his conscience forbids him to carry out the orders of superior authority. Presumably some system of retirement on proportionate pension is what he has in mind for officers already in the Service. That seems to me reasonable. But it is a very different thing to ask that it should be extended to those who enter after the introduction of the new scheme of Government. It might perhaps be sound policy from the business point of view to make it possible for future European entrants to retire after, say, five years' service. If the future Government of India wants to attract British recruits it will clearly have to agree to conditions which will attract them.

Sir Wilberforce Ross Barker: The speakers have covered so many points that I find it difficult to touch upon all. I think many of the points upon which some criticism has arisen in regard to my paper are really due to the fact that I am unable to express myself as I should like to.

Sir Charles Fawcett, I think, perhaps a little bit exaggerates my opinion as to the uselessness of the Public Service Commission, though I am very glad to find he does agree with me that as it is constituted at present it cannot give very much security to the European officer. He says if the Public Service Commission is a broken reed, the Secretary of State will protect the officer. I am afraid my view is that, under future conditions, the Secretary of State will be a far more broken reed than the Public Service Commission. The real difficulty of the Secretary of State will be that he will not know, and you cannot deal with these delicate matters unless you know.

The Indian politician thinks, and in my opinion he thinks quite rightly, that there are too many commissionerships. Well, the responsible ministers of the Viceroy advise him to reduce the number of commissionerships. A certain amount of reduction can be carried out perhaps without any great injustice to European officials. On the other hand, an extensive reduction may be most unfair. It will be extraordinarily difficult for the Secretary of State to make a distinction and say, "I am going to override the ministers on these points. I know more about them than they." Just the same with regard to promotion. The question whether A shall be promoted or B is not a matter which the Secretary of State can possibly decide. He has not the knowledge.

Sir John Thompson said quite truly that appointments to commissioner- ships are made by the Governor, but if the Governor frequently disregards the advice of his ministers the situation would be absolutely impossible. That is what I fear for the European official. It will be the same Government, the same Secretary of State, but a completely different orientation. And in a way I do not wish to find any fault with that. All I say is that the European official is likely to suffer.
I am very much obliged to Sir Philip Hartog, who brings his own experience to this discussion. I was perhaps rather unwise to use the word "appendage" to describe the appointment of officials by selection. An appendage is sometimes a very important thing. A tail has been known to wag a dog before now. All I meant was that the bulk of the work was examinations and the smaller part of the work (appointment by selection) was the appendage.

With regard to Commissions, I rather agree with Sir Philip that you cannot have a good Commission unless it is expensive. What I wish to emphasize is that if you have an expensive Commission, you ought to give it a great deal of work, and that is what the Government of India has failed to do. He touched upon publicity. I think the real danger is that in the future the Government of India will ignore the advice of their Public Service Commission whenever that advice is disagreeable, and it is very difficult to say that a Public Service Commission should have power to override the Government. It has always struck me as a very sensible solution of that problem, that when the Government overrides the Public Service Commission they should be bound to lay on the table of the Legislative Assembly a statement that they have done so and their reasons for doing so. That becomes public property.

With regard to lawyers, well, lawyers are dreadful people, of course, but, after all, the question whether a man is guilty or not guilty of an offence is a matter which it does require some legal training to deal with adequately, and I should be sorry to see such matters settled entirely by laymen; as I should be sorry to hear lawyers claiming to cut off our limbs. Everybody has his own function in this life, and legal experience is extraordinarily valuable.

With regard to what the Sardar said, I agree with most of it. I would have no anxiety about European officials at all if he was to be the future Governor of India. But is he?

Sir John Thompson argued that when the Legislature set up a Public Service Commission to discharge with regard to the recruitment and control of Public Services in India such functions as might be assigned by the Secretary of State, it was consistent with the Parliamentary enactment that no powers of control should be given at all.

The Chairman: No, my point was to force on the Public Service Commission the power of advising the Government, which was in itself in compliance with the Act.

Sir Ross Barker: Well, I have been spending most of my ill-spent life drafting Acts of Parliament, because I do think there are too many Acts of Parliament. But there they are, and I am bound to say I have never known an Act of Parliament legislating for a control which it did not intend to be exercised. And the argument is that it was not required that any control should be given. But that is, after all, a small point.

I was very much struck with what Mr. Pelcher said with regard to infiltration. It seems to me the history of this matter is the old story—too late, too late, too late. I think if fifty years ago the Government in India
had seriously said to themselves, "We have to train up Indian administrators; we have to put them in high posts and to show them how to do it," I think at this time of day we should have very little trouble.

Again I should like to say that I do not envisage a future Government of India as necessarily hostile to Europeans. For years to come Europeans will be required in the Services. But you have always to remember that hardship falls not on a body, but on the individual, and it is the individual who will suffer by losing his job.

Sir John Kerr moved a vote of thanks to the speaker for his interesting and stimulating address, and it was carried with acclamation.
RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN MYSORE STATE

By Sir Alfred Chatterton, C.I.E.

The address of the Dewan of Mysore, Sir Mirza M. Ismail, to the Mysore Representative Assembly at the Dasara Session in October last, furnishes convenient illustrations of the economic problems which face the constituent States of the Federal India of the future. In the issue of this Review for April, 1930, the then recently appointed Trade Commissioner in London, Mr. B. T. Kesava Iengar, gave a short account of "the development and resources of the Mysore State." After paying a well-deserved tribute to the enlightened administration of the present Maharajah, he referred to the progress which had been made in giving the people an effective voice in the management of the internal affairs of the State, by the establishment of an advisory body termed the Representative Assembly, which was first summoned in 1881, and later, in 1907, by the formation of a Legislative Council, the character of which was changed by stages from an entirely nominated membership to one with a non-official majority and endowed with powers similar to those enjoyed by the Provincial Legislatures in British India. Mention was also made of the Mysore Economic Conference, an elected Council summoned annually by authority of the Executive Government, which affords a convenient means of associating the people with the discussion of measures for promoting economic progress. Three standing committees of this Conference, dealing respectively with Education, Agriculture, and Industries, carry on the work throughout the year and materially assist in bridging the gulf between the intelligentsia and the bulk of the subjects of the Maharajah, who are still living under mediæval conditions, though stirred by the impact of modern ideas and Western material developments.

The Government of H.H. the Maharajah of Mysore is entrusted to a Dewan and two or three members of Council, who hold their appointments directly under the Maharajah, to whom they are responsible for the orderly conduct of the business of the State in accordance with the established constitution and the sanctioned rules of procedure. The services were organized in the days of the Commission and in essential features resemble those that have been evolved in British India. With the exception of a few European or American specialists they are almost entirely recruited within the State, though the majority, till quite recently,
were trained in the educational institutions of British India, whilst some have received an advanced technical training in the colleges and hospitals of the West.

It is difficult to conceive of administrative machinery better adapted to the conditions prevailing in India. A permanent head of the State, deeply concerned with the welfare of his people and in a position to enforce a continuity of policy free from the vagaries of party politicians holding office at the mercy of an uninstructed and inexperienced popular vote. A trained executive with such security of tenure of employment and such prospects of official promotion as will enable them to devote their whole energies to rendering the best public service they are able. Representative bodies, elected on a sufficiently wide franchise, enjoying constitutional prerogatives and able effectively a exert a salutary influence over the bureaucracy. After having served for nearly twenty-five years in the Madras Presidency, for the last twenty years having varied associations with the Mysore State, both in a public and a private capacity, I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion that in many important respects the administration of the State is better suited to the conditions prevailing in India than is that of the Presidency. I do not think it is more efficient, but it is certainly more human, and those in authority are more sympathetic to the idiosyncrasies of the people and are in closer touch with them than seems to be the case in Madras, especially in recent years. Contributing in no small measure to this result is the greater degree of internal autonomy enjoyed by the State, which engenders a personal pride in the progress which is being made.

A very enlightened policy has been pursued in developing the natural resources of the country, and in an altogether satisfactory way State socialism has been accompanied by adequate measures to encourage the growth of private initiative. Mysore enjoys the distinction of having erected the first hydro-electric installation of any importance in India, and has during the last thirty years with comparatively limited resources pursued a steady policy of increasing the output of energy and providing facilities by which private enterprise might put it to profitable use. Initially it was solely because of the demand for power on the Kolar gold-fields that this work was undertaken, and during the last thirty years it has largely contributed to the successful working of the mines, but today there is not the slightest apprehension felt that the future prospects are any longer dependent on the continued existence of the Kolar demand. That it will long continue is certain, but when the inevitable end comes, as come it must, there will be other forms of enterprise ready to take over the power.

In the electrical department long views as to future progress are
necessary and have been taken. In the last six years no less than 15½ lakhs have been expended on the extension of the distribution mains to rural areas, whereby some forty towns and villages have been supplied with power, which at present is chiefly used for lighting and for driving small irrigation pumps installed in wells used for watering what are termed "garden" crops. This investment already yields a certain amount of revenue, and according to the Dewan there is every reason to hope that in a few years it will so increase that an adequate return will be obtained, whilst at the same time greatly improving the amenities of village life. In the cities of Bangalore and Mysore the low rates at which energy is supplied to small industrial undertakings have proved a powerful stimulus to such forms of enterprise, which include a number of textile factories engaged in silk-throwing and in silk and cotton weaving, oil mills, flour mills, and small workshops. The total capital outlay on this hydro-electric installation is about £2,000,000, and from a gross annual output of about 170 million k.w.h. a revenue of £380,000 was obtained.

Both Bombay and Calcutta utilize a much larger amount of electric energy, the former deriving it from water power and the latter from steam, but they are large centres of population with highly developed industrial demands. The Mysore installation is still unique inasmuch as it supplies a comparatively rural area in which it plays a very important part in bringing into existence industrial enterprise which could scarcely be carried on without its aid. In the Punjab the Mandi hydro-electric station and in Madras the Pykara scheme are both approaching completion, and for the utilization of the energy which they will provide problems very like those which have presented themselves in Mysore will have to be solved. There has always been much misgiving on the part of those interested in the ultimate welfare of the Indian people regarding the introduction of the modern factory system with its apparently inevitable concentration in congested industrial areas. Where electric energy can be distributed over wide areas, as is the case in Mysore and will be possible in the Punjab and Madras, the evils of concentration can be avoided and favourable conditions provided for individual enterprise as an alternative to large impersonal joint stock undertakings. A certain measure of success in this direction has already been achieved in Mysore, and the experience there gained should be useful in other parts of India.

The Cauvery hydro-electric installation at the outset in 1902 had a capacity of 6,000 horse-power, and was designed to supply 4,000 horse-power to the gold-fields. The initial success led to the installation of additional plant, and power and light were transmitted to Bangalore in 1905 and to Mysore in 1908. Further additions were then made and the hot weather supply of the
river was fully utilized. It then became evident that there was scope for the employment of a much larger output and that to obtain such increase it would be necessary to regulate the flow of water in the river. The construction of a great dam across the river was accordingly undertaken to create a storage reservoir with the object of securing a much larger minimum flow to the power station, and to provide for the irrigation of a large tract of land by the diversion of part of the flow of the river into a canal on the eastern or left bank of the river. Very protracted negotiations with the Madras Government ensued regarding the abstraction of water for irrigation in the State, as vast irrigation interests in the waters of the Cauvery already existed in that Presidency. The final settlement gave Mysore the right to take enough water for the irrigation of 120,000 acres, and the works to render this supply available are approaching completion. The total expenditure on the dam and the irrigation works will be about £4,500,000. Part of the return on this capital outlay is already realized in the electrical department, the remainder must come by way of water rates levied on the land that will be irrigated. The Government fully realize that they have a unique opportunity of carrying the development of the agriculture of the country a stage further than has heretofore been considered possible in any part of India.

The irrigation works which have been constructed during the last century, beginning with the remodelling of the Tanjore delta by Sir Arthur Cotton and ending with the great Scinde barrage on the Indus at Sukkur, are monuments of engineering skill and have conferred inestimable benefits to very large tracts of country. The science that was directed to the design of these works was not, however, applied to secure the best results from the use made of the water which they have rendered available. The canals and distributary channels carried the water to the land and the cultivator was left to make the best use of it he could. Beyond bemoaning the obvious waste of water nothing was done, and no attempts were made to introduce new crops, new methods of cultivation, or provide such financial assistance as would enable extensions of cultivation to take place more rapidly than was possible by the ryots with their limited resources. The histories of the great Delta works in the Madras Presidency furnish a record of slow progress in the extension of irrigation. The establishment of canal colonies in the Punjab and the introduction of the block system on the Deccan canals of the Bombay Presidency were the first indications of recognition that something more was necessary than merely to render water available for the cultivator. In the light of the knowledge and experience then available it
was perhaps wise that nothing more was attempted, but the results of this policy of inaction are now very apparent, and it is recognized that the material progress of India is not keeping pace with Western nations because of her primitive methods of agriculture. In recent years the gulf has widened and evidence is forthcoming that the pressure of the population on the soil is reaching the extreme limit. The new irrigation from the Cauvery reservoir is to be controlled so as to obtain the highest possible economic yield from the perennial supply of water that will be available in the interest of both the State and the cultivators. The block system of cultivation will be enforced with a triennial rotation of crops suited to the growth of sugar cane as the principal crop. Sir Mirza Ismail in his address stated: “It is anticipated that, when irrigation is fully developed in the Irwin canal area, about 40,000 acres of land will be annually cultivated with sugar cane. Even at the beginning the volume of crop will be considerable, and its economic handling and disposal will require at least one sugar factory in the area. It is the intention of Government to establish a factory as soon as possible. The sugar industry in India, as you know, is protected by a heavy duty on imported sugar. With this advantage and an assured supply of raw material in the canal area, the prospects of the factory are very promising. Local business people have also shown great interest in the undertaking.”

Of the land commanded by the irrigation canal from the Cauvery reservoir, the area of which greatly exceeds the 120,000 acres for which water will be available, the major portion is already occupied by ryots, who have hitherto been accustomed to grow dry crops, whilst the remainder is Government waste land which has hitherto been uncultivated. If left to themselves the ryots would gradually convert their dry land into wet and would grow paddy. It is fairly certain that the process would be a slow one and would only be completed in from ten to fifteen years, during which period the revenue from the water would certainly not meet the interest charges on the cost of the works. A committee which was appointed in 1927 to advise the Government as to how to deal with the problems presented by this irrigation project estimated that the value of the crops which could be grown under a triennial rotation would be for sugar cane Rs. 500, for paddy Rs. 80, and for garden produce Rs. 50 per acre, from which it is easy to deduce that the block system would annually yield produce worth 282 lakhs as against only 96 lakhs for paddy. Comparisons with other crops could also be made, but if anything they would only emphasize the superiority of the return to be obtained from cultivating as much sugar as possible.

It is quite certain, however, that unaided by Government the ryots
could grow very little sugar cane for reasons which may be briefly stated. The ryots have no experience of growing sugar cane, and initially would have great difficulty in getting supplies of seed cane. The crop is essentially one for capitalists, as it is on the ground for a whole year, requires much cultivation and involves heavy expenditure on fertilizers if a good yield is to be obtained. Finally, when the cane is cut the juice must be immediately extracted and boiled down to jaggery or converted into sugar. The crude indigenous methods of making jaggery are very wasteful and would involve the employment of cattle power far beyond the resources of the cultivators. The substitution of power driven mills for crushing the cane would get over this difficulty and would partially reduce the loss due to inefficient crushing, but such mills are costly, and experience has shown that it is difficult to get the cane growers in any area to work in co-operation. Apart, however, from these considerations jaggery as a final product is out of the question, chiefly because it does not store well and deteriorates in transit, whilst there are local prejudices regarding it that would seriously militate against the successful marketing of large quantities from a single centre. It is recognized, therefore, that if sugar cane cultivation is to be firmly established in this area sugar mills must be introduced and arrangements made to take over the whole crop from the very beginning. A Government sugar cane farm has been established in the area and two hundred acres are under cultivation this year, the whole crop from which will be available for seed cane next year, when cultivation by the ryots will be started. To deal with whatever crop may be grown a sugar mill with a daily capacity of from 400 to 500 tons will be installed. It should be easily possible to keep such a mill at work for 150 days in the year, and to ensure this there should be a crop of 60,000 tons of cane, which means that the area under cultivation should be at least 1,500 and preferably about 2,000 acres. The Government farm will therefore be extended to about 1,000 acres, and agreements have already been made with the ryots for the cultivation of a similar area—advances being made to them in the form of seed cane, fertilizers, and cultivation expenses. The whole crop will be taken over by the Government at an agreed price per ton of cane, when the value of the advances together with the water rate will be recovered and the balance due to the ryots paid to them. Thus far definite arrangements have been made, and future developments will no doubt depend on the results obtained during the first season.

Here it may be convenient to consider what the ultimate development of the whole scheme will involve. The crop expected from the 40,000 acres is from 30 to 40 tons per acre, and
taking the lower figure of 30 tons with an extraction of 10 per cent. of sugar the yield will be about 120,000 tons of sugar a year. With rigid control of the planting the conditions in Mysore are such that the season may be extended over at least six months, and it should therefore be possible to run the mills an equal length of time. This would give about 160 working days and would involve dealing with about 7,500 tons of cane a day. To obtain such a milling capacity would probably cost about a million sterling and involve annual working expenses of about £900,000. The value of the sugar produced would be of the order of £2,500,000. These figures are cited merely to suggest the scale on which operations will ultimately be conducted, and so indicate the magnitude of the undertaking upon which the Mysore Government are now embarking. The management of a big commercial enterprise of this character will require very careful consideration. There are weighty reasons why it should be controlled by the Government, which may be briefly summed up by stating that any superior commercial efficiency that might be obtained from private enterprise is likely to be more than offset by the less expensive finance which the Government can command, coupled with the fact that its prestige and experience will probably make it much easier to deal with the cultivators, who will have to be brought under a rigid system of control if satisfactory results are to be achieved. No doubt at the present time the Government view the financial implications with much concern, but if the initial results are in accordance with the not very extravagant forecast of possibilities, it is fairly certain that they will not be inclined to surrender the development in the future to private capitalists, who will naturally demand adequate remuneration for the capital they provide and for the work involved.

The whole trend of Mysore policy is exemplified by the establishment in London of a Trade Commissioner, whose duties include assistance to private traders, but are mainly concerned with the business of the Government in such directions as the sale of sandalwood oil, the by-products of the wood distillation plant, and other commodities in which the State for the time being may be interested, combined with the purchase of stores. The commercial undertakings of the Mysore Government are already on a very large scale and of a very miscellaneous character. Just now, in common with the whole world, they are suffering from the economic situation, and they are consequently somewhat diffident about embarking on new ventures, but with a return to normal conditions it may be expected that their confidence will be restored and that they will not forgo the advantages of keeping this sugar industry in their own hands. In the Bombay
Presidency, under one of the Deccan canals, an area of about 5,000 acres has been granted on a long lease to a private company for the purpose of growing sugar cane. Cultivation started at the end of the war, but as a commercial enterprise the company met with little success and had to obtain help from Government. Recently, due partly to better management with increasing experience and partly to the high duties now imposed on imported sugar, the corner has been turned, the loans paid off, and a substantial dividend paid to the shareholders. This is a good augury for the success of the Mysore scheme, which depends for results on the goodwill and co-operation of the cultivators, amongst whom there will be much prejudice and inertia to overcome.

The demand for sugar in India has for many years been a serious drain on the resources of India, and it is therefore satisfactory to note that importations are steadily going down and that much interest is manifested in the establishment of sugar mills. The progress, however, is in no way regulated, and it is inevitably that serious trouble will arise in certain areas due to competition between the new mills for the ryots’ cane. The Dutch in Java have solved this problem, and it is urgently necessary that provincial authorities in India should recognize the necessity for analogous action.* The Government of Mysore is therefore to be most heartily congratulated on the policy which it proposes to pursue.

The economic conditions of the last two years have brought home to the nations of the world in a very stern way their inter-dependence on one another. The catastrophic fall in world prices of raw materials has hit India very hard. The complexity of the problems arising therefrom preclude discussion here, but reference may be made to over-production of many staple commodities due to the application of scientific and technological advances to the methods of cultivation in which India has joined only to a very limited extent. The returns from the last census have revealed a population increasing at the rate of three millions a year, unaccompanied by any corresponding increase in the yield of its soil. It is impossible to ignore the implications of a situation so clearly exposed, and it is urgently necessary that the political situation should be cleared up as soon as possible, so that those who in the future will be entrusted with the administration of internal affairs may be in a position to deal with these problems.

* This aspect of the Indian sugar question is the subject of a very interesting article which recently appeared in Capital, by Mr. Noel Deer, to whose worldwide reputation as a technical expert in all sugar questions may be added an experience extending over more than ten years in a group of factories in Northern India, where he has been remarkably successful in improving the efficiency of Indian milling.
while they are still of manageable dimensions. By abandoning a policy of laissez faire in reference to the development of this new irrigation in Mysore it has been shown that the value of the return to be obtained will be increased threefold. It is not suggested that similar ratios of improvement can be effected all over India, but in the one direction of increasing the fertility of the soil by the application of suitable fertilizers there is room for a very great advance. It would be interesting to learn in detail what measures have been taken or are contemplated to assist the ryots of Scinde to obtain the best possible returns from the vast extension of irrigation which is possible under the new canals. The provision of canal colonies or the encouragement of new settlers is one way to speed up cultivation, but it ultimately leads to an increasing pressure on the means of subsistence and not to a rise in the standard of living. It is the application of capital to the land rather than the creation of a dense population that should be the object in view.

The revenue of the Mysore State for the year under review in Sir Mirza Ismail’s address was 338 lakhs and the expenditure 356 lakhs, against what may be taken as a normal balance of revenue and expenditure at 375 lakhs. On items contributing to “moral and material development,” as given in the statement of accounts, there was a net expenditure of 59 lakhs, or one-sixth of the total. Of this 45¼ lakhs was spent on education, 10 lakhs on agriculture, 13½ lakhs on industries, and 1½ lakhs on co-operative credit. No comparison with similar figures for the more advanced provinces of British India, such, for instance, as the Madras Presidency, its nearest neighbour, would serve any useful purpose. The figures themselves are sufficient evidence of an enlightened administration. Public opinion is altogether in favour of a big expenditure on education, but it may be questioned if the results are altogether satisfactory. The system of education suffers from the defects common to all India—it is inefficient in the primary field, ill adapted to the conditions of Indian life in the middle stages, and in the higher branches produces too many men inadequately equipped for the strenuous competition which they have subsequently to face. Naturally the demand is, in Mysore as elsewhere, for the employment of its own people to carry on the affairs of the State, and these are now of such a varied and complex character as to call for the service of men of broader outlook than can normally be trained in a local university, very poorly endowed in respect to staff and equipment when compared with similar institutions in the West. The results of foreign training emphasize this in a conspicuous way and suggest that expenditure on sending selected students abroad yields better results than can be obtained at home. The disadvantages attend-
ing such a course are very obvious, but it is quality in the final product rather than volume that is essential. In many branches of education Indian resources are adequate and an excellent training could be given provided the numbers to be trained were restricted, but as it is the classes are overcrowded and the general result poor. Education is only a blessing to those who receive it if they can make use of the trained mental and moral faculties resulting therefrom. Unfortunately in India there is not scope in the modern activities of the country for utilizing the products of Western education, and many thousands who might have led a happy life in rural contentment are doomed to experience the miseries of ungratified aspirations in the drudgery and squalor of towns and cities. Obviously, therefore, there should be some attempt to adjust expenditure on education and on the promotion of material progress, so that there is a rough kind of equilibrium between the supply and demand for specialized service. Looked at in this light, it would seem that there might be some adjustment in the ratio of expenditure on the various items which are grouped together under this heading of the Mysore budget.

It would be possible further to illustrate the character of a purely Indian administration by reference to other matters dealt with in the Dewan’s address, but it is hoped that sufficient evidence has been furnished to allay any doubts that may exist as to the wisdom of granting to the provinces of India such a measure of internal autonomy as has now been enjoyed by Mysore for the last fifty-one years. Favoured by nature as it is in many respects, the record of progress over the last half-century is one of which its rulers may well be proud.
THE INDIAN FEDERATION AND THE FEUDATORY STATES UNDER INDIAN PRINCES

[This contribution is by a progressive and experienced feudatory ruler who has paid special attention to the subject upon which he writes.]

The third Round-Table Conference has once more directed attention to the question of the future constitution of India. In the light of the discussions at the two previous Round-Table Conferences it may now be fairly assumed that the future constitution of India will be a federation comprising British India and Indian India, that there will be some form of responsibility at the centre with certain necessary and essential safeguards, and that full autonomy in the Provinces will be established. To those who have closely followed the discussions at the last two Sessions of the Round-Table Conference, it must have been clear that no question has assumed greater importance than the question of safeguards for minorities and vested interests. Although a very complicated problem, it is on a satisfactory solution of this that the safety of the future Indian constitution depends. Fully realizing the importance of this question, the British Indian statesmen have been devoting much attention to this matter and are trying their utmost to arrive at an agreed solution. The British Cabinet also had to interest themselves in this question of the minorities, and they have given their award regarding the communal representation in the Provinces, which has met with general approval, except in so far as the representation of the depressed classes was concerned. It is to be hoped that the questions as regard other essential safeguards and representation of the minorities at the centre will also be amicably solved and a settlement satisfactory to all be reached.

While so much attention and thought are being devoted to these important problems, the question of certain classes who are not as vocal as others is apt to be overlooked. I refer to the Feudatory States under Indian Princes and to the landholding classes such as Sardars, Inamdars in the Bombay Presidency, and Zamindars in Bengal and other Provinces who own large estates guaranteed by the British Government. The Feudatory Chiefs also exercise varying powers of jurisdiction in their territories. Both these classes, representing ancient historic houses, wield no small influence in the country. Belonging to British India, the
landholding classes have some representation both in the provincial and central legislatures, though it is inadequate in proportion to their interests and influence in the country. But the position of the Feudatory Chiefs under the Princes is still less favourable. They are too scattered and divided to form their own organization. The Princes are represented by the Chamber of Princes and are quite capable of protecting their interests. But the position of the feudatories is somewhat peculiar. Being subordinate to the Indian States, the Feudatory Chiefs are not classed as Princes nor have they any voice in British India, as they count as being under the States. While the Princes and every other class and interest in British India have been represented at the Round-Table Conference, the Feudatory Chiefs under the Princes have no representation.

These Feudatory States, which form an important group of small States by themselves, are not quite a negligible factor. Under most of the large Indian States there is a large body of small Feudatory Chiefs, exercising varying jurisdiction. Under the Gwalior Darbar there is a number of these Chiefships, most of which are guaranteed by the British Government. Similarly there are mediatised feudatories under Kashmir, Jaipur, Indore, Cutch, Kolhapur, and many other States.

It is unnecessary to describe in detail here how all these States came into being. But it is important to mention that when the East India Company came into closer relationship with Indian States they found a large number of Chiefs who exercised jurisdictional rights in their own domains, while at the same time they owed a sort of precarious allegiance to some powerful neighbouring Prince. These Chiefs sought the protection of the British Government, who, acting as mediators between them and their suzerains guaranteed their rights, privileges, and possessions, and secured their formal allegiance to their suzerains. No fixed principle was, however, followed in effecting these settlements. In Kathiawar most of the States were subordinate to the Gaekwar of Baroda. But all these States were made independent of Baroda subject only to the payment of tributes. On the other hand, most of the smaller States in Central India and elsewhere were placed under their respective suzerains with a British guarantee for continuance of their rights and possessions. Thus the settlements were largely influenced by the exigencies of the moment and were the result of historical circumstances. The status and position of most of these States were originally practically the same, but by the settlement some States were brought directly under the control of the British Government, while others continued under their suzerains protected by guarantees from the paramount power.
Similarly some of the lapsed States such as Satara and Nagpur had guaranteed feudatories under them, which, after the lapse of the suzerain States, came under British control. Though the powers of the feudatories of the lapsed States and of the feudatories under other States were originally the same, the powers of the former have been enlarged since they came into direct relations with the British Government, while the powers of the latter that are under their suzerains have been considerably reduced.

The above arrangements worked satisfactorily for all parties, so long as it was the policy of the British Government to enforce strictly the terms and conditions of the guarantee and to protect the smaller States against any encroachment by their suzerains. The policy of the British Government was to maintain intact the rights and privileges of both the suzerain States and the feudatories. No deviation from the guarantees thus given was allowed. But during the past few years there has been a change in the policy of the British Government towards the Princes, which has, I think, been prejudicial to the rights and privileges of the feudatories, and their very existence as separate entities seems to be jeopardized. In recognition of the valuable services rendered by the Princes, the Government have enhanced their powers, prestige, and position. The establishment of the Chamber of Princes has also increased their status. In short, the Government have adopted a policy of trust and generosity towards the Princes, and they are allowed as large a measure of independence in their internal affairs as possible. Most of the States have been transferred from the control of provincial administrations to the direct control of the Government of India. The supervisory powers, which the British Government used to exercise over the guaranteed feudatories, are also being gradually relaxed; and the feudatories are being handed over to the control of their suzerains. A few years ago, at the request of the Gwalior Darbar, the supervisory control over their feudatories which was exercised by the British Government, was transferred to the Darbar. Following upon this, the Kolhapur Darbar also asked for the transfer of supervisory powers to themselves over their feudatories, which have been hitherto exercised by the British Government through the Resident. The transfer was carried out in spite of very strong and unanimous protests of the feudatories. It is true that in transferring the control, Government have declared that the guarantees are not affected by the change. While the feudatories that were freed from the control of their suzerains by the original settlement have their powers enlarged—some of them have become even members of the Chamber of Princes—those that were continued under their suzerains have come in for a curtailment of their
powers, and the transfer of control is tantamount to a virtual
cancellation of the guarantee, though it is continued in form.
Once the direct control of the paramount power is withdrawn,
the suzerain States can feel that they may deal with their
feudatories as they like. Naturally the feudatories would
resent this, but there is little hope of redress being obtained at
the hands of the paramount power, because of the policy of
non-interference, and also the question of prestige of the Darbars
comes in.

One may ask why there should be disputes and quarrels and
consequent ill-feeling between the suzerain States and their sub-
Chiefs. It would really be a happy day for both the Princes and
their feudatories if all their disputes were amicably settled and they
lived in peace, harmony, and goodwill. But the real cause of the
trouble is that there is a conflict of interest between the Princes
and their subordinate States. Again, in some cases, there are age-
old family feuds and quarrels between the suzerain States and
their subordinates, and, like the Hindu-Moslem differences,
these quarrels have unfortunately continued even to the present
day.

In the interests of justice and fair play, it is important that there
should be some third party to act as arbitrator in the settlement
of these disputes. Until now the British Government acted as
arbitrators by holding both the parties fast to their engagements.
But now they are withdrawing from this position and handing
the supervisory control over the feudatories to their suzerain
States. Instead of improving their relations, this may tend only
to aggravate the situation. A really satisfactory solution of this
problem would be the establishment of a Court of Arbitration
for adjudication of disputes between the suzerain States and
their feudatories. Such a tribunal would inspire confidence in
both the parties, and its decisions would be more acceptable
to both.

Theoretically it does not matter whether the supervision is
exercised by the British Government or the Indian States over
the Feudatory States. But it does matter much in practice, for
the British Government's supervision is apt to be more liberal
and impartial than that of Indian States, and this is the reason
for the preference which the Indians have for British administra-
tion. It is well known that frequently when a question of exchange
of territory between British India and the States is discussed, or
retrocession of territory to Indian States is under consideration,
the British Indian subjects are opposed to such a transfer.

It is sometimes said on behalf of the Princes that the feudatories
are not as loyal and obedient to their suzerains as they should be.
But this is not quite true. They are most loyal and devoted both
to their suzerains and to the British Government. But any honest attempt on the part of the feudatories to safeguard their interests and rights against encroachment by the suzerain States is considered as a sign of insubordination and disloyalty. This is really a very unfortunate position in which the feudatories find themselves. That there is estrangement between the feudatories and their suzerains none can deny. But that appears to be very largely due to the fact that the Princes do not treat their feudatories with the same spirit of trust and generosity that characterizes the treatment which they receive at the hands of the paramount power. How unfairly and unjustly the feudatories are sometimes treated by their suzerains can be illustrated by examples. But I do not wish to enter into all these details here owing to limitations of space.

While the policy of the British Government towards the Princes is one of non-interference in the internal administration, the suzerain States try to exercise as minute a control in the administrations of the feudatories as possible. Consequently the condition of some feudatories is really deplorable. Only those who have some actual experience of such administrations can realize how intolerable their situation can be. The British public is unfamiliar with the subject dealt with here. Even in India it is not all who know the full significance and bearing of this question. It is only the officials in the Political Department who can realize the importance of this problem and appreciate the difficulties in the way of the feudatories. Most of their time, energy, and limited resources are spent in defending their rights and privileges against the encroachment of the suzerain States, and they can hardly pay any attention to the improvements in the administration.

The British Government have pledged their word to the mediatized feudatories to maintain their rights and privileges intact. The guarantees given to them should not be lightly treated. The British Government have declared that the treaty rights of the Princes are inviolate and inviolable and that they will be scrupulously observed. The pledges given to the feudatories are in some cases expressed in the treaties and in others they are embodied in separate documents. All the same, the British Government is pledged to maintain the rights of the feudatories. If the rights of the Princes are inviolate and inviolable, one fails to understand why the pledges given to the feudatories should not be regarded as equally binding and sacred.

The interests of another class—namely, the landholding class—require to be equally safeguarded. They hold land on fixed and permanent tenures, and sanads have been issued to them by the British Government that their grants will be continued to them unimpaired and from generation to generation. In the new
democracy that will come into force in India, there is danger of these big incomes which these landholders enjoy being taxed. In Bombay there was a bill for imposing succession duties on all incomes, not excluding these landed incomes. The British Government have guaranteed the undisturbed possession of their holdings in perpetuity at a fixed quit rent, and any attempt to impose fresh taxation on these holdings would be contrary to the promises given by the British Government and a violation in spirit, though not in form, of the terms of the grants.

The British Government have shown much anxiety and solicitude for the treaty rights of the Princes, whose views have been invited as to how their rights and privileges can be safeguarded in the future federal constitution of India. Just as some of the Princes hold their States under sanads (grants) and engagements, so also the Sardars, Inamdars, and Zamindars have their estates guaranteed by engagements and sanads issued by the British Government. So far as the Princes are concerned, no distinction is being made between the treaty holders and those who hold under engagements and sanads. The British Government have declared that the rights and privileges of the Princes will be adequately safeguarded in the future federal constitution of India. But what about the landholders? Do they not want their guaranteed rights and privileges to be equally protected? They have no representation at the Round-Table Conference, nor has any provision been made to safeguard their interests. Why should any discrimination be shown between the landed aristocracy who have their rights guaranteed by sanads and the Princes who also are sanad holders? If at all, it is the landed aristocracy that requires the British Government's sympathy and support, as they are entirely dependent on the British Government for the preservation of their rights and privileges.

The rights of the Feudatory States under Indian Princes, and those of the landholding class referred to in the preceding paragraph, are historic and fundamental rights, and the British Government ought to show the same solicitude for their rights as they have shown for the rights of the minorities and other interests. The Feudatory Chiefs and the landholders wield great influence in the country. They have a great stake in the land. Their loyalty and devotion to the Crown are unquestionable. It is necessary therefore that, in the future federal constitution that will soon be framed, these fundamental and historic rights should be adequately safeguarded by statutory provision, thus securing them permanently against any possibility of encroachments. The Feudatory Chiefs and the landholding class are apprehensive that in the future constitution their rights and privileges may not be safe unless they are safeguarded by the statute creating the new
constitution. And in order to make the safeguards more effective, the feudatories should be given adequate representation in the Chamber of Princes and the federal legislature in proportion to their extent and influence, thus providing a constitutional platform for a free expression of their views. The representation of the landed interests in the country should also be increased both in the Provinces and in the central legislatures.
PENSIONED WIDOWS OF INDIAN SOLDIERS
AND THE VOTE

BY MRS. G. H. BELL, O.B.E.

(When in India with her late husband, Lieut.-Colonel G. H. Bell, the
author made a special study of the problems and outlook of the women
of the martial classes. She is well known as a novelist under the pen-
name of "John Travers.")

SHOULD the pensioned widows of Indian soldiers be enfranchised? It
may be assumed that many people with Indian experience
would reply "No." The nature of their objection is not so easy
to guess. There may be some who would refuse votes to all
Indians, and others who would re-open the whole question of
Votes for Women throughout the world, but to consult such a
mentality in 1933 is to try to tell the time by a clock that has
stopped. Those with more imagination and a greater sense of the
realities of the situation might object to enfranchising these par-
ticular women on the grounds that the majority claim to be
"purdah," that they are for the most part illiterate, and that they
are a small community. Their claim to be given a vote can only
be appreciated if the whole projected scheme for Indian women’s
franchise is reviewed.

Women were first enfranchised when the provincial electorate
rules were finally approved by Parliament in 1920. For men and
women alike the qualification for the vote was a property one,
and as only an infinitesimal number of Indian women own
property in their own right the women’s electorate was less than
one-twentieth of the men’s. That being so the Franchise Sub-
Committee of the Round-Table Conference stated that they felt
"special qualifications should be prescribed for women." The
Statutory Commission had, indeed, made definite suggestions to
that end and proposed that, in addition to the existing qualifica-
tion of property ownership, the wife (over 25 years of age) of a
man with the property qualification to vote should be enfranchised.
As regards an educational qualification for men, the Commission
recommended that it should also apply to women over 21 years
of age. Representatives of women’s organizations demanded a
theoretic equality as between men and women; but in existing
conditions few women are educated to the standard of men in
India and, as has been said, few own property themselves. This
theory in practice was held by the Indian Franchise Committee to mean "extreme inequality" under a restricted franchise, and the Committee had rejected adult suffrage after giving it consideration. All interested and informed opinion, whether of delegates to the Round-Table Conference, or members of the Statutory Commission and the Franchise Committee, representatives of women's organizations or individual witnesses, called for a substantial increase in the ratio of women to men voters, and the Prime Minister stated that "His Majesty's Government attach special importance to the question of securing a more adequate enfranchisement of women." The Indian Franchise Committee reached the conclusion that the size of the women's electorate must be sufficiently large "to compel candidates to consider their interests and opinions, to awaken political interest among women, and to make their votes an effective lever, particularly in providing reforms of special concern to women and children." The position, then, is that there is a considered and authoritative view that the woman's vote in India is a desirable part of the electorate, that it is necessary for the welfare of the female population, and is for the children's good, and that the need to bring women in influential numbers to the poll outweighs other considerations.

While they are to possess the vote under the same qualifications as men with regard to property and education, the latter qualification is merged in a special qualification, for it is proposed by the Indian Franchise Committee that a woman shall be enfranchised on a mere "literacy" qualification. That is defined in the census as ability to read and write a letter in any language. She will be required to satisfy the officer in charge of the roll that she is equal to that test. The second special qualification proposed for women is that the wife of a man entitled to vote through the "property qualification" (which varies in different provinces but is low in all) shall be enfranchised. As regards age, women with the prescribed qualifications will be entitled to vote if 21 years old.

In that multitude of women who can just read and write, and that greater multitude of wives still quite illiterate and accustomed in thousands of cases to the seclusion of the "purdah," one can picture an electorate that will have to go through a strange mental process and many nervous throes before it reaches the polls. The Government of the United Provinces indicated that they believed that 80 per cent. of the women electorate would not go to the polls. Not yet, perhaps. The Chief Commissioner of the N.W. Frontier Province observed that, "Female suffrage is probably so unthinkable in public opinion as to be outside the scope of practical politics." But the Indian Franchise Committee noted that "there is considerable public opinion that the province ought not to be lagging behind the Punjab and the rest of India
in this and other matters," so perhaps the youngest of the Governor's Provinces may study appearances forthwith and enfranchise its ladies!

It will be seen, then, that women are to vote when educated as are men, but the woman's education enfranchises her when she knows less than the man. And women are to vote when the man they marry owns property, though the woman's relation to the property is actually less real than the man's. If the man dies his widow is to retain her vote unless she re-maries, when she loses it in respect to her first husband. It was hoped that this might raise the status of widowhood. But it is of other widows that this article deals, and, the whole situation having been now briefly reviewed, their special claim can be clearly understood when the enfranchisement of ex-regular Indian soldiers is considered.

The Franchise Committee of 1919 recommended the enfranchisement of all retired and pensioned officers of the Indian Army, and also all non-commissioned officers. The House of Commons on an amendment, which was accepted by the Government, enfranchised for provincial legislatures all retired, pensioned and discharged officers, non-commissioned officers or soldiers of His Majesty's regular forces. A provision to this effect was included in the provincial rules when Parliament finally approved them. The Indian Franchise Committee's report says that all local governments and committees agreed to the retention of this qualification, and that the representative of the Army Department who gave evidence expressed the opinion that the withdrawal of the existing military service qualification for the provincial legislatures would be likely to give rise to resentment in the army. The Indian Franchise Committee recommend its retention and its extension to the Federal Assembly. Yet it is an electorate of fluctuating and diminishing numbers, and the ex-service men of 1920 were often illiterate. In Bengal they only muster 618, and in Assam (in the Shillong urban constituency) but 325, and in Sind 1,000. But in the Punjab they are 190,000 strong.

Had the men who fell in the war lived to become ex-service men, they must, under the military service qualification, have possessed the vote. But there was a moment in that service that proved fatal. They died. And thus they passed into the unique category of The Fallen. In all highly organized countries a special responsibility to their dependents is recognized. There is, for instance, the pension system. And in India the pensioned widows and mothers of soldiers form, with a few widows of policemen, the only body of pensioned women in existence. The Indian soldier whose death is attributable to his service may nominate for a pension his father, or mother, or son, or daughter,
or widow. His nominee becomes the recipient of the family pension which carries with it a recognized responsibility to the family. Where the soldier nominated his widow he did all that it lay in his power to do to put her into the position of his representative. Is she to have no vote?

In the introduction to the Indian Franchise Committee's report it is admitted that "under all democratic systems it is the interests of those who are represented which tend to receive consideration, while the interests of those who are not represented are liable to be ignored, both at election time and afterwards." What, then, is the position of the pensioned widows of Indian soldiers in relation to the political power now organizing itself among men and women, and being distributed to women just able to read and write in the vernacular, and to women who are the wives of men with a little holding? Their position is that they are "liable to be ignored." And in ignoring them we ignore all that their pension indicates to us of their special claim to representation.

The pensioned widow is "aware," as few women in an Indian village are aware, of the existence of a frontier, of service "overseas," of foreign powers, of what a dire thing war is, of a discipline that is not merely domestic discipline and indicates a wider "law and order" across the threshold. She comes out of her seclusion several times a year to the post office to draw her pension. She has some experience of official regulations and communications. The integrity of postal officials touches her nearly. She hears of hospitals in cantonments, and she may have been to distant cantonments and brought a traveller's mind to her village. She is not a whit inferior in any respect, if she be of the Punjab, to the 450,000 women who may hereafter, if they will, go to the polls in that sturdy Province. Is the pensioned Subadari not worthy of being part of such an electorate? Will history record against British and Indian statesmen that, in building a new Constitution for India, over six million women were enfranchised, but the pensioned widows of Indian soldiers were forgotten or, if remembered, ignored?
WARREN HASTINGS BI-CENTENARY: AN APPRECIATION OF THE MAN'S CHARACTER

BY PROFESSOR H. H. DODWELL

Hastings was a man of singularly gentle manners; he never allowed the bitternesses of public life to obtrude upon his hours of privacy. Fanny Burney was deeply impressed by the gentle gaiety of his manners, and indeed could not understand how the tyranny of Burke could attack this gentle, pleasing exterior. Cooper, his schoolfellow, remembered him as "humane, conversable, and mild." In the time of Clive, when he was resident with the Nawab, he was required to be more vigorous in his allocations, to put more "Goddams" into his conversations with the unfortunate Princes—that is to say, he was not a man disposed to override those with whom he came in contact. He was a man born to persuade others to his will rather than to beat them down. Every Indian Prince he met welcomed and loved him; he was able to converse with them directly without the interposition of an interpreter, from the feeble Nawab of Arcot up to that vigorous and enterprising Nawab of Oudh, whom he helped to overthrow in the Rohilla War. He cherished the hope that one day he would be able to bring all the Princes of India into alliance with King George III.; so far was he from cherishing any ambition that he would overthrow them by force.

In the second place, he had the most even-tempered courage. In 1782, when Benares bursts into revolt against him, he prepares his movements, and makes his arrangements as coolly and unconcernedly as if he had been sitting within the garrison at Fort William. A couple of years earlier had occurred the duel with Francis. Although deeming Francis' conduct to be devoid of truth and honour, Hastings had decided to wait, but when Francis had first of all raised and dropped his pistol once, Hastings says: "I wished that I might seriously take aim at him. I did so, and when I thought I had fixed a true direction, I fired." Hastings fired; Francis fell because Hastings' nerves were as steady as his will. His manners were difficult to resist, and his charm was reinforced by a deep sincerity. He was a faithful friend. His love

* Extracts from an address delivered before the Royal Empire Society on December 6, 1932.
for his respectable Marian—a lady whom I regard as thoroughly unworthy of him—was deep, tender, and lasting; with this constancy of affection went a corresponding quality of consistency of dislike and obduracy which was the principal defect of his character. He could not easily forgive. After all, he demanded of other men the same constancy of conduct which he always sought himself, and when he did not find it he was apt to be a strong, and sometimes even bitter, critic. He cared very little for money. He was the only member of the Council who passed through those troublous years of 1761-63 without a shadow of reproach. He was generous to extravagance; he was zealous to promote learning, was one of the founders of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and he established the first British College in India.

At the service of this amiable character was a mind that has, I think, seldom been rivalled. Never was a statesman endowed with more resource. Put him in a difficulty and he will find a dozen ways out of it, and try them one by one until he finds that which succeeds. Deprive him of an ally and he will make a score of others. Prejudice the Ministry against him, bribe the Court of Directors until they wish to recall him, and he will still hold his own. Direct against him the strongest possible league of Indian Princes and add French help to them, and he will dissolve the league and hold back, defeating all his enemies. Think of him from the point of view of Philip Francis; watch him for years; record in your mind and your notebooks every act of his which looks in the least degree reprehensible; place the worst construction upon them all; go home and persuade one great party and half persuade the other that your version is true. Get him summoned before the House of Commons as a criminal; get him impeached before the House of Lords; direct the evidence, drag out the trial for seven long years, and see your enemy emerge triumphant at the end; see him return years afterwards to give evidence before the House of Commons, and the House of Commons rising and uncovering. Such a man, invested with power, would have done great things for India; he sought two objects in especial—one to establish the Company in full control of the administration; the other to change traditional methods, slowly, cautiously, gradually. He viewed himself as an Indian ruler; left alone he would surely have devised a system of government definitely Indian in character, without that ruthless exclusion of Indians from all high office which marked the system of Cornwallis. First of all he was saddled by the Regulating Act with a hostile majority, and then, when his career in India was almost finished, the British Government substituted for his policy that of framing the administration as nearly as possible on the
English model. Indeed, his theory of Indian Government shocked his contemporaries; nothing more angered Burke than his assumption that he was to act in all things as an Indian ruler according to Indian customs and Indian prejudices, and that he claimed to exercise despotic power as a right.

In two ways in particular Hastings should be remembered by us to-day. He was charged with administering British India in circumstances of extraordinary difficulty—difficulties greater than beset any other Governor-General. After two years of quiet, in which he had managed affairs with great success, introducing reforms into the Bengal administration until the discontented murmured that in a few years India would not be worth visiting, he was suddenly made Governor under the Regulating Act, and the Act was unworkable. It divided power in India to such an extent that even when the Ministry was bent on recalling Hastings, it could not carry out its wishes. Hastings was left without control, guidance, or support to carry on as best he could, and in India he was apparently Head of the Government, but a Head without authority. He was constantly thwarted by his Council, but he and his Council were constantly thwarted by the Supreme Court in Bengal and by the Governors of the two other Presidencies, and in these circumstances he was called upon to face the greatest gathering of enemies the Company had ever known. Yet, in defiance of these difficulties, and out of these difficulties, Hastings saved the Company’s possessions, and that was a tremendous achievement. He never lost courage when all men’s hearts were failing them for fear. When Francis was writing daily minutes declaring that the only salvation of the Company lay in an instant peace, and when a little later he was threatened once again with a new hostile majority in his Council, he remained cool, resourceful, commanding. “If you want peace,” he said to one of these faint hearts, “you must seek it in the terrors of a continued war and in the incitement of a greater advantage to be derived from its conclusion. If you expect to obtain it by concessions and entreaty, you will be disappointed,” and so he hurled his forces again and again into hostile territory, until they were convinced that peace was more worth while than war, and peace accordingly was secured. But all the time, in order to carry the Council with him—and without his Council he was hopeless—he had to buy the assistance of his colleagues. At the first stage his colleagues were utterly unmanageable; they desired to wrest from him the chief office, and consequently he was powerless. Later on his colleagues became more amenable, and then he had to buy them. He pacified one with a contract and another with promotion for a nephew, and hence arose many of the matters over which Hastings was called in question. He had, in fact, a choice between
securing the interests of his country and condescending to acts unworthy of him. Of course, he never hesitated, no more than the elder Pitt ever hesitated to accept the bought majority which the Duke of Newcastle maintained for him in the House of Commons. The cases were precisely parallel, excepting that Hastings, unlike Pitt, had to do his dirty work for himself. The same course, too, led him into dubious financial expediencies. Wars cannot be maintained without money. With Madras and Bombay clamouring for funds, troops fell deep into arrears; there was no possibility of securing loans; money had to be taken where it could be obtained. To all these expedients, let us remember, he was driven by being required to work an unworkable system, in which he had the responsibility without the reality of power. With the authority with which Cornwallis was entrusted, Hastings would have made a very different showing, and his administration is therefore great and lasting warning against the dangers of ill-considered legislation applied to a remote dependency.

And in another way he deserves our attention as a great example. He achieved his work only by means of an intense and glowing faith—faith in himself, in his purpose, in his policy; for, like the elder Pitt, again, he believed, and with truth, that he alone could save the Empire, and no one else could. He regarded himself as under the immediate protection of Providence. "My enemies," he says, "sickened, died, and fled." That alone carried him through the fierce vexation of the trouble with Francis. He indeed possessed not only a strong faith in his own mental powers, but also a complete faith in his moral rectitude. He met the histrionic eloquence of Sheridan and the massive attacks of Burke with the same icy, burning scorn, claiming as his just reward not accusations but gratitude, not abuse but praise. Nothing could shake him. Such fortitude is, indeed, reserved for only the greatest of men. Common men achieve little, partly because they quickly tire, partly because they are easily cast down, partly because they have not the singleness of mind to pursue a great object; and so we must proudly regard Hastings as perhaps the greatest man of his century, as certainly the greatest and most ill-used man who was ever sent to govern British India.

Lord Lothian: I am sure that I am expressing your views when I say to Professor Dodwell how much we appreciate the penetrating and brilliant address to which we have just listened. Some of you, no doubt, were present this afternoon at the very remarkable gathering which took place in the Hall of Westminster School, the school in which Warren Hastings, whose life you have just heard described, was trained for the work which he
afterwards undertook. We heard there some very remarkable tributes to his work; we have heard another tribute to-night—a tribute not less remarkable; and it is in these days a fine thing that we can look back and view in all the perspective of history the work, the character, and the aims of the man who really laid the foundations for the modern government of India. For I venture to think that Warren Hastings was not only a great figure in the history of India and of the British Empire, but in the history of the world. He was not merely concerned with extending the British Empire; he was a past master in the greatest of all arts—the art of governing men. I do not believe—though I do not profess to have any intimate knowledge of his life—that he went to India with any preconceived ideas as to what he was going to do. Trained as he was, with his character, he reacted or responded to the circumstances in which he found himself, and he laid the traditions of perhaps the greatest system of government the world has seen since the Roman Empire.

There is a saying of Bacon's I have been trying to look up which goes very far in considering these matters. "Rome," says Bacon, "did not spread upon the world; it was the world that spread upon Rome." That, I think, is the most penetrating analysis of the real foundation of the British Empire, or, as it is now called, the British Commonwealth of Nations, that has ever been made. It has been made; it will exist just as long as it responds to the real needs of the people which are within its borders.

As I read Warren Hastings, his greatness was that with his training, with, if you like, the commonsense British character which he represented, he did respond to the real necessities of the world in which he found himself, and he gave it order, peace, justice, and sound administration, and that is the problem with which we are confronted to-day in very different circumstances from those which confronted Warren Hastings.

I would very much like to know what Warren Hastings, if he came back to-day, would say about three novel features which did not concern him or any of the great Viceroyds and rulers of India in the last century, but which do concern us to-day. In the first place, 100,000 Indians in Indian Universities—twice as many as there are Britons in British Universities, every one of them being turned out a young and ardent Nationalist. Secondly, a Press. We know something of the power of the Press in this country, but a Press which is already powerful in India and strengthened every day, which in one form or another reaches now almost every village, and which, except for two great newspapers and perhaps a third, is wholly in Indian hands and connected to the Nationalist party. Thirdly, an electoral system begun, not yester-
day, but in the last century, developed in 1908, developed again in 1920, in which the whole legislative machinery except for a somewhat silent official block is in the hands of elected Indians, from Municipal Councils to the Assembly in Delhi or Simla. I would very much like to know what Warren Hastings would say about the art of governing men and women in India under these conditions.
THE "PIONEER'S" CELEBRATION BANQUET

EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECHES

A notable occasion in the history of Empire journalism was celebrated at the Savoy Hotel on December 2nd, when the Pioneer held a banquet to mark a new epoch in its existence.

Mr. Srivastava's Message

The Chairman, Nawab Liaquat Hyat Khan, read the following cable from the Hon. Mr. J. P. Srivastava:

"The Pioneer extends friendliest greetings to Sir Samuel Hoare and other guests, and trusts it may be instrumental in strengthening the ties which bind Great Britain to India. Those behind the paper have full faith in the British connection, and propose working unceasingly to bring about a better understanding between the two countries. They are opposed to discrimination in trade and commerce, and appeal for reciprocity from His Majesty's Government and their fellow subjects in Great Britain."

The message was greeted with a hearty round of applause.

It is interesting to recall that Sir Malcolm Hailey, in his message to the Pioneer, said: "There were very many of us who were relieved when we heard that a new directorate under the Hon. Mr. J. P. Srivastava had been formed to take over the Pioneer and to conduct it as a journal representing what I may best sum up as moderate and conservative Indian interests. I wish it a long and prosperous career in the service of the interests which it will represent, and I hope that these interests will in their turn give it all necessary support."

The Chairman's Speech

The Chairman, in the course of his speech, said:

"You would, perhaps, expect me to say something about the occasion of this function. To most of you gathered here the Pioneer is a familiar name as one of the most important and representative newspapers in India. The long tradition of that newspaper in the cause of friendly co-operation between Indians and Englishmen has given it a special position in India, and in the recent reorganization of the paper we have tried to broaden the basis of that co-operation and to establish it definitely as an organ of Indo-British association in political and
economic life. My idea of the future of India is that of a composite nationality in which there will be a place not merely for Hindus and Muslims and the other communities but also for Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and I hold definitely that in the working out of that future all communities should be closely united on the basis of common economic and political interests. It is this idea which is at the bottom of the organization of the new Pioneer. My friend, Mr. Panikkar, who is more closely connected with the paper, will no doubt say something about this later.

"There is one point, however, which I would like to emphasize. The Indian States have no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of British India. But recent developments have shown that public opinion in British India is a matter of vital concern to the States, especially as their policy and action are often misunderstood and sometimes purposely misrepresented. The great danger arising out of this tendency has recently become obvious in certain cases which would be present to the minds of most of you.

"It has thus become necessary for the States to safeguard themselves effectively by shaping public opinion, not merely by giving legitimate publicity to their policies, but by resisting the subversive propaganda often carried on against them. Co-operation with all responsible elements in British India has, therefore, been the accepted policy of the States for some time, and our interest in the Pioneer, limited though it be, is only for the specific purpose of creating goodwill and friendly feeling on which alone can we safely build the future of India.

"Gentlemen, I consider that your presence in this gathering is an expression of your goodwill towards the Pioneer and towards all attempts now being made to bring the different communities and races of India together in a spirit of friendly co-operation for the future of our great country.

"Gentlemen—Our guests, with whom I desire to associate the name of Mr. Butler."

MR. R. A. BUTLER'S SPEECH

Mr. R. A. Butler, Under-Secretary of State for India, who was accorded an enthusiastic reception, said: "I have come here as an M.P. so often does, in a representative capacity to take the place of the Secretary of State for India, who has been unavoidably prevented by reasons of State from accepting your kind invitation. He has asked me to pay, on his behalf, a tribute to the initiative and foresight of those great interests who have come together as the new board of directors of the Pioneer—princes, landowners, and commercial interests—to inaugurate a period of
prosperity and importance for the paper which he hopes will rival its great days in the past.

"I have the pleasure of the personal acquaintanceship of Mr. Srivastava, Minister of Education in the United Provinces, who is to be the chairman of the directors, having stayed with him as his guest, and I feel sure that there could be no better presiding genius over the start of this journal in its new hands."

Referring to Mr. Srivastava's cable, Mr. Butler said it might be divided into three parts:

1. Friendly greetings to Sir Samuel Hoare and other guests.
2. Desire to strengthen the ties which bind Great Britain to India and expression of faith in the British connection.
3. Promise to work unceasingly to bring about better understanding between the two countries.

"On behalf of His Majesty's Government," he added, "I welcome that message, and give the assurance of the heartiest expression of our goodwill."

Continuing, Mr. Butler said it was most important at the present time that the people of India should be well informed. The directors of the Pioneer were to be congratulated upon their remarkable success in having secured the united support of the Princes, the landowners, and the commercial interests of India, all of whom must be vitally affected by the new order of things. The new enterprise was a happy instance of the union of British and Indian capital and British and Indian brains, and he earnestly hoped that the Pioneer might be entering upon a long and prosperous era.

**Mr. Wickham Steed's Speech**

Mr. Wickham Steed, in proposing the toast of "The Press of India," was fain to confess that his sole qualification for the task was "comprehensive ignorance." Nor, never having visited that country, could he claim much knowledge of India, even though he had read the Simon Report. Much of what he knew of India he had learned from Sir William Hunter and Lovat Fraser—and more still by picking the brains of F. H. Brown. Despite that smattering of information, however, as an insular Englishman, his outlook on Indian affairs could hardly be regarded seriously.

Proceeding, Mr. Wickham Steed recalled his interview with Mahatma Gandhi last year, and mentioned that he had the audacity on that occasion to advance the theory that if the Muslims were indeed a backward community the Hindus could well afford to give them all they asked, for the sake of the unity of India. Did Mr. Gandhi agree? But he had not succeeded in obtaining
a clear statement on the subject from the Mahatma, who replied: "I must seek my inner light." He believed, however, that Mr. Gandhi’s last fast had given to the British a deeper understanding of the Mahatma’s mind than Indians imagined.

In an earnest appeal for the strengthening of the connection between Britain and India, Mr. Wickham Steed dwelt upon the spiritual factor, and urged Indians to stick to the ideals which they knew to be true. He felt sure that India would play a noble part in the history of the Empire, and that a well-informed Press would be one of the chief pillars of that better future which lay before us all.

**Sir Alfred Watson’s Speech**

Sir Alfred Watson, in the course of his remarks, pointed out that with the advent of the new Constitution Indian journalism entered upon a new era. The difficulty of the task by which the authorities were confronted consisted, not so much of framing a Constitution for India, as of finding men willing and able to work it. It would be essential for the political leaders to gather behind them a body of Indian opinion which would have the support of a strong Press covering the greater part of the country.

"The main tradition of the Press in India," continued Sir Alfred Watson, "is that of opposition to the Government, and this applies both to the Indian-owned Press and to the European-owned Press. Indeed, I can recall only one exception to this rule, and that is the case of the *Pioneer* in the early days of its existence. Now, India is about to enter upon a period of measured self-government which will necessarily entail new conditions for the Press. I am no believer in a Government-owned Press: such a Press is usually bad and untrue, and must inevitably be under suspicion. Yet the great experiment in India is doomed to failure unless the Government find means of explaining and justifying their policy to the people who have the power to make Governments. There need be no difficulty about this if the Press of India in general carries out the policy laid down for the *Pioneer.*"

**Sir Harcourt Butler’s Speech**

Sir Harcourt Butler said he was most happy to have been asked to propose the toast of the *Pioneer*. He presumed that the reason he had been singled out for the honour was that he had been connected with the *Pioneer* longer than anyone else. It was in 1890 that he went to India and was posted to Allahabad. After the Mutiny, Allahabad, mainly owing to its position at a railhead, was regarded as of great strategic importance by Lord Canning
and figured in Queen Victoria's Proclamation. It was about that time that the Pioneer was founded.

"In the early years of my service," continued Sir Harcourt, "the Pioneer was a great force in Upper India, and when I knew it best it was conducted by George Chesney and Howard Hensman. That was an excellent combination. They enjoyed the confidence of all; the secrets of Government were entrusted to them, and there was no phase of commerce or industry with which they were not familiar. Never was that confidence found to be misplaced. The Pioneer developed a policy of supporting the Government, and so it became possessed of all the inside information. The Pioneer also supported the Services, which were more powerful then than they are today.

THE BEST ADVERTISING MEDIUM

"There was another phase of the activities of the Pioneer—it was a most useful exchange and mart. People going on leave would advertise their belongings in its columns, whether polo ponies, guns, furniture, ducks and hens—any mortal thing.

"In my day officials were regular contributors. We were encouraged to write for the Press by Lord Dufferin, who took the view that it was in the interests of India that the people should be fully informed on matters of administration. It was understood, of course, that we should observe some restraint in our articles. An article which I wrote for the Pioneer was the occasion of me being afforded supreme and undiluted enjoyment. The Pioneer never revealed the identity of its contributors, and there was much speculation regarding the authorship of that particular article which was regarded as of some merit and importance. Then one day in Simla, at a dinner, when the matter was being discussed, I heard a guest admit, with a blush, that in fact he was the author! I do not think that anything ever gave me keener enjoyment than to hear him make that confession.

"The difficulties before us relating to the new Constitution are very great. There is a vast population to be educated in the ideals of self-government. The Indian Press has peculiar difficulties to deal with, but if it faces them in the right spirit it will accomplish a great work in India, which will be for the good of the whole country and help to preserve the unity of the British Empire. And I myself cannot conceive of an India apart from England.

"The object of the Pioneer, we are told, will be to foster those stable elements which will work for the prosperity of India through the British connection, and it has my heartiest wishes for its success."
Mr. K. M. Panikkar's Speech

Mr. K. M. Panikkar, in responding to the toast of the Pioneer, said, inter alia:

"To me, as an interested observer of political life, it has always appeared that the Press stands in a position of unique importance in the building up of the future of India. I visualize that future, not merely in terms of constitutions, but in terms of co-operation between races and communities, of collaboration between the directive experience of Britain and the constructive minds of India in building up a stable and progressive nation. Only thus can the national life of India grow up to its full vigour. In this task the newspaper Press of India has a great and noble part to play. Whichever be the shortcomings of the Indian Press, nobody can deny that it has played a great part in generating the national spirit in India. But in doing so it was perhaps fortunate that it should have seemed often to be in unreasonable opposition, often to advocate purely racial and communal views. But I venture to hope that with the coming of the Reforms, in the working out of which many of those present here are actively engaged, this aspect of Indian journalism will fast disappear. It is not my desire to wander into politics, but this much I may be permitted to say. In the Conference Room in the House of Lords we see every day representatives of all communities and all interests working strenuously to evolve a suitable constitution for India. That is the one lesson that this Conference has taught us, that co-operation between all communities based on goodwill and desiring only the welfare of India is the only method by which we can achieve our ideal. And surely it is not only important to achieve the ideal, but to keep and consolidate our achievements, and for that nothing is more essential than goodwill between Britain and India and close co-operation between communities. In any case, and this is the point which I would like to emphasize, the Pioneer is based on the co-operation of all communities—Hindus, Muslims, and Europeans, representatives of States, landholders, and commerce. It is in this association of Europeans and Indians, of Hindus and Muslims, of agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, that I see a new alignment of forces which I am convinced is not without importance for the future of India.

The Moulding of Public Opinion

"There is only one more word I desire to say. The Government of India as at present constituted is perhaps indifferent to the moulding of opinion. The official attitude, for which there is no doubt much to be said, is what Wellington picturesquely expressed as:
'Publish and be damned.' But a future Government of India, which is even partially responsible to the people, could not look upon the Press with that indifference. The moulding of public opinion in favour of the policy which the Government desires to carry out, the explanation of the motives and objects of the Government to the public, testing the strength of popular sentiment on important questions—these are vital to a Government based on representative institutions. The India of the future which we visualize, and for which all of us are working, cannot afford to leave the Press permanently in opposition. I am convinced that the new Pioneer, representing as it does the close co-operation of parties interested in the steady progress of India, will have a great and noble part to play in creating that atmosphere of friendliness, co-operation, sympathetic understanding, and goodwill between the Government and the people whom it has not merely to govern in the future, but to placate, to convince, and in the last resort to obey."

The guests remained for some time after the banquet, chatting with old friends and forming new acquaintances. Mr. Panikkar (who, together with Mr. Souter, was responsible for the arrangements) received hearty congratulations upon the success of the gathering.
KASHMIR: TODAY

By JOHN DE LA VALETTE

"Kashmir, like every other country in the world, has been through some difficult times in the last eighteen months. So far as we could judge, however, its political difficulties had been surmounted, and the State had now embarked upon a new chapter of, they hoped, continued happiness."

With these significant words the Secretary of State for India, Sir Samuel Hoare, recently summed up the result of the vigorous and effective steps taken by the Government of H.H. the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir towards removing the causes of the troubles through which the State recently passed.

It will be recalled that serious disturbances broke out in 1931. The principal of these were the Muslim riot at Srinagar in July, followed in September by organized rioting in various important towns of the Kashmir Valley; again in November, when British troops were called in; and finally the rebellion at Mirpur in January, 1932.

When those responsible for leading the agitation found that the British Government co-operated with the State in the suppression of lawlessness, they launched a campaign of Civil Disobedience in the form of non-payment of land revenue. This action was facilitated by the undoubted fact that in Kashmir, as in most parts of India, the strain of the general economic depression was being felt by the agricultural population. For that very reason His Highness's Government had already authorized remissions of revenue ranging from 12½ to 25 per cent., according to the circumstances of each district. As was apprehended, the so-called non-violent campaign soon became violent. Assaults were made on the military and the police, as well as on private persons, and much damage was done to property. During January, 1932, practically the whole of the tehsils of Mirpur, Kotli, Bhimber, and Rajouri, and the ilaga of Poonch, were under mob rule. So far as Mirpur was concerned, the Government of India lent the assistance of British and Indian troops for the maintenance of peace, while in the other districts State troops brought the situation under control. By the beginning of February the disturbance had been reduced to mere sporadic and isolated attempts to create trouble.
Meanwhile energetic action was taken to remove any causes which might lead to future disturbances of the peace as well as to re-settle the populations which had been driven from their homes. Furthermore, a Commission was appointed to enquire into the grievances from which certain classes of the people in the State alleged they were suffering. This Commission comprised both officials and non-officials, and was presided over by Mr. B. J. Glancy, C.I.E. After examining numerous witnesses from all the different communities in the State, the Commission made a number of recommendations, which were accepted in toto by His Highness and put into effect.

Since the troubles subsided the best part of a year has gone by and peace and tranquillity have returned to the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

The last remaining British Indian troops left the State in November. As for the refusal to pay land revenue, all arrears, at the reduced rates allowed by the State, have meanwhile been paid up.

Thus the State Government has been able once more to revert to its policy of planning for the future and working out schemes which enhance the earning capacity of the population. But first of all several measures of economy had to be taken, partly by amalgamating certain Departments, and curtailing all avoidable activities. One of the latter measures, the abolition of the Archaeological Department, will be greatly regretted by those who have had opportunities of seeing the useful work which this Department has been doing. Fortunately an attractive and interesting account of some of the results of this work by Pandit Ram Chandra Kak, until recently Director of the Archaeological Department, will shortly be published by the India Society under the title of Ancient Monuments of Kashmir. It is to be hoped that at the first opportunity the Archaeological Department will be revived.

One of the important constructive schemes which have been taken in hand relates to the protection of the Kashmir Valley against the floods which occurred with such disastrous results in 1928, 1929, and again in 1931. Not only did the Government on these unfortunate occasions assist the agriculturists and other sufferers in the flooded areas by granting relief, making advances, and remitting taxes, but substantial sums were allocated for flood protection works in Kashmir. These include not only a general strengthening of the dykes along the river banks, and drainage works, but also an overflow canal from the Jhelum River into Lake Anchar and a new lock gate at the junction of the river with the Tsunti Kul Nallah.

Works for irrigation purposes were also continued. Thus the
Qainagir Canal was completed, as were also protective works on the Ranbir Canal, while an extension was added to the Ujh Canal in Jammu and works were started for improving the water supply of the arid submontane areas of Jammu. Pictures of some of the drainage work will be found in the illustrated section of the present issue of the Asiatic Review.

To the forests, of which some ten thousand square miles are now being administered by the Forest Department, special care continued to be devoted. An important new departure was the steps taken towards the regeneration of deodar in the Udil range of the Ramgan Division, where the pohu bush, which retards the growth of deodar, was systematically burnt down. There can be little doubt that in a not distant future the coniferous trees of India, those in Kashmir among them, will come to play an important part in the indigenous production of "news-print," an industry which, as yet, is unduly neglected in India, but for which great possibilities exist.

A recent innovation was the erection of a Santoner factory, the raw material for which is supplied by artemisia, which grows extensively in the forests of Kashmir. The progress of the silk industry was, inevitably, greatly hampered by the low level of world prices. Although the drop in exports of silk led to an accumulation of stock, the Department of Sericulture, taking a broad view of future possibilities, continued its endeavours to improve and even expand this industry, which is proving of such growing importance to Kashmir and seems destined to play an important part not only in the supply of silk to India, but also in regard to exportation to Europe. The planting of mulberry trees, on which the silk industry depends, made further progress both in Jammu, where a new mulberry nursery was established at Nowshera, and in Kashmir, where, during 1931 alone, 115,600 trees were transplanted. Various measures were adopted for the improvement of silkworm "seed" and its distribution in suitable localities. Certain facilities and attractive conditions were offered as a further inducement to the rearers of cocoons. In the matter of production and the proportion of output the Jammu silk factory showed all-round improvement and the Government sanctioned the working of another filature. It is an interesting sign of the progress of mechanical industry in India to find that the apparatus for this expansion of the spinning works was locally manufactured and installed. Finally, undaunted by the temporary setback in the overseas demand for silk, and confident in the future, a new silk-weaving factory was started in 1931.

One result of the increased demand for swadeshi, or home-made, cloth in India was an enhanced export from Kashmir of
cheap woollens. It is the view of the Kashmir Government that in the supply of these cheap woollens to India "Kashmir can, if the industry is properly organized, practically secure a monopoly, as the cost of production of such fabrics is very low, owing to the fact that in Kashmir the manufacture of pattoo is a cottage industry, which the agriculturists take up in winter, when they are free from other work, and they rear sheep themselves and utilize the wool on their own looms." Here we see a practical example of the development of those industries in India which, producing for Indian consumption, will be able to grow on the strength of a permanent domestic demand, unaffected by the ups and downs of the world's erratic markets.

With its plentiful water supply, the production of electricity in Kashmir is only limited by the use to which the current can be put—that is to say, by the extent to which local industries can be developed. As it is, practically every factory which employs power is supplied with electricity by the State Electrical Department. During 1931, in spite of all the depression, the number of industrial installations in Kashmir increased from 119 to 155. The Department also supplies the cities and various towns with current for lighting, the number of such installations having increased in 1931 from 15,540 to 18,840.

The Mineral Survey of the State, which has been steadily continued since 1917, was recently carried further in the Sindh Valley in Kashmir and in the Reasi area in Jammu. In the former locality asbestos deposits, copper ore, and iron pyrites were discovered, and in the latter new deposits of coal were located at Kalakot. These new finds, coupled with those previously located, justify a technical expert, writing on "The Mineral Resources of Jammu and Kashmir,"* in concluding: "Enough has been said to indicate that the State . . . is enormously rich in mineral deposits, many of them of great importance." The question of the possibility of establishing, at a commercially justified cost, adequate railway communication to the principal centres where minerals are found in useful quantities has been answered in the affirmative. "It will thus be seen," the above-mentioned writer continues, "that the main coal deposits, the bauxite deposits, the earlier known and recently discovered deposits of iron, and many other deposits of important minerals, offer encouraging prospects of economic operations."

To such development the economic depression is no lasting deterrent, especially not since there is within the tariff boundaries of India a wide and growing demand for the ultimate products derived from many of the minerals found in Kashmir. In this field of activity there is obvious scope for co-operation by British

* Engineering, November 11, 1932.
interests. But, as I have pointed out elsewhere, if British enterprise is to play a substantial part in the future economic development of the Indian States, English business men will have to realize that the conditions upon which their co-operation will be welcomed are neither those which have ruled in India in the past, nor such as they have known in some of the young countries of the New World. The political changes which are shaping in India will, it may confidently be asserted, tend towards greater eagerness on the part of the States to welcome British capital and British enterprise. But the exact form of this co-operation will have to be worked out with some care and mutual adaptability. Towards this end a closer study by British business men of the conditions and potentialities in the Indian States is a first essential.

Fuller information on many matters of interest which is being regularly made available by many of the States is a valuable contribution towards the desirable achievement of the greater development of their resources in conjunction with British enterprise.

* The Economic Prospect before the Indian States. (East and West, Ltd., London, 1931.)
RECENT LITERATURE ON THE NEAR EAST

(Reviewed by A. Guillaume.)


Dr. Howard considers the Great War as "a struggle of the Great Powers of Europe over the Turkish question in all its aspects." He begins by describing clearly the conflicting aims of the Balkan States and their powerful neighbours in the years immediately preceding the tragedy of Sarajevo. He supports his statements by translations of the actual words of the statesmen concerned, giving the authority for the same in an appendix. The merits of this method are obvious. The reader can see for himself the march of events, the impossibility of reconciliation between the Balkan States, and the baleful influence of the Great Powers at those times when a prospect of common agreement among the Balkan States threatened their interests. Those who have been astonished at the apparently unnatural alliance between Bulgaria and the Germanic countries against Russia will see from Dr. Howard's study how inevitable that association was.

Germany's interests in the Baghdad Railway alarmed the Entente; but its constituents could not arrive at a common policy which was likely to commend itself to the Turks; and so Germany, in the nick of time, August 2, 1914, was able to conclude what was in effect an alliance with Turkey. According to Dr. Howard's information, only five persons in Turkey knew anything about the treaty, and only one, Enver, was altogether happy about it. Certainly the Entente did not learn of it till later, and when they did the advantages they offered the Turks in return for assistance, which would have been of inestimable value, were meagre in the extreme. Russia made overtures, but England and France so seriously underestimated the power of the Turks that they made no serious effort to conciliate them. Whether any efforts would have sufficed to wean the Turks from their secret alliance with the Kaiser after the Goeben and the Breslau had steamed through the Straits can never be known; but Dr. Howard suggests that they would, and brings some evidence in support of this opinion. The Angora Government's condemnation of the weakness of the Turkish people in submitting to German domination may, as he
would think, point the same way; but it may, on the other hand, be no more than eleventh hour repentance.

In an interesting chapter the author traces the plans which the Allies made for the partition of Turkey after her entry into the war. The unhatched chickens were counted and recounted. English readers of this American book will naturally focus their attention on the diplomacy of their own leaders. They will hardly find the author’s description of their country’s engagements with the Arab chieftains of the Hijaz and Najd, and with the French, and with international Jewry, flattering to their reputation for honourable dealing. Nevertheless, they will be able to respect the impartiality of an American who can say that “the Government of the United States . . . though it assumed no responsibility for the Near East, desired to partake of all the benefits.”

Before the abortive Treaty of Sèvres had been signed the most remarkable instance in the world’s history of a national revival had begun under Mustapha Kemal. English and French interests in the old Turkish Empire were incompatible, and to all intents and purposes the Entente was broken. Turkish diplomacy had again succeeded in setting the nations of Europe at variance. In fact Dr. Howard seems to have made good his thesis that Constantinople and the Straits have been more potent agents of war and misery than any other part of the world’s surface.

Dr. Howard sums up the question of the Straits as it was “settled” at Lausanne thus:

“The Allies obtained freedom of passage of the Straits and demilitarized the zones of the Dardanelles, the Marmora, and the Bosphorus. Demilitarization, however, was not followed by what the Turks considered an effective neutralization or guarantee of security. The Allies rejected a collective and individual guarantee of the Straits which they stripped of armaments. . . . Turkey and the region of the Straits are safe only in time of peace. In time of war, even when neutral, Turkey is seriously handicapped, and when at war the entire zone of the Straits is peculiarly subject—as always—to superior sea power. . . .” He sees the only solution of the problem in a general reduction of naval armaments.

The care and exactness with which Dr. Howard has sifted the enormous mass of material which he has consulted are beyond all praise. The more complicated the question the more lucidly does he explain the place which each warring factor holds in the scheme of things. Seldom is the promise of the “jacket” so honoured by its wearer. We can agree with Count Sforza that “Mr. Howard’s work is marked by an impartiality rarely to be found among the historians who most honestly desire to eliminate their own national prejudices.”
THE EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES: BULGARIA, GREECE, AND TURKEY.
By Stephen P. Ladas. (New York: The Macmillan Company.)

The writer of this extraordinarily painstaking work has hardly succeeded in reaching the height of detached impartiality to which Dr. Howard has attained. Valuable as the book will always remain as a record of the sufferings and vicissitudes of upwards of two million people, it is hardly a book to be read: consulted, yes; but not read. Such a mass of information, such a wealth of detail, of schedules of property, lands, taxes, claims, and counter-claims, will daunt all but the historian in search of detailed information. To sift what the writer gives us in this monument of diligence and industry would be to deprive the book of its distinctive character. But he who wants to know when and where the exchange of populations began (and they began before the war) will find the answers fully documented in this book.

We are apt to think of these wholesale transportations of peoples as transactions between Greece and Turkey, but in reality the adjustment of the irreconcilable differences between Greek and Bulgars called for equally strong measures. A good deal is to be heard about the doings of "the Allied and Associated Powers" in this book. By some happy combination of circumstances they got together upon the battlefield, for we learn from Mr. Ladas that Bulgaria "lost Western Thrace to the Allied and Associated Powers"!

According to Mr. Ladas, Venizelos was the prime mover in the negotiations for the exchange of Greeks and Bulgars. Despite a certain philhellenism which seems to arise at times, Mr. Ladas would appear to be right in crediting Greece with fairness and perhaps generosity in her dealings with a defeated Bulgaria.

The work of the Mixed Commission, which was set up to arrange the conditions of the valuation and sale of such assets as the emigrants could not take with them, seems to have dragged on for an unnecessarily long time, bringing many hardships in its train. The ingenious diagram of the network of the system of transmission of reports through sub-committees to the final clearing house well illustrates the working of the cumbrous machine, and the reader wonders not so much that there was delay as that anything at all was accomplished.

There would seem to be evidence that the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey was carried out with far greater regard for justice on the part of the Greeks: certainly their attitude towards the commissioners was more proper.

In his summing up the author finds that the exchange of Greeks and Bulgars resulted in political good. Elements of friction and
disorder were forcibly removed to areas where they were at peace with their surroundings. Relations between the two countries have greatly improved and many of the old provocations have ceased.

The vastly greater exchange between Greece and Turkey stands on a different footing. Tens of thousands of Greeks perished in their flight from Asia Minor, and the million and a half that ultimately reached the shores of Hellas went through untold hardship and privation before they could be provided with homes and the means of earning a livelihood. Mr. Ladas notes that the Muslim minority in Greece which was banished was a law-abiding community, living usefully and peacefully beside its Christian neighbours. We should have liked to know more about the treatment accorded to it. The Turks got rid of two million Greeks and received half a million Muslims in exchange.

The author's summary of the effect of the vast influx of citizens into the ancient land of Greece contains much that is of interest, especially those pages which deal with the new orientation of the intelligentsia and the new university and colleges which have sprung up to challenge the age-long supremacy of Athens.

As we have said, this book will remain a valuable contribution to the history of a chapter in human misery to which Finis cannot yet be written. For parallels we must go back to the persecution of the Huguenots or the expulsion of the Moors from Spain. But the author has not attained that true perspective which makes the work of his compatriot a pleasant picture. The generosity of the British public in sending money, food, and clothes to the refugees while they themselves suffered a burden of taxation unparalleled in modern history is hardly mentioned. The reader is left with the impression that the Associated Power was without associate in administering of its charity to the destitute. No doubt it is more blessed to give than to receive; but if the British peoples are beginning to question the moral value of material sacrifices which receive little or no recognition responsibility lies elsewhere.

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**Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East.** By Dr. K. Krüger. *(George Allen and Unwin.)* 7s. 6d. net.

A book describing Turkey as it is to-day which can be easily assimilated by the reader with no special knowledge of the Near East was much to be desired, and here we have, if not exactly the thing, at any rate something so near that we need not wait for another attempt.

The author is a professor at Berlin-Charlottenburg, a fact which
might dispose the casual to regard the book with suspicion. This attitude is not justified. On the whole the book is an objective description of the Turkish Empire as it is to-day. It is not an elaborate study, but a series of compact statements covering economic policy, national resources, cultural innovations, and foreign relations. The writer’s information is thoroughly up to date, as he notices under economic policy the work of the Swedish contractors at Mersina, a port which will probably be of increasing importance as the Turks develop their resources.

Kemal’s programme of railways, roads, and harbours is most impressive. The old picturesqueness and somnolent mystery of Oriental life are submerged in a sea of works reminiscent of Morris and Macadam. Of the 150 newspapers that are now printed in Turkey, 127 are in Turkish and not one in English. Here is food for thought. The intellectual life of Turkey is likely to be dominated by the 2,000 Turkish boys who have passed through German High Schools and Universities, particularly now that the old church schools, or madrasas, have been suppressed.

It is but natural that the Germans, who had no part in the dismemberment of Turkey, should be invited to take a leading part in the national reconstruction. In the field of archaeology and Oriental studies generally their labours have been characteristically thorough and fruitful. In commerce their only serious rival would seem to be Italy.

One of the most interesting chapters is that dealing with the future relations of Turkey and Russia. Dr. Krüger gives his reasons for asserting that Russia is hermetically sealed and correct prophecy can only be founded on a study of its history during the last century. He believes that, despite the close and friendly relations between the two countries, sooner or later Turkish aspirations in Azerbaijan and Turkistan are doomed to drive a wedge between them.

Dr. Krüger contrasts the French mandate in Syria with the British mandate in Palestine, and his conclusions are highly flattering to the latter. His idea of Jerusalem as the headquarters of an Intellectual League of Faiths, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim, might well receive the attention of those in charge of University and higher education at that storm centre.

A few blemishes may be noted. European forms of Arabic numerals are not, of course, Roman numerals (p. 78). The divorce laws of Islam require the husband to provide maintenance for a set period and to pay the bride’s price. Thus it is hardly true to say that a divorced wife is “left without any means of subsistence” (p. 90). The least satisfactory chapter is that which deals with the Armenian massacres. The writer tries to maintain his balance, but falls heavily on the side of the Turk. Such words
as "involvements" should be avoided. It is difficult to believe that so well-informed a writer could have said that the French introduced Christianity into Syria.

These are minor faults in a most interesting book. The author concludes with two sentences in which every enlightened European will concur: "It is perhaps one of the greatest tragedies in the history of the German nation ... that it should have been afflicted with the Hohenzollern anachronism. ..." "America's rejection of the whole system elaborated in the League of Nations Covenant is extremely deplorable."

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ENGLAND IN PALESTINE. By Norman Bentwich. (Kegan Paul.) 12s. 6d. net.

Real pleasure is to be got from many pages of this book. The author is a lawyer, and legal matters are apt to be dull to the layman; but not as Mr. Bentwich deals with them. Here we have a history of our countrymen's doings in Palestine from about 1800 down to last year.

In July, 1918, true to its historic mission, the Zionist Commission laid the foundation of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem before the noise of the guns had died away. A people whose high purpose has held unwavering through the centuries deserves well of the future. We could wish that Mr. Bentwich had said something about the achievements of the Hebrew University. Already the record is impressive. In an empire unconversant with, and largely indifferent to, Oriental languages he cannot be blamed for not citing the text of his authorities, but the Orientalist cannot but regret his inability to control the statements attributed to journals and speakers. (Unless we are mistaken, the Arabic proverb—really a saying attributed to Muhammad—which Mr. Bentwich quotes, says that there is no monkery in Islam: it is not a condemnation of brotherhood.)

Mr. Bentwich pays a deservedly high tribute to the administration of Sir Herbert Samuel, which those who were influenced by anti-Jewish propaganda in the early days of the Mandate would do well to read for themselves.

Of course the problem of Judaeo-Arabian relations dominates this book, and somehow one never feels that a satisfactory modus vivendi will be reached. The religious difference forms a gulf which no man can cross: only a rapprochement in the religious sphere can induce Jew and Arab to dwell together in amity. Attempts to understand the "other man's point of view," however successful, cannot avail against the deep dislike which every orthodox Muslim feels towards Judaism. To blink this fact
is to display ignorance of Islam. Hope for the future lies in the Universities and High Schools of Palestine. They must grapple with this problem in the light of modern knowledge as applied to ancient dogma.

This book is authoritative and informing to a degree. Mr. Bentwich employs the mot juste both in humour and solemn contexts and by his very restraint conveys conviction to the reader.

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**The Influence of Islam. By E. J. Bolus, B.D.** *(Lincoln Williams.)* 10s. 6d. net.

The sub-title informs us that the book is a “study of the effect of Islam upon the psychology and civilization of the races which profess it.” Mr. Bolus has amassed a great deal of information, but the connecting thread wears so thin at times that it becomes invisible. The result is that the reader is in doubt as to what the influence of Islam has been. On the other hand, Mr. Bolus has made an honest attempt to set forth the merits as well as the defects of Islam as he sees them, and he takes an obvious pleasure in writing of some of its greatest thinkers. There is much that is interesting in the book, especially when the author is writing from his own knowledge of the Muhammadan world.
THE REFORM IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES: DECENTRALIZATION AND THE NATIVE STATES

By Professor Dr. H. Westra

(The author has served in the Dutch East Indies as judicial official, Assistant Commissioner for Constitutional Reform, Member of the "Volksraad," and Professor in the Technical College at Bandoeng. He is now Professor at Utrecht University.)

Permanent contact between the Dutch and the East Indies was established under the flag of the East Indian Company, the ensign of which bore the characteristic device of a ship under sail. Throughout the two centuries of its rule, it remained true to its national tradition—trade under a monopoly. It was just this system, however, which compelled it from the very beginning to make use of the authority conferred on it by the Charter granted in 1602 by the States-General of the Republic of the United Netherlands. In this way it received the dual character of merchant-ruler. As commercial interests formed its basis of operation, it made use of its political authority solely to establish and develop its factories and commercial relations. It concluded treaties with native Princes, resorted when necessary to the sword to subjugate the smaller States, and thus established a colonial empire extending over the greater part of the East Indian archipelago. Generally the company did not concern itself with the internal form of government of the States and interfered only when compelled by its own commercial interests. This non-intervention policy, therefore, was based on opportunism and not on principle.

When the East Indian Company was liquidated and its assets and liabilities were transferred to the "Bataafsche" Republic in 1798, the task of governing became paramount whilst commercial interests receded into the background. This reform was the work of Daendels, but more especially of Raffles, during the period of the interregnum. The principal result of this period was the consolidation of authority and the extension of government throughout the Indies. Complete centralization was found to be the only means of achieving this end—i.e., Batavia, as a centre, governing the whole territory divided into official districts. Even in these early times two kinds of corporations were left outside this scheme—viz., the native villages and the native States—but these attracted little attention. Owing to their economic self-sufficiency, the first led a life apart, whilst the authorities did
not interfere with the second. Where the power to bring everything under rather direct control of the government failed, the advantage of leaving the native population under the authority of their own chiefs was considered to be convenient for the government as it educated the natives to help themselves.

But this time had not yet come. That new light could only dawn when real unity of government was attained, as the task of governing from one centre was growing cumbersome. Nothing illustrates the dawn of the third period better than the evolution of the term "government reform." At first this expression meant the transfer of a part of the authority from the top-heavy centre to the officials scattered all over the Indies; in the course of its accomplishment, as a result of the altered circumstances, practice made it outgrow its original meaning. It developed into a transfer of authority to municipalities, in the councils of which non-officials also had a voice. By this measure the reform into an organic unit was consciously initiated.

The first efforts in this direction were made in 1903, when municipal and district councils were first instituted. Imposed by the Government, vested with very little power—viz., the care of certain local interests, for which a fixed amount from the local funds was appropriated—this experiment was only partially successful. Only the towns knew how to profit by the opportunity afforded them to create an active political life. As a reward, their authority was extended, and they were given the privilege of electing the members of their councils.

It is worth while to investigate why this first tentative experiment did not come up to expectations. The fundamental mistake made was that no contact was sought between already existing territorial and group units. The conversion of an official district, created for the sake of an adequate distribution of labour among the officials, into a municipality has only a chance of success if a general sense of solidarity exists among the inhabitants. This is only possible if the organization is based on historically evolved units. The institution of the Volksraad caused a remarkable development of the local councils. Originally, the task of this central body, established at Batavia and composed of representatives from every part of the realm, Europeans, foreign Orientals—practically speaking the Chinese—and the members of the principal groups of the indigenous population, was to advise the Government on all kinds of subjects relating to legislation, so that all currents of thought in indigenous society could be taken into account. The great difficulty, however, lay in the manner in which part of the members were to be elected. Direct suffrage was out of the question on account of the overwhelming percentage of illiterates among the indigenous population. It was
therefore found necessary to adopt a gradation system of election, and therefore communication was established with the districts and municipalities that had been created and whose councils acted as electoral bodies, as a result of which the latter assumed a more political character.

This reform became a reason for an increase in their number and strengthened the conviction that the position could not remain as it was because a closer contact between government and population needed to be established.

Before such plans were realized, a new group of units was created, which, unlike those already in existence, did not bear a territorial character, but represented various interests. The question at issue was the setting up of an impartial supervision to arrive at a fair distribution of water between the two competing agricultural interests, indigenous rice-growers and the European sugar-planters. For this purpose "waterschappen" (water boards) were established in 1918, which consisted of representatives of the two interested parties under control of the European authorities and were entrusted with irrigation interests.

Whilst only creating new units so far, the authorities now also paid attention to the already existing groups, the native village and the native State, and, besides, to the possibility of making the indigenous life of the Indies express itself better than formerly in those bodies.

One difficulty made itself felt. The important characteristic of this scheme is that differences between the various groups are duly considered and that—as is the case with centralization—all groups are not treated on the same footing. The slight differentiation by the law, which only admits the two above-mentioned groups, made it practically impossible to give a legal basis to the great variety of groups. The efforts made to make such legislation produce examples of what might be called "twisted construction" can scarcely be said to make pleasant reading. And one may ask to what purpose? Is it not possible, and has it not by the stress of circumstances also become necessary, to assume that existing indigenous corporations or lost forms of them are varieties *sui generis*, which the law does not admit, because at the time when this law was enacted nothing of all those matters was known? In Eastern policy, as in physical research, it is wiser to distinguish the existing indigenous formations; to investigate the significance which they may have for Eastern life; to reform them, if they prove less suitable, and to strengthen their organization with our own authority, than to ignore them, on the ground of their not fitting in our narrow system of constitutional law.

Simultaneously with this recognition by the law there arose an
increased appreciation for these indigenous forms. It was in strong contrast with the first period, that of the East Indian Company, because their continuation is no longer the result of indifference, but of a leading political principle.

This led to the enacting of ordinances, of regulations—the Native States regulations—by which those States have been vested with a number of well-defined powers, and it has been stated that the Government regulations shall be in force in those areas only if that has been stipulated in so many words. This guarantees the possibility of a development of these units, whilst control by the Government assures that the regulations are duly carried out. In addition to the reorganization of the already existing corporations, a new factor has been introduced there, the restoration of the indigenous units. Thus, in southern Celebes, two small Native States, which had been annexed by the Government, have been restored, and although the methods employed may, perhaps, give rise to criticism, on the ground that efforts were made to force them into the existing constitutional system, the guiding policy is praiseworthy. To gain complete knowledge of indigenous formations, by testing their value for political development and fitting them into the general Government system, is a problem which will take many years to solve.

Meanwhile, the formation of new units by the Government was again undertaken, and, as far as Java was concerned, those created in 1903 were dissolved. On two points improvement was attempted and benefit was obtained from the lessons derived from experience. First, contact with the mental currents among the population was sought, whilst, on the other hand, the juridical structure was so arranged that room was left for further development. The provinces created in 1925 were three in number, based on the three races of Java—a Sundanese province, West Java; a Javanese province, Central Java; and a Madurese province, East Java. For the present day their equipment is somewhat top-heavy, but they will work better as their sphere of action is extended.

With the institution of regencies another criterion has been adopted as a basis—viz., the territory. Formerly the regencies were autonomous units, and although they had gradually become official districts, the consciousness of unity had remained, more especially because the ancient head of the population, the Regent, always ruled the indigenous population of that district as its highest official. This system, inaugurated in the days of the East India Company, was embodied in the law of 1854 in such a manner that a son of a Regent should be given the preference of succession, if he proved to be the equal, both in ability and character, of the other candidates.
This reform of the mechanical structure into an organic structure is now—as has been seen from the examples quoted—in full progress. It will, however, take a considerable time before the process is completed, whilst on account of the continual development it will have to be extended constantly.

It is a characteristic sign of our times that everywhere in European constitutional law the inclination towards differentiation is manifest and decentralization striven after in order to allow diverse activities to find expression. This is especially true of Eastern society, where inner dissensions are still far greater as a result of difference in race and widely divergent degrees of civilization. By considering these differences between the races and by giving them an opportunity to develop in organic communities one will find the best guarantee for maintaining the ties with the Mother-Country.
LITERARY SECTION

LEADING ARTICLE

THE EAST IN RECENT FICTION

By STANLEY RICE

(Author of "The Challenge of Asia")

The novelists of today who write of the East are more fortunate than their fathers in that the East has been brought so much nearer to us. We can now observe and record with fidelity the outward and visible signs of an unfamiliar civilization; we can take note of the sky and the scene, the architecture, the painting, the women's veils and the men's dress—even the poverty, the outward habits, and the religious or superstitious rites, but are we much nearer to the soul of the East? Must we forever cry that the soul of the East is inscrutable, a book closed to us never to be opened?

The romance of today tends towards the psychological. The best literature is judged rather by its portrait painting than by situations, adventures, and generally what is called "plot." It cannot be said that, in the flood of imaginative writing that is ceaselessly poured out, the East has not its fair share, all things considered. There is indeed something rather attractive in putting your story into a setting itself rather romantic and at the same time giving you an opportunity to display your knowledge, such as it is, of the country you have chosen. But it is very rare to find a novelist of today who will draw for you even an outline sketch of a real native character. This is perhaps due to timidity; when one really tries to conceive such a character, the difficulties seem insurmountable. What would they do in such circumstances? What would they say? What do they ordinarily talk about? How do they live, apart from public life or in contact with Europeans? And the answer to these questions must too often be that we do not know. In India there is indeed what the lawyers might call "contributory negligence." Until very recently the rigid rules of caste on the one hand, the seclusion and illiteracy of the women on the other, forbade any but the most formal intimacy. You could not visit a friend in his own house without
causing all sorts of dislocation of everyday life; you could not invite him to any kind of a meal, at which men can, as it were, unbutton and talk as friend to friend and man to man. Your visitor usually came with some definite object, which he discovered at the end of a desultory conversation on indifferent subjects. But it would be unfair to impute to others the blame, if blame there is, which is mainly our own. The Oriental is not so secretive as he is thought to be; but his innate courtesy will prevent him from forcing upon you what he thinks you have no wish to hear. He is quick to respond to advances and equally quick to see when his own advances will be unwelcome. And by far the greater number of white men and nearly all the women stand aloof in Olympian solitude, not merely from active participation in the life of the country (which is hardly to be expected), but also from any serious interest in the normal, everyday life of the people. They see and know those with whom they come into contact—officials and clerks in Government service, clerks and contractors in mercantile business, lawyers in the courts, students in the colleges, peasants in the villages—but of their inner home life they know very little. And yet one would suppose there is a large field of romance as yet hardly touched in which the exile, returned to his native land, might well employ his experience and also his enforced leisure. Many, if not most, of the novels we get give a very distorted picture of such native life as they introduce, and yet a large public prefers the romantic to the historical and shapes its views accordingly.

It is, of course, possible—and indeed natural—that to this kind of criticism the authors of this particular class of work would answer, “We did not set out to write novels about the natives of China or India; we do not think that the British public would be interested or that we should be able to publish, let alone sell, the books.” Or again, with perhaps even greater force, “We do not know enough about these people to be able to write about them in detail with any approach to accuracy, and without that detail a novel must become a lifeless, unreadable thing.” Either point of view is not without its weight. If we concede that the plot must be European on a geographical background, these novels have much to recommend them. In *Peking Picnic* we are introduced to folk from the British Legation in Peking, who go out to a show place in the neighbourhood for a picnic lasting some days. There they—or some of them—are captured by bandits, who in the end are discomfited by the wit of two women. The sexes at the picnic pair off in the approved style, though in the end only one of the matches comes to anything. The characters are well drawn, and the bandit episode is very well

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*Peking Picnic*, by Ann Bridge (Chatto and Windus). 7s. 6d. net.
done, but it is not China. In Flamboyante*—where the plot of its kind is well conceived on a background evidently familiar to the author—we have a coffee planter and his wife, who, with the usual promiscuous hospitality of the East, take in various guests—perfect strangers to them—a very repulsive novelist who is compounded of bombastic egotism and nothing else, a jocular Punch artist, and a lady with a past who is otherwise full of Christian virtues. There are complications. One after another the male characters fall in love with the lady, and there are jealousies and misunderstandings, carefully fanned by a smug woman, who delights in making mischief, of course unacknowledged. The tangle is unravelled and the lady marries the artist. In The White Fakir† Mr. Hudleston has expanded the legend, true or false, of a white woman who has turned recluse, and the story is centred in the married life of a young couple, the husband turning out to be the son of the White Fakir, who is tracked down by the wife and dies practically in her arms. It may be that these short summaries of the plots are inadequate, but one seems to trace a sort of common denominator in all three—a denominator that is made up of several factors. It is plain that all three writers have a genuine affection for the land in which their stories are set. Miss Bridge describes the Chinese scene with obvious fidelity and obvious admiration; and if the sketches of Bali and of India are somewhat slighter, the same affection and the same observation peep out. In the abstract, when it comes to detail, we find the same inclination to dwell upon the less attractive side of the native character. The Chinese bandits, the fanatic priest of Bali, the wicked woman of the herdsman caste, and the slighter character of Pitumber, the Hindu fakir—these are the types, or, in cinema language the “close-ups,” which leave the reader, especially the un instructed reader, with the impression that these native people must be very disagreeable. In fact, human nature, given differences of national character and national customs, is much the same all the world over. In India and China and Malaya there flourish love and jealousy, charity and meanness, fidelity and disloyalty, mercy and ferocity, just as they flourish in England, France, or Germany. For some inscrutable reason—ignorance perhaps, dramatic fitness, or the exigencies of the plot—the Oriental in too many Eastern stories is a villain or, if educated, a comic. No one really supposes that Chinese bandits are typical of the Chinese people, and the fanatical priest of Bali is perhaps only the vehicle for a description—and a very good description—of a funeral, to European ideas rather gruesome, of a Bali chieftain. But one is inclined to ask oneself

* Flamboyante, by Hubert S. Banner (Hurst and Blackett). 7s. 6d. net.
† The White Fakir, by George Hudleston (Ocean Publishing Co.). 7s. 6d. net.
what would be the impression on a foreigner if nine novels out of every ten about England described the English in general terms as very decent folk with strange manners and then proceeded to draw the detailed portrait of any given Englishman as a knave or a fool. It must, of course, be admitted that vice is more attractive fictionally than virtue, and that while there is something to be made out of a robber chief who seizes the (preternaturally) beautiful heroine, only to be confronted by the (preternaturally) brave hero, there is little to be made of the ordinary householder who lives with a virtuous wife in temperance, soberness, and chastity.

But since the Oriental villain is a familiar figure and almost ranks with Homer's constant epithet, all the more remarkable is the unanimity of these three volumes in describing the shallowness, the artificiality, even the silliness of social life in a tropical station. To Miss Bridge's heroine it was "a protracted bustle about little things—clothes and notes and comings and goings and people and interruptions, and more clothes and more notes. Clothes and notes—that was really the bulk of her life. Yes, and cocktails—clothes and notes and cocktails." Mr. George Bilainkin endorses this verdict in Hail, Penang!* "The average young white woman," he says, "has little to do in Malaya except to dress nicely, play games and entertain guests." And again he records a conversation with a woman friend. "The trouble in Penang" she said, "is that there is nothing to do. . . . Play bridge and mahjong in the mornings, to wait in for my husband at tiffin, and to sleep in the afternoon till teatime when I take a bath. . . . Nobody dreams of reading at any time, and, if you do, you are thought quaint or funny or touched by the sun." And in the absence of reading, or, as Miss Bridge puts it, "ideas," gossip. Gossip of trivial things, not always without malice. Both Mr. Hudleston and Mr. Banner draw the picture of the ill-natured woman, always ready to believe the worst and to pass on their own interpretations by means of innuendoes and half truths. Mrs. Farquhar in India and Mrs. Stapleton in Bali are types of the woman with nothing to do, whose outlook is circumscribed by the narrow circle of the "station" and to whom their neighbours' private lives are the one absorbing interest—Mrs. Farquhar because she is the social leader of the small community, Mrs. Stapleton apparently from natural perversity. They are drawn, as perhaps befits a novel, in lights that are over-high; one seldom or never in real life meets women who are forever harping upon the frailties of their neighbours and who seize upon every innocent trifle to turn it to sinister account. Granted, however, that the requirements of fiction demand high lights, do

* Hail, Penang! by George Bilainkin (Sampson Low). 12s. 6d. net.
not such characters reveal the emptiness of ordinary station life and suggest that something better might be found?

And when one reads these British and French novels in juxtaposition, one is tempted to ask whether these British women—and some at least of the men, who nevertheless live primarily in the East to do their job—cannot find anything better to do than to frivol away their lives in "clothes and cocktails," in bridge and gossip. All around them is the life of millions of men and women, who work and play, love and hate, have their tragedies and comedies, their customs and conventions as strange to us as ours are to them, and we take little or no notice. "That may be true of the women," someone will say, "and possibly of the men too who are immersed in business. It is not true of me, nor of those who are brought into live contact with the villages, with the townsfolk, with native life in its varied aspects." Let such an one ask himself whether he could write a story of native life which a native—Chinese, Indian, or Malay—would accept as a true picture. For what, after all, do we know except what officially we see—some no doubt more than others?

Mr. Bilainkin supplies the key. His book on Penang is written with much sympathy, and what is more to our immediate purpose it is a genuine attempt to look into the minds of the Asiatics around him. He likes the Chinese, educated and uneducated, though his liking is perhaps more akin to admiration than affection; he has a warm feeling for the Malay, whom he understands. He does not seem to like the Indian—at any rate, the Indian who goes to Penang—and does not show that he really knows nothing about him. For the Indian Mussulman he may have some sympathy, because his Malays have brought him into contact with Islam, but the crudity of his remarks on some of the commonplaces of Hinduism show that he has made little or no attempt to trace the origin or meaning of customs which are strange or unfamiliar. "Tout comprendre c'est tout—comprendre." Mr. Bilainkin, not very long after his arrival in the country, was seated on the lawn of the hotel in company with a Chinese friend. An Englishman, well acquainted with the latter, passed by with no sign of recognition. "That fellow," said the Chinese, "is like the rest of the white people. He never sees Chinese or Indians when they are not in his office. There he knows them and is friendly. Outside he forgets their existence."

Mr. Bilainkin was shocked. Whether the new arrival had jumped to conclusions from a single incident, whether his Chinese friend was disgruntled, or whether manners are cruder or more wanting in Penang than in India or elsewhere, the general attitude is typical. You are courteous, you are as far as you can be cordial, you do not ignore socially the men you meet officially,
like the man in the quotation. But there it ends. You part at
the door of your office and you drive to the club; he goes—
wherever he does go, and does—whatever he does do. You do
not know and you do not want to know. You cannot know
unless you take trouble, and after the day’s work you do not want
to take trouble; you have earned and you mean to enjoy recrea-
tion in the society of your own countrymen. And why not? Not
the least reason in the world. No one wants to turn all European
society into prigs and cranks. But there must, and there do,
occur many little opportunities of learning more of village and
even of town life, and in nine cases out of ten they are neglected.
One is tempted to say that “they order this matter better in
France.” The French have the reputation of being more free
from colour prejudice than any other peoples of the West, and
the inference is that they are therefore more intimately acquainted
with the lives of subject races. This view is partially—but only
partially—borne out by the three volumes under notice. Whereas
in the English trio the plot is woven round about the lives of
English exiles to whom the natives of the country concerned are
little more than a shadowy foil, and the visible country only a
background or stage scenery, in the French trio the Europeans
either sink to a subordinate place or are no more than equal in
the balance of the story to the native characters. In Désorientée,*
indeed, they disappear altogether, unless you are to count the
Turks of Constantinople as Europeans. That is to be expected
from the author, who apparently hails from the Near East. He
has sketched the portrait (for all the rest is subsidiary) of a young
girl who, born in an obscure town in Anatolia, is there married
to a Turk and follows him to Constantinople. Bewildered at first
by the novelty and overpowered by the extreme modernity of the
Turkish capital, she conceives the idea of becoming according to
her lights the most modern of the moderns. At first ashamed of
wearing European clothes and of having her hair cut short, she
ends by giving orgiastic feasts and by abandoning herself to one
lover after another. And so, terrified at the thought of her hus-
band’s return from a tour he has had to make in Anatolia, she
flees with the last of her lovers, who deserts her in a small town
in the North. We may contrast with this sombre sketch—for
it is little more—the work of M. Herbert Wild. L’Ambassade
Oubliée† is set in a somewhat fantastic framework. There is
nothing new in the device of a discovered manuscript which be-
comes too mutilated to decipher when it reaches a point incon-
venient to the author. The fancy of a Roman embassy to China

in the reign of Marcus Aurelius—with the convenient hiatus when the party reaches India—is the vehicle for thoughts and opinions upon Chinese art, culture and religion. The tale is no doubt embellished with a thrilling account of a battle with the Huns and with the love-story of Celius and Publia whom he deserted for the Chinese girl he had saved from the savages. That episode ends in gloom, for the Roman girl, like Ophelia, drowns herself and the remorse-stricken lover kills himself upon her corpse. But we get the impression that the artist’s real purpose is to reflect upon the culture of China. In a book where there is no definite hero, the outstanding figure is that of the Buddhist priest, who followed the party from Ceylon. The keynote is perhaps in a passage taken more or less at random. They are discussing war and the circus games and turn to Nagarjuna for his opinion:

‘Je pense,’ dit-il, ‘que ton ami est enchainé dans le monde des apparences. La gloire réside dans la bienveillance des hommes pour les hommes, dans la simplicité de la vie, dans la victoire sur soi-même, dans les trônes dont les occupants ne portent pas l’épée, dans le renoncement aux vanités.’

The superiority of the Roman civilization—and we may suspect that the author is casting a side glance at Western civilization generally—lay in its genius for war. For the soldiers of the party that was enough. "Such a civilization" (the Chinese) "could not produce heroes. These people are no good at war. War has composed the history and is the glory of Rome; it has fashioned the Roman character."

"Estimes-tu," dit Charilaos "(the philosopher), "que l’on n’est point civilisé quand on ne pousse pas l’art de la guerre à sa suprême perfection?"" Clearly the author does not think so.

In these two books, then, we find on the one hand the simplicity of an Asiatic village thrown into the hectic hurly-burly of a European city, on the other the dominant warlike European introduced suddenly to a civilization of culture and peace. They need not be called typical. The one is not a protest against Western civilization, but against its extravagances and dangers to the simple; the other less a glorification of Chinese culture than a discovery and, as it were, an apologia for its existence.

But whatever may be thought of these speculations, there is no doubt about the meaning and purpose of Bà-Dâm,* an enigmatic word which is simply the Indo-Chinese corruption of "Madame." The joint authorship of a Frenchman and an Annamite guarantees the accuracy of the minutely detailed descriptions of festivals and ceremonies and of the intimacy of

private life. A fastidious critic might say that these which are mainly the trappings of the book, are given a disproportionate space, and that the story is related to them by somewhat artificial means. But they are not the theme of the writers; the situations are well worked in and all have a bearing on the general development. What the writers have set out to examine is the desirability of mixed marriages, and their verdict is emphatically adverse. A young Parisian girl is married to an Annamite, cultivated, highly educated, full of academic honours, with the prospect of a bright career before him. She follows him to his home in a provincial town in Annam and at first all goes well. She is received by the family, if not with open arms, at least with smiles and courtesy. In spite of her strange surroundings she settles down fairly happily to her new life. But then clouds arise. Gradually—by this small incident and that—she discovers that she is not wanted and not liked; the people frown upon her, the mandarin whose daughter she has supplanted is hostile to her husband’s family and she is drifting apart. She meets a young Frenchman and like calls unto like. Her husband, a true Annamite at heart in spite of his French education, loses grip; and when the inevitable happens and his wife flies with Jacques, he abandons himself to drink, drugs, and debauchery. The girl, having failed to persuade her lover to give up his colonial career, sails away alone to France. France calls her more insistently than either husband or lover.

All this is admirably done. Incidentally to an Englishman, not the least interesting is the similarity between Indian and Indo-Chinese conditions. On the side of the “colonials” the same impatience with the educated higher classes, the same tolerance of the peasantry, the same sense of ingratitude for material benefits conferred, the same general contempt for a subject race, the same claim to a superior civilization; on the side of the Indo-Chinese the same covert dislike of the French, the same complaint of native institutions and traditions destroyed, the same claim to moral superiority, the same impassivity of the cultivators. With the few changes here and there incidental to geography, the descriptions of the country, its ceremonies, festivals, customs, and even its curses might have been written of India. There is no pretence that the French colonialis are any more en rapport with the intimate life of the country than are the English in India; they are, it would seem, frankly disliked, as all those must be who have supplanted the native races in power.

But the quality of Bú-Đám, which is most to our present purpose, is that here we have a real picture of the East. The English novels all conform to the same convention; they are stories in the East, but not of it. Across a background, more or less clearly defined, of Oriental scenery flutter occasionally the dim figures of
shadowy natives, reinforced by the evergreen white-robed and noiseless servant. The characters in Bā-Dām are alive; they are a part of the play, not merely of the scenery. The tragic figure of the brilliant scholar whose marriage is first the crown and then the disaster of his life; the old father, full of courtesy and of the pride of family, proud of his son, yet himself Asiatic to the fingertips; the pious old mother with her visits to the pagoda and her pathetic faith in the curse of the ancestors upon her beloved son; the mandarin ready to gratify an ignoble spite; best of all, the opium-sodden uncle, intolerant of the West, clinging desperately to the old life, and careless of politics and their implications—they all stand out from the canvas as individuals, characters more worthy than the little figures of the planter, the railwayman, or the diplomatic assistant.

It is, indeed, this quality of insight into the native character that won for Mrs. Steel and for Rudyard Kipling their great and deserved reputations as interpreters of the East to the West. If in their longer works the European element predominates—for even Kim was not wholly Indian—the native characters are no longer shadows: they live, they are of the essence of the book. And in some of the shorter stories, in the volume In Black and White, in In the Rukh, and in Mrs. Steel's From the Five Rivers, we get examples of an interest purely Asiatic. It is not suggested that these examples should be slavishly copied: there are other types than the gentle lama of Kim, and the faded Mussulman townsman of Voices in the Night. Every writer must create his own genre; though one or two veins have been worked, there is still rich ore in the mining field. It may be that the fiction, which is the subject of this article, is not typical of the whole: it may be—it probably is—true that there are other authors who have dealt faithfully with the Asiatic, but who have not achieved the same reputation. What I am pleading for is the encouragement of such, though not to the exclusion of those who prefer the more beaten track of the Anglo-India story.

Can nothing be done to encourage enterprise in this direction? Are we, whose boast it is that we rule over so many diverse races, always to neglect them in the realm of fiction, through lack of interest or of knowledge? The French offer prizes for this kind of literature. There is a prize of 5,000 francs for colonial literature in general, and another of 25,000 francs for Indo-Chinese literature in particular, open only to residents of Indo-China, besides local prizes in Algeria and Tunisia, also reserved to local writers. If our Book Society can promote the enterprise of writing good fiction, if our newspapers can offer huge prizes for "spotting" film-stars, can no agency be found to encourage the Imperial task of presenting the coloured races in the true perspective and pro-
portion? For it is no less than that. It is surely time to clear away the misunderstandings, the prejudices, the vain repetitions of hoary shibboleths, that pass for instructed opinion of the East. Fiction, it may be said, is only imaginative literature, but fiction must be true to type and at least probable. What are we to think of a people when fiction, if it condescends to treat them as live beings, is for ever harping upon their vices and weaknesses, and seldom or never presents them as the ordinary men and women they are?
THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM IN CURRENT LITERATURE

(Book Reviews by O. M. Green.)


Since China’s problem is coming to be recognized as the world’s problem no one should miss this extraordinarily interesting and valuable book. It might very well be read in conjunction with Mrs. Pearl Buck’s classic The Good Earth—the one for cause, the other for effect. But, although packed with facts, Professor Tawney’s book is anything but heavy reading. It is always vigorous and lucid, and continually illuminated with pithy sayings. Here indeed is the real China, the unhappy background of the cruel sport of Tuchuns and politicians, and an explanation of how many of the Kuomintang’s problems, and consequent miseries of China, today, are quite unnecessarily self-made.

In a country that stretches nearly from Equator to Arctic Circle the widest possible variety of climate and soil necessarily exists, and communications being slow and painful, the widest variety of customs. The Imperial system took wise account of these facts, the duty of officials being mainly to keep order and collect taxes (always strictly limited by the people’s willingness to pay), while a very large measure of local autonomy was allowed, particularly in matters of land tenure, relations between landlord and tenant, division of land so that good soil and bad was fairly distributed, and the like. The Kuomintang have tried to substitute a Procrustean bureaucracy, which at its best has upset “olo custom” with calamitous results, and at its worst (far commoner than its best) impoverished the people fearfully. In the main, China has never suffered from the evils that afflicted European peasants, vast estates in a few hands, seigniorial hunting rights, and the like. Landlordism is undoubtedly a burden, but a notable feature is the number of small owners. The average size of a farm is calculated at from three to six acres; the average family income from as low as silver $36.22 a year to a little over $200 (say £2 5s. to £12 10s.) a year, but the higher class is scanty. The comparison of the Chinese peasant to a man standing up to his mouth in water, whom the least ripple will drown, is no exaggeration. With such poverty he easily falls a prey to the moneylender—and a good moneylender is one who does not charge more than 25 per cent. The hold that the Communists have acquired in southern China is
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entirely due to their redistribution of all land, destruction of contracts, and I.O.U.s, and establishment of people's banks to finance the peasant between seed time and harvest. Professor Tawney sets out a list of agricultural reforms planned by Nanking nearly two years ago. One can only pray that their good intentions may not be wrecked by the culpable delay in framing them.

Probably the greatest obstacle to China's agriculture is her lack of trees. For centuries forests have been not only ruthlessly plundered, as Professor Tawney says, but deliberately hacked down as encumbering ground which should grow food. The result is a perpetual alternation of drought and flood. To this has been added in recent years increasing cultivation of opium enforced by militarists for the sake of its profits. Chinese peasants are the most industrious and skilful in the world: no one could do more with their resources than they do. But even the slenderly equipped example of Mr. James Yen, in the famous "Tinghsien experiment," shows how much more the soil might produce with scientific treatment. Improved communications would do much. It is calculated that if the farmers in Shensi made a free gift of their grain to the mills in Shanghai, it would still pay the latter to import grain from Seattle. But, looking to communications, one cannot help thinking that China would do better to develop her unrivalled waterways than go in extensively for railways—at least just yet. Railways breed civil war. There are too many uncontrolled generals about, and, as Professor Tawney says, "a Chinese general with a railway is like a monkey with a watch."

In the industrial field little progress has yet been made. Estimates of numbers employed in factories range from 1,204,318 (official calculation) to 2,500,000. But, as Professor Tawney asks, does China genuinely desire to be industrialized? Probably not. With her vast population labour-making, not labour-saving, devices are her desire. But, as Western observers have just begun to discover, China never did and does not wish to be Westernized; she seeks only to learn enough of Western "tricks" to serve as a shield against further Western inroads on her ancient culture. Nevertheless, it is certain that factories must increase, and Professor Tawney's chapter on "Problems of Social Policy" specially deserves study. China still has it in her power to avoid the terrible mistakes which industry has made in the West. As an interesting example of how to combine old and new, Wuhsi, the most industrialized city purely in Chinese hands, the so-called Manchester of China, is one of the few towns where the old patriarchal government by the heads of the chief families has successfully defied Kuomintang innovations, and it is, on the whole, a very happy town. On which one may appropriately quote Professor Tawney's all-embracing aphorisms: "The disease of young
China is its fever for imitation . . . they rehearse impossibilities with dreadful monotony as though mere persistence in repetition could convert fancies into facts. . . . What is needed now is not to add to the number of plans competing for attention, but to drop four-fifths of those already put forward."


This is the report of the four educational experts, Professors Becker of Berlin, Langevin of Paris, Falski of Warsaw, and Tawney of London, sent out in the autumn of 1931 at the Chinese Government's request to investigate education in China and advise on its reorganization. It was a colossal task for the three months they spent in China, and they are heartily to be complimented on the amount they managed to see and the soundness and comprehensiveness of their recommendations. More, perhaps, than by lack of time the Commission were hampered by feelings of delicacy. Thus it is notorious that education in China is consistently starved. What the schools may leave untaught is not nearly so harmful as the bitter, anti-foreignism which the Kuomintang oblige them to teach. And of the almost countless "universities" numbers are mere associations of students, who band together to hire a few teachers and give themselves some resounding title. There is a world of significance in the Commission's observation "that modern China is, to a large and increasing extent, the creation of her universities." The first step to reform should be to suppress half of them.

But in general there is an abundance of incisive and valuable criticism and it is easy to read between the lines. The comments on the universities are all very good—professors poorly paid, often with their pay months in arrears, no security of tenure, always liable to be upset by political influence or clamour by their students; the latter obtaining their degrees, not by a final examination, but by a series of credits accumulated throughout their career, so that the university course comes to be looked on "not as a rounded whole, but as a series of hurdles or obstacles, each of which must be jumped in turn and can then be left behind"; and a general tendency towards "window-dressing" which "is peculiarly out of place in a seat of learning" and, incidentally, lies at the root of all Nationalist failures.

The report considers every aspect of education, primary, middle, and university, system, finance, and organization, with special recommendations in each instance. The truth is that modern Chinese education is haphazard, the natural result of the large variety of influences behind it, while confusion has been increased by the eagerness of "former students of foreign universities to try
to engraft models of these institutions on to the sensitive plant of their own education system.” At the same time there is a strong tendency, as ever, to make education the preserve of a privileged class. A tribute is paid to the adult education, “one of the most satisfactory features of education in China.” One of the most interesting pieces of work in the world is the Mass Education Movement, by which labourers and peasants are being taught to read and write through the noble and wholly voluntary work of private individuals. But in general there is a terrible gulf between the chances offered to the well-to-do and “the stupid people,” with top-heavy “favouring of schools of higher standard . . . whilst the primary and vocational instruction most indispensable for the people is neglected.”

On the danger of copying, holus-bolus, from abroad, the Commission make some admirable criticisms, particularly as regards “the remarkable, not to say alarming, consequences of the excessive influence of the American model on Chinese education.” That, they emphasize, is not to condemn American systems, but merely to point out that they are necessarily sui generis, something America has developed for herself, but by no means equally good when transplanted from the youngest to the oldest of civilizations. China has not yet risen beyond the conceptions in which Tzu Hsi and her counsellors threw over the classics and plumped for Western education in 1905—namely, that, by borrowing a little of the Western cunning, they might learn to keep out the West. But, as the Commission well say: “No country has ever sacrificed the whole of its historical culture without suffering the most baleful consequences”; and, if China is to reform her education on sound and wholesome lines, she must begin by looking back into her own past and seeking there the foundation for her new ambitions. Altogether a most thoughtful, valuable report.

3. CHINA SPEAKS. By Chih Meng. (Macmillan.) 7s. 6d.
4. JAPAN SPEAKS. By K. Kawakami. (Macmillan.) 7s. 6d. net.

When the day at last comes that peace is restored between China and Japan, one incidental blessing will be the cessation of the flood of propaganda that now pours from both sides. Japan started later than China, probably because she could not conceive that the West, after all it has endured at the hands of the Kuomintang, would so misjudge her as it has done; while China must have been desperately afraid that the Powers would remember, what they seem so strangely to have forgotten, that she herself had tried to do to Russia, in the quarrel over the Chinese Eastern Railway, what Japan has done to her, only two years before.

Mr. Kawakami’s book is written with dignity and continual
appeal to hard fact. Mr. Chih Meng has avoided the reckless inaccuracies of most Chinese propaganda, but he has weakened his book with copious quotations from notorious partisans or the cables of reporters "out for" mere sensationalism. Thus it is childish to argue from Japan's strengthening her Yangtze flotilla in October, 1931, for the protection of her nationals in the Valley, and from an unconfirmed report of naval mobilization at Sasebo, that Japan was actually planning to control all China's coasts and rivers. Nor is there any use in trying to brush aside the protocol of 1905 by which China bound herself not to build railways parallel to the Southern Manchuria Railway. Not only does the protocol exist, but it was actually America who first in 1900 imposed such restrictions upon China, thus setting an example which others have followed beside Japan. Mr. Chih Meng's continual appeal to what he calls America's "international magnanimity" is rather pathetic in its apparent delusion that Washington would ever stir an inch abroad without the clearest prospect of a solid return.

China's case against Japan rests on the one fact that Manchuria is Chinese territory, and it is a strong one. Until September 18, 1931, he says "Japan controlled only about one-half of one percent. of Manchurian territory ... since then they have occupied over two-thirds." Yet it is the bare truth, as Mr. Kawakami points out, that, but for Japan, all Manchuria would be Russian territory today. It cannot fairly be denied that Japan's subsequent activities were almost wholly economic, that she developed wealth about which the Chinese had never bothered themselves, and has provided peace and employment for millions of Chinese fleeing from the devastation caused by their own war lords and Kuomintang. One does not exonerate the Japanese military in saying that no just view of the conflict can be formed without reference to the shocking condition of China and the misdoings of her political classes. In this connection the introduction to Mr. Kawakami's book, by the late Premier, Mr. Inukai, should be read by every student of Far-Eastern problems. Mr. Inukai writes as a life-long friend of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, to whom he gave asylum for long periods, and a sympathizer with the National ambitions. One quotation from his preface must be given.

"The covenant then adopted (at the Washington Conference) was not meant to concede to China unbridled liberty to violate treaties, disregard international obligations, incite the masses against the foreigners through officially compiled school books and officially subsidized associations. What the treaty meant was to give China an opportunity to put her own house in order without foreign interference. . . . China could have undertaken the task of internal rehabilitation, if she only had had the will, without disturbing the foreigners and foreign rights. To attribute all her domestic troubles to `alien imperialism' is neither truthful nor manly."
That is really the whole case against China in a nutshell. If Mr. Chih Meng makes no attempt to meet it, the reason is unfortunately obvious.

5. The Present Conditions of China.
6. Relations of Japan with Manchuria and Mongolia.

In one of its earliest encounters with the League of Nations, Japan expressed polite regret that Geneva appeared to be imperfectly acquainted with the historical background of the conflict in Manchuria. Many friends of Geneva must since then secretly have confessed the deadliness of the taunt. But for anyone who makes even a cursory survey of these two massive volumes, recently published in Tokyo, no possible excuse of ignorance remains. Any charge of "Japanese propaganda" is defeated by the fact that they contain very little that is not within the knowledge of anyone who has read some Chinese history and has been able to watch events in the Far East at close quarters for the past twenty-five years.

The volumes may be classified, broadly, under two heads: what specially interests Japan, and what interests the whole world. But it needs little perspicuity to see how closely the two are interwoven. One factor which critics of Japan have never admitted is that the question of Manchuria and Mongolia is, for Japan, entirely different from any question of China Proper. It always has been, from the days of the Empress Jingó. And considering how often and how widely other Great Powers have claimed special interests in territories not their own upon which others must on no account infringe—the Monroe doctrine is the classic instance—it is, to say the least, Pecksniffian to hold up indignant hands at Japan's iniquities in Manchuria, especially remembering that all other lands are closed to her (most of all by those who now judge her most hardly) and that her islands are far too poor in natural wealth to support her teeming population, which increases by 700,000 a year. It is impossible for Japan not to view with the gravest concern what happens inside her great neighbour. As the Lytton Report justly says, "At the heart of the problem for Japan lies her anxiety concerning the political development of modern China and the future to which it is tending." With Russia impinging on the north and Mongolia nothing less than a Russian province, the spread of Kuomintang agitation into Manchuria and the alarming increase of Communism in Central China finally put Japan in a predicament in which it is not difficult to accept her plea that she has indeed acted in self-defence.

Turning to the general interest of all the Powers, there is, of course, first and foremost the Red peril. The chapters in the first volume on the growth and present extent of Communism in
China deserve wide and careful attention. The present writer has been able to check the statements from other sources, and they are in no way exaggerated. It is the plain truth that Chinese Nationalism is in deadly peril of being swamped by Communism, and no Power in the world can afford to shut its eyes to the fact, least of all a great Asiatic Power like ourselves. In conjunction with this is the vile and mendacious anti-foreign teaching with which the minds of all Chinese schoolchildren are being inoculated, not by the chance influence of a few teachers, but by a deliberate policy for which the Kuomintang cannot but be held responsible. Not only by books, but posters, newspapers, and the continual observance of Humiliation Days (commemorative of some alleged act of "imperialist aggression"), the whole of the younger generation are being reared to hate the foreigner and to accept the most poisonous untruths about him as gospel. It is a question whether in the long run China may not suffer more by this iniquity than foreigners. But in reading the earnest appeal of the Lytton Report for "international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China," it may well be felt that the Chinese textbooks are not the least of the abuses calling for redress.
REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL


(Reviewed by P. K. Wattal.)

The appearance of this work is greatly to be welcomed, as it fills a long-felt gap in the study of comparative politics. The author, after in 1914 completing his studies in China, was appointed officer for Chinese affairs in the Netherlands Indies. In 1922 he served on the Opium Commission of the League of Nations. Five years later he commenced the compilation of the present volume. He has since served with the Lytton Commission in Manchuria. The Dutch share with the British and the French the honour of being one of the three great colonizing nations of the world and the responsibility of controlling (with them) the destinies of one-third of the human race. The Dutch Ministry of Colonies is therefore to be congratulated for arranging the publication of these volumes and making accessible to English-knowing readers valuable information concerning Dutch colonial theory and practice. The English translation, though considerably abridged from the Dutch, still covers 1,200 long pages and contains much detail that will perhaps not interest a very wide circle of readers. The work, though authoritative, also suffers somewhat from a lack of the critical faculty, as there is in several parts of the picture too much of sunlight without the redeeming shade. Apart from these two drawbacks, the work is undoubtedly of permanent interest to students of political science and practical administrators all over the world and will remain an enduring monument to Dr. Kat Angelino's industry and ability.

To an educated Indian these volumes must make a special appeal. Javanese culture has been in the past affected by Indian contact, and even now there is a great deal that is in common between Java and India. Moreover, the treatment of an Asiatic people by a Western nation over the entire period covered by the connection of Great Britain with India brings into clearer relief features and tendencies relating to Indian problems which might otherwise seem perplexing. One sees a striking similarity in the problems of Java and India and notes the differences in the manner of handling them by the Dutch and the British. There is, as in India, the growth of nationalism with its concomitant of political agitation and non-co-operation. Equally, there are two schools of political thought: one section saying all the constitutional reforms that have been granted are mere eyewash and pretence and asking for complete independence; another section saying that the Government has gone too far. There are indigenous rulers
in Java as in India. One learns there are three hundred states in the Dutch East Indies. The relations between the Indonesian States and the Dutch Government are, however, regulated on very different principles from those we are familiar with in India. In India, the British Government stands by the treaties and regards them as sacred. Its policy has been one of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the States. Political officers exercise no supervision in the administration of full-powered States. But in the Dutch East Indies the policy pursued is a very different one. Practically all the States have been made to sign what is called a Short Declaration, under which the Dutch Government has "practically acquired freedom to act as it likes." The Indonesian States Rules, which correspond to resolutions of the Government of India in regard to political practice, circumscribe the freedom of action of the indigenous rulers to an appreciable degree. In stating these outstanding differences one must not be drawn into misleading inferences and conclusions. While the British view has been not to impose advanced ideas on the States and to let reforms emanate naturally from within, the Dutch do not believe in abstention which would leave the States "in the outer darkness of backwardness, ignorance, and evil." In the author's own words, "the more States, by making use of leadership and education, discover how to adapt themselves to the requirements of an enlightened administration that wishes to place the well-being and development of their subjects above all else, the less reason there will be for interference." The two points of view are different, that is all.

A reference to these differences leads us to the wider questions, viz.:

(i.) What are the aims of Dutch Colonial policy; and
(ii.) What practical steps have been taken in fulfilment of these aims?

The answer to question (i.) is given in a somewhat lengthy dissertation in Vol. I. It might have been very succinctly stated by reproducing the text of the official declaration on the subject. For instance, anyone desiring to know what British policy is in relation to India can refer to the Montagu Declaration of August, 1917, and the Irwin Declaration of October 31, 1929. But, in spite of a careful reading, one fails to find in these volumes any official announcement on the subject, and one sometimes wonders whether in places the author is stating his personal or the official view. One cannot help thinking that, in the English translation at any rate, official texts relating to political and constitutional matters would have been far more satisfactory and added immensely to its value as a work of reference. As far as one can gather, Dutch Colonial policy has a dual purpose: that of protection and that of calling forth the power of self-exertion. We have to turn to Vol. II. to see how far this dual purpose has been achieved.

Dealing with protection first, the Dutch have undoubtedly maintained law and order, introduced modern ideas in the administration of justice, and given to the Colonies an efficient administrative system which has preserved much that is best in indigenous institutions. It is greatly to their credit that in spite of an enormous increase of population in Java (from 18 millions in 1875 to 42 millions in 1930) and the growing pressure on the means of subsistence—the official report says "there is no question of
a serious drop in the level of prosperity of the population or of the miserable existence of millions of people”—the death-rate is only 20 per 1,000, as against 30 per 1,000 in British India, and 23 per 1,000 in the Philippine Islands. In education considerable progress has been made: 6·5 per cent. of males and 0·5 per cent. of females are able to read and write. This compares well with the 7·2 per cent. for the literate population of British India. A system of popular education is worse than useless without a system of communications, and here again Dutch enterprise has been very successful.

We will let figures speak for themselves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dutch East Indies</th>
<th>British India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>60 millions</td>
<td>272 millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>36,000 miles</td>
<td>60,000 miles (metalled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mileage</td>
<td>6,000 miles</td>
<td>41,723 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital invested</td>
<td>1,000 million guilders</td>
<td>Rs. 856 crores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Offices</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>23,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraphs:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of offices</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>10,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of line</td>
<td>28,000 miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones:</td>
<td></td>
<td>104,312*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of offices</td>
<td>347</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of trunk lines</td>
<td>25,000 miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>1·5 million bouws of 32 million acres (by sawahs Government works only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital invested</td>
<td>200 million guilders</td>
<td>Rs. 130 crores</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In matters of fiscal policy also the record of Holland in recent times has been worthy of praise. There was a period when the Colonies were regarded by the Mother Country merely as a source of revenue. The Government in Holland applied any surplus of the East Indian Budget to the payment of the interest on Dutch loans and to public works in Holland. But with the advent of modern ideas this point of view was abandoned, and there have been no remittances to the Dutch Treasury since 1875. The incorporation of the Netherlands East Indies as a body took place in the year 1912, when the principle of differentiation was established between the Colonies and the Mother Country respecting property, assets, and liabilities. This principle has governed Indo-British relations ever since the assumption in 1858 of direct responsibility by the Crown for India. The N.E. Indies are now a separate, self-subsisting entity, with independent power to contract debts and to spend in its own interests any favourable balance of its Budgets. Dutch writers mention with great pride that the fiscal policy of Holland is characterized by an unusual spirit of free trade, an open door policy of the most undiluted kind. All foreign and Indonesian capital and all spirit of enterprise is admitted without discrimination to carry on agriculture, mining, commerce, banking, industry, and fishing. All import and export is treated in the same way by the Dutch Treasury, and there is no

* Telephone lines belonging to companies are not included.
preference in favour of imports from Holland. This, they say, is greatly in advance of the practice adopted by Mandatory Powers and other colonizing nations. They point out that whereas 43 per cent. of India's imports come from the United Kingdom, which is the largest individual supplier in the Indian market, Holland's share of exports to the N.E. Indies was only 15.3 per cent. in 1931 as against Japan's 16.8 per cent. It appears, however, that Ottawa is exercising Dutch minds, and there is now a tendency to resort to a tariff policy with a view to protecting exports from Holland to the Netherlands Indies. It will be interesting to see what this ultimately leads to.

We have dealt above with protection as one of the purposes of Dutch Colonial policy. We now proceed to see how far the other purpose—viz., development of the power of self-exertion in the indigenous population—has been achieved. Two tests have here to be applied:

1) How far the people of the Colonies have been associated in the higher branches of the civil and military administration; and

2) To what extent popular self-governing institutions have been introduced.

As regards "Indianization" of the services, it appears that the higher branches are recruited almost entirely from Holland, and there is no policy of displacement of Dutch recruitment by a systematic training of the local population. This is in marked contrast to the policy of steady elimination of British recruitment for so many of the superior services in India.

This contrast becomes more marked still when we survey the achievement of the Dutch in the field of popular self-government. Like the British, the Dutch realize "that the force of circumstances imposes popular consciousness, popular self-defence, and popular responsibility as the only form of government that will live in the future." They have, accordingly, taken some steps in the direction of self-government in the N.E. Indies. There is a "Volksraad," or Council of the People, having its seat at Batavia, whose assent is required for all legislative enactments. The Council, as constituted in May, 1931, has 20 elected and 10 nominated Indonesian members, 15 elected and 10 nominated Dutch members, and 3 elected and 2 nominated members of foreign Asiatic origin, Chinese and Arabs. Or, in other words, out of 60 seats only 20 are occupied by elected representatives of the people. The proportion of elected members to the total in the Indian Legislative Assembly is very much higher.

The Volksraad is competent to deal with only "internal affairs" (a term which has not been defined and is regarded as incapable of definition) of the N.E. Indies, in as far as the Constitutional Act or Statutes laid down by Dutch legislation do not determine otherwise. Matters outside this category are dealt with by the Dutch Parliament. The Crown is further empowered to provide, by an Order in Council, for cases where no agreement has been come to between the Governor-General and the Legislative Assembly, even after a repeated presentation of the Bill to the Legislative Assembly. As regards the Budget, each of its eleven sections "is determined by the Governor-General in consultation with the Volksraad and sub-
mitted to the Legislature in Holland for approval. The Indian Budget is passed finally by the Indian Legislature and is not even formally submitted for the "approval" of the British Parliament. As regards executive power, "the broad lines of policy are in the hands of the responsible Dutch Minister of the Colonies, the organ of Royal authority, who, according to the foundations of the parliamentary system, cannot run counter to the views held by the Dutch Parliament, so that, finally, the States-General determine the policy to be followed" (Official Handbook of the Netherlands and Overseas Territories, 1931, p. 285).

One more point and we have done. Owing, it is said, "to misinterpretation of recent political reforms," the Government made a declaration some time ago in which it was said that "responsible Government in the Dutch East Indies cannot be promised in advance because it must largely be the outcome of the people's self-exertion and belongs therefore to an unknown future." Ever since, the question (with which one is familiar in India) is being asked, why and how long Dutch leadership will still be needed in the East Indies. To this, Dr. Kat Angelino gives the following reply, whether on his own or his Government's behalf is not very clear: "Western leadership must remain until the foundations have been constructed. This implies that illiteracy must have disappeared as a result of a good, general, popular education, as it has disappeared in Japan; that the particularist village spheres must function as village autonomies, as conscious organs of the great whole; and that the popular credit system and the co-operative movement must have freed the people of debt and must, by the application of better methods of production, have called into existence a prosperous population and a strong middle-class." If such a declaration were ever made in India it would be regarded there as postponing the realization of responsible self-government to the Greek Kalends.

Shakespeare through Eastern Eyes. By Ranjee G. Shahani, M.A., D.Litt. (Herbert Joseph.) 6s.

(Reviewed by Mrs. Westbrook.)

Dr. Shahani, however one may dissent from his conclusions, has something to say, and has written an interesting and suggestive book. He is very learned as to contemporary and seventeenth and eighteenth century judgments on Shakespeare, and the collection he has made is valuable. He compares the adulation of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries with the critical attitude of the more uniformly critical eighteenth century. He finds today in England only G. Bernard Shaw and T. S. Eliot who dare to stand out from the general chorus of praise; Germany has followed the English lead and has taken Shakespeare to her bosom; in France he is little read and is regarded as somewhat barbaric.

When we read of the Indian student's introduction to Shakespeare, or indeed to any English poetry, as dramatically and bitterly portrayed by Dr. Shahani, we wonder indeed at the genuine appreciation of our literature shown by Indian writers and by our own Indian friends. We hope his
picture is somewhat overdrawn, although it is not so long ago since in English and Scottish schools the loveliness of Shakespeare's music was overpowered by the floods of pedantic notes one had to tackle about obsolete words and recondite allusions. The beauty of the words it is not easy for the foreign reader to appreciate; and it is with happy astonishment that one finds diligent and discerning Indian scholars who realize the dignity and pathos of Burns, the burning speech of Shakespeare's Hamlet and Macbeth and Othello, the ethereal verse of Shelley. Not very long ago we in London heard Harendranath Chattopadhyaya render the parts of Shylock, Hamlet, and Othello, with most persuasive understanding. But one can believe that this enchantment of the actual phrase does not appeal to the majority of Indians; and, like Dr. Shahani, they demand satisfaction, and fail to find it, with the content. We expected the author to criticize the stories of Shakespeare's plays; for even English readers deplore the lack of invention of a dramatist who took old stories as he found them, with their obsolete and clanging machinery of masquerade and coincidence. But Dr. Shahani passes that over: he desires to find out Shakespeare's religion and his philosophy, and is disappointed that all the mysticism of Shakespeare resolves itself into a shudder at the "something after death." Elaborately, and at length, the author sets forth the Indian idea of a great thinker, which demands that thought to be great must be original, profound, fertile, and universal; and he finds that on all these points Shakespeare fails, just as he failed as a religious teacher. But does not Dr. Shahani, misled perhaps by vague and general eulogies of Shakespeare, ask more of him than he, as a dramatist whose function is only to present, illumined by his poetic genius, the life of man on the earth, can reasonably be expected to give?

The book is a valuable piece of research, and expresses the outlook of student India, nourished (or perhaps forcibly fed) for long on English literature, now awaking to criticize, and to select, and to argue, where formerly it had blindly accepted. Dr. Shahani is an acute and eloquent spokesman of the younger generation, and his voice is one well worth listening to. (But what does he mean by saying that the England-returned young Indian "hectors his poor little wife in the most approved English fashion"?)

Whither Islam? A Survey of Modern Movements in the Moslem World. Edited by H. A. R. Gibb, Professor of Arabic in the University of London. (Gollancz.) 15s. net.

(Reviewed by J. V. S. Wilkinson.)

This is an important book, containing a wealth of information about present-day Muslim movements, problems, and aspirations.

There are now, it has been estimated, as many as two hundred and fifty millions of Muhammadans in the world, and on this account alone their future is a matter of universal concern. But the interest is a special one, depending on the peculiar character of a unique system, and on the nature of the crisis which that system is now experiencing. For Islam has been
stirred, as never before, by great world events and internal convulsions, and is rapidly emerging from the medievalism in which she seemed, till only the other day, to be immersed for all time. Broadly speaking, the tendency at present seems to be towards the adoption of separate nationalistic ideals—as in Turkey, Persia, and Egypt—and the abandonment of the pan-Islamic dream which stirred so many hearts a few years ago. How is this general tendency operating in the various Muhammadan countries, from the Atlantic to the Far East? How far is it likely to grow in intensity? How, especially, is it going to affect the unity of Islam, and to weaken the bonds which have imposed, for 1,300 years, the same codes of law, the same mental outlook, and the same essential social forms, on so many different races? "Whither Islam?" is an attempt to provide the material for the solution of such questions as these.

The method of analysis adopted is to divide up the Islamic world into sections, each of which is treated by an expert, who knows his part of that world from within. Professor Louis Massignon writes on Africa (excluding Egypt); Professor Kampaflmeyer on Egypt and Western Asia; Lieut.-Colonel M. L. Ferrar on India; and Professor C. C. Berg on Indonesia. Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan are, unfortunately, briefly noticed only. Professor Gibb, the editor, contributes two long essays: one is an introduction to the whole subject, while in the other he attempts a general interpretation and a forecast. The essays are all valuable as expositions of facts, and all are interestingly written, in spite of an occasional tendency to diffuseness. Perhaps that of Professor Massignon, though the shortest, is the most suggestive of all, as in his observation that "in Islam the movements of opinion brood secretly and in silence, and suddenly break out without giving, as far as can be seen, any warning indications." It is certainly true that history shows that orderly evolution is exceptional in Muslim societies, but the point is not often emphasized and has probably never been better expressed than here.

Professor Gibb's concluding summary is a cautious one. Recognizing the rashness of dogmatic generalizations which will fit the varying circumstances and unequal civilizations of the central lands, not to speak of North-West Africa, India, and Indonesia, he tends to the view that though Islam looks like being dethroned as the arbiter of social life, it has lost little of its force as a religion, even in those countries where the passion for modernization is strongest.

INDIA


(Reviewed by Hugh Molson, M.P.)

There was a real need for a volume of this kind to provide in convenient form a summary of information about the politics of India. Those who know nothing of India will find in this work sketches full of new informa-
tion; those who have made some study of Indian problems will find familiar facts arranged and catalogued for ready reference. The studies in this book are the work of experts, and consequently are of value to the most and the least learned.

Lord Irwin contributes the first and the most valuable chapter in the book. He is usually thought of as a politician and a churchman; in this essay we are reminded that he is also an historian and a sometime Fellow of All Souls. We have here a philosophical survey of the record of the British in India and of their consistent, if unconscious, policy from the early years of the nineteenth century to associate Indians increasingly with the administration. He points out how every constitutional advance which has taken place in what are now the British Dominions had an immediate repercussion on India. "We may justly claim for the old East India Company," he says, "that even in those far off days when a united India, still more a united self-governing India, could have been hardly more than the merest fantasy, its administration unconsciously laid foundations from which the modern constitutional life of India has grown." He faces quite frankly the formidable and fundamental question of whether Western democratic principles are capable of being ever assimilated by the Indian peoples. He shows, however, that any other course would have been impossible and that the events of the last twenty-five years have only been a great acceleration along the same course that we have always followed.

Lord Irwin's article is a remarkable revelation of the basis of his policy when Viceroy. Unlike a mere administrator, he did not regard each problem as a single issue to be solved on opportunist lines; he regarded his period of office as a chapter in India's history which must carry on the tale of those which preceded it and prepare the way for those which must follow and which must bring the tale to its logical conclusion.

A series of chapters describes the development of Indian political activities. Professor Dodwell deals with the period from 1834, when Lord William Bentinck acting on Macaulay's advice introduced English education, until 1885 when that policy had its inevitable consequence in the birth of the Indian National Congress. Professor Rushbrook Williams describes the chequered history of Congress and shows how it remained a great national body until 1918 when the dominance of the Left Wing, which dated from 1916, had its necessary consequence in driving the Moderates into separation. Mr. J. A. Jones, the great editor of The Statesman from 1912 to 1924, takes up the story of the Moderates, contrasts their effectiveness by means of co-operation with the futility of the Extremists who have consistently nullified themselves by non-co-operation. The Moderates influenced considerably the reforms of 1919 and worked them with success for three years until the Extremists, more conscious than the Moderates themselves of the latters' success, decided to enter the Councils. To-day again, at the Round-Table Conference, it is the Moderates like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Mr. Jayakar, and Mr. Sastri who are moulding India's future, while Mr. Gandhi, imprisoned by his obstinately sterile mind, leaves unrepresented that large party in India for which he undoubtedly can speak.
Sir Theodore Morison, for sixteen years on the staff at Aligarh, writes with sympathy and understanding of the Muhammadan community and of its claims. He shows how the prospect of the Minto-Morley Reforms caused the formation of the All-India Muslim League, and its insistence upon separate electorates. There has been too little said in this country of the real reasons which underlie the Muslim demands for safeguards in the new constitution, and this paper is valuable because it emphasizes that Islam is not only a creed but also a civilization, and that therefore as between Hindus and Muslims "the problem of India is international, not national." The other minorities are treated of in short studies by writers familiar with their problems. Mr. Chartres Molony, writing with long experience of Madras, gives a fair estimate of the advance made in recent years by the Depressed Classes. The spokesmen of these unfortunate masses are naturally inclined to exaggerate the misery which their servile status involves for them; Mr. Morley is inclined to attach more importance to their economic subjection. He thinks that the retention of untouchability is as much due to the interests of employers as to the dogmas of religion, and "the political agitation over the disabilities of the Indian emigrant in the Straits Settlements, Ceylon, and South Africa, springs quite as much from a desire for abundant and cheap outcaste labour as from a sensitiveness to Indian dignity."

A chapter on "Mr. Gandhi as a Factor in Indian Politics" is interesting rather as a summary of that remarkable career than as throwing any fresh light on an enigmatical personality. A chapter on "Subversive Movements," by Mr. Campbell Ker, M.P., should be read by anyone who doubts the need for exceptional judicial procedure in dealing with the terrorist movement in Bengal. Of special value are the last three essays in which Sir Robert Holland treats of the "Federal Idea" of the Indian States which has so profoundly affected the whole future course of constitutional plans for India; Lord Zetland paints with a broad brush the first two Round-Table Conferences; and Mr. F. H. Brown fixes on the permanent pages of a book those recent events in 1932 which we read in recent papers but find it so difficult to recall with precision.

This small book is admirable in its limited scope and should be of the utmost use to anyone who wishes to follow intelligently the events of the pregnant coming year.

**Finance and Commerce in Federal India.** By "British Indian." (Oxford University Press.) 5s. net.

(Reviewed by L. F. Rushbrook Williams.)

This little book contains a most workmanlike survey of the problems to be faced in laying the financial foundations of an All-India Federation, and it deserves to be studied by all who are interested, whether directly or indirectly, in solving these problems. The author does not write merely as a theorist: it is plain that he has had practical experience in Indian finance of these pre-Federation days. His guidance is throughout of the most serviceable kind, and he has steadily kept in view "the earnest hope and
belief that a way can be found along which the two countries can travel harmoniously together and help one another, each in its own special way, in establishing and working a constitution.”

The critical faculty of the anonymous author is formidable developed, as will be apparent from his remarks upon certain of the reports of special committees appointed between the second and third Round-Table Conferences. He has some pointed things to say, but he says them with restraint and with an obvious desire to be fair to all sides. More notable still, he contrives to hold the balance strictly even as between British India and the Indian States. And while he does not find himself able to endorse without reservation the claims of either side, he has expounded conflicting points of view, and pronounced judgment upon them, with an impartiality which is beyond all cavil.

This is indeed a most noteworthy little book, and deserves a wide circulation. There is nothing in it which is too technical for the ordinary reader, and the presentation of complicated issues is remarkably lucid.

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**The Indian Riddle. By John Coatman. (Humphrey Toulmin.)** 2s. 6d. net. (Reviewed by Sir Charles Fawcett.)

In this small book the difficulties of the problem of constitutional progress in India that has now reached such a critical stage are admirably stated by Professor Coatman, whose experience and knowledge lend special authority to his views. Apart from this, his forcible and lucid logic will appeal to most readers, even if they differ from some of his conclusions or arguments. His essay also deals with the questions discussed in a manner that takes due account of the Indian, as well as the British, point of view.

As Professor Coatman points out, the difficulties in the way of the creation of an All-India Federation proceed from every one of the three parties to it—the British people, the people of India, and the Indian Princes. As to the communal problem, the situation has advanced, since he wrote in May, 1932, by the decision of the British Government on the representation of the various communities in Provincial Legislatures; and the result has, fortunately, not been so embarrassing or unsettling as he thought it might be. But the hostile claims of Hindus and Moslems on this question remain unappeased; and it can scarcely be said that the time has yet come for the almost unfettered autonomy for the Provinces which Professor Coatman advocates and which, as he says, “assumes a settlement of the minorities problem.” The proposal that he makes to solve the difficulties about autonomy at the centre during the “transitional period” also involves serious obstacles. He suggests an extended Executive Council for the Government of India “composed of the best men who can be found,” representative not only of British-Indian politicians, but also of the Indian States—a Council that would not be responsible to the Central Legislature, but would (he thinks) be able to control and receive its support. He also hopes that Indian political leaders will accept the proposal as a unique
arrangement to meet unique circumstances and as one that is avowedly transitory in preparation for the time when an All-India Federation can be completely created. This would, he holds, lead to co-operation with the Government of India and be a more flexible and appropriate method of settling the terms on which central autonomy should be achieved than the present plan of drawing up a complete scheme with more or less rigid safeguards. If this proposal were acceptable to Indian political leaders and would result in the co-operation he visualises, it would, of course, have a great deal to commend it. The fulfilment of the former premise, however, seems unlikely; and the weakness of the other is indicated by Professor Coatman’s criticism of the somewhat similar proposal that was made by the Government of India on the Simon Commission report, that the Viceroy’s Executive Council should become more “responsive,” though remaining non-responsible to the Indian Legislature. He points out, for instance, the unlikelihood that Indian political leaders of the front rank would enter the Government of India on such terms, and the virtual certainty that their influence would disappear if they did.

But though he may not have found an answer to the riddle that will satisfy British and Indian statesmen, there is no doubt that Professor Coatman’s contributions to its right understanding is one of real value, particularly for those who have no prior acquaintance with the subject and desire enlightenment on the problems it involves.

NEAR EAST


In another notice we have commented upon the high level of the work done by the French Institute. The first volume of the “Documents” is a catalogue raisonné of the pottery housed in the Institute. In a brief introduction of eight pages Monsieur Sauvaget, well known through previous publications, describes where the pottery was recovered, and further the manufacture of two types; finally, he dwells upon the influence of Mesoopotamian work. The forty-nine plates are beautifully produced by the French collotype process.

No. 2: La Maison Syrienne. Par R. Thoumin.

We cannot do better than quote the first sentence of this valuable publication: “La maison compte au nombre des faits essentiels de géographie humaine.” It is this fine expression and idea which underlies the composition of the monograph. After the physical description of the country, the different types of houses are reviewed, those in mud, in stone, and in rock, and finally the ground plans are dealt with. Numerous illustrations in half-tone make it easy to obtain a complete view of the Syrian house in the Hauran and other places. A very clear map is at the end of the handsome volume.
BULLETIN D'ETUDES ORIENTALES. Publié par l'Institut Français de Damas. 
Tome 1, 1931. (Paris: Ernest Leroux.)

This excellent journal is printed in Cairo in a beautiful style. The French occupation of Syria has produced a wholesome effect upon the revival of Arabic literature and culture in general, and the new Bulletin is a testimony to the standard of erudition comparable to that of Paris itself. Monsieur Massignon contributes an opening article on the influence of Islam in the Middle Ages on the foundation of Jewish banks. M. Lassus contributes a paper on two cruciform churches in the Hauran, Saint-Elie d'Ezraa and the church of Segra, to which excellent illustrations and plates have been added. Another article of special interest is by R. Thoumin on two parts of Damascus: the Christian of Bab Musalla and the Kurdish—the sites, the buildings, water supply, customs, etc. Monsieur Lecerf writes on Sibli Sumayyil, the contemporary moralist, who died only a few years ago. Besides a few other articles of equal standing, there are some able reviews of recent books published in Syria, and the student and general reader will be grateful to learn of their existence, as in pre-war days it was very difficult to hear of the literary activity of Syria. We feel confident that the Institute will continue to devote its efforts towards spreading the knowledge of literary and artistic developments in Syria.

FAR EAST


(Reviewed by Dr. H. G. Quaritch Wales.)

Annamite culture owes its peculiar interest to the fact that, now that China is no longer an empire, the Annamite monarchy alone preserves those ancient cultural traditions which formerly centred about the Imperial Court of China. Now only the Emperor of Annam remains to bear the title of Son of Heaven, and to carry out the royal rites of Chinese ancestor worship. Moreover, it is probable that Annamite culture preserves some archaic forms which long ago disappeared from China.

The present scholarly work cannot fail to interest all who study monarchical institutions, especially those of the various nations of Indo-China. The author has made careful use of the sources available in European languages, and, though there is no evidence of his having any direct acquaintance with indigenous literature, on the other hand he has obtained sound information from those personally acquainted with the traditional life of the Court at Hué. The result is a well-balanced account of the rites of accession, the early Court ceremonies, the priestly and secular aspect of the Emperor, his administration, his Court, and finally the royal obsequies. A useful bibliography is appended.

It is unfortunate that Dr. Petit does not appear to have had any oppor-
tunity for personal observation, the more so as the last few years have seen a demise of the Crown with its accompanying funerary and installation ceremonies in Annam, as also in the neighbouring kingdoms of Siam and Cambodia. It is further a matter for regret that the author confines himself mainly to the earlier reigns of the present dynasty, since the Annamite monarchy is, even at the present time, not a mere survival. It is a living institution, and as such still plays a definite rôle in the government of the country. The present work whets our appetite for more information as to the working of the native government in conjunction with modern French policy, but it does not satisfy that appetite. Notwithstanding these limitations, however, the book makes an excellent introduction to the subject.


(Reviewed by K. M. Panikkar.)

M. Dorsenne has written an interesting study of Franco-Annamite relations under the above title. The title is a slightly misleading one. M. Dorsenne does not discuss either the possibility of evacuating Indo-China or even the establishment of a modified form of self-government in the colony. What the book contains is an acute analysis of the social and political malaise resulting from the economic colonialism of France in Indo-China. Students of British policy in India would find the book extremely interesting, both from the points of view of comparison and contrast. The social problems with which M. Dorsenne deals are in a limited degree applicable to India, while the economic and political aspects are interesting as evidence of the contrast in the colonial policies of France and England. Socially all contact between the Annamites and the French seems to be interdicted. As M. Dorsenne puts it: "Sauf à Hué, où s’exerce l’influence bienfaisante d’un résident supérieur intelligent et énergique, le divorce est total entre protecteurs et protégés. La Société bien élevée de Saigon ignore les Annamites, tel garçon inculte et vulgaire s’estimerait déshonoré s’il recevait dans son salon un de ces mandarins courtois fin et lettrés dans le genre de ceux que Jules Boissières nous a dépeints de si inoubliable façon!" If the French claim that they are less susceptible to colour-feeling than the British in social psychology, that is not apparent in this description of their officially accepted code of behaviour.

If there are comparisons of this nature in regard to social life, the political and economic policy of the French in Indo-China and England in India seems to differ fundamentally. The system of monopolies on which the fiscal régime in Indo-China still seems to be based was discarded long ago in India. Politically also the idea of associating the people of Indo-China effectively with the administration has not yet found favour.

The most interesting portions of M. Dorsenne’s book are those which deal with the Communist parties in Indo-China. Here he seems to speak with first-hand information and with intimate knowledge of the personalities behind the movement.

This book begins with a suggestive essay on "La Doctrine Coloniaire," in which the saying of Montesquieu on conquests made by democracies is quoted: "They enjoy the advantages neither of a republic nor of a monarchy." French colonial history has, however, given the lie to this doctrine. The author's view is: "Men are influenced by two feelings: justice and hope." The mission of the colonizing power is to be just, to develop the country, but also, within reason, to offer the consolation of eventual emancipation. There follow a very useful survey of the resources of the French colonies, in which much space is given to Indochina and Madagascar, and a study of their economic and administrative problems. Much interest attaches to the last section, which deals with international problems. For Indochina he recommends a policy of friendly co-operation with the British in Malaya and Hongkong, with Siam, and with the Philippine Islands. He sees danger in the ambitions of Germany and Italy and the suggestion emanating from certain American quarters for the payment of French war debts by the cession of islands of the West Indies.


Maurice Long had a notable career already previous to his appointment as Governor-General of Indochina, but the present volume deals only with the four years during which he held that office. His first problem was the financial one, and as in 1920 there was little hope of obtaining adequate support from France he found it necessary to try the experiment of raising a loan locally (the first of its kind). The amount asked for was six million piastres. Already on the eleventh day this amount had been raised. Owing to the high value of the piastre he was able to protect Indochina from the monetary crisis occasioned by the fall of the French franc and assure her an era of prosperity comparable to that of the United States. His next task was to develop the economic resources of the country. This was much facilitated by the construction of roads and railways, the first of which excited the admiration of Lord Northcliffe. It was fortunate that the first four years of the post-war period were marked by internal tranquillity, as France was in a state of exhaustion. In spite of the reduced effectives at the disposal of the French authorities, raids from the Chinese border were few, and easily repulsed.
WHERE EAST AND WEST MEET

THE NORTHBROOK SOCIETY

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, 1932

The Annual General Meeting of the Northbrook Society was held at the Society's rooms, 21, Cromwell Road, London, S.W. 7, on Thursday, September 22, 1932. Sir Mancherjee Bhownagree, K.C.I.E., occupied the Chair, and was supported by Mr. C. E. Buckland, C.I.E., Col. W. M. Coldstream, C.I.E., Lady Mullick, Dr. F. S. Gotla, L.R.C.P.S., Mr. and Mrs. H. S. L. Polak, Mrs. Nicholson, Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Roy and Miss Gordon Roy, Mrs. Damry, Mrs. and Miss Bahadurji, Miss Percival-Hall, Miss Beck, Miss Thomas Jones, Mrs. and Miss Oliver, Mr. E. Oliver, Hon. Secretary, etc.

The Secretary, having read the notice convening the meeting, was called upon by the Chairman to read the Report, as follows:

Annual Report for 1931

The record of work for the twelve months ended December 31, 1931, follows closely the programme outlined in the Report of the preceding year. The whole of the income of the Society, available after its administrative expenses are met, has been employed in providing Grants-in-Aid to deserving Indian students in this country who happen to require necessary financial assistance to enable them to complete the final graduate or further research courses. The attention of the Committee has been largely concentrated upon investigating the qualifications of the applicants for these Grants and selecting the most deserving of help. This work calls for no little discrimination and judgment in order to insure, from among a number of applicants, that the most worthy shall benefit. The proof that this endeavour has been successful in the past has been provided by the students themselves, most of whom, having benefited thereby, have not only been able to take their final degrees, but to obtain responsible and lucrative posts subsequently.

The Sir Dinshaw Petit Library has been another object of the Committee's attention, as its usefulness to students of Oriental literature is a feature of the Society's work in their interest. It is kept up-to-date as mentioned below.

In regard to the social complement to the Society's essentially
educational activities, it is interesting to record that it has been privileged to co-operate with the National Indian Association in a series of functions in honour of distinguished public men both on appointment to great offices in India or on their return, together with social reunions of students and of visitors from India and their British friends. These opportunities have special educational value as establishing amicable relations between the peoples of both countries.

GRANTS-IN-AID

In all, thirteen Grants of £50 each have been made since the inception of the now settled policy of the Society to use its available funds in helping the higher grade of Indian students. Two of these Grants were made during the year under review, as follows:

Mr. S. Anwar Ullah, who at the time was studying for his Ph.D. degree at the Imperial College of Science, London. Mr. Anwar Ullah secured the degree and has since returned to India.

Mr. T. D. Kansara, who was studying for his Ph.D. degree at Cambridge University. He, too, was successful, and has returned to India.

The new appointments to Grants will be noted in the next Report.

SIR DINSHAW PETIT LIBRARY

The educational purpose served by the library is evidenced by the regular requests for the loan of books by Indian students and other scholars. The library is being kept abreast of the times by purchases of current works from its special endowed fund, the object being to make it a representative collection of Oriental works. The Committee have the pleasure once more to acknowledge their indebtedness to the Library Sub-Committee, consisting of Captain L. A. Cranmer-Byng, Mr. C. E. Buckland, and Mr. H. S. L. Polak, for invaluable service in keeping the collection up-to-date. Captain Cranmer-Byng’s personal constant supervision and recommendations deserve special recognition. The Committee are encouraged by his expert advice to buy such costly works as Marshall’s *Mohenjo-Daro*, Codrington and Rothenstein’s *Ancient India*, etc.—acquisitions which are regarded as likely to prove of increasing value to the library.

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS

The following functions have been held during the year as referred to above:
A New Year Party, on January 3.
A Reception to Lord Willingdon on his appointment as Viceroy of India, on March 3.
A Reception to Lord Irwin on his retirement from the Vice-royalty of India, on June 26.
A Reception to Members of the Round-Table Conference and other Visitors from India, on November 6.

LOSS THROUGH DEATH

The Northbrook Society has suffered irreparable losses during the year, especially that by the death of their illustrious President, Lord Harris. Lord Harris remained to the end of his long life an outstanding personality in whatever sphere he chose to adorn. As statesman, sportsman, and a great social figure, he left his mark upon three generations of the British Empire. It is especially gratifying to remember that he always showed the keenest personal interest in the affairs and objects of this Society, and on two notable occasions himself organized special entertainments for the members and guests. Another loss was the untimely death of Sir Basanta Mullick. He was an eminent authority on Indian education, who had occupied high public positions, and was a charming colleague whose advice was of inestimable value to the Committee. The loss of a veteran member of the Society is also to be regretted in the passing of Sir William T. Morison, K.C.S.I., who, through his membership of the Society, had for many years since his retirement manifested his friendly interest in India.

A second vacancy on the Committee was caused by the retirement of Dr. R. P. Paranjpye, another high educational authority, owing to his permanent return to India.

The Committee has been able to fill these two vacancies by the appointment of Lady Mullick and Mr. A. Yusuf Ali, whose cooperation is sure to prove of great value in the interests of the Society.

RETIREMENT OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE

In conformity with Regulation 34 of the Articles of Association, the following members of the Committee are retiring, but are eligible for re-election:

Sir M. M. Bhownaggree, K.C.I.E.
F. S. Gotla, Esq., L.R.C.P. and S.
Lady Mullick.
E. Oliver, Esq.
F. J. P. Richter, Esq., M.A.
A. Yusuf Ali, Esq., C.B.E.
Audited Accounts

The Hon. Treasurer’s Audited Accounts are placed on the table for inspection.

Gift of Periodicals

The thanks of the Society are due to the Government of India for official publications, to the India Office and the Office of the High Commissioner for the gift of periodicals and official publications, which include the following: The Statesman, Madras Mail, Times of India, Pioneer Mail, Calcutta Gazette, Calcutta Review; also to Mr. John Murray for the Quarterly Review and East and West, Ltd., for the Asiatic Review, which, like the above publications, have been supplied for many years, and are much used and appreciated.

The Chairman, in the course of his review of the period covered by the Report, said: The Committee can look upon the results of its labours with a certain amount of satisfaction as having been successfully devoted again to furthering the cause of the educational and social interests of India. There were a number of philanthropic bodies now in England inspired by a more or less similar aim, and in order to avoid overlapping, it had been found necessary to plan a specific course that shall produce the maximum of good for the money and activities which were available for our objects. After long experience of the needs of students from India, they had come definitely to the conclusion that the most effective means of rendering such help as would confer permanent benefit on the recipients was to assist those who had reached the border-land of their studies for attaining their English diplomas and found themselves in need of funds to reach the final stages. The resources of the Society were limited, but such as they were, they had been devoted exclusively to this purpose, and, as the Report had described more fully, they had good reason to be satisfied with the results achieved.

The Library, continued the Chairman, had been fully kept up to its high standard by the Library Sub-Committee, under the expert advice of Captain L. Cranmer-Byng., J.P., and the many valuable additions made during the twelve months under review have contributed substantially to making the collection one of the most representative of Oriental literature. The applications for the loan of books are the most practical tribute to its usefulness, and it may be noted in proof of it that it furnished textbooks necessary for the preparation of theses which earned Doctorate diplomas for a good many students, and also for others engaged in research and scholarly work.
Turning to the social side of the Society’s work, the Chairman said that he was pleased to see Miss Beck amongst those present. Those who attended the enjoyable gatherings owed much to her for the success of the functions in which the Northbrook Society had co-operated with the National Indian Association. Among the more notable of these had been a farewell reception to Lord Willingdon prior to his departure to take up his Viceregal duties. These functions served specifically to perpetuate the wishes of the illustrious founder of the Northbrook Society, to promote friendly relations between the British and people of India. (Cheers.)

The Society had suffered exceptionally heavy losses by death during the past year, said the Chairman. The passing of their revered President, Lord Harris, had left a void which was being felt not only by reason of his eminent position and his active sympathies with the work of the Society, but of the difficulty in finding a comparable successor. The Committee had given much thought to filling this vacancy, but most of those who might be expected to maintain the tradition started by Lord Northbrook and continued by a succession of Viceroy and Governors had their time already fully occupied by public duties. Still, they were hopeful of securing as their President a personality of outstanding position in the service of the Empire, with a reputation for being a well-wisher of India. The death of Sir Basanta Mullick was another serious loss to the work of the Society, because from the time he first became a member of the Committee he had made it his duty to give his colleagues the fullest benefit of his unique knowledge of the youth of India and their educational requirements. The Society was fortunate, however, in finding Lady Mullick willing to fill the vacancy.

Then in the death of Sir William Morison they had lost one of those quiet friends of India, who were so retiring by nature as not to be in the public eye prominently. Nevertheless the solid good they did in their unostentatious way was typical of the mission of the Northbrook Society in that it conferred no advantage on its members in return for their services.

In conclusion, the Chairman paid a generous tribute to the work of his colleagues on the Committee, the Hon. Secretary, Mr. Oliver, and Mr. Gregory, the Clerk and Librarian, who, amongst many other services, had compiled a very useful catalogue of the Library, keeping it up-to-date. He thanked all those present for coming to the meeting, and especially Mr. Buckland, who, in spite of his advanced age, continued to take keen interest in the fortunes of the Society, and whose sound and experienced advice was highly valued by his colleagues. (Applause.)

The Chairman then proposed the adoption of the Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. The motion was seconded
by Mr. C. E. Buckland and supported by Dr. F. S. Gotla, and was carried unanimously.

The motion to re-elect the Vice-Presidents was proposed by Col. W. M. Coldstream and seconded by Mrs. Polak; carried unanimously.

Mr. H. S. Polak proposed the re-election of Mr. Gordon Roy as Hon. Treasurer, and was supported by Mrs. Nicholson; carried unanimously.

The re-election of the retiring members of the Committee was moved by Mr. Gordon Roy and seconded by Mrs. Oliver; carried unanimously.

Miss Percival-Hall proposed and Mrs. Bahadurji seconded the reappointment of the Auditors, Messrs. Hicks, Walters and Company.

A vote of thanks to the Chairman was moved by Mr. H. S. L. Polak, who said that it was difficult to imagine the Northbrook Society without Sir Mancherjee Bhownaggree at the helm. Their Chairman had devoted himself wholeheartedly to the interests of the Society and of India generally, and his name would be long associated with his labours for the advancement of Indian education. The motion was supported with the warmest enthusiasm.

The Chairman made his acknowledgment with characteristic modesty, and a very successful gathering was brought to an end.
PROJECT OF BUILDINGS FOR OSMANIA UNIVERSITY (HYDERABAD) SUBMITTED TO H.E.H.'S GOVERNMENT BY MR. JASPER, CONSULTING ARCHITECT OF THE UNIVERSITY.
TIMBERING SIDES OF DRAINAGE TRENCHES (KASHMIR)
LANDSLIPS IN DRAINAGE TRENCHES (KASHMIR)
DRAINAGE TRENCHES SHOWING PROCESS OF DEWATERING
(KASHMIR)

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Seringapatam (Mysore State): The Mausoleum of Hyder Ali and Tippu Sultan

Copyright reserved, Railway Dept., Government of India
THE COURTYARD OF A MOSQUE AT ISPAHAN

Copyright reserved, Railway Dept., Government of India
SNOW SCENE IN THE CITY OF NAGAOKA

By courtesy of Nippon Travel Association

THE ARAKAWA RAPIDS IN SHOSENKYO GORGE
MT. HAKUBA, 2,933 M.: NORTHERN JAPAN ALPS

MT. FUJI REFLECTED IN LAKE SHOJI

By courtesy of Nippon Yusen Kaisha
VIEW OF MT. FUJI

LAKE KAWAGUCHI AT THE FOOT OF MT. FUJI

By courtesy of Nippon Yusen Kaisha
“KIJUN OGI,” OR SILK FANS: A JAPANESE PAINTING BY MR. SEIHA MORIKAWA

“UJO,” OR CASTLE OF SNOWY HERON: A JAPANESE PAINTING DEPICTING THE OLD CASTLE AT OKAYAMA BY MR. YOSEN IKEDA

By courtesy of Nippon Yuwen Kyusha.
MT. SENNOKURA AS SEEN FROM THE TOP OF MT. MANTARO IN THE EARLY SPRING

By courtesy of Nippon Yusei Kaisha
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

THE THIRD ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE

By Hugh Molson, M.P.

When the Second Round-Table Conference was concluded on December 1, 1931, the Prime Minister announced the setting up of four Committees to work in India, three so-called fact-finding Committees to deal respectively with the Franchise, Federal Finance, and States Finance, and a small Consultative Committee of members of the Round-Table Conference to carry on the work of the Conference in India under the chairmanship of the Viceroy.

On getting to work, the Consultative Committee ran up against the communal problem which had so greatly impaired the utility of the Second Round-Table Conference, and at last it invited His Majesty's Government to give a decision upon the matter. Having themselves undertaken this heavy responsibility, the British Government hoped that the Committee would be able to get to work on the other outstanding problems. In this hope, and desirous of expediting the slow machinery of Constitutional reform, the Secretary of State announced in Parliament on June 27 that it was not proposed to hold a third Round-Table Conference if the Consultative Committee worked with success, but they hoped to proceed in due course to the stage of a Joint Committee of both Houses to which representative Indians would be attached in a consultative capacity, and the Government intended to lay definite proposals before this Committee with a view to the preparation of a Bill. The Secretary of State added:

"It may be that the course of discussions in the Consultative Committee may prove that matters will not be ripe for the formulation of definite proposals for the consideration of a Joint Select Committee without further consultation of a more formal character. In that event, at the cost of delaying their programme, His Majesty's Government will make arrangements accordingly; but they would regard it as essential... that the size and personnel of the body to be summoned for such further discussions in Vol. XXIX."
London should be strictly determined with reference to the number and character of the subjects found to require further discussion."

Sir Samuel's fears were realized, for the Consultative Committee made little further progress and had to be adjourned indefinitely. A number of important Indian delegates expressed strong disapproval of the proposed elimination of a further Round-Table Conference, and cited as broken pledges several statements by British statesmen, notably one in the Prime Minister's last speech: "But in the end we shall have to meet again for a final review of the scheme."

As the British Government had no desire even to appear guilty of a breach of faith, and, as the Consultative Committee had left so much undone, the Viceroy announced on September 5 that a small body of representatives of British India and of the States would be invited to meet them for a further Conference in November. That is the Third Round-Table Conference which we are discussing this afternoon.

A BUSINESSLIKE CONFERENCE

The Government remained firm in their intention that this was to be a more businesslike body than the two which preceded it. It was kept small and delegates were selected largely with an eye to their capacity for thought rather than to their capacity for talk. The decision that speeches should not be published removed a great temptation to loquacity and to intransigence. The Ministers who this time represented the Indian States were, owing to their training, better committee men than their masters who had taken part in the first two Conferences. The absence of Mr. Gandhi may have detracted from the representative character of the Conference, but it in no way diminished its constructive capacity; the more regrettable abstention of that section of the Labour Party which is in Opposition was less of a handicap than might have been expected.

The existence of a more limited agenda of a concrete character, and the fact that the British delegations took a more active part in the discussions and regarded themselves less as observers, all tended to enable definite conclusions to be more rapidly and more easily reached.
In addition to the organization of the Conference, it had a far better background of fact on which to work. Owing to the communal decision given by the Government in August, much of what had previously been No Man's Land and the object of skilful manoeuvres had now become the secure entrenchments of the combatant parties—though that does not imply that the communal issue did not frequently reappear in other guises.

The Lothian Report enabled the Conference to deal with fairly clearly defined electorates; the Percy Report indicated with some precision how much money would be at the disposal of the Centre and of each province; the Davidson Report enabled British India and Indian India to know for the first time what federation meant in a profit and loss account. The Third Round-Table Conference therefore touched the concrete, whereas its predecessors had only seen with the eye of faith and sometimes of imagination. This somewhat lengthy introduction has been necessary in order to enable us to see the Third Round-Table Conference in proportion. We must now go through the agenda and note the discussion on each item and the recommendations made.

**The Legislatures**

The first questions were those arising out of the Lothian Committee's Report. As was anticipated, the recommendation that the Federal and Provincial Lower Houses should be elected by large constituencies of direct voters was accepted. This is one of those questions where English opinion is most sceptical of the wisdom of what Indians almost unanimously demand, but it is essentially a domestic problem in which, after expressing our doubts, we are prudent to leave the decision to India. The main recommendation that a low property qualification should be prescribed for the provincial franchise was accepted, but some doubt was expressed as to the practical difficulties in the way of the supplementary educational qualification. The recommendation of the Lothian Committee that approximately one woman should be enfranchised for every four and a half men was accepted, but there was again doubt as to whether the Committee had proposed the best methods of attaining that end. The further
proposal that everywhere except in the Central Provinces the existing electorates for the provincial councils should elect the new Federal Assembly was approved, and it was once more accepted that the new Federal Upper House should be elected by the provincial Legislatures.

On the subject of the size of the two Federal Chambers, no agreement could be reached, for it was necessarily tied up with the number of seats to be allotted to British India and the Indian States respectively, and with the allocation of seats to the Indian States inter se. Many British Indian delegates were willing to give the Indian States 40 per cent. and $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. of the seats in the Upper and Lower Houses respectively, but the Muslims were opposed to any weightage being granted to the States, and restated their demand for $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. of the Lower House as a demand for $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. of the share that British India would have had on a population basis if no weightage had been granted to the States. This may be regarded as a concession in so far as it avoids introducing the complication of a communal proportion into the States representation, but it is of course a claim for more than one-third of the British Indian seats.

It looks as if this fundamental problem, which will of course determine how much power the Indian States will exercise in the Federation, would have to be referred, like the communal problems, for the arbitral decision of His Majesty’s Government, but even that point has not yet been reached. British Indian delegates were willing to leave the size of the Chambers to this arbitration, but not the percentage to be given to the States; the latter were prepared for the percentage also to be arbitrated, subject to their right not to enter Federation if they were dissatisfied! This may be regarded as the worst deadlock which the Conference reached, and it is made more difficult because neither the British Indian nor the States’ delegations were agreed amongst themselves upon their minimum terms.

The second item on the agenda dealt with the relations between the Units and the Centre in the new Federation. This is a technical subject which I propose to omit entirely.
The Safeguards

The third item brings us to the so-called safeguards, and is of outstanding importance and interest. It had been recognized at both the previous Conferences that for a number of years to come the responsible Government which the new Constitution will confer must be subject to certain powers to be left in the hands of the Governor-General. This year these powers have been clearly defined, and they fall into three categories:

1. The Governor-General's discretionary powers.
2. The Governor-General's powers to discharge his "special responsibilities."
3. The Governor-General's powers in regard to Reserved Subjects.

1. The "discretionary powers" are in most cases such as are possessed by every head of the State. The Governor-General can decide where and whether to summon, prorogue, or dissolve the Legislature, or to summon a joint meeting of both Houses, and to assent to or veto legislation. The powers include also the right to grant or refuse his previous sanction to the introduction of certain classes of legislation.

2. The "special responsibility powers" relate to those occasions where under the Instrument of Instructions the Governor-General will be required to intervene in matters which normally are entrusted to responsible ministers. He would be in duty bound to use these powers:

(a) To prevent grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of India or of any part thereof.
(b) To protect minorities.
(c) To preserve the rights of the public services.
(d) To prevent injury to the credit of India.
(e) To protect the rights of the Indian States.
(f) To prevent commercial discrimination.
(g) To safeguard the administration of the Reserved Subjects.

I think all those examples speak for themselves; the powers relate not to any particular Department, but to all Departments in so far as is necessary for the purpose laid down.

3. The powers relating to the Reserved Subjects enable him to administer the Departments of Defence and External Affairs
through nominee ministers, who will be solely and entirely responsible to him. It is, of course, contemplated that there would be the fullest and freest discussion between the Governor-General and his nominees administering the Reserved Subjects and the responsible ministers (just as there has been in Madras since Lord Willingdon’s time between the Executive Council and the Ministry), but the British Government refused to make such consultation obligatory in the statute.

Having seen the threefold scope of the Governor-General’s powers, we must now consider their nature if we are to know whether they will be effective. The Governor-General is to have power of legislating on his own responsibility, both temporarily and permanently, and of securing supplies for the purpose of administering his Reserved Departments or of discharging his “special responsibilities.” This, it will be seen, is an even wider power than that he now possesses of issuing temporary ordinances and of restoring demands for grants refused by the Assembly. It is not therefore, I think, possible to deny that the Governor-General will have ample powers to make the safeguards effective—although some people may wonder whether any man would be capable of discharging such varied and extensive responsibilities.

These great powers are, of course, intended to be kept in reserve and only used in case of necessity. If, as is to be hoped, the new constitution is well and faithfully worked, they will never be called into operation at all. They will not be used so as to nullify the responsible self-government which is being given.

Of course, one of the most difficult of these will be to determine how much of India’s revenues must be earmarked for defence. Indians are not alone in believing that the present figure is higher than it need be, and in looking to economy in that Department as a means of relieving the pressure on Federal finances, the subject to which we now turn.

Financial Adjustments

It will be remembered that at the Second Round-Table Conference a Committee was set up under the chairmanship of Lord Peel to report on that most fundamental and difficult of problems
in a Federation, the allocation of revenues to the Centre and the Units. As the Peel Committee had only limited time and information, it recommended that its own conclusions should be examined by two expert committees, one of which would put its proposals to the test of estimated Budgetary figures in British India, and the other would make recommendations as to the financial settlement to be made with each State. As already indicated, the first was presided over by Lord Eustace Percy, and the second by Mr. J. C. C. Davidson.

The Percy Committee found that, "given a recovery from the present abnormal economic conditions, the financial scheme outlined in the Peel Report provides a foundation on which an Indian Federation can be established and can begin its work," but they recommended an important modification in the allocation of income tax. The Peel Committee had proposed that the whole of income tax, though collected by the Federal Government, should be distributed to the provinces, the resulting deficit at the Centre being made up by new Provincial Contributions. The Central Government should retain for itself income tax levied in Federal areas—e.g., Delhi, Coorg, etc.—or paid by Federal officers. A corporation tax, of which the existing super-tax on companies is an example, was proposed as the only tax on income which the Princes seemed likely to allow to be levied in their States for the benefit of the Federal Government.

The Round-Table Conference has substantially modified these proposals. They propose that a number of heads of income tax—or the sum which those heads would represent—should be permanently assigned to the Federal Government. That means, of course, that British India would be making that special contribution to the cost of the Federal Government, and it is only on condition that this contribution amounts to Rs. 8 4/5 crores annually that the Indian Princes are willing to allow corporation tax to be levied in their States. At present the British India representatives are not prepared to agree to a contribution out of income tax exceeding Rs. 5 4/5 crores. Even if that dispute were settled, however, the present acute financial stringency makes it impossible for this system to be introduced immediately, and it
was therefore agreed that for $x$ years the Federal Government would have to retain a block amount out of the Provinces' share of income tax.

It is quite impossible to summarize within the scope of this paper the many detailed proposals for dealing with the various items of Federal finance, but I have given a few particulars with regard to the allocation of income tax, partly because it is of such fundamental importance to the stability of the Indian Federation and partly because it shows how carefully the representatives of the States and British India, of the industrial provinces and the agricultural, of the deficit provinces and those with surpluses, have been fighting amongst themselves to secure fair, if not favourable, treatment for the interests they represent.

FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS

It is natural to pass from Federal finance to financial safeguards, and here we come up against the problem which many people believed would shipwreck the Conference. The task of the Third Conference was to define with accuracy what was necessary to implement para. 18 of the Second Report of the Federal Structure Committee, where it is said:

"It would be necessary to reserve to the Governor-General in regard to budgetary arrangements and borrowing such essential powers as would enable him to intervene if methods were being pursued which would, in his opinion, seriously prejudice the credit of India in the money markets of the world. The Sub-Committee recommend, with a view to ensuring confidence in the management of Indian credit and currency, that efforts should be made to establish on sure foundations and free from any political influence . . . a Reserve Bank which will be entrusted with the management of the currency and exchange. . . . The service of loans, with adequate provision for redemption . . . and the salaries and pensions of persons appointed on guarantees given by the Secretary of State should be secured, along with the supply required for the Reserved Departments, as Consolidated Fund Charges."

It was also proposed that the Governor-General's previous sanction should be required for the introduction of a Bill to amend the legislation which deals with exchange and currency.

The Committee which dealt with this matter accepted the need
for giving the Governor-General complete powers of intervention if he is satisfied that the course of action being pursued by his Finance Minister is likely to endanger seriously the financial stability of the Federation, and it also agreed to his having a Financial Adviser without whom the power could hardly be effective. The Adviser's services would also be available to the Government. More unwillingly the Committee agreed to the requirement of previous sanction for legislation affecting currency and exchange, if it is ultimately thought necessary to insist on this.

The real difficulty arose, however, in the matter of the Reserve Bank, for the British Government now take the view that this must be set up and working as a preliminary to Federation. It will be seen that this definitely goes beyond the wording I have quoted from the First Conference, and some protest was made at a new condition precedent being laid down. The Secretary of State made it quite clear, however, that this is the direct result of the collapse in confidence all through the world, and that what was possible two years ago when investors were confident is not possible now when they are nervous. He explained that the British Government has abandoned all idea of temporarily reserving Federal finance after Federation until the Reserve Bank has been set up. It is because they intend to transfer finance to the charge of an Indian Minister responsible, like his colleagues, to the Legislature that they must insist upon a Reserve Bank to manage currency being set up in advance.

How long this will take is a mere speculation, but probably it would first be necessary for the Indian budgetary position to be really assured, for the existing short-term debt in London and India to be substantially reduced, for adequate reserves to be accumulated, and for India's normal export surplus to be restored. Should it appear, however, that this requirement of a Reserve Bank is alone hindering Federation, the Secretary of State has undertaken to discuss this particular problem again with representatives of Indian opinion. The attitude of the Government all along has been that their requirements for the adequate safeguarding of the Secretary of State's liabilities to investors, civil
servants, etc., could be comparatively easily satisfied; the real problem is how to satisfy the City of London, upon the goodwill of which depend the terms upon which India will be able to convert the large loans which fall due in the next few years.

COMMERCIAL DISCRIMINATION

The question of safeguards for British commercial and industrial enterprises established in India was also further defined. It may be remembered that the First Conference accepted with one dissentient the proposal of the British commercial community that equality of rights as between British and Indian subjects, firms, and companies, should be established by means of a commercial agreement based on reciprocity to be entered into by Great Britain and India. By the time of the Second Conference the British Government, which had been very much attracted by the idea at first, had definitely turned against it on the ground that it would be improper to tie India to an agreement of this kind before the introduction of the new Constitution. It is an interesting proof of the genuine character of these scruples that the Ottawa Agreement with India was made liable to denunciation at six months' notice, whereas those with the Dominions were for a minimum period of five years.

At the Second Conference, therefore, it was decided that, while the object aimed at remained the same, "the Constitution should contain a clause prohibiting legislative or administrative discrimination in the matters set out . . . and defining those persons and bodies to whom the clause is to apply." This, it was thought, would adequately cover British individuals ordinarily resident in India and companies registered there. As it was intended equally to cover companies registered in Great Britain and trading in India, it was proposed to have another clause establishing the right of persons and bodies in the United Kingdom to enter and trade with India on terms no less favourable than those on which persons and bodies in India enter and trade with the United Kingdom.

The Committee of the Third Conference accepted these pro-
posals, and that one of the "special responsibilities" of the Governor-General and of the Governors would be to intervene if ministers sought to discriminate by administrative action, in addition to their normal power of vetoking or reserving proposed discriminatory legislation. The majority agreed that no differentiation should be made between companies registered in India and companies registered in the United Kingdom.

It is perhaps in a way unfortunate that, while at the first two Conferences attention was directed chiefly to the constitutional advances to be made, the third was obliged to spend much of its time on safeguards. This was because the details of these safeguards had been somewhat neglected, but it would be wholly false to regard the third Conference as less progressive than the other two in its results. It is the hope of everyone, and the belief of many, that in practice the safeguards and the protections will rarely or never come into operation.

**Fundamental Rights**

The minorities in India have always attached considerable importance to a declaration of so-called fundamental rights. This is the only branch of the Constitution where Indians have not followed English precedent, and, conversely, it is almost the only matter on which Englishmen consistently advise them to do so. We are accustomed to a Constitution which does not lay down any abstract rights of Englishmen, but only prescribes penalties for those who wrongfully infringe the rights of individuals, and Parliament is not subject to any limitation as to what it may do. English lawyers, therefore, are instinctively sceptical of declarations of fundamental rights which, while purporting to preserve the liberty of all men, must limit the legal powers of the legislature; and the experience of countries with such constitutional provisions tends to confirm our view that they are usually ineffective for their purpose and frequently effective in unfortunate and unforeseen ways. It was therefore suggested that these fundamental rights should be laid down in a Royal Proclamation as the aims of good government rather than as provisions of a statute which might render *ultra vires* quite innocent legislation.
Constituency Powers

Another difficult Constitutional problem arose in connection with the power of Indian Legislature to amend their Constitution. The British Government would willingly empower the Indian Legislatures to make small amendments which will certainly be needed from time to time if the Constitution is not to be so rigid as to chafe the growing and developing body of the Indian State, but the danger of reopening the communal question will probably necessitate that power being retained in this country—just as the racial problem in Canada has prevented the Eldest Dominion from adopting in its entirety the Statute of Westminster.

The old problem of whether residuary powers should be federal, as is desired by the Hindus, or provincial, as is desired by the Muslims, again gave some trouble. As the residuary subjects are only those which have not yet been thought of but may arise in the future (as aviation and wireless were unforeseen when other federations were formed), it may be thought that the importance of this problem has been exaggerated. There is some hope of a compromise on the lines that the much-burdened Governor-General shall apportion the residuary subjects when they arise to either the Centre or the Units.

The speech with which the Secretary of State concluded the Conference contained no broad pronouncement of Government policy as had the speeches of the Prime Minister at the end of the first two Conferences. There was, in fact, no scope for anything of that kind, for the work had been to define and clarify the details outlined in previous years. It was, however, an important statement of the spirit in which the Government intended to proceed, and it was undoubtedly effective in reassuring the delegates that, where it had not been possible to meet their wishes by diminishing the legal force of the safeguards, it was at any rate intended only to use them if it were absolutely necessary.

Sir Samuel Hoare did make three important announcements of the Government's intentions. For the first time he indicated that the accession to the Federation of about 50 per cent. of the Indian States, in number and population, would be regarded as
sufficient to justify the formation of a Federation. He also announced the intention to create new provinces of Sind and Orissa. The former was expected, although it is likely to mean a deficit of about Rs. 80 lakhs, but the second was something of a surprise and will probably add to the charges on India’s revenues by about Rs. 35 lakhs. Finally, he expressed the Government’s intention to grant to the Muslim community 33½ per cent. of the seats in the Central Legislature which will be allotted to British India.

**Satisfactory Deductions**

What, then, can we deduce from the numerous discussions and recommendations of the Third Round-Table Conference?

First, I think, it emerges that busy men from the Indian States, from British India, and from Great Britain would not have spent six weeks of hard work in contending over the details of a Constitution unless they all believed that an Indian Federation will come into being before many years are over.

Secondly, it is clearer than ever that these Conferences are not a tug-of-war between an autocratic British Government and an united India struggling to be free. Some of the severest struggles were between the different Indian interests, while the British Delegation acted as disinterested conciliators.

Thirdly, some of the Indian delegates, while disliking the safeguards and disbelieving in their necessity, frankly accepted them, even in their clearly defined form, as the *quid pro quo* which they were in honour bound to concede as the price of responsible Government. Moreover, many of them were genuinely persuaded of the necessity of the safeguards in the light of actual discussions with City authorities.

And, fourthly, the Conference shows that there is still a large fund of mutual goodwill and understanding between India and Britain, out of which it should be possible to build up a new Constitution, satisfying at once the political aspirations of India and the prudence of Great Britain.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A meeting of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Monday, January 16, 1933, when a paper was read by Mr. Hugh Molson, M.P., on "The Third Round-Table Conference." The Right Hon. Viscount Sankey, G.B.E. (the Lord Chancellor), was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, among others, were present:


The Chairman: You all know the story of a distinguished Member of Parliament who went down to give an address in one of the suburbs of London. The Chairman who introduced him spoke for an hour and a half, and at the end of that speech the distinguished Member of Parliament got up and said, "Ladies and Gentlemen, my address is 127, High Street. Good-night." I am glad to say we have rather improved upon that. I think it is largely due to the B.B.C. There is quite a different form of introduction now, which runs something like this, from one of the distinguished announcers: "Mr. Snooks has come to the microphone this evening to tell you something about Noah's Ark. Mr. Snooks." Then Mr. Snooks starts from behind scratch. (Laughter.)
I want to vary those things, first of all, to tell you what an honour and pleasure I feel it to be occupying the Chair this afternoon for several reasons. Mr. Molson, the lecturer, and I were at the same school. We were at the same University, and we are members of the same Parliament. There is, however, one great difference between us, and that is this: I was born in the last century, and he was born in the present one. Therefore you will at once perceive that he is far more up to date than I am. It fell to my lot, however, to preside over the Federal Committee of the First Round-Table Conference, and of the Second Round-Table Conference, and over the recent Round-Table Conference.

But I have come here this afternoon not to speak but to listen and to learn, because Mr. Molson is a man of great knowledge and great experience on the matters on which he is going to address us. From 1926 to 1929 he was the Political Secretary of the Associated Chambers of Commerce in India. As a result of that, of the many speeches which were made in the House of Commons last year on India, he made one of the most brilliant. But perhaps that was only to be expected from a man who had occupied the proud position of President of the Oxford Union.

(The paper was then read.)

Sir Hubert Carr: I am not sure that I am really prepared to say anything which is of much interest to this gathering at the present time, because although I hoped to hear the debate and perhaps take part in it, I had intended to wait for some greater incentive to talk. What the lecturer has said agrees very much with what I feel myself about the Round-Table Conference. A point of view which has appealed to me very strongly whilst taking part in it has been that all through the first two Conferences there was a great deal of criticism as to the unrealities of the position and the sentimental emotion with which the Conference was carried off its feet, yet I think it has been generally accepted that, whatever the correctness of the first criticisms, at the Third Conference we were brought face to face with actualities and realities.

If that is so, and I believe it is, it is rather remarkable that the Third Conference confirmed in almost every item the findings of the first two Conferences. There has been very little difference from the findings of the Conference in their confirmation at the Third. The Third covered so many subjects and touched on such important issues that I will confine my remarks to just one, and that is to me the most trenchant of the whole lot—namely, the question of finance. It was recognized perfectly clearly that without financial responsibility, responsibility in government can be only a very minimum quality. In order to place that financial responsibility the whole Conference had to be brought face to face with the actualities of the position, and these, as I understand them, may be condensed into the proposition that the Federation which we envisaged might be a success if we could maintain India's credit and get cheap finance, but that it is almost certain to be a failure if we endanger that credit.

That view was brought home, I think, to most of the delegates at the Conference, and it was in recognition of that fact and also by the extremely
clear and conciliatory way in which the Secretary of State brought home the necessity of safeguards in order to maintain India's credit that the safeguards were generally accepted by the Conference.

The great difficulty in attacking the question of safeguards was that our Indian friends saw quite clearly that for those liabilities for which the Secretary of State is responsible the Governor-General must have clear powers of control, but that one field of finance so closely affects another that in order to give the Governor-General the necessary control, it practically meant giving him a general power over the whole field.

It was a bitter pill to swallow for anybody who is wanting financial responsibility and government, but it was accepted because the Secretary of State, speaking on behalf of the Government, gave definite pledges that these powers would not be used in a general way, as the lecturer has told us, to interfere with the responsibility of Ministers; but it was recognized that they must exist even if they remain in the background, if India is to be willing to meet its financial responsibility and thus have a chance of making a success of the Federation.

It is this financial point of view which has interested the British in India very deeply. It is an eminently practical light on what is likely to happen, and although they are as definite as anybody can be in regard to the safety of India's credit, they are just as honestly anxious to transfer responsibility as soon as it may safely be done. With that in view they have pressed in various ways through their delegation, and through the Indian Governments, for certain conditions in the constitution which will tend to give a stable legislature.

We want to see sound Second Houses in the Provinces, where autonomy is almost bound to fail unless it has good finance.

At the Centre we want to see a strong and responsible Second Chamber, because we believe that it will reduce the necessity for the exercise of the special powers of the Viceroy to a minimum. That is the position that the British community have taken with regard to this matter of safeguards. They recognize, and they require that the Governor-General and the Governors shall have those safeguarding powers, and for the reason mentioned they want to see the constitution strengthened in several directions.

Generally speaking, we take the view very much which has been given by the lecturer this afternoon, and we hope that when the time comes for the White Paper to be issued, proposals will be put forward in a way which will allow Indians to accept these necessary safeguards and yet will enable everyone to see what I am certain is the honest intention of the Government, and that is that self-government is to be instituted to the fullest extent of safety.

Sir Patrick Fagan: In presuming to take a small part in the discussion of the interesting paper to which we have just listened, I feel somewhat handicapped by being one of those—daily increasing in numbers, I believe, though perhaps not very extensively represented in this meeting—who regard the proposed scheme of Indian Constitutional Reform as not only destined, if introduced, to be disastrous to the welfare of India, but also in
its own nature impracticable in view of the whole complex of Indian conditions. To develop the many solid grounds on which such a view is based would obviously require a long time, and I do not, of course, propose to undertake such a task in the few minutes at my disposal today.

But to those who have held that view, it naturally is a matter of very considerable interest to learn to what extent tangible, concrete progress has been made in erecting that unique constitutional structure which is contemplated. And after listening to the lecturer I am bound to say that very little appears to have been, in fact, accomplished beyond a certain vague delimitation of the very large area to be covered.

That area seems to be littered with materials, incomplete and largely incompatible, and giving very little promise that out of them any solid and habitable building can be erected within any reasonably near time.

Federation, which is admittedly the indispensable foundation of the whole structure, still appears to lie mainly in a fluid, in many respects even in a nebulous condition, not only as regards the obligations and the extent of cessions of already limited sovereignty which it will entail on the States who may agree to enter it, but also in most, if not all, other respects.

Whether any, and if so how many of the States will enter the Federation, is apparently still less certain. And small wonder it is that it should be so, for this projected Federation in its extent, its complexity, its incidence, and its implications is one absolutely unknown and unique, so far as I can see, in the whole history and experience of mankind.

Even in a matter so fundamental as the delimitation between the fields of exclusive jurisdiction, Federal and Provincial, and of concurrent jurisdiction, if any, and of the allocation of residual powers, the stage of detailed discussion, much less of agreement, was not reached. It is, in fact, in the subject of Federation that the lecturer himself, and I have no doubt very rightly, has found the worst deadlock which the Conference reached.

Safeguards, more especially those which relate to the discharge of what are called the "special responsibilities" of the Governor-General, appear to have been defined, at all events on paper, with a considerable degree of precision; but the whole trend of the discussion about them seems to have been directed not towards providing measures for their prompt and effective use in cases of need, but rather towards emphasizing on the part of all concerned a hope that they would never have to be used, and an assertion of the principle that they were not to be used in nullification or abrogation of responsibility.

Personally, I can conceive nothing better calculated to ensure that safeguards should be merely brutus fulminata in the hands of those who should use them in time of need. They will indeed become, as has been suggested, rusty weapons in the armoury of government. Judging from the way in which a luxuriant crop of pledges—spurious and so-called—has been allowed to grow up, and indeed has been cultivated round this Indian problem during the last few years, there seems to be little doubt that as soon as the occasion arises, as admittedly it may arise, for the application of these safeguards, their application will be at once met with the contention, "You are pledged not to use them."

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Finance is perhaps the subject which in a very special measure causes the gravest apprehension to those who, while having the welfare of India at heart, are not obsessed by any enthusiasm for a pseudo-democratic constitution. I presume that most of those present at this meeting have some acquaintance with the contents of the Report of the Percy Committee on Federal Finance, to which the lecturer has alluded, and which, of course, was considered at some length, I believe, by the Conference. It is impossible to review here all the intricate and complicated financial estimates, proposals, and adjustments which that Report involved, but from it and from what, so far as is known, transpired at the Conference, this result seems clearly to emerge:

(1) That apart from additional taxation to the extent of something like 2½ crores—i.e., £2,000,000 sterling—the proposed Federation will begin its career in insolvency.

And (2) that even if that additional taxation is approved by the new Legislature, which in itself seems to be by no means certain, the Federation will commence its life near the verge, if not on the very verge, of insolvency. Such appears to be the general result, though, of course, it has been set forth in somewhat more optimistic terms than I have found myself able to employ.

Now, my lord, with all deference to your welcome presence in the Chair this afternoon, and sharing to the full in the recognition which has been so rightly extended to the self-sacrificing and immense labours which you have undertaken in connection with the Conference, I am bound to say that the net result of that Conference appears to me to be this, that it has gone no way towards proving that a Federal Constitution is practicable; that it has gone a very long way, if not the whole distance, to prove that it is entirely impracticable.

But the Conference will not have been in vain if it should induce those who are responsible, and in whose hands the fate of India now lies, to think not once nor twice but many times, and, having thought, to turn from a course which involves grievous danger to India to the saner proposals of the neglected Simon Report; though even these must be subject to modifications on which it is impossible for me to dwell on the present occasion.

It is a matter of regret to me that in a meeting of this Association, a preponderating majority of which, I believe, are staunch supporters of the proposed Constitution for India, I have had to deal with this subject in, I fear, a critical spirit. But I feel deeply that the juncture is one in which it is the duty of every citizen of this country who has any feeling of public responsibility to say what he thinks fearlessly and without favour, and that I have endeavoured to do—I hope without giving offence.

Sir Amstrong Martin: Mr. Molson in his admirable address necessarily could not, in the brief time at his disposal, touch on all the important subjects which were dealt with at the last Conference. But with your permission, my lord, I would like to refer briefly within the allotted time to one of the subjects—namely, the future of the Indian judiciary.
I think I may fairly say that hitherto the chiefly prized qualities of the Indian judiciary have been its independence, its impartiality, and its reasonable efficiency. Those qualities have made it over a long series of years one of the greatest supports of Government, and for this simple reason, that the people of India down to the humblest villagers know that the High Courts and the subordinate Courts stand between them and oppression, from whatever source that oppression may come. What is proposed to be done in the future? I think if we are to maintain the qualities that we have hitherto had, it is essential that there should be security of tenure and of conditions for the judiciary.

For instance, I have recently seen proposals from a committee set up by one of the Provincial Governments that the salary of the Chief Justice—and presumably that applies also to his brother Judges—should be reduced by 40 per cent. When I left Bombay two and a half years ago the salaries were hardly adequate, and if they are to be reduced by 40 per cent., that is not calculated to maintain efficiency. An independent judiciary is not always favoured by a powerful Executive. And you will not get the best men at the Bar—men, for instance, who can earn "refreshers" of 1,000 rupees a day—to go on the High Court Bench for, say, 2,500 rupees a month.

Following on that, I should like to see this, that the High Court judges are appointed in the future, as in the past, by His Majesty. (Applause.) They should still have the proud title of H.M. Judges. They should be appointed on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, or alternatively of the Viceroy as being His Majesty's direct representative.

Further, I would suggest that the subordinate judiciary should only be appointed on the recommendation of the Chief Justice and Judges, or alternatively in the case of some of the highest officers on the recommendation of the Chief Justice alone. Also the pay and tenure of all judges should not be alterable by the Provincial Governments, but only by the Imperial Parliament or else by the new Central Legislature; with this exception, that possibly as regards the subordinate judiciary, changes might be effected with the consent of the Chief Justice and Judges of their particular High Court.

As regards financial and other administrative matters between Government and the High Courts, I would suggest that all the High Courts in India should deal direct with the Central Government, as is the case at present in Calcutta.

I pass to a very important matter, the proposed new Supreme Court. It has two proposed branches—viz. (1) to deal with Federal matters; and (2) to deal as a final Court of Appeal from British India in the place either entirely or partially of the Privy Council.

As to the first branch, in a discussion we had here two years ago, so experienced a lawyer and administrator as Sir George Lowndes doubted the necessity for a Federal Court. And if the proposed Federation was unhappily to be confined to British India alone, then the argument for this Federal Court would by no means be so strong. In that case, there are surely many subjects which the existing Courts could well decide, subject to appeal to the Privy Council. And in some other matters—e.g., those
arising between the governments of two Provinces—those might be dealt with by the advice of the Privy Council given in an agreed case.

As regards the second branch—viz., that this Supreme Court should be a new final Court of Appeal—that has given rise to considerable difference of opinion. Although personally I favour it, it is not a Court I should like to see established against strong opposition. The adverse opinions are partly based on its expense. And one great point undoubtedly is a natural reluctance to lose to any degree the fine work which the Privy Council has done for a large numbers of years, and which has largely assisted to maintain confidence in our administration of justice in India.

May I add this? I should be sorry to see a Federal Court alone established. Let us have both or none. The new Court will have to win its reputation, and it would be hardly fair to start it as a Federal Court alone. Cases of a Federal nature have hitherto been few and far between. So there would be a lack of experience both by Bench and Bar. But if both branches were established there would be scope for the specialist in Hindu or Muhammadan law, land tenures, or commercial law.

I attach, however, far more importance to maintaining intact the integrity of the existing Courts than to establishing a new Supreme Court or final Court of Appeal in India. But whatever decision may be arrived at, I respectfully offer my best wishes for the success of the arduous deliberations which you, my lord, and your colleagues have been engaged on.

Mr. J. E. Woolacott: I have only a few words to say, but I should like in the first place to thank Mr. Molson very heartily for the lucid exposition he has given us this afternoon.

The point I wish to make is that in all the discussions in London on a new Constitution for India no regard has been paid to what is actually happening in India itself, especially in the Central Legislature. It has been said that in the last two or three months the Legislative Assembly has done well in regard to the maintenance of peace and order. What are the facts? It may be recalled that at the opening of the Session in Simla, a few months ago, the Viceroy made a magnificent speech, in which he described the evils that had arisen through the civil disobedience movement and declared that he and his Government were determined to use to the full the resources of the State in coping with a movement which was a constant menace to ordered government and to individual liberty. The movement, he said, had hitherto been dealt with by Ordinance, but it was now proposed to lay before the Legislature a Bill embodying a number of the features contained in the Ordinance.

The Bill was carried with the aid of the official vote and the votes of the European group. It would, I believe, have been thrown out at the outset, when it was proposed that it should be taken into consideration, if it had not been for the official vote, as the resolution had a majority of only 24, while there are 26 votes of officials at the command of the Government, to say nothing of the European votes which are to be relied on to support measures for the maintenance of order.

This is a fundamental and vital question which ought to receive the fullest
consideration at the hands of the Joint Committee of Parliament which is to be set up, as well as at the hands of Parliament itself and of the British electorate. It must be remembered that the Congress is not represented in the present Legislature at all, its leaders having boycotted the elections. Supposing you have elections with the Congress taking an active part in them and no official ratio are available in the Legislature, what kind of legislation will you have then? After all, Congress is the best organized party in India.

Mr. Joseph Nissim: The very fact that some of the most distinguished men that have ever adorned the public life of this country have been responsible for the position now attained in the Third Round-Table Conference should perhaps give confidence to the peoples of this country that here has been evolved a scheme which is not a visionary or an impracticable one.

The second point I would like to mention is this: We certainly owe a great deal to the point of view of Sir Patrick Fagan and similar points of view held by friends and colleagues of his. But we have to exercise an independent judgment upon the grounds which he puts forward in justification of his pessimistic view as to what will be the result. He tells us that Federation in India is absolutely unprecedented. On that I would say that the position of the British Government in India today is itself unprecedented, and somehow or other we have carried on to a point of time when I think impartial critics will admit that India has been well administered.

Secondly, we have the unprecedented position of this vast Empire acting as one body on all critical occasions, whether it be war or whether it be peace. That in itself gives one confidence that Federation is practicable in India, that in matters of large policy it is possible for the units in India and their representatives to come together and to act as a whole for the good of India, for the good of the Empire, and for the mutual good of our two countries in particular.

His next point is one of insolvency. With regard to that, what I wish to say is this, that perhaps there is no Government in the world which is in a stronger position financially and economically, as the Secretary of State has told us, than the Government of India.

I have no time today to elaborate that, but the economic and financial position of the Indian Government as we find it after two centuries of British occupation is one which might well give us pride and confidence. It is true that in the last two years the Budget does not balance, but that is no criterion.

The third point is with regard to the powers of the Governor-General. He says it is impossible to expect any single human being to be able to carry out all these duties. My answer to that is merely to point to what has taken place in the past. We have had Governors-General in India who have had little or no assistance from their Legislature, and they administered that country in a way for which we owe them undying gratitude.

I do think we may go right ahead with the scheme which has been worked out in a manner that perhaps no constitutional scheme has been
worked out before, with devoted attention and interest given to it. I think that scheme may well command our respect and will prove efficient.

The Chairman: I am sure that I am consulting all your wishes when I say how very thankful we are to Mr. Molson for his admirable lecture. (Applause.) He has not disappointed us, and I express the personal hope that when the Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament is appointed to deal with this question, he may find a place upon that Select Committee.

If I might be allowed to do so, I should like also to pay a tribute to your Honorary Secretary, Mr. Brown, who sits on my left. (Applause.) You have heard a good many compliments in the last month showered upon different people with regard to their work upon India. But I can assure you that a man to whom we all owe our thanks is Mr. Brown. (Applause.) I remember not only at this Round-Table Conference, but at the previous Conferences, the great help he has been and the assistance he has given in this matter. He has a joining mind—he joins people together. He has been a very real help to those of us engaged in this difficult task.

With regard to my other remarks, I could, of course, be controversial. I am not going to be. I am going to be mainly historical, but I am going to indulge in my last remarks upon a prophecy, and therefore I will endeavour to make my historical remarks as short as possible in order that we may come as soon as may be to my prophecy, which I think will turn out a true one.

The original title of this lecture was "The Third Round-Table Conference and After," and I was a little more myself concerned with the last word "After." But you will not expect a member of the Government to discuss that word "After" very much.

With regard to the matters leading up to this Third Round-Table Conference, we had the first one which laid down very far-reaching principles. If I may indulge in an historical reminiscence, I doubt if in any Constitution which has been drawn up more time or more thought has been bestowed upon every word that has been written down. I do not mean my own, but the time and thought of the experts who took part in that historical document.

The Second Round-Table Conference was very indefinite, and for this reason: First of all, we had a General Election in England, and everyone was off electioneering except myself. I fortunately have not got to go and speak in the country. I often found myself the only British delegate present, but I hope you will not think its only partial success was due to that fact. There were, as you know, great difficulties on the communal question. I always anticipated those difficulties. I was never one of those who thought that there would be a mutual agreement upon that, and I am glad to think that they are now out of the way and that a settlement has been come to, which I hope will be a satisfactory one and a lasting one.

With regard to the Third Round-Table Conference, I should like to pay tribute to my colleague, Sir Samuel Hoare, to whose great patience, great skill, and great hard work the many successes we attained during that very difficult period are mainly due. (Applause.)
What were the successes of the Third Round-Table Conference? I think the most remarkable thing was this: that the principles which were laid down at the First Round-Table Conference were in effect reaffirmed. I never expected anything different, but you all know this, that you cannot legislate ahead of public opinion. You must carry public opinion with you. It is an old and trite saying that Rome was not built in a day, and I think the value of the Third Round-Table Conference mainly was this: that public opinion both in England and in India has taken a great stride forward, and without that public opinion being behind you, however good your Constitution is, you are not likely to make it a real success.

May I say to my Indian friends, some of whom I see present today, we put forward our best at that Conference. I have heard it said, "What did that Round-Table Conference know about India?" Well, may I just call your attention to this: We had two ex-Viceroy's of India. I suppose they know something about India. We had two Secretaries of State for India. I suppose they know something about India. We had two Under-Secretaries of State for India: Englishmen who had all of them spent four, five, six, or seven years of their lives giving their attention to these various problems.

Mr. Woolacott: In London.

The Chairman: Was Lord Irwin in London while he was Viceroy of India? Was Lord Reading in London when he was Viceroy of India? Those were gentlemen who spent their time in India, as far as I know. I am not going to get into controversy with that gentleman at all. All I am doing is this: I am stating facts. Of course, if he says Lord Irwin knows nothing about India, and if he says Lord Reading knows nothing about India, all I can say is that I humbly disagree with him.

Mr. Woolacott: I must protest. I never said anything of the kind; but there are many men who know a country more than Viceroy's of India.

The Chairman: I did not think it was you who said it, Mr. Woolacott. We had many eminent Indians, distinguished men—Mr. Jayakar, Sir Tej Sapru, Mr. Zafrullah Khan, Mr. Joshi, and a great number of other people. At any rate, they could help us in regard to India. We may have been right or wrong, but at any rate we did our best.

What was done? I think we have established this great principle, that in any future Constitution of India there must be responsibility at the Centre. That we have nailed to the mast. Personally I think one of the chief things we have done there is to advance the position of women in India. I look forward to the influence of women and the education of women as being one of the most potent factors in the development of the future Indian Constitution.

Then, as Mr. Molson has already pointed out, we have laid down the position of the Governor-General. I must say I rather agree with Sir Patrick Fagan here. I think we have put a great deal upon the Governor-General. Sometimes, when I look at the things the Governor-General has to do, I sympathize with the future Governor-General of India. But there is one thing I should like to say. Sir Patrick Fagan was Financial Commissioner in the Punjab and a most distinguished member of the Indian Civil Service. I only wish he was thirty years younger.
With regard to finance I entirely agree with Sir Hubert Carr. I do not think it is much use entrusting people with a Constitution unless you can entrust them as far as possible with some of their own financial affairs. But, you know, it is the most awkward time in the world for finance. There is an old English proverb—I have not the slightest doubt you have the equivalent of it in India, because the wise men came from the East, and I expect many of our proverbs are simply translations—that it is very foolish to swap horses when you are crossing the stream. We are crossing the financial stream. Although that motto which we made so little of about three years ago is not a very good motto, "Safety First," at the same time in these very difficult financial conditions of the world I do think in the interests of India chiefly we must be careful and be quite sure that our finance is going to be A1 copper bottom.

I was very much interested in the remarks made by the ex-Chief Justice of Bombay, Sir Amberson Marten, and let me assure him that he need have no fear in regard to the independence of the Indian judges in the future. One of the difficulties—and I am talking now as Lord Chancellor, and I do not want to divulge too many secrets—one of the difficulties you always have in the appointment of judges is that some people take the view that the State ought to support the courts, and other people contend that the law courts ought to support themselves by the fees they charge for hearing and so forth. Perhaps you would like to know how the matter stands. But we very carefully considered that, and above all things we must do, not only in England, but in India and other places, is to maintain the independence of the judges, and the independence of the judges cannot be maintained if you leave them at the mercy of the executive. If a judge is apt to have his salary cut down to 6s. 8d., you do not get the independence of the judiciary. But I can assure the Chief Justice that he need have no anxiety on this point.

Now let me come to the words "and After." My only fear, and I have got a fear, for the future success of this endeavour is delay. The people of India have waited a very long time. It is perfectly true we have made promises which some people say are conditional, but there is a very celebrated speech in Latin which begins quoque tandem, and which means this, "How long will you abuse our patience?" That is my one fear. My one fear is that unless we can get a move on, unless we can make up our minds rapidly, not too rapidly, we shall have great difficulty in India. They will again say, "Well, this matter is being put off to the Greek Kalends." I think the chief difficulty in the way of delay is this. It is now up to the Princes to say what they are going to do. Till we know what the Princes are going to do, we cannot really have any effective solution of this situation. Therefore I very much hope that as soon as may be the Princes will let us know on what terms they are coming in and when they are coming in.

I am not one of those who object to criticism. I welcome it. I quite realize that we are making an experiment which is unprecedented, and the more criticisms we have the better, because criticism—and I am sure all the criticism is well meant—is really helpful and prevents you from falling into pitfalls. Sir Patrick Fagan said this—I think he rather mixed his
metaphors, and I am going to mix mine also—he said that everything was in a rather fluid condition and nothing had been decided. I do not agree. Who has got to decide it? This is one of the things which has to be decided by Parliament.

Sir Patrick gave the example of a building, and it is a good metaphor. I think what Parliament has to do is to build up this Constitution, and I think we have been doing the donkey work. We have assembled the materials, and those materials will be ready for use by Parliament. It may be we shall find that brick is too large. It may be we shall find that a particular stone wants to be re-shaped. According to the general principles we have suggested to Parliament, it will be for the Select Committee, and after that for Parliament, to make a new Act, which, as I hope, will show a great advance in the Constitution of India.

Sir Patrick says, "How do you know this will work well?" How do you know whether your Christmas pudding is going to taste well? The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and that is what we shall have to do. I am sure of this: there is not one man or one woman in this room who does not wish well to India. It is true that some of us think we may be going ahead too quickly, but I want my Indian friends to remember this: With regard to those people who oppose, their opposition is valuable. It is helpful. I welcome it. Do not run away with the idea that they are ill-wishers to you. They are not. It will probably happen that some of the advice we take from them will turn out to be very helpful and very good for India.

Now the prophecy. I think that there are very great difficulties ahead, but one thing is certain, and that is that in the lifetime of the present Parliament there will be a new India Act on the Statute Book, and by the clauses of that new India Act the ambitions of India will be very largely satisfied. (Cheers.)

Mr. Molson: I have confined my paper almost entirely to an account of what has taken place at the Round-Table Conference, so there is very little to which I need reply.

I was very gratified that Sir Hubert Carr in his speech confirmed the suggestions I had made with regard to the financial question.

I am very glad the Lord Chancellor answered Sir Amberson Marten's point, which is, of course, immensely important, but I would only point out that a reduction of the judges' salaries has also taken place in this country and has nothing to do with the Round-Table Conference.

I did not quite agree with my old friend Mr. Woolacott in what he said about the irresponsibility of the Indian Legislature. That has frequently been the case in the past, but during the last six months or so there has been a very remarkable change for the better, which I believe to have been chiefly due to the Round-Table Conference held in this country and to the confidence now felt in the intentions of the Secretary of State and of the Viceroy. The remarkable examples of that are that whereas for months past it has been necessary for the Viceroy to maintain law and order in India by the exercise of his special powers of issuing ordinances, from the beginning of this year in the case not only of the Centre, but of the
individual Provinces, all the powers which the Governments still consider to be necessary have been enacted by the Legislatures, and they are now part of the ordinary legislation of the country.

Mr. Woolacott pointed out—this is, of course, an important point—that the official bloc was used for carrying those measures. I think that anyone who has seen the working of any of the Indian Legislatures at close quarters will know that there are many occasions when Indian legislators are inclined to rely on the official bloc, when if there were not that official bloc and if the full responsibility did rest upon themselves they would behave in a different way. The fact of the official bloc, of having a battalion of officials who, regardless of the merits of the debate, simply have to obey the whips, is a direct incentive to irresponsibility on the part of legislators.

I was afraid that I should arouse the ire of my friend Sir Patrick Fagan. I do not quite agree with him about the complete uncertainty of the Indian States coming in. There is certainly very much less doubt about it now than there was a year ago. All the indications are that the majority of the Indian States are intending to come in. It is obviously quite true that it depends upon the conditions. The gestation of Indian Federation is only like that of all other Federations in the world. If you take the case of the Federation of Australia or Canada you will find that there were long negotiations. In the case of Canada the Federation began with only the Federation of Upper and Lower Canada. It was only years afterwards, and as the result of long and difficult financial negotiations, that the rest of the Provinces came in. There is, as far as I can ascertain, every likelihood that a large number of the Indian States will come in, although it is obvious that they are not going to make a definite promise until the terms are settled in a way as satisfactory as possible to their own interests.

I was glad to find that Sir Patrick Fagan did not dispute that the safeguards which have been in effect agreed upon are at any rate, as he said, on paper extremely effective. We have been told in the past by gentlemen who think with him that you could not devise safeguards. Now that we have had the thing worked out at the Third Round-Table Conference, he thinks the safeguards would be effective if they were put into operation. They naturally will be. I cannot think we shall ever be accused of having given a pledge that the safeguards shall not be used when for weeks upon end controversy has gone on in the Third Round-Table Conference in order to make it abundantly clear that these safeguards are to be maintained and to be available for use, not in order to curb responsible government, but in order to prevent irresponsibility on the part of the Government.

With regard to finance, as Sir Patrick Fagan referred to the deficit which he understood that the Percy Committee anticipated would result from Federation, I have just looked up the forecast of the Federal Budget and of the Provincial Budgets, and what I see here confirms my recollection that the actual figures set out are the figures upon the present basis, and it is an estimate of what the position would be if the present Constitution were continued for some years. Therefore the deficit is not the result of Federation.
Of course, there is at present a deficit in a number of the Provincial Budgets. India is suffering as every other country from the present economic depression, and, so far as the Central Government is concerned, the Government of India and the Government of this country are, I believe, the only two which at the present time have a balanced Budget, and are not anticipating a deficit at the end of this year. I hope our anticipations in both cases will be justified.

Then we are asked to return to the Simon Report, but not to the Simon Report pure and simple—the Report subject to certain reservations. I wonder whether Sir Patrick Fagan was thinking of having the Simon Constitution without the transfer of law and order in the Provinces. It would not be altogether an unfair description of the Simon Commission to say that their most important recommendation with regard to the Centre was that we should look forward to Federation as being the only permanent solution of India's problems, and with regard to the Provinces it was that complete provincial autonomy should be given.

Sir Patrick Fagan does not agree with Federation. He does not even accept it as a possibility in India, so that really when he is asking us to go back to the Simon Commission subject to certain reservations, he is in fact asking us not to move at all beyond the position which we at present occupy.

**LORD LAMINGTON:** Before you go, I would ask you to endorse the vote of thanks I am going to put before you to our lecturer this afternoon for his very able address. I thought his paper had particular value because he wrote it from a detached point of view. He was not in India in an official capacity; he saw the country more from the commercial side. Therefore he is able to give us views more detached than those of some officials.

I confess that I cannot agree with Sir Patrick Fagan's remarks. Leading men in the past have given the vision to the people of India of a time when they would conduct their own affairs in their own methods. That is the vision which has been created, and we are trying to give effect to it. The Lord Chancellor has said, and also Mr. Molson, that an atmosphere more favourable to the realization of this vision has been accomplished by this last Round-Table Conference. No one can deny that we in this country have done our best to create a workable Constitution.

I ask for a vote of thanks to Mr. Molson, and also to the Lord Chancellor, who has given us the pleasure of his presence for the first time in this Association. I am indeed proud that he should have come here. He has favoured us with some very interesting and valuable remarks on the work done by these Conferences.

The vote was carried by acclamation and the meeting closed.

**Dr. Gangulee writes:**

Sir Henry Maine once observed that the difficulty of governing India lay in the problem of keeping one's clock in time in two distant longitudes. That is, we cannot change suddenly from Greenwich to Indian time. Now, this idea of an Indian Federation is not only logical, as being the ultimate
form of government in that vast sub-continent; it is considered to be the only solution of providing a basis of reconciliation between Indian Nationalism and British Imperialism. But such a basis cannot be constructed by just assembling divergent materials; it has to be evolved out of the organic socio-economic life of the country. As I examine the materials collected by the Simon Commission, the Round-Table Conferences, and the various committees, I feel that the component parts that would be required for a genuine federal structure are undeveloped because of this absence of development of the component parts. The Round-Table Conference became an arena where—to quote a simile of Lord Winterton—"the tired old circus horses of phrases and sentiments" continued to trot round.

Be that as it may, as one who has devoted a considerable time to the study of the conditions of the rural masses, I wonder if the proposed Constitution will assure a better state of affairs for the masses than at present. At a time when the economic world is driven almost to desperation by the vagaries of politics, one may relevantly ask whether the economic condition of India's teeming millions is likely to be improved by such changes as proposed in the mechanism of India's administration. It is known that there has been a vast increase in the cost of all her administrative and legislative services under the Reforms, and one doubts if India is in a position to meet the demands of a Federal Constitution. The estimated cost, for example, of the proposed electoral changes alone seems to be prohibitive for a country the average annual income of whose peasantry does not exceed £5. The Indian Franchise Committee estimate the cost of each election to the Central Government and the various Provinces at some £450,000 on the basis of a 75 per cent. poll, and to the candidates and political organizations at some £750,000. Then we are to have a Federal Senate, a Federal Assembly, a Federal Court—and it is not known what would be the annual burden for the maintenance of this great Indian Federal edifice. How is this complicated, expensive Federal form of administration going to solve India's economic unpreparedness in the world of organized economic activities? What guarantee is there that the forces required for economic equilibrium should be allowed to work themselves out without undue hindrance?

These are some of the questions that arise in the minds of those who do not owe an allegiance to any political party but are deeply concerned with the social and economic development of the rural population of India.
DELHI AS CAPITAL

By Sir John Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

I want today to consider Delhi in its aspect as a capital city, not merely as the modern capital of British India, but also as the capital of many former Powers. I shall try to explain the natural advantages of the site, which may be presumed to have led to its early occupation and must have contributed to its later importance. I shall discuss the motives of the many moves which have taken place within the sixty square miles of rock and level that we call Delhi, as well as those which have caused its kings on two occasions to plant their capital elsewhere. Last of all, I shall say something of the latest move which has brought the capital back again to Delhi after many days.

On the map of Northern India you will notice four things. First, the central position of Delhi; secondly, that it lies on the direct line from Kabul through Lahore down into the rich plains of Hindustan; thirdly, that the traffic for Hindustan which came by the Indus valley through Multan was directed straight on to Delhi by the necessity of avoiding the desert and the hills; and, lastly, that Delhi is on the Jumna, where river transport was available. We sometimes forget how valuable river transport was in the days before railways.

The next map shows the natural features of Delhi, bare of all city sites. You see the river, the plain at a level of just under 700 feet above the sea, and the low, rough, rocky hills which at the northern extremity are less than 100 feet above the plain. This northern portion is what we read of as 'the Ridge' in the accounts of the Mutiny. South of it comes a gap, which I would ask you to notice, and then again a rise, fairly sharp for the first hundred feet, and then very gradual, until a height of over 1,000 feet is reached twelve miles further south. In the triangle made by the hills and the river lie the sites of the cities, and the hills provide stone for building. Northwards you will find no more stone within a hundred miles.
The Ridge is just the northernmost extremity of the Aravalli range, which stretches from Guzerat across Rajputana. It hardly seems an extravagant fancy to picture this long narrow line of rocks as Nature's forefinger, pointing to the destined seat of Empire before ever there was king or subject on the earth.

THE GATEWAY OF HINDUSTAN

I asked you to notice the gap towards the northern end of the ridge. That gap is the gateway of Hindustan. The first road must have passed through it, just as the Grand Trunk Road does today. Shah Jahan used it for his canal, and through it runs the railway. From there the road passed on to the river crossing, which brings me to the first stage in Delhi history, more than 1,000 years before Christ.

The crossing was already hallowed by the legend of the Nigambodh ghat when the five Pandu brothers established themselves on a low eminence on the Jumna bank four miles further south. The eldest of the brothers, Yudhishthira, after challenging all other princes in Northern India to dispute, if they dared, his claim to supremacy, offered a sacrifice at the Nigambodh ghat beside the crossing, no doubt with the intention that travellers from the east and from the west should spread the knowledge of his name. This story gives us the two earliest historical sites at Delhi, the ghat and the fortress of the Pandu brothers at Indrapat.

Of Indrapat nothing remains, but the struggle in which the Pandu princes defeated the Kurus on the plain eighty miles north of Delhi, where the fate of India has so often been decided, is described in the great epic of the Mahabharata.

After that we know practically nothing for two thousand years. To the Buddhist pilgrims of the fifth and seventh centuries, to the Arab geographers of the ninth, tenth and eleventh, Delhi was unknown. In the time of Mahmud of Ghazni, who invaded India seventeen times during the first thirty years of the eleventh century, there was apparently nothing to attract a marauder where Delhi now stands.
Medieval Times

The old Hindu dynasties in Northern India had been terribly shaken by these invasions, and in the bewilderment which followed the mediaeval history of Delhi began. The Delhi site, with its old associations and its advantageous position, offered a fair prospect to the adventurer, and Anandapala or Anang Pal, a Tomara Rajput, who came from no one knows where, founded the first of the cities to which the name of Delhi was given about 1052, fourteen years before the Norman conquest of England. He selected a site eight miles from the river, and more than ten from the crossing at Nigambodh, doubtless for the sake of greater security. The fortress of Lalkot, which was incorporated by later conquerors in their own fortifications, and a number of other monuments are associated with his name. Whether they are all correctly attributed to him or not, they must all, I think, belong to the Tomara period, and they clearly indicate resources and a degree of established power.

The Tomaras were conquered by the Chauhans in the middle of the twelfth century. The Chauhans had been established at Sambhar, near Ajmir, for many generations, and they had conquered the country up to the Himalayas at some date prior to 1164. It is said that on the defeat of the Tomara Raja of Delhi, a Delhi princess was given in marriage to the heir of Sambhar, and that the fruit of this marriage was Prithvi Raja or Rai Pithora, who succeeded to the combined kingdoms about 1178. He is still remembered as a hero of romance in northern India, and when the troops rose in mutiny at Delhi on May 11, 1857, they paraded through the streets with shouts of Prithvi Raj ki jai.

I propose to dwell for a moment on Prithvi Raja, for he marks the close of the era of Hindu rule in Delhi. He considerably enlarged the fortress of the Tomaras, and a small outlying fort seven miles further north on the top of the hill of Naraina, commanding the road, is attributed to him. His most romantic exploit was the carrying off of the daughter of the King of Kanauj. Jai Chand of Kanauj wished to find a husband for his daughter, and invited all the Princes of Hindustan to
attend his court that she might make her choice. Prithvi Raja alone dared to absent himself, and Jai Chand, annoyed at the insult, set up a golden effigy of him to stand as a porter at the door. On the day appointed for the choice the Princes were all assembled in the Darbar Hall. The Princess entered, garland in hand, to throw round the neck of the man of her choice. The bard tells us how she went down the line, slowly and deliberately surveying each of the suitors. Each, as she approached, bent his head in hope to receive the garland, and was left blushing for shame as the girl passed on. She came to the end of the line, and then catching sight of the effigy at the door, flung the garland over its neck, exclaiming,

“If one alone of the Kings of Ind
Dares slight my father’s word,
That one alone is kingly enough
For his daughter to take as lord.”

The King instantly dismissed the darbar, and sent his daughter to her chamber. He summoned a second darbar for the morrow, and the girl again cast her garland round the neck of the golden image. I need not follow the story further in detail. The Princess was locked up and Prithvi Raja came and carried her off. They were pursued to the gates of Delhi, and the only members of the party who entered the city alive were the hero and his bride and the bard who told the story.

THE MUSLIM CONQUEST

It was this enmity with Jai Chand, according to some accounts, which led directly to the Muslim conquest, as Jai Chand called to his aid Muhammad of Ghor. Muhammad’s brother, the Emperor of Ghor, had given him the throne of Ghazni about 1173, and from there he had made many expeditions into India, which must have revived memories of the raids of Mahmud. But he had a loftier ambition than Mahmud. He meant to retain and to govern what he conquered. He had removed the last of the Ghaznavid kings of Lahore about 1187, and from that date the great conflict between the forces of Islam and Hinduism was inevitable.
In 1191 the armies met at Naraina, near Thanesar, on the historic battlefield between Panipat and Thanesar, and the Hindu king was victorious. Next year Muhammad returned. A second battle was fought on the same field and Prithvi Raja was defeated and slain. The victor advanced on Ajmir, the capital of his conquered foe, and in the following year Delhi was taken by his general Qutb-ud-din Aibak, and became the capital of the new province of the Ghorian empire.

The Hindu city was soon stamped with the seal of Islam. Twenty-seven temples fell under the hand of the destroyer to make the mosque of the "Might of Islam," and beside the mosque rose the Qutb Minar. For the next hundred years it was round those buildings that the life of Delhi centred.

But during the lifetime of Muhammad of Ghor Delhi was only a provincial capital. After his assassination, Qutb-ud-din, hitherto a slave, received his freedom, and with it the title of Sultan, but he still owned allegiance to the Emperor of Ghor.

The first independent Muslim king of Delhi was Shams-ud-din Altamsh, who had been a slave of Qutb-ud-din. He rose rapidly in his service, and when Qutb-ud-din died as the result of a polo accident at Lahore in 1210 a party at Delhi invited him to assume the Sultanate. The Empire of Ghor no longer existed, and when Altamsh ascended the throne at Delhi it was as an independent monarch.

He died in 1236 after a glorious reign. He had restored the authority of Delhi as far as Bengal, and had brought Sind and parts of Rajputana and Central India under his sway. For the pious Muslim, lustre was shed on his reign by the presence at his capital of the saint Qutb-ud-din, the second of the great line of Muslim mystics in India. A contemporary speaks of Delhi, at the close of Altamsh's reign, as "the centre of the Muslim world, the sanctuary of the faith and the tabernacle of Islam in the East." It was already beginning to assume something of the aspect of a holy city, and its greatest treasure was the nameless mound of earth which marks the sleeping place of the saint.

There is much to remind us of his disciple, Altamsh, among the remains of ancient Delhi. He enlarged the mosque of the
Might of Islam, he completed the Qutb Minar, and he constructed the Hauz-i-Shamsi, the hundred-acre tank outside the walls, which became a favourite resort for the citizens of Delhi. But perhaps the place which we associate most of all with his name is his tomb in the precincts of the Mosque. He was the first sultan to be buried at Delhi, and his tomb is the first of a long and splendid line.

For fifty years after the death of Altamsh the limits of the old Hindu capital sufficed the Muslim kings. The first to break fresh ground was Kaikobad, the last of the so-called Slave Kings. He was a youth who had been strictly brought up, but when he succeeded to the throne he plunged into the wildest dissipation. The historians connect the move from the city palace with the beginning of his career of debauchery, and we may perhaps conjecture that he wished to avoid the restraints of the city, and preferred to live in a pleasure house by the river. The site he selected was at Kilokhri, already perhaps a popular suburb, six miles north-east of the capital. He took the whole court with him, and people of every class came out in pursuit of their occupations. The memory of the Kilokhri orgies is kept lurid by the historians, and the whole population seems to have been infected. In less than three years the Sultan's constitution was undermined and he was stricken with paralysis. In the confusion which followed, Jalal-ud-din Khilji, one of Balban's old commanders, obtained control, and an officer who had a personal grievance against the king was sent into the palace. He found the wretched boy almost at the point of death, rolled him in his bed clothes, kicked him to death, and flung his corpse into the river.

Jalal-ud-din Khilji succeeded, but his succession was unpopular, and he felt it prudent to reside at Kilokhri, where he busied himself with the completion and decoration of his predecessor's palace. His reign was a short one, and he was succeeded by his nephew and murderer, Ala-ud-din, who abandoned Kilokhri and returned to Delhi. He devoted much energy in the early years of his reign to making conquests in the south, but he came to realize before long that it was his first duty to make his northern frontiers
safe against the Mughals, who had more than once penetrated to the walls of Delhi. He decided accordingly to undertake a regular scheme of defence, and the first item in his programme was to build a fortress at Siri on the site which he had twice selected as a temporary station for his troops, to protect the city against the invaders from the north. The fortress was completed in 1303, and he made it his capital.

**Transfers of Capital.**

It must not be supposed that the establishment of the capital at Siri meant that Old Delhi was deserted. The Court was at Siri and the fortress was garrisoned, and there were shops and artificers and untouchables, but Delhi was still the business centre and the great mosque there had no rival in Siri. Ala-ud-din died in the fortress he had built, and was buried in the old capital. Among his memorials in Old Delhi are the extensions of the mosque, the huge unfinished minar, and the exquisite gateway which bears his name. He also constructed the tank which we know as the Hauz-i-khas. He must be ranked as one of Delhi's greatest builders, but history will always shudder over the annals of his reign.

The capital was rescued from the confusion into which it fell after his death, by Ghazi Malik, the governor of Dipalpur, the terror of the Mughal marauders, who ascended the throne in the palace of Siri as Tughlaq Shah, and a new dynasty began which was destined to rule for some eighty years.

The next move of the administrative capital was to Tughlaqabad. It was the third change in less than forty years. Ibn Batuta, who reached Delhi only eight years after the death of Tughlaq Shah, tells us that Ghazi Malik, as he then was, once remarked to the Sultan that he ought to build a city on the site where Tughlaqabad now stands. The Sultan replied ironically, "Well, when you are Sultan, build one." And build it he did, as soon as he found himself on the throne, and it took him rather over three years to complete it. There can be little doubt that it was the prospect of having a lake below his battlements that attracted him. The huge dam and the sluices are there still, and
the causeway that led across the water to his island tomb, but the water never stands there, and the gentler beauties of the place are gone, with the glory of the golden pavilion, which, Ibn Batuta tells us, shone so bright in the rays of the rising sun. But, as it is left to us, there is none of the Delhis, I think, except the city of Shah Jahan, that is so haunted by the spirit of its founder as Tughlaqabad. As a capital, it barely survived his death.

He was succeeded by his son—probably his murderer—who is described as one of the wonders of creation. Scholar, artist, philosopher, athlete, sportsman, man-at-arms, he has washed out in blood the fame that his better qualities might have brought him. Ever at the gate of the palace stood the executioner, and above it were suspended the relics of his work. Bands of fettered criminals were brought before him in the palace every day, and sentenced to stripes or torture or death, and hardly a day passed without some execution at the palace gate, where the bodies lay exposed. Ibn Batuta tells how one day, riding up to the gate, his horse shied at something on the ground. It was part of a human trunk that had been cut into three.

Muhammad Tughlaq abandoned his father’s city. According to tradition, it had been cursed by the saint Nizam-ud-din Auliya. It may well have seemed haunted to a parricide son, but the badness of the water has been suggested as a more likely reason for its abandonment. The new king walled in the space between Delhi and Siri, and called it Jahanpanah, and there he built himself a palace.

Two years after his accession he decided that Delhi was to be abandoned and the capital removed to Deogir, which he renamed Daulatabad. The comments of the historian Barni, with the change of one or two words, might almost have come from a Calcutta newspaper of December, 1911:

"The Government, without consulting anyone, and without any careful consideration of what could be said on both sides, had ruined the old capital, which, as a result of the steady progress of a century and a half, had become a real metropolis."

Muhammad Tughlaq’s reason, according to Barni, was that Deogir was much more central than Delhi. During the first cen-
tury of the Delhi Sultanate, the Muslim forces had never crossed the Narbada. But ever since Ala-ud-din made his expedition to Deogir in 1294, with the deliberate object of financing his bid for the throne out of the loot of it, the Deccan had been an object of immediate interest to the Delhi Sultan, and there had been numerous expeditions not only to Deogir, but even further south. The Punjab had been quiet for years except for the Mughal raids, and Ala-ud-din’s measures had stopped them for the time. Anyhow, there was neither conquest nor loot to be looked for on that side. The southern horizon was bright with the prospect of both. His predecessors had moved with their conquests from Ghor to Ghazni, from Ghazni to Lahore, from Lahore to Delhi, and it was but one step further from Delhi to Deogir, 600 miles to the south. Ideas of this sort may well have influenced the mind of Muhammad. But it is not always logic that appeals to the exaggerated ego of the despot, and there may be something in the story told by Ibn Batuta, who says that the real reason was the large number of abusive and presumably anonymous letters which used to be thrown into the palace at night, in envelopes marked, “For the hands of the King alone.” At first it appears that the move was not compulsory. Two years later, however, the orders were imperative. At last only two men were found in the whole city who had dared to disobey. One was a cripple. The other was blind. The former was sentenced to be hurled from a catapult, the latter to be dragged the forty days’ journey to Daulatabad. The foot by which he was tied to whatever it was that dragged him was all of him that ever reached the journey’s end. And one night, after the last caravan had left, the King went up on to the palace roof and looked out over the city. All was dark, not a glimmer of light to be seen, and his heart was satisfied at last.

**The Return to Delhi**

The move was not a success. In 1343 general permission was given for the people to return, and Daulatabad dropped out of the Delhi empire and Delhi history for nearly 300 years.

The return to Delhi was the fifth change in less than sixty
years. Muhammad Tughlaq was succeeded by his cousin Firoz Shah, who was more Indian than Turk, as both his mother and his grandmother had been Hindus. He was a pious Muslim and a man of high character, with a passion for sport and building. About 1359, he began building a new city, Firozabad. The city, which was unwalled, extended at least from Indrapat to the part of the Ridge north of the present city, where the Sultan erected his Kushak-i-Shikar or Hunting Palace. The citadel was what we know as Firoz Shah’s Kotla.

It used often to puzzle me to know what had been the result of all this feverish city-building during the past eighty years. Kilokhri and Tughlaqabad were dead, or at any rate mere villages. Delhi—that is, Delhi, Siri, and Jahanpanah—had recovered from its enforced evacuation, and was clearly a busy, well-populated city, though the fortifications had been allowed to fall into disrepair, and some of the old material had been removed to the new city. But throughout the whole period, except for the Daulatabad interval, it had been customary to speak of Delhi as the capital, in spite of the fact that the court might have been residing in one or other of the newer cities. Muhammad Tughlaq once dreamed of enclosing the four cities—Delhi, Siri, Tughlaqabad, and Jahanpanah—in a single wall, thus emphasizing their unity, while in Feroz Shah’s time, we find the “four cities”—the same four with the substitution of Firozabad for Tughlaqabad—spoken of as if they made up a single unit. Siri, Jahanpanah, and Delhi, which people were now beginning to speak of as Old Delhi, were within one wall, and though there must have been a gap of some three miles between the outskirts of Siri and those of Firozabad, the intervening space was probably by no means devoid of habitation.

**THE COMING OF TIMUR**

Firoz Shah died in 1388, and then, in 1398, after much indeterminate strife in Delhi, came Timur, one of the Titans of history, whose descendant, Babur, more than a century later, was to found the Indian empire of the “Great Moguls.”

When Timur, that December morning, with an escort of 700
men in armour, rode up to the deserted palace on the Ridge, the prospect he looked down on was different from that which presents itself to the watcher of today. What he saw was a foreground of rough lowland, broken by winding and waterless torrent-beds, with a few buildings, perhaps, belonging to the northern part of Firozabad, in the middle distance some low rocky hills, and further away the towers and domes of Firoz Shah’s Kotla.

That afternoon a detachment of the Delhi forces, 9,000 strong, marched out to the attack, but after a sharp action they were driven in again. Timur had already returned to his camp on the other side of the river, and next day he marched down the left bank to some position extending perhaps from opposite the site of Metcalfe House to the railway bridge.

The following night, 100,000 Hindu prisoners, some of whom had shown signs of excitement and sympathy when they knew that the Delhi troops were attacking, were put to the sword. After the noon prayer the army marched again, and probably crossed to the right bank of the river somewhere below Indrapat. Battle was joined the following day. The Delhi forces fought gallantly, but they were borne back into the city and Timur encamped by the Hauz-i-khāss. During the night the king escaped, and the next day Timur’s drums beat above the gates of Delhi. The troops unfortunately got out of hand and for three days there were scenes of massacre and pillage. When order was restored, Timur rode round the three cities of Siri, Jahanpanah, and Delhi, spoke words of comfort to the leading Muslims in the great mosque, and broke up his camp on January 1, 1399. His Indian campaign, we might say, was a cold weather tour, and he spent a fortnight in Delhi at Christmas, surely the bloodiest Christmas that Delhi or any other town has ever known. He inspected the Kotla of Firoz Shah as he withdrew, encamped the first night near the palace on the Ridge, and then Delhi saw him no more.

During the years that followed, the power of Delhi sank to a level that it was not to reach again for nearly four centuries, but even during this period, one of its rulers founded a new city,
which he called after his own name, Mubarakabad. It was on the banks of the river. We know no more. It did not survive its founder's murder.

Half a century after Timur's withdrawal, the renaissance began. The Tughlaqs had long passed away. The Sayyids, the feeblest dynasty that ever ruled in Delhi, had succeeded them, and in 1451 the power passed to the Lodis, who ruled for the next seventy-five years, until the last of them was overthrown by Babur, the first of the Mughals, on the field of Panipat.

Agra as Capital

The second of the Lodis had moved his administrative capital to Agra in 1503, because he felt that he was in a stronger position there for dealing with the recalcitrant Raja of Gwalior, and, except for a short break in the time of Akbar, Agra remained the headquarters of the government for more than one hundred and thirty years, until the days of Shah Jahan.

During this interval Humayun founded the Purana Qila on the site of Indrapat as a measure of security, and completed the walls and gates. Sher Shah added the mosque and the Sher Mandal, the scene of Humayun's fatal fall in 1556, and also made some progress with a new city, adjoining the Purana Qila, of which two fine gateways and a bazar survive. The historians record that he used for his buildings the materials of the old city of Siri, which had been in existence for more than two hundred years. His city occupied part of the same site as Firozabad, and in both cases the nearness of the river was an important addition to the amenities, especially from the Hindu point of view. The tendency in almost all the new foundations since the days of Kilokhri was to get nearer to the river, and it is the distance from the river that accounts for the number of tanks round Old Delhi. A third building that was constructed while the capital was at Agra is the Salimgarh fort at the river crossing, which was built by Sher Shah's son. But though during all this period the administrative capital remained at Agra, the kingdom is still described as the kingdom of Delhi, and not as the kingdom of Agra. Delhi is the dar-ul-mulk, "the house of the king-
dom," while Agra is the dar-ul-khilafat or Royal Abode. The royal abode was of necessity the administrative capital, but Delhi was the traditional centre of the kingdom, and still preserved its prestige as such.

It was Shah Jahan who brought back the capital, in the sense of the royal residence, to Delhi. He did not like the lie of the land at Agra. The river bank was much cut up with ravines, some of which came down through the city, and the palace itself was not well arranged. There was no adequate forecourt, with the result that there was apt to be crowding and jostling at the entrance, especially on important occasions. In the city, too, the bazars and open places were not sufficiently spacious to accommodate the crowds which often gathered in the streets of the capital. Orders were issued accordingly to select a site at some spot between Agra and Lahore. The choice fell on a site overlooking the Jumna between Salimgarh and the northern limits of the then existing suburbs of Delhi, and there accordingly was built Shahjahanabad, the last capital of the Mughals, where their glory shone with its greatest splendour and where its embers were destined to expire.

The next change, the change to Calcutta, came almost imperceptibly. There was no formal transfer. The British power rose gradually to the supreme position, and when it arrived there its capital became the capital of India. But, as the Pioneer once observed, Calcutta held its position by a precarious tenure, when on occasions of national importance, such as the Imperial Assemblage of 1877 and the Coronation Darbar of 1903, it had to yield precedence to Delhi.

The King-Emperor's Durbar

Another such occasion occurred in 1911, when His Majesty King George V. decided to visit India in order to announce his coronation. It was taken as a matter of course that the Darbar would be held in Delhi and not in Calcutta, but, even when the day arrived, none, save the very, very few who were in the secret, had any thought of the nature of the announcement they were to hear.
I well recall the scene—looking out northwards into the sunlight from the covered stand. Under its shadow, those bidden to the darbar, tier above tier, with a glittering fringe of princes in seats of honour in front. In the arena, troops, twenty thousand of them, in the full dress uniforms that since the war we have almost forgotten; beyond, on the raised semicircle which closed the arena to the north, a multitude past numbering, and in the midst, the red canopies bright with gold, and the golden thrones. And then the Emperor himself announced to his people the decision to “transfer the seat of the Government of India from Calcutta to the ancient capital Delhi.”

It was beyond belief. Calcutta capital no more? King George on the Mughal throne? It was almost as though the order of nature had been reversed and kingship had resumed its old prerogatives. The amazement spread with the news and soon there was a tumult of discussion from one end of the country to the other. At first the wider horizon was lost sight of. The move to Delhi was only one of the changes proposed, and it was not the one which everywhere attracted most attention. The Muhammadans were afraid that their interests would be damaged by the reversal of the partition of Bengal. The Congress authorities were jubilant at its undoing. The British community in Bengal were almost unanimous in regarding the move to Delhi as “mischievous in itself and unfair to Calcutta.” The Princes were strongly in its favour.

In Delhi itself I well remember an old Muhammadan telling me that the sentiment of the thing had soon worn threadbare, and that what he and his friends were most concerned with was the sudden rise in prices and rents. He mentioned too an old saying that the building of a new city in Delhi would bring bad luck to the builders, and for any who heeded omens there was more to come. At the end of March, people were startled to read that, just before the Viceroy’s final departure in state from the old capital, the flagstaff on Government House had been struck by lightning and the Union Jack torn to shreds. Nine months later, on the occasion of the first state entry into the new capital, Lord Hardinge was nearly killed by a bomb.
THE TRANSFER

But neither omens nor storms nor the King's enemies could turn the Government from its purpose, and it is now, after twenty years, when prophecies have been superseded by experience, possible to look at the change in a steadier light.

In the debate which took place in the House of Lords in February, 1912, the expense, the secrecy, the failure to consult Parliament, were all urged against the Government, but Lord Curzon, who led the attack, endeavoured, on the merits of the change, to make four main points. First, Delhi was unhealthy. Secondly, it was in a weak position strategically. Thirdly, the Government of India would be cut off from public opinion; and, lastly, the move to Delhi would diminish British prestige, react on the efficiency of the administration, and shorten the period of British rule.

I propose this afternoon to speak on the merits alone. First let us take the expense. The preliminary estimate given in Lord Hardinge's despatch was four million pounds or six crores of rupees. The estimated total expenditure is now 15·07 crores, or two and a half times as much. It is, I suppose, more than probable that unless the scheme had been put forward just in those last years before the war, the Government of India would still have been in Calcutta. Are we to look on the change of capital as a calamity which might have been averted, or as a blessing which might have been forestalled? I must leave it to those who know Calcutta better than I do to say whether, in view of the great political developments since 1912, the necessary accommodation could have been provided there, and if so, whether the large area of land required would not have cost a great deal more in Calcutta than it did in Delhi. Some economies might have been possible in Calcutta, and the new accommodation need not have been spread over so large an area as in Delhi, but, cutting it all down to the minimum, the questions remain (1) whether the necessary sites could have been found, and (2) whether the expenditure would have been appreciably less if the move had not been made. If the answer to both these questions
is in the negative, then there is no more to be said on the score of expense.

On the grounds of convenience and economy it is a great advantage to have the hot and cold weather capitals so close together as Simla and Delhi, instead of having them more than a thousand miles apart.

Lord Curzon apprehended that Delhi would be found unhealthy. In New Delhi the crude death-rate in 1931-32 was less than 9 per mille, which is considerably lower than the English rate. Large adjustments are no doubt required to give the true rate for New Delhi, but still it seems incredible that Calcutta, where the rate is something between 25 and 30, will ever rival it in salubrity.

I doubt whether many experts would support Lord Curzon’s view that strategically it was a mistake to put the capital in such an advanced position as Delhi, and indeed I do not quite know what contingency he had in mind.

A weightier criticism was that the move would isolate the Government of India from public opinion, and this argument of Lord Curzon’s was emphasized by Lord Lansdowne, who pictured the new capital as something “little better than a cantonment grouped round the official residences, with such bazaars and things as are necessary for the supply of those residences.” That is not a description that anyone would apply to the capital today. It is true, no doubt, that Delhi has yet to develop some of the features which are often associated with a metropolis; true also that the Government of India at Delhi is less advantageously situated for ascertaining Calcutta opinion, and that in some matters Calcutta opinion is of very great importance. A capital, on the other hand, is not always a metropolis, and, as pointed out by Lord Hardinge’s Government in their despatch, “public opinion in Calcutta is by no means always the same as that which obtains elsewhere in India, and it is undesirable that the Government of India should be subject exclusively to its influence.”

If the ideal is that the Central Government should be located in a central and generally accessible position, where all views may be listened to and none count too much, it can hardly, I think,
be denied that Delhi fulfils those requirements better than Calcutta. With the enlarged legislatures sitting in Delhi for some months every year, the frequent conferences and committees of all kinds, the perpetual coming and going of men with special causes to plead and special interests to pursue, the presence in force of representatives of the press, the sessions of the Chamber of Princes and the visits of Princes for business or private purposes—the Government of India at Delhi is able to make contacts with all important interests without laying itself open to the suspicion that it is specially susceptible to the influence of one province and one city.

Another aspect of the presence of the Government of India in Calcutta, at the headquarters of a provincial government, received special notice in the despatches. The point is put very plainly in Lord Crewe's despatch:

"The Viceroy is faced by this dilemma, that either he must become Governor-in-Chief of Bengal or he must consent to be saddled by public opinion both in India and at home with direct liability for acts... over which he only exercises, in fact, the general control of a Supreme Government. The Local Government, on the other hand, necessarily suffers from losing some part of the sense of responsibility rightly attaching to it."

**The First Step to Federation**

Lord Curzon's last argument was that the move would lessen British prestige, react on the efficiency of administration, and shorten our rule in India. Even if for the sake of argument it is admitted that in some of these respects the position is different from what it was in 1912, I do not understand how the move to Delhi can be held responsible. The move to Delhi was indeed a preparation for a future different from the past. Lord Hardinge's despatch looked forward to a day when India would consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in all provincial affairs, and *The Times* followed this line of thought to its logical conclusion and spoke of the merits of Delhi as a future federal capital. The tremendous influences which have been released since 1912 to work on the minds of men have brought what was then a distant prospect to the verge of realization. Lord Hardinge set the stage for a future he could not fully
see, and now that it is at the doors there is little wanting in New Delhi for its reception. The country has there acquired—and acquired just in time—an administrative capital which combines space with splendour and accessibility with independence.

The site originally contemplated for the new city lay beyond the Ridge, to the north-west of Shah Jahan's city, but it was condemned on the ground of its unhealthiness, and the Raisina site adopted, five miles further south, on the other side of the city.

I have shown you pictures of the buildings and gardens and roads which now adorn it. Last I show you the plan of the city. You will notice how those who planned it have made the Viceroy’s House look down the central vista to the walls which guard the memory of the long-vanished Indrapat. Thus the cities of Delhi, as it were, come full circle, with the palace of the last looking on to the site of the first, and the long ages that separate the two contain almost the whole of the written history of mankind.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, February 7, 1933, when a paper was read by Sir John Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., on "Delhi as Capital." The Right Hon. Lord Irwin, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

The Lady Irwin, the Right Hon. J. H. Whitley and Mrs. Whitley, Sir John Kerr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir Louis Dane, G.C.I.E., C.S.I., and Lady Dane, Sir James MacKenna, C.I.E., and Lady MacKenna, Sir Alfred Chatterton, C.I.E., and Lady Chatterton, Sir Charles Armstrong, Sir Reginald Glancy, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., and Lady Glancy, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., and Lady O'Dwyer, Sir Alexander Rouse, C.I.E., and Lady Rouse, Sir Edwin Lutyens, K.C.I.E., Sir Edward Maclagan, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., and Miss Maclagan, Sir Herbert Baker, K.C.S.I., Sir John Cumming, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Philip Hartog, K.B.E., C.I.E., and Lady Hartog, Sir John Bell, C.S.I., and Lady Bell, Lady Thompson and Miss P. Thompson, Lady Scott Moncrieff, Lady Abbas Ali Baig, Lady Shea and Miss Shea, and Miss Elizabeth Shea, Sir Hugh Keeling, C.S.I., Mr. John de La Valette, Colonel Graham Seton Hutchison, D.S.O., Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Mr. and Mrs. H. M. Willmott, Mr. V. H. Boalh, C.B.E., and Mrs. Boalh, Mr. J. Sladen, Mr. G. S. Ingram, Rev. R. Burges, Mr. S. Altaf Husain, Mrs. Weir, Mr. and Mrs. Gray, Rev. E. S. Carr, Mr. T. A. H. Way, Colonel W. F. Hamilton, Mr. Hugh MacGregor, Mr. A. H. Joyce, Mr. H. R. H. Wilkinson, Mr. George Pilcher, Mrs. Damry, Mr. R. A. Wilson, the Hon. Emily Kinnaird, Mr. S. T. Sheppard, Mr. J. J. Nolan, Mr. Ernest Esaiale, Mr. P. B. Haigh, Dr. C. C. Fink, Colonel A. S. Hamilton, Mr. F. Furnivall, Lieut.-Colonel W. E. Lees, Colonel W. H. Lowry, Mr. E. E. Hall, Mrs. Arthur Gordon, Mrs. Donkin, Miss F. Blackett, Mr. H. Wright, Mrs. W. Kirkpatrick, Mrs. Tyrrell, Miss Corfield, Mr. F. Grubb, Mr. Ghulam Khan, the Rev. W. Stanton, Colonel M. L. Ferrar, Mrs. C. H. Pratt, Mr. H. A. Keyser, Miss Bennett, Colonel Jones, Miss Oakeshott, Mr. M. S. Gandhi, Mr. and Mrs. A. R. Thompson, Miss Thompson, Mrs. and Miss Banes, Mr. Ayana Angadi, Mrs. Foden, Mr. H. A. Medd, Major A. C. Addison, Mrs. Kisch, Mr. E. E. Hall, and Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., Hon Secretary.

The Chairman: Delhi is evidently very popular, and I am quite sure that all those who have come here this afternoon will have come partly because they want to hear about Delhi, the centre of Indian history, and also because they want to hear about it from Sir John Thompson, than whom nobody is better qualified to speak on it. He requires no introduction from me. A great many of you know him, and those who do not know him, know of him,
and all who either know him or of him respect him as one of the truest servants that India has ever had.

Sir John Thompson said: My Lord Chairman, when I say that we are all delighted to see that you have so far recovered from your recent indisposition as to be able to keep your engagement this afternoon, I am expressing the feelings not only of those who are present in this hall, but of a very much wider circle outside, for, if I may say so, there are few persons whose health is of more importance to the country than yours. What you have said about me makes me a little nervous, as I fear you may have excited hopes, only for the lecturer to dash them. Before I start my lecture, however, I propose to try to create some prejudice in my favour by showing on the screen some of the architectural triumphs of New Delhi. After that, I shall plunge with an easier conscience into maps and plans and history.

Sir John Thompson then read his paper.

The following letter from Lord Hardinge of Penshurst was read by the Hon Secretary:

Dear Mr. Brown,

I thank you for sending me a copy of Sir John Thompson's most interesting paper, and it is a source of profound regret to me that, owing to absence abroad, it will be impossible for me to be present and to take part in the discussion that is to follow the lecture.

I see the old story repeated of how the flagstaff on Government House, Calcutta, was struck by lightning and the flag torn to pieces when I finally left what had been my official residence for two years. It was not so. The story was due to the nautical language of a newspaper correspondent, who informed his journal that the flag was "struck" as I left Government House, meaning simply that it was lowered. This was made into a good story by the Calcutta Press. It is true there was the sound of distant thunder and no lightning, but a gentle rain, which, coming at the end of March, was considered of happy omen by the Bengalis, who were delighted at the reunion of the two Bengalis.

Sir John Thompson has balanced with great fairness the criticisms against the transfer of the capital to Delhi and the advantages in its favour, and I venture to think that, as the years go by, the advantages will even be greater and more striking, while the voice of criticism will be dead. Still, the transfer of the capital from Calcutta was not an original idea on the part of my Government, for Lord Lawrence had considered it, and, as I was assured by the late Sir Valentine Chirol, Lord Curzon had at one time even contemplated the possibility of transferring the capital to Agra.

Events have moved fast in India during the twenty years that have elapsed since the Durbar, and administrative autonomy in provincial affairs has already been generally accepted as a desirable constitutional advance. But how could Bengal have become a Presidency Governorship and acquire provincial autonomy if the Viceroy and Governor of Bengal both occupied the same capital as headquarters of two entirely different administrations? It was difficult enough, as I found, when Bengal was only a Lieutenant-
Governorship, but it would be impossible if and when Bengal became an autonomous province. Sooner or later a transfer would have had to be made.

Sir John rightly says "Lord Hardinge set the stage for a future he could not fully see, and now that it is at the door there is little wanting in New Delhi for its reception." Let us all hope that just as New Delhi has developed from a stony waste into a most beautiful and delectable city, so also may that future expand and give to the world a great and loyal India of ever-increasing glory and prosperity.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Sir Edwin Lutyens: If for one reason only I am glad to have been asked to say a few words so that I am able to acknowledge in public my admiration and gratitude to our Chairman, Lord Irwin, for all his help and sympathy. If he did not always understand what I said, he was always kind enough by questioning, and that with great patience, to discover what I did mean—a great boon to one who is often misunderstood. (Laughter.) It is due to Lord Irwin and to Lady Irwin, who worked indefatigably, that the principal building in New Delhi [the Viceroy's House] has won so kindly a tolerance.

Sir John Thompson, in my time the last Commissioner of Delhi, has told us the emotional and tragic story of the many Delhis of the past. You have only to look at him to recognize him as a man of stalwart qualities, and one with a single purpose—to do right. He is, I know, a good man, too, for his residence at Delhi was hung with Arundel prints. (Laughter and cheers.)

The new city owes its being to Lord Hardinge, whose statue now stands surveying the length of the central vista (King's Way), and has inscribed upon its pedestal the right, proper, and proud word "Founder." His patience and courage in times of great stress—personal and political, his even temper in the midst of diverse discussion remain in my memory as being parallel only with the greatness of his conception. His command that one avenue should lead to Purana Kila (Indrapat) and another to the Jumma Masjid was the father of the equilateral and hexagonal plan. This was a sorry nuisance to all whose thoughts could not merge beyond the right angles of New York nor embrace the intelligence of l'Enfant at Washington.

It was early in 1912 that Sir Richmond Ritchie, then Permanent Under-Secretary at the India Office, sent for me and asked me if I could undertake the planning of the New Delhi. We went on to his club, where in the guest book he wrote my name and gave my address as "Delhi." This was the first intimation I had of being selected for this momentous work. The last I heard of Sir Richmond Ritchie was from Lord Curzon, who told me he had just come from the funeral of one of his old secretaries. He spoke with great respect, affection, and praise; but added it was a very dull affair—no horses, no plumes.

In April of that year, Mr. J. A. Brodie, the distinguished engineer of Liverpool fame, Captain George Swinton (at that time chairman-bespoke of the London County Council), and myself started on our great adventure. We were three gay musketeers—luckily unarmed—and ignorant of all that...
India really was and meant, with the exception of Captain Swinton, who had served as an A.D.C. during Lord Lansdowne's Viceroyalty. Montmorency (now Sir Geoffrey, the Governor of the Punjab) was attached to us. We grew even more attached to him, and regretted—we really grudged—the quick-following promotions that were his due and which eventually separated us in the progress of the Delhi project. We had great and exciting disputations, and the outer world joined in.

In the following year the Government gave as a help Sir Herbert Baker, and all I can say is that I am a difficult person to work with. Each successive winter brought its annual flock of Cassandras flitting across the Indian skies, and self-constituted town-planners; one of which was loquacious enough to be turned out and forbidden the city. (Laughter.)

One great battle was that of style, and the pointed arch was hailed as being the only form really sympathetic to the Indian temperament. A lucky remark in that when God created India He did not show His wide sympathy by pointing the rainbow made a point; and the rainbow arch won the day. (Laughter.) Then there was the battle of the sites—Raisina or the Delhi Ridge. It is odd that the talk of many should be allowed to influence those whose job it is to design. One cannot imagine how any discussion on ethics can better a beech or any other tree; or that talk can in any way affect the insistence of the sap invisible within its growth. I should like to hint that there may be some frailty in the method of our modern education. (Laughter and cheers.)

Delhi owes a great debt to Sir Hugh Keeling—a great engineer, a solid and loyal collaborator. As the principal engineer-in-charge, he came to be a veritable mother of New Delhi and all who worked for it. His many able subordinates toed his dictates with precision.

Sir John Thompson has shown you photographs. To realise the scale of the Central Buildings, I may say that what Buckingham Palace is to the Admiralty Arch, so is the Viceroy's house to the Great Place. Generally speaking, over 20,000 labourers were employed, 5,700 of whom were skilled. The sandstone used was of the same strata as that used by Akbar and Shah Jehan. The stoneyard was one of the largest in the world, employing over 3,500 men, who dressed over 3½ million cubic feet and about 350,000 cubic feet of marble. To the south of the city, 700 million bricks were made out of 27 kilns. Joinery shops were established and about 700 men were employed to produce about £200,000 worth of work in teak, shisham, ebony, koko, and other Indian woods. There were 84 miles of electric distribution cables and 130 miles of street lighting, 50 miles of roads and 30 miles of service roads. But a list of materials and their amounts can be prolonged endlessly. A great debt of gratitude is due to Mr. Mustoe, the gardener-in-chief, by whose persistent labour, thought, and foresight New Delhi has been adorned.

The cost, including the purchase of a veritable territory, amounted to about £10,625,000, of which the Viceroy's house, gardens, and staff quarters cost about £1,353,000. The whole of the new city, with its land, roads, and buildings, cost about twice as much as the London County Council had to pay for its hall. (Cheers.) The cost in money, at about £500,000 a year,
having been met out of revenue, leaves no debt remaining on this great project.

The Indian craftsmen gradually grew in excellence and accuracy as time went on. One mason, in the earlier days, cut a stone so inaccurately that he was discovered altering the template to fit his ill-cut stone. This man was discharged, but was reinstated in that he was the first of the masons who showed any sign of a dawning intelligence. I regret deeply that it was not practical politics, when the work closed down, for the Government to retain a number of the best men—both masons and joiners—for public work.

Last summer I had the opportunity of a transit through the Near East, and in Athens, Constantinople, Baalbek, and Jerusalem saw the sequences of man's destructive aptitude so ably described by Sir John Thompson in his story of the old Delhis. History will ever repeat itself, and such sequences can soon, in all good faith, begin with our New Delhi.

I hope these few words have not been too many—for the greater the spoke the greater is the tire! (Laughter.)

Sir Herbert Baker: I would like to say a few words about the general position of the capital and about the buildings.

Sir John Thompson described to you how the geography of North India and its river dominated the sites of the great battles which decided the fate of empires. He explained also how geology dominated the actual sites of the capitals; how they were placed on the only stone outcrop which ran through the plains. That stone is as hard as granite and more difficult to work. The marvel is how masons in those days, with their primitive tools, ever cut the stones of which the earlier buildings of Delhi are built. Those who know them will remember the more delicate parts are often carved in red sandstone, and that brings us to the fact that there is another finger, to use Sir John's eloquent simile, pointing to another possible capital in the Jumna; and that was the long ridge of red sandstone, 100 miles farther south, west of Agra.

Barbar went to Agra perhaps because it was a clean place, and while he was a great conqueror he was also a poet and a great gardener. But Akbar built his capital first at Fatehpur Sikri, on the edge of the red sandstone ridge, but he did not take into account the shortage of water there, and so he soon had to leave it and went back to Agra on the river. Then Shah Jehan went back to Delhi; some of his reasons Sir John gave. I think other reasons were that it was cooler at Delhi, particularly by the gap in the ridge shown on the screen; and also because it was nearer the north, where they trekked in the summer to the hills. There was no doubt another reason, and that is that the roads had improved. The emperors were very great road builders, and so the soft red sandstone could easily be brought up to Delhi. It no longer had to be brought the 100 miles on the backs of elephants or of camels, like the yellow marbles for the great columns of the Viceroy's House were brought from the deserts of Rajputana.

There may, indeed, have been another reason for the change. The Mogul emperors had the ambition to build their own capitals. It is a very good ambition—particularly for the benefit of architects!—provided they do not,
as in the case of the architect of the Taj Mahal, have their eyes put out. I am glad the autocratic powers of modern Viceroy's do not go as far as that! (Laughter and cheers.)

I am very glad Sir John has mentioned the strategic and central position of New Delhi, because in the very depressing days when everybody prophesied ill of Delhi and said it was entirely the wrong place for the capital, the one thing they were unanimous about was that there could never be unanimity about any other site.

Sir John gave some very gloomy omens, one from Heaven, which I am glad to hear was not true; we heard many of them, and they were very discouraging during the dreary days of the war, when enemies of the new capital prophesied that as long as we went on building so long would the war go on. But I would like to round off his lecture with two good omens.

There was one occasion exactly twenty years ago when I was first out there and the site of the capital had just been decided on. I sat on the rock of Raisina which Lord Hardinge had chosen as the centre of New Delhi. The surroundings were very untidy, nothing but the little mud houses of the hamlet, the dust heaps, and the untidy foundations of many destroyed capitals; it all certainly seemed to justify what I think Lord Curzon said of it, "a deserted city of dreary and disconsolate tombs." My two companions were Herbert Fisher, the Warden of New College, and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, our Prime Minister. As we were looking down the great vista where it was planned to be, as shown on the screen, wondering how a great city could rise from such dreary surroundings, a perfect rainbow arch formed down the centre of that vista, appearing exactly where the great arch now is. We at once lost all doubt and acclaimed it as a great omen for the success of the new city.

Finally, eighteen years afterwards, our present Chairman, the Viceroy, presided at the dedication of that great arch just where the rainbow arch had appeared to be. Though smaller than the great Durbars of Delhi, it was a beautiful scene, and looking through Sir Edwin's majestic arch we saw the white domes of the new city, one and a half miles away, set against a most wonderful sunset, glowing with crimson clouds above, fading down to gold below. I am sure you will agree that then the heavens themselves declared the birth of a princely city, to be the solid focus round which the new constitution for India will crystallise. (Cheers.)

Sir Louis Dane: I suppose I have been asked to speak as I was the last Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab who administered Delhi. Now, after twenty years, I may perhaps reveal some quite innocent secrets.

In his careful and most interesting historical paper Sir John Thompson has told you how extraordinarily well the secret of the change of the Government from Calcutta to Delhi was kept in India. I believe I was one of the first outside the actual Viceroy's Executive Committee to know of it. It was about ten days before the Durbar that Lord Hardinge was walking round the fort of Delhi with me. I was showing him the improvements that had been made by the Punjab Government. He was very much interested, and at last, just as we were at the jharoka, where Their Majesties
Delhi as Capital

were, according to old custom, to show themselves to the multitudes on the plain below the walls, he said to me: "I think I ought to tell you, Dane, that His Majesty has decided to move the capital from Calcutta to Delhi. I am sure you will be delighted." I said: "Well, sir, whatever His Majesty decides, that of course is right, but as a Punjabi I am not quite certain that for the moment I am unduly elated with joy."

Delhi, as I dare say most of you know, was made over to the Punjab after the Mutiny because of the great service that the Punjab officers, peasants, and princes rendered in making it possible for us to recover Delhi. From 1858 down to 1912 the Punjab administered Delhi. The Punjab Government looked after all the great gatherings that took place there, such as the Imperial Assembly of 1877, King Edward's Durbar of 1903, King George's Durbar in 1911, and many other great gatherings. I am one of the few still living who have managed to survive three Durbars at Delhi. Throughout that long period of years it was the pride of the Punjab that there never was any form of disturbance or unpleasantness at any of the great gatherings at Delhi. I think you will admit that it is something for a Government to be proud of, and whatever may happen in the future the pride of the Punjab in that matter will remain.

I may say that on the occasion of the formal handing over of Delhi to the Government of India, as the charge had already actually been made over on October 1, 1912, the Punjab Government was not actually responsible for what happened. I had prepared a speech with the permission of Lord Hardinge, in which I ventured to point out what the Punjab had done for Delhi in various ways, and to say that if at any time the necessity should arise, the officers, the people, and the Princes of the Punjab were still there to play their part in defending Delhi or, if necessary, recovering it.

That speech was prepared before the attempt on the Viceroy's life. Here I should like to say how much I admired, and still do admire, the extraordinary courage and fortitude that Lord Hardinge displayed when he was stricken down by the bomb. It was rather a dramatic episode. It was an elephant procession. I was supposed to be an adept as Master of Ceremonies, and I had been asked to suggest something that could be done suitably to mark the handing over of authority. I protested, because, I said, "I feel rather like the burghefs of Calais being brought round with halters round their necks to hand over the keys of the city. Am I to arrange the ceremony for my own execution?" Also it was exceedingly difficult, after so short a period, to suggest any ceremonial which would not clash with or challenge comparison with those of the Royal Durbar.

However, the Viceroy insisted, so I suggested, "The King had no elephant procession and no ceremony in the fort except the garden party and the great people's fête. I think you might have an elephant procession down to the fort and let the handing over of charges be made in the Diwani-Am or Great Audience Hall of the Mogul Emperors."

That is how it came about that there was an elephant procession, and I really think it was providential. If the Viceroy had been travelling at foot's pace in a carriage and that bomb thrown, as it was, from the roof, and it had fallen into the carriage, the mortality would have been shocking. As it was,
he was about fourteen feet up in the air on an elephant in a very strongly made steel and silver howdah, and the force of the explosion passed over the heads of the people and was broken by the howdah. The bomb hit the State umbrella, killed the poor Balrampur jemadar who had claimed the honour of carrying the umbrella as he had done for King Edward's Durbar, and killed and wounded others. Lady Hardinge escaped, as she was bowing. Lord Hardinge was sitting up, and part of the bomb case caught his neck and shoulder over the back of the howdah. The howdah stood the shock and the elephant fortunately remained standing. If it had not been for that, I have no hesitation in saying that there would have been sixty or seventy people killed. So there is some good in elephant processions.

Lord Hardinge, stricken as we believed almost to death, still had the courage to say that the procession must go on and the whole ceremony must be gone through. I think you will admit that that was the act of a very brave man, and it was a very wise proceeding. If we had not done it I very much doubt if there would have been a New Delhi at all.

I do not propose to follow Sir John Thompson into the pros and cons of the move to Delhi. But I should like to say one thing. I was to a small extent concerned in the founding of New Delhi. As soon as the announcement was made, or very shortly afterwards, the Revenue Member of the Government of India was asked by the Viceroy to come and see me and to ask for suggestions as to where the new capital should be placed. I had spent a great deal of time at Delhi, and was able to go into the matter. You will have noticed that all the old Delhis were either along the river or up on the rocky ground to the south. The reason was they had to be near the river to get the water, or had to be near the rocky ground to collect rain water, as the well water is saline and not fit to drink. That explains why all the previous nine Delhis were either along the river or on the rocky ground near the ridge.

It so happened, if you looked at Delhi, the first idea was one of decaying tombs and old buildings, and it would be very difficult to find a place where you could put a new large Delhi. But there was one little place that was about four square miles near Raisina, where the ridge was too narrow for a collecting area and it was fairly clean ground. It was too far from the river or from the hilly collecting area to have been built over. I suggested that might be suitable, but first of all I had to ask the Revenue Member what was intended. I said: "Do you require a city for a population of 60,000 or 70,000 in addition to the existing Delhi?" He said: "No, the Viceroy says arrangements are to be made for a possible 250,000 people." I said that was a very noble conception, but I did not quite see where they were to come from unless the Viceroy was going to compel the inhabitants of the existing Delhi to go down to New Delhi, as Muhammad Tughlag had tried to do. The smaller number could have adequately housed on the old civil station and Durbar sites, but for the great new city Raisina was the only site.

His Excellency was good enough to ride over the country and examine the whole idea with me, and approved of that site. I was also asked to give some sort of idea of what I thought would be a suitable layout. You
have often heard of putting down a treaty or a will on a half-sheet of note-paper. That was exactly what the plan of the New Delhi was so far as I was concerned. I put the Vicereoy’s House and the offices of State near Raisina, with great avenues radiating to Purana Kila, the fort and mosque, Safdar Jang’s tomb, etc., to secure these fine prospects.

The paper was carried off, and I heard no more about it till in 1914 I happened to be at Delhi and was asked if I would like to see Sir Edwin Lutyens and Sir Herbert Baker. Sir Herbert held out this old paper of mine and said: “You will think we have stolen your thunder, but we had never seen this paper of yours until about a fortnight ago, though it is almost exactly what we are working at.” I naturally felt pleased that a very humble and inexperienced person had hit upon the plan which was approved and has been elaborated by those two great men into the splendid capital of which you have seen the pictures.

One word more. I consider that there ought to be a strong European garrison at Delhi for many reasons. First, to maintain our prestige, which in the last resort rests on our British troops; second, to prevent any awkward incident. People may say there are garrisons at Meerut and Ambala. So there are. So there were at the time of the Mutiny, but it was not enough to stay the madness at its birth. I maintain that there should be a stronger European garrison there. You have to be prepared for sudden gusts of popular excitement, and for that reason and so that there should be something in evidence to show the ultimate power of the British Government, there should be a strong British garrison at Delhi. You are not there in a coast town like the old Presidency towns in a non-martial area, where you may have communal or other city riots, but in the centre of a tract held by martial races trained to arms, some of whom are very excitable—Jāts, Ranyars, Meos. Why, only the other day several thousands of Muslim Meos in the Alwar State, perhaps forty-five miles from Delhi, rose in rebellion. They elected to demonstrate in the State, but they might easily, with their brethren in British India, have moved on Delhi to memorialize the Legislative Assembly, which might have been awkward. The fact is that in a small Imperial enclave like New Delhi you cannot have a large ordinary police force. It was the inadequacy of police protection which conduced to the bomb disaster that has been mentioned. For this and other State reasons it is, in my opinion, desirable to supplement the inadequacy by a strong force of British troops, at any rate for the cold weather.

Sir Alexander Rouse: I feel extraordinarily diffident about getting up to speak before such a distinguished gathering, especially after listening to Sir John Thompson’s eloquence, but I am glad of the opportunity, as I was the first and last, I think, on the construction of New Delhi. I came there to build temporary Delhi in January, 1912, and I left at the same time or a little earlier than Lord Irwin at the finish of the new capital.

It was a great privilege to be asked by the Association to come and listen to Sir John Thompson. One of the things that struck me most in reading his paper was a feeling of envy, envy of the builders of the old Delhis. They were extraordinarily unhampered by difficulties which we had to con-
tend with very frequently. I notice that Muhammad of Ghor destroyed twenty-seven Hindu temples to get the materials for his new buildings, and Sher Shah was not deterred by any sentiment when he destroyed the old Muhammadan buildings of Sivi to build his Delhi.

We did not desire any materials from the remains of the past for the building of New Delhi, but many a time we should have been very glad to remove useless and unsightly buildings, relics of the past, which interfered with the development of the new capital. But even if the removal did not offend any communal susceptibilities, there was always the Archaeological Department to contend with.

As a matter of fact, the materials of old Delhis were of little use to us in our modern methods of construction, but the clearing of the site produced an enormous quantity of old stone which we used for concrete or road making, and this had one rather curious effect on the design of New Delhi. I do not know if you noticed in the picture that at the back of Government House it was proposed to construct a large amphitheatre in which it was hoped that future Durbars would be held. We got out large quantities of expensive machinery to dig out that amphitheatre, and to get therefrom building material and stone for roads and concrete; but the levelling of the site yielded so much old material that it was a mere scratch we made on the hill at the back, and there is in consequence no amphitheatre, and probably never will be.

Lord Lansdowne is quoted as saying that the new capital would be something "little better than a cantonment grouped round the official residences, with such bazaars and things as are necessary for the supply of those residences," and many have said that Delhi was a back number and never would grow. I took the trouble yesterday to turn up the census figures, which are rather illuminating.

Delhi as a whole has grown by 47 per cent. between the census of 1921 and that of 1931. The new capital, as far as I remember the figures, has more than doubled in those ten years, although the census figure of 1921 for the New Delhi area included our very large labour staff which had practically disappeared in 1931.

It is rather amusing to look back and see what were the forecasts of the growth of Delhi. The scheme for the water supply was based on the probable population in 1955, which it was anticipated would be 430,000 persons. The census figure of 1931 was 474,000. I may say that the water supply is entirely inadequate in consequence, and the scheme is now being remodelled on broader lines. And when excesses over the estimated cost of New Delhi are spoken of it has to be borne in mind that Delhi is already considerably bigger than it was expected to be, and especially that the Government of India has grown out of all recognition, which has seriously affected the cost of construction.

I should like to say, in closing, how much I personally am indebted to our Chairman and Lady Irwin for the help and personal effort which they generously gave toward the completing of the new capital of Delhi. Without them we should never have got the funds or the permission to carry it out as it should have been and was carried out. (Cheers.)
The Chairman: It has been a delightful hour that we have spent. Certainly I have not spent one that I have enjoyed so much for a long time. We have followed Sir John, as well as our all too limited historical knowledge permitted, through a long pageant and procession of history, and he guided us through many centuries and eventually handed us over to the care of Sir Edwin Lutyens and Sir Herbert Baker and Sir Alexander Rouse.

I remember very well, and I am sure Lady Irwin would too, the first sight that we had of that State dining-room which Sir John Thompson showed us on the screen. As far as I remember, there were about three or four half-naked women with babies lying about chipping brick in that room, and I wondered to myself how it would ever become what Sir Edwin Lutyens assured me it was going to be, the most remarkable room in the house.

And, indeed, up to the end, when Sir Alexander Rouse used to assure me that the house would be inhabitable by 1929, it seemed completely and utterly incredible. But in the remarkable way in which these things happen in India, the flowers were made to grow, and what had been utter chaos almost in a night bloomed and represented the full conception of the architects.

I think one of the most valuable results, and the thing that always comes to my mind when I hear people criticize the expenditure or even the whole project of New Delhi, is the fact of the building of New Delhi having taken place, with all the decoration that was attached to it, has been responsible for a tremendous stimulus or revival of the art and the craftsmanship of India. I am certain of that, and in no other way would anything at all equivalent to that stimulus have been given.

I do not think that I shall ever forget the formal opening of the capital, when the representatives of the Dominions were there to unveil those Dominion columns. The scene that Sir Herbert Baker described will always live in my mind with that great arch and the sunset behind it and the Indian troops marching through the memorial arch. It was a thing that nobody who was privileged to take part in it would ever forget.

All that pleasure Sir John Thompson has revived for me, and I am sure for everybody here who was there, either before or after completion, by what he has said this afternoon.

Sir John Kerr: For the last year or so the discussions at these open meetings of the East India Association have turned very largely on questions connected with the coming constitutional changes in India. Interesting and absorbing as those matters are, it is well for us to remember that there are other things in India besides politics, and we could not have been reminded of that important fact in a more delightful way than we have been this afternoon. (Applause.)

I do not want to strike any discordant note, but I was for the greater part of my service a Calcutta man, and the views of the Calcutta man have received scant consideration this afternoon. Speaking for myself, I can honestly say that I always felt that from the point of view of the Government of Bengal, it was a very good thing that the Government of India and the Viceroy should leave Calcutta. As a matter of fact, they have not been
able to leave it yet, because I see from the papers they pay an annual pilgrimage to Calcutta about Christmas-time and stay there as long as they decently can. (Laughter.)

I thank Sir John Thompson for that reference to the historian Barni. I cannot say I had ever heard of him before, but if the quotation had been available in 1912, the opposition to the removal would have been more pointed than it was.

Now I will only say that among the many lectures which appear on the records of this Association that of Sir John Thompson will stand out in a class by itself. It is instinct, if I may say so, with eloquence and scholarship and fine feeling, and it will not be readily forgotten by those who have heard it today.

I should also like to thank you, sir, for sparing the time to come and preside over our gathering this afternoon.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to pass by acclamation a hearty vote of thanks both to the lecturer and to the Chairman.

Sir John Thompson: I am very grateful to you for the kind way in which you have received my lecture. There is not time for me to add anything to the remarks that have been made, but there is one point which Lord Hardinge dealt with in his letter on which I should like to offer a personal explanation, and that is with regard to the story about the flagstaff having been struck.

It is a well-known story in India. I felt a little sceptical about it when I was writing my paper. I had not been in Calcutta at the time, and I thought I had better try to verify it. So I looked up the files of the Pioneer and The Times, and in both these papers the story was given. Indeed, the Pioneer gave the actual minute at which the accident happened—4.30 p.m.—an hour and ten minutes before the procession started. I regret I did not take any further steps to verify the story, but I am glad to have elicited an authoritative contradiction from Lord Hardinge.

I should like to add my tribute of thanks to Lord Irwin for having come here today at, I know, very considerable inconvenience to himself; I wish also to express my thanks to Sir Edwin Lutyens, Sir Herbert Baker, and Mr. Medd, who have made it possible for me to show those beautiful pictures on the screen, not only for their having lent me the pictures but also for the friendship which prompted them to help me.
CALCUTTA AS CAPITAL: THE OBJECTIONS OF WARREN HASTINGS

By C. COLLIN DAVIES

In his excellent paper on "Delhi as Capital," Sir John Thompson, after giving us a graphic description of the varying fortunes of Delhi under Muslim rule, concentrated his attention upon the advantages of Delhi as the capital of modern India. In the discussion that followed the paper little reference was made to the disadvantages of Calcutta. Although these are too obvious to need any mention here, it is not generally known that one of the greatest of the Governors-General, the much-maligned Warren Hastings, was firmly convinced that the permanency of the British dominion in India could never be ensured while Calcutta remained the capital city.

The following minute, hitherto unpublished, is to be found amongst his private papers deposited in the British Museum. For some unknown reason, although addressed to the Board, it was never actually submitted. The minute speaks for itself and furnishes further evidence of the remarkable foresight of the great pro-consul. That this was his opinion in those early days when the Company's north-west frontier marched with the territories of the Nawab Wazir of Oudh is sufficient proof that Hastings, had he foreseen the later expansion of the British dominions in India, would have been a staunch supporter of a more central political capital.

_Minute of the Honble. the Governor-General for removing the seat of Government from Calcutta to Colgong, dated June 4, 1782. (British Museum, Add. MSS. 29,200, fol. 210-218.)_

From the hour of my arrival in Calcutta in the year 1772 to the present time I have continually lamented, and have had continual cause to lament, the defects of its situation as the capital of a powerful dominion and the source of a vast political system. Instead of a central distance, or a position from which its authority could issue with the speediest communication to every part of its jurisdiction, it stands in a remote angle at the distance of three or four hundred miles from its circumference, and within fifty of its
southern boundary, and on the lower extremity of a rapid river, at a distance which may be estimated at less than one month from its intersection with the frontier line in its descent, and its ascent three.

The climate of Calcutta, though greatly improved by the care which has been occasionally bestowed on it, was within my memory very pernicious, and may be still accounted the most unfavourable to a European constitution of any in the provinces. Its remote situation furnished the grounds of the multiplied sovereignties which I found dispersed over the country on my accession to the government, and has been the principal cause which has even to this time frustrated all the endeavours of the present united administration to fix the collections of its revenues and the exercise of its power to the capital, exclusively of all the evils which have grown out of a licentiousness encouraged by impunity, and that impunity assured by the impossibility of exercising a penal control over those parts which are removed beyond the reach of inspection or information.

The unwholesomeness of the air is an essential objection. Every man who has resided in Calcutta must have experienced a debility in the powers both of the mind and body which he has not felt in other places; yet there is none where more business is conducted, nor where subjects so frequently occur in the ordinary course of business which require an unremitting attention and the faculties of the mind in their fullest energy. We are all born to pursuits of pleasure, interest, and ambition; and the calls of official duty, though our only ostensible occupations, are but the secondary instruments to one or all of those ruling principles. I am forced to use this reflection, because it furnishes the only clue to another great evil derived from the situation of the present capital. The habits of society are less prevalent, and the amusements of private life are fewer in Calcutta than perhaps in any other city its equal in wealth and population.

These defects may be ascribed to the humid and relaxed state of the air, and to the dead uniformity of the face and productions of the country. The impulse of pleasure is therefore precluded from all artificial aids, while its natural force is diminished by the tendency of the body to disease, or checked by the cautions which are necessary to avoid it: and the other incitements to action are only powerful in a great degree as they facilitate the means of deliverance from a state of irksome existence, and of restoration to a land to which the memory recurs as the scene of youthful enjoyment, and where the objects of ambition and interest are as permanent as the expected term of life itself.

To this source is to be ascribed that impatience which every sojourner in this country shows to leave it, and the consequent solicitude with which many have been reproached for the accumulation of wealth, which they must attain to attain that end, and in the pursuit of which their desires and means must cease with it. The rapid succession of men in authority is unaccountable on any other grounds to those who view their condition with all the advantages of power and fortune which are annexed to it. I am myself a single exception in a list of eight persons who have been placed at the head of this government since it began to acquire the consequence of a political state, and whose periods of service divided between them have scarcely
exceeded two years for the portion of each. The fluctuations in the next
degree of rank have borne the same proportion.

These frequent changes of men who by constitutional pre-eminence, or by
the weight of personal influence, have possessed a superior share of rule in
the government itself have naturally tended to impede the consistency of its
acts, and afford one reason why the numerous and rich materials which
fortune has thrown into the lap of the Company have never been arranged
into system, but remain even to this hour an unimproved and almost useless
mass. A government to be prosperous must be permanent. Those who plan
great measures should see and feel their own interest and reputation con-
ected in their success, and should remain in power to aid and support them
in their operations. In a series of successive authorities little is attempted
out of the beaten track but by that in being to undo what had been done by
that which preceded it.

It will be remembered that the town of Calcutta was first occupied by
a few frugal adventurers who erected their huts without design or order
where it suited their separate convenience or fancy. These as they multiplied
served to direct the lines of the streets and lanes, which could not afterwards
be corrected or modelled to any regular plan, because of the value and rights
of private property which opposed it, however necessary to the health and
safety of the inhabitants. Besides these, every other improvement which
could be suggested for the police or convenience of the town was, and is
liable to the same, and as I am assured, insuperable difficulties, if the rigour
of the law is allowed to operate against it.

Hitherto I have considered the situation of Calcutta in relation to its own
dependencies.

As the seat of a great political dominion its inconveniences are yet greater,
since its communication with all the powers in alliance with it is restricted to
correspondence by letters, and to the agency of local Residents. On every
urgent emergency the occasion of action is past before a letter can be written
and an answer returned to it, even in the distance between the Presidency
and its nearest connection, which is Lucknow. As to personal interviews
between the first members of the government and the chiefs with whom it
is in alliance or negotiation the distance renders it almost impossible, yet if
my assertion may be credited and allowed to stand in the place of a long
train of reasoning upon a subject apparently self-demonstrative, but too
delicate for liberal discussion, there may be occasions in which none but the
principals in authority on both sides could effect a solid arrangement. By
the effects of frequent intercourse friendships might be conciliated; attach-
ments improved; the harshness and unpiancy of remote claims softened by
personal converse; mutual confidence established; and the genuine wishes of
the heart exchanged, which shame or distrust will restrain, where they can
only be made known through intermediate channels, exposed to witnesses;
the field of knowledge would be expanded; and the means of information
facilitated.

Even a nearer approach without that advantage would be productive of
many of the same effects in less though proportionate degree.

These considerations and many others of the same tendency which I have
omitted, induced me when I was last on my return from Benares to direct Mr. Cleveland,* the collector of Bhagalpur, to visit the land above Colgong, and to direct a survey of it to be taken; judging it from its position, and my own observations upon it, the fittest spot for a capital city, if it should ever be resolved to change the seat of government. His report I have lately received with an accurate survey of the ground taken by Lieutenant Baillie, and I now lay both before the Board. From these evidences it will appear how well adapted this spot is in itself to the purpose for which I have made it the subject of my enquiries, to which I shall subjoin some other observations.

Having twice occasionally passed the district of Colgong, I can pronounce it from my own knowledge as far as my eye could extend to each side of the road from Colgong to Shahbad (sic), by far the most beautiful country to the view that I have ever seen in India, and the most elevated of any not hilly. From the temperature and healthiness of the air, the richness of the soil, and the variety of the surface, it seems to possess every advantage which can contribute to the conveniences and comfort of life or add to its elegancies. Its distance from the different extremities of the province is nearly central. It has the advantage of standing on the bank of the great river, and on a part of it not liable to the usual devastations of its floods. Its vicinity to the jungle tarai† or hilly region of Bengal may tend to the speedy improvement of that extensive territory into all the blessings of culture and population, for it abounds with a variety of valuable ground, even the summits of its hills having been proved fit for almost every kind of vegetation, and its inhabitants who formerly subsisted on the scanty expedients of savage society at home, and by predatory incursions on the cultivated lands of their more civilized neighbours, have been found on a nearer acquaintance with them most docile and gentle in their dispositions, and capable of being humanized and instructed in all the arts of civil life. For this discovery we are indebted to the benevolent and successful policy of Mr. Cleveland, to which I have already had occasion to bear testimony in a letter which I had the honour to address to the Board in August last. But where the calls upon industry are few the improvements of a people will be necessarily slow and bounded. The neighbourhood of a populous city would augment both to such a degree as might afford the most rational ground to hope that this great extent of now useless property would in the course of a few years become a very profitable part of the Company's dominions.

In confirmation of these specific conclusions, and as a general argument in favour of the proposed removal, it may be safely presumed that any place which on mature reflection, founded on local examination, and on its application to the actual state of our existence, shall have been selected to form the seat of government, must exclusively of other considerations be preferable to one assigned by accident to our first adventurers and continued to their successors down to the present time through all the successive deviations which they have undergone from their commercial character.

* Further information concerning Augustus Cleveland will be found in The Story of an Indian Upland, by F. Bradley-Birt. (London, 1905.)
† MS. = Jungulterry.
The only objection of any weight which has occurred to me, and which I feel as such, is the loss which individuals may sustain by it in their private property, which is fixed to the soil and which must lose its value as its use will be less in demand. To this objection I must oppose the advantages which I suppose will be derived from a separation of the government and its numerous dependencies from the commercial body of the people. The latter have certainly lost much of their professional character by too mixed an intercourse, and are most likely to regain it when they have no longer the examples of other modes of life presented to them: and with such advantages as Calcutta possesses as a port of trade, and such as it derives from the productions and manufactures with which these provinces abound, and their facility of transportation, it may be reasonably expected that whenever the pursuits of its inhabitants shall be wholly confined to trade, its wealth will increase and draw other occupants to it to repair the loss of those whom it is proposed to remove from it.

The expense which will be obviously suggested as an objection will be none; at least it ought not to be one. The immediate charge of the removal of the offices of government, and an allowance for temporary erections for the accommodation of the members and officers of government would be apparently considerable, but would vanish to a very small sum, if the same expense, as it is paid in Calcutta, were deducted from it. A house might be thought necessary for the governor because he would require one on a larger scale than such as could be had for hire, the general plan on which all houses of private property are constructed being adapted to the purposes of many, to ensure their being occupied. But this want equally subsists in the present residence of the government, and will not probably be corrected till an abundant treasury shall warrant the expense. The rest of the town will of course be laid out in lines which will serve as directions to the streets and squares of it, and let in shares to individuals under fixed and constitutional conditions and restrictions. This will be an accession of revenue, not an expense. Fortifications will not I hope be deemed necessary.

I shall add only one word in respect to myself as the author of this proposal. The term of my residence in this country cannot in the course of things be of much longer duration, and some years must yet pass before what I have proposed can be allowed to take place. It is therefore evident that I can have no personal interest in its accomplishment, and the credit of it, if any, will be wholly theirs to whom the charge of erecting the new foundation shall be assigned. I too shall bear my portion of the loss which will fall on the proprietors of landed property in Calcutta.

If the Board shall agree with me in their judgment of the measure which I have projected I recommend that it be referred with their opinion upon it, and the accompanying report and survey transmitted to the Court of Directors, by the approaching dispatch; that if they shall approve of it, they may apply for an act of Parliament to empower the Governor-General and Council for the time being to transfer the seat of government either to the situation which I have recommended, or to any other that shall be judged more eligible, or to declare more generally that in whatsoever part of the provinces the members of the government or the major part of them shall
be, the powers of the government shall accompany them, or in other words that the government shall exist in the persons of those to whom the exercise of it is entrusted, and not in the place of their assigned residence.

I venture to close the subject with my decided opinion that the permanency of the British dominion in India can never be ensured while Calcutta continues to be the capital of it.
THE INDIAN STATES AND FEDERATION*

By the Right Hon. J. C. C. Davidson, P.C., C.H., C.B., M.P.

It is vitally important, in order to appreciate the position of the Princes in relation to Federation, and to meet ignorant or tenden-
cious criticism, that certain facts should be fully understood. In
the first place, the British Parliament cannot legislate for the
Indian States. The House of Commons might pass Bill after Bill
dealing with the States, but the Acts would have no force or
validity within the borders of the Princes' territories. The sugges-
tion therefore that Parliament is being asked by the Govern-
ment to coerce the States is nonsense.

In the second place, it must be clearly understood that it is not
possible to treat British India, on the one hand, and the States on
the other as though they were the two parties to Federation.
The States are not a collective unit, but a collection of independent
sovereign entities, of varying size and resources, and differing
races and religions. To-day India numbers within her borders
nearly one hundred Princes entitled to the appellation of "High-
ness," and a far larger company of rulers who, though not
entitled to style themselves "Highness," possess and exercise
many of the main attributes of sovereignty. Many of the most
important States have separate treaties with the Crown, and there-
fore the British Government have decided on a method by which
each State will sign a separate "Instrument of Accession" to
Federation. Each Instrument would have to be negotiated
separately between the Crown and each State, and until the Indian
State had signed the Instrument it would not be a member of the
All-India Federation. The suggestion that the Government are
trying to coerce or rush the States is therefore quite untrue.
Coercion is impossible, for the reason which I have already given,
and whether the States act quickly or slowly depends upon

* Based on an address given at a discussion meeting of members on
February 21, 1933.

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whether they sign the Instruments of Accession to Federation soon or late. It has been suggested in some quarters that the Princes' first enthusiasm for Federation has now cooled off, and that they are approaching the matter in a bargaining spirit. But surely this is the sensible thing to do? If the foundations of an All-India Federation are to be well and truly laid it is essential that the partners in it should understand one another, and that they should feel satisfied that Federation will be to their mutual advantage.

Now when we talk of the Princes of India, it is important to remember that all Indian States do not possess an equal measure of internal autonomy. On the contrary, while some preserve almost intact their sovereignty outside the sphere of external affairs, others in varying degrees are required to accept advice and even administrative control from the agents of the Paramount Power. A glance at the map will show much more clearly than I can say in words the varying size and geographical distribution of these territories. Within some 600,000 square miles containing 81 millions of people, that is, one-third of the area of the Indian continent and approximately one-fourth of its inhabitants, the laws of British India are not in force, and the writs of the King-Emperor's courts do not run. I think you will therefore agree that to talk of All-India, whether geographically or politically, without reference to the Indian States would be a contradiction in terms.

When I and my colleagues of the Indian States Enquiry Committee (Financial) set out for India to play our part in clearing the ground for Federation, we all realized the immense difficulties of our task, which was financial and not political. The ideal system of finance in a federation is obviously one in which all the units contribute upon a uniform basis to the federal resources; and in India as elsewhere it follows that the ideal system would rest upon contributions from the Indian States and the British Indian Provinces on a uniform basis. But the States are not a collective unit and cannot be treated as such, so that a uniform basis for contributions is clearly impossible. We therefore set out to find some principles which would on the one hand
most nearly approach the ideal and on the other could be applied broadly with justice to each of the Indian States. Each State has either a separate Treaty or some other document setting out its obligations and/or its immunities. In some States it is a matter of all contribution and no immunities—in others the reverse is the case. It would have taken years to have searched the records and come to a separate judgment upon the case of each State individually. We therefore decided to recommend for the acceptance of the States and of British India a principle which could be applied to the individual circumstances of each State, namely, that against contributions should be set off immunities from taxation. The main principles, I am glad to say, of our Report have been accepted both by British India and the States as a fair basis of negotiation. Financially, therefore, I believe that it will be possible with a little give and take on both sides to do justice to the States while not making their price of entry higher than is reasonable. In any case, the maximum annual charge on the federal budget would only amount to something considerably less than 1 crore of rupees a year; and if our recommendations are accepted in full it will be in the neighbourhood of half that amount.

But what I imagine is exercising many people's minds are two questions: whether it is to the advantage of India that the Princes should take part in an All-India Federation; and secondly, whether it is to the advantage of the Princes to enter an All-India Federation?

As regards the first question, I suggest that the answer must be in the affirmative. The Indian States represent Indian India, that is, an indigenous form of government which existed long before the British connection and which has evolved largely in harmony with the advice of several generations of wise political officers; and I may say that from my short sojourn amongst the Rulers I came definitely to the conclusion that a great deal of wisdom is to be found amongst the States ministers as well as amongst the Rulers themselves, and that they have an advantage over the British Indian politician in that they have actually taken part in government and not merely talked about it. If the Princes
choose their representatives well they will add a great deal both to the stability and to the wisdom of the federal centre. If that were the only reason it would be a very strong one for coming to the decision that the States not only must but will play a very important part in the future evolution of India. But in addition it must be remembered also that although the Indian States are independent of the British Indian Government, Federation is already an accomplished fact in certain fields. Already to a great extent railways, currency and coinage, posts and telegraphs, and salt are federal subjects. All-Indian services of public utility function in the States as well as in British India, and taxation through sea customs and salt is largely of All-Indian incidence. Every State co-operates fully in matters of defence, and many maintain troops, the purpose of which is to reinforce His Majesty's Army in times of emergency. Clearly, therefore, it is to the advantage of India that the States should join the Federation.

But now comes my second question: does it benefit the States to do so? My answer is yes. In the first place, there can be no question whatever that when in the past the Government in Delhi has settled upon its fiscal policy and altered it from time to time the interests of the States have not been adequately safeguarded. Neither they nor their interests have been consulted, and as the unification of India proceeded so the position of the States became worse. It has become very difficult for the Crown to discharge its responsibilities as trustee for all the conflicting interests under its suzerainty, and my view is that in many directions the States have come off second best. Take customs alone. India changed from free trade to protection without any consultation with the Princes, and, as was inevitable in a revenue tariff, the cost of the imported article rose, and with it the cost of living. Not only did this put an immense additional burden upon the shoulders of States subjects, but it also limited the field of potential taxation within the State itself. Is it not therefore reasonable that the States should have a medium through which to put their case before British India? A responsible Federal Government would enable the States to make their influence felt, and would give them what they have hitherto lacked: a platform and a Press.
Sir Manubhai Mehta of Bikaner in a speech at the Third Round-Table Conference said:

"Just as it is remarked that the entry of the Princes into the Federation made it easy to confer responsibility on the Centre, and as responsibility at the Centre is not possible without the Federation of the Princes, so at the same time there cannot be any Federation of the Princes unless there is full responsibility at the Centre."

There is also a much broader reason why the States should come into Federation. However we may view the past, looking at the present as it is, the States, should they decide to remain outside Federation, will be subjected to intensive and subversive propaganda from outside their borders. With the best will in the world the Paramount Power would not be able to deal with that situation, and in time in these modern days of the Press, and with a powerful democratic machine operating in British India, the authority of the Rulers might undoubtedly be undermined. If, on the other hand, the Princes combine to take their part in the Federal Chambers, they will be able to make their voices heard and to rouse public opinion, which in India after all is mainly conservative, in their favour. No armed force can keep a ruler on his throne against the wish of his people.

To sum up, therefore, I believe that it is to the interest not only of the States themselves, but of all India, that the Princes should join an All-India Federation. The Indian States cannot avoid their geographical proximity to British India and to the British Indian Government; but they can advance to a position which they have not occupied in the past of effectively influencing British Indian policy. There can be no advantage to them in standing out of Federation, which is the latest evolution of government in India. They can only improve their position vis-à-vis their subjects by coming in. The cost is not really serious, but in my view the risks of staying out are politically considerable; and unless they all come in they will of course be a very small minority, and the protection of those who stay out can necessarily only be of a negative kind.
JOURNALISM IN INDIA

By Sir Alfred Watson

Just as the first act of a Scotchman on landing in a new country is said to be to seek out a site for a golf course, so, it has been said, the first ambition of the Englishman is to start a newspaper. Both allegations require modification. Certainly the British had been in Bombay for a century and a quarter before anybody thought of a newspaper, and by that time Calcutta had half a dozen different organs of what was called opinion, although Calcutta still had unpleasant memories of Plassey. The pioneer journalist was Hickey of the Bengal Gazette, who must not be confused with that other Hickey of the Diary. His venture lasted a little more than two years, and then Hickey disappeared into the debtors' prison, from which Warren Hastings showed little disposition to release him in spite of his many appeals to the Governor. Hickey certainly deserved his fate. His paper was a scurrilous and bombastic sheet largely concerned with his personal quarrels—and he seems to have had a genius for quarrelling. Perhaps a better type of journalism could scarcely have been expected under the circumstances, for the East India Company kept the tightest hold upon all that was printed, and swift deportation awaited those who incurred a displeasure that was aroused by any serious comment upon the administration. Naturally enough, journalism fell into the hands of those who had little to lose in reputation or anything else. Of Dr. Dodd, the English divine who was hanged for forgery, an apologist said that he had once sunk so low as to write for the newspapers, and apparently in early days in India a man had to be very much at a loose end before he became a journalist.

THE EARLY NEWSPAPERS

Nevertheless there was activity in the journalistic field, and there is a record of four papers started in five years in Calcutta.
One founded in 1784 still survives as the official Gazette of the Bengal Government. Another, the Indian Gazette, had a career of half a century before it was amalgamated with the Bengal Harkaru, which in turn was absorbed into the Indian Daily News, a paper which after many vicissitudes finally emerged as Forward, the organ of the late Mr. C. R. Das. Meanwhile, Bombay having commenced with the Bombay Herald in 1789, had a like activity in the creation of fresh newspapers, and the Bombay Courier of 1790 went on until 1861, when it was amalgamated with the Bombay Times, the two becoming the Times of India, now the principal organ of the Western Presidency. Madras also became active in starting newspapers, although less lavishly; but outside the Presidency towns decades were to pass before newspapers were established.

All the early newspapers were small ventures, living a precarious life under the stern eye of Government, which exercised a rigorous control until 1818, the Marquis Wellesley going so far as to set up an official censor, to whom everything had to be submitted before publication. To the Marquis of Hastings we owe the abolition of these rules and the admission of journalism to respectability. Rules or no rules, the journalist had to mind his manners, as James Silk Buckingham discovered when his Calcutta Journal, started in 1818, was suppressed in 1823 during the acting governorship of John Adam, and its owner was deported from the country. Adam had chosen his victim badly. Buckingham was an able, enterprising, and voluble man. He made the welkin ring with his complaints. He became the first member of Parliament for Sheffield after the Reform Bill, and he secured from a Select Committee a proposal that the wrong done to him should be redressed. Yet it was many years before the East India Company agreed to pay him compensation in the form of a pension of £200 for life.

Another of the significant figures in this early journalism was Stocqueler, who spent twenty years in Calcutta. In 1821 a group of British merchants in Calcutta had started John Bull in the East as an organ which would be responsible and conservative. Stocqueler, after various other ventures in journalism, transformed
this into the *Englishman*, destined for a very long period to be the first paper in the East in point of influence and a strong supporter of the Government. It was at the *Englishman* press that Macaulay had set up in type those Indian essays which were eventually to appear in the reviews at home.

**From Carey to Townsend**

From no account of the early days of the Press in India can the names of the missionaries Carey, Marshman, and Ward be omitted. They were the pioneers of the vernacular newspaper with the *Samachar Durpan*, started in 1818, and so favoured by the Government of that time that it was carried by post for one-quarter the usual fee. Four years later appeared the *Bombay Samachar*, a paper which still exists. But Carey, Marshman, and Ward have a further claim to a place in the history of the Press in the foundation of the *Friend of India*, a paper that was eventually absorbed into the *Statesman* of Calcutta. For a long period from 1844 it was edited by a young man, Meredith Townsend, who was to become famous as co-proprietor with Hutton of the *Spectator* and to establish a reputation as the ablest leader writer of his day. His pen did not lack pungency in India, and he made the missionary journal the strongest advocate of war, at one time going so far as to contemplate the subjugation of China. He quarrelled with Sir Charles Napier, and in a farewell article on Sir Charles departing from India wrote:

"The wisest plan he can now pursue is to retire at once to the privacy of private life and to allow time for his extravagances to be forgotten."

That was not the most polite dismissal to a great soldier, but it was more than paralleled by the effort of another journalist who at a later date speeded the first Lord Lytton from his Viceroyalty with the words: "In India Lord Lytton has shown the manners of an Italian organ-grinder with the intelligence of his monkey." It will be plain that restrictions on the Press had then disappeared. All regulations had been swept away by Lord Amherst, and more
particularly by Lord William Bentinck in 1835. They were to be restored for a year during what Lord Canning insisted on calling the Sepoy Mutiny, and were then dropped until in later years the rise of the vernacular Press made some measure of control a frequent matter of anxiety to successive Governments.

ROBERT KNIGHT

This coming of a vernacular Press, Indian owned, dates from after the Mutiny, which gave a great stimulus to newspapers of all kinds. The succeeding years produced a number of journalists of high ability who set their stamp upon newspapers in the East. Foremost among them was the late Robert Knight, who, after a career in Bombay which won him the affection and gratitude of Indians, migrated to Calcutta to acquire the Friend of India and to establish the Statesman. That was in the early seventies. Knight was a man of very unusual attainments who had spent most of his life in India and knew the country thoroughly. An able economist and financier, he was employed for a time by the Bengal Government as Assistant Secretary to the Department of Agriculture. He was to become the mouthpiece of the rising national sentiment in India, and he carried the crusade to London, where for a time he ran an edition of the Statesman and came into contact with most of the Liberal leaders of the day. Mr. Gladstone in particular had great respect for his knowledge of Indian finance. Knight knew no fear where his principles were concerned, and almost ruined his paper by his support of the Ilbert Bill when practically the whole European community in India was in violent opposition to the Government of Lord Ripon regarding that measure.

Another Bombay journalist of this era was James Maclean, eventually to come home and take his seat in Parliament as member for Cardiff, a publicist of a very different type to Knight, but a man of parts and judgment. With so much stir in the journalistic field many new papers were bound to appear, especially now that the country had been opened up. The Civil and Military Gazette, first started as a weekly at Simla, presently
absorbed the *Mofussilite* and transferred its office to Lahore, becoming a daily. Of the various men who have been connected with that paper, outstanding is Rudyard Kipling, who contributed to its columns work that has given him a world-wide fame and an enduring place in literature. Even more significant in the history of the Indian Press was the foundation of the *Pioneer*, a paper that was quickly to attain for itself the leading place as an organ of opinion in India, in part because of its close connection with the Government of India and in part by the brilliancy of the men it had in its service. For a time the *Pioneer* had almost a monopoly of certain forms of Government news, and men like the Chesneys, Sir James Walker, and Howard Hensman wrote in its columns with authority. The story of its rise and its subsequent falling away from high estate until it recently passed into the control of a group that is mainly Indian is one of the romances of the Press, and points the moral that it is still men who make the success of newspapers.

**THE INDIAN-OWNED PRESS**

The real significance of the period with which I am now dealing was not to be found in the fortunes of the European papers, but in the rapid rise of the vernacular Press. Once they commenced to appear the Indian-owned dailies and weeklies came in a spate, and along with them were Indian papers published in English. Outstanding among these latter was the *Bengalee*, which, under the editorship of the late Sir Surendranath Bannerjee, was at once an able newspaper and an organ of opinion which gave life to the nascent national movement in Bengal. Had all papers been conducted with his sense of responsibility there would have been little problem for Government, but from obscure presses there poured so-called organs of opinion that seemed to have no mission but the misrepresentation of the acts of the Government and the abuse of its servants. Many of these papers openly advocated murder. Yet it was difficult to fix responsibility. The real writers were in many cases not known. The papers themselves appeared and disappeared in a night. From these circumstances spring the history of Press Laws in India.
From 1835 onward the Government only required the registration of a newspaper. In 1867 the existing registration Act came into force. Eleven years later we have the first attempt to bring the vernacular Press under control in the Act of that year. This was repealed by Lord Ripon in 1882. The next legislation was the Indian Press Act of 1910, which proved ineffective for its purpose and was replaced by a fresh Press Act in 1922. There was nothing oppressive to decent journalism in this later enactment. If one judged the control of the Indian Press by the letter of the laws under which it is produced one might say that it was not a free Press, but in my personal experience during my years in India I can say that no Press in the world enjoyed such latitude in the expression of opinion, and over a large field none so flagrantly abused its freedom.

The time was bound to come when a Government which had been apathetic in using the powers that it had must take the problem seriously. The compulsion to print the name of the responsible editor was laughed at. I have personally been at Government conferences with the Press when there was scarcely a man present as the man responsible for policy whose name appeared on his own sheet. Prosecutions were of little use. Dummy editors went to prison and were replaced by other dummies, while the papers went on as before. It was possible for a newspaper mulcted in heavy damages by the courts for an atrocious libel on Government servants to snap its fingers at the decision, changing its title overnight and appear the next day under a new name, although produced by the same staff, printed on the same machine, and issued from the same offices. Government had no remedy but the remedy it was ultimately forced to adopt—that of compelling newspapers to deposit a sum of money as a guarantee of good behaviour. It would be impossible for me to tell you to-day the number of separate newspapers that are published in India. One hundred faded away as soon as the Government moved seriously, but the probability is that while the English-owned newspapers are fewer in number than twenty, the Indian-owned are over five hundred.

Not alone in numbers have the Indian-owned newspapers made
advance. They have been apt pupils, and in one or two instances are not far behind their rivals either in mechanical equipment or in appreciation of what makes a newspaper. These are the exceptions, but they are significant. For the most part the papers are frankly organs of propaganda with a tradition of relentless opposition to the Government. The leading article in India still enjoys the prestige that it has lost elsewhere. Editorial opinion is all-important to the newspapers of all classes, and whatever their views it must be allowed that the Indian Press has at its service many brilliant writers. This improvement in Indian-owned newspapers, many of which are equipped with rotary presses and mechanical composing, has forced a higher standard upon the English newspapers.

Modernization

During the last twenty or thirty years the gain has been marked. At the beginning of that period most of the British newspapers sold for four annas and circulations were almost ridiculously small. The Statesman set the standard of one anna, which has now become almost general, and by the introduction of the modern rotary press gave a new meaning to circulation, to distribution, and to the numbers of the staff required to produce a journal. In short, the British-owned Press in India has kept pace with the changes in the newspaper world at home, and by the increase of cabling and news agency service has made the mails almost superfluous in the provision of news where once the weekly posts were their mainstay. It is in this era that the Times of India has been served by men like Lovat Fraser, who was not less trenchant in Bombay than subsequently in London, and Sir Stanley Reed, while Calcutta has seen the notable combination of the sons of Robert Knight and of Mr. J. A. Jones, my predecessor on the Statesman.

A more vigorous life for the Press was inevitable in the new political conditions in India and that awakening and increase has put the Government at a serious disadvantage. The Government of India has never had the means of explaining its acts to the people whom it governed. It has made some feeble efforts in
that direction. It is on record that the first Lord Lytton was concerned to improve relations between the Government and the Press, and much talk ended with the appointment of a Press Commissioner whose duty it was to keep the newspapers both informed and corrected. The job became a sinecure in due course until it expired towards the end of last century, the last occupant being Sir Roper Lethbridge. At times there have been proposals to subsidize newspapers; at others for the Government to produce its own news-sheets. Whatever has been attempted in these directions has failed. Practically the whole Indian-owned Press is to-day in opposition, while the British, if benevolent towards the Government, has retained its independence.

**Present-Day Problems**

In the new order of things that cannot continue. Somebody has said that the management of the Press is an unsolved problem of democracy. Certainly it is an unsolved problem in India. The multiplication of newspapers has added enormously to the embarrassments of Government, since almost the whole of the new journals are offering a mass opposition to the Government and are not particular as to the weapons they use. If government in India is to be more democratic then the governing forces will require their own organs to explain and support policy. Some beginnings in that direction have been made. In Bengal the Muhammadans, who, although a majority, have never been able to run daily newspapers of their own, have acquired control of what was the Bengalee and is now the Star of India. In Allahabad the Pioneer has passed into the possession of a group of wealthy Indians who are loyal to the new conditions.

These are the beginnings of what may become a very big movement in India. The autonomous provinces will all require organs of their own, and if experience elsewhere is reproduced in India there will be newspapers supporting the Governments and in opposition to them. Though we speak of provinces in this connection, we must never forget that these provinces will have areas greater and populations larger than many European countries.
They will have a local life and their local politics which must be served by newspapers. Some of the existing organs will, no doubt, pass over to the support of the Governments, since they are owned by men who may be expected to sit in the legislatures. Others will have to be started on behalf of the parties who are destined to rule. And Indian journalists will have to be trained with a new technique and learn to be constructive instead of to denounce. I would put the thing bluntly by saying that the parties that hope to rule under the new constitutions will have to provide themselves with their own newspapers if they are to hold the electorates, and these newspapers will devote themselves primarily to the affairs of the provinces rather than to all-India matters.

**The British-owned Press**

And what of the British-owned newspapers under the new conditions. I have no fears for their future because I believe that in the future in India Britishers will play a larger part in commerce and industry than ever before and their interests must be served by British newspapers which will cover the whole of India. I do not look for any increase in the numbers of the British-owned newspapers. They may even be fewer, but they will continue to have that great influence that they have exercised in the past. They discharge a necessary function if only in maintaining the standard of journalism.

I may remark incidentally and by way of comment upon what Sir John Thompson had to tell us recently of the glories of New Delhi, that it is only by the enterprise of a Calcutta journal that the capital has been provided with an organ that can adequately serve the interests of the Central Government on its own ground. Delhi has still to look to the condemned capital of the past for one of the prime requirements of a modern community. But for long years to come that large growth in British financial interests in India for which I confidently look must be fostered and encouraged by a Press that is predominantly British in its direction.

A matter of grave concern for the future is the relation to the Press of the complex Government at the centre in India. Since
the beginnings of democratic government in India the executive, alone of governments in the world, has had no public weapon of defence. Should that condition continue the new Federal Government will be gravely handicapped. Nobody who has studied Indian problems in the last few years can fail to be aware of the grave calamity that outside a tiny group of newspapers there has been unflinching hostility to Government. To remedy that is as much a part of reform as the passage of a Government of India Act. How is it to be done? I have no belief myself in the effectiveness or even the utility of a Government-owned Press. To-day I would merely suggest for consideration whether some arrangement is not possible between the greater commercial interests in India, the Government, the present British-owned newspapers and patriotic newspaper interests in this country whereby the Government case could be adequately stated and explained by first-class newspapers published both in English and the chief vernaculars. I would say of such a plan that if the Government was a party to it there must be an unbreakable understanding on its part that will not change with new Viceroy or new executives—that the other parties to the arrangement shall not be left at some stage or other to carry the baby. There has been too much of that in the past. And I would add, with bitter experience behind me, that in times of financial stress the Press must not be subjected to the heaviest imposts on its machinery and on practically everything that it buys, and that having added enormously to production costs by its legislation the Government should not be first to attempt to reduce advertisement rates.

The new era that is coming for such Indian-owned newspapers as I have envisaged will be full of difficult problems for Government, and probably it will be long before the Press has such freedom as it has gained in Great Britain. Governments in the beginning may have to rely on restrictive legislation, perhaps to a greater extent than now. But it is impossible to believe that the tradition of an unceasing opposition can continue. The Indian Press hitherto has been in the hands of parties to whom, in the words of one of their famous leaders, "no method can be too mean" to further their ends. Those parties are being
forced into a position in which they will have to develop responsibility. And side by side with those parties there are others to whom orderly, peaceful, and constitutional government must be a major concern. To these we must look for the elevation of the Indian Press to a real instrument in the service of good government.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A meeting of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. I, on Tuesday, February 28, 1933, when a paper was read by Sir Alfred Watson on "Journalism in India." The Right Hon. Sir Stanley Jackson, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

Sir John Kerr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir John Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir John Cumming, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Alfred Chatterton, C.I.E., Sir Edward Gait, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., Sir Ross Barker, K.C.I.E., C.B., Sir Charles Tegart, Sir Hugh McPherson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., and Lady McPherson, the Hon. Lady Jackson, Lady Scott Moncrieff, Lady Abbas Ali Baig, Sir Duncan J. Macpherson, C.I.E., Mr. F. G. Pratt, C.S.I., Mr. H. M. R. Hopkins, C.S.I., Mr. J. Sladen, Mr. H. M. Willmott, Mrs. A. E. Watson, Mrs. Macdonald, Miss Rennett, Mrs. Foulkes, Miss Bulan, Mr. P. P. Graves, Lieut.-Colonel Graham Seton Hutchinson, D.S.O., Mr. Glororny Bolton, Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Mr. W. F. Papworth, Rev. R. Burges, Mr. J. H. Freeman, Miss Gravatt, Mrs. D. Chaplin, Miss E. L. Curteis, Mr. Desmond Young, Mr. Hugh MacGregor, Mr. John Ross, Mr. W. Turner, Mr. C. R. Nixon, Mr. H. R. Wilkinson, Mr. G. B. Coleman, Mr. S. Altaf Husain, Mrs. Bacon, Mrs. Churchill, Mr. C. L. Katial, Mr. J. M. K. Mackenzie, Mr. G. Ward Perkins, Mr. M. H. Gandhi, Mr. A. Inglis, Mr. C. A. Mehta, Mr. S. T. Sheppard, Mr. E. Villiers, Miss White, Mr. H. K. Sadler, Dr. Tahmanker, Mr. B. K. Sinha, Mr. K. G. Chapheker, Miss C. K. Cumming, Mr. R. C. Lai, Mr. J. N. Hood, Mr. T. J. Hudson, Mr. Jehangiani, Mr. M. Cox, Mr. S. Power, Mr. C. R. Corbett, Mr. Ayana Angadi, Colonel W. G. Hamilton, Mr. J. Owen, Mr. R. V. N. Nayudu, Mrs. G. Foden, Colonel A. G. Hamilton, Miss Booth-Tucker, Mrs. Weir, Rev. W. Stanton, Mr. C. H. Northmore, Miss Hopley, Mr. D. F. L. Brown, Miss Margaret Brown, Mr. James Spence, and Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The Chairman said: It was my pleasure not very long ago to take the Chair at a meeting of the Royal Empire Society when an old colleague of mine, Sir Charles Tegart, delivered an address upon "Terrorism in India," and I feel quite sure that everyone who heard that address would agree that they were listening to someone who was an exceptional authority on that subject.

Today Sir Alfred Watson is to address us upon journalism, a subject which is rather more peaceful, and I think more agreeable, and I feel sure that when we have heard him we will also agree that we have listened to someone who is a great authority upon his subject. However, Sir Alfred Watson can claim to have had some first-hand knowledge of terrorism, and I am sure that we can all congratulate him most sincerely upon being here well and strong after a double dose of disagreeable experience. (Applause.)

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My immediate duty is merely to introduce Sir Alfred Watson. I do not know whether, to be a great journalist, one must be born or made, but Sir Alfred Watson can claim, I think, a little of both. He was the son of a well-known and highly respected Northern Journalist, Aaron Watson, and I believe it is correct to say that nearly the whole of the Watson family are connected with journalism in one way or another, one of his brothers being the editor of a very important newspaper in London.

Sir Alfred Watson was ten years in the Press Gallery of Parliament, going there as a very young man. I believe for a very considerable time he was the youngest man in the Press Gallery in the House of Commons.

For twenty years he was with the Westminster Gazette in various capacities, general manager and managing editor, when he contributed regularly to its columns on political, economic, and social matters. He went to India in 1924 as Chairman of the Directors of the Englishman newspaper, and almost as soon as he got there he became the editor of the Statesman and Chairman of the Board of Directors. During the last five years in India he was the correspondent of The Times for Bengal, Burma, and Bihar and Orissa.

It was my good fortune during the five years that I was in India to be brought into close personal touch with Sir Alfred Watson. Therefore I feel somehow that I am in a position, or was in a position, certainly to judge of the value of his work as editor of that great paper, the Statesman; I think I may call it the most influential paper in India—certainly of the British-owned papers in that country.

I can say without hesitation that Sir Alfred carried that responsibility (and all of you, I am sure, will appreciate that it was a great responsibility, especially during these last five years) not only with great advantage to his publications, but with advantage to Government and the community. His contributions, through his leading articles on the many controversial subjects of the day, were framed with dignity, ability and courage, and a sincerity which carries conviction, and which offered an example to all the other journals which made their appearance in Bengal, but which example, I fear, was not as frequently copied as it might have been. I think perhaps the best proof of Sir Alfred’s success in journalism in India was that he possessed the esteem and the confidence of all who counted in Calcutta, both Europeans and Indians.

No one could have been more pleased than I was when his work was recognized last year by the honour conferred by His Majesty upon him in the Birthday Honours, for I know—I have every reason to know—that the honour is really well deserved. My duty is merely to introduce Sir Alfred, which I have attempted to do. I should have said a good deal more about him, but I have some sympathy for him, and therefore I am not going to give him any more than I have already given him.

I would add that we have messages of regret, amongst many, from Mr. Kipling, Sir Roderick Jones, and Lord Burnham, who are abroad; from Mr. J. H. Spender, Sir Alfred Watson’s colleague for so many years on the Westminster Gazette; and from Major J. J. Astor.
Sir Alfred Watson: I am glad, sir, that sympathy induced you to stay your hand. I was already feeling that I knew more about myself from what you had said than I have ever before known, and was intensely embarrassed by the compliments you were paying me. I thank you nevertheless.

Perhaps I ought to preface what I have to say today by remarking that time and space have compelled me to confine my review of the Press in India practically to its daily journalism. I say nothing today of the very considerable weekly and monthly Press which flourishes in India.

(The paper was then read.)

Mr. S. T. Sheppard: When I was asked if I would speak on this paper, I did not know I was to have first shot at Sir Alfred Watson; but I am all the more grateful to you for this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of his paper, and of the skill with which he has written it. It seems to me to raise a very large number of points of interest, not only to journalists, but to everyone connected in any way with India. If I may, I will refer briefly to a few points.

I do not think Sir Alfred's rather rigid distinction between Indian-owned and the British-owned Press is altogether happy. I think we know in India very well what he means; but the distinction might easily be misunderstood in England, and, in fact, I know a case in which "British-owned" has been interpreted as meaning read only by British people. That, of course, is not the case. The so-called British-owned papers, which are not wholly British produced, are read by a very large number of Indian readers. It seems to me that in the future the English papers in India will have increasingly to rely on the support and the co-operation of moderate Indian opinion.

The dividing-line between the two classes of papers may be dangerous, too, in another way, because there is always the temptation in England, I think, to tar all Indian journalists and all Indian newspapers with the same brush, and that would be most unjust. Sir Alfred has mentioned Sir Surendranath Banerjee as an outstanding example of the good type of Indian journalist. There are many others today who might equally well be mentioned, like Natarajan and Murzban in Bombay; and in the rank and file of Indian journalists with whom I have happily been associated there are a very large number of honest, hard-working independent Indian journalists. (Applause.) Of course, the "British-owned" paper is not wholly British produced. The converse is equally true; the "Indian-owned" paper is not wholly produced by Indians. There are several examples of English journalists working for Indian proprietors. The Indian proprietors subscribe to the English agencies like Reuter and the Associated Press.

I do not think we can altogether maintain that the higher standard to which English papers in India have recently attained is due entirely to the effects of competition from Indian papers. There had been a long struggle to get cable rates reduced before Sir Alfred came to India. When I first went to Bombay, in 1907, I think the Press cable rate was rs. a word to London. The Empire Press Union at its first meeting over twenty years ago started a long and, as it proved, an obstinate fight to get these rates
reduced. Not until they were reduced was it possible for the English papers in India to go ahead and to turn out a news service comparable with that in the papers in England. Our struggle for improved communications is not yet over. We must still rely on the mail or air mail to bring us photographs from England. We hear a great deal about the exploits of Imperial Airways, but at the end of last year, in a period covered by ten weeks, six air mails out of ten to India were delayed from two to three days. Since that day one air mail has been five days late in arriving in India. You can understand, then, that our external communications are still far from perfect, and so are our internal communications. For instance, the long-distance telephone. For long distances, such as from Bombay to Delhi or from Bombay to Calcutta, the telephone is almost wholly useless.

I agree absolutely with what Sir Alfred has said about the legislation dealing with Indian papers in India, but I do not think he has said quite enough. There are not only Acts like those which he mentioned and like the Act of 1931, which embodied one of the Press Ordinances dealing with the registration of newspapers, but there are various other Acts of the Legislature affecting newspapers very closely, such as the Princes' Protection Act, which is almost futile, and another Act which rather cramps one's style in criticizing neighbouring countries. There is also the censorship, which can be and often has been used under the Telegraph Act. That operates in India, and has also affected papers in London. During the civil disobedience movement in Bombay internal messages were frequently held up because the telegraph office did not like the look of them. Messages to London were similarly held up or delayed and no explanation given.

While Government may thus rather oppress the newspapers, they do practically nothing to make their own standpoint clear to the public, as was forcibly pointed out by the Simon Commission. That applies chiefly to the Government of India. During the war they had a brain wave and got Sir Stanley Reed to go to Delhi to help them, but since then their publicity has not been of a kind very helpful to the papers.

In Bombay the Local Government has, I am glad to say, done much better than the Government of India. In fact, it started a Press Room in the Secretariat nearly eighty years ago, though it was not until Lord Lloyd went to Bombay that the possibilities of much closer liaison with the Press were developed and he appointed a journalist as information officer. It is only a journalist of experience who is in close touch with the papers and who knows what they want—like Mr. Gennings in Bombay and Mr. Macgregor at the India Office—who can possibly do that work. Other Governments, I am afraid, have not followed suit quite as they might have done, but I think something could be done to develop this idea.

I think the future of journalism in India, as sketched by Sir Alfred Watson, is full of interest; but I hope the idea of papers advocating sectional or provincial interests will not go too far. That would in reality be a throwback to earlier conditions. There was, for example, a happy time in the late 'eighties when the newspapers in Bombay referred to the "Kingdom of Bombay." Personally, I look forward to the development of journalism
in India, in which both "Indian-owned" and "British-owned" papers will represent the views of India as a whole, and will work for India and not for one section or for one part of it.

Mr. Philip Graves said he had no personal experience of journalism in India, his experience being in the Near and Middle East. His only object in speaking was to convey a message to Sir Alfred Watson from the Editor of The Times, who asked him to say that nothing but extreme short-handedness would have kept him away. The Editor of The Times wrote:

"I should very much like to have come to the meeting, both out of respect for a valued correspondent of The Times, who has run constant risks of his life in the course of his profession, and because of the immense importance of his subject. I have always felt that the present state of journalism in India, so far as the vernacular Press is concerned, lies at the root of most of our troubles, and that the future of India depends to a very large extent on the men who will be in charge of its newspapers under the new dispensation. The past influence of a section of the Indian Press in fostering suspicion and misunderstanding is far too little known in this country."

Mr. William Turner, the Overseas manager of Reuter's Agency, said: Reuter established itself in India in the middle 'sixties of last century, and has supplied a news service to the papers there ever since. In this connection there is to be noted a striking fact: that during the past few years—"to be precise, eight years—there has been a significant tendency for the Indian-owned newspapers to increase in number and for what we might call the Anglo-Indian newspapers to decrease, or at least to remain stationary. The Indian-owned have increased by 100 per cent. in that period. This is quite a natural and understandable tendency. Parenthetically I might remark that it has added to Reuter's many other problems one in regard to the selection of news which is suitable alike to the Anglo-Indian and Indian-owned papers. We find that the Indian-owned papers do not always want the kind of news that the Anglo-Indian papers are accustomed to receive, and vice versa. But I suppose it is a problem that time will solve.

There is one other point which especially struck me in the very stimulating address of Sir Alfred Watson, namely, the problem of the future of the Press in modern democracy—if modern democracy survives, which looks a little doubtful at the moment. It is a problem the significance of which no one who has travelled about the world can fail to realize. I think, however, that it is robbed of some of its more serious consequences where there is a really first-class liaison between the Governments and the newspapers, the type of contact, I mean, which has been brought to a fine art in Washington. In the United States that contact has proved invaluable in providing a safety-valve alike for the Government and for the people. It ensures always a statement in the papers of the Government case on important domestic and external issues. And that is a big thing.

I speak with some diffidence in regard to this question as it affects India, because, unlike most of those present here today, although I have been
several times in India, I have not been there for long periods on end. Nevertheless, I venture to suggest that in an extension and a drawing closer of the contact between the Raj and the Press of India may possibly be found at least a partial solution of this very big problem of the future of the Press in India.

Sir John Thompson: As the ex-Chief Commissioner during whose time the Statesman first started its Delhi edition, I very gladly respond to the challenge that Sir Alfred has thrown out to me to acknowledge, not only on my own behalf and on behalf of my late province, but on behalf of all people in Northern India, the debt under which the Statesman has laid us by bringing out a first-class newspaper in the new capital of India. I am particularly glad to observe that the representative of the old capital should have so far forgotten his not unnatural resentment at the transfer as to confer on Delhi one of the most important appurtenances of a capital.

Sir Alfred has given us a very interesting description which has ranged over the whole of journalism in India, the English-owned papers, the Indian-owned papers and the vernacular papers. Some of you may have thought it was not very flattering with regard to the vernacular papers.

In the vernacular papers which I received by last mail I came across two articles which seemed to me to be so à propos that perhaps it may be of interest to you if I give you rough translations of them. The editor of this paper, a new paper—and you will see he has all the frankness of a man who is launching a new journal—is Khwaja Hasan Nizami. He says in his first issue that he has been a journalist now for thirty-five years. He is a man of enormous industry, great learning, and a master of Urdu. He is a man who has not by any means always been in sympathy with Government, and his views will, I think, be of interest to you.

From the Adil of Delhi, December 17, 1932: “Nowadays Government officials, leaders of public opinion, and the Indian public in general, are always complaining about the vernacular Press. They say it is debased, seditious, and ignorant, has no money behind it, and is dependent on flattery and blackmail. But if their complaints are justified, it never occurs to them to consider what the reasons are. Does the Government ever think of helping the Press except by means of Press Acts and Ordinances? Do the leaders ever look for anything from the papers except to hear their own praises sung? Do they ever think of the starving journalists? Do the big people in the country ever read anything but the English papers?

“It is true that the vernacular newspapers never do themselves justice or show any self-respect, and that they are of little account in their own eyes, but let those who abuse them say how they themselves have behaved towards these vernacular servants of the public.”

From the Adil of Delhi, December 22, 1932: “The Urdu papers have become the prey of the bad taste of the Muslim community, and are unable to give consistent support to any particular policy because the one absorbing thought of the people who run them is how to get enough to eat. If they
cannot get the ink and paper required for producing the paper, how are
they to run it at all, and how can they produce the hymns of praise and
pictures with which they flatter the wealthy and degrade their readers' intelli-
gen?

"Compare the Press in England and America, where a single journal has
a circulation of a million, where they pay their staff thousands of rupees a
month, where the Governments themselves assist and encourage them, and
where all the merchants and manufacturers and cinema companies spend
fortunes in advertising in them. The Urdu papers in Hindustan are abso-
lutely without any of this sort of support, so to whom can they look to
supply a foundation for their prosperity, and for what class in the country
are they to act as spokesmen? The result is that they merely supply stale news taken from other papers. The clubs, societies, schools, and
factories haven't the spirit to subscribe even eight or ten rupees a year
in order to get a regular supply of cheap but reliable news and good articles.
Even on this paltry amount they ask for a rebate of 30 or 50 per cent. The
wretched newspapers are compelled to give their purchasers once or twice
a year presents in the form of books or gaily painted calendars in order to
stimulate their interest.

"Even in a great port like Bombay, where lakhs and crores of business is
done every day, I am told there are not more than two or three Urdu papers
which can make enough to meet their ordinary expenses. They are sold in
the bazaars at a halfpenny or a farthing a copy, and in the evening, with the
proceeds, the editor will get five hundred or a thousand copies of his next
issue printed at some job-press, filled with scissors and paste items of news,
pirated from other papers. This with a little local gossip makes up the
paper, and the same individual is proprietor, editor, manager and trans-
lator, and often does the lithographing as well.

"Papers of this sort give very little evidence of life and progress in Indian
communities, and they reflect no credit on the country. Is it conceivable
that such papers should be able to have any real policy or to give any help
in applying remedies to the ills from which the people are suffering? What
really is wanted is that wealthy people should put their hands in their
pockets and subscribe towards starting a good paper in an important centre
which would in all sincerity and truth draw the attention of the Govern-
ment and the people to the people's demands."

Those are, I think, rather striking confirmations, from the opposite point
of view, of what Sir Alfred has told us in regard to the vernacular papers.
It applies, of course, primarily only to the Urdu papers. I do not know
whether it is also applicable to the papers in Bengali and Marathi, for
instance. But I think you will realize from this picture the need there is
for constant control of the Press on the part of Government.

I was glad to see that last December the Legislative Assembly passed into
law the provisions of the ordinance which dealt with the Press, and I think
they are very much to be congratulated on this advance towards responsi-
bility.
The Hon. Secretary read a letter from Mr. J. J. Nolan, sometime editor of the Rangoon Times and later Director of Publicity, Burma, as follows:

"I very much regret that it is impossible for me to be present tomorrow at Sir Alfred Watson's address on 'Journalism in India,' which I have read with very great interest. I am sorry he has not had the opportunity to mention circumstances in Burma. The Rangoon Times was started in 1854, very shortly after Rangoon was taken over, and was the first paper in the province. It was then a morning paper. The Rangoon Gazette, which was started some years afterwards, was in its beginnings an evening paper. Now it is a morning paper. Recently the Times, after many years as an evening paper, has begun to issue a morning edition as well.

"With what Sir Alfred has said at the close of his paper, as to the duty incumbent on British proprietors and British journalists in India, I am in full accord. Most of the Indian-owned and Indian-run Press can economize in a way which is impossible for us. They seem to prefer the French style of placing views first and news a very long way after, and then in a garbled form, for some of them are unfortunately inclined to be economical of truth, or at least to handle it very carelessly!"

The Chairman: We are very grateful to all those who have taken part in the debate today. They have helped us enormously, and I am sure Sir Alfred has much appreciated the remarks that they have made upon his address.

I was very interested in many things Sir Alfred said, and, if I may say so, especially those remarks which were addressed to the outgoing Viceroy's and Governors by one gentleman who speeded Sir Charles Napier and the other who helped Lord Lytton out of India after he had been Viceroy. I am glad to say that that class of eulogy and compliment had ceased when I left India, and I do not remember having received anything like that from any of the papers with which I had been brought into contact in Bengal. Sir Alfred's address appeared to me to rather divide up journalism in India into three parts. He spoke of the past, the present, and of the future.

With the past and the present I have some slight connection; but I am rather afraid to say very much because I always feel in this question of journalism in India, which extends through every part of India, that one has to realize that when one has been five years in India consecutively, all in the same place, right in the middle of Calcutta, your eyes are fixed there and you are looking through the spectacles of Bengal at nearly everything that is going on all over India. Bombay does not appreciate it if you criticize Bombay through the spectacles of Bengal.

I do not know very much about journalism, although I was a Director for many years of an important newspaper in this country before going out to India. I was interested in what you said, both as regards the present and the future. I know, of course, from experience the difficulties that we used to have in Bengal with various journals when I first got there. I admit that I was rather alarmed at the persistent manner in which they appeared to spend most of their time discovering how they could possibly embarrass
the Government. It was continuous, and it was in a great many cases extremely clever and well done.

I did feel at times that the way in which the Indian-owned newspapers were produced in India was not altogether to the general interest of Bengal, and I often wished the Government had more powers by which they could have curbed the activities of some of the journalists throughout that province. A great deal used to be printed of deliberate misstatements, which I felt were bound to do a great deal of harm. I thought it would not be until serious trouble occurred that we should feel the results of those misstatements going out without contradiction. What most disturbed me was the lack of any Government counter-propaganda to put right what so often went out. The English-owned newspapers could do something, but not very much, to counteract propaganda put out for political purposes and which did a considerable amount of harm.

I look to the future of India, and I try to visualize the possibility in the near future of great Indian leaders rising capable of guiding and swaying public opinion and who will produce policies. By policies I mean policies aimed and framed in the general good and the general interest. Policies will produce parties, not the parties that we have in Bengal at the present moment, entirely based upon a communal basis, but parties composed of all classes of the community and supporting and opposing the policies. When you have parties, those parties must be supported by newspapers, and newspapers must come. What I am anxious about at the present time is, if they are to be run to support political parties, what example of journalism these new papers are going to follow.

Journalism today is of various kinds, and the Indians are quick enough—they are very quick—to be able to see what is the most attractive to the public. I pray sincerely that when they do look round for the class of journalism they should adopt in support of parties and in support of policies, they will try and take the best possible example from this side of the papers which support politics today, and not be too anxious to believe that they will get the best results from adopting a quick method of the pictures and all the rest of it without much substance behind them.

I was interested when you said at the end of your address that you believed that it would be necessary for Government to look after themselves from the point of view of supporting the newspapers. You even went so far as to mention the word subsidy. I do not like subsidies. I often think if any party had the power of subsidizing with Government money, they would never be turned out. That would be a great danger. Any idea of subsidy by Government for purposes of support of the Press or otherwise is extremely dangerous. I do not think Sir Alfred really meant that.

In India you must have good journalism. If they are going to have a new constitution, which many people are looking forward to, then they must, if they are going to be successful with that new constitution, see that the newspapers and the Press and all the news which goes out is of such a character that it will be wholesome and good and in the best interests of the country.

I do not like to judge the future of the Indian-owned papers by what I
have known in the immediate five years past. I was not at all impressed by that, because you will understand it was a very difficult time. We were passing through very awkward times right from the start, and eventually the ordinances came in and we were able to control what before we had not been able properly to do. But I do not take a hopeless view at all of the future of the Indian Press; I think improvement is sure to come. If we want to see India go ahead and look after herself with greatly increased responsibility, it is up to us to do everything we possibly can to help them to produce a class of press in India which will really help her.

Sir Alfred, we are all extremely grateful to you for your address today. It has been most interesting to me, because you and I have been in such close touch for the last five years. Many is the time we have been almost as close as we are now talking over awkward matters, and very often making suggestions and criticisms upon which we did not always agree, but you always had the courage to tell me when I made a proposal as to whether you thought it was a good one or a bad one, and I always found your advice valuable. We are all extremely grateful to you for the address today. It is one which I am sure will not only be read here but in India with very great interest and I know with very great advantage.

Sir Alfred Watson: I am grateful to you, sir, for what you have just said, and I shall always remember with pleasure the days in India when you were at Government House and I was a humble caller on various occasions.

I can have no complaint of my critics. I should be sorry if anybody went away with the impression which Mr. Sheppard seemed to have that I made some sharp line of distinction between British-owned and Indian-owned papers which would lead anybody to believe that the British-owned papers had not a considerable circulation amongst the Indians. They have. If they had not, both Mr. Sheppard and I would have had a very thin time in India. I should be equally sorry if anything I said could be interpreted as a disparagement of all Indian journalists. Far from it. The majority of my colleagues on my own paper were Indians, and there were many Indian journalists for whom I had the highest respect both as men and as journalists.

But there is another type of Indian journalist. I remember when I first went to Calcutta I called upon the then Commissioner of Police, now Sir Charles Tegart, and I asked him to give facilities to journalists in Calcutta such as the journalist enjoys in London by the issue of a police pass. Sir Charles said, "Yes, Watson, that would be all very well for your men. But if I did it for them, I should have to do it for all the journalists in Calcutta, and let me tell you, who are new to this country, that there is not a single member of the staff of one paper published here whom I have not had through my hands in Lalbazar."

I should like before sitting down to say that we have with us today Mr. Desmond Young, the editor-designate of the Pioneer, who is going to make what I regard as one of the most promising experiments in Indian journalism. I am sure that as an editor in India I wish him well. He may
have many disappointments. He may have bitter experiences. I hope he may also have great triumphs. Whatever his experiences may be, I am sure that after a few years in India he will return to this country with the love for India that I bear.

Sir John Kerr: It is a very special pleasure to me to move a vote of thanks to Sir Alfred Watson tonight because I have been a constant reader of the Statesman for more than forty years. It was in 1892, when I first went to India, that I began to subscribe to the Statesman, and I have missed very few issues of the paper since—the daily issue when I have been in India and the weekly issue when I have been at home.

In 1892, as Sir Alfred Watson has told us, the Statesman was not the leading newspaper in India or even in Northern India. The shadow of the Ilbert Bill controversy still hung over it, and the leading papers were probably the Pioneer and the Englishman. I took in the Statesman partly because the man I was chumming with took in the Englishman, and secondly because I liked the Sunday Statesman. The part played by the Sunday Statesman in India has not been maintained today. I speak as a low-brow and not one of the high-brows that have been talking to us this afternoon. I do not know whether Sir Alfred Watson has ever had time to look over the Sunday edition of his paper, but it is full of columns of wit and humour, and articles and stories which are most entertaining and are looked forward to very much by the people up-country. If I could only remember half the information that I have imbibed from the Sunday Statesman during the last forty years, I should be a more objectionable person than I am today. (Laughter.)

But seriously, ladies and gentlemen, the qualities of the Statesman have always been twofold. First of all, it expresses the ideas which it holds without fear or favour; and in the second place it always has good reasons for those ideas, whether you agree with them or not. Those qualities have never been more prominent than during the seven or eight years during which Sir Alfred Watson has been connected with the Statesman. Those qualities have also been prominent in our Chairman, who was associated with Sir Alfred Watson for five years in Calcutta.

If I may use a cricketing metaphor in Sir Stanley Jackson's presence, I would say that these two men, whom we have among us tonight, have kept their ends up and have kept their heads against bowling of all sorts—fair bowling, and unfair bowling, and sometimes malevolent bowling. They have never swerved from the course they thought right in spite of the troubles and difficulties that came upon them, and they have kept to the course at the risk of their lives. We are proud to have them here this afternoon, and I ask you to show your gratitude to them by passing a very hearty vote of thanks. (Applause.)
INDIA'S SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS
AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION

BY SIR ALBION BANERJI, G.S.I., C.I.E.

The religious and social problems of India have not received the
attention that they deserve in the constant discussions that have
taken place since the appointment of the Statutory (Simon) Com-
mission at the close of 1927. For the most part the discussions,
as was to be expected, have centred upon political issues, though
we have heard much recently of the disabilities of the Depressed
Classes. I have no special claim to discuss these religious and social
problems as a scholar, historian, or a student of constitutional law
and practice; but I may be permitted to mention that the very
first piece of social legislation passed by the Governor-General's
Legislature over sixty years ago gave the religious community to
which I belong a statutory right not applicable to the Hindu,
Muslim, Christian, Parsee, and other religious communities of
India. The Civil Marriage Act of 1872 was accepted and passed
on the understanding that it applied only to adherents of the
Brahmo Samaj, and they had to make the negative declaration
that they were not Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsees, or
members of any other recognized religious grouping.

I was born in England of Brahmo parents, although descended
on both sides from the highest caste Kulin Brahmins of Bengal.
My mother travelled to England with my father in 1870 and
was the first among Indian women to do so, thereby sacrificing
all her caste privileges, prerogatives, and rights. My father,
Sevabrat Sasipada, was one of the most practical and ardent
social workers of India in his day. He was a pioneer in Bengal
of work for women's education, for widow remarriage, and for
uplifting the Depressed Classes. During the last years of his life
he founded the Devalaya as a common meeting-ground of all
religions in a spirit of brotherhood, toleration, and mutual respect
for each other's beliefs and convictions.

For myself, as a District Officer in Madras and as Dewan of
Mysore and Cochin, I had ample opportunities of watching social and religious movements in Southern India and took some little part in the measures adopted there for the amelioration of the Depressed Classes. I may claim, by upbringing in an atmosphere of non-sectarian home-life, by education and ethical and religious conviction, and also by official experience, to have an outlook which cannot be called narrow or partisan. Hence it would ill become me to discuss the religious and social problems of India from a dogmatic or controversial point of view. Speaking broadly, it may be said that each sect or community follows its own faith; its religious rituals and modes of worship are distinct and there is little propaganda to convince or convert, except amongst the Christian missionary societies, which provide but a small fraction of the total religious influence in India.

**Changing Backgrounds**

The political and economic backgrounds of India are changing from day to day. Politics are what politicians make of them according to the exigencies of the time. The science of economics is founded, as we know from observation over a series of years, on shifting sands. The sound economics of one generation becomes fossilized remains in the eyes of the next. New forces working from below modify the foundations of society and the general economic life of the people. But the religious and social problems of India are based on certain permanent factors in the life of the people which undergo little or no change from centuries of custom in spite of the vicissitudes of her history. It is the more necessary to bestow some attention on these factors, as they are likely to have serious repercussions on any form of government which may be established for All India. Governments, if they are to be for the good of the people, should have, as their primary concern, the contentment and prosperity of all sections, irrespective of caste, creed, or community. The State, according to Edmund Burke, is a partnership without which no government or constitution can be stable or lasting. Are we framing the future Constitution with that end in view?

The Hindus are divided not only under the four main caste
divisions, but even amongst each caste into separate sects and communities following different rituals and worshipping in different temples following different cults. A list of 2,300 different castes was once drawn up when a systematic classification was attempted. The non-Brahmin movement, which is chiefly directed against Brahmin supremacy and monopoly of culture, is a political and not a religious reform movement. We have in India the Indian Christian, Sikh, and Parsee communities among the smaller minorities. There is the Muslim population of nearly 78 million following a religion and a culture sundered widely from Hinduism. In religion and sentiment the Muslims are solidly united.

It is a truism to say that if the whole of India is to have one general Constitution, Federal or otherwise, her caste differences and sectarian animosities must be put in the background. But differences of religion cannot be forgotten in a country where religion is the heart and soul of the people. This religion breathes through its temples and mosques and has sacred associations in forms and emblems, rituals and ceremonies, all so diverse that without Government neutrality, which has been observed with care since 1858, there would be veritable chaos through a clash of ideals and the methods employed to practise them.

The Brahma Reformers

The Brahma Samaj movement, started a century ago by Raja Ram Mohan Roy, stood for an eclectic faith accepting the main principles of all religions. Such a doctrine appealed to the intellectuals, but was not suitable for the masses. The movement emancipated young India from the fetters of ancient prejudice and the superstitions of idolatry, as well as from the ban of foreign travel. As the Marquis of Zetland points out in his book The Heart of Aryavarta, when Ram Mohan Roy established the Brahma Samaj, his main object was to reform Hinduism and raise it from its then degraded position of superstition and corruption. The Brahma Samaj raised the level of Hindu society and the status of women. The movement served its purpose and is a notable instance of indigenous effort towards reform of a decayed
and obsolete Hindu social system. Outstanding leaders in the field of education and politics during the past fifty years have come from this movement. The Indian National Congress in the past had the active support of some of the best representatives of the Brahmo Samaj, including Mohan Lal Ghose, Ananda M. Bose, Lord Sinha, and Chittaranjan Das.

The Brahmo Samaj movement, however, is now practically dead—the gospel of religious and social equality and tolerance which it preached has been forgotten. There is more religious intolerance to-day than half a century ago. Amongst Hindus the Justice Party was organized by non-Brahmins for mere political purposes. Many sects and sub-sects have sprung up with a militant form of clanship with political ideas and special schemes for sectarian education and propaganda, one of them being the spread of Sanskrit culture amongst non-Brahmins. The subordinate castes are all asserting superior rights, and some of them even aspire to wearing the sacred thread which is the exclusive prerogative of the Brahmin, "the twice born."

**Religious Tension**

Owing to changed conditions, India is now a battlefield of social and religious animosities, and it is not easy to deal with disputes within the four corners of the Criminal Procedure Code. As a District Magistrate I had experience like many other Indian Civil Servants of having to preserve order by issuing injunctions against one sect or another, forbidding a certain procession with or without music or effigies, or forcible entry into prohibited shrines or holy places. Sometimes these injunctions were due to disputes between Hindu sects, as for example the Tangalis and Vadagalis, amongst the Iyengar Brahmins of Madras, and the bitter struggle between the Shanars and Maravars of the Madura District, due to the assertion of the right of temple entry by the latter against the former. There were besides frequent disputes between Hindus and Muslims due to cow killing and Hindu processions with music. Precedents were cited before me and decisions had to be given on evidence of communal rights of easement and not on equity. Mosques and temples have been built anew; new
antagonism bordering on intolerance has arisen amongst the people who lived in rural parts hitherto in peace and concord.

Cow killing and processions with music are the two bugbears affecting peaceful relations between Hindu and Muslims and often resulting in serious conflicts. When I was Dewan in Mysore, with the aid of my colleagues in the Council, one of whom was a Muslim, I made an attempt to solve these two burning questions and put some definite proposals before the Representative Assembly for the consideration of both the communities. The line of compromise suggested was that the Hindus should refrain from exercising their right of carrying religious processions with music in front of mosques, and the Muslims would refrain from killing cows within the vicinity of Hindu residential quarters and temples. The idea was for His Highness the Maharajah to issue a proclamation embodying these agreements, so that they would have the force of law. The compromise, however, was not finally accepted by the parties concerned.

The Prevention of Disputes

When I had the privilege of interviews with the Marquis of Reading and Lord Irwin during their Viceroyalties, on the subject of communal disturbances, I pointed out that new conditions had arisen, new religious sects and new practices had sprung up, and new rights were being asserted which could not be dealt with and determined by old Privy Council and Indian High Court decisions and for which there were no precedents. The communal problem is not a provincial problem. It is therefore incumbent on a strong National Central Government—be it Federal or otherwise—to control all such matters. How is this to be done if law and order are to be transferred to provincial Ministerial responsibility? The answer is, firstly, that a provision be made in the Constitution itself like that of the Constitution of the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, of which I quote verbatim sections 1 and 2:

"Article 128: Protection of national, religious and racial minorities. (1) All citizens shall be in all respects equal before the law and shall enjoy the same political rights without distinction of race, language or religion."
(2) Differences of religion, creed, faith or language shall not prejudice any citizen in any way, within the limits laid down by general laws, particularly in regard to public employment, office or honours and to the exercise of any trade or calling."

These provisions, however, refer chiefly to political rights. Religious festivals, processions, and practices form the everyday life of an Indian. There is an adage in Bengali: "Baro masé tāro parvan," which means: "There are thirteen religious ceremonies and festivals in twelve months." Hence the need for supplemental provisions. Rules have to be framed for the guidance of law and police officers when disputes arise. When new parties are formed under a democratic system new groups will fight battles for themselves and, it may be, political devices will be resorted to by contending groups seizing sacred religious emblems and holding them up to ridicule. The suggested rules therefore should be embodied in the King-Emperor's Instrument of Instruction to the Governor-General who should have dictatorial powers. In the Instruments of Instruction to Governors it is already laid down that those classes which are in need of protection of Government owing to lack of educational and material advantages shall not suffer or have cause to fear neglect or oppression. This principle should be enlarged to cover all religious and communal disputes. Powers should be specified and means for the Governor-General to exercise them should be clearly indicated.

Conciliation boards or advisory councils consisting of members of different communities have proved useless in the past. One has only to recall the Shanar and Marava riots of South Madras, the Moplah rising in Malabar, the Hindu and Muslim riots in all parts of British India, the Cawnpore massacres, and the recent disturbances in the Kashmir and Alwar States to see how futile they have been.

Central Authority

What are the prospects of a National Indian Government at Delhi under a democratic Federation with the franchise extended and minorities safeguarded by special electorates preventing such clashes throughout India amongst vast multitudes of illiterate
peasants, when some small happening or a mere sign is sufficient to rouse the population by the thousand? Religious sentiments and prejudices are older than civilization itself, and civilization has yet to devise a means to harness them to man's common purpose and good. All that it has done is to provide civilized methods to increase the venom due to such influence and to cause appalling disasters.

India is to-day face to face with a religious intolerance due to political rivalries and jealousies which no Government, however constituted, can meet without special powers. It rests with the Central Executive, no matter how it is formed, to have organized strength at call to resist subversion of peace and order and loss of life and property, in the shape of a strong All India Police Force specially maintained for the purpose. The force must be under the direct orders of the Governor-General (for few will be ready to obey the orders in such matters of a centralized All India Executive) and must be for the purpose of keeping the peace in relation to religious and communal problems.

Religion in India has largely ceased to be a spiritual force. The late Mr. Gokhale's plea that public life should be spiritualized was even then a cry in the wilderness. *Ahimsa*, Mr. Gandhi's famous touchstone for his philosophy of non-violence, is honoured more in the breach than in the observance. In founding the *Devalaya*, my revered father, Sevabruta Sasipada, aimed at the fraternity of religious faiths in India on a basis of mutual toleration and human brotherhood. That movement, after the founder's death, lost its vigour. We have no religious leaders to-day like Keshab Chunder Sen, Dayananda, Ramakrishna and Vivekananda. The Theosophical Society, the Arya Samaj, the Hindu Mahasabaha, seem to me to spend their energies and use their organizations largely for political ends. Should India be free from any manner of British connection, the consequences are too dreadful to contemplate. Without a strong impartial government at the helm religious and even sectarian animosities may drive the ship of state into stormy seas from which there will be no returning to a harbour of safety and tranquillity. India is truly at the parting of the ways. What is needed to-day is a new
Brahmo Samaj movement, call it what you will, embracing all religions and communities and having social service and uplift as a main purpose. It is through such a movement that the true idea of nationalism can grow.

Professor Rupert Emerson of Harvard University has placed his finger on the weak spot in the nationalist movement of India to-day. He writes that India is diversity while nationalism is unity, and it is doubtful whether nationalism offers India a programme for the future. He apprehends the great danger that nationalism in India will lead to the appearance of counter-nationalism within India. No truer words have been written.

**Dictatorships**

We have in Russia to-day the anti-religious movement; we have in Germany the fight between the Nazis and Communists and Catholics and Protestants; we have in Czecho-Slovakia the bitterness between the Germans and the Czechs. All these are strongly controlled by extraordinary measures. We have the babel of languages and the strife of culture even in Asiatic countries like Turkey, where recently Mustapha Kemal promulgated an order to substitute Turkish for Arabic in Muslim prayers; so that the traditional “Allahu Akbar” becomes “Tanri Uludur.” Such policy, to uproot deep traditions, can only be politically attempted when there is a dictator capable of meeting violent opposition. What personal force is there in India corresponding to that of Mustapha Kemal? Bernard Shaw said that in India we want more than one dictator like Mussolini. Perhaps he is right.

Language and religion are a serious stumbling-block to India’s democratic advance. India could be totally denationalized only by the brute force of a dictator like Mustapha Kemal or the Shah of Persia, and thus lose all her ancient culture and traditions and faith, and become irreligious like Japan, where patriotism is the only religion, or like Russia, where the machine is the new god. Is this possible in India, where people are steeped in religious sentiment?

Religion is a sentiment, a faith, or a conviction; conviction translates religion into action and shapes everyday conduct of
life. It is a faith and a sentiment with the Hindus and a conviction with the Muslims. I would like to challenge anybody to define to-day what Hinduism is as practised by the bulk of the people. Is it Vedantism, Brahminism, the religion of the Gita or of the Upanishads and Puranas, Sakti Puja, or the Tantric doctrine? The creed of Chatanaya or Sankaracharya? The Brahma Samaj tried to crystallize the nuggets of Hinduism, the hidden truth of its philosophy and doctrine of life. But the people would have none of it. Ask a Hindu what he believes in and why he goes to a particular temple where some special deity is installed as a manifestation of Siva or Vishnu, and he cannot tell. He only follows with tenacity the religious custom of his caste. The census report of 1921 says "except perhaps to the few who understand its philosophical meaning, Hinduism has no one distinguishing central concept."

In view of all these facts, it is not altogether wrong to say that in its present state of religious and social organization it would not be safe for India to have representative institutions of a modern type. India has to be governed by force or coercion of some sort or other—call it the coercion of priests or princes or the coercion of a dictatorship—which has existed through all ages in the village headman upwards to the head or chieftain of a clan or group exercising absolute authority without right of appeal.

**Temple Entry**

I am afraid I am going to say some very unconventional things unpalatable to my own countrymen, especially at this stage of the Indian question. Has Mr. Gandhi tried to tap the religious sentiment of the people, to drive it into proper channels to make for unity, or is not his policy to set up and to lay down one kind of law for one person and another for another? See, for instance, his latest bid for power with reference to the Untouchables and temple entry. He has now indefinitely postponed his fast in view of the private Bill introduced in the Legislative Assembly by Mr. Ranga Iyer. Mr. Gandhi says in effect: "Let Hindus have the caste system and let the Untouchables be legally permitted to make an inroad upon it." It appears to me that the Bill will
never get through, but only raise a dust of religious storm all over the country. You cannot blow both hot and cold: either be an orthodox Hindu or be a reformer. Purge Hinduism of its excrescences and abuses, or, in the alternative, be an out and outer believing in nothing, and do as you please. Is not India tending gradually to the third category so far as the majority of the thinking classes is concerned? It is a mistake to suppose that, with so many groups and parties in India based on religious and social differences, there can be any kind of stable government. Hindus themselves will break off into innumerable contending parties, and it will be a long time before India can become a united nation able to wield the instrument of democracy as a means of governing for the good of all concerned. Events to-day in many European countries, in spite of a common social organization and less cleavage from religious antagonism, show that various conflicts are crystallized by the forming of distinct groups which make it impossible for any one group to secure an absolute majority and thus the power to govern by consent. It is difficult, indeed, in India to-day to find what Rousseau calls the "popular will" that will assert itself to give such a consent.

**Social Life**

Social problems in India have a religious basis, for society is divided by habits and customs which have in themselves a religious sanction. The social life of the people cannot be developed on the same lines as in European countries or, for that matter, as in Turkey, Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, China, and Japan, for Indian social customs, and the position held by women amongst the different social groups, are all different in the different parts of India. Without equality of the sexes and equality of status as between average men and women, social progress is confined to the advanced sections amongst the people who have travelled and moved on equal terms with the rest of the world. These, after all, constitute a microscopic element of the vast population of India.

The problem of social intercourse between the Briton and the Indian in the country itself is difficult, chiefly because of the
difference of outlook and customs regarding women in the first
place, and habits of dress and food in the second, but common
interest in sport and foreign travel has had a most useful effect.
The tour of the All India cricket team in England last year was
a demonstration of the possibilities of common fellowship
amongst all classes of Indians between themselves and as between
them and the English people. Indian society to-day is moving
rapidly towards emancipation in many ways. This is eminently
desirable, so far as it brings people together, although one has to
admit that there is not the remotest chance of customs and habits
amongst the majority of our people adapting themselves to one
common Indian pattern, or castes or communities surrendering
their own ways in preference to those of others. The actual
position is that each individual group is fighting for itself as
against the rest, rigidly adhering to its own practices.

The Depressed Classes

A few words may not be out of place in this connection
regarding the Untouchables. There is much confusion in the
terms “Hindu,” “Caste Hindu,” and “ the Depressed Classes.”
The term “Untouchable” is of a very recent origin. In Madras
these people were designated “Panchamas” and are popularly
known as pariahs. The question whether the Untouchables are
a class of Hindus is answered differently by students of Hindu
ethnology. But the fact remains that they do not follow the
ordinary rituals of the Hindus or worship the same deities. Their
social and marriage customs are different. Their disabilities are
due chiefly to the extreme rigour of the Hindu caste system and
the degradation under which they have been labouring for
thousands of years. Untouchability is an ugly word and has come
into vogue only recently. The original conception of untouch-
ability is pollution, and amongst the 62,000,000 people who come
under the classification of “exterior castes” in the 1931 census
all are not untouchable. Amongst them there is a sharp division
of rank and caste, which is enforced as rigorously as between the
caste Hindus. Untouchability necessarily brings in its train segre-
gation, rules to be observed for keeping at a safe distance—in
other words, "unapproachability"—and purification ceremonies. The class of work performed by some of the depressed classes and the habits of everyday life stamp them with inferiority. Segregation was brought about by the carrying out of the menial duties of the village—namely, scavenging, sweeping, and removing carcasses of dead animals—together with the acquirement of unclean habits, one of which was eating carrion.

Untouchability or pollution, even by look, leave alone touch, is prevalent among Hindus as between groups within the same caste. There are strict customs amongst caste Hindus as to the supply of drinking water. Even amongst the highest-caste Brahmins of Madras, the Iyers and Iyengars, a member of one community cannot partake of food seen by one of another section. Some of the most refined and advanced Courts of Southern India, to preserve their position as heads of Hindu States, practise technical untouchability in their social intercourse with non-Hindu members of society, Christian or Muslim, Indian or European. Human beings in every grade of civilization have prejudices against mixing on a level of social equality with those who are considered below, and have to go through a process of advancement in personal hygiene and cleaner habits of food and clothing. And even when similarity of habits and tastes exists or grows up by assimilation of ideas, such prejudices continue. I have only to mention the United States attitude towards coloured people and the prejudice against Jews in some European countries, such as Russia and Austria before the War. Have not the English people likewise shown prejudice against Indians, no matter how high-born and cultured, as regards their clubs in India and some of their boarding-houses and hotels in England, on the ground of colour?

We members of the Brahma Samaj and our predecessors have attempted for a hundred years to blot out the evil of untouchability in the Hindu social system. I remember being entrusted, as a boy forty-five years ago, with the duty of teaching the three R's to the Untouchables (called Chamars and Chandals) in my father's night schools in Barnagar, his native town. We were then as a family treated as outcaste, worse than pariahs, and boycotted in the town. When I joined the Indian Civil Service
in Madras I engaged a pariah cook; my Hindu friends could not tolerate the idea, and treated me with less respect than they did the European members of the Service, who did likewise. All this is mentioned to show that in various forms untouchability is practised by people according to their prejudices and superstitions.

During the past decade or so, the Maharajah of Mysore, one of the most orthodox Hindu Princes, made a crusade against untouchability by passing administrative measures such as opening all State schools to the Untouchables, gradually weaning them from dirty surroundings and habits, giving them clean clothing and settling them in healthy localities, providing the landless with arable land, and finally giving educational facilities in the form of scholarships and other encouragements to enable them to reach higher standards of education, even up to the university grade. The most important reform, however, was to allow the members of this class seats in the Representative Assembly. These measures roused considerable orthodox feeling at the time, but the opposition has now completely died down.

The fact is, this is a human problem to be dealt with sympathetically and firmly by the Government and the people in cooperation. But I do not believe that forcing democratic institutions all at once, or superimposing equality of status by legislation before adopting measures for social and economic uplift, will prove a satisfactory solution. I am further convinced that the separate grouping of our people on the basis of social and religious distinction in an elected Chamber invested with responsibility will eventually lead to the formation of innumerable political parties, out of which it will be impossible to form even a coalition cabinet. One has further to remember that the so-called majority party—namely, the Hindu section of the population—is becoming gradually a more heterogeneous body. They are disintegrating themselves into many separate and hostile groups which will not act in concert for party purposes in a democratic constitution.

Let me refer again to the attempt being made to pass a law permitting Untouchables to enter Hindu temples. Hindu temples are, for the most part, endowed by some pious individuals or in-
stitutions and consecrated by the installation of some idol representing the manifestation, in some form or other, of the Hindu trinity. It is a matter of contention amongst Hindus whether the religions practised by the Untouchables conform to the accepted doctrines of the Hindu faith. Hindu temples are situated in the residential parts of villages and towns where the majority of caste Hindus reside. The Untouchables maintain their own places of worship and their own emblems and rituals, which, for the most part, are animistic in form. It is a question whether the proposed reform can be brought about by legislation and whether it will not create serious discord if forced upon the orthodox Hindu community.

It appears to me that the temple entry reformers want to maintain caste at all hazards, and yet profess their belief in the desirability of allowing those who do not belong to the recognized Hindu caste subdivisions a certain right which neither religion nor custom gives them. Are these reformers prepared to abandon the very foundation of the Hindu religion—namely, the Brahmin supremacy, which is so inconsistent with the proposed new legislation? One may with reason doubt the bona fide character of this movement, which may be, after all, a mere political expedient adopted for a special purpose.

Religion has played havoc in the past history of mankind and brought about intolerance, inquisition, persecution, and bloodshed. Thus it is that Soviet Russia to-day holds all religions up to ridicule and has an anti-religious propaganda everywhere. Are we to have the blind forces of religious fanaticism and prejudice let loose throughout the length and breadth of India, and thus bring about eventually a reaction and revolt against every form of religious sentiment? Moreover, are the Hindu temples, without exception, scenes of such holiness and purity that Mr. Gandhi should make them the sole goal and ambition of the lowest classes? The present corrupt form of Hinduism, its superstitions, its cruel rigour of caste distinctions, its monopoly of culture and learning only amongst the priesthood, are beginning to produce a revolt amongst certain sections. The policy most needed at the present time in India, so far as the Hindu popula-
tions are concerned, is to reform the whole Hindu society and make for social and religious freedom amongst all classes in the community as against Brahmin exclusiveness and supremacy.

**The Attainment of Unity**

India is struggling for the moment with the idea of Swaraj and nationality, mainly directed against the British rule, but this is surely not a permanent factor in history. We fail to realize that world conditions are radically changing so far as the art of Government is concerned. Even Europe is now in the throes of a new revolution in science, art, politics, and administration. European dictatorships have been evolved in Yugoslavia, Italy, and Germany out of democracy, which itself has failed to solve the problem of Nations. Fascism in various forms is spreading its wings to announce a new order of things, and we see this movement even in a small country like Finland, where the battle-cries of political parties make any kind of national government impossible. Turkey, Persia, Irak, Afghanistan, China, and Japan are moving towards a new Asiatic civilization on altogether different lines. Will not India find herself at the crossroads, be compelled to retrace her steps, and turn to an altogether different direction to attain national salvation?

I for one see little or no hope of India's moral and material salvation till she is united as a nation and our caste and communal differences are put in the background. The need of a great leader, a master mind to lead a party based on other than religious or communal principles, call it what you will, with equality of status and equality of opportunities for all castes and creeds committed to its opinions, seems imperative. The British connection gives the people at large a moral support which it most needs at present, and which all Indians hope may in the near future be on the basis of complete equality of status and not dominance. The loss of that connection would bring about chaos and be a disaster to civilization itself, for it would mean the breaking up of India into fragments unable to withstand the irruptions from the East on the one side and from the Near West on the other. The future of India rests not on Great Britain,
but on the shoulders of Indians themselves, Princes and people alike. Hope for the future is centred in the younger generation, who can be expected to rise above the differences of religion, caste, or sect and to form the nucleus of an All India Party of the kind I visualize to lead India to her predestined goal.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 20, 1933, when a Paper was read by Sir Albion Banerji, C.S.I., C.I.E., on "India's Social and Religious Problems and the New Constitution."

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

Sir John Kerr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir Louis Dane, G.C.I.E., C.S.I., and Lady Dane, Sir Charles Armstrong, Sir William Owens Clark, Sir John Cumming, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Hugh McPherson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Edward Gait, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., Sir Henry Wheeler, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir Reginald Glancy, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Leonard and Lady Adami, Sir Alfred Chatterton, C.I.E., Lady Abbas Ali Baig, Lady Scott Moncrieff, Sir Beauchamp St. John, K.C.I.E., C.B.E., Sir Duncan Macpherson, C.I.E., Sir Ross Barker, K.C.I.E., C.B.E., Mr. F. G. Pratt, C.S.I., Mr. John Ross, I.S.O., Mr. V. Boalth, C.B.E., Mr. P. K. Dutt, Mr. John de La Valette, Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Mrs. H. Gray, Mrs. Irving, Mr. R. A. Wilson, Mrs. Weir, Miss E. L. Curteis, Mrs. Polak, Canon Arthur Davies, Mrs. Dorothy Chaplin, Colonel A. G. Hamilton, Mr. T. A. H. Way, Mr. H. B. Holme, Mr. and Mrs. H. M. Willmott, General and Mrs. Foulkes, Mr. R. K. Sorabji, Miss Mary Sorabji, Miss C. K. Cumming, Mr. A. E. Rushworth, Mr. D. Burke, Major and Mrs. Shah, Mr. Raphael Hurst, Mr. Lincoln, Mr. H. K. Sadler, Mr. H. Jehangiani, Mrs. Collinson, Mr. F. Grubb, Miss Carlyle, Miss Stacey, Miss L. Rama Krishna, Mr. C. A. Mahol, Rev. E. S. Carr, Miss F. M. Green, Mr. T. G. Rose, Mrs. G. Foden, Miss B. Bacon, Mr. and Mrs. A. Allen, Miss L. C. Edmondstone, Mr. Philip Cooper, Mr. Maneck B. Pathewallia, Mr. and Mrs. Maurice M. Bear, Mr. S. N. Ziman, Mr. Victor E. G. Hussey, Miss Hogan, Mr. J. Le Brasseur, Mrs. and the Misses Burke, Miss M. B. P. Hanson, Miss Gravatt, and Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think there is much need for me to introduce Sir Albion Banerji to you because he is already very well known. But I should just like to say this as prefatory to his lecture, that I know for some years that he has been very keenly and sincerely interested in this question of the social and the religious state of India as apart from the political. I have met him on several occasions, on which he has emphasized this.

As you know, he has had great experience in India as a member of the Indian Civil Service, and has held high positions under the Government of India and in the Indian States. And from that wide experience he will speak to us this afternoon.

(The Paper was then read.)

The CHAIRMAN: I listened just a little over a week or two ago to a speech by Sir John Simon at a welcome to General Higgins, the great leader of the
Salvation Army, on his return from India. Sir John Simon said that what had impressed him during his tour through the length and breadth of India was the way in which religion penetrated the whole life and customs and traditions of the Indian people. That apparently was the point which most struck Sir John Simon. But one hears unfortunately also, and we heard it today from the lecturer, that the sense of religion in India does seem to be lessening. I understand from the lecturer that the young people of today have not that strong sense of religion that their fathers had. That is to me a very sad thing striking at the very base of the remarks and recommendations of the lecturer this afternoon, because if India is to progress at all it must be on the basis of religious feeling.

I think it is not going against modesty to say that we English people are remarkable for our common-sense and our political sense. Those are our strong points. The Indian strong point, as I see it, is a deep spiritual sense. She has that delicate feeling in religious matters, I think perhaps deeper than we have, while we have a common sense and a political sense stronger than the Indians.

So the best, as I look to the future for India, would be if she could regain (if she has lost it) and refine and sharpen up the old spiritual sense, and combine with it that strong common-sense and political sense for which we English are especially remarkable.

I do not think there is any need at all for there to be opposition between us. We can always go on together. There will always be a contrast in that respect, but I think we shall both gain by this contrast showing up the excellencies in each and making each profit by the excellency in the other.

For that reason I do not know whether more safeguards in the Constitution will be of very great avail. I have only just glanced through the Proposals in the White Paper for the new Constitution, and they seem to me to be bristling with safeguards already, but none of those will be any use unless at the foundation is this combination of the common-sense and political sense which we English can supply with that deeper and most valuable spiritual sense for which the Indians are remarkable.

I would like a letter to be read from Bishop Whitehead, who is not able to be present this afternoon, but who has written giving his views upon the lecture which Sir Albion Banerji has been so very kind as to deliver to us.

Bishop Whitehead’s letter was read by the Hon. Secretary as follows:

Sir Albion Banerji’s paper is a welcome change from the fog of vague abstractions and generalizations that have obscured the political situation in India for the last fifty years. It faces frankly the realities of Indian life and gives a most able survey of the communal and religious chaos that is the dominant factor in Indian politics at the present time. My own experience of India goes back to the year 1883 in Calcutta, when the National Congress was coming into being; and looking back to the period between then and 1922, when I retired from work in India, I can fully corroborate the account that Sir Albion gives of the growth of communal and sectional animosities during the last fifty years. It is now ten years since I left India, but from
all accounts the communal strife has become during that interval much worse instead of better.

I agree, therefore, with the diagnosis of the disease from which India is suffering. On the other hand, I venture to disagree as to the remedy. Sir Albion Banerji finds the remedy in the rise of "a great leader, a master mind," who will create and lead a party based on non-religious and non-communal principles with equality of status and equality of opportunities for all castes and creeds—in fact, a dictator of the type of Mussolini, Mustapha Kemal, Hitler, or Lenin. I have no faith in dictators anywhere, except to meet a temporary crisis. In India, as it seems to me, dictatorship would be fatal to progress of all kinds. Practically it would mean not equal status and opportunity for all creeds, but the restoration of the Moghul Empire. A Muhammadan dictator of the calibre of Mustapha Kemal, supported by the whole power of the Muslim world from the North-West Frontier of India to Cairo and Constantinople, is conceivable. A Hindu or a non-religious dictator seems to me beyond the bounds of possibility.

Personally, I look for the salvation of India in a very different quarter. I firmly believe that it lies in the rapid growth of the Christian Church in the villages of India and the spread of the spirit and power of Christ among the masses of the Indian peoples. This is not the occasion on which to justify my faith. I will only state briefly one set of facts which have come under my own personal observation for the last thirty years, and which may serve to illustrate the possibility of the rise of a new power in Indian social and political life during the present century. In the Telugu country, or, as it is now called, the Andhra country, of South India, there are now close upon a million Christians, nearly all of them gathered during the last seventy years from the outcaste or Depressed Classes in the villages. I need not describe the state of these Depressed Classes as members of the Hindu community. And time forbids me to give even a short account of the colossal task of raising them out of the depression and degradation of 2,000 years.

I will only mention one fact—namely, that the miraculous change that has taken place in the lives and characters of the Christian community as a whole in that area has led directly to the conversion of about 30,000 caste people in the villages to faith in Christ during the last ten years. It is an impressive and significant sight to see the new caste converts to Christianity worshipping together with Christians from the outcastes in the same churches, receiving instruction from outcaste teachers, and sitting side by side with their fellow Christians from the untouchable classes in the common meals, eating food prepared by outcaste cooks, and uniting with their outcaste brethren in the common life of the Christian Church. When we turn from the futile efforts that are being made to secure for the outcasts admission to the temples of orthodox Hinduism to this spectacle of the unity of caste and outcaste in the Christian Church, we cannot but feel that here is the new power that India needs as a remedy for the communal and sectional strife and animosity which threaten to make representative government in India possible.

I entirely dissent from the view that what is needed now is to exclude religion altogether from the sphere of politics in India. Religion is far too
deeply ingrained in Indian thought and feeling and too closely embedded in Indian social life to make that possible. What is needed, I venture to maintain, is the sincere and earnest pursuit of religious truth. "The Truth shall set you free," applies to the people of India as fully as to every other country in the world. And now that the time has come for the people of Great Britain to resign the reins of political power into Indian hands, the greatest service that we can still do for the great country that many of us love and have tried to serve in the past is to throw our energies heart and soul into the work of creating a united Christian Church in India, which in face of all this religious strife and bitterness may uphold and spread throughout the length and breadth of the land the great principles of the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God.

Sir Edward Gait: Sir Albion Banerji bases his claim for impartiality, which no one will question, partly on his record as an administrator in the Indian Civil Service and as Dewan of two important Indian States, and partly on the fact that he has sprung from a well-known Brahma Samaj family. The Brahma Samaj is well known for its broad and tolerant outlook and for its readiness to recognize what is good in all religions, foreign as well as indigenous. It was founded in Bengal about a century ago, when the memory of previous misrule was still fresh in the mind of the people. They were grateful for the establishment of the Pax Britannica.

In their attitude towards other religions the Brahma Samaj formed an entire contrast to the Arya Samaj which came to birth in the Punjab nearly two generations later. By that time some people had become oblivious to the benefits of British rule and were resentful of alien domination. Dayanand Saraswati, the founder of the Arya Samaj, was one of the pioneers of the new outlook. Although his monotheistic tenets differed very little from those of the Brahma Samaj, who was frankly eclectic, he claimed to have derived them entirely from the teaching of the Vedic Rishis, who were the only human beings, he said, who had had divine inspiration. He inculcated belief in a bygone Golden Age in India, when the people under their own rulers enjoyed peace and prosperity and a social and religious system superior to anything that has even existed in any other part of the world. He was aggressively hostile towards the great monotheistic religions, and he did his utmost to induce his followers to reconvert to Hinduism those who had been previously converted to Islam. He also proclaimed the sacred character of the cow, which was not a Vedic doctrine, and urged his followers to do everything they could to prevent them from being sacrificed by Muhammadans. Ill-feeling on one side begets ill-feeling on the other. When I went to India, close on fifty years ago, the new teaching had not progressed very far. At that time, though there were occasional clashes, the Hindus and Muhammadans usually lived together in peace. In Bengal the Muhammadans often took part in the religious processions of the Hindus. No doubt there have been other contributing causes, such as the Wahabi movement in Bengal, but the main source of the ill-feeling which exists today lies in the teaching of Dayanand Saraswati. As the lecturer has said, the ill-feeling has been aggravated in recent times by political rivalries.
As to the Untouchables, the position in regard to their ordinary civil rights seems to be steadily improving. Railways and other modern developments have necessarily greatly mitigated the rigidity of the old idea of touch or proximity causing pollution. Nobody now, in most parts, attempts to prevent them from using the public roads. The objection to their taking water from the public sources of supply or sending their children to the ordinary schools is also becoming less, at any rate in Northern India. With the spread of education amongst them and the adoption of more cleanly habits, and with the help of philanthropic people like those mentioned by the lecturer, we may hope that in time all civil disabilities will eventually disappear. They have already disappeared in the case of those members of the Depressed Classes who have been converted to Christianity and who, under the guidance of the missionaries, have improved their material condition and adopted a better way of living.

The case of temple entry stands on a somewhat different footing. If the caste Hindus based their objection on the ground that these people cannot be regarded as Hindus, there would be a great deal to be said for excluding them from many of the temples. Although they recognize some of the great Hindu deities, they have their own Animistic beliefs and their own peculiar religious practices. But when the caste Hindus for political reasons assert that they are, in fact, Hindus, it is impossible to justify their exclusion from Hindu temples. They cannot have it both ways. The attempt to do so, more than anything else, has caused the great ill-feeling which exists at the present time between the Untouchables and the people of the better castes.

There is no time to discuss the next development in democratic government, but no one will dissent from the lecturer’s view that whatever its nature may be, it is absolutely essential to give to the Viceroy and the Governors of the Provinces power to intervene in order to protect the interests of minorities and to avert communal disturbances, or to put a stop to them when they occur.

Canon Arthur Davies: I think we shall probably all agree that Sir Albion Banerji in heredity and experience is well equipped to describe the social and religious conditions in India today. Although he has painted a very dark picture of disharmony, it would be difficult to say that it is too dark. He has, it seems to me, reached his main conclusions by a consideration of the facts, and yet I should say not by a consideration of all the facts.

I take it that the two main conclusions of his paper are that there is no hope of securing political or social advance in India until her peoples adopt some new eclectic faith, by whatever name it may be called, which shall remove the sharp edges of conviction from the different religions professed today by the peoples of India, and that until that comes about there can be no secure advance; and, secondly, that while that process is going on, the firm hand of the British Government must be kept in control, and that the hope is that under that control this religious development, this new kind of eclectic faith will grow up.

I cannot believe myself that that view is based on a full consideration of all the facts. The greater part of the paper that we have listened to has
described—and, as I say, I think has described quite truly—the social and religious conditions of India: but it would have been as easy to take up those pages in describing with equal truth other aspects and conditions of India. It would have been possible to describe not only from India but from the whole of Asia and other parts of the world the sweeping advance of the Nationalist spirit. It would have been possible to maintain that that is at least as strong as the religious influences. Indeed, I remember how I was struck on my last visit to Benares to see the Swaraj flags flying from the umbrellas of the holy men on the banks of the Ganges. The feeling which that denotes, the evidence for that, could have been marshalled with tremendous force in a paper which would have led us all to say that obviously and at all costs something must be done to satisfy that. I only mean that that is another powerful force at work in the East, and not least in India today, and must be taken account of as much as the influences and the conditions which Sir Albion Banerji described.

So that, that being so, it would seem to me that his temporary solution by which over a period of years, one does not know how long, security shall be kept by a foreign hand while this new development takes place—that there is some reason for doubting whether that temporary measure could go on for any very great length of time.

Secondly, Sir Albion Banerji sees hope in some new development of a new faith, and naturally he sees it rather in the terms of the Brahma Samaj, which, small as it has been, has had so noble a history.

I cannot help thinking that perhaps from his suggestion of the work which there might be for a dictator or a powerful leader to do in bringing this about, he had in his mind the figure of Akbar, who combined the offices of dictator and religious reformer in the same person. Yet is not this hope of some kind of faith which is going to remove all the convictions which divide religions today, is that not one of the will-o'-the-wisps that has often been before people as a possible solution of the tiresome difficulty which religious conviction again and again presents? Is there any reasonable hope that that is to be the way out? Does not the history of the Brahma Samaj itself, with all the great men that have adorned it, does it not suggest—for Sir Albion Banerji himself says that today it is almost dead in India—does it not suggest that not in that way is a solution to be found? That religion is a queer and difficult thing which refuses to behave like that; which will not have all its corners and edges worn down to convenient curves which will not give trouble to India? Although you may get a certain distance that way, up it rises again, this conviction in the hearts of men.

Therefore I cannot believe that we can wait until all religions agree that there is much difference between them. What we must look for is that, while men of different faiths yet hold their convictions as strongly as you like, they may at least learn this, that they cannot expect to bring other people to their convictions by force: and that they must be willing to leave room for other people in the same world with different convictions. It is because we have learnt, in some measure at any rate, that lesson in a country like England that we can hold convictions and yet not necessarily come to

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blows. It would seem to me that it is only by learning that lesson that we can get the peace that Sir Albion feels, and we must all feel, is so necessary in India.

Sir Louis Dane: We have listened to an extraordinarily interesting paper. Sir Albion appeals for a dictator as the best way of dealing with present conditions in India. The last speaker said he probably had in mind the great Akbar. I think it is quite possible that if Akbar's great-grandson Darash Shakoh had not been defeated by Aurangzeb communal difficulties would not have been so serious in India.

I have only just glanced at the White Paper, and one thing you will realize is that Sir Albion, according to that White Paper, will probably get his dictator; that is to say, the dictator for the whole of India will be the Governor-General in certain circumstances, particularly on matters dealing with religion, and in each Province the Governor will in similar circumstances be the dictator. It is contemplated that the Governor-General as dictator should issue his orders to the Governors of the Provinces to take such action as he considers desirable, and those Governors must carry out those orders irrespective of the wishes of their Ministers and autonomous Assemblies.

But unfortunately the White Paper ends there at the moment. Nothing is said as to how those orders will be carried into effect by the Governors or as to the agency through which they will work. It is a very serious thing. If the police are handed over to the duly elected Assemblies and the elected Ministers, they may not be available for the purpose of carrying out these special orders of the Governor-General through the Governors, especially as such orders will usually be issued when tension is at its highest.

My own view is if this policy of reforms in India is to be a success—and I am sure we all desire it should be—that at any rate for a good many years at the beginning of the experiment there must be some special agency created or preserved in India, which shall be available to the Governor-General and to the Governors for the purposes of carrying into effect the special powers, on which it is admitted that this scheme rests for any chance of success at all.

The special agency which I contemplate, and which I ventured to suggest to Captain Wedgwood Benn when Secretary of State for India about three years ago, was that we should take measures now to create a special European Police Reserve in India. I dare say you have all noticed—and anybody who has been in India will bear out what I say—that when there is a communal dispute, due perhaps to the throwing of a cow's head into a temple or a piece of pork into a mosque, the heart of India blazes up like a conflagration, and the ordinary Indian police are not always capable of bringing such a conflagration to an end. It generally results in some European agency or British troops being sent down to bring about peace. This has happened everywhere within the last few years. There has been absolutely no change in Indian conditions in that particular matter since I went out there in 1876.

Let us take the opportunity while we can to create a backbone of European police in India. John Company had such an agency in its British regiments
for a century, and they worked exceedingly well on the whole. Physical
conditions in India have changed. There is access to the hills, and with
electric fans and electric light there are very few places where the Europeans
cannot live quite decently, and I go so far as to say, too, can bring up their
families there. One wants a body of men to be recruited as a special
European military police. Lots of Provinces have military armed police.
Let this be a special armed police for the whole of India, and, as Sir Albion
suggests for his police agency, it should be under the orders of the Governor-
General, and practically treated as a police reserve of the army, which he is
to control. Then when there is a necessity to put down any disturbance,
at the very beginning he will be able to draft a sufficient number of those
police to the Governor concerned, so that he may be able to carry out the
orders given.

I need hardly say Captain Wedgwood Benn did not altogether agree with
me, but I am convinced that unless something of that kind is done, this idea
of the Governor-General being temporarily a dictator through the Governors
will be impossible of execution. I wish to see the reforms carried out and
autonomy in the Provinces brought about as quickly as possible, because I
believe that can be worked if only there is some real safeguard against
unrest. No such constitution can work unless peace is assured, as present
eamples all over the world prove. It may be said, But why create a Reserve
of this kind when the Governor-General can use the Army for these pur-
poses? The answer is that it is not desirable to use the active army for such
purposes, and that even if it were, our small army in India is not sufficient
now to meet external aggression as well as ordinary internal unrest. There
was a very awkward situation in the spring of 1915. On the North-West
Frontier it is no longer a question, as in Lord Salisbury's time, of large-scale
or small-scale maps. Our nearest great Power neighbour now has not only the
Trans-Caspian railway to Khushk near Herat, but has constructed the great
strategic lines through Orenburg and Semipalatinsk to Karki on the Oxus.
That is only about 450 miles from Peshawar. We must remember that
with modern mechanical transport Japan has just moved in ten days an army
of 50,000 men in terrible climatic conditions through the rugged moun-
tainous track of Jehol to the Great Wall in face of the opposition of a
numerically greatly superior Chinese force. That distance was about 350
miles. What could be done there, and what was done by us between
Baluchistan and Meshed in Persia during the war, can be done again now
that communications and general conditions in Afghanistan and Baluchistan
have been much improved. India is now more than ever exposed to attack
from without, and a small organized invading force from the north-west will
always bring along with it a horde of hardy harpies for the spoil of India.
It is impossible to go into the question of finance on this occasion, but the
peace of India is the first consideration and must be secured at all costs.
If salaries are readjusted to meet the fall in food prices, funds can be made
available, and there is always the salt tax in reserve, which was specially
reduced to form a war reserve. Even if salt was again at Rs. 2 a maund
(82 lbs.) it would be cheaper, owing to improvements in communications
and selling arrangements, than it is in this country.
I can only say that I am exceedingly grateful to Sir Albion for his lecture, and am glad to be able to agree with him. Sir Albion told us how he and his whole family were put out of caste. I remember something of the same kind happening in my experience. A young Indian passed with me in 1874 for the I.C.S. He was a Madrasi, and an extremely able man; one would have predicted that he would rise to an extremely high position in the service. Unfortunately when he went back to India he was called on to go through some very expensive and even horrible ceremonies to recover his caste. He refused. The result was his father, who occupied a high position in Madras, and his whole family were put out of caste. Their lives were made absolutely miserable. It created some stir, and there was a danger of a serious religious disturbance. But eventually, and I am afraid one must think fortunately, this poor fellow died. It was said he had cholera; anyhow, he died. When he was out of the way, the family were brought back into caste. But happily things are not as bad now as they were then, and in this matter of crossing the ocean, India has moved in fifty years.

Sir John Kerr: Sir Albion Banerji has always been known as a vigorous and outspoken advocate of the views he holds and as a formidable opponent. I only wish that this afternoon he had had here an opponent worthy of his steel. I do not wish to depreciate in any way the value of the remarks made by those who have spoken, but what I should like to have seen here this afternoon would have been one of the old-fashioned Brahmins. I should like to have heard their observations on his paper and their views on the outlook for the future generally from that point of view.

We have not had that good fortune, and that being so I think we may at any rate congratulate ourselves that we could not have had anyone more competent than Sir Albion Banerji to lecture to us on this subject of the relations between social and religious conditions in India and the coming political reforms.

That aspect of the case, we may be sure, attracts many million people in India who will never even see the outside of the White Paper. If we could in this country visualize even to a small degree what those people are thinking of these coming reforms, I am sure that it would be of enormous assistance to us. But it is very difficult to bring forward that point of view in this country.

We are fortunate also in having as the Chairman for a discussion of this kind Sir Francis Younghusband, who has been noted throughout his life for sincere appreciation of spiritual values in India and the East and his true sympathy with the spiritual aspirations of the people.

Before Sir Albion Banerji replies to the criticisms of his paper, I will ask you all to pass a very hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer and to the Chairman this evening. (Cheers.)

Sir Albion Banerji: I do not think that at this late hour it is necessary for me to say very much with reference to the observations that have been made regarding my paper.
I am afraid I did not make myself quite clear about the dictatorship. I certainly did emphasize the fact that in all countries where democracy has been tried, and where democracy has flourished and developed, and where there have been very strong conflicts over religious or political matters, there had been extraordinary measures adopted or extraordinary forms of coercion applied. In thinking out a Constitution for India, we have to devise some means by which such serious conflicts may be avoided—conflicts which will produce perhaps greater disorder than any other conflicts we have seen in Europe during the past twenty or thirty years.

I am sorry to say that I am not able to agree with my most revered friend Bishop Whitehead about the remedy he suggests, that the spread of the Christian Church in India will be a solution of the difficulties which I have been trying to explain to you. I do admit that in regard to the lowest classes in India, especially the Untouchables, the great Christian missionary movements, both the Protestant and the Catholic, especially the Catholic Church movement in Southern India, have succeeded in ameliorating the condition of the Depressed Classes and have developed a spirit among them which gives them the idea of self-reliance and self-respect and makes them feel they are part of the common humanity.

But taking the religious condition as it has been during the past centuries, I doubt very much whether there would be any reasonable chance of the spread of the Christian Church as you understand it today, although I personally devoutly wish that in any form of new religious movement that may spring up some day in India the teachings of Christ and the true Christian religion may form a very important part of that movement, as they did, as a matter of fact, in the Brahma Samaj movement.

I certainly did not imply that religion should be excluded from politics, as Bishop Whitehead seems to have thought that I did. Religion at the present moment stands in the greatest possible danger of being wiped out in India in spite of the fact that our people in India are intensely religious in a sense. If we are going to have all this struggle, if we are going to have these innumerable parties springing up, based primarily on religion or religious sentiments, customs, and practice, I fancy that, as it has happened in Russia, India one day will be in the throes of an anti-religious movement. Young people will be sick of all religion. They will say, “You are steeped in all these different kinds of superstition which are making you cut each other’s throats. We will have none of it. We will do without religion. We will have a political community which will be non-religious.” I for one think that that would be a disaster.

Till we can set our house in order, till we are able to form amongst ourselves a common brotherhood, based on a mutual toleration—and I speak with the feeling that was expressed by my father always in his life, the feeling of common brotherhood and mutual toleration—we must have some kind of coercion even if we have our own National Government. I can assure you that when we have complete control over India, we shall have to employ some method of coercion whenever there is a chance of these serious disputes.

The question is, What form shall that coercion take? Whether it is an
all-India British police, or dictatorial powers in the hands of the Government, that is a question for the Constitution-makers later on to consider.

All I have attempted to do is to indicate the true position, the difficulties and dangers. Whatever we may do we have to count on the existing factors. These are so important that in deciding on anything final we must first of all depend on ourselves as Indians to work from within our reforms, and until we are united as a nation we shall have to depend on the co-operation and support of Britain in some form or another.

The Chairman : We thank Sir Albion very much, not only for his paper, but for a very spirited reply.
THE POLITICAL STATUS OF INDIAN WOMEN*

By Miss Eleanor Rathbone, M.P.

It is customary to begin an Address with an apology, and I have good reason for obeying that tradition. I apologize for speaking about India to a society many of whose members have spent far more years there than I have spent weeks. My excuse is that for the past five years I have made an intensive study of the women's side of the Indian problem. One can learn a good deal in five years if one gives one's mind to it.

To most of this audience, certainly to the vast majority in Parliament, the subject of our discussion today probably seems of quite trivial importance compared with the vast issues raised by other parts of the White Paper. The Report of a Director of Education in India once alluded to the education of women as "an interesting offshoot of general education," and that is the light in which my present subject seems to be regarded in official circles today.

Theoretically, Indian women are enfranchised already on precisely the same terms as men in all the Governors' Provinces except the N.W. Frontier. But these terms are such as to place on the electoral roll only about six and a half million persons, of whom less than a twentieth are women. The main qualifications being based on property, they exclude (in the words of the Simon Commission), "nearly all women and the general body of the poor."

The reason for the disparity between the sexes is that under Hindu law women have exceedingly little chance of owning property. Muslim laws of inheritance are fairer to women, but in some parts of India Muslims prefer to follow Hindu customary law rather than the juster teachings of their own prophet. In the two predominantly Muslim provinces of Bengal and the Punjab.

* Based on an address at a discussion meeting of members on March 23, 1933.
there is actually a smaller percentage of women voters than in Hindu Madras.

But although the granting of citizenship rights to women has hitherto been little more than a gesture, it has been (again quoting from the Simon Commission) "a gesture of high significance." It has shown how completely mistaken were those official advisers in India who, at the time of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, assured the Home Government that they would be acting far in advance of Indian public opinion if they extended citizenship rights to women. The matter was left to the Provincial Councils themselves, with the result that within ten years all of them had passed the necessary resolutions.

That is the present position. What of the future? The Government has had many advisers. But differing in much else, all the investigating bodies set up by the Government to advise them on the Indian problem have concurred in recommending a substantial increase in the number and proportion of woman voters.

I will first take the Simon Commission, whose Report is elevated by the more Conservative sections of British opinion into a place of peculiar authority. Even Mr. Winston Churchill stands by the Simon Report, though differing from it on the important subject of "law and order." Concerning women, the main conclusion of the unanimous Report is so important that I will quote it in full:

"We desire to see a substantial increase in the present ratio of women to men voters. If this is not effected now, the situation will later on be reached when so large a proportion of adult men are on the register, and so few women, that a further extension to bring the number of women voters more nearly to an equality . . . would necessitate the sudden admission of vast numbers of women with hardly any increase in the number of men. It is far better to proceed gradually and steadily, and a further step in developing women's suffrage in India should be taken now." (Vol. II., p. 93).

To achieve this result, the Report recommends that, in addition to women qualified in respect of their own property, the vote should be extended to the wives and widows of men voters, provided they are over twenty-five years of age. As some indication of the number of voters likely to be thus added to the roll the
Report estimates that married women over twenty-five are about one half of the number of men over twenty-one. This takes no account of the large number of widows who would be added. An educational qualification for both sexes is also suggested. It is a fair deduction from this passage that the Simon Commission contemplated a ratio of not less, and possibly more, than one woman to two men electors.

The proposals of the Lothian Commission reduced this proportion to a ratio of one woman elector to four and a half men. The reduction is effected by confining the wife's vote for Provincial Councils to the wives of men holding a much higher property qualification than the minimum. In addition, an educational qualification is proposed—a test of simple literacy for women and the upper primary standard for men. For the Federal Assembly no wife's qualification is proposed, but by including women, who satisfy the literacy test instead of the much higher educational qualification proposed for men, the proportion of women voters is raised to the desired ratio of one to four and a half men. In the matter of the franchise, Lord Lothian has thus been less generous to women than Sir John Simon. But he provides substantial compensation for this in his proposal to reserve a certain number of seats for women, both in the Provincial Councils and in the Federal Assembly.

The Third Round-Table Conference, like the other two bodies, states that "no system of franchise can be considered satisfactory, or as likely to lead to good government, where such great disparity exists between the voting strength of the two sexes" as that in force at present. It recognized the necessity both for special qualifications and for reserved seats for women. But the Lothian proposals came in for some criticism. Some members disliked the wife's vote, while others took exception to the literacy qualification. The general opinion, however, was favourable.

How does the White Paper deal with the recommendations of these responsible bodies, which, at great expense to the taxpayer, have travelled thousands of miles and spent many months on the investigation of these problems, with the assistance in India of innumerable advisers, official and otherwise?
One might have expected a ready acceptance. Did not the instructions to the Lothian Franchise Committee state that

"His Majesty's Government attach special importance to the question of securing a more adequate enfranchisement of women than the existing system, which . . . has produced a woman's electorate numbering less than one-twentieth of the total male electorate"?

Ah, but there have been forces at work behind the scenes. And here are the results in the White Paper. The Committee's proposal as to reservation of seats is accepted. But as to the franchise—

"For the Federal Assembly the ratio of women to men electors will for practical purposes remain unchanged"—i.e., will remain at the figure which the Lothian Committee was expressly instructed to increase. This result is effected by dropping that Committee's proposal of a literacy test and substituting a much higher education standard. The authors of the Paper evidently feel compunction, for they reiterate the assurance that "His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the importance of a large woman's electorate for the Federal Assembly." They have yielded, it appears, to "administrative difficulties" urged by the Indian authorities. But were these difficulties not represented to the Committee on the spot, which had fuller opportunities of weighing them?

As to the Provincial Councils, the White Paper rejects the Lothian Committee's proposed literacy test, except for the Province of Madras, and substitutes in the remaining Provinces varying forms of school certificates, which the Committee rejected on the express ground that the result would be to increase rather than decrease the disparity in voting strength between the sexes. The effect of this is to reduce the estimated voting strength of women from one-fifth to one-seventh. But that is not all. Wives qualified in respect of their husbands' property will only be enrolled if they make application for their votes, a requirement which does not apply to the husbands of these women. The effect can be foretold, in general terms if not in exact figures. There are many here who know India far better than myself, and it would be interesting to hear their estimates. Will more than
one woman in three make application for her vote? If that is the proportion, then we are back at the less than one woman voter to twenty men which the Government have expressly repudiated.

Some may say that no one who is not willing to apply for a vote deserve to have one. Then why not apply that test to men? But think again. What proportion of electors even in this country would trouble to apply, if they had to do it not during the excitement of an election, but during the preceding months? And in India, where many of the women are in purdah, where many are scattered over wide distances, where the visit of the postman is a rare event, what can you expect?

Again, the Government evidently had scruples, for they insert in an appendix that this provision may have to be reconsidered and reiterate their desire for an adequate proportion of women. May I interpolate a suggestion by which this desire could be gratified? Let the Government give something in exchange for what they have taken away. They could do this by reverting to the Simon proposal to enfranchise all wives, above a specified age, of men voting in respect of any property qualification, instead of merely the wives of men with the proposed high qualification. Coupled with the requirement that the potential voter must make application for her vote, this might not in effect yield a much larger proportion than the Lothian standard of one woman to four and a half men.

But taking the proposals as they are, let us sum up these dreary and depressing figures:

The Simon Commission—one woman voter to two men.
The Lothian Committee—one woman voter to four and a half men.
The White Paper—one woman voter to twenty men for the Assembly and probably little if any better proportion for the Provinces.

Admirers of Jane Austen may remember a delightful passage at the beginning of "Sense and Sensibility," which describes Mr. Dashwood's cogitations as to how he might keep his promise made at his father's death-bed to provide for his mother and sisters. Beginning with a resolve to give them a thousand pounds apiece, he arrives by several stages at the conclusion that an occasional basket of garden stuff is all that can reasonably be
expected of him. It seems to me that the official mind has followed somewhat the same course in its dealings with Indian women.

To some people the grievance will appear a small one. "After all," they say, "are women who are illiterate, or in purdah, or living in places remote from human contact, fit to exercise the vote?" Let me remind you that, except for purdah, these very obvious considerations apply equally to the great majority of the male voters, especially those of the Depressed Classes. Yet we find a practical unanimity of opinion, among the wisest and most experienced men who have recently studied the subject, that the peasantry, the Depressed Classes, and the women, all need the protection of the vote.

Concerning women, after sketching its proposal to enfranchise about half as many women as men, the Simon Commission says:

"Many will be disposed to say that Indian wives and widows are so largely uneducated or living in seclusion that their enfranchisement to this extent is premature and extravagant. We do not think so. The beginning of a movement among certain Indian women, however comparatively few in number they may yet be, to grapple with problems which specially affect home and health and children, is one of the most encouraging signs of Indian progress, and we believe that this movement would be strengthened by increasing the influence of women at elections" (Vol. II., p. 94).

"To grapple with problems specially affecting home and health and children." That puts in a nutshell the special case in all countries for enfranchising women, over and above the patriotism and self-respect which make men and women alike desire enfranchisement.

But let me expand that special case a little. What are the conditions under which we find large numbers of women in India still living after a century and a half of British rule? (Of course, these conditions do not apply to educated and emancipated women, nor even to others universally all over India.)

I. Illiteracy.—Some may think this tells against the case for enfranchisement. Sir John Simon has already answered that. I will give further answers. The Depressed Classes are quite equally illiterate. Yet the White Paper enfranchises 10 per cent. of them and perhaps 3 per cent. of the women. And why are
women illiterate? We know the reason from the Hartog Report. It is because Provincial Governments grudge money to the education of girls and the fathers are indifferent to it. How are these obstacles to be overcome if you deprive women of political influence? Yet innumerable authorities have testified to the way in which the illiteracy of women is retarding the progress of the whole community.

II. Purdah.—It is hard to say what proportion of women observe some degree of purdah or whether that proportion is increasing or decreasing. Some say 40 per cent.; some much less. Some say it is rapidly breaking down; some, that for every woman who comes out of purdah at the top of the social scale, one or two others go into it halfway down, because purdah is increasingly regarded as a mark of gentility. But note one thing: this recruitment of purdahnashins from the bottom is deleterious from the health point of view. Purdah for the rich is bad enough; but for the lower middle class—here is the description given me by a Zenana missionary in Patna, just a year ago, of the normal conditions of her charges: “A small, almost completely dark room; no window, but slits under the eaves; the women and children all crowded together, eating and sleeping in that room.” What wonder that Dr. Arthur Lankester, who made a special survey of the problem, found a very close connection between purdah and the enormous tuberculosis death-rate among young women and girls. What wonder that India, land of fierce sunlight, is the special home of osteomalacia—which so distorts the bones that natural child-birth becomes impossible for the mother.

III. Marriage Laws and Customs.—Who can defend them? A girl married in childhood (for even if the new law is obeyed, what is a girl of fourteen but a child?) to a man she had not chosen; bound to him indissolubly for life, while he is entitled to use “reasonable restraint” (I am quoting the law books) to confine her within the four walls of the home, and may cast her aside on a scanty maintenance on the ground that she is barren.

IV. Child Marriage.—Read that most courageous but terrible document—the Joshi Report on Age of Consent, 1929. It showed
that almost 50 per cent. of Indian girls are married before they are fifteen, many of them before they are five. It showed that consummation nearly always follows close on puberty and fairly often forestalls it; it showed that this custom was decreasing scarcely at all, advance in some sections of society being counterbalanced by retrogression in others. And this weighty Committee of Indians, mostly judges or lawyers or doctors, appointed by Government finally sums up the result in a passage which deliberately declares that child marriage leading to premature maternity causes such intense and prolonged suffering and has effects so devastating to the vitality of the race that it is a worse evil than suttee—the practice of burning widows alive on the husbands' funeral pyres. That Report was followed by the passing of the Sarda Act.

V. Widowhood.—I will confine myself to quoting a single description by an Indian speaking in the Legislative Assembly only a few years ago:

"I shall not take the time of the House by narrating what Hindu widowhood means. There is no Hindu who does not know it from practical experience in his household. It is a life of agony, pains and suffering, and austerity. It is a life which has been inflicted not so much by Providence, not so much by the Shastras, as by social customs" (Kumar Garganand Sinha, speaking in the Legislative Assembly, December 15, 1927).

Legally, the Hindu widow of today may re-marry. But few widows are practically able to do so, even if their own religious traditions make them willing. And hampered by illiteracy, by the laws of inheritance which give them a right to maintenance but no independent income, most of all by the superstition which makes the widow a thing of evil omen, few indeed are their opportunities of earning an honest livelihood; and that in spite of the fact that female education is seriously held back by lack of teachers, adult women who are not widows being nearly all married and occupied at home.

VI. Health Conditions.—These are closely associated with purdah and child marriage. But what is the machinery for grappling with the enormous mass of suffering and disease to which these and other evil customs lead? A very large propor-
tion of Indian women, not only those in purdah, are debarred by social custom from attendance by any but women doctors. A recent Report reckons the number of these in British India as about 400, or approximately one qualified woman to every 300,000 of the female population. There are, in addition, a certain number of semi-qualified women. But great portions of the country are still without a single woman doctor, and large tracts without a doctor of either sex. The number of trained nurses, except in the towns, is practically negligible. As for midwives, there exist many descriptions, by Indian and British doctors, of their medieval methods. There are many schemes, mostly voluntary, some aided by Government, for training or replacing the native dai. But these as yet affect but a tiny percentage of the confinements. The problem of bringing trained midwifery to the villages, where 90 per cent. of the people dwell, is, according to recent reports, as yet barely touched. And the results? I have studied carefully the records of maternal mortality in India. In this country we think a death-rate of four mothers to 1,000 confinements alarming. In India, at a very cautious and conservative estimate, I reckon that there cannot be less than fifteen deaths to 1,000 confinements—i.e., 126,000 maternal deaths a year, or fourteen every hour.

Enough of these details! What bearing have they on our subject today—the status of women in the future Indian Constitution? I think they have a very real and immediate bearing. Consider where we stand. The conditions I have sketched are those under which we are going to hand over women to their future rulers. We have not been able to do much to amend those conditions during the century and a half of our rule. Something we have done by the hand of Government—the suppression of suttee; a great reduction of infanticide; legal permission to widows to re-marry; the beginnings of education. Considerably more has been achieved through missions and philanthropists.

But are we satisfied? Are we satisfied even that we have done all that we might? The answer of most Indian social reformers is emphatically, No. I will quote only one out of many opinions. Dr. Muthulakshmi Reddi is the leader of the largest women’s
organization in India today. A much respected physician in Madras, she was nominated on to its Legislative Council and unanimously elected by her colleagues as its Deputy-President. She resigned that position because (in her own words) she believes that

"The British Government in my opinion has not been helping our moral and social progress, and has been adopting a policy of utter indifference, neutrality, and, sometimes, direct opposition to all our social reform measures."

Is there any justice in that charge? I have no time now to press the question and perhaps it does not matter. The past is past. But this much I will say: in all the matters where the evidence is sufficient to enable an outsider to form an opinion, it does seem to me that more, much more, might have been done if the British rulers of India had cared more, thought more, struggled harder to overcome obstacles in the matter of these women’s questions.

A century ago, Lord William Bentinck put down suttee with a strong hand, in defiance of all his official advisers. Only two years before the issue of his famous decree another Governor-General, Lord Amherst, advised trusting to "the growth of useful and rational learning among the natives for the gradual suppression of this detestable superstition." Among later British rulers there seem to have been many spiritual descendants of Lord Amherst, but few of Lord William Bentinck. Take the Sarda Act, which followed the Joshi Report of which I have spoken. Passed with the full approval of the Government, it prohibits—under very light penalties—the marriage of girls under fourteen or boys under eighteen. Has any trouble been taken by the Government to ensure that the Act was effectual? The Joshi Report strongly recommends a widespread campaign of education and publicity, and also several administrative provisions as essential if the Act was to be effectual. Though I have made persistent enquiries, in Parliament and in India, I cannot find out that this educational campaign, or any of the administrative provisions recommended, has been carried out.

A distinguished civil servant, a member of this Association,
told me that when he first went to India, one maxim was sedulously impressed on him: "Keep your hands off religion and the women." Is not the truth of it that this maxim has been so faithfully obeyed that not merely the hands but the thoughts of the British rulers have been kept off the women—all the more easily because these are out of sight behind the veil? The very thought of the women, if it ever intruded, has been hastily dropped into that oubliette which all of us keep in our minds for that most detested of intruders—a persistently neglected responsibility.

Perhaps you think that I am wrong; that I speak with the rashness of ignorance. Very well, then, let us assume that I am wrong; that it has all been inevitable. But why inevitable? Because we were alien rulers? Because we could not rashly interfere with social customs grounded on religious beliefs which we did not share? But now we are going to hand over control to the Indian people themselves, for the proposed safeguards do not affect such domestic questions as education, health, and marriage laws. Some of you may think that is all the more reason why we should leave the matter alone. "Let the Indians set their own house in order," you may say, "let them reform their own laws and customs if they think fit."

But to what part of the Indian people are we going to hand over control—to the women who have suffered under these customs? No, the overwhelming majority of voters will still be men. Do you really question whether a generous measure of enfranchisement for women would help them to reform their own conditions? Here at least I am on ground where I can speak with authority, for I have been one of the leaders of the women's movement in this country and have watched it closely all over the world. Everywhere the granting of full citizenship rights to women has given a strong impetus to social and administrative reforms in the matters that concern women most closely—education, health, child welfare, marriage laws. It will be so in India. It is true that the majority of Indian women are still inarticulate and seemingly passive. But there are the stirrings of life among them. They have articulate and emancipated leaders who can
speak for them, but will only speak with effect if they are known to have substantial voting strength behind them.

The mind of a candidate or of a political party is like a theatre where all the best seats are booked in advance for constituents and voters. It has little room for anybody else. The vote turns every man and woman into a Penelope with many suitors.

Many people today distrust democracy for India. They believe that India would do better under some form of autocratic rule. But the time for that is past. Rightly or wrongly, for better or for worse, India is about to receive a great extension of democracy. When the new constitution is placed on the Statute book there will be no changing it, unless by revolution, for many years. Our opportunity is now, and for British men and women it is unlikely ever to recur. In view of all that we know of the conditions of women in India, and of the forces at work to maintain those conditions, are we content to renounce our trusteeship without at least putting into the hands of women the means, the constitutional means, of securing for themselves that release from cruel laws and customs which we ourselves have so unquestionably failed to effect for them?
LANDOWNERS IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION

By the Raja of Parlakimedi

Having had the privilege of contact with British statesmen and leaders in my capacity as a representative of the landowning interest at the Round-Table Conference, I desire to put before the readers of the Asiatic Review a brief statement of the outlook of the Zemindari class on the approach of the great constitutional changes about to be submitted to the judgment of the British Parliament.

It was a source of great gratification and of justifiable pride to the landowners of India when H.E. the Viceroy, in receiving a deputation from the Zemindars of the United Provinces, said they came from a class from which the country may well find its natural leaders. We may indeed claim that as a class we have not only long traditions of loyalty to the Crown, but that throughout the history of Hindustan we have sought to discharge the obligations which have been imposed upon us by our position, and also by our religious tenets. Thus we have been in the habit of giving as free grants large areas of the best land for the upkeep of temples and other buildings for religious purposes. We have also made other provision for spiritual ends. Furthermore, we have played our part in the promotion of social amenities. In this connection we may mention the provision of tanks and the digging of wells: a most important service to the countryside. Not only the traveller, but also the ryot greatly benefits thereby, especially in seasons of deficient or ill-distributed rainfall. In this connection mention should also be made of Sanskrit pathasalas and rest-houses.

We have given much practical support to the spread of general education by encouraging the arts and scientific research. This has taken the form of establishing colleges, girls' schools and centres for industrial training, and of founding scholarships for art students and for technical research. Nor have we neglected those spheres of activity in which we might be expected to show the greatest interest: the opening up of communications, both by

* At a meeting of the landowning members of the Indian Legislature recently held in New Delhi, a resolution was unanimously passed expressing gratification at the decision of H.M. Government to form a separate Oriya Province, but urging that the boundaries of the Province would not prove acceptable unless they included the estate of Parlakimedi, the Raja Saheb being a recognized leader of the Oriya landholders.
our own initiative and by cordial support of the larger undertakings of public authority. The great reservoirs for irrigations, the great increase in the mileage of roads and railways in many Zemindari areas are a visible testimony to our zeal in this direction. The model farms and cattle breeding stations have similarly contributed to the advancement of the countryside. My only purpose in enumerating these improvements has been to show that we have a fund of experience which constitutes a well-grounded claim as a class for proper consultation by Government when the new Constitution has been framed, and for adequate representation in the legislative and executive bodies of our country.

In this connection I may refer to a cogent memorandum submitted to the Third Session of the Round-Table Conference by my friend and colleague the Raja of Khallikote. He wrote: "The Franchise Committee, while recommending the existing special representation of Landholders, did not realize the necessity for their increased representation in proportion with the increased representation of other interests and the expansion of the Legislatures based on an extended franchise. It is essential, in the circumstances, that the Landholders should have more adequate representation. In certain elections a few Landholders have been elected through general constituencies, but their success was not due to the fact that they were Landholders. It was due entirely to their merits and experience in the Local Board administrations. Landholders elected through general constituencies cannot truly safeguard or support the interests of Landholders in the Legislatures."

The Raja Saheb further pointed out that: "In the Madras Council there are only six Landholders' representatives, in the true sense of the term, out of a total strength of 132, and it is proposed to maintain the same representation even in an enlarged house of 215. This very small and disproportionate group of Landholders, in a big house of 215, will not be able to exert their influence to safeguard their vested rights and interests." He showed that in all the Provincial Councils, out of a total strength of about 1,700 members, there would be only 32 Landholder representatives under the proposals of the Franchise Committee. He was certainly voicing our views when he added that special representation of Landholders in Provincial and Central Legislatures should be increased proportionately with the strength of the respective houses.

It is quite wrong to describe the landowning interest as forming an ultra-conservative body, adhering to old-fashioned ideas not applicable to a progressive country travelling along the road to representative institutions. We do not oppose the inevitable
change in Indian Constitutional conditions, and now, as in the recent past, we shall not be afraid to enter the arena of politics; nor shall we shrink from the responsibilities of office. On the contrary, we can point to provinces where we hold our own in open competition with other communities and interests, and have discharged adequately the duties we have undertaken. The result is that landowners have repeatedly secured re-election in various provinces by popular suffrage, and this at a time when, unfortunately, efforts have been made to create cleavage between the landlords and the tenantry. This is conclusive proof that our services are appreciated by our countrymen. Nor do I think it inappropriate to point out that we have a long record of unshaken loyalty to the Crown in the Empire's wars, both by personal service and generous monetary contributions.

Having regard to the not ignoble part that we have played in our country's history, so cordially recognized by H.E. the Viceroy in the words I have quoted, we feel sure that we can look forward with confidence to being called upon to play a worthy part in the new era, and that our services in the past are not likely to be overlooked. We feel that we may justly claim a share in the moulding of our beloved country's future, both on the ground of our hereditary influence and the examples which we have so amply provided in the past of fitness to carry out the important duties with which we have been entrusted.
REFORMS IN KASHMIR: EDUCATION AND THE SERVICES

BY RAM CHANDRA KAK

It will be remembered that the Government of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur of Jammu and Kashmir appointed in the autumn of 1931 a Commission under the presidency of Mr. B. J. Glancy of the Indian Political Department to enquire into the grievances of the various communities resident in His Highness's territories. The Commission examined a large number of witnesses of all classes and creeds, and formulated proposals for the redress of such disabilities as appeared to them to be genuine. His Highness approved of those recommendations and directed that they should be carried into effect. As the work and the findings of the Glancy Commission attracted much public attention at the time, some indication of what His Highness's Government have achieved in a number of specific departments during the period of one year that has elapsed since the publication of the Glancy Report may not be without interest.

The recommendations of the Glancy Commission, except those of a miscellaneous character, relate to four main subjects—viz., Religious Disabilities, Land Tenure, Education, and Government Services. In regard to "Religious Disabilities," the chief grievances were that certain mosques were retained under the possession of the Government, and that in certain cases Government officials did not pay sufficient consideration to the religious susceptibilities of the Muslim community. On enquiry it was ascertained that some of the mosques referred to had for generations past been put to secular use. Most of these and all those that were lying unused have now been restored to the Muslim community. Further, steps are being taken with regard to the restoration of the few that still remain in the possession of the Government.

The principal complaint under "Land Tenure" was that in various parts of the State the ownership of land was vested in the Government itself, and that the Government in certain cases levied Malikana—i.e., "owners' dues"—in addition to the usual land revenue. His Highness approved of the recommendation of the Commission to the effect that the recovery of the State Malikana should be discontinued, subject to payment of a Nazarana by the occupancy tenants and others in occupation of the
lands concerned. This question proved on investigation to be of a very complicated character, as the conditions of tenure in different parts of the State and among different classes of people vary considerably.

All these very important and complex questions have been fully investigated, and a complete proposal is now under consideration of the Government, who, it is hoped, will make their decision known to the public without avoidable delay.

With regard to matters educational, the following recommendations of the Commission have been carried into effect: Shikasta (cursive) writing has been introduced in schools. This will enable the students to write vernacular in cursive script, and will therefore be useful to them in after life. The value of special Muhammadan scholarships has been equalized with that of merit scholarships, and free studentships and orphanage scholarships are granted to Muslim students. Last year orphanage scholarships were distributed nearly equally between Muslim and non-Muslim students. Scholarships from the Cow Protection Fund have been thrown open to students of all communities. Orders have been issued to the effect that as far as possible women teachers in girls' schools where the great majority of the population belong to a particular community should belong to the same community, and that satisfactory purdah arrangements in schools in which Muslim girls predominate should be made. Arrangements have been made for giving instruction in Urdu in all schools except those attended by non-Muslim girls only. A special Muslim inspector has been appointed to supervise Muhammadan education. The value of educational scholarships for students belonging to the Frontier districts has been increased. Special facilities have been granted to Muslim students for admission into science classes in the S.P. College, Srinagar, and last year fourteen out of a total of fifteen who applied for admission were admitted. Added educational institutions are given special help with regard to the training of teachers. This year ten such teachers were admitted to the Junior Vernacular Training Class of the Normal School.

Orders have been issued prohibiting the transfer of primary school teachers except in cases where such transfers are necessary for special reasons. Thirty scholarships for training of women in and outside the State have been granted. Twenty-two are of the value of Rs.15 each, four are of Rs.10 each, and four are of Rs.40 each. In 1932 fifty scholarships for training as teachers have been given to Muslims and twenty-two to non-Muslims.

The following matters relating to education are still under consideration of the Government:

Proposals regarding the expansion of primary and secondary education. Financial stringency is hindering this and the four
following measures, but the principle has been agreed to: construction of primary school buildings; increase in the number of Arabic teachers; expansion of technical education; and revision of the pay of the employees of the Education Department. These will be dealt with when detailed proposals are received and funds are available. The Commission recommended that the Gandu di Chawni should be allotted for the construction of the Islamia High School. It appears that the Military Department cannot make this site available. The authorities of the school have been asked to select another site.

With regard to Public Services, the main grievance of the Muslim community was that appointments were given on the basis of educational qualifications only, and as they were backward in education, they did not find themselves able to compete with more advanced communities. To safeguard their interests the Glancy Commission fixed certain minimum educational qualifications for various cadres in the public service, and suggested that (a) vacancies, when any should occur, should be notified; (b) the powers of the Heads of Departments should be defined; (c) direct appointments should be made as occasion arose; and (d) in the districts local men should be given preference in subordinate services. These recommendations were accepted by His Highness, and all appointments have been made with due regard to them, but in this connection the following remarks of the Glancy Commission must not be lost sight of:

"It is obviously impossible to revolutionize the State machinery all at once, nor is it practicable to lay down any definite proportion of percentage for the representation of each community in the State service," etc.

The lists received from the various departments show that except in cases where men retrenched in Government departments on account of financial stringency were given appointments (and it was necessary to give them these appointments, otherwise the Government would have been guilty of breach of faith) the majority of appointments have been given to Muslims. In certain cases, as, for example, the case of the two Deputy Inspectors of Customs, even rules regarding the departmental examinations have been relaxed.

With regard to the suggestion of the Commission recommending the preparation of a regular programme for the improvement of communications, it is contemplated to appoint a Committee to prepare such a programme for consideration of the Government; but on account of the stringency of funds it is difficult to say whether any extensive programme can be operated in the immediate future.

An estimate for the provision of water-supply to Chrar-i-Sharif
has been prepared and sanctioned by Government, and is now awaiting provision of funds. A scheme for the protection of the banks of the Chenab, which suffered from continuous erosion, is under preparation. Statistics are being collected regarding waterlogging in the Ranbirsinghpura Tehsil. Bridges in the Gilgit Wazarat are being prepared. The Home Minister has examined the question of invitation of tenders and grant of P.W.D. contracts, and he reports that though the system is not free from defects, for the removal of which he is taking suitable steps, there is no ground to believe that favouritism is shown by the authorities concerned in this matter.

Sanitary arrangements in Srinagar and the removal of congestion in the interior of the city are being attended to as circumstances permit. An estimate to provide a suitable approach road to the Muslim cemetery at Jammu has been prepared, and its construction will be taken in hand immediately.

The attachment of trained midwives to mufassil dispensaries is a great desideratum, but a sufficient number of midwives should be first made available for this purpose. The number of dais under training is being increased, and as soon as the needs of the town are more or less met, the surplus will be sent to the mufassil.

The question of the reorganization of sericulture is being considered in the light of the recommendations, but a big question of this nature obviously requires time for examination. Moreover, the question of the silk industry in general is at present under correspondence with the Tariff Board.

As will appear from the details that have been given, the great majority of the suggestions made by the Glancy Commission have been carried into effect. In many respects the change brought about by the adoption of these measures is visible and conspicuous, but in some others it is obvious that, with the best will in the world, some time must elapse before the full effect of the Commission’s proposals can be seen on the surface. There are a few instances where final action has not yet been taken, but, as mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, the reason for this delay is due, not to any want of will on the part of the authorities concerned to expedite the materialization of the recommendations, but to the necessity of having a detailed preliminary investigation on the basis of which the procedure for their adoption could be devised. In most cases this preliminary investigation has been completed, and the final proposals are under the consideration of the Government, who, it is expected, will pass suitable orders on them without undue delay.
THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF OTTAWA TO INDIA

By P. K. WATTAL

The debates on the Ottawa Trade Agreement in the Indian Legislature during the months of November and December, 1932, the discussions on the subject in the Economic Conference held at Delhi in January, 1933, and the contributions which these debates and discussions gave rise to in the public Press afford plenty of material for study of Indian politics and economics.

The Agreement has been ratified and is in operation. We are more concerned with the future than with the past. Moreover, the working of the Agreement is to be reviewed after three years, so it is unsafe to indulge in any prophecy as to whether it will prove more beneficial to India than to Great Britain or vice versa. According to the calculations of the Indian Delegation, the balance appears to be fairly even. But, as they truly point out, the only test by which the value of a Trade Agreement can be judged is the extent to which it results in an increase in the export trade of the countries concerned or in the retention of trade which would otherwise have been diminished or altogether lost. Time alone can decide conclusively an issue of this kind. Moreover, owing to lack of necessary statistics, the conditions of the problem do not admit of mathematical calculations of gains or losses at the present juncture.

The tariff policy of the Indian Government is one of discriminating protection and remains unaffected by the Ottawa Agreement. A guiding principle is that no preference should be accorded to Great Britain which would impair the protection afforded to an industry by an Act of the Indian Legislature. The Customs tariff is principally for purposes of revenue and has been increased in recent years entirely on financial grounds. Under the shelter of revenue duties several minor industries, such as soap, aluminium, glass, boots and shoes, etc., have grown up. It is alleged that they will suffer as a result of the preference granted to British imports. They have not yet asked for protection. If and when they do, the way is left open for such manufactures. If at any time it is desired to bring new commodities within the protective scheme, the Government of India can give notice under Article 14 of a variation in the Agreement and in this way bring about the desired result. Moreover, as under the
Agreement India provides only a margin of preference and no fixed duties or free list, she is not debarred from raising duties high enough to give the needed protection with immediate effect, without waiting for the concurrence of the other party to a proposed variation in the Agreement. Great Britain, on the other hand, has given India a free list, mostly specific duties in some categories and a margin of preference in others. So her freedom of action in regard to variation of duties is not so great as that of India.

The manner in which the preferences have been granted is also noteworthy. The interests of the consumer and the taxpayer have been equally borne in mind. Had the preferences been given entirely by lowering the tariffs on British goods the Customs revenue would have suffered to a certain extent. Similarly, if preferences had been given entirely by raising the tariff on non-British goods, prices would have risen somewhat. The middle course has, therefore, been adopted; preference has been given partly by a reduction of duty on British goods and partly by increasing the duties on non-British goods. In this manner it is estimated that the effect on Customs revenue would be very small: a reduction in a whole year of three lakhs, or an increase of three lakhs, in a total Customs revenue of Rs. 46 crores.

A comparison of the Indian Agreement with the Dominion Agreements provides further vindication of Indian tariff policy. In appointing the Import Duties Advisory Committee Great Britain paid a compliment to the Indian Tariff Board. A similar compliment was paid by the provision in the Canadian Agreement for the constitution of a Tariff Board and by the undertaking of the Canadian Government that British producers will be fully heard by the Tariff Board when protective duties affecting British goods are under consideration. Somewhat similar provisions are to be found in the Australian Agreement. Indian tariffs have for several years now been determined in this manner, and protection is not given if not recommended by the Tariff Board. To this extent one can say that Ottawa has only taken a leaf out of India’s book.

The Dominion Agreements are criticized by several leading economists in Great Britain on the ground that they recognize (i.) the vicious principle of compensatory tariff—viz., that protective duties should not exceed such a level as would give British producers full opportunity of reasonable competition on the basis of the relative cost of economical and efficient production—which, if carried out strictly, would jeopardize almost all foreign trade; and (ii.) the quantitative regulation of meat imports into Great Britain, which is worse than any tariff protection, as there is no way of getting round such a restriction, which is intended to
bring about a contraction of supply and an artificial rise of price through diversion of trade from its natural channels.

It is a matter for genuine satisfaction that neither the principle of compensatory tariffs nor of quotas finds a place in the Indian Agreement.

It has been agreed that a report shall be prepared every year by the Government of India reviewing the effect of the preferences given in the Agreement on the export and import trade of India. This report will be submitted for examination to a committee of the Legislative Assembly specially appointed for the purpose. One member spoke of this as "a triumph for the Assembly." Another rejoiced for the reason that "we have, for the first time in the history of constitutional development of this country, made the Executive Government of India responsible to the popular Chamber in this matter." With these purely political considerations we are not concerned here. From the strictly economic point of view the direct association of a political body in the appraisal of a scheme of trade and tariff preferences must be regarded as a serious matter. One would have preferred examination by the Tariff Board or by a committee consisting of representatives of agriculture, trade, commerce and industry, with possibly one or two economists of high standing.

It is interesting to note that public opinion in India is veering round in favour of the creation of National Economic Councils. Sir Arthur Salter prepared a report on the subject for the Government of India in June, 1931, but his mission found some sections in India doubtful. Happily, however, when Sir George Schuster broached the subject at the Economic Conference in Delhi in January this year there was no sign of dissatisfaction. In fact, Lord Willingdon's announcement on this point in his opening speech to the Legislature on February 1 has met with general approval. The Bengal National Chamber of Commerce has, in a memorandum to the Government of Bengal dated January 20, 1933, laid great stress on the necessity of planned action in economic development, to be determined in accordance with the advice of a properly constituted Economic Council for the Province.

To this quickening of thought on the subject in India the present economic depression and the Ottawa Trade Agreement have largely contributed. The world crisis has everywhere led to a drastic revision of ideas on the doctrine of laissez-faire. The United Kingdom, its greatest protagonist, has also considerably modified her attitude. The Abnormal Importations Act and the Import Duties Act were the first steps in the reversal of the old policy. The Ottawa Agreement brought in the quantitative regulation of imports in the shape of meat quotas. The former was a somewhat negative and the latter a more positive step in the
planning of imports. In finance "planned money" is finding an increasingly large body of supporters, as against the old predilection in favour of a self-adjusting and uncontrolled currency. And so on in transport, electricity, the pig industry, housing, etc.

In India laissez-faire had never any large following, while "planning" was suspect on political grounds. Now that it is becoming obvious that finance and commerce will be transferred subjects under the new régime the old objections to economic planning are steadily losing ground. There is possibility of a violent swing of the pendulum in the direction of State intervention and control when the new order takes effect. Whatever the future has in store, it is essential that the constitution and functions of Economic Councils should command public confidence. Also, they must be so designed as not to be cumbrous or ineffective, as is the experience of countries where such Councils exist, but to be of real value in promoting economic progress and social welfare.

Economic planning postulates a highly developed system of statistics and intelligence. Anybody who has followed the discussions on the Trade Agreement will have realized that the most serious handicap to the study of economic conditions in India today is the absence of carefully collected and well compiled statistics. Improvements in this direction also have been promised in the Viceroy's speech, and here again we are indebted to the Trade Agreement for change of outlook. In their annual report on the working of the Agreement, Government are required to include a statement of the Indian industries, if any, which have made representations to the Government in regard to the effect upon them of the import preferences and a statement of the action taken by the Government on such representations. This necessitates the official compilation of figures of production for practically all industries—at present figures for only the bigger industries are available—including the various branches of agriculture.

The Bengal National Chamber of Commerce has suggested the formation of a Statistical Bureau as an adjunct to the Economic Council. The Agricultural Commission devoted a special chapter to statistics in their report and emphasized the urgency of improvement in agricultural statistics. The Banking Enquiry Committee made a similar recommendation with regard to their own subjects. If the question is going to be taken up in relation to the Trade Agreement it will be necessary to bear in mind its wider implications also. Improvements in statistics pertaining to all branches of economic development—production, trade, population, etc.—must be considered simultaneously, as they are more or less inter-dependent. The difficulty of finance is undoubtedly formidable, for the Economic Enquiry Committee
which examined the subject in 1925 reported that the cost of a really up-to-date statistical agency will be as below:

**By the Central Government.**

(Lakhs).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial outlay</th>
<th>16.56</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recurring yearly outlay</td>
<td>29.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**By all the Provincial Governments collectively.**

(Lakhs).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial outlay</th>
<th>15.31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recurring yearly outlay</td>
<td>28.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Which means that in the first year about 90 lakhs will be required altogether, and about Rs. 60 lakhs in subsequent years. This is undoubtedly a formidable demand, which in these days neither the Central nor the Provincial Governments will be willing to take up. It will, therefore, be necessary to devise a modest scheme which will at the same time meet all essential requirements.

The world economic crisis through which we are passing is attributed to several causes, partly economic, partly financial, and partly political. Among the economic causes reference is frequently made to over-production. According to figures compiled by the League of Nations it is stated that the world production of foodstuffs and raw materials rose by about 17 per cent. between 1913 and 1925, whereas world population rose only 6 per cent. Between 1925 and 1929 there was a further rise of 11 per cent. in production and of only 4 per cent. in world population. And the world's productive capacity has by no means reached its maximum limit. As a member of His Majesty's Government recently put it, the problem before statesmen nowadays is how to dispose of the glut created by the scientist. It must therefore be obvious that commercial policy alone cannot solve this problem. Trade agreements and lowering of trade barriers will help the free flow of international trade and ensure its better distribution, but if the total production is ahead of world demand no mere regulation of tariffs and quotas, or removal of trade prohibitions and exchange restrictions, can be of much use. Such action must be accompanied by regulation of production. We come back by another route to the necessity of economic planning and collective control of industrial enterprise.

A contribution in this direction also was sought at Ottawa in the enunciation of the doctrine of complementary production.

* Rs. 1 lakh is equal to £7,500.
The idea is that no country should continue to foster uneconomic production or subsidize an industry which can even after the infant stage only be kept alive by artificial means. This involves a division of the sphere of production whereby the production of certain goods should be recognized as being the province of the Dominion manufacturer, whereas others would be regarded as better left to the United Kingdom manufacturer. For instance, it is suggested that while Australia is best fitted to supply blankets to Great Britain, Bradford is best equipped for the production of high grade woollens. Similarly, it is said that Indian cotton mills are best adapted for the production of comparatively coarse goods and those of Lancashire for the supply of fine cottons. This principle is recognized in the Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Agreements by the undertaking given by the Dominion Governments concerned that protection by tariffs will be afforded only to those industries which are reasonably assured of sound opportunities for success. There was no necessity for such a provision in the Indian Agreement, as it is already a cardinal principle of tariff policy in India.

The Supplementary Agreement in regard to iron and steel is a practical illustration of what can be achieved by mutual cooperation in this direction. But the initiative in these matters necessarily lies with those engaged in production and not with Governments. If, for instance, British and Indian producers of cotton goods can come to a mutually satisfactory arrangement, the time will be then ripe for seeking Government assistance. The difficulties are great. The ideal of economic self-sufficiency for the country still makes a strong appeal, but the competition of Japan is hanging over both Great Britain and India. Similar possibilities exist in regard to several other industries, excepting what are usually classed as "key" industries. But the establishment of goodwill is an essential preliminary step.
REPRODUCTIVE EXPENDITURE IN MYSORE

By John de La Valette

In all the countries which still attempt to control their destinies, especially in the industrialized states, feverish activity is being shown with the object of producing—not more goods—but more consumers. The production of consumers is rapidly becoming the world’s greatest industry, one to which the constant attention of Governments and Rulers is being devoted. For the much vaunted economic laws, according to which mass-production inevitably was to spell mass-gain, have, like so many other “laws,” proved an empty fallacy. Nor, as is now being more generally realized, can mere restriction of production in the long run lead to anything but a lowering of standards of living. To produce more, and ever more, consumers; to turn potential purchasers into actual buyers, has now become the policy of countries, as it has long been the aim of industries. Roughly speaking, the principal remedies suggested to this end fall into one of two categories: inflation, or spending on capital account.

The mysterious operation of inflation is likely to remain a sealed book to the man-in-the-street or in the market square, for there exists scant unanimity about it, even among the experts. To tamper with one’s measuring rod in the hope of finding one’s garden enlarged is a conception which does not settle down very snugly in the mind of the ordinary person who is unversed in the metaphysics of political economy. Nor, having heard the monetary spade, which is used in the cultivation of the economic garden, called by every unparliamentary name in turn, is the bewildered citizen likely to believe that all would suddenly go well if only he were to call every spade “two spades,” or three, or four, or five—provided always he did not attempt to expand it into a lakh or a crore of spades! For a little inflation is a tonic, but much inflation is poison to the economic system. So, at any rate, we are told by entirely serious experts. To so dangerous a remedy few will care deliberately to resort.

These will consequently be driven to explore the merits of expenditure on capital account. Here there would seem to be two schools: that to which immediate spending appeals as such, and that which considers the husbanding of capital resources essential, and would spend capital only on schemes which are financially self-liquidating. The difference is as that between
those to whom the immediate production of golden eggs seems all-important, and those who believe first of all in preserving the hen. To assess in this light the merits of any particular scheme must present complications both of fact and of conception. Especially for governments established on a wide democratic basis will the decision frequently involve political considerations, which are hampering to progress. For that which may ultimately be in the best interest of the community is not always so recognized by a majority of citizens. If it invariably were, all democracies would shine forth as beacons of wisdom. Since they are not always obvious as such, it may be interesting to study what happens in countries where the form of government is sufficiently autocratic, and its spirit sufficiently enlightened, to enable that to be done which, in the opinion of the best judges, would be best. The example of the more advanced Indian States is here of particular value for the useful lessons which it may provide.

The latest Administration Report of the great South Indian State of Mysore* gives some facts in this connection which are, perhaps, the more valuable in that they are presented without much comment, and thus left to speak for themselves. Although the seasonal conditions were favourable during the year under review, Mysore, in common with most parts of the world, felt the repercussions of the economic depression and was forced to retrench on its expenditure, if it would not increase the burden of taxation at a period when such a course entailed greater hardship than ever. The interesting thing is to see where outlays were curtailed, and where normal, or even expanded, programmes were carried out. On the administrative side we find several reductions in personnel, coupled with general cuts in salaries, ranging from 5 to 10 per cent. Wherever possible two or three offices are combined and put in the charge of one official. Establishments, too, are ruthlessly reduced. Conferences are dispensed with, even though they be “Economic Conferences” and entail the suppression of “its three constituent Boards” as well.

But to constructive, reproductive works expenditure, both of a current and a capital nature, continues to be devoted. Especially those projects are advanced which benefit the agricultural population. For in Mysore, as in other predominantly agricultural countries, the mere outlay of capital on plant and machinery does not necessarily increase the spending power within the country, nor yet that of those who are the normal buyers of its produce. Hence, quite wisely, the investment of capital in public works of vast dimensions is, in Mysore, concentrated on projects which directly and permanently benefit the rural population.

Among such works the supply and storage of water, both for rural irrigation and for the use of urban populations, takes the first place. The great work on the Krishnaraja Sagara Dam, which crosses the Cauvery River some nine miles up-stream of the historic island of Seringapatam, and which ranks among the greatest undertakings of its kind, was energetically pushed forward. The aggregate expenditure on it to the end of the year under review amounted to over £3½ millions sterling, as against a total estimated expenditure to complete the whole scheme of some £3½ millions. Already the part completed has brought some fifty square miles of arid land under irrigation and supplied 35,000 h.p. to the electric power station at Sivasamudram. On the Irwin Canal, an undertaking derived from the foregoing, some sixteen lakhs were spent in the year concerned, raising the total expenditure to well over a million sterling. At the time of the report the main works on this canal had been completed both in the first section between the Dam and the Tunnel, and on the Maddur Branch, thereby supplying water to some 40,000 acres of land. A further canal, to branch off from the latter, has been sanctioned, which is calculated to irrigate some further 10,000 acres. Almost as important, however, as the provision of irrigated land is the turning of it to good account. In order fully to study the problems peculiar to the new tracts which have been rendered available, a special farm of 600 acres has been started in the Irwin Canal area which is to serve both as a seed supplying farm and to give demonstrations to the new settlers.

In addition to this, the research and demonstration work of the various other stations was vigorously carried on, the allocation of funds in this direction not being stinted. The Botanical, Chemical, Mycological, Entomological, and other sections of the Agricultural Department continued their researches into the main crops of Mysore such as ragi, paddy, sugar-cane, cotton, jola, ground-nuts, coffee, areca-nuts, etc. By hybridization and other means they pursued their work of supplying the rayats with improved seed as well as instructing them in better methods of cultivation. Notwithstanding that Mysore, like other parts of India, suffered much in recent years from the continued fall in the price of silk and from the growing competition of cheap Japanese silks in the Indian markets, the Government of Mysore has persevered in its encouragement of sericulture in the State. In addition to assisting at various stages with a view to raising the yield and quality of the raw material, great improvements were made both in the Government filature and the weaving factory. These have now been provided with new machinery and the former removed into close proximity of the latter, a policy which is reported to have brought about a marked improvement in the
output of both. The installation of a dyeing plant was undertaken and nearly completed during the year.

In other industries, also, further capital expenditure was decided upon. Thus about two lakhs of rupees were spent on the iron works, bringing the aggregate capital outlay to the end of June, 1932, well above 1.6 million sterling. As was only to be expected, the operations for the year were unsatisfactory, and, in fact, resulted in a loss of some 1.8 lakhs of rupees. This is attributed not only to the general depression, which caused both America and Japan to buy less pig iron, but also to the fact that "Japan has practically shut out Indian pig iron by the imposition of prohibitive tariff rates." The Government porcelain factory commenced operations on a commercial scale in March, 1932. Its main object is to produce insulators, bushings, and other porcelain parts for the electrical industry, which is steadily expanding in the State. Thus a secondary industry is being created for which a local market is waiting.

On the electrical industry, too, further capital was spent, bringing the aggregate to the end of June, 1932, to over two million sterling. By that time there were 17,763 power installations in operation and 16,761 lighting installations, as well as some ten thousand street lights, all of which consumed over 171 million kilowatt-hours during the year. Further electrification schemes were sanctioned and several measures introduced to popularize the use of electric power. Among the latter were the lowering of hire-purchase deposits on irrigation plants, the general easing of deferred payment terms, and the reduction of various minimum charges on small installations.

Another undertaking, which is described as having operated very successfully during the financial year, was the Government soap factory. This establishment increased its profits to some 1.4 lakhs of rupees. In addition to soaps it now produces several toilet preparations, including vanishing creams, as well as boot polish, for all of which products there appears to be a ready demand. As before, the Department of Industries continued to erect through its officers industrial installations for private persons, a limited part of the capital being provided by the Department in the shape of loans or advances. In the year under review only twenty-three such installations were erected (as against forty-six the year before), the Government advancing 20 per cent. of the capital expenditure. Outlays under this heading are bound to become increasingly fruitful in raising local prosperity, for it may be taken for granted that the only undertakings enabled to be founded in this way are such as will supply an existing demand, rather than such as would merely add to the general competition in the world's markets.
Nanking and Canton in a state of virtual civil war, the outcome of General Chiang Kai-shek's attacks on the Kuomintang and his arrest of their champion Hu Han-min. The madness of the war fever during that autumn in Nanking and Shanghai, when thousands of students invaded Nanking, very nearly killed Dr. C. T. Wang, the able Foreign Minister (accused of being pro-Japanese, which merely meant that, like Chiang Kai-shek, he had too much sense not to realize the folly of armed resistance to Japan), wrecked Government offices and ultimately brought about the Japanese invasion of Chapei, enabled the Cantonese (who are always the champions of Kuomintangism) to overthrow the Government and seize the reins of power themselves. Only a few weeks, however, convinced them of the impossibility of the drastic measures with Japan which they had promised. In December Chiang Kai-shek had resigned all his offices. By May he was in possession of them again, while the Cantonese had slipped quietly away to the South.

So it was that the armistice with Japan was signed on May 5. Mr. Quo Tai-chi, now Minister in London, who signed on behalf of China, was mobbed by students for his audacity—fortunately with no great damage to himself. But stronger hands were in control in Nanking, and General Wu Te-chen, the exceedingly able and likeable Mayor of Greater Shanghai (i.e., the Chinese districts surrounding the Foreign Settlements), could at last count on some real support in keeping order. It is noteworthy that neither Manchuria's declaration of independence, nor Japan's recognition of it, nor even the Jehol campaign has been accompanied by the student fever of earlier months. The boycott is not lifted. But violence, if not wholly suppressed, has been nothing to compare with that in 1931. In July, the Government actually took the extreme step of closing the National Central University at Nanking and the National University at Tsingtao.

It is significant that, within a fortnight of the armistice being signed, Nanking had proclaimed that thenceforth it would fight no more civil wars except against the Communists. As regards the latter, an overwhelming campaign led by Chiang Kai-shek succeeded during the autumn in driving the Reds out of the Middle Yangtze, where they had very nearly captured the whole of Hupeh and Anhui, and were not far from threatening Nanking itself; General Chiang's success earned him an enormous ovation on his return to Nanking at Christmas. But elsewhere provinces not immediately under Nanking's control might do as they pleased; Nanking would trust to time and the magnet of her own prosperity to bring them into line another day. And to this self-denying policy Nanking has adhered. She declined in any way to be drawn into the civil wars of Szechuan and other provinces; she
has cut down her administration expenses; even the army has been limited to the $18,000,000 a month, which has been the goal of Mr. T. V. Soong, the Finance Minister, for three years; by a large conversion scheme, very patriotically accepted by the merchants and bankers, she has reduced the charge on domestic loans by $100,000,000 a year; and between February and December of last year, for the first time without new loans, she had balanced her budget.

It is part of Nationalism's good works that it has stimulated Chinese merchants to think nationally—part of its bad that, under the Kuomintang régime, it has never made use of them. But signs are appearing of a reversal of this short-sighted exclusiveness. Throughout Chinese history the business class have always known how to rebel when official exactions became intolerable, and the officials invariably caved in. Something of the same sort has undoubtedly been happening again. But it is possible to hope that a wiser spirit begins to prevail in Nanking. Mr. T. V. Soong has always seen the necessity of giving the business class a share in the administration. At the end of last May the important step was taken of putting finances under the control of a Finance Commission of thirty-five to forty-five members, the majority of whom are drawn from the non-official world. The restrictive effect on national spending and in consolidating a number of taxes has been undoubted.

Even more important was the decision of the Kuomintang Conference in December (the Cantonese ostentatiously absented themselves and the delegates seem to have shown a proportionately greater sense of practical necessities) to abolish the provincial committees and reinstate the Civil Governors. These provincial committees of the Kuomintang, the notorious Tangpu, have been a grave embarrassment to China. Composed of raw lads (no one over twenty-three was eligible for membership) their supposed duty was to keep a check on provincial officials and disseminate the blessings of Kuomintangism. By a decision dating from last June, district councils, elected by the people, are to be set up. Their functions for the present are only to be advisory, and so far they have only come into existence in a few of the larger cities, but the intention behind them appears genuine. Thus at the inauguration of the first of these Councils in Greater Shanghai last January, Mayor Wu Te-chen said:

"Strictly speaking, the people need to be educated before they can be considered as being qualified for self-government. This will take time. The crying needs of Shanghai, however, do not allow of further delay. Immediate action is necessary. This is why this Provisional Board of City Councillors is today inaugurated. To me and to my colleagues, however, this board will be provisional only in name. We are prepared to accept its advice and recommendations as if it were permanent. It shall not be a
signboard or an ornament. It will be treated and respected as a true body of representatives. With its members we are determined to work faithfully and honestly for the welfare of the people. When I say so, I can say that I truly represent my colleagues."

General Wu Te-chen's reputation is such that one may be sure he spoke sincerely. He went on to dwell upon the general failure of civil administration, and "the wide diversity in conditions prevailing in different parts of the country," in view of which "it would be inadvisable to prescribe one uniform law for application through the country; different measures must be devised to meet different circumstances."

This is seeing China as she is and always has been. From time immemorial the real government of China has been in the hands of the people themselves, according to local temperament and custom. She was, in fact, an endless series of little local autonomies within a loose official framework centring upon the Throne. It is worth mentioning that the brilliant success of British administration at Weihaiwei, which transformed the little Territory into a perfect Eden, was entirely due to its being modelled on the ideal classical form of Chinese government. A tiny handful of British officials kept order, collected taxes (which, however, they spent in the public good), and left the people to manage their own affairs, in their different villages, as they pleased, under their respective headmen. The Kuomintang endeavoured to substitute for this an all-embracing bureaucracy centred in themselves and rigidly enforcing Kuomintang doctrine. This was the "period of political tutelage," as prescribed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but, in fact, a tyranny that taught the people nothing but how to hate their oppressors. The speech just quoted, coupled with the setting up of elective district councils and the abolition of the Kuomintang district committees, is the first real indication one has seen since the Revolution that China is beginning "to think Chinese" once more.

While such ideas are becoming fashionable in Nanking, Canton withdraws more and more into itself. It is head of the so-called South-west Group, composed of the five principal southern provinces, runs its own army, has recently set up its own Supreme Court for all the South-west Group, and is, in fact, as independent of Nanking as is Manchuria.

In North China Nanking claims authority at Peking through General Ho Ying-ch'in, its Minister of War, whom it has put in charge on the resignation of the unhappy Chang Hsueh-liang, ex-Governor of Manchuria, following the defeat of his troops in Jehol. But the North is really as many principalities as it contains provinces. Its tendencies are extremely difficult to analyze, but there is certainly a considerable party in Peking, mostly Man-
churian generals, who want to get back to their homes, which favours a bargain with Japan. Informal overtures were made to Nanking in this direction in January; and now that China is "out of the news," as Fleet Street says, they might be made again. Undoubtedly General Chiang Kai-shek's private inclinations lie that way. "We must first set our own house in order before we can successfully resist foreign aggression," he said at the Kuomintang Congress in December. But public feeling is still so hot against Japan that there is little hope at present of more than sullen acquiescence in the inevitable.

Even this, however, marks an advance on the past. Whatever a few fire-eaters may advocate, it can be taken for granted that Japan does not mean to come south of the Great Wall if the Chinese will admit that as a natural frontier. Nor has she any intention of annexing Manchuria. What she wants is a supply of the raw materials in which she is herself so poor, and a market—not a new province, which, as the example of Korea has shown, would be ruinously expensive to run. And the fact that China visibly divides herself into a number of different States is another sign that she is beginning "to think Chinese." It is by no means impossible to imagine China as a United or Federated States, reproducing the old semi-autonomous viceroyalties in something like democratic form, accepting the headship of Nanking to represent it internationally, and even allowing Nanking to appoint its provincial governors, so long as they do not try to interfere with each province's management of its private affairs. They would even contribute financially to the running of Nanking. What they did object to was the Kuomintang's claim to appropriate all their revenues and allocate so much to each province for its own expenses. That was intolerable to Chinese feeling and the beginning of all the civil war since 1928.

Throughout this web of provincialism, party prejudice and self-interest, relieved by touches of a wider vision and tentative reawakening of the old China, there runs in all directions a sinister streak of Red. Though beaten out of the Middle Yangtze, the Communists still possess their former stronghold in South Kiangsi and Fukien, from which the mountainous nature of the country makes it extraordinarily difficult to dislodge them. There they have their own ministries, laws, money, and schools, styling themselves the Soviet Socialist Republic of China. They have latterly appeared in great force in Northern Szechuan, where the miseries due to the long civil war in that province give them a rich opportunity; and although the Nationalist officials are fearfully on the alert against them, their propaganda spreads insidiously all through China. It is to be feared that they will receive a great accession of strength from the renewal of diplo-
matic relations between Moscow and Nanking. With Russia in full possession of Mongolia, rapidly gaining control of Eastern Turkestan and Sinkiang, and even reported to be establishing herself in Kansu—that is, inside China Proper—the outlook is indeed most anxious.

These are facts of which surely the West should take note. The evident determination of Nanking to establish an organized State in at least one part of China offers an opportunity of practical assistance. China as a whole is so vast that its regeneration is beyond the power of anyone but the Chinese themselves in their own time and working in their own way. But within the limits of the Yangtze Valley, accessible in most directions by its wonderful waterways, help could usefully be offered. Moreover, much as one may hope of Nanking’s new policy, and of what it has actually done, the obstacles to success are almost overwhelming. The ability of the Kuomintang to rush the country into the humiliating campaign in Jehol is a case in point. We can say that China is exhibiting certain new, or, rather, very old, and therefore hopeful, tendencies. They may become something stronger than that unaided. But there can be no question that the process could be immensely strengthened and quickened, not only for China’s benefit but for that of the whole world, by wise and timely assistance from without.

Geneva has lost the chance of giving this assistance, which the Lytton Report pressed upon her. But her failure may prove a blessing in disguise, partly by shutting off the publicity which has hitherto made it impossible for the wiser heads in China and Japan to come to terms in their own fashion, partly by opening the door for a constructive policy on the part of those Powers which have the most experience and greatest interest in Far Eastern affairs, nor can they afford to neglect the chance. Pre-eminent among them is Great Britain.

We are at present bound by Sir Austen Chamberlain’s Memorandum of 1926, which, broadly, volunteered to surrender all British rights, safeguards, and concessions in China as fast as possible. That policy has failed, as the Washington Conference policy, of which it was an offshoot, failed, because it assumed that there was, or would shortly be, in China a Government responsible for the whole country and capable of performing its functions like any civilized and united government. There was not such a thing, is not, and is not likely to be for a considerable time; for, much as we may respect Nanking’s endeavours to produce an organized State in the Yangtze Valley, the day is far off when her writ will run through all China. Meanwhile, it may fairly be argued, our policy has done more harm to China, whom it expressly sought to please, than to anyone. For example, we
unquestionably forced the pace in handing over the District Court at Shanghai to the Kuomintang in 1930, under such meagre safeguards that the Municipal Council could not get justice done, could not get the anti-Japanese rioters put down, and the destruction of Chapei was the result. It is also hardly questionable—the Japanese are convinced of it—that the acceptance by us and America of countless pinpricks helped not a little to encourage the attitude of the Kuomintang which finally brought down upon them the Japanese military wrath.

Since the days of Sir John Jordan, the task of mapping our course in China has passed to Downing Street. Obviously, all foreign policy must be subject to control by the Foreign Secretary. But China is so far away, so peculiar in her requirements and liable at any moment to such disconcerting changes, that it is impossible for a Department 10,000 miles removed to originate a policy that will be of true service to China and to ourselves. The choice of a successor to Sir Miles Lampson, who leaves China in the near future, becomes a question of the most urgent importance. It is perfectly possible to frame a policy of true helpfulness to China (by which alone we can help ourselves), but only on the spot, and never on a basis of futile surrender of rights and safeguards, which are indirectly as important to her as to us, since, to impose upon her responsibilities which she is still manifestly incapable of bearing is only to expose her to further trouble. Nanking has made a fresh start, and that gives us the excuse, if such were needed, for doing the like. We need new views, frank recognition of ineluctible facts, and to shape our actions accordingly. The biggest man we can send to China is not too big for the task that awaits him. The compliment implied in sending such a man would be inexpressibly appreciated in Nanking.
JAPAN AND THE FAR-EASTERN PROBLEM

By Yosuke Matsuoka

(The author after twenty years in the Japanese diplomatic service entered politics and was the leader of the last Japanese delegation to the League of Nations.)

Nowhere in the world is the need for a "new deal" more acutely felt today than in the Far East. China's failure to set her house in order, after being accorded sympathy and patience by the Powers having interests in that part of the world, has brought about a situation which can only be described as appalling.

The conditions existing today in the territories under the virtual jurisdiction of the Nanking National Government is something which no Western mind can conceive. What was known twenty-odd years ago as the great Chinese Empire has disintegrated into a number of small units, autonomous in so far as they are under the absolute control of certain warlords. The outlying regions such as Chinese Turkestan, Outer Mongolia, and Tibet are practically independent. During last year Manchuria, the birthplace of the Manchu dynasty, the last line of Chinese emperors, also broke away from China to become the new State of Manchoukuo.

Japan accorded the new State of Manchoukuo her recognition because she saw in it an opportunity to prevent further chaos spreading at least in Manchuria, and a possibility thereby of eventually recovering and consolidating peace throughout Eastern Asia.

Once we had adopted this viewpoint we were determined never to retreat from our position. To uphold this stand we even had to withdraw from the Assembly of the League of Nations, although we did it with profound regret.

I hardly need to point out that Manchoukuo has made it clear that it intends to observe the just obligations entered into by the Chinese Government in so far as they are applicable to Manchoukuo, and to preserve with zeal the principle of the Open Door. I believe that the world should trust this solemn declaration of the new State.

To Japan, China's closest neighbour, the condition of unrest and anarchy in that country gives cause for the greatest concern. Nearby is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, operating under a political and social system wholly incompatible with that of Japan. Russia is fast becoming an industrial country, thereby adding to her strength as a military power.
Believers in the Communist form of government are conducting an active campaign in China which has not been without bearing fruit. In Central China there exists today a Soviet form of government, which controls a territory about eight times as large as that of England. Repeated expeditions conducted by the Nanking authorities to stamp out this Communist government have ended in failure; indeed, the Reds show every indication of extending their power.

It goes without saying that Japan does not want the Sovietization of China. Japan in 1904-1905 fought the greatest war in her modern history, truly a life and death struggle, to stem the extension of Russian power in Manchuria. But the spread of Communism in China is a danger far greater to our national existence than was the Tsarist menace almost thirty years ago.

By that I do not mean that Japan wants to fight Russia. On the contrary, Japan wants to cultivate peaceful relations with her great Western neighbour. Personally, I do not believe that Japan and the U.S.S.R. will ever enter into a conflict. I have used and will use all my efforts to prevent the situation from coming to such a head. But we Japanese cannot afford to see a Sovietized China, and I do not believe that any other Power with interests in that country can do so either.

From the outset of the Sino-Japanese dispute my countrymen have been paying special attention to the public opinion in this country. The views of the British Press have been closely followed and their counsel, when constructive, has been carefully weighed.

The reason for this lies in the fact that, apart from the position of Great Britain among the nations of the world and her position as a Power with great interests in the Far East, there lingers a certain warm feeling in Japanese hearts towards Great Britain in that she was once our close ally.

It was with regret that Japan saw the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922, because in that compact Japan saw the greatest force for the stabilization of conditions in the Far East. The troubles we now are facing in the Far East may be traceable to a great extent to the breakdown of that Treaty.

I think it is time that we should now discard the argument advanced by China at the time of the Washington Conference of 1922 that, if the Powers were sympathetic, she would become a modern, well-organized state within a few years. We Japanese also believed that China had the will and the capacity to do so, and agreed to the various compacts concluded at that Conference.

In so doing we agreed to the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which, I am convinced, was the greatest stabilizing influence in the Far East. In its place, so to say, the Four Power and Nine Power Treaties were concluded.
Unfortunately, however, to quote from the Lytton Report, "more attention has been given to the negative than the constructive side of nationalism in the education of the young. . . . As a result of this virulent anti-foreign propaganda, begun in the schools and carried through every phase of public life, the students have been induced to engage in political activities which sometimes have culminated in attacks on the persons, homes, or offices of Ministers and other authorities, and in attempts to overthrow the Government."

Boycott of the goods of countries against which the Chinese have a grievance, real or imaginary, can be said to have started in 1905 with a boycott against the United States. From that moment onward, to quote again from the Lytton Report, "there have been ten distinct boycotts, which can be considered as national in scope (besides anti-foreign movements of a local character), nine of which were directed against Japan and one against the United Kingdom."

Meanwhile the Government at Nanking is an example of how Western minds can be misinformed with regard to China. The real power is today in the hands of the warlords, who are able to hold out largely on account of the taxation that has been imposed upon the people.

Europe and America, preoccupied with their own problems, have not had time to study the present conditions in China. On account of the propaganda that has been made in that direction they are liable to believe in the descriptions of improving conditions in that country. But Japan, whose proximity to the seat of all this trouble enables her to obtain a true picture of the state of affairs, is compelled to regard with anxiety the realities of the situation.

I maintain that the action my country was provoked into taking in Manchuria in September, 1931, was actuated by the desire to bring real peace and order to that part of the world closest to Japan, not only geographically, but economically and strategically as well. The new State of Manchoukuo, born as the result of the dispute between Japan and Chang Hsueh-liang, the former Manchurian warlord, appears today as the only guarantee of a lasting peace in that part of the Orient.

But conditions in China Proper are still far from reassuring. I believe that the statesmen of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan should be aware of the fact that to the breakdown of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance can be traced many of the present ills of China. I firmly believe that the time has come for those directing the destinies of the Powers with large interests in the Orient to take steps towards reaching some agreement to rectify the present dangerous situation.
China: A Record of Progress

By Su-Lee Chang

(The author was Secretary to the Chinese Delegation to the League of Nations in 1930)

To casual observers China may still be what she has been known to the world during the last two decades. The usual story of civil war and political treachery, of famine and banditry, has perhaps been made more dramatic and colourful by communist uprisings in the north-west and the Japanese military adventure in the north-east. If the curtain of foaming events is lifted and the actual drama of life seen closely, however, one is reassured, if not struck by a change for the better which is slowly but steadily taking place among the people.

Politically speaking, there is a marked improvement in the tone of Chinese politics. There are singular instances of intrigue and rivalry, of corruption and malpractice, but there is also a greater sense of discipline and responsibility in the conduct of public affairs. The acrimony of personal politics was greatly softened down by common awareness of its futility. The self-opinionation of Kuomintang leaders was healthfully corrected by the realization of their own limitations and weakness. The arrogance of the military was curbed by a self-inflicted humiliation in face of the Japanese attack. Those who control and seek to retain their control of the Government no longer rely on the common methods of professional politicians without due regard for their obligations. The acknowledgment that work and result are the only justification for authority and opportunity is the most encouraging sign of the beginning of a healthy political development.

The most significant step forward in the betterment of national life is the growing strength of public censorship. Hitherto critics of the Government have been ignored or persecuted. Eminent writers and thinkers have suffered for their opinions concerning the affairs of the state. Government oppression had sealed every avenue for expression of the public mind. Kuomintang dictatorship was beyond and above the law of the land. A change has come. There is increasing tolerance and a growing sense of reasonableness on the part of government authorities. Newspapers and magazines have shown greater courage in offering constructive criticism to high officials and leaders. To the
student of contemporary history the summoning by General Chiang Kai-Shek of experts and scholars to a national conference and the censorship of Chang Hsueh-Liang and other vociferous generals must be regarded as events of importance in the growth of a responsible government.

In connection with the development of the rights of the people one cannot fail to notice the coming into existence of two nationwide organizations and their influence on national affairs—namely, the Anti-Civil War League and the League of Civic Rights. The entire nation has given whole-hearted support to the activities of these two organizations. To no small degree are they responsible for the speedy conclusion of severe fighting among rival military commanders in Szechuen province, and for the release of a number of political prisoners and the securing of a just trial for others.

In the employment of men for government positions greater discretion and sound judgment have been exercised. Better and abler men are selected for important posts, which have hitherto been held by men who had no claim to an office except the backings of high officials and influential personages. Political wire-pulling and nepotism are still maladies in government administration, but good and honest men are not thereby excluded from national service. A sense of loyalty to a system is gradually developing in the midst of government employees who, while respecting the wishes of their superiors, give first consideration to the task to which they are assigned. Continuity as an indispensable element of good government is not only appreciated but studiously preserved.

Not only did the Nanking Government survive the Japanese invasion in Manchuria and the attack on Shanghai, but in certain respects it has gained a measurable degree of security and permanence. It is a notable fact that three changes of administration have taken place during the last sixteen months without the accompaniment of bloodshed. As a result of the fourth session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang the passion of political animosity was somewhat relieved. There is a north-west political bureau, but there is no separate government. While the authority of the Nanking Government is by no means unchallengeable, it is not openly challenged.

The decline of the prestige and the authority of the Kuomintang has on the whole been made up by the increasing stability of men who have entrenched themselves in power by sheer force of courage, tenacity, astuteness, and their unfailing efforts to give evidence of their ability to rule. Such evidence has not been lacking in national finance, in emergency work, in the pacification of territories overrun by the communists, and in the settle-
ment of national disputes by methods of conciliation and agreement.

The National Budget for the year 1931-32 was balanced without resorting to the favourite method of internal loan issues or to foreign borrowings, which usually result in undermining government credit at home and abroad. The Government has resolutely faced the problem with retrenchment in all branches of administration. The enforcement of rigid economy has brought untold hardships and privations to those in the government service, but their sufferings bore fruit in the growing confidence in China credit as reflected by the steady rise of government bonds in the London and New York markets throughout 1932.

The loss of Manchuria has curtailed the income of the National Treasury Customs revenue for 1932 to the extent of 46,000,000 taels less than in 1931. All loans and indemnity obligations secured on the customs, however, are met in full. Substantial progress has been made in the reduction of military expenditure. The Finance Minister reported that the “annual rate of military expenditure is below the limit of 210,000,000 dollars per year set at the Disbandment Conference in 1929, which for so long seemed unattainable.” A sum of 8,500,000 dollars every year from the Customs Receipts is to go to a sinking fund for the redemption of all government loans. Although the Government is far from being out of the wood financially, given peace and the lifting of world economic depression a continuation of steady improvement may be hoped for.

The flood situation in the Yangtze Valley has considerably improved. The building of three thousand miles of dykes, involving an expenditure of 70,000,000 dollars, the employment of an engineering staff of four thousand, and an army of labourers of six thousand men, was completed during the year. This great human enterprise stands as a monument to Chinese vitality and energy.

The Japanese attack on Shanghai brought trade and industries practically to a standstill. A return to normal conditions, however, began last April, and within two weeks factories and Stock Exchanges were reopened. A temporary station was erected to enable resumption of railway traffic. Building activity immediately took place. In the last quarter of 1932 over five hundred building licences were issued by the Municipal Government of Shanghai. For the rehabilitation of the devastated area a municipal loan of 6,000,000 dollars has been successfully floated. Within a few years the shabby looking Chapei district will perhaps become the most prosperous section of the Shanghai municipality.

Industries have contributed their share in bringing China a step
nearer a modern nation. The Government has signed contracts with the Kondofer, representing thirteen German firms, for the erection of a great steel plant in Yangtze. A plan for the capitalization of 11,000,000 dollars for the establishment of an industry for the production of sulphuric acid has been put into operation. After eleven years of laborious efforts the Central Mint was opened on March 1, 1932. The old mint in Hupeh was converted into a machine shop for the production of agricultural implements.

During 1932 the Chinese Government Purchasing Commission spent three-quarters of a million pounds in England for the purchase of railroad material for China. Orders have been placed for fifteen locomotives, 200 cars and wagons, 20,000 tons of rails, and a large quantity of bridges and electrical machineries. A train ferry sailed from Newcastle-on-Tyne in February, 1933, to link up Pukow and Nanking on the Tsin-pu railway. The entire cost of the boat and machinery amounts to 1160,000. Three hundred thousand sleepers have been laid in in the reconditioning of the Peiping-Hankow railway, while construction work on bridges on the Shiu Chow-Lokchong section of the Canton-Hankow railway was begun in June, 1932. It is hoped that the entire length of the railway will soon be completed.

Striking progress has been made in the field of communication. The Central Radio Broadcasting Station, which is the largest in Asia, opened on October 10, 1932. News has been daily broadcast on a nation-wide scale since November. Negotiations have reached a successful conclusion with the Marconi Company for the installation of a high-power radio station at Nanking, and it is expected that within three months direct radio communication between England and China will be realized.

In the province of Chekiang there are now 2,000 miles of long-distance telephone wire linking fifty-five out of seventy-five districts in a communicable network. In Hupeh province a combined length of 200 miles of telephone wire has been laid, and in Honan, where bandits once were rampant, seventy-eight districts are joined in a telephone system. Radio stations have been installed in the province of Anhwei, but only for official messages at present.

Test flights have been successfully made between Shanghai and Tochong, a distance of 4,050 miles, and a regular air service will soon be inaugurated. A mail and passenger service between Shanghai and Tientsin has been in operation since October, 1932, and a distance of 690 miles is now covered in seven and a half hours.

Road building has been the most notable aspect of reconstruc-
tion in China. The Shanghai-Hanchow highway was opened formally to traffic on October 10, 1932. It is 130 miles in length and covered by an omnibus service which runs regularly four times a day. The Nanking-Wuhu highway was formally opened to traffic on January 1, 1933. It is sixty-three miles long. In the province of Hunan 957 li of second-class roads have been opened to the public. Various sections of inter-provincial highways have been completed, notably the Anyang-Shancheng, of which 797 li are now opened to traffic, and the Nanching-Kian, of which 421 li have been opened to traffic.

Canton claims the distinction of the opening of a bridge across the Pearl River. It is the first of a series of bridges to connect Canton with the islands. The completed one is an American structure of the Scherzer Rolling type. It is 600 feet long and 60 feet wide. It was built at a cost of over one million dollars. The year that has just passed also witnessed the opening of two new direct telephone lines between Hongkong and Canton, the completion of 14,000 feet of roadway to the surrounding points, the inauguration of three new bus lines, and the completion of two new municipal buildings.

There is activity everywhere in China, especially along the coast. Indicative of the tempo of the time the train between Peiping and Hankow now takes 44 hours instead of 55 hours, which has been the record since the building of the railroad. 45,520 people in Canton are going to the cinema every day. The average consumption of cigarettes is put at a figure of two hundred per head. Public schools in the municipality of Swatow registered two thousand students more than in 1931.

Progress in facts and figures is difficult anywhere in the last few years. It is tabulable in China. For China has been down. She cannot go down any further. She is rising up gradually but steadily.
penalty of otherwise being destroyed for their disobedience. Here circumstances were favourable to the extension of the territory under the direct rule of the Company. (This may be compared with what happened in British India.) Besides, the merchant authorities of the Company could not entirely abstain from interfering with the more powerful sultanates. The Company was a strong, well-armed corporation, and the endless intrigues in the native states of those days nearly always caused a party to spring up within their borders which thought it worth while to secure Dutch support. On the other hand, the Company was not averse from rendering such assistance, because it was promptly paid with monopolies or other commercial profit. Moreover, the security of their own territories often induced the authorities to interfere with the political relations between the states.

Through internal disturbances as above described the Javanese kingdom Mataram, for instance, the largest and most powerful state at the time of the foundation of Batavia (1619) and never friendly to the Dutch, was weakened to such an extent that in 1749 the Soesoehoenan bequeathed it by will to the Company, which divided it among the four pretenders to the throne on feudal tenure. After that year it depended upon the favour of the Company who should reign over the parts of the former Mataram, and gradually the Dutch authorities occupied the northern provinces along the rich and accessible seacoast, leaving only the hinterland under the rule of their vassals. At the same time the intervention in the permanent rivalry between the Malay and the Buginese branches of the sultan's family in Riau was a source of important commercial profit in the regions near Malacca Straits. At the end of the eighteenth century the Company had even succeeded in acquiring by this penetration the sultanate of Bandjermasin on the island of Borneo, where no Western power had ever had a permanent influence or settlement before, but which could be made over thereafter by its directors to any pretender they chose.

The security of Batavia doubtless influenced the attitude of the Company in maintaining friendly relations with the adjacent sultanate of Bantam. The efforts of Mataram to extend its supremacy over the western part of Java and the necessity to prevent an alliance between both sultanates made the Company adopt a more prudent policy towards Bantam than seemed compatible with the serious commercial competition from which Batavia suffered. Nevertheless this sultanate, seriously weakened by disturbances and revolts, which could only be put down with the aid of the Company, in 1752 also entered into a state of vassalage.

In summing up the development of the relations between the
East Indian Company and the indigenous states with which it came into contact three periods can be distinguished:

i. The Company, in pursuit of commercial profit only, feels itself weaker than most of the states; the relations with "Princes and Potentates" show the character of the Company as that of a commercial enterprise, compelled to make some display of power.

ii. The Company rises in prestige; it acquires an equality of status to the indigenous states; it acquires territories of its own.

iii. The Company proves the more powerful party and acquires a certain supremacy or overlordship over the states.

The Dutch Government, succeeding the United East Indian Company in 1795, adopted the same policy, but neither in the years until 1811 nor during the British interregnum did the nearly permanent state of war in Europe admit of a policy of great efficacy in the Archipelago. Thus the Kingdom of the Netherlands found itself in 1816 at the restoration of the Dutch authority in about the same position towards the states as the Company at the time of its liquidation.

In the first years no important change took place. Want of capable officials and financial resources prohibited all effective policy. It is not until about 1850 that a new, well-defined plan can be seen. The causes of its being traced out are two new phenomena that show themselves in the nineteenth century. The first is connected with the international position of Netherlands India, especially in regard to the tendency some other European powers show, to acquire a colonial territory in the Far East. Therefore a systematic recognition of Dutch sovereignty extending to the most remote regions of the East Indian Archipelago was judged necessary, the more so as the treaty of London (1824) in connection with the clause of treatment on the footing of the most favoured nation in different commercial treaties allowed foreigners to settle in the seaport towns of the indigenous states. The second phenomenon bears another character. It was the gradually growing sense of responsibility of the Netherlands India Government for the internal state of affairs and conditions in the indigenous states. It was the consciousness that a colonial power should strive to impart to the indigenous population the benefits of Western development and civilization.

Both causes in combination made the Government aim at the conclusion of new treaties with the states, which show a certain uniformity. Especially since after 1854 such treaties were communicated to the States-General there can be traced a systematic striving after guarantees on the part of the states involving the surrender of all rights in regard to foreign policy and the
THE NATIVE STATES IN NETHERLANDS INDIA

BY PROFESSOR DR. J. C. KIELSTRA

(Director of the College of Tropical Agriculture in Wageningen.)

The native states in the Dutch East Indian Archipelago cannot in any way be compared with the large dominions under indigenous princes' rule in India. On those island groups, where the inhabitants of even the smaller islands often belong to various peoples, who immigrated in successive currents and differ greatly in culture, circumstances were not favourable to the development of the kingdoms and empires which the Indian continent could show. Beside small native tribes and village communities, the "Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie" (United East Indian Company) found there only a relatively small number of more or less powerful sultanates, and even the most influential of them were unimportant in comparison with the Indian States which the British East Indian Company found. This difference is of importance, because neither the position of the states in the body politic of Netherlands India nor the rapid development of the Dutch control over their internal affairs, which characterizes the East Indian policy in the first decade of this century, is intelligible unless that dissimilarity is borne in mind.

By the charter issued to it the Dutch Company was entitled to enter into treaties and other engagements with all "Princes and Potentates" in the Archipelago, on behalf of "de Staten Generaal en den Stadhouder der Vereenigde Nederlanden" (the States-General and the Stadtholder of the United Provinces). The competition from the Portuguese, the demands of shipping and trade of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries forced its directors and representatives from the beginning to make use of this commission with the aim to acquire their own indispensable settlements. But from the first a difference can be noticed between the relations the Company entered into with the sultanates and its attitude towards the smaller communities mentioned, although in both cases the same expressions such as treaty, alliance, or league are used.

The earliest treaty known is that signed on July 3, 1596, by Admiral de Houtman and the Sultan of Bantam's Vizir, by which the contracting parties agreed to be in "permanent league and eternal friendship." The Dutch were allowed to erect a factory
near the roads of Bantam, but it was understood at the same time that neither Javanese and Chinese nor Portuguese merchants were to be importuned by the Dutch. Thus the Company was considered merely as a foreign trader, the Sultan of Bantam as an independent prince.

In the eastern part of the Archipelago the relations with the indigenous population immediately bore a different character, notwithstanding the formal establishment of an alliance with the chiefs. On these islands Spaniards and Portuguese had been settled during roughly a century, and moreover on a part of them, especially on the important Spice Islands of the Moluccas, no sultanate was encountered, as there were only small village communities. It was Admiral van der Haagen who, in 1600, concluded a treaty with some of the Amboinese villages, in which he undertook to protect them against Portuguese and Spaniards, but on the other hand stipulated that the inhabitants should be obliged to sell their spices to the Dutch only and at a fixed price. Monopoly was thus secured in exchange for protection. After the Portuguese town Amboina had been conquered in 1605 this settlement with its fortifications became the centre of Dutch activities in the Moluccas, whence they gradually extended their sway over all the smaller islands in those regions.

After a short period of this more or less accidental founding of settlements, as a consequence of the European war, the East Indian Company in 1609 directed the first Governor-General, Pieter Both, to try to obtain a warrant from the Regent of Jacatra, a dependency of Bantam, for the establishment of a Dutch settlement, within whose boundaries Dutch authority would completely prevail. The spot was to be chosen with regard to the nature of the roadstead, the opportunities for obtaining fresh supplies for the fleet, etc. Thus at that time the aim of the Company was to settle definitely in the Archipelago as an independent power among the indigenous states. As a consequence of this policy there followed not only the foundation of Batavia on the site of the former Jacatra, but also other stations all over the Archipelago, at first not more than fortified factories, but gradually to become surrounded by new arising towns.

Still the Dutch authority was confined to its own territories. Even if the Company had acquired or conquered some tract of land the native states remained completely independent. The Company did not seek to interfere with their internal affairs.

This position, however, could not last. For the maintenance of the monopoly in the Molucca trade the Company inevitably had to make its power felt within the village communities on those islands. Those weak bodies, lacking any central authority to protect them, had to accept the Company's supremacy under
penalty of otherwise being destroyed for their disobedience. Here circumstances were favourable to the extension of the territory under the direct rule of the Company. (This may be compared with what happened in British India.) Besides, the merchant authorities of the Company could not entirely abstain from interfering with the more powerful sultanates. The Company was a strong, well-armed corporation, and the endless intrigues in the native states of those days nearly always caused a party to spring up within their borders which thought it worth while to secure Dutch support. On the other hand, the Company was not averse from rendering such assistance, because it was promptly paid with monopolies or other commercial profit. Moreover, the security of their own territories often induced the authorities to interfere with the political relations between the states.

Through internal disturbances as above described the Javanese kingdom Mataram, for instance, the largest and most powerful state at the time of the foundation of Batavia (1619) and never friendly to the Dutch, was weakened to such an extent that in 1749 the Soesoehoeman bequeathed it by will to the Company, which divided it among the four pretenders to the throne on feudal tenure. After that year it depended upon the favour of the Company who should reign over the parts of the former Mataram, and gradually the Dutch authorities occupied the northern provinces along the rich and accessible seacoast, leaving only the hinterland under the rule of their vassals. At the same time the intervention in the permanent rivalry between the Malay and the Buginese branches of the sultan’s family in Riao was a source of important commercial profit in the regions near Malacca Straits. At the end of the eighteenth century the Company had even succeeded in acquiring by this penetration the sultanate of Bandjermas in on the island of Borneo, where no Western power had ever had a permanent influence or settlement before, but which could be made over thereafter by its directors to any pretender they chose.

The security of Batavia doubtless influenced the attitude of the Company in maintaining friendly relations with the adjacent sultanate of Bantam. The efforts of Mataram to extend its supremacy over the western part of Java and the necessity to prevent an alliance between both sultanates made the Company adopt a more prudent policy towards Bantam than seemed compatible with the serious commercial competition from which Batavia suffered. Nevertheless this sultanate, seriously weakened by disturbances and revolts, which could only be put down with the aid of the Company, in 1752 also entered into a state of vassalage.

In summing up the development of the relations between the
East Indian Company and the indigenous states with which it came into contact three periods can be distinguished:

i. The Company, in pursuit of commercial profit only, feels itself weaker than most of the states; the relations with "Princes and Potentates" show the character of the Company as that of a commercial enterprise, compelled to make some display of power.

ii. The Company rises in prestige; it acquires an equality of status to the indigenous states; it acquires territories of its own.

iii. The Company proves the more powerful party and acquires a certain supremacy or overlordship over the states.

The Dutch Government, succeeding the United East Indian Company in 1795, adopted the same policy, but neither in the years until 1811 nor during the British interregnum did the nearly permanent state of war in Europe admit of a policy of great efficacy in the Archipelago. Thus the Kingdom of the Netherlands found itself in 1816 at the restoration of the Dutch authority in about the same position towards the states as the Company at the time of its liquidation.

In the first years no important change took place. Want of capable officials and financial resources prohibited all effective policy. It is not until about 1850 that a new, well-defined plan can be seen. The causes of its being traced out are two new phenomena that show themselves in the nineteenth century. The first is connected with the international position of Netherlands India, especially in regard to the tendency some other European powers show, to acquire a colonial territory in the Far East. Therefore a systematic recognition of Dutch sovereignty extending to the most remote regions of the East Indian Archipelago was judged necessary, the more so as the treaty of London (1824) in connection with the clause of treatment on the footing of the most favoured nation in different commercial treaties allowed foreigners to settle in the seaport towns of the indigenous states. The second phenomenon bears another character. It was the gradually growing sense of responsibility of the Netherlands India Government for the internal state of affairs and conditions in the indigenous states. It was the consciousness that a colonial power should strive to impart to the indigenous population the benefits of Western development and civilization.

Both causes in combination made the Government aim at the conclusion of new treaties with the states, which show a certain uniformity. Especially since after 1854 such treaties were communicated to the States-General there can be traced a systematic striving after guarantees on the part of the states involving the surrender of all rights in regard to foreign policy and the
maintenance of an internal state of affairs, for which the Government would bear the international responsibility. Hence the principal points of the new treaties were:

(a) Recognition of the supremacy of the Netherlands as the paramount power and of the Governor-General as their representative; the state is to be considered as a feudal territory.

(b) The promise of the ruler, to whom the territory is ceded as such, to be a good vassal, to abstain from any relation with foreign powers, and to foster as much as possible the prosperity of his country and subjects.

(c) Neither Western nor Eastern foreigners shall be allowed to settle in the state without the consent of the Dutch authorities except for commercial purposes in the seaport towns.

(d) The Netherlands India Government is entitled to establish fortifications or other settlements and to appoint its officials within the boundaries of the state.

(e) A bar on the levying of any taxes without the consent of the Government and definite regulations as to the granting of concessions to foreigners and Dutch subjects in accordance with its officials.

(f) The legality of some Government regulations for the state’s subjects.

(g) The control of the administration of justice.

(h) The promise to promote public instruction and vaccination against smallpox.

Some unimportant differences may be stated, but in general the tenor is the same in all the modern treaties.

From a superficial point of view it may be said that affairs seemed well arranged in this way. Nevertheless experience proved the opposite. Its chief lesson was that there was a great gulf between the stipulation and the fulfilling of even the most important clauses. The indigenous rulers generally showed neither the will nor possessed the power to carry out the agreements they had signed. They lacked the sense of responsibility towards their subjects that would have urged them to promote their prosperity. On the contrary, in too many cases they considered their country and its inhabitants as created for the rulers’ sake. The Government, however, for the reasons developed above, pressed continually for their cordial active co-operation in the integral carrying out of the treaties. Hence the will arose to make the Dutch influence practically felt also in the internal affairs of the states, and, once this desire was felt, the force to carry it through became available.

A more elaborate and exact system of treaties seemed useless for the purpose of attaining their fulfilment. It was obvious that the rulers attached little importance to the contents of a treaty;
it meant for them only a recognition of the supremacy of the Government. The practical extent of its overlordship was apparently less connected with any clause in a treaty than with the consciousness on the rulers' part of being obliged to conform themselves to the explicit will of the more powerful other contracting party, who until then had showed itself more or less inclined to let the internal affairs of the states take their course and to be content with a certain appearance of goodwill.

As such an attitude did not mean the fulfilment of a treaty, the political agreements between the Government and the states in that form seemed objectionable. From the side of the Government it seemed unworthy to be content with something that was in effect a sham treaty, whereas in reality it imposed its will upon the states. And the indigenous rulers, who knew the real state of things just as well as the Government, hardly preferred one special form of recognizing their dependency on the Government to another. Thus, where the opportunity presented itself, first in states where the necessary alteration of ruling methods had to be enforced, later also in those where the relations in reality bore the character described above, the treaties were substituted by the so-called "Korte Verklaring"—i.e., "short declaration."

These documents consist of no more than three paragraphs, in the first and second of which are stated the dependency of the state upon the Netherlands and the Netherlands India Government and the veto upon entering into any relation with foreign powers, whilst the third only contained the general obligation to follow and to maintain all regulations issued in regard to the state by the Netherlands India Government or on its behalf by the Resident Governor, and to obey in general every order issued or in future to be issued by the Resident Governor or on his behalf.

Only the more important states, such as the Javanese sultanates and those on the east coast of Sumatra and of Borneo, kept treaties on the old basis, though in a modernized form.

It may be asked: what remains of the political existence of a state after a declaration like this? It is evident that the Government could have seized the opportunity to reduce the indigenous rulers to mere rois fainéants and to execute all power in the states with its own officials as intermediaries. Such a policy, however, was not adopted. On the contrary, the aim pursued was a greater activity from the side of the princes, a rule in accordance with modern principles but executed by them, though for the time under a necessary and inevitable supervision. Not only do statements in the States-General, made by different Governments, give evidence for such a conclusion, but manifold instructions to
the Resident Governors and civil service officials, appointed in the states territory, were conformable to it. Still, notwithstanding the nobility of the aim, a principle may prove impracticable. Thus a second question arises, whether an alteration of this policy would be advisable?

To answer this question it should be borne in mind that a territory as extensive as Netherland India, consisting of such heterogeneous elements, can hardly be governed from a central point and by officials only. The Government can only answer its true purposes if local organizations, finding their origin in the different regions themselves, are in charge of the affairs on as large a scale as possible. This is the only way of adapting the principles and methods of the central Government to the local state of affairs. Hence the real and great importance the states can acquire in future. By history and tradition the princes possessed complete rule over their dominions, however insufficiently in our opinion they may have executed their power. In future all modern principles of government may be introduced under Dutch influence; the ruler can fulfill the same task, though under supervision. From these traditional rulers the subjects would accept new regulations more readily than from any alien official. So the states could develop into local units of great importance, the greater because the competence of their rulers, on historical grounds, is hardly limited. Though perhaps the practically absolute and unlimited power of the princes, in which the official resorts seem inclined to believe, may be not more than a hypothesis (for in practice it was limited everywhere by customary law and by a certain self-government of tribes and village communities), their competence still remains very extensive.

Thus also from the point of view of the policy to be adopted, the general interest of Netherland India requires the maintenance and even the internal strengthening and development of the states. If, therefore, the Government wants to have its principles of rule fully carried out in the states' territories, any deviation from the policy adopted seems at least improbable, as being inexpedient.

When a prince had signed the short declaration the question arose, in what manner, except by orders on the part of the Resident Governors and the officials, the principles of government to be carried out in the states could be made known? Formerly the contents of the treaty had supplied the answer. By the signing of such a document the Government and the state could be considered to be in agreement with regard to this subject, though perhaps only in form. The short declaration, however, supposed that instructions for the execution of power in the states should be given by the Government. The latter confined itself
first to a general reference to the contents of treaties, which formerly were concluded with the state concerned, or, if such treaties had never existed, to those concluded with the nearest states. In the long run, however, such a reference proved insufficient; moreover, new questions arose which were not foreseen at the time the old treaties were drawn up. As a result of full consideration, therefore, in 1914, a "Native States Ordinance" was enacted, finally revised in 1929, in which the principles and regulations for the rule of the states which were under the régime of the short declaration were laid down. This ordinance contains in the first place fundamental principles concerning the position of the states in the body politic of Netherlands India and the competence of their rulers; it decrees further the application of the Netherlands Indian legislation in regard to some special subjects; finally it regulates the principal points of the internal rule of the states—for instance, the finances, the administration of justice, etc. These principles generally were not new, but the significance of the ordinance was that they were withdrawn by it from the administration and based on law.

The policy adopted requires a certain activity on the part of the princes. This was entirely new to many of them, who were more or less apathetic or conservative. Indeed, they had hardly opposed any measures taken by Government officials, but now it was no longer sufficient to preserve an attitude of "laissez faire" towards the officials' activity. Especially the putting in order of the states' finances stimulated them to take a more active part in the affairs. This matter was rather intricate. In the smaller states, rather like tribal communities, the levying of regular taxes was unknown. In the larger dominions they existed, but the princes had the idea, once expressed so tersely by "le roi soleil" in the words: "L'état, c'est moi!" They considered themselves and their family entitled to enjoy the full returns of every revenue. It is evident that such a conception was untenable in modern times, but it was by no means easy to carry out new principles concerning the finances, which were completely opposed to the view of the rulers on this point, especially as in more than one state the ruler kept a court and lived in a style out of proportion to the small importance of his dominion.

It would have been still more difficult had not a beginning been made by some officials long before the Government systematically interfered with the internal affairs of the states. Occasionally they had succeeded in persuading a prince to spend a part of the revenue on behalf of any public purpose, perhaps without considering that they thereby made such a ruler accept quite a new principle. By different circulars official interest in such measures was shown and in the treaties of recent years the exist-
ence of such embryonic treasuries is more than once mentioned; sometimes even the obligation to establish them is inserted, and a certain development is perceptible. First it is stated only that the ruler disposes of a part of his income with the object of organizing a treasury. A next step meant a fundamental change; it was understood that all revenue should be deposited in the treasury, although the prince was considered legitimately entitled to at least a part of it. In the end matters were clearly put, as the separation between the finances of the state and the income of the ruler was achieved by the clause, found in the youngest treaties, that all revenue collected must be paid into the treasury and that a certain amount should be paid out of it to the ruler as a civil list. In the states under "short declaration" it is of course the same.

This evolution necessitated a more modern and accurate financial administration than had existed before; moreover, as much as possible it had to be entrusted to the authority of the states themselves. As long as only a certain amount of money was put at the disposal of a Government's official by a prince, it mattered little how it was administered and expended, if only punctual accountability was assured. Once the conception was agreed to that the money ought to be considered as public revenue of the states, it followed that not an official, representing the central Government, should be in charge of their administration, but in principle the princes or any other states' authorities. Gradually such regulations on the states' finances were issued, first by the Resident Governors, later in a consolidated form in the Native States Ordinance. It seems worth while to examine their leading principle.

As is the rule with all public revenue an annual estimate has to be made. It has to be done by the prince, or by the prince with his council, in accordance with the Resident Governor. As for the accountability and book-keeping greater expertness and accuracy is needed than are generally to be found in indigenous society, these functions usually are entrusted to European officials. Instructions, however, are issued to prevent it being done without the knowledge of the rulers, who must be repeatedly and completely advised of the state of affairs. This furnishes an example of the greater activity that is expected from them.

After the budget is worked out an account of it must be rendered. This also has to be dealt with by the states' authorities in accordance with the Resident Governor, again to stimulate their activity. Further, the Home Office at Batavia has a special department for the states' finances, which examines all budgets and accounts and acts as a kind of audit office.
It cannot be denied that not all indigenous princes proved able
to understand the demands of the new era. Was it their fault?
They never had been educated for modern rule. Still there were
only a few cases where their resistance became so serious that they
had to be dethroned—and only in one case this was followed by
annexation and incorporation of the state in the territory under
direct rule.

Finally I may deal with the question of the political, social,
and economic consequences of the new policy towards the states.

We may state that none of them is any longer of any political
importance in the international sense of these words. If the larger
states ever had the qualities for it, the evolution in the nineteenth
century has made an end of them. In reality they have become,
as stated above, self-governing parts of Netherlands India, com-
parable, be it "in comparatione claudicante" with provinces,
their extensive competency being accounted for by their history.
As such, however, they can be important, while this competency
allows a very differentiated legislation, adapted to the various
conditions in the widely differing regions of the Archipelago.
The centralization to which each bureaucratic Government seems
inclined may be mitigated by their influence.

The situation of many states in more remote parts of the Outer
Provinces and the policy of non-interference in their internal
affairs have made the states generally slower and less liable than
the Government’s provinces to be affected by the changed econo-
ic conditions, which have resulted from the more prominent
position Netherlands India has secured in international traffic.
The continuity of their internal political forms has also caused
a certain survival of the existing economic and social organization,
which at least from a Western point of view is to be considered
backward to those in the direct territory. Gradually now the old
economy is superseded by more modern conditions. Especially
in later years, when peace and internal quiet were no longer
interrupted and a sufficient amount of money could be spent for
the development of the population, the states shared continually
in the changes of the economic life and, thanks to the measures
taken under guidance of the Government’s officials, also in the
benefits of modern institutions, which bring social improvement.
Increased education, better public health, medical aid, the reclaim-
ing of land for plantations, the erection of other enterprises will
make the inhabitants of the states come up to the level of the
population of the direct territory.

Whatever the future may bring, the foregoing pages may
suffice to give the impression that after the political relations
between the Government and the states had once taken their new
form the development of the states was carried on diligently. It
was a work of consolidation and peaceful construction on the basis that was laid down in a former period, during which the Dutch supremacy was established, externally perhaps less brilliant than the latter, but internally doubtless of equal value as that fundamental work. The results of it have already benefited the indigenous peoples of Netherlands India, especially the inhabitants of the native states, and should do so even more in the future.
WHERE EAST AND WEST MEET

CHINA HOUSE

By P. T. Ho

(Chairman of the London Chinese Students' Union)

The need for a centre for the meeting of Chinese students in this country, as well as for the promotion of Sino-British friendship, had been long felt by the Chinese students and British friends of China, but the question did not go beyond discussions until recently, when the Universities' China Committee very generously devoted a portion of the grant they received out of the returned Boxer Indemnity Fund, endowed for the purpose of creating Chinese lectureships and studentships in this country, for the establishment of a house, now named China House, in answer to that long-felt need. The much cherished hope of seeing such a home for the Chinese students established is at last realized in a glorious form.

China House is ideally and imposingly situated in the centre of Bloomsbury. No one can miss it, this landmark of Sino-British friendship, when passing along Gower Street (No. 91).

Its interior decorations are unique; a very harmonious blending of Chinese and European designs and colour, typifying the very characteristic of the House itself.

February 17 saw the opening of the House, amidst a gathering of over a hundred Chinese and English. Dr. A. D. Lindsay, Master of Balliol College, Oxford, and Chairman of the Universities' China Committee, in a very charming speech declared the House open. He was followed by Dr. W. C. Chen, Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, who read an appreciation on behalf of the Chinese Minister, who was away at Geneva. Then Dr. Sze, on behalf of all the various societies (mentioned below), thanked the Universities' China Committee for their wonderful gift to the Chinese, while Mr. H. T. Silcock, Deputy Warden of China House, explained the various facilities China House offers to Chinese students.

The opening of China House provides the many Chinese organizations with permanent headquarters. The organizations now having their offices there are: The Central Union of Chinese Students in Great Britain and Ireland, The London Chinese
Students' Union, The Chinese Students' Christian Union, the London Chinese Association (Chinese merchants), and The China Society, consisting of British people who are interested in China.

The facilities offered by China House to Chinese students are worthy of record. Extreme hardship had been repeatedly experienced by new students arriving in London in the dead of night, and being absolute strangers without any friend to greet their arrival they would not know where they could put up for the night. Often they were landed at expensive hotels. China House has rooms to meet such emergencies, not only in the case of a newly arrived student (who has only to mention the address on his arrival in London), but also in the case of a student paying a week-end visit to London from the provinces.

Again, a student, at the end of his stay in England, often finds he has not sufficient money to do much sight-seeing on his homeward journey and, in many cases, to pay for his passage. China House offers another privilege to him. He is exempted from membership fees throughout his stay if he deposits a sum of fifteen pounds on his arrival, which will be returned to him in its entirety when he leaves for home.

In China House a Chinese student finds many opportunities of meeting his fellow students or British friends, besides at the regular weekly meeting of the student societies. He is also able to return hospitality to his British friends by entertaining them in China House when he is not in a position to do so in his own lodgings.

The Universities’ China Committee has also appointed an adviser to Chinese students in the person of Mr. H. T. Silcock, who has his office in China House and who will render every assistance he can to Chinese students regarding lodgings, admission to colleges, introduction to British friends, etc.

The establishment of China House is the opening of a new chapter in the history of Sino-British friendly relations, and every Chinese wishes the House long life and prosperity.
GENERAL MEETING AND REPORT FOR TWO YEARS ENDING OCTOBER 20, 1932.

The general meeting of the Indian Women's Education Association was held in the Lecture Hall, 21, Cromwell Road, London, S.W. 7, on Thursday, October 20, 1932, at 4 o’clock.

Sir Mancherjee M. Bhownaggree, K.C.I.E. (Chairman of the Committee), presided, and amongst those present were Princess Sophia Duleep Singh, Lady Mullick, Sardar Shivdev Singh Uberoi, Miss Ashworth, Mrs. Bahadurji, Miss Beg, Miss Beck, Mrs. Bhada, Mr. Bhiwandawala, Mr. and Mrs. Bonarjee, Miss Dutt, Mrs. Haigh, Mr. and Mrs. Kotval, Miss Martin, Mr. J. D. Moos, Mr. and Mrs. M. B. Pithawalla, Mrs. Polak, Miss Raut, Mrs. and Miss Gordon Roy, Miss Toogood, Mr. Vajijdar, and Mr. E. Oliver, Hon. Secretary.

The Hon. Secretary, Mr. E. Oliver, read the notice convening the meeting, and was then requested by the Chairman to read the following report:

The two years under review have shown a steady maintenance of progress according to the purpose and policy of the Association. The Committee consider applications for scholarship grants, and, after careful investigations into the character and qualifications of applicants, endeavour to select the most eligible candidate for the annual scholarship.

The work of the Association is becoming increasingly recognized and appreciated in India, and the Calcutta Branch continues to render valuable service, both in recommending suitable candidates of whom they have personal knowledge, and, even more important, in placing them, on their return to India, in educational positions of authority which give scope to the exercise of their qualifications. An essential condition is that candidates must possess an adequate knowledge of, and familiarity with, the English language; otherwise the student would be unduly handi-
capped, as has actually happened, in following lectures and competing under like conditions with English students.

Mrs. Basak, the scholar for 1930-31, has shown herself to be a very great credit to the Association. She was given a brilliant report by the principal of her College, and took her Teaching Diploma with a term to spare. Like Miss Vakil, who read a paper containing an account of her experiences as an Indian student over here at our last general meeting, Mrs. Basak was invited to give her impressions of her residence and work in England.

In a descriptive letter she relates how she decided to come earlier than the appointed time in order to learn something of her environment in advance. The academic year begins in October, and she arrived in England in July. She commenced work at once by attending the summer course of the Montessori College (Studio House), and by taking language lessons at the Berlitz School. During this preliminary period she made many happy friendships and acquaintances. When the College opened she was glad to find that there were other Indian students there, and she was fortunate in discovering a spirit of friendliness and good comradeship existing throughout the College.

She adds that she never experienced the least difficulty in following the lectures, and she found the tutors most considerate and ready to help in every respect. Her first term was occupied with attending lectures and classes. Many of the lessons were demonstration lessons, some given by the College tutors and some by the mistresses themselves in elementary schools. She also visited many different kinds of schools, such as nursery schools, secondary schools, public schools, technical schools, working women's institutes, Montessori schools, etc.

In the second term she herself began to take an active part in teaching. As she had had previous experience of this in India, she found it congenial from the very first, and the work offered no difficulties. The children were obedient and responsive, and she had no trouble in maintaining discipline. She lays particular stress on the general atmosphere of goodwill and camaraderie in all her associations.

The candidate chosen for the 1931-32 scholarship was Miss Monica Dutt, B.A., B.T., who had previously had three years' teaching experience, and has been in residence at the Maria Grey Training College since last October. Very favourable reports have been received of Miss Dutt's progress and conduct generally.
This year your Committee find themselves in the happy position of being able to offer two scholarships, and they have awarded one of these scholarships to a student who has the most excellent credentials and has been specially sponsored by high authorities personally known to members of your Committee. The student in question is Miss Indira V. Raut, an M.A. of Bombay University, who has been Principal of the Vanita Vishram English School for girls in Bombay, a post to which she will return on completing her training for the English Teaching Diploma next year.

The candidate for the second scholarship has been recommended, after due consideration of a number of other applications, by the Calcutta Committee, and has been approved by your Committee. She is Miss Roshan Jahan Beg, B.A., of the Muslim Girls’ High School, Lucknow. With regard to the students mentioned in the last report, your Committee have been very glad to receive good accounts from Miss Vakil, who has been appointed head of the Tata Zoroastrian Girls’ School at Navsari, and is doing most useful work in training the teachers under her.

The death of Sir Basanta Mullick has been a severe loss to the Committee, to whom he gave invaluable assistance both by his ready and active co-operation and the experienced wisdom of his counsel. In testimony of their deep regard for him, the Committee unanimously passed the following resolution moved by the Chairman:

"That this meeting desires to record the deep loss the Association and Indian education generally has suffered by the lamented death of Sir Basanta Mullick. During the short time he had been a member of the Committee he had shown great and practical interest in the work of the Association, and his intimate knowledge of Indian educational affairs had been of exceptional service to his colleagues."

The Committee also deeply regret the death of one of the Association’s Vice-Presidents, Lady Dorabji Tata, and of their esteemed colleague, Mrs. Evelyn Bowie. The Committee are glad to welcome the assistance of Lady Mullick to fill one of the vacancies.

Last year the Wedderburn certificate and prize books were awarded to Mrs. Basak on taking her Diploma. These awards for 1932 will be considered in due course when the result of the final examination is known.
The statements of accounts for the two years are open for inspection.

The Chairman, in reviewing the work of the Association, said that the report was brief, as became a small body, but it was a record of sound work developed on lines which had been found to give the best results. In the early days of the Association the Committee aimed not only at providing women graduates of India with a training in this country, but at finding them suitable scholastic positions on their return home, where they were to have opportunities of training others as teachers. The latter obligation, however, proved to be very difficult to carry out at such a distance, so that when there was formed the Calcutta Branch, which could co-operate in selecting and recommending the most eligible candidates from a number of applicants, and in finding suitable posts or work for them after their return, the arrangement was welcomed by your Committee, and has worked very well since it was adopted.

On the whole, the Association had been fortunate in the type of students who have enjoyed the benefits of the scholarships. To take two recent examples, Miss Vakil had found a most useful scope for her exceptional abilities as head of the Tata College at Navsari, and Mrs. Basak, whose account of her experiences in London had just been read, and who took her Diploma with a term to spare, had also been well placed in useful work on her return to Calcutta.

The Committee was happy both in being able to award two scholarships in the present year and in having two most promising recipients of these grants. Miss Indira Raut had filled a distinguished scholastic position in Bombay, to which she will return on completing her course of training here; she was, moreover, closely related to a lady who had taken an important part in the public life of India and who would be well known to some of those present today—Dr. Rakhmabai. Miss Roshan Jahan Beg, our second scholar, came with excellent testimonials and holds out promise of doing credit to the Association.

The Chairman then read a message from Lady Wedderburn, whose health unfortunately did not permit her to be present, offering her best wishes for the success of the meeting and of the Association.

Turning to the losses by death suffered by the Association, the Chairman said that by the passing of Sir Basanta Mullick the
Committee had been deprived of the services of an invaluable colleague. His deep knowledge of the educational problems and his keen personal interest in the work and objects of the Association were the measure of their loss. They were glad, however, to welcome in his place Lady Mullick, whose interest was no less wholehearted in the objects and work of the Association.

The Chairman then called upon the Hon. Treasurer, Mr. Kotval, to explain the main features of the statement of accounts.

Referring to the matter of payment for membership, the Chairman said that the subscriptions were merely nominal and were meant to indicate members' interest in the Association. It would be idle to hope for a substantial contribution towards additional scholarships from this source for serving Indian needs and purposes. Such funds should come from India, which was intelligent enough to know its educational needs and quite capable of paying for the same without asking for foreign help. It would be humiliating, in his judgment, for India to rely on outside aid for her educational advancement. It was computed that about £300 had to be provided for the total expenses of each student, and it was open to anyone to contribute this sum for the training of a graduate in teachership here. The Association was prepared to take charge of any number of students sent with such provision, and the ladies of the Committee would be most willing to give them every assistance and guidance, as they had done for years.

In conclusion, the Chairman expressed warm recognition of the assiduous attendance given by members of the Committee, coupling with this tribute the names of Miss Ashworth and Mrs. Haigh as educational experts, and to the work of the Hon. Secretary and Hon. Treasurer. He also acknowledged the convenience afforded by the Northbrook Society for Committee meetings. He moved the adoption of the report and statement of accounts.

The motion was carried after it was seconded by Lady Mullick, and supported by Miss Ashworth, who in the course of a very informative address said:

"One great obstacle to the progress of women's education among the masses was the difficulty of obtaining women teachers of good social class and efficiency. The profession of teaching was most unpopular with Indian women and parents of good class would not allow their girls to submit themselves for the necessary course of training. It had been found necessary to staff the schools either with men or with women of low caste who,
entirely uncultured, were sent to training colleges for a few years of intensive cramming and then put in charge of schools to carry on as best they could. Naturally schools thus staffed were hopelessly inefficient and unpopular with both parents and girls. The Indian Women’s Education Association sought to meet this difficulty by offering to Indian girls of the cultured classes, who were graduates of an Indian university, scholarships to enable them to come to England for a year’s training in a college for teachers, in the hope that, after completing their course, they would return to India and train others in the art of teaching. It could be claimed that the Association had met with some considerable success. Girls of good family and of high academic qualifications had applied for these scholarships; most of them had had a most successful career here, and on their return to India had obtained high responsible positions in which they were able to radiate some of their own enthusiasm to raise the whole status of the profession and thereby to make the schools attractive and successful.

The Chairman moved that Lady Simon, who had been compelled to relinquish her membership of the Committee on account of pressure of public engagements, be elected Vice-President in place of the late Lady Tata. Miss Martin seconded the resolution, which was carried unanimously.

Vacancies on the Committee

Mrs. Haigh proposed that Sir Ernest Hotson, late Acting Governor of Bombay, be invited to join the Committee. Seconded by Miss Martin and carried unanimously.

Miss Ashworth proposed that Professor Hamley, member of the Council of the London Day Training College, be invited to become a member of the Committee. Seconded by Princess Sophia Duleep Singh and carried unanimously.

Mrs. Polak proposed and Mrs. Kotval seconded a motion to invite Mrs. Gordon Roy to join the Committee. Carried unanimously.

The proceedings closed with a hearty vote of thanks to the Chairman.
REVIEWS OF BOOKS


(Reviewed by Sir Alfred Chatterton.)

This book really deals with the sea-borne trade of India during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, though for the fifty years before Clive (1757) it purports to no more than briefly describe the operations of the several European Companies, each engaged in endeavouring to secure for itself a privileged, if not actually monopolistic, position in the commerce between Southern Asia and the Western nations of Europe bordering on the Atlantic. Portugal had led the way at the beginning of the sixteenth century and was followed by Holland, England, France, and Denmark in the course of the next two hundred years. With varying fortunes they had opened up a not inconsiderable trade and had carried into the East the animosities and rivalries of the West. Territorial acquisition beyond the establishment of secure trading bases was not part of their policies, and aggressive warfare was confined to maritime operations chiefly between themselves. The Portuguese, it is true, had occupied the country round Goa and the Dutch had obtained a kind of political supremacy in Ceylon, and such influence along the coast of Java as ultimately enabled them at a much later date to become supreme in the Eastern archipelago. In India at the beginning of the eighteenth century European influence was confined to the neighbourhood of the factories and was directed to the promotion of commercial intercourse. Imports were mainly in the form of bullion and metals, such as lead, copper, tin, and mercury, with some broad cloth and other woollen goods. The exports were chiefly cotton and silk fabrics, cotton yarn, raw silk, pepper, salt petre, sugar, and indigo, to which may be added some minor items such as drugs, diamonds, and other jewels. The trade was far from static in character owing to the growing competition in sugar and indigo of the West Indian Islands and the diminishing demand for spices consequent upon the discovery of winter fodder for cattle. The long years of war with France exhausted the belligerents, and after the treaty of Utrecht was signed in 1713 there were marked increases in the volume of Eastern trade. Our author furnishes such statistical data as are apparently available regarding the value of this trade, but judging by the tabular statements given in the appendix the evidence is not very accurate, and his analysis fails to present anything more than a blurred and imperfect picture of the external trade during this period. Probably nothing more is now possible. An examination of the data suggests that by the middle of the century the total value of the imports from Europe was under £2,000,000. The exports, valued at the shipping ports, were undoubtedly on a larger scale due to the remission of profits from the internal trade in which Europeans engaged. Of this the coastal traffic from port
to port was very remunerative and was relatively of much greater importance than now. These developments, combined with the growing anarchy consequent upon the decay of the Moghul Empire, enabled the European Companies to greatly enhance their status in the country and increase their establishments. Their armed forces from mere factory guards became disciplined troops whose aid was sought by contending native princes. The war of the Austrian Succession spread to the Orient, and the English and the French Companies were involved in it, and for some years after it was concluded in Europe by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1749). The far-reaching and ambitious projects of Dupleix were finally countered by the genius of Clive, and for a short interval there was comparative inaction. In 1756 the Seven Years’ War began, and hostilities were renewed between the French and English Companies. Contemporaneously in Bengal, the Nawab Siraj-ud-dowlah, quite ignorant of events in Europe, attacked the Bengal factories, captured Calcutta, and perpetrated the tragedy of the "Black Hole." Madras with some difficulty assembled a small fleet and army and despatched them to the Hooghly to recover the position. Calcutta was soon reoccupied, and a few months later the troops of the Nawab were routed by Clive at the battle of Plassey. Thereafter the East India Company became a ruling power and ultimately dominant in India. Mr. Durga Parshad deals very fairly with the not very creditable transactions of the succeeding years and reduces to reasonable figures the extent to which Bengal was plundered by the servants of the Company before the authorities in London realized the responsibilities which had been thrust upon them. The facts are patent: there was no fabulous wealth to drain away, and the withdrawals from India can be ascertained from the records of the sales effected in London and on the Continent by the trading Companies. For a time the flow of bullion to the East almost ceased, and the commercial operations of the Company were largely financed by the purchase of private bills of exchange by which individuals remitted their funds home and by the slowly growing demand for imports of manufactured goods. From 1763 to 1793 the Company enjoyed a monopoly of the foreign trade from its own territories, but there was considerable competition from the French, Dutch, and Danish settlements. From 1793 to 1813, in addition to the limited private trade which had been allowed to the commanders and officers of the Company’s vessels, the Company was required to provide 3,000 tons of outward and homeward carrying capacity for privileged private traders. In 1813 the trade to India was opened to private individuals on condition that they traded only through the ports of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras in vessels not under 350 tons burden, but they were still excluded except by special licence from engaging in the coastal trade. Finally, in 1833, when the Company’s Charter was renewed, it was required to surrender all its commercial rights, privileges, and property in return for an annuity chargeable on the Indian revenues.

It is beyond the scope of this review to follow Mr. Durga Parshad through his presentation of the tangled data upon which his account of the growth of India’s external trade is based. It must suffice to say that a very intricate and in some aspects a highly technical business has been described
without the exaggeration or bitterness which has so often marred the accounts of previous Indian writers on the subject. Englishmen may well be proud of their achievements in India, and at the same time acknowledge that from the standpoint of the accumulated experience of today much was done in the past that can only be justified by taking into consideration the pressure of concurrent events viewed in the light of such public opinion as then existed. The gradual acquisition of a great empire by a trading Company was without precedent in the history of mankind, and the infinite variety of episodes arising therefrom gave rise to much controversy of a bitter nature. The parliamentary enquiry into the conduct of Clive, the impeachment of Hastings, and the periodical discussions over the renewal of the Charter were opportunities, fully availed of, to cast aspersions on both individuals and the general administration. Much evidence that was biassed, distorted, or had no foundation in facts was recorded, and these records have in recent years been used by those discontented with British rule to frame a general indictment against the justice of our administration. In the field of economics, with which we are now concerned, it has been asserted that we have exploited India purely for our own benefit; that we plundered Bengal and reduced it to indescribable poverty; that we wantonly destroyed the indigenous handicrafts of India to make a market for our factories and foundries; that we adopted a policy which has deprived the people of that diversity of occupations which can only be obtained by the application of capital to the industrial utilization of the products of the soil. Mr. Durga Parshad's studies throw light on these questions and furnish data from original sources which is of value in determining not only the justice, but also the adequacy, of the measures taken from time to time to solve the complicated and difficult problems which were thrust upon what was at first merely a commercial organization trading for profit. The monograph covers too wide a field within its restricted limits for adequate treatment of the many issues involved in the commercial relations of a sub-continent with the rest of the world, but its perusal by Indian students will give them a fair idea of the way in which their country has progressed.

Much patient research has in recent years vindicated the character of Warren Hastings from the aspersions to which it was subjected at the end of the eighteenth century, and it would be of advantage if an equal effort could be made to place in true perspective the reactions of what was going on in Europe at that time on the course of Indian trade and commerce.

Mr. Durga Parshad supports the view that the decline of Indian manufactures was due to the deliberate action of the English authorities. Europe was then engaged in the wars following the French Revolution; England was in the early throes of the industrial revolution and was carrying the major portion of the financial burden of the titanic struggle with France; less than one-third of India was under British rule, and the rest of the country was in a state of discord, if not anarchy, due to the lack of any central controlling power. No doubt the external trade suffered from the restraints imposed by tariffs and by the war, but these had no influence on the internal markets, which were adversely affected by the growing poverty
of the people consequent upon a century of almost continuous war and rapine. When the pax-Britannica was finally established indigenous industries took on a new lease of life. Wealth increased, and the growing needs of a rapidly increasing population were mainly met by the productions of local craftsmen. The failure of India to respond to the changes brought about by the industrial revolution was partly due to the indifference of the intellectual classes, who despised manual labour and considered commerce beneath their dignity. Only in comparatively recent years have they abandoned this intolerant attitude. It was, however, lack of capital more than anything else that delayed matters. The trading classes had wealth which they employed very lucratively in their business, the rest of the country hoarded any surplus that came to them in the form of bullion or jewels and thereby sterilized it. Only very slowly did the idea of joint-stock enterprise take root in the country, and even now it is looked upon with suspicion by the majority. Our author condemns the laissez faire attitude of the Indian Government towards industry as dictated by special economic conditions in England, and there is no doubt that at times Manchester was in the background when economic questions were under discussion, but on broad lines, at any rate, Manchester may claim that its interests were not inconsistent with the welfare of India. The opening up of the country by railways, the provision of irrigation, and the combating of famine were primary duties which fully engaged all the resources that could be obtained. Premature industrial ventures would certainly have proved failures and would have weakened the steadily improving credit of the Government which was vitally necessary to carry out its major programme of public works. Looking at the world today, it may be fairly claimed for the British administration that in respect to material development, though mistakes have been made, the general policy was sound and has yielded results which place the country in an enviable position among the nations.


(Reviewed by F. G. Pratt.)

Professor Coatman's book has been written with two main purposes. The first is to show that the constitutional changes now emerging in India are one of the "big movements in human affairs," and destined to transform completely the status of India and her relations with the outer world. They are being brought about not by temporary or local causes, but by the slow moving and in the end irresistible power of the great ideals which are the corner-stones of the British Commonwealth of Nations. His second purpose is to show what, indeed, must stand out unmistakably in any impartial survey of these difficult and critical years, that their events were in the main directed and controlled by Lord Irwin's courage and statesmanship, and that it was his initiative which determined the lines of a constructive policy for the reconciliation of the claims and aspirations of India with the rights and obligations of Great Britain. It is true, as Professor
Coatman points out, that the Viceroy always carries a special burden of responsibility because of his power to overrule the opinion of his Council, but the power is rarely exercised. It is only the exceptional Viceroy, the "daring pilot in extremity," who in a difficult and dangerous passage will have the skill to set his own course and the courage to maintain it in the face of all obstacles.

The narrative has two prologues, the first of which fills in the immediate background in the recent past, and the second a more distant background, which goes back to the origins of British rule. And here the author enquires why the time lag has been so great before the beginnings of India's approach to the full national stature achieved by other members of the British Commonwealth. He finds the reason solely in the social and economic backwardness of nineteenth-century India. May it not, however, be suggested that something may also be attributed to the operation from quite an early period of the nineteenth century of influences and modes of thought, which still survive and are still convinced that the hands of the clock have been moving too fast and must now be set back?

The chapter on material and moral foundations of modern India is good so far as it goes, but hardly justifies its title. On the other hand, the chapter on "Parties and Personalities" is valuable and interesting, for Professor Coatman writes about persons with whom he was in frequent and intimate personal contact. The only exception is probably Mr. Gandhi, who is dismissed a little too summarily as a "dangerous sham." There is no mention of the "desire for social betterment of the Indian masses," which Lord Irwin, writing in Political India, speaks of as "probably the strongest motive of action in the minds of Mr. Gandhi and many other of the Congress leaders." If the Congress is really "the party of privilege and vested interest," it is strange that their chosen leader should be a Tolstoyan.

The historical chapters are a close and detailed account of the five stormy years of Lord Irwin's viceroyalty and carry the story on as far as the end of the second Round-Table Conference. Professor Coatman expresses doubts, which many have shared, as to the manner in which Lord Willingdon handled the situation which ended in Mr. Gandhi's arrest.

The book provides much material for sound judgment on Indian affairs and problems, and Professor Coatman may be congratulated on the success with which he has achieved the main objects which he set before himself in writing it.

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**The Indian States and the Government of India.** By K. M. Panikkar. Second edition. (Martin Hopkinson.) 10s. 6d. net.

*(Reviewed by Hugh Molson, M.P.)*

The first edition of this work, published in 1927, has always been regarded as a standard work on the constitutional relations between the Indian States and the Paramount Power. Since then the problem has assumed immediate political importance, and the proposed federation of
India may well prove to be the only solution of what promised to be a question of ever-increasing complexity and difficulty.

Mr. Panikkar takes the point of view of the Princes who complain that during the last century and a quarter the Paramount Power has encroached unjustifiably on the treaty rights of the States; but he is too fair-minded and, it may be added, too detached an historian to associate himself with those who attribute this encroachment to a mere lust for power. He recognizes that it arises to a large extent out of the economic and commercial unification of the Indian sub-continent and the development of modern means of transport.

The history of the British relations with the States falls into three phases. Up to 1813 Britain was only one of a number of political powers in India, and the majority of treaties entered into up to that time were intended to strengthen our position. They were, therefore, in the majority of cases, "in fact and not only in theory, treaties of alliance." From 1813 until the Mutiny the Princes were left largely to their own devices, a policy modified only by a number of annexations. When the Crown took over responsibility after the Mutiny, the policy of annexation was abandoned and by a necessary consequence there was a great development of the doctrine of intervention, both to secure a certain minimum of good government and obtain such a degree of co-ordination and co-operation between British India and the States as the Government of India deemed necessary in the interests of the country as a whole.

The greater part of the book is devoted to an examination of the extension of the rights over the Indian States which the Paramount Power claimed to exercise. That some of these were unjustifiable was admitted by Lord Chelmsford, who said: "There is no doubt that with the growth of new conditions and the unification of India under the British power, political doctrines have constantly developed... The change... has come about in the interests of India as a whole... We cannot deny, however, that the Treaty position has been affected and that a body of usages, in some cases arbitrary, but always benevolent, has come into being."

The new edition contains a valuable chapter called "The Future," which explains the reasons for the initiative of the Princes in proposing federation at the first Round-Table Conference. The author points out that although the States are legally independent units they have, in fact, long ceased to be so, and the Government of India does at present exercise in relation to them powers with regard to foreign relations, defence, customs, communications, and the coercion of recalcitrant states which are appropriate to a federal government. He suggests, therefore, that the offer to join a legal federation does not in fact subject the States to a much greater degree of control than is at present exercised, while it will give them a considerable voice in that existing central government.

The Princes are also aware that with changes in the political constitution of British India their own position must be affected. A large proportion of their ministers and officials are drawn from British India, and the peoples of the States tend to regard British Indian politicians as their own leaders. "The Government of India, whether Indian or Anglo-Indian, has
to remember that the age of Lawrence, Dufferin, and Curzon disappeared with the rise of an integral nationalism in India. Nor are the Princes entitled to forget that the political evolution of a hundred years lies between them and their ancestors, who fought with the British Government and negotiated treaties... and it is a forlorn hope to think of re-establishing on the basis of a surrender by the British Government the India of many states."

**Indian Caste Customs.** By L. S. S. O'Malley, C.I.E., I.C.S. (Retd.). (Cambridge University Press.) 6s. net.

*(Reviewed by P. K. Wattal.)*

Mr. O'Malley wrote an eminently readable report on the Bengal Census of 1911, but, as the general reader does not care to go through a census report, he will welcome this small book of 182 pages, which contains an interesting account of an institution which exists only in India and which must seem queer in many ways to persons who have never been to India. It will, for instance, not be easy for an English reader to understand why food cooked with water is defiled if persons not belonging to the same caste enter the place where it is being cooked or eaten, but food cooked with *ghi* or clarified butter can be eaten fairly freely. It was some time ago when the late Maharaja of Jaipur chartered a steamer and took large casks of Ganges water and every article of food for his visit to England. But the same feat was repeated on a very modest scale when Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya visited London as a delegate to the Round-Table Conference in 1931. Though spiritual authority is not nowadays supported by temporal power and civil rights are safeguarded by the Caste Disabilities Removal Act, outcasting still involves social and religious disabilities which very few Hindus can with impunity disregard.

The chapter on Untouchables, or *harijans*, as they are now called, will be read with considerable interest in view of the heroic efforts now being made in India to get rid of untouchability by moral persuasion and legislation. Few would be disposed to disagree with Mr. O'Malley in his statement of the case, but one wonders if it is true today that separate schools for the depressed classes are "in the opinion of many the most hopeful line of advance."

People in England may find it difficult to understand why so much stress is being laid in India on the question of temple entry to the exclusion of economic and social uplift of the Untouchables. But there is no doubt that this attack on orthodoxy, if successful, will purify Hinduism and will give new life and new hope to these classes as no mere economic uplift can do.

After carefully weighing the pros and cons of caste, the author inclines to the view that the abolition of caste in the present state of Indian society would be attended with danger, as it is chiefly caste which checks vice and keeps up the standard of propriety, particularly among the lower castes. It would therefore be necessary to find an adequate (if not a better) substitute before the existing basis of morality is destroyed.
Hazard of Asia's Highlands and Deserts. By W. Bosshard. Illustrated. (Figurehead.) 5s. net.

Mr. Bosshard belonged to the Trinkler Expedition, of whose activities accounts have already been issued. This volume contains an account of the author's terrible experience in Ladakh, over the Karakorum and Kun-lun Ranges, and in the Taklamakan in Chinese Turkestan. The account is certainly most fascinating, and should, indeed, be read by all who like to learn of arduous and successful adventures in inhospitable surroundings. The author can be congratulated upon the endurance he has shown and upon the most fascinating photographs.

The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 1852-1856. Edited with notes by D. G. E. Hall. (Oxford University Press.) 30s. net.

Private letters written by administrators and politicians often disclose when published more material for the understanding of politics than official papers. This correspondence, which is now in the possession of the University of Rangoon, is no exception, and we are grateful to Mr. Hall for undertaking a difficult task. Burma is rather neglected, compared with India, in the minds of the British public. The present book deals with the second Burmese war and the firm establishment of British rule. Lord Dalhousie was exacting, but he was also human in his relations with his subordinates. The letters, kept too long from the public eye, were collected by Lord Dalhousie himself and arranged by him, but the work of editing, documentation, and references to published works was that of Mr. Hall, and calls for the highest praise. The second Burmese war was chiefly due to the treatment of British merchants in Rangoon, and as no excuse or reparation was forthcoming, Lord Dalhousie had to enforce them. The Scotch merchant, whose portrait is given in the volume, deserves to be remembered as the chief agent between the King of Ava and Phayre, who had reason to rely upon the information Spears could send him. An example of Mr. Hall's careful work is to be found at the end of the introduction, where the old spelling of Burmese place-names, as they appear in the letters, are supplemented by modern spelling and thus made recognizable. A further difficult task has been accomplished in the very complete Index which facilitates the study of this valuable volume.

The Muslim Creed: its Genesis and Historical Development. By A. J. Wensinck. (Cambridge University Press.) 15s. net.

Dutch scholars have played an honourable part in Arabic scholarship, and Professor Wensinck, in this capital work, gracefully continues the tradition with a new monograph on Islam. Every line testifies to a profound original study. Professor Wensinck has, in fact, worked on the lines of the old-time scholar. The volume is a serious study of the historical development of
Muhammadan dogmatics, and is sure to find a prominent place in the studies of scholars and on the shelves of libraries and universities.

In this work the author has incorporated numerous original translations from the Arabic. On each page almost are references to these originals and to European writers, and the Bibliography is a fine testimony to the author's wide reading. The work is not a translation. The author must be complimented on his excellent prose.


The first edition of this interesting volume has been out of print for a number of years, and it was wellnigh impossible to procure a copy. The publishers have rendered a service to sinology in reprinting it unaltered, though the subject might by some writers have been expanded into a larger book.

NEO-HINDUISM, AN EXPOSITION OF SWAMI VIVEKANANDA'S CONCEPTION OF VEDANTISM. By D. V. Athalye. (Bombay: Taraporevala.) Rs. 5.8.

The Great War's aftermath has produced in many people a longing for man's spiritual forces. Swami Vivekananda undoubtedly has exercised influence through his lectures on Yoga philosophy and also through his writings. The subject is not always easy for lay readers to understand, and for this reason we are fortunate in having before us an able exposition of the various forms of Yoga. The chapters are well balanced, and the subject is compiled in an able and very clear manner. When in doubt about the meaning of the great teacher's lessons, the student can safely turn to this commentary if he is anxious to forget the earthly worries of the present day.


There are already a number of recent books on the life of the Maratha ruler Shivaji, who is rightly called the Great. The author gives a long list of books which evidently have been used in one way or another. Besides those in Indian dialects, he has drawn from various European works. The present work is perhaps the most able and profound study of Shivaji, well written and conscientiously compiled. The present volume deals with the ancestry of Shivaji, besides a lengthy introduction, with a tentative chronology of Shivaji's ancestry. The immediate predecessor Shahji has his historian in Professor Bal Krishna. The volume is well documented and a serious piece of research.
The volume just published forms a new departure from the previous volumes inasmuch as it includes researches in chemistry, zoology, and anthropology. To judge by the varied contents, it appears that the record of work done at the Institute is most praiseworthy. The contributors of the seventeen articles are throughout Hindus, and the Indian Government must look with great satisfaction at the work accomplished, for which they have given in various forms opportunity to serious study, such as exist in Europe. There have been, of course, signs, especially in journals, of a new life amongst Indian scientists, but it is safe to say that this volume represents the most learned outcome of such research that has come to our notice. Not only are the chapters on plants continued in the same scholarly style, but keen observations by Mr. Bhattacharjee on the “Fish-Eating Spiders and their Habits” are ably presented. Another chapter of special interest is the “Study of the Burmese Crania,” by Mr. P. C. Basu, which are compared with the skulls found at Mohenjo-daro. The measurements of these Burmese skulls is a very neat performance, and there can be only praise for the results achieved. There is no reason whatever to doubt that with the guidance of such great scientists as the present contributors, the ability of Indian research workers will develop throughout the country.

Asiatic Mythology. By J. Hackin. (Harrap.)

This sumptuous volume is a very welcome English translation of “Mythologie Asiatique Illustrée,” which was published in Paris some years ago, and is an indispensable work of reference for the growing number of students of Asiatic art. Let us say at once that the translation is everything that can be desired—accurate, clear, and eminently readable. Mr. Atkinson deserves great credit for what must have been a very arduous task—much more so than he would have us believe in his modest little translator’s note. The contents are divided into chapters according to the subjects, and each has been entrusted to an expert. Mr. Joseph Hackin, who has now been on the road in Asia for several years, but is expected back at the Musée Guimet shortly, writes on Lamaism, Buddhism in Central Asia, and the Mythology of the Kāfsirs; Buddhism in India comes from the pen of Mr. Raymonde Linossier; Clément Huart writes on Persian Mythology; Mr. H. de Wilman Grabowska on Brahmanic Mythology; Mr. C. H. Marchal on that of Indo-China and Java; Mr. Henri Maspéro on China; and Mr. Serge Eliseev on Japan. These names prove that this is an authoritative work, the like of which may not be seen for many years to come. The publishers are to be congratulated on the presentation of the volume in clear type, with excellent illustrations, and on the provision of an index which we did not find in the French edition.
RUMANIA. By George Clenton Logio. (Sherratt and Hughes.) 6s. net.

The author, who is already known for his excellent study of Bulgaria, here gives us a careful analysis of the various problems that beset the modern Rumanian State. He begins with a short historical introduction, in which he makes the interesting statement that it is owing to their saturation with French culture that the Rumanians have not been absorbed by the Russians. He also recalls that on the forced deposition of their first prince, Alexander Battenberg, brought about through Russian hostility, Bulgaria's greatest statesman, Stambulov, offered the Bulgarian crown to King Charles. He adds that a close co-operation between Rumania and Bulgaria under the common sceptre would have been tantamount to the creation of a sound bulwark against the underhand schemes and machinations of the Russian and Austrian Empires, which were the main cause of all the unrest in the Balkans. The political chapters are written with great clarity, and we then arrive at Economics, which take up the second half of the volume. The agricultural system and the mining and oil industries are described in detail, and altogether this is a mine of information upon a country about which far too little is known.

CURRIES, AND OTHER INDIAN DISHES. By Mulk Raj Anand. (Desmond Harmsworth.) 3s. 6d. net.

In a very attractively written and learned introduction, vying with the best French masterpieces in its appreciation of the \textit{art culinaire}, the author describes how a letter in \textit{The Times} from Sir David Hunter Blair on curries had been the immediate cause of embarking upon this work, and by the time the reader has perused the introduction he will share the author's enthusiasm. Moreover, he will be properly equipped for the task of appraising Indian curries at their true worth by having the proper knowledge of their literary and symbolical history. For has he not learned that in the words of the Ramayana and Mahabharata cooking is not a menial occupation fit for slaves, but that everyone should learn this art as a sacred duty? And has he not read of the delights of an Indian feast?

It is to be hoped that this volume will reach many homes in this country, and perhaps, who knows, it will also cross the Channel to France, where the vast production of rice in her Far-Eastern colonies is a source of growing embarrassment to the French consumer. For after reading Dr. Mulk Raj Anand's graceful volume one finds it difficult to believe that there can be too much rice in the world.

CURRENT PERIODICALS

The February issue of \textit{Commercial India} begins with an article entitled "Economic Backbone of India," in which the following passages occur: "Out of the economic distress into which the world has been plunged for VOL. XXIX."
the last two years one fundamental fact emerges. It is the failure of industrialism to adjust itself to the reaction of an over glut of riotous production, of catastrophic falling of prices, and of defective distribution of primary commodities. Industrial cycles are now a truism; slump follows boom as morning follows night. The see-saw of industrial prosperity and adversity carries awhile the masses on a crest of employment to submerge them under a seething sea of unemployment. . . . So man is turning to mother earth for nourishment and healing. Immeasurable waste tracts are awaiting cultivation that shall convert them into colonies of contented folk. Virgin soil is calling for fruitful seed. The promise of food and crops and ancillary yield beckons the plough and the harvester. . . . On Indians primarily lies the obligation of reconstructing India's rural structure. . . . Let Young India build the prosperity of New India on the foundation of golden cereal and crowded paddy." Mr. H. H. Ghosh writes on the Balance of India's Trade; other interesting subjects discussed include "Marketing of Manufactured Goods," "Federal Bank in Bengal," and "A Carrier's Business."

Further attractive features in this very readable publication are book reviews, Indian Produce Outlook, and Notes and Comments.

In the previous issue of the above-mentioned journal, which is now in its twelfth year, there was a prize announcement "for narration of the practical side of the small business and the practical chances that make it a success."
FRANCO-BRITISH ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING
VICTOR JACQUEMONT'S "TRAVELS IN INDIA"

The year 1932 is the centenary of the death of the celebrated
French naturalist Victor Jacquemont, who won fame by his travels
and researches in India from 1829 to 1832.

The Museum of Natural History, who entrusted him with that
mission, and the Academy of Colonial Science, and the Society
of Colonial History, are desirous of honouring the memory of
this great scholar, and a committee under the presidency of Mr.
André Chevillon, member of the French Academy, has decided
to arrange for next May a commemorative ceremony at which
the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and His Excellency the
Ambassador for Great Britain in Paris have kindly undertaken to
preside.

In connection with this event it has been thought fitting to
print the unpublished correspondence of Victor Jacquemont with
the distinguished German geologist de Charpentier, and also to
republish the more important parts of his journal of his Travels
in India, a work now very rare and of very high price. This
masterly picture of the social and political condition of northern
India towards the middle of the nineteenth century is of special
interest to lovers of things Oriental as well as to scholars who
make a study of the Indian world. For Jacquemont, in the course
of his numerous journeyings throughout the length and breadth
of the Indian Empire, gathered a harvest of observations of all
kinds, hoping to make on his return home a judicious selection
from them, but death prevented him. This task has now been
performed by Mr. Martineau, who was formerly Governor of the
French Settlements in India, and now holds the chair of Colonial
History in the Collège de France. He has selected from Jacque-
mont's journal everything dealing with the social condition of
India at that period. This publication is to appear in May, and
will be a revelation of the distinctive life of the Indian peoples
of a hundred years ago, a life that was to be so deeply changed
by prolonged contact with the men and things of Europe. For
Jacquemont brings us face to face with an India that was still
real, still intact, and the portrayal of it which he has left to us
is both attractive and instructive. Whether he speaks to us of the
religious traditions, or of the civic and military institutions, or
the form and appearance of the towns, or describes for us the
English “society” of Calcutta and of Delhi with its racial qualities or its passions, or again of the customs of the Rajas and their subjects, he has always a fresh point of view on old matters. And, lastly, we enter side by side with him into that mysterious Tibet, a visit to which is still in our days a real achievement. In short, it may be said that Jacquemont has pictured India at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and this work, better than any other, enables us to measure the road travelled since that period, and to judge the value of the work done by Great Britain and the effective benefit it has brought to one of the oldest civilizations of the world. Thus the work of this great Frenchman ends by honouring British action in India; and it is eminently satisfactory to think that the stake in an old rivalry has become the means of a fine expression of Franco-British friendship, witnessing to the bonds which unite the intellectual circles in the two countries.*

* Subscriptions to the work, which has six drawings, of which five are by the author, and is printed on linen paper, are being received by Mr. L.-Ph. May, Secretary of the Committee, 101, Boulevard Malesherbes, Paris, VIII*. Copies will be specially reserved for subscribers and printed with their name.

March, 1933.

L. Ph. May.
THE NEW HOTEL ROAD, SRINAGAR (KASHMIR)
THE MINES OF HONGAY (INDOCHINA)
The title of my lecture is "The Reform Proposals and their Reasons." I do not intend to say a great deal about the White Paper proposals, but I want to give some sort of idea of the way in which India has been brought to the present point of political development.

It is not altogether fanciful to look on the political history of India under the British as one act of the great drama of destiny, destiny being, as always in such cases, the necessary result of the national character in action. It is a curious picture, that of the character of a nation driving it along, happy and contented so long as it does not realize whither it is being driven, and protesting uneasily when it discerns the inevitable goal. But of course there are always the few who see and the many who applaud. Political advance in India is just a form of British self-expression. We sow the seed, be it wheat or tares or dragon's teeth, and the harvest follows, true to type, and we have to take it as it comes and make the best of it.

It all really began in that seed-time of modernism, the period of the Revolution in France, the Napoleonic Wars, the industrial revolution in Britain, the beginning of our missionary enterprise, Catholic emancipation, and the growth of democratic ideas and parliamentary reform.

It is difficult to date precisely the beginning of political development in India, but certainly one of the significant dates must be 1813, when Wilberforce persuaded Parliament to allow Christian missionaries to work in British India. Not long before, the East India Company, in discussing a scheme for sending missionaries to India, damned it with seven different epithets in a single sentence, and summed up the proposal by saying that "it struck
against all reason and sound policy, and would bring the peace and safety of the possessions into peril." The first British missionaries accordingly worked under the Danish flag at Serampore. The apprehensions of the Directors were not without substance, but they were out of keeping with the new age which was coming to birth, and would not in any case have been allowed to prevail much longer. The spread of ideas by missionaries, even apart from the direct educational work they have done, has certainly been one of the factors in India's political evolution, and the action of the Government in giving them permission to start work in British India was a remote cause of the situation as we see it today.

**ENGLISH EDUCATION**

A more powerful influence was brought into action twenty years later, when the Government of India definitely adopted the view that "the great object of the British Government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science among the natives of India, and that the funds appropriated to education would be best employed in English education alone." From that time onwards, the minds of Indians in schools and colleges have been steeped in all our British ideas of freedom, Parliament, and responsible government. As a result, these ideas dominate the political thought of India today. It may be true that only about 20 per cent. of the male population over twenty years of age are literate, but practically all the new political ideas which reach the unlettered masses reach them through these 20 per cent.

I think people sometimes fail to realize what a bond of union we have given to India in the English language. The Abstract of the 1931 Census, recently published, shows that out of the whole male population of twenty and over, 1 in 40 know English, but the illuminating figures from this point of view will be those for the cities, which are the centres of political, commercial, professional, and educational activity. Unfortunately, none of the reports for the major provinces have been published, but let me give you some figures from the reports for Baroda, Mysore, and Ajmere, which are among the few that have appeared. I am well
aware that they are not altogether typical, but I confess it surprised me to learn that in Baroda city among men of twenty and over, more than 1 in 6 know English, while among youths of fifteen to twenty, the ratio is more than 1 in 4. The proportion is even higher in Mysore city, 1 in 4 for all males of ten and over. In Ajmere, it is rather over 1 in 7. In Bombay city it is almost as high as in Baroda.

Or to look at the question in another way—just think of the difference between the position of an educated Madrasi who tours the provincial capitals today and that of his great-grandfather who might have visited the same cities a hundred years ago. His great-grandfather would have been a stranger in a strange land, quite unable to make himself understood in most of the places he visited. Today the great-grandson, thanks to his knowledge of English, and the bond of the English language, is able to find out all he wants at the railway stations, book rooms and dispute his bills at the hotels, make purchases at all the big shops, converse with local politicians, officials, seditionists, professors, and press-men, read local papers, explain himself if he gets into trouble with the police, listen to debates in the local council or to cases in the local courts, and lose his money on the local racecourses. There can, indeed, be no question that the English language is a very real bond of union between the different parts of India, and not only the English language, but the English ideas it is used to express.

No one can pretend that the results of English education have been all to the good. The fruit of the tree of knowledge has spoiled many a garden of Eden. Perhaps there would have been more happiness in India if we had kept English education out. It is useless to speculate. The hypothesis is an impossibility, and English education was bound to come. We must take the results as they are, both good and evil. Both are relevant to my subject as both have gone to create the political atmosphere we have to deal with, and both are the direct or indirect consequences of a policy which we have proudly and deliberately followed.
THE OUTLOOK OF YOUTH

Let me hazard the following sketch of the surroundings in which the ordinary boy in a city school and a city college grows to adolescence and maturity. All around him is a feeling that India and the Indians are not treated fairly by the British Government, and that the natives of the country are kept out of their birthright. The English textbooks on history are looked on with distrust, and are suspected of distorting facts for the purpose of glorifying the achievements and justifying the actions of the British. British officials are men who are keeping Indians out of a job, and every youth who has had an English education has, in his own eyes, won a right to an appointment under the Government. The discrepancy between British democratic theory and the bureaucratic system of Government in India is proof of British duplicity. And these doubts and misgivings are not often combated by anyone with whom the boys come in contact, or by any newspaper which comes within their reach or which they care to read. The Indian Press, whether written in English or in the vernacular, works to spread dissatisfaction with the existing system of government; it works, too, to disseminate the belief that the principal aim of the British is to postpone as long as possible the surrender of power and privilege. Any good that we have done is belittled on the ground that we ought to have done a great deal more, and that what we have done is nothing but what any other power in our position would have done. What wonder that in an atmosphere like this the national heroes should be those they are?

I might without exaggeration paint that side of the picture in darker colours, but do not let us forget that there is another side. It may be that too much stress has been laid on liberty, and too little on the restraints and obligations of democracy. That is probably difficult to avoid in the absence of practical experience. But it can, I think, be claimed justly, not only (what is obvious) that our system of education has created a vigorous demand for British institutions, but also that it has familiarized educated Indians with certain concepts which must be of value in helping them to use those institutions as they get them.
INDIANIZATION

Another course of preparation that we have given India for a future in which she will govern herself is the gradual Indianization of the services. Half a century ago, except for a few judicial appointments, practically all the higher services were officered exclusively by Britons. Till 1895, there were no Indians in the Indian Civil Service in my own province, the Punjab. Ten years later there were, I think, three. In 1922, the I.C.S. all over India contained 15 per cent. of Indians. In 1932, 35 per cent. In 1922, the Indian Police contained 10 per cent. of Indians. In 1932, 22 per cent. And at the present moment three-fourths of the members of the Provincial and Central Governments—the Cabinets as we should say—are Indians. A 50 per cent. limit of Indians has been fixed for the present for the I.C.S. and the Indian Police, and it will be reached in the case of the I.C.S. in less than ten years. The White Paper, as you will remember, proposes that an enquiry should be held into the question of recruitment five years after the Act comes into force. Meantime it is to remain, as at present, in the hands of the Secretary of State. I make no forecast as to what will happen then if the scheme goes through. I am merely speaking of the Indianization of the services as one of the paths which lead to self-government, and it is clear that with more than one-fifth of the 700 superior police officers Indians, more than one-third of the 1,300 members of the Civil Service, and three-fourths of the Provincial and Central Cabinets, we have gone a fairly long way already. For the other services I have no figures, but I imagine that except in the commissioned ranks of the Army, where Indianization is much more recent, the percentages must be a good deal higher than in the I.C.S. and the police. An Indian bureaucracy would, of course, be a form of self-government, and we have gone a longish way to create one.

Here, again, we may say that our policy has been ill-judged. From some points of view that may be so, but it is many years now since the Rubicon was crossed. And with the prospect of
having, in a few years' time, half of the great administrative responsibilities of the I.C.S. resting on Indian shoulders, can we maintain the position much longer that the brothers and cousins of these Indian members of the I.C.S., lawyers and merchants and professional and business men, cannot be entrusted even with the duty of criticizing and supporting or ejecting a Ministry? I might find half a dozen reasons to show that we could. But could I find one that would convince the Indian brought up in the atmosphere I have described?

Education and Indianization have thus been two of the paths which lead towards self-government. A third path, a rocky and broken one, which has not been followed with quite the enthusiasm which once was hoped, is that of what we call local self-government, irreverently dubbed "local stuff" in its early days.

**Local Self-Government**

In every country some arrangement has to be evolved for enabling people to manage their petty local affairs, and in India we find from time immemorial the village headmen, the townward chaudhris, and the caste and trade panchayats or committees of five. The old saying is *panj men parmeshwar*, or "where five are gathered together, God is among them." But these bodies all deal with very small or what I may call private units. And in time, if you are seeking to develop democratic institutions, you have to look for larger units and try to give them some method of group-expression, and, what is more, you have to give them definite duties and powers. In this way the process of evolution creeps forward from the townward to the town, and from the villages to the group of villages, the subdivision of a district and the district itself, and you give a statutory basis to the powers and functions of the Boards.

The great development of what we call local self-government is associated with the name of Lord Ripon, who was Viceroy in the early eighties. Perhaps of all the nineteenth-century Viceroyys he was the most popular with the Indian educated classes. The Calcutta Europeans, on the other hand, it is said, at one time formed a conspiracy to kidnap him on his way home from a
dinner party, put him on board a ship which was to be waiting in the Hooghly, and send him back to England.

But to return to the district boards and municipal committees. For many years, partly owing to the apathy of members and partly to the overshadowing influence of the district officer, they did not develop the hoped-for sense of public responsibility and public spirit. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms aimed at relieving them from this dominating official influence, and put the whole of them under an Indian Minister at the headquarters of the province. Since then they have been left too much to themselves, and it has hardly yet been recognized that the discharge of public duties and the power to spend public money demand a system of central control such as we have in England.

The Simon Commission found that the transference of power from official hands had been followed by a fall in efficiency, but that the members had shown an enhanced interest in their work. That is typical probably of the whole of the reforms. The changes made do not imply an improvement in the machinery of administration. The reformers look for their reward on another plane, and, within limits, an increase in interest more than compensates them for a loss in efficiency. In many of the smaller town councils and outlying rural boards, I daresay even now the members would not be sorry to have the burden taken off their shoulders, but, after making all allowances, it can hardly be denied that we have at the present time a very large number of local bodies, each of which in its degree has become the focus of the idea that we mean India to manage its own affairs.

**THE LEGISLATURES**

Education, Indianization, local self-government—three of the paths that we have followed—and at last we come to the main highroad: the development of self-government on what I may call the grand scale—i.e., in the sphere of the governments of the provinces and of India as a whole.

Let me remind you of the principal stages on that road. In the early days of our rule we had our executive governments in each presidency, consisting of the Governors with their Councils. The
making of laws was one of their functions. Seventy-two years ago, with the Act of 1861, came the first step in development. Two new elements were introduced. Non-official Britons and non-official Indians were associated with the official executive Councils, just for the purpose of making laws.

So it remained for thirty years, and then in 1892 came the next advance. The Councils were enlarged, though they were still very small, but the important change lay in the widening of the functions of the Councils. They were no longer to be confined to legislation. The members were given the right to ask questions and to discuss the Budget. The grant of these powers meant the opening up of an altogether new perspective. The members might range over the whole field of administration in their search for information by means of questions, or in the course of the Budget debate. But the Councils were still very small—there were only 10 non-officials even in the Central Council—and there was no system of direct popular election. It was no doubt for these reasons that seventeen years elapsed before the next step was taken.

This was under the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909. The Councils were again enlarged, and three notable changes made. Election was recognized. The provincial Councils were given non-official majorities, and in all the Councils henceforth members were to have the right to move and discuss resolutions.

It must appear to us fairly obvious which way things were tending, and it seems now almost incredible that John Morley, statesman and philosopher, should have said, in reference to these Reforms which were sponsored jointly by him and Lord Minto:—"If it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or indirectly to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India, I, for one, would have nothing at all to do with it." Surely a very striking illustration of what I said at the beginning of my lecture.
The 1917 Announcement

Five years later came the War. The effect of it was to accelerate India's political progress. This was partly due to a good deal of undiscriminating talk by persons in authority about the services of India as a whole which came in extraordinarily useful as an argument in support of political claims. But what had far more effect than this comprehensive sense of obligation was the set of the world-mind in the direction of self-determination. As Lord Curzon said in a note written in June, 1917, when the drafting of the famous announcement which was to be made two months later was under consideration:

We are really making concessions to India because of the free talk about liberty, democracy, nationality, and self-government which have become the common shibboleths of the Allies, and because we are expected to translate into practice in our domestic household the sentiments which we have so enthusiastically preached.

These, then, were the influences which shaped the decision of the Coalition Government to make an announcement of their policy in India. The declaration was that the policy of the British Government in India was the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.

Up to the last moment there had been no word of responsible government. The reference was inserted by Lord Curzon when the draft was circulated on the eve of publication, and it was apparently accepted without further discussion. The Cabinet had other preoccupations. The Ministers were possibly rather sick of the subject and some of them apparently did not take any very deep interest in the discussions. So the thing went through, and Great Britain stood committed to the attempt to establish parliamentary institutions in India. And stranger still, when Mr. Montagu, in obedience to his instructions, returned from India with a scheme for the beginning of responsible government in the provinces, Lord Curzon disowned his own offspring. But the Bill which was later introduced into Parliament to give effect,
with certain modifications, to the proposals of Mr. Montagu and the late Lord Chelmsford, went through without a division on any cardinal point, and another illustration of my initial thesis was added to history.

I need not detail all the changes which this Act of 1919 made—the Second Chamber in the Central Legislature, the power to vote on money demands, and majorities of elected members everywhere. By far the most important change was the introduction of something entirely new in the political history of India, and that was responsibility, in the sense of the executive being responsible to the legislature as the representatives of the people. The principle was not introduced into the Central Government, but in the provinces effect was given to it under the system of dyarchy. I need not explain to the members of the East India Association the meaning of dyarchy, nor need I tell them of the provision the Act made for an enquiry into the working of the new system after a term of years. That enquiry was made by the Simon Commission. The object of the enquiry was to enable Parliament to decide whether the sphere of responsibility should be widened or restricted. The main tests were to be the amount of co-operation received and the sense of responsibility displayed.

THE STATUTORY COMMISSION AND AFTER

The Simon Commission was appointed in 1927, and visited India twice. The Commission’s terms of reference applied only to British India, but they came to the conclusion that the picture would be incomplete if the Indian States were left out, so they got permission to include the question of the future relationship of the States and British India. But the questions involved had not been formally discussed while the Commission was in India, so the Round-Table Conference was arranged in order that the new issues might be discussed with the representatives of the States and of British India.

And it was at this juncture that Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, was authorized by the British Government to declare that Dominion Status was the goal of British policy in India.
The Report of the Simon Commission was presented some months before the Round-Table Conference met. Its recommendations were, briefly:

(1) In the Provinces, full responsibility;
(2) In the Central Government, no responsibility; and
(3) Certain measures which it was hoped would some day lead to Federation between the States and the provinces of British India.

The Round-Table Conference opened in November, 1930, and the warmth of the welcome given to the idea of Federation by the Princes who were present took everyone by surprise. They insisted, however, that the Federal Government which would take the place of the present Government of India should be responsible to the Federal Legislature. This, as it were, forced the hand of the Government and made Federation with a responsible Federal Government an immediate objective, instead of the distant possibility which the Commission’s recommendations would have left it. The further discussions accordingly proceeded on the triple basis of full responsibility in the provinces, Federation and as much responsibility as was practicable in the Central Federal Government.

That is broadly the scheme that is now before Parliament in the White Paper, and it is proposed that the Bill which is to be drafted should provide for the early establishment of responsible autonomy in the provinces, and for the setting up of the Federation when the complicated preliminaries, which will take some years, are completed and a sufficient proportion of the States—roughly one half of the more important of them—have executed the necessary instruments of accession. If the necessary number of States do not come in, the Government is not committed as regards responsibility at the Centre. The Princes therefore hold the key of the situation in their hands, and responsibility at the Centre without Federation is not yet in issue.

**The Indian States**

Now let me go back for a moment. The fifth line of approach to the present position is one which lies outside British India. It
was Lord Hardinge who first summoned what was called a Chiefs’ Conference. The very title seems to carry one back to a past age. The term “chief” as applied to the more important Rulers is as obsolete as the term “native.” Both terms were discarded for similar reasons, and the discarding of them was symbolic of a changing attitude. But the summoning of the Chiefs’ Conference and the establishment later by Royal Proclamation of the Chamber of Princes, marked a complete break with the old policy of isolating the States from each other. It made combination possible and the Princes have found in it a new strength. It is, I think, just to say that, without the Conferences and the Chamber of Princes, the States would never have come into the foreground of Indian politics as they have done, and that the present state of affairs in which the British Government and British India are both, as it appears, waiting for the Princes to say the word which is to decide the political destinies of one-fifth of mankind, could never have arisen.

Lastly, as Lord Reading pointed out in the House of Lords the other day, there is yet another path that India has trodden in her upward advance, the path of association with the United Kingdom and the Dominions in the great events of Imperial history. He referred to the contributions of India to the War, India sitting in the War Cabinet, India signing the Treaty of Peace and the Covenant of the League of Nations, India attending the Imperial Conferences, signing the Ottawa Treaty, and coming to arrangements with the rest of the Dominions. Unless we had meant these acts of association, I will not say as a symbol of a reality which had already passed into fact, but as an earnest of an assured future, it would have been better if we had never laid ourselves open to the implications they necessarily convey.

The British Contribution

We shall not all attach the same value to each of these courses of preparation for democracy and self-government that we have given to India. But surely there can be no doubt as to their cumulative effect, and that we must go ahead towards the goal that we
have fixed. It is we who deliberately, out of great division of opinion, decided to give to India English education and education in British ideas. It is we who, in spite of warnings, decided to Indianize the services. It is we who, braving much ridicule and opposition at the outset, have developed the machinery of local self-government. It is we who, in the face of much gain-saying, have gradually admitted Indians to the higher councils of the country and we who have started them on responsible government. It is we who, in disregard of misgivings, have given the Princes the power of combination and amalgamated the weak and isolated units into a powerful union, and we who have deliberately brought Indian Princes and Indian commoners on to the same platform with the representatives of the United Kingdom, the Great Powers and the Dominions. It is all so characteristic of ourselves, our persevering belief in the merits of British institutions, our conscientious desire to communicate their benefits to those who have been placed in our charge, our intermittent misgivings as to the reactions to what we have done, and our not infrequent blindness to the logical consequences of our actions. But one fact stands out from all this conflict of motives, that when we have had to make a decision, it has never yet been a decision to turn back, and even at the present time, though there are many who feel that the White Paper goes too far, there are practically none who are not in favour of some advance.

I have tried to summarize what I regard as the main historical reasons for the reforms, to give, as it were, a historical background to the present phase, but the main issue on which opinion is split at present is how far Parliament shall go. Is it to give (1) complete responsibility in the provinces except for Law and Order, or (2) complete responsibility in the provinces for everything including Law and Order, in either case reserving to a later date responsibility in the Central Government, or is it to give (3) complete responsibility in the provinces plus partial responsibility in the Federal Central Government? The issue whether responsibility should be given at the centre without Federation has not yet arisen.

The Simon Commission and the Governments in India agreed
in condemning the first and in recommending the second. I need not summarize the reasons. You are familiar with them. As regards the second and third courses, there seems to be an impression that there is some antagonism between the Simon Commission and the White Paper. Sir John Simon put the correct view the other day in the House of Commons. The position was entirely changed at the first session of the Round-Table Conference after the Simon Report had been published, by the welcome given by the Princes to Federation as an immediate possibility if accompanied by some degree of responsibility at the centre. Rightly or wrongly, prudently or precipitately, that attitude of the Princes was accepted at its face value at once. But the acceptance was there, and if any party in the country had wished to challenge the action of Government the usual methods were open.

**WHERE WE STAND**

When at the end of the second session of the Round-Table Conference the Prime Minister asked the House of Commons to approve the Indian policy of the Government, and an amendment was moved, Mr. Baldwin, speaking at the end of the debate, just before the division, made it clear that when a motion like that moved by the Prime Minister is made, any motion to add words or subtract them is, by the acknowledged practice of the House, taken as a vote of censure. In spite of this, the amendment was pressed to a division, and the enormous majority by which the motion of approval was passed seems to me to be an emphatic endorsement of the triple policy of Federation with partial responsibility at the centre and full responsibility in the provinces.

I am aware that Parliament has been assured that it is free to take what course it, in its wisdom, thinks proper in respect to the grant of responsibility, and there is obviously no commitment in regard to any particular safeguard. But the assurance given assumes that the scheme, which in its broad outlines obtained from Parliament so favourable a reception, will now be examined in its detail with a desire to find a solution on those lines, if it is in any way possible. In other words, unless Parliament is con-
vinced after the fullest consideration that no such scheme can be
devised which the United Kingdom, British India, and the States
will agree to work, the triple basis will not be rejected. To that
extent, I believe, we are committed to India, and for that reason
I consider that at present there is no other course open to us but
to endeavour to arrive at a settlement on this basis. It may be
that in the end the States will turn against Federation, and if so
that part of the scheme falls to the ground. But if that should
happen, it should be quite clear that there is no question of the
Princes as a body having let anyone down. The representatives
of the States at the first Round-Table Conference were not pleni-
potentiaries. Individual Princes may have allowed themselves to
be influenced by the super-charged atmosphere of the occasion.
But all that they could do, and all that they did, was to express
the hope that the idea would be welcomed by their brother Princes
as warmly as they welcomed it themselves. They did not and
could not commit either themselves or the other members of their
Order to the acceptance of any particular scheme.

The time has now come for the shaping of the details. Parlia-
ment is not, of course, in the same position as regards the States
as it is in regard to British India. As regards British India, it is
supreme, so far as mere statute can make it so. As regards the
States, it is not. As regards British India, it can insist on any
provision it deems essential. As regards the States, it cannot.
But even in regard to British India, there is always a margin
between what can be insisted on and what can be worked. All
that I am concerned to urge today is that we in England should
feel that our immediate object is Federation on the lines laid
down, and that we are bound to weigh the scheme which has
been put forward by the National Government with an earnest
desire to find in it the solution of which Parliament has declared
that it holds so fair a promise, a United India in an undisturbed
Empire.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, May 9, 1933, when a paper was read by Sir John Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., on “The Reform Proposals and their Reasons.”

The Right Hon. Lord Lamington, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E. (in the unavoidable absence of the Most Hon. the Marquess of Reading, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O.), was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

Sir Louis Dane, G.C.I.E., C.S.I., the Maharajadhiraja of Burdwan, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., the Maharajkumar of Burdwan, Violet Viscountess Melville, the Lady Pentland, Major-General Sir Arthur Money, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.B., C.S.I., and Lady Money, Sir Michael O’Dwyer, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., Sir Patrick Fagan, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Manubhai Mehta, K.C.S.I., Sir Robert Gillan, K.C.S.I., Sir Elliot G. Colvin, K.C.S.I., Sir John Cumming, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Hugh McPherson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir John Maynard, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Edward Gait, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., Sir Philip Hanson, C.B., and Lady Hanson, Sir Hari Singh Gour, Colonel Sir Richard Needham, C.I.E., D.S.O., Sir Annepu P. Patro, Sir Thomas Smith, Sir James MacKenna, C.I.E., Sir Charles Armstrong, Sir Hubert Carr, Sir Lawless Hepper, Sir Wilberforce Ross Barker, K.C.I.E., C.B., Lady Abbas Ali Baig, Lady (Lionel) Jacob, Miss Eleanor Rathbone, M.P., Colonel S. B. A. Patterson, C.S.I., C.I.E., Mr. F. G. Pratt, C.S.I., Ghazanfar Ali Khan, C.I.E., Mr. V. H. Boallth, C.B.E., Mr. John Ross, I.S.O., Miss Cornelia Sorabji, K.-i-H., Mr. A. Sabonadiere, Mr. C. P. Caspersz, Mr. M. S. A. Hydari, Canon Arthur Davies, Mr. H. S. L. Polak, Mr. Sachchidananda Sinha, Mr. A. H. Joyce, Mrs. R. M. Milward, Mr. Kenneth C. Keymer, Mr. Alexander Inglis, Mr. Joseph Nissim, Mr. H. R. H. Wilkinson, Colonel W. G. Hamilton, Mrs. Weir, Mrs. F. Loraine Petre, Mrs. N. B. Dewar, Maulvi A. R. Dard, Professor H. G. Rawlinson, C.I.E., Mr. S. T. Sheppard, Mr. R. N. Mazumdar, Mr. Zafarullah Khan, Mr. S. A. Shere, Mr. A. R. N. Hussain, Mr. S. A. Rafique, Mr. H. M. Willmott, Mr. K. M. Pardhy, Mr. W. H. Jones, Mr. C. Cockburn, Syed Amjad Ali, Mr. Glenn, Mr. D. W. Watkins, Mr. George Pilcher, Miss Caton, Mr. H. B. Holme, Mr. T. A. H. Way, Mr. C. M. Mehta, Miss C. K. Cumming, Miss Margaret Brown, Mr. G. H. Ormerod, Mr. J. B. Hall, Mrs. C. H. Bell, Mr. R. C. Lai, Mr. E. M. Hartree, Miss Rodney, Miss L. Andrade, Mr. Gerald Thompson, Mr. Gray, Mr. W. F. Westbrook, Mr. R. K. Ranadive, Miss Thompson, the Nawabzada of Toru, Mrs. and Miss Bains, Swami B. H. Bon, Mr. Hartog, Miss Hanson, Mr. O. C. G. Hayter, Mrs. Barns, Mrs. E. W. Harral, Mr. Morris Horovitch, Mrs. Tyrrell, Miss L. M. Saunders, Rev. R. Burges, Mr. and Mrs. E. F. Harris, Mr. A. J. R. Hickes, Mr. B. K. Sinha, Mr. S. S. Mahomed Ali, Mr. E. F.
The Reform Proposals and their Reasons

Rathbone, Mr. Madhav Rao, Mrs. Fowle, Mr. E. E. Hall, Mr. E. C. Wrench, and Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The following letter, dated May 8, was received from the Marquess of Reading:

"Dear Mr. Brown,

"I very much regret that it will not be possible for me to take the chair at Sir John Thompson's lecture tomorrow afternoon. You will remember that when I provisionally accepted your invitation I explained that my acceptance must be subject to my finding it necessary to attend the House of Lords. It now happens that I must be in the House of Lords tomorrow afternoon.

"Please express my great regret to Sir John Thompson and to the Association.

"I am the more sorry as I much desired to hear the views of Sir John, who has had long and varied experience in India, and has filled important posts as a member of the I.C.S.

"Yours very truly,

"Reading."

The Chairman: I am sure you will share my regret that Lord Reading, who was to have presided this afternoon, has been detained in the House of Lords by a debate in relation to India. We deplore the fact that he is not here. He might have given us some very valuable guidance as to his views on the delicate position in connection with the White Paper proposals.

I am not going to say more at the outset of the meeting. It will be more profitable if we have from Sir John Thompson at once the benefit of his advice and experience. That experience is very great, as he gave up his office as Chief Commissioner of Delhi Province only last year. We are told that most people, when they have been three or four years away from India, know nothing of the situation, but this afternoon we shall hear someone with up-to-date experience.

Sir John Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.: I think if we were to be deprived of the presence of Lord Reading, who is one of the protagonists in this great controversy, there is something peculiarly satisfying to us as a society that we should meet this afternoon to discuss this important question under the chairmanship of our own President. (Applause.)

(The paper was then read.)

The Chairman: We have listened to a carefully thought out address, which traces very clearly the chief steps by which the present policy connected with India has been arrived at.

At the outset Sir John alluded to the importance of the education and training we have given Indians for many years past. I agree with him to a large extent. I think it was a great pity that young Indians were tempted to take up higher education without any serious consideration being given to the formation of their character. Having passed with their very clever brains and quick intellects, they found they could not put to a useful pur-
pose the obtainment of these university distinctions. The result was that they not unnaturally became discontented and challenged what they considered to be our method of government as being inconsistent with those principles of freedom and Parliamentary rule on which we had laid such stress during their training.

To come more to the present time, we have arrived at a very complicated situation. Sir John in his purview of the different stages of this political development has assumed that we have almost drifted to the present position, as if almost unconsciously we had developed on the present lines and thereby arrived at a situation we had not foreseen. There was one stage where I think we should have taken up a strong position and tried to arrive at a clear understanding of what we should do towards Indian self-government, and that was after Sir John Simon's Commission had reported. A very clear issue was then before our country. But unluckily for some political reasons at home the Commission was given the go-by; and we had the Round-Table Conferences which have led to some very difficult situations at the present time. I think Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who has very strong views on the subject, will agree that, had we worked on the Simon Commission Report, the position would be much simpler today than it is.

That is an instance of how a Parliamentary Government in this country can adversely affect the conditions of Indian Government. It was strictly a party intrusion into the consideration of Indian affairs that led to the abandonment—or practical side-tracking—of the Simon Commission Report. It seems to me, whatever the future developments may be, that the less Parliamentary action in this country is concerned with Indian affairs, so much the better for India.

That is really also practically supported by that statement which Sir John has just read out of the late Lord Morley's opinion as to responsible self-government in India. He was a Liberal of very advanced thought, and if he could disclaim the idea of setting up Parliamentary Government in India, it shows that there is another side to the question. The mere fact of putting our institutions into working order in India will not necessarily lead to success. I think in one speech he made in the House of Commons he doubted whether a democracy like ours could retain control of a great Empire like that of India.

However, that must lie in the womb of the future. At the present time we have reached the stage where a Committee of the two Houses of Parliament is considering what form of government should be set up. And I suppose the critical feature of the present moment is that alluded to by Sir John in the latter part of his address as to the action of the Princes in regard to the new Constitution: that if they decide they will not come in and share in the new Constitution, what will our Government or what will the people of this country do? I am not going to attempt to say what will be the best course to pursue. I do not think anybody could speak advisedly at the present moment on this subject, but it is now the real crux of the whole question. We only hope that some satisfactory agreement will be arrived at by the Joint Committee now sitting. I strongly hold that we have gone so far now that we must try to give effect on a general basis to
what is contained in the White Paper. Things have got to the stage where the more discussion there is, the better realization the people of this country will have of the importance of the question, and they will be able to give a sounder judgment if all the pros and cons have been put before them.

Sir Michael O'Dwyer: We have all listened with great interest and great profit to the admirably lucid, and, I think, on the whole impartial, survey of the situation that Sir John has given us. The White Paper is indeed fortunate in having found in him so able and eloquent an advocate. I can speak with some experience because fifteen years ago, after the Montagu announcement had been made, I was Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and Sir John was my Chief Secretary. I owed much to his power of criticizing that particular provision which aimed at giving responsible government in the provinces. Things have moved since then. Sir John, as we have heard, is now in favour of wholly responsible government in the provinces and partial responsibility at the Centre. I am afraid I still retain the opinion that conditions are not ripe for full responsibility in the provinces or for any responsible government at the Centre, and I will endeavour to give you the reason why.

Perhaps I have a pre-war mind, but may I say that the pre-war mind in Indian matters is one that regarded the interests of the masses of the Indian people as having priority over any constitutional experiments? The one test to be applied to any constitutional change was this: Will this promote the interests of the people, and especially of the illiterate masses who are not able to safeguard their own interests? That test should be applied even now. To me one of the greatest omissions in the White Paper and in the debates of the Round-Table Conferences is this, that not one word has been said to show that these far-reaching proposals are going to promote the welfare and the prosperity of the Indian peoples.

That is the more significant because, in the Statute of 1919 on which we are working, Parliament expressly declares that it is responsible for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples. The welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples is the supreme consideration. Let us apply that test, the Parliamentary test, to the proposals now put forward. What are the essentials of good government in any country, and especially in an Oriental country? (1) External and internal security. (2) Impartial administration and justice. (3) An efficient and progressive administration in all departments. (4) Last, but not least, light taxation. We in England take the first three for granted. In the East they are rare, outside India under our rule. I hold that the proposals put forward in the White Paper conflict, seriously conflict, with every single one of those considerations.

Let us take first external and internal security. We know that it is proposed that the Army should remain in control of the Viceroy. But Indian politicians have resented that and demand, many of them, even the so-called moderate ones, that a time limit should be set for the withdrawal of British troops. As you know, prior to British rule in India, no invasion of India ever failed. Since British rule has been established no invasion has succeeded.
Take the matter of internal security. We are supposed to transfer straight away the 180,000 Indian police which now so admirably maintains security even in the most trying conditions to the control of the Ministers in the provinces. It is logical from one point of view, but you have to remember that in every province of India you have a communal majority, a Muslim majority in the three smaller provinces, a Hindu majority in the rest, and you are proposing to transfer control of the police and the courts, which should be the impartial safeguards of every man, to the control of a Minister who represents a permanent communal majority in the province and must inevitably be guided in the discharge of his duty by the wishes of his supporters. I say that is a very risky experiment, and one which causes alarm to all the minorities.

Let us pass on to the question of the impartial administration of justice. It is the one thing, I suppose, which gives us the greatest reason for pride in India that we have made the administration of justice impartial and that our Indian judges and magistrates have come up to that standard. But that standard is due to the presence of a considerable British element in the judiciary. That British element is rapidly disappearing, with the inevitable result that the administration of justice is deteriorating. I will not ask you to take my word for that. Last year I met the Indian Chief Justice of an Indian High Court. I had known him in India. I said, "Well, how are you getting on?" He replied, "I am labouring under enormous difficulties. At present, of 26 district judges, 17 are Indian, 5 British, and 2 Anglo-Indians. Owing to the great mass of cases in which communal questions arise, there is a general demand for a British judge. I have not been able to meet it, and people are beginning to lose confidence in the administration of justice."

That shows you what risks you run if you transfer the administration of justice as well as the police to the control of Indian Ministers representing communal majorities. You had an illustration of that in the final sitting of the Round-Table Conference, when the two members representing the great minorities in the Punjab both stood up and said, "If the future provincial administration means the rule of a communal majority, we prefer not to go forward at all."

Then we come to efficient administration in the Departments. It is now proposed to transfer the great Departments of Land Revenue, Irrigation, Finance, Forests, which have hitherto been reserved. That in itself is an enormous step forward. I would be prepared to take the risk, but only if you maintain the small British element. After all, all those great Departments were established by the British. Their efficiency is largely due to the British officials at the head. Train up as you are doing your Indian officials to take their place, but do not eliminate the British personnel, and while racial and religious cleavages are so acute do not transfer control of the police and the courts. Be content with the other Departments, and in them retain a substantial British element, not in the interests of British people, but in the interests of the masses. The last thing they desire is to get rid of the British officer, to whom they look for fair play, for they stand outside and above racial and religious divisions.
Finally, we come to the last test of all—taxation. We know this year it has been found most difficult to balance the all-India Budget. We also know that most of the provincial Budgets have had a serious deficit. Sir George Schuster, in introducing the Budget, said we only balanced it this year by severe cuts. People in India are groaning under heavy taxation. "But," he said, "let me remind you, if the proposed Federal Government comes into existence a great increase of taxation will be necessary." Let us hear from the point of view of practical men and taxpayers, whether in India or in this country, what the increased taxation will be.

You have to subsidize two new provinces. You lose Burma's contribution of 2½ millions. You have to meet the heavy cost of the enlarged provincial and federal legislatures, Ministers, etc., and of a general election for 35 million proposed voters. Next year the opium revenue will disappear—i.e., another 2 or 2½ millions to make good. Finally, you have also to remember that, in order to try and induce the Princes to enter the Federation, one of the baits held out to them is that the tribute some of them at present pay will be remitted. So a country trying to pay its way is to be called on to find at least another 9 or 10 millions. How do you think that the average man in India will look at it? That was a point of view which was never examined all through the deliberations of the Round-Table Conferences. I agree with what Sir Robert Horne, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, said in the House of Commons on that particular point. He said, "Of the 350 million people of India, at least 300 millions, if they were told they would have to pay extra for this new Constitution, would refuse the gift. All of this about people yearning to govern themselves even at a higher cost is entirely fallacious."

I have tried to bring down those lofty constitutional sentiments which Sir John so admirably expressed to the level of the common sense of the situation as it affects the average man at the present day. I think there is reason to believe—I hope my forecast is wrong—that the average man, above all the 90 per cent. who are not interested in politics and have no vote, will be a sufferer owing to the decrease in security, the decrease in the efficiency of the services and of the administration of justice, and the increased taxation. Surely the price is too high.

I admit you have to go forward with this experiment, but Parliament must be the final judge of whether the measures to be proposed will not only satisfy the aspirations of Indian politicians, but primarily will promote the welfare and prosperity of the Indian peoples, and I am content to have that test applied. If it were shown that the White Paper survives that latter test, I would give it my blessing; but I hold that it does not.

The Maharajah of Burdwan: Lord Lamington, Ladies, and Gentlemen,—In spite of the damper of the last speaker, you have got to go ahead with regard to India.

(Sir Michael O'Dwyer: I agree.)

Sir Michael is no doubt very sincere in what he says and what he believes, but let me assure him as an old friend that he is not only out of date today in the eyes of modern India, but I am much afraid that, with the exception
of a very few, the educated Indian does not regard him as a real friend of Indian aspirations of today.

I must congratulate Sir John Thompson on the tone of his paper and for such a lucid exposition of the development of self-government in India. In view of the fact that the Joint Parliamentary Committee is discussing the proposals of the White Paper, and that my unfortunate countrymen from India have come to help them in a very dubious position, I do not propose to say anything as to what is going to be the result. But I can assure you that, never having belonged to the exalted order of the Princes, I thank my stars today that I do not belong to that order. For I think that the Indian Princes have been put into a very difficult position in connection with these reforms and in connection with the position that they did take up at the first Round-Table Conference.

All I wish to say to those interested in the Indian problem is, Do not forget that one of the reasons that the Simon Commission’s Report was not acceptable to India was because in it there was no proposal for any responsibility in the Centre. And those who want to hide behind the recommendations of that Report today, and those who say, “Why not take the Simon Commission’s Report?” seem to forget that, so far as the provinces were concerned, the Simon Commission suggested and proposed full responsibility and not keeping back law and order. I heard very carefully what Sir John Simon had to say in the House of Commons the other day with regard to the transfer of law and order, and, in spite of the difficulties that I know we shall have in the Province of Bengal, I am inclined to agree with Sir John in giving full responsibility.

All I wish those interested in the reforms for India to consider is that, should Federation fail, you cannot go back; you cannot take away even the partial power that the Assembly has today, and therefore you must be prepared, with or without the Princes, to give partial responsibility in the Centre.

Sir Manubhai Mehta, Prime Minister of Bikaner: I am much obliged for this opportunity of expressing some of my views, especially because I am one of those who represent the Indian States and the Princes.

I must first acknowledge my gratitude to Sir John Thompson, who has been connected with the Indian States for many years, and who has placed the standpoint of the Indian Princes in a very clear light. His paper has been admirably lucid, and the way in which he has expressed the attitude of the Princes leaves very little for me to say. Only I will add this, that it might appear from his remarks that the Princes at the time of the first Round-Table Conference leapt into the dark by accepting Federation. Let me at once correct this impression. The Princes had thought of Federation for many years. I have had the privilege and honour of working with the Princes for the last seventeen years, from the time the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were in contemplation and when the Princes’ Chamber was being conceived. I had the fortune of being associated with the Princes in their deliberations at that time. I had the good fortune of being the Chief Minister of Baroda, and I remember in a Memorandum which the Maha-
rajar Gaekwar sent H.E. the Viceroy in 1917 he held that Federation was the only solution which would satisfy the Princes in the new Constitution. So since 1917 the idea of Federation has been working in the minds of the Princes. In the Montagu-Chelmsford Report there is an equally clear suggestion of the desire of the Princes to come into the Federation, and the same goal was foreshadowed by Sir John Simon in the Report of the Statutory Commission.

Federation, therefore, was not a new concept into which we leapt as with closed eyes. It was not by bungling or blundering that we accepted Federation, but we had clearly arrived at that idea fostered and cherished by many long hours of thinking. We wanted really—to be very frank—we wanted to conserve the interests of all the four important parties connected with this question: First, of the Princes; secondly, our subjects of the States; thirdly, the British-Indians, our countrymen; and, lastly, H.M. the King Emperor. When the Congress passed the resolution about independence, it was the Princes who said they would fight for His Majesty, with whom they were bound by treaties of alliance. In order to mark their disapproval of this idea of independence, they encouraged and accepted this concept of Federation within the British Empire. They said India must always remain within the British Empire.

Secondly, they wanted some good for themselves. Up to now, in questions of joint concern, of joint interest, like Customs, railways, post and telegraph, currency and exchange, the Indian States were affected, but they were never consulted. Whatever was decided they had to accept. The Indian States wanted some voice in the future deliberations, and therefore they welcomed Federation. Thirdly, they sought the interests of their own subjects, who pay Customs to the extent of about Rs.9 crores. They do not get any advantage in return. The salt duties, railway fares, increases in the postal and telegraph charges are all levied from them without any consultation. The Indian Princes wanted that their subjects should share in the joint benefits.

Fourthly, the Princes looked to their own countrymen. The British Indians wanted political progress, and some of the Indian Princes at the time of the Round-Table Conference gladly declared that they were Indians first and Princes later. In this way they wanted to conserve all the four interests, and I meant this when I said it was not by bungling or mistake that the Princes jumped into Federation, but they did it of set purpose.

When I read the other day Sir John Thompson’s very lucid and admirable essay on the White Paper and the coming reforms, I noted that there is probably some misapprehension as regards the attitude of the Princes. It was remarked in the paper that as the present Chancellor is now the Maharajah of Patiala and the Vice-Chancellor is the Maharana of Dholpur, perhaps the old idea of Federation has been given up and the new idea of Confederation has been given prominence, and there is a split amongst the Princes of two different schools of thought.

I beg leave to correct this impression by saying that after 1932 there has been no such divergence of opinion amongst the Princes. By the Delhi Pact the Princes have all come to think in the same way, and it was in
order to mark this very unanimity that they elected the Maharajah of Patiala to be Chancellor and the Maharana of Dholpur to be the Vice-Chancellor. It is only an acknowledgment of this fact that some of the Princes might think that it would be more advantageous to them to confederate together before they came into the Federation. They were free to do so, and many of the smaller States would find it advantageous to first enter into a confederation amongst themselves before they enter into Federation with British India.

Now, therefore, there is very little doubt that the Princes will join the Federation. I have myself no doubt that the Princes will come in, as there are only three or four outstanding points which require examination in the coming discussions. They are very simple.

First, there is some difference of opinion as regards votes or seats in the Upper Chamber. According to well-understood principles of Federation, it is the States and their Governments that are represented in the Upper Chamber, and the States are all individually represented and equally represented; whether one is a big State and the other a small State, they have equal representation in the Upper Chamber. The Princes wanted this quota of equal representation. Naturally, the larger States wanted their predominance to be maintained even in the Upper Chamber. Though they have tried their best to solve this problem, I am afraid it has remained insoluble and will have ultimately to be decided by His Majesty's Government.

Secondly, there is the question of the quota of votes to be given to the States. Originally, from the first, we have been asking that the Indian States should be regarded as co-equal partners with British India. They have been asking for 50 per cent. of seats. British-Indians would not agree to this, but have finally agreed to give them 40 per cent. in the Council of State. Now, in the White Paper it is mentioned that if the Princes do not join in their full strength, but if only 50 per cent. join, the Federation will materialize. Then it will not be 40 per cent. votes which will be given, but only less—it may be 20 per cent. There the Princes find a stumbling-block. They will not agree to come into the Federation on that basis as weak or sleeping partners.

It is for you, gentlemen, to see that the Princes are brought in as efficient factors in the Federation, and not merely brought there under conditions which lead them to believe they will never be able to do any good. That was one view they have been urging, and they hope that that position will also be cleared up.

Thirdly, there was the question which has nothing to do with the White Paper, and that is one of paramountcy. We have Sir Harcourt Butler's proposition in the Report of his Committee that paramountcy must always remain. The Princes have always urged that it should be something that can be defined, that they can understand. They want a reference to an ad hoc judicial tribunal in all justiciable points of difference with the Government.

Lastly, there is the question of taxation. The Princes always agreed that the federal sources of revenue may be confined to any indirect sources of
taxation and not be extended to direct taxation. That also is mostly agreed. I do not therefore anticipate much difficulty.

The Princes have always asked for central responsibility. Without that there will be no Federation. Just as H.M. Government have said that there cannot be any responsibility at the Centre without Federation, I reverse this, and I say there will not be any Federation unless there is full central responsibility, because the Princes want to come into the Federation in order that they may also share in that central responsibility. I maintain that central responsibility should be looked to if Federation is to be made possible.

These are two interdependent questions, and I trust that the Select Committee of Parliament will find a way in which these ideas can be harmoniously combined.

I have a great respect for Sir Michael O'Dwyer, but I must say I was not convinced by his remarks. He referred to the desirability of retaining law and order and not transferring it to the responsible Government. I will only ask him this: In the Indian States there are 80 millions of subjects. Is not law and order properly preserved amongst Indian States? Indian States are not a hotbed of riots and disorder always. Therefore I fail to see how law and order will not be properly looked to if they are in the care of Indian Ministers who are equally responsible in the Indian States for looking to law and order.

Secondly, he said, quoting one Chief Justice, that at present he looked to English judges in order that impartial justice may be given. I quite agree, but that is because there has been such tension of communal feeling. What is the reason why there should be such communal feelings and bitterness in British India and not in Indian States? The reason is not far to seek. It is only of late that in Kashmir there has been trouble, but I am afraid that was also due to outside influence of the same communal type.

As regards taxation, if you can reduce the expenditure to some extent it is possible to avoid enhanced taxation. The military expenditure has been lately reduced from Rs.55 to Rs.48 crores. If you try to come down further to its pre-war level, I am hopeful it may yet be reduced to an appreciable extent. There are several ways in which expenditure could be reduced, and therefore taxation kept within restraint. I am accordingly not despondent as regards the success of the new reforms. Let us all initiate the new era in the spirit of hope, with faith in the justice of the cause.

Sir Annapu Parasuram Patro: After the very lucid review by Sir John Thompson it seems to me unnecessary to add to the very thoughtful observations made on the present position. We are greatly indebted to him for the exposition of the matter at this juncture, when opinions in this country seem to be divided. But I am sure what he has said today, when it reaches those that have entertained doubts regarding the capacity of India and Indians to work out the political scheme as described in the White Paper, those doubts will disappear.

I would ask the British Parliament to consider that today India stands unique in the Empire. You called on India to sign the great Treaty of
Peace at Versailles. You invited India to take part in the Imperial Conferences. You asked India to take part in the Ottawa Pact. You have asked India to bear every responsibility. You felt that India is capable of bearing all this responsibility. And now, according to the opposition to the White Paper, India is not competent to discharge any responsibility. There, it seems to me, all reason and logic has forsaken the opposition.

Sir Michael O'Dwyer was a very strong administrator. The Punjab was his great field of activity. I am glad to note the statement of the late Lord Birkenhead that the Punjab has worked the dyarchic system successfully. The system which Sir Michael O'Dwyer condemned, the principles which he said were all wrong, has now proved to be a success, and he was a false prophet.

(Sir Michael O'Dwyer interpolated that he had quoted the representatives of the minorities of the Punjab.)

I hope that the able administrator will just remember something of his past life as an administrator, so that he may realize that these disjointed remarks of certain individuals, taken away from their context, give a different meaning from what was intended. I was present when they spoke. I do not think that they would support Sir Michael O'Dwyer. I have the high authority of the late Lord Birkenhead in a speech in the House of Lords, when he said Madras and the Punjab had succeeded in working the dyarchic system. Lord Birkenhead was not a man given to sentiment or emotion, but a matter-of-fact man.

Then Sir Michael O'Dwyer asked whether the success of the proposals outlined in the White Paper would benefit the people. Sir, I come from the people. I do not come from the aristocracy or the bureaucracy. I come from the agricultural people. I move with them, live with them. The people want changes and reforms. The many forces which the British in their love of fair play and justice have introduced into India, the many influences, have gradually worked on the minds of the people, and today in the villages, Sir Michael, you would see a different spectacle from what you saw twenty years ago.

Today the newspaper is read at the centre of the village. Today the people deliberate questions relating to their village and to their circle. They discuss these things in a very interesting manner. Therefore the interest that has been aroused is due to the British influence, British education, and British justice. Do you now say all this is to be ignored, that India is not yet fit to govern herself? (Sir Michael O'Dwyer: I say, go by stages.) Yes, go by stages is a different matter. What is a stage in your sense is not a stage in the sense in which we recognize it.

Indian Nationalism is the self-expression of the British rule in India. Are you going to disown that which you have created among the people, among the ancient race, among the ancient civilization? Britain has created a force and a power which will strengthen the Empire. Do not lose this opportunity.

Sir Michael, may I appeal to your school of thought and say that you were short-sighted in the matter, that you are not able to see that a great national sentiment is growing in the minds of the people. Not among the
intelligentsia only, but among the real people you will see today a spectacle different from that which you were accustomed to observing some years ago.

Sir Michael O'Dwyer has said that there are four tests of the efficiency of administration. Surely they are standards which he followed as Governor of the Punjab. First, he said, internal and external security. All of us have accepted that for the time being defence shall be in the hands of the British. What we want is gradual training. As officers are trained and available, give opportunities for military service to Indians. That is what we want. Not at once to send away all the British element in the military forces. We do not want to eliminate all the British forces at once. We want you to train us, give us opportunities for training Indians, so that they may gradually take the place of the Britishers; ultimately British and Indians joining together may work for the defence of the country. That is the position we are aiming at, and it is not the position which has been described to you, ladies and gentlemen: "Oh, Indian politicians want the British soldiers to go out of India." It is not true.

Then there is the finance of India. Sir Michael said that India is groaning under taxation. The Indian's heart is breaking. Therefore pray save him from these reforms. I have heard cries when Sir Michael was the head of the Punjab administration and the land system was being reorganized. I wish I had heard such sentiments from the head of the Government, to save the poor ryot and cultivator from burdens of land tax at that time. Today it is very easy to say when there is no personal responsibility. It is very easy to cry aloud and plead for the taxpayer. Sir, we know our own burdens. But these are not due to reforms. Our heavy taxation is the work of the administrations in the past.

Take this one single item: Before the war the military expenditure of India was about Rs.24 crores. After the war it came to Rs.52, Rs.56, Rs.58 crores. The highest proportionate expenditure on military defence in the whole world! How came it to rise from Rs.24 to Rs.58 crores? Is it the result of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, or the result of the White Paper? The problem is there. The burden was laid by these administrators on the suffering ryot. I am grateful that Sir Michael feels sympathy for him.

Sir Michael has said peace and order are very good things, but he thinks they should be in the hands of Europeans only. (Sir Michael O'Dwyer demurred that he had not said that.)

Today you have peace and order administered by Indian councillors. In every province you find the subject of law and order is in the hands of an Indian administrator. It has been so for the last ten years. Law and order have been administered properly in the interests of the country by an Indian administrator. Why should there be any doubt now? The Minister will be the same as he is today. He realizes his responsibilities. Therefore it is not true to say that an Indian Minister will not be able to administer law and order. There should be no doubt whatever of the capacity or of the disinterestedness of Indians to administer these subjects.

As regards the proposals outlined in the White Paper, we say we are
going to work the reforms and ask the other parties to work the reforms. The tendency in India today is not to reject the White Paper. It would be wrong to say that India is opposed to the proposals of the White Paper. India wants those proposals modified in various directions. But all we say is that the proposals will be welcomed by all constitutionalist parties in India. All that we want is that some alterations should be made, so that the proposals may be more acceptable to the people.

Sir Patrick Fagan: I rise, my lord, at this late hour with much deference to offer a few critical remarks on the very interesting paper which has been read by my old friend and colleague, Sir John Thompson. We have often had heart-to-heart talks about these matters, but I am afraid that we have never yet been able to convince each other about our respective views.

If I understand him correctly, his view is that the present position, with which the White Paper is confronted, is wholly the inevitable result of British racial and national characteristics, or character, in their impact on Indian conditions during the one and a half centuries of connection between Britain and India. It is, as it were, the inescapable working of destiny.

It seems to me that there is a considerable degree of exaggeration, perhaps misconception, in that view. I suggest that the results of the impact or the contact between the two cultures has in many respects been collision rather than assimilation. Considerable portions of the educated classes in India appear disposed to reject many of our British and Western ideals. At one end you have Mr. Gandhi, who is apparently disposed to say: "Away with all the paraphernalia of Western culture!" His panacea for the economic evils of India would apparently be the cult of the spinning wheel and, I suppose, similar measures. At the other end you have the Brahmin, stanch in his desire for the maintenance of that majestic and venerable structure, the Hindu religio-social system.

I should therefore be disposed to deny very strenuously that British ideals and notions and conceptions of such things as Parliamentary government, responsible government, democracy, the fundamental conditions of democracy and democratic conditions, have, in fact, been really assimilated by the masses of the population of India.

The present position—that is the position here and now with which the White Paper is concerned—seems to me to be far more the result of political indecision and of the shifts of policy demanded by considerations of immediate political expediency which we have seen during the last sixteen years rather than the normal and natural result of the contact between Britain and India which has obtained for the last century and a half.

The very interesting paper to which we have listened supplies a considerable field for discussion on many subjects. It is impossible, of course, to deal with them all. One of the most interesting passages, I think, was that regarding the youth of India. I am sorry that it is quite impossible for me in the few minutes to touch on that in any adequate way. There came to my mind the saying of a great and wise man, who many years ago reminded us all that we were all fallible, all liable to make mistakes, even the youngest of us.
It is well that youth should have its ideals. I fully sympathize with that point of view. The burden of years has not, I hope, led me to scepticism regarding that matter. But the wiser part of youth, I think, very generally or frequently, as it matures, comes to see that its ideals must be viewed in the light of practical possibilities, and that the real work of the idealist is not to grasp hurriedly at the realization of his ideals for himself or in his own time, but to work, it may be obscurely and humbly, for their realization in due time to come. I think that we may hope that many Indian youths who are prone to entertain ideas and opinions of the kind which Sir John indicated in his paper will in time learn something of that higher wisdom.

One other point was local self-government. Of its results Sir John was not able to give us a very encouraging account. It appears that there has been an increase of interest and a decrease of efficiency. That does seem to me to be rather a curious combination of results, and one rather trembles to think what the results will be of increased interest and decreased efficiency in the wider spheres of federal and provincial government. Doubtless enthusiastic reformers will find their reward on that plane, but the question seems to me to be what the inarticulate masses of India will think about it, whether they will appreciate the fact that increase of interest on the part of those above them compensates for a decrease of efficiency.

In the concluding portion of the paper Sir John deals with the history of the last sixteen years. He begins with what I may call the incubation of the famous message of 1917. If his account is correct—and I have no doubt whatsoever that it is correct—I venture to think that it is scarcely reasonable to suggest that action of that nature, hastily decided and, so to speak, fortuitous, should be regarded as the normal and natural outcome of British contact with India.

I venture to predict that, when all the circumstances of that curious story shall become known in the future, posterity will stand amazed at the haste, the precipitancy, the rashness with which the interests of 300 millions of people were dealt with by the British Government in the stress of the Great War.

I was going to make a few more remarks, but I will only conclude by repeating my view that the immediate position present here and now with which the White Paper is confronted is not the logical natural outcome of the history of the past one and a half centuries. That period has doubtless generated conditions which require sane, orderly, tentative, and educative political progress. But there is neither necessity nor justification for the revolutionary scheme with which we are confronted.

Sir James MacKenna: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have been asked to propose a vote of thanks to the lecturer and to the Chairman this afternoon. This is the second paper that Sir John Thompson has given the Association during this session, and I am sure you will all agree that the discussion on this one has induced far more liveliness than that on New Delhi. How much that is due to Sir John and how much to Sir Michael O'Dwyer I will leave you to decide.
With regard to the Chairman, our obligations to you, sir, are continual and continuing. To preside over a meeting in an emergency and at short notice is a very small item in what we owe to you as our President.

I will ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to accord a very hearty vote of thanks to Lord Lamington and Sir John Thompson.

Sir John Thompson: Lord Lamington has asked me to thank you, both on his behalf and on my own, for the vote of thanks which has been passed. I do feel very grateful to everybody here for the way in which they have taken my remarks, and, above all, I may say, to my old friends Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Sir Patrick Fagan. There is that between us that makes it impossible for me to cross swords with either of them in public.

We often feel, as we read the history of British India and look at the stage which we have reached, that we should like to wring someone's neck. The moral of what I have told you today is that the necks that we want to wring have long since moulder in the dust. (Applause.)
INDIAN REACTIONS TO THE WHITE PAPER

By A. Yusuf Ali, C.B.E.

When the East India Association asked me at very short notice to prepare a paper on the present situation in India, it occurred to me that it might be profitable to discuss the Indian reactions to the White Paper. I was in India when the White Paper was published. I have been during the last seven months in the closest touch with all political parties in India. As a member of the Executive Board of the All-India Muslim Conference and President of the last special session of the Conference in Calcutta I have borne my share in helping to define the Muslim attitude towards the coming Reforms. The Indian Delegates who are cooperating with the Joint Parliamentary Committee on India have a heavy task before them. They have, on the one hand, to keep in touch with their constituents’ views in India, and on the other to convince British opinion of all shades that the Indian demands are not an abstract proposition, but have behind them the insistent pressure of movements which may be dangerous unless they are met in a frank spirit of understanding and statesmanship. They have, moreover, as practical men, to use their own judgment in reconciling divers views, Indian and British, on points as they arise.

The object which I propose to myself is not to attack or to defend the White Paper, but to show how different circles feel about it in India, and to offer a few suggestions, if I may, about the huge complex of the Indian situation, which (it must be remembered) is not merely a political matter, but has intertwined strands economic, social, educational, and religious.

The three sessions of the Round-Table Conference in London (if they did nothing else) helped to develop and show the trend of opinion on Indian Reform in different circles in India and England. It is not correct to say that clear-cut or definite conclusions were reached on any major points, nor even that the
greatest measure of agreement among all sections was ascertained. But the different schools of thought tried to probe each others' ideas, and the process was educative to themselves and to the public. His Majesty's Government put forward in the Communal Award a definite scheme of communal representation, which was accepted as a basis for proceeding further with the scheme of Reforms by Moderate opinion. By Moderate opinion I do not mean the opinion of any organized party which can be labelled Moderate, but the opinion of men of moderate attitude in all parties. At the same time the Communal Award awakened latent powers of resistance in those minds—and they are not a few in India—which think of politics in terms of abstract philosophy or mass imitation rather than in terms of concrete realities. They looked upon the Communal Award as unjust and impracticable, and some even as a mischievous attempt to set the two great communities in India by the ears. With this in the background of their minds, any scheme built on the Communal Award was bound to appear indefensible to them.

If we bear this background of events in our mind we shall readily understand the different reactions which were called forth in different sections of opinion when the White Paper was published.

THE CONGRESS VIEW

Let us take the Congress first. It has been definitely hostile to co-operative effort with the Government or with the British authorities in England from the time that it passed the resolution in favour of Independence. Where it has professed to explore new avenues for Purna Swaraj it has all the time been sceptical in its own mind. It did not join the third session of the Round-Table Conference. Most of the leaders were in jail or went to jail soon afterwards. It is true that some of them have since seen the impracticability, or at least the barrenness, of Civil Disobedience. But the Congress as a body has never disowned that weapon. The Government of Lord Willingdon (whom I found hale and hearty and full of youthful cheerfulness and confidence) is fully entitled to take credit for its recent policy of greater firm-
ness in the preservation of law and order. But Governments invariably wear rose-coloured spectacles. Too much optimism in this matter is a mistake, as it would put us on a false scent.

There are whole sections of population in whose minds the boundary between Congress propaganda and terrorism is ill defined. Underground terrorism flourishes in India as it has never flourished before, and its most enthusiastic advocates and recruits are women and youth of both sexes. There is glamour in forbidden conduct. The glorious defiance of authority beckons young minds of generous ambitions. In this sort of atmosphere slow, plodding work in constitutional discussions seems futile and a waste of time. When further it is openly declared that the word of Britain is not to be trusted and that the whole of the present proceedings are a breach of faith, we can understand that no scheme short of complete abandonment of responsibility by Great Britain would have any chance of acceptance.

Even such a scheme might be viewed with suspicion as an insidious attempt to tighten Britain's grip in some mysterious way. To the extreme wing of the Congress the Crown means nothing; the Indian States and their rulers are an anachronism; minorities have only one right, that to suffer; religion is a discredited thing, except the religion of chauvinistic nationalism. If they want to conciliate minorities at all it is only in order to absorb them. There is a kind of snake which fascinates its victims with a glad eye. Fascination is not a false description of its attitude and motive. We know it not only in the Indian jungle but also in the Indian political field. Constitutional reform has no meaning to such a mentality. Fortunately that section is not numerically large. Those composing it did not read the White Paper, but condemned it in advance.

HINDU NATIONALISM

I do not wish to attack the large body of Congress men who hold sane views (if sanity can be separated from practicality). But because they have funds, organization, and a clamorous Press their influence may very well be exaggerated. Leaving them aside, there is undoubtedly a large body of Hindu opinion, includ-
ing some very distinguished public men, who sincerely but inconsistently look upon the suppression of illegal Congress activities as a mark of high-handed tyranny and the claims of the minorities—especially of the Muslim minority—as an intolerable spoke in the wheel of progress. They would weld Hinduism, under a wide definition, to include every shade of religious thought except the Muslim, and would make the Hindu Mahasabha the arbiter of Indian Nationalism. To doctrinaire politicians abroad their propaganda appears plausible. To us in India who do not agree with them their propaganda appears the very negation of nationalism or democracy.

However that may be, it is this section, whose boundary is ill defined, which, while disclaiming adherence to Congress, is really most bitter about the Communal Award and the consequential steps that may be necessary to implement it. They have been trying, with the help of the Congress, to upset the Communal Award by many methods, of which I shall mention three. In the first place they succeeded in modifying the Communal Award about the Untouchables. But by no means all the Untouchable leaders are satisfied with that modification. Nor is it certain that in the new orientation towards the Untouchables, which Mr. Gandhi’s efforts have brought into prominence, some of the caste Hindus who agreed to the modification in the first flush of their enthusiasm have not repented of it since.

In the second place they have tried to get the Sikhs to identify themselves with the general Hindu position. In this they have half succeeded. I have the highest respect for the Sikhs, and I number some Sikhs among my best friends in India. But I feel that if the Sikhs wish to preserve their identity and really to work for the progress of the country as a whole on realistic lines, their best plan would be to accept the position assigned to them in the Communal Award and work definitely with their Hindu and Muslim fellow subjects in the direction of a gradual evolution of a true Indian nationality.

In the third place Congress inspiration was behind a great many unsuccessful conferences which were called Unity Conferences. To my mind, as I have said elsewhere, they really
became disunity conferences, as they caused new fissures and lines of disruption to appear among the existing political bodies. Their much advertised attempt must not be confused with the earnest attempts (of which one hears so little) that are being made by leaders in many parts of the country to find a *modus vivendi* and a rapprochement between the different communities, on the principles of the Communal Award, but leading up gradually to a greater and greater and more harmonious co-operation between the various communities in India.

The section of intransigent Nationalists found the White Paper too great a shock because it built on the Communal Award. They were unwilling to assume the implications of the Communal Award and they were impatient with all the safeguards and reserve powers which were set out in such meticulous detail by His Majesty's Government.

**The Muslim Attitude**

And now we come to the Muslims. Much disappointment has been caused in England because the organs of Muslim political opinion have not been enthusiastic in the reception of the White Paper. They have been severely critical of it on many points and instructed their delegates to bring these points as clearly as possible to the notice of the Joint Parliamentary Committee. It is not that the Muslim community as a whole is not going to make an honest attempt to co-operate with His Majesty's Government and the Government of India in building up the new Constitution, or that they do not realize that many of the reserve powers, discretionary powers, and extraordinary powers of the Governor-General and the Governors are designed to protect minority interests. But they feel that as set out in the White Paper the proposals err so much on the side of caution that they nullify the promise of provincial autonomy and of responsibility at the Centre.

**A Cold Reception**

It will be asked what section of opinion found the White Paper acceptable. I should say none in India, barring very small sec-
tions of numerical insignificance. This is the more remarkable as some of the very critical delegates who had come in a sceptical mood to the third session of the Round-Table Conference had been so charmed with the personality of Sir Samuel Hoare that they came back very much reassured and awaited the White Paper with an open mind. Perhaps it was because they expected too much that they were disappointed. Perhaps in the nebulous atmosphere of the Round-Table Conferences, especially in the earlier stages, language was used and hopes were raised which meant different things to different people. Perhaps also a certain amount of propaganda had been carried on in India to make the people believe that the Conservative element in the National Government were not sympathetic to even the most modest aspirations of the Indian people. Perhaps the language of Mr. Churchill and Lord Lloyd, which was perfectly intelligible in its setting in England, sounded falsely in the Indian atmosphere and was wholly misunderstood. The fact remains that there was a sort of dismay produced in non-official circles in India on the publication of the White Paper—even among the circles which were accustomed to support the Government. The White Paper was called the Black Paper and by all sorts of other opprobrious names which the resources of polite English language may not be equal to reproducing in full-blooded significance.

The time that has elapsed since has sobered public opinion a little, and I think it is correct to say that reasonable people are beginning to see the safeguards and the reserve powers in better perspective after the first mist of disappointed expectations has been dissipated. They are beginning to realize that the extreme emphasis laid on reservations and discretionary and extraordinary powers was after all meant for home consumption in England, where an organized effort is being made to defeat the Government's policy. A remarkable speech which Sir Malcolm Hailey, Governor of the United Provinces, addressed to his Legislative Council just before he left India to assist the Joint Parliamentary Committee had also a steadying effect. I was in the United Provinces when the speech was delivered, and it visibly affected the tone of a discussion at which I was present.
Objections to Moderates

So far for general impressions. Let us take specific grievances as they have emerged from a specific examination of the proposals at leisure. In the first place let me note the eight points which Mr. Srinivasa Sastri urged as the most important defects of the scheme in an article which he wrote for the Indian Review. He wants:

1. Indianization in Defence to be completed within a fixed period, and preparation to be made for Indian responsibility during the transition period.
2. No Governor-General's Acts and no Governors' Acts, as distinguished from Acts passed in due course by the Legislature.
3. No special responsibility and powers to the Governor-General or the Governors in the transferred sphere except on behalf of the minorities or of an Indian State.
4. Previous sanction (if kept) in matters of currency and exchange to be expressly only in the interests of India.
5. The Services to be in future under the control of the Federal Government (and presumably of the Provincial Governments in the case of the Provinces).
6. The Constitution Act to be alterable by the Indian Legislature except where Imperial interests are involved.
7. The Railway Board as well as the Reserve Bank to be constituted by Indian legislation.
8. The Secretary of State's Council (and presumably the "Advisers," the term used under the new scheme) to be abolished.

In a memorandum put forward by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad and other Liberal leaders the following four conditions were laid down for an acceptable scheme:

1. Full and unfettered responsible government in the Provinces.
2. Central responsibility, including control of the purse; control of economic policy, including questions of exchange, currency, and industrial and commercial matters; and an increasing share of responsibility and control in matters of Defence.
3. Central responsibility to be introduced simultaneously with provincial autonomy.
4. Safeguards to be only for a fixed transitional period and to be demonstrably in the interests of India.

Some Questions

Viewing the matter from a different angle, I will exhibit certain heads of pertinent criticism in the form of questions rather than of dogmatic assertions:
1. Is the White Paper an advance on Dyarchy? Does it point the way to Dominion Status? Is it likely to lead to greater confidence as between Great Britain and India, or between the Government and the people in India, or between the different communities which are organizing politically? In some respects the greater definition of the special responsibilities and powers of the Governors in the transferred sphere will make the position of Ministers worse instead of better in the Provinces. The control of the purse will not be complete even in the Provinces, on account of the classification of a large number of subjects as Federal, which in many federations would go to the units of the Federation. The limited Dyarchy proposal in the Federal Government is even more restricted than in the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme for the Provinces. There is no definite pointer to Dominion Status in the future. Some of the provisions are likely to cause more friction instead of leading to greater harmony and mutual confidence. I say nothing about the greater happiness of the masses of the people, because that is a nebulous term.

2. Are the financial provisions adequate and are the transferred powers backed up with sufficient financial resources? Is provincial finance sufficiently safeguarded vis-à-vis the Federation? Is it going to lead to an intolerable burden of taxation? Is it going to make the masses of India more contented?

3. Is the Federation proposed going to give India a strong Central Government, able to enforce its will and to work harmoniously with the Provinces and the States? Will British India tolerate the interference of the States' members in the Central Executive with British Indian matters when the Central Executive will be unable to interfere in State matters not expressly made over to the Federation?

4. Is it possible for Ministers in the Provinces to carry on an efficient and responsible administration without full control over all the Services actually working in the Provinces? What will be the position of Ministers when they cannot even post Indian Civil Service and police officers to particular districts or transfer them without the personal concurrence of the Governor? Is the Ecclesiastical Department for ever to remain outside the control of Indian authorities, although paid from the Indian revenues and ministering mainly to the religious interests of numerically negligible non-Indian Services? Are the superior Railway and Medical Services, about which the decision is reserved in the White Paper, to be outside the control of Indian authorities, and is such a provision consistent with autonomy in the real sense of the term? Is it justifiable on any but racial grounds? The Foreign and Ecclesiastical Departments Services are to be exempt from a statutory enquiry after five years; any decision after a statutory enquiry about the other Services will rest with His Majesty's Government, and not with the Indian authorities. How far is that justifiable with even the limited autonomy which is proposed?

5. What are the Rulers of the Indian States really thinking of the White Paper proposals? Is the protest of the late Jam Saheb to be treated as of no significance? Is the somewhat cool attitude of the latest sessions of the Chamber of Princes to be considered as lending support to the scheme?
Will the States be strengthened or weakened by their contact with all the communal, revolutionary, and terrorist movements, from which they have hitherto been free? Is it possible that ambitious Ministers in the States will not be subject to the same kinds of pressure as publicists in British India, and is it possible that the policy of the Indian States and many of their cherished traditions will be thrown into jeopardy? What are to be the reactions of the subjects of the States to their Rulers and to the new conditions which must necessarily be set up in the States? Is the rise of these new problems going to strengthen or weaken the support of the British connection by the States?

6. Is the form of protection given to the minorities in virtue of the special powers conferred on Governors and the Governor-General adequate? Is that form satisfactory to the minorities themselves? Does it lead to the real rapprochement between the different communities which is essential for the general advance of the country in political education? Can the minorities be expected to be content with mere protection, or will they demand full status and the power to manage their own affairs in their own way themselves?

7. Are the Administrative Services which are described as Imperial to retain a similar form and status to those which they enjoy at the present moment? Will they eventually disappear? Can they fit into the patchy framework of a make-shift Constitution? If not, is it not necessary to devise newer Services adapted to the new conditions and less expensive to the country? What are the views of the Indian and British members of the Services, and have they been sufficiently taken into account in the framing of policy?

**Some Wider Considerations**

I feel convinced that no efficient political scheme can be framed without taking full account of economic, social, educational, and religious considerations. Is it a heresy to say that our political discussions have not hitherto sufficiently taken account of these very important factors? In the economic sphere the Royal Commission on Labour showed somewhat startling maladjustments, even in the limited sphere of its enquiry. Our industrial system, though new, has many weak joints, some of them peculiar to India. The enfranchisement of Labour is both just and necessary, but considering the weak organization of Labour in India, how is Labour going to work as a factor in the stabilization of Indian political conditions?

The biggest economic interest in India is agricultural, and a large number of people among the illiterate rural masses will be
enfranchised. What will be their influence on Governments? There are already signs of cleavage between town and country interests. Will there be a political clash between them, or will they be able harmoniously to adjust their relations in working for the common economic betterment of India? The world-wide economic depression has touched India, but produced new problems peculiar to India. The present slump in the prices of manufactured articles is exceeded by the slump in the prices of raw produce. Will the Indian producer be satisfied with political conditions under which he will continue to feel the pinch of economic poverty without being able to help himself to such remedial measures as more advanced economic communities devise for themselves?

The question of rural indebtedness has loomed large for many generations in India. It has almost become dangerous in the present economic depression, in which there is no stability in prices or currency, and the pressure of debt has enormously increased, much to the advantage of creditors and disadvantage of debtors. Where debtors and creditors often belong to different races or religious or political communities, is a greater advance towards paper democracy likely to help in the solution of these difficult questions, or is it more likely to lead to confusion, perhaps even to upheavals, before which political systems will be dissipated like smoke before a driving wind?

In the social system of India the Untouchable question has recently assumed a new phase. But apart from the Untouchables there are many social inequalities and anomalies which will be thrown into relief by the new political forces. The remedial measures which are being taken in other countries have not yet been formulated in India. Indeed, the traditional spirit of India may impose obstacles to the working of remedial measures which are borrowed from other countries. It may also be that the social systems which have maintained a greater traditional hold in the villages than in the towns and in the Indian States than in British India may suffer violent shocks in the hotch-potch which we are now cooking. Such shocks are bound to have serious repercussions in our political system. No true son of India wishes
the present chaos to be deepened. If we are wise we shall not let our political system creak under a greater strain than it can bear.

The educational system of India has often been blamed for the various social, economic, and political maladjustments which we are dealing with. Without subscribing to any wholesale condemnation, I am bound to confess that the whole educational question needs to be reviewed in the light of the new conditions. The unemployment among the educated classes is on a scale of which no one could have any conception who has not lived in intimate contact with these classes. Educational discontent is very much at the bottom of a great deal of the anarchy and confusion that exist in India. Perhaps it may even be said that a desire for openings for the educated classes in the Public Services was the real starting-point of the various political movements which have taken such aggressive and fantastic shapes in our own time. That desire is in itself just. But it should not be exploited merely for political purposes. Otherwise there will be rude awakenings, whatever Government is in power. What perturbs me is that the new tendencies are not all in the right direction. The multiplication of universities, or making them unitary instead of affiliating, will not give us more bread. Making education more expensive will not necessarily make it better. "Compulsory universal education" is a fashionable slogan. The good it will do will depend on its quality.

In the religious sphere it is distressing to see that economic, social and political ambitions are only too ready to exploit the religious feelings of the people. The result is a weakening of the moral fibre which should be associated with religion, and the creation, in the minds of the young, of a sort of malaise with the name of Religion itself. This has produced curious complications in Indian life. Whatever course political movements in India may take, I hope religious leaders and all those to whom the message of religion makes an abiding and permanent appeal in life will set their faces against the conflicts which political ambition often creates by exploiting the religious feelings of the masses. The Indian question is as much a moral question as it is political,
economic, social, or educational. But none of these factors can be isolated from the others.

One thing is certain. There are currents of thoughts, feelings, passions, and prejudices in every department of life, in India as everywhere else; perhaps more in India than anywhere else, because the gradual evolution, through many generations, of an ordered conformity between politics, religion, education, the social order, business, agriculture, industry, and all the complexities of modern civilization has not yet had time to operate. The revolutionary feeling is in the air. The word "revolution" (inqilab) is in everyone's subconscious thoughts, if not on everyone's lips. To draw from this the conclusion that you can stand still is a dangerous fallacy. Will the man of the hour come? His task will be not to bottle up the trouble, but to ride the whirlwind and direct the storm.

My advice to impatient reformers is: March slow; make sure of every step; and look all round. My advice to hesitating or obstinate reactionaries is: Go forward; too much caution may spell disaster; take risks, but do not pretend that you are doing more than you are.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Thursday, June 1, 1933, when a paper, entitled "Indian Reactions to the White Paper," was read by Mr. A. Yusuf Ali, C.B.E., I.C.S. (retd.). Dewan Bahadur Sir V. T. Krishnamachari, C.I.E. (Dewan of Baroda), was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

The Right Hon. Lord Lamington, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., Sir John Kerr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., The Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., Sir John Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir Charles Armstrong, Sir John Cumming, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir William Ovens Clark, Sir Henry S. Lawrence, K.C.S.I., Sir K. Venkata Reddi, Sir Alan Pim, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Alfred Watson, Colonel Sir Henry Gidney, Lady (James) Walker, Lady (Lionel) Jacob, Professor H. G. Rawlinson, C.I.E., Mr. J. R. Martin, C.I.E., Mr. H. M. R. Hopkins, C.S.I., Begum Shah Nawaz, Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan, Pandit Ramchandra Kak, Mr. Stanley P. Rice, Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Mrs. Weir, Mr. R. W. Brock, Mr. A. Sabonadiere, Rev. E. S. Carr, Swami B. H. Bon, Mr. H. M. Willmot, Mrs. Roberts, Miss E. L. Curteis, Miss C. K. Cumming, Miss Thomas, Mr. E. B. G. Head, Mr. F. Grubb, Colonel A. G. Hamilton, Mr. R. K. Ranadive, Mrs. Dewar, Mr. John Ross, I.S.O., Mr. and Mrs. Richardson, Miss Hopley, Mr. G. W. F. Gray, Mr. H. Jehangiani, Miss Speechley, Mr. J. P. Fletcher, Miss Clarkson, Miss Hanson, Mr. S. A. Rafique, Mr. P. M. Sharpe, Mr. J. Spence, Mrs. Drysdale, Mr. Joseph Nissim, Mr. C. F. Cooper, Mr. W. F. Westbrook, Mrs. Yate, and Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think Mr. Yusuf Ali requires any introduction to this audience. He has just returned from India after spending seven months in that country, during a part of which he was engaged on a Committee for the reorganization of the Punjab University.

I feel sure we shall be delighted to hear his address on the reception which the White Paper received in India.

(The Paper was then read.)

Sir Venkata Reddi: I think anyone who has heard Mr. Yusuf Ali and who has been in India must admit that he has given us this afternoon a very clear conception of the situation in India. He has told you that he has seen almost the whole of India, and that he did not find anywhere any signs of any persons or institutions who have given their whole-hearted support to the White Paper.

I come from the southernmost province, Madras—I think there is a body of opinion in that province of a party which claims to represent nearly 80 per cent. of the population there. We are about forty-five millions in that province. The party of which I have been speaking, to which I have the honour to belong, the great Justice party, as it is called, at least can
claim to have given more support to the White Paper than any other party in the country.

That is not to say that it has accepted it wholly. No doubt we join others in saying that the White Paper is not quite satisfactory in all respects. I suppose any amount of talk in this country and any amount of conciliation and goodwill cannot make people in India think that everything is satisfactory. Something will always be unsatisfactory, and people who are responsible need not mind that much of dissatisfaction. But on the whole it must be confessed that at least my party believes that a great advance is made by this White Paper over existing constitutions. (Applause.)

In the very first question put by Mr. Yusuf Ali he asked, "Is it an improvement on dyarchy?" Well, sir, as one who has worked the dyarchical system for three years in the province of Madras, I, speaking for myself and for all those whom I represent, can say with certainty that a really great advance is made.

Then the wide franchise that has been given to us, some millions having been added to the existing number of voters, is another great thing which I at any rate, coming as I do from a community of agriculturists—my caste is called Kapu (agriculturist)—must be very grateful for. I am very thankful to all those who are responsible for that wide franchise that has been granted to us—though again we would like to have it widened still more and still more.

To answer the numerous questions that are put here would take a very long time indeed, and since the President has been pleased to tell us that we shall not be given more than five minutes, I cannot attempt it. I would tell you this, however, that though no doubt there are elements in India which cannot accept this wholly on the one hand, there are elements on the other side—as in the case of my party—there are people who are prepared to be grateful for the White Paper, subject to alterations that may be made by the Joint Parliamentary Committee in consultation with the representatives of India. There are men in India who have advised that these reforms should be accepted as they finally emerge from the Joint Parliamentary Committee.

In India, as in this country, there will always be dissatisfied elements. I do not know whether to call them really alarmists or only people who are anxious to see that the right thing is done in the right manner. The trouble is that those who are responsible for these things have already been in great difficulties about this matter. Here are twenty-eight gentlemen from India as delegates to the Joint Select Committee and many witnesses: our best brains are gathered here. May I ask those that are agitating in this country and in India to conceive how difficult is the task that is set before these great men, and how unfair it is on the part of these dissentients to create more difficulties for these people. (Applause.) For three years they have laboured. The best men of India have been sent here. Your own Cabinet Ministers, responsible to the people, to Parliament, are sitting there. They are your watchdogs. They will see that the interests of England and Great Britain are in no way sacrificed. On the
other hand, here are these Indian representatives sitting with them, who will see that they get the best they can from Great Britain.

Why, then, create difficulties in this way? Reading the newspapers in this country, I discover a great agitation being stirred up in this land for which there is no justification at all. (Applause.) You have given us education. We have learnt to love liberty and freedom, such as you love in this country. We have evolved representative institutions and responsible governments. For 150 years you have trained us to this end, and it is not right that you should think we should fall short of British citizenship. We only claim to be British citizens, your equals, your partners.

There is no good in telling India that this Paper should be scrapped. Nothing of the kind. You have trained us well and nicely, and we are in a position to take your place and take such place as you are prepared to give us in consultation with our countrymen here.

I hope that the people of this country will realize that it is very unwise indeed to create feelings in India in the manner that has been done here now. It will be good for you and for us to be friends, to extend your helping hand in friendship, and then England and India can work together in close co-operation for the benefit of both countries.

Lord Lamington: Perhaps I may be allowed to say, as President of the Association, a few words on this very momentous question. Mr. Yusuf Ali, who has been so good as to prepare this paper at short notice, has touched on many points in it which arouse our extreme interest and require careful thought. At the beginning he said he was not going to attack the White Paper. I note the absence of any even faint praise of the White Paper and I thought very successful condemnation of it.

Towards the end of the paper he says, "If we are wise we shall not let our political system creak under a greater strain than it can bear." I gather he meant it had not gone far enough in his view. As opposed to this statement, he gives very wise advice at the end. He says, "March slow; make sure of every step; and look all round." He is quite right, but the point is, at the present time so vast is the subject that outside interference is to be deprecated. The matter is too important for any sort of party feeling.

We have in this country two parties: one which says that the adoption of anything like the White Paper will lead to absolute disaster in India, to our connection with India; and you have on the other hand moderate reformers like Mr. Sastri and others, who ask for reforms so-called to an extent that to my mind would be impossible if it is wished to maintain the British connection at all.

I myself believe that failure to adopt the White Paper, even in its more general form, will lead to very serious difficulties. It would mean that you are to close down the idea of the Indian people having responsible self-government. That seems to me a most dangerous proposition.

It may be a very dangerous policy introduced by the White Paper, but to withdraw a vision held by three hundred millions of people and say, "No, you are not to have what you expect," would be disastrous. (Applause.)
Of course, those in this country who advocate that the White Paper should not be adopted say that it is, after all, only a very small section in India, the Congress party, which really wants this extreme measure passed. My answer to that is that it is quite true it is only a small party, but a very highly educated party, and whilst hundreds of millions of uneducated Indians do not understand the political position one scrap, all the more liable are they to be seduced from reasonable ideas by members of the Congress party influencing them to these wonderful ideas of benefits that are going to accrue to them by the adoption of self-government. To say to these, “You are not going to have self-government,” seems to me a most dangerous proposition.

People who have held high expectations will be all the more liable to be carried away by those who are opponents of the connection with this country. You cannot overthrow people’s hopes and expectations, however vain they may have been, that have been aroused even by those who want a very strong policy. Therefore it seems to me that anxious and dangerous as the proposal may be, to bring forward this measure in whatever form may be decided on by the Joint Committee may lead to very painful results; yet on the whole it is safer to try that than to disappoint people whose expectations have been aroused.

We must remember that there are two different standards in this country and in India. [The speaker read a letter written by an Englishwoman respecting a club; the writer described the disrepair into which the premises had got, everything in holes, dirty, all the glory had departed. This was a description of what had occurred in a very short time after the removal of the British. It went on, “The people seem happy and contented enough. All they want is to be left alone, and so far they do not seem to be worrying.”]

This is an instance of the difference between our ideas in this country of comfort and orderly administration. The masses of the people would be quite content to go back to their pristine habits. Are we to allow them to do that, or are we to safeguard what we in this country consider their most material interests? I say myself, I think you must try the experiment to see whether it is not possible to carry out some form of co-operative government between the Indians and the British. If you could get the best representatives of both countries working together you would get a peaceful and prosperous India.

I believe it is possible. I believe it would be more possible if you got rid of party political influence from this country. For that reason I am all for trying this great experiment and giving the Indians a greater interest, a greater control in the administration of their own affairs.

Colonel Sir Henry Gidney: I find myself in rather a delicate position this afternoon because, as a member of the British India Delegation attending the Joint Parliamentary Committee proceedings, my lips are sealed on certain matters relating to the White Paper, which is the subject of this afternoon’s discussion. Therefore what I am about to say now will be with reference to the White Paper in general, dealing with a few of the questions asked by the speaker.
I must first of all congratulate him on his very interesting address. It was, of course, to be expected that the White Paper would not please everybody and, therefore, one is not surprised to know that various communities and sects of political thought have received it in different ways. But there is one point that is agitating my mind very much and to which the speaker did not refer in his very able paper. I have been in active political life in India for the past fifteen years and so I feel that I can talk with some authority and experience.

The point is this: However much we may safeguard the future Constitution in India by insisting on the many safeguards that are to be found in the White Paper and however anxious we may all be to grant complete provincial autonomy and even partial responsibility in the Centre, there is one fact which I am afraid many people do not realize, and that is the possibility, indeed the probability, that the next two elections will return into power the only organized political party in India today. I refer to the Swaraj or Congress party. To my mind the policy of that party will be to wreck the Constitution, to disregard the safeguards, their object being to secure complete responsibility in the Centre. I know that there are many Indians, as also Englishmen, who believe that the Congress is more or less dead.

That is not my view. If I read the times aright I think that the moment the new Act begins to operate the Congress party will be very much alive, and this is the one fear that dominates my thought in my readiness to join with most Indians to secure provincial autonomy and partial responsibility in the Centre. In support of my fear I would instance the Corporation of Calcutta, which I look upon as a sort of amplifier, or loud speaker, of the Congress gramophone in Bengal or, might I say, as the mirror reflecting the political views of Bengal. For instance, look at the recent election of the Mayor and Aldermen in Calcutta. This election took place about two months ago, and despite the knowledge that the White Paper was according a great increase in franchise and the communal award had given Muslims a majority representation in the Council, we find that the Congress had an overwhelming victory in that they returned the Mayor and most of the aldermen of the Corporation of Calcutta.

It is therefore my belief that for the next two elections to the Councils, if not more, the Swarajists will be returned in an overwhelming majority in certain provinces in India and that they will form the Cabinet. One must always keep this picture before one's mind when thinking of what is best for India and what should be the nature of the safeguards, as also the giving of responsibility in the Centre. One of the questions asked by the speaker today was, "Will the White Paper give India a strong responsible government?" To my mind and as I read the White Paper it seems as if it is based on what I might call an imaginary federation. I say this because the Princes have decided not to federate until the provinces are functioning autonomously. The White Paper also states that responsibility in the Centre will only be given when federation is a fait accompli. On the other hand, the Princes will not federate with British India until the provinces are properly functioning and until they are assured that they are
federating with a solid and not a fluid British India, and I might add that I do not believe Parliament will consent to giving any responsibility in the Centre until federation has actually taken place. This is the quagmire of thought and doubt in which I find myself, and one is entitled to say that since federation will not come about for some time responsibility in the Centre will not be given for some time.

In other words, although the White Paper implies federation with certain responsibility in the Centre, in practice it will mean provincial autonomy for some time to come and then, depending on many other factors, such as the Reserve Bank, exports, imports, and an improvement in the general economic conditions of the country, we may see federation with central responsibility. It is for this reason I have said that, to my mind, the White Paper is based on imaginary federation or a federation to come at an unknown time, and this leads me to the second question which was asked by the speaker: "What do the Princes think of the White Paper?" It seems to me that the Princes are divided among themselves and have not made up their minds as to whether federation will be to their interests or not. True, some of them have signified their assent and consent to the White Paper; while others are hostile to it and are adopting a more or less rigidly conservative view. This is another reason why I think that federation is in the distance.

The question that agitates not only my mind but the minds of Indian politicians is, what will be given to India during the interim period—that is the period when the New Constitution Act begins to operate and that uncertain period when federation will be a fait accompli? Will the White Paper, when it emerges from the Houses of Parliament, contain any element of responsibility in the Centre or will there be an absence of this responsibility? This is the crucial point and this will be the acid test to which the whole of India will respond—that is, co-operate or non-co-operate with the White Paper when it is in operation. There is no doubt that the White Paper, as it stands today, demands as prerequisites to federation certain very important fulfilments, but many of these are beyond human control, and this again adds an additional doubt in my mind for the future of federation and/or its date of accomplishment. As the White Paper stands at present I think it is a very liberal contribution of reform to India, for it has carried India very far ahead of the present reforms, and the authors of the White Paper are to be congratulated on its production. But what concerns me most of all is what will be the reaction of the White Paper in India when it finally emerges from the House of Commons.

The next question put by the speaker was, "What do the communities think of the White Paper?" In answering this question I shall confine my remarks to the community which I have had the honour to lead and to represent for the last 15 years, that is, the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled European community. Let me in a word say that, outside of Paragraph 101, which deals with Anglo-Indian education and for which I am extremely grateful, there is no other evidence whatever of any protection being given to my people, indeed, it looks as if England is leaving its offspring, the Anglo-Indian community, as its bankrupt legacy to India.
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I shall not weary you by detailing the past history of the community and the great services it has rendered to India in the past and is performing even today, but let me here state that the Anglo-Indians can truly be called "Empire builders" in that they have helped their forefathers, the Englishmen, by whom they have loyally stood ever since the country came into existence many hundreds of years ago, in developing the main commercial arteries of India such as the railways, telegraphs, and Customs to their present state of perfection and benefit to the finances of India. These services date from the early John Company period to the present day. Our military services during the Great War and during the recent Civil Disobedience disturbances alone entitle the Anglo-Indian community to economic protection and which means very life or death. India owes a great debt of gratitude to this community.

It was the British nation that created the community, and I feel sure that no White Paper can be passed by Parliament which does not adequately protect the future of this community, for a certain number of years at any rate. I look in vain for such evidence in the White Paper as it is today. The community has served England and India loyally and honestly and its flag of loyalty is un tarnished today. The speaker asked, "What do the minorities think of the White Paper?" The Anglo-Indian and Domiciled European community is dissatisfied with the absence of any specific economic provision made for it, with the result that today one-third of the able-bodied men of the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled European community are unemployed and are roaming the streets of India seeking employment in those very services which we helped to build and from which today we are being ostracized. Is this the reward that the community is to get for its services to the Empire? The White Paper as passed by Parliament will answer this question. Personally, I am hopeful that adequate statutory economic protection will be given to them.

Sir Alfred Watson: I do not know whether I am to be classed amongst the "impatient reformers" or the "obstinate reactionaries" in India, and in that divided state of mind I find the advice of Mr. Yusuf Ali a little difficult to follow, for at the same time I am asked to "march slow" and to "go forward," to "make sure of every step" and to "take risks."

Mr. Yusuf Ali has shown himself an adept in asking questions. We are all of us asking ourselves these questions today, and I wish Mr. Yusuf Ali had attempted to answer some of his own questions, because the answers are vital to the future in India.

Unless there is some large party in India which is prepared to support the reforms in the White Paper, which is prepared to make sacrifices for them and to fight for them in the country, then it is useless—I say it advisedly—for us to go forward. We cannot force reforms on to an unwilling country, and what we who have the battle to fight in this country look for is that support from India which is absolutely necessary to convince English opinion.

Mr. Yusuf Ali has put a good deal of emphasis in his paper upon the restrictions which India, we gather, resents in some measure. I would
say to India that it would do well in the beginning to accept those restrictions which will not be operative unless they are necessary, and it is for India to prove by its conduct of the new Government that the restrictions are unnecessary and that they can be safely abrogated.

I can quite understand that impatience in India of which Mr. Yusuf Ali speaks. I have had experience of it in that country. But there is an almost equal impatience amongst those of us who are supporting the reforms that India should show such willingness to go forward by easy stages. I can assure those who are looking forward to power in the future in India that they have a task before them in bringing the administration of India into line with that of the rest of the world which will occupy the whole of their powers and which will be very much better done if it can be taken step by step.

Lastly, I would like to say this. Mr Yusuf Ali has held out very little hope to us this afternoon of unanimity amongst parties in India. If India is to advance she must have union, and union first of all amongst the Muslim community, and, secondly, a real union and combination and co-operation between Hindus and Muslims.

It would be intolerable to all of us who have worked for Indian reforms for years if the only outcome of those reforms in the beginning was to be an accentuated strife between the various communities in India.

The Maharajah of Burdwan: Mr. Yusuf Ali’s reflections on the Indian reactions to the White Paper certainly do not give us any great assurance at the present moment. He has mentioned many of the difficulties which he foresaw during his sojourn in India. I think one of the greatest difficulties he mentions is that in the religious sphere it is distressing to see that economic, social, and political ambitions are only too ready to exploit the religious feelings of the people.

Those of us who are anxious to see that the two great communities in India, the Muslims and the Hindus, should combine to help in the new Constitution that may be evolved after the Joint Select Committee has reported to Parliament are most anxious that in the future constitution of India the strife for power should not be tinged with that communal hatred and hostility which has given so much handle to the unfriendly people in this country to belittle our own powers to build up a new nationhood for India.

That is why I hope that those that have come from India to help the Joint Committee will not only help to keep down emotions and to see that the communal spirit does not prevail amongst them, but that men like Mr. Yusuf Ali and others with their culture and with their great depth of learning and feeling for others will be able to bring into India a new spirit, a new spirit of co-operation between the Hindu and Muslim, an idea that the Muhammadan in India is an Indian first and a brother to the Hindu, and that whatever may be the martial races outside belonging to that community, the Muhammadans and the Hindus must shoulder the future responsibilities in the new Constitution for India.

With regard to minorities, I can assure my friend Colonel Gidney that,
belonging to a minority community myself, he has my fullest sympathies. But what we have to consider in the minority problems before the Joint Select Committee is that all minorities must expect the inevitable position in the future constitution of India—namely, that they must make themselves felt as important minorities, but as relatively small minorities they must also realize that they will have to make room in larger questions for the two great communities.

Lastly, may I say that when the White Paper has not been accepted by certain politicians, or most politicians, in India as a good thing, or has been described as a “black paper,” and when a certain bulldog element in Great Britain says “Ride over it,” I think there is something really good in the White Paper and that is why I support the main principles embodied in it.

The Chairman: We have had a most useful and instructive paper and discussion today. I do not think you will expect me to answer the many points to which Mr. Yusuf Ali has referred. I shall answer one of his questions—namely, “What are the rulers of the Indian States really thinking of the White Paper proposals?” My answer is, The majority of the rulers, the large majority of them, are wholeheartedly in favour of an All-India Federation. Only the other day on a very formal occasion—i.e., the visit of His Excellency the Viceroy to Baroda—the Maharajah of Baroda spoke the following words, referring to the discussions proceeding at the Round-Table Conference: “I am glad that today we are proposing to build on the wider basis and surer foundations of an All-India Federation. I believe in the idea of a Federation. For many years I have thought that a definite step should be taken towards the evolution of a united India, in which British India and the States as equal partners will work for the common good. I am fully convinced that in any such scheme the States can play a notable part.”

Later on His Highness said: “In many fields of activity—mass education, reorientation of indigenous culture, social legislation, devising of methods for associating the people with the administration, reconciliation of conflicting communal and other interests—States with their distinctive traditions can embark on fruitful experiments which will add to the wealth of political and administrative experience in India.” This answer, I think, represents the prevailing opinion among the Princes.

Having said this, I would only add another remark. The new Constitution of India should be founded on justice to the numerous communities and interests in India. All of them should feel that in the Constitution that is going to be set up they have adequate safeguards for protecting them. I have no doubt whatever, judging from past experience, that such safeguards will be resigned willingly by the communities once they feel confidence in the new order of things.

There is an example of that in the province from which Sir Venkata Reddi and myself come. When the Montagu-Chelmsford constitution was about to be set up the great party to which Sir Venkata Reddi belongs asked for reservation of seats as a measure of protection. This was given.
When the Simon Commission went along to Madras that party, through its leaders, told the Simon Commission that they did not want that protection any longer.

If the new Constitution is to be successful at all it must be such as to inspire confidence in the numerous communities and the powerful interests that we have got in India, and the White Paper recognizes this principle and gives effect to it.

Mr. Yusuf Ali: I do not wish to detain the meeting a moment longer than is necessary, but it is only due out of common courtesy to the various speakers who have kindly taken part in the discussion that I should say a few words on the points they have raised. It is not a question of answering those points, because I was gratified to find that all the speakers approached my paper in a very sympathetic spirit, and if discussions like this were to be the pattern for the future Legislative Assemblies I should not have the slightest misgivings about the future Government of India.

I am exceedingly glad to see my old friend Sir Venkata Reddi back again. He and I worked together in Geneva some years ago, and I have followed his work as the Indian Government's Agent in South Africa. His sound common sense is an asset anywhere. Now he is taking part in the welter of politics in the Southern Presidency. He, I was glad to see, struck a very cheerful note. I do not want you to go away with the impression that I came here merely to croak. I think you have got that impression from the fact that I faithfully tried to depict the feeling of gloom that overspread India at the time the White Paper was published. But you will remember that I myself indicated that, as the mists were being dissipated, people were beginning to see things in better perspective. I do not say that anybody is really enthusiastic. Not even Sir Venkata Reddi is enthusiastic about every point in the White Paper. But taking facts as they are we must make the best of the situation. This is the formative stage, and it is only right that every one of us should emphasize points on which he considers further alterations are necessary.

That is not to say that any party would be justified, least of all the party with whom I act, in rejecting the White Paper or in pretending that they can do without the gradual steps which the White Paper indicates. That, I think, answers to a certain extent Lord Lamington's complaint. He thought that I had damned the White Paper with faint praise. I neither damned the White Paper nor gave it faint praise. My object was quite different. I have really tried in an objective spirit to place before you how people in India saw it at the time it was published and also how people are beginning to see it now. I should have been wanting in my duty if I had merely praised it, instead of placing before you the different points which are being raised in the various discussions. Some of us wish to extend the proposals; others to qualify them. If we can link our hands together in goodwill we can march together without tearing each other to pieces. The same goal may be reached by different ways. As to time, we must never forget the homely adage, "More haste, less speed."

Personally, I feel rather sorry that the evidence before the Joint Select
Committee is being given behind closed doors. I think it might have been well for public opinion both in India and England if the public had been taken into the confidence of our legislators. People would have been better able to gauge the situation if the discrepancies and the criticisms had appeared in broad daylight. The one thing we lack at present is mutual confidence. In India suspicion and mistrust prevent understanding. In England want of knowledge goes with over-confidence or no confidence that these things will work well. So far as that confidence or mistrust is honest we must respect it. But we must try to conquer it by a transparent adherence to facts. The best way of dispelling want of confidence is to make our strong and weak points as public as possible and to let the people feel that, while we all have our various points of view, we are prepared to pool in the common stock such wisdom and experience as each of us possesses, so that the plan may emerge with the greatest possible chance of success in the future.

To Sir Henry Gidney I am obliged for the remarks he made, especially on behalf of his own community. It is a community for which I have the greatest respect, and Sir Henry and I have been very close friends. He and I have had many talks in the past and no doubt shall have many talks in the future. While his impression was on the whole very favourable, you must not forget that he was equally critical, for he called the Federation imaginary or illusive, and he is already dissatisfied with some of the proposals.

The capture of the Constitution by those who have no belief in it is a contingency not lightly to be contemplated. Personally, I think it will not be only in the first two elections. My own idea is that the first election may possibly go by default against the Congress. But that is doubtful. The band will begin to play when India is permeated with Congress ideas and a responsible Indian Government has to resort to the sort of measures that Lord Willingdon's Government has had to resort to in the past. That is not a prospect which any of us view with any complacency. But it is a part of the situation. If we claim to have any share in the government of the country we must take all responsibility and we must be prepared for every contingency. Our political capacity will be judged by our firmness or weakness in face of danger. Are we to be afraid if a large number of our countrymen accuse us of having betrayed our country and of acting in the interests of a foreign Power, when we know that we are working for a strong and an effective India?

Sir Alfred Watson said I did not answer the numerous questions that I put. If I had attempted to answer them I do not think Sir Alfred Watson would have got away to his dinner. In any case, the questions are legitimate questions, and can only be answered by His Majesty's Ministers or those whom they call in to advise them. Sir Alfred Watson himself has done a great deal in India to produce understanding and a feeling of solidarity as between British and Indians and to bind the two peoples together. Such solidarity is essential to our own progress. I am not one of those who are free and liberal with verbal eulogies of England. But I have lived in England as a British citizen for many years, and I can
understand and appreciate and to a certain extent share in the feelings of the British people. On the other hand, I am an Indian born and bred. I have never cut off my connection with India. I hope always to work for India and to work for her in the best possible spirit of service. Therefore you will see I have also a double interest, and nothing would distress me more than to feel that in the consideration of these Reforms, or as a consequence of these Reforms, the people of the two countries should fly apart. British and Indian interests are not really opposed. In saying this I am not talking sentimental nonsense. I am speaking as a realist. I am here as an Indian. I have breathed British civilization, and I know all the good and all the harm that England has done in the past to India. I can only see one possible line of advance for India—viz., by promoting a gradual and complete understanding not only amongst all sections of the Indian people, but also with the British people.

To my friend the Maharajah of Burdwan I am indebted for again emphasizing the need of Hindu-Muslim unity. That is the cardinal question in India—nothing will go well without it. I do not see how they (our people) can work any sort of popular government if they are divided in compartments. Even if you have separate electorates your representatives must come to your legislative councils with the determination to work as a body and as a team or teams, and any differences that they have must be on principles of political measures and political administration and on no other principles. But it would be an evil day if, as is suggested in some quarters, we make a sort of sinister combination between the Hindus and Muslims to work against our friends the Anglo-Indians or the representatives of England who will still have considerable powers in the new Constitution. It is not that sort of combination I want, but one that will sink all minor differences for the great task which I believe both England and India can accomplish together.

To you, sir, as Chairman, I am very much obliged for presiding on this occasion and for placing before us the views of the ruling Princes. You quoted from a banquet speech of His Highness the Maharaja Gaekwar, for whom I have the profoundest feeling of respect and admiration. You, as one of the notable Ministers of one of the biggest and most progressive States in India, do carry a great deal of responsibility; but at the same time, if you will permit me, sir, I should like to say that the States as a body have not yet definitely made up their minds. Their official attitude, as shown in the Chamber of Princes, is that they must wait and see the whole picture before they can definitely accept or reject the scheme. It is because there is a great deal of doubt in my own mind whether the big States and the small States can sink their own differences and come together as federating units on equal terms with British India without insisting upon impossible terms, terms that British India may find it almost impossible to concede—it is because of that that I feel that there are serious difficulties still in the way.

Sir JOHN KERR: Before you go I would ask you to pass a very hearty vote of thanks to the Chairman and lecturer this afternoon. (Applause.)
INDIAN WOMEN AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION

By Begum Shah Nawaz

A despotic ruler, as a mother and a mother-in-law, a ruler whom each and all in that little kingdom, the home, must obey; and then the patient and submissive slave, the daughter and the daughter-in-law of that autocrat, waiting for her turn to come, as come it must in the end: such was the picture which the women of India presented to the eye of an observer in the nineteenth century. To-day the members of the younger generations have homes of their own, or, if live in a joint family they must, the mother and mother-in-law must retire to the prayer-room. Such is the change in the picture which the twentieth century presents.

Many of those who think that the awakening amongst the women of India is only of very recent origin, may be interested in the few facts which I am placing before them this afternoon. The work of the women in the more advanced parts of India, such as Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, is well known, but unfortunately very few people know anything of the work that has been accomplished by the women of other provinces.

The women of the North owe a deep debt of gratitude to a lady named Muhammadi Begum, who is more or less unknown in this country. She wrote many books drawing the attention of the public to the urgent necessity of education for women, and also to the need of social reform in different spheres of society. It was she who first started, in 1886, a weekly paper known as Tehzibi Niswan (Women and Civilization), which has had a weekly publication ever since and is still widely read all over the country. During the first few years of issue the articles in this paper were contributed mostly by men, but gradually its columns began to fill with stories and articles written by women. This helped to make the women realize how much could be done through the agency of the Press, and at the beginning of the
twentieth century quite a number of good women's magazines began to appear in many parts of Northern India. Magazines like Khatun, Ismat, and another weekly paper known as the Sharif Bibi, were amongst the best known.

Most of these magazines and papers provided a field for young and budding writers and poetesses to have a chance of enriching their language with new and exquisite flowers of thought. Poetesses like Z. Kh. Shin, and writers like Mrs. Sajjad, Brijkumari, and Razia, with their vivid descriptions of the evils present in the social system and the decay in general of Indian womanhood all round; and how they were as voices crying in the wilderness for reform, helped to make the women of my country awake from their long sleep and open their eyes in broad daylight. They at once realized that with the sun almost at noon in the world's race for progress they must run in order to make up for lost time. Faced with almost insurmountable difficulties, the women of India addressed themselves to the task.

**Practical Work**

Hindu women who were not living in seclusion began to take part in large numbers in their Maha Sabha gatherings. In many towns and cities women's sections were organized along with the men's associations, and most of the meetings of these organizations used to begin with songs by the women. In 1902, when the Sikh Conference was held in Lahore, over 2,000 women were present, and one Sikh lady had managed to collect a lakh of rupees. The Mahavadyala School in Jallundhur, which has been so ably run by Shirimati Lajiavati, is the result of the efforts of the prominent women workers of that time. Muslim women, hampered as they were by the purdah system, started their activities behind the four walls of their homes, in the form of associations, the meetings of which were usually held in the houses of the different members after the Friday prayers. At these meetings social problems were keenly discussed and debated. Within a few years any number of women's associations sprang up in almost all the big cities and towns in the different provinces.

In 1914 the late Begum of Bhopal, realizing the necessity of co-
ordinating all such efforts, first conceived the idea of an All-India women's organization. On her initiative an All-India Muslim Women's Conference was organized, and the first meeting was held at Aligarh. It was attended by Muslim women from all over the country. This Conference worked very successfully for many years, and did most valuable work in making the Muslim parents realize the duty of sending their daughters to good schools. In 1917, when the Conference was held in Lahore, a resolution against polygamy which I proposed was not only carried unanimously, but over a thousand Muslim women present at the meeting signed a paper pledging themselves not to give their girls to any man who had a wife already. In the subsequent years a similar resolution was passed at every session of the Conference and the women present were asked to sign the pledge. The well-compiled annual reports of that Conference are a good record of its valuable work.

**All-India Organizations**

So far, until 1926, there were only two All-India women's organizations: the Women's Indian Association, which was started in Madras in 1915, and the All-India Muslim Women's Conference. Many of us were feeling the need of an All-India organization which would help to combine all efforts and would safeguard women's interests all round. Mrs. Cozens' circular letter containing a proposal for such an organization was welcomed by women in every province. In 1927 a meeting of most of the prominent women was held in Bombay, at which Her Highness the Maharani of Baroda presided, and an All-India Women's Conference was organized. In the following year, when the annual session of the Conference was held in Delhi under the presidency of the late Begum of Bhopal, over thirty-two constituent conferences from different provinces and Indian States sent elected delegates. This shows that the women of India were ready for such an organization of an All-India character. Sir John Simon, who was present at one of the meetings, was very much impressed by it.

It is no exaggeration to say that the All-India Women's Con-
ference is the most representative and the best organized women’s organization in India. It has branches in almost every province and in many of the Indian States, where, throughout the year, committees known as the Provincial Organizing Committees are working. Many of the larger provinces are divided into two or three sections and local committees are working in each section. It is the work of each provincial or sub-provincial organizing committee to see that each district, town, and city in the province or the section has a small committee of its own. These local committees are again subdivided into various small committees that take charge of different subjects, such as education, social reform and political questions.

Three or four months before the annual session local conferences are held in almost all the district towns where the conference work has been organized, and delegates are elected at these meetings to take part in the provincial or sub-provincial conferences, and resolutions are sent up for consideration by the local committees. These, along with the others that are framed by the provincial committees, are discussed at the provincial conferences, which, in turn, elect delegates to take part in the annual session of the Conference, which is usually held in one capital or another of any one of the provinces. It is not only bills like the Sarda Act that stand to the credit of this Conference, but there are innumerable and much appreciated local activities of these committees. It is due to some of these committees that there have been useful changes in the curriculum of the universities for the education of girls, important subjects being added to them, and suitable provision being made for the books required for imparting instruction in such subjects. It is through the efforts of these committees that we have managed to get more health centres, more maternity hospitals, adult classes, industrial schools, and recreation grounds. Of course in some provinces the work is far more advanced than in others. I know that I am speaking to an audience many of whom know almost as much about my country as I do, and many of you are already aware of some of the work that has been accomplished by these Conference Committees. I would request you to bear in mind that, India being a continent,
there are certain parts of the country that are still in a very backward state, and that, having started our work rather late in the day, we women could not have done more than has been accomplished within so short a time.

At an early stage in the work of the Conference the pioneers realized that the greatest hindrance to their progress was the illiteracy of their countrywomen, and one of the obstacles to the spread of education was the lack of a sufficient number of teachers. Therefore, at the second annual session of the Conference, held in Delhi, an appeal was made for funds to establish a central training college. It was liberally responded to, and within the next few years the Fund Association of the All-India Women's Conference managed to collect nearly Rs. 4 lakhs. Mrs. Rustamiji Faridoonji, the honorary secretary of the Fund, has devoted herself with untiring energy and wonderful zeal to the task of bringing this college into existence. The work was started in October last, and the college was formally opened by His Excellency the Viceroy at the end of March.

The aim of the college is neither to de-Westernize nor to masculinize the girls, but to provide teachers for schools that will give the girls instruction in domestic science. As you are aware, in most of the schools in India the girls study for the university examinations only. What the Indian women are now trying to do is to provide schools where the girls should learn to be good housewives, capable mothers, and practical social workers, so that, instead of becoming learned students and professors with a lot of letters after their names, at least 80 per cent. of the women who have to become housewives should learn to fulfil their duties in that sphere. Their object is to combine the new Western civilization and culture with the old Eastern tradition and knowledge in such a manner that out of the fusion of the two cultures a higher and better system of education should evolve. The curriculum for the girls of this college includes science, chemistry, physics, literature, laundry, cookery, physical culture, hygiene, nursing, painting, and music (Indian as well as European). How far they will succeed in this great idea remains yet to be seen.
Political Status

Economic independence is one of those great powers which make a human being self-reliant and self-respecting. Women deprived of this lose both self-reverence and self-esteem. Indian mothers must achieve their economic independence in order to become mothers worthy of great sons. And what are the obstacles to the realization of their birthright? They are the social customs and old traditions which are keeping them in bonds of slavery. Then how can we demolish these walls of iron which customs of centuries have erected? These questions were present in the minds of prominent women workers, and they came to the conclusion that the answer lay in women having an effective voice in the political life of the country. No doubt they were enjoying the vote, but the proportion of their voting strength was less than one per cent. of the population, therefore their voice was not one that must be heard. The Simon Commission went out to India, and the members very wisely realized the important part that the women of India were going to play in the future life of their Motherland. They pointed out that the key of the “future progress of India was in the hands of its women,” and in order to give them a power in the political life of the country they recommended that women should become voters in large numbers and that their proportion in the voting strength should be one woman to two men. They tried to lessen the disparity that would otherwise exist between men and women voters by proposing special qualifications for women, a principle which was accepted by the Franchise Sub-Committee of the First Round-Table Conference.

The women of India rejoiced that at last the Government had realized the importance of women’s voting strength. Their representatives who came to the Conference asked for their full voting strength on a basis of equality, either through adult suffrage or, if that was not possible for the present, through the indirect method known as the Group System. The women of India feel—and feel very strongly, too—that no differential qualifications of any kind can satisfy the aspirations of all the different races
and both the sexes in India. It is unfortunate indeed that such a system of franchise should have been turned down by the Third Round-Table Conference. The Prime Minister, in his letter to the Indian Franchise Committee, stated clearly that:

"His Majesty's Government attach special importance to the question of securing a more adequate enfranchisement of women than the existing system, which applies to women the same qualifications as to men, and has produced a women's electorate numbering less than one-twentieth of the total male electorate."

**Franchise Proposals**

The Indian Franchise Committee's proposals provided for a women's electorate of 6,600,000, their proportion to the men being that of 1 to 4.4 for the provinces as well as for the Central Legislature. They recommended a property qualification for both men and women, and, an educational qualification, which for men was to be the upper primary standard and for women mere literacy. They also proposed a special qualification for women that the wives of voters under the present property qualification to the Provincial Legislatures should also have the vote.

When the Report of the Lothian Committee was published the women's organizations were indignant, and strong protests were cabled to the Premier and the Secretary of State. That their proportion in numbers, instead of being 1 to 2, as recommended by the Simon Commission, should be reduced to 1 to 4\(\frac{1}{2}\) by the Indian Franchise Committee made them feel very depressed. Those women, who from the very beginning had been for non-co-operation with the new Constitution, felt triumphant, pointing out to the co-operators that their policy had not gained them anything. The women belonging to the moderate section tried to make as many women as possible accept the figure recommended by the Lothian Committee.

At the Third Round-Table Conference almost all the delegates accepted the qualifications proposed by the Indian Franchise Committee, that there shall be a property and an educational qualification for both men and women voters. The principle of special qualifications for women, to lessen the disparity between men and
women voters, was also accepted, but the question of what those added qualifications were to be was referred back to the Government of India and the Provincial Governments.

**Present Position**

The three All-India women’s organizations, the All-India Women’s Conference, the Women’s Indian Association, and the National Council of Women, elected ten representatives each to reconsider the position and formulate new constructive proposals. Before their meeting could be held the White Paper was published, and the proportion of women voters was further reduced from 1 to $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 to 7 in the provinces and 1 to 20 for the centre. No wonder that the women of India felt very disappointed, and the elected representatives of the women’s organizations who were present at the meeting which was held in Bombay at the end of March sat down to work with a heavy heart and an unwilling spirit.

By not accepting literacy as an educational qualification for women voters, and by laying down a condition that the registration of women voters under the special qualification shall be through application by the potential voter, the White Paper has not only reduced the proportion of women voters to 1 woman to 7 men, but in reality to a much lower figure. In all those remote villages where people have great difficulty in having an everyday letter written, and sometimes have to walk two or three miles in order to find someone who can write, how are the women going to apply for registration as voters? It will indeed be very difficult for women in rural areas to be enrolled as voters if this barrier is not removed.

All the Indian women are ready to accept the property qualification for women on the same basis as men. They are also prepared to accept literacy as the educational qualification for women voters. The women’s organizations propose that in place of the wife’s vote, women above a certain age should be given the vote in urban areas. This would lessen the administrative difficulties which stand in the way of women becoming voters in large numbers. Instead of three lists under the different qualifications one list of women voters in towns and cities would suffice. The
population in these areas is nearly 29,000,000. That means nearly 14,500,000 adults, and the number of women being less than that of men, approximately the number of women voters under this qualification would be almost the same as that recommended by the Lothian Report. There is the strong objection to such a qualification that it means chiefly enfranchising women in large towns and cities, and most of the women in the rural areas will be left out of the voting registers. The women's organizations say that, education having been first introduced in urban areas, it is in these places that an intelligent electorate is to be found. If education could be introduced in urban areas only at first, why should not the same principle be followed in regard to the vote?

The majority of Indian women do not like the idea of getting the vote through their husbands because they feel that their civic rights should be given to them as individual members of the State. It is still something alien to the mind of Eastern women to be known by the names of their husbands or fathers. This Western custom has only recently been introduced into Eastern countries.

A small number of women, mostly in Bengal, are strongly in favour of a wife getting the vote in respect of her husband's qualifications. Whatever may be the special qualifications ultimately accepted by Parliament for women, all the Indian women are agreed that nothing less than the numbers recommended by the Indian Franchise Committee (i.e., 6,600,000) for the Provincial Legislatures will be acceptable to them. They hope that His Majesty's Government will reconsider the proportion which should be given to women as voters for the Federal Assembly.

**Representation in the Legislatures**

One happy feature of the women's movement in India is that there are no communal differences among the women. Realizing that the reservation of seats for women would mean dividing them on communal lines, the members of the women's organizations decided not to ask for reserved seats in the Legislatures. The principle of reservation of seats for women having been accepted under the Communal Award by His Majesty's Government, it is essential that at least two seats in the Provincial Legis-
lature and one in the Federal Assembly should be reserved for the women of the North-West Frontier Province. Their backward condition demands that their own representatives should safeguard their interests in the Legislatures. One seat ought to be reserved for the women of Assam in the Federal Assembly. It is essential that provision should also be made by His Majesty's Government for the women in the two new provinces, Sind and Orissa, to have their franchise and representation.

The Indian women are very anxious that they should have a voice in the election of their own representative to the Federal Assembly, and that it should not be left in the hands of the members of the Provincial Legislatures to elect women members for the Central Legislature, as proposed in the White Paper. They are apprehensive that, if it is left in the hands of the members of the Provincial Councils, the women belonging to the majority parties alone will get a chance of entering the Federal Assembly, who in many cases may not be the women's real representatives.

There is no mention in the White Paper of the representation of women in the Upper Chamber and the Indian women feel that some seats should be reserved for them there. They hope that the high property qualification for membership of the Upper House will be supplemented by an educational qualification in order to make more women eligible for membership of the Upper Chamber.

**Women and Status**

Equality of status between the two sexes in their rights of citizenship is one of those fundamental principles which ought to be accepted in every Constitution and the women of India hope that their right of equality will be recognized under the new Constitution.

Some may say, "There is so much to be done in the field of social reform and educational progress, why should not the Indian women at present confine themselves to that all-important work?" My reply is that in order to achieve success in that sphere we must become a part and parcel of the administration of our
country. What is our position to-day? We go to our men, they hide behind the screen of having neither the power nor the money for our requirements. We go to the officials, and their reply is that it is not possible for the Government to interfere in old social customs. Let the women of India become voters in large numbers, and it will be their business to see that the members who hold the power in their hands would be those who would safeguard the interests of the women and will be prepared to do all they can to break the chains that bind them. It is the proportion in the voting strength that matters far more to us than anything else. The Indian women are asking the British Parliament to hand them the key that will unlock the door of their progress and emancipation. Once they have this key the path before them will be straight and clear.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, June 13, 1933, when a paper entitled “Indian Women and the New Constitution” was read by the Begum Shah Nawaz. Lady Procter was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

The Right Hon. Lord Lamington, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., Sir John Kerr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir Louis Dane, G.C.I.E., C.S.I., and Lady Dane, Sir Walter R. Lawrence, Bart., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., C.B., the Maharajahiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, G.C.I.E., K.C.I.E., Sir Prabhashankar D. Pattani, K.C.I.E., Sir Manubhai Mehta, K.C.S.I., Sir George Forbes, K.C.S.I., Sir Mancherjee M. Bhownagree, K.C.I.E., Colonel Sir Umar Hayat Khan, K.C.I.E., C.B.E., M.V.O., Sir John Cumming, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir James MacKenna, C.I.E., Sir Ernest Hotson, K.C.I.E., O.B.E., Sir William Owens Clark, Sir Hugh McPherson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Wilberforce Ross Barker, K.C.I.E., C.B., Sir Hubert Carr, Sir Duncan Macpherson, C.I.E., Sir Muhammad Yakub, Lady Scott Moncrieff, Lady Hartog, Lady (Lionel) Jacob, Lady Abbas Ali Baig, Lady Chatterton, Lady (Herbert) Pearson, Lady Mant, the Hon. Mary Pickford, M.P., Miss Eleanor Rathbone, M.P., Mrs. G. H. Bell, Mrs. Rama Rao, Mr. A. Yusuf Ali, C.B.E., Mr. H. N. Hutchinson, O.B.E., Mr. John Ross, I.S.O., Mrs. Nicholson, Mrs. Jackson, Mrs. Dewar, Mr. Sabonadire, Mr. Kenneth C. Keymer, Mr. P. K. Dutt, Mr. R. A. Wilson, Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Colonel W. G. Hamilton, Dr. Colin C. Davies, Miss E. L. Curteis, Miss C. K. Cumming, Mr. H. M. Willmott, Mr. Sachchidananda Sinha, Mr. H. R. Wilkinson, Rev. E. S. Carr, Colonel A. G. Hamilton, Miss C. T. Stack, Miss Caton, Mr. and Mrs. J. H. Lindsay, Mrs. H. Ward, Mr. J. W. Beggs, Mr. S. Wasiuddin, Mrs. Roberts, Mrs. Drysdale, Rev. Herbert Anderson, Mr. B. K. Sinha, Mr. H. Williams, Mr. H. K. Sadler, Colonel and Mrs. Johnston, Mrs. Polak, Mr. and Mrs. R. C. Gupta, Mr. J. G. Laithwaite, Mrs. Flors Macdonald, Mr. A. Carlyle, Mr. A. V. Subbaran, Mr. and Mrs. E. Hopkins, Mrs. Bonarjee, Mrs. Foden, Mr. L. Perkins, Miss Margaret Brown, Dr. Shafa’at Ahmad Khan, Mr. F. Grubb, Mr. C. L. Katial, Miss Hopley, Miss Ella Sykes, Mrs. J. J. Nolan, Mrs. Tydeman, Mr. R. M. Gray, Miss Speechley, Miss Cox, Mrs. B. Bacon, Mrs. R. Churchill, Mr. H. Jehangiani, Mr. W. F. Westbrook, Mr. Charles C. Boyd, Mr. John F. Boyd, Mr. R. R. Chaudhuri, Mrs. Paul Stewart, Hon. Mrs. A. Gordon, Mr. J. E. Bagram, Mr. and Mrs. A. Inglis, Mrs. Foulkes, and Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN: I know I am expressing the feeling of all here, and I know that I am expressing my own real deep sentiments, when I say how extremely sorry we are that Lady Astor is not able to be here this afternoon. May I just read a letter from her to Mr. Brown, written this morning:

“I am very sorry that I cannot be with you today to take the chair at the meeting on Indian women’s franchise. I feel that this is one of the most important questions connected with the new Indian Con-
stitution, and I am perfectly convinced that it is necessary to include a good proportion of women voters in the electorate if the New Constitution is to be satisfactory."

We recognize that if we had Lady Astor here in the chair, we should have had someone with a very real knowledge of the importance of the subject, and whose power of quick perception would have been a tremendous help in what I am sure will be a very interesting discussion, quite apart from the fact that wherever she comes Lady Astor brings a certain lightness and an element of fun and amusingness, if I am permitted to use that expression.

So I feel I am extremely inadequate to take the chair this afternoon. Though in one way I take the chair with such regret because of Lady Astor's absence, in another way I feel it is a tremendous honour to be here, because I agree with her that this subject is one of the most important developments in what is before India at this time.

I do want in your name to assure the Begum Shah Nawaz of our very warm welcome to her this afternoon. (Cheers.) It has been a very great pleasure to many of us to have had her in England several times within the last few months. We have got to know her and to love her, and to appreciate that which she is doing in this very important time. We want to assure her this afternoon that we are here to understand as far as we possibly can all that she has to tell us and to get her point of view, so that whatever our own point of view—we may have varied ones in many ways—we shall be only too glad of every bit of fresh light and fresh knowledge, so that we can do our utmost to help and co-operate at this time of tremendous opportunity and difficulty for the women of India. They have been showing such wonderful courage these past years, when so many changes have been taking place and things have moved forward with such rapidity, and we are glad of any opportunity that we can have to make our knowledge better, wider, and deeper, so that we can do the very utmost that lies in us to help them at this really wonderful time in the history of their great country.

Begum Shah Nawaz: Madam Chairman,—I am very grateful to you for your kind words of welcome and for all the sweet things that you have said about me this afternoon. Let me assure you that I have begun to look upon England as my second home, and I consider myself very lucky indeed in having friends like yourself in this country.

As a member of the Indian Delegation to the Joint Parliamentary Committee, I am not supposed to enter into any controversy or talk of any proposals that are being discussed in the Committee itself, but realizing that it is my duty to place before the people in this country the point of view of the different sections whom I represent in regard to franchise qualifications and the representation of Indian women in the new legislatures, I am taking the opportunity of reading this paper to you all to-day.

(The paper was then read.)

The Chairman: We do indeed thank the Begum Shah Nawaz for a beautiful paper, lucid and clear and definite. I hope that as many will take part in the discussion as possible, because we really want to go away from
this meeting with a much clearer idea in our minds, so that we can spread the understanding of this great problem and this great opportunity among those we meet day by day, for there is often so little knowledge and understanding of all that is involved.

Lady Hartog: The Begum Shah Nawaz has put so clearly and with a charm that is all her own the claims of Indian women that I have not so very much to add. She has told us how fast the women of India have been moving during the last few years. If I may say so, the East India Association has been moving fast too. I think it is only three years ago that for the first time a woman was asked to take the chair at one of these meetings—Lady Simon. I do not know if that was regarded by some members as a dangerous innovation, but at any rate I have not heard anything of the formation of an East India Association Defence League! To-day the Council has done the Begum Shah Nawaz the great honour of asking her to be the speaker at their annual meeting. I do feel that we women owe a very real debt of gratitude to the Association for giving us a platform—I think this is the third time during the last twelve months—for the discussion of women’s questions.

I should like to support all that the Begum has said about the very special importance of the numbers of women voters, especially in regard to education and medical aid for women. Girls’ education at the present time gets just about one-seventh of what is voted for the boys. Now we know that India under the New Constitution is going to be poor, at least for a good many years. What chance is there that the girls are going to get an adequate share of educational funds—a share which the Education Committee said was vital for the progress of India as a whole—unless women are present as voters in sufficient numbers? If the women voters form an important section in a great number of constituencies, then the women’s associations will be able to organize them, and the women will be able to demand from candidates that they should support the grant of funds for girls’ education, and also the grant of funds for providing more adequate medical aid for women and children. If women do not get that voting strength, then they will continue to be as negligible a factor at elections as they have been in the past.

I should also like to put in a special plea for the acceptance of simple literacy as a qualification for women voters. As everybody here must know, that has been dropped in the White Paper except in the Province of Madras. To all women, both here and in India, it seems quite the best of the special qualifications for women voters. It has so many advantages. It will increase automatically the number of women voters as time goes on without any further legislation. It is independent of property. It applies to widows and to unmarried women as well as to married, and—this is very important—it will give the vote to those who have been educated at home and not at school, and who cannot therefore possibly have school certificates. For another thing, it cannot fail to give a great stimulus to education, both of girls and of women.

The only objections that have been put forward against it are administrative difficulties, but are there not administrative difficulties to be faced in
connection with every single subject in the New Constitution? I cannot believe that they are insuperable. I would urge that everybody here who has influence with members of the Joint Select Committee should impress upon them how earnestly women are hoping that this qualification of simple literacy will be accepted, as recommended by the Franchise Committee.

The Hon. Miss MARY PICKFORD, M.P.: Perhaps as a member of the Lothian Committee on the Franchise, which went out last year, I might say a word or two in amplification of what has been said. One of the criticisms that has often been made against a large extension of the women's vote in India is that at present, under the existing qualification, the proportion of women who have exercised their vote in India is very small. But to set against that, we found in the evidence that was put before us on the Committee that where the number of women voters was very small, the percentage even of that small number who voted was very small also, because it might happen that in a single constituency there might not be more than five or six women qualified to go to the poll, which made them extremely conspicuous. It was a difficult matter for them to brave the public opinion which is still against them, and also what was the good of doing it when their tiny handful of votes could make no difference one way or the other?

But, on the other hand, where women were enfranchised in fairly large numbers, as, for instance, in Madras for local elections, the proportion of women who polled was no less than the proportion of men. They went freely to the poll because there were large numbers; and the percentage of women voters who exercised their vote was no lower than the percentage of men—indeed, it was a high percentage: in some elections about 60 per cent., in others even more. Those who have engaged in local elections in this country will know that is a very large percentage. Usually here we do not get more than 30 or 40 per cent. That is a strong argument for putting a sufficiently large number of women on the electoral roll, so that they shall support each other in going to the poll, and also so that their votes shall be something the candidates have to take into consideration; because clearly if the women's vote is so small that it is not going to make the least bit of difference one way or the other, no candidate is going to take very great trouble about the women voters. But if they are in an appreciable number, the candidate has to pay attention to the demands of the women voters just as he has the demands of the men. That will probably be the experience of people in this country too.

Taking that into consideration we on the Franchise Committee had to weigh the claims of both men and women, because owing to the difficulties which exist in India in polling large numbers owing to the very large amount of illiteracy in the country, it is not possible administratively to poll more than a certain number. Therefore in each province to which we went we had to find out what was the number which could be polled with safety. After all, I think this meeting would agree that nothing would give a worse effect under the New Constitution than for the electoral machinery to break down.

The proportions which we proposed were in the ratio of one woman to
every four or five men voters. We thought that under our recommendations we were placing upon the register a number of women voters sufficient to make their influence felt, both by voting power and also, we hoped, by reservation of seats in the Provincial Councils and in the Federal Assemblies.

As the Begum has explained, these numbers have been diminished from what was recommended on the Committee’s Report by the proposals which are put forward under the White Paper.

As a member not only of the Lothian Committee but also of the Joint Select Committee, I am treading on rather delicate ground in criticizing the proposals put forward in the White Paper.

But there are two points to be brought out. One is the question of literacy. That would add about 1½ million women throughout India to the electoral roll for the Provincial Assemblies and for the Federal Assembly as well. The other point is the necessity for women to apply before being placed on the electoral roll. We fully realize that with regard to the educational qualification for both men and women that would be necessary. It would be almost impossible for the officials to ask each individual whether he or she had qualified either by examination or by sufficient knowledge of reading and writing for literacy. So it was necessary for both men and women to make their own application to have their names placed upon the roll. A further disadvantage from which the woman voter will suffer under the White Paper proposals is this: It is proposed that the wives of men holding a property qualification, which will qualify their wives to vote, will have to make their application in order to be placed upon the electoral roll.

You can imagine, as the Begum has said, that that is going to be a matter of very considerable difficulty to women who live in a rather remote part of the country, because that application will have to be made several months before an election takes place. I wonder how many of us would remember to make our application in time to be placed upon the register if the initiative lay with us?

Mrs. Rama Rao: I meant to tell you merely one little thing about the questions that have been raised to-day, and that is the question of the franchise. I in this country have been authorized to represent one of the All-India women’s associations in India. On that account I could only in talking of the franchise question lay before you the point of view of the three main All-India women’s organizations that have met and conferred with regard to this particular question. Their objection lies mainly with the wives’ qualification, as it is known now amongst us, the qualification that says that the wives of those who come in under the property qualification will be enfranchised. As an alternative they are just as anxious as our friends in this country to keep the numbers of enfranchised women as high as possible. Under that qualification about 6,000,000 women would be enfranchised. To make up for that, they desire a qualification which to them seems much more fair, the qualification of enfranchising all women of twenty-one and over in urban areas.

To some of you here it will seem rather a drastic recommendation to make, but the more you think about that particular recommendation, the
more you will realize that there are very many advantages in the plan. First of all, there is no getting away from the fact that the vast majority of people in India are hoping for adult franchise at some stage or the other. By enfranchising women who live in urban areas, you are forming the nucleus of that ultimate aim that we have in our minds—adult franchise—because in these areas you would have all that corresponds to adult franchise in your country. Therefore it sounds perfectly fair that we should experiment that way. Then it is fair in another sense, because in enfranchising women in this fashion you are enfranchising all ranks of women: the property holders, those who are educated and those who are uneducated. So that you get a fairer electorate in that section—the whole urban section.

Some people object very strongly to it on the ground that it is not being fair to women in rural areas. Granted. But this particular recommendation of enfranchising the wives of those who come under the property qualification—is that fair? To double the vote of those who hold property and leave all the other sections out completely—is that fair? In any case, when a limited franchise is offered to any country, you have to be unfair to one section or the other. The suggestion that women living in urban areas should be treated differently from those living in rural areas has also this behind it. There is no doubt that the former have advantages the latter have not. All the main educational institutions in India are in urban areas. Then you have the contact with newspapers, current topics, the radio where it does exist, women's associations, health and welfare work, and other social service schemes—all these amenities of life can be found in our urban areas. Therefore these women are better qualified, and the injustice is not quite as great as it seems to be. Under the scheme that the women's organizations have chalked out, there is no doubt that the women drawn into the electorate are as great in number as those coming under the qualification that the Lothian Committee has recommended.

With regard to one other point in the Begum's paper, as far as I am able to gather, there is a very, very decided stand made by the women of the country against reservations of any kind in local Provincial Legislatures as well as in the Central Legislature. Women do not want reservation of seats at all. They made a stand some time ago of equality. They want equality. Since they cannot have equality, these special qualifications are accepted for the time being. They have always stood out against reservation of seats in legislatures. If you have enough women enfranchised in the electorate, they are quite content to use the influence that that enfranchised section is going to bring to bear on the members in the Councils. They are not anxious that one, two or three women should occupy specially reserved seats. They are confident that they can do the job.

Another thing the women are dead set against is the Communal Award. Never, in all the work women have done during recent years in India, never have we had any communal bias, the poison of communalism entering our ranks, and we are most anxious to keep that poison out of our section in the new Constitution and to be an example to some of our men. We therefore do not want to divide ourselves into Hindu, Muslim, and Christian representatives in the legislatures.
Miss ELEANOR RATHBONE, M.P.: I agree with the Begum and with most of the speakers that what we have really to concentrate on is the question of numbers to secure a really adequate vote for women. There are differences of opinion, as the speech we have just listened to shows, and as the Begum admitted, among Indian women and among men and women in this country as to the relative merits of two proposed qualifications. But I think that all who have interested themselves in this subject are agreed that we shall not get a satisfactory franchise for women unless it is adequate both in numbers and in ratio. That has been admitted by the Government itself and by everyone of the investigating committees appointed by the Government, but that principle is not given effect to in the White Paper.

The difficulties have been described to a certain extent by the Begum herself in her most charming and lucid speech. They were alluded to by Miss Pickford, but those of us who are interested in this question remain unconvinced that those difficulties need be found insuperable. Difficulties are meant to be got over. It is the business of an administrative department to point out difficulties to the Ministers who are relatively temporary people; but it is the business of the Ministers to tell those departments that those difficulties have to be got over.

The Begum and Miss Pickford have both alluded to the two principal changes in the White Paper proposal: the substitution of a much higher educational test than that of simple literacy and the requirement that the wife voters must apply for enrolment. If the Joint Select Committee really find the difficulties against the previous proposals insuperable, it is up to them to find some alternative. Take the question of the votes for the Federal Assembly: there, by the Government's own admission, the proposal in the White Paper secures no better ratio of women voters than the present one, which the Indian Franchise Committee was expressly asked to find a means of improving.

The White Paper does away with the literacy test, and therefore cuts down the proportion of women to the Federal Assembly to the old miserable less than one-twentieth. Clearly there is room for a larger vote. The proposals for the Provincial Councils involve the enfranchisement of 14 per cent. of the adult population; those for the Federal Assembly an electorate of only 3 per cent. If for the Provincial Assembly you can poll 14 per cent. of the population, it is inconceivable that the addition of two or three millions at Federal elections can present any great administrative difficulties. I suggest there is an easy way of pushing up the numbers, and that is by adding to the Federal electorate the women who are enfranchised on the wives' qualification for the provinces. But if it cannot be done in one way, it can in another. If public opinion manifests itself in this country and in India with sufficient strength, the Government will find the means.

I should like to say one word as to the question of reservation of seats. Many of us agree that ideally there should not be a necessity for reserved seats for any class of the community if you have a perfect system of franchise. But the repudiation of reserved seats by Indian women's organizations was coupled with a demand for adult franchise. If the most we can hope for under the present proposals is the ratio of one woman to
four and a half men voters recommended by the Indian Franchise Committee, then the reservation of seats for women is merely a very inadequate compensation for the smallness of that ratio.

I was talking only yesterday to an experienced public servant. I said to him, "Why is it that many of the Provincial Governments in India have put up so many objections on the question of the women's vote?" His answer was perfectly explicit. He said it was because many of the Provincial Governments in India think that the women will be keen after social reform, and they do not want social reform because it is going to be very troublesome. For that reason I submit that every man or woman who realizes the vast need for social reform in India should put all his or her strength into the movement for trying to secure a really adequate enfranchisement for the women of India.

There are those who think the proposals for the reform of the Constitution in India go much too far. Very well, then, we say to those who take that point of view, "If you have so little confidence in the men of India, why put the women of India under the feet of the men of India?" To those who say these proposals do not go nearly far enough and who want a much more democratic Constitution for India, we say, "Then see at any rate that democratic principles are fulfilled to some extent so far as the women are concerned." Here we have a case where we have a right to appeal to both wings and to all sections of opinion to secure a more adequate franchise for women.

Sir John Kerr: As a member of the Franchise Committee, I only want to say one word in regard to that question of reservation of seats. We felt, as Miss Pickford has said, that we could not go beyond the proportion of 1 to 4, and we felt that there was at any rate a chance that with that proportion there would be very few women, or perhaps no women, on the Legislative Councils in India. We felt it would be a public calamity if ladies like the Begum Shah Nawaz and Mrs. Rama Rao had their entry into the legislative bodies indefinitely postponed, and it was for that reason that we put forward this proposal for the reservation of seats for women. I would ask the women of India to think well over the matter before they reject that very well-meant remedy.

Mrs. Rama Rao: In regard to the reservation of seats, it is partly because it brings communalism into the ranks of women that we resent it as strongly as we do.

Mrs. Bell: I listened with the very greatest interest to the beautiful speech of the Begum Shah Nawaz. It brought back to me the women in India that I have known—the voice, the manner, the idealism, that which sweetens the life of India and will eventually in public life lift it high among the nations of the world!

I would like to say that I entirely agree with those who want to see Indian women enfranchised in sufficient numbers. It is very delightful to know the world is so anxious to keep us in the position of being "precious,"
but there is not the smallest doubt that when there are political contests people will fight it out on numbers, because they must; and women will require the weight of numbers just as much as men. To try to diminish to us the value of numbers is almost to throw us back to that old game, "You do not need a vote because you have such influence." That bamboozled me in my youth, but never again!

I feel it is a mistake to prevent the proposal for the "literacy" qualification from realizing itself; and to make it so difficult for women to exercise the vote by saying that they must come forward with an application to be placed on the electoral roll. In mountain villages women will hear late that there is going to be an election. The difficulties of coming forward to obtain a vote and to poll it will be insuperable to some village women, but you must not make the fact that a woman is bad at the complicated affair of opening the political door a reason for saying she should not have a vote at all. It is her judgment you want on certain matters. You want her judgment in matters of social reform, because it is the judgment of thousands of years of women's experience. But you also, I submit, want her judgment on matters of political moment. She should speak not only for women, but for a population. I would have a woman speak for the population, and not specially for her sex. To speak only for her sex is to lay an emphasis on it in public affairs which is unnecessary. Let her speak for the home; and the ideal home is man, woman and child, and their interests are united.

I certainly think that the wife of a man with property should be enfranchised. The proposal requires a higher property qualification in the family than that which will entitle a man to vote, for her husband must possess some twenty-four acres of irrigated land or forty-eight unirrigated; whereas a man who has something like five or six acres will be entitled to vote for the new provincial legislatures.

I would also ask for the enfranchisement of a category of women who have been omitted in the recommendations of the White Paper: the pensioned widow and the pensioned mother of Indian soldiers. (Applause.) Those women represent at present the only pension system in India, and as such surely they should carry their weight in political councils.

If you draw a pension, you know the meaning of a pension system. You know the meaning of efficiency in public places such as post offices. You know where the world can be helped by such things, and eventually pensioned women will be capable of being pioneers in measures of social assistance which India will increasingly need.

Then I would plead for the pensioned widow, because, had her husband lived, he would, as an ex-Regulator in H.M. Army, have had a vote. He nominated her for the pension as his representative. She bears the sacrifice of his death in battle, and you should give her a vote in the legislature of her province. If you give it to a fallen soldier's pensioned mother, you give her something for what she gave to you, and the position of the mother of a son is so revered in India that her presence in polling booths will enable the younger and modest and shy women to come forward without embarrassment and bear their responsibility.
I would ask for the wife of a soldier that she should share his privilege of the vote. A soldier's wife is often separated from her husband in a way no other woman in India is called upon to be. She bears the anguish of his danger. And among the poorest of the poor, I cannot tell you what it is to be the wife of a wounded pensioner, for the ordinary services of the home are carried on by the man: he draws water, carries wood, and without a leg or arm he is constantly obliged to ask for help. These women will look back on history and remember how from 1914 to 1918 by every emotion that moved us we urged them to make great sacrifices. Now, in 1933, when we are organizing and distributing political power among 6,000,000 Indian women, it will make a bad story if they are ignored.

A Member: I should like to ask the Begum one question. Instead of all these complicated qualifications, what is the objection to adult suffrage now for men and women, and to save the expense of polling to introduce the representative system of voting in force and working well in Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq?

Begum Shah Nawaz: In reply to this, may I point to one sentence in my paper which makes it quite clear that we are still very anxious that an indirect method of franchise, which is in force in all these Eastern countries mentioned by the gentleman, should be accepted for the New Constitution. If the British Parliament were even now to accept the group system of franchise, no one would be more pleased than the women of India. We strongly feel that such an indirect system alone can really work well in India.

A Member: Did they support it?

Begum Shah Nawaz: The full support of all the three women's organizations was given to this system, and their witnesses who appeared before the Indian Franchise Committee gave unanimous evidence in support of the indirect system of franchise.

A Member: I mention this chiefly because many of us think that only by adult suffrage can the peasantry be given a voice in the Government of the country.

Begum Shah Nawaz: The memorandum which was presented to the Second Round-Table Conference by the women's organizations made it clear that nothing but adult suffrage will be acceptable to the women of India. But later on, when they gave their full consideration to the question, the women realized that when at present only 2-8 per cent. of the population were enfranchised, it would be very difficult to introduce adult suffrage immediately. They decided to give their full support to the next best method which had been a success in other Eastern countries—that is, the indirect system of franchise.

Miss Cox: I would like to ask the Begum about the enfranchisement of women who have property. This seems to be enfranchising a class at the expense of other classes. Is it not a fact that in her own province of the Punjab, for instance, the ownership of land is concentrated in the hands of one or two communities? Would it not give a very strong communal bias to the electorate at the expense of the other communities?
Begum Shah Nawaz: Being a member of the women's organizations, and one of their elected representatives who took part in the meeting which was recently held in Bombay, I am one of those people who do not believe in differential qualifications of any kind, whether property or otherwise; but I am also one of those who feel that if our voting strength can only be secured through such qualifications, we should be prepared to accept them. If giving up certain qualifications would mean our having barely 2,000,000 women voters, I would think twice before refusing any qualification which would give us 6,600,000 women voters.

Ladies and gentlemen, first of all I must thank you for the kind help which most of the speakers have given me this afternoon, and also for providing such a large audience. I am delighted to see how much interest the people here are taking in the future status of the women of my country.

Lady Procter, while giving her full support to our claims, said something about our not being able to get sufficient money for the women's education in India. About six months ago one of the district inspectors sent me a copy of his remarks. After giving an amazing picture of some of the girls' schools that he had inspected, he said that everywhere he found that the girls' education was considered more as a waste-paper basket, so that whatever money was left over from the boys' education was thrown into it. If women had their own representatives on most of these committees, such a state of affairs could not have existed.

Many of the prominent women workers of today will not get the vote under an educational qualification if that is to depend upon university certificates of any type. Most of the women belonging to my generation, and more so those of the older generations, do not hold certificates of any kind. In our time the parents would not allow their daughters to go in for university examinations at all. The English principal of my college was strongly against girls appearing for university examinations. Her idea was that the girls should concentrate more on acquiring knowledge of an all-round character rather than devote their time to learning higher mathematics and such other subjects that would not be of much use to them in after-life.

I am very grateful to Miss Pickford for all the kind support she has given me this afternoon. She, having studied this question thoroughly, and having had the opportunity to do so in connection with the work of the Indian Franchise Committee, now understands the question very well indeed. She has told you how women have begun to exercise their vote in large numbers. At the last election my telephone was ringing from morning until evening. In my family we have many women voters under the present property qualification, and both the candidates who were standing for one of the seats in the present Assembly tried to make me bring old ladies of eighty-six and ninety to the polling booths. Once women are registered as voters, it will be in the interests of the candidates to see that they record their votes for them, and for this they will leave no stone unturned.

Mrs. Rama Rao said something about the views of the women's organizations. I think she is aware that I belong to the women's organizations, and I am one of the signatories of the memorandum that is to be presented to
the Committee on behalf of the three All-India women's organizations. Therefore I need hardly say that I agree with her in everything she said this afternoon. It is my first duty to see that the three All-India women's organizations' views are placed before the Joint Parliamentary Committee. I do not believe in reservation of seats myself, but the principle of reservation of seats has been accepted under the Communal Award by the Government, and as far as that is concerned it is more or less a closed door. We have to make it clear that, if reservation is to remain, such seats should be provided for women in all the legislatures of the future. I find that people in India are taking it for granted that wherever seats for women are not reserved, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government that women should not enter those legislatures.

Coming to Miss Rathbone, first of all I would like to take this opportunity of thanking all my friends here, especially Miss Rathbone and Miss Pickford, for the wonderful help which they have given me at almost every step in this country. I need not say that if our efforts are crowned with success, I shall not only feel but I shall consider it my duty to tell my people that it has been mostly due to the very great help which has been given to me by almost all the women's organizations and many of the women M.P.'s in England.

She said that Provincial Governments, as well as the Government of India, say that there are any number of administrative difficulties in the way of women becoming voters in large numbers. One would like to ask all the members of the Provincial Governments to let us know what those administrative difficulties are, so that we may have a chance of meeting them. Why are we being kept altogether in the dark? Are there no administrative difficulties in all that the Government is going to do in order to safeguard the rights and interests of the different communities? Even the creation of new provinces is not difficult, but the enfranchisement of 6,600,000 women is not possible, because of insurmountable and insuperable difficulties.

I am grateful to Sir John Kerr for his kind support in the Franchise Committee, and I hope he will continue that support in the future. I have every hope that, with the kind help and support of all our friends in England, we will succeed in getting at least the very moderate figure of women voters recommended by the Lothian Committee, accepted by both Houses of Parliament.

I am very glad Mrs. Bell spoke of the widows and mothers of the soldiers. Let me assure her that I have not forgotten them. Nothing would give me greater pleasure than that all the women of India should get their vote, but unfortunately it is not possible for the present.

There is one other thing that I would like to say to you all. We have not had to put up a very great fight in order to gain our right to vote. I suppose our men gave it to us because at that time our number as voters was very insignificant. At the same time I know that the real battle has been fought by the English women over here, and I am grateful to them for the success which has meant the success of all of us.

What greater example can there be for us Indian women than to see in
this chair you, Lady Procter, who have not only devoted your life to the service of your countrymen, but to that of the women of the whole world, as Vice-President of the Y.W.C.A. May it be our good fortune to follow in the footsteps of selfless women like yourself of this country.

Being a member of the East India Association, and knowing how much my father loved this Association—he, as you are all aware, was one of the oldest members—I would like to say that we are very fortunate indeed in having Mr. Brown as our Honorary Secretary—a Secretary who is always trying to bring the East and West together, especially to link India and England into one great bond of love and friendship.

Talking of a stabilizing force, many a time I have said to myself, "If only the people in this country were to realize what a wonderful stabilizing force women can be." I beg you to bear in mind that the Indian woman, if given all her rights, is going to be one of the greatest stabilizing forces under the New Constitution. India's expectations today from this country are similar to those of a child which is growing up and claims a home with peace and prosperity. Satisfy those aspirations like a loving parent. Guard against emergencies by all means, but give ungrudgingly, remembering always that a happy and contented child will be a greater jewel than a discontented and unhappy one.

Sir Louis Dane proposed a vote of thanks to the Chairman and lecturer, and the meeting closed.
THE SIXTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

FOR THE YEAR ENDING APRIL 30, 1933

The problem of the future government of India continued to attract close attention during the year. The civil disobedience campaign was maintained, but in the later months lost all vigour. Government steadfastly pursued the dual policy of fighting the challenge and promoting proposals for a new Indian constitution transferring responsibility to autonomous provinces and an All-India Federation, subject to safeguards. A third and smaller Round-Table Conference met in London early in November, and was brought to a close on December 24 with a survey of conclusions and a declaration of Government policy on many important points by Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India. The White Paper setting forth the Government proposals was published in March and discussed with eagerness in both Houses of Parliament. Thereafter a Joint Select Committee was set up to consider the whole question of constitutional reform, and some twenty-eight delegates from India were called to London to consult with the Committee.

No small share of this constructive work fell to members of the East India Association and participants in our proceedings. To give but one instance, the Chairman of the Joint Select Committee is our Vice-President, the Marquess of Linlithgow. The programme of the Association throughout the year had in view chiefly the elucidation of questions connected with the reform proposals. It has been widely recognized that by providing a platform, free of party connection, for the giving of authoritative information and the exchange of views on the great Indian issues now before the public the Association has been fulfilling an important service for "the welfare of the inhabitants of India" which it exists to promote. This service was enhanced by the degree of attention the public meetings of the Association received in the Press, and by the many requests for copies of the record of those proceedings in
the *Asiatic Review* and the *Journal* of the Association. Most gratifying testimonies to their value were received from members in India and this country.

**Membership**

The severe economic depression, which led to a slight net reduction of our numbers in 1931-32, still had its effect in checking the growth of membership; but the Council is happy to report that, while there were 35 resignations and 9 names were withdrawn from the roll by revision, there was substantial gain by the election of no less than 75 new members. Unhappily, however, the actual net gain was reduced to 11 by the removal of 20 members by death. Our losses therefrom included a Vice-President and former Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and three members of the Council—Mr. J. B. Pennington, Sirdar Bahadur Shivdev Singh Uberger, and Sir James Walker. Mr. Pennington, who was ninety-three, and had become "the Father of the Indian Civil Service," was long associated with the late Dr. John Pollen in the administrative work of the Association, and prepared some twenty years ago a series of pamphlets for the Association, collected in book form under the title of "Truths about India." The Sirdar had been in this country only for a few months, but had established a reputation as a fair-minded and worthy representative of the Sikh community in the Council of the Secretary of State. Sir James Walker, a distinguished administrator, was most constant in attendance at meetings of the Council.

The names of deceased members given in Appendix C also include men of such eminence as H.H. the late Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, so widely and affectionately known throughout the English-speaking world as "Prince Ranji"; Arthur Lawley, sixth Lord Wenlock; Sir Dorabji Tata, joint founder with his brother of the great iron and steel industry at Jamshedpur; and Sir Daniel Keymer and Sir Logie Watson, who had been actively associated throughout their lives with Indo-British trade. While we have these and other losses to deplore, our ranks have been reinforced, as reference to Appendix A will show, by many distinguished men and women who have taken and are taking a
notable part in Indian affairs. A gratifying feature has been the growth in membership of women, including several of the widows of late members.

**Discussion Meetings**

The meetings and discussions of the twelve months were more numerous than for many years past. This extension of opportunities for exchange of views was due to the new departure, begun near the end of the previous year, of holding private discussion meetings limited to members or special guests invited by the Council, and on the understanding that the proceedings are not reportable in the Press. The first four gatherings of the series during the year were held in the rooms of the Association, and on each occasion a member recently returned from visiting India gave valuable information—Mr. Yusuf Ali on the effect of the Ordinances and the steps which might be appropriate in the interests of law and order and appeasement; Mr. L. F. Rushbrook Williams on the attitude of the Princes towards Federation, based upon his presence at the 1932 annual session of the Chamber of Princes; the Maharaja of Burdwan on the situation arising from terrorist activities in Bengal; and Sir John Kerr, who was Deputy-Chairman of Lord Lothian’s Franchise Committee, on the report of that body and the reasons for some of the conclusions reached.

The meetings grew rapidly in numbers and interest, and it was found necessary to seek more ample accommodation than the offices could provide. Early in the autumn Lady Procter led the way in a new departure by inviting members to be her guests at 36, Prince’s Gardens for tea, as the prelude to a discussion opened by Mr. H. A. F. Lindsay, the Trade Commissioner for India, on the British and Indian Trade Agreement at Ottawa. As both he and the chairman of the meeting, Sir Gilbert Vyle, were participants in the proceedings at Ottawa, their observations were most informative. Similar hospitality was provided by Sir Louis and Lady Dane at 24, Onslow Gardens, on November 10, when Mr. J. C. Curry, the author of a recent book on the Indian Police, opened a discussion on the future of the force, with Sir Francis Griffiths, late Commissioner of Police, Bombay, in the chair.
On February 21 Lady Bennett, who has been a member of the Council for a number of years, kindly entertained us at the Ladies' Carlton Club. The Right Hon. J. C. C. Davidson, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Chairman of the Indian States Inquiry (Financial) Committee, introduced the subject of the Indian States and Federation. In March the Viscountess Astor, M.P., invited the members to her house in St. James's Square, and there was a lively discussion opened by Miss Eleanor Rathbone, M.P., with Lord Lothian in the chair, on the political rights of women under the new Indian Constitution. The final meeting of the series for the year was held late in April at the Rubens Hotel, when the hosts were two members of the Council and the chairman was Sir Alfred Watson. Mr. F. G. Pratt encountered some vigorous opposition in expounding his views on the response to be made by India to the aims of the Disarmament Conference.

Warm appreciation was shown by members of the opportunity such meetings provide both for social contact and freedom in expression of views and giving of information. The one drawback of the new plan is that, since the proceedings are not placed on record, members in India and elsewhere unable to be present are not provided with means through the Asiatic Review of knowing all that takes place. Happily, this disadvantage is met in large degree by giving the lecturers facility to make their views public, if they think well, by writing articles for the record, based on the material they prepared and possibly dealing in some degree with the criticisms raised. Readers of our proceedings will have recognized the value of this facility by the articles originated in this way and written by Sir John Kerr, the Right Hon. J. C. C. Davidson, and Miss Eleanor Rathbone on the subjects they presented.

The Lecture Programme

The main interest in our proceedings, however, is rightly taken in the meetings at which the views of the readers of papers and their critics are duly recorded. A lecture of special value was that given by Sir Arthur McWatters, the late Secretary of the Finance Department of the Government of India, on the baffling financial aspects of the proposed federation, the more so as his constructive
suggestions were supplemented from the chair by Sir Basil Blackett, late Finance Member of the Governor-General’s Council. In his own field there was corresponding first-class authority in the observations of Sir Wilberforce Ross Barker, the first Chairman of the Public Service Commission in India, on its work and prospects under the new Constitution. A study pertinent to the issue of the award of H.M. Government on the communal distribution of legislative seats in the provinces, and the subsequent commencement of a fast by Mr. Gandhi, was Professor John Coatman’s paper on the political and social position of the Depressed Classes.

Great interest attached to the comprehensive survey given by Mr. Hugh Molson, M.P., in January of the work of the Third Round-Table Conference, and the occasion was given particular significance by the presidency and observations of the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Sankey, who was the working Chairman of all three sessions of the Conference. In the summer Mrs. R. M. Gray spoke with intimate knowledge and sympathy on the advance of Indian women, and gave an exposition of their views on political questions. A more general consideration of matters affecting the new Constitution was provided in April by Sir Albion Banerji’s paper on India’s social and religious problems. He spoke with the knowledge derived from hereditary interest in the social and religious progress of India, and from wide administrative experience both in British India and the States.

A paper having a close bearing on the new conditions was that in which Mr. F. G. R. Peterson in October described the changes which have come in the Frontier Province—"From Redshirts to Reforms"—based on his personal observations as the Special Correspondent of The Times in India. A few days later Mr. Peterson went out to New Delhi to resume his journalistic mission, but unfortunately his life came to a premature close in January. One of the most distinguished members of the same profession who has served in India, Sir Alfred Watson, late Editor of the Statesman, gave in March a luminous survey of journalism in India. In June Mr. H. A. F. Lindsay, the Trade Commissioner for India, brought to our attention many important aspects of India’s place in world trade, and made suggestions upon world
economic recovery. Last to be mentioned, but by no means least in the series, and attracting an audience too large to be accommodated, was the comprehensive lecture by Sir John Thompson, the late Chief Commissioner of the Delhi Province, on "Delhi as Capital," illustrated by lantern views, and with Lord Irwin in the chair. Our thanks are due to the Chairmen of these meetings—both those already mentioned and Sir Walter Willson, the Lady Pentland, Sir Hamilton Grant, Sir James Crerar, Sir John Thompson, Sir Stanley Jackson, and Sir Francis Younghusband.

WARREN HASTINGS

A notable pendant to Sir John Thompson's lecture was the appearance in our proceedings of a hitherto unpublished Minute by Warren Hastings, dated 1782, recounting objections to the selection of Calcutta as capital, and expressing the conviction that the permanency of the British dominion in India could never be ensured while the settlement on the Hooghly remained the capital city. This contribution to British Indian history was unearthed in the British Museum by Mr. Collin C. Davies, of the staff of the School of Oriental Studies, London University. Note may also be taken of the co-operation of the Association with the Royal Empire Society in sharing the cost of a bibliography of Warren Hastings, prepared by the Librarian of the Society, in connection with the bicentenary celebrations in December of the birth of that statesman.

HOSPITALITY FUND

It was the privilege of the Council to entertain to an afternoon reception at Grosvenor House, Park Lane, the All-India Cricket Team during their tour in this country last summer. The occasion was marked by the last speech delivered by the late Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar under the auspices of the Association, as well as by the reply of the Captain of the Team, H.H. the Maharaja of Porbandar.

In this connection we are gratified to report that our desire to maintain and, as opportunity offers, to develop social contacts of members and Indian residents and visitors has met with practical encouragement from one of our senior and most honoured Vice-
Presidents, the Maharaja Gaekwar of Baroda. By way of recognizing the value of the social work of the Association, His Highness has made a grant of £50 per annum for a period of five years to form a Hospitality Fund. The first annual payment of £50 has been received, and the Council feel that it will be appropriate for the initial use of it to be for a reception at a time when His Highness is in London and able to be present.

Donations

The Council has also the satisfaction to record generous donations of £100 from H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad and of £200 from H.H. the Maharaja of Kashmir. Particularly gratifying was the manner in which General H.H. Maharaja Sir Joodha Shamshere Jung, the new Prime Minister of Nepal, has shown practical interest in our work. In a letter acknowledging the congratulations of the Council on his accession, His Highness stated that, though he was unable, as the head of a foreign Government, to participate directly in the work of the Association, it gave him pleasure to make a donation of £50 as a mark of appreciation of the objects and aims it pursues.

The Council

Sir Louis Dane retired at the last annual meeting from the chairmanship of the Council after a tenure of seven years. He was cordially thanked for his services, and was succeeded by Sir John Kerr. The meeting approved the revision of rules, the objects of which were explained in the last Report. One of the most important of the changes, made on the proposition of Sir Louis Dane, was that of the limitation to a period of three years of the election of the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen of Council.

When Sir Leslie Wilson, who had done useful service on the Council, left to take up his appointment as Governor of Queensland, the opportunity was taken to add his name to the list of Vice-Presidents. H.H. the Maharaja of Kashmir has accepted the same position. H.E.H. the Nizam and H.H. the Prime Minister of Nepal were elected Honorary Life Members, and Sir Reginald Glancy and Sir Hubert Carr were co-opted to the Council. Under
the new rules Sir Mancherjee Bhownagree retires from his Vice-Chairmanship, but is eligible for re-election. It is open to any member of the Association to propose a candidate for election to any vacancy in the Council on fifteen days’ notice being given to the Hon. Secretary. The following members of Council retire by rotation:

Sir Charles Armstrong.
Lady Bennett.
F. H. Brown, C.I.E.
Sir Louis Dane, G.C.I.E., C.S.I.
Sir Stephen Demetriadi, K.B.E.
Colonel Sir Umar Hayat Khan, K.C.I.E., C.B.E., M.V.O.
John de La Valette.

Finance

The Council had no hesitation in converting the Association’s small holding of War Stock last summer from 5 per cent. to 3½ per cent., in accordance with the efforts of the National Government to reduce expenditure. The rise in the value of our securities in the twelve months, consequent upon the improved credit of the Indian Government, was noteworthy: the market value of invested funds rose approximately in the twelve months by no less than £1,976 10s. The Council has been able to place to the reserves in a liquid form, not affected by changes in the money market, the special contributions of the year to which reference has been made. One hundred pounds is on deposit account, and, on the advice of the Hon. Auditors, £250 has been placed in the Post Office Savings Bank. The finances have been administered with scrupulous regard to the need for economy, so far as it is consistent with fulfilling the functions of the Association. The Honorary Auditors report that they have found the accounts "accurate and well kept," and have noted with satisfaction the increase in the market value of our securities and the very substantial sums received by way of donations.

The President and Council feel that they cannot let this occasion pass without expressing their very high appreciation of the exceptional services rendered during the year by the Honorary
Secretary, Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E. It is mainly due to his initiative, tact, and resource that the Association has been able to play an active, and it is hoped, a useful part in the discussion of Indian questions at this momentous time.

The Council looks forward to continued helpful activity in the present year, when so advanced a stage has been reached in efforts to solve those great problems of Indian constitutional change which have been engaging uninterrupted attention since the appointment of the Statutory Commission nearly six years ago.

JOHN KERR,
Chairman of the Council.

F. H. BROWN,
Hon. Secretary.

June 1, 1933.
ANNUAL MEETING

The sixty-sixth Annual General Meeting of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, June 19, 1933. The Right Hon. Lord Lamington, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., was in the chair, and the following members were present:


The Chairman: As the Annual Report has been circulated to members within the last few days and gives a very full account of what has taken place, I do not propose to offer any detailed comments upon it. It shows that we have had a successful and useful year, in which many minds have made contributions to the knowledge of and interest in India. These contributions have been of more than ordinary importance, for the reason that at a time when public controversy in respect to the White Paper is so prominent, they have been made under the auspices of an Association which is in no way identified with party politics. We have the good fortune to include in our membership those who hold widely divergent views on the great questions which are now engaging the attention of the Joint Select Committee and of the delegates from India who have come to share in discussions with that body.

There have been occasions in the past when for a short time India has been in the front of the political stage—as, for example, in the nineties, when an issue that exercised the public mind was that of the extent to which British cotton goods should be required to contribute to the import duties then imposed for revenue purposes. In 1919, when we had just emerged from the Great War, the Government of India Act was under consideration, and my recollection is that it made rather more impression upon the public mind than has been suggested recently in some quarters.

But the interest in India on those occasions was small in comparison with that which exists today, when the future constitution of India is one of
the foremost issues on the political horizon. It is true that relatively little was said of India in the exceptional circumstances of the General Election late in 1931; but that was due in the main to the economic and financial crisis with which we were then confronted. The fact is that for several years past Indian questions have engaged the attention of larger numbers of our people than at any time within living memory, unless, indeed, anyone survives who can recall the Mutiny.

The clear duty of an Association such as ours is not to identify itself with any propagandist organization, but to provide opportunities by its lectures and discussions for the elucidation of the many questions which have arisen in connection with the proposals for reform. I think it may fairly be said that in this respect we have discharged our obligations and have given our members, and, through our printed proceedings, the general public, a great deal of valuable material to provide a basis for definite conclusions to be reached. We have at least shown the possibility of discussing even controversial Indian questions without bringing them into party politics at home. We exist for the welfare of India, and to this end we have heard the views of those who differ very widely on the question of what will best contribute thereto.

Probably there is no organization in this country which is better able to appreciate at their real value the arguments used by the various schools of thought in the present controversy; and certainly there is none which provides a better background for their presentation.

We are fortunate to hold our annual meeting at a time when so many distinguished Indians are in this country in connection with the proposals for constitutional reform. Some of them are present this afternoon, and it is my pleasure to ask Sir Manubhai Mehta, the Prime Minister of Bikaner, to propose the adoption of the Report.

Sir MANUBHAI MEHTA: It gives me great pleasure to place before you the proposition that the Report and Accounts, which have been circulated, should be adopted.

The Chairman has spoken of the work done during the past year, and I join my feeble and humble voice in congratulating this Association on the very valuable work it has done. It has provided a very useful platform for the elucidation of truth concerning India. It is very necessary in this country that correct impressions should prevail, because though we have been visiting this country in connection with constitutional changes for the last three years, we find that there has been a certain amount of prejudice bred out of ignorance and fostered by misrepresentation. It may not be mischievous on all occasions. It may be quite innocent, but there has been both ignorance and misrepresentation, and this East India Association therefore deserves congratulation on the very successful function it has discharged in providing a platform for the elucidation of truth.

It is very necessary that at this juncture the truth should be known, because we are at the parting of the ways. The Constitution, the whole Empire, is at the cross-roads at the present moment, and therefore it is necessary that no blunders or mistakes should be committed. An unkind
critic of the British Government and the British nation has remarked that the British nation has stumbled on to greatness through mistakes and pitfalls. Though it may not be quite fair, there is a certain amount of truth in that remark. The East India Company began with a career which we will not all agree was statesmanlike. They had not the genius or the imagination of the French soldier Dupleix and several mistakes were committed. Even the assumption of control over India by the Crown came out of mistakes of an enthusiastic Governor-General, who was rather too fond of absorption, by which several States under the plea of lapse were merged into India.

There is not entire truth in the remark I quoted. On the contrary, I believe that the British nation, though not consciously assuming Imperialistic responsibilities, have the instinctive genius to come to the correct conclusion through means which may appear erroneous. Therefore, the East India Association, by providing this platform for the elucidation of truth, has furnished us with opportunities for avoiding blunders and mistakes. That is why I congratulate them on the work they have done.

From the Report also you will see that there is another very useful function which this Association has been discharging. It is in the way of hospitality, and references have been made to several donations and contributions by rulers of Indian States. The Maharaja Gaekwar of Baroda has promised a contribution of £50 for five years with choice to continue it longer. Similarly there are contributions from H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad and H.H. the Maharaja of Kashmir. These illustrate the fundamental truth that Indian States and Rulers of Indian States are as much interested in the future of India as the citizens of British India and also the citizens of England. These social functions of hospitality are a great political asset. More valuable work is often accomplished at society salons and drawing-rooms than at chancelleries and legations.

We are all at one in this great Empire, and if our work in the past in this Association has redounded with credit, it should inspire us with hope and faith for the future.

With these remarks I commend this Report to you and ask you to adopt it.

Mr. R. A. Wilson: I do not know why Mr. Brown asked me to second the Report today. However, Mr. Brown has done so much for this Association that it would be churlish to refuse to comply with any request made by him.

We have covered a wide range of subjects during the past year, and there has been great divergence of views expressed, but no one, I think, who knows the East India Association and its members would think other than that, whatever may be the divergence of views, we are all united in our devotion to India where so many of us have spent the best part of our lives. One thing I notice on looking through the Report, and that is the extraordinarily happy knack which our Secretary has for finding the right Chairman to preside on the right occasion. What, for instance, could be happier than his choice of the first architect of the Viceroy's house in Delhi to preside over Sir John Thompson's delightful résumé of the history of
Delhi as the capital of India? And what could have been happier than the choice of Lord Sankey to preside over Mr. Molson’s address on the subject of the Third Round-Table Conference?

The Report expresses the gratitude of the Council to Mr. Brown for his labours on behalf of the Association during the year, and I think all of us who are present here, who are not members of the Council, must join in sharing that very high appreciation of the exceptional services rendered during the year by Mr. Brown. (Applause.)

I should like to be allowed to say one word with reference to the discussion meetings which have been held during the past year. The Report seems to me to be somewhat inconsistent with regard to these meetings. At the beginning of the section which deals with the subject, the meetings are referred to as an opportunity of holding private discussion meetings, limited to members or special guests, and on the understanding that the proceedings are not reportable in the Press. But later on the sentence occurs, “The one drawback of the new plan is that, since the proceedings are not placed on record, members in India and elsewhere unable to be present are not provided with means through the Asiatic Review of knowing all that takes place.” It seems to me that if the object of these meetings is to enable members to express their views very freely without any possibility of their views being reported in the Press, that can hardly be called a drawback. I gather from what I have been told that the tendency has been for these meetings to become larger and larger and to be of a more formal rather than of an informal and intimate nature, and I venture to suggest that this may detract in the eyes of some at least a little from their value.

I will only add one word, and that of a personal nature. In the list of the deaths of various members of the Council during the past year is mentioned Sir James Walker. I served for many years in the Central Provinces with and under the late Sir James Walker, and I would like to add my personal expression of regret at his untimely death. I am sure that in losing him the Council have lost a shrewd and kindly adviser.

I beg to second the adoption of the Report.

Carried unanimously.

Sir Prabhushankar Pattani: The second item on the agenda today is the proposal for the election of President for the coming year. The pleasant duty of proposing the re-election of Lord Lamington has been entrusted to me. (Applause.) I had the privilege of knowing his Lordship when he was the Governor of Bombay. Those were happier days than now. He was such a good Governor that his name is held in great respect in Western India even now. You have known him not only as an active member of the Legislature here, but as the President of your Association for many years, so you will readily agree that he has qualities which help to make such an Association successful.

In the adoption of the Report and in the Report itself, the good work that the Association has been doing has been mentioned, but I have always felt that it is the guiding spirit of the Association that makes the work valuable, enabling it to proceed on the right lines and on the principles on
which the Association was established in the first place. I think that
guidance has been carried out by your President so well and in such a
spirit that we hope he will be able to look after the welfare of the Asso-
ciation for a great many years to come.

I submit to you the proposal that Lord Lamington be re-elected.

Sir Louis Dane: I have very great pleasure in seconding the motion.
You have heard Sir Prabhshankar Pattani’s high opinion of Lord Lam-
ington. I can only say that I entirely re-echo that. The duty of the President,
of course, is to preside, but you can preside in one way and you can preside
in another. After seven years’ experience as Chairman of Council, I can
only say that Lord Lamington’s advice has been freely given and has always
been sound.

Therefore I have the greatest pleasure in strongly recommending to you
that Lord Lamington be invited to remain as President, and I put that
motion to the meeting.

Carried unanimously.

The Chairman: Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is very gratifying to me to
be the recipient of your favour as shown by my re-election as President. I
quite recognize that my term of office should have had a termination ere
this, and on intimation of the slightest desire that you wish for a change I
will go, with regret but with the full understanding that it would be in the
interests of the Association that there should be a successor to myself.

I was much moved by the kind remarks made by my old friend Sir
Prabhshankar Pattani. We knew each other in Bombay, and now his
frequent visits to this country make me feel that he is going to be a
permanent resident here and I shall enjoy still more of his society. He
made two points which pleased me very much, first when he said my
name was still known in Bombay. My heart always clings very much to
Bombay, so I was specially gratified. Also I appreciated very much his
remark that my presence in the Association here was of some benefit to its
working.

As to the kind observations made by my friend Sir Louis Dane, I feel
he gave up his office of Chairman much too soon. At the same time I am
bound to say that a year or two ago he was not looking in the best of health.
Now I am glad to see him looking younger than ever. (Cheers.) I appreci-
ate very much his kind references to me, and I also thank you all, ladies
and gentlemen, for the real honour that you should think me worthy of
being still your President. I accept the offer with pleasure.

Mr. Yusuf Ali: I have the honour to propose the re-election of the
following members of Council: Sir Charles Armstrong, Lady Bennett, Mr.
Mr. John de La Vallette. These are seven names which represent various
different interests. You have ex-Governors and administrators. You have
a member representing the arts. You have a lady. You have a journalist,
and you have men representing other interests in public life.
But, after all, the test of a Committee or Council is, Are they content to stand on the old beaten paths, or do they seek out new openings for the work that they have to perform? The Report which you have all read and which you have adopted shows that it is a very live Council. I remember the Association from my earliest days in India, and indeed from the days of my father, who was a member. I remember I used to read the Journal when I was a student just learning English. From the early days to the present day, the Association seems to have made a great deal of progress. We have got not only the public meetings but the private meetings, and in addition the hospitality meetings in the houses of distinguished hostesses, where an atmosphere of social gaiety mingles with the atmosphere of earnest work for India.

All that shows the Council is very much alive and getting new openings for its work, and I think I might be allowed to associate in that respect especially the name of Mr. Brown. He is a splendid asset to the Council and to the Association, and also, I think, to the whole community of Indians and Anglo-Indians in London and visitors to England. (Applause.)

I have the very greatest pleasure in proposing the re-election of the Council.

Sir Ernest Hotson: I have much pleasure in seconding this resolution. It requires no words from me, because I know everybody is more than well satisfied with the work the Council has been doing.

Carried unanimously.

The election of the following new members, the Rt. Hon. Lord Brabourne, M.C. (Governor-Designate of Bombay), Sir Alladi Krishnaswami (Advocate-General of Madras), Sir Muhammad Yakub, Mr. C. R. Corbett (Journalist), was proposed by Major Gilbertson, seconded by Mr. Sachchidananda Sinha, and

Carried unanimously.

The Chairman: I should like to say on my own behalf it is an additional gratification not merely to be President but to have such earnest workers as constitute the Council. Mr. Brown we all know. Everybody seems to have their heart in the work of the Association. They all do their best for it. I am sure that the very successful management of our affairs is owing to the loyalty and service of those who constitute the working foundation of the Association.
INDIA AND THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE*

By F. G. PRATT, C.S.I.

"The deep-seated suspicion of the nation that we intend someday to possess ourselves of their country, grounded as it is on what has happened in the past, is the chief obstacle to the existence of really cordial relations. Eradicate that suspicion (which only within the last few years has found expression in the creation of a national quasi militia by encouraging the importation of arms and ammunition) and you will go far towards establishing a footing of mutual confidence and trust such as, for instance, that existing in Nepal. Then 'the sun of friendship will shine clear in the sky of contentment not darkened by the clouds of distrust'"—Afghanistan, by W. R. H. Merk, C.S.I. (published in 1913 by the Royal Central Asian Society).

"Personally, I no longer believe in the Russian menace. The whole situation is so changed. Modern political progress, railways, steam communications and such-like modifications have put it out of the power of Russia to invade India in the easy way they so jauntily contemplated twenty, thirty, or forty years ago."

There was an interesting debate in Parliament in March, 1933, when the Supply Estimates were sanctioned for a British Army of 148,700 men. The point was raised by the opposition that the size of the Home and Overseas Army should be reduced in keeping with the very considerable reductions in Continental armies which were part of the Prime Minister's disarmament proposals. The official reply to this was that the British Army has never been designed to take part in great Continental wars, but exists only for the purpose of maintaining order in the British Empire, and, therefore, no changes in the outside world and no reduction in armaments outside could logically be used as arguments for reduction of the British land forces.

This line of reply is good and valid so far as the British Army proper is concerned, but it cannot be used to rebut arguments put forward for the reduction of the Army in India, which is roughly 50 per cent. more numerous than the entire British Army now maintained at home and overseas.

* Based on an address at a discussion meeting of members of the East India Association on April 28, 1933, and incorporating notes and comments on objections and criticisms.
For the Army in India is maintained not merely for the purpose of maintaining order in British India—it is maintained also for the protection of India from external aggression and for taking part in a major war against a powerful European State which might attack India's frontiers. If, therefore, it can be shown that the world situation has been transformed in such a manner as to make the danger of such aggression negligible or insignificant in that quarter, then the question must necessarily arise whether there should not be a corresponding revision in the strength and organization of the Army in India. On these matters the latest statement of the views of the Government of India is contained in the last issued annual volume, *India*, 1930-1931, where we read that the reduction of the military budget substantially below the existing level would imply a complete abnegation of statesmanship and sanity on the part of those responsible for the welfare of the Indian masses.

We are, therefore, entitled to assume that in the opinion of the Government of India there has been no material improvement in India's security since the year 1927, when the Simon Commission, on the basis of official information, described the dangers against which India needs protection of the Army. We read in the Simon Commission Report of a land frontier exposed on the north-west to a constant and pressing danger of a magnitude without parallel in any other part of the Empire. We are reminded of the series of incursions by foreign invaders throughout history, and of the fact that "comparatively small bodies of invaders have often succeeded in overcoming all opposition and making their way to the plains and establishing themselves as conquerors." And we read that at the present time the external dangers are of a wholly exceptional character. They are, indeed, described as being of the first order of magnitude, and they are dangers caused by the hostility of States which are not members of the League of Nations—in plain English, Russia and Afghanistan. There are also references to the need of arrangements for preventing raids by independent Pathan tribes on the North-West Frontier. The Simon Commission Report seems to accept the reality and the magnitude of these dangers as things self-evident, and not needing analysis or discussion.

At a later stage in this paper I propose to undertake that task, but for the present it is sufficient to note that the Government of India, as at present constituted and advised, must still be convinced that the dangers are so imminent and so deadly that anything in the nature, say, of a "ten years' military holiday" for India would be, to use their own language, a complete abnegation of sanity and statesmanship.

It is also quite certain that the Government of India can only
have reached this conclusion with very great reluctance, for it is
agreed on all sides that reduction, if possible, would be desirable.
The Government have repeatedly declared that they are very sensi-
tive to the longstanding demand for reduction made by Indian
publicists, a demand which in this year’s Budget debate was
voiced also by Sir Leslie Hudson, the leader of the Europeans in
the Indian Legislative Assembly.

It is, in fact, undeniable that in India we have a country which
less than any other country in the world can afford to have a
large proportion of its resources earmarked for defence expendi-
ture. For India’s crying need is economic development, and
large masses of her immense and rapidly growing populations are
still submerged below a poverty line, the range of which is deeper
than in any other country of the world except China. Sir George
Schuster, in his speech at Ottawa, referred to the very heavy
increase of taxation which had been found necessary in the last
two years, in spite of drastic economies in administrative services.

It was suggested in discussion that it would be wrong to argue
that taxable capacity should be the sole factor in defence expendi-
ture, but no such argument is here intended. Taxable capacity
cannot be the sole or the dominating factor, but where it is
admittedly very low it must surely be a powerful argument for
scrupulous economy in adjustment of expenditure to really vital
needs.

The expenditure on the Army has increased by something like
100 per cent. above its pre-war level. India’s defence expenditure
is more than 50 per cent. of her Central revenues, and is 33.7 of
her combined Provincial and Central net revenues, while in
Great Britain, with all her Imperial and overseas responsibilities,
the corresponding ratio is 23.6, or less than a quarter. The
serious significance of these figures is in no way diminished by
the production of statistics showing that a heavier rate of defence
expenditure in relation to population is incurred in the U.S.A.
or in European countries. If the outlook is black from the econo-
ic standpoint, the political consequences of the present situation
are even more depressing.

The successful development, and even the first inauguration of
the Federal Reform Scheme, admittedly depends upon the
financial stability and resources of the new Governments, Central
and Provincial. It will be remembered that the recent White
Paper expressly states that even on the eve of the inauguration
of the new Constitution it may be found that economic and
financial difficulties may necessitate reconsideration and a change
of plan. The whole Federal system will be gravely imperilled if
from 1933-1934 the history of 1920-1921 should be repeated, when
the new ministers in the Provinces took office only to find them-
selves powerless because their Budgets were starved by financial stringency.

Briefly stated, the situation now is that more than 50 per cent. of the Federal revenue is earmarked for military expenditure. The Budget can only be balanced by the inclusion of income tax revenues which accrue in the Provinces, and which it is admitted in principle must sooner or later be completely surrendered to the Provinces. Without those revenues the Federal Budget would now be in serious default.

In the Budget Debate of March, 1933, the Army Secretary of the Government of India referred to the work of two Committees whose reports would shortly be submitted to the British Cabinet. The first report, that of the Capitation Tribunal, of which Sir Robert Garran was Chairman, was submitted to the Prime Minister three months ago.

The capitation charges are charges made by Great Britain on the Indian Budget for contributions leviable from India towards the cost of the recruiting and the training of British soldiers who are sent to serve in India. The cost was fixed at £11 8s. per head in 1908, but after the war it rose in 1920 to £28 10s., and since 1924 India has been paying under protest £1,400,000 per year and at the same time resisting still further demands from the War Office which would bring the annual payments into the region of £1,700,000. The Tribunal was appointed last year to advise on what basis the contributions, if they are to continue at all, should in future be fixed. Among other matters referred to this Tribunal, the most important was that they should examine India's claim that a contribution should be made from Imperial revenues towards India's military expenditure and report the basis on which any contribution approved should be assessed.

The second Committee has been appointed on the advice of the Defence Sub-Committee of the First Round-Table Conference, which, recognizing the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure, recommended that this question should be investigated by expert authority. Any reduction in the number of British battalions or any substitution for them of Indian units would, of course, make substantial economies in the Indian Budget, and in this connection two considerations are important and relevant. The first is that the Defence Sub-Committee recorded their opinion that the defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people and not of the British Government alone. The second is that the special function and the special value of the British soldier in India is that his complete detachment and impartiality make him the ideal peace-maker at times of communal riots and disturbances. For
a good many years past he has taken little or no part in frontier fighting.

In 1919 seven or eight battalions of British troops were sent to the front during the third Afghan War, but that war lasted only a few weeks, and in all the subsequent years of hard fighting in Waziristan, which came to an end in 1923, no British infantry were employed.

The point was made in discussion that the third Afghan War demonstrated the necessity of a large proportion of British battalions in frontier campaigns. But it must not be forgotten that at the moment of the outbreak of that war India, by reason of her immense efforts in the Great War, had been drained dry of trained troops, of armaments, and of supplies and transport. At the moment of the outbreak of this Afghan War India had actually 124 battalions and 89 squadrons engaged in war service overseas.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the labours of these two Committees may result in some substantial reduction of India's burdens, but unless and until that happens it would not be safe to count upon any material alteration in the present status quo.

The Army in India now consists of 58,000 British and 132,000 Indian troops. The official account of its organization is that it is regarded as consisting of three categories. First, the so-called "Covering Troops," intended to hold the frontiers and in the event of major operations to form a screen behind which mobilization can proceed undisturbed. This screen would be composed of roughly 40,000 men, twelve and a quarter infantry brigades.

Next, there is the Field Army of approximately the same size, which is India's striking force in a major war and which must compensate for its small numbers by possessing the "fullest measure of mobility and offensive power."

Thirdly, there are the category of internal security troops, whose function is the maintenance of order in British India. In addition to these regular troops there are maintained in India by the Indian Princes 37,000 men, the Auxiliary Forces manned by European and Anglo-Indians 22,000 men, and the Indian Territorial Army, now about 15,000, all of which would on occasion be available if needed for internal security purposes.

We may now undertake a critical examination of the dangers of external aggression which are said to threaten India and which are held to justify the strength and organization of the defence forces now maintained. And while doing this it is necessary to keep clearly in view the background against which such a discussion must be conducted. It is generally agreed that Great Britain must for an indefinite period, certainly for many years
to come, continue to guide and control the defence policy of India. If there were no other reason for this there would still be a sufficient reason in her obligations towards the Indian Princes. She will not relinquish that control until those obligations are fully discharged or until India, either by her own strength or by international guarantees or both together, is secure from internal and external dangers. The discussion refers to the defence of India during that period of transition and tutelage. Therefore no analogy can fairly be drawn from the fact that in past ages invasions and irruptions have taken place under totally different conditions, when there was no settled or organized Government.

When Shakespeare spoke of the England of his day as "this fortress built by nature for herself against invasion and the hand of war," it would have been pedantic to point to the Roman invasions and the Teutonic and Danish and Norman invasions as proving that England must necessarily and at all times be in danger of invasion.

In the course of the discussion the possibility of overseas invasion of India by a great naval Power was suggested, and reference was made to the smallness of India's naval contribution towards Imperial Defence. These questions are outside the scope of the general argument presented in this paper, but it may be observed that no responsible person has ever suggested that a reserve of military strength for Imperial purposes should be maintained in India at India's expense as an offset against the heavy cost of the naval defence of India.

External dangers are said to threaten India from three directions: either singly or in combination from the frontier tribes, from Afghanistan, and from Russia. A fair estimate is needed of each of these factors which will avoid the Scylla of exaggeration and the Charybdis of optimistic understatement. The frontier tribes, from Chitral down to Swat and the Mankand; the Afridis of the Khyber and the Tirah; the Mahsuds and Waziris of Waziristan are often spoken of as if they constituted a serious danger to the security of India. It is usual to quote the numbers of the adult male population and the numbers of their rifles as if these men were an organized and equipped army corps backed by the resources of a great and powerful Government, which might at any moment be mobilized for the conquest of Northern India.

Now it is true that in their own mountain homes they are very formidable enemies, who can only be safely attacked by greatly superior numbers of trained forces with a careful and costly organization of supply and transport and lines of communication. But it is only in their own mountains and within raiding distance of their mountains that they are formidable.
They fight only on foot; they have no money, no stores, no wheeled transport, no artillery, no machine-guns. "At no time," says the late Mr. Merk, a frontier officer of unique experience, "and for no purpose could all this mass of men combine for collective action... drawn from innumerable different clans, torn by family and tribal feuds living in a tangle of mountains, over a length of 600 miles of country, with no recognized head or leader and jealous to the death of each other. In former ages they swarmed down for the loot of India. But this was in the wake of the regular invading armies of the day and only to the tune of a few thousand tribesmen at a time. There is no instance of the fate of a battle or other event or of the course of history in India having been altered by the tribesmen as such."

Over large parts of the tribal country improved communications and developing trade have for many years past been establishing a Pax Britannica which is unlikely to be seriously interrupted. This is true of Chitral and Dir and Swat and the Mohmands and Afridis and Orakzais further south. Even Waziristan, for generations the most troublesome of the frontier regions, is now penetrated from end to end by strategic roads with strong garrisons of regular troops in key positions. In 1913 the only garrisons in the whole of the tribal country north of Baluchistan were three Indian battalions at Chitral and the Malakand. Today in the same country, at Chitral and the Malakand in the Khyber and Waziristan, we have three British and fifteen Indian battalions, together with an immense development of road communications, mechanical transport, and aviation. The problems involved are domestic and political, and their military aspects are purely local and tactical.

This is not to deny that for many years to come they will remain a very serious local problem and that the local forces maintained for their control must be as vigilant and mobile and efficient as the London Fire Brigade. But, when all is said and done, the tribesmen cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as more than a purely local problem of trans-Indus security.

When we turn to Afghanistan, the first and most important consideration is the complete change in the obligations and responsibilities of the Government of India, which has been brought about by the Afghan Treaty of 1921 establishing the complete internal and external independence of Afghanistan. Prior to that event Great Britain and the Government of India were bound by treaty engagements to protect Afghanistan from interference or attack. In a despatch of 1898, Lord George Hamilton reminded the Government of India that these engagements might possibly lay upon them the obligation of despatching a large army over
their border for the defence of Afghan territory. Great Britain is no longer saddled by this obligation. The Afghan king and Government are solely responsible for their own defence and external relations, and so far have found no difficulty in meeting their responsibilities.

In 1925, when Russian and Afghan troops came into collision on the Oxus River, the dispute was quickly and easily settled, and did not, as in Mr. Gladstone’s days, result in a colossal war scare and huge army credits and an addition of 10,000 British troops to the Army in India.

But the question to be examined here is the probability or danger of aggression by Afghanistan upon India.

The extract from Mr. Merk’s paper on Afghanistan, which stands at the head of this article, was written in 1913, twelve years before his death, but there have been no indications that the state of public opinion there described has materially altered in the post-war period.

Have we on our side any grounds for believing that the Afghan Government harbours any sort of aggressive design against India? Amanullah’s mad attack in 1919 was, in fact, a kind of backwash of the Great War, and its results were not such as to encourage any future ruler to repeat his attempt. At the present day The Times correspondent tells us that Kabul is an increasingly steady- ing factor in the politics of the frontier. It is on official record that during the frontier disturbance in 1930 the Afghan Government actively discouraged the unrest in our tribal areas, and its assistance is stated to have been of incalculable value. It is probable that the Afghan Government, on their side, were equally grateful for our active co-operation in 1933 in preventing our Waziris from taking part in the Afghan rebellion in Khost. A Constitution was promulgated in 1932, and the Government is concentrating all its efforts on trade and pacification with a cautious policy of internal development. Her army of 40,000 is of no serious military importance. It would be almost as pre-posterous to speak of Switzerland as a dangerous neighbour to the French Republic as to represent Afghanistan as a serious menace to the security of India. There are no possible grounds of dispute which could not easily be settled with or without the intervention of Geneva.

It may, of course, be urged that Afghanistan, though not for- midable by her own strength, may be used as a catspaw by Russia, who will first Sovietize Afghanistan and then proceed to the conquest of India. It is in this argument that we at last come up against what is generally believed to be the real menace to India’s security, that “danger of the first order of magnitude” arising from the hostile attitude and the aggressive intentions of a great
European Power. The specific references to Russia in the Simon Commission Report establish quite clearly that the Government of India and their military advisers look upon the danger of Russian military aggression as not less serious today than it was fifty years ago, when memories were still fresh of the days when Russian armies were knocking at the gates of Constanti
nople and the fear of Russian aggression in the Mediterranean brought Indian troops to Malta and British battleships to the Bosphorus.

In spite of all the changes which have transformed the whole balance of power in the East and have transformed international relations since the Great War, they are still treating Russia as a first-class military power and are still making her a dominant factor in their military policy and preparation.

The changes referred to can only be summarized very briefly. Towards the end of the nineteenth century Tzarist Russia recognized that she had reached then her natural limits in Central Asia, and began to look to Manchuria and the Far East for further expansion. The fear of Imperial Germany led to closer relations with France and Great Britain, and in 1893, and again in 1907, she bound herself by treaty with Great Britain to respect the inde
pendence of Afghanistan. Her Far East policy soon brought her into collision with Japan: the disastrous war of 1905 and the sub
sequent domestic revolution shook Tzarist Russia to her founda
tions, and after the Great War her ruin was completed by another revolution and the old régime finally crashed. From that time onward the military strength of Russia for any purpose of external aggression has been as negligible as the naval strength of post
war Germany.

Most of all would this be true of a prolonged campaign in the face of fierce opposition through hundreds of miles of the most difficult and mountainous country in the world, where the success and even the bare survival of the invading forces would depend upon an elaborately organized and invulnerable system of supply and transport. If it took Lord Kitchener three years to organize the Nile campaign against the Dervishes, how many years would the Soviet Government require to organize expeditions from the Oxus to Kandahar or Peshawar—the Soviet Government which has to resort to martial law in order to raise its internal food supplies and which cannot conduct any large-scale piece of organization without periodical pogroms of heretics and traitors?

The hypothesis that the Afghans would willingly allow their country to be used as a corridor and overrun and Bolshevized by Soviet commanders need only be mentioned to be set aside as not worth serious discussion.

It would be more profitable to ask whether the conduct of
the Soviet Government has been such as to give any grounds for believing that they have any special designs against Afghanistan. They had ample opportunities for subversive activities during the ten months of civil war in 1929 prior to the accession of the present King Nadir Khan, when the British Minister withdrew and the Russian Minister for the best part of a year was left alone in Kabul. What, in fact, happened was that the Soviet Government took an early opportunity after Nadir Khan’s accession to renew the 1926 treaty of friendly neutrality and non-aggression. It is undoubtedly the fixed policy of the Soviet Government to work for a world revolution which should destroy the capitalist system in every other country and set up in its place a system similar to their own—and to achieve this end they will employ every engine of propaganda for stirring up discontent and revolution in capitalist countries.

But apart from propaganda the foreign policy of the Soviet Government is emphatically a policy of peace and non-aggression. If there is one stable factor in the world of today it is that Russia will never attack. She will never attack because external war would mean the collapse of her economic programme; it would mean peasant risings and revolution, and nationalist rebellions by all her discontented minorities in Central Asia and Georgia and the Ukraine. This is the obvious explanation of the meekness and long-suffering of her diplomacy in the Far East in her relations with China and Japan. She lives in constant fear of her capitalist neighbours. It is for this reason that for years past she has been weaving a network of protective treaties of non-aggression with all her border States in Europe and Asia.

At the same time her fear of war has led her to energetic preparations for defensive war and a great spread of militarism. There is a flourishing society for aviation and chemical defence; military aviation has made great strides, and children in schools are given lessons in shooting and in the use of gas-masks. But it is a complete misinterpretation of plain and obvious facts to suppose that the Russian military preparations have any aggressive purpose or that any weapon except the weapon of propaganda will ever be turned against foreign countries. If this is anything like a correct statement of Russian psychology and of Russian powerlessness for attack, even if they were willing to wound, it must surely be a matter of very grave anxiety when we find the Government of India still wedded to the ideas and the policy of 1890, when Lord Roberts was looking forward to the inevitable conflict between Russia and Great Britain which would be fought out in Afghanistan. We find the Government of India in its latest official publication defending its military policy by laying great stress on the Russian anti-British propaganda, and
by references to Russia's acquisitive designs in Central Asia while she was under the Tzardist régime, and to the suspicion and alarm which were felt at that time by Indian authorities because of Russia's relations with Persia and Afghanistan.

Their military policy and preparations still look upon the territory of the tribesmen as a corridor through which the lines of supply and transport and communication must pass for supporting the Field Army when it has been mobilized for the major war and its battles in Afghanistan or on the Oxus. It is legitimate to ask against whom those battles are to be fought. We are bound by our international commitments, and the ordinary decencies of modern international intercourse have made it impossible for a state of war to exist between India and Afghanistan.

The world has moved on since 1919, and Kandahar and Ghazni and Jalalabad can no longer be regarded as possible objectives for India's Field Army. The reader need hardly be reminded that we are still maintaining a strategic railway with a terminus at New Chaman, the purpose of which is to serve as the spearhead of an advance on Kandahar. This is the railway of which the Amir complained that he felt it like a "knife in his vitals."

If the enemy is to be Russia there is nothing in the history of the last fifty years to support the theory that Russia intends to attack; and no such attack would be possible without long years of hostile preparation, even the first beginnings of which could not possibly be concealed. It is therefore suggested that the time is ripe and more than ripe for giving India the blessings of a military holiday during which her armed forces, like the armed forces in other parts of the British Empire, shall be determined solely on the basis of the maintenance of internal order and effective military control of the frontier tribes. Would such a formula be one of reasonable security for India under existing conditions? I am quoting Sir Austen Chamberlain when I say that "this is a question which has to be answered by the politicians. The answer does not affect and cannot be given by the military, naval, or air experts. It depends on political considerations and must be answered by politicians and statesmen."

A few remarks, in conclusion, must be made on the problems of internal security. It was objected that application to the Indian populations of the Hoover "police component" formula—viz., the 100,000 internal troops allowed in Germany for a population of sixty millions—would justify an Indian Army three times larger than she now possesses. But the reply to this objection is that in fact and in practice for many years past roughly one-third of the existing Indian Army has been considered a sufficient police component. The margin for reduction is in the large excess over and above the necessary police component. It may
be freely admitted that this emergency function of the Army is of vital and essential importance under the peculiar conditions of India. It must always be ready to stand by and support the civil power when it is in danger of being temporarily overwhemed. But it must be remembered that the masses of the Indian population are peaceful and unarmed villagers. The larger urban centres are always within easy reach of regular troops, and the occasions of disturbance, when the vast areas and populations are considered, are rare and exceptional.

We have now the opportunity of giving a lead to our neighbours in the Middle East. The Governments of both Afghanistan and Persia have set their hands to the task of modernizing their countries, especially in the way of economic development. Our influence and our example might do much in preventing them from wasting their resources in extravagant armaments. The valley of the Helmund, now a cemetery of dead cities, not so very long ago was the granary of Asia and is capable of giving homes and food and employment to the hungry hillmen of the Suleman mountains.
Mr. F. G. Pratt writes:

The proceedings printed at pages 298-9 of the April number of the Asiatic Review reproduce some remarks by Sir Louis Dane about the Russian menace to the North-West Frontier of India, some of which, owing to time limitations, were not actually spoken.

Will you allow me space for a few brief comments on Sir Louis Dane's statements?

1. The terminus on the Oxus of the Russian railways is not Karki but Termes. Karki is not on or near the Afghan border, but is the river terminus of a small branch line in Bokhara.

These Russian railways in Turkestan and Siberia—single tracks many hundreds of miles long—are hardly what can be called "strategic" railways. For serious military purposes they would be useless.

2. The Japanese advance through Jihol is cited to demonstrate the ease with which the Russians would advance through Afghanistan. But the conditions both physical and psychological are totally different. The "mountains" in Jihol are on the scale of the Welsh hills. The resident population of Jihol consists of Chinese peasants, the most pacific people in the world. The Chinese troops put up no real resistance. They were wretchedly led, organized, and supplied, and had no aeroplanes. The "terrible climatic conditions" were not adverse but favourable to the Japanese, for their mechanical transport moved quickly and easily over hard frozen ground.

May I in conclusion call attention to the opinion of Sir Edmund Barrow which I have quoted in another communication to the Asiatic Review?

In his remarks on that occasion General Barrow gave in full detail his reasons for disbelieving in the reality of the so-called Russian menace.

Yours truly,

F. G. Pratt.

Sir Louis Dane replies:

Mr. Pratt is, of course, correct in pointing out that the terminus of the main Tashkent line is at Termes on the Oxus, and it was a slip of memory on my part in mentioning Karki. But this is only about eighty miles west of Termes and is close to the Afghan frontier, and the railway from Bukhara to this gives another jumping-off point on the Oxus and would relieve pressure on Termes. For the rest I have nothing to add to or subtract from my remarks about the present position on the North-West Frontier of India and the necessity for watchful care there. Our strategic railways in India were, and in many cases still are, single lines.
THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF INDIAN RAILWAYS

(From a Financial Correspondent in India)

In their report dated January 19, 1933, the Preparatory Commission of Experts appointed in connection with the World Monetary and Economic Conference state that the total value of world trade in the third quarter of 1932 was only about one-third of that in the corresponding period of 1929. Such being the case, it is not a matter for surprise that transport industries all the world over should be in a desperately bad way. We find from Brassey's Naval Annual for 1933 that in the autumn of 1932 no less than 13½ million tons of the world's merchant fleets were lying idle. Railways also are everywhere in a similar condition. A special article which appeared in The Times in April indicated a deficit on French railways of £120 millions (gold) during the last ten years. The British railways, according to The Times Trade and Engineering Supplement, dated April 8, 1933, showed during 1932 a ratio of profits to capital of 2:1 per cent., which, considering the normal return of 4 per cent. for an even position, must be regarded as equivalent to a deficit and not a surplus return. The Canadian National railways, which work under more or less similar conditions to Indian railways, had a total income deficit of 96½ million dollars for 1932.

India's foreign trade has since 1929 been reduced to a little less than one-half in value. There has also been since that date an uninterrupted succession of deficits in railway working, vide figures given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deficit (in Rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>519 lakhs*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>920 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-33</td>
<td>934 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-34 (Budget estimate)</td>
<td>777 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above deficits have, however, not imposed any additional burden on the general taxpayer, as they have been met entirely out of railway reserves. Of course, since the commencement of 1931-32, railways have not paid the annual contribution to general revenues, amounting roughly to about Rs.600 lakhs, under the Convention of September 20, 1924. Owing to this unprecedented drain, the Railway Reserve Fund, which stood at nearly Rs.1,900

* One lakh of rupees = £7,500 at the current rate of exchange.
lakhs in 1928-29, has been wiped out and the Railway Depreciation Reserve Fund will have a balance of Rs.1,371 lakhs at the close of the year 1933-34.

**RAILWAY EARNINGS**

It would be incorrect to say that the above deficits are entirely due to the economic depression. For a proper appreciation of the position it is necessary to examine in detail the figures of revenue and expenditure for the last few years. To take revenue first, some figures are given below:

(In Lakhs of Rupees.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Earnings, Passenger</th>
<th>Earnings, Goods</th>
<th>Earnings, Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>35,75</td>
<td>65,25</td>
<td>1,70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>28,96</td>
<td>55,41</td>
<td>2,26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-33</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>29,30</td>
<td>54,52</td>
<td>2,68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-34 (Budget estimate)</td>
<td>29,72</td>
<td>55,68</td>
<td>2,85</td>
<td>88,25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The drop in goods earnings is greater than in passenger earnings, and is due to trade depression. It will continue until trade revives. The drop in passenger earnings is partly due to economic depression and partly to motor competition. The Mitchell-Kirkness Committee put the loss to railways from motor competition at Rs.190 lakhs per annum. A conference was recently held in Simla to discuss the question of co-ordination of road and rail transport, but no decisions were taken. Centralized control is not possible in India, as roads are a provincial subject and railways a central subject. The utmost that can be hoped for is a central advisory body, which, however, cannot be expected to function until the new autonomous provinces have been brought into being.

The improvement in receipts for 1933-34 is, of course, an estimate, and may or may not be realized. The Commerce Member, in introducing the Railway Budget in the Legislative Assembly, said in the course of his speech:

"In the hope that we have plumbed the lowest depths of the present period of economic depression and we may anticipate a slight recovery, we are placing our estimate of traffic earnings about 1½ crores,* or barely 2 per cent. above the current year’s figures."

This is a fundamental assumption which underlies the whole of the financial position for the current year, and if not realized

* One crore = 100 lakhs.
will increase the deficit beyond the budgeted figure. It was subjected to criticism by both British and Indian non-official members. British railways apparently do not share this optimism. The Economist of February 18, 1933, says that "the omens for early trade recovery are not regarded as sufficiently clear" by the Board of Directors of the London Midland and Scottish Railway. Let us hope that the Indian Government forecast will be justified.

**Railway Expenditure**

The following statement gives the figures for working expenses and the "operating ratio"—i.e., ratio of working expenses, including depreciation, but not including interest, to gross traffic receipts—for the years 1929-30 to 1933-34:

(In Lakhs of Rupees.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Working Expenses</th>
<th>Operating Ratio</th>
<th>Capital at Charge at End of Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>68,18</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>7,69,98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>67,46</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>7,83,18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>62,77</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>7,89,64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-33</td>
<td>62,85</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>7,91,04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-34 (Budget)</td>
<td>63,10</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>7,94,34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The operating ratio has increased steadily during the last twenty years. From 50 per cent. pre-war, it rose to 56 in 1924-25. It rose by another 10 points in the next five years and a further 6 points in the last three years. The decrease in 1933-34 may or may not be realized, being, as stated already, a pure estimate.

Another interesting feature is that the rise of the operating ratio has been much greater on State-managed than on company-managed lines. Below are given figures for the operating ratio for 5 feet 6 inch gauge lines for the year 1931-32, taken from page 55 of vol. ii. (Statistics) of the Report by the Railway Board on Indian Railways for 1931-32:

**State Managed Lines:**

- Eastern Bengal Railway 82.00
- North Western Railway (commercial section) 74.10
- Great Indian Peninsula Railway 76.16
- East Indian Railway 65.17

**Company Managed Lines:**

- Bombay Baroda and Central Indian Railway 59.56
- South Indian Railway 57.40
- Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway 53.40
This goes to show that State management has not been a great success from the purely business point of view.

The need for economy is insistent. The Pope Committee Report just published is not a very inspiring document. It says that "there are no big avenues of economy left except the intensive use of locomotive power; no fundamental changes can be made now on Indian railways to reduce expenditure except amalgamation. Considerable savings can, however, be made by detailed analysis of every operation conducted on every railway." The amalgamation of the East Indian and the Eastern Bengal systems has long been suggested. If it comes about as a result of the above recommendation, it will be some gain. Job analysis is a matter for the technical expert, on which a layman can offer no opinion. But, even so, informed opinion will not be willing to agree that Indian railways offer no other avenue for retrenchment and economy.

The Railway Retrenchment Sub-Committee, which reported in October, 1931, suggested annual savings of Rs.300 lakhs, the major portion of which related to cuts in pay of staff (225 lakhs). These have not yet been given effect to. The Director of Railway Audit only recently reported that control over expenditure is faulty and that the whole system of railway budgeting and accounting needs overhauling. Several projects have been sanctioned on too optimistic estimates on which the return originally anticipated will not be obtained in any reasonable length of time.

We could go on giving instances to show that the Pope Committee Report should not be regarded as the last word on railway financial reorganization in India. The establishment of a Statutory Railway Board is now under discussion. The object in view is the placing of railways on a business footing. Let us hope that opportunity will be taken to place the finances also on a business footing. Investigation by a committee including some financial experts is clearly necessary, notwithstanding the contrary recommendation of the Pope Committee. It should always be borne in mind that for the success of the Federal plan it is essential that the financial position of the railways be immediately improved. If the railways fare badly, general taxation would have to be increased, with railway reserves so sadly depleted. Moreover, the Central Government could not surrender one-half the jute export duty and a substantial share of the income tax to the provinces— as proposed in the White Paper—with the present inadequate margin of revenue at its disposal. Railway finance might very well be described as the keystone of the Federal arch. Early action is needed.
SOME ASPECTS OF A CENTRAL RESERVE BANK FOR INDIA—I.

A REVIEW OF THE ABORTIVE CENTRAL BANKING SCHEMES

By B. R. Shenoy, M.A., M.Sc. (Econ.), London

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This is the first of a series of studies on some of the problems connected with the establishment of a Central Reserve Bank in India. In this one we shall review the abortive Central Banking schemes that were proposed from time to time. Further articles will consist of an analysis of the Indian Money Market, the question whether India needs a Reserve Bank at all under her existing state of financial development, the controversy, Private Bank v. State Bank, and the Reserve Bank in relation to the Money Market. Although these essays will form connected parts of one theme, it will be attempted to make them as far as possible self-contained.

The Reserve Bank Bill, which was thrown out by the Legislative Assembly in 1928, did not represent the first serious attempt to establish a Reserve Bank in India. There were many schemes before this which were similarly set aside although by different authorities. Treatises on Indian Banking, in their passing references to the subject, state that the first proposal of the kind was made in 1836.† This is to ignore two interesting schemes before that date. Warren Hastings was responsible for the one in 1773,† and Robert Rickards, a member of the Government of Bombay, for the second in 1808.‡

1. The first of these was more than a mere proposal because the Bank was working for some time before it was dissolved by order of the Company’s Directors in England. It was the result of a "Plan for a General Bank in Bengal and Bahar"§ placed before the Board of Revenue in January, 1773, by Warren Hastings. After certain amendments it was finally approved by the Board on April 13 of the same year.

It is interesting to note that one of the primary causes that occasioned a demand for the Bank was the inconvenience caused

* E.g., see J. M. Keynes, Indian Currency and Finance, p. 233.
† India Office Records, Miscellaneous Despatches, Vol. 776, p. 209 et seq.
§ If we ignore the Northern Circars and the possessions round Madras, Bengal and Behar comprised British territory in India at that date.
to the money market by the withdrawal of money in the Company's Treasury in times of revenue collection. To quote the words of a minute adjoining the plan, "The great complaints which are made from all the Northern Districts of the two provinces, of the inability of the farmers to pay their rents, on account of the uncommon plenty and cheapness of their grain, are primarily owing to the great drains which have been made of the current coin in the Districts by the collections, which for some years past have centered in the Public Treasuries of the city of Moorshedabad and at the Presidency, and to the want of an equal trade to carry it back again into circulation."

"The object of the Bank," continued the minute, "is to provide an effectual remedy to this growing evil." The manner how this was to be done was given at some detail in the body of the plan. The collectors were to pay into the local branch of the Bank all the revenues they received in return for "bills on the Capital House at the Presidency. . . ." The Hoondian, or the rate of discount on these bills, was to be fixed by mutual agreement according to the distance, risk, and charge of transporting the sums in specie, if necessary to the residency or from place to place; or to the facility of remitting the sums by Bills in the Districts." While ensuring the receipt by the Government of the full value of the rents paid to them, this was expected to obviate the otherwise costly necessity of conveying forwards and backwards, by the Government in the one case and merchants in the other, of loads of cash under military escorts, travelling agents, etc. In modern parlance, therefore, the first object of the Bank was to act as bankers to the Government.

It was also to provide easy and cheap means of remittance through its branches round the two provinces to "the merchants and others who may have dealings in the country." To prevent the Bank taking advantage of its privileged position in exacting high discount rates, the plan laid down that "tables of Hoondian which merchants shall pay for bills shall be affixed at each cutchery of the districts and in the most public places of the Presidency and Moorshedabad."

Another object of the Bank was as stated in a circular letter to the District Collectors, to "enforce the currency of the 'Sicca' rupees" as the standard coin of the provinces. This was to be done by insisting upon payment by the Bank to the Government of the revenues received by it in "Sicca" rupees. It was thus hoped that the Bank in its turn would insist upon or show a preference for dealing also in the same coin. And as a result of the influence of the Bank on the community it was possible that the coin in question would have acquired increasing currency and popularity.
Some Aspects of a Central Reserve Bank for India

The proposed constitution of the Bank was also interesting. It was not to be on the Company's "own immediate account," but was to be organized as a private corporation under the patronage of the Company. This was because, in the first place, the expense of the collections and the official emoluments "in the former case would far exceed the moderate profits the Bank might derive." Secondly, "the want of time and ability in the Government either to superintend or control so complicated and expensive a business is an insuperable objection to it." It will be noted that these are precisely some of the objections today advanced against the Central Bank being State owned and State managed. The plan therefore provided that "a Principal House, or Bank, under the conduct of one or more responsible shroffs, be established at the Presidency, through which all remittances of the Revenue shall be made from the districts of the Provinces; and an inferior House under the charge of one or more Gomastas* dependent on the principal in each district or Collectorship."

Two distinguished and well-established shroffs† were appointed managers of the Bank. It was at first contemplated that these "Shall enter into an engagement with the Government and give security for the performance of these stipulations." But both the bankers, having declined to offer security,‡ it was agreed to "adjust the accounts at the end of each month and to pay into the Treasury the balance which may be in their hands."

The Bank was established in April, 1773, and it soon began to spread its branches round the two provinces.§ But from the very start the managers seem to have encountered difficulties. In a representation to the Government they complained that the collectors were not paying into the Bank revenues as they were being received, but only at times when Bills were required; that in Dinapore a rival Bank was established; and that the collectors required the agents of the Bank to attend in person at the "cutchery" to draft the bills, a practice which "discredits the Bank." They also asked for preferential rates of coinage at the mint as enjoyed by Juggat Seth.

In December, 1773, new regulations were made by the Government to remedy these grievances, and the minting privileges asked

* Gomasta usually means a clerk.
† They were "Bauboo Hazzurimull, and Roy Dalchand, the former an ancient and respectable merchant of Calcutta, the latter a banker at Moorshidabad, and a branch of the family of Juggatseet" * (India Office Records, op. cit., p. 229).
‡ The security was refused because they complained that "it would materially affect their credit in the country; they having themselves been hitherto considered in such a light of responsibility as never to have had occasion in the course of their extensive dealings to enter into securities."
§ A Branch was established in Midnapore in June, 1773. See History of Midnapore, by J. C. Price, Vol. I., p. 203.

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for were granted. At the same time the collectors were warned that "any attempt to counteract or obstruct the business of the Bank would be noticed with the severest displeasure." The Bank, however, proved to be a short-lived experiment, the Court of Directors in England having disapproved of it.*

Whether or not this germ of a Central Bank would have evolved in course of time into a fully developed Central Bank is now mere speculation. But considering that in the early seventies of the eighteenth century banking in the modern sense was still in its period of inception, and Central Banking theory as such was yet to be formulated, the "General Bank" of 1773 was perhaps not a poor beginning. It was organized as a private corporation under the patronage of the State. It was to act as Bankers to the Government and thus remedy the inconveniences caused by the withdrawal of money from circulation into the Treasury. It was to facilitate trade by providing easy and cheap means of remittance to merchants. And, finally, it was expected to enforce the currency of the "Sicca" rupee as the standard coin of the State. All these are certainly Central Banking functions, and it is interesting to note that the Bank of England did not at this time possess the privilege of the custody of Public Revenues.† Nor could it facilitate trade remittances, it being without branches. Both these functions were contemplated in Warren Hastings' Plan.

2. The second proposal of a Central Banking nature was made by Robert Rickards, a member of the Government of Bombay, in his memorandum to the Government of Bengal, dated July 29, 1808—i.e., about two years after the establishment of the Bank of Bengal. It was more elaborately planned than the first scheme and perhaps is superior to it in many respects.

The primary objective that he had in mind while drafting the scheme was a reduction of the Company's debt through the instrumentality of the Bank. We do not enter into the details of how this was to be done.‡ Suffice it to say that the shareholders' part of the Bank's capital—the income from the Government's share of the capital—a loan of £3,500,000 in bank-notes to the Government, and a Government Sinking Fund, to be built up by an annual contribution of £1,000,000, were to be used for the purpose.

‡ These details were given by Rickards in his memorandum. See Parliamentary Papers, op. cit., pp. 266-67.
The outline constitution of the "General Bank" (as Rickards proposed to call it) was interesting in many ways. It was not to be a State Bank, nor was it to be a purely private institution. If entrusted to the exclusive management of private individuals, these were "just as liable to enter into hurtful combinations to promote their own interests as a Government is to injure public credit by arbitrary acts to relieve occasional distresses. By their union these parties will operate as a check on each other." The General Bank of Rickards, therefore, was to be a quasi-public institution. Its management accordingly was to be composed of a Court of Directors of six, seven, or eight members (he was not definite about the exact number), all of whom were to be "independent men," with the exception of one, who was to be a Government nominee. The chief concern of the latter was the "successful operation of the Sinking Fund and other public advantages derivable from the whole institution." He was also to act as a check "to speculations tending to promote private advantages at the expense of public good." But the presence of the Government member, Rickards assures us, would not compromise the independence of the Bank, because all decisions would be made by a majority vote. The Bank would thus be in a position to resist inflation on the part of the Government as a means of raising cheap revenue.

It was to have three head offices, one each at Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. In this he anticipated the constitution of the Imperial Bank of India. In addition to the head offices, he contemplated the establishment of "subordinate banks or offices" round the country, to facilitate remittance business and popularize bank-notes.

The capital of the Bank was to be £12,500,000, of which £8,500,000 were to be subscribed by the public and £4,000,000 by the Government.

It was to be entrusted with the right of note issue and the convertibility of the notes was to be guaranteed by the Government. Rickards would so manage the note issue as "never to exceed in amount the quantity of precious metal a society would otherwise demand and of which it was intended to be a useful and cheap representative." And he imagined that the "constant and immediate convertibility into specie" would restrict the volume issued to this limit. It may be noted that, in his method of regulating currency issue, he anticipated the doctrines of the Currency Principle of a future date.*

Regarding the functions of the Bank, Rickards observed:

"The Bank thus constituted to be conjoined with the Com-

* A. E. Feavearyear observes that the currency and banking principles were so named in 1840. See his Pound Sterling, p. 244.
pany's Treasury in the receipt and payment of sums on account of Government, to be a Bank of discounts, to grant credit on unexceptionable security, and at such times only, as the Bank shall in their own judgment deem perfectly unobjectionable, and also to engage in the business of exchange by granting bills at a more reasonable rate than can be procured from individuals, in favour of merchants applying for the same on any part of the company's territories. . . ." To these functions he later adds the selling of exchange bills on England.

Rickards recognized that the success of the Bank required the co-operation of the great private bankers who, as a result of their vast resources and extensive branch organizations, wielded considerable influence over the business community. Owing to the competition the Bank might offer them, he thought it likely that, in the first instance, these bankers might attempt to obstruct the Bank. He would meet their opposition by competition with them. The Bank would offer lower rates of discount, exchange, and remittance to the public than corresponding rates charged by the private bankers. This, he expected, the Bank would be in a position to do, as a result of the vastness of its organization, control over Government balances, and the privilege of the remittance of specie free of cost, which the Government would be asked to extend to it. "When the shroffs are thus driven out of this part at least of the money market," he continued, "they may not improbably seek, in the gradual course of time, a connection with the Bank." He would then offer them seats on the Directorate of the Bank. And thus, through their "means" and "money-connections," he hoped that the Bank would be in a position to extend its benefits beyond the British territories over "the whole extent of India."

The advantages he expected of the Bank were many. In the first place, the rates of exchange between district and district, which were "liable to sudden and violent fluctuations," would be lowered to "a very near approximation of the real par of exchange." Secondly, in case of monetary stringency in any part of the country, "a neighbouring district or the Presidency will always be at hand to relieve." Thirdly, as a result of these advantages, "the mercantile body will be freed from the losses and inconveniences now suffered in exchange and from the artifices of shroffs, and therefore find their pecuniary intercourse with every part of British India much facilitated."

The Governor-General forwarded this plan to the Company's Directors, with the remark that "the ideas of Mr. Rickards appear to resolve themselves into mere speculation, without embracing objects capable of being realized, while the machinery proposed by that gentleman . . . was extremely cumbrous and compli-
cated. . . ." The Directors do not seem to have taken a different view of the plan, and it was some time before they wrote back finally rejecting it.

Rickards' General Bank, like that of Warren Hastings' before him, was clearly a Central Bank. It was to have the monopoly of issue. It was to act as bankers to the Government. By competition with the private bankers it was to stabilize rates of exchange, remittance, and discount. It was to mobilize its resources to relieve local monetary distress in any part of the country. Finally, it was to control the operations of the shroffs, who were almost the sole components of the contemporary financial system of India.

3. The next proposal for the establishment of a Central Bank was made in 1836.* In that year "a large body of merchants interested in East Indies" submitted to the Court of Directors a project for a "great banking establishment for British India." They were of opinion that a single State Bank, "confining its transactions strictly to banking principles and business," and "established by Act of Parliament and possessed of adequate capital, would, under judicious management and control, become an instrument of general good by facilitating the employment of the redundant capital of this country (England) for the general improvement of Indian commerce, giving stability to the money system of India, and preventing those occasional fluctuations to which it is at present subject, and also by affording the company facilities and advantages in their future financial arrangements."

The Bank was to transact the general banking business for the Government, and, in particular, "facilitate the receipt of revenue and its diffusion, and furnish the remittance to Great Britain of the sums required there for the Home Charges." The Bank of Bengal, they observed, owing to its limited capital, could come to but little assistance of the Government in times of distress, which the new Bank would be in a position to do to much greater satisfaction.

The project was sent to the Directors of the Bank of Bengal for their opinion. They naturally disagreed with the view that their Bank was incapable of satisfactorily discharging the functions enumerated in the scheme. In particular, they were ready at once to take over the management of Government business. In case additional capital was needed they "doubted not that the community of the Presidency had the means and would have the desire to make the addition."

As a consequence this scheme also came to be dropped.

4. After this date, incidental allusions in official correspondence

* The account of this scheme is based on J. B. Brunyates' An Account of the Presidency Banks, pp. 106-107.
to the establishment of a Central Bank are numerous. And after the establishment of the Banks of Bombay and Madras these allusions were sometimes in the direction of amalgamating the three Presidency Banks. Successive Finance Members, being not adverse to it, early materialization of the project seemed likely.

Perhaps the first of such allusions was made by Wilson in his minute of 1859, concerning the management of a sound paper currency in India. His scheme for the creation of a Government Issue Department, he observed, was not inconsistent with the establishment of a Central Bank, on the lines of the Bank of England, provided it restricted itself to the functions of the Banking Department of the latter. His successor, Laing, also believed that "a State Bank was a great protection against the frequency, the intensity, and duration of commercial panics." And in 1866 Sir Bartle Frere favoured the amalgamation of the three Presidency Banks. But the Government of India gave little attention to these suggestions.

5. The subject again came to prominence, when the old Bank of Bombay was known to have lost a large part of its capital. This was made the occasion for submitting a scheme* to the Government of India for the amalgamation of the Presidency Banks by Dickson, the Secretary of the Bank of Bengal.

His plan was to increase the combined paid-up capital of the three Banks to five crores of rupees, to form the capital of the new Bank. The shareholders of the Banks of Bengal and Madras were to contribute additional capital of 80 lakhs and 44 lakhs respectively at a premium of 25 per cent. The Bank of Bombay was to go into liquidation and its shareholders were to contribute one crore of capital to the new Bank, also at the same premium. The proceeds of the premium were to be added to the amalgamated Reserves of the Banks.

In the constitution of the new Bank the Local Boards at Bombay and Madras were to be retained, "but the supreme control and the rules and regulations for the conduct of business must rest in and be laid down by the Board in Calcutta." The latter, therefore, was to form the supreme management of the amalgamated Bank.

Dickson had no doubt that the "United Bank" thus constituted would not only be able "to meet the legitimate requirements of commerce . . . but . . . to control their recurring monetary crises. . . ." The Government would have "an absolute guarantee for the unvarying management of their Treasuries . . .; a certainty of greater economy in the use and distribution of their balances throughout India; uniform management of the Public Debt . . .; and a powerful agent in aiding

* Gazette of India, October 12, 1901, p. 1943 et seq.
them in all financial measures. . . .” And he thought it possible
that at a later date the privilege of issue (which was withdrawn
from the Presidency Banks in 1862) could be restored to the new
Bank somewhat on the British model.

The Viceroy, however, was opposed to the idea of amalgama-
tion on “public grounds.” He feared that a powerful institu-
tion like the one proposed might overshadow the State; the
Banks of Bombay and Madras would resent their control from
Bengal; and in any event he thought it difficult to find men of
leisure and ability to manage the Bank. Among the shareholders
of the Bank of Bombay there was a strong body opposed to
amalgamation, and it was only by a narrow majority of three
that the proposal was carried at a general meeting. Under these
circumstances Dickson thought it proper to withdraw his scheme.

In 1870 a member of the Governor-General’s Council again
raised the idea of “a real State Bank . . . thoroughly under
Government control.” But the Government of India were de-
cisive on the point. They “looked upon the establishment of
a State Bank in India as a matter of great uncertainty, perhaps
of impossibility.”

6. The matter seemed to have closed there for about three
decades. In 1898, however, some of the witnesses before the
Fowler Committee supported the idea of a Central Bank. Alfred
Rothschild outlined a plan for such a Bank in his written state-
ment to the committee.* He advocated a Bank “with privi-
leges similar to those held by the Bank of England.” It was to
be a shareholders’ Bank and not a State Bank, for its manage-
ment “requires a technical skill and adaptability which can
hardly be looked for in a Government Department.” The three
Presidency Banks were to be absorbed by it, and its capital was
to be the same as “that of the Bank of England—namely,
£14,000,000.” The Board of Management of the Bank he would
make “as influential as possible and composed of representatives
of the chief merchants and bankers, the Government having the
right to appoint its own representatives, as it is most desirable
that the policy of the Government of India and that of the Bank
should be in absolute harmony.” It was to be entrusted with the
management of the currency.

He expected that the Bank would impart “security and per-
manence to the currency system,” stabilize the exchanges and
the rates of discount. Confidence in the financial system of the
country that might then ensue might stimulate the flow of capital

* Keynes apparently ignores this scheme, as becomes evident from his
observation that, “apart from Mr. Hambro’s memorandum, no attempt
was made to deal with the question in detail.” See Indian Currency and
Finance, p. 235.
from abroad. In times of financial difficulties the Government would find the Bank of great help.

This question of a Central Bank being outside their terms of reference, the committee did not deal with it. Hambro, one of the members, however, in a separate memorandum* pointed out that "the success of the recommendations of the committee, if adopted, will very much depend on the banking wants of the country being assisted in times of pressure and curtailed in times of slackness." This, he believed, "could only be done by the establishment of some institution ... formed on somewhat similar lines to those of either the Bank of England or the Bank of France."

7. This memorandum of Hambro became the subject of correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Government of India for some time. The latter called for opinions on it from the provincial Governments, Presidency Banks, and the Chambers of Commerce. Since these opinions, however, were found unsatisfactory or conditional in character, an informal conference was convened between the Financial Department of the Government of India and the representatives of these other bodies. At this conference the question of amalgamating the Presidency Banks was discussed, and Mr. Dawkins, the Finance Member, placed before it a scheme for an Indian Central Bank.

This Bank was to have an "expert Direction in London—particularly conversant with both Indian and the London Money Markets—elected by and responsible to the shareholders, who would be mainly in India. In India itself there would be a Central Management apportioning its time and energies between the various centres, and in close relation to local directorates of the Presidency towns."

The Bank was not to deal in foreign exchanges for business purposes, but only for purposes of borrowing funds in London on its own account, or for "making remittances in payment of stock or other authorised investments and in payment of loans." It is interesting to note that in times of monetary stringency the Bank was to have the privilege of issuing "uncovered notes upon the payment of a tax of 10 per cent."

Among the advantages of the Bank, he counted on adequate control over the money market, a more "rapid return into the general circulation of money raised by taxation," and "a relative steadiness in the rates of discount, which would be of vital importance to sound business."

The project, however, could not materialize, for the Secretary of State found it difficult to come to a decision about it. He wrote on March 22, 1900: "There are circumstances, however,

at the present time which prevent my coming to an early decision on the proposals now submitted to me.”

8. Dawkins was followed by Sir Edward Law as Finance Member. On the strength of a minute on the “Establishment of a Central Bank,” submitted by him to the Government, the latter also felt some uncertainty upon the point and recommended to the Secretary of State that “the scheme be held in abeyance.” But they wished it to be recorded, nevertheless, that it was their “deliberate opinion that it would be distinctly advisable, if practicable, to establish a Central Bank in India so as to relieve the Government of its present heavy responsibilities.” The Secretary of State accepted this recommendation.

Sir Edward Law examined the question in his minute from the point of view of its desirability and cost to the Government. While on principle he was convinced of the first, the cost of the measure appeared to him prohibitive. This he calculated on the basis of the extra-capital over the combined capital of the Presidency Banks† that he thought would be necessary from the point of view of the safety of the Bank, and the compensation that the Presidency Banks would demand from the Government to make good the fall in their dividends that might ensue as a result of the increase in capital. This compensation he put at 6 per cent. per annum. In addition to the question of cost, he was doubtful of “securing a thoroughly suitable Board of Directors having the necessary leisure to devote to the business.” He suggested, therefore, the suspension, if not the rejection, of the idea of establishing a Central Bank.

The question was not further considered until the deliberations of the Chamberlain Commission in 1913. Two schemes of a “State Bank for India” were placed before this Commission, one by Sir Lionel Abrahams, then Assistant Under-Secretary of State for India, and the other by Mr. Keynes, himself a member of the Commission, at the Commission’s own request.

9. Abrahams’ memorandum, as stated by him, was, in many respects, “in effect a development in more definite form of suggestions put forth in the correspondence that passed between the Secretary of State, the Government of India, and other bodies in India,” over the memorandum of Hambro.

His idea was to amalgamate the three Presidency Banks into a Central Bank. The Board of Directors of the Bank were to be Government nominees, “following the precedents of the Bank of France, the German Reichsbank, the Austro-Hungarian Bank,

* The correspondence on Hambro’s memorandum was published in the Gazette of India, dated October 12, 1901.
† His scheme was for the absorption of the Presidency Banks by the Central Bank.
the Bank of Russia, and the Bank of Japan.” He was sceptical of the idea of entrusting the management of the Bank to the shareholders’ representatives, even if these were to be guided by a “code of rules sanctioned by the Government.”

It was to act as Bankers to the Government, and as such was to have the custody of the Government’s balances, with the exception of £1,000,000, which the latter would keep with itself to meet “unseen emergencies.” It was to manage the paper currency and provide for inland remittances to the business public.

But the Bank was not to engage in the business of exchanges, for that would mean unequal and, therefore, unfair competition with the Exchange Banks, and the duty of supporting the exchanges was to rest with the State and not with the Bank, although, “as a matter of convenience, the carrying out of particular transactions relating to it . . . might be entrusted” to the Bank. It may be remarked, however, that the maintenance of the internal and the external stability of the currency being complementary functions to one another, their dual control might have led to important practical difficulties. This was, therefore, one of the weaknesses of Abrahams’ scheme.

10. Mr. Keynes’ scheme was based on the Continental model like that of Abrahams’. It was more elaborately drafted than all the preceding ones. The framers of the Imperial Bank of India Act, 1921—it is the name Mr. Keynes would give to his bank—seem to have borrowed freely from it. And if the Imperial Bank of India has failed to show the results Keynes hoped of his Bank, the reason probably is to be found in the fact that the Bank was not given control over the paper currency, and that the currency system was not based on his principles.

The title “State Bank” has misled some reviewers of the scheme into the belief that he recommended the establishment of a State Bank in the post-war sense of the term. It was designed, on the contrary, to be a compromise between a purely private Bank and a purely State Bank. To put it in his own words, he expected of his Bank “the best of both worlds.”

The State Bank which he recommended embodied three principles which he considered essential for the successful functioning of a Central Bank in India. In the first place, it combined in it ultimate responsibility to the State with a high degree of day-to-day independence for itself. Secondly, while making use of the business talent and experience of the shareholders’ representatives, it enabled the Bank to take a “broad and not always commercial view of policy.” In the third place, in view of the vast extent of the country, the administration of the Bank embodies “a high degree of decentralization.”

The Bank was to be managed by a Central Board and three
Local Boards, one each at Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. The Central Board was to be composed of three members, all of them nominees of the State. But the Board was to be independent of Government interference in the day-to-day transactions of its business, except that the Viceroy was to have the power of veto in all matters. The Local Boards were to be composed of six members each, three of whom were to be representatives of local shareholders. The Local Boards were designed to serve the requirements of decentralization.

The Central Board was not to have direct dealings with the public. This was the function of the Local Boards. The duties of the Central Board were to be, chiefly, determination of bank rates, remittance and distribution of funds between the centres, between India and London, and questions of general policy. While the general volume of the transactions of any kind were to be within the ultimate control of the Central Board, the nature of the individual transactions making up the total was to be left to the discretion of the Local Boards.

With the exception of £1,000,000 to meet unseen emergencies, the Government balances were to be held with the Bank. It was to be entrusted with the management of the paper currency modelled on the pre-war Reichsbank issue. The normal reserve backing was to be 60 per cent. of the total issue; but this could be lowered to 40 per cent. on payment of a tax to the Government. The elasticity that would thus be imparted to the currency supply would serve the requirements of the seasonal fluctuations in the demand for money. But, for the same reasons as were advanced by Abrahams, the responsibility of maintaining exchange stability was not to be part of the Bank's functions. It was to remain the duty of the Secretary of State.

While recognizing the desirability of the Central Bank, the Commission observes that they were not in a position to make precise recommendations. For this, they felt that “a careful study of conditions on the spot was essential.” They therefore suggested a separate and expert enquiry into the question. The war suspended consideration of the Commission's recommendation and the expert enquiry was not carried out. The terms of reference of the Babington-Smith Committee did not include examination of the question of a Central Bank. And, apart from incidental references in the evidences given before the Committee, there was not a serious discussion of the subject.

II. The amalgamation of the Presidency Banks in 1921, to form the Imperial Bank of India, did not put an end either to the demand or to the necessity of a Central Bank. The question, therefore, was again raised by and before the Hilton Young Commission of 1926, who recommended the establishment of a Central
Bank. Since we will have occasion to examine in some detail the outline constitution of the Commission's Bank, we shall deal with it here very briefly.

The Bank recommended by the Commission is best described as a quasi-public institution. Though its capital was privately subscribed, its management had Government nominees on it. But the independence of the Bank was made secure by the provision that the representatives of the shareholders were to be in a majority.

The management of the Bank was to be decentralized on the model of the Imperial Bank of India. There were to be three Local Boards, one each at Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. The representation of the shareholders on the Local Boards was to be direct, while their representation on the Central Board was to be indirect—namely, through the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Local Boards—and one member elected by each of the Local Boards. The Central Board, which was to consist of fourteen members, was to have only five Government nominees on it.

The functions of the Bank were limited to those which are appropriate to a Central Banking institution. On the one hand, competition with the commercial banks was avoided, and on the other, the importance of the liquidity of the Bank's assets was looked to. It was to have the monopoly of note issue; it was to act as sole bankers to the Government, and as such manage its balances, debts, issue new loans, arrange for remittance on Home Charges, etc. Through the mechanism of rediscount it was to provide emergency currency to meet seasonal demands. To enable this to be done effectively, the system of currency over which it was to have sole control was to be the well-known proportional reserve system. This, by enabling the issue of a multiple volume of currency over a given volume of gold, rendered possible seasonal expansion of currency supply. It was to act as bankers to the commercial banks whose banking reserves were to be centralized with it. Unlike the Banks of Abrahams and Keynes, the Commission's Bank was to have full responsibility for maintaining the stability of the exchanges.

The recommendations of the Commission were accepted by the Government, and those relating to the Central Bank were introduced into the Assembly in a Bill entitled the Gold Standard and Reserve Bank of India Bill, on January 25, 1927. (Perhaps the only recommendation of importance which was dropped in the Bill was the provision for Local Boards.)

From the very start the Assembly showed a lack of enthusiasm for the measure. They saw in it none of their pet schemes for a gold currency, and they were sceptical of the Gold Bullion Standard.
On March 24 the Bill was referred to a joint select committee, and when it emerged from their hands on August 18 it was in all essentials very much different from the original. Among the changes effected two were conspicuous. In the first place, the private Bank was made into a State Bank. Secondly, the number of directors was raised to fifteen, of which five were to be Government nominees, six were to be elected by the Legislatures, and the remaining four were to represent special interests like the Chambers of Commerce. On these two points, however, the difference between the Government and the Assembly proved to be formidable, and, since no compromise could be effected on them, the Government had finally to abandon the Bill on February 10, 1928. This put an end to a long series of attempts to establish a Central Bank in India, the first of which was made as early as 1773.
MR. T. V. SOONG'S VISIT TO ENGLAND

By Owen M. Green

(Late editor of the North China Daily News.)

The visit to England this summer of Mr. T. V. Soong, the distinguished Chinese Minister of Finance, is of great importance in view of the recent marked changes in Nanking's policy and prospects. Those changes were described in the April Asiatic Review. Very briefly, they comprise concentration on the revival of Nanking's special sphere, the Yangtze Valley, other districts being temporarily left to their own devices; refusal to be drawn into more civil wars, rigid economy, and administrative reforms.

For this policy, and the success so far achieved in it, Mr. Soong is very largely, perhaps chiefly, responsible. He arrived in London on June 5, spent the following week-end at Chequers, and attended the opening phases of the Economic Conference. (At the moment of writing it is uncertain how long he stays.) Before he left America an informal message was sent that our Government would welcome the opportunity of conversation with him. There is a strong feeling among all who know the Far East that a more active British policy is needed in China. The Chinese fully realize that our guiding principle in recent years has been to avoid trouble at all cost, and, very naturally, they do not like it. Concessions made in such a spirit inevitably appear as sugar-plums to unruly children. The Lytton Report pressed strongly that China should be helped in setting her house in order. It will certainly have been part of Mr. Soong's business in London to explain what his Government are doing and how such help could be given.

"The Soong Dynasty," as its opponents call it (it includes General Chiang Kai-shek, who married the youngest daughter), has as many enemies as any party in power anywhere. Yet there can be no question that it is actuated by a keener sense of practical needs and possibilities than any of its predecessors, and is responsible for the best chance yet offered to Republican China of evolving a stable, workable constitution.

Incidentally all its members are Christians, the father, now dead, having been converted in America in 1885, while the mother was, all her life, a pillar of the Chinese Methodist Church. The eldest daughter married Dr. H. H. Kung, a lineal descendant of Confucius, but a Christian: he was in England this spring
on an industrial mission, and, though at present without a port-
folio, is always an important figure in Nanking’s politics. The
second daughter married Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who was converted
when a medical student in Hong Kong and died a Christian.
The youngest, May-ling, married General Chiang in 1927. She
is a very lovely woman, of most sweet disposition, an ever-grow-
ing influence in her husband’s life, to whom one may well attrib-
ute his conversion to Christianity two years ago.

“T. V.,” as everyone calls him, is now forty-two. He took his
degree at Harvard in 1917, worked for some time in a New York
bank, was President of the Central Bank of Canton for a year,
and, in 1925, became Minister of Finance in the Nationalist
Government at Canton which, after many vicissitudes, blossomed
into the present Nanking Government. Tall, rather reserved,
but of very winning personality, he has a deservedly high repute,
both as man and financier. He is a tremendous worker, yet
always accessible, with a habit of going straight to the point that
is rare in the Orient. His very directness, also that he does not
suffer fools gladly, tends to make him unpopular with politicians.
But one always knows where one is with “T. V.,” and can rely
on him implicitly.

During the wretched, war-ridden years from early in 1929 to
late in 1931 “T. V.” often bitterly complained that all his energies
were wasted in raising loans. Yet his loans were well secured
and payment of interest and amortization safeguarded from poli-
tical interference. The Central Bank of China, which he
founded in 1929 at Shanghai, has developed into a solid and use-
ful institution. Another service, which naturally appeals to
foreigners, was his revival of the Salt Gabelle organization,
founded by Sir Richard Dane in 1913 and ensuing years, which
the Communists, in 1926-1927, had practically smashed. Mr.
Soong took the first opportunity, after Nanking had been fairly
established as the seat of government, to reinstate the foreign
inspectors; he has rearranged the cumbrous old salt districts,
thus simplifying control; and in 1929 he framed a scheme for
gradually bringing up to date the heavy arrears of payments on
foreign loans secured on the Salt. In spite of depreciated silver
and internal disorders this scheme, except as regards the Hukou-
ang Loan (which is only half chargeable to Salt) has been very fairly
carried out.

“T. V.” may be said to represent the business conception of
government which is gradually gaining ground. His reluctance,
or difficulty, in compromising with the enormous force of tradi-
tion in China is, perhaps, a weak point in his character. Yet no
one has done more than he to introduce into co-operation in
Government work the oldest and soldest element in the nation,
China's business men, whose large representation in the Commis-

sion he invented to control finance has contributed markedly to
the past year's improvements.

Of General Chiang Kai-shek very little is known abroad except
his name. Yet it is no exaggeration to describe him as the ablest
public man in China and one of the most remarkable men in
any country today. "T. V." is sometimes prone to take things

too much to heart. General Chiang is always cool and imper-
turbable, and he sees very far ahead. As a youth he studied
military science in Japan and Paotingfu and at a much later period
in Moscow, where what he saw of Bolshevism at close quarters
explains much of his more recent actions. He built up the famous
Whampoa Academy of Cadets, who officered the army which he
led in triumph from Canton to the Yangtze in 1926, and he is
undeniably a very able soldier. Yet I believe that his real qualities
are those of a statesman. He followed the fortunes of Dr. Sun
Yat-sen from the very beginning of the Revolution in 1911, and
in those bewildered years he learnt two lessons which few of his
countrymen have learnt—the supreme importance of time, and
of sticking to one thing. (It is noticeable that in the hottest
days of the conflict with Japan General Chiang never allowed
himself to be diverted for more than the briefest time from his
main purpose of crushing the Communists. He knew that it was
futile to fight Japan, and that China's most dangerous enemies
were at home.) His opponents furiously denounce him as a
tyrant. Autocratic he is. Yet on a dispassionate review of his
career it may fairly be claimed that on those occasions when he
seemed most ruthless his real aim was to destroy a tyranny greater
than any single man has wielded, which sought indeed to bind
China in fetters of brass and iron.

This surely emerges in General Chiang's two great struggles,
with the Russian domination in 1927 and with the Kuomintang
after 1929. It is hardly yet recognized abroad how very nearly
Moscow, through the agents whom Sun Yat-sen had summoned
to his aid in 1923, succeeded in capturing all China. General
Chiang had already had one brush with Borodin in 1926; and, in
the spring of 1927, backed by the army of his native province,
Chêkiang, and supported by all the moderate Nationalists, who
were panic-stricken at the grip that Communism had got over
their movement, he turned upon the Reds, upset their Govern-
ment at Hankow, and drove the Russians from China.

The evil results of the Kuomintang monopoly of power in the
Nanking Government have been described in these pages in
recent times. Anything more cumbrous, ineffective, and corrupt
could hardly be imagined. From early in 1929 General Chiang
began attacking this monopoly with a freedom now echoed by
many others. The story of the contest is too long to tell here, but not the least favourable omen for the present régime in Nanking is that, at least in the Yangtze Valley, Kuomintangism has been shorn of much of its powers.

In both these episodes, as may well be imagined, General Chiang raised up a host of enemies. Even among those who, on the whole, sympathized were some whose Chinese sense of propriety was shocked by the undoubtedly drastic things the General has had to do. But they were things that very few Westerners would have failed to praise in view of the long purpose to be served.

At the age of forty-six General Chiang, when out of uniform, is more like a country gentleman amateur of art and letters than a soldier. He seems to have abundant time for visitors, yet there are few matters of state of which he is not master. Most people go in awe of him, of his short, sharp questions which brook no evasion, of his impenetrable reserve. Yet his smile is even more charming than that of all Chinese, his immediate subordinates adore him, and, if his word is brief, he is ever a man of his word.

With such undoubted assets as these two brothers-in-law it is necessary, though unwelcome, to have to take notice of the debit side. Undoubtedly the most damaging blot on China's reputation today is her failure to pay the long arrears of interest and amortization on her railway loans and even bills for material supplied years ago. There is a glaring contrast between the loans secured on Customs and Salt—the latter have already been mentioned, and there has never been any default on the Customs loans—and the railways. The Shanghai-Nanking, Tientsin-Pukow, and Peking-Mukden are the principal ones, but five or six more are also concerned.

In answer to a question in the House of Commons last July, it was stated that China's railway debts to foreign bondholders, of whom the proportion of British, though it cannot exactly be given, was admitted to be "certainly high," amounted to the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrears of interest</td>
<td>£4,210,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tls.1,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrears of amortization</td>
<td>£5,856,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tls.78,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Last December Captain Eden, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, told the House that "the Chinese Ministry of Railways are engaged in devising means for liquidating the debt," and that the Tientsin-Pukow Railway had agreed to set aside a monthly sum for this purpose. But nothing further (at the time of writing) has been heard from the Chinese Ministry, and the
Tientsin-Pukow payments to reserve, always meagre, have been suspended altogether since January.

That the railways suffered badly in the civil wars from 1926 onwards is admitted, but for the past two years their earnings have greatly improved, those of the Tientsin-Pukow in 1931 being equal to the best ever recorded. In these two years, moreover, advances to Chinese railways out of Great Britain's returned share of the Boxer Indemnity, either made or approved, amount to over \( \mathcal{L}4\frac{1}{4} \) millions. There is a wide and by no means unnatural feeling that some check should be put upon further loans until the railways have made a serious effort to pay up what they already owe, which at present they certainly are not doing.

Another matter deserving notice, because of the conspicuous principle involved, is that of the Pekin Syndicate, which obtained a concession as far back as 1898 to develop coal and iron deposits in Shansi and Honan—the latter province is nominally under Nanking's control. The Shansi concession was cancelled owing to local obstruction, and in 1915 the Syndicate went into partnership with a Chinese concern, the idea being that the foreigners superintended the mining and the Chinese shared in the selling. A handsome royalty was payable to the Chinese Government. The whole should have been a bright example of Sino-foreign business co-operation.∗

Yet for six years past the Syndicate has had nothing but obstruction and loss, partly due to the depredations of militarists, who at times have bodily closed the mines (thereby throwing 12,000 Chinese out of work), partly to the jealousy of rival owners—though, in fact, China could easily consume all the coal in Honan and ask for more. There was something like a riot in March when hundreds of Chinese schoolboys stopped the Syndicate's coal trains by sitting down on the line, plastered them with anti-foreign placards, and forced them to return. No satisfaction appears to have been reached, and thus thousands of Chinese workers are left unemployed, the Government are deprived of valuable royalties, and British bondholders, who have invested nearly \( \mathcal{L}2,000,000 \) in the mines, railway to serve them, and subsidiary enterprises, are owed nearly \( \mathcal{L}700,000 \) in interest and loans.

The moral of both stories is the same. Customs and Salt loans are under Mr. Soong's personal control; the railways unfortun-ately are not. And the mines in Honan are five or six hundred miles from Nanking. In other words, much as the Government

∗ Since this article was written, news has been received from China that the foreign managers of the Pekin Syndicate have been able to come to some arrangement with the local Chinese authorities in the Honan mine-fields. It is hoped that this will prove satisfactory.
has done in strengthening its authority and starting reforms, and much as it should yet do, it is not the effective authority it may hope to become later on.

The danger of all governments in an era of change such as China is passing through is that, like despotisms, there is no sure promise of continuity. Again and again the Western Powers have fancied they had discovered "the strong man" whom they might back—Yuan Shih-kai, Tuan Chi-jui, Chang Tso-lin, Wu Pei-fu—only with repeated disappointments, until now they are chary of hailing any saviour, however apparently well accredited. Nevertheless, it is permissible to hope that circumstances have so far altered as to allow departure from this cautiousness.

It is true that the Nanking Government rests largely on the shoulders of General Chiang and "T. V." Yet undoubtedly they and their colleagues represent something in politics, something in public respect, at least within the limits they have set for themselves, such as no previous Government has done. Excepting for the brief and feeble interregnum of Cantonese control at the beginning of 1932, Nanking has existed more or less in its present form for five years, and there can be no question that it is a great deal stronger, wiser, and more practical than at the beginning.

There is a natural disposition, in the light of China's 3,000 years of continuous thought and custom, to say that she will never settle down under the Western-trained student's rule. That belief would be a certainty if the Western-trained rulers never changed. But they are changing. The recent check to the Kuomintang is an undeniable sign that China is beginning to think Chinese again; and, though the process may be delayed, it must continue. At the same time, ideas have been introduced and are filtering even to the slow-going interior, even though at present they mean no more than electric light and motor-cars, which make impossible an out-and-out recoil to the old exclusivism. The future must see a combination of new and old—a building, as Professor Tawney so well puts it, "with Western technique but on Chinese foundations."

In considering how this process might be helped judiciously from abroad it would be a grave mistake to think in terms of money, at any rate for some time to come. With assurance of ordered government, even over a limited area, the Chinese could find a good deal more money themselves than is commonly supposed, and foreign loans are so closely connected in their minds with the old bogey of "imperialist aggression" as to excite suspicion and friction at once.

It is rather on administrative lines that the most useful help could and should be given. China needs an up-to-date civil ser-
vice; an organized gendarmerie to protect roads and waterways from bandits and pirates (here is a valuable outlet for some of her superfluous troops); expert assistance in road-making, bridge building, scientific farming, and other forms of economic development. Mere advisers, of course, are useless; there have been too many of them. But the Customs, Salt Gabelle, and, though unnoticed abroad, the work of the late Colonel Bauer and his German officers in building up General Chiang's "Model Division," afford an analogy of how practical work can be done by foreigners, responsible to a Chinese superintendent, without hurt to Chinese amour propre.

These are a few ideas suggested by experience. But an effective scheme can only be evolved in China. It is there that British policy ought to be initiated, as it used to be, as it might be again, with untold benefit to both countries.
MANCHOUKUO, ONE YEAR OF ACHIEVEMENT

By Isoshi Asahi
(Japanese Vice-Consul in London.)

Notwithstanding the world-wide depression referred to by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in his opening speech to the World Monetary and Economic Conference, Manchoukuo's international trade increased by more than three-quarters during 1932, offering a ray of sunshine to what might be described as a picture of unrelieved gloom.

The combined figures of the foreign trade of Dairen, Antung, and Newchang, the three greatest sea ports of Manchuria which usually represent 70 to 80 per cent. of Manchuria's foreign trade, for one year ending February 28, 1933, covering exactly the first twelvemonth of Manchoukuo's existence, show the aggregate of 569 million Manchoukuo yuan* (to be abbreviated M. yuan throughout the present article) as against 248 million M. yuan for the preceding one year, an increase of 77 per cent. Exports increased by 45 per cent. to 320 million M. yuan, while imports increased by 150 per cent. to 248 million M. yuan.

A casual glance at the latest available trade returns shows that this phenomenal increase in both imports and exports is shared by all countries with the single exception of Germany, and counters the argument raised in some quarters that Japan is putting obstacles in the way of Manchoukuo's declared policy of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity. Articles have appeared in some newspapers to the effect that Japanese merchandise was given preference to the exclusion of British and other foreign goods in spite of the professed policy of the Open Door. An answer to this assertion is to be found in these returns:

* The approximate value of the Manchoukuo yuan is 18. 3d. It was established as the Manchoukuo unit of currency by the Monetary Law of June 11, 1932, and is equivalent to 23.91 grammes of fine silver. The Chinese character used to denote the Manchoukuo yuan is the same as the one used for the Japanese yen. This fact was a constant source of difficulty to the League Commission of Enquiry (see the Lytton Report). The monetary unit of the Nanking Government is also yuan, which is sometimes called Mexican dollars in English. But Nanking uses a different Chinese symbol from that used by Manchoukuo. The Chinese yuan has the legal standard of 23.9775 grammes of fine silver. For these reasons the term Manchoukuo yuan is used in this article in contradistinction to the Chinese yuan and the Japanese yen.
The Foreign Trade of Dairen, Antung, and Newchang

(Unit: 1,000 Manchoukou yuan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>121,777</td>
<td>110,780</td>
<td>167,119</td>
<td>57,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>55,281</td>
<td>50,801</td>
<td>46,009</td>
<td>26,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>30,161</td>
<td>8,384</td>
<td>3,382</td>
<td>1,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,239</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,971</td>
<td>10,916</td>
<td>2,639</td>
<td>3,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>41,534</td>
<td>19,550</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>4,728</td>
<td>5,352</td>
<td>3,862</td>
<td>2,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>52,606</td>
<td>16,009</td>
<td>22,837</td>
<td>6,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>320,550</td>
<td>222,381</td>
<td>248,226</td>
<td>97,932</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It may be pointed out that the imports from Great Britain nearly trebled, as did those from Japan. It is true that the year 1931 cannot be regarded as normal in any comparison of the trade of Manchuria on account of the Manchurian incident of September 18, 1931. But credit for regaining that normalcy in trade, which is conspicuous by its absence elsewhere in the world, must first go to the Japanese and Manchoukuo authorities, who devoted a large part of their energy, time, and treasure for the restoration of peace and order in Manchuria during the year under review.

Through the energy of the forces of Japan and Manchoukuo the difficult task of restoring peace and order within the borders of Manchoukuo was very largely carried out within one year of her foundation. Thus the spectacular advance of the combined forces of Japan and Manchoukuo through Jehol Province in the early part of March this year closed the campaign of pacification which was started last autumn after the harvest of the Kaoliang, the staple food of Manchuria.

At the time when the Lytton Report on Manchuria was published on October 1, 1932, there were over 220,000 men under arms hostile to the new State, including bandits, political and otherwise, insurgents, Kuomintang agents, and the so-called "volunteer forces for the salvation of the Fatherland." 70,000 men were distributed in the mountainous regions of Kirin Province. Heilungkiang Province harboured 38,000, while the newly-created province of Hsingan had 13,000. Nearly half of the 220,000 were threatening the borders of Mukden Province with headquarters in Jehol Province. From official sources it can be shown that, after six months of campaign, all the hostile
elements were completely suppressed or expelled with the exception of about 20,000, the majority of whom are bandits. They are now scattered all over the country, reduced to a position which forestalls any concentrated attack upon Manchoukuo. Over 35,000 have definitely pledged allegiance to the new State and have been placed on farms or reorganized into peaceful units to be employed in road-making or similar constructive enterprises.

Side by side with the suppression campaign, the authorities of Manchoukuo proceeded with the reorganization of the police force. Under the old military régime of Chang Hsueh-liang each province had its own independent police. Bribery and nepotism were often the means by which men were appointed to higher posts in the police. As a rule the police were inefficiently trained and uninstructed in their duties. Nor was this to be wondered at having regard to the inability of the officers to support their families on their small pay. The expenditure of the police was farmed out to the highest bidder, who in his turn imposed all kinds of taxes and contributions upon the people, using the police as their collectors. There was little or no distinction between the police and the army. Soldiers often exercised police authority and were able to carry out arrests and executions.*

In order to eradicate these evils Manchoukuo embarked upon a number of reforms. The police systems of the various provinces were unified, the sole control of which is now vested in the Department of Civil Affairs in Hsinking. A staff training college for the police force was established in Hsinking, while a training school of lower grade was started at each of the provincial capitals. Selected officers have been sent to Japan to receive special training. The pay of the officers was substantially raised, with the result that the lowest paid constable in Manchoukuo today receives 18 Manchoukuo yuan a month. The average pay of the constable under the old military régime was 6 or 7 yuan a month. The lowest monthly salary of the frontier policeman was raised to 60 M. yuan from about 7 yuan under the old administration.

Important progress was also made in the administration of justice. In the pre-Manchoukuo days incompetent and unqualified persons frequently found their way to the Bench by influence, just as in the case of the police and other branches of the public service. Military satraps appointed and dismissed judges at will. The pay of judges was insignificant. Power and favouritism were liable to influence the verdict and supersede the law. The military intervened in the administration of justice and exerted pressure on the judges.

With an enthusiasm which was manifested everywhere in her

activities, Manchoukuo earnestly set about to remove these abuses. The power of appointment and dismissal was taken from the provincial governments and is now transferred to the newly-created Department of Justice in the capital. Capable and qualified judges were appointed to the newly-established Supreme Court, the building for which is in actual course of construction in Hsinking. The annual expenditure for justice was increased to 4,476,000 M. yuan from about 1,400,000 in 1930. The old system under which the maintenance of judicial organs was farmed out by contract gave way to the modern Budget system. A commission of able men was appointed to draft the Constitution of Manchoukuo and other substantive laws of state. Schemes are being formulated for the introduction of the examination system of judicial officials in order to raise the standard of their qualification. A number of promising officials were sent abroad for the study of the judicial systems of other countries with this end in view.

Perhaps the most outstanding accomplishment in the initial year of her administration may be found in the fields of public finance, banking, and currency. To gain a rough idea of the conditions prevailing in the pre-Manchoukuo days reference may usefully be made to the Special Studies by the experts of the League Commission of Enquiry as contained in the “Supplementary Documents to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry.” To quote from this publication, “amongst the many evils of Chinese and Manchurian financial methods, absence of publicity was one of the most characteristic, and therefore information of a budgetary and financial nature is extremely scarce. As a matter of fact, even the most sincere effort to produce reliable financial statements would have met with failure owing to the complete absence of regular methods or records concerning revenue and expenditure. . . . There was no proper Budget system nor did there exist a proper system of assessment and collection. Owing to the absence of a properly unified system it was a general habit to levy taxes of a temporary nature for local and ‘special’ purposes. These latter taxes were not based on proper regulations. Even the rate might vary according to the circumstances or the whim and needs of the person levying them. Finally it often happened that military authorities covered their financial needs by imposing tributes in an absolutely arbitrary manner.”

The new State successfully adopted and introduced the Budget system and placed before the public the accounts of the nation’s income and expenditure. A uniform system of tax collection was introduced. In the place of the old “contractors,” modern collecting offices were established at a number of places through-

* Extracts from Study No. 4, pp. 124 and 126.
out Manchuria under state officials directly responsible to the Government. The military expenditure, which used to absorb 80 to 90 per cent. of the entire revenue, was drastically reduced to one-third. Ten kinds of irregular or burdensome taxes were totally abolished, and five taxes were reduced by half in order to lighten the burden of the people. The total of the taxes thus abolished or reduced amounted to about 10 million M. yuan. It is needless to say that no new tax was introduced in their stead. Thus the tax burden of the people in general was lightened by one-third. The restoration of peace and order in the country, coupled with the improvements introduced by the new State, resulted in actual increase of national revenue month after month. The revenue for the half-year ending December 31, 1932, was estimated at 37,473,000 M. yuan. The sum actually paid into the national treasury during this period was 37,733,000 M. yuan. Her Finance Minister, Mr. Hsi Chia, is firmly convinced that an annual increase of 20 million M. yuan can be easily made in the revenue in the next five years.

On the question of Manchurian currencies the League of Nations expert writes that, "There are few provinces of China in which the currency chaos matches that to be found in the north-eastern provinces. Not only does one find that each of the three provinces has its own peculiar, but not always mutually exclusive, currencies, but also that various cities in even the same province have theirs, and that any one of the currencies may fluctuate violently and enormously with respect to almost any and all of the others . . . the Chinese authorities have always lacked either the will to standardize and unify the currencies or the power and ability to do so. They have almost from the very outset consistently abused the note-issue by turning out in endless variety ever-increasing quantities of constantly depreciating fhips."* The fengpiao, or the irredeemable notes of Mukden Province, is a representative of these inconvertible notes. "From 1930 on the Mukden authorities were preparing for war and financed themselves almost entirely by the issuance of fengpiao. The Chinese authorities, during the course of the fengpiao's depreciation, were continuously laying the blame on exchange-shop dealers, speculators, profiteering merchants, and the Japanese, seldom making reference to the enormous injections they themselves were making into the media. Chang Tso-lin made numerous ingenious attempts to discover costless and inexpensive methods of bolstering the tottering currency . . . During the latter part of August, 1926, he had five prominent merchants and nine money brokers shot for speculating in currency and had many others arrested and in some instances even

confiscated the property of those whom he executed. Despite these drastic measures the fengpiao dropped with renewed vigour and merchants dared to refuse acceptance of it altogether. * During the years 1930-1931 its market value fluctuated between one sixtyieth and one-sixty-fifth of face value. Official attempts to retain it as the sole standard for quoting prices and keeping accounts had to be abandoned in 1927.

Manchoukuo did not repudiate this worthless paper money. She took it over, redeemed it with the notes of the newly-founded Central Bank of Manchoukuo which have always been accepted at their face value. By October last year she had thus redeemed nearly one-third of the old notes in circulation. The actual amount of the old notes thus collected and destroyed between July and October 18, 1932, reaches the total of 43 million M. yuan calculated in the new currency. Stated in the terms of the old currencies this shows the following remarkable total:

Convertible Tayang notes, Mukden ... ... ... 11,750,000 yuan
Inconvertible notes, Mukden (fengpiao) ... ... ... 24,000,000
Same without official seal (fengpiao) ... ... ... 1,558,000,000
Inconvertible notes with or without official seal, Kirin 2,374,979,902 tien
Tayang notes, Kirin ... ... ... 13,681,500 yuan
Harbin Tayang notes ... ... ... 496,500

The Central Bank was established on June 15, 1932, absorbing the four old note-issuing institutions. The minimum reserve against the notes issued by it is prescribed by law at 30 per cent., but the actual reserve never fell below 50 per cent. Consequently its notes are being freely circulated at face value throughout Manchuria and are widely used for quoting prices of commodities, a fact reflecting the confidence of the Manchurians in Manchoukuo and her future. What the Bank has been able to achieve during the brief space of less than one year of its establishment is certainly a credit to the leaders of Manchoukuo.

Consideration of space compels me to spare you further details of the tangible beneficial results which one year of Manchoukuo’s administration has brought about—results which may be tabulated. There are, however, other things which cannot be stated in the definite terms of hard cash, but which nevertheless play a far more important rôle in the welfare and happiness of the people of Manchoukuo and in the peace of the Far East. The principle of “Wang-tao” occupies the forefront of these things. It is the very principle upon which Manchoukuo was founded. It gave, and will continue to give, to her enthusiastic state builders that guidance, the outcome of which was the wonderful achievements briefly described in these pages. It is the cardinal principle of ideal government in the Far East for five thousand years. Liter-

* Study No. 5, *ibid.*, pp. 144-6.
ally translated, it means the Way of the King, and is frequently referred to as the Kingly Way in many publications. It is the antithesis of "Pa-foo," or the Way of Might. "Pa-foo" values the law above morals, coercion above agreement, might above right. One of the practical applications of "Wang-foo" is Manchoukuo's opposition to Communism. Another is the withdrawal of those anti-foreign text-books which Nationalist China imposed upon the school children of Manchuria on the pretext of teaching Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three People's Principles." This one measure alone will go a long way in the furtherance of international peace.

The next in importance is Manchoukuo's diplomatic policy. The fundamentals of her foreign policy are set forth in her Declaration of Independence of March 1, 1932, and are enlarged upon in the letter addressed to various nations by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hsieh Chieh-shih. The principles therein enumerated contain equality of races, the Open Door, and Equal Opportunity—features lacking practical application in many parts of the world today. Those who care for peace in the world should take notice of Manchoukou's foreign policy, as it is bound to affect the international situation of the Far East for many years to come.
THE PROPOSED SALE OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

By CHING CHUN WANG, PH.D., LL.D.
(Former Director-General of the Chinese Eastern Railway.)

Once more the Chinese Eastern Railway has become the bone of contention in the Far East. News dispatches report that the Soviet has been endeavouring to sell its share of interest in that railway to Japan and that China has protested against the proposed sale. First of all China calls the attention of the Soviet to the pledge mutually made by the two Governments in paragraph 2 of Article IV. of the 1924 Agreement which stipulates:

The Governments of both Contracting Parties declare that in future neither Government will conclude any treaties or agreements which prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of either Contracting Party.

With the relation between China and Japan so strained as it is, apparently China can well base her objection to the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway on the ground that such a deal will prejudice her vital interests as well as her sovereign rights.

In addition, China especially recalls paragraphs 2 and 5 of Article IX. of the 1924 Agreement which directly governs the question at issue:

2. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to the redemption by the Government of the Republic of China, with Chinese capital, of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all appurtenant properties, and to the transfer to China of all shares and bonds of the Railway.

5. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the exclusion of any third party or parties. (My italics.)

As these two paragraphs clearly provide that it is only the Government of the Republic of China that is entitled to redeem the railway with Chinese capital, China's objection to its being
bought by Japan with *Japanese capital* appears quite irrefutable. China's protest, however, failed to make much impression upon the Soviet. Indeed, the Soviet, with equal emphasis, refutes China's argument on the ground that "force of circumstances has excluded the Nanking Government from any share in the control of the railway." The Soviet also points out that the impossible conditions created by "Manchukuo" bandits, especially along the eastern section of the railway, compel it "to dispose of the railway, which under present circumstances is equally unprofitable, economically and politically." In other words, the Soviet answers China's protest by avoiding the contractual aspect of the question.

To this argument China*†* retorts that the 1924 stipulation is self-contained, whose validity is not affected, much less nullified, by local events. She contends that it is only *force majeure* that has prevented her from participating in the administration of the railway and that she has not for that reason given up any of her contractual or sovereign rights in the railway. Moreover, one is inclined to ask: Does not the Soviet's reasoning resemble that of a man in business, seeing his partner held up by bandits, who tries to sell his interest in that business to the very bandits for the reason that the partner is unable to exercise control of that business?

The Soviet's claim‡ that "the toiling masses of Russia have paid for the construction of the railway with their hard-earned money" is incorrect, because that is exactly what the toiling masses of Russia did not do.

With the exception of the supervision work, the entire railway was built by Chinese labourers, who were paid with Romanoff rouble notes, which Russia introduced into the country. Since the completion of the railway in 1903 foodstuffs and other valuable goods produced by the toiling Chinese in Manchuria were purchased with the same Romanoff notes and transported to Russia in trainloads year in and year out until, by 1917, when the Tzarist régime, which built that railway, collapsed, about 1,000,000,000 roubles—in notes—were in circulation in North Manchuria. When the Soviet renounced the rouble the value of this enormous amount of Romanoff notes soon evaporated.

In so far as it is clearly printed on the Romanoff notes that all "the resources of the Russian Empire" are pledged as security, the holders of these notes obviously have a direct claim upon the Chinese Eastern Railway. Therefore, it is the toiling masses of

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* Reported in the *Manchester Guardian*, May 17, 1933.
† Bulletin No. 109 of March 16, 1933, issued by the Chinese Government Delegation to Geneva.
‡ London, *The Times*, May 12, 1933.
Manchuria that have paid for the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently are entitled to take over that railway in partial satisfaction of their losses caused by the Soviet’s renunciation of the Romanoff rouble.

But these arguments are legalistic. We must recognize the Soviet’s unenviable position. Japan’s attitude vis-à-vis the Chinese Eastern Railway is such that the Soviet has either to surrender its interests in that railway or to defend it by force. As the lesser, or at least the slower, evil of the two the Soviet apparently chooses the former course.

To sell its interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway the Soviet will also violate one of the cardinal doctrines which has governed the railway from the time of its conception in 1896. According to this doctrine the ownership of the railway shall remain in the hands of Chinese and Russians, for Article 1 of the original contract of 1896 clearly stipulates that “the shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company can only be acquired by Chinese and Russian subjects.”

Moreover, the Soviet itself has heretofore attached great importance to this doctrine, because it was the proposal of the Soviet that actually led to the embodiment of the doctrine in Article IX. of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924 referred to at the beginning of this article, which not only limits the redemption of the railway to the Republic of China alone, but even goes so far as to exclude the possibility of China’s purchasing the railway with borrowed money. During the negotiations of the 1924 Agreement people were very much surprised by the strenuous efforts of the Soviet in preventing the possibility of China’s redemption of the railway with foreign money, especially that of Japan, for fear that foreign interference might be introduced. Therefore the Soviet’s sudden and radical change of attitude is so much the more significant.

Incidentally it may be mentioned that it is largely the provision in Article 1 of the 1896 contract limiting the ownership of the shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company to Chinese and Russian subjects, just referred to, that has prevented certain foreign Powers from claiming any proprietary rights in that railway, in spite of the fact, as often reported in the Press, that the original shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company have fallen into the hands of a certain bank in Paris during the Russian revolution. The reason is obvious. Because of the above-quoted stipulation no bank or any other institution can claim legal ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company’s shares unless it is Chinese or Russian. A foreign bank may hold the Chinese Eastern Railway Company’s shares, but such shares will immediately become null and void the moment they pass into the
hands of any other than persons or institutions of Chinese or Russian nationality.

It has also often been reported that the Chinese Eastern was built with money borrowed from Paris and that therefore the French creditors have a right claim on that railway. These reported claims always appear interesting, because it is an undeniable fact that France had lent a tremendous amount of money to Russia during the years when the Chinese Eastern Railway was constructed. Those who have any inside knowledge, however, hesitate to support that claim. The fact is that the money which Russia borrowed from France was apparently in the nature of general loans made in the name of the Treasury and was credited to the Treasury for Russia’s general use. Some or even a great part of the money spent on the Chinese Eastern might well have been the proceeds from the Paris loans; but in so far as the Chinese Eastern was not pledged as security for any of these Paris loans the French creditors apparently cannot have any more claim on the Chinese Eastern than on the Russian battleships which were sunk in the Japan Sea.

As we recall the numerous occasions during the last twenty-five years on which foreign interference with that railway loomed formidable under one excuse or another, we must recognize the farsightedness of the former authorities in providing for the eventualities which they seemed to have foreseen long before the construction of that railway began.

At this juncture the only obstacle in the way of the sale of the Chinese Eastern is the price. The Soviet asks 300,000,000 roubles, whereas Japan bids 30,000,000 yen. Assuming both currencies to be on the gold basis, then Japan’s bid is just about 10 per cent. of what is asked for.

We do not know what is the basis for the price asked and the price offered. Generally speaking there are four ways by which the price of a railway may be fixed. First of all, the existing contracts governing the question must be given due consideration. The Chinese Eastern Railway agreement of 1896 provides that the price to be paid for the redemption of the railway should cover the capital cost of construction plus all the losses which the operation of the railway may incur up to the time of redemption. According to this stipulation the price to be paid will be in the neighbourhood of 800,000,000 gold roubles, for the capital cost of construction is about 400,000,000 roubles, whereas the accumulated operating losses up to 1924 amounted to another 400,000,000 gold roubles.

In other words, the construction of each mile of the Chinese Eastern Railway has cost on the average about £40,000 at par, which is just about three times as much as the average per mile
cost of the Chinese Government railways as a whole. If the accumulated operating loss is also to be met as stipulated by the 1896 contract, then what will have to be paid for the redemption or purchase of the Chinese Eastern will be more than sufficient to build another railway six times as long as the Chinese Eastern. It was rumoured at the time that the Tsarist régime purposely spent money lavishly on the railway so as to make it unattractive for China to redeem it. If that report is true, the Russians in the old days certainly have done well in accomplishing that purpose.

The second and most reasonable way, from the point of view of investment, is to capitalise the net average profit of a number of years at a reasonable percentage so as to yield a fair return on the price to be paid. Another method of valuation is what is known as the cost of reproduction, according to which the price of any existing road should be equal to the estimated cost of rebuilding that road. A fourth method consists of a combination of the two preceding methods by taking into due consideration the cost of reproduction as well as the earning power.

Since the Chinese Eastern Railway is badly menaced by the "Manchukuo" bandits and is operated without any profit its value as an investment must be small. On the other hand, to rebuild the Chinese Eastern today will probably cost something like 125,000,000 gold roubles. Therefore the price which the Soviet asks is considerably less than the original cost of construction but is more than double the cost of reproduction, whereas Japan's bid must be based partly on a conservative estimate of the value of the railway as an investment after its amalgamation with the whole Manchurian railway system and partly on what must be considered as the negligible value of that railway in its present unenviable position to the Soviet. The final price of settlement, we presume, will probably be between 50 and 125 million roubles, with the better bargainer getting the upper hand.

But the Soviet's proposed sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, coming as it does directly after resuming diplomatic relations with Nanking, cannot arise out of purely financial considerations. It must be obvious to everyone familiar with Far Eastern affairs that the Soviet's interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway is of paramount importance to its position in the Far East. Once Japan secures the control of that railway all Russia's territorial possessions east of Chita will be placed at the mercy of Japan. Indeed, the proposed sale must mean that the Soviet is forced to compromise its position in that vast region of Eastern Siberia which is so rich in mineral, forest, and other resources. Whether the boundaries of "Manchukuo" will extend to the North of the Amur, whether the Far Eastern Republic will reappear so as to
serve as companion to the "Manchukuo," or whether the Amur Provinces will remain Russian as a bargain of the Soviet's recognition of Japan's freedom of action in all Manchuria, time will tell. Whichever event may take place the actual change of hands of the Chinese Eastern Railway is bound to foreshadow developments as momentous as that which followed the conception of that trouble-breeding line in 1896. Incidentally, the Soviet's proposal to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan, more than anything else, proves beyond a doubt that the Soviet will have more justification to cry "Yellow!" "Yellow!" than Japan will have to shout "Red!" "Red!"
THE INSTITUT COLONIAL INTERNATIONAL AT LISBON

By Professor John Coatman, M.A., C.I.E.

The recent twenty-second session of the International Colonial Institute, held in Lisbon last April, met in circumstances of extraordinary importance and interest for the whole colonial world. It is common knowledge that no part of the dependent empires of any metropolitan country has escaped the ravages of the world economic crisis. The various colonial governments have all striven to their utmost to cope with these ravages, and the study of the various policies and expedients adopted is a fascinating exercise. It was therefore both natural and appropriate that the main interest of the session this year was directed to the study of the crisis in the different colonies. But, true to the tradition of the Institut Colonial International of keeping well in the forefront of its attention the permanent problems arising out of colonizing activities, a material portion of the time of the session was devoted to the position of the indigenous natives, vis-à-vis the systems of law under which they live.

In a word, the session rightly busied itself with both the short period and the long period aspects of colonization. And in this connection it is worth while noting how very far from merely academic are the proceedings of the Institute. Session by session the discussions become franker and more practical. In the excellent and completely impartial theatre provided by the Institute at its biennial sessions views can be freely exchanged between the delegates of the different nations, all of whom have first-hand personal contributions to make. For this reason the documentation of the Institute provides the most illuminating and, as far as non-official publications are concerned, the most authoritative survey of colonial problems to be found anywhere.

It was a happy chance which took the Institute this year to Lisbon. For there is not the slightest doubt that Portugal is now entering on a period of revived glory in both her domestic and imperial affairs which will rank with the great phases of her history. Nothing could have been more impressive than the formal opening of the session with Count Penha Garcia presiding, and Senhor Dr. Armindo Monteiro, Minister for the Colonies, delivering the opening address. It is greatly to be hoped that this speech will be widely read when it is published, for not only does it
breathe a virile pride in the Portuguese Colonial Empire and the
determination to preserve it inviolate, but it shows how clearly
aware the responsible Portuguese ministers are of the practical
steps to be taken, and the definite work lying ready to their hand.
There was nothing formal or platitudinous in it, and none of the
delegates present, proud as they were of their own colonial empires,
and of the men who had made them, could fail to be stirred by
Dr. Monteiro's generous enthusiasm, and impressed still more
deeply by the significance of the discussions on which they were
about to embark. Certainly the British delegates recognized and
appreciated in the speech that spirit and those qualities which
drew England and Portugal into alliance six hundred years ago,
and have kept them in unbroken friendship ever since.

The actual work of the session occupied the inside of a week,
beginning with a close study of the incidents and effects of the
economic depression on the numerous colonies in all quarters of
the world. Naturally there was complete unanimity as to the
causes of the present deplorable condition of most colonial coun-
tries. Nobody can possibly read the numerous authoritative
memoranda submitted on the subject without being strongly,
even painfully, impressed by the inescapable moral obligation
which rests on the shoulders of the statesmen of the metropolitan
countries concerned to guide their policy under the one paramount
consideration of insuring by all the means available to human
competence the welfare of the helpless peoples committed to their
charge. As it happened, this was the keynote of this part of the
work of the session. It may well be that the session of the In-
stitute at Lisbon this year will leave a lasting influence on what
we might call the human side of colonial policy. It must be
admitted, however, that the accounts of some of the measures
taken to meet the crisis in the different colonies give rise to a
certain anxiety; for example, it is clear that one result of these
measures will be a great expansion of the cultivation by organized
plantation and other methods of some of the most typical tropical
products. Naturally, there is no co-ordination of expansion
between the different foreign colonial powers; indeed, there is
little or no co-ordination between the different colonies of the
same power. Possibly the French are giving more thought than
anybody else to the desirability of keeping their several colonial
possessions, so to speak, in economic step with each other. But
it is obvious that there is a great likelihood of an unmanageable
 glut of colonial produce a few years hence which might itself be
the cause of another economic upset. At any rate, the proceedings
of the Institute will provide all concerned with the material on
which to form their own judgment, and in this respect will add
one more to the many invaluable services which it has performed.
Another warning note may be detected in the extent to which rationalization has been pressed in many of the economic activities of the colonies. It was clear that to more than one of the delegates one of the main lessons of the economic crisis in the colonies is that too great a stress has been laid on purely economic development, and that in consequence there is serious danger of grave upset of the whole balance of indigenous life. The opinion was expressed in more than one quarter that it would be desirable in future to go slow in the matter of economic development, and in any case definitely to subordinate it to the general welfare of the native whose countries are being developed. The whole discussion, in fact, was carried on with such paramount considerations as the above looming larger and larger, and colouring the views of speakers more and more. Also emerging from the discussion was the view—one which will take more tangible form and growing strength as time goes on—that more international co-operation than hitherto is not only desirable but necessary. Of course, such a development as this has its own peculiar and very formidable difficulties, but the Institute is an absolutely ideal form for the working out of the basic ideas and the definition of the conditions on which such co-operation must rest. Unquestionably here again is work of the first importance lying ready to the hands of the members of the Institute, and in view of the latter’s recent history there is not the slightest reason to doubt that they will apply themselves to it with the same skill and impartiality as they have shown in connection with other important tasks in past years. Thus it is apparent that this session of the Institute at Lisbon may well prove to be an event of much significance in the future of colonial policies.

I have dwelt on this part of the work of the session at some length because of its pre-eminent interest, but it must not be supposed that the second part of its work was overshadowed. On the contrary, the discussion of the important subject of the laws applicable to the juridical relations of private law between the indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in the colonies was raised at once to a high plane by Professor Solus of the Faculty of Laws in Paris. Professor Solus has made this subject peculiarly his own, and his contribution was well up to the high standard which has been consistently maintained by the French delegates since the inauguration of the Institute nearly four decades ago. Properly considered, of course, this subject is the reverse side of the medal of which the economic discussion was the obverse, and important contributions were made by both Dutch and Belgian delegates. The proceedings terminated on this note of the vital importance of the personal position of colonial subjects, and so ended what is surely one of the outstanding sessions of the Institute.
No account, however, would be complete without some mention of the extraordinary kindness and hospitality of our Portuguese hosts, and of the quite amazing competence and tact of our Secretary-General, M. Louwers. There was a time, of course, when M. Louwers was not Secretary-General, but it is very difficult to imagine. It is even possible that the Institute might continue to survive without M. Louwers, but it would certainly not be the Institute of which we are all so proud to be members, and which has a personality and camaraderie rare among international bodies.

Count Penha Garcia, our President this year, assisted by the charming ladies of his family, represented hospitality in its highest and most urbane form, and all the foreign delegates left Lisbon with ineffacable memories of delightful and spontaneous friendship, and of personalities whom it was in the truest sense of the word a privilege to meet.
DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN STATES:
ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRESS

BY JOHN DE LA VALETTE

MILITARY REORGANIZATION IN HYDERABAD

The power to ward off foreign aggression and to maintain internal peace lies at the root of all self-government. Among the problems which beset India in her advance towards constitutional rebirth, that of providing for her external defence and internal tranquillity is not the least vital. Steps taken in any part of India towards these ends cannot, therefore, fail to rouse interest beyond such local importance as they may possess. In this connection the advance which is being made in remodelling the regular forces of the Indian States on up-to-date lines promises to provide not only tangible assistance, but valuable object lessons. These developments deserve, therefore, to be more widely known.

The report on the regular forces of H.E.H. the Nizam for the year 1341 Fasli (1931-1932), which has recently become available, affords an interesting survey of useful progress in this direction. To secure the co-operation of Indian States troops with British forces in India was a well-established policy of the East India Company, and provisions to this effect already appeared in the treaties which were negotiated in the latter part of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century with Hyderabad, Baroda, Gwalior, Travancore, Mysore, and the Peshwa. As the Davidson Committee’s Report of last year reminded us, “there are records of fine services having been performed by States troops” under these treaties in many wars both before and since the Mutiny, as well as during that tragedy. The important part which the Nizam of Hyderabad played on the latter occasion, and the unstinted recognition on the part of the British Government to which it led, are too well known to require repetition here.

During the years 1880 to 1887 when relations between England and Russia were strained almost to breaking-point as the result of a series of incidents on the Afghan frontier, numerous offers of money and services were received from Indian Rulers, for—once again to quote the Indian States Enquiry Committee’s Finance Report—“apart from any treaty provisions, unstinted military co-operation has always been forthcoming from Indian
States in time of war." It was the Nizam of that day, Mir Mahbub Ali Khan, the father of the present Ruler, who, in 1887, by offering financial and personal support to the Government, set the example which was so widely followed. Although, fortunately, war was averted, there grew out of these spontaneous offers of assistance permanent military organizations in a number of States which came to be known as the "Imperial Service Troops."

In 1903 a brigade of these troops was successfully employed in China, whilst during the World War 1914-1918 they took an honourable part in the operations in many fields, side by side with the other forces from India.

The unprecedented ordeal of the Great War revealed, in India as in other countries, some defects in the military organization which led to various reforms. Certain matters concerning the Imperial Service Troops were discussed with a number of the leading Princes. The outcome was a reorganization of these troops under their present title of "Indian States Forces." In a general way these forces are now divided into three categories: Class A comprises units having establishment, organization, arms, and equipment equal to those of corresponding units in the Indian Army. For these the arms are initially issued free of charge by the Indian Government. Class B is composed of units not organized or armed on quite the same lines as Indian Army establishment, but, nevertheless, such as to be fit to reinforce Class A troops, or for employment as second line troops. Class C consists of all other formations and those not permanently embodied.

Under this general scheme Hyderabad has reorganized its States Regular Forces so that some 7,200 troops, of all ranks, are now brought within Class A. These comprise the 1st and 2nd Hyderabad Imperial Service Lancers and the 1st Hyderabad Infantry Battalion, together with the Cavalry Training Squadron and the Infantry Training Company. The 3rd Golconda Lancers, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Hyderabad Infantry, the 15-Pounder "A" Battery Horse Artillery, and the Animal Transport Section have been placed in Class B; but as will be seen the aim is to raise both classes to equal military standards. The remaining troops—viz., "B" Battery Field Artillery, the Nizam Mahbub Arab Battalion, and the African Bodyguard Squadron—are considered Class C units.

The re-armament of the "A" units is being brought up to Indian Army standards; the newly organized 15-Pounder Battery commenced its first firing practice in camp as recently as January last. Incidentally, as the old Martini-Henry rifles are gradually replaced, they are used for arming Class C troops, or reserved for the Territorial units which are in course of formation.
Among the measures being taken to improve the Class B units up to the standard of Class A is the raising of the establishment of officers to the same level, the equalizing of their pay and allowances, and the organization of the training of Army cadets on a scale calculated to furnish an adequate supply of officers, not only for normal requirements, but also so as to cope with the increase in the total establishment of some forty officers.

The training of officers is being intensified, and special "training grants" have been introduced. Every opportunity is also taken to send officers and men on courses of instruction to British India and to the British units at Secunderabad. In regard to the promotion of officers, the Indian Army time scale has been adopted.

Educational standards for the promotion of non-commissioned officers have been laid down in conformity with those in force in the Indian Army. The two rates of rations and allowances which were in force until 1931 respectively for the Imperial Service and the other troops have been abolished, and a system similar to that which has worked successfully in British India of free rations plus certain messing allowances has been substituted.

In regard to improved housing and other facilities the Hyderabad Government are following a policy similar to that adopted for British and Indian troops in British India under the so-called "Amenity Programme" of 1927. During the year under review the Hyderabad Lancers' lines were rebuilt at a capital outlay of thirteen lakhs, and similar provision is being made for the other units.

That these and other reforms entail an appreciable additional expense will be seen from the Budget provisions for military objects which rose from about 73½ lakhs in the year 1340 Fasli and 73½ lakhs in 1341 Fasli to 89,68 lakhs in the current Budget, an increase of some sixteen lakhs.

The progress and further development of these and other military reforms in the Indian States will be watched with keen interest, for the measure of their success should furnish a fair indication of that which may be anticipated in other parts of India on the road towards an increasing Indianization of India's foreign defence and internal security forces.

**MYSORE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROAD AND RAIL TRAFFIC**

The advent of the internal combustion motor and its application to land vehicles has not only revolutionized transportation, but raised a number of highly complicated problems. Some of these relate to the protection of the humble pedestrian who persists in moving about without mechanical assistance; others involve the creation and maintenance of roads; whilst a more recent, but
important, set of difficulties has grown out of the conflict between road and rail traffic. In India the number of motor-cars in use has not yet reached the proportions attained in this country, there being nearly fifteen hundred persons to each motor-car in India as against thirty-four in Great Britain. The increase of motor vehicles has, however, been sufficient to raise the problems referred to in a manner which requires effective and prompt solution. The Indian Motor Vehicles Act, 1914, and the regulations made under it, attempt to do this for British India as a whole, the Provincial Governments supplementing the general provisions of the act by more or less independent Provincial Rules.

Between the Indian States and the British Indian provinces, the respective territories of which are frequently intricately interwoven, co-ordination of traffic rules and regulations is an obvious necessity. The Motor Vehicles International Circulations Rules of 1931, issued by the Government of India under section fourteen of the Motor Vehicles Act, attempt to provide for this. The most useful provision is that those Indian States which have enacted the regulations of the Motor Vehicles Act as a State law are granted in British Indian provinces the same reciprocity in matters of licensing, registration, etc., as exists between the provinces inter se. But further co-ordination on an all-India basis was felt to be essential, and the Government of India have therefore appointed a Road-Rail Inquiry Committee whose report is shortly expected. Its recommendations are to form the basis for the consideration of further action in which it is anticipated that British India as well as the States will participate. The action already taken in certain Indian States is, therefore, of importance also beyond their borders. Hyderabad has recently enforced a number of practical measures for the co-ordination of rail and road traffic and the State railways have themselves organized certain motor services. These include a monopoly line of some 240 miles of district roads worked from depots at Narket Palli, a village about 51 miles from Hyderabad on the main road to Musalipatam, and at Kazipet. Suburban services between Hyderabad and Secunderabad are also being worked in competition with privately owned buses. The capital cost of the scheme has been estimated at over four and a half lakhs of rupees. The services are reported to be gaining in popularity and the receipts already cover the expenditure.

In Mysore two important developments have taken place, and a special Motor Transport Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Charles Todhunter, k.c.s.i., has just issued an interesting report in which it makes comprehensive recommendations. Since the passing of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Regulation of 1928 the State law has been brought in conformity with that
obtaining in the British Indian provinces. Subsidiary matters are dealt with by rules, issued by the State Government under the Regulation. Whilst the regulation of licensing and similar matters follows established practice, the provisions to ensure coordination between rail and road transport and the basis of taxation are in advance of the practice obtaining either in British India or in Great Britain. The principle of taxation includes an excise duty which for hackney coaches is based on seating capacity and for lorries on the unladen weight, whilst vehicles provided with pneumatic tyres pay on a lower scale than those without. In this way a far more rational relation is established between road usage and the incidence of the tax than under the horsepower tax in force in this country. The problem of regulating and restricting competition between railways and road vehicles, without discouraging the development of motor transport on routes where no railway facilities exist, is solved by a combination of several measures. First of all the mileage cess payable by buses is doubled, and that for lorries increased by fifty per cent., on all routes which compete with railways. Secondly, the issue of fresh licenses for buses on such competitive roads is restricted. A curious, but very practical, regulation is the prohibition of any passenger motor-bus, plying on competitive routes, to leave a town where there is a railway station between one hour before and one hour after the departure of a train. Finally, special measures prevent the competitive running of buses on festivals or jatra occasions, and at the same time encourage the Railway Department to run extra trains as well as to subsidize terminal bus services in conjunction with these trains on such special occasions.

Space prevents our following the report in detail in its interesting recommendations, or to indicate more fully the extent to which the building of roads and the provision of motor transport facilities have been developed in Mysore. Suffice it to say that in all these matters the example of Mysore contains many points which might be usefully considered in making arrangements in other parts of India. It is, therefore, satisfactory to learn that the Government of India's Road-Rail Inquiry Committee has given special consideration to the developments in Mysore in drawing up its own conclusions and recommendations.

**Continuity of Policy in Baroda**

The annual Administration Reports of the State of Baroda continue to be models of a pleasant economy in words coupled with an adequate supply of lucid information. The financial year 1931-1932 was, in Baroda as almost everywhere else, marked by
the adverse effect of economic conditions on the State revenue, as well as on public prosperity. The fall in agricultural prices and their results continued to dominate the financial position of the State, the total receipts falling to 249½ lakhs in 1931-1932 as compared with respectively 259 and 265 lakhs in the preceding two years. Against this the aggregate expenditure was maintained at approximately the same figure as in 1930-1931—viz., just below 239 lakhs—with the result that even the year under review ended with a small surplus of 10½ lakhs compared with over 20½ and 22½ lakhs in the previous two years.

But although the financial situation rendered a curtailing of the aggregate expenditure inevitable, skilful administration enabled this pruning to be restricted to such departments as Land Revenue, Palace Upkeep, etc., so that expenditure could be maintained in accordance with the settled policy on nation-building activities such as agricultural research and development, education, cooperation, sanitation, and others of public benefit. Nothing is, perhaps, more striking in these annual surveys of the State activities in Baroda than the perseverance with which the main lines of the general policy continue to be adhered to, whatever events the years may bring. In this steady pursuit of certain great aims it will not be unreasonable to see the guiding impulse which Baroda’s famous ruler has instilled into the policy of his Government, a policy which throughout his long reign has always been directed towards the physical and cultural advancement of his people.

Agricultural development continued to be stimulated by the work of the three experimental farms which the State operates in the Baroda, Mehsana, the Amreli districts respectively and of the Makarpura dairy and cattle breeding farm. By local propaganda, supported by agricultural and cattle shows, practical assistance is given to the farmers, whilst the annual conferences and the participation by the State in the work of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research enable those responsible for guiding these activities to keep abreast of the latest scientific developments in this field. During the year under review special attention was devoted to the combating of “root rot” in cotton, the Indian Central Cotton Committee having delegated important work in this respect to the Baroda authorities, a special grant for a two years’ programme being made for this purpose. As in other States, so in Baroda, the possibilities in regard to the cultivation of sugar cane and the making of sugar are being seriously studied. The great quantities of cane sugar which are normally being imported into India from Java are obviously considered as being in the nature of a needless anomaly. Bearing in mind the enormous consumption of sugar by India’s largely vegetarian
population, and the fact that many parts of the country are as suitable to the growing of cane as Java, it seems only reasonable that definite efforts should be made in this direction. In view of the great experience of the Dutch in this field, and the fact that Java cannot, in the long run, expect to remain the main source for the supply of cane sugar to India, it may well be asked whether it would not be in the interests of the Dutch, as of India, to join hands in establishing, by combined capital and combined technical skill, that sugar industry in India, which should have been built up long ago, and which is bound to arise before many years pass.

Industry received a further impetus by the addition of two cotton mills to the fifteen already in operation in the State, although some of these worked short time during the year. It is interesting to observe that of the 70,000 bales of cotton consumed in these mills about 58,000 consisted of Indian cotton. In other fields of industrial enterprise progress was limited, but the fact that several applications were received for the acquisition of land for factory purposes indicates a growing interest which an improvement in world economic conditions cannot fail to stimulate. The varied activities of the Baroda Government in promoting industry should, therefore, gradually bear fruit.

Education, not only on the widest attainable basis, but on lines likely to produce lasting results, has, as is well known, been a matter of permanent concern to the Government of Baroda throughout the long reign of its present ruler. Before 1871 there was no Education Department at all, nor any State-owned schools. Even by the time the present Maharaja assumed full powers, in 1881, there were only 180 primary schools with 7,465 pupils. In 1893—forty years ago be it noted—compulsory education was introduced as an experimental measure in the Amreli district. It was gradually extended, until in 1906 it was applied to the whole State. At the end of the financial year 1931-1932 the total number of educational institutions was 2,643 and the total number of pupils attending them 253,664, an increase of 10,079 over the preceding year. Expenditure on education, which in 1908 barely reached eight lakhs, has steadily risen until it aggregated some thirty-five lakhs last year. The educational organization now embraces 2,545 vernacular schools, including training colleges for men and for women and technical schools, and 98 schools in which English is taught in addition to the vernaculars. These latter include the college, 23 high schools for boys and one for girls, and 73 Anglo-vernacular schools. The difficult problem of educating the children of the forest tribes and backward races is being slowly but sensibly approached by special board schools in appropriate centres.
But education at school is of little abiding value unless its use can be maintained after the leaving age. To prevent the lapse into illiteracy after leaving school is in all parts of India the real problem that has to be faced. In Baroda it is being solved by the provision of libraries scattered not only throughout the cities, but as far as possible in the villages. In addition to the Central Library in Baroda City, which comprises lending, reference, and Mahila libraries, as well as a newspaper room and a children's playroom, there are 45 libraries in other towns and 818 in villages, whilst 152 villages not yet provided with libraries have reading rooms. At the end of last year out of the total population of Baroda of 2,443,007 over 65 per cent. were within reach of a library, that is to say the whole of the population of the towns and about 56 per cent. of the village population. It has been ascertained that there is no appreciable lapse into illiteracy after leaving school in those villages where there are libraries. Hence the Government of the State has settled upon the policy of providing every village where there is a school with a library. At present there are still 418 villages which have schools but no library. From this year on the Baroda Government has decided to establish 100 new libraries every year. In this way it expects at the end of the sixth year to have supplied every suitable village with at least one library as well as improved those which exist. The result of these well planned measures over a long period has been to raise the degree of literacy among the population of Baroda beyond the average for the whole of Gujerat, including the British Indian parts—namely, to 209 per mille (of all ages over 5 years) for Baroda State compared with 163 for North Gujerat and 156 for South Gujerat. In Baroda City literacy amounts to 408 per mille. In the State as a whole, although its population includes, as mentioned, certain backward forest tribes and others, one in three males and one in thirteen females can read and write. Among the city populations these proportions are even higher. For males they vary from 584 to 482 per mille and for females from 294 to 110 per mille of the population of each sex over seven years of age.*

In order to afford a comparison in regard to the results achieved by the educational efforts of Baroda State it may be worth while to compare the number of literates in the State—viz., 209 per 1,000 inhabitants (over 5 years of age) with the corresponding figures for British Indian provinces (Burma not included) which range from 50 for Bihar and Orissa to 163 for Delhi, with 110 for Bengal as the second best. Of the other Indian States only Travancore and Cochin exceed the achievement of Baroda, Mysore being the third in the list with a literacy

* Baroda, Census figures, 1931.
figure of 106 per mille. As for the knowledge of English by
the male portion of its people, Baroda State with 28 per mille
runs Bombay’s 32 close and exceeds the 26 of Madras, whilst
the figure for Baroda City of 166 per thousand compares with
153 for Bombay City. The Government of Baroda may therefore
look with satisfaction not only upon the generosity of the support
it has constantly given to popular education, but also upon the
practical results which these efforts have achieved.

Gwalior: Census Facts

One after the other the 1931 Census reports of the Indian States
are being published, gradually fitting the details of Indian India
into the general picture of that sub-continent. Among the latest
reports which have become available is that of the Gwalior
Census. It derives special interest from the fact that, whilst it is
signed by the Gwalior Census Commissioner, Mr. Rangi Lal, its
proofs have been read by Colonel Sir Kailas Haksar, C.I.E. The
conclusions and reasons for drawing them bear in many parts
the obvious impress of the broad views and wide experience of
that statesman. The special feature of this report would seem to
lie in the somewhat unusual light which it throws on certain
problems common to India as a whole, but the development of
which does not everywhere proceed along parallel lines.

The total population in the State has fluctuated rather violently
since the 1881 Census was taken. Although it has generally
maintained itself between 3 and 3½ millions, aggregating at the
last count 3,523,070, it showed an increase over the previous
decade of as much as 13·9 in 1891 and a drop of 12·7 the follow-
ing Census. In 1931 the net gain during the ten years reached
just over 10 per cent. The growth and decline of the capital,
Lashkar, has been even more erratic. After reaching 104,000 in
1891 its population dropped to 56,000 in 1911, increasing to
80,000 in 1921 and to 86,767 at the last Census. This increase of
some 8 per cent. compares, as regards some neighbouring cities,
with increases of 36·8 for Indore, 24·5 for Ujjain, 23·8 for Agra,
19·9 for Jaipur and 19·2 for Baroda during the decade prior to
1931. It is obvious that plague or influenza epidemics alone
could not account for such a marked difference, and the conclu-
sion that it is due to railway developments, which made Lashkar
at first an important terminus and subsequently a mere inter-
mediate station with little scope for industrial or commercial
advancement, seems well justified.

Another interesting observation contained in the report relates
to the preponderance of males over females in the population, a
phenomenon which is, of course, general in India. An analysis
of the figures according to castes shows that there would appear to be ground for the conclusion that "the lower the caste the greater is its number of females." While the castes at the lower end of the scale show an almost even proportion of the sexes, the Rajputs, Brahmins, Banias, and Marathas at the other end of the scale disclose "a startling excess of males." This leads the rapporteur to the conclusion that "it seems that the sex ratio at birth and duration of life are both transmissible characteristics which are passed on from generation to generation—just as stature, nose, and eye or hair colour—with a relatively high degree of precision."

On the subject of juvenile marriages the Indian Census reports published so far generally tend to an expression of the opinion that there has been an increase in juvenile marriages during the previous decade. A close scrutiny of the figures for the various age groups in Gwalior leads to the conclusion that the method of collecting information on this subject in connection with that adopted for ascertaining the ages of the individuals has affected the resulting figures, with the consequence that these are to be considered as "entirely misleading," in so far as they suggest that among all religions there has been an enormous increase in the marriages of children in the 5- to 10-year age group. The writer of the report holds that there is adequate evidence that recent legislation against child-marriage has had no effect in hastening the marriages of immature persons towards the close of the last decade, and that this may, in fact, be taken as an indication of "the existence of a general feeling in favour of later marriage." Whilst it may be yet too early to draw any definite conclusions on this point, one can more readily accept that "the economic depression appears to be a considerable factor in reducing the proportion of early marriages."

On the interesting question of the changes which are taking place in the caste system the report observes that "there are clear signs that this ancient institution is dropping piece by piece its heavy armour of form and formulae." Even among the orthodox sections of the Hindu community the emphasis is said to be moving from the non-essential to the essential aspects of the system, while the introduction of Western innovations is stated to have produced a tendency "which finds vigorous expression in extensive caste displacements." Widespread sympathy with the position of the lower classes, combined with the effects of education on Western lines, the increased facilities for travel and similar influences are kindling new hopes in the masses and hardening their determination to break through social barriers.

"The inference," states the report, "may safely be drawn that the social and psychological bases of the Hindu caste system have
been rudely shaken.” Coming from such a source the statement is of special interest.

BHAVNAGAR: RECENT PROGRESS

With its 2,961 square miles and a population of just over 500,000 Bhavnagar is one of the most important States of Kathiawar. As its Census report for 1931 discloses, only 43 per cent. of its area is cultivable and the whole of it is in use. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that of its population, which increased from about 400,000 in 1872 to its present figure, an increasing proportion lives in towns. Whilst the percentage of the urban population was 26·8 in 1881, it is now 30·5. Even so, the farmer’s struggle for life is no easy one, and his indebtedness correspondingly burdensome. A committee of inquiry which was appointed to investigate this question delivered itself of an able report which disclosed a disturbing state of affairs. The number of kheduts free from debt was only half that of those who were in debt, and as many as 30 per cent. of the total number of farmers were stated to be “hopelessly involved in debt, and their condition such as to give cause for grave anxiety.” Here the matter might have remained, as such matters frequently do after recommendations have been made. Not so in Bhavnagar, where the thorny problem was energetically tackled on the basis that the cultivator “should be liberated from the economic bondage of the money-lender,” whilst the latter should at the same time be equitably treated. A system was organized under which existing obligations could be investigated at the joint request of the khedut and the money-lender in accordance with rules similar to those of the Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act. After reducing the amount due to equitable dimensions, the Darbar discharged the khedut’s debts by distributing the total amount of the liability so fixed pro rata among the farmer’s creditors in full settlement. At the time the Census report went to press the cultivators of three districts had in this way been completely freed from debt to money-lenders, their resulting obligation to the State being brought within reasonable limits. Operations in other districts are proceeding to similar effect. This bold and constructive policy by the Bhavnagar Government cannot fail to react favourably upon the condition of the peasantry. As those directly engaged in the “exploitation of animals and vegetation,” together with their dependents, represent 56·2 per cent. of the total population, the measure is of widespread importance.

In addition to this direct furthering of the interests of the agricultural population, the State’s fostering of the co-operative movement, its facilities for the sinking of wells, and its attention
to the creation of railway communications have a beneficial effect in similar directions. Bhavnagar owns its own railway system which intersects every district and, with the exception of a small tract between Mahuva and Talaja, encircles the whole of the State. The construction of these lines has increased the aggregate mileage from 217 miles in 1921 to 341 3/4 miles in 1931. As regards industries in the State, the number of cotton looms in operation increased from 337 in 1921 to 727 in 1931, and that of spindles from 19,600 to 29,138. But it is a disheartening indication of the drop in world prices to find that, whereas the production of yarn rose in the last decade in weight from 830,000 lb. to 2,2 million pounds, its aggregate value only appreciated from ten lakhs of rupees to not quite fourteen. Similarly, the cloth output grew in weight from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to over $2\frac{1}{2}$ million pounds, but its value only from twenty-four to $25\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees. In any event it shows that when economic conditions improve the cotton industry in the State will be able and ready to reap its share of the benefit.

In connection with the remarks quoted above from the Gwalior Census report on the relation between sex and caste, it is interesting to note that the Bhavnagar report also draws attention to the fact that “on the whole it may be surmised that masculinity is found to be greater in the higher and lower in the descending social and economic groups.” On the subject of child marriages the report concludes towards “an obvious change in the former attitude of the people towards infant and early marriages.” Educated public opinion among the people in the State has during the past decennium rallied all its support in favour of late marriages,” and the Darbar “took the necessary initiative to recognize it by passing the Child and Old Age Marriages Prevention Act of 1930,” by which it fixed the minimum ages for marriage at 14 for girls and 18 for boys. Altogether the Bhavnagar Census report, in addition to supplying much detailed information, gives some interesting indications of the vigorous and statesmanlike policy which the ruler of the State is following in his attempts to improve both the economic and social condition of his people.
THE INDIAN REFORMS AND THE PEASANTRY

By STANLEY RICE

(Author of "The Challenge of Asia," "Life of the Maharaja of Baroda," etc.)

To Lord Curzon is attributed the saying that India is ruled by the district officers. The phrase has far-reaching implications. The Government of India may direct policies of high finance and military defence; Provincial Governments may sanction schemes of importance or reject them and may issue orders affecting indirectly the lives of the people; legislative assemblies may enact measures, wise or foolish, according as they are gifted with foresight and imagination, or may in the stress of political passion obstruct those that are evidently necessary. But the district officer is bound up with the intimate life of the villagers. It is to him that they look and have been taught to look for the just arbitration of their little disputes, for the mercies of remission when the seasons are bad, for the improvement of their roads and watercourses, for the development of their schools, and ultimately for the protection of life and property. In no civilized country, perhaps, does the supervision of the Government officer descend to such petty detail; in no civilized country have the peasants greater recourse to authority in small matters. And in no civilized country does the subordinate staff conform so closely to the temper of its chief. A vigorous officer creates a vigorous staff; weakness and laxity are reflected throughout the district administration. To do no more than you need is the natural tendency of human nature, especially of human nature working under tropical conditions; but it is a tendency that can be, and more often than not is, corrected by a high sense of public duty, by an intense pride in the work, and by pardonable ambition. From this it is evident that what matters to the masses is not so much the composition of the legislature as the character of the executive. And since that is in rapid process of Indianization which has not so far produced any catastrophic results to the people, or, conversely, since during that process a by no means negligible proportion will remain in the hands of Englishmen, it might be concluded that the new constitution, which touches neither of these aspects of the district executive, will not seriously affect the masses at all. Those who oppose the reforms on the ground that in surrendering control to Indian hands we are guilty of betraying the masses and the "sacred trust" which we have assumed for
their welfare, cannot be supposed to overlook these considerations, and, in truth, if that were the whole story, there would be no more to be said. But it is not the whole story.

In the first place, if the district staff dance to the tune of their chief, it is also true that the district officer looks to his Government for support and for the recognition of his work. I do not mean by this that he is constantly looking out for approbation on the one hand or for promotion and honours on the other. What I am thinking of is rather the evidence of a real interest in the affairs of the district, of the realization of the efforts of the officer on behalf of the people and of his recommendations for their welfare. Nothing is more heartbreaking, nothing is better calculated to stifle enthusiasm, than an attitude of indifference, an attitude which says, "Do as you please, we don't care," or, on the other hand, an attitude which, like Mephistopheles, stets verneint, which instinctively says "no" to every proposal, well or ill conceived, in the belief that to refuse shows greater independence than to accept. If this attitude should manifest itself—and whether it will or no is a matter of speculation according to individual temperament rather than of proof, argument, and evidence—it cannot but result in a certain apathy or disillusionment which will react eventually upon the welfare of the people.

Secondly, there is a tendency to procrastination. Governments, like the mills of God, have a habit of grinding slowly, and sometimes they grind exceeding small; but there are other times when a matter is laid aside "for further consideration," which in less polite English means that it is put off from day to day and from week to week without any consideration at all, because the authority whose business it is to "consider" can never arrive at any conclusion. But this habit of procrastination can easily develop into a habit of inaction. You appoint a committee to report on a large question, perhaps comprising many important factors; you receive the report and you agree "in principle," rejecting this and accepting that. But as nothing can be done without money, you put off the final action till a period, known as "financial stringency," has passed. No one knows when it will pass, and in the meantime the unfinished file remains to disfigure the returns and to undergo slowly the process of disintegration. At last, when everyone has forgotten its very existence, it is quietly transferred to the record room and there decently buried. Now a report which contains recommendations approved in principle cannot be altogether without value and therefore the shelving of it cannot but be, however indirectly, to the people's disadvantage.

There is a natural inclination in many men—perhaps in most—to avoid really hard thinking; the mental effort involved is far
greater than any commensurate physical effort. A man who will cheerfully trudge over the fields and through the jungles, in search of snipe or bear, or in the execution of his duty, will often shrink from the task of applying his mind thoroughly and honestly to some difficult problem. This tendency, perhaps inherent in human nature, has been said by a distinguished Indian to be specially characteristic of Indians—a tendency so marked that if not resisted consciously and continually it may gain the upper hand. If that be true, one may expect to see a good deal of this kind of relegation to Limbo of problems which ought to be grappled with. The structure of the Hindu religion is philosophic; it was born and evolved in India; it is not, like Christianity, an importation from a foreign land, modified and transformed by a new environment, and it may therefore be supposed to embody the genius of the Hindu people. They are familiar with its dialectic, and they are, as it were, nurtured upon discussion and argument. It is difficult for the Western mind, filled with the practical solution of material things, altogether to appreciate this innate tendency to discuss. But in matters of administration too much discussion obscures the issues. There is a well-known story of a certain Viceroy who, confronted with a portentous file containing opinions, cross opinions, arguments, comments, recommendations and perhaps recriminations, closed the whole thing with the two words "Drop it." That, it is not improbable, may be the fate of many a salutary measure under the new constitution.

Thirdly, there is, doubtless owing partly to inexperience and partly to an inclination to think on too small a scale, a certain prudence which is apt to degenerate into timidity. The biggest schemes in India—schemes which have brought prosperity to thousands—have been the outcome of courage; some have been failures, and failure always brings with it some obloquy; some, like the Punjab colonies, have been conspicuously successful, but the question one asks is this: Would these schemes now have been sanctioned at all by Indian ministers, fearful of accepting the responsibility, conscious of their own inexperience, not perhaps quite sure of reports, and anxious to do nothing which would imperil their political prospects with the electorate? If not, India will be the poorer. It is not an easy matter to spend the people's money on schemes which promise no immediate advantage and which may turn out to yield no advantage at all. No one can justly blame a lack of courage which may after all be only prudence, just as nobody should in reason praise rashness which, though unjustified by every canon of good government, happens to be successful. That is the difficulty of administration; of two courses to choose the better. Either may be plausibly adopted; either may lead to success or failure.
Yet, in spite of these tendencies, the Swaraj Governments of the more advanced Indian States have managed to rule without injustice to their populations and without seriously falling behind their neighbours in British India. Such inferiority as there may be is due largely to two causes: the lack of money and the lack of credit. In such States as I am thinking of the will to govern well is quite apparent; the general condition of the States has improved past belief since the last century. If it be permitted to quote from oneself a catalogue of misdeeds, "in 1825 the ruler of Udaipur was 'a man of no character, addicted to vicious habits and low pursuits.' . . . In 1867 the State of Jodhpur was on the brink of rebellion owing to general misgovernment. In 1837-38 such was the state of disorganization in Indore that the British Government was forced to intervene. . . . About 1840 so bad were the affairs of Kolhapur that 'misrule could scarcely have reached a greater pitch,' and finally came the climax in 1875 of the deposition of Mulhar Rao in Baroda. Such a catalogue is unthinkable now. Everywhere we find hospitals established; everywhere there are Courts of Justice, not always of the British type; in all States that lay claim to good government education is fostered, the peasantry are cared for, veterinary science and co-operative societies have made headway, and there are tolerable roads and perhaps railways. The smaller States cannot afford so much, but they too, where the ruler understands his business, have made good progress. But the resources of a State are limited and under an autocratic system credit must necessarily be restricted. Hence it is that the personnel is inferior; hence it is that crying needs have to be postponed. In all such States the days of extravagant magnificence have passed.

If then the Indian States, the best of them, are well governed, it is difficult to see why British India, with its infinitely greater resources, its superior talent, and the traditions of British institutions behind it, should not be at least as well governed under the new constitution. There remains, however, an undoubted risk. It will be noticed that in the advance of the States, each new step, especially those which depend on modern scientific development, has been imported or copied from British India. Medical science (as understood in Europe), veterinary science with improved methods of castration, co-operative credit, agricultural research—progress in these directions and others has been inspired by British India, and British Indian laws often serve as the model for State laws, if indeed they are not adopted as they stand. Will there be the same initiative in future? Will the States look to British India as before for their accustomed lead? Nobody knows. The doubt is there; but it may be that the responsibility will itself beget the initiative and that the modern Indian, thrown back upon himself,
will develop qualities hitherto unsuspected because hitherto unused.

And finally there is the risk—a very insidious one—that in fits of economy the quality of the personnel will deteriorate. Every Government is under the temptation to cut down the staff to the lowest possible, and to offer rewards below the standard of efficiency. It is not easy to decide to employ two men when perhaps one will do, or to fix his pay at Rs. 1,000 when perhaps Rs. 500 would suffice. High pay does not always ensure good government, and a huge staff is sometimes an unnecessary incubus; but adequate pay and an adequate staff are the first essentials of successful administration. The difficulty is always where to draw the line, and complaints are heard from departments that they cannot do the work well if Government refuses to increase the staff or insists on employing officers on clerks' pay. It needs courage and foresight and wisdom to strike the happy mean which shall ensure that the work shall be adequately but not extravagantly done, to realize that work badly done had better not be done at all.

In all these ways the new constitution may react upon the life of the people, but to say that such things may happen is not to assert that they will. At worst they would mean no more than that the rate of progress would be checked, that there would be some waste of money and of energy, and that there would, or might, be in consequence a loss of that confidence which is so necessary to good administration. But those who speak of the sacred trust and of the betrayal of the millions are not thinking of these things. They are after all not fundamental.

And it is in fundamentals, as we are assured, that the danger lies. First, of course, law and order. The Police, it is asserted, will loyally trust their British officers and no one else and, with British control removed, they will become a party to the communal and religious strife of Moghul and Maratha days from which British rule has purged them. But is this accurate history? The Police Force is not like the Army—a body of men led into action by British officers with whom they are in close and often familiar contact every day and from whose bodily presence they may derive confidence and loyalty. They are scattered all over the country and often many of them can hardly know their British superintendent by sight, if indeed the superintendent is British. They have often to act on their own initiative under an Indian inspector or even sub-inspector, and the tale of gallantry against odds and of injuries received certainly does not suggest any special loyalty to some abstract authority many miles away, be he superintendent or inspector-general. The Police, moreover, work fairly well in the States where there is no British inspiration at all. Nor is it true to say that British rule has freed India from communal
faction and religious animosities. The old days of Moghul rule were marked by fanatical insults by the conqueror to the religion of the conquered; and the uprising of the Marathas, which led to an empire, was largely inspired by indignation at these insults. Since then communal faction has persisted, and religious animosity has shown itself in sporadic episodes, sometimes of no particular account, sometimes extending to loss of life and arson. In these latest days such animosities have been intensified by political passion, and it is surely significant that this passion has burnt at its fiercest, not in Indian India—that is, the States—but in that very British India which is supposed to have been purged by British rule.

Communal faction and religious animosity have in fact been aroused and kept alive by fear and uncertainty. When there are two communities, both deeply religious, but professing antagonistic creeds, and each conscious of the past I have just sketched, it is hardly astonishing that both should be afraid of an unknown future. When uncertainty comes to an end, and when fears are shown to be groundless, India will return to her normal ways; but as long as that uncertainty and therefore those fears exist, as long as problems remain to be solved, which some day must be solved, so long will these factions and animosities continue. That is a vicious circle. So long as there are factions, the control of law and order must be withheld; so long as the control is withheld, factions will continue. The assumption appears to be that communal feeling is inherent in Mussulman and Hindu, and that therefore it is bound to continue on the same scale as we have lately been witnessing whether the control of the Police is in British or in Indian hands, that as it has been kept within bounds by British officers and by them alone, it must necessarily get out of control in Indian hands. That again is a false assumption. Hindus and Mussulmans, as Sir Verney Lovett has said, ordinarily live on amicable terms; it is only in times of excitement that religious feelings are stirred and then, it is true, the most trivial of sparks will serve to start a conflagration. The history of previous agitations confirm this. With the opening of a new era and with the subsidence of excitement, communal passion dies down, and the spark which then would have served to light the fire now splutters out unnoticed.

But we must not overstate the case. As I have said before, the department is apt to take on the colour of its chiefs, and if the administration of the Police becomes lax, infirm, and inefficient it is quite likely that laxity, infirmity, and inefficiency will pervade the whole force, leading to disloyalty and the loss of morale. Communal rioting may break out unexpectedly, either because the Government does something incredibly silly, or possibly
owing to something that has happened in a foreign country such as Egypt or Turkey or Japan. In such an event the Indian Police Force would be put on its mettle and the uncertainty of the outcome prohibits a too facile optimism. Indian opinion itself is not blind to the risk. But the risk must be weighed against the certainty, and nothing is more certain than that if true autonomy is now denied to the Provinces, communal faction will continue if it does not increase. As for security to life and property against ordinary crime, that may be dismissed in a very few words. Not only is the record of crime no higher in the States than in British India, but the great majority of criminal problems are worked out by Indian Police under Indian inspectors. The picture of the unfortunate peasant fleeing to the jungle because he has been left helpless to the mercy of thieves, robbers, and murderers is merely the fantasy of a lurid imagination.

Secondly, law. If there is one department in which Indians have distinguished themselves and in which they have hitherto been given a chance to prove their capacity, it is the department of justice. Eminent lawyers have sat on the bench of the High Court; district judges there are in plenty. The vast majority of cases, both civil and criminal, are tried by subordinate magistracy, by district Munsifs, by sub-judges, all of them without exception Indian. It is a system that has served well enough hitherto, and the changes in the constitution cannot possible affect the administration of justice to any appreciable extent. Here again the experience of the States shows us that wherever the courts have been organized there is no complaint from the peasantry. Black sheep there will be in every flock; here and there a corrupt magistrate, now and again an inefficient, lazy, weak, or eccentric judge, but it will not do to condemn a whole class by its exceptions. If then it is not incompetence which arouses this special fear, we are driven back upon communal bias and corruption.

When the Government is accused of betraying the masses, the bias of Hindu for Hindu, of Mussulman for Mussulman, of caste for its own members, is one of the chief heads of the indictment. There is sure to be favouritism, and favouritism not merely of the kind which is thrown into the scale of two otherwise equal claims, but of that more unblushing kind, which, to gratify a kindred feeling, does not hesitate at positive injustice. You cannot exorcise what is bred in the bone. You cannot expect a Mussulman to side with the infidel, or the Brahman to give judgment against a Brahman. Hence will arise tyranny and oppression and the villager will become the plaything of prejudice. Corruption and nepotism will aggravate the situation until the lot of the unhappy man will be no better than that of the canaille of pre-revolutionary France.
The attitude of the orthodox towards the Untouchable problem, the working of the caste system which makes blood-brothers of its members, and the institution of the joint family, which substitutes the family for the individual, lend some colour to these gloomy prognostications. But it would be unfair to ignore the growth of a public spirit during the last ten or fifteen years. The sense of responsibility has been, or is being, gradually evolved through the successive advances of the Morley-Minto and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. The signs are not unhopeful. As an illustration, though not a proof of this, take this quotation from the latest report on Moral and Material Progress: "Ministers of the Provincial Governments have of late unquestionably displayed more courage and initiative with regard to education. . . . Municipalities and local boards are being entrusted with wider powers, and many of them are exercising them wisely. Particularly satisfactory among recent developments has been the attention devoted to the education of children of the 'depressed classes.'" And if we may thus observe the growth of public spirit in the local boards which are manned by an inferior class of talent, may we not reasonably expect something more in the talented men who will be called upon to fill the executive posts in the new Government?

And this development of public spirit has gone some way towards checking nepotism and corruption. Granted that the individualism of Europe finds it difficult to grasp that feeling of clanship which is inherent in caste, or to realize the implications of the joint family, cases are not unknown of flagrant scandals such as those which not long ago came to light in the Punjab. But flagrant nepotism and flagrant corruption are as severely reprobated by Indians as by Englishmen. The corrupt officer in an Indian State will, if convicted, obtain as short shrift as his brother in British India. Of the petty kind of so-called bribery, which really amounts to nothing more than "tips," that kind which according to custom is given to peons to obtain, or at least on the occasion of, an interview with the great man, it would not be necessary to speak, were it not that too much is made of them by those who expect a higher standard in India than they exact in England. Corruption among lower officials there is and always will be, though it is not more conspicuous in the States than in British India and can hardly be counted amongst those evils from which British rule has freed the country.

Lastly, there is the question of taxation. When it is more exactly determined what the new Government will cost it will be possible to say whether extra taxation will be needed and if so to what extent. Two things, however, are certain: (1) That if there are extra taxes they cannot but affect the people indirectly, and (2) that no one, British or Indian, wants to tax the land directly
beyond its present burden. The periodic settlements will recur, bringing with them the periodic revision of the land tax, based upon prices, but that is not a system peculiar to Indian barbarity. We need not be at pains to insist that the lot of the villager will in no wise be changed; we need not assume the mantle of the prophet and attempt to predict what no one can foresee. We may well admit, as has so often been admitted, that there are risks to be run, the greatest of which is the transference of law and order. But to represent the Indian as the natural enemy of his countrymen, to insinuate that the peasantry are being thrown to the wolves, to suggest that the British and the British alone care for the villages, is neither fair to the Indian nor to the system of British rule which has been patiently guiding him into that path which he has now entered.
REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL

THE GARDEN OF VISION. By L. Adams Beck. (Benn.)

(Reviewed by Stanley Rice.)

The transcendental novel will probably make but a limited appeal to the average reader of fiction. "Consider the lilies" is a precept to which most of us pay only lip service: we are far more likely to consider the speed limit. And when the language is that of Buddhism and the setting is Japan, the task of the author becomes even more difficult. To anyone who is entirely ignorant of Buddhism and its terminology much of the conversation must be wellnigh unintelligible. Here is a typical passage, clearer than some to the average man or woman, taken at random and as it happens from the love-letter of the dying hero to his beloved: "I who have known satori know that for me there is no rebirth. The weary round is over. I behold the Clear Light which burns away all earthly illusion. You are Life and Light as I, and because there is no place where you can end or I begin, I summon you to the knowledge of the Formless, the Desireless, the Utterly Desirable in which is neither change nor division."

Yet the book was worth doing. It is an attempt—a not unsuccessful attempt—to introduce the casual reader to the more intimate knowledge of the East, to seduce him from the commonplaces that India worships idols and is caste-ridden, that Japan consists chiefly of cherry blossom and geishas and Buddhist monks, and that both countries have a veneer of Western civilization which from the nature of the case must be all to the good, if only it goes deep enough and is not too delicate to show the slightest scratch.

I suppose that a theme, as opposed to a plot, requires that the light and shadows shall be in high relief: What you are trying to do is to convince your reader in the manner of an advocate, not to charm him by the method of a portrait painter. Judged by the latter standard, the books seems overdrawn. A young English girl, Tasma Brandon (whose name is justified by a far-off strain of Indian blood) meets at the house of an English friend who is a convert to Buddhism a young Japanese student from Oxford. She, belonging to the so-called "smart set," takes an instant dislike to him, avoids him when she can, and goes off to live her own life. The climax comes. She surrenders herself to a worthless man and her eyes are opened. She seeks to fly from her environment and is advised to find peace in Japan. So great is her dislike to the Japanese youth that, finding he is to be a fellow-traveller, she changes her boat: he, from a chivalrous recognition of her dislike to him and in order to save her embarrassment, finds the same thing and does likewise. So after all they travel together, and before they reach Port Said they are on the verge of love. Arrived finally in Japan, she goes to a sort of monastery, or rather school for the discipline
of mind and body according to esoteric Buddhist precepts. There she is perfectly happy in the "simple life" and grows ever more attached to her hero, Ito. But the serpent comes into her happy Eden in the shape of the man to whom she had given herself. There is a quarrel between him and Ito. Ito throws him by his knowledge of jiu-jitsu, and Maxwell, from the ground, shoots him with eventually fatal results.

A summary of a story is bound to be inadequate, and the author may reasonably demur at the omission of what is really the core of the book—the long sojourn in the garden of Arima, the Garden of Vision, by which she is enabled gradually, through the mystical effects of the discipline of mind and body (for even the physical jiu-jitsu has its esoteric meaning), to approach to, if not actually to achieve, Enlightenment. That and the contrast between Eastern and Western civilization. Yet the unenlightened mind, which has merely dabbled in the written word, cannot avoid a certain scepticism. If this school is typically Japanese, what are we to make of that race of determined little men who, forced into the open by American action, have built up armies and navies, have established a formidable competition in trade, and won for themselves a foremost place as one of the world's great nations? Is it the author's intention that these things are only the result of adopting an inferior civilization, or that they have been achieved by observing the Higher Law of Buddhism? In the suggestion—unconscious, perhaps, but that is the impression—that the typical life of London is garish, hectic, vicious, and essentially vulgar, the author has, I think, possibly in zeal for the theme, overdrawn the picture, except perhaps in the last particular. The simple life could have been had in England without flying for it to Japan.

Nevertheless, the book provokes more thought than most of its kind. If it goes too far in exalting the Oriental ideal at the expense of the West, it does at least bring service to the East, in that it shows the Japanese, not in the usual garb of the Eastern villain intent on exploiting or injuring the heroic Englishman, nor as the man who has thrown on an ill-fitting cloak of Western respectability over the nakedness of his own Orientalism, but as a man with high ideals, with all the instincts of a gentleman, and with the innate love of culture which is seldom to be found in England and when found is too often the subject of ridicule. Above all, this is a book which is about the Japanese and not about some exotic European immigrants who happen to live in Japan and who are painted against a background of local colour. The book might almost be described as an essay in Buddhist transcendentalism thrown into the more attractive form of fiction.

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**FAR EAST**

*China: The Pity of It.* By J. O. P. Bland. (Heinemann.) 8s. 6d. net.

(Reviewed by Brig.-General C. D. Bruce, C.B.E.)

A book about China by an author so fully equipped to write it as Mr. J. O. P. Bland is something to be thankful for. So many authors of latter-day books upon China and the Far East are qualified mainly by their
earnestness of purpose or by their ability for research into standard works. There is, unfortunately, no small proportion of the reading public which prefers to follow the prevailing fashion in its study of a peculiar question, and to accept as proved fact theories frequently the outcome of a limited and superficial knowledge. This book is essentially a carefully documented presentation of facts as opposed to theories about the Far East. In one sense, readers may be a little disappointed, for Mr. Bland seems to have allowed himself to be enticed out of his way in an attempt to convert the unconvertible. In other words, to engage in somewhat controversial discussion, and to waste good space when the same might have been used with more advantage to his readers by filling it with his own practical knowledge and experience.

The author begins by showing how the elements of unrest and disorder, which came to the front in 1911, have ever since been greatly multiplied and encouraged, as the result of the well-meant but misguided policy of laissez-faire and attempted conciliation imposed on the Treaty Powers by the Washington Agreement of 1922. The actual result of this policy has been that for a decade past, as has long been apparent, China has not had any government capable of fulfilling the obligations which her representatives assumed at Washington in 1922. Looking back over the course of events in China since the beginning of the present century, Mr. Bland traces the chief causes of the rapid demoralization of the body politic. He puts this demoralization down mainly to the over-sudden substitution of Western learning for the old classical system of education in 1905, and to the violent indiscipline and chronic unrest displayed by the new generation of scholars. Here are some of the disruptive forces which China's patriarchal civilization was unable to resist. These new Western and republican political ideas could not possibly be adapted suddenly to its deep-rooted social system. "That the race will in time find an issue out of its present afflictions cannot," Mr. Bland thinks, "be doubted, but the length of time required, and the amount of suffering which the masses must endure in the meanwhile, are matters in great measure dependent upon the collective wisdom and good will of the Powers chiefly concerned, upon their sympathetic understanding of the Chinese people's real needs, and upon the substitution of realism for idealism in concerting measures to protect their helplessness through the necessary period of adjustment and reconstruction."

Here in a nutshell is the gospel of salvation which alone can set China on her feet again. Whether the Great Powers chiefly concerned are not themselves within measurable distance of succumbing, temporarily, to the disruptive social and economic influences of our modern system of Western civilization remains to be seen. In any case, such sympathetic assistance as can be offered to China by the Powers has today to run the gauntlet of being accepted or refused by at least three political parties continually quarrelling among themselves—the parties are those who represent the Northern, Southern, and Central zones of that unfortunate country.

In Chapter 2, "The Washington Conference and After," the author outlines the new trend of American Pacific policy after the Washington Con-
ference of 1921-2. This is a chapter of exceptional interest for, in Mr. Bland's opinion, America has been mainly responsible for the institution of a Far Eastern policy which has led the world astray. "Inasmuch," says the author, "as America's Far Eastern policy has now become the paramount factor in the immediate and future problems of that region, let us briefly consider the genesis, tendencies, and implications of that policy."

Mr. Bland goes on: "The significance of the Washington Conference was twofold. It was, in the first place, an outward and visible sign of the American nation's consciousness of its new rôle of predominance in world affairs; in the second place, it inaugurated a new alliance of the Powers, in substitution for that of the Anglo-Japanese alliance pledged under American initiative, to a policy of non-interference and patient conciliation in China."

To those who have followed and are following carefully the trend of events in China and Manchuria, the results of this policy are plain to see.

Mr. Bland continues, "The effect of the Treaties and Agreements signed (at Washington) by the four and nine Powers respectively concerned, was practically an intimation to the world in general, and to Japan in particular, of America's intention to establish a moral guardianship over China, and, by virtue thereof, to challenge Japan's position of ascendency in Manchuria and Mongolia." Here, again, is plain-speaking, but many readers who have followed the course of American policy vis-à-vis China during the time the Kuomintang Nationalist Government has been in power will agree with Mr. Bland.

Another chapter of great interest to anyone endeavouring to understand the effects of the impact of the West upon the people of China is Chapter 5, "The Missionary Factor." The present disruptive influences of this impact can hardly be gainsaid, even if their future effect may in the end compensate for the harm already accomplished. Continuing his survey of various factors to which he desires to call particular attention, Mr. Bland discusses in Chapters 6 and 14 such leading questions as China's Modern Students, Can China be Westernized, The Question of Manchuria, and Geneva and the Far East. On all these matters he has something original to say. In Chapter 15, "A Survey of Realities," readers may find information which may interest them as much as anything in the book, for in the Survey of Realities is to be found a condensed account of certain main events during the last decade in China. This chapter illustrates only too well the sub-title of Mr. Bland's present book. The chapter is a sad record of opportunities missed and realities shirked.

In the final chapter the reader is given the conclusions the author feels called upon to draw from the earlier chapters. "The process of demoralization (in China) has gone so far," writes Mr. Bland, "that only by a benevolent intervention of the friendly Powers can final ruin and disintegration be averted." Which few readers, having an intimate acquaintance with the past and present condition of the country, will be likely to deny. But they will probably ask by what means is any kind of intervention, benevolent or otherwise, to be put in force today? If China was represented by a unified Government—which she is not—confessedly in sore distress, ready to accept foreign advisers and to give such experts honestly a free
hand to carry out what they advise, there would be some hope of an eventual if not a speedy reorganization. But with not one but at least three separate political parties to be consulted and placated, "benevolent intervention," even in its most promising form, will not easily be achieved.

Mr. Bland's latest book can be confidently recommended to everyone interested in one of the most vital problems of the day.


(Reviewed by Brig.-General C. D. Bruce, C.B.E.)

Mr. Wou's book, l'Histoire diplomatique de la Chine, is a carefully compiled account of China's attempts to get rid of the so-called "unequal" treaties with foreign nations. Also of how China endeavoured to force the rest of the world to accept her, politically and otherwise, upon a footing of perfect equality with the Great Powers.

As everyone interested is aware, a beginning was made in 1928 when China informed the Powers of her intention to abrogate all the "unequal" treaties and to conclude new treaties "on the basis of equality and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty as the most pressing problem of the present time."

The Nationalist Government of 1928 began this notification in the following words: "Now that the unification of China is an accomplished fact. . . ." It then proceeded to state that (1) "all the unequal treaties between the Republic of China and other countries, which have already expired, shall be ipso facto abrogated and new treaties shall be concluded." (2) "The Nationalist Government will immediately take steps to terminate, in accordance with proper procedure, those unequal treaties which have not yet expired, and to conclude new treaties."

The notifications above referred to are here recapitulated because, under numerous sub-headings, they make up the entire contents of Dr. Wou's book. Like the Nationalist Government in 1928, Dr. Wou appears to adhere to the fiction that "the unification of China is an accomplished fact," and as many of his arguments and assumptions seem based upon what all the world knows to be a mis-statement it is only right to mention the fact.

To Dr. Wou the collection of the numerous papers, memoranda, and documents he quotes so fully has evidently been a labour of love. The bibliography given at the commencement of the book refers to innumerable treaties and documents published in European languages, as well as to one hundred and eighty-one separate books in English and French. In addition, Dr. Wou's research has included, he tells us, a great number of Chinese works.

In the course of marshalling his facts, Dr. Wou discusses such provocative matters as Consular Jurisdiction, Foreign Settlements, Foreign Concessions, Foreign Guards, Tariff Barriers, Foreign Law Courts, and China's
right to erect on her own soil Radio Stations. After close on fifty pages of introduction comes a "Preliminary Chapter" upon the historical relations of China with the outer world. Chapter I. describes the post-war efforts of Chinese diplomacy; Chapter II., the attempts to obtain a hearing at Versailles of China’s representatives—an acknowledged failure; Chapter III., the work carried on at the Washington Conference; Chapter IV., that at Geneva before the League of Nations. The final chapter, number V., sums up the results to date, as Dr. Wou sees them, of China’s efforts to obtain the revision of treaties originally quoted demanded by the Nationalist Government in 1929.

At times, some of Dr. Wou’s readers may find a perhaps pardonable note of bitterness in his general comments upon the relations of China with foreign Powers (pp. 262-3, Sec. II.). In fact, it almost seems to amount to the possession of an inferiority complex far from common in China. If the reviewer is correct, such feeling is entirely uncalled for. The people of China have the sympathy and respect of all who have sojourned among them. To no people in the world today are both more abundantly due. Whether the ordinary student of Chinese affairs will be willing to be taken once more and at no little length through the doings of China’s representatives at Versailles, at Washington, and at Geneva is perhaps doubtful. To those who have leisure Dr. Wou’s book offers a good opportunity of studying the Chinese view of the international drama now being played before the world in the Far East.

ORIENTALIA

AN INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHIST ESOTERISM. By Benoytosh Bhattacharya, M.A., PH.D., Rājaratna, Tattvavācaspati. (Oxford University Press.) 15s. net.

(Reviewed by Dr. Ranjee G. Shahani.)

A reproach is sometimes levelled against Indians that they are unwilling to face the stern realities of life. Temperamentally or constitutionally, it seems, they have no gōdt for harsh, ugly facts. If this is so, it argues a sad limitation in a great people. For to see things in too simple a light is ultimately to see them as in a glass darkly. To attain to anything like an adequate view of the cosmos we must envision the entire mosaic of the totality spread before us. Not a shade, not a ray must be ignored. Truth, as we are beginning to sense, often lies on the dim borderland where light melts into shadow.

There is thus no excuse for cavilling at Tāntrism, whether Hindu or Buddhist. Those learned scholars who have condemned it as a “disease” in the “fair flesh of India” know little or nothing of human nature. Their opinions appear to us merely a measure of their own ignorance. No derogatory epithets can wash away the “is” of life. Some writers, indeed, have tried to show that Tāntrism is not of indigenous growth, but “came with Magi priests of the Cythians.” It is consoling to believe so. There is, however, no evidence for it. Alas, it is a characteristic of certain
AT THE TOP OF THE KORAPATHAR PASS (11,668 FEET)
exclusively logical minds to trace all things to one unique source, as though
the human mind were incapable of experimenting along similar lines in
different lands or at different times. It is as though we should insist that
the number 1 must have come before the number 100. It is quite con-
ceivable that the reverse is the truth. Who can tell?
Tantrism, to my mind, is a kind of spiritual materialism—a sort of
Rabelaisianism of ideas. It has satisfied a human need and thereby justified
its existence. It cannot be without a moral content. To outgrow it is not
to negate it or to vilify it.
I cannot, therefore, agree with the author of this book, and the authori-
ties that stand behind him, that Tantrism is "consuming the vitality" of
"the Hindu population of India." "Someone," we are told, "should
therefore take up the study comprising the diagnosis, etiology, pathology,
and prognosis of the disease, so that more capable men may take up its
treatment and eradication in the future." Mr. Bhattacharya cannot be so
simple as all that. Surely he is not suggesting a "bowdlerization" of the
Hindu spirit! In youth, it is true, one is apt to be a crusader; but with
"ripeness" (not at all a matter of years) one finds oneself reduced to a
serene acceptance of the spectacle of life, and valuational epithets as applied
to manifestations of the mind of man appear jejune and meaningless.
Happily, Mr. Bhattacharya has confined his attention to giving "a dis-
passionate account of the Tantras in general and Buddhist Tantras in par-
ticular." I cannot help feeling that a kindly fairy was whispering in his
ear.
Mr. Bhattacharya has carried out his arduous but limited task with com-
mendable thoroughness. His wide knowledge of the original texts and his
judicious handling of the enormous material at his disposal are manifest
throughout the book; and only a captious expert would quarrel with him
for not doing what the critic imagines he must have done. The book, let
me hasten to add, is not altogether intended for the specialist, though he
too might consult it with profit. Of special interest to laymen are the
author's ideas on the significance of the Vedic Hymns, on the rise and
stratification of the theory of Moksha, and, last but not least, on the con-
tribution of the Buddha to the intellectual dower of India. Here, to my
mind, the author has shown considerable independence of interpretative
thought.
May I, in conclusion, request Mr. Bhattacharya to give us, if possible in
the same series, a volume dealing with the adventure of India as a chapter
in the unfolding drama of life. What I mean is a book of critical philosophy
on the place that India may justly claim in the story of mankind. Such a
book would fill an empty place. The Maharajah of Baroda, whose interest
in things of the spirit is so happily alert, would earn the gratitude of all
serious students by encouraging the pursuit of this inquiry. May I express
the hope that this appeal is not in vain!
The great depression between the Tien-shan and Kuen-lun Mountains, extending east from the Pamir plateau through the Tarim basin to the Gobi desert and the Chinese province of Kansu, is Central Asia.

The dead heart of this arid region is the 1,500 miles of the Taklamakan desert, north-west of Tibet. Sand dunes and steppe vegetation make up the landscape. Life is limited to a string of comparatively small oases and depends entirely upon streams, which have contracted steadily owing to the shrinkage of the ice from the last glacial epoch. As some of the streams dwindled towns were deserted, but fortunately the dry atmosphere has preserved their remains.

The scientific exploration of this desolate part of the world began with Sven Hedin in 1890. Stein soon followed and made the subject his own. Beside these, Kozlov, Pelliot, and Von le Coq are other names that come easily to mind in connection with Central Asian exploration and archaeology.

Stein’s first expedition to Taklamakan was made in 1900. The second expedition lasted from 1906 to 1908 and the third from 1913 to 1916. He travelled some 25,000 miles and examined Yotkan, Dandovilik, the Lop-Nor region and the disappearing lake which, according to Dr. Eric Norin, is the last survival of an enormous inland sea in late glacial times. He crossed the Gobi in the footsteps of Marco Polo and the earlier Chinese Buddhist pilgrims to India, explored the ancient site of Karo-Kolo, the Etzina of Marco Polo, which the Russian explorer Kozlov had identified, and visited Zungari, Turfan, Kashgar, and Samarkand. The original reports of these expeditions are scarce: this book is a condensed account of them, which was delivered as the author’s Lowell lectures in Boston.

China turned her attention to these regions in the second century B.C. In the first century A.D. Pan Ch’ao established her power in the Tarim basin all the way to Kashgar. White Huns or Ephthalites and Western Turks disputed China’s dominion, and in the eighth century she had to give way to Tibet; but in 747 A.D. Kao Hsien-chih marched 10,000 men over the lofty passes of the Pamirs and Hindu Kush—the only time the feat has been accomplished by a considerable force—and regained control. Chinese power waxed and waned until 1775, when the Manchus brought the whole of the Tarim basin under direct Chinese administration.

For nearly a thousand years Central Asia served as the principal scene for the early interpenetration of three great civilizations. It was here that the cultural influences of Greece, India, and China met. Mongol hordes, the troops of Darius and Alexander, Fa-hien, Hsuan-Tsang, and other Chinese pilgrims travelled along these highroads. So did Marco Polo. And it was by this way that China sent to other countries her silk wares, which later reached Europe through Parthia and Syria. To guard the silk route between Kashgar and Tun-huang the Chinese Emperor Wu Ti built a fortified wall about 2,000 years ago. Stein discovered the wall and explored it for 200 miles. The Chinese pilgrims between the end of the fourth cen-
tury and the middle of the seventh century found flourishing cities along their way: Marco Polo, six centuries later, described their ruins.

Stein has carefully traced the early reactions of pure Indian culture, and through it of Grecian art, in Central Asia. The more one studies Hellenistic influence in Buddhist art the more astonishing it becomes.

At Miran, near Lop-Nor, Stein found Buddhist frescoes with the signature of the Roman decorator Titus. One of the Miran panels represents the "King of the Rats," mentioned by Hsuan-Tsang as having saved Khotan by setting his rats to work on the bowstrings and harness of an invading army. Herodotus has a similar story about Egypt.

Stein reaped a rich harvest of manuscripts in the Tangut and Tibetan languages at Kara-Kolo. But his greatest finds were in the Cave of a Thousand Buddhas at Tun-huang, an oasis in Kansu. The cave was first noticed by de Lóczy in 1879, and since Stein's visit has rewarded the investigations of Professor Paul Pelliot and the two Japanese expeditions of Otani and Tachibana.

A crack in a wall led to the chance discovery, by the Taoist priest in charge of the monastery, of a room crammed with manuscripts, embroideries, and paintings. They had been hastily secreted there at the beginning of the eleventh century on the invasion of the Tanguts (Uighurs) from the extreme north-west of China. By negotiating with the priest Stein acquired twenty-four cases of manuscripts and five of embroideries and paintings. There were wooden documents in Chinese with clay seals bearing impressions of Eros, Heracles, Pallas Athene, and other Greek figures. At Niya he had found similar documents in Kharoshthi, one of the two scripts from which all the alphabets of India have been derived. Among the documents that Stein acquired at Tun-huang are some originals of Hsuan-Tsang, the oldest specimen of a block-printed book, dated 868 A.D., and the oldest known Sanscrit manuscript. Some of the Kharoshthi manuscripts are far older than any preserved in India. These finds leave no doubt that in the second century A.D. Indian influence extended to the frontiers of China.

Silks of many charming patterns have been preserved in their pristine colours although they are about 2,000 years old. They are the oldest Chinese textiles we know, belonging to the T'ang dynasty when Chinese art was at its best.

This is a singularly stimulating and valuable book. In reading even the first few pages the impression asserts itself that it is a great book, created out of sound scholarship, patient endurance, and much faith. It is a story of great courage. Sir Aurel Stein has suffered to the full those hardships which are the inescapable lot of every genuine explorer. Much of his work was done under gruelling conditions, with only the loyal help of an Indian surveyor, but there is little in the book of his hardships and still less of his skill. He has chosen instead to resurrect the past and make it live for his reader; and his vivid yet simple phraseology conveys not a little of the glamour and romance of his discoveries.

The book is lavishly illustrated in monotone and colour, and is provided with excellent maps. The coloured plates are particularly beautiful.

(Reviewed by John Caldwell-Johnston.)

In this work, now an established book of reference in its kind, Professor Granet takes the Chinese Book of Odes, the Shih Ching, and, by modern critical methods, discovers in it a great deal which illustrates the ancient popular customs of China, especially those associated with the public festivals that have been held there since the dawn of time. Needless to state, authentic documents relating to such matters are rare.

The Shih Ching, one of the classical books of China, is an ancient anthology of political compositions. Tradition maintains that the selection of the odes and songs was the work of Confucius, who urged the study of his anthology on the ground that from it the practice of virtue might be learned: the habit of moral reflexion, respect for social duties, and a strong antipathy to evil—these would be the benefits of such a study. Regarded as being of assistance in the development of the upright man, and having the authority of a great saint, the Book of Odes has become a handbook of instruction, sanctioned by millennia of scholarly comment and interpretation.

But those who do not feel bound to revere the Shih Ching as a classic, or to accept the scholarly pronouncements as of paramount importance, are no longer under the necessity of attributing to this work a moral and educational value, independent of its actual origins. Since the odes were used in China for purposes of instruction, it was imagined that they were composed for that purpose: since they were employed as a stimulus to goodness, it was assumed that each poem was specifically an exhortation to virtue.

The ancient festivals, the record of which has been preserved for us by the Shih Ching, appear as festivals of union which, in the ordered life of the Chinese peasants, marked the period of the assemblies of local and sex groups. They ordered the course of social life, but because their order coincided in point of fact with the natural order of the seasons, they were also credited with possessing the power to insure the normal course of things and the well-being of nature.

Thanks to the study of the ancient festivals, it is possible to describe the form of Chinese society at a remote age; and this Professor Granet has done in great detail and with remarkable insight and intelligence in this book, which can be recommended to the attention of all who may desire a knowledge of the foundations upon which the prodigious superstructure of the Chinese civilization has been reared.

Professor Granet's book is a truly epoch-marking and monumental work, which has been adequately and clearly rendered into English by Dr. Edwards.

Akbar. By Laurence Binyon. (Peter Davies.) 5s. net.

Assuredly it is among the strangest circumstances in historical research that so little should, in fact, have survived regarding almost everything that
is truly worth knowing in our past. One must exclude, of course, those matters wherein it was plainly profitable to suppress or mutilate all contemporary witness. But those other occurrences which took place before a host of observers, many of them highly intelligent and fully literate—of many such events, without doubt closely documented at the time, today scarce a wrack remains. Thus, concerning the last hours and death of our own Charles I., or of the actual circumstances attending the Restoration of his son, what do we know? Little indeed! So too with the subject of this monograph, Akbar. In Akbar's Court it is probably no exaggeration to say that every third or fourth person was literate—a very high average for those days, when at the contemporaneous Court of Elizabeth scarcely one in ten of the nobles could do more than sign his own name—and of these literate persons probably not less than one-half kept some form of journal or memoir. These memoirs, where are they? Apart from Abul Fazl's so carefully manicured disclosures, and the Jesuit Fathers' notes, there has survived to all intents and purposes—nothing.

Thus Akbar's life, in so far as revealed to us, resolves itself largely into a throat-parching, dusty catalogue of campaigns, negotiations, enactments, treaties, massacres, and similar greenroom frippery, illuminated by but few human touches. Of the ruler, the general, and, strangely! the theologian, we know much: of the man, scarcely one single worthwhile thing. How like our William Shakespeare in this! How liker still to Akbar's own fated City of Victory, Fatehpur Sikri, which he built of the glorious red sandstone in a desert place—as it were with the aid of the fierce red desert Djinns—and forgot to endow with water! Truly did the great King unknowingly (or was it knowingly?) inscribe his own life's sum and epitaph upon a gateway in this haunted place: "Thus saith Jesus, upon whom be peace. 'This world is a bridge. Pass over. Build not there!'"

Within this slender volume Mr. Binyon has gathered up, and sedulously set down, all that is recorded of Akbar—one of the world's few greatest men. More cannot be done. What remains must be reconstructed, as best may, by the reader's own sympathy and imaginative insight.

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(Reviewed by Arthur Duncan.)

During the last thirty years the Madras Museum has gathered together a particularly fine collection of South Indian metal images, chiefly Hindu. The closest European parallels to the generalized type of facial expression characteristic of Indian work are to be found in the stone figures of Gothic cathedrals. It was in this connection that Rodin studied Indian images, and two of the Natesas mentioned in his memoir Le Danse de Civa are illustrated in Fig. 1, Plate XVIII., and Fig. 2, Plate XVIII., of this catalogue. The first is from Velankanni in the Tanjore district and was found
in 1872; the second was found in 1907 at Tiruvelangadu in the Chittor district.

Another Natesa (Fig. 2, Plate XVI.) is the only definitely dated South Indian Hindu metal image known. It bears the date A.D. 1511—the Vijayanagar period—and was found in 1906 in treasure trove at Belur in the Salem district. Beside this, the only other images bearing inscriptions definitely relating them to a period are Kali No. 6 (early Chola period), Chandrashekara No. 1 (late Chola period), Balakrishna No. 41, and Alvar No. 9 (Vijayanagar period).

The Natesas, or Natorajas, as Indian craftsmen term them, are figures of Siva dancing to quell the pride of Kali. They are characterized by the completely different pose necessary to express great activity and have the prabha.

Literature about Hindu iconography in South India is limited. Professor Jouveau-Dubreuil is the only one who has attempted to deal with the subject in detail, and one of his conclusions is that the animal vahanas (vehicles) for the different gods seem to have been introduced from North India in the twelfth century A.D.

Every Hindu image must conform to the traditional pattern described in the salpa-sutras; and most images are designed to remind worshippers of the dual conception of the Divine, philosophically as the Impersonal Absolute and devotionally as Lord and Divine Lover of believers. Notwithstanding such rigid rules and the fact that much of the subject-matter is grotesque, there is considerable scope for the expression of art, as one may see by referring to the illustrations of Varadaraya, Vishnu, Srinavasa, Narashima, Hanuman, Rama, Venagopala, Chandrashekara, Kali, Somaskanda, and the Natesas.

This catalogue is indispensable to students of Indian iconography. It was commenced by the late Mr. S. R. Ayyangar and has been continued by Messrs. Gravely and Ramachandran. There are twenty-three excellent plates illustrating about eighty-five images.


This is Vol XXIV. of the Translation Series of the Pali Text Society. Mr. Woodward has once more excelled in his translation of this part of the Pali Canon. The English rendering, in spite of its difficulty, is fluent and easy. A number of notes on every page testify to his unquestioned knowledge and reading. The Gathas have been put into good rhythmic verse, but of course there remains the constant controversy whether any poetry in a foreign tongue should be translated into poetry or prose. The reader should be reminded that Mr. Woodward has done previous fine work for the same series by his translation of the Samyutta Nikaya, or Book of Kindred Sayings, and other volumes.
CENTRAL ASIAN ANTIQUITIES MUSEUM, NEW DELHI. Catalogue of wall paintings from ancient shrines in Central Asia and Sistan recovered by Sir Aurel Stein. Described by F. H. Andrews. (Delhi.) 8s. 6d. net.

The present volume adds considerably to our knowledge of art in Central Asia and forms another stepping-stone to the solution of early intercourse between the Far East and the West. Mr. Andrews, one of the early scholars in this field, has described the collection fully, and his introduction explains where these paintings were found, the structure of the shrines, and their materials. Of special interest to archaeologists is his information regarding the colours used. The problem of the paintings is not yet solved. Most of them are entirely Buddhistic, but there are others of Sasanian character. There are three plates showing paintings, two sketch-plans, and one map.

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INDIAN MYSTICISM: MYSTICISM IN MAHARASHTRA. By R. D. Ranade. (History of Indian Philosophy, ed. by S. K. Belvalkar and R. D. Ranade, Vol. VII.) (Poona: Aryabhusan Press.)

This formidable History of Indian Philosophy is not published in regular sequence of volumes. The first volume sent out was Vol. II. (1927), which traced the development from the Vedic through the Brahmanic to the Upanishadic period. The present volume of over 500 pages is a perfect monumental work in itself. It traces mysticism back to the Upanishads and shows how the system came into perfect form in the Narada and Sandilya Sutras. The larger part, however, is devoted to a discussion of the spreading influence which was introduced into Indian thought by writers such as Ramanand, Kabir, Tulsidas, Mirabai, Tnkaram, Manik-kavasager, and many others. The author divides the work into five large parts, the first of which deals with the age of Jnanadev, whose chief work, the Jnanesvari, is a free paraphrase of the Bhagayat-gita in Marathi verse (A.D. 1290). The second part is the age of Namdev (the friend of Jnanesdev) and entitled Democratic Mysticism. Synthetic Mysticism in the age of Gkanatha, whose chief work is a commentary on the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavata Purana, fills the third part. Personalistic Mysticism is contained in Part IV. as the age of the great poet Tnkaram, and the final section contains the age of Ramdas (about A.D. 1600), whose chief work, the Dasabodha, is the outcome of the fullest experience of the world by one having attained to the highest spiritual experience. This important volume concludes with a bibliographical note on Comparative Mysticism (18 pages), an Index of source and a very elaborate and careful Index of names and subjects of 32 pages. Professor Ranade has once more proved to be a great painstaking scholar, as well as a deep philosopher.
PLANTATION LABOUR IN INDIA. By Rajani Kanta Das, M.Sc., Ph.D. (Calcutta: R. Chatterji.) Rs.3.

(Reviewed by P. K. Wattal.)

Dr. Das has written several books relating to labour and industrial production in India which are fairly well known.

*Plantation Labour in India* is a study in the rise, growth, condition, and problem of the workers employed on the tea gardens in Assam. Other plantation labour—viz., on coffee and rubber estates and tea gardens in Southern India—has not been dealt with.

The main object of the study is a critical analysis of the work and life of the labourer with a view to ameliorating his condition. The author has with great care and industry presented the history of plantation legislation and the system of recruitment of labour, which at one time was the subject of acute controversy in India. Since the publication of this book the whole question of plantation labour has been very fully and impartially examined by the Whitley Commission, who have devoted four chapters of their report (covering nearly 80 pages) to this subject.

The Commission reported that economic and general health conditions on the plantations in Assam were of a higher standard than those in the average rural or urban area and that the physique of plantation labourers and their families appeared to be satisfactory, and the general standard was certainly higher than that of the population of the recruiting areas. After this authoritative testimony it is strange to read that "the tea gardens of Assam are virtually slave plantations, and, in Assam tea, the sweat, hunger, and despair of a million Indians enter year by year." The remark is extracted from the Report on labour conditions in India by Messrs. A. A. Purcell, M.P., and J. Hallsworth of the British Trades Union Congress Delegation to India (1928) and was successfully challenged at the time.

Though the abolition of the indenture system in 1926 put an end to many abuses in connection with the recruitment of labour, the ideal of free recruitment has not by any means been realized. Organized recruiting is still necessary, and with the recent enactment of the Tea Districts Emigrant Labour Act, which embodies many of the proposals of the Whitley Report, a further step in the direction of elimination of control over recruiting has been taken and is greatly to be welcomed.

The depression in the tea industry since 1930 has been gaining in intensity from year to year. More than 90 per cent. of the tea gardens in India paid no dividends in 1932. The preference of 2d. per lb. on Empire teas granted by Great Britain in 1932 has given some relief. Further relief is expected from the scheme recently adopted for the restriction of tea production throughout the world. When the industry is once again in a position to pay its way proposals for voluntary action to provide better sanitation, housing, and welfare work in relation to labour made by the Whitley Commission could be pressed with greater hope of success.
INDIAN PROBLEMS. Speeches by Lord Irwin. (Allen and Unwin.) 12s. 6d. net.

It is a difficult task to make a selection from the speeches of a viceroy. There is necessarily so much that is scrappy and transitional, references to schemes and projects for which the head of the Government can only promise "sympathetic consideration," and to phases in negotiations which are not yet ripe for a pronouncement. The subjects are so numerous that they pass before the reader almost like a succession of lantern slides, which have little connection except that they all relate to one country and represent different aspects of the policy of one government. So brief is the space that can be devoted to each that their treatment allows no room for the display of the mind of the Viceroy in action, and the reader who seeks light on the methods adopted by Lord Irwin, and the principles and aims which he set before him, is continually knocking his head against these rocky departmental paragraphs. But if he perseveres he will be rewarded, for he will inevitably find himself in touch with a mind of singular distinction and charm. The main impression one gets is that of a viceroy who regarded it as one of his primary duties to meditate, to interpret, and to explain, while at the same time doing all in his power to ensure "the maintenance of a progressive, orderly, and contented India within the orbit of the British Commonwealth." Lord Irwin had no illusions as to the necessity for order and the iniquity of the civil disobedience movement. One point which he is never tired of emphasizing is the supremacy of Parliament. It appears in the earliest speech in this volume, and also in the farewell speech delivered at Delhi a few days before his final departure from the capital. It is in keeping with his strong views on this point that he should so frequently have given advice and warnings to Indian politicians as to the probable effect on Parliament of certain lines of action. On the other hand, he emphasizes the inevitability of advance, while at the same time bringing out the mechanical necessity for maintaining, in the Crown, a common centre for all the conflicting elements.

The index is not very satisfactory, and the text contains a number of slips which should have been corrected before the volume saw the light, among them a misquotation of the famous epitaph on Wren in St. Paul's cathedral. But the collection is one which should be studied by all who wish to understand the different phases of Indian politics during Lord Irwin's viceroyalty. The editor has done well to include the Toronto address, which was written more than a year after Lord Irwin left India, and contains an admirable expression of his matured views on Indian problems.

We cannot leave the book without saying a few words about the style. Its primary quality is perhaps lucidity. The reader is never left in doubt as to the speaker's meaning. But it is something more than that. Polished and cultured without being laboured, grave and dignified and yet not lacking in humour, it abounds in happy phrases which leave the reader with the feeling that they are a natural growth rather than the product of a literary workshop.

Although the present work deals with general civics, it has special reference to India. The first volume is divided into three books on the essentials and the types of Governments, and on the general organization of the Government of India, being an introduction to the science of politics, whilst the second part deals with the science of economics. The bibliography is very lengthy, and both authors show that they have studied these numerous books. They must have obtained a very wide knowledge of the minds of chiefly European, but also Indian writers. The students of universities, to whom these volumes are directed, will receive a well classified exposition of civil government which should assist them in their future studies in understanding this very difficult problem. Both authors have placed university students under an obligation by the neat division of the chapters and the clear presentation.

NEAR EAST

IN THE MARGIN OF HISTORY. By Sir Harry C. Luke, Lieut.-Governor of Malta. (Lovat Dickson, Ltd.) 12s. 6d. net.

(Reviewed by Hy. S. L. Polak.)

In the odd moments of a busy and adventurous career Sir Harry Luke has found time for wide travel and close observation in some of the more obscure and less-known parts of Europe and Western Asia. His literary output is a distinguished one, and this book affords an additional illustration of his scholarship and the curiosity of his mind. One can understand how readily an administrator, whose tasks are usually laborious, not seldom dangerous, and frequently involving grave issues, chooses for his playground those unfrequented by-paths that are to be found in the penumbra of history. The incongruous and the incredible alike have happened and do happen, and they still remain to bear their record of interest for us. Sir Harry Luke writes his marginal notes in a clear hand and his style delights whilst at the same time it informs.

In the present book he recalls to us scenes, places, and events mostly, but not entirely, in Europe. The opening chapter, which gives its title to the book, brings to mind the exploits of would-be or might-have-been kings of territories overseas or beyond the boundaries of Europe. In another chapter we are reminded that weakness and an incapacity for military defence can be as effectively corrected by the judicious exercise of diplomacy, for the purpose of preserving the freedom and independence of a tiny state, as the jealousies of two great countries have helped to preserve the sturdy independence of another minute territorial fragment, notwithstanding that a shot from a modern big gun fired from one of its boundaries would pass right over its area and fall far beyond.

There was, in fact, a King of Yvetot that most of us, even had we known
of it, had forgotten, or else we had regarded the story as legendary. The continued existence of a single Grand Duchy in Europe on the borders of France, Belgium, and Germany recalls how a woman rules there, notwithstanding that the accession of another to the throne was barred by the Salic law.

In medizval Europe we are shown all sorts of obscure currents and counter-currents of envy, jealousy, fear, cruel ambition, and all the other sombre passions that only too often formed the warp and woof of "romance." The forgotten names of dead Republics on the Dalmatian coast are brought back to recollection, whilst the new world of the peace treaties emerges at Aqaba, where four countries and two continents meet.

And, finally, a flashlight is thrown upon the Mediterranean of the corsairs and piracy in the reign of Charles II. by extracts from the diary of a naval chaplain who, apart from his amazing feats of spelling, must surely have been a sort of spiritual ancestor of the author of this excellent and racy book.

Sir Harry Luke, who is now the Lieutenant-Governor of Malta, goes to that historic island for part of his background. Perhaps we may look to him at some future date for a brilliant and illuminating history of the island, whose origins and antiquities go back to prehistoric times. It only remains to be said that he adds to our enjoyment of the book by the profuseness of its illustrations and by a series of twelve useful maps.

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THE INDEPENDENT ARAB. By Sir Hubert Young. (John Murray.) 15s. net.

The author has had extensive experience in the Near East, where he has resided since 1913. He began his work when journeying across Turkey and down the Tigris to Baghdad. During the war Sir H. Young was sent to Mesopotamia, where he took part in a number of expeditions, and in 1918 he met Col. Lawrence and other officers who helped the Arabs to destroy Turkish suzerainty in Arabia. An interesting account is given of the dispute with the French regarding the position of Mosul. There are three small maps at the end, one dealing with the Middle East, the second dealing with Mesopotamia, and the third with Syria, Arabia, and Petraea.
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INDIAN ART AND LETTERS

INDIA'S future is being widely discussed, and the chief importance seems to be given at present to her political problems. These, however, cannot be rightly judged without some study of her literature and her art. The India Society had this need in mind in founding INDIAN ART AND LETTERS. A perusal of its pages reveals the extent of India's literary and artistic influence far beyond her borders, down the centuries through Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam—religious ties which unite her cultural history with that of the Near and the Far East.

INDIAN ART AND LETTERS is issued by the India Society, and is the only publication in England devoted to the study of the Painting, Sculpture, Architecture and Literature of India, and those countries which have been influenced by, and which in their turn have influenced, India, especially Java, Siam, Indo-China, Afghanistan, Tibet and the Middle East.

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Published twice annually, in June and December, by the

INDIA SOCIETY, 3 VICTORIA STREET, LONDON, S.W.1

Subscription:

Five Shillings per issue.

Ten Shillings per annum

The Asiatic Review, July, 1933.
It requires some temerity for one who left India twelve years ago to express any opinion on the present situation. If there is one single topic upon which there is general agreement among Englishmen who are near the end of long service in India, and upon which there is universal agreement among one's old Indian friends and correspondents, it is the startling change that has come over India since the war. To the post bellum unrest and discontent, largely economic in its origins, which pervades the world at large, there has been added in the East a new—or at least a newly expressed—racial sensibility, with a more or less explicit revolt against the assumed superiority of the West. We can, all of us, see something of this for ourselves: but it is only those in recent administrative touch with India who can tell us how deep these disturbing factors have penetrated into the masses whom we used to regard as placid and voiceless, and to what extent the spirit of Nationalism—or of what in India's present conditions must pass for Nationalism—is spreading and becoming a reality. On this point there is convincing testimony, and I see no reason why those of us who served India in the last generation should mistrust the powers of observation of our successors. To approach the present political issues, therefore, as if they were developing in the old pre-war atmosphere of British officialism, would be foolish; and any opinion offered exclusively from that standpoint would be listened to with some natural impatience.

There are other standpoints, however, which are open to the ex-official as well as to any student of the situation. India is essentially the product of her own history; and there are certain constants in the Indian character, in the social structure of India, which may be temporarily obscured, but are unlikely to be altered,
by waves of political aspiration. In what manner it seems probable that these will react to a new system of government is certainly relevant at the moment. It is also a matter less for theoretical speculation than for evidence by those who have had ample opportunities of watching those factors at work under other conditions, when India was her natural self and not acting a somewhat self-conscious part on the world’s stage. What I am going to submit to you this afternoon, accordingly, will take a good deal for granted of which I have no very recent personal knowledge, but will emphasize the possible bearing of certain characteristics in Indian life and polity upon the proposals for a new Constitution.

Prolonged Controversy

Anything in the nature of a dispassionate or philosophic study of the situation is rendered difficult by the excitement which now surrounds it. That the interest of Englishmen should be sharply aroused in the future destinies of India is all to the good, even at this eleventh hour. But quite unnecessary obstacles have been thrown in the way of any newcomer to the topic acquiring an interest which is intelligent and at all comprehensive. In the first place, the extravagances of the Indian extremists started a number of superficial emotional currents in this country: the idea that India had suddenly become a great nation struggling for freedom; the idea that our power in India had been so weakened that we had better abdicate before worse things befell us; the idea that we ought to reconquer India and exterminate sedition. These currents might have been stayed by the only authoritative and systematic analysis of the problem which has yet been made—the Simon Commission’s Report—if that document had been given its proper place as a State Paper of the first magnitude. The Government of the day, however, for reasons which I am not here to examine, virtually shelved the Report. This, of course, did not prevent conscientious readers from digesting it: but the effect on the general public was to create an impression that the Simon Report had in some way failed of its purpose, and was to be replaced by something more authentic.
Then came the Round-Table Conferences, conducted—perhaps, in the circumstances unavoidably—as a series of dramatic interludes with rhetorical fanfares rather than as a solemn inquisition into India’s preparedness for change. Public opinion got drawn insidiously away from the unparalleled complexity of the issues to the picturesqueness of their setting.

Finally, we have the controversy now raging over the White Paper—almost as if, in some obscure way, the White Paper were an abstract dogma instead of a bundle of highly arguable propositions. The result has been an amazing outcrop of intolerance in certain quarters. A document which calls for careful and detailed judicial study—and is now receiving such study at the hands of the Parliamentary Joint Committee—is in imminent danger of being bandied about as a test of partisan loyalty. The threat has actually been used that differences of opinion regarding it may break up the Conservative party. On such a catastrophe there could be no worse an authority than a person like myself, who sits on the benches of a party which is regularly rent from head to foot by internal schism about twice a year. But, even with this handicap, I venture the suggestion that the break-up of India would be a catastrophe of a somewhat different order from a temporary dyarchy in one, even the largest, of our Parliamentary groups. If ever there was a time for the calm and non-partisan treatment of Indian affairs it is today.

THE CASE FOR ADVANCE

In what follows I am asking you to consider the argument for enlarging India’s political freedom, and then how we are to measure the proper degree of enlargement? If we find any such measure we can apply it to the proposals now before the Joint Committee, and then look into the justification for stopping short for a time, and how far short, of the goal of our promises.

As a matter of law the case for revising the Constitution rests on section 41 of the Government of India Act, 1919, which provided for an enquiry in 1929 into the “development of representative institutions,” etc.—the wording is well known to us all. Though much that is legitimate and much that is illegitimate has
been read into this section, it made no promise of further progress in or after 1929 towards self-government; and indeed there are commentators who would use it as a means for retracing the steps by which Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford disturbed the pathetic contentment of the Indian masses fifteen years ago.

Of all the criticisms of our Indian policy I have always found special difficulty in understanding the view that our troubles in recent years derive their origin from the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme. Its authors—both, alas! now departed—never troubled to answer the charge; and it would have been hard for any man who held responsible office in India during the war to shut his eyes to the urgency of some pronouncement as to the objective of our rule. Challenge was in the air all around us: the old world was upside-down, what was to be India's place in the new one? Those of us who hoped to postpone an answer till after the war were finally shaken out of our ground by the Lucknow Pact of Christmas, 1916, when the Hindu and Muslim leaders, after generations of aloofness, met on the common platform of a demand for reform. It was impossible to carry on as if those voices had not been heard, as if India must wait indefinitely for her share in the new world-order for which we and she were fighting. Once the declaration was made that our objective is to lead India to self-government—and could we have put our names to anything less?—it followed, as certainly as the night the day, that a clear step forward should be taken. Whether that step had been what Parliament decided in 1919, or one of the many variants that were discussed, would probably have mattered little. The Montford scheme never got a fair chance, either from most of the Indian leaders or from several of our administrators; and it suffered from at least two inherent defects which were thrust into it against the advice of the then Government of India. It served its purpose, however, as a transitional measure, perhaps as well as any other intermezzo would have done; and there is no use in crying over spilt milk. The question now is whether, having had our decennial enquiry, we are to go forward or to go back.
THE MEASURE OF CO-OPERATION

If India stood today exactly where she stood in 1917 the answer would be in the words of the announcement made by the Cabinet in that year, or in effect that the issue would be determined by the degree of co-operation in reform which has been received from the Indian leaders. This criterion is being forcibly urged as the rest which we ought now to apply to the demands for complete responsibility: and the implied argument is an argument which cannot be lightly gainsaid. A large section of the Indian leaders have shown no sense of responsibility whatever for the good government of their country since 1919; why should trust be reposed in them now? It is undeniable that the appeal by Parliament, in the preamble of the Act of 1919, for co-operation, met with a meagre and partial response; while a powerful section of Indian leaders definitely adopted a policy not of co-operation, but of wrecking. Would it then be expedient for Parliament to declare that, its conditions of 1919 having not been fulfilled, no further advance towards responsible government can be conceded?

Out of that perfectly logical position we have, in my judgment, all but contracted ourselves. Co-operation or no co-operation, we have never since 1917 treated India as being on trial. She participated in the peace treaties on the same footing as our self-governing Dominions. Like them, she leads her own delegations to the League of Nations. Viceroy's have negotiated with wrecking leaders as if they were spokesmen of responsible political parties. These are in no sense criticisms; they are objective facts which seem profoundly to modify the stipulation as to co-operation. There are even stronger arguments behind in the impossibility, as a practical matter of business, of maintaining the status quo. The provincial authorities, whether official or non-official, are nearly, if not altogether, unanimous in their desire to make an end of dyarchy. The Central Government is like a gallant steed with its forefeet hobbled. The whole machine is full of friction and displacements, and it is only just kept going at the moment by ordinances and by the lull of anticipation. Some radical
change has to come before the art of government can reassert itself.

One other and still weightier consideration claims attention. By far the strongest, the most consistent, and the best organized of the parties in India has refused to come into the scales and be weighed against our standards of capacity to govern. Few of us can have much sympathy with the Congress party or its methods; but what is to be done with them? Permanent suppression is not beyond our power, but there is the gravest risk that it would drive the trouble underground and intensify a type of anarchy with which in the past we have been only too familiar and which we find it increasingly difficult to cope with. My own conviction—though I know how hotly this view is contested—my own unalterable conviction is that the Congress and its fantasies are merely a façade behind which a more subtle and enduring power is operating, which is in its very essence hostile to the whole theory of our democratic reforms. If that hostility is to be stemmed, if the most efficient political force at present existing in India is to be weaned from permanent obstruction, the status quo offers no solution. On the contrary two conclusions seem inevitable: first, that no constitution is going to work unless the advanced nationalists can be brought in to pull their weight with it and not against it; second, that there is no chance of securing this unless they can in some way have responsibility forced upon them, for only thus will the sword which they are always sharpening for us be turned against themselves.

These, to my mind, are the converging reasons why we cannot go back, why, on the contrary, we must unhesitatingly go forward. One can imagine an Indian proconsul of the old school boggling at them. His view, based on his own experience, would be that you have only to keep a stiff upper lip, put the leading malcontents under constraint, demonstrate that you can govern and mean to govern, and you would soon find the mass of the people gratefully rallying round you and disowning the troublesome agitators. He is quite honest in his belief that this course would be the kindest to the people as a whole; and that, as it has been followed before, so it can be followed again. One can
only turn for an answer to the proconsuls of today: they are
unanimous that such heroic handling of the situation is impossible
under present conditions, and that the government which tried
it would share the fate of Mrs. Partington and her broom. I
think we must take this as final.

The Measure of Advance

Now comes our second question. Assuming an advance to
be necessary and inevitable, what is it to be? How are we going
to measure the proper degree of change? There are many of
us, I am sure, who would fervently rejoice if it were possible
to end our anxieties and our responsibilities at once, to imitate
the generous confidence of Mr. Campbell-Bannerman when he
put an end to representative government in the Transvaal; in
short, to take India at her word and give her the Dominion status
which has been so loudly demanded. That stark British selfish-
ness is the only reason why we do not indulge in this fine, careless
rapture is a commonplace with the extremists, and there are
people in this country who seem to derive some pleasure from
repeating it. It would be waste of time to discuss a pure parrot-
cry, just as it would be sheer treachery to India to leave her to
her own devices, at least until we have an unequivocal mandate
from India herself in that sense. So for the moment, with your
permission, I put aside the doctrine of abdication, the lament
of a lost dominion.

The answer to the question which I put just now seems implicit
in the considerations which we have been arguing in favour of
an advance. What is now imperatively wanted is that an adequate
measure of direct responsibility be transferred to the Indian
leaders. It must be a clear-cut, easily-defined responsibility, not
open to confusion and mutual recrimination like the hybrid which
dyarchy was sometimes allowed to become. It must be com-
plete in its sphere, so that any failure or any error or any success
will be ascribed solely to the responsible administrator. It must
be sufficiently wide to enable the outer world to see at a glance
how it is operating. In other words, if dyarchy is to be set aside
it must be set aside completely. For these reasons I think that
we can start with nothing short of what the Simon Commission advised—namely, the transfer of complete responsibility in the provincial sphere.

In this country it is not always understood how vast a field will thus be opened for Indian talent. Some writers speak of it as if we were proposing the transfer of County Councils, in ignorance of the fact that the province may be as great in area as Italy, as full of people as the British Isles, and that it embraces the whole range of public business which touches the happiness of the people and the well-being of the State, save only those departments—defence, railways, and Customs—to which geographical limits cannot be put. It provides ample scope for the best brains in Indian public life for another couple of generations.

**Transfer of Law and Order**

Particularly is this true if the transfer extends to the control of the magistracy and the police. This question of law and order is, to my mind, the crux of the situation, and chiefly with reference to it have I ventured to describe my paper as a middle view. Those who regard the transfer of the police to a minister’s control as a dangerous experiment deserve more consideration than it pleases certain sections of what I may call the White Paper party to accord to “old colonels and retired civilians.” Many of them have more knowledge of the facts than our arm-chair reformers. To not a few of them there recur vivid memories of blood-stained lanes in some northern city, of hospitals packed with wounded and dying, of nameless atrocities committed in the sacred name of rival creeds, and of the pathetic entreaties for a British officer to quell the trouble and to do justice. There is no washy sentiment about all this. There is equally no intention to affront the Indian reformer. There is only the conviction that at times of emergency, and especially in communal strife, the fear of want of support in the mind of the junior Indian official, and the social pressure upon those above him, will weaken the hands of those on whom will fall the grave duty of dealing promptly and firmly, whenever and wherever it breaks out, with the chief evil in India’s civic life.
On the other hand, have those who pooh-pooh the dangers of the proposal been quite honest with themselves or with us? The bitter hostility that has been manifested to the idea of confining the coming advance to provincial autonomy seems to me to rest mainly upon two fears. To one of them I shall return later; the other is undoubtedly the fear that if Parliament is cajoled into stopping at provincial autonomy for the present it may hesitate to include the police in the transfer. "Shout loudly enough," seem to be the tactics, "that provincial autonomy is inadequate and there will be less risk of our losing part of it." Quite conceivably this apprehension has been sharpened by the halting line of argument—you will remember how it stumbles—by which the Simon Commission supported their recommendation for the transfer of law and order.

**The Choice**

When we disentangle ourselves from the secondary issues which surround this vital question I feel that we have to face the choice between a grave present danger on the one hand and on the other a measure of transferred responsibility which will fail of all the purposes for which we are granting it. I feel that to hand over the government of a province to ministers without at the same time giving them the means of making government effective is to lay up a certain cause of future trouble. Suppose that, in one of their departments, ministers decide on a policy which occasionally requires the support of the police; and suppose that the independent authority controlling the police considers this particular policy so utterly wrong that he refuses to allow the police to enforce it; how can the administration in such circumstances hold together? Or suppose that the authority controlling the police does, in spite of his own views, use his force to carry out a policy which turns out to be wrong and oppressive, popular feeling—and, mind you, popular opinion is all-important in a system of responsible government—will fasten on the police as the wrong-doers and not on the minister who is rightfully accountable.

No, I see all the dangers, and I foresee errors and suffering; but I am convinced that the quickest way and the only sure way
of checking error and curtailing suffering is to give ministers control of, and the unmistakable responsibility for, the agency of force which, however unseen and however unused, must lie behind the departmental policies with which you are entrusting them. In actual fact (speaking for Northern India), I am often inclined to think that in the administration of land revenue and irrigation in particular there are quite as many opportunities for causing distress and injustice, although it may be with the best intentions in the world, as there are in the employment of the police. My view, therefore, is that on all grounds, and in spite of the grave risks involved, law and order must go to ministers along with the rest of the provincial administration.

THE CENTRE AND THE PROVINCES

A minute ago I referred to another hidden fear as swaying the minds of those who angrily oppose our stopping short for the moment at provincial autonomy. What I had in mind was the apprehension, the very justifiable apprehension, that the Central Government, in its general powers of supervision, will neutralize some of the independence which we mean to assign to the provinces. One besetting sin of our British bureaucracy has always been its flirtation with uniformity. Never in the whole story of our administration, except, perhaps, in the unfortunate instance of the Permanent Settlement of Bengal, have we allowed individual provinces to develop their own lives in their own way. The whole structure of our system, it is true, was incompatible with enterprise of that type; and the result was that the Central Government acquired a habit of intervention which, if challenged, was always defensible on the ground of the ultimate responsibility of the Governor-General for the acts of all his subordinates. The new Constitution will turn over a completely new page; and if there is one lesson which has to be burned in upon the Central Government of the future, whatever that government may be, it is that it must keep its hands off the autonomous provinces.

Suppose that in one province, pervaded by a particular theory of Hindu life, the Legislature were to enact that every Hindu
must be married, if at all, before reaching the age of twelve. Suppose that, at the same time, in an adjacent province with a different view of its social duties, the Legislature were to enact that no Hindu marriage may take place until both the parties are of the age of fifteen. Can you imagine Simla accepting such a situation? Unless there is a change of heart (to use the jargon of the day) Simla will still endeavour to interfere; but my suggestion is that the change of heart must come, and that the Central Government must be most definitely deterred from intervening, unless there is the clearest case for the enforcement of a safeguard, with the spontaneous development of the different provinces. Should this duty be made perfectly clear, and should law and order be definitely assigned to ministers, I venture to hope that some of the opposition to resting at the moment on provincial autonomy would disappear. To express such a hope, however, let me say at once, is not the same thing as advocating that our coming stage of advance should stop at provincial independence. It is rather a hope, and an appeal to the good sense of Indian leadership, that provincial autonomy should be accepted and honourably worked during the interval that must elapse before a Federal Government gets into commission at the Centre. There is no shutting one's eyes to the fact that this interval must be considerable.

**Federation**

About federation itself as an ideal there is no particular novelty. I remember it being discussed one evening in November, 1917, at a banquet which the Princes gave in Delhi to celebrate the admission of India into the War Cabinet of the previous spring. Even if it sounds egotistical, might I quote from a newspaper report a speech which I made that evening, because it preserves the impression left upon those of us who had been discussing the general outlook with representatives of the self-governing Dominions a few months before. From the general outlook of the Empire we had come to talk about the part to be played by India and the necessity for a closer union between British India and the States. We had been anticipating that the growth
of international obligations would facilitate that union, and from that point I went on to say this:

"When union comes India will be an empire within an empire. Its three hundred millions will probably be the citizens of a federation of States based upon race or language or historic tradition, some ruled over by Princes bearing Your Highnesses' names, others by the chosen of the people themselves, but all cemented by a common love for India and a common devotion to the British Crown."

Nobody thought of this ideal as immediate. That evening in November, 1917, we were talking about it as if none of us at the table would live to see it. Sir John Simon and his colleagues took much the same view. Lord Irwin and his colleagues, in their dispatch on the subject, were almost equally cautious. It is only in the last three years that we have suddenly been asked to think of federation as a thing that might grow up in the night and face us as a fait accompli any morning. There has been almost a conspiracy of silence regarding its difficulties; yet no one who has really studied them can fail to appreciate their magnitude.

"The course of history during the last one hundred and fifty years," write the Davidson Committee, "has brought into existence an intricate network of relationships between the States and British India, the unravelling and readjustment of which must be accomplished before any advance can be made." As that Committee made manifest, the financial complexity alone is appalling. It is fully matched by the political artistry involved in inducing the Princes to forgo, in varying degrees, their cherished sovereignty, and then in defining how far the British provinces will go in accepting dictation from a federal power in which the Princes participate, or, looked at from the reverse of the shield, how far the Princes will agree to accept dictation from a federal power in which the democratic provinces are partners.

It is far from the wish of any of us to magnify these difficulties. Indeed, it will only be when they are removed that India will be able to have a Central Government suitable to her national dignity. For obviously there is no Central Governmental structure except a federation which is possible in a self-governing India. And when the structure is ready our position must be
profoundly modified. Or to put it differently, unless our control is modified we cannot have federation, for it is impossible to expect the Princes to surrender sovereign powers both to us and to the federal authority. Whether we liked it or not, therefore, I think we must agree with the logic of Lord Reading's reasoning when he turned the scales at the Round-Table Conference by his pronouncement that federation ipso facto entails the grant of responsibility to the central authority. Some such sort of transfer of power to the Central Government as the White Paper contemplates would thus appear to be inevitable, and there is no reason why we should not indicate it in the new Constitution as the next stage. There is, indeed, every reason why we should push on the preparations for it with all practicable speed.

The Federal Structure

What needs emphasizing, however, is that with the best will in the world the federal structure will rise but slowly. Incidentally it seems highly questionable, on purely practical grounds, whether the structure should be counted as fit for tenancy until a considerably larger ratio than one-half of the States are ready to occupy it. Be that as it may, each prospective occupant has to have a pretty elaborate tenancy agreement negotiated with him, and it is only when he sees this in draft that he will realize what he is undertaking and what he is sacrificing. It calls for neither cynicism nor hostility to the ideal to convince the ordinary man familiar with Indian methods and suspicions that these preliminaries will be a lengthy process. If that is true, then two considerations emerge: first, that while the preparations are running their course some interregnal power will have to occupy the Central Government; and, second, that on this vital question the White Paper is virtually dumb. In a short concluding paragraph it mentions the possibility of "transitory provisions," which would leave the executive of the Central Government "in substantially the same position as that occupied by the Governor-General in Council under the existing Act." Any more lugubrious prospect it would be difficult to imagine; and surely one of the most urgent tasks of the Joint Committee will be to devise
a form of Central Government which can maintain our standards of good administration until provincial autonomy is safely launched on the one hand and a sure foundation laid for federation on the other. The present form of Central Government would be powerless to do either.

Safeguards

Time will not admit of much discussion on what many regard as the most critical feature in the White Paper, the so-called safeguards. In regard to these, it is extremely difficult to take a middle view. On the face of them they are sensible, normal precautions which a country, seasoned in the risks and vicissitudes of democratic government, might reasonably ask a country to accept which is, for the first time and with very little experience, plunging into those risks. If they are accepted as a normal part of the Constitution, applied only when necessary and with ordinary common sense, and recognized as part of the routine of government, then their value, both educative and prophylactic, would be incalculable. If, on the other hand, the cry goes up that safeguards are an insult to Indian statesmanship and a vicious refusal to implement our promises, and if the cry is followed by a determined policy (as the Congress party announce that it will be) of making safeguards unworkable, then neither the safeguards in the White Paper nor anything else that human wit can devise in their place will be worth the paper they are printed on.

The Governor-General, with the Army at his back and some nucleus of skilled advice at his elbow, might be able to get his intervention respected for a time. But look at the position of a Governor of a province. He will not always, if we may judge by some appointments that have been made, be of the strongest and most intelligent type which England can spare. He will very often have no experience whatever of Indian conditions. He will be very isolated in any disagreement with his ministers. The prospect of his being able to detect the origins of such a disagreement, when they first occur, is remote; the prospect of his being able to enforce his view, when the disagreement comes to a head, is uncertain. Rarely, if ever, will he be in the for-
tunate position of being able to take his stand heroically on some broad principle regarding which the world at large must be with him. It will be the slow, insidious undermining of a principle which will be his danger, for he may not have his eyes opened to it until a situation has been reached where he can quite easily be made to appear in the wrong if he tries to assert himself. Even, however, if he is lucky enough to be able to choose his own ground for the disagreement, things may be made very difficult for him. Ministers may resign; the Legislature may refuse to function; agitation may rage; Government House be boycotted, and so on. A dissolution and a General Election may do him more harm than good, for he cannot go into the constituencies single-handed and defend his action against the attacks upon it with which they will be saturated. Those of us who have some experience of how a conflict of this type develops will agree that one of the most anxious tasks before the Joint Committee is how safeguards are wisely to be made efficacious. Unless this is secured I fear that they will gravely disappoint those who pin their faith upon them as a serious element in the Constitution.

There are other features in the White Paper about which a middle view is permissible. Finance, unhappily, is not one of them; because, struggle the exchequer as it may, I see no possibility of its being equal to these costly changes and at the same time to the programmes of social reform which will be expected of the new régime. Nor is it easy to take a middle view about the methods of election, or of the impracticable idealism of the franchise proposals. All these, however, are problems which the new administrators must tackle for themselves, and they provide not the least of the good reasons for giving the necessary powers without delay. When these powers are complete is it too much to hope that the chief problem connected with the White Paper will solve itself—the problem of the relation between Britain and India? India complains that she has had to suffer in the past from British ill-manners, insularity, arrogance. There is truth in the complaint, though these are not the only gifts that Britain has brought to India. But there is another side to the shield. We have had to complain of India’s suspicion and con-
tinuous charges of bad faith. If she would allow herself to believe, as we believe and know, that the promises of 1917 were promises which will be redeemed to the letter, and that when we put the brake on sentiment and enthusiasm we have good and perfectly unselfish reasons for doing so; if she would believe this, then the new Constitution might make a happy start.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, July 4, 1933, when a paper was read by the Right Hon. Lord Meston, K.C.S.I., on “The White Paper: A Middle View.” The Right Hon. Viscount Goschen, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., C.B.E., was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

The Right Hon. Lord Lamington, G.C.M.G., G.C.S.I., Sir John Kerr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir William Ovens Clark, Sir James MacKenna, C.I.E., Sir Prabhashankar Pattani, K.C.I.E., Colonel Nawab Sir Umar Hayat Khan, K.C.I.E., C.B.E., M.V.O., Sir Hassan Suhrawardy, O.B.E., LL.D., M.D., F.R.C.S., D.F.H., Sir Montagu Webb, C.I.E., C.B.E., Sir Henry Wheeler, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir Ernest Hotson, K.C.S.I., O.B.E., Sir James Donald, C.S.I., C.I.E., Sir Ness Wadia, K.B.E., C.I.E., Sir Henry Sharp, C.S.I., C.I.E., Sir Robert Gillan, K.C.S.I., Sir Alfred Watson, Sir Hugh McPherson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Henry Lawrence, K.C.S.I., Sir T. Vijayaraghavacharya, K.B.E., the Chief Saheb of Phaltan, the Thakore of Amod, Lady Scott Moncrieff, Lady Bennett, Lady Abbas Ali Baig, Lady Cunynghame, Mr. F. G. Pratt, C.S.I., Mr. H. M. R. Hopkins, C.S.I., Dr. M. B. Cameron, C.I.E., and Mrs. Cameron, Mr. J. R. Martin, C.I.E., Sardar M. V. Kibe, Swami B. H. Bon, Mr. Y. G. Thombre, Mr. M. K. Acharya, Miss Cornelia Sorabji, K-i-H., Mr. R. K. Ranadive, Mr. A. Sabonadiere, Miss Price, Mr. G. H. Ormerod, Mr. R. H. Hood, K-i-H., Mr. H. R. H. Wilkinson, Mr. T. A. H. Way, Mr. J. Sladen, Mr. J. B. Hall, Pandit Shyam Shankar, Mr. J. M. K. Mackenzie, Mr. John Ross, I.S.O., and Mrs. Ross, Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Colonel W. G. Hamilton, Justice and Mrs. Mirza A. A. Khan, Mr. K. C. Roy Chowdhury, Rev. E. S. Carr, Mr. L. C. Lai, Mr. L. M. Deshpande, Pandit Nanak Chand, Mr. Kenneth C. Keymer, Miss E. L. Curteis, Mr. C. T. Stack, Mr. W. S. Lane, Mr. A. Chavan, Mr. M. G. Moodaliar, Mr. and Mrs. W. F. Westbrook, Mr. B. K. Sinha, Mrs. Roberts, Mr. H. K. Sadler, Miss C. K. Cumming, Miss E. Coleman, Mr. Hartog, Mr. O. W. Watkins, Major G. W. Gilbertson, Mr. R. C. Gupta, Mr. O. C. G. Hayter, Miss L. Sorabji, Mr. S. A. Ghafar, Mr. E. M. Richards, Miss Gray, Captain W. D. Woellwarth, M.C., Mr. Paul Stewart, Mr. Jehangiani, Mr. and Mrs. N. B. Bonarjee, Miss V. H. Jones, Mr. Philip Cooper, Miss L. A. Cox, Mr. T. Cooke, Mr. C. R. Corbett, Miss Hanson, Mrs. B. Dobson, Miss D. H. Watts, Mrs. Bery, Mr. A. G. R. Hickes, Miss U. M. Peck, Dr. and Mrs. Shahani, Professor J. E. G. de Montmorency, Mr. A. G. Pawar, Mr. R. Henniker-Heaton, and Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN said: The signal services which Lord Meston has rendered in various capacities to India will, I am sure, enhance for us the interest of his address. Those services are so well known to a gathering like I see here today that I am sure Lord Meston will need no further introduction.

(The Paper was then read.)

The CHAIRMAN: We have listened to a most able and clear statement of his views by Lord Meston, and one which I am sure has held our attention.

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I think you will agree with me that the address shows the careful consideration which Lord Meston must have given to the details of the White Paper before arriving at the conclusions which he has submitted to us today. I am very glad that in that address Lord Meston laid stress upon one or two matters of principle, which I think we are sometimes apt to overlook in discussions on the White Paper.

He began by referring to the great change which has taken place in India since the war. About this, of course, I realize that there may be considerable differences of opinion. It must be difficult for those who lived in and served India before the war to realize how greatly and how rapidly India and Indian views have changed since then. Those of us who have been out in India since the war, as Lord Meston says, only for a short time, and even those perhaps who did not know a pre-war India, can bear testimony to this change. For myself I am convinced that the spirit of Nationalism is, in Lord Meston's own words, "spreading and becoming a reality," and must be reckoned with. We must accept that as a starting-point in considering future reforms. Lord Meston went on to speak of the prolonged controversy which has taken place, and which is now "raging over the White Paper." On this I would only plead that a calm and sober examination of the work of the Parliamentary Joint Committee in the country at large may not be hampered or interfered with by allowing this great problem to enter into the arena of any party politics. (Applause.) That would be a disaster for India and this country alike.

As regards the case for advance, it is not possible for me in the few minutes I will allow myself to deal with this at length. But those of us who went out to India after the Reforms and were called upon to take any part in the Government of India soon recognized that the existing form of Government could only be—as indeed it was intended to be—transitional, and that it was failing in its object of teaching responsibility, and indeed rather encouraging irresponsibility, even in the places where it was working well. We in Madras as far back as 1924 advocated full provincial autonomy, including the transfer of law and order—i.e., the control of the police.

We felt that to transfer the other subjects in order to teach responsibility, and yet to withhold that one which is the means of making government effective, would not achieve the object we had in view. Personally, I believe there is another reason for handing over the police, and that is this. The police are the guardians of law and order in the provinces. They are the protectors of all classes. But if you are to transfer all the other portfolios, but to retain this, I believe that they would not be regarded as they should be, as a public body, but they would be regarded as guardians of British interests, which would impair their utility and place both the officers and men often in an invidious position. (Applause.)

In Madras, as I dare say many of you know, since the Reforms were introduced in 1921, the portfolio of law and order has been in the hands of an Indian member of the Executive Council. I admit that he was a member of Council and not a Minister, and that there is a difference between them, but many of the arguments against the transfer which might apply to one might also apply to the other. I would like here to bear testimony to the
efficiency and loyalty with which the administration of the police during those years has been carried out. (Applause.)

I agree with Lord Meston in the expression of his hopes that when full autonomy is given to the provinces, it will be so in deed and in fact, and that the provinces will be allowed to develop their own future on their own lines, except, of course, in such cases where there is a clear case for the application of safeguards. I believe that under such a system the provinces would not only increase in importance, but would greatly develop their own sense of responsibility.

I mentioned the word "safeguard," and, like Lord Meston, I recognize that this is one of the most important questions in connection with the White Paper. But I think we must remember that safeguards have been a part of the Constitution, that they have been used by Viceroy and by Governors—I have used one of them myself—and that they have been recognized by the people. Still, this is one of those questions before the Joint Committee which we are most anxious should be given a full consideration. I hope and believe that they can be made really effective.

I am sure we were all very interested in hearing the words which Lord Meston used of Federation in 1917 and of their prophecy for the future. (Applause.) No one, even in the last few years, could have foreseen the swiftness with which this question has come before us for discussion and settlement. I must not delay you this afternoon by speaking about Federation, beyond saying that I agree with much that Lord Meston has said. The vital question, of course, is finance, and I have not sufficient knowledge of the figures to speak about this. But I am sure we all await their publication with very considerable anxiety.

May I just say, in conclusion, this. It is sometimes said by way of criticism of those of us who have been India for a short time and have advocated considerable advances in the Constitution that we are visionaries. If by visionaries is meant men who allow their imagination to run away with them and who live in the clouds, I would reply that no one taking a part in the Government of India, large or small, and daily called upon to face the problems of administration and deal with the facts of everyday life could long remain a visionary; the materialism of life would be too much for him. (Applause.) But if by visionaries are meant those who have had some vision of a future Constitution, and have refused by conviction to adopt a negative policy and to stand still where they are, but who prefer to face the future rather than the past, then I have no objection to the word.

To the principles of the White Paper, I believe at the present moment there is no alternative, except, of course, such amendments as may be introduced by the Joint Parliamentary Committee. I believe that, in view of the spirit of India, such principles will be adopted as inevitable. And I believe that to delay now would be to alienate the sympathy and help of those Indians who have steadily supported us, would be to witness the deterioration of public life during the interval, and would be to hand over a machinery, when the time comes, whose efficiency will have run down during the time of waiting. (Applause.)
Sir Prabhashankar Pattani: I have to make one or two conditions before I speak, and the most important condition is a request to Mr. Brown, the Hon. Secretary, who has made this Association a great success, as we all know, to observe that while I am prepared to say a few words here, I hope he will relieve me from the necessity of having to correct what I say. The second condition is that, being a member of the Indian delegation which is considering this great issue in association with the Parliamentary Joint Committee, I cannot disclose anything about our proceedings. Therefore any views that I may have to express today will be personal. They will also be in the mutual interest of the two countries, in the good association of which I have all my life believed, and in which I still believe.

I have been an official all my life. I have not been used to platform speaking. Therefore as an old man, tuned in office and used to files, I will not go much further than my experiences. And those who may feel that in spite of official experience this old man has been influenced by forces that are operating in India will also, I hope, excuse me when I say that man, while he lives, grows daily by new experiences that he gathers. Lord Meston I have had the privilege of knowing for several years, and what I have always valued is this: that wherever we have met we have spoken frankly and I have never had the fear of being misunderstood. When I read today's able paper I felt that it was only meant to grant provincial autonomy and nothing further; but his lordship has made it quite clear that the lecturer believes in the eventual Federation of India. That being the only right solution, there is going to be a continued friendship between the East and the West. I should have said continued friendship between India and England, but I have purposely said between East and West, because I know that a satisfied India is a satisfied East.

The Joint Parliamentary Committee is now sitting on this great question. The members of the Committee are all of them experienced men on such questions. There are ex-Viceroyes, ex-Governors, administrators of the present and the past, people who have worked on committees to enquire into Indian questions. Whatever decision they come to as a result of the conferences, examinations and cross-examinations that are being held, it will be acceptable to Parliament and, I fondly hope, to India also.

It is not possible to get everything at once, but whatever is given should be used; and we should not start a tug-of-war the next day. This is what happened in Bengal in 1919 and onwards. It happened because of one or two drawbacks in the scheme; because of that the whole thing failed. Mr. Montagu was a great statesman. He saw that by transferring a number of departments today, if the Indian Ministers worked their departments well and to the satisfaction of the transferers, then gradually and automatically under that very scheme other departments would be transferred, and eventually there would be no department in the province which would remain untransferred. So, gradually, the provinces would have complete autonomy.

That was a great scheme, but it failed. I will tell you why it failed: they were reasons I placed before Mr. Montagu unofficially at the time. These are two points which are still being insisted upon in the new scheme, and they
are (1) re-entry in the event of a breakdown, and (2) the protection of the Services.

Now, right of re-entry if a thing fails is an inducement to bring about a breakdown, and it has happened like that, as in a quiet way Lord Meston in his great speech said it might. Dyarchy has failed, probably because the Ministers would not work it, and perhaps because some of the administrators would not let them work it. He is right. He has said it after ten or fifteen years' absence. I have been in that country until yesterday, and I know because I have the advantage of meeting Governors, Viceroy, Members of Council, and they have not kept it a secret from me. They were talking to me, and I to them, quite frankly: "Oh, this may not succeed, and when it breaks down we shall re-enter. We shall go in again." I always used to say, "Never believe that democracy fails. The system may fail, but democracy will go along forward and forward; and therefore those who believe that a breakdown will give us a chance are making a great mistake." I am afraid that any constitution, setting forth that in the event of a breakdown we shall re-enter, is always in danger. There is the danger that the two sides will always remain separate—the one trying to make a breakdown, the other avoiding it.

India should not break promises made to servants whom the administrators brought in for their own interests. In this way both efficiency and discipline may be affected. A great feature of the British Empire is efficiency of the Services, but greater than that is the idea of obedience to the superior, whoever he is, without distinction of class, or creed, or race. The first condition of the new Reforms is that India should remain within the Empire. The other safeguards required are protection from outside aggression, the efficiency of the police, and the upholding of law and order. I hope I have not said anything that is not in the interests of both our countries. (Applause.)

Mr. M. K. Acharya, after making an invocation in Sanskrit, said: Allow me to thank you all on behalf of 270,000,000 of His Majesty's subjects in India for the great interest your Association takes in their affairs. You do so at a time when not a few hard problems of your own—financial, economic, commercial, industrial—are weighing heavily upon your minds. That your statesmen are now giving so much time and attention to India is ample proof of their goodwill and of their earnest desire to do the best they can for India. I offer to them my most grateful thanks; but may I in all humility venture to add that good intentions alone will not suffice. Knowledge, deep knowledge, deeper than what evidently has been available to the promoters of the White Paper, is necessary, especially in dealing with a huge country like India, which teems with countless diversities—physical, climatic, racial, communal, social, economic, religious, and linguistic.

If any of you go to India and take to India any pet theories of your own, you will easily find evidence to support those theories. You may, for instance, say that India is a land of colossal ignorance and superstition. But if you will probe deep you will marvel how the most illiterate peasant in India grasps almost intuitively the supreme truth of the God in man
and God in all that perhaps most learned doctors of divinity in other lands cannot comprehend. Or, again, you may say that nowhere else in the world are women such hopeless victims of men's tyranny as in India. But here, too, if you probe deep, you will find that whereas in other lands perhaps women are only respected, in India they are worshipped—worshipped verily as incarnations of divinity; that nowhere in the world is the sanctity of motherhood honoured more.

Likewise, while some of you may be shocked at the condition of the Depressed Classes, and believe that it is due to the age-long tyranny of the higher castes, as evidently some so-called "friends of India" here seem to believe, more faithful investigators will marvel how it is that in the holiest shrines of the caste Hindus are kept and worshipped the images of saints, some of whom were born among the lowliest of Untouchables, a fact that even Mr. Gandhi does not seem to understand.

Yes, India is a land of baffling diversities, which even those who, like your lordship or like the learned lecturer of this afternoon, have spent many years among her peoples may find hard to explain. For through the ages India has stood, and divinely until the end of time India will stand, for the supreme law of unity in and through diversity.

India and England together must explore and discover the key to true Swaraj. It is going to be the privilege of Indo-Britannia to discover the key. And self-government for India, whether through the very imperfect White Paper scheme or any better scheme, is after all only a preliminary step towards this joint mission of Indo-Britannia. Again I thank you all for the great interest you are evincing in the problems of my country. God bless you all for it.

Sir Hassan Sahrahwady: I do not belong to the profession who are adept in the art of speaking, a lawyer, but I take the liberty of speaking this afternoon, impromptu, and I hope you will kindly forgive me my defects and omissions.

I have been in charge of young men in the biggest University numerically in the British Empire. I found there that Hindus and Muslims having drunk out of the same fountain of knowledge (the young Hindus and the young Muslim boys) are growing up in friendship and harmony, and the future units of the nation of India are inspired by the spirit of Nationalism, which is growing, as Lord Goschen said.

It is not very true that the Hindu communities are the only ones crying for reforms. The Muslims also want reforms. They are as sincere and as strong in their demand for going forward as any other educated class or unit in India, large or small. They feel that India should be given some sort of a standing which will take away the great stigma of subordination, which they feel acutely when they come into European countries or come in contact with other people, maybe the Irish. That is a growing feeling and demand from all classes of people in India.

As regards the White Paper it is there. It has been read by the people of India of all classes for whatever it is worth, good, bad, or indifferent. They know that certain things were promised to us. If you do not give
them you will create disappointment, and strengthen the hands of those very people in India who are our worst enemies, the enemies of law and order, without which no country has progressed or can progress. If we want goodwill in India, if we want happy trade relations between the British countries to be re-established, goodwill must be restored and as quickly as possible without party politics coming in between.

As your lordship pointed out, there are normal and sensible safeguards. Those safeguards may never come into operation at all. There is the Indian Penal Code against robbers and murderers and thieves. It does not come into operation except on those people who commit those offences. The Indians will work the Reforms so well that it will not be necessary to bring in the safeguards; but those who say there must be safeguards should realize that they are effective safeguards, which to my mind—I may be very wrong—will make responsibility at the centre come in in ten or fifteen years. There is your Reserve Bank. That must come into being and function, and the trade relations must be so established that our financial stability should be restored. Those two safeguards will take fifteen years or more. Let good trade relations be established, and let your people have their careers in India. If the Indian people have a bad feeling against British products and British relationship, that is really a definite menace that ought not to be trifled with.

As regards the transference of law and order, it was very refreshing to hear what Lord Meston said. Why should they not be transferred? If you do not trust people, the feeling of injustice and grievance will remain. But there is another gain. You transfer law and order to an Indian Minister. If he is so foolish as not to consult his other colleagues, if he does not work with his Governor, he and the party that he represents would be the people who would get all the attacks and all the odium and not the British Government or the British member of the Executive Council in charge of law and order. That is an advantage to be taken into account. The British people know that it is by working a thing that we learn. Trust us. Give us law and order and see what we can do.

I thank Lord Meston very much and support his scheme. We in Bengal felt we had a grievance against him in respect to the Meston Financial Settlement, but I am very glad that his award was so just and so fair that it will be remembered as a popular measure.

Mr. Thombre: The question of the future Constitution of India involves the destinies of nearly one-fifth of the entire humanity of the world, and deeply concerns the mighty British Empire. Lord Meston, who, if I may say so, was a most distinguished ornament of the Indian Civil Service, has treated his subject with a dignity worthy of the exalted rank he holds, and of the great duties he performed in India.

Coming from an Indian State, I find myself interested in that part of his lordship's paper in which he deals with Federation, and I will confine to it the few remarks that suggest themselves to me on the topic. His lordship recognizes that Federation with responsibility at the centre is inevitable, but he would have it indicated in the new constitution as the next stage,
although he would have preparations pushed on for it with all practicable speed. If this means that the reforms are to be introduced apart from Federation and responsibility at the centre, the prospect, I fear, is gloomy.

It is hardly necessary to dwell on the genesis and necessity for Federation. I will only refer to the facts which have been often pointed out, that the States are closely identified with numerous branches of All-India activities; that All-India services of public utility function in the territory of the States as well as in British India; that much India taxation is of All-India incidence; and that, nevertheless, decisions affecting India as a whole have been reached by the Government of India without the views of the States being taken into account, and often without even reference to them, notwithstanding the fact that they are vitally affected by them.

The problem is to ascertain and give weight to the views and to co-ordinate the interests of the different political units of India. For this no better means has been suggested than the All-India Federation. There are at present three partners in the Government of India—namely, Great Britain, British India, and the Indian States. As has been so well put, the old articles of association between them have become out of date. The federal bond has been, by common consent, acknowledged to be the most satisfactory one by which to replace the existing form of union, and it would be a great misfortune if the scheme of Federation could not be started without delay on its great career.

On one point a large number of States will be glad to have the support of the high authority of the lecturer. The criterion for inauguration of Federation of States with half the total States' population and half their representation in the Upper Federal Chamber is an inadequate one. The White Paper lays down, as you are aware, that Federation may be brought into operation if this proportion of States should signify their willingness to come into it. I find on scrutiny that this criterion would enable only twenty-eight or twenty-nine States to commit Indian India to Federation, irrespective of the wishes of the remaining hundreds of States. Many States will therefore be glad to find that Lord Meston holds it highly questionable that the Federal structure should be counted as fit for tenancy until a considerably larger number of States are ready to occupy it.

A second point touched on by the lecturer is the length of time that may be required in negotiating the treaties of accession. In my humble opinion, Lord Meston has taken an unduly pessimistic view in this respect. The negotiations should certainly not be hurriedly completed. But even two or three years is a small period in the evolution of great constitutional changes such as those contemplated for a Federated India. In fact, it has been made clear on behalf of the Chamber of Princes that when all the necessary material is laid before the Princes it should not take them more than a year or so to come to a final decision as to whether or not they will join the Federation.

I think that the "lugubrious prospect" referred to in connection with the transitory provisions again involves an unduly pessimistic attitude. On the side of the States I feel sure that full provision will be made to ensure that their views and interests are not lost sight of during the period of transition.
In my view, it is one of the points which the Joint Select Committee must attend to.

In conclusion, I have merely to say that it is of vast moment not only that a step forward should be taken, but that it should be a quick and adequate step. Goodwill and harmony are the prime necessity, and their restoration will contribute as nothing else to the well-being and contentment of India.

Lord Lamington: I wish on your behalf to express the thanks of the Association to Lord Meston for his very carefully prepared and studied pronouncement on the question of Indian Reforms. He kept the middle way successfully, though he edged, naturally enough, to the endorsement of the White Paper.

In his address he referred to the Simon Commission's Report being dropped, and he said: "The Government of the day, however, for reasons which I am not here to examine, virtually shelved the Report." Well, I think that was a very discreet remark. It was very obvious that it was dictated by party considerations in the House of Commons.

I do feel that in the future, whatever Constitution may be set up, the less the House of Commons has to deal with the affairs of India, the better. It would be better to set up some other form of authority in this country which would deal directly with Indian Government and the Crown. It seems to me absolutely essential that there should not be this possible interference with the great Indian question by a body which may be elected on quite a different issue from anything to do with India.

As regards the other point of the possibility of a Viceroy in the future who may go out of this country ignorant of Indian life and character, I do not believe in the future it will be possible to appoint anyone from this country unless they have had previous experience in India. They must understand the people and be able to rely on their own judgment. Otherwise a man goes out to India absolutely at sea. Tremendous questions are put before him, administration most complex, and he will have to rely upon his Executive Council. But how would he know the personnel of the Executive Council sufficiently to rely upon the opinion of any one particular member or of them all together?

I only want to make those two points, and to express again our thanks to Lord Meston for having taken the trouble to prepare this paper. Also I should like to thank Viscount Goschen for having come here and presided, and for having told us about his experience of the working of dyarchy in Madras.

The President put the vote of thanks to the meeting, which was carried by acclamation.

Lord Meston: The evening is far spent, and I am afraid that we must come to a conclusion. In a sense the discussion has been a little disappoint- ing. Coming before you, as I did, as a very obvious mugwamp, I expected to receive the treatment which those undesirable animals generally are accorded, and I certainly anticipated that the extremists on both sides would
unite in rending anyone who attempted to pursue a middle course. So that in that sense anticipations have been disappointed.

Neverthe less, I would express my gratitude to you, Lord Lamington, and to the speakers as a whole for the kindness they have shown to the attempt I made to put before them a moderate and considered view of the marvelously difficult problems which now confront our nation. Particularly I am indebted to you, my lord Chairman, for your endorsement of much which I attempted to prove, and to that veteran administrator Lord Lamington for his very generous remarks.

We had a very interesting speech from my old friend Sir Prabhashankar Pattani. He and I have faced considerable perils together in the past, and he himself, I am sure, is ready to face still more in the future. But it is always a solace to hear from one with his wide experience and sound judgment such an expression of confidence in the wisdom of the general lines upon which we are proceeding.

Then we are indebted to the Pandit Acharya for his Vedic benediction, and, I hope, although I did not quite follow some parts of it, his absolution. To Sir Hassan Suhrahwady we all agree in offering congratulations upon the high legal distinction which the London University has just conferred upon him, and which his speech this afternoon would seem very fully to justify.

As regards Mr. Thombre, I trust that he will not go away under the misapprehension that, although Federation may not arrive tomorrow morning, it will not be one of the pillars of the new Constitution as laid down in the forthcoming legislation. There is, I think, in the White Paper, and certainly in the pronouncements of our public men, right away from the beginning of the negotiations which are now in force, the clearest evidence of the intention, whatever step may be taken for the moment, to make it perfectly clear that a Federation in the future, though without reference to the precise time at which that further step will materialize, is an integral and an essential part of the new Constitution.

There has been this afternoon no serious divergence of opinion on the general lines of the action which ought to be taken by Britain at the present crisis, and all good friends of India, as we are here in this room, most warmly hope and most confidently believe that a wise and happy solution will be found for the enormous issues which are now before our country.
THE SUMMER RECEPTION

The President and Council gave a reception at Grosvenor House, Park Lane, on Friday, July 21, 1933, to meet the Maharajah Gaekwar of Baroda. Viscountess Melville assisted Lord Lamington in receiving the guests. The Secretary of State for India, who was accompanied by Lady Maud Hoare, took part in the proceedings. More than 300 members and guests were present, including many members and delegates to the Joint Select Committee on Indian Reforms; also some of the witnesses and others from India in connection with the inquiries on the future Constitution of India.

Lord Lamington gave messages of regret for inability to be present from a number of prominent members. He added:

There are two names which I particularly wish to mention. Our invitation was accepted by Lord Burnham, who thereby showed his continued interest in the welfare of India, and whose death in the midst of his activities we so much deplore. The other name is that of the Governor-Designate of Bombay who had intended to be present with Lady Brabourne, but now finds this to be impossible.

On behalf of the Council I welcome the many guests we have today, and particularly His Highness the Maharajah Gaekwar, the Secretary of State for India and Lady Maud Hoare, and the King's Indian Orderly Officers. (Cheers.) I have enjoyed the close friendship of His Highness the Maharajah Gaekwar for thirty years, and can speak from personal observation not only of his solicitude for the welfare of his own people, but also of the great share he has had in the changing and widening of the general Indian outlook. For more than half a century the Maharajah Gaekwar has exercised a formative influence on public opinion in India. You can gain some measure of that influence if you turn to the biography by Mr. Stanley Rice, a former Honorary Secretary of this Association, and also to the collection of speeches by His Highness issued only this month by the Oxford University Press. It will be seen from these volumes that the Maharajah Gaekwar has been consistently ahead of opinion in social, educational, and administrative ideas and plans. (Cheers.)

It is a striking fact that so long ago as 1917, before the Montagu-Chelmsford inquiry took place, His Highness declared his conviction that the future Constitution of India should be founded on federal lines. It is but natural that a Ruler who has exercised so strong an influence on the thought of India should have taken close interest for many years past in the work of the East India Association, which exists for the welfare of that country and to stimulate thought and discussion upon its problems. Even before I went out to the Governorship of Bombay thirty years ago he was a Vice-President of the Association and remains so to this day. Now we are indebted to him for a generous grant, spread over a period of five years, which gives us opportunity to exercise hospitality and thus to promote the social
contact between Britain and India in this country which is of so much value. I take the opportunity to express to His Highness our warm gratitude and our best wishes for his own health and the prosperity of his great State. (Cheers.)

I have also to thank Sir Samuel Hoare for finding time to be with us this afternoon in the midst of his manifold preoccupations. (Cheers.) If possible this has been a more busy week for him than usual, for on Monday he was in charge of a debate on the Indian Estimates in the House of Commons, and he has spent the normal working hours of three days in undergoing the exacting ordeal of examination by the Joint Select Committee on the perplexities of the White Paper. Yet immediately on leaving the witness chair this afternoon he comes to us fresh and smiling, and he adds to our indebtedness by bringing with him Lady Maud Hoare, who by her charm, courtesy, and tact, is the worthy helpmeet of a statesman engaged upon a momentous constitutional task. (Cheers.)

We meet when another great stage in that task is in progress. It is right that every point of view should be brought under the consideration of the Joint Select Committee. Whatever our opinions may be on the subject, I am sure that you will share my view that no good could result from disappointing the expectations that have been reasonably raised nor from allowing any substantial justification for the allegation that we have not fulfilled our undertakings. I was in the House of Commons in the eighties of last century, and, recalling the long-drawn-out struggle for Home Rule in Ireland, I cannot but regret deeply the fact that party spirit prevented reconciliation and a judicious settlement forty years ago or more in place of the present unsatisfactory condition in relation to Ireland. No one could wish for another such protracted struggle, but with party spirit and motives now laid aside my own personal opinion is that if a Constitution, in which experienced British officials work with representative Indians, is set up India can be made a contented unified entity under the British Crown. (Cheers.)

The Maharajah Gaekwar of Baroda, who was warmly received, said: I must, in the first place, say how grateful I am to the East India Association for the honour it has done me in inviting me to be its chief guest this afternoon. As my old friend Lord Lamington has reminded you, I have been connected with the Association for over thirty years; and I have watched, with much gratification, the steady growth of its influence in this country and in India. If I may say so, the Association has rendered, and is rendering, valuable service to both countries. (Cheers.) It provides a common platform on which Englishmen and Indians can meet and exchange views on the important questions of the day in an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual understanding; and through its Journal and its meetings it has helped to create an instructed public opinion on Indian questions. I need not remind you that India has 350 million people with an ancient heritage. We are studying your heritage and institutions. Will you not study ours? Partnership implies mutual respect and understanding. Would that there were more such institutions both in India and England! (Cheers.)

Secondly, I am sure I am only giving expression to your feelings when I
say how sincerely we appreciate the presence of Sir Samuel Hoare with us. The Secretary of State for India has at all times a difficult task, but today, with the momentous issues involved in the framing of a new Constitution for India, the office carries with it a burden of responsibility which, I venture to say, is as arduous as any under the Crown. (Cheers.) We recognize in his presence evidence of his interest in the great work which the Association is doing.

Sir Samuel Hoare's presence here possesses a deeper significance: it is an evidence of the increasing recognition of the position which Indian States occupy in the Commonwealth. If I may be pardoned a personal note, I may say that during all my fifty-five years of public life I have endeavoured to obtain for Indian States their rightful place in the polity of India. (Cheers.) I have fought for their rights, I have never ceased to insist on their duties. Let us insist on both rights and duties. Federation without frustration, development without domination—let this be our motto. A partnership of free peoples—this is the Commonwealth. To me therefore it is a gratification that, in the Constitution that is now being set up for India, the fundamental principle has been recognized of an All-India Federation, in which Indian States shall have their legitimate share in the formulation and execution of policies which will affect the well-being of India as a whole. For many years I have been convinced that it is only along these lines that a proper solution can be found for India's problems, and that the edifice of a self-governing India within the Commonwealth must be built on these wider and deeper foundations. (Cheers.)

Just after the Great War I voiced this main principle, which I had long held, and I am glad that today the details of such a scheme are being worked out by expert committees. This principle has now found firm adherents everywhere, and I earnestly hope and pray that soon—very soon—we may see the new Constitution at work which shall give it full and fitting expression. And, if I may repeat here what I have said elsewhere, I am convinced that, in this new order, Indian States, with their distinctive tradition, can play a notable part—a part which will redound to the benefit of India and of the Commonwealth. (Cheers.)

As in a well-governed State the individual enjoys much freedom to develop his true self, so in the Commonwealth the success will be judged by the freedom of the parts to live and develop their true genius. India within the Commonwealth, the States within India, demand to live a full and true life and to realize their hopes and aspirations of regeneration in their own way.

I shall now conclude by thanking Lord Lamington for the kind words in which he has referred to me today, by wishing Sir Samuel success in the great task on which he is engaged, and expressing my gratitude to the East India Association for the honour it has done me. (Cheers.)

Sir Samuel Hoare, who was cheered on rising, said: Our distinguished Chairman expressed his surprise that I should have come to this delightful entertainment, and that I should have come to it smiling at the end of a rather onerous week of work. My Lords and Gentlemen, how could I have
avoided coming to an assembly so representative as the assembly I see before me, and how could I have avoided coming smiling when I see around me so many friends both Indian and British?

My Lord Chairman, your Association for many years past—indeed, for almost two generations—has provided a wonderful Round Table and the gathering together of the friends of India of all schools of thought. You have provided the first example of a really big Indian Round Table, and tonight I seem to see around me representatives of almost every school both of Indian and of British thought.

One of your distinguished officers, Sir John Kerr, I have had at my right hand in the Joint Select Committee during the last two days. (Applause.) I was going to give evidence upon the Franchise, and, feeling rather a lightweight, I looked round for a good heavy-weight to go with me before the Committee, and accordingly during the last two days, including today, I have had his very valuable assistance.

Tonight I am here for two reasons. First of all, to pay a tribute to the work that your Association has been doing, and particularly to the work of distinguished public men like Lord Lamington and Sir John Kerr, and, if I may mention him also, my friend and associate in many Indian questions, Mr. F. H. Brown. (Cheers.) We are fortunate in having such an Association in London, and you are trebly fortunate in having three such very distinguished and useful officials.

But the other reason why I am here today is to pay an equally sincere tribute to His Highness the Maharajah Gaekwar. I suppose that His Highness is one of the senior princes not only of India, but in the whole world. He succeeded to his great inheritance almost sixty years ago. Looking at him tonight, hearing him speak, we could not believe that those dates were true did not we see them set out in black and white in all the directories. Throughout all this long period, covering two generations of time, His Highness has ruled over one of the greatest States in India; and, if I may say so, he has ruled over it consistently, not only with great knowledge and with great sympathy, but with great forethought for the future.

The last thing in the world that I would do tonight would be to say a word about Constitutional problems. All I would venture to say is that the speech we have heard His Highness deliver tonight shows you with what foresight he regards the Indian problems of the future, and how, although he has ruled so many years over his State, he is keeping himself in the closest and most continuous contact with the modern movements both in India and in this country. I understand that the title that he bears means "The Shepherd." What better shepherd could a community have in these difficult times than he? And what ruler more careful of the present, and more foreseeing of the future?

I am sure you would wish me to associate with him in the tribute that I am venturing to pay Her Highness the Maharanee. (Cheers.) We wish that she were here tonight. We wish that she could hear the words of tribute that we are all paying to her distinguished husband. I remember the Maharanee in conditions somewhat different from these. I have a curious habit of taking exercise very early in the morning, and one of my
habits is to go to Queen's Club and play tennis sometimes almost in the
dimness of the dawn. The only other individual that I have ever found
playing tennis at so early an hour at Queen's Club has been Her Highness
the Maharanee of Baroda. I wish that she were in London today to give
me the great pleasure of having a game with her.

Now tonight we are here not only to pay His Highness a tribute, but to
give him especial thanks for the generous gift that he has made to the East
India Association. I feel sure, looking around this great assembly this
afternoon, that no gift could have been more apposite, and no gift will prove
more useful to the Association in the future than His Highness's gift.
Your Highness, we are most grateful to you, and I am glad to be here
tonight to express my own personal thanks for your beneficent act. (Cheers.)

I would end with this one observation. During the course of the last few
days I have been giving evidence before a committee and delegation com-
posed of sixty very acute British and Indian gentlemen, and one of my
friends said to me, "What a risk you are taking!" I comforted myself by
remembering what once happened to a prisoner in the dock at the Old
Bailey. Perhaps he had not too good a case. None the less he went into
court with an air not only confident, but cheerful, and throughout the
evidence he maintained both this cheerfulness and this confidence. When
the trial was ended one of his friends said to him, "How did you remain
so confident and so cheerful in all this difficult time?" He replied, "It was
quite all right. Every member of the jury was a personal friend of mine!"
(Laughter.) Well, after the very difficult week with which I have been
faced, I hope my British and Indian friends on the Joint Select Committee
will allow me to make a similar claim. (Applause.)

Having made these observations, and having made them with all the
sincerity that I can command, once again I thank His Highness for his
munificent gift to the East India Association.
THE LANDED CLASSES AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION

BY RAJA SAYID MOHAMMED MEHDI OF PIRPUR, M.L.C.

A few weeks ago I had the honour to be one of six representatives of landowning interests in various parts of India who appeared, under the leadership of the Maharaja of Burdwan, to give evidence before the Joint Select Committee on Indian Reforms. Last week Sardar M. V. Kibe and others appeared before a sub-committee, as representatives of landowning interests in the Bombay Presidency, which differ in some important respects from those of other provinces. But from whatever part of India we come we take our stand unitedly on the broad general ground that there should be provision in the forthcoming Constitution Act, and in any rules that may be made thereunder, for the preservation of our old-established rights, and for us to play a due share in the political and local administrative life of India.

No one can challenge the reasonableness of the claim that in a great sub-continent where agriculture is and must continue to be the main industry of the vast majority of the people, provision must be made, so far as humanly possible, for a contented and prosperous rural population, whether they be owners or tillers of the soil. To this consideration recognition has been given by a long line of British statesmen entitled to speak with the fullest authority. I need only quote in this connection a reply made by the late Viceroy three years ago almost to the day to an address presented to him by a deputation representative of the landholders in India. Lord Irwin said:

"Families like yours, which have—some of them from ancient times—their roots deep in the broad acres of Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihar, and other parts of the country, and whose interests depend, perhaps more than those of any other section of the community, upon peaceful and orderly administration, should from the very nature of things be one of the chief and most stable buttresses of the Government, which, either now or in the future, has the welfare of India's many millions in its charge."
You will be in a better position to appreciate the truth of this observation if I give you some description of the countryside with which I am best acquainted—viz., that of the United Provinces. I was one of the landowning witnesses before the Joint Select Committee in my capacity as Secretary of the British Indian Association of the Taluqdar of Oudh, while the sister province of Agra was represented by my friend Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, speaking for the Agra Zemindars' Association. I may remind you that the Statutory Commission wrote of the United Provinces as the most typically Indian of all the provinces. It follows that a description of the conditions of life and the people inhabiting the Indo-Gangetic plains is applicable more or less to the whole of India. Though there are a few great cities in this part of Hindustan, the life of the people is essentially rural, and thus typical of India generally. In times of normal employment a highly industrialized country like England has 58 persons out of every 100 dependent on manufacturing industries, and only 8 dependent on agriculture. But in India 73 per cent. of the people depend on agriculture and only 8 per cent. on industry, transport and trade.

TENANT AND LANDLORD

The simple life of the Indian countryside has always impressed those who have seen it closely at first hand. The people make their humble dwellings of mud more than of bricks; and are able to spend most of their time in the open air. They are industrious and thrifty, but spend very freely on events of family importance such as weddings. This means, unfortunately, resort to the money lender. It must not be supposed that there is a wide gulf between the owning and the cultivating classes. Not infrequently there is little difference between the standards of life of the well-to-do tenants and those of the smaller landowners. Indeed, you may sometimes go to the dwellings of the tenants and find there evidences of more prosperity than in those of small zamindars. Nothing could be more mistaken than the picture sometimes drawn of zamindars as exacting capitalists whose only relations with their tenants are those of rent collection. The
fact is that they are connected with the tenants through the strong ties of blood, caste, and religion, as well as those of a mutual interest in agricultural welfare. This observation is more or less applicable to the larger landholders. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, written fifteen years ago, made observations on this subject which still hold good in every respect.

"The natural and acknowledged leaders in the country are the landed aristocracy. They generally represent ancient and well-born families and their estates are often the result of conquest or grants from some mediæval monarch. By position, influence, and education they are fitted to take a leading part in public affairs."

The Statutory Commission fully confirmed this judgment, observing that the great landowners are marked out as persons of authority and prestige in a society which is far from objecting to social distinctions. In respect to the class I more particularly represent, the Report pointed out that while the estates of the Taluqdars of Oudh number no more than 260, they comprise two-thirds of the area of Oudh and pay about one-sixth of the land revenue of the whole United Provinces. I may here remark, in passing, that the Taluqdars entertain feelings of the warmest regard for our Chairman, Sir Harcourt Butler, and when he vacated the Governorship of the United Provinces in 1922 conferred on him the unique honour of election as an honorary Taluqdar of Oudh. In the words of the Simon Report, some of the Taluqdars represent the old conquering Rajput families with an ancestry dating back to the ninth century:

"The most powerful of the Taluqdars own hundreds of villages and enjoy very large incomes. Their wealth, their social status, and the control they exercise over their tenants give these 'Barons of Oudh' a position of very great influence in their area. They comprise numbers of both the major communities, and their common interests cut across the communal divisions."

**Rural Society**

I must now say something of the people of the countryside generally. A characteristic of the cultivating masses which has impressed many observers is their credulity. They are no exception to the rule that credulity and lack of education go hand-
in-hand. It must be difficult for people in this country, with all the facilities they possess to be informed of the course of events, to understand how rapidly the wildest and most fantastic rumours gain currency among the people of rural India. This characteristic has been the origin of many a village dispute leading to violence and communal rioting, with marked tendency to spread from district to district. But linked with this credulity there is a quickness of apprehension in matters affecting their own interests. In times of excitement and unrest the cultivators show acuteness in detecting weakness and want of decision on the part of those who are called upon to exercise authority. Indeed, they appreciate and quickly respond to resourcefulness and calmness of judgment, such as was shown by our Chairman in the unrest in Oudh fomented by Congress agitators in 1920 and 1921. The cultivators are more than ever the prey of credulity when there is a lack of certainty as to the action which will be taken by Government.

Another characteristic of the people having a strong bearing on the problems of India's future is their innate conservatism and their attachment to family ties. They dislike sudden changes and are suspicious of sweeping innovations. They are reluctant to leave their village homes, even under the glamour of the promise of good wages in manufacturing industry. If they are persuaded to go to the towns, they do so only to replenish family resources by working in factories or some other urban employment, but with the full intention of returning to their villages. The Royal Commission on Labour in India recommended that this tendency, instead of being hampered and condemned, should be encouraged and regularized as a not undesirable feature of the industrial system. In a sense, the system springs from one of the most worthy of human motives. The factory worker in Cawnpore never ceases to recognize that though he may be absent from his own folk, he has responsibilities towards them, and must do his best to save for his family and to return in due time to his own humble roof. The ideas underlying the joint family system are deeply rooted in the Indian mind, and though the system may be undergoing substantial modification under present-
day conditions, the basic principle remains that those members of the family who are unable to work are to be maintained by those who can earn a living.

**Present-Day Changes**

It is not my purpose to discount or belittle the extraordinary changes which are coming over the countryside and which have been indicated in the evidence of Sir Charles Innes and others before the Joint Select Committee. Living, as I do, among the village people, I can testify to the rapidly-growing signs of their awakening in the last dozen years. I can recall the time when they took little or no interest in events outside their own villages. They still make matters which have some bearing on their economic and general welfare their chief interest; but under modern conditions they have come to recognize that such matters depend in no small measure upon the play of events and policies shaped outside the village. They are quick to detect and lament any rural grievance—such, for instance, as the economic difficulties arising from the continuous fall of prices in the last few years. Political agitators make use of this trait of character to claim that the people are in agreement with their often subversive political views and are to be ranked among the supporters of Congress. But we have had not infrequent evidences that when a genuine grievance has been met in a sympathetic spirit the people have shown no disposition to attach themselves to the political programmes of agitators. One reason for this has been that the programmes have been drawn up by people not in real touch with the rural masses.

The vernacular press, conducted mostly by men who are opposed to landholders, exercises great influence in shaping the ideas of the people. The writers know how to play upon the credulity and ignorance of the villagers by painting pictures of the allurements of revolutionary change. There is little effective machinery to counterbalance such insidious efforts to wreck the whole fabric of agricultural society in the country. Those who could really influence the minds of the people, by reason of their standing and knowledge of conditions, have been slow to adopt
counteractive efforts; but some at least of them are now coming forward to explain the real facts of the situation to the people.

In this connection I may express keen satisfaction that a most important daily newspaper, having behind it great traditions of influence and standing, has been acquired by a group of representatives of the most stable elements in Indian life. The transfer of the Pioneer from Allahabad to Lucknow, which is now being made, will give the paper a direct link with the landed interests of Oudh. An English daily of such distinction is a great asset; but it is to be hoped that the problem of establishing sound and fair-minded vernacular papers will be taken up in earnest and solved in the near future. It is essential that papers of reasonable views should be published in languages used by the humblest people of the countryside.

LEADERSHIP

It is a matter of common remark that the urban politicians are far less in touch with the agricultural classes than their contemporaries in Western countries. Yet every effort is made to induce the masses to believe that such political propagandists suffer for upholding the interests of the cultivators. Nothing suits them better than to be surrounded with a halo of martyrdom. Subversive organizations have penetrated every district and for a time seemed to be strongly established. No doubt the people were carried away by the excitement arising from such activities. It may appear on the surface that politicians holding the most extreme views—promoting, for instance, ideas of communism—enjoy popularity among the masses, but this is not the fact. India is in a real sense a conservative country and has been so for centuries. Under good leadership the cultivators are capable of forming a sound judgment.

THE NO-RENT CAMPAIGN

I can illustrate what I have said by a reference to the agrarian trouble in the United Provinces issuing in the no-rent campaign of 1930-31. I had occasion to visit some of the worst-affected districts in Oudh, and I am also familiar with conditions in the
eastern part of the Agra Province where I hold property. It might have been supposed by any outside observer reading the Congress-owned newspapers that the discontent was due to the neglect and mismanagement of the landowners, and that the entire rural population had thrown in their lot with the apostles of the no-rent campaign. The fact was that, owing to the economic world depression, the price of grain was so low that it was impossible for the tenant to pay full rents, and, therefore, for the landowner to pay full revenue. There was a feeling of great anxiety throughout the province.

As soon as Government announced substantial remissions the people were satisfied and the situation grew calm. Happily, we possessed in Sir Malcolm Hailey a Governor who has a penetrating knowledge of all aspects of Indian life, and will rank with our Chairman, Sir Harcourt Butler, as one of the very ablest and most far-sighted administrators who have ever had charge of an Indian province. The United Provinces Government had grave Budgetary difficulties owing to poor trade, but His Excellency had the mingled prudence and courage to place the welfare of the agriculturalists above other considerations. As a result of the remissions he boldly decreed, the situation was eased and the way opened for a return to normal conditions. The rapid subsidence of the no-rent campaign proved that many people who took part in the demonstrations and the rioting were not enamoured of the subversive political programme put before them by the agitators, but simply sought the relief which was necessitated by economic conditions and partial failure of crops. You are well aware that the world still awaits economic recovery, and this fact has an important bearing upon agrarian problems.

RURAL ORGANIZATIONS

Last winter the conditions in the United Provinces again became difficult, owing to the partial failure of rain and the damage caused to the crops by hailstorms. The British Indian Association recognized that it could best help to relieve the anxieties of the people by establishing local branches in various districts of Oudh, and even in sub-divisions of districts. An
appeal was made to the people to come forward and establish local institutions and hold meetings. The response to this appeal was so great and marked that even the most optimistic among us could not have imagined the success which was ultimately achieved. We had remarkably large attendances at the meetings, reaching on one occasion no less than 15,000 persons. An organization consisting of landowners and tenants was formed under the experienced and inspiring leadership of our President, Raja Sir Rampal Singh, who is looked upon throughout Oudh as a "father of the people." All joined to do their best in helping those who suffered from the bad times and poor crops. A particularly gratifying feature has been the attendance at our meetings of the military pensioners and their families, for men with army service behind them have considerable influence among their neighbours. We have made a good beginning, but there is no doubt that we must continue these activities to bring our organization to a high level of value and influence in all parts of the province.

The success of our efforts and the response received from the masses provide eloquent testimony to the fact that the people prefer to listen to the advice and to follow the lead of those who, as owners of property, belong to the countryside themselves and understand the condition of the people rather than to professional agitators from the towns. This success provides hopeful augury that under the new Constitution the natural leaders of the people will be able to exercise an increasingly beneficent influence on the welfare of the countryside. The people will more and more realize that the interests of the owners and the tillers of the soil are closely identified; and that those interests will not be promoted by revolutionary changes.

I have not attempted in this lecture to outline the suggestions made by the landowning witnesses before the Joint Select Committee as to the methods by which the influence of the zamindari class can best be preserved and made effective under the new Constitution. Our suggestions for the maintenance of a reasonable proportion of seats for landholders in the Legislatures, for specific statutory safeguards, and for the provision of Second
Chambers, not only in Bengal, Bihar, and the United Provinces, but also in other provinces, are set forth at length in the Minutes of Evidence (No. 7) which have been made public. Moreover, some light will be thrown upon our proposals, no doubt, in the course of the discussion which is now to ensue. My object has been to seek the sympathetic support of public opinion in this country for the claims we have made by showing from personal experience and observation that the landowners constitute a most important stabilizing element in the India of today, and that, if their rights and interests are duly conserved in the Constitution Act, they will be able to make a most important contribution to the functioning of the new system of government on soundly progressive but reasonably cautious lines.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1., on Friday, July 28, 1933, when a Paper entitled "The Landed Classes and the New Constitution" was read by Raja Syed Mohammed Mehdi of Pirpur. Sir Harcourt Butler, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

Sir John Kerr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir Malcolm Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Sir Abdul Qadir, Lady Abbass Ali Baig, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Rao Bahadur M. V. Kibe, Mr. F. G. Pratt, C.S.I., Mr. H. M. R. Hopkins, C.S.I., Dr. M. B. Cameron, C.I.E., and Mrs. Cameron, Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan, Mr. H. R. H. Wilkinson, Major G. W. Gilbertson, Nawabzada Muhammad Azum Khan of Toru, Swami B. H. Bon, Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Mr. A. Carlyle, Mr. M. Naim, Sirdar Hardit Singh, Mr. E. Bloomfield, Mr. C. Anwas Ali, Mr. Paul King, Mr. C. R. Corbett, Mr. K. C. Roy Chowdhury, Mr. J. H. Benton, Mr. M. M. Jee, Mr. H. Jehanjaini, Dr. Ruschl, Mr. H. P. Sukla, Mr. J. M. K. Mackenzie, Mr. E. Coleman, Mr. S. Y. Hashmy, Mr. Mohamed Yamin Khan, Mr. R. P. Sinha, Mr. M. K. Acharya, Mr. L. M. Deshpande, Mr. H. L. W. Matters, Mr. T. Mardy Jones, Mr. H. K. Sadler, Mr. J. B. Hall, Mr. M. Bonnevie, Mr. B. K. Sinha, Mr. B. D. Mirchandani, the Misses Anderson, Miss Hopley, and Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The Chairman said: It is a great pleasure to introduce to you my old friend the Raja of Pirpur, a well known and much respected Taluqdar of Oudh. From the earliest days of my service I was convinced that we ought to encourage the landlords of Agra and Oudh. They represent stability and conservative feeling. It is right to protect the tenants, and I can claim that it was largely due to my relations with the Taluqdaris of Oudh that we were able to pass with their consent a Rent Act giving large reasonable privileges to the tenants. And in my experience—I speak only of Agra and Oudh, and especially of Oudh—the most prosperous tenants are to be found on the estates of the large landowners. As a body, the large landowners are good landlords. Poor landlords cannot afford to be generous.

It has been said that the landlords are a dying class, largely in debt. Thanks to the beneficent operations of the Court of Wards, many large estates have been saved. The majority of estates are not in debt. A rough enquiry made under my orders when I was Governor of the United Provinces showed that about 60 per cent. of landowners paying Rs. 5,000 revenue a year or more were free of debt. I doubt if any country could show such a prosperous landowning class.

One reason why the landowners have not gained more general recognition is that they have not combined. The Taluqdaris of Oudh have a powerful Association which protects their interests. It has always been my desire to see greater combination between the landowners of Agra and Oudh and of other parts of India. Distance and provincial jealousies have frustrated this,
and the landowners of the United Provinces are as a result dissatisfied with their position under the reform proposals. I do not wish to enter into any controversial matter, but this I do urge on the landowners of my old Province, and if my voice will reach them outside also, to sink differences, to combine, and so to protect and promote the interests of their order. The Raja of Pirpur has done much public-spirited work in this direction, and I will now call upon him to address you. (Cheers.)

(The Paper was then read.)

**NAWABZADA LIAQUAT ALI KHAN** : My friend Raja Sayid Mohammed Mehdi of Pirpur has, in his well-thought-out paper, described very fairly the condition of the rural population in India. He has told you the object of our visit to this country. We have come here to place before the Joint Select Committee and the people of Great Britain the views of the land-holders of India as regards the future Constitution that is intended to be given to that great country. We gave our evidence last month before the Joint Parliamentary Committee, and we are grateful to this Association, and especially to the Honorary Secretary, for having afforded us this opportunity of placing our views before the British public.

There are two main demands that have been placed before the Joint Parliamentary Committee on behalf of the land-holders of India. They are, firstly, their increased representation in the legislatures of the country; and, secondly, the safeguarding of their proprietary rights in land and other privileges which they have enjoyed for centuries and which they have always held very dearly to their hearts.

Now it may be said that in democracy there is no such thing as special representation. The people of this country may find it difficult to understand this demand of the land-holders, but it is not so difficult to understand it if we take into consideration the conditions that prevail in India today and that are to prevail in that country for some years to come. India, and especially the United Provinces, is mainly an agricultural country. As has been pointed out by the Raja Sahib, 73 per cent. of the population depends on agriculture alone. In the future legislatures of the country agricultural problems are to be the most important ones, and I boldly put forward this claim, that we who are directly connected with the welfare of the agricultural classes of India are fit persons to represent their interests in the legislatures. This may be considered a very bold claim, but if I can show by the experience of the past few years that we have safeguarded their interests most zealously, then I am sure you will agree that my claim is not unfounded.

During the last ten years the majority of the members of the United Provinces Council has consisted of zamindars, and more has been done for the tenants than was ever done before. That shows that we are more concerned about the welfare of the tenantry than any other class of people. Certain legislation has been passed which has given tenants rights which a number of Provinces have not conferred upon the cultivators, and this has been done when the zamindars were in a majority in the Council.

Then during the last three years we have had very great economic de-
pression. Every country has suffered, but the fall in agricultural prices has made the people of India suffer most, since 73 per cent. of the population depend entirely on agriculture. We have been passing through most difficult times, and it is to the credit of the zamindars that they have done what no other class of people, what no other interest in the world has done—that is, they have remitted rent of their tenants to the extent of nearly fifty millions of rupees every year, and thus have given great relief to the tenantry of the United Provinces. (Applause.) I would like to know what other class of people have foregone their dues to any such extent. On the contrary, every day we hear of countries demanding their pound of flesh from those who owe them money. The relief that we got from the Government in the remission of revenue has been only about eleven millions every year. In other words, zamindars have given out of their own pockets about forty million rupees every year to the tenantry in the remission of rent. These facts, unfortunately, are not known to the people at large.

Now, sir, it can be said that in the future most of the constituencies will be rural. Therefore, if the zamindars have done so much for the tenantry, they have every chance of being returned to the legislatures in greater numbers. But those who are acquainted with the conditions in India know that illiteracy is very great. Only 6 per cent. of the population is literate, and, as has been pointed out by my friend the Raja Sahib, the villagers are carried away for the moment by those people who carry on dishonest propaganda against the zamindar class and against the established form of government in that country. They go round and tell the poor tenant that, "if you support us, you will not have to pay any dues," and the poor tenant is misled. It will take him some time to understand that no government can be run without money, whether it be the British Government, the Zamindari Government, the Congress Government, or the Bolshevik Government. Whatever kind of government you have, you must have money to run it.

For that reason we feel that during the course of the next few years, until a tenant is able to realize the position and to understand fully the significance of the Constitution that is being given to India, the representation of the agricultural interest in the legislatures should be guaranteed. This step is most essential for the transitory period. After a few years it may not be necessary.

We feel that a great injustice has been done to the land-holders in the White Paper. At the present time in the United Provinces out of 100 elected members, the zamindars have six special seats. It is proposed to have a house of 228 members in the future. All of these members are to be elected, and the number of the seats given to the zamindars is the same—i.e. six. Our demand before the Joint Parliamentary Committee is that, in justice and in fairness, our number should have been increased proportionately. That is to say, we enjoy representation to the extent of 6 per cent. now. The same percentage should be maintained in the future Constitution. (Applause.)

Now, Mr. Chairman, in the United Provinces zamindars have been running the Government for the last ten years. You, sir, will testify to the claim I put forward that they have run it well. There has been political
agitation. There has been agitation to overthrow the ordered form of Government, and we zamindars have always stood up for the maintenance of law and order. No Government can suppress a movement of this kind unless and until it has the support of the people behind it, and we gave our fullest support to the Government in the maintenance of law and order. It is sometimes said that our demand for special representation is based on the mistrust of the people. It is nothing of the kind. The object in increasing the number of members in the future legislatures is that every interest should be adequately represented, and I contend that our interest has not been adequately safeguarded in the White Paper as regards our representation in the Legislative Council.

The other demand put forward by the land-holders from all over India before the Joint Parliamentary Committee was for the safeguarding of their proprietary rights in land. Everyone who has any regard for the sanctity of proprietary rights will support this demand. Unless and until the whole world, the Government in every country, is run on Bolshevik lines, where there is no property, where no property belongs to anybody, this demand cannot be fairly challenged.

It is sometimes said that the zamindars do not want the progress of the country—that the zamindars in their own interest do not want the political emancipation of the masses. The evidence given before the Joint Parliamentary Committee by the zamindars coming from all over India has given a direct lie to that statement. We want the progress of the country. We want political emancipation of the people, but we do not want chaos in the country. The evidence that was given by the zamindars before the Joint Parliamentary Committee supported the proposals in general as embodied in the White Paper.

You, sir, and everyone of us here, reads every day in the papers about the various safeguards embodied in the White Paper. To my mind the best safeguard that can be in any Constitution is to ensure stable elements in the legislatures—elements that stand for orderly progress of the country; no other safeguard will work. If you are sure of having people in your legislatures who stand to lose by chaos in the country, then you may be sure of the satisfactory working of the Constitution. You may give special powers to the Governors, you may give special powers to the Governor-General, but if those people who stand for orderly government are weeded out, the satisfactory working of the Constitution will be greatly endangered.

Sardar Rao Bahadur M. V. Kibe: There is nothing, I think, which I can add usefully to the two able speeches that have been delivered. In the faithful, accurate, and beautiful picture of the rural India which the lecturer of this evening drew, there is much which is common to other parts of India. The same is the case with regard to the aspirations and the demands, if I may say so, of the landowning classes of all the Presidencies.

As was stated in the memorandum submitted by the Taluqdar class, their demand is for guarantees of the sanads. The Bombay land-holders have also been given sanads by the British Government, and they desire and they have submitted their representation that these sanads should be respected.
and guaranteed by the future Government. In fact, it is an obligation on
the present Government to see that the terms of these sanads are respected,
and not, if I may say so, tampered with by the legislatures of the country in
the future. Because the provision of a second chamber has been assured to
the United Provinces, neither the lecturer nor the Nawabzada said anything
about that subject. I think it is very necessary in the interests of stability
and so many other things that there should be a second chamber in all the
provinces, and particularly in the Bombay Presidency, because the land-
holders of that Presidency are not so united nor so strong as the land-holders
of Agra and Oudh.

It is said that Second Chambers are a clumsy machinery and are not
wanted in a Government which has a Federal Government at the Centre.
But it must be remembered that it is also said that the Federal Government
at the Centre will have a few subjects, and the bulk of the matter for the
amelioration of the condition of the people and the advancement of the
Provinces will be centred in the Provincial Legislatures. If that is so, it is
very necessary in the interests of stable government in those Provinces that
they should have Second Chambers. Therefore this is a demand which we
have very strongly made for a Second Chamber in the Bombay Presidency.

As regards increased representation of land-holding interests, I think that
a demand which will be regarded as just and will be granted. As has been
shown by the second speaker, the land-holding classes are not unmindful of
the progress of the country and of the interests of other people. In fact, I am
certain that in every province they will always come forward to relieve and
help the people.

Sir Malcolm Hailey: I am sorry that owing to engagements with the
Joint Select Committee I was unable to be here during the reading of the
paper, but I have just had the advantage of seeing a copy of it, and I wish
to express my accord with what the Raja Sahib has said regarding the im-
portance of the landlord classes in the two provinces which I know best.

You can regard that importance in two aspects. It is often impressed
upon us that their assistance and their loyalty has been of great value to
Government. I acknowledge that fully, and I need say no more on that
subject in the presence of one who knows them so well and has appreciated
their loyalty so highly as Sir Harcourt Butler. But there is another aspect.
We are now entering on a new order of things, and I myself should prefer
to regard the landlord class, not so much as an assistance to that somewhat
vague entity known as "the Government," but as an element of stability in
the Constitution. With the influence they possess in the countryside, with
all the traditions they have had in the past, and the hold they still have on a
very numerous tenantry, they can make a most important contribution in
directing on the right lines the power which is now being placed in the
hands of popular representatives.

In the future everything depends not so much on the form of our Con-
stitution as the hands in which authority is placed. (Applause.) You can
frame Constitutions in many forms and in many different ways; but the
essential factor always is, where does the power lie? It may be a good
thing to place authority in the hands of elected representatives, but that is not enough in itself and does not in itself secure good administration; it is the quality of these representatives which counts. If we are to utilize for the good of the province the influence which the landlords can bring to the new Government, it is essential that the landlords should so organize themselves that they can take their due share in the Provincial Councils of the future, and ensure to these Councils the benefit of the conservative element— I am not using the word in any party term—which they represent. That is to our advantage, as well as theirs, for they have shown in the past that they are capable of taking political views which extend far beyond their own interests.

How is it proposed that we should give that class their position in the Constitution? Admittedly the institution of Second Chambers in three of the Provinces will give them some considerable weight. They will also secure some direct influence by special representation; they have asked for more, and I know that their claims will be carefully considered by the Joint Select Committee. But let us assume for the moment that they will get a larger representation than it has been proposed to give them; there still remains much more. The Second Chamber can only be in the long run revisory. Special representation on the scale they have been given, or even on the scale for which they have asked, can only give them a voice in affairs, not a voting power equivalent to the interest for which they stand. It is essential that they should, by organization and full use of the influence which they have among the voters, secure a greater authority in the State than could be secured to them by these two constitutional devices.

Many efforts have been made in the United Provinces to form associations and to combine landlords in a movement for this purpose. Anyone interested in the future of the Indian Constitution must wish all success to these efforts. There is in the future which we can foresee much that ought to appeal to them particularly and to add an additional stimulus to their activity. Let me explain my point. We have of late seen a general economic change, which will have particular effect on the position of landlords in India. In the big landlord provinces the rentals hitherto depended on two predominant factors—namely, a great congestion on the soil and a low standard of living among the cultivators. It was the combination of these factors, creating a great competitive demand for land, that regulated rentals. The congestion on the soil will still continue, but, on the other hand, you have a great increase of the standard of living among cultivators, and with their access to political influence this is bound to mean that great political pressure will be exerted on the side of the tenant in order to secure adjustment of rents as against the landlord. That is a new factor, for hitherto the claims of the tenants have been directed mainly to secure stability of tenure.

You will remember that in Ireland—which affords something of an analogy, though not a very close analogy—the first claim was for fixity of tenure, which was followed by a claim for fair rents, and ended in a claim for land purchase. Are we to follow the same course in India? It is conceivable that it may be so; but I only hold that out as a prospect which
must be before the eyes of the landlords, and, apart from our desire to see
them as a powerful element in the Constitution for the good of the Con-
stitution itself and for the good of India, I would point out to them the
necessity of organization in order that they may adjust themselves to new
political conditions which may involve a possible attack on their own position
in society and their influence in the province. Any sudden or drastic change
in that position, diminishing the influence which they can exercise for good
in the life of the province, would prejudice the future of the province itself.
(Cheers.)

Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan: I am very sorry I was late because I was
attending a meeting of the Joint Select Committee. I have read the paper
by Raja Sayid with the greatest interest; it deals with a problem with which
almost every citizen of my province is acquainted.

Within the last eleven years, from 1921 to 1933, our Province has been
faced with what is called the tenancy problem. I remember in 1921, when
practically the whole of Oudh was in confusion and Sir Harcourt Butler
brought order out of chaos and restored peace. The new Constitution de-
manded qualities of the very highest form of statesmanship, and it was
under the Chairman's guidance and inspiration and advice to the zamindars
that the Tenancy Act of 1921 was passed. That Act forms a monument
alike to the statesmanship of our ex-Governor, who is presiding today, and
to the generosity, vision, and foresight of the great Taluqdars of Oudh.

Then from early in 1924, when I entered the Council, till 1926, for three
years the tenancy problem in the Agra Province became very acute indeed.
In almost every sitting of the Council we had discussions on the principles on
which tenancy legislation should be passed, and for the next two years the
Council devoted considerable time to the discussions of this thorny problem
in the committees that were appointed in connection with it. I believe it
will be admitted by all who attended the meetings of the Council in the
summer of 1926 that we dealt with the question in a spirit of give and take,
and the Council was not unfair to the tenants at all. We sat for about ten
to twelve weeks continuously, and used to start at about eleven and go on
sometimes till about six p.m. As was only natural, some of the amend-
ments to the various clauses aroused fierce controversy, but ultimately it
was admitted that the zamindars not only of the Agra Province but also
of Oudh showed a remarkable example of generosity of vision and states-
manship.

Then we had a very serious problem again in 1931—that of the No-Rent
Campaign. Organized attempts were made by the most powerful political
body in India—viz., Congress. The ramifications of the Congress could
be traced in two or three districts of almost every village, in almost every
house in every village. The campaign was intensified and the propaganda
was carried on according to the latest devices of publicity, with the result
that in some districts it seemed for a moment that the whole of the
administration had gone over to the hands of the tenants. I have attended
meetings addressed by leaders of the tenants in which the undiluted and
unadulterated doctrines of Sovietism were preached from the house-tops;
the audience attended and drank in every word, and all the tenants were asked to carry the message to the remotest home and village.

It was at that particular time that our popular and efficient Governor, Sir Malcolm Hailey, took the lead. I am not exaggerating when I say that, but for Sir Malcolm Hailey's initiative and statesmanship, society in the whole of Oudh—at least in the latter half of the year 1931—would have been reduced to its elements. It was Sir Malcolm Hailey's wonderful initiative which prevented the conflagration from spreading.

I am afraid I can express no opinion on the various points which have been raised by the speakers today, because in the last three years of attendance at the Round-Table Conference and the Joint Select Committee, I have made it a rule not to commit myself or to speak out on any questions which are the subject of discussion at the meetings of the Committee. But this I can say, that the land-holders' deputation, which appeared before the Committee, produced a very good impression indeed, and that almost every member of the Joint Select Committee came to know then that such a problem as the problem of land-holders did exist in India. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that so far as in me lies I will do my very best to safeguard the position of the class to which I belong myself and of whose political future I have formed very high hopes. I feel that that class is going to produce leaders who will ultimately serve as a noble example of the landlord class—leaders who will impart an element of stability to the new Provincial Constitutions that are going to be introduced, on the one hand, and who will not regard and confound stability with stagnation, but will combine progress with stability, as they have done from 1921 to 1933.

For the successful working of the policy we hope—I hope at least—that we shall continue to have a succession of the brilliant Governors with whom our province has been blessed during the last eleven years, and that the new reforms will be inaugurated under the auspices of a Governor whose name is a household word in India. It was our good fortune, Mr. Chairman, that the reforms in the United Provinces were inaugurated under your auspices. I am sure that but for your experience, your great statesmanship, and your care for the legitimate interests of the landlords the reforms in my Provinces would never have been a success. And I do hope that next year or the year after, when the new Constitution is inaugurated, we shall have the advice, the guidance, and the direction also of our Governor, Sir Malcolm Hailey.

Justice Sir Abdul Qadir: I have been asked, as an old member of this Association, to say a word or two on this occasion. I need hardly say that, so far as any of the political aspects of the questions discussed by the Raja Sahib today are concerned, I am precluded, by virtue of my present office, from saying anything about them, but I make bold to say this much, as a non-zamindar, who has always been in touch with the zamindars of his province and is in sympathy with their aspirations, that I appreciate fully the desire expressed by the two first speakers for a due share in the administration and in the legislatures of the country being given to the zamindars of the country. Before I went on to the Bench, I was a member
of the Council in my own Province. I represented an urban constituency, and am myself not a landowner. Therefore whatever I say on this point is quite disinterested.

As has been so aptly observed by Sir Malcolm Hailey, who has a great experience of the administration of two important Provinces in Northern India, the Punjab and the United Provinces, the better representation of the landed classes would mean more stability and more durability to the new Constitution which is now being formed.

I may add that I am very glad to notice in the remarks of the first two speakers who represented the cause of the landlords of the United Provinces before us this evening, that they are landlords who are fully alive to the needs of their tenantry. They have assured us that the landlords in their Provinces have done all they could to help their tenants, and are prepared to recognize their rights. If this tendency continues, then, as was said in the lecture, there will be no conflict between the landlords and the tenants.

Just as it is essential that there should be no conflict between landlords and tenants, in the same way there should be no conflict between the rural and the urban population. While wishing the zamindars well, I must add that the movement for the organization of the zamindars and for the betterment of their condition should be worked in such a way that there be no clash between the rural and the urban interests, and it may be recognized that both classes are essential for the progress of the country, both want to serve a common cause, and should advance together to a common goal.

Mr. R. P. Sinha: Much has been said about other Provinces. My little province, Bihar, has been left out. In Bihar and Orissa there has been a large measure of co-operation between the land-holders, and this fact is evidenced because of the fact that the same ministers have been in power continuously during the last ten or twelve years.

In order to bring the theories into practice an Association called the Indian Conservative Association should be formed to look after the interests of the landowner class, and as London is the nerve centre of the Empire it should be here. I propose that Sir Harcourt Butler, a Taluqdar, be its first Chairman. (Cheers.)

Mr. K. C. Roy Chowdhury: I am not familiar with the conditions in the United Provinces. I come from Bengal. But it was a pleasant surprise to me to hear that the relations between the capitalist landlords and the poor tenants are not so bad as was thought by the whole world. I thought the relations were similar to those between capital and labour in many lands. I am equally surprised to hear, and I hope it is true, that the United Province landlords have remitted something like five crores of rupees to the tenants and the Government's share was only one crore. Unfortunately in Bengal most of the zamindars are very apathetic towards the tenants, and 90 per cent. of them are bankrupt on account of their extravagance.

I strongly suggest setting up Conciliation Committees in the United
Provinces. They are working beautifully in Japan. I would also wish them to copy the example of British landlords. I had the good fortune during my student days to visit Chatsworth, the seat of the Duke of Devonshire. I found the Duke of Devonshire was an ideal landlord. He was looking after every scrap of well-being of the tenants. I do hope that some of the zamindars who are now here on holiday will go into the country and see how the British landlord's relation with the tenants exists.

RAJA SAYID MOHAMMED MEHDI OF PIRPUR: I am afraid I do not know very much about the conditions of the zamindars of Bengal, and still less of Japan. I protest against the last speaker suggesting that the relations between landowners and tenants in the part of India which I come from are similar to those which exist between capital and labour in other countries, because I think, if he goes and studies the conditions in India, he will find that there is not the same distinction between a zamindar and a tenant. You may find a rich zamindar admiring the wife of one of his poor tenants. A zamindar is not only a capitalist, but is also—I do not know about Bengal, but in other parts—head of the most important clan in the neighbourhood. So they are looked upon as the natural leaders.

What I have read about Bengal is that owing to the succession law the old class of nobility has disappeared, and I think the estates have gone to a certain extent to some people who live in the towns. The majority of the zamindars in the United Provinces live with their tenants, and if you go to these you will find a tenant's house showing greater signs of prosperity than that of his small zamindar. That zamindar probably is related to his tenant. I think it is very hard to say that we resemble the capitalist.

I am grateful to Mr. Chowdhury for the advice he has given, but I think instead of taking holidays in Europe he should go and study the rural conditions of which he speaks.

Sir JOHN KERR: My primary duty this evening is to express on behalf of the East India Association and on behalf of this audience our very grateful thanks to the Raja Sahib for coming here tonight and giving us this very interesting lecture on the landed classes.

Before I do that I must dissociate myself from the remarks that have been made by my friend from Bengal about the zamindars of Bengal. Mr. Chowdhury and I are old friends and old opponents, and if it were a question of the labour conditions in Calcutta, the conditions of the tramway men or jute workers, there is nobody whose opinion I would sooner have than his. I do not say I would agree with him even on those points, but I should be glad to have his opinion. In regard to the Bengal zamindars, however, I do not think that he has any very detailed knowledge or any actual experience. If he will allow me to say so, I think that he is wrong, I might say fundamentally wrong, in his attitude towards that problem.

I am very sorry indeed that we have no representative of the Bengal zamindars here this evening, because the zamindar problem in Bengal is unfortunately different from that in most other parts of India. There is that fatal mistake of the Permanent Settlement, which has poisoned the
relations of landlord and tenant and made it very difficult to reach a satisfactory solution. But I must not go into all that now. I am not starting a lecture on my own account on conditions in Bengal.

Elsewhere, in the King's Robing Room of the House of Lords, the problems of constitutional reform are being gone into in a manner which is, I suppose, necessary, but is at times very dreary. Here tonight the Raja Sahib has brought us back to the realities of the case: the landlord and tenant, proprietor and cultivator, or, to use the old Indian phraseology, the zamindar and the ryot. For the way in which he has brought that problem before us and for the very interesting discussion that we have had we owe him our grateful thanks.

We also owe our thanks to Sir Harcourt Butler for kindly coming here today. As the lecturer has reminded us, he is an honorary Taluqdar, and nobody could be more suited therefore to preside over a meeting where the question of the landed classes is under discussion.

I ask you to pass a very hearty vote of thanks to Sir Harcourt Butler and the Raja Sahib for coming here this afternoon. (Applause.)
"INDIA—1983"*

BY SIR MALCOLM HAILEY, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
(Governor of the United Provinces)

The title I have chosen may appear to be somewhat fantastic; but I do not pretend to have found any dark passage in the Book of Revelations which I can claim to predict the future of India. The sole value of a forecast such as this lies in the study of the factors which may operate in deciding that future. The historian of fifty years hence may find that they have operated in a different direction to that which we may expect today; he may indeed find that new forces, now invisible, have come into operation, or events have occurred which have disturbed (as the Great War disturbed) the course of normal and predictable developments. But we ought at least to be able to estimate the character and strength of the factors now visible and to form some idea of the direction in which they will move.

Let me, by way of illustration, assume that a reader of Sir John Strachey's well-known book on India (which he commenced to write in 1884) had used that work to attempt some kind of forecast of the factors then operating or likely to come into operation within the fifty years now concluding. He would have found in that book an admirable description of what the administration had achieved for India, and he might well have formed the impression that the picture which the country would present at the end of the next half-century would in the main be the result of activities initiated and controlled by Government. These activities had proved their strength for the particular ends to which they were operating, and had found on the whole a sufficiently plastic material in India itself. Our reader, stirred to a spirit of further speculation, might have proceeded to an assumption that material conditions would improve on lines already charted out; thus communications would be extended, and new sources of irrigation brought into use, though perhaps he could hardly have foreseen that we should by this time have the largest irrigation system in the world. On the other hand, industries would only expand slowly, for only slow growth was possible under the restrictions of a system of free trade and in face of well organized foreign competition. The country would continue to settle down under the system of order with which we had provided it; we should gradu-

* Based on an address delivered before the Royal Empire Society Summer School at Oxford.
ally improve rural conditions under a land revenue and settlement system which (save perhaps for that very debatable Permanent Settlement) was well suited to the country, and needed only adjustments in detail, which it would assuredly receive, to meet varying agricultural and climatic conditions. Education would grow, though here again his vision would be tempered by recognition both of the narrowness of finance and of some lack of enthusiasm on the part of the administration for universal primary education. Political interest would undoubtedly grow; but it would centre mainly on the moderate objectives which characterized the earlier aspirations of Congress—namely, some lessening of direct control from England and the grant to Indians of a larger share in the service of a bureaucratic form of government.

Up to about thirty years those speculations would have been correct; he would have rightly estimated the factors which would operate up to the end of that Augustan period of official rule, the Curzon régime. For the remainder of the period new factors supervened; but I will not dilate on them here, for my object is only to suggest to you that in looking at the factors which must operate in our own future, we must lay emphasis on dynamics of a different class to those which would have counted with the reader of Strachey’s book. India is no longer in the same plastic state; certainly the chief word does not rest with the administrative forces; and it is not on these forces that our attention must in the first instance concentrate. One must first clear the ground by making certain assumptions. One cannot speculate here on the accidental’s of history—irruptions from outside or chaotic upheavels within. Fifty years ago there was a background of impending menace from the north-west; so far as that menace came from Russia we should today approach it with a fuller recognition of the limits of modern warfare over long lines of imperfect communications. As for the frontier tribes, the extension of our own communications in that area has placed us in a far stronger position than before; if the task of guarding the frontier still remains both a military commitment and a burden to our finances, we have circumscribed its scope. As for that secession of the Muslim provinces in Northern India into a federation with neighbouring Muslim states, of which there has been much talk, I rank this as part of the material produced in the interest of one side or another in the Hindu-Muslim dispute. We have for our present purpose to assume that India, safeguarded as in the past by the British connection, will keep its framework intact, and our interest here must be in depicting the elements and the forces which affect its internal development.

It is not easy to schedule elements of this kind; it is more convenient to deal with them in the fields in which they operate.
In the economic field we have, in the first place, a great growth of capital available for use in industry. Capital is leaving the traditional recesses of hoarding and money-lending, and has a fluid use for larger purposes. It is not possible to illustrate this better than by the fact that the deposits in joint stock banks, which in 1883 were about $\frac{3}{4}$ million pounds, are now 50 million pounds; and that the rupee debt of India, which had stood at 90 million pounds at the earlier date, is now 434 million pounds. This growth of capital has a new significance with the entry of India on a protective policy. The rapidity with which Indian capital can respond to such a policy is shown by the recent development of the white sugar industry. A few years ago we were importing a yearly average of between 600,000 and 1 million tons of foreign white sugar; since then we have guaranteed a period of protection to the white sugar industry, and it is estimated that within a year’s time we shall have plant which can supply about 750,000 tons of white sugar manufactured from India-grown cane. It seems now likely that India will continue to move along definite lines of protection, with an increasing absorption of her own raw materials. On the other hand, the standards of consumption are not at this stage high enough to support a growth of manufacture on a really large scale; it is difficult to assume that India will, in the period we are contemplating, become industrialized to an extent that will sensibly affect the character of the population. We can confine ourselves to saying that we shall see in social life a good deal more of the manufacturing interest, and we shall lose something of the outlook which characterizes the predominance of agricultural classes. In politics we are likely to see a more definite move on the part of the consuming classes to safeguard their interests. This has already begun to show itself, and will gain strength with any change in the constitution which adds importance to the rural as against the urban vote. The composition given to the Central Legislature will have an important bearing on the issue of this conflict of interests.

Secondly, we have to reckon, in the economic field, with the result of the general increase in the money value of raw produce which has marked the last thirty years. This has led to a noticeable increase in the standards of living in the general population. That has not merely given the Indian people a new value in the world’s markets (Indian imports were valued at 39 million pounds in 1883 and at 189 millions in 1929) but has had powerful reactions in other directions. There has been a marked change in the attitude of the cultivating class, presenting a new problem in rural economics. Previous tenant movements were in the main confined to demands for stability
of tenure on the part of the cultivator; we shall now probably see an increasing movement for State intervention in the adjustment of rentals. It will be remembered that in Ireland the initial demand was for fixity of tenure and right of transfer of tenant rights; it was followed by a demand for fair rents, and finally for land purchase. The parallel is not complete, but there is a suggestive analogy. In the landlord provinces of India the decisive factors have hitherto been a great pressure of population on the soil and a low standard of living in the cultivating class. The former factor persists, and has not been affected by a draw-off into industry; but the change in the standard of living among cultivators, and a general growth of consciousness following access to political influences, will produce a new situation. It is already being argued that the landlord class has lost its economic value in that it does not make a contribution to the soil or to the protection of the cultivator proportionate to the share of produce represented by the rentals; and there is likely to be increasing pressure on the part of the vast cultivating population for State assistance in adjustment of the relations of landlords and tenants to correspond with economic facts. The weight of industrial opinion, interested rather in the consuming power of the tenant than the maintenance of the landlord, will be against the landlord class. Even if we do not proceed to the final stage of land purchase, we are likely to see legislation in favour of the tenant in the matter of rentals which will reduce materially the position and influence of a class now occupying an important place in social and political organization, and we may see the rise on a large scale of a class having the characteristics of small peasant proprietors. It would be difficult to over-estimate the effect of this change both on the economic and social life of some of the larger provinces of India.

There is a third point in the economic field which calls for notice—the position of industrial labour. Though the number of men employed in industry has risen greatly, it is still small in proportion to the total population. Its importance lies mainly in the fact that industrial labour is apt to acquire a solidarity which gives it an influence beyond its numbers. Hitherto such labour has been slow to acquire the true characteristics of an industrial class, since it has moved backwards and forwards to agricultural pursuits; but with the demand for work of a more skilled nature (as shown, for instance, by the progressive production of finer counts in the cotton industry or the later developments in the steel industry), it is assuming a more permanent character, and it appears certain that India will before long have to face increasingly the incidents arising from combination of labour of this kind. These incidents may be tempered to some extent
by the existence of a large agricultural over-population in the background, ready to flow into a vacancy caused by strikes or the like; but this is a check which will operate fully only where there are large casual elements in employment, and not in the more skilled lines of industry.

But though these developments may all have their effects in the next fifty years, one cannot help feeling that the dominating fact in the economic picture will be the continuing poverty of India. Some considerable industrial progress there may be, and, we may also hope, some considerable improvement of agricultural processes. There is hardly likely to be an expansion of canal irrigation equal to that of the last generation, for we are reaching the limit of the use of the waters of our great rivers by "flow" irrigation; we shall have to turn to the use of electricity in drawing up the subsoil water or to the expensive expedient of making reservoirs in the hills to imprison the monsoon supply for winter use. Improvements in agriculture will come rather by way of intensifying than by expanding cultivation. But can we hope that any improvement of these processes, in the presence of climatic conditions which are often catastrophic, will give us standards of living in India that are comparable to those even of the poorer Western countries? The census shows a gradual increase in the population of India, already heavily congested in many areas, and it is hardly likely that the doctrine of birth control will supervene in our generation to adjust the disproportion between the capacity of the soil and the mouths which it has to feed.

I pass to what may be conveniently called the social field, of which in India religion forms so large a part. Here we find factors less determinate in direction but nevertheless of great moment. The strictly religious side presents some complexity. On the one hand we have many proofs of the breakdown of orthodoxy—the success of dissenting movements such as the Arya Samaj, or the patent effects of outside influences in loosening the restrictions of the caste system. On the other hand the world has been presented with striking and indeed painful evidence of the growth of religious solidarity produced by communal animosities. There appear, therefore, to be two opposite tendencies, and their real import requires some analysis. Communal animosities are largely due to secular causes; the closing of the ranks of the Sikhs against Hindus, or of the Hindus against Muslims, does not necessarily imply the growth of religious force within the life of the community itself. It is indeed compatible with a decline in the strength of religious feeling and observance. The dominant factor, to my mind, is not the particularism which these religions are manifesting under the influence of exterior causes, but the rapidity with which they are reacting to moderniz-
ing influences. Hinduism now presents a picture of a gradually disintegrating caste system and the dissolution of the joint Hindu family, its two most distinguishing features.

Islam has been equally accessible to new influences, though the effect has been seen in a different form. The narrowing down of Islamic strength in the outside world has turned the eyes of Indian Muslims to India itself as a centre of Islamic culture. They look now to maintain this culture largely by access to political influence. But at the same time the growth of secular education has had its own effect on their modes of life and thought; Islam is no longer a purely religious interest. The importance of these developments lies in the fact that India is losing what has hitherto been the chief focus of interest for the bulk of its population. There is not merely a potential source of mental unsettlement, but a vacuum is being created for the inflow of fresh ideas, political or social, many of which may be of a very disturbing nature. In the case of Hinduism, it does actually amount to the gradual break-up of a social organization. On the top of this we have to reckon with two movements, both of recent origin: firstly, the movement for the uplift of untouchables, partly originating within those classes themselves, but largely fostered from outside for a variety of motives; and secondly, the growth of a Women’s Movement among women of the educated classes. The initial effect of the former has been to rally the more orthodox elements in Hinduism to the defence of the caste system; its ultimate effect will inevitably be an addition to the forces which are disintegrating the Hindu organism. The issue of the Women’s Movement depends in part on the political authority which women can acquire. If that authority is considerable, we shall see attempts to achieve reformist legislation which will provide a further solvent of religious conservatism. In Islam, the attempt will be to legislate for monogamy, for giving more practical effect to the Islamic precepts regarding the division of property among women, and for giving to women the divorce right now possessed by men. In Hinduism, the attempt will be to recognize intercaste marriages, to secure the right of divorce, and to enforce the grant of maintenance to widows; in both religions we shall have efforts to make more effective the regulations regarding the age of marriage.

It is a commonplace which might have been repeated with justice at any time during the last fifty years, that we have no longer to reckon with a static India; but I think that it is only now that we can really promise ourselves the sight of an India swept by these somewhat convulsive reform movements. If there is one feature of modern India which is more striking than another, it is the revelation of its accessibility to mass movement.
Hitherto this has shown itself largely in political matters, and has more easily been directed towards attack (which is indeed the most characteristic direction of mass impulse) than to any constructive effort. But the field for mass influence in India is only now being explored, and we may conceivably see strange things happening in the attempt to secure social reform. It at all events touches a sphere which possesses for the great mass of people an interest which merely political movements cannot attain.

Finally, while these factors in the social field are distinguishable, there is one general factor less definable but nevertheless of much importance. In the last generation, control of such public opinion as existed, or the exercise of influence in social affairs, was in the hands of a small class, partly intellectual, but partly composed of people of recognized position. Today, a great mass of men who could not be described as intellectuals, and who are socially of a lower status, have now come into the field. They reflect in their attitude the circumstances in which their class finds itself; economic conditions press with particular hardship on this class in the East, for it has rising standards of living, and in a non-industrial country has small hopes of satisfying these standards. Its members tend to be radical in politics and in some degree also in religious and social matters. Their outlook is urban, and they are little interested in rural development. All indications point to a rapid growth in the controlling influence of this class; and when we think of the future direction of social and political movements we must remember that they will be largely what this class will make them. Both direction and methods will be very different to those which they would have taken under the influences which prevailed a generation ago.

I have purposely left for last the political field. At the moment it engages an embarrassing amount of our attention, but it is not my intention to deal with the immediate issues now before us. Politics and administration ought for our present purpose to engage our consideration only so far as they can affect or direct the forces for change now afoot in the general population. But in the modern world political institutions react widely on social and economic conditions; and we cannot neglect this element. The possible reactions of political developments on India are the more difficult to forecast because the institutions which we are introducing are not an organic growth from movements taking place in Indian national life, but find themselves there in pursuance of concepts which have their roots in European experiences. It will be realized that I necessarily approach this matter in the most objective way; I will view political developments purely on what may be described as the dynamic side. For about a century India has had a government of which the most
prominent characteristics were that it proceeded from a single centre, and thereby constituted a strong unifying force; it based itself on its own acquired authority, and not on any form of popular support, in the constitutional sense, though in other respects it earned (and, I think, earned on its merits) a general acquiescence in its authority; and thirdly, though it adapted itself to Indian conditions, it represented in the main ideas and standards which were European rather than Oriental. We have for some years now followed a policy which, by giving increasing importance to provincial centres of administration, has encouraged centrifugal forces, shifting the focus of attention from the centre and dividing authority with it. More important, we are substituting for a form of government dependent on its own authority one in which the administration will in its main activities be definitely based on a popular vote. I am not concerned in the extent to which immediate proposals may carry that substitution; but clearly we are about to see now a definite advance in the substitution of popular for non-responsible government, and for the purpose of a forecast ranging over fifty years one is bound to assume that this process, when once firmly established, will within the course of that period be carried to very considerable lengths.

It is not merely a matter of interest to speculate how far the type of government we are substituting will prove to be suited to Indian conditions; its suitability or adaptability is an essential element in arriving at a forecast of the effects it may have on Indian developments. In so far as the previous régime was self-sufficient in the sense that it did not base itself on representative institutions, it was a form of government to which the East was well accustomed. So far as it was alien in composition and in some of its ideas it may have become unacceptable to a people rapidly advancing in education and self-esteem; it may, to that extent, have become unsuitable to modern conditions; but at least as a type of government there was nothing in it foreign to Eastern traditions. Earlier political movements in India were not indeed directed to securing a change in the type of government; they were mainly designed to secure a larger share for India in the administration in the form in which it then existed. That movement, it is true, has been replaced by a widespread demand for representative institutions and responsible government, but the mainspring of that demand is not anything that India has drawn from its own traditions. One is indeed at times driven to feel that some of those who have been advocating a responsible form of government have failed to appreciate the fact that, for the English people, that form of government has only one meaning—namely, the grant of executive authority to the representatives of the majority of a widely based electorate. So far as we know
the spirit of India at present, it is fair to say that it would probably prefer some form of government not definitely responsible to a majority vote. There are even members of the extreme Left wing who do not seem to think in terms of responsible government, but of utilizing for their own purposes the field of authority prepared for them by a previous official rule, just as Lenin and his circle stepped into the field of authority ploughed and levelled by two centuries of Czardom. I do not mean by what I have said on this point to join with those controversialists who ask why we are introducing democracy to India at a time when democracy is coming into disrepute in the West. To my mind the question and the implication it carries are both mistaken. We are not discarding democracy in the West, though events may have brought into disrespect certain forms of Parliamentary institutions in which democracy expressed itself. The modern "dictatorate" everywhere stands on some form of popular support; indeed, it is an instrument for giving a direct response to the body of opinion which supports it, unhampered by the restrictions which had grown up round the earlier forms of Parliamentary institutions. Probably every "dictatorate" now existing could stand the test of a referendum, either because it has a majority behind it, or because it can by its own methods secure such a majority. I suggest, therefore, that arguments based on the suggested breakdown of democracy do not apply; and, indeed, I only referred to them here because they doubtless came to your minds in connection with what I had said as to the suitability of responsible government to Indian conditions. I suggest to you that the real justification for the introduction of that form of government in India lies in the faith that India must pass through the educative and formative influences of representative institutions before she can evolve the form of government best suited to her own conditions. That, if I may say so, is a very reasonable theory on which to work; it should allow India gradually to evolve her own proper form of government under influences making for the maintenance of order, instead of proceeding by a series of catastrophic experiments.

But in the end it may very well be that India may find herself best suited with something different from Parliamentary government in our form—something, that is, in the nature of a dictatorate sufficiently responsive to popular needs and ideas to gain general acquiescence, but not dependent in the constitutional sense on a majority vote. I suggest this for two reasons: first because this conclusion would be in line with what we know of previous Indian tradition; and, secondly, because India seems to have acquired a peculiar talent for looking to State guidance and control in every form of activity. The current Indian mind
thinks of the State in terms more common in some Continental nations than in Great Britain; it does not seem to suffer from the shock which we should feel, or at all events used to feel, when faced with proposals that the State should regulate the most ordinary transactions of every-day life. Now the further you progress in State intervention or State management, the more certain is it that you will seek means to eliminate that compromise of opposing forces on which our Parliamentary institutions depend. In English political theory, the existence of a strong opposition has been held to be an essential element in arriving at correct action; but the English theory of politics has not hitherto contemplated a thorough-paced system of State management.

I offer this merely as a long-range speculation about the way in which Indian political forms may ultimately shape themselves. But we are concerned now with more visible developments. We may anticipate one thing with tolerable certainty; as I have already implied, it will be progressively difficult to maintain that unitary control of policy from the centre which characterized the past. That will not necessarily be due to the adoption of the form of federation now proposed or any alternative form of confederation; the process began when a measure of responsibility was given to provincial governments, and it will gain fresh impetus in proportion as provincial self-government completes itself. Moreover, physical facts add weight to the tendency produced by constitutional changes; provinces so large that some contain populations of 40 to 50 millions, and an area equal to Spain or Italy, cannot be controlled from the centre in any but the most elementary matters. When once they begin to interest themselves in the problems of their own internal development, attention concentrates on the local aspects of affairs, provincial patriotism intensifies, and central influence declines. The ultimate tendency may not necessarily be towards complete separation from the centre, but it will certainly be towards diversity of policy and resistance to any effort of the centre to impose uniformity. This process might be delayed were it possible now to break up the provinces into a number of smaller units, for an aggregate of small units would exhibit far less centrifugal force than the small number of large units with which we have now to deal. A second and consequential development may also be foreseen. The pressure of the various economic and social forces which have been described will have a more pronounced effect on a provincial than they would on a central field of administration. Local solutions are likely to be sought for economic and social difficulties, and in some cases perhaps will be less well considered than they would be under unitary control. All this, let me add again, is not a criticism of the grant of provincial responsibility—that has its own
value in the political sphere and in the development of initiative and responsibility which I fully accept—I am only pointing to some of the natural developments. Thirdly, the substitution of popular for official control of administrative activities will, quite apart from any change of personnel in the State services, alter in many ways the standards and methods of administration largely established under European influences.

An administration based on a popular vote yields more quickly than a purely official Government to pressure for expenditure on projects of internal development. How narrow is the financial basis on which provincial administration is now conducted is shown by the fact that one of our great provinces spends only 1½ rupees, three spend between 2½ and 3½ rupees, and the most costly of the provincial governments spends annually only 8½ rupees per head of the population. The field of provincial taxation is limited by circumstances, and there will therefore be a constant effort to find money by reducing the cost of administrative agencies, and this, apart from any other consideration, is bound to modify previous administrative standards. We are not here considering any question of values, nor are we weighing the merits of what we can foresee in the future against what we have known in the past. We have not here to ask ourselves whether the future administration will or will not conform with the ideals or the methods which characterized it in the past. The question is, whether the change will be such as to produce visible effects in the India we are attempting to forecast. A general breakdown of order, or a gravely impaired confidence in justice, or a widespread prevalence of administrative corruption would certainly do so. We have heard many anticipations that we must expect this result, just as we have heard, from the Indian side, confident assurances of the betterment which popular government will produce on the type of administration. It is difficult to prevent our forecast from being coloured by prepossessions on the one side or the other. That the administration will be widely affected is certain; the full extent is not easy to estimate. I would here only put forward one consideration. Much importance attaches to the momentum which a State machinery acquires during a long course of settled and authoritative administration, and my speculations do not at present go beyond the expectation that this will continue for many years to exert a full influence.

We come now to the last of the forces which present themselves in the political field—one hard to define, but certainly one of the most potent with which we shall have to reckon. What will be the reaction of India to that Nationalistic spirit which has gripped every other people of the world? It is not necessary to debate here the old question whether India is a nation. Our
friend Strachey began his book on India by stating roundly that there was no such country as India. There are many today who, pointing to the diversities of her peoples, languages, and creeds, make a strong point that India cannot claim to be a nation; or, rather, they seek to deny the deductions which might be drawn from admitting that claim. The question of what constitutes a nation may be left for political philosophers to decide; in any case, the problem whether India falls within any formula they may adopt is largely an academic point. On the other hand, recent world experiences leave us in no doubt of the results which follow when people comprised in any political unit exhibit a nationalistic spirit, and no one can deny that such a spirit has of late been evident in India. You may at your choice view that as the product of a growing self-esteem, or the revolt of a conservative people against modernist ways, or—as some would have it—as the outcome of our own influence in politics and education. But it is the dynamics rather than the ethics of this feeling which matter to us now. If it is not easily definable, it is certainly ponderable. It would be a mistake to imagine that it is confined to the intellectuals; if it is not by any means universal, yet it is common among great numbers of ordinary people, and it is the type of feeling which is bound to widen and intensify.

Of some things we may be certain. However much on its literary side it may seek to recall the glories of a fabled past, or to advocate the virtues of purely Indian institutions, it will not impede the rapid adaptation of modern scientific or mechanical improvements, nor check the influences they entail. Whatever it may do for the Indian languages, it will not stop the growing use of English as a common language. On the economic side, it will here, as elsewhere, add support to a protective policy and perhaps to attempted discrimination against non-Indian commercial undertakings. On the political side, it will involve a growing pressure for the reduction of the visible signs of British authority, and, in my opinion, we shall before the end of our period see its effects in the reduction of British personnel and an increasing measure of Indianization of the Army. But while we can count on these more or less objective results, can we foresee that this spirit will so permeate India as to produce a mentality of a "national" type? Other peoples have been at times galvanized by such a spirit, particularly when accompanied by a new sense of political independence; but this result has been seen more often where the area has been smaller and the social elements less diverse. One may speculate with interest on the possible use by the new administration of those modern agencies for direct communication of ideas—broadcasting and the like—
which have aptly been described as shortcircuiting the slow processes of education. But on the whole one may be permitted to feel some doubt whether the world will at the end of our fifty-year period see that ultimate development on which intellectual India sets its hopes—an India united in those bonds of common sentiment and ideas which make real nationhood. There is much to hamper this—the centrifugal forces which the new politics are creating, the difficulties of a vast geography, the persistence of social organizations which, even in some process of disintegration, will still maintain a basic resistance to cohesion.

Now it may be thought that I have done an unwise and perhaps irritating thing. I have dealt rather vaguely with tendencies and movements, but I have not been able to define their conclusion. I have attempted to show the threads that may make warp and weft, but have not the craft or the courage to weave the fabric. But those who care for India cannot stop at pondering over her immediate problems. On the background of her ancient civilization we have already painted many new colours. Time seems about to work on the canvas with a more rapid and more heavily laden brush. What is the picture which her civilization will present in the future? It would be a bold mind that claimed to give a complete answer, but we have gained something if we can feel that we have seen our way even to part of it.
COMMERCIAL PROSPECTS IN MUSLIM ASIA*


It is perhaps not generally known that our Holy Prophet started life as a trader and merchant, and up to the moment when he received the divine call he was active as one of the leading merchants of Mecca. In numerous passages of the Koran not only the vital importance but the blessedness of commerce, industry, and trade are impressed upon the faithful. Many passages deal with trade by sea and land, with agriculture, with mining, with all the wonders that Nature has placed at the disposal of man for his material comfort and enjoyment.

In the golden age of Islam's civilization, reaching down to the sixteenth century, the Muslim countries were in the van of all that we consider the world's economic life. But a great change came with the discovery of the Americas and the Cape route to the East. Sea-borne trade to the Far East and India replaced trade through the Muslim countries. It developed and became the great source of wealth for the world in general. This process went on with ever-increasing momentum till the outbreak of the Great War. The vast millions of China and India were brought into touch with the advanced countries of Western Europe and America by direct communication. What can be conveniently called the big Muslim square from Samarkand to Sind and from Egypt to Constantinople diminished in economic importance for the world in general and for Europe in particular. This process went so far that, although here and there attention was paid to those countries by houses that had hereditary and historic connection with them, they were ignored by the general trend of commercial enterprise in Great Britain.

Then came the War with its immediate reaction of fictitious prosperity, but with its present consequences of worldwide depression and economic languor. The old and familiar sources of trade and commerce are proving themselves insufficient to meet the productive activity of the post-war world. New sources must be found; new economic worlds must be conquered. It is fortunate that, now the opening-up of the economically backward Muslim countries is most needed, science has placed at our disposal means

* This article is based on an address at a meeting of members of both Houses of Parliament and visitors convened by the National League at the House of Commons during the sittings of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Reforms.
and methods by which that end can be achieved. We have only
to consider the conditions which have led to the World Economic
Conference to see that the fulfilment of the task is imperative
for the welfare, not only of Islamic countries, but of the world
at large.

One of the main causes of the diminished economic importance
of Muslim lands before the war was the absence of cheap means
of transport. They were essentially land-locked continental areas
with—here and there—a window to the sea. Bays and channels
and inland seas were rare, if not wholly absent. The great rivers
such as the Nile, the Indus, and the Euphrates were far apart
and were separated by vast continental areas. When railways
came in other countries the initial cost of that form of communi-
cation made it difficult, if not impossible, to build and equip
sufficient lines to give Islam a due share in the nineteenth century
prosperity of the West.

Today new and cheap forms of communication have revolu-
tionized the outlook upon the geographical and economical con-
ditions of these undeveloped lands. Motor traffic—for which
vast amounts of petrol can be found in the very heart of the land
of Islam, in Persia, and Arabia—has made it possible, with the
development of roads, once more to bring commercial prosperity
to the furthest interior of these countries.

The aeroplane is replacing the camel as "the ship of the
desert," and cheap aviation will make every part of these countries
easy of access. Overland travel from Europe to the heart of Asia
is far quicker, safer, and more convenient, and is held to be much
more pleasant and interesting than the sea voyage.

Thus the process started after the sixteenth century is being
reversed, and once more the great and populous lands of Eastern
and Southern Asia can communicate with Europe over land
rather than by sea. The immense importance of this transforma-
tion to all concentrated and quick forms of trade is obvious. The
world depression, which has shown the insufficiency of markets
for West and East alike, will lead every manufacturing country
to turn its eyes to this new world of Islam which again, after
400 years, takes its place among the great markets of the world.

Political and territorial adjustments that followed the war
have placed Great Britain and her Empire in a peculiarly advan-
tageous position to benefit to the full from these developments.
The old bureaucratic Ottoman Empire has been broken up and
replaced by the nationalistic States of Iraq and Arabia and by
Turkey. Persia has been freed from the political dominance of
Russia. The old Empire of the Czars which—with the help
of protective tariffs—hoped to dominate the markets of Western
Asia with dumped goods has disappeared. The new Communist
Socialist Soviet Republic has not so far shaped an industrial and economic system by which it can seriously compete with the export trade of a highly organized and experienced commercial community such as exists in this country.

It may be argued by some of my readers that the countries of Western Asia are poor. But I would point out that since the war there has been a radical change in this respect. Afghanistan has no public debt. The capital debt of Persia is less than the receipts of the Shah's Government in one year from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Arabia has no external debt, and in Iraq the debt commitments are very small. The bearing of these facts on the question of trade relations is obvious. The countries I have named are not among the nations which must export goods for the purpose of paying debt and interest charges. Consequently they can buy our British and Indian goods by the mutually beneficial method of exchange of commodities.

Great Britain has today very friendly relations with Egypt, and her moral influence in that part of the world is greater than ever in the past. I think this can be said with equal truth about all Arab lands, and I have every hope that a fair and equitable adjustment of conflicting claims will be made in Palestine. With the new kingdom of Iraq and her ruler this Empire is happily not only on terms of friendship, but of intimate co-operation. There are no serious political differences with Persia or Afghanistan. Of the 80 millions of Indian Muslims a large proportion inhabit the borders of these very States, and thus come within the geographical limits of the solid Muslim economic block to which I have referred. The Muslims of North-Western India can become the great bridge-head for further trade development, economic improvement, and healthy, peaceful, commercial rivalry both for the manufacturers of this country and for the producers of India and Burma.

There used to be a saying when I was young that "trade followed the flag." Today we can go further and say "Trade follows friendship." The Muslims of India are happily placed in being the link alike in friendship and in trade between the people of Great Britain on one side and those of Islamic lands on the other, and also between the vast Hindu population of India and Muslim countries to their west. But this friendship can hardly grow as quickly as the economic needs of the world require today, nor can it be built without a full and complete understanding of each other's mentality.

I desire to place some practical suggestions before you as my British fellow-subjects for expediting the process which we should all welcome. It is urgent because it will go far towards the economic regeneration of Muslim countries on the one hand and the
improvement of export trade and employment in this country on the other.

I could give many practical illustrations in respect of the opportunities for business which are available. But I will mention only one of these. We all know how great a place insurance fills in modern business life. The development of this branch of business in South America enured to the benefit of well-established insurance companies in Great Britain and the United States. But it does not seem to be realized that in the Islamic countries to which I have referred the insurance business is non-existent. In all these lands there is hardly a house, or life, or packet of merchandise owned by the inhabitants which has been insured. In this field alone there are enormous possibilities which have never been touched. It is not an over-estimate to put the potential capital value of insurances to be effected in these countries at £200,000,000.

Some years ago it was usual to hear fathers of families of nearly all classes in Britain say that they would like their children to learn Spanish and Portuguese so as to be prepared to take advantage of the economic development of South America then in sight. But the Muslim countries to which I refer have potential wealth and trade possibilities which can favourably compare with those vast regions of South America, the development of which has proved insufficient for the business enterprise of the people of this country. Might it not be possible for at least some of the younger English people to learn Persian, or Arabic, or Urdu? In addition to the stimulus knowledge of these languages would give to mental and spiritual understanding between East and West, the practical and commercial advantages would be great. Incidentally, anyone with a knowledge of one of these languages can easily familiarize himself with the other two, since they are intimately related. As a knowledge of Spanish is necessary for those who go out for trade in South America, so for trade with Islamic countries a knowledge of at least one of the three principal languages there spoken is essential for the realization of all the possibilities.

Another thing which has so far been neglected in Muslim lands (perhaps through the want of cheap and easy communications hitherto) is the supply of commercial travellers suited to the conditions of today. Such men ought to be able to sell the goods that are required and for which markets are needed and, on the other hand, to buy the local goods for this country.

Many of you know the regular commercial traveller on the Continent and in America. I have seen him in wayside inns all over Europe and found him both modest and efficient. A great many not only sell, but also buy, and a number bring back news as to the kind of material needed and the kind of manufacture
required. The same methods applied to Muslim countries by an efficient corps of commercial travellers would, I am sure, give most satisfactory results. In this great work the Muslims of India can become coadjutors and partners, they can become the help-mates of their British fellow-subjects of the King as well as of their co-religionists throughout the rest of the Middle and Near East.

There is no wish on our part for exclusiveness, and no jealousy, but an intuitive yearning after an understanding and co-operation for mutual benefit. I know very well the feelings and sentiments not only of my Muslim countrymen, but of Muslims generally. Everywhere they show not only willingness, but a sincere desire for political, cultural, and, above all, financial, economic, and commercial co-operation with the people of this land.
INDIAN MUSLIMS AND THE REFORMS

BY SIR MUHAMMED YAKUB, M.LA.

None who are acquainted with the present condition of India will doubt the urgent need of expanding the Indian Constitution in order to meet the legitimate demands of all classes and communities of her people.

The Musalmans are not behind any other community in India in their desire to see their country holding an honourable position and a respectable status in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Indeed, it is inevitable that they should hold this view, since the very essence of Islam is that ideal of brotherhood and human equality which sums up all we mean by democracy. It would not, therefore, be right to think that the Musalmans of India are a stumbling block in the way of the progress of their country. Having ruled in India for about ten centuries, and having lost their empire through the blunders of their monarchs, and having suffered immensely since the Mutiny of 1857, the Musalmans are naturally anxious that trust and freedom should not be misused. They are determined that the germs of anarchy and revolution, which brought the overthrow of the Muslim rule in India, shall not again destroy their country. A wise man always takes a lesson from the miseries and misfortunes of his predecessors, and I hope that the British will not lose sight of the causes which brought about the downfall of Muslim rule in India.

My next point is this. Today, all over the world, in Europe, America, and Asia, after a long period of political stability and quiescence, ideas, policies, and institutions are in the melting-pot once more. Political constitutions are being moulded to the new conditions set up by the war, the progress of mechanical, scientific, and industrial discovery and development, and so on. These great forces are at work in India also, and we Muslims who are essentially "political animals" naturally desire that they shall be recognized in our new Constitution. A constitution based on a priori notions or outworn conditions is doomed from its birth.

To the Musalmans of India the British connection is a matter of the utmost importance; their sympathies and interests extend far beyond the limits of India, and the peaceful maintenance and development of all they value depends on England retaining her predominant place in the world. It is therefore essential for us to associate ourselves wholeheartedly with the maintenance of law and order, to co-operate loyally with the servants of the Crown in promoting the welfare of the country, and to put aside
any wild and visionary dreams about India's sudden emergence to independence. At the same time, far be it from us to recommend that we should cease to urge our claims to our fullest share of the benefits of British rule, or forego our right in the general advancement of the world.

Let me make it quite clear that I, and those who think with me in India—and I assure my readers that their number is very large amongst the educated classes of my community—are most grateful to the Prime Minister and the Right Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, for their sincere efforts to meet the wishes and satisfy the aspirations of my countrymen. I wish also to make it clear that we, the Musalmans of India, are not actuated by any ill-will or antagonism towards any other community. We are animated with the single desire of safeguarding our rights and interests in such a form as will give us an assured position in the political institutions of the country without making any encroachment upon the legitimate rights of any other community.

Now it is clear that India is going to enter on a period of much fuller experience of the actual working of democratic institutions than any she has known in the past. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the engineers who will handle the machinery which is about to be set up shall possess some expert knowledge. Consequently the association of the foreign engineers and mechanics who have been working at it for centuries is very essential. Of course, to continue my analogy, many of the engineers and mechanics of the future will have to be selected ultimately by the rough and ready method of democratic election. The question of the franchise is, then, of fundamental importance. In my opinion no case has been made out for any sweeping extension of the franchise at present, and the balance of argument is against it. Under the system of administration that is proposed greater responsibilities will devolve upon the various Governments than ever before. And it is imperative that the electorate should be capable of understanding the value and use of their vote. All experience goes to show that the extension of the franchise should keep pace with, but not go ahead of, the spread of education and the development of political knowledge. In Great Britain it was a very gradual process, covering a long period of time. In 1832 only 3 per cent. of the population were enfranchised; 9 per cent. in 1868, and 16 per cent. in 1884. Since the introduction of Reforms in India, since 1921, there has not been such a great change in the educational knowledge, economic conditions, and political experience of the people as would make it desirable to lower the franchise too much. Any undue lowering would inevitably mean the complete transfer of power to the illiterate and
the inexperienced, and would tend to exclude from the Legislature men with a sense of responsibility and experience of administration. To my mind the franchise should remain for the present substantially as it is, and I favour giving to the provincial Legislative Councils power to alter the franchise in each province as their experience makes it expedient. It must be remembered that India is not a country but a sub-continent. The difference in the conditions prevailing in the different provinces in India is as great as, if not more than, in the different countries in Europe. Would it ever be within the range of practical politics to frame one single Constitution for the whole of Europe? How could it therefore be possible, or even prudent, to frame one single Constitution for the whole of India. Different provinces must therefore have different qualifications for franchise and different systems of election.

Now as regards the enfranchisement of women, far be it from me to impose any inferiority of status on the womenfolk of my country. Indeed, as a Musalman, I am compelled to allow her full equality of status. I would therefore like to place women on the same level as men and I would have the same qualifications for them relating to property or education as for men. I think it would lower the prestige of a woman if she were placed on the electoral roll only because she happened to be the wife of a certain male elector. Then again in India polygamy is not very unusual, and it would be highly illogical to give the vote to one wife and not to the other, having the same legal and social status. Then again I consider it to be very unjust to deprive a woman of her vote, after using it for a very long time, as soon as she loses her husband. Also, I do not see any reason why the wife of an ordinary voter should have the right to vote while the mother or the wife of a soldier or policeman, who has rendered invaluable services in the defence of his country, or lost his life in the service of the Crown, should be deprived of it. I am therefore strongly opposed to creating any artificial qualifications for women other than those, or in addition to those, of men.

It is the provincial administration rather than the Central Government which comes into close contact with the lives of the people, and it is in them that the most important devolution of power can immediately be made. I should not be considered as being opposed to the introduction of reforms in the Centre for an indefinite period, but for the reasons given above I contend that the immediate establishment of full provincial autonomy and responsibility, under conditions which will guarantee the security and stability of the administration, is essential. I am convinced that the surest means of establishing political peace and contentment in India lies in establishing at once, in the
fullest possible manner, real and effective responsibility, which would rally all the best elements in the country to the Government and induce them to put their shoulders to the wheel. This leads to the important question of law and order. I recommend that the transfer of law and order should be accompanied by two conditions essential to secure the stability we have in view: they are, the placing of the judiciary under the control of the High Courts, and the appointment of a head of the police force from the All-India services to assist the minister in charge of this portfolio. The complete independence of the judiciary from any possibility of political control or bias is the hall-mark of a constitutional state. My recommendation, therefore, is that the minister for law and order should be relieved of responsibility for the control of the judiciary, which should be vested in the jurisdiction of the High Courts, and through them be made directly responsible to the Crown. I also consider that the heads of provincial police forces should be members of the All-India services, because that will guarantee their complete freedom from any trace of provincial patriotism or communalism and bring to the control of the department the wide official outlook which comes from experience in the superior services. I cannot agree that by the imposition of these conditions the transfer of law and order will be incomplete or a sham. The tradition of the All-India services is one of complete loyalty to those set in authority over them, and I have no doubt that the heads of the police so appointed will be fully loyal to the Government and the ministers they serve.

Turning now to the Central Government, I submit that, for the great majority of us in India, Federation originally was conceived as the Federation of British Indian provinces. The Indian Princes were not included in the picture. I have the greatest regard for our Indian Princes, and consider the existence and stability of Indian States in India very essential in order to maintain the ancient glory and civilization of the country; but the association of the Indian States with the Federation has created innumerable difficulties in the establishment of our Constitution. In the first place, the linking up of democracy with autocracy is a very uncongenial combination which has never before been tried and is obviously very liable to set up dangerous strains and stresses. I am therefore of opinion that in starting the construction of our federal structure the British Indian provinces should first be brought within the compound, and room should be left for blocks of the Indian States to be added afterwards. Otherwise the introduction of Reforms in the Central Government will come only after long suspense and uncertainty. Then responsibility in the Centre must come under conditions securing
the safety of the framework of administration. The question of
defence in India is an extremely important and difficult one.
We have a very long and wild land frontier extending along the
north, through which all the conquerors of India have entered
in the past except the British. The establishment of great mari-
time Powers has also made the defence of India by the sea very
difficult. Therefore Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Political
Relations should remain outside the domain of the transferred
subjects.

All that the Indian Musalmans want is fair treatment and bare
justice. They do not want to be given a share in the administra-
tion for which they are not fully equipped. They do not wish to
be placed in charge of difficult and delicate offices if they are not
thoroughly qualified for them. The Muslim claim is not for
spoon-feeding, but for not being kept out on the ground that they
are Musalmans. The strained relations between the Hindu and
Muslim communities arise in no small measure out of the desire
of the young men of each community to secure Government posts.
Partly owing to the greater economic pressure to which they are
subject, and partly in consequence of their past history and tradi-
tions, this desire amongst the Musalmans is a matter of life and
death for my community. The paucity of careers for educated
Indians has accentuated the trouble. It follows that if we Indians
want to avoid jealousies, intrigues, and incessant friction an effort
should be made to define each community’s share in the public
services. The number of posts allotted the Musalmans will obvi-
ously vary from province to province. And it seems that in the
absence of a more workable basis we might fix it at the figure
assigned to each community for the purposes of representation.
It is obvious that the population basis, in this connection, would
be highly unsatisfactory and misleading. The late Sir Antony
(subsequently Lord) MacDonnell, sometime Lieutenant-Governor
of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, who was regarded
by the Musalmans as hostile to their interests, had to admit the
Muslim claim for a larger number in Government service than
that to which they would have been entitled on a population
basis. In a speech in 1900 he said:

“I must say that, subject to the general rule, the best man
for an important post should get it irrespective of creed or
race, the Muhammadans could not fairly claim more than
three appointments for every five appointments going to the
Hindus.”

And his policy was initiated for a province in which the Musal-
mans are only 14 per cent. of the population.
The next point on which the Musalmans lay the greatest stress is the preservation of their culture, religion, and laws. The violent utterances of certain Hindu leaders have made the Musalmans extremely nervous about this matter, and therefore it is very necessary, from the Muslim point of view, that guarantees as regards the above-mentioned two points shall be by statute. Sir Samuel Hoare's evidence before the Joint Select Committee makes it quite clear, "that nothing can be inserted in the Instrument of Instructions that is not within the framework of the Act."

And as Lord Reading is reported in the Press to have observed:

"Although letters of instruction might be referred to by a court of law in trying to construe what was intended, it did not affect the position. No rights of the subject were founded upon it that could be dealt with by a court of law. The rights to be construed by the court were the rights which were prescribed within the statute itself, and could not travel outside."

A mere mention in the letters of instruction, therefore, is not sufficient. These are the two special demands of the Musalmans, upon which they cannot accept any compromise or alternative.
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE IN INDIA

BY DR. P. P. PILLAI

It is now about five years since the International Labour Organization of the League of Nations began its experiment of having an outpost established in India. Ever since the inception of the Labour Organization, it has been making every effort to keep in living touch with the day-to-day developments in industrial and social matters taking place in the more important countries of the world. For this purpose, it has been found necessary to appoint permanent representatives at London, Paris, Washington, Berlin, Rome, and Tokio, and more recently at New Delhi and Nanking; and national correspondents in eleven other capitals. The opening of the first few branch offices of the Geneva organization suggested to the Indian representatives to the Labour Conference the desirability of having a similar branch started in India as well. There were, indeed, many reasons why a representative of Geneva had to be posted permanently in India. In the first place, the claim of India to take rank with the eight leading industrial countries of the world having been upheld by the Council of the League of Nations, and India having thus established her right to a permanent seat on the Governing Body of the Labour Organization, it was but natural that the Government of India and the leaders of Indian industry and labour should desire that closer and more intimate relations should be maintained between India and Geneva.* There was also the feeling on the part of the Government and of the employers of labour in India that such closer relations, which must necessarily lead to a fuller knowledge of the economic conditions of India at Geneva, would help considerably to influence the decisions taken at the International Labour Conferences, in so far as they had a reference to India. One of the clauses of Article XIII. of

* Thus, for example, Sir B. N. Mitra, the Chief Delegate of the Government of India to the Conference of 1932, referring to the importance of securing the close co-operation of all non-European States, said: "It is indeed a pleasure to find that, so far as India is concerned, the necessary means for establishing contacts now exist in the shape of a branch office of the International Labour Organization in Delhi, which is doing most useful work—work which I am glad to find is appreciated by the Employers' and Workers' Delegates from India" (page 241, Record of Proceedings of the Sixteenth Session of the I.L. Conference. See also pages 82 and 234 of the same volume for the opinions expressed by the Employers' and Workers' Delegates).
the Peace Treaty clearly lays down that due recognition ought to be given to the differences of climate, habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial traditions, in the attempt to enforce uniformity in the conditions of labour throughout the world. Nevertheless, the suspicion lurked in certain quarters that, in the zeal for social progress which is one of the most hopeful features of the Labour Conference, the special conditions prevailing in a particular country might be overlooked in the endeavour, however altruistic it may be, to establish uniformity in labour legislation. The workers of India, on the other hand, were apprehensive that, in the absence of an impartial observer in their midst, too much stress might be laid on the backwardness of the existing social system in India, and that any undue emphasis on the "special conditions" prevailing in this country might put off to the Greek Kalends all prospects and programmes of social reform. Early, therefore, in the history of the Labour Organization, Mr. N. M. Joshi, the universally respected champion of Indian labour, pressed before his colleagues in the Conference the necessity for having one of Geneva's own men permanently stationed as an economic and social "observer" in India. All the Indian labour representatives who attended the International Labour Conferences till 1928 added their voices to that of Mr. Joshi, including, among others, men of such opposing schools of political thought as the late Mr. Joseph Baptista and the late Lala Lajpat Rai. The request put forward by the exponents of Indian labour opinion was strongly supported by the representatives both of the Government and of the employing classes. Sir Atul Chatterjee, who represents the Government of India at Geneva, was enthusiastic in his support of the idea, and the views of Mr. G. D. Birla and the late Seth Narottam Morarjee welcoming the idea of an Indian branch may be regarded as fully representative of the opinion of the Indian commercial and industrial community. A considerable part of Mr. Birla's speech in the Conference of 1927 was devoted to the proposal for the establishment of an Indian branch which he regarded "as a move in the right direction"; and his successor as Indian Employers' Delegate "noted with pleasure" the decision of the Governing Body to have an outpost of the International Labour Office set up in New Delhi.

I started my work as the representative of Geneva in India on November 15, 1928, and in the light of the experience gained during the past five years, an attempt may be made to trace the possible lines of useful activity which lie open before the Indian branch of the International Labour Office. To deal satisfactorily with this aspect of the problem of India's relations with "the world's industrial parliament," it is necessary briefly
to recall the objects which the framers of the Peace Treaty had in calling into existence the new international organization. The preamble to Part XIII. of the Treaty may here be referred to; it runs as follows:

"Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice;

"And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease, and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young persons and women, provision for old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organization of vocational and technical education and other measures;

"Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries;

"The High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity as well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world, agree to the following."

It was felt that a mere enunciation of principles of social reform, however generous, would mark no advance upon the past unless provision was made at the same time for getting those principles effectively translated into practice. The main object of the International Labour Organization is thus to keep the principles enunciated in the Peace Treaty in the foreground, and to see that they actively influence the social legislation of each country. But it would be wrong to imagine that the only function of the I.L.O. was to legislate for the industrial classes. Though started primarily to improve social conditions all the world over by gradually levelling social legislation up to the standard prevailing in the most advanced countries, it has become, in addition, a great international research institution. By ascertaining the facts of industrial life and progress and by disseminating this knowledge by means of its numerous publica-
tions, the I.L.O. is attempting to create public opinion, both national and international, which will stand for social justice in all its forms.

One of the main functions of the Indian branch is to aid the central office in the collection and distribution of information on all subjects relating to labour conditions, whether in this country or abroad. The Geneva Office, which attaches the highest importance to the collection of the most recent and up-to-date information on these subjects, has established contacts with all important government departments and employers' and workers' organizations in each country; and its research department contains sections and services dealing, *inter alia*, with statistics, industrial legislation, unemployment, industrial health and safety, social insurance, disablement, agriculture, technical and vocational education, etc. In short, no aspect of the industrial problem is overlooked at Geneva; and in keeping themselves *au courant* with the latest developments in this sphere they are considerably assisted by the numerous publications, both official and non-official, which are every day reaching Geneva in large numbers. There is, however, an important limitation to the value of information gathered exclusively from printed documents, and the representatives of the International Labour Organization are expected to provide the necessary corrective to the abstract, bookish conception of social conditions gathered from documents alone, a conception which is liable to lose touch with reality, and might consequently lead to ill-advised action. In order to overcome this limitation, the Indian branch has already established valuable contacts with the relevant Government Departments, and the leading employers' and workers' organizations in the country. The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and the Associated Chambers of Commerce of India and Ceylon, which represent the Indian and the European commercial and industrial interests in India respectively, are already maintaining close touch with this office.* Similarly, the various sectional organizations, such as the Indian Mining Association and the Indian Mining Federation, the Bombay and Ahmedabad Millowners' Associations, the Indian Jute Association, etc., have also been sending us their published literature and keeping us informed from time to time of their views on current economic problems. Nor should I omit to mention in this connection the hearty co-operation we have been receiving from the executives of the various Chambers of Commerce. The problem of keeping in touch with the agricultural industry has

* The All-India Organization of Industrial Employers and the Employers' Federation of India, both of them started during the year, are also keeping themselves in close touch with us.
not proved capable of a ready solution, but thanks to the collaboration of the South Indian Planters’ Association, and the sympathy of representatives of the Assam tea industry, it has been found possible to follow the trend of events in the organized planting industry. As regards maritime workers, the various port trusts have been sending us their official publications, and in the inquiry which we undertook some time ago into the question of seamen’s welfare in ports, not only these bodies, but also the various institutions connected with seamen at Rangoon, Calcutta, Karachi and Bombay, proved very helpful in supplying us with the data needed. The workers’ organizations have been even more eager to co-operate with us and give us of their best, though it may now be confessed that, at the time of starting the I.L.O.’s branch in India, we were rather dubious as to the reception we would meet with from the side of organized labour. It will be remembered that the leaven of communism was very active in the Indian labour world of 1928, and that this communist element has as one of its principal tenets the inculcation of a spirit of hostility towards all persons with “reformist” tendencies and programmes. In spite of this, I was received with equal cordiality by friends belonging to both the extremist and the moderate wings of labour politics when I attended the Trade Union Congress meetings of 1928 and 1929. On the public platform, some of the extremists advocated the severance of India’s connection with the I.L.O., but in private, a good many of them were prepared to co-operate with the I.L.O. in its various spheres of beneficent activity. The arrests in connection with the Meerut case removed from the scene the more vocal of the extremist leaders, and it was therefore impossible to judge how far persons like Messrs. Dhondi Raj Thengdi or Sripad Amrit Dange could have helped or hindered our work. However that may be, the I.L.O. in India was assured, from its very inception, of the unstinted support of that vast mass of organized labour which had sought union under the standards of Messrs. N. M. Joshi, R. R. Bakhale, Jamnadas Mehta, and Syed Munawar in Bombay, V. V. Giri and B. Shiva Rao in Madras, Mirnal Kanti Bose and Aftab Ali in Calcutta, Harihar Nath Shastri in Cawnpore, and Diwan Chamanlal in Lahore. Thanks to the loyal support received from this section of Indian labour, as opposed to the dissident minorities with communist leanings scattered here and there which still want to boycott the I.L.O., it has been possible for Indian co-operation with our work not only to maintain its continuity, but also to expand its scope and character. The leaders of the three most important labour units in India—the National Federation of Trade Unions, the All India Railwaymen’s Federation, and the Seamen’s Organizations of Bombay
and Calcutta—have represented Indian labour at Geneva on several occasions; and from these organizations, as well as from the various individual unions with which we have had the privilege of establishing relationships, we have invariably met with the most generous measure of sympathy and assistance.

In return for the cordial co-operation that we have thus all along been receiving from employers’ and workers’ organizations, we have tried our best to be of service to them by giving them information on various points intimately concerning them in their own work. Here it is possible to draw a line of distinction between the requests for information received from employers’ organizations, and those that were made by workers’ organizations. The employers as a rule wanted enlightenment as to the prevailing conditions in other countries in the industries in which they were interested. The cotton millowners were among the first employers to avail themselves of our service, and the problems which interested them most were conditions in the competing industries of Lancashire, Japan, and China. Particular stress was laid on the conditions of labour and the amenities provided for it in other countries; and it was with real pleasure that this office undertook to obtain for them the information they wanted, as the nature of their inquiries clearly revealed a genuine desire to improve the conditions of Indian labour. It is pleasing to us to note that our efforts in the direction of satisfactorily responding to the enquiries addressed to us have been generously recognized by our correspondents. One of the foremost employers of labour in India wrote to us some time ago: “I see the great possibilities of your office and the valuable information that Indian industry can obtain from it,” and offered even to reimburse the office for the expenses it may have been put to in collecting the information he wanted. Reimbursement, of course, was out of the question, since the raison d’être of our organization is to serve industry and labour; but we must confess we were pleased with the offer, for when a hard-headed business man offers to pay for anything, it is because he finds the thing really worth paying for. “Unsolicited testimonials” of a like nature have been coming in from many other sources, and we should have been less than human if these have not encouraged us to pursue our work with greater enthusiasm.

As contrasted with the demands from the employers’ side, it is significant that the requests received from Indian workers’ associations are mostly concerned with the question of organization. This does not by any means mean that the problem of organization is the only problem in which they are interested; it was but natural that conditions of wages and service should also have been dealt with in many of their communications. The
fact, however, remains that the Indian worker of today is more vitally interested in the ways and means of creating class-consciousness and class solidarity than in anything else. He feels that organization is more than half way to victory, and that it is imperative for the preservation of his own interests that he should belong to a body fully and unchallengeably representative of his class, in order that his case may be convincingly stated and adequately defended before the whole world. The cross-currents of labour opinion in this country perplex and bewilder him; the times are out of joint; and in his efforts to reason out a policy for himself and his brothers, he is now slowly learning that the path marked out by Geneva—the path of progressive improvement—is the only one that can lead him to his desired end. He also finds that the war-cry of his class—"Workers of the World! Unite!"—has approached its nearest realization under the ægis of Geneva. For, though the International Labour Organization consists of the representatives of governments and employers besides those of his own class, the workers who meet together at Geneva are in fact, if not in name, the representatives of the largest and the most coherent labour organizations it has yet been possible to call into being. In the workers' group of the Geneva Conferences, the International Federation of Trade Unions of Paris and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions at Utrecht, together with the representatives of certain national movements not affiliated to either, work in unison, and in fact act as an ad hoc organization of over thirty million workers. In allying himself, therefore, with this mighty organization under the auspices of Geneva, the Indian worker feels his class consciousness satisfied, while at the same time he obtains the moral support of labour throughout the world for any just battle he may be engaged in.

A review, however cursory it may be, of the nature of the enquiries that flow into the Indian branch of the International Labour Office will reveal how varied and multitudinous are the problems for the solution of which the general public looks to Geneva. A few cases may here be cited. It would appear that some building contractors in a certain part of India habitually employ coolies for seven or eight days and then dismiss them without paying for the work already done. Has there been legislation in any country to prevent this kind of injustice, seeing that the coolies are too poor to sue their employers even in a small cause court? Can we supply information regarding the constitutions of the Board of Commissioners or trustees of the more important ports of the British Empire? What are the terms of employment of textile workers in Lancashire? What are the collective agreements in force in the major industries of Great
Britain? Are there any countries where strikes without notice are penalized by law? What are the prevailing rates of piece and time wages in the cotton mills of Lancashire and Japan? What is the general practice in other countries as regards recognition of labour unions? What are the hours of work on board ship while in harbour and at sea? Can this office supply information as to how the new Japanese Factory Act Amendment is being enforced? What are the social amenities usually provided by textile manufacturers for their employees? How can unemployment of the educated classes be prevented? What are the conditions of labour prevailing in Indian States? What is the economic condition of graduate employees in England and Germany? Can the International Labour Office take steps to better the conditions of the elementary and second grade teachers in India? Can we draft a Memorandum and articles of Association for a Labour Bank in India? These, to take a few examples, indicate the range and amplitude of the enquiries coming into the Indian branch; and though the amount of research which this sort of work entails has often reduced me and my colleagues to exhaustion, none of us has ever had occasion to feel that the work lacks either variety or interest. Occasionally, we also get a comic touch as when some enterprising university student naively suggests that we might prepare for him a thesis on an economic subject which he might submit to his university.

Altogether the response which the Indian public has been giving to the Indian branch of the I.L.O. has been distinctly encouraging. Apart from our duty of disseminating accurate information on industrial questions, the Indian branch has also to win for itself and its parent institution public sympathy and support. The late Lord Burnham once advised us "not to advance under a smoke screen," but, in view of the humanitarian interest which actuates the work of the I.L.O., to spread by every legitimate means accurate knowledge of the kind of work it is undertaking. Already, during the first decade of its life, it has succeeded not only in getting a more or less apathetic world to accept its new ideals of social justice, but has also been directly instrumental in persuading various industrial countries to adopt practical measures of far-reaching social reform. In India there had been, for long, the feeling that the League and the I.L.O. were bodies the orbit of which lay in Europe, and that non-European countries were roped in only to create the semblance of universality for these institutions. But this charge is no longer levelled against Geneva, since even countries like the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., which have so long ostentatiously refused to participate in its work, have now made it a practice to send their representatives to Geneva Conferences. As regards the I.L.O., its
composition is even more universal than that of the League of Nations, and the system for national representation, both in its Governing Body and in its Conference, which it has evolved, enables the voice not only of Governments but also of the leading spokesmen of labour and industrialism to be effectively heard. In its editorial of July 6 last, the Leader of Allahabad points out how, in this respect again, the I.L.O. stands ahead of the League; and refers to the Government of India being represented on the Governing Body of the I.L.O. by a permanent member in the person of Sir Atul Chatterjee, while the interests of Indian industries and labour are there looked after by two deputy members, Messrs. D. Erulkar and N. M. Joshi respectively. Sir Atul has indeed been India’s representative at several Imperial and international conferences, but it is undeniable that it is through his connection with the I.L.O. that he has made his most effective contribution to raise India’s status in the comity of nations. In 1927 he was unanimously elected President of the Tenth International Labour Conference—the first time that the honour of guiding the work of an international deliberative body has been conferred on an Indian. An even higher honour was in store for him and for India, for, in 1932, he was unanimously elected the Chairman of the Governing Body, and by virtue of his position, stood second only to the President of the Council in the hierarchy of the League.

While this sentimental consideration has played its own part in rebutting the charge that the I.L.O. was not really universal in character, there is the even more remarkable fact that, under the impulsion of Geneva, the countries of the East have displayed a surprising readiness to undertake and carry out progressive social reforms. India has already ratified no less than thirteen Draft Conventions and adopted a great many Recommendations passed by the various Labour Conferences.* The atmosphere necessary for the carrying out of these measures of social reform was generated under Geneva’s direct influence. The passing of the amended Factories and Mines Acts, the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Trade Unions Act, etc., is by itself sufficient to prove the value and usefulness of our connection with the world-currents of social progress which converge at Geneva. Several other schemes for social betterment are now engaging the attention of the Government which is anxious to implement, as far as it can, the various recommendations of the Royal Commission on Indian Labour, so ably presided over by Mr. Whitley. What is even more important than the measures for the redress

* For a detailed study of what India has gained through her membership of the I.L.O., see India and the I.L.O., Banailli Readership Lectures, 1929-30, University of Patna.”
of labour grievances which the Indian legislature has already passed is the spirit that has been introduced into India as a result of our contact with the I.L.O. Public interest in the entire question has been actively stimulated and measures are now being initiated which might not otherwise have been even thought of. This is full of significance, for the International Labour Organization is not so much an institution as the symbol of the hopes and aspirations of humanity; and Geneva connotes to the thinking mind not a group of offices, but a new temper, a new spirit, a new mentality. It stands for concord instead of discord; and in the industrial world, particularly, it has taught us to think of Government, employers and workers, not as elements fighting with one another, but as joint partners in a glorious enterprise.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATES OF THE LEVANT UNDER THE FRENCH MANDATE

By Camille Fidel
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Although geographically the States of the Levant under the French mandate seem to be more homogeneous than the Asiatic countries under the British mandate, the problem of their status and evolution presents much the same diversity, as well as a certain parallelism. In the hinterland, the kingdom of Iraq is no longer under the British mandate and has become an independent State, connected, however, with Great Britain by a treaty of alliance which includes certain guarantees of an imperial character; the Syrian Republic, also in the hinterland, is still under the French mandate, and the political unsettlement which has hitherto marked that State explains why attempts to substitute a Franco-Syrian treaty for the mandate have hitherto been unsuccessful. In the Mediterranean, just as there is no question of making a change in the British mandate over Palestine, where the method of direct rule allows Great Britain to play the indispensable part of arbiter in the rivalry between Jews and Arabs, nor in the British mandate over Transjordania which is now a constitutional monarchy, so also in the Lebanon and the other small States under the French mandate which have been given constitutional forms it does not seem practicable, owing to the differences in race, religions, and aspirations which separate their peoples from the Syrians, to contemplate, in any near future, a radical change in the present state of things. It may be added that in the States under the French mandate there is, in the form of an organization for their common interests, a bond of law, the like of which is not to be found in the countries under the British mandate.

Geographical Sketch

The States of the Levant under the French mandate have a total area of about 150,000 square kilometres and include, on the Mediterranean, the Republic of the Lebanon; the States of the Alaouites; the Sanjak of Alexandretta which is an autonomous part of the State of Syria; in the hinterland, south, the small district forming the State of the Jebel Druses; and the State of Syria, the most important of these territories, comprising the ancient vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo; and east, a great region
including the Syrian desert and reaching to the upper valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris (the Jeizireh). The population is about 2,700,000, not including the nomads of the Syrian desert who are about 200,000; it is greatly diversified as regards race and religion, and the administrative divisions correspond. In Syria, with 1,500,000 inhabitants, the mass of the population are Sunni Muslims: but in the Sanjak of Alexandretta a large part of the population are Turks. In the Lebanon out of a total of over 800,000 inhabitants nearly half are Christians of various sects, of which the Maronites are the most important community; the rest of the population are Muslims and Druses. The people in the jurisdiction of the States of the Aliaouites (350,000) and the Jebel Druses (60,000) belong respectively to the sects of the Ansariehs and the Druses. Since the beginning of the mandate the population has been constantly increased by foreign elements: one may reckon at about 200,000 the Armenian refugees from Turkey, and for several years Kurds and Tcherkesses have made their way across the northern frontier and have settled in the plains of the upper Jeizireh. The population is very unevenly spread, owing to the difficult character of the soil and the differing climatic conditions: in the coastal region with a Mediterranean climate, on the western slope of the lofty chain of the Lebanon, there are eighty inhabitants to the square kilometre; on the plains in the interior, with a very dry continental climate, the density decreases to fifteen, and falls still lower in the solitudes of the Syrian East. This is explained by the fact that nearly half the population of the State of Syria is grouped in four towns—Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama.

The natural products are very varied: cultivation of vegetables in the coastland and the oases; fruit cultivation in the orchards and vineyards of the hill districts; rich industrial cultivation in the low plains; cereals on the high plains; grasses on the vast steppes of the east, where the nomads pasture their numerous flocks, the breeding of which constitutes an important source of wealth.

The Small States under the Mandate

In accordance with the duties imposed by the mandate the French High Commission endeavours loyally to prepare these populations for governing themselves, to set them gradually on the road to independence. With that aim it has undertaken to endow them, on the one hand, with the equipment necessary for the development of the country, and on the other hand, as far as practicable, with the instruments of government and with representative institutions. The steps to be taken, however, were not
the same everywhere in territories whose populations are more or less advanced and are distinct in race, religion, interests, aspirations: and on the other hand, it was necessary to afford them the possibility of an apprenticeship for political liberty and to avoid premature haste in leading them along the road to emancipation.

What has just happened in the Lebanon goes to prove this. The Mountain is by far the most advanced part of the territories under the French mandate; and Lebanon society, thanks to the numerous schools and the two universities at its disposal, has reached the highest intellectual level, perhaps, of all the Asiatic Orient. In 1926 the Lebanon Republic received its constitution. But this new system, with the machinery of government and parliament and bureaucracy that it involved, proved far too burdensome for the little State; the yield of the taxes, with which the people were overloaded, served chiefly to maintain over-numerous and partly useless officials, and the public works were neglected, though the budget had been doubled in six years. Faced with the general discontent and with the menace of bankruptcy M. Henri Ponsot, the High Commissioner, had to decide to suspend the constitution provisionally; the President of the Republic, M. Charles Debbas, whose functions were extended, obtained full power to make decrees having the force of law, and he has now taken in hand the task of simplifying the administrative machine and putting the finances right.

This step back may obviously retard the freedom of the Lebanon; people, indeed, are facing a revision of the Lebanon constitution on models better suited to the local needs, with institutions less liberal perhaps, but certainly simpler. Although the eventual making of a treaty between France and the Lebanon in the future is not abandoned, the maintenance of the French protection in this coastal region is held to be an absolute necessity. Even granting that the annexation of districts peopled by Muslims has disturbed the original cohesion of a society which formerly was in large majority Christian, still the Mountain forms a distinct entity—geographic, ethnographic, economic—turned towards Europe and Mediterranean civilization, and, with the exception of some Muslim elements in the recently annexed districts, the people of the Lebanon, especially the Christians and, above all, the Maronites, desire to safeguard their nationality, under the mandate of France, and are resolutely opposed to any annexation to Syria, with its Muslim mentality.

At the other pole, so to speak, of the social evolution in the countries under the French mandate are the two small territories, the Jebel Druses and the State of the Alouites, which have been placed under direct administration. The former, which has been under military control since the end of the revolt in 1926, is
governed by the General in command of the forces, aided by a
council of government; the restoration of security and the im-
provement in the economic situation, thanks especially to road
construction, testify to the success of this administration. The
State of the Alaouites, called also the government of Latakia,
has had at its head a French governor, aided by a representa-
tive council; the inhabitants, who are of the sect of Ali, the son-in-law
of the Prophet, are now protected from the religious persecutions
they suffered from the Sunni Muslims, and would not on any
account become part of the State of Syria, the less so because the
French administration has transformed the country by endowing
it with a network of roads and a harbour, and by encouraging
its agricultural development by suitable measures.

North of the State of the Alaouites, also in the coastal region,
the Sanjak of Alexandretta includes among its inhabitants a good
proportion, 30 to 40 per cent., of Turks. Stirred by a violent
campaign inspired from Angora, the aim of which was to get the
district of Antioch and Alexandretta considered purely Turkish,
they had a tendency to look to the other side of the frontier, but
this is gradually diminishing. Numerous also in the Sanjak of
Alexandretta are the Armenians, refugees from Cilicia; the
Arabs there are only a minority. On account of its special charac-
ter resulting from this composition of the population, the Sanjak
of Alexandretta, while forming an integral part of the State of
Syria—it has lately elected some Moderate deputies to the Damascus
parliament—has been endowed with a wide administrative and
budgetary autonomy; and the mutessarif, aided by an adminis-
trative council, exercises, by delegation from the President of the
State of Syria, the functions of a head of the State. The economic
progress of the country and its improvement in sanitation are
proof of the good results achieved in the Sanjak under its special
system.

Syrian Politics

The State of Syria received a Republican constitution on May 14,
1930. The elections to the Syrian Parliament, which took place
in December, 1931, gave a substantial majority to the Moderates,
who were in favour of an agreement with France, and fifty-two
of their party were elected, while the Nationalists obtained only
seventeen seats; but among the Moderates elected thirty represent
the north of Syria, which has its centre in Aleppo, where not one
Nationalist got in, while the seventeen Nationalist deputies repre-
sent the electors of Damascus, Homs, Hama, etc. Now, at the
time of the election by the Chamber of Deputies of the President
of the Republic, a coalition between the Nationalists and
Moderates of the south secured the victory of the Damascus can-
didate, Mohamed Ali bey el Abed, over the Aleppo candidate, Soubi bey Barakat, the antagonism between south and north taking the place on this occasion of the struggle between parties. The government formed after this election was presided over by Hakki bey el Azem, Moderate, who took for himself, together with the Presidency of the Council, the Ministry of the Interior. But while one portfolio, without any political character, Public Works, was assigned to a Moderate, Selim bey Jambart, two Nationalists were put at the head of the most important departments—Mazhar pasha Razlan, Justice and Public Instruction, Djemil bey Mardam, Finance and Agriculture.

The question was: what would be the fate of this government markedly Nationalist in character, in a parliament where the Moderates have an enormous majority? It was expected that the agreement which had been in force at the Presidential election would be renewed, and at first this optimism seemed to be confirmed. The Nationalist minority appeared to give up their barren system of abstention, and on November 7, 1932, the Syrian Parliament, almost unanimously, voted confidence in the Government, and granted it full power to negotiate with the French Government a treaty of alliance. The High Commissioner, M. Henri Ponsot, on his side, had received instructions to open negotiations, and he was able to make known before the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations the intention of the French Government to encourage, by the conclusion of a treaty with a Syrian government with constitutional responsibility, the evolution of Syria towards independence and sovereignty.

Here it must be pointed out that the question is one of concluding, as in the case of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, a treaty between France and the single State of Syria, in order to satisfy the aspirations of the Syrian people for independence, whilst the mandate system should not cease to be applied to the other States, in accord with the opinion of their respective peoples. Now the negotiations have been used, from the Syrian side, to raise with greater urgency than previously, the question of unity; not indeed Arab unity—a loose phrase and elastic when expedient—but Syrian unity; in other words, practically the incorporation into the State of Syria of the small States of the Alaouites and the Jebel Druses without prejudice to certain reservations affecting the Muslim territories annexed to the Lebanon.

A Nationalist congress held at Aleppo definitely put forward this claim to unity as the only possible basis for the Franco-Syrian treaty, but the Alaouite chiefs and the Druse notables demanded anew, with the utmost plainness, the maintenance of the autonomy of their country under the mandate of France. It may be added that the chief authorities in the Sanjak of Alexandretta
have asked for the maintenance of the present system and for separation from the State of Syria, and that even the chiefs of the Jeziresh, the district between the Euphrates and the Tigris peopled with Kurds and Arabs, have declared themselves opposed to Syrian unity and in favour of autonomy.

The Nationalist ministers of the Syrian Cabinet, faced with this formal opposition to their annexionist proposals as contrary to the rights of the peoples to self-determination, tendered their resignations, and were replaced by Moderates. Hakki bey el Azem retained the Presidency of the Council and the Ministry of the Interior, Selim bey Jambart retained Public Works and obtained also Public Instruction; the portfolio of Finance was given to Chakir bey Nimat ech-Chabani, deputy for Aleppo; that of Agriculture and Commerce to Yahya bey el Atahli, deputy for Antioch; and that of Justice to Soliman el Djoukhdar, formerly President of the Court of Cassation, not in parliament. So that it is probable that the Franco-Syrian treaty will be concluded by the French Government with a Moderate Syrian ministry, even though the Moderates themselves are partisans of Syrian unity, but do not make it a *sine qua non* of the conclusion of the future treaty.

**Common Interests**

One of the reasons for which the Syrians advocate the incorporation of certain small States which are under the French mandate is that the coastal regions include the ports and ways of access to Syria. Beirut, the capital of the Lebanon, the chief maritime and commercial centre of the States under the French mandate, handicapped, however, by the proximity of the Mount of Lebanon, connected with Damascus, the capital of Syria, by a narrow-gauge railway, partly plate-laid, giving poor traffic returns, but also by a good motor road; Tripoli, port of Lebanon, connected with Homs in Syria by a railway of normal gauge, at the end of the French branch of the pipe line which serves to bring to the Mediterranean the petrol of the Mosul region, where it is proposed to construct an air-port, together with an anchorage basin protected by a breakwater; Latakia, capital of the State of the Alaouites, where a small harbour has been constructed; Alexandretta, the capital of the autonomous sanjak of that name, the port of Aleppo and outlet for Northern Syria, with trade little inferior to that of Beirut. But in the absence of political unity there is among the States under the mandate an economic unity of real and practical usefulness; they form a common customs territory, without internal barriers, and Syria is able freely to use all the ports mentioned above.

As has been already said, the States under the French mandate
have common interests. A conference of delegates of the different
governments, associated with the High Commissioner, assists him
in the preparation of the administrative accounts of receipts and
expenditure for the services of common interest. The common
receipts are derived mainly from the customs; of the common
expenditure, the main item is for the upkeep of the local forces;
the annual surplus of receipts over expenditure is divided among
the States. Now the ending of the mandate as regards one of
the States cannot alter its position with regard to the others nor
affect the economic life of the whole; it will be for the mandatory
power to settle all questions that may arise between Syria and
the States left under the mandate.

FRANCE AND SYRIA

The fluctuations in Syrian politics, together with the recent
change in the High Commissionership, have slowed down the
negotiations for the Franco-Syrian treaty. It may be assumed
that the essential arrangements in it would have a certain analogy
with those in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, for France has, like England,
imperial interests to safeguard, a material and moral situation to

In the course of an enquiry in the Levant in September, 1932,
I gathered from Syrians of high position, Nationalists as well as
Moderates, the expression of their desire to see concluded between
Syria and France a treaty guaranteeing the reciprocal interests of
the two countries. They all agreed that France should continue
to Syria, when independent, her economic, financial, intellectual,
and military help. Following the example of certain clauses of
the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, it would especially be agreed that the
Syrian Republic should call upon the French for technical advisers
and military instructors, that French garrisons should be main-
tained at certain points, and lastly, that bases of French military
aviation should be installed.

Speaking generally, it is of importance that the progress
achieved in every direction under the mandatory system should
not be endangered. France, in addition to her credits and the
large material interests represented by the creation of economic
equipment and the enterprises of her citizens, ought also to
protect in Syria the moral and secular work of teaching and
assistance to which is due the intellectual influence which has
greatly developed since the operation of the mandate. The
French missions, through which the language, culture, and spirit
of France have penetrated to every class of the population, with-
out distinction of race or religion, should be enabled to pursue
without hindrance their fruitful activities.
A well-defined system of agreement, settled upon such principles, to replace the French mandate over Syria, would give satisfaction to the desire of the Syrians for independence, while satisfying the material and moral interests of France in the Levant. There, as at so many other points on the globe, following different models but in complete agreement, Great Britain and France will pursue side by side their work of development and uplift.

(Translated.)
JAPAN'S POPULATION PROBLEM

By HUGH BYAS
(Formerly Editor of the Japan Advertiser, and now Correspondent of The Times in Japan)

It might be said without much risk of exaggeration that none of the problems of Asia is more important than that of the pressure of population in Japan. It is the driving force behind Japanese expansion; and whether that take the form of expansion of resources, as in Manchuria, or of trade, it raises dangerous and difficult questions. The Manchurian affair was hardly over before the British and Japanese Empires found themselves engaged, almost by inadvertence, in economic warfare, the British abrogating long-standing commercial treaties and imposing prohibitory tariffs on Japanese goods, the Japanese retaliating with a boycott of the kind which their Government had declared to be a form of war when practised by Chinese. Indignation against Britain was expressed with a warmth which startled British residents in Japan. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was forgotten, or, if remembered, only its usefulness to England was recalled. In the Manchurian affair the Japanese people had instinctively closed their ranks and driven out ministers whose nationalism it suspected. In the Indian tariff dispute it showed itself instinctively sensitive to the danger involved in any obstruction of Japanese exports. The ultimate cause was in each case the same—pressure of population on the means of subsistence, pressure of imprisoned national energy for an outlet. Far from relaxing, this pressure has not yet reached its maximum.

The number of babies born in Japan last year, according to the Cabinet Bureau of Statistics, was 2,182,743. The number of deaths during the same period was 1,174,875. The natural increase of population was 1,007,868. The round million had never before been reached in Japan, and only in Russia has this figure been exceeded. It seems, though the statement cannot be statistically proved, that a natural increase of one million in one year is a record held by Japan and Russia over all other countries. The United States, with a population of 120 millions as against Japan's 66 millions, had in 1931 a natural increase of only 800,163. The highest American year was 1927, when the excess of births over deaths was 961,031. Even India, with a population of 315 millions, increases only at an annual average rate of about 380,000. More babies are born in China than in Japan, but the
positive checks of Malthus—famine, war, disease, and death—are formidable in operation there, and it is questionable whether China's population is increasing at all. At the other end of the scale, the Japanese death-rate was last year the lowest recorded—17.72.

It is true that the birth-rate is slowly decreasing and has fallen from 35.1 per 1,000 in 1921 to 32.16 in 1932. But as the population as a whole is always growing larger, and as it is predominantly a young population with a large number of boys and girls reaching marriageable age every year, the actual number of babies increases. Owing to this factor—the large proportion of young people who in the next few years will marry—the increase must be expected to continue for some time. Yet there is a social cause at work which, in the opinion of Japanese statistical authorities, will bring about equilibrium within say twenty years from now, the population becoming stationary at between 80 and 90 millions. The age of marriage is gradually growing later. Middle-class families no longer hasten to marry their sons at 21 and their daughters at 18 or 19. The married student is a rarer bird than he was even ten years ago. In 1921, 519,193 marriages were registered; in 1931 the number had fallen to 496,754. The Japanese student to-day, as he leaves the university with his hard-won degree and tightens his belt for the struggle to capture a "white collar" job, may look forward to equilibrium about 1953. But even when equilibrium is reached it will be at a level 10 or 20 millions above that of to-day. And the question is: If 66 millions are straining Japan’s resources to the uttermost, how is she to cope with an additional 10 millions?

It is generally admitted that emigration is at best a palliative and not a remedy for over-population. But even as an effective palliative it is denied to Japan. The countries which could absorb any considerable proportion of her surplus—America, Canada, and Australia—have banged and bolted their doors. Manchukuo may provide useful openings for Japanese traders and technicians, but there can be no colonization in the real sense, for Manchuria is inhabited by Chinese and, low as the Japanese farmer's standard of living is, that of the Chinese farmer is lower still. Brazil received Japanese settlers, but the number has never exceeded 12,000 a year. The sale of contraceptives is illegal, and the birth-rate is sufficient evidence that birth control is not practised. By a process of exhaustion, therefore, we come to industrialization as the only means by which Japan can provide food and work for her people. Industrialization is a difficult task since it means that Japan must pit her cheap labour and frugal standards of life against the machines and capital of the
West. But up till now it has succeeded. Japan has been able to rectify her narrow political frontiers by an expanding economic frontier. Subsidized shipping lines, State-aided banks, Government assistance in many forms, plus readiness to learn, capacity for organization and tireless initiative, have enabled her year by year to extend her markets. But now, when the value of money rises and falls like the mercury in the barometer, Japanese industrialization is met with a zareba of tariffs and quotas hastily raised to protect markets from her cheap goods. India, Malaya, East Africa, West Africa, Egypt, and Turkey have taken fright one after the other.

There are certain important factors in Japan's favour, and it must be said that up till now the problem has not been acute. The rapid increase of population is a modern phenomenon, due, as in Europe and America, to the rapid increase of wealth brought by the modern industrial system. In old Japan saturation point under the feudal economy had been reached. For at least 150 years the population remained stationary at about 30 millions. From the census of 1721 to that of 1846 the increase was less than 900,000. Babies were born, but they died. Famines occurred periodically. Epidemics could not be checked. The death-rate was high and the high birth-rate was controlled by abortion and to some degree by infanticide. The first census of new Japan, taken on the last day of 1871, showed the population to be 33,110,285. The 33 millions of 1871 had become, in the census of 1930, 66,392,183. The annual increment has risen from 200,000 in 1871-72 to a million annually.

The children who came so rapidly were born to comparative plenty. New Japan was a land where two people could live where one had lived before and live better. No longer had the farms to provide for every child born on them. Cities grew and factories multiplied. Between 1890 and 1925 the number of people living in cities of over 10,000 inhabitants rose from 5,504,000 to 21,853,000, an increase of 300 per cent. In the same period the rural population increased by only 7 per cent., though the productivity of the farms was doubled. The new industries employed the new millions as fast as they left school. Food supply kept pace with population. Feudal restrictions on the use of land and the mobility of the peasants was abolished, and greater economic freedom brought increased productivity. The output of rice in 1880 was 4.46 bushels for a population of 36,000,000. In 1928 the population had increased to 66 millions and the rice yield to 4.67 bushels per capita. Calculations in other lines as to numbers and resources give similar results. Savings bank deposits are as good a test as any other of the working man's prosperity. Taking 1912 as the basic year represented by the
symbol 100, we find that fourteen years later, in 1925, the population had risen to 112, but the number of depositors to 236 and the amount deposited to 586. The wealth of Japan was increasing more rapidly than population.

These facts must be remembered as a corrective to the pictures sometimes drawn of the density of Japan's population. The uncorrected picture is terrifying. Japan, a land of farms, comes next in density of population to such intensively industrialized countries as Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain. If population and cultivated land are compared, the fields of Japan are the most crowded in the world. Belgium, the classic example of close human settlement, has 394 inhabitants per square kilometre of cultivated land; Japan has 959, according to the latest issue of the Japan Year Book. The State of California, with a population of five and a half millions, has double the cultivated area of all Japan.

Such parallels are useful to illustrate the degree of population pressure in Japan, but certain imponderable realities of their life have protected the Japanese from the sufferings which the contrast between numbers and resources would seem to imply. The civilization of Japan was and still is an inexpensive civilization. Sheep and cattle cannot live on the bamboo grass of Japan, and, therefore, the Japanese are not a meat-eating people. Rice, fish, vegetables, and millet cost little. The climate is for the most part moderate and the Japanese people need comparatively little fuel. During half the year little and cheap clothing is adequate. A Japanese gentleman these summer days may be well and comfortably dressed in the costume of the country for what a pair of gloves would cost him in Regent Street. It has been relatively easy for the Japanese to maintain decent standards of life on small means. It may be literally true that some Japanese textile workers are paid only one-eighth or one-tenth of the money wages earned by the corresponding workers in England (at the present abnormal rate of exchange), but it is entirely fallacious to suppose that their standard of living is therefore ten times worse. The Japanese standard is lower in the sense that it is simpler and far less expensive, but it would be impossible for anyone who knows the country to argue that the Japanese worker is more degraded or more dissatisfied than the European.

Some American sociologists trace the social and economic malaise of the United States to the fact that the frontier has disappeared with all that it meant as an escape and a safety valve. Japan's population problem boils down to the question whether her industrial frontier can continue to expand and provide work for the coming millions. Her agricultural frontier has been reached. The land, subdivided into minute farms of an average...
size of 2.7 acres, can employ no more. It is super-saturated. Can the factories continue to absorb the increase? The answer seems to be that if international trade is given at least no less freedom than in the past, if industry retains the form of relatively free enterprise, Japan can face the future with confidence. Industrially, the Japanese are the first nation in Asia. They are capable of organization on a large scale, and, though their industrial efficiency is still below that of Britain or America or Germany, it is superior to that of India or China. Japanese industry has many things in its favour, amongst them moderate capitalization, the cartel buying and marketing system, good machinery and hydro-electric plant, freedom from trade union restrictions, low costs of production and transport, and relatively low taxation. As Lancashire begins to see, it would be foolhardy to set a limit to Japanese technical efficiency. Japanese labour is cheap, and its cheapness is solidly based on climate and inherited simplicity of life. It should not be entirely a wild dream to suppose that an industrious and ambitious people, equipped with machinery and versed in modern industry, should be able to sell a sufficient quantity of their manufactures to pay for their raw materials and the marginal supplies of food they need to import. They are part of Asia, whose millions need the cheap goods which Japan can supply. A free-trade economist of the old school would see something providential in the fact that the cheapest manufacturing country was beside the poorest market.

The unplanned economy of the past has, in fact, provided quite tolerably for Japan's new millions as they came. But the momentum of increase has never been so great, and, just as the load on the economic machine is growing heavier, economic nationalism threatens to throttle its expansive power. India, Egypt, Malaya, East and West Africa are raising tariffs, cancelling trade treaties and devising other measures to check the importation of Japanese goods. The economic frontier may be fixed, may even contract. If Japan's cheap shirts, rubber shoes, electric bulbs and what not are no longer to be accepted by other markets in increasing quantities the outlook is dark.

The risks must be pointed out. Japan's population will continue to increase at the rate of about a million a year for not less than ten and perhaps not more than fifteen or twenty years. There is no way of providing for these children but by employing them to manufacture goods and selling them chiefly in Asia. If economic nationalism means a blocking of economic frontiers, it seems hardly worth while troubling the Disarmament Conference further.

But there will be nothing inevitable about the catastrophe if it comes. It is more in accord with Japan's experience during the
past fifty years to expect that a growth of productive power will not prove destructive. A supply of cheap shirts cannot intrinsically be a bad thing for millions of unclothed men in Asia. The immense unsatisfied requirements of these millions are Japan's strongest allies. As the world's demand for their primary products revives, so will their purchasing power. Industrialization at a rate which will provide for a population increasing by a million a year is a hard but not an impossible task. But the exigent nature of the Japanese problem should be understood.
WHEN AND HOW MUHAMMADANISM ENTERED CHINA*

BY ISAAC MASON, F.R.G.S.

To those who have read much about the Chinese, or who have resided in China, it is well known that Muhammadans form an appreciable part of the population of that land. Yet comparatively few know much about the Far-Eastern followers of the Arabian Prophet, and perhaps even less is known of their origin and their introduction into China. It may therefore be a matter of interest to set forth here some of the results of investigations along this line.

Others have laboured in this field, and much useful information is available to those who know where to look for it. I have made use of such of the published results of the labours of others as I have found helpful in preparing this paper, with due acknowledgments. I have, however, made independent investigations of the sources of information, and prepared my own translations of documents and inscriptions, and hope that I have succeeded in putting together a trustworthy account of when and how Muslims first entered China.

Estimates of the present number of Muhammadans in China vary all the way from four millions to thirty millions. There can be little doubt that the larger figure is excessive, and, on the other hand, the estimate of Commandant d'Ollone, which is the lowest, is probably much too low. After considering the various figures available, and in the absence of a reliable census, I believe we may safely assume the number of Muslims in China to be about eight millions, scattered over the whole country, but found in larger proportions in Kansu, Yunnan, Szechwan and Chihli, of China proper, and in Sin Kiang and Chinese Turkestan on the north-western borders.

When and how Muslims first entered China are matters of uncertainty about which differing views have been held. The traditions of the Muslims are interesting, but mostly rest on very slender foundations. We do not know of any Chinese-Muslim book now extant which was written as long ago as three hundred years. A bibliography of over three hundred and fifty titles is known to exist—of which I have collected about two hundred and eighty—many being small tracts or leaflets, but quite a number are books of considerable size. Some of these books profess

* Lecture delivered before the China Society on December 7, 1932.
to be historical, and tell of Muslims reaching China over thirteen hundred years ago, but no satisfactory proofs are given for such claims, and the absence of contemporary documentary evidence must be regarded as unfavourable to the claim. There exist a few monuments which are referred to in support of the early-entry claim; the most famous of these is a stone tablet in a mosque at Sianfu, and it is dated A.D. 742. This will be referred to later.

It will be interesting to first give some attention to Chinese-Muhammadan traditions before entering upon the consideration of historical documents.

Among Muslims themselves there are two lines of tradition: one is that the introduction of Islam to China was overland by the north-west route; the other says it was introduced by way of the sea to Canton. Both stories refer to the same individual as being the pioneer sent by Muhammad, so they may be variations of a common tradition.

At Canton there is a famous mosque known as the Hwai Shêng Szû (Prophet-Remembrance Mosque), the original of which is said to have been built by the apostle Sa’d Wakkas; and nearby is an ancient tomb which is said to be the resting place of that pioneer. The Muslim traditions gather round the coming of Sa’d Wakkas, about whom we must set forth all that has been ascertained.

The most famous Chinese-Muslim writer was Liu Chih (Liu Chia-lien), whose standard Life of Mohammed* was completed in 1724, and was published later. In that work Liu Chih, by a chronological error, sets the time of Muhammad’s birth in the Ping Yin year of Chung Ta T’ung of the Liang dynasty (A.D. 546 or 547), which is twenty-three or twenty-four years earlier than the correct year, A.D. 570. This will be referred to later, but meanwhile should be borne in mind as we consider the traditions. Liu Chih says, respecting the first entry of Muslims into China:

"In the sixth year of K’ai Hwang of the Sui dynasty (A.D. 586), which was the first year of the Prophetship of Muhammad, there was seen in the sky a strange star. The Chinese Emperor Wên Ti commanded the Chief Astronomer to divine its meaning, and he said that an extraordinary person had appeared in the West. The Emperor sent an envoy to investigate if this was really so, and after about a year he arrived at Mecca. He desired the Prophet to accompany him back to the East, but he declined. The Prophet sent Sa’d Wakkas (his maternal uncle), and three others, to go with the envoy to China. Muslims first entered China in the seventh year of K’ai Hwang of the Sui dynasty."

* Translated into English by I. Mason, with title The Arabian Prophet. (Luzac.)
Liu Chih continues: "The old statement that the entry of the religion of the Prophet to China was in the reign of Hsüan Tsung of the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 713) is an error. As for the other account, which tells of Chen Kuan of the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 628) sending an envoy to the West to obtain a Koran, resulting in Muslims entering China overland, that was subsequent to the period of which we are writing, so is not recorded in this Life of the Prophet."

It is to be noted that the "maternal uncle" in the above is a gloss on the text. It may not have been in Liu Chih's original manuscript, as, on other occasions, he describes Wakkas otherwise than by family relationship.

Elsewhere Liu Chih says that an envoy was sent in the time of Wên Ti of the Sui dynasty, with a request for Canonical books, in response to which the Prophet, in the seventh year of K'ai Hwang, "sent his minister Sa'd Wakkas and others with the Koran in thirty volumes. They entered China from the Southern Seas to Canton, and first built the Prophet-Remembrance mosque, and subsequently spread the faith through the empire." Liu Chih says this is proved by records in certain books; but it may be said here that neither the Sui nor the T'ang official histories have any mention of Sa'd Wakkas, nor of any entry of Islam at this period.

One more extract from Liu Chih says that, "In the fourth year of Wu Têh of the T'ang dynasty, after a remarkable dream, the Emperor sent an envoy of several men to the country of the Prophet, who commanded his disciple Sa'd Wakkas to bring the Koran of thirty volumes, comprising 114 sura, 6,666 paragraphs, to give to the Emperor, who had it transcribed and promulgated throughout the empire."

The tradition concerning Sa'd Wakkas is found in several Chinese-Muslim books, and in a previous paper I have given a full translation of one of these named Hsi Lai Tsung P'iu, so I will not repeat here. Briefly, it is a Muslim tradition of the first entry of the Muslims into China, which is stated to have been in the second year of T'ai Tsung of the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 628). It is said that in consequence of a dream of the Emperor, a deputation was sent to Mecca to invite Muhammad to come to China. He declined, but sent three followers to represent him, and to explain the Faith. Two of these died on the way, but the third, Sa'd Wakkas, had an interview with the Emperor and was able to converse with him, having acquired the language through the influence of the Prophet in a miraculous way—namely, by taking a pinch of the native soil and smelling it. This tradition also tells of a proposal by the Emperor to exchange 3,000 of his own soldiers for 3,000 Muslims, which resulted in 800 Muslims being
selected to go to China to assist Wakkas in propagating the Faith, and these married Chinese wives.

It will be noticed that though there is forty years of difference in time between this account and that of Liu Chih given above, and though one tells of the entry by sea and the other by land, they both claim that Sa'd Wakkas was the apostle.

It will be of interest to quote from another Muhammedan document entitled *A Record of the History of the early Sage and Sahabi*, which says:

"The early sage Wan Ko-shih (Wakkas), after coming to China in obedience to command, requested permission to return to the West on three occasions. The first time he went to obtain all kinds of Canonical books to give to his Chinese co-religionists. The second time he went to secure a Koran, that his disciples might recite it and study it. He also requested the Prophet to indicate to him where he would die. The honourable Prophet commanded him to take as much of the Koran as had then been revealed, and said that as more followed he would send it by a messenger to Wakkas. 'As for the place of your death,' said the Prophet, 'that shall be shown by the head of an arrow.' He then pointed with his finger towards the East, and ordered a man to fix an arrow in his bow and pull the string to the full extent, and then let go: in an instant all trace of the arrow was lost. The Prophet then said to Wakkas: 'By virtue of my influence, the arrow will fall at the place where you will die; get you back quickly to China, and in the course of time what I have said will prove true.'

"Wakkas went aboard a ship, and with propitious winds he was at Canton almost before he knew it; and there he found the mark of the arrow, outside the north wall, in the north side of the Liu Hwa bridge. He had the place walled round as a burial ground, and asked permission to build a 'Prophet-Remembrance' mosque, which permission was granted, and there was also given a portion of land for the upkeep of the mosque and the support of those in it. The mosque is called the 'Prophet-Remembrance' mosque because it is meant to cherish remembrance of the Prophet. Inside the enclosure there was built a smooth pagoda or minaret, one hundred and sixty Chinese feet high, and of unusual appearance. Inside the minaret there was a spiral staircase, and Wakkas used to go to the top of the minaret, morning and evening, and repeat the call to people to come to the mosque.

"The third time that Wakkas returned to Arabia was because he had a dream, in which he saw a tall man, who said to him: 'The honourable Prophet is soon about to leave the world; if you hasten back to the West you may see his face, but if you delay it may be too late.' On awakening, Wakkas was greatly
agitated, and the next day he set off for Medina; but when he arrived the Prophet was already dead. He died at 63, in the twentieth year of Chên Kuan (a.d. 647).*

"Wakkas learned from the eminent sages that the Prophet had left command that he was to return to China to propagate the Faith. There was also given to him a complete copy of the Koran, 6,666 paragraphs, divided into 114 chapters, made up into thirty volumes. This book Wakkas carried back with him to China, and gave to the Faithful, to be kept for ever.

"Not long afterward Wakkas died at Canton, and was buried by the believers inside the walled enclosure. A stone pavilion was erected, surrounded by mounds of earth, and the centre of this was subsequently used by people as a place for offerings and sacrifice, on which account it is called the 'Hsiang fên' (the Tomb of Offerings). On the outside of the door is written, 'The ancient tomb of the early sage.' Such are the historical records of the Sahabi Wakkas."

This interesting record must be regarded as apocryphal in the light of investigation, as will be shown presently.

The story of the entry by land is recorded in another Chinese-Muslim work entitled Hui Hui Yuan Lai, of which there are various editions, differing in details. M. Deveria had a copy bearing the date 1712, and Wylie mentions one of the date 1754. My own copy is much more recent. The book is supposed to have been given to one of his Muhammadan Generals by the Emperor K'ang Hsi (a.d. 1662-1722). A partial translation is given in Broomhall's Islam in China. It is obviously a work of Muslim propaganda, giving imaginary dialogues between the T'ang Emperor and the "turbaned man," these being a vehicle for conveying Muslim teaching. It is of very little value as history, and must be regarded as apocryphal.

In this story, as in the other, it is the Chinese Emperor who makes the first move, sending to Arabia for apostles. It is distinctly said that these came by land stages, enduring much hardship. Two died on the way, the only one who arrived being Sa'd Wakkas, who, in this story, is called Ko Hsin. An interpreter was found necessary for the interviews in this case. In conversation with the Emperor, Wakkas refers to the complete Koran, which he said consists of 6,666 sections, and the Four Books and Five Classics of China do not equal half the amount! But the Koran was not completed at the time when this interview is dated (a.d. 628), and the complete book is nothing like so voluminous as the Chinese books mentioned. The record also says that the term "Hui Hui" was discussed at that in-

* Muhammad died in a.d. 632. The Muslim writer of the above post-dates, while Liu Chih ante-dates.
terview. But this term is not known in Chinese history until some centuries later. These anachronisms mark the book as apocryphal.

The tradition about Sa’d Wakkas is found in various other places, but these need not detain us, so we may proceed to our conclusions about the story of this pioneer of Islam to China. The Chinese characters used for his name vary, but there is sufficient similarity to lead us to believe that all refer to the same person. In the legends he is styled “Sahabi,” which would mean that he had seen the Prophet, and associated with him in his lifetime.

A maternal uncle of Muhammad was named Abu Wakkas, but there is no record that he ever left Arabia. His son, Sa’d ibn Wakkas, was also called Sa’d ibn Malik ibn Wahb az-Zuhri. He was the seventh person who embraced Islam, and he was present with Muhammad at all his battles. He died at ‘Aliq (A.D. 675) at the age of seventy-nine, and was buried at Mecca. He never visited China, so was not the apostle of the legends.

Turning now to the dates given in the traditions. We have the definite statement that the arrival in China was in the seventh year of K’ai Hwang (A.D. 587). Muhammad was born in A.D. 570, so was only a youth at the time mentioned. He did not receive his first revelation until he was forty, and the Hegira was in A.D. 622. The sending of an apostle of the new faith in A.D. 587 is an impossibility.

There is an error in calculation which will be dealt with when referring to the Sianfu tablet, which is probably the source of the errors in these legends. The point that is of importance now is that many writers commit themselves to definite years of the emperors of the Sui and T’ang dynasties which are absolutely incorrect. The Sui dynasty ended before the Muhammadan Hegira began, and the year given for the bringing of the Koran to China was five years before Muhammad’s first revelation, and long before the Koran was completed. Historians who make such glaring mistakes in their dates are likely to be wrong in their other statements.

As there is no reference to the arrival of Sa’d Wakkas at that early date in any Chinese history, nor in Arabic records, but only in Muslim writings of a much later date, we are bound to regard the whole story as untrustworthy. The legend is rejected by such authorities as M. Deveria, E. H. Parker, A. Wylie, J. Dyer Ball, and Marshall Broomhall. The last-named says, “The tendency of the Muhammadan traditions to find some personal link with Muhammad for the sake of added glory, and the apocryphal account of the Emperor of China’s dream, for the same reason, do not help the student of Muhammadanism in China to accept
the very improbable, if not impossible, story of Muhammad's maternal uncle."

Of the stone monuments relating to Muslims in China there is only one which need be dealt with in the limits of this paper, and that is the Sianfu tablet, which claims to be the oldest, and which is probably responsible for perpetuating the legend about the very early advent of Islam to China. This remarkable monument is dated A.D. 742, thus claiming to be older than the famous Nestorian monument.

I translate the inscription as follows:

"A Monument to Record the First Building of a Mosque."

"Inscription of the monument recording the first building of a mosque, written by Wang Hung, Graduate of the Third Degree, Secretary of the Board of Revenue, and Censor."

"I have heard that what remains undoubted after a hundred generations is Truth (the Path); and that by which men are mutually influenced though distant a hundred generations is mind (heart). Now sages have one mind and their principles are the same, so they influence one another and remain undoubted through a hundred generations.

"In all parts of the world sages have arisen, and their being called sages was because they had this similarity of mind and principles. The Western sage Muhammad was born later than Confucius, and lived in the country of Arabia. I do not know how far removed in time and place he was from the sage of China. Their language differed, yet their principles agreed. Why was this so? Their minds were as one, therefore their principles were the same. The ancients had a saying, 'A thousand sages have one mind; and a myriad ages have one governing principle.' This may be believed as truth.

"But though the times and generations are distant, and the men have passed away, their sacred books have survived. From what has been handed down we know that the Western sage was born with supernatural intelligence; he understood the laws by which heaven and earth produce all things; he also understood what was said about the obscure and the apparent, about life and death. Among his teachings were such things as the purification of oneself by bathing; to nourish the mind by having few passions; to inure to endurance by means of fasting; to depart from evil and turn to the good as the essential of self-cultivation; to regard absolute honesty and no cheating as the radical thing in influencing people. At weddings all should mutually assist, and at funerals they should be in attendance. From the great matters of the moral obligations and the laws of natural relationships down to the small things such as rising or resting, eating and
drinking, and so forth, there are none which have not their proper principles, none for which there is not proper instruction, and nothing in which Heaven should not be feared.

"Although the articles of the teaching of the sage were multifarious, yet they may be brought together into one whole, which is to acknowledge the Heaven (God), which created and sustains all things, as Lord; and the way of serving God may be comprehended in one word, which is no other than the 'reverence' of our hearts.

"The Emperor Yao said, 'Reverence accords with Heaven.' T'ang said, 'Saintly reverence daily advances.' Wen said, 'Intelligently serve God.' Confucius said, 'He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray.' These, in a general way, are points of resemblance, and are sufficient to prove what has been said about sages mutually influencing one another and remaining undoubted through a hundred generations.

"Although the teaching of the sage (Muhammad) was the same as that of the others, it prevailed only in the West, and China had not heard of it, until the time of the Emperor K'ai Hwang of the Sui dynasty (A.D. 581-601), when it entered China, and gradually spread throughout the empire.

"His Imperial Majesty T'ien Pao, of our present dynasty, considering that the doctrines of the sage of the West are consistent with the doctrines of the sages of China, and that the religion is established with its roots in what is correct, therefore commanded the Superintendent of Public Works, Lo T'ien-chio, to take charge of workmen and build this mosque for the accommodation of the followers of this religion. Their leader is Pai-tu-er-ti, who is well versed in their Canon; he will be able to lead them in all the exercises of their holy religion, reverencing Heaven wherever they worship, and praying for the long life of the Emperor, in this place.

"This work was begun on a lucky day of the third month of the first year (of T'ien Pao), and was completed on the twentieth day of the eighth month of the same year.

"Lest, as time goes on, this incident might be forgotten, and no evidences of it remain, this tablet is set up as a remembrance, and the circumstances inscribed thereon; the tablet being erected on a lucky day of the second month of Autumn (eighth month) of the first year of the Emperor T'ien Pao (A.D. 742).

"Engraved by Shih Kung, at Wan-nien-hsien, Kwan Chung."

The inscription on this stone makes an impossible claim when it states that Islam entered China in the Sui dynasty, prior to A.D. 601, after having already been prevailing for some time in the West. We have seen that Muhammad did not claim to have
his first revelation until A.D. 610. The year of the inscription is given as A.D. 724, yet terms are used which are not found in history until much later. T'ien Fang is used for Arabia, though this name is not found in histories earlier than A.D. 1258; the term in use during the T'ang dynasty being Ta Shih. At the period mentioned Sianfu was known as Ch'ang-an, but the stone bears the name Wan-nien-hsien, which, according to Playfair's *Cities and Towns of China*, belongs to the posterior Chou dynasty, A.D. 951-960.

The evidences against the genuineness of this monument are so strong that its claim cannot be accepted. It is to be regarded as a forgery, and it is certainly misleading in its statement that Muhammadanism entered China in the Sui dynasty, which has been seen to be an impossibility. It is quite possible that a mosque was built or repaired at Sianfu in the year mentioned, as there had been visits of Muslims earlier than that. But an Arab traveller, in A.D. 878—more than 130 years later than the date of this monument—says nothing about either mosque or monument, nor of meeting co-religionists there.

Presuming that the monument is a forgery, it is still a question of interest how the forgers made such an anachronism as to state that Islam entered China before A.D. 601. Marshall Broomhall, in his *Islam in China*, shows that there has been an error in calculation between Chinese and Arabian years. He says:

"The calendar in China is based upon a luni-solar year, the interjection of an extra month every two or three years rectifying the lunar with solar time. A similar arrangement had prevailed in Arabia for some two centuries before Muhammad, but the Prophet, for some reason or other, altogether prohibited intercalation; so a simple lunar month was reintroduced in Arabia. As the Muhammadan calendar stands today, it consists of twelve lunar months of twenty-nine or thirty days alternately, with an intercalary day added to the twelfth month at intervals of two or three years, making eleven intercalary days every thirty years. This gives a difference of almost exactly eleven days a year between the Arab lunar and the Chinese luni-solar year, or, roughly, three years a century."

"M. Deveria has suggested that at some date, perhaps A.D. 1351, when the mosque at Canton was restored, the Chinese Muslims transmuted their Arabic chronology into Chinese, and being ignorant of the variations between the lunar and solar years of the two systems, simply counted back the Arab years since the Hegira as so many Chinese years, thus antedating by twenty-three or twenty-four years the date they had in mind."

This was an ingenious suggestion, and gave the clue to what I believe to be the real solution of the problem. Not being quite
satisfied with the restoration of a mosque as being the occasion of the transmuting of the chronology, I looked for a more probable reason, and found it in the record that in the second year of Hung Wu—the founder of the Ming dynasty—which was A.D. 1369, there was a Muslim Chief Astronomer, who, with a number of Muhammadan officials, was employed in rectifying the Chinese calendar, and at the same time they apparently essayed to co-relate the Muslim calendar with the Chinese. The year A.D. 1369 would be A.H. 770, and by counting back that number of Arab years without considering the variation between lunar and solar years, the period A.D. 599 was arrived at as the year of the Hegira, which, however, is twenty-three years before that event took place, in 622. The addition of three years per century to the shorter lunar years would bring the chronology to be about correct. There can be little doubt that it was in A.D. 1369 that the calculation was made.

The year A.D. 599 having been officially fixed as the time of the Hegira, Muslim historians and writers appear to have accepted it without realizing the mistake, and Liu Chih simply counted back the years of Muhammad's age at the time of the Hegira, and thus arrives at 546 or 547 as the year of the Prophet's birth, which is stated to be in the time of the Liang dynasty, while actually it was in 570, at the time of the Sui dynasty. Muhammad's death is given as occurring in 608 or 609, which was long before his removal to Medina and his subsequent career.

It should be mentioned in passing that the Chinese cycle method of calculating a year does not quite coincide with the Western system of months, so a particular cyclical designation may cover parts of two A.D. years; hence the hesitation in definitely fixing the A.D. year for a particular event.

Returning now to the Sianfu monument, I arrive at the conclusion that it was engraved subsequently to A.D. 1369, as it adopts the transmuted chronology above referred to. The mosque itself was probably built much earlier, as records show that it was repaired as early as A.D. 1127, and again on subsequent occasions, one of these being in the reign of Hung Wu (1368-1388), and it is extremely probable that this last-named occasion was the one when the monument was erected.

We may now leave traditions and erring monuments, and come to the safer ground of history. It is probable that commercial intercourse between China and Arabia dates back to very early in the Christian era. Travellers by the sea route arrived at Canton, or at Kanfu, by which name may be meant the ancient port of the famous city of Hangchow. It is very likely that soon after the Hegira, when Islam spread throughout Arabia, some of the traders to the East had become converts, and these
would observe their religion at the places where they visited or resided in China. It has been shown in the foregoing that the Chinese-Muslim claim for the arrival of their faith in A.D. 586 is untenable, and even when the chronological error of twenty-four years is corrected, and the date made A.D. 610, it is still too early.

It was during the illustrious T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) that Muhammadans first came to China. In the New T'ang History, chap. 221, the name Ta-shih for Muhammadan Arabs is first met with, in connection with the Persian king Yezeirdgird, who was slain by them in A.D. 652. His son Firuz had previously fled to Tokharestan, and from there he sent a messenger to the Chinese Court to appeal for aid. This was in A.D. 650, when the Emperor Kao Tsung had succeeded to the throne. Kao Tsung made excuse that the distance was too great for him to send troops to Persia, but he sent to the Muslims to plead the cause of the fallen power. In response to this the Caliph Othman sent an envoy, with presents, who arrived in A.D. 651. It is not stated by which route he travelled, but as he would start from Medina, the sea route may have been quicker, and possibly was the one chosen. The brief account in the T'ang History is as follows: "In the second year of Yung Hui (A.D. 651) the Ta-shih king 'Amir-al-mumemin' (Prince of the Believers) first sent an envoy to Court with tribute, who said that the kings of Ta-shih had possessed the country for thirty-four years, through two successive generations."

It should be noted that Othman was the fourth ruler, Omar and Abu Bekr preceding him in the succession from Muhammad. Also, thirty-four years from the Hegira would mean A.D. 655 or 656, instead of A.D. 651.

The History follows immediately with a leap of sixty years to the next envoy, and says: "In the beginning of K'ai Yuan (A.D. 713-742) an envoy was again sent, with a present of horses and a magnificent girdle. At the audience the envoy stood, without doing obeisance; he said that in his country they only worship God, and do not do obeisance when seeing the king. The civil officials reproved him, and then he did obeisance. In the fourteenth year (A.D. 726) another envoy was sent, named Soleiman, with presents of local products, who did obeisance and was given a red robe and girdle."

Other embassies are mentioned in the T'ang History, but there is nothing said about the introduction of Islam as a religion. Abu Jafar, the builder of Bagdad, and the second Caliph of the Abbasides, sent an envoy in A.D. 756.

Shortly before that time a great rebellion had broken out in China, led by An Lu-shan, a man of Tartar descent, who held high office and had been much trusted by Hsüan Tsung. The
Emperor fled to Ch'engtu, and the rebels took possession of the two capitals Sianfu and Honanfu. The heir-apparent was proclaimed Emperor in Kansu, with the title Su Tsung, and in order to put down the rebellion he secured the help of mercenaries, under promise of great rewards. From the regions west of China a miscellaneous army was gathered, including Uigurs, T’u Fan, Nan Man, and Ta-shih, who helped to put down the rebellion. Ta-shih is the term used at that period to denote Muslims of Persian or Arabian origin.

It is not clear how many Muslims were included among those who first responded to Su Tsung’s call for aid, but the total of Uigurs and others from the West is given at over four thousand. It seems very unlikely that troops would be sent from Bagdad or Arabia on the long and perilous journey to China. Probably they came from some frontier garrison in Turkestan. It is said they did not return, but remained in China and married Chinese wives, and became the nucleus of the Chinese Muslims of today. It is probable that such infiltrations occurred more than once or twice, and that they account for the large Muslim populations of Western China.

The T'ang History was written, in part, by writers contemporary with the events recorded, and was revised in the eleventh century. The Sianfu stone monument claims to have been erected in A.D. 742, and a mosque also built at what was then the capital, where the historiographers would be; yet they do not mention this tablet, nor do they give the coming of Muhammadans as prior to A.D. 601, as the stone does. The name T’ien Fang for Arabia, which is used on the tablet, is unknown to the History; while Ta-shih, the name of the period for that country, is not found on the stone. These considerations strengthen the conclusion that the monument was erected later than the eleventh century.

It is not proposed to give here more about the various embassies and other entrants mentioned; but before leaving the T'ang History it will be useful to translate what is said about Muhammadans, under the heading of Ta-shih, as follows:

"Ta-shih was originally part of Persia. The men have high noses, are black, and bearded. The women are very fair, and when they go out they veil the face. Five times daily they worship God. They wear silver girdles, with silver knives suspended. They do not drink wine, nor use music. Their place of worship will accommodate several hundreds of people. Every seventh day the king (Caliph) sits on high and speaks to those below, saying, ‘Those who are killed by the enemy will be born in Heaven above; those who slay the enemy will receive happiness.’ Therefore they are usually valiant fighters. Their land is sandy
and stony, and not fit for cultivation, so they hunt and eat flesh.

"About the middle of the Ta Yeh period of the Sui dynasty there was a Ta-shih man shepherding on the hills of Medina, and a beast spake to him, saying, 'On the western side of the hill there are three caves (holes), in one of which there are sharp swords, and a black stone with an inscription in white, saying that whoever possesses it will become king.' The man went and found everything as stated. The inscription on the stone said that he should rebel, so he gathered followers together at the stream Hên Ko. They robbed merchants, and fortified the western parts, and the man made himself king. He removed the black stone, and regarded it as precious. The people went to punish and suppress him, but they were all badly defeated. From this he became still stronger, and destroyed Persia and Fu-lin, and invaded India and other countries."

It will be seen that fact and fiction are very much mixed in the above account. The time mentioned is about the time that Muhammad received his first revelation, in a cave at Mount Hira—at Mecca, not Medina. The finding of the swords may be an echo of the tradition of Muhammad's grandfather rediscovering the Zem-Zem well, and finding some armour and other things there. The Black Stone mentioned was not found by Muhammad, but was built in the Kaaba long before his time, and again at the rebuilding, before he received his revelations. There are no white characters of the kind mentioned on it. The story of rebellion and very sudden rise to power does not indicate the twelve years of hardship and quiet propaganda between his first revelation and the Hegira in A.D. 622, after which his career at Medina began. It was not made clear that Muhammad died, and the days of extensive conquest were those of his successors.

It is evident that, even in the eleventh century, when the T'ang History was revised, the historians actually knew very little about Arabia and Muhammadanism.

We come now to the important witness of the first Western travellers to China who have left accounts of what they saw. Two Arab travellers, who reached China over one thousand years ago, left records in Arabic, which have been translated, and are available to us.* The first of these travellers was in China in the year A.D. 851. His name does not appear, and there is a page missing in the account when he begins to tell of China. Speaking of Kanfu (Canfu), he says:

"Canfu is the port for all ships and goods of the Arabs who trade in China. Soliman the Merchant relates that at Canfu, which is the principal sale for merchants, there is a Muham-

* The English translation is dated 1733.
madan appointed judge over those of his religion, by the authority of the Emperor of China; and that he is judge of all the Muhammadans who resort to these parts. Upon festival days he performs the public service with the Muhammadans, and pronounces the sermon, or khutbah, which he concludes in the usual form, with prayers for the Sultan of the Muslims. The merchants of Irak who trade hither are in no way dissatisfied with his conduct, or his administration of the post he is invested with; because his actions, and the judgments he gives, are just and equitable, and conformable to the Koran, and according to the Muhammadan jurisprudence.”

One other extract is of interest to our present investigation: “I know not that there is anyone that has embraced Muhammadanism, or speaks Arabic.” That was two hundred years after the authentic account of Muslims being officially received in China, and allowed to propagate their faith. There may have been converts from among the Chinese at various places, but at the large port of Canfu, with a considerable Muhammadan population, our traveller implies that he did not meet any, but only Muslims of foreign extraction.

The second traveller was Abu Zeid al Hafan, of Siraf. He was in China in A.D. 878. He tells of a revolution during which the city of Canfu was besieged by a rebel leader, the year being A.D. 877:

“At last he became master of the city, and put all the inhabitants to the sword. There are persons fully acquainted with the affairs of China who assure us that besides the Chinese who were massacred upon this occasion, there perished one hundred and twenty thousand Muhammadans, Jews, Christians, and Parsees, who were there on account of traffic.”

This writer tells a remarkable story of an Arab he met in China who had had an interview with the Emperor at Sianfu. Some extracts from the story are of sufficient interest to be given here as follows:

“There was a man of the tribe of Koreish whose name was Ibn Wahab, and he dwelt at Busra, and when that city was sacked he came to Siraf, where he saw a ship ready to make sail for China. The mind took him to go on board this ship, and in her he went to China, where, in the sequel, he had the curiosity to travel to the Emperor’s Court; and leaving Canfu, he reached Cumdan (probably Sianfu), after a journey of two months. He stayed a long time at the Court, and presented several petitions, wherein he signified that he was of the family of the Prophet of the Arabs. Having waited a considerable time, the Emperor at last ordered him to be lodged in a house appointed for him, and to be supplied with everything he should want. This done, the
Emperor wrote to the Governor of Canfu, commanding him carefully to inform himself, among the merchants, concerning the relation this man pretended to bear to the Prophet, and the Governor, by his answers, confirming the truth of what he had said touching his extraction, the Emperor gave him audience, and made him rich presents.

"This man, when we saw him, was well advanced in years, but had his senses perfectly about him, and told us that when he had his audience, the Emperor asked him many questions about the Arabs, and particularly how they had destroyed the kingdom of the Persians.

"Ibn Wahab made answer that they did it by the assistance of God, and because the Persians were idolaters, adoring the stars, the sun, and moon, instead of worshipping the true God."

The story then relates that the Emperor showed his visitor some pictures which had come into his possession, and Ibn Wahab recognized the representations of certain Old Testament patriarchs, and of Jesus and Muhammad. This was followed by questions regarding Muhammad and his religion. The traveller Abu Zeid then goes on to say:

"We asked Ibn Wahab many questions concerning the city of Cumdan, where the Emperor keeps his Court. He told us that the city was very large and extremely populous; that it was divided into two great parts by a very long and very broad street; that the Emperor, his chief ministers, the soldiery, the supreme judge, the eunuchs, and all belonging to the Imperial Household, lived in that part of the city which is on the right hand eastward; that the people had no manner of communication with them; and that they were not admitted into places watered by canals from different rivers, whose borders were planted with trees and adorned with magnificent dwellings. The part on the left hand westward is inhabited by the people and the merchants, where also are great squares and markets for all the necessaries of life."

This is interesting as probably the earliest account we have by a Western observer of a Chinese capital. For our present study, it is remarkable that in the account given, Ibn Wahab makes no mention of any mosques or Muslim population at Sianfu. There was an interpreter who could speak Arabic, but it is not clear whether he accompanied Ibn Wahab from Canfu or was already at Sianfu. The stone monument above referred to, professedly commemorating the building of a mosque at Sianfu, is dated A.D. 742—that is, one hundred and thirty-six years earlier than the time when Ibn Wahab was telling of his visit—and yet he makes no mention of meeting with co-religionists, or uniting with them in worship during his long stay there. It may, however, be regarded as established that some Muslims had visited
Sianfu two hundred years prior to Ibn Wahab’s visit, and it is possible some were living there at the time referred to; but it is strange that no mention is made of any.

I venture to suggest that there is probably some more or less close connection between Ibn Wahab (Wahb) and the ancient tomb at Canton. The myth of Sa’d Wakkas and the sixth century having to be discarded, the ancient tomb still remains to be accounted for. Ibn Wahab was probably the most notable Muhammadan in China in the early days, and although the Arab traveller Abu Zeid met him at Canfu, there is no reason why he should not also have been identified with Canton, and he may have died there. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that some regard the name Canfu (Khanfu) to refer to Canton.

The Muhammadan legend uses the name Sa’d Wakkas, and says that he was related to Muhammad. The Arabic records say that Sa’d ibn (son of) Abu Wakkas was also called Sa’d ibn Malik ibn Wahb. The early visitor to China was called Ibn Wahab, descended of Heber, the son of Al Asud; and he was of the Koreish tribe, and claimed relationship with Muhammad. He came by ship, as Wakkas was said to have done, and also went to see the Emperor at Sianfu. The Emperor made him presents, and he returned to Irak. Apparently he went back again to China, as he was a man well advanced in years when the Arab traveller Abu Zeid al Hafan conversed with him in A.D. 878. There is considerable agreement thus far with the legend about Sa’d Wakkas.

The time would be more than two centuries later than that claimed for Wakkas; but, as we have seen, that story is quite untenable. Muslims came to China earlier than Ibn Wahab, but none that we know of claimed to be related to the Prophet, nor to have been so venerated and so highly honoured. So it is possible that the tomb of the saint at Canton is the resting-place of Ibn Wahab, who may have died near the close of the ninth century; in which case it would still be over one thousand years old, and sacred enough to account for the pilgrimages and the legends.

It is significant that neither Ibn Wahab, nor the Arab travellers, nor any other ancient and authentic authority mentions Sa’d Wakkas and the tomb, which, on the theory of the earlier entry, should have been well known in the ninth century. Absence of mention is not absolute proof, but it is a strong presumption that the tomb was not there, nor the seventh-century apostle known anything about in the ninth century. The legend probably arose subsequent to the death of Ibn Wahab, who might very well be the historic figure about whom the fables and miracles have gathered. It is possible that the name Ibn Wahab, and the
claimed relationship to the Prophet, led Muslims of a later date mistakenly to make the ninth-century visitor to be a contemporary of Muhammad who had reached China during the Prophet's lifetime.

The results of our investigations may now be summed up briefly. We conclude that the earliest authentic accounts show that Muhammadans were first known officially in China in A.D. 651, when the embassy from Caliph Othman was received. It is not recorded whether the messenger reached China by sea or by land. As the sea route had been used for a long time by traders, it is very probable that some of the merchants from Arabia, who had become Muslims, took their religion with them to Canton and other coast cities at about the same period; but apparently they were not concerned with propagating their faith among the Chinese.

The progress of Muslim conquests in Central Asia brought Muhammadans to the frontiers of China on the landward side, and it seems certain that the larger numbers entered China from that side. It is said that some Muslim Zaidis, fleeing from the Omeyyads of the same religion, probably entered Chinese territory. It was about the middle of the eighth century that Muslim soldiers arrived in numbers, and subsequently settled down to family life in China. It is probable that more than one contingent of soldiers arrived at different times.

The two routes by which Islam entered China were quite different in character and in object; the land route brought Islam into the Western parts only, and did not send colonies to the coast. The sea route founded colonies in many parts on or near the coast, but made little or no attempt to advance into the interior. In course of time, travel and infiltration resulted in smaller or larger groups of Muslims being settled in all the provinces of the country.

The preponderance of the Muslims on the western frontiers of China is doubtless connected with the rise of the Mongol dynasty. Khublai Khan (1260-1294) appointed many Persian officers of Court and State, and they were probably Muslims. The Persian words found in Chinese Islam indicate the overland entry via Turkestan. One outstanding appointment was that of Saiyid-i-Adjall 'Omar, a reputed descendant of Muhammad, known to Chinese Muslims as the Prince of Hsien Yang, who was made Governor of Yunnan by Khublai Khan, and acted from 1273-1279. His son, Nasir-al-Din, is even more famous, and there is every reason to believe that these two were responsible for considerable immigration of Muslims into the western parts of China.

Mosques would be required where groups of Muslims gathered, and these were probably very simple places at first, not deserving
mention in the official histories of the period. Muslim traditions are so confused and uncertain that they cannot be relied upon as giving the correct period of entry, nor of the erection of the first mosques. We know from Arab travellers that in the middle of the ninth century there were Muslim places of worship at which services were held. The famous pagoda, or minaret, at Canton, according to Dr. Kerr's Canton Guide, was built about A.D. 900. This may have been about the time of the death of Ibn Wahab, for whom the famous tomb may have been made at the same time.

It will be seen that there is much uncertainty and some conjecture when we leave the reasonably safe ground of the T'ang History; and one of the purposes of this study has been to show that it is not wise for anyone unreservedly to accept traditions as facts concerning when and how Muhammadans first entered China.
JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

BY LIEUT.-COL. H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD, F.R.G.S.

The intended withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations in 1935 does not render her foreign policy less interesting or less important to the rest of the world.

Although a section of the English Press writes of the possibility of war between Japan and America, there is little that either country would have to gain, and very much to lose, by recourse to war. It is sometimes little realized in England that Japan is one of America’s best customers and that America is in the same position vis-à-vis Japan. America’s export of raw cotton to Japan and Japan’s raw silk exports to America are two very cogent reasons against war between the two countries. The League of Nations exists to prevent war, but self-interest is also a valuable war-preventative. It is no doubt possible that both these countries might place their raw material elsewhere, but in these days of the world’s undigested bounty of raw materials markets are not easy to find.

When considering Japan’s foreign policy one must look at those countries where she is best able to market her manufactured goods. One of the direct results of penning Japan within her own frontiers is the menacing of markets previously held by our own and other manufacturing countries.

Let us consider dispassionately Japan’s situation. She has a rapidly increasing population in her small island empire. Her population increases at the somewhat alarming rate of about a million a year. She looks westward to America; the door is closed. She looks southward to the sparsely populated wastes of Northern Australia; she finds no welcome in either quarter. In whatever direction she looks there is either an excess of population or there is a prejudice against her immigration. How often have I heard it said that Japan’s demand for increased opportunity of emigration is met by the existence of Manchuria? But how far is this from the truth when one realizes that there are only a quarter of a million Japanese in the whole area of Manchukuo, and in a population of over thirty millions of people? True there are three-quarters of a million Koreans who are Japanese subjects, but who have come from Korea and not from overcrowded Japan. Korea absorbs but few Japanese; the same thing applies to Formosa and to the Marshall Islands. It is to mass emigration that Japan would have to look for any serious
relief from her troubles of over-population. Manchukuo is closed
to her mass immigration by the vast numbers of Chinese agri-
culturists who, with their lower standard of living, making it im-
possible for the Japanese agricultural classes to emigrate to Man-
churia. It is only from these agricultural classes that emigration
in any numbers can be expected. The penetration of the Japanese
into other Eastern countries is largely analogous to British pen-
etration into India, Burma, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements:
British emigration is confined to the governing and commercial
classes. You do not see British porters on Chowringhee in Cal-
cutta, nor working on the land for Zemindars; neither do you
see Japanese coolies on the Bund at Shanghai or Japanese cul-
tivators in Chinese fields. It is unlikely that this situation will
change for a good many years. Societies exist in Japan, chiefly
in military circles, for the encouragement of emigration to Man-
chukuo, but as yet with little practical result. A certain number
of Japanese rice farmers have gone to Manchukuo, but it is diffi-
cult for them to work alongside Koreans on equal terms.

The turning inwards of Japan's emigration stream has there-
fore resulted in industrialization and super-industrialization, and
the very countries which have blocked Japan's immigration,
rightly or wrongly, are now faced with the keen, even cut-throat,
competition resulting on this industrialization. Idle looms in
Lancashire follow in the wake of Japanese competition. Japan
buys India's short staple cotton which is not suited to Lancashire
mills and ships it back to India in the form of cotton textiles.
For several years, until 1932, India had a favourable trade balance
with Japan, but in 1932 the balance swung from a favourable one
of twenty-two million yen to an adverse one of seventy-five million
yen. As recently as 1925 there was a balance favourable to India
of four hundred million yen. This rapid decline has alarmed the
Indian Government so much that it has abrogated the Indo-
Japanese Commercial Convention of 1904. This has caused very
hard feeling between the Japanese and Indian Governments, also
between Japan and Britain. Japan complains about discrimina-
tion and the Japanese Cotton Spinners Association demands a boy-
cott of Indian cotton. This latter step would be serious for India
in that Japan's purchases amounted to one hundred and thirteen
million yen in 1931 and ninety-one million yen in 1932. It is sug-
gested that this boycott of Indian cotton is to be replaced by
bigger purchases from America.

The reasons for Japan's success in the cotton textile markets
of the world, particularly in the East, are not far to seek. Namely,
her low scale of factory wages, compared with those of Great
Britain and other manufacturing countries, allied with the depre-
ciated yen. In addition, of course, British shipments to the East
suffer under the high Suez Canal dues, whereas Japanese shipments go all over the East in their own bottoms and free of any Canal imposts. I have stressed this cotton question as Japan’s foreign policy is likely to be shaped, vis-à-vis Great Britain, by her economic interests in the world’s cotton textile markets. There are already suggestions that she should buy her wheat and wool from outside the British Empire as a retaliatory measure for the abrogation of the Indo-Japanese Commercial Convention. Simla, it is devoutly to be hoped, will find some modus operandi and will successfully initiate some sharing of markets and some means of avoiding the hard feeling which exists at present. There is no doubt in my mind that Japan still cherishes a deep friendship for Great Britain as her former ally. Despite strained relations which have arisen owing to the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in deference to American sentiment, the construction of the Singapore base, the sympathy extended to China, and the lack of it to Japan, in the disagreement between those two countries, the keen competition in Eastern textile and electrical markets, the adverse vote at the League of Nations—in spite of all these I feel there is common ground between the two nations and that the rift separating them can be bridged with goodwill on both sides.

The countries with which Japan’s foreign policy is chiefly concerned are China, Russia, America, and Great Britain. I have dealt with her policy with my own country, which mostly has to deal with commercial questions, though there may be questions arising sometimes in China owing to the large interests that both countries have there; these are usually capable of local adjustment.

With Russia in the recent past there has been the nervousness engendered by Japan’s fear of Bolshevism and a few incidents chiefly connected with the Chinese Eastern Railway. Negotiations now proceeding will probably result in the Chinese Eastern Railway becoming the property of the Manchukuo Government or the South Manchurian Railway. This will probably remove the most fruitful source of friction. One of the results of these negotiations will be that Vladivostock as the terminus only of the Ussuri-Amir Railway will lose its importance and South Manchurian and Korean ports gain correspondingly. It is reasonable to expect that the wide gauge of the Chinese Eastern will be altered to conform to the standard gauge of the South Manchurian lines. It is also likely that Harbin will become less Russian and more Japanese. Land purchases by Japanese in Harbin have been made for some time past. Perhaps the foregoing may be rather outside Japanese foreign policy, but they may be amongst the results of Japan’s influence on the Government of Manchukuo. If Japan’s interest increases in Manchukuo
one feels she will regard with complacency the downward thrust of Soviet Russia into Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.

Japan's policy in China is surely one of peace; she cannot regard with indifference the loss of her markets there. True these have been largely replaced by her successful penetration into other Eastern spheres, particularly India and the Dutch Indies, but China's four hundred millions of people, with their immense potential purchasing power, must be ever present in the mind of commercial Japan. Peoples cannot be forced to purchase goods presented to them on the end of a bayonet, and trade must follow the flag of friendship rather than the flag of war. There is in China a movement to bring about a cessation of the strained relations between the two countries, and when these efforts bear fruit Japanese trade will no doubt revive in China proper. A suggestion has been made that Japan is prepared to give up her extra-territorial rights in exchange for a guaranteed ending of the boycott. If this happens it might create an awkward situation for those Powers who still have extra-territorial rights.

In North China, where many of the inhabitants have relations and friends in Manchukuo, the enmity for Japan is giving way to understanding and an appreciation of the more settled conditions obtaining in that country. This feeling may be gradually extending to the centre and south of China, but it must be remembered that for the Kuomintang to stretch out the hand of friendship to Japan would involve a violent change of policy and consequent loss of face. I have no doubt that there is a section of the Nanking Government who would welcome a rapprochement with Japan, and which Japan urgently desires, but as against this there is a political group which maintains itself in power by appealing to the patriotism and anti-Japanese feelings of the people; also there are professional propagandists and employees of the anti-Japanese boycott movement. Japan's policy is to arrive at a peaceful solution of their disagreements with China by direct negotiation. It has long been my view that "assistance" rendered in negotiations between these two peoples is a hindrance rather than a help. These two great Oriental peoples can surely more easily understand each other better than can we Westerners.

There is no doubt that Japan means to uphold the independence of Manchukuo. Though it has so far failed to absorb Japan's surplus population, it certainly continues to supply Japan with the essential raw materials of coal, iron, and soya. With regard to the latter, it is well-known that Japan's rice fields and mulberry trees need the fertilizing which they get from the residues from the soya bean oil presses, but a new situation has arisen recently. An increasing amount of soya beans is exported to Germany
and re-exported to Japan in the form of fertilizer. This has resulted in a falling off in the direct export of soya bean cake to Japan and a glut of that commodity in Manchukuo. In time, no doubt, Japan will treat this cake herself, but for the present the trade is almost entirely in German hands. The development of the manufacturing of soya flour may relieve the situation, but for the time being it is becoming increasingly difficult for Japan to absorb the soya production of Manchukuo.

Mr. Hirohito, the new Foreign Minister, the other day announced in no uncertain terms that Japan had no intention of lessening her interests in Manchukuo, and this is easy to believe when one remembers the enormous effort, expressed in terms of money and lives, that she has made in that country. Any settlement with China must of necessity recognize this. Japan has made an immense effort to get rid of the bandit element in Manchukuo, and there is no doubt that she has been partially successful. Manchuria has always had its bandits, but their ranks have been largely increased by ex-soldiers of Chang-Hsueh-Liang, and from other armies. Bandit control is by no means easy in Manchukuo, and the entire stamping-out of banditry will take some time. A stable government, allied with rehabilitation of bandits who have only become so by stress of circumstance, are the two most likely preventatives of banditry.

There are various stages in this bandit suppression. The first was the defeating and dispersing of the regular troops under such leaders as Ma Chang Shan and Su Ping Wen. This was the task of regular Japanese troops, but that phase may be regarded as at an end. It can be assumed that there were two hundred and fifty to three hundred thousand bandits when Japan began her campaign against them. The elimination of the "soldier bandit," supported by arms and funds from outside Manchukuo, has to be followed by the suppression of the professional and "part-time" bandit. An important step has been taken in this direction by the forbidding of the planting of kowliang—or millet—near the railways. The construction of many miles of road will necessitate a similar precaution in their neighbourhood. To the uninitiated, the growing of kowliang does not appear to have direct relation to bandit suppression, but this grain grows to a height of twelve feet and more, and forms ideal and almost impenetrable cover to wrongdoers who desire to conceal their whereabouts. Granted that the soldier-bandit menace is dealt with, there remains the fifty thousand, possibly increasing to over one hundred thousand in the summer season when the kowliang is high, which can be dealt with by an increasingly efficient force of police backed up by Manchukuo troops. True it is that in the background there are Japanese troops scattered throughout
the country, but it may be said that bandit suppression is becoming a matter for police rather than military action. As long as bandits are a perpetual menace the general trade of the country is bound to be held up, and the looked-for development of Manchukuo may await the ending of that menace.

Japan's policy in Manchukuo was summed up for me the other day by a Japanese official in the words, "Peace and the open door." Peace is most certainly the spear-head of her policy—if such an expression is not a contradiction in terms—but there is an uneasy feeling abroad that the door to trade will be held a little further open to Japan than to other nations. Though Japan has never made any official pronouncement to the effect, it seems probable that business will largely be conducted in Manchukuo through the Japanese as intermediaries, rather on the compradore system as in China proper. It is, however, difficult to be didactic on this point while the presence of banditry holds up the development of the country and the increase of trade.

In 1935, when the revision of naval pacts must come up for consideration, there is no doubt that Japan will voice her dissatisfaction with the ratio of 5:5:3. How America will view the naval parity proposals that Japan is likely to make, it is difficult to say, but it is reasonable to suppose that naval parity is likely to meet with less opposition in England than in America. America may look forward with uneasiness to the time when she abandons the Philippine Islands to Philippine self-government, but it appears clear that Japan will be content with nothing less than parity.

Japan's policy with relation to the mandated islands is quite firm in that she contends the mandates were given to her by the Treaty of Versailles and were only confirmed by the League of Nations. It is by no means certain that the League contemplates a change or removal of mandate, but it is certain that any such démarche on the part of the League will be strenuously resisted by Japan, who will contend that her mandate can only be terminated by a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. It is not easy to foretell what the attitude of the League will be to a mandatory country which ceases to be a member, as will be the case with Japan in 1935.

It may be said in conclusion that the more one studies the foreign policy of Japan the more reasons there are for believing that her future policy must be a peaceful one. The only way she can keep her teeming industrial millions employed is by devoting her attention to her growing markets. A warlike policy cannot help her in this direction, and her present undoubtedly increasing success in the world's markets is likely to convince her of the extreme importance to the economic life of her country of peace
and industry. In order to keep the peace of the world a sympathetic understanding of Japanese difficulties in England is most desirable. Japan's statement of her own case is not always well put. The Japanese are a proud and reticent people; facile speech and easy propaganda are not their strong points. Commercial competition does not oil the wheels of understanding, and the present loss of British markets to the Japanese is bound to make for hard feeling.

The conference in Simla on the subject of Japanese trade in India, it is to be hoped, will result in a reasonable working agreement being arrived at, and one may hope that a policy of mutual forebearance will emerge.
LINKS IN THE IMPERIAL CHAIN

BY SIR M. DE P. WEBB, C.I.E., C.B.E.

Among many unforeseen consequences of the Great War, none gives more food for thought than the tendency to separation and disintegration which has recently shown itself in certain parts of the British Empire. The itch for "self-determination" and "independence" which untutored democracy has here and there developed can only be assuaged and finally cured by that greater knowledge which more frequent (and, if possible, personal) contact with other parts of the Empire, and with the rest of the world, can effectively give. No quicker or better way of establishing these more frequent contacts (and so acquiring the vitally essential additional knowledge) has yet been devised than by the various air services by which British enterprise is gradually linking all parts of the Empire.

To my personal knowledge many efforts were made in Karachi to discover the secrets of human flight (by aid of clockwork models and experimental full-sized gliders of V-shaped design), as far back as 1894 and 1895. A few years later, Sir Hiram Maxim conducted experiments in England with large planes affixed to power-driven light trolleys travelling on railway lines, the experiments being designed to test the lifting power of planes of different sizes, moved through the air at different speeds. But the honour of constructing the first machine to fly, carrying its pilot, goes to America. Wilbur Wright first flew in 1903. Bleriot first flew across the English Channel in 1910. Hawker flew around the United Kingdom in 1911. Three years later came the Great War, 1914-1918, during which the art and mechanics of flying made immense progress. An Englishman, the late Captain Alcock (afterwards Sir John William Alcock, D.S.O.), was the first to fly across the Atlantic—America to Ireland—in 1919. Five years later two (out of four) U.S.A. aircraft successfully flew around the world, 27,534 miles in 351 flying hours.

In 1918 the first aeroplane, one of the large Handley-Page biplanes designed for bombing Berlin, appeared in India, at Karachi, much to the amazement of the local population. The following year four British aircraft companies commenced work. The distance flown by these companies, which was 225,000 miles in 1921, increased to 794,000 miles by 1924, in which year the four concerns were amalgamated into "Imperial Airways, Ltd.,"
whose services now extend to Rangoon in the East and Cape-town in the South; and will probably reach Singapore (en route for Australia) this year, and Canada via Newfoundland in the near future. The mileage flown by Imperial Airways, Ltd., last year was 2,030,993.

The development of the British air-route across Europe and Asia in the direction of Australia has not been without difficulties—almost entirely political. Immediately after the conclusion of the Great War, the United Kingdom advocated the same freedom of the air as the nations of the world enjoy in connection with the navigation of the ocean; but the attitude of certain Powers has, up to the moment, defeated this good intention. Indeed, the growth of “economic” nationalism, which has so greatly hindered the progress of the world in general in recent years, has seriously delayed British Imperial civil air developments; and even at this moment British air mails are carried the whole length of Italy (and, until a few weeks ago, across the whole breadth of India) by train! The Persian Gulf, which, like the Suez Canal, is a link of vital importance in British communications between East and West, has been a source of anxiety owing chiefly to the difficulties created by the Persian authorities. On the last occasion on which I flew via the Persian coast, Persian officials at three consecutive Persian ports—Jask, Lingeh, and Bushire—examined passports, medical certificates, and luggage. The electric fans that had just been fitted in the little rest house at Jask had lain for many months in the local Customs House before the Customs authorities could be persuaded to allow them to pass. With Customs, medical, and other departments to deal with, the obstacles created by the Persian authorities decided Imperial Airways, Ltd., to transfer their regular weekly service to the Arabian side of the Gulf. The outward air-route now taken is via Basra, Koweit, Bahrein, Sharjah, and Gwadar (on the coast of Baluchistan); and thence on to Karachi—India’s chief airport.

The fear that a British air company might in time acquire the same position of economic superiority and intolerance in India which, in the opinion of some Indians, certain leading British mail steamship companies have exhibited, has led to strong opposition in India to Imperial Airways being granted permission to run local air services in India, or even across India as a portion of an Imperial through air-route to Australia. Opposition has been shown in Australia also to the granting of any monopoly British mail contract, or even of any local mail contract to a purely British company. In the case of both countries, “economic nationalism” has, no doubt, added fuel
to the local opposition. However, after much discussion and negotiation, all difficulties in the way of forging the urgently needed links in the Imperial air-chain have now been overcome. Local companies have at last been formed in both India and Australia which, aided by the experience and co-operation of Imperial Airways, Ltd., have now brought Calcutta within seven days of London, and will very shortly make Australia only eleven days distant.

Indian pilots have for some time past been successfully flying the English mails between Delhi and Karachi Airport, and between Madras, Bombay, and Karachi Airport; in the former case in the machines of the Delhi Aero Club, and in the latter case in the planes of a purely Indian company. The new Indian company recently formed to carry the mails between Karachi Airport and Calcutta and Rangoon will probably work the oversea air service as far as Singapore, at which point the Australian company will link with the Indian company, and fly the mails between Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane and the Singapore air base.

Today the weekly mails from India are timed to leave Calcutta on a Monday; Karachi, on Wednesday; Sharjah, on Thursday; Baghdad, on Friday; Alexandria, on Saturday; arriving in London on Monday morning via Brindisi, Milan, and Paris. From Brindisi (where Imperial Airways flying boat arrives on a Saturday afternoon) mails and passengers are conveyed to Paris, as before mentioned, by train. The last two hours, Paris to London, are spent in the air—quite a short trip compared with the runs of four and five hours across the Arabian Sea from Gwadar to Sharjah, or across the Mediterranean from Alexandria to Athens.

These longer runs, however, are pleasantly broken by frequent diversions in the shape of breakfast, or it may be luncheon or tea. In place of a hasty and somewhat sketchy meal in a tent or primitive building in the wilds of Baluchistan or Persia, elaborate meals are now served during flight on board the aircraft, at tables for two or four, in much the same way as in a railway refreshment car. These are the more appreciated when it is realized that the new route over the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf is ordinarily quite smooth; whereas flights overland, especially over hilly country, are sometimes "bumpy" in places.

With the object of personally comparing the present Arab coast route with the former Persian coast route, in what is perhaps one of the worst months of the year in the Persian Gulf—June—I booked a passage to London from India by Imperial Airways four-engined flying monster Hanno, leaving
Karachi Airport at 8.30 a.m. on May 31 last. This type of machine is larger, faster, and more comfortable than the previous City of Baghdad type in which I flew in 1931. There are two spacious saloons—fore and aft; and the provision of tables makes it possible to write, if required, whilst flying. The rhythmical hum of the propellers is no longer loud enough to interrupt conversation in ordinary tones; indeed, the effect, after a while, is soothing, and conducive to sleep! Gwadar was reached in about three hours. Here we descended to take in petrol—a forty-minutes' job. The next “hop”—440 miles, mostly over the Arabian Sea—was the longest in the journey, concluding with a twenty-minutes' tossing in a sandstorm whilst climbing over the rocky mountains of the Oman Peninsula, preparatory to alighting at Sharjah—once a notorious Arab headquarters on the pirates' coast, but now a peaceable little town and port.

Sharjah is today the main key of the new Arab coast British air-mail route. An excellent rest house, of the fortress type, erected by the Iraq Government at Rubbah Wells, affords the traveller the amenities of a good Eastern hotel, and a cool night's rest in quietness and security. It is in wireless communication with the shipping at sea, aircraft flying eastward and westward, and so, with the whole civilized world. The aerodrome and adjoining rest house are guaranteed the protection of the Sheikh of Sharjah. There has been no occasion during the past year to invoke his good offices, or to make other than prudent use of the chevaux de frise and barbed wire defences within which the air liner rests during its night's stay alongside the fort.

The Arabs on this coast, though very friendly with the British, are conservative in the extreme. The outlook of the local Sheikh may be gathered from the fact that motor vehicles are not allowed in Sharjah, as no mention of them appears in the Koran. Nor are gramophones; possibly because the Arab's conception of music may not fit in with the strident jazz noises which nowadays seem to form so large a proportion of our "canned" music. The Sheikh of Sharjah insists on his own national flag being flown over the British wireless station. The flag is exactly similar in design to that in the British signalling code, meaning, "We are short of water." But there is no shortage of water (or anything else), so far as I could see, in the new Imperial Airways rest house. Indeed, its erection and equipment, in surroundings the reverse of hospitable, is a triumph for British enterprise and organization.

From Sharjah to Bahrein is 330 miles, all over the sea. Hanno made a perfect landing on the fine, flat sand surface of
Muharraq Island, where the contents of a hillock of petrol tins were quickly pumped into our fuel tanks. Enterprising local merchants endeavoured to sell us pearls which one fertile-minded Arab salesman suggested (in English) we should take home as "Christmas presents" for our "girls"!

Bahrain to Koweit is 269 miles. Here we met the full force of the north-westerly shimal with its fine dust from the plains of Iraq. This somewhat obscured the view and delayed our progress a little. At Koweit a large number of motor-cars, driven by Arab traders and sightseers, dashed recklessly out of the gate of the trebly-walled town as soon as we landed, and spent a quick quarter of an hour of inspection and friendly conversation, whilst official mail and airway business was being carried out.

From Koweit to Basra is only 75 miles. After which, the former route—Baghdad, Rutbah Wells, Gaza, Cairo, Alexandria, Athens, and Brindisi—is followed.

The passage from Alexandria across the Mediterranean, and over the mountains of Crete, to the Piræus (Athens)—580 miles—occupied, in the flying boat Silvanus in which I travelled, only five hours, an astonishing contrast to the two or three days, and more, that the journey by steamer used to take not so very long ago. The selection by Imperial Airways of Cairo as the air base for their trans-African service to Cape Town makes it very convenient for passengers from the East to visit Khartoum, Kenya, Tanganyika Territory, Rhodesia, and South Africa; and, vice versa, for African residents and travellers to visit India, Burma, and the Far East. The journey from Cairo to Cape Town is timed to take under a week—2½ days to Nairobi, 3½ days to Tanganyika Territory, 4½ days to Salisbury (Rhodesia), 5½ days to Johannesburg, and 6½ days to Cape Town.
THE CHINA SHADOW PLAY

By W. Nunn, M.P.

The stage has little apparent connection with the political situation in the Far East; yet the imaginative and industrious, but not generally too well informed, persons who create stage characters often serve as the unconscious instruments which indicate how important and far-reaching changes are moving. Thirty years ago the rare Chinese character in an English play was almost invariably cast for light relief, a comic figure walking oddly and expressing himself in a quaint idiom which was accepted light-heartedly as reasonably true to life. Today the Chinese on the stage takes a very different rôle. Often he plays a leading part, and he is always sinister; a strong, inscrutable, dangerously urbane and dominating personality.

The same striking change has been noticeable in our fiction. Why? Is it merely an accident that this change should be coincident with the change which has come over the face of China since 1911? Or is it that, without knowing how, the caterers for our amusement have registered the tremors of the distant disturbances, and have realized, without knowing why, that China is no longer so remote nor her problems so negligible that she and they can be dismissed with a smile?

From the early seventeenth century, when the first Englishman set foot in China, until nearly the end of the nineteenth century, China, to most Englishmen, was merely a shadow dimly seen in the distance. From that shadow came occasional flashes and rumblings of trouble; into it went enterprising Englishmen, few in number, and mostly humble in rank, taking with them British goods and bringing back, in due season, their profits; but there was no Chinese problem to engage the earnest attention of British statesmen, except at odd moments. Normally, in Downing Street, China lived behind a shadowy curtain which was opened only occasionally and, being drawn again, left her obscure and forgotten.

It would be absurd to blame British statesmanship that a definite policy was not laid down to deal with a shadow so filmy and low on the horizon as China up to the end of the nineteenth century. A civilization which could claim that its roots sank four thousand years into the past; which, among its less ancient evidences of culture, could look back along an uninterrupted system of official training and selection extending over thirteen
hundred years; which, even in its later years, had had contact with the West only in a very limited degree; and which, throughout its long history, had never been conscious of any doubt that it was the one supreme power in the universe; was not one with which any Western nation could get into close touch, nor whose development might seem to have any importance, other than commercial, to the rest of the world.

England's attitude, therefore, towards China throughout two hundred and eighty years or so was influenced almost entirely by commercial considerations. By sheer accident, or perhaps because the considerations were purely commercial and, therefore, single-eyed, England did, in fact, achieve some continuity of policy. There was, generally speaking, strength and decision in such action as she took, although it must not be overlooked that those qualities were easier to put into operation then than they are now.

It would have been expecting too much of British statesmanship, with its long record of good fortune in the avoidance of ordered planning, that from 1900 to the end of the War some attempt should have been made to determine the lines upon which this country's policy towards China should run. Business was going on not only as usual but in increasing measure, assisted by well-established British official and commercial connections. It was true that the Boxer trouble set the sky blazing and drew all eyes for a time, but the clouds soon closed down again. There was talk of the Open Door. Spheres of interest began to appear, under various thin disguises. Western influences began to press more and more closely upon China in the interest of trade and commerce; and where Western men and women, engaged in works of charity, pressed forward, the trader trekked steadily at their heels. None seems to have been particularly concerned with the growth of a new type of Chinese, nor with the growing strength of new ideas, largely imported from America and encouraged by well-meaning Americans in the country. Even the emergence of Sun Yat Sen was a matter of indifference; so much so that the opportunity he sought to obtain some Western co-operation and guidance in the work to which he had set himself was disregarded. Downing Street had an occasional sense of uneasiness, which it relieved from time to time by the utterance of good wishes and pious sentiments, while it continued to keep an alert eye upon its competitors for favourable commercial openings. The Revolution of 1911 shook the Eastern sky, but the resultant oscillation of the chairs in Downing Street merely produced a passing qualm. China was, in fact, still a shadow, although higher above the horizon, growing darker in hue, and showing more frequent flashes from behind her
piled masses. England, like other Western nations, was engrossed in matters much nearer home. The idea of the smallness of the world had not yet been forced upon her, and she was only dimly beginning to understand that there were undeveloped people outside the limits of her own Empire whose welfare might be her welfare and whose progress might affect her own fortunes. Later, the greater shadow of the War obscured all else; but it has been sheer folly that England, since the War, should have continued to employ hand-to-mouth methods.

By the time the War was over the old China had passed away. The Imperial régime, corrupt, tyrannical, and obstinately unprogressive as it had been, had at least held China together. The sacred character of the Throne had sufficed to give such authority to its occupant as to guarantee the remittance to Pekin of a proportion of the revenue sufficient to meet the requirements of government. The old system by which all members of the official services entered at Pekin, and renewed their contacts there at regulated intervals, ensured continuity of practice and an invaluable means of control. But the spread of Western education and the rapid growth of Western ideas had swept away the old controls; and when the Western Powers drew their breath and had time to look about them at the end of the War, they found themselves faced with a China in turmoil, with no recognized central authority. The new China, passionately desiring to express itself, yearning to attain an ideal state whose perfection seemed all the more desirable because it was veiled, attempting with indifferent success to reconcile the conflicting elements of personal ambition and pure patriotism, had unleashed forces which were beyond control. Vast areas of the country lay at the mercy of contending war lords, most of whom had embarked upon military activity as a profitable undertaking. Sun Yat Sen’s influence had practically cut off the South, and his disappointment in failing to secure the support of the Western Powers had forced him into communion with Soviet Russia. Soviet agents were busily engaged in sowing propaganda, and were for a considerable period actively directing affairs. In Manchuria Japan was consolidating her position in competition with Russia. Rival politicians and war lords were disputing in Pekin.

It was under these conditions that the West realized that something of more than ordinary importance was going on behind the China shadow, and that the shadow was, in fact, growing ominously greater and blacker.

It was the obvious duty of England to take the lead. Her contact with China, throughout three hundred years, had been close. Her nationals had played a great part in the development
of the country, and her political influence was still strong. But a new spirit of internationalism, by which each nation attempts to shift the weight of its responsibility, had come over the world, and in a multitude of councillors there was none to give a strong lead.

This new spirit, added to fatigue, and helped by the hope that he who gave most would reap the greater reward, set the Powers upon a competition in placation. It is no wonder that the success of the Chinese politicians went to their heads, and that the more they were given the more they demanded. They are not to blame for failing to realize that what they were achieving was the mere shadow of good government. They were dealing with unfamiliar affairs, under conditions of extreme difficulty; they were anxious to gain the admiration and approval of their fellow countrymen by spectacular successes; and, naturally enough, in their haste and inexperience the production of impressive shadowgraphs seemed to them to be more useful than the slow building up of realities.

The proceedings of the Powers encouraged the Chinese politicians in the projection of their shadow play. The Customs Conference met and debated, under almost opéra bouffe conditions, while all round about them and in their hearing the contending Chinese forces demonstrated the folly of belief in the stability of the government. Fiscal autonomy was granted upon the express condition of the abolition of likin, but no steps were taken to guarantee the fulfilment of the condition; so that today it is not uncommon that merchants find themselves mulet in as many as fourteen extra transit or passage charges when their goods pass up-country. The recession of extra-territorial rights would have become a reality but for the Shanghai tragedy of 1932; and England, at any rate, would seem to have been prepared to place her nationals and their interests at the mercy of courts which are notoriously susceptible to political or military influence, possibly not without a shudder of apprehension but apparently without making any real effort to avert the danger. Shanghai, raised upon a valueless swamp by the energy, brains and capital of foreigners, and now one of the greatest trading centres of the world, in the building up and control of whose fortunes the British have played the leading part was threatened and is still under threat, despite the fact that, as the one efficiently governed and stable centre in China, it provides the only safe anchorage for the financial and commercial welfare of the country.

There is no need, in these days, to argue that the granting of fiscal autonomy, the abandonment of the concessions, the recession of extra-territorial rights, and the regulation of the
government of Shanghai are essential to the attainment of that state of independence which will make it possible for China to feel that she is shouldering the full responsibility for her own affairs; but, in dealing with these matters, the helter-skelter blundering of the Powers has done serious harm to China, and has retarded the basic work of reconstruction without which government can never function. Timorousness and sloppiness have enabled leaders who would otherwise have been obscure to pose before their people as heroes, impeding the work of better men; while even the best minds in China have been decoyed from their troublesome and disheartening duties on to the international stage, where the heated atmosphere of intrigue, and the glare of publicity, have given them the feeling that they are doing great things with comparative ease. While the political leaders of China have been making shadows on the world stage the reality of a united country has slipped away. The South and West, and to a great extent Mongolia, are either under communistic control or inspired by communistic ideas. If they ever again come under the authority of a central government at Nanking or elsewhere it will not be for many generations. In many areas the conditions are deplorable. Late news from Szechuan, for instance, tells of misrule, military aggression, and oppression of the gravest character. The poor, patient, industrious people, whose only interest in their government is that it shall be good, are pillaged, starved and ravaged by flood and famine in appalling manner, while the national progress, which should have been in orderly march, marks time.

The indecisive policy of the Powers might still have been going on, with the efforts of the handful of men in Nanking who were tenaciously hanging on to the last vestiges of their authority growing weaker and weaker, if it had not been for Japan. The attack on Mukden, indefensible in principle, sent a gust of reality through the shadows. Japan had lost patience. She had decided upon action. The tragedy of Shanghai followed. No justification under any of the accepted rules which may govern affairs between country and country can be admitted. Yet, deplorable as the incident was, it served a purpose which, in all probability, will reveal itself as in the interests of China. Broken and disheartened at Shanghai, China could offer little effective opposition to the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese forces. In the operations there a Chinese general, whose presence to the north of Nanking could never have been anything but a cause of apprehension, was broken, and his source of revenue in Jehol wrested from him. The Manchukuo government was set up, and Nanking lost its nominal control of that great northern area. Nanking has survived the shock, which is a clear indication,
if such were needed, that the government is composed of men who are not mere political puppets, but are statesmen in fact; and Nanking, having been forcibly concentrated upon itself, is now in a position to apply its energies to the work which lies definitely within the bounds of possibility.

It is not likely that Japan will attempt any further aggression south of Pekin upon Nanking's sphere of control. It is not likely that Manchukuo itself will take any action independently of Japan. Japan cannot entertain any hope of making Manchukuo an effective Japanese state. There is no people in the world less likely to be absorbed than the Chinese, and no area where the population is predominantly Chinese today will be anything but Chinese in fact tomorrow. Even if the Emperor Pu Yi should be set upon the throne of a northern empire, Nanking should still remain the nerve centre of the great Yangtse basin. There lies its work, in the consolidation and extension of good government, in the building up of a state which will extend its influence little by little westwards and south, to the recovery of control over those areas which are now existing in anarchy. The north may be left to work out its own salvation and to establish, in its own way, similar conditions of good government; and, in the distant future, it may not be impossible that China may once again be united under some form of federal government.

A great work lies at the hand of the Nanking government. The forcible concentration upon that work which circumstances have brought about has lessened, in some degree, the difficulty of the task; but the Japanese aggression in Manchuria served another purpose which may prove to be quite as useful. China has always had great faith in its diplomatic skill. The presentation to the League of Nations of her case against Japan gave her a great opportunity, of which she was quick to avail herself. Here was her chance to attain by the art of diplomacy the towering success which the drudgery of routine work at Nanking was so slow in bringing. She may actually have entertained a hope that justice would triumph. No effort was neglected to secure that triumph, and, week after week, the Chinese mission at Geneva was engaged in expert, and undoubtedly attractive, propaganda. But the end was bitter disappointment, and China has now withdrawn upon herself fully conscious that only by her own efforts and by unremitting application to the difficult work which calls for attention in Nanking can she establish herself in the eyes of the world.

However good for her soul it may have been to pass through the valley of affliction, and however powerfully it may have operated to show her the stony and difficult country which lies beneath the clouds, it might have been possible for the Powers,
and for England in particular, to spare her that humiliation. From the beginning it was obvious that Japan, as yet little attracted by the cult of internationalism, and not yet having refined away the power of knowing her own mind, had a definite purpose in view, and that her strong individualist spirit was not likely to be cowed by any fear of the consequences of defying the League. She knew that while a multitude of councillors may make for wisdom it does not make for decided action, and, barely concealing her scorn for the wavering and voluble West, she went on her way, confident that the strength of her position as the one party having a definite policy would carry her through.

Had England retained anything of the influence and prestige in China which she held during the days of Sir Harry Parkes and Sir John Jordan, and had she had the courage to exert that influence, the Manchurian dispute might have been negotiated to a settlement which, while almost certainly resulting in the setting up of some form of separate government in Manchuria, would have saved the face of China.

The report of the Lytton Commission was admirable as a literary production, but for all that it contained in the way of special evidence it might have been written in London by anyone reasonably well informed.

There were available sources of information, one of which should be the archives of the British Foreign Office, which would have disclosed the fact that Japan was not merely playing her own game, but that she was making use of a strong monarchist movement. Mr. Pu Yi had been approached at various times for some years past to allow himself to be set up on a new Imperial throne. The original objective, probably as far back as the days of Yuan Shih Kai, had been Pekin; and at one time Marshal Chang Tso-lin himself had favoured the enterprise and would probably have engaged in it but for the fact that a sudden onslaught by Feng Yu-hsiang drove him back again to his Manchurian fastness. Later, the monarchists turned their attention towards Manchuria, and it is significant that when Pu Yi became Chief Executive of Manchukuo the title assigned to him deliberately indicated the temporary character of his standing. The fact that, after his public investiture by a colourless modern ceremony, Pu Yi received, in strict privacy, some seven or eight leading Chinese who thereupon performed the ancient Kow Tow ceremony, goes a long way to prove that Pu Yi in Manchuria is fulfilling in some measure the aims of the monarchist section of the northern Chinese. Those aims are just as legitimate, if they make for good government, as the aspirations of the believers in pure democracy; and it might well be for the good of China that two separate forms of government, linked by
blood and language ties, should exist side by side in friendly relationship within the borders of that vast area.

The difficulty in dealing with China is to get away from the shadows and face the reality. The welfare of some four hundred millions of people is in the hands of a few small groups, of whom the strongest and most efficient is the existing government in Nanking, controlling actually or virtually the most highly developed area, and having nominal authority over even greater contiguous areas. The future of China rests in the hands of Nanking. The instruments by which good government can be fashioned are there. Ability of a high order, will to work and steadfastness of purpose, experience gained in the past years of trouble, shrewdness and patience all the stronger because they are typical Chinese qualities, and real statesmanship, are available. There remains to be added the genuine friendly co-operation of those Powers whose interests are linked with the country.

Can that co-operation be counted upon? By all the signs discernible, Nanking is ready to welcome it, if it is offered honestly. The moment is propitious, but the overture must not be expected from Nanking, nor must a people to whom "face" is a matter of vital importance be expected to respond to any crude and public offer. There would be possibilities in concerted action by England, France, America and Japan, if it were not that such action would be likely to lead China back again to the stage, to enact the shadow play of high politics. If Nanking is to be assisted to get down to the solid work of administration the greatest hope seems to lie in action by England.

A new British minister is going out shortly to take up his duties in China. If he can see beyond the possibilities of his ordinary diplomatic rôle he has a great mission in his hands. If he can put something of the spirit of Sir John Jordan into his work, burn his paper and destroy his pens and typewriters, establish his headquarters at Nanking, and rely upon personal contact and the friendship he will be offered, he may help to do great things not only for China but for the world. The world cannot afford to have China a festering centre of distress and unrest. England can afford it least of any country.

The essential steps which seem to be required if England is to take a part in the rehabilitation of China are: that she should know her aim and adhere to it; that she should carry the other interested Powers with her, if possible, but, if not, should continue upon her own line until the others join in; that she should deal honestly; and, above all, that she should not be weak-kneed.
TRENDS IN COLONIAL POLICY: THE PROGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE

By Professor J. Coatman

(Professor of Imperial Economic Relations, University of London)

A recent speech made by Prince Leopold of Belgium in the Upper House of the National Legislature deserves notice, both because of its own intrinsic merits and because of the importance of its subject—namely, the Colonial Question. For all colonizing powers this latter question is doomed to overshadow in increasing measure their national and international policies. It is one of the roots of the world economic problem, and as national state planning becomes universal, as it assuredly will, the relations of all kinds—economic, political, and human—between metropolitan countries and their colonies will become part of the very essence of national plans and policies, and so will have tremendously powerful repercussions on international relations also. Moreover, inside the colonies, the human problems now raised by the question of the native economic and political development are of an almost alarming formidableness, and call for the exercise of the rarest skill and the deepest knowledge on the part of the statesmen and others concerned with their solution. Students of comparative colonial administration are aware that in the approach to the solution of some of these "human" problems Belgium leads the world. The Belgian Congo Labour Policy, and the whole-hearted and altruistic attempt to restore on sound modern principles the old native institutions destroyed in the period of ignorance, before their vital importance to native welfare was understood by anybody, stand out as models of statesmanship, and will, it is to be hoped, be made increasingly widely known by Belgian workers in, and students of, the colonial field. For these reasons we welcome Prince Leopold's wholly admirable speech and draw attention to its salient points.

We might, however, first explain that under the Belgian Constitution the sons of the King on attaining their majority become members of the Senate, which is the Upper House in Belgium. It is customary for the heir-apparent to the Crown to make use of this prerogative, and to take part in the business of the Senate by making speeches there intended to draw the attention of the country to questions in which he is specially interested. In pursuance of this custom Prince Leopold of Belgium lately made a speech in the Senate on the colonial question, which roused
considerable attention in the country, and is both an example of civic courage and a notable statement from one aspect of the colonial problems which occur in the Belgian Congo. In that speech he stated the conclusions which he had reached after his recent travels for study in that colony. The views expressed by Prince Leopold relate, of course, to an African colony, but we feel sure that they also find their application and their proof in many Asiatic colonies. Prince Leopold by his speech has once more shown the deep interest he has in colonization. He is, moreover, an authority on colonial science, for he has gained a wide knowledge of colonial problems by his many travels abroad, chiefly in Asiatic colonies—Netherlands Indies, Federated Malay States, Indo-China. He is a member of the International Colonial Institute, and was, in fact, the President of its meeting at Brussels.

The Prince began by drawing attention to some of the weaknesses inherent in the policy of rapid development of the economic resources of the Congo which had marked the early stages of Belgian rule. Such a rapid development was, however, unavoidable in view of the pressing need under which Belgium lay in order to make effective her occupation of the whole region of the Belgian Congo, and also in order to give practical proof of her capacity as a colonizing power. Private capital, mostly European, was the prime agency used in this development—as in all other colonies of European powers—and, as elsewhere, the native was regarded as merely an instrument for this work. But the success of European enterprises could not be regarded as the final goal of Belgian activities in the Congo. The circumstances of the war and post-war period have led to the retention of an agrarian system which has been generally condemned, and also to the creation of increasingly numerous industrial enterprises and ever more ambitious programmes of public works. In the above we have a state of affairs in which the native can continue to be regarded as a mere productive instrument. But nowadays Parliament itself was awake to the dangers of this system. In 1926 the Medical Service had drawn attention to certain aspects of native labour conditions, and valuable measures had been taken in that connection. And now the Colonial Commission of Parliament had made a candid examination of faults committed in the past. He then showed by implication the mistake of supposing that the future of the Belgian Congo depended solely on the success of private enterprise. Nevertheless, it was no good thinking that a total reversal of policy would be made in one day. Existing conditions had to be taken into account in anything which Parliament might do, and certainly the State had a duty to help those enterprises now imperilled by the economic crisis. But certainly in future reservations must be made. The Prince
did not desire on this occasion to discuss the mining industry, but would confine himself solely to agriculture, which should always be given an important place in colonial activity. New methods of procedure were desirable in future which called for a dual policy. Firstly, the agriculturists should be organized on sound principles, and it should be open to the natives to become property owners and have that economic liberty which is guaranteed to them by the Belgian Colonial Charter. Secondly, note should be taken of the present position. Some European enterprises could continue to keep themselves in their present shape, whilst others, harder hit by the depression, would have to enter more into partnership with the natives in some form or other still to be settled, such as, for example, allowing natives to have small areas to develop, with the promise that their produce should be marketed at fixed prices. But, of course, all existing rights should be preserved, and Government should not grant any new concessions for some years to come in regions capable of agricultural development. He drew attention to a passage in a speech delivered to the members of the International Colonial Institute at Lisbon by M. Armindo Monteiro, the Portuguese Colonial Minister, in which he said that the application of foreign capital should take into account first and foremost the actual needs of the region concerned and not those of the industries and financial interests of the metropolitan countries. Prince Leopold insisted that the future belonged to those colonies where development could be most economically carried out and this involved the partnership of the natives. He did not wish to exclude Belgians from agricultural activities in the Congo, but he thought that their most fruitful work lay in the sphere of scientific research, purchase of produce, in the processing of the latter, and in its transport and export. He then showed by specific examples that the most favourable financial position was held by those colonies where the development of the soil was in the hands of the natives themselves. Thus there were two schools of thought on colonial questions. The first believed that the policy of concessions to Europeans should be maintained. The other held that exploitation should be done directly by the natives. The time had come to face the dilemma which had arisen and courageously choose a policy.

The Prince's reference to the International Colonial Institute serves as a timely reminder of the increasingly important role now being played by the latter in the study of colonial affairs, and it will interest readers to know something of the valuable literature which it publishes.

Among the many publications which the International Colonial Institute at Brussels regularly brings out, and which are highly
appreciated by all who take part in the study of colonial problems, its Year Book of Comparative Colonial Documents takes first place. This work, which appears annually in three volumes, brings together the documents—legislative, administrative, political, social, and economic—which have been published in the chief types of colonies throughout the world. Vol. I. relates to the Belgian Congo, Netherlands Indies, Italian and Portuguese colonies; Vol. II. the French colonies—colonies generally, Indo-China, Equatorial Africa, West Africa, Madagascar, Togoland; Vol. III. the British colonies—colonies generally, Ceylon, Burma, Bechuanaland, Gold Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda.

The documents are of two kinds: (a) Official reports, speeches, statistics, notices giving information on the various aspects—political, administrative, social, economic—of life in the colonies concerned; and (b) the texts of laws, decrees, ordinances, decisions, and regulations of a general character. All these documents are given in their original language either with a French or English translation or with a summary only, according to the importance and character of their subject. This publication is therefore unequalled as a source of information. It has the advantage of making known, not the personal impressions of some colonials, but from official sources the practical results of the action of the governments.

The first volume, for the year 1932, has just appeared. Among the documents therein collected we may draw attention to those relating to the Netherlands Indies, which are indeed of a kind to interest all who follow the movements of Asiatic colonization, and especially the extracts from the speeches or reports of the Governor-General on the crisis and the financial situation. The effects of the crisis have been cruelly felt in the Indies, and it is of interest to learn how the Government there has faced the difficulties it had to meet. The report of the Bank of Java, also given, has for the same reason considerable interest. We note, further, the statistics taken from the Bulletin of the Official Bureau of Statistics published by the department of Agriculture, Industry, and Labour, which show the representative shares in the exports from the Netherlands Indies, of the produce of capitalist agricultural undertakings and of native cultivation.

In legislation we note as of special interest the ordinances relating to marriage under Muslim law, and repudiation; private unsubsidized school teaching, taxation of income and capital; and also those reforming the judicial code for Europeans and natives.
PROFESSOR J. C. KIELSTRA: GOVERNOR OF SURINAM

(An Appreciation by Fred. Oudschans Dentz)

The name of Professor Kielstra is well known to the readers of the Asiatic Review, as he has written articles in it on various colonial subjects. He has now been appointed Governor of Surinam.

Johannes Coenraad Kielstra was born on November 13, 1873, he studied Law and selected the career of a judge in Dutch East Indies, leaving Holland to take up his work in 1903.

In the East Indies he filled various positions as judge, as a civil servant, and as assistant secretary in the Government Railway Department at Bandoeng.

He returned to Holland on sick leave in 1915 and his colonial career was terminated by his appointment as professor in Colonial Civil and Penal Law, in East Indian Agricultural Economics, and in East Indian Agrarian Law. He accepted this appointment on October 7, 1917, and now, fifteen years later, he has been accorded the honour of the appointment of Governor of Surinam on the departure of Dr. A. A. Rutgers.

Professor Kielstra is the fifty-sixth Governor to rule over Surinam or Dutch Guyana since Anthony Rowse acted as Governor in the colony founded by Willoughby in 1651. His task will be arduous. The colony is economically in great straits, scantily populated (2.87 per square mile, less than in all surrounding countries), with a large corps of officials, an unfavourable position compared with other West-Indian colonies as regards commercial routes, and a lack of any mass product for the world market, with a population with Western ideas and culture, yet where a native communal bond is lacking. So far no Governor has been successful in developing the colony; lawyers, engineers, officers, both naval and military, agricultural specialists (some with great reputation) have all done their best. Kielstra is the first professor to devote his gifts of heart and intellect to this ancient colony which has belonged to the Netherlands since 1667 (with the exception of three short intervals). He will find there entirely different circumstances from those prevailing in the East Indies with its native population, though he knows the land from his special study journey in 1925, in the reports of which he has given his impressions of the land and its people, both in writing and in lectures.
He may be expected to prove a strong leader and practical organizer. Professor Kielstra is a Colonel in the Dutch Reserve Army and is greatly interested in the training of youth. Both as a former ruler in the colonial empire in Asia and as a scholar he will be enabled to place his gifts at the service of Surinam and its progress, which is indeed of great interest to him.
To see in its true perspective the struggle of the French with England in India, the drama must be thrown upon the background of European history. The English Company had been founded in 1600, and its early fortunes were to some extent affected by the rise of Sivaji and the Maratha power in the latter half of the seventeenth century. The French Company was established in 1719, and thus, so far as the struggle was a battle of commercial rivalry, the English had the start of more than a century. But in the eighteenth century France was beginning to show the signs of exhaustion which eventually culminated in the revolution. The soaring ambition of Louis XIV. had already involved the country in the War of the Spanish Succession, and this was followed later by the Seven Years’ War. Nor was this all—there were complicated affairs to be looked after within the country. Europe itself was in a peculiar state, it might almost be called, of ferment. Hassall says, “Solemn treaties carried no weight; national boundaries and race limits were held to be of no importance; the condition of the labouring classes was little considered. Jealousy and suspicion marked the dealings of States with each other. . . . Adventurers were found at every Court; spies inundated each European capital. Atheism was rampant, the financial condition of every country was rotten, and self-interest was the only guiding motive.”

The French, like the English, thus started their career in India as traders, and just as the English Company was reluctant to interfere in Indian quarrels, and so to take on a political connection, so its seems the French Government had no desire to become a power in India. “The Crown,” says Professor Dalgleish in his learned study of the French Company,* “was interested not only in the Company’s government but also in its domain. The French Government ‘had only disdain for colonies,’ so it used

its influence to curb the expansionist tendencies of Dupleix. In this the Paris directors co-operated most heartily.” But Dupleix had to be reckoned with: there apparently was not room for the two Companies in India, especially when the ambitions of the Frenchman turned in the political direction. The clash of commercial interests drifted into armed opposition; each party sided with its chosen Indian chieftain, and the dominance of European military powers practically left them as protagonists, fighting the battles of their respective countries whenever these were at war.

All this is well enough known to any student of Indian history. Everyone knows how Dupleix, badly supported by a lukewarm government, finally failed, and how the star of France sank lower and lower, until the ascendancy of England could no longer be disputed. But though the struggle itself was hopeless, there were still men who, fired by that spirit of adventure already mentioned, as well as by the desire for individual gain, joined themselves to this Prince or that, and with one eye on their private fortunes, flattered themselves that they were serving their country against the hated national enemy. Perron, de Boigno, Walter Reinhardt, du Drenec, Raymond, Madec—these are names which now flit across the page of Indian history, though at the time each of them played an important part. They could not change the destiny of India: perhaps they did not try to. Attracted, most of them, by the romance of mysterious India, finding themselves at last in a position of which they could never have dreamed, they were generally true to their salt, and fought with the companies they had raised, often drawn, so far as the Europeans were concerned, from very questionable sources, but highly trained, well organized, and brave to a fault, for the Prince to whom they had attached themselves. Mr. Maurice Besson has been at pains to tell these romantic stories in detail;* he may be pardoned for the occasional intrusion of national pride, but he has unfolded with a skilful pen what must have seemed to contemporaries a fairy tale. What are we to make of the ragged Breton gamin, René Madec, who haunted the quays of Bordeaux and on whom the fine ladies took pity, and who yet lived to play his part in India, to surrender at Pondicherry and to receive a special safe-conduct which enabled “M. Madec, Captain in the service of his Most Christian Majesty,” to travel to Mauritius and thence to France? More famous still is the free lance Walter Reinhardt, whose fame is bound up with and largely eclipsed by his wife, the ex-courtesan known to history as the Begum Sumroo. A strange figure this Begum—a sort of combination of Catherine II. and Cleopatra—a woman for whom men fought and quarrelled and were ready to

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die—a capable woman who, converted to Christianity, endowed church and seminaries and who left a legacy to the Pope.

Two of these adventurers stand apart from the type. Claude Martin took service with the English and was a friend of Englishmen. He made a fortune rather by a natural gift for finance than in the less reputable ways common in those days. Far different was Paillébot de Saint Lubin, a humble citizen of Lyons, who somehow seems to have ingratiated himself with the Court of Louis XV., but who was essentially a rascal. Full of his own importance, a man around whom, in his own estimation, the world revolved, a man, moreover, "of courage and intrigue, and a thorough-paced liar," he might have served Molière as a character for a comedy had he lived in time. He died in the obscurity from which he should not have emerged after exchanging the glories of India for the more suitable profession of a hair-dresser. And so these adventurers fade out of history. France had no more need of them, and the steadily advancing power of England left no room for the romance of adventure and of fortune-making at the expense of Indian Princes.

By 1830 British power was supreme. The French had given up the hopeless struggle, and even the adventurers by whose help some of the Indian Princes, notably Sindhia (or more properly Shindé) and Holkar, had been able to put up a resistance had disappeared. Everywhere except in the Punjab the British ruled the country, although then as now they recognized within limits the independence of the States. But they had hitherto been too busy consolidating their power to have contributed much towards the general well-being of the inhabitants. Railways were yet to come: and the great irrigation systems. Macaulay and the famous minute of 1835 were not far off, but as yet education went on the old way. There was still a pretence that a descendant of Timur sat upon the throne at Delhi, but he was a Samson with his hair shorn, and figuratively, if not literally, blinded. It was into an India so constituted that M. Jacquemont arrived* in search primarily of science, but eager to record, in a desultory and inconsequent fashion, his impressions of the country. Waterloo had been left behind some 15 years, and it is in no spirit of hostility that he writes of his English hosts who seem to have received him with such cordiality as they were capable of. And that, speaking generally, was not much. For Jacquemont, like so many other continental observers, was chiefly impressed by the coldness, the formality, the rather terrifying reserve of the Englishman, the unimaginative maintenance of his own customs.

* État Politique et Social de l'Inde du Nord en 1830. (Paris: Ernest Leroux.) This is an extract of relevant passages from the diary of Jacquemont, written a century ago.
and habits in spite of climate and circumstances, the want of anything that could be called conversation. "They pass the time smoking and lying on the sofa, which combined induce sleep easily, and make a pretence of reading some novels and newspapers; some drink spirits and water: in the evening a ride or a drive without any purpose, and so back to dinner and bed after a more or less long session of hooka and grog." Such, it seems, were the men who made India part of the Empire.

Outwardly there is much that persists in Hindu custom to this day—with a difference. M. Jacquemont, to do him justice, was in India for scientific research and not to study the people, so that what he sets down—in all honesty and simplicity—is but the rather superficial observations of a tourist. He nowhere attempts any analysis of esoteric Hinduism, does not, in fact, seem to be aware that it exists, though he does notice that some at least of the superstition can be paralleled in the Roman Church. That was the time when Lord William Bentinck passed the memorable ban on the practice of becoming sati, but the writ of the Governor General did not run beyond the left bank of the Sutlej, and we read without surprise that when Ranjit Singh, the Lion of the Punjab, had married two little girls in his old age, "les pauvres petites à la mort de leur vieux mari impuissant, seront obligées de se brûler avec son corps. C'est de rigueur dans leur famille, qui est de la plus haute caste." The practice has all but disappeared now, and it has at all times been difficult for the Western mind, with its insistence on the sanctity of human life, and its different conception of womanhood, to appreciate the idea that the woman was irrevocably part of the man, and in dying with him she did not so much sacrifice her life (which was of no value) as avoid the break in spiritual continuity which the bonds of living flesh must occasion. M. Jacquemont does not take this view. He thinks that women, to whom this kind of death is an ever-present possibility, grow accustomed to the thought of it, so that when the hour has struck they can face the ordeal with indifference. It is an instance of observation, not of study, for there can be little doubt that the indifference is brought about by spiritual exaltation, like that of the Christian martyrs.

The sense of dignity—that "izzat" of which writers so frequently speak—seems to vary with the reality of power. The poor shadow of an Emperor, permitted with almost contemptuous kindness to play at being an Emperor, kept up a shadow Court with strangely elaborate shadow ceremonies. One might almost be reading of the establishment of Mr. Turveydrop. Salaams, then a short advance, then more salaams. Presentation of gifts, and more salaams. Presentation of a robe of honour, further salaams and more ceremonies, and that was all. Very
different was the reception by Ranjit Singh, who not only made his visitor sit beside him, but entered into a conversation which is a curious mixture of shrewd insight and of childish simplicity. Something of the kind may be seen today. Durbars are after all tedious ceremonies, possibly as tedious to the Prince as to his guests, and perhaps not more tedious than a European levee. Visits of ceremony from Prince to Viceroy and Viceroy to Prince, are nothing more than visits of ceremony. It is when the Prince puts off his trappings of State and becomes, as the Maharaja of Baroda remarked, "an ordinary mortal," that one sees the true man, and it is only the Prince who is without power who tries to conceal the nakedness of his impotence.

In another way, too, this visit to the Great Mogul is not without its lesson. It has sometimes been remarked that the English in India do not appreciate the value of pageantry. Granted that to a man who takes his chance with a London crowd fighting for a bus it seems ludicrous to be escorted by outriders or even a mounted company, or again to find a sentry mounting guard with fixed bayonet. These things nevertheless count: they are expected and to "ride in triumph through Persepolis" in a bullock-cart seems to the Indian mind undignified. They ordered this matter better a century ago: they order it better now in the States. Like the Maharaja, you learn that there is a time for relaxation and a time for ceremony and that to possess power is not enough. You must also be content to display the visible signs of it: that is due, if not to yourself, then to your position and the Prince you serve. Jacquemont travelled in a palanquin with elephants and cavalry and police through saluting lines of infantry, as became one who was accompanying the Resident, the visible symbol of the English power.

Women were of no account. As in ancient Greece, the honest women were left to mind the house and the feminine part of society was furnished by the courtesans. These were, however, more respected and, it would seem, respectable than their corresponding sisters in Europe. Jacquemont, however, it may be repeated, was not studying the Indian, and he did not observe that the women in the background had a great deal of influence over their menfolk. He cannot be held to blame for recording the mistake into which so many others have fallen. Today we know better: the women are coming forward to take their part in public affairs, but perhaps those are wiser who still refuse to discard the spiritual sari for the spiritual dhoti.

And what of the people themselves? Let it always be remembered that there were but fifty-eight years between the time when the Company "stood forth as Diwan" in Bengal and the date with which we are concerned. During that time there had been
war with Haidar Ali and then with Tipu; but the French, though no longer serious rivals, were able to hamper British operations both by the assistance they gave to Indian Princes and by naval descents under the brilliant Suffren: Sindia had to be reckoned with and the Marathas, both the Peshwa and Holkar. It was not until the arrival of Wellesley and Hastings that the policy of non-intervention was abandoned, and Hastings left in 1823. The policy of Wellesley apparently had to be stated: a policy "which promises to improve the general condition of the people of India and to unite the principal native States in the bond of peace under the protection of the British power." Little wonder, then, that Jacquemont found much to blame: there was little or no sympathy for the people. "Les Anglais n'ont pas cette sorte de magnificence qui tient au sentiment national et tourne au profit de pauvre peuple." There were excellent roads made by and for the English, but no wells were sunk nor any village tanks made; nor, he seems to imply, was anything else done for the people to whom "they meant nothing." Apart, however, from this want of sympathy—apart from a life like that of "étrangers campés au milieu du pays qu'ils ont conquis"—apart from their contempt for the people which makes the Englishman say "I am alone," raised in Olympian seclusion above the rest, where the Frenchman would say "Je suis le premier"—apart from these things M. Jacquemont has nothing but praise for English qualities of administration—"fiddles à leur parole toujours, probes, équitable"—but the one thing wanting is sympathy. "They enjoy their conquest with moderation, with equity, because both are indicated by their own interest, if not inculcated by their European education; but they have no sympathy with a conquered people." Security of life and property, moderation and justice, the absence of caprice which inspires confidence, were not enough to make the administration popular. Our author notes with some surprise that more people crossed the Sutlej from the left bank to the right than the other way, though Ranjit Singh ruled the Punjab with all the caprice of an unfettered autocrat.

Opinions will differ how far such sentiments are true of today. There can be no question of an immense advance in the care for the material and moral welfare of the people. Everyone—not only Europeans but Indians also—knows that the first care must be for the ryot, for his marketing, his irrigating channels, his means of transport, his health; and not only directly by schools, but indirectly in these and other ways, the means of raising him morally—in the somewhat cant phrase of the day his "uplift"—is constantly borne in mind. How far M. Jacquemont would admit that such things show an increase of sympathy and how far he would ascribe them merely to an improved administra-
tion—to a higher conception of duty rather than to an access of affection—is another question which each must answer for himself. In spite of a higher plane of government and of generally lower taxation, the people of an Indian State do not, in fact, migrate into British India, nor does the contrary happen, but if any deduction is to be made from this it must be that everywhere the ryot is attached to his own soil and that conditions are not so startlingly different as to support a change in face of that attachment. This want of sympathy of which the author complains was perhaps natural in the conditions out of which British rule was evolved: like some other traditions, it has persisted, probably more than the present attitude justifies. M. Martineau, in his Preface, remarks that "toutes les difficultés actuelles ont peut-être leur source dans ce divorce initial entre associés qui se sont méconnus." That is how it strikes a foreign observer: the words are there for the Englishman to take or to leave according to temperament.

One curious fact seems worthy of mention, since it is so completely at variance with what one sees today. It is true that it occurs in the diary during the travel through the Punjab which, as I have said, was not under British rule, but since the expressions "dans l'Inde" is used, and since the diary does not profess to be a consecutive story, but is a desultory record of experiences from day to day without compression or revision, it is not unreasonable to suppose that this particular entry is of more general application. It appeared, then, that, contrary to the usual experience, the population avoided the main roads and canals and preferred to live in the more remote parts. There, it is cynically remarked, they might be subject to their master's oppression, but to no one else's. Along the highway they were the prey of every traveller who had the power. When you arrived at your camp there was litter for the horses, but nobody paid for it; soldiers and servants in the retinue of any person of consideration lived on the villagers; guides were taken at night and received never a copper; elephants and camels were fed on the surrounding trees and hedges and no one thought of the damage done.

When one thinks of the great irrigation systems in the Punjab and Madras, when one considers the vast populations which crowd the fertile valleys of the rivers, when one remembers that in the wastes of Ladak in Kashmir the population is about five to the square mile, the enormous difference which confidence and a sense of security and fair play have made can be appreciated. The morality of the British and, to some extent for this cause, of the Indian has undergone a complete change. It is recognized now, not only that the villagers have rights, but that those who contribute most to the exchequer are entitled to get some
return. Only the other day when a large scheme for the benefit of the capital of a State was in contemplation, it was ultimately postponed, though good in itself, on the ground that enough had been spent on the capital and it was time something were done for the villages.

Incoherent though the narrative is, the picture is on the whole sombre when compared with that of today. The villagers, we hear, were miserably poor and lived miserably: the one consolation was that they were still more wretched in the years that went before. Now they are still poor, but in spite of what missionaries and philanthropists say, they do not live miserably. They have gained enormously, not only in material ways—in the provision of water, in the care of health, in education, and in security—but what is perhaps even more valuable than all these—in self-respect. The Indian ryot is a gentleman: he expects to be so treated, though he does not expect a foreigner to enter into all his customs and idiosyncrasies. His offer of hospitality is always sincere; it may be given to a superior as from an inferior, but not with cringing. He will put out deck chairs—the best he has—for his visitors, and take one himself if invited, and will talk as man to man over a cup of tea. How many an Englishman can recall days when, after a hot and tiresome journey for the sole benefit of the people in his charge and with no thought of his own comfort or reputation, he has been amply rewarded by the unsought kindness of the simple village folk?

The days of indifference have passed and are passing. In the towns, maybe, the Englishman will still remain aloof, yet even there, partly owing to the reasonable laxity of rigid custom, intercourse is freer and more cordial. Another hundred years will pass, and when the commentator compares that time with this he will perhaps record with satisfaction how the old colour prejudice and the old aloofness on the one side, the old suspicion and the old rigidity on the other, have completely disappeared and and all things have become new.
THE PROFESSOR AT THE ROUND-TABLE

The Key to Freedom and Security in India. A constructive study of the elementary principles of civic freedom and security with reference to the establishment of stable free institutions in modern India. By An Indian Student of Political Science. (Oxford University Press.) 6s. net.

(Reviewed by Sir John Kerr.)

The author of this book is unduly modest in his description of himself. It is clear that he has been a diligent student of his rather arid subject, but he is now a master of it, and if he is not a professor, he ought to be. He has the proper academic virtue of lucidity, and the proper academic disdain for the pusillanimous politicians and administrators who hesitate to follow the path so clearly marked out for them by logical theory. It is a good thing that such people should from time to time take stock of their position, and, while so engaged, they might do worse than listen to the words of wisdom contained in this book.

The author begins, as is right, with a definition of his political objective. "The mere consent of the governed is not sufficient to protect and ensure the freedom and sovereignty of the people: their active participation and voluntary decision must lie at the basis of all legislative and executive authority in the really free state." The author admits that this ideal state has not yet been reached in any country, and it may be questioned whether the great majority of people in any country really want to undertake active participation in the legislative and executive measures of government. So long as they are free to pass upon their lawful occasions without undue interference or restriction on the part of the officers of government, and so long as they are not unduly mulcted in the matter of rates and taxes, they are not greatly interested in the persons who govern them or in the details of governmental action. In western countries, since the war, this happy state of affairs has been somewhat disturbed by doubts as to the capacity of the politicians to cope with the conditions which have arisen; but the persons whom our author terms the "governed" or the "people" show no signs of wanting to take on the job themselves. They prefer to have it done for them by a Mussolini or a Hitler. In India, in spite of the efforts of the late Mr. Montagu and of those who have tried to wreck the constitution which he set up, the placid, pathetic contentment of the
peasantry persists, and it is clear that not for many years, if ever, will they be ready and willing to play the part which our author wishes to assign to them in the government of their country. Even, therefore, if we accept his view that his ideal is a good one, it is too remote to serve as the basis of a working constitution at the present time.

There remains, however, what the author calls "the urgent practical question of how these people are to be stimulated to take an interest in public affairs." He accepts the view of the Lothian Committee and the White Paper that adult suffrage, either direct or indirect, is impracticable and undesirable at the present time for elections to the legislatures. But he proposes its adoption for elections to village councils, which are to be set up, where they do not already exist, "for the actual control and management of all internal village affairs." Alas! the experienced administrator has been down this path already, and has found that it leads nowhere. The author's eloquent description of "a small body of experienced and competent elders chosen annually by all the adult residents of each village or natural unit of habitations" who "would undoubtedly form the most natural and the best body for dealing with all matters of local concern and interest and would act as the village tribunal of justice dealing with all civil or criminal cases," recalls the speeches made by the late Lord Sinha fifteen years ago or more when he introduced his scheme for rehabilitating village self-government in Bengal. He hoped much from that scheme and nothing grieved him more than its failure. The fact seems to be that in no country does the villager take more than a very mild interest in the village pump, while in India, at any rate, he greatly prefers to submit his complaints and disputes to a distant but impartial tribunal, even if it is relatively dilatory and expensive, rather than to the village elders who know too much about him and his affairs. Even a kindly observer like Lord Irwin has felt constrained to refer to these little village councils as "all that has survived of the rich promise of the first Aryan political genius, the arrested germs, as it were, of parliaments which might have been, and now the object of scientific study, much as atrophied organs in the human body, which once were vital parts in the structure of ancestors very different from ourselves, today engage the attention of physiologists."* Not by such bodies are the Indian masses to be stirred into political consciousness and life.

In the case of higher forms of political organizations the author proposes "progressively restricted franchises through a graduated scale" for taluq and district boards, and for the provincial and federal legislatures, therein differing from the Lothian Committee.

* Political India (1932), p. 6.
and the White Paper, which have proposed in the main to adopt
the franchise for local bodies as the basis of the franchise for the
provincial legislatures. It is not clear in what way our author
would graduate this scale for the various bodies, but he would
apparently accept in all cases property and educational qualifica-
tions on the lines put forward in the White Paper. He would
supplement them by a progressive scale of various forms of public
service as qualifying persons for a higher franchise. He proposes
that "the younger generation of citizens should be encouraged
to join a local civic guard and undergo voluntary training in
police duties, so that they may share in the opportunity and
responsibility of local defence and relieve in part at least the
necessity of the State to maintain a large, expensive, paid police
force adequate for effective protection of person and property."
Service of this kind for a specified period of three or five years
would qualify those who have rendered it for the higher franchises
for the provincial and federal legislatures, while shorter periods
would make them eligible for the taluq vote or the district
franchise. Similarly voluntary service on arbitration boards or
village committees or in fighting epidemic diseases would qualify
for a vote. The experienced administrator will remembered that
civic guards of various kinds have been formed in the past and
have not been a great success, except occasionally during tem-
porary emergencies; while it may be doubted whether voluntary
public service would enfranchise many people who would not
already be entitled to the vote under one of the qualifications
enumerated in the White Paper scheme. The author, by the way,
seems to underestimate the extent to which that scheme en-
franchises the small cultivator, the agricultural tenant, the
labourer, and the depressed classes.

The author has not overlooked the communal problem. He
gives an excellent account of its origin and complexities, and has
no difficulty in showing that it has not been solved by any of the
authorities who have tackled it so far, from the authors of the
Montagu-Chelmsford scheme and the Simon Commission down
to the Prime Minister and Mr. Gandhi at the present day. His
own solution is "a statutory division of the electorate into two
classes, one consisting of majority community constituencies, and
the other of minority communities' constituencies." The number
of constituencies in each class would be initially fixed "on a
population basis, or better still on the basis of the relative voting
strength of the two sides." The division would not be final like
the present division into Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan
constituencies, but "on the eve of a general election or at the
end of a limited period of three or five years, as the case may be,
it would be open to any person or section on either side to change
over to the opposite side, if it deemed it desirable or expedient to do so," the number of constituencies allotted to each class on the population or voting strength basis being modified accordingly. As an example, the author suggests that in a province with a large Hindu majority, the Brahmans or the depressed classes or both, dissatisfied with their treatment by the non-Brahmin caste Hindus, might decide to throw in their lot with the minority constituencies, which would thus receive such an accession of strength in the legislature as to enable their representatives to take over the government. Or, conversely, in the Punjab, where the Muhammadans would normally be in the majority, economic issues might cut clean through communal ranks on both sides and lead to entirely fresh groupings. It is not for the alien observer to pronounce on the practicability of a scheme of this kind. Let the author submit it to the Hindu Mahasabha and to the Muslim League, and then reconsider it in the light of the opinions he receives from those bodies.

In dealing with the defence problem, the author gives an excellent account of the main elements of the situation, and points out with justice that the policy of Indianization in the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army will not by itself solve the constitutional problem of the relations between the army and the civil government under the new conditions. He throws out an interesting suggestion regarding the danger of a military dictatorship being set up by the Punjab if recruitment continues to be made predominantly from that province. His remedy is the reduction of the regular army and the creation of civic guards in the villages, of district and taluq "reserves," and of a provincial and national "militia." These matters will doubtless be argued in the new legislatures.

The chapter on finance is perhaps the best in the book. The conclusions of the authorities who have investigated this question during recent years are clearly set forth, and the author does not conceal his own view that the assessment and collection of income tax may well be tightened up, that the exemption of agricultural incomes is a mistake, that death or succession duties might justifiably be imposed, and that local taxation has been inadequately developed. It is to be hoped that the author's views on these points will be made available to the new legislatures, and that the new elements in the electorate will insist on a thorough overhauling of India's financial resources on the lines suggested in this book.

The chapter on the services is disappointing. The author insists strongly that British co-operation and help were never more needed in India than at this time and that the masses would generally prefer a neutral British officer to Indian officers with
local prejudices. But in view of the difficulties likely to arise under the new conditions between Indian ministers and services recruited in England, he would abolish the services as such, and substitute "a new type of British public servant made available for India on special short term contracts." An arrangement of this kind would be suitable enough in the case of scientific experts or academic appointments, but the Indian minister has already discretion in regard to posts of this nature. For administrative posts, some preliminary training and knowledge of the language are essential, and a man brought out for five years would only just be getting fit for his job when the time came for him to depart. If Parliament decide to retain for the present a certain British element in the higher administration, the Indian ministers and the services should not find it impossible to adjust themselves to the new conditions.

The chapter on the Indian States is sketchy and the author has apparently no personal acquaintance with any of the States. But there is food for reflection in his conclusion that "the whole idea of setting up undiluted autocracy in the States and democracy in the provinces into one federation is fraught with the gravest danger for both alike. The net result will be an unholy alliance between the propertied upper classes in British India and the representatives of the purely autocratic rulers of the Indian States." He urges that no State should be allowed to enter the federation unless and until it has adopted constitutional government by means of which its subjects can choose their representatives to sit in the lower house of the federal legislative. But it is for the States to decide whether they will enter the federation, and, if so, upon what terms. It is extremely doubtful whether they would agree to any stipulation of this kind, or whether it could at present be worked in many of the States.

Whatever view may be taken of the author's concrete proposals in regard to various subjects, his work as a whole is of great value at the present time. It summarizes clearly, accurately and adequately the discussions on most of the controversial matters that are at present outstanding, and the appendices contain critical reviews of the most recent reports on a number of technical questions, such as the franchise, finance, the position of the army, the services, and so on. There is also a useful summary of the author's own proposals. Finally, as has already been indicated, the author's point of view is one that the practical politician or administrator may profitably ponder, even though in the end he may find himself unable to adopt it.
THE UNIVERSE AND MAN

By Ranjee G. Shahani

I

Among men and women we find two opposing types of mentality which, though grading into one another by intermediary instances, are, in their typical extremes, sharply contrasted. At one extreme we have the men and women who seem formed entirely by their social surroundings. They think, feel, and act "like everyone else," as they would say. Here "everyone else" means, of course, the people with whom they commonly associate. Persons of this type are essentially plastic and imitative. In those of little mental capacity there may be no awareness whatever of the forces at work on them; but the type by no means excludes minds of considerable intelligence, though the exercise of this intelligence is confined within strict bounds. To our present type questions of conduct and valuation are solved by an appeal to some constituted authority to which they have been accustomed to bow down.

At the other pole we have the "independents," who do not passively reflect their immediate social environment, but strike out paths of their own. I do not mean to imply that their natures are not receptive: the point is that they choose among different influences and are more or less indifferent to mere contiguity. If they are readers, they will listen to Plato or Sankara, perhaps, with as much deference as to a member of their own family circle. They draw from a larger world. In matters of conduct, they may or may not be "rebels" in outward action, but they will tend to question all institutions and will refuse to accept any claim to authority as valid if nothing more can be urged for it than general acceptance. In fact, they "think for themselves" in all things, and are a constant source of surprise, apprehension, and disapproval to their conventional friends. "Wherever did you get such ideas?" is one of those questions which, when addressed by one person to another, tells us a good deal about the character of each. On the side of the questioner it is an unconscious confession of faith, implying, at any rate, the assumption that one cannot have an idea without getting it from someone else, also, very possibly, that the opinion has been obtained from some ineligible source. Needless to say, a mind
may be independent without being original, except in so far as originality can be shown in selective choice. The material must in general be given, though it is a certain fact that a new thought is occasionally born into the world.

As regards the "independents" and the problem of conduct, a man may heartily despise the standards and ideals that prevail around him and yet, for one reason or another, outwardly conform to them. There is no necessity that he should "run amok" against the conventions.

I seem to find, in the non-independent type, a singularly invincible obstinacy. "Wax to receive, and marble to retain" are the words that seem exactly to express their condition. Reason and argument cannot move them, and it comes as a surprise to them for anyone to hold that reason has anything to do with the matter. "I was taught so" is with them the final word. They are what might be called the slave type.

To persons of this description any disturbance of conventional valuations is abhorrent. They are content to abide by the customary envisagements. It is not for people of this type that the present work* is intended. The author belongs to the class of "independents." It is to kindred spirits that he addresses himself. This is not to say that he is an intellectualist. He would probably be one of the first to repudiate this ascription. Indeed, before justice can be done to this book, we are forced to examine the place of intellect in human experience.

II

However highly the function of intellect may be esteemed—if only to redeem our universe from chaos—it is not uncommon to find the profounder spirits referring to intellect in a certain tone of disparagement. I think there is some justification for this attitude, though the reasons usually advanced are far from satisfactory.

If we look at intellectual eminence as we actually find it among men, we must be impressed, I believe, by the fact that with the possession of great intellectual grasp and subtlety we sometimes, perhaps not infrequently, vaguely feel that something is lacking that plain human beings, of no pretensions to this dialectical facility, seem to possess. For this missing element I know no fitting name, though "touch with reality," "soul," "intuition," "mystical experience" dimly shadow forth what is meant. There is much exquisite thinking that we feel disposed to call "mere empty cleverness," a mere tour de force of logical expertise.

* The Living Universe. By Sir Francis Younghusband. (John Murray.) 10s. 6d. net.
Looking back in the history of thought, perhaps the much-abused Scholasticism may be held to give us abundant illustrations.

Now, what is the ultimate function of the intellect? "It seems," says Taylor, "as if the function of mere intellect were always that of a necessary and valuable intermediary between a lower and a higher level of immediate apprehension. It breaks up, by relations and distinctions it introduces, the original union of the what and the that of simple feeling, and proceeds to make the what, which it deals with in its isolation, ever more and more complex. But the ultimate issue of the process is only reached and its ultimate aim only satisfied so far as it conducts us at a higher stage of mental development to the direct intuition of a richer and more comprehensive whole in the immediate unity of its that and what." In other words, intellect is not creative but critical. In its functions it might well be equated with the performance of a weighing-machine.

Indeed, the prominent quality of intellect I would describe as "mechanical." It is fundamentally concerned in bringing coherence and consistency into a "given" that, qua intellect, it is not called upon, or is not accompanied by any impulse, to transcend. Of course in this connexion we are minded of Bergson and various older "intuitionists"—for example, Jacobi. But the most daring exponent of the creed in our own times is undoubtedly Léon Chestov. In tome after tome he has tried to establish the limitations of intellect. Despite his Russian volubility and exaggeration, his last book, In Job's Balances, is a work of real importance. It tells us that the really "important, eternal things" lie beyond the pale of intellect. Reason, we are aptly reminded, is a Hellenic deity. This Kali of the Western world has no such claim on our allegiance.

Now this may be true. Nevertheless, a qualification seems called for. Chestov, for instance, tends to forget that reason itself is rooted in instinct. Not its suppression, but its controlled use, is what we would urge. Reason plays the same part in life that the douane plays in commercial affairs: it can sift the goods that are presented but cannot create them. This is a point on which we must be very clear.

From another point of view, intellect would seem to be entirely concerned with practical interests. All mentality can be reduced, say the Evolutionists, to the type of reflex action. "Cognition," says William James, "is but a feeling moment, a cross section at a certain point of what in its totality is a motor phenomenon." Such, it would seem, is the conclusion of Pavlov too. The fact is, no living organism, as long as it is alive, is largely under the sway of intellect. The organism comes within the purview of intellect only after death, when it has become a mere aggregate
of chemical elements. Then, and not till then, do the laws of intellect apply. This implies that intellect is only visible post mortem.

We can now understand why the purpose of the creative process cannot be fathomed by the methods of science. The *raison rasonante*, by itself, is a purely destructive force. Pushed to its logical extreme, it offers but one goal to mankind: collective suicide. The life and writings of Mainländer are a case in point. But the larger spirits—a Pascal, a Shakespeare, a Dostoeievsky, a Nietzsche—seemed to have denounced reason as an imposter. It is an impertinence, they appear to say, to foist on God or universal life concepts developed by the mind of man—concepts issuing from partial and limited experience. Not being of the same dimensions as the mind, life will not fit any intellectual mould. It is as a child enjoys it, or as a mystic apprehends it, that life consents to yield up its secret.

III

This brings us to *The Living Universe* of Sir Francis Young-husband, a book by a modern mystic who also happens to be a thinker and a man of action. It gives us the quintessence of a lifetime’s research connoted by the title. Having experienced life in different rôles, the author puts before us the cumulative findings of his spiritual adventure. The promise is rich and the performance is adequate. The questings of a many-sided mind cannot but be of supreme interest. This is why I have devoted so long a prelude to my notice of this book.

It is divided into two parts, entitled respectively: “Mainly Facts” and “Mainly Inferences.” The first section is essentially an attack upon the Second Law of Thermodynamics. But, unpleasant and unwelcome as this Law has been felt to be, it seems the only deduction from empirical facts. It appears ineluctable. Of course, if we agree with our author that the universe is governed by spiritual rather than by physical laws, then the “running-down” theory no longer appears inevitable. Sir James Jeans has asserted that there is a Mind—of a mathematical order—behind the universe; Sir Francis in turn tells us that this Mind is endowed with a sense of beauty—indeed is the Mind of an Artist. The student of physical science finds no foundation for either supposition. It is a matter of approach: we can accept the one or the other as our particular bent inclines us. But, as we have seen reason to believe, the point of view of the man of science—strictly limited in its range and scope—must not be expected to yield what it is unfitted to give. We must seek illumination from other sources. I may perhaps mention that the Eastern,
particularly the Hindu, would wholeheartedly accept Sir Francis' point of view. For him, Creation is *Prem Leila*: the Play of Divine Love. And this too, in essence, is the teaching of our author, just as it is that of another great spirit—Baruch Spinoza. In fact, most of the choicer spirits, whether Western or Eastern, have spoken thuswise. It is the God of Love that they worship.

This is the ultimate verdict of the mystic based on his own intuitional experience. That the mystic is the consummation of the human adventure is our writer's final conclusion. And in this conclusion the entire East will agree. Not only the East, it would seem, but the entire race of humanity. Has not Bergson, in his *Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, asserted the same thing? This leads to a direct comparison of the two writers. Superb as Bergson often is, he seems to suffer from a sad limitation: the God he worships is a French Dieu. Sir Francis suffers from no such limitation—he takes the whole world into his ambit. His tribute to Ramakrishna is the most splendid that I have met with outside the pages of Romain Rolland. It shows a rare degree of insight of what we may call catholic appreciation to have apprehended the uniqueness of this solitary sage, who was, we can scarcely doubt, the most significant personality of the nineteenth century and perhaps one of the few truly free spirits that the world has ever seen. It is now easy to understand why Sir Francis finds Wordsworth tepid, lacking in the real mystic intensity. These asides, even if taken alone, serve to make the book memorable. My only complaint at this point is that a deeper exposition of the much- and ill-used term mysticism would have been invaluable.

Section two deals with what the writer calls "Inferences." The universe, he tells us, is without beginning or end. . . . The Vedas say the same thing. . . . This universe is like the intermittent play of a fountain; each efflux gives significance to the source and to the jet; the same energy accounts for both. This energy, whose other name is creative love, manifests itself in the tiniest grain of sand and in the flaming ramparts of the world. The entire universe, then, is to be trusted. Holy is the raindrop, holy the river, holy is the mighty ocean. In a word, the whole Creation moves to the music of Krishna's lute—his Song of Love. It is this that pulses through all things. This creed is voiced in all climes and in all tongues. Browning's *cri du cœur* is typical:

God! Thou art love! I build my faith on that.

Such is the *credo* of our author too.

We have not mentioned Sir Francis' delightful fantasy concerning the Altaireans, "beings far higher than man—beings
reputed to be the highest in the whole universe—beings who in the highest degree embody the Cosmic Spirit of the Universe." Here is something to startle the lethargic intelligence of the mere terrene consciousness. But, to my mind, a serious book loses nothing by a certain infusion of playfulness. For example, H. G. Wells is perhaps at his best when he seems least serious. *The Food of the Gods* is superb, just because its apparent frivolity covers a great depth of thought. Which suggests that there is something worthy to be called cosmic even in the irresponsible play of fancy. In our author's picture of the dwellers in the "lucid interspace of world and world" we have a mystic's anticipation of the human consummation. We may say that it reveals the inmost core of his own thought. The universe, he seems to be saying, is not solely reserved as a playground for soccer and rugger, or even for the St. Leger and the Ebor Handicap, but as a training ground for the Sons of God. It is to be feared that the average Englishman will find such a prescription unpalatable.

In some such way does a mystic seek to justify his existence. Anyway, this is how he regards the universe. If his envisagement appears inadequate, then let the critics suggest a better way.

In all sobriety do I believe the author of this book to be the most celestial in vision, the most fearless in the adventure of thought. These are high-sounding words, but I have seriously weighed them.
REVIEWS OF BOOKS

CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA. Vol. VI.

(Reviewed by J. C. French.)

The first sentiments of the reviewer of this volume are admiration for and appreciation of the experience, knowledge, and research which have combined to put it together. Here is a perfect mine of information for future historians of India. For the record is something very much more than the usual "history" produced nowadays, a paste and scissors product from other people's work. The writers of many of the chapters have taken part at some period in the development of the events they describe, and all the chapters but one bear the unmistakable marks of such experience. But for all this the book remains a mine from which the golden ore of popular history is yet to be extracted. A reader who knew nothing of India would make very little of the present excellent work. The way in which the chapters dodge about from province to province, and from subject to subject, is all right for the expert, but will leave the average unspecialized reader, "the man in the street" (to use a modern political phrase of power and might), in a state of bewilderment. The remedy is for a future historian frankly to recognize that India is an empire and not a country. The only way to get a clear view of its history is to take the provinces, which are really countries, separately and give their story in each case from start to finish. When this has been done, the various great dynasties that have succeeded in uniting the divergent countries of India into an empire should be dealt with. This is the only way in which the history of India can be presented to the public in a comprehensible form, for the very good reason that it is the only one that corresponds to reality.

Where the general standard of work is so good it would seem invidious to single out particular authors, but I cannot omit all reference to Sir Verney Lovett's excellent contributions and Mr. J. C. Lindsay's careful and practical account of local self-government.

Though the first Afghan and Sikh wars are dealt with in a previous volume, the present work has a chapter on the Indian Mutiny. The story of that sombre drama draped in the dark tints of ferocity and treachery, the last great struggle of the older Indian world against the strange new empire from across the seas on the one side, and on the other the heroism and the brilliant feats of arms, assisted by the loyalty and devotion of the newer India, is one of an enduring interest. The causes of the Mutiny are well known, and there is a fair measure of agreement about them nowadays. But what is still entirely obscure is the machinery by which such a sudden widespread outbreak was engineered. It is known that shortly before it the Moulvi of Fyzabad visited certain centres, and the Nana Sahib made some extensive journeys and pilgrimages, but no trace of a real directing centre has yet been discovered, and the probability is that it never will be.
To anyone who has had practical experience of the extraordinary capacity in India for suppression and concealment on an extensive scale, this will not appear surprising.

The author of this chapter rightly attributes the extensive spread of the trouble to the indecision and weakness of Lord Canning and judges that Lord Dalhousie could have suppressed it promptly (p. 175). He also shrewdly notes how, whenever British rule was overthrown, the great anarchy which dominated eighteenth-century India raised its head again. But the rest of his treatment of his subject is less satisfactory. He falls into the facile habit of recording what is to the disadvantage of the British troops. When they got drunk, when they ill-used camp followers, when they ill-treated villagers—such incidents are noted. Now this is all very well, but if the historical picture presented is to be a correct one proportionate attention must be paid to the atrocities of the mutineers. The author has failed to do this on the plea that it is more important to describe how the people responded to the novel conditions than to give actual details of occurrences (p. 179). The result is that a misleading impression of undue and excessive British severity is produced. I am particularly disposed to quarrel with the author's statement that the atrocities of Cawnpore were reprisals for Neill's shooting of mutineers in Benares, and for some severities of English and Sikh troops on villagers (p. 184). Neill has been criticized in recent works, but from Malleson, his contemporary historian, he receives high praise. It can be fairly maintained that Neill did his duty adequately in the terrible crisis with which he was confronted.

Now the mutineers in Cawnpore were soldiers and could have been under no illusion as to the penalty which mutinous troops invited. Shooting down mutineers was not peculiar to the British Army. The Sikhs indulged in it freely less than twenty years before 1857. So this could not have been a cause. As regards the second reason, severities in villages, it would have been difficult to excel the mutineers themselves in this respect. Their cruelties to the local population were frequent and terrible. So this second reason also is of no weight. When the events of the Mutiny are reviewed as a whole in a correct perspective of time and place, it will be apparent that there was no undue severity in the suppression of it.

But this unfortunate occurrence, this "Devil's Wind," as it is correctly named in India, was no more than a temporary break in the great story of imperial development and achievement described in this book. One is tempted to linger on the various points and phrases of intense interest, but to do so would be to expand this review to the limits of this magazine. But it may be of interest to glance for a moment at its conclusion in the reforms of Lord Morley. The present volume brings out very clearly the great importance of these reforms. It is not so much what Lord Morley did—namely, to admit Indian members to the Viceroy's and Secretary of State's Councils and to increase the size and elective character of the Provincial Councils. Previous Oriental despots have enlarged the field from which they accepted their advisers. What is important is the way he did it. As this volume points out, no previous Secretary of State ever browbeat a Viceroy or ignored a Council to the extent Lord Morley did. In a letter to
Lord Minto, Lord Morley vigorously described his "holy rage" at certain Lieutenant-Governors who had the temerity to show some independence. The autocratic changes announced in the Royal Declaration at the Delhi Durbar of 1911, about which even Parliament had not been consulted, are the product of the same policy, which amounted in a word to the supersession of the Government of India by the Secretary of State as the direct governing authority in India. This revolutionary change occurred silently and almost unnoticed. Did Lord Morley like the results of his innovation? These words which he said on January 21, 1921, will show:

"Montagu calls himself my disciple. I see very little of my teaching in him. This dyarchy won't work. As for his strange plea for rousing the masses of India out of their 'pathetic content' by reforms for which they do not ask, and which they cannot work, it's a most unwise remark. My reforms were quite enough for a generation at least."

But with the mention of the reforms of 1919 we are in politics, and are far removed from the great administrative task of which this book treats, a task which in future ages will be regarded as not the least of the mighty monuments of imperial achievement which the British Empire has contributed to history.

Incomparable India. By Colonel R. J. Blackham. (Sampson Low.) 12s. 6d. net.

(Reviewed by Arthur Duncan.)

Field-Marshal Sir William Birdwood, in his Foreword, says that Colonel Blackham "has tried to describe the peoples, their manners and the customs of the great sub-continent with sympathy and understanding." I think he has succeeded admirably.

Colonel Blackham has written a very readable and instructive book, which is well illustrated. In twenty-seven short chapters he discourses pleasantly on such subjects as Indian religions, ascetics and saints, temples and shrines, holy cities and sacred rivers, magic and mythology, fairs and festivals, caste, women, crime, and drink.

The attentive reader will realize four main facts: (1) the janao, or sacred thread of the Brahman, is the symbol of a divinized attribute; (2) Indian religion is a complex mass of cult and philosophy with a rich vein of mysticism, of a florid and luscious kind, running through it; (3) theocracy is the greatest obstacle in the way of political progress; and (4) many Indian customs are now so far behind the times as to be distinctly harmful to the national welfare.

The author touches the political situation in the last chapter, in which he traces, very briefly, the march of events in post-war India. "Democratic ideals and self-determination," he says, "are due to the fertile brains of gifted Europeans, but they have been absorbed by Indian minds and have swept over India, changing the whole political fabric of the country."

There is now grave anxiety throughout England about Indian policy. The objections to self-government in India are not generally based on doubts of the integrity or capability of influential Indian leaders who are
loyal to the Empire and, left to themselves, would uphold the British traditions that have served India well in the past. The doubt is whether these leaders will be able to succeed against the narrow loyalties of the people and the tenacious Oriental tradition of partiality, nepotism, and corrupt administration.

The Indian question seems to have divided us into two camps. All who are not "diehards" are "mugwumps." The mugwumps favour the maximum advance in reasonable proportion to such insurance as can be provided. They are inclined to trust Indian affairs to the better-informed judgment of the men on the spot rather than to vacillating political sentiment in Great Britain. The diehards, on the other hand, look backward and argue from the logic of events. But logic has never provided the key to our more serious Indian problems, and in this one we may conceivably have to exercise a faith that is greater than fate.

FICTION

QUINLAN. By A. M. Westwood. (Murray.) 7s. 6d.

When you start with a policeman who, though English, was brought up in early youth by Muslims, you may expect a story brimful of exciting incidents. Mrs. Westwood, however, is artist enough to distribute the thrills, and her novel is a very good example of Anglo-Indian, surrounded by the darker side of Indian, life. In spite of the somewhat conventional theme, she rises above the too frequent presentation of the dummy or the hackneyed Indian, and her Indian characters are really alive.

Anne, the heroine, comes out from England to join her sister, Quinlan's wife. She gets engaged to Jimmy Crane, with whom she is not in love, and accepts him at an evening party just before a bomb explodes which kills a favourite dog and threatens to blind Jimmy for good. She is, however, really in love with the Collector, a good-humoured, Newfoundland-like Scot, and the story is worked out to that end. Then she is kidnapped, and Mrs. Westwood makes the most of her rescue. The catty Mrs. Hickory (the Judge's wife), the plethoric planter, and the explosive railwayman are all well drawn, though in each case the drawing amounts to little more than a sketch. One does not know quite what to make of Anne. The impression she leaves is that of a minx who wanted smacking, but the Collector, and presumably the author, was not of that opinion. Quinlan himself is a somewhat sardonic person, full of zeal for his work, but full also of a certain love for his foster-family.

Is this India? Yes, and no. There is the treacherous old butler, loyal and devoted till greed took him; the foster-brother, with lust and murder on his hands; the wicked old foster-mother, hoist with her own petard when she lets loose the masth elephant to destroy others. These are Muslims. Of the Hindus we have Surendra, the signaller who consorts to his own undoing with terrorists, the conventional money-lender, and the magic worker, Suruchi. With the single exception of Surendra, who is more
sinned against than sinning, they are all more or less villains. That is Indian life if you search for it in the purlieus of crime and intrigue and treachery. It is not the Indian life of the village or of the towns and cities. If you want a good story, vividly told with a considerable knowledge of Indian life, Quinlan is to be recommended. But we must not imagine that the story of the courts, civil and criminal, is typical of a kindly, usually virtuous, and altogether amiable folk.

Stanley Rice.

KAMUL. By Sir Jogendra Singh. (Lahore: Uttar Chand Kapur and Sons.)

Sir Jogendra Singh is Minister of Agriculture in the Punjab, and he modestly disclaims the title of novelist. All that he claims is that his work is an accurate picture of village life. The heroine, a barber girl, is living with her father quietly when famine overtakes the village. They are starving, but eventually the man gets some work with a dissolute Raja, with the obvious result. The girl escapes, and is finally taken up by an English missionary lady. A young Brahman falls in love with her and is set upon marriage, but the girl dies.

An unpretentious story that rings true. It need hardly be said that Sir Jogendra Singh knows well what he undertakes to describe. It is, one supposes, a kind of protest against certain customs—against the wild life of certain men who have more money than brains, against the spurning of the poor because of their poverty. Incidentally it would seem that the English are so woven into modern Indian life that even an Indian tale cannot avoid the European.

Stanley Rice.
THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF ARCHÆOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN THE INDIAN STATES*

By John de La Valette

EARLY BEGINNINGS

The study of Indian antiquities may be said to have received its first impulse from Sir William Jones, who in 1774 founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal, which counted Warren Hastings among its first members, a connection in which we may, perhaps, see the first step on the path which would eventually lead to official patronage of archæology and the arts in India. The collection and deciphering of Sanskrit and other inscriptions; the study of Hindu law and other work, largely of a literary kind, was the main concern of the pioneers of those early days and of the fifty or sixty subsequent years.

About 1835 a new period opened with the activities of James Prinsep, whose official position was that of Assay Master of the Calcutta Mint, but to whose penetrating sagacity and intuitive perception epigraphists in India owe an immense debt of gratitude for removing, once and for all, what Cunningham has called "the thick crust of oblivion which for so many centuries had covered and concealed the characters and language of the earliest Indian inscriptions which the most learned scholars had in vain tried to penetrate." During the thirty years which separate the commencement of Prinsep's activities from the appointment of the first Archæological Surveyor, a number of men, in various parts of India, did valuable work in a private capacity and on a voluntary basis, the results being largely connected up through Prinsep. Among these early "field archæologists" and "traveling antiquarians" should be mentioned James Ferguson, Markham Kittoe, Edward Thomas, and Alexander Cunningham in Northern India; Sir Walter Elliot in Southern India; Colonel Meadows Taylor, Dr. Stevenson, and Dr. Bhau Daji in Western India, the latter being one of the earliest enthusiasts among Indians.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA

With Major-General Alexander Cunningham begins a new and vitally important chapter in the history of Indian archæology.

* Being an extract from a paper entitled "The Encouragement of Archæological Research and Art in the Indian States" read before the Eighteenth International Congress of Orientalists at Leyden.
In 1861, whilst still a Colonel, and Chief Engineer of the North-West Province, he impressed Lord Canning with the advisability of organizing a systematic "investigation of the archaeological remains of Upper India" for a start to be gradually extended to the whole of India. What was aimed at was "an accurate description—illustrated by plans, measurements, drawings or photographs—of such remains as most deserved notice, with their history and a record of the traditions that were retained regarding them."

There was at first no suggestion of establishing a permanent department; in fact, any department at all, the appointment of Cunningham being merely that of "Archaeological Surveyor" to the Government of India, any assistance of which he might have need being supplied by the existing departments of the local Governments. Some ten years later, however, it came to be realized that it was essential to direct the researches in a more systematic manner than had been attempted at the outset, and of concentrating the supervision of the entire system in one department. This led in 1871 to the establishment of the Archaeological Survey of India as a distinct department and to the appointment of General Cunningham as its first Director-General. The preservation and repair of ancient monuments and an epigraphical survey were in due course also provided.

In 1885 Cunningham retired as Director-General and was succeeded by Dr. Burgess, who carried on the work during the next four or five years, when he, too, returned home. His retirement, coinciding with an era of retrenchment, led to a prolonged suspension of the department, and it was not until the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon that its activities were revived and expanded.

Modern Developments

Within a few weeks of his landing in 1899, Lord Curzon struck a fresh and welcome note by accepting the encouragement of research, the promotion of archaeological study and the preservation of the relics of the past as "a part of our Imperial obligation to India." Before the close of that year definite proposals had been sent to the Secretary of State which, upon being sanctioned, resulted in the sending out, in 1901, of the new Director-General Mr. (now Sir) John Marshall. With his arrival begins the modern chapter in the history of the Archaeological Survey of India.

Two developments of special interest in connection with the subject of this paper took place during the directorship of Sir John Marshall. The recruitment of Indians for the various branches of the Survey was systematically fostered, and the relations with the Indian States in regard to matters of art and
archaeology were developed into a most happy, mutual collaboration.

Until about 1900 there were no facilities in India for the study of archaeology, and the Government of India had no option but to seek recruits in Europe. In 1903 it was decided to encourage the pursuit of archaeology among Indians by the offer of State scholarships. The results may be seen, not only in the number of Indians who are now employed as experts in various branches of the Archaeological Survey of India, but also in the fact that the present Director-General is Rai Bahadur Daya Ram Sahni, who received his training under Sir John Marshall, and, after serving a number of years in the Archaeological Survey of India, was lent to the Government of Kashmir. His useful work in that State resulted in scholarly contributions to the official Reports of the Survey.

In the interim period between the retirement of Sir John Marshall and the appointment of Rai Bahadur D. R. Sahni, Mr. H. Hargreaves was at the head of the Survey, a great deal of whose important work was done on the North-West Frontier, where he discovered the pre-historic remains at Nal.

Co-operation with the States

In another way, too, the action of the British authorities has had a direct effect upon the States. In 1901 the Government of India invited the systematic co-operation of the Indian States in the task of rescuing from decay and repairing the national monuments of the country, seeing that such monuments were not confined to British territory. This invitation met with an immediate and warm response from the Indian Rulers. As a result many important measures of conservation were carried out by the Darbars of Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore, Kashmir, Gwalior, Bhopal, Udaipur, Dhar, and other States, whilst in several States archaeological departments were established or reorganized, and these now employ Indian archaeologists who have received their training in or through the British service.

Hyderabad

Among the important work so achieved, that carried out in India’s premier State, Hyderabad, in connection with the cave temples at Ajanta and Ellora, ranks very high indeed. Already in the days of Fergusson and Burgess the Nizam’s Government had furnished valuable assistance towards their investigation and preservation, and many of the Ajanta frescoes were carefully copied under the direction of John Griffiths, Principal of the J. J. School of Art in Bombay, by his pupils. Some twenty years ago, when
the late Lady Herringham, assisted by five young Indian painters, all of whom have since become artists of great repute, set out to produce large-scale copies of the Ajanta frescoes, generous support was once more afforded by the Hyderabad Government. Further assistance was again supplied to the India Society when, in 1913, it undertook the publication of the results of Lady Herringham’s expedition.

But the rôle of this State in promoting the study of archaeology and the practice of the arts was not limited to collaborating with British undertakings. In a State which annually spends between £800,000 and £900,000 on education, these matters were unlikely to be permanently left to British initiative.

In 1914* an Archaeological Department was established, of which Mr. G. Yazdani, M.A., is at present the Director. This Department set to work to preserve the country’s ancient monuments, in particular the frescoes at Ajanta, for which latter purpose it requisitioned the services of Signor Ceconi, the Italian expert, who succeeded in preventing further decay in a manner which, it is expected, will be permanent. The Hyderabad Archaeological Department publishes periodically important works dealing with the inscriptions and works of art of the country. The latest of these are the monumental volumes of a monograph on Ajanta by Mr. Yazdani, the illustrations to which are of the greatest accuracy and beauty. Among the more popular publications intended for the instruction of the general public may be mentioned Mr. Yazdani’s Antiquities of Bidar, the Guides to Ajanta and Ellora, and a Memoir by M. Foucher, being a Rapport Préléminaire sur l’Interprétation des Peintures et Sculptures d’Ajanta.

Side by side with these official activities there may be noted those of the Hyderabad Archaeological Society, of which His Exalted Highness the Nizam is the patron.

Kashmir

From the early days of archaeological study in India Kashmir has been visited by many Englishmen, who have written accounts of its monuments. Among these may be mentioned Garrick, Cunningham, Cole, and Bishop Cowie during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and more recently Sir Aurel Stein, whose intimate and unrivalled knowledge of the geography and antiquities of that country is revealed in his Ancient Geography of

* For reference, it is here mentioned that these and the following figures and facts concerning the Indian States are, unless otherwise indicated, derived from the official publications of these States, such as Annual Reports, Archaeological and other special Reports and Gazetteers.
Kas'mir and his translation of and commentary on Kalhana's Rajatarangini: A Chronicle of the Kings of Kas'mir. In his preface to the latter work, Sir Aurel Stein acknowledges the "generous interest" in his labours by the Maharaja,* which included "a grant towards the publication of the Chronicle." But it is to a Dutch scholar, Professor J. Ph. Vogel, at that time in the British Indian service as Superintendent of Archaeology, Northern Circle, that the Government of Kashmir owes the detailed advice on the basis of which it established an Archaeological Survey Department in 1903. Considerable progress in the department was made under the direction of Mr. Ram Chandra Kak, who had been trained under the Director-General of Archaeology in India. A remarkable find made under his supervision was the site of the Buddhist colony at Harwan, where the remains of several stupas and an apsidal temple have been cleared, the latter being surrounded by a fine floor of terra-cotta tiles stamped with figures reminiscent of Sasanian art. As a memoir of the Archaeological Survey of India, Mr. Kak published an interesting account of a survey tour in Bhimber and Rajauri, two districts of historical interest in Jammu Province, and an illustrated description of the two rarely visited valleys of Mars and Wadwan in Kashmir. His Handbook of the Museum deals with the evolution of the sculpture of Kashmir and with the history of the country as evidenced in its coins. The latest contribution to the archaeology of Kashmir is Ancient Monuments of Kashmir which Mr. Kak has recently completed and which is published for the Government of Kashmir by the India Society. Of interest to the general public as well as to scholars is the collection of some 1,200 photographs of monuments, sites, excavations, etc., made by the Department, copies of which can be supplied to the public.

Mysore

In Southern India it was the abundance of important inscriptions rather than the existence of architectural monuments which gave rise to the earliest archaeological studies. Thus in Mysore the beginnings of the archaeological survey may be said to date back to the year 1865, when Major Dixon was deputed to obtain photographic copies of inscriptions in various places in the State. On the basis of these, Mr. Lewis Rice, then Director of Public Instruction in Mysore, issued a volume entitled Mysore Inscriptions. In 1884 Mr. Rice was appointed Director of Archaeological Researches, and in 1888 a permanent Archaeological De-

* H.H. Maharaja Pratap Singhji, then Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, is referred to here.
partment was formed under him. The exploration and copying of all the inscriptions found in the country was now systematized, and the results were published in the successive volumes of the series known as *Epigraphia Carnatica*, whilst separate volumes on epigraphical subjects also appeared.

Attention was further paid to the collection and transcription of ancient manuscripts of works in Kannada and Sanskrit, the results being from time to time published in the *Bibliotheca Carnatica*.

At the same time, even before Mr. Rice's retirement in 1906, care was beginning to be bestowed upon the ancient architectural monuments in the State. Steps were taken for the restoration and preservation of some of them, and contributions concerning Mysore were made to the Indian Monumental Series of the Imperial Government.

Upon Mr. Rice's retirement in 1906 an Indian, Mr. Narasimhachar, his former assistant, was appointed Director of Archæology, and was in his turn, in 1922, succeeded by another Indian, Dr. R. Shama Sastry. It would lead too far to enumerate all the work that has been carried out in Mysore during these last twenty-five years. In addition to continuing the epigraphical and numismatical work and collecting and publishing manuscripts, an increasing interest was taken in architecture and sculpture. Several Dravidian and Hoysala temples were described and illustrated in the Annual Reports, and a large number of studies of individual works of art were also published. Excavations on a small scale were conducted in several places, and the conservation of ancient monuments was systematized from 1920 on. Finally a careful ethnographic survey was undertaken and successfully completed.

**Travancore**

In Travancore the Archæological Department goes back to 1891, but it was materially reorganized in 1908, when a "Superintendent of Archaeology" was placed in charge of the Department and supplied with a staff consisting of a "Pandit Assistant," one photographer, one clerk-typist and four peons. The work of the Department is made available to the public through the publication of the *Travancore Archæological Series*, of which one or two volumes appear every year. The main activities of the Department have hitherto been in the field of epigraphy, but, in addition to these studies of valuable sources for the history and philology of the country, the Department has devoted considerable efforts to the study of the *Muttas*, or Vedic, colleges which were attached to the monasteries and were for a long time a powerful force in the religious and social life of Kerala.
In the sphere of the fine arts the present Archaeological Superintendent, Mr. R. Vasudeva Poduval, has recently been devoting attention to the fine wood-carving and the mural paintings in the temples in Travancore State, some of which can claim a fair degree of antiquity as well as of beauty. Through age, exposure, and neglect these works are fast decaying, and it is hoped that the care now being bestowed upon their preservation may cause to be retained what is left, and that the result of these studies may soon be made available.

In addition to the preservation of the temples and forts in the State, a valuable contribution to the history of architecture in Kerala is being made by the study of the numerous manuscripts on the science of architecture which, together with published works in Sanskrit and Malayalam, will, it is hoped, enable the special architecture of Malabar to be studied with the thoroughness it deserves.

**Baroda**

Important contributions to the study of the ancient literature of India, as well as to the popularizing of knowledge, have been made in the progressive State of Baroda. The Maharaja Gaekwar's Oriental Series has acquired a worldwide reputation by its publications of original texts with English translations, several volumes of which are brought out every year. Recently the Sanskrit section of the Central Library at Baroda was expanded into a separate organization known as the Oriental Institute and placed in charge of Dr. B. Bhattacharya, M.A., Ph.D., as Director. In addition to supporting scholarly learning, the Baroda Government, under the initiative of the venerable Ruler of that State, who throughout his long reign has taken the keenest personal interest in all endeavours to promote not only the material, but also the mental and spiritual welfare of his people, has made a deliberate and effective attempt to spread the result of the work of scholars among the general public. A comprehensive system of district and travelling libraries has been established, even in those districts of Baroda which are not in easy communication with the centre. To supply these libraries with up-to-date books, a constant stream of translations into the vernaculars is being maintained at the rate of from twenty to thirty volumes a year. It is the proud achievement of this organization to have brought public libraries within reach of the whole of the populations of the towns in Baroda and of 62 per cent. of the inhabitants of the rural districts. The Museum and Picture Gallery at Baroda, under the curatorship of Mr. S. Ganguli, includes, in addition to Indian and European pictures, an archaeological and an ethnographic section. Special care is
devoted to the temples at Dwarka and Bet in the Okhamandal District of Baroda, which is situated in Kathiawar, and which are every year visited by thousands of pilgrims.

**Bhopal**

Bhopal has long attracted the attention of archaeologists on account of the famous site at Sanchi, which contains, perhaps, the most beautiful of the early Buddhist monuments still extant. By arrangement with the Darbar of Bhopal, the Archaeological Survey of India were placed in charge of the excavation and preservation work connected with the Sanchi site. The magnificent results are there to testify to the skill with which the work has been carried out. Sir John Marshall's *Guide to Sanchi*, and his bigger work on the same subject now in course of preparation and written in collaboration with Professor Foucher, will form a lasting record of this work. After the completion of the excavations and the restoration of the monuments at Sanchi, the Archaeological Department of Bhopal was established in May, 1919, the Superintendent of Archaeology, Professor B. Ghosal, M.A., being also appointed Curator of Sanchi. There are many other places of archaeological interest in Bhopal in addition to Sanchi and a detailed account of these by the late Colonel Luard was published in the *Bhopal State Gazetteer*.

**Gwalior**

Gwalior, one of the principal fragments of the once great empire of the Mahrattas, has long attracted archaeologists by reason of the fine cave temples at Bagh, to mention only one example. These were cleared and the buildings and paintings as far as possible restored and preserved for the Gwalior Government by the Archaeological Survey of India. The results were embodied in a finely illustrated volume published for His late Highness the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior by the India Society in co-operation with the Department of Archaeology in Gwalior. Unfortunately, neither the Maharaja Scindia nor Colonel Luard, who had taken such an active part in the preparation of the volume, lived to see its publication.

**Dhar**

At Mandu, in the small State of Dhar, as at Sanchi and Bagh, we may witness an instance of collaboration by the Archaeological Survey of India with an Indian State to restore and preserve monuments of archaeological value. Paths have been cut through the jungle to the principal monuments, and the latter, as far as possible, cleared and protected against further decay. The in-
terest of this group of monuments, and especially of the Jami Masjid, the chief and least injured among them which dates from A.D. 1454, lies in the fact that it is probably the finest and largest specimen of Afghan architecture to be found in India.

The foregoing examples of effective steps taken in various Indian States, both big and small, are by no means a complete list of such activities, but will probably be sufficient to convey some idea of the wide and varied field which these cover and the measure of success which has crowned these efforts.
THE ASIATIC REVIEW
3 VICTORIA STREET, LONDON, S.W. 1.
(FORMERLY "THE ASIATIC QUARTERLY REVIEW")
PUBLISHED QUARTERLY. SUBSCRIPTION £1 PER ANNUM

VOL. XXIX.
JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1933. Nos. 97—100

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Architect: W. M. Dudok. Sculptor: H. A. van den Eijnde

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BAS-RELIEFS OF THE VAN HEUTSZ MONUMENT AT WELTERREDEN

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THE WHITE PAPER: A MIDDLE VIEW

By the Right Hon. Lord Meston, K.C.S.I.

It requires some temerity for one who left India twelve years ago to express any opinion on the present situation. If there is one single topic upon which there is general agreement among Englishmen who are near the end of long service in India, and upon which there is universal agreement among one's old Indian friends and correspondents, it is the startling change that has come over India since the war. To the post bellum unrest and discontent, largely economic in its origins, which pervades the world at large, there has been added in the East a new—or at least a newly expressed—racial sensibility, with a more or less explicit revolt against the assumed superiority of the West. We can, all of us, see something of this for ourselves: but it is only those in recent administrative touch with India who can tell us how deep these disturbing factors have penetrated into the masses whom we used to regard as placid and voiceless, and to what extent the spirit of Nationalism—or of what in India's present conditions must pass for Nationalism—is spreading and becoming a reality. On this point there is convincing testimony, and I see no reason why those of us who served India in the last generation should mistrust the powers of observation of our successors. To approach the present political issues, therefore, as if they were developing in the old pre-war atmosphere of British officialism, would be foolish; and any opinion offered exclusively from that standpoint would be listened to with some natural impatience.

There are other standpoints, however, which are open to the ex-official as well as to any student of the situation. India is essentially the product of her own history; and there are certain constants in the Indian character, in the social structure of India, which may be temporarily obscured, but are unlikely to be altered,
by waves of political aspiration. In what manner it seems probable that these will react to a new system of government is certainly relevant at the moment. It is also a matter less for theoretical speculation than for evidence by those who have had ample opportunities of watching those factors at work under other conditions, when India was her natural self and not acting a somewhat self-conscious part on the world's stage. What I am going to submit to you this afternoon, accordingly, will take a good deal for granted of which I have no very recent personal knowledge, but will emphasize the possible bearing of certain characteristics in Indian life and polity upon the proposals for a new Constitution.

Prolonged Controversy

Anything in the nature of a dispassionate or philosophic study of the situation is rendered difficult by the excitement which now surrounds it. That the interest of Englishmen should be sharply aroused in the future destinies of India is all to the good, even at this eleventh hour. But quite unnecessary obstacles have been thrown in the way of any newcomer to the topic acquiring an interest which is intelligent and at all comprehensive. In the first place, the extravagances of the Indian extremists started a number of superficial emotional currents in this country: the idea that India had suddenly become a great nation struggling for freedom; the idea that our power in India had been so weakened that we had better abdicate before worse things befall us; the idea that we ought to reconquer India and exterminate sedition. These currents might have been stayed by the only authoritative and systematic analysis of the problem which has yet been made—the Simon Commission's Report—if that document had been given its proper place as a State Paper of the first magnitude. The Government of the day, however, for reasons which I am not here to examine, virtually shelved the Report. This, of course, did not prevent conscientious readers from digesting it: but the effect on the general public was to create an impression that the Simon Report had in some way failed of its purpose, and was to be replaced by something more authentic.
Then came the Round-Table Conferences, conducted—perhaps, in the circumstances unavoidably—as a series of dramatic interludes with rhetorical fanfares rather than as a solemn inquisition into India's preparedness for change. Public opinion got drawn insidiously away from the unparalleled complexity of the issues to the picturesqueness of their setting.

Finally, we have the controversy now raging over the White Paper—almost as if, in some obscure way, the White Paper were an abstract dogma instead of a bundle of highly arguable propositions. The result has been an amazing outcrop of intolerance in certain quarters. A document which calls for careful and detailed judicial study—and is now receiving such study at the hands of the Parliamentary Joint Committee—is in imminent danger of being bandied about as a test of partisan loyalty. The threat has actually been used that differences of opinion regarding it may break up the Conservative party. On such a catastrophe there could be no worse an authority than a person like myself, who sits on the benches of a party which is regularly rent from head to foot by internal schism about twice a year. But, even with this handicap, I venture the suggestion that the break-up of India would be a catastrophe of a somewhat different order from a temporary dyarchy in one, even the largest, of our Parliamentary groups. If ever there was a time for the calm and non-partisan treatment of Indian affairs it is today.

THE CASE FOR ADVANCE

In what follows I am asking you to consider the argument for enlarging India's political freedom, and then how we are to measure the proper degree of enlargement? If we find any such measure we can apply it to the proposals now before the Joint Committee, and then look into the justification for stopping short for a time, and how far short, of the goal of our promises.

As a matter of law the case for revising the Constitution rests on section 41 of the Government of India Act, 1919, which provided for an enquiry in 1929 into the "development of representative institutions," etc.—the wording is well known to us all. Though much that is legitimate and much that is illegitimate has
been read into this section, it made no promise of further progress in or after 1929 towards self-government; and indeed there are commentators who would use it as a means for retracing the steps by which Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford disturbed the pathetic contentment of the Indian masses fifteen years ago.

Of all the criticisms of our Indian policy I have always found special difficulty in understanding the view that our troubles in recent years derive their origin from the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme. Its authors—both, alas! now departed—never troubled to answer the charge; and it would have been hard for any man who held responsible office in India during the war to shut his eyes to the urgency of some pronouncement as to the objective of our rule. Challenge was in the air all around us: the old world was upside-down, what was to be India's place in the new one? Those of us who hoped to postpone an answer till after the war were finally shaken out of our ground by the Lucknow Pact of Christmas, 1916, when the Hindu and Muslim leaders, after generations of aloofness, met on the common platform of a demand for reform. It was impossible to carry on as if those voices had not been heard, as if India must wait indefinitely for her share in the new world-order for which we and she were fighting. Once the declaration was made that our objective is to lead India to self-government—and could we have put our names to anything less?—it followed, as certainly as the night the day, that a clear step forward should be taken. Whether that step had been what Parliament decided in 1919, or one of the many variants that were discussed, would probably have mattered little. The Montford scheme never got a fair chance, either from most of the Indian leaders or from several of our administrators; and it suffered from at least two inherent defects which were thrust into it against the advice of the then Government of India. It served its purpose, however, as a transitional measure, perhaps as well as any other intermezzo would have done; and there is no use in crying over spilt milk. The question now is whether, having had our decennial enquiry, we are to go forward or to go back.
THE MEASURE OF CO-OPERATION

If India stood today exactly where she stood in 1917 the answer would be in the words of the announcement made by the Cabinet in that year, or in effect that the issue would be determined by the degree of co-operation in reform which has been received from the Indian leaders. This criterion is being forcibly urged as the rest which we ought now to apply to the demands for complete responsibility: and the implied argument is an argument which cannot be lightly gainsaid. A large section of the Indian leaders have shown no sense of responsibility whatever for the good government of their country since 1919; why should trust be reposed in them now? It is undeniable that the appeal by Parliament, in the preamble of the Act of 1919, for co-operation, met with a meagre and partial response; while a powerful section of Indian leaders definitely adopted a policy not of co-operation, but of wrecking. Would it then be expedient for Parliament to declare that, its conditions of 1919 having not been fulfilled, no further advance towards responsible government can be conceded?

Out of that perfectly logical position we have, in my judgment, all but contracted ourselves. Co-operation or no co-operation, we have never since 1917 treated India as being on trial. She participated in the peace treaties on the same footing as our self-governing Dominions. Like them, she leads her own delegations to the League of Nations. Viceroy's have negotiated with wrecking leaders as if they were spokesmen of responsible political parties. These are in no sense criticisms; they are objective facts which seem profoundly to modify the stipulation as to co-operation. There are even stronger arguments behind in the impossibility, as a practical matter of business, of maintaining the status quo. The provincial authorities, whether official or non-official, are nearly, if not altogether, unanimous in their desire to make an end of dyarchy. The Central Government is like a gallant steed with its forefeet hobbled. The whole machine is full of friction and displacements, and it is only just kept going at the moment by ordinances and by the lull of anticipation. Some radical
change has to come before the art of government can reassert itself.

One other and still weightier consideration claims attention. By far the strongest, the most consistent, and the best organized of the parties in India has refused to come into the scales and be weighed against our standards of capacity to govern. Few of us can have much sympathy with the Congress party or its methods; but what is to be done with them? Permanent suppression is not beyond our power, but there is the gravest risk that it would drive the trouble underground and intensify a type of anarchy with which in the past we have been only too familiar and which we find it increasingly difficult to cope with. My own conviction—though I know how hotly this view is contested—my own unalterable conviction is that the Congress and its fantasies are merely a façade behind which a more subtle and enduring power is operating, which is in its very essence hostile to the whole theory of our democratic reforms. If that hostility is to be stemmed, if the most efficient political force at present existing in India is to be weaned from permanent obstruction, the status quo offers no solution. On the contrary two conclusions seem inevitable: first, that no constitution is going to work unless the advanced nationalists can be brought in to pull their weight with it and not against it; second, that there is no chance of securing this unless they can in some way have responsibility forced upon them, for only thus will the sword which they are always sharpening for us be turned against themselves.

These, to my mind, are the converging reasons why we cannot go back, why, on the contrary, we must unhesitatingly go forward. One can imagine an Indian proconsul of the old school boggling at them. His view, based on his own experience, would be that you have only to keep a stiff upper lip, put the leading malcontents under constraint, demonstrate that you can govern and mean to govern, and you would soon find the mass of the people gratefully rallying round you and disowning the troublesome agitators. He is quite honest in his belief that this course would be the kindest to the people as a whole; and that, as it has been followed before, so it can be followed again. One can
only turn for an answer to the proconsuls of today: they are unanimous that such heroic handling of the situation is impossible under present conditions, and that the government which tried it would share the fate of Mrs. Partington and her broom. I think we must take this as final.

THE MEASURE OF ADVANCE

Now comes our second question. Assuming an advance to be necessary and inevitable, what is it to be? How are we going to measure the proper degree of change? There are many of us, I am sure, who would fervently rejoice if it were possible to end our anxieties and our responsibilities at once, to imitate the generous confidence of Mr. Campbell-Bannerman when he put an end to representative government in the Transvaal; in short, to take India at her word and give her the Dominion status which has been so loudly demanded. That stark British selfishness is the only reason why we do not indulge in this fine, careless rapture is a commonplace with the extremists, and there are people in this country who seem to derive some pleasure from repeating it. It would be waste of time to discuss a pure parrotcry, just as it would be sheer treachery to India to leave her to her own devices, at least until we have an unequivocal mandate from India herself in that sense. So for the moment, with your permission, I put aside the doctrine of abdication, the lament of a lost dominion.

The answer to the question which I put just now seems implicit in the considerations which we have been arguing in favour of an advance. What is now imperatively wanted is that an adequate measure of direct responsibility be transferred to the Indian leaders. It must be a clear-cut, easily-defined responsibility, not open to confusion and mutual recrimination like the hybrid which dyarchy was sometimes allowed to become. It must be complete in its sphere, so that any failure or any error or any success will be ascribed solely to the responsible administrator. It must be sufficiently wide to enable the outer world to see at a glance how it is operating. In other words, if dyarchy is to be set aside it must be set aside completely. For these reasons I think that
we can start with nothing short of what the Simon Commission advised—namely, the transfer of complete responsibility in the provincial sphere.

In this country it is not always understood how vast a field will thus be opened for Indian talent. Some writers speak of it as if we were proposing the transfer of County Councils, in ignorance of the fact that the province may be as great in area as Italy, as full of people as the British Isles, and that it embraces the whole range of public business which touches the happiness of the people and the well-being of the State, save only those departments—defence, railways, and Customs—to which geographical limits cannot be put. It provides ample scope for the best brains in Indian public life for another couple of generations.

**Transfer of Law and Order**

Particularly is this true if the transfer extends to the control of the magistracy and the police. This question of law and order is, to my mind, the crux of the situation, and chiefly with reference to it have I ventured to describe my paper as a middle view. Those who regard the transfer of the police to a minister’s control as a dangerous experiment deserve more consideration than it pleases certain sections of what I may call the White Paper party to accord to “old colonels and retired civilians.” Many of them have more knowledge of the facts than our arm-chair reformers. To not a few of them there recur vivid memories of blood-stained lanes in some northern city, of hospitals packed with wounded and dying, of nameless atrocities committed in the sacred name of rival creeds, and of the pathetic entreaties for a British officer to quell the trouble and to do justice. There is no washy sentiment about all this. There is equally no intention to affront the Indian reformer. There is only the conviction that at times of emergency, and especially in communal strife, the fear of want of support in the mind of the junior Indian official, and the social pressure upon those above him, will weaken the hands of those on whom will fall the grave duty of dealing promptly and firmly, whenever and wherever it breaks out, with the chief evil in India’s civic life.
On the other hand, have those who pooh-pooh the dangers of the proposal been quite honest with themselves or with us? The bitter hostility that has been manifested to the idea of confining the coming advance to provincial autonomy seems to me to rest mainly upon two fears. To one of them I shall return later; the other is undoubtedly the fear that if Parliament is cajoled into stopping at provincial autonomy for the present it may hesitate to include the police in the transfer. "Shout loudly enough," seem to be the tactics, "that provincial autonomy is inadequate and there will be less risk of our losing part of it." Quite conceivably this apprehension has been sharpened by the halting line of argument—you will remember how it stumbles—by which the Simon Commission supported their recommendation for the transfer of law and order.

**THE CHOICE**

When we disentangle ourselves from the secondary issues which surround this vital question I feel that we have to face the choice between a grave present danger on the one hand and on the other a measure of transferred responsibility which will fail of all the purposes for which we are granting it. I feel that to hand over the government of a province to ministers without at the same time giving them the means of making government effective is to lay up a certain cause of future trouble. Suppose that, in one of their departments, ministers decide on a policy which occasionally requires the support of the police; and suppose that the independent authority controlling the police considers this particular policy so utterly wrong that he refuses to allow the police to enforce it; how can the administration in such circumstances hold together? Or suppose that the authority controlling the police does, in spite of his own views, use his force to carry out a policy which turns out to be wrong and oppressive, popular feeling—and, mind you, popular opinion is all-important in a system of responsible government—will fasten on the police as the wrong-doers and not on the minister who is rightfully accountable.

No, I see all the dangers, and I foresee errors and suffering; but I am convinced that the quickest way and the only sure way
of checking error and curtailing suffering is to give ministers control of, and the unmistakable responsibility for, the agency of force which, however unseen and however unused, must lie behind the departmental policies with which you are entrusting them. In actual fact (speaking for Northern India), I am often inclined to think that in the administration of land revenue and irrigation in particular there are quite as many opportunities for causing distress and injustice, although it may be with the best intentions in the world, as there are in the employment of the police. My view, therefore, is that on all grounds, and in spite of the grave risks involved, law and order must go to ministers along with the rest of the provincial administration.

THE CENTRE AND THE PROVINCES

A minute ago I referred to another hidden fear as swaying the minds of those who angrily oppose our stopping short for the moment at provincial autonomy. What I had in mind was the apprehension, the very justifiable apprehension, that the Central Government, in its general powers of supervision, will neutralize some of the independence which we mean to assign to the provinces. One besetting sin of our British bureaucracy has always been its flirtation with uniformity. Never in the whole story of our administration, except, perhaps, in the unfortunate instance of the Permanent Settlement of Bengal, have we allowed individual provinces to develop their own lives in their own way. The whole structure of our system, it is true, was incompatible with enterprise of that type; and the result was that the Central Government acquired a habit of intervention which, if challenged, was always defensible on the ground of the ultimate responsibility of the Governor-General for the acts of all his subordinates. The new Constitution will turn over a completely new page; and if there is one lesson which has to be burned in upon the Central Government of the future, whatever that government may be, it is that it must keep its hands off the autonomous provinces.

Suppose that in one province, pervaded by a particular theory of Hindu life, the Legislature were to enact that every Hindu
must be married, if at all, before reaching the age of twelve. Suppose that, at the same time, in an adjacent province with a different view of its social duties, the Legislature were to enact that no Hindu marriage may take place until both the parties are of the age of fifteen. Can you imagine Simla accepting such a situation? Unless there is a change of heart (to use the jargon of the day) Simla will still endeavour to interfere; but my suggestion is that the change of heart must come, and that the Central Government must be most definitely deterred from intervening, unless there is the clearest case for the enforcement of a safeguard, with the spontaneous development of the different provinces. Should this duty be made perfectly clear, and should law and order be definitely assigned to ministers, I venture to hope that some of the opposition to resting at the moment on provincial autonomy would disappear. To express such a hope, however, let me say at once, is not the same thing as advocating that our coming stage of advance should stop at provincial independence. It is rather a hope, and an appeal to the good sense of Indian leadership, that provincial autonomy should be accepted and honourably worked during the interval that must elapse before a Federal Government gets into commission at the Centre. There is no shutting one's eyes to the fact that this interval must be considerable.

**Federation**

About federation itself as an ideal there is no particular novelty. I remember it being discussed one evening in November, 1917, at a banquet which the Princes gave in Delhi to celebrate the admission of India into the War Cabinet of the previous spring. Even if it sounds egotistical, might I quote from a newspaper report a speech which I made that evening, because it preserves the impression left upon those of us who had been discussing the general outlook with representatives of the self-governing Dominions a few months before. From the general outlook of the Empire we had come to talk about the part to be played by India and the necessity for a closer union between British India and the States. We had been anticipating that the growth
of international obligations would facilitate that union, and from that point I went on to say this:

"When union comes India will be an empire within an empire. Its three hundred millions will probably be the citizens of a federation of States based upon race or language or historic tradition, some ruled over by Princes bearing Your Highnesses' names, others by the chosen of the people themselves, but all cemented by a common love for India and a common devotion to the British Crown."

Nobody thought of this ideal as immediate. That evening in November, 1917, we were talking about it as if none of us at the table would live to see it. Sir John Simon and his colleagues took much the same view. Lord Irwin and his colleagues, in their dispatch on the subject, were almost equally cautious. It is only in the last three years that we have suddenly been asked to think of federation as a thing that might grow up in the night and face us as a fait accompli any morning. There has been almost a conspiracy of silence regarding its difficulties; yet no one who has really studied them can fail to appreciate their magnitude.

"The course of history during the last one hundred and fifty years," write the Davidson Committee, "has brought into existence an intricate network of relationships between the States and British India, the unravelling and readjustment of which must be accomplished before any advance can be made." As that Committee made manifest, the financial complexity alone is appalling. It is fully matched by the political artistry involved in inducing the Princes to forgo, in varying degrees, their cherished sovereignty, and then in defining how far the British provinces will go in accepting dictation from a federal power in which the Princes participate, or, looked at from the reverse of the shield, how far the Princes will agree to accept dictation from a federal power in which the democratic provinces are partners.

It is far from the wish of any of us to magnify these difficulties. Indeed, it will only be when they are removed that India will be able to have a Central Government suitable to her national dignity. For obviously there is no Central Governmental structure except a federation which is possible in a self-governing India. And when the structure is ready our position must be
profoundly modified. Or to put it differently, unless our control is modified we cannot have federation, for it is impossible to expect the Princes to surrender sovereign powers both to us and to the federal authority. Whether we liked it or not, therefore, I think we must agree with the logic of Lord Reading's reasoning when he turned the scales at the Round-Table Conference by his pronouncement that federation *ipso facto* entails the grant of responsibility to the central authority. Some such sort of transfer of power to the Central Government as the White Paper contemplates would thus appear to be inevitable, and there is no reason why we should not indicate it in the new Constitution as the next stage. There is, indeed, every reason why we should push on the preparations for it with all practicable speed.

**The Federal Structure**

What needs emphasizing, however, is that with the best will in the world the federal structure will rise but slowly. Incidentally it seems highly questionable, on purely practical grounds, whether the structure should be counted as fit for tenancy until a considerably larger ratio than one-half of the States are ready to occupy it. Be that as it may, each prospective occupant has to have a pretty elaborate tenancy agreement negotiated with him, and it is only when he sees this in draft that he will realize what he is undertaking and what he is sacrificing. It calls for neither cynicism nor hostility to the ideal to convince the ordinary man familiar with Indian methods and suspicions that these preliminaries will be a lengthy process. If that is true, then two considerations emerge: first, that while the preparations are running their course some interregnal power will have to occupy the Central Government; and, second, that on this vital question the White Paper is virtually dumb. In a short concluding paragraph it mentions the possibility of "transitory provisions," which would leave the executive of the Central Government "in substantially the same position as that occupied by the Governor-General in Council under the existing Act." Any more lugubrious prospect it would be difficult to imagine; and surely one of the most urgent tasks of the Joint Committee will be to devise
a form of Central Government which can maintain our standards of good administration until provincial autonomy is safely launched on the one hand and a sure foundation laid for federation on the other. The present form of Central Government would be powerless to do either.

**Safeguards**

Time will not admit of much discussion on what many regard as the most critical feature in the White Paper, the so-called safeguards. In regard to these, it is extremely difficult to take a middle view. On the face of them they are sensible, normal precautions which a country, seasoned in the risks and vicissitudes of democratic government, might reasonably ask a country to accept which is, for the first time and with very little experience, plunging into those risks. If they are accepted as a normal part of the Constitution, applied only when necessary and with ordinary common sense, and recognized as part of the routine of government, then their value, both educative and prophylactic, would be incalculable. If, on the other hand, the cry goes up that safeguards are an insult to Indian statesmanship and a vicious refusal to implement our promises, and if the cry is followed by a determined policy (as the Congress party announce that it will be) of making safeguards unworkable, then neither the safeguards in the White Paper nor anything else that human wit can devise in their place will be worth the paper they are printed on.

The Governor-General, with the Army at his back and some nucleus of skilled advice at his elbow, might be able to get his intervention respected for a time. But look at the position of a Governor of a province. He will not always, if we may judge by some appointments that have been made, be of the strongest and most intelligent type which England can spare. He will very often have no experience whatever of Indian conditions. He will be very isolated in any disagreement with his ministers. The prospect of his being able to detect the origins of such a disagreement, when they first occur, is remote; the prospect of his being able to enforce his view, when the disagreement comes to a head, is uncertain. Rarely, if ever, will he be in the for-
tunate position of being able to take his stand heroically on some broad principle regarding which the world at large must be with him. It will be the slow, insidious undermining of a principle which will be his danger, for he may not have his eyes opened to it until a situation has been reached where he can quite easily be made to appear in the wrong if he tries to assert himself. Even, however, if he is lucky enough to be able to choose his own ground for the disagreement, things may be made very difficult for him. Ministers may resign; the Legislature may refuse to function; agitation may rage; Government House be boycotted, and so on. A dissolution and a General Election may do him more harm than good, for he cannot go into the constituencies single-handed and defend his action against the attacks upon it with which they will be saturated. Those of us who have some experience of how a conflict of this type develops will agree that one of the most anxious tasks before the Joint Committee is how safeguards are wisely to be made efficacious. Unless this is secured I fear that they will gravely disappoint those who pin their faith upon them as a serious element in the Constitution.

There are other features in the White Paper about which a middle view is permissible. Finance, unhappily, is not one of them; because, struggle the exchequer as it may, I see no possibility of its being equal to these costly changes and at the same time to the programmes of social reform which will be expected of the new régime. Nor is it easy to take a middle view about the methods of election, or of the impracticable idealism of the franchise proposals. All these, however, are problems which the new administrators must tackle for themselves, and they provide not the least of the good reasons for giving the necessary powers without delay. When these powers are complete is it too much to hope that the chief problem connected with the White Paper will solve itself—the problem of the relation between Britain and India? India complains that she has had to suffer in the past from British ill-manners, insularity, arrogance. There is truth in the complaint, though these are not the only gifts that Britain has brought to India. But there is another side to the shield. We have had to complain of India's suspicion and con-
tinuous charges of bad faith. If she would allow herself to believe, as we believe and know, that the promises of 1917 were promises which will be redeemed to the letter, and that when we put the brake on sentiment and enthusiasm we have good and perfectly unselfish reasons for doing so; if she would believe this, then the new Constitution might make a happy start.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, July 4, 1933, when a paper was read by the Right Hon. Lord Meston, K.C.S.I., on "The White Paper: A Middle View." The Right Hon. Viscount Goschen, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., C.B.E., was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

The Right Hon. Lord Lamington, G.C.M.G., G.C.S.I., Sir John Kerr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir William Ovens Clark, Sir James MacKenna, C.I.E., Sir Prabhushankar Pattani, K.C.I.E., Colonel Nawab Sir Umar Hayat Khan, K.C.I.E., C.B.E., M.V.O., Sir Hassan Suhrawardy, O.B.E., I.L.D., M.D., F.R.C.S., D.P.H., Sir Montagu Webb, C.I.E., C.B.E., Sir Henry Wheeler, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir Ernest Hotson, K.C.S.I., O.B.E., Sir James Donald, C.S.I., C.I.E., Sir Ness Wadia, C.B.E., Sir Henry Sharp, C.S.I., C.I.E., Sir Robert Gillan, K.C.S.I., Sir Alfred Watson, Sir Hugh McPherson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Henry Lawrence, K.C.S.I., Sir T. Vijayaraghavacharya, K.B.E., the Chief Seheb of Phaltan, the Thakore of Amod, Lady Scott Moncrieff, Lady Bennett, Lady Abbas Ali Baig, Lady Cunynghame, Mr. F. G. Pratt, C.S.I., Mr. H. M. R. Hopkins, C.S.I., Dr. M. B. Cameron, C.I.E., and Mrs. Cameron, Mr. J. R. Martin, C.I.E., Sardar M. V. Kibe, Swami B. H. Bon, Mr. Y. G. Thombare, Mr. M. K. Acharya, Miss Cornelia Sorabji, K.C.I.E., Mr. R. K. Ranadive, Mr. A. Sabonadiere, Miss Price, Mr. G. H. Ormerod, Mr. R. H. Hood, K.C.I.E., Mr. H. R. H. Wilkinson, Mr. T. A. H. Way, Mr. J. Sladen, Mr. J. B. Hall, Pandit Shyam Shankar, Mr. J. M. K. Mackenzie, Mr. John Ross, I.S.O., and Mrs. Ross, Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Colonel W. G. Hamilton, Justice and Mrs. Mirza A. A. Khan, Mr. K. C. Roy Chowdhury, Rev. E. S. Carr, Mr. L. C. Lai, Mr. L. M. Deshpande, Pandit Nanak Chand, Mr. Kenneth C. Keymer, Miss E. L. Curteis, Mr. C. T. Stack, Mr. W. S. Lane, Mr. A. Chavan, Mr. M. G. Moodaliar, Mr. and Mrs. W. F. Westbrook, Mr. B. K. Sinha, Mrs. Roberts, Mr. H. K. Sadler, Miss C. K. Cumming, Miss E. Coleman, Mr. Hartog, Mr. O. W. Watkins, Major G. W. Gilbertson, Mr. R. C. Gupta, Mr. O. C. G. Hayter, Miss L. Sorabji, Mr. S. A. Ghafar, Mr. E. M. Richards, Miss Gray, Captain W. D. Woollwarth, M.C., Mr. Paul Stewart, Mr. Jehangiani, Mr. and Mrs. N. B. Bonarjee, Miss V. H. Jones, Mr. Philip Cooper, Miss L. A. Cox, Mr. T. Cooke, Mr. C. R. Corbett, Miss Hansson, Mrs. B. Dobson, Miss D. H. Watts, Mrs. Bery, Mr. A. G. R. Hickes, Miss U. M. Peck, Dr. and Mrs. Shahani, Professor J. E. G. de Montmorency, Mr. A. G. Pawar, Mr. R. Henniker-Heaton, and Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN said: The signal services which Lord Meston has rendered in various capacities to India will, I am sure, enhance for us the interest of his address. Those services are so well known to a gathering like I see here today that I am sure Lord Meston will need no further introduction.

(The Paper was then read.)

The CHAIRMAN: We have listened to a most able and clear statement of his views by Lord Meston, and one which I am sure has held our attention.
I think you will agree with me that the address shows the careful consideration which Lord Meston must have given to the details of the White Paper before arriving at the conclusions which he has submitted to us today. I am very glad that in that address Lord Meston laid stress upon one or two matters of principle, which I think we are sometimes apt to overlook in discussions on the White Paper.

He began by referring to the great change which has taken place in India since the war. About this, of course, I realize that there may be considerable differences of opinion. It must be difficult for those who lived in and served India before the war to realize how greatly and how rapidly India and Indian views have changed since then. Those of us who have been out in India since the war, as Lord Meston says, only for a short time, and even those perhaps who did not know a pre-war India, can bear testimony to this change. For myself I am convinced that the spirit of Nationalism is, in Lord Meston's own words, "spreading and becoming a reality," and must be reckoned with. We must accept that as a starting-point in considering future reforms. Lord Meston went on to speak of the prolonged controversy which has taken place, and which is now "raging over the White Paper." On this I would only plead that a calm and sober examination of the work of the Parliamentary Joint Committee in the country at large may not be hampered or interfered with by allowing this great problem to enter into the arena of any party politics. (Applause.) That would be a disaster for India and this country alike.

As regards the case for advance, it is not possible for me in the few minutes I will allow myself to deal with this at length. But those of us who went out to India after the Reforms and were called upon to take any part in the Government of India soon recognized that the existing form of Government could only be—as indeed it was intended to be—transitional, and that it was failing in its object of teaching responsibility, and indeed rather encouraging irresponsibility, even in the places where it was working well. We in Madras as far back as 1924 advocated full provincial autonomy, including the transfer of law and order—i.e., the control of the police.

We felt that to transfer the other subjects in order to teach responsibility, and yet to withhold that one which is the means of making government effective, would not achieve the object we had in view. Personally, I believe there is another reason for handing over the police, and that is this. The police are the guardians of law and order in the provinces. They are the protectors of all classes. But if you are to transfer all the other portfolios, but to retain this, I believe that they would not be regarded as they should be, as a public body, but they would be regarded as guardians of British interests, which would impair their utility and place both the officers and men often in an invidious position. ((Applause.))

In Madras, as I dare say many of you know, since the Reforms were introduced in 1921, the portfolio of law and order has been in the hands of an Indian member of the Executive Council. I admit that he was a member of Council and not a Minister, and that there is a difference between them, but many of the arguments against the transfer which might apply to one might also apply to the other. I would like here to bear testimony to the
efficiency and loyalty with which the administration of the police during those years has been carried out. (Applause.)

I agree with Lord Meston in the expression of his hopes that when full autonomy is given to the provinces, it will be so in deed and in fact, and that the provinces will be allowed to develop their own future on their own lines, except, of course, in such cases where there is a clear case for the application of safeguards. I believe that under such a system the provinces would not only increase in importance, but would greatly develop their own sense of responsibility.

I mentioned the word "safeguard," and, like Lord Meston, I recognize that this is one of the most important questions in connection with the White Paper. But I think we must remember that safeguards have been a part of the Constitution, that they have been used by Viceroyos and by Governors—I have used one of them myself—and that they have been recognized by the people. Still, this is one of those questions before the Joint Committee which we are most anxious should be given a full consideration. I hope and believe that they can be made really effective.

I am sure we were all very interested in hearing the words which Lord Meston used of Federation in 1917 and of their prophecy for the future. (Applause.) No one, even in the last few years, could have foreseen the swiftness with which this question has come before us for discussion and settlement. I must not delay you this afternoon by speaking about Federation, beyond saying that I agree with much that Lord Meston has said. The vital question, of course, is finance, and I have not sufficient knowledge of the figures to speak about this. But I am sure we all await their publication with very considerable anxiety.

May I just say, in conclusion, this. It is sometimes said by way of criticism of those of us who have been India for a short time and have advocated considerable advances in the Constitution that we are visionaries. If by visionaries is meant men who allow their imagination to run away with them and who live in the clouds, I would reply that no one taking a part in the Government of India, large or small, and daily called upon to face the problems of administration and deal with the facts of everyday life could long remain a visionary; the materialism of life would be too much for him. (Applause.) But if by visionaries are meant those who have had some vision of a future Constitution, and have refused by conviction to adopt a negative policy and to stand still where they are, but who prefer to face the future rather than the past, then I have no objection to the word.

To the principles of the White Paper, I believe at the present moment there is no alternative, except, of course, such amendments as may be introduced by the Joint Parliamentary Committee. I believe that, in view of the spirit of India, such principles will be adopted as inevitable. And I believe that to delay now would be to alienate the sympathy and help of those Indians who have steadily supported us, would be to witness the deterioration of public life during the interval, and would be to hand over a machinery, when the time comes, whose efficiency will have run down during the time of waiting. (Applause.)
Sir Prabhashankar Pattani: I have to make one or two conditions before I speak, and the most important condition is a request to Mr. Brown, the Hon. Secretary, who has made this Association a great success, as we all know, to observe that while I am prepared to say a few words here, I hope he will relieve me from the necessity of having to correct what I say. The second condition is that, being a member of the Indian delegation which is considering this great issue in association with the Parliamentary Joint Committee, I cannot disclose anything about our proceedings. Therefore any views that I may have to express today will be personal. They will also be in the mutual interest of the two countries, in the good association of which I have all my life believed, and in which I still believe.

I have been an official all my life. I have not been used to platform speaking. Therefore as an old man, tuned in office and used to files, I will not go much further than my experiences. And those who may feel that in spite of official experience this old man has been influenced by forces that are operating in India will also, I hope, excuse me when I say that man, while he lives, grows daily by new experiences that he gathers. Lord Meston I have had the privilege of knowing for several years, and what I have always valued is this: that wherever we have met we have spoken frankly and I have never had the fear of being misunderstood. When I read today's able paper I felt that it was only meant to grant provincial autonomy and nothing further; but his lordship has made it quite clear that the lecturer believes in the eventual Federation of India. That being the only right solution, there is going to be a continued friendship between the East and the West. I should have said continued friendship between India and England, but I have purposely said between East and West, because I know that a satisfied India is a satisfied East.

The Joint Parliamentary Committee is now sitting on this great question. The members of the Committee are all of them experienced men on such questions. There are ex-Viceroy's, ex-Governors, administrators of the present and the past, people who have worked on committees to enquire into Indian questions. Whatever decision they come to as a result of the conferences, examinations and cross-examinations that are being held, it will be acceptable to Parliament and, I fondly hope, to India also.

It is not possible to get everything at once, but whatever is given should be used; and we should not start a tug-of-war the next day. This is what happened in Bengal in 1919 and onwards. It happened because of one or two drawbacks in the scheme; because of that the whole thing failed. Mr. Montagu was a great statesman. He saw that by transferring a number of departments today, if the Indian Ministers worked their departments well and to the satisfaction of the transferers, then gradually and automatically under that very scheme other departments would be transferred, and eventually there would be no department in the province which would remain untransferred. So, gradually, the provinces would have complete autonomy.

That was a great scheme, but it failed. I will tell you why it failed: they were reasons I placed before Mr. Montagu unofficially at the time. These are two points which are still being insisted upon in the new scheme, and they
are (1) re-entry in the event of a breakdown, and (2) the protection of the Services.

Now, right of re-entry if a thing fails is an inducement to bring about a breakdown, and it has happened like that, as in a quiet way Lord Meston in his great speech said it might. Dyarchy has failed, probably because the Ministers would not work it, and perhaps because some of the administrators would not let them work it. He is right. He has said it after ten or fifteen years' absence. I have been in that country until yesterday, and I know because I have the advantage of meeting Governors, Viceroy's, Members of Council, and they have not kept it a secret from me. They were talking to me, and I to them, quite frankly: "Oh, this may not succeed, and when it breaks down we shall re-enter. We shall go in again." I always used to say, "Never believe that democracy fails. The system may fail, but democracy will go along forward and forward; and therefore those who believe that a breakdown will give us a chance are making a great mistake." I am afraid that any constitution, setting forth that in the event of a breakdown we shall re-enter, is always in danger. There is the danger that the two sides will always remain separate—the one trying to make a breakdown, the other avoiding it.

India should not break promises made to servants whom the administrators brought in for their own interests. In this way both efficiency and discipline may be affected. A great feature of the British Empire is efficiency of the Services, but greater than that is the idea of obedience to the superior, whoever he is, without distinction of class, or creed, or race. The first condition of the new Reforms is that India should remain within the Empire. The other safeguards required are protection from outside aggression, the efficiency of the police, and the upholding of law and order. I hope I have not said anything that is not in the interests of both our countries. (Applause.)

Mr. M. K. Acharya, after making an invocation in Sanskrit, said: Allow me to thank you all on behalf of 270,000,000 of His Majesty's subjects in India for the great interest your Association takes in their affairs. You do so at a time when not a few hard problems of your own—financial, economic, commercial, industrial—are weighing heavily upon your minds. That your statesmen are now giving so much time and attention to India is ample proof of their goodwill and of their earnest desire to do the best they can for India. I offer to them my most grateful thanks; but may I in all humility venture to add that good intentions alone will not suffice. Knowledge, deep knowledge, deeper than what evidently has been available to the promoters of the White Paper, is necessary, especially in dealing with a huge country like India, which teems with countless diversities—physical, climatic, racial, communal, social, economic, religious, and linguistic.

If any of you go to India and take to India any pet theories of your own, you will easily find evidence to support those theories. You may, for instance, say that India is a land of colossal ignorance and superstition. But if you will probe deep you will marvel how the most illiterate peasant in India grasps almost intuitively the supreme truth of the God in man
and God in all that perhaps most learned doctors of divinity in other lands cannot comprehend. Or, again, you may say that nowhere else in the world are women such hopeless victims of men’s tyranny as in India. But here, too, if you probe deep, you will find that whereas in other lands perhaps women are only respected, in India they are worshipped—worshipped verily as incarnations of divinity; that nowhere in the world is the sanctity of motherhood honoured more.

Likewise, while some of you may be shocked at the condition of the Depressed Classes, and believe that it is due to the agelong tyranny of the higher castes, as evidently some so-called “friends of India” here seem to believe, more faithful investigators will marvel how it is that in the holiest shrines of the caste Hindus are kept and worshipped the images of saints, some of whom were born among the lowliest of Untouchables, a fact that even Mr. Gandhi does not seem to understand.

Yes, India is a land of baffling diversities, which even those who, like your lordship or like the learned lecturer of this afternoon, have spent many years among her peoples may find hard to explain. For through the ages India has stood, and divinely until the end of time India will stand, for the supreme law of unity in and through diversity.

India and England together must explore and discover the key to true Swaraj. It is going to be the privilege of Indo-Britannia to discover the key. And self-government for India, whether through the very imperfect White Paper scheme or any better scheme, is after all only a preliminary step towards this joint mission of Indo-Britannia. Again I thank you all for the great interest you are evincing in the problems of my country. God bless you all for it.

Sir Hassan Sahrahwady: I do not belong to the profession who are adept in the art of speaking, a lawyer, but I take the liberty of speaking this afternoon, impromptu, and I hope you will kindly forgive me my defects and omissions.

I have been in charge of young men in the biggest University numerically in the British Empire. I found there that Hindus and Muslims having drunk out of the same fountain of knowledge (the young Hindus and the young Muslim boys) are growing up in friendship and harmony, and the future units of the nation of India are inspired by the spirit of Nationalism, which is growing, as Lord Goschen said.

It is not very true that the Hindu communities are the only ones crying for reforms. The Muslims also want reforms. They are as sincere and as strong in their demand for going forward as any other educated class or unit in India, large or small. They feel that India should be given some sort of a standing which will take away the great stigma of subordination, which they feel acutely when they come into European countries or come in contact with other people, maybe the Irish. That is a growing feeling and demand from all classes of people in India.

As regards the White Paper it is there. It has been read by the people of India of all classes for whatever it is worth, good, bad, or indifferent. They know that certain things were promised to us. If you do not give
them you will create disappointment, and strengthen the hands of those very people in India who are our worst enemies, the enemies of law and order, without which no country has progressed or can progress. If we want goodwill in India, if we want happy trade relations between the British countries to be re-established, goodwill must be restored and as quickly as possible without party politics coming in between.

As your lordship pointed out, there are normal and sensible safeguards. Those safeguards may never come into operation at all. There is the Indian Penal Code against robbers and murderers and thieves. It does not come into operation except on those people who commit those offences. The Indians will work the Reforms so well that it will not be necessary to bring in the safeguards; but those who say there must be safeguards should realize that they are effective safeguards, which to my mind—I may be very wrong—will make responsibility at the centre come in in ten or fifteen years. There is your Reserve Bank. That must come into being and function, and the trade relations must be so established that our financial stability should be restored. Those two safeguards will take fifteen years or more. Let good trade relations be established, and let your people have their careers in India. If the Indian people have a bad feeling against British products and British relationship, that is really a definite menace that ought not to be trifled with.

As regards the transference of law and order, it was very refreshing to hear what Lord Meston said. Why should they not be transferred? If you do not trust people, the feeling of injustice and grievance will remain. But there is another gain. You transfer law and order to an Indian Minister. If he is so foolish as not to consult his other colleagues, if he does not work with his Governor, he and the party that he represents would be the people who would get all the attacks and all the odium and not the British Government or the British member of the Executive Council in charge of law and order. That is an advantage to be taken into account. The British people know that it is by working a thing that we learn. Trust us. Give us law and order and see what we can do.

I thank Lord Meston very much and support his scheme. We in Bengal felt we had a grievance against him in respect to the Meston Financial Settlement, but I am very glad that his award was so just and so fair that it will be remembered as a popular measure.

Mr. Thombre : The question of the future Constitution of India involves the destinies of nearly one-fifth of the entire humanity of the world, and deeply concerns the mighty British Empire. Lord Meston, who, if I may say so, was a most distinguished ornament of the Indian Civil Service, has treated his subject with a dignity worthy of the exalted rank he holds, and of the great duties he performed in India.

Coming from an Indian State, I find myself interested in that part of his lordship's paper in which he deals with Federation, and I will confine to it the few remarks that suggest themselves to me on the topic. His lordship recognizes that Federation with responsibility at the centre is inevitable, but he would have it indicated in the new constitution as the next stage,
although he would have preparations pushed on for it with all practicable speed. If this means that the reforms are to be introduced apart from Federation and responsibility at the centre, the prospect, I fear, is gloomy.

It is hardly necessary to dwell on the genesis and necessity for Federation. I will only refer to the facts which have been often pointed out, that the States are closely identified with numerous branches of All-India activities; that All-India services of public utility function in the territory of the States as well as in British India; that much India taxation is of All-India incidence; and that, nevertheless, decisions affecting India as a whole have been reached by the Government of India without the views of the States being taken into account, and often without even reference to them, notwithstanding the fact that they are vitally affected by them.

The problem is to ascertain and give weight to the views and to co-ordinate the interests of the different political units of India. For this no better means has been suggested than the All-India Federation. There are at present three partners in the Government of India—namely, Great Britain, British India, and the Indian States. As has been so well put, the old articles of association between them have become out of date. The federal bond has been, by common consent, acknowledged to be the most satisfactory one by which to replace the existing form of union, and it would be a great misfortune if the scheme of Federation could not be started without delay on its great career.

On one point a large number of States will be glad to have the support of the high authority of the lecturer. The criterion for inauguration of Federation of States with half the total States' population and half their representation in the Upper Federal Chamber is an inadequate one. The White Paper lays down, as you are aware, that Federation may be brought into operation if this proportion of States should signify their willingness to come into it. I find on scrutiny that this criterion would enable only twenty-eight or twenty-nine States to commit Indian India to Federation, irrespective of the wishes of the remaining hundreds of States. Many States will therefore be glad to find that Lord Meston holds it highly questionable that the Federal structure should be counted as fit for tenancy until a considerably larger number of States are ready to occupy it.

A second point touched on by the lecturer is the length of time that may be required in negotiating the treaties of accession. In my humble opinion, Lord Meston has taken an unduly pessimistic view in this respect. The negotiations should certainly not be hurriedly completed. But even two or three years is a small period in the evolution of great constitutional changes such as those contemplated for a Federated India. In fact, it has been made clear on behalf of the Chamber of Princes that when all the necessary material is laid before the Princes it should not take them more than a year or so to come to a final decision as to whether or not they will join the Federation.

I think that the "lugubrious prospect" referred to in connection with the transitory provisions again involves an unduly pessimistic attitude. On the side of the States I feel sure that full provision will be made to ensure that their views and interests are not lost sight of during the period of transition.
In my view, it is one of the points which the Joint Select Committee must attend to.

In conclusion, I have merely to say that it is of vast moment not only that a step forward should be taken, but that it should be a quick and adequate step. Goodwill and harmony are the prime necessity, and their restoration will contribute as nothing else to the well-being and contentment of India.

Lord Lamington: I wish on your behalf to express the thanks of the Association to Lord Meston for his very carefully prepared and studied pronouncement on the question of Indian Reforms. He kept the middle way successfully, though he edged, naturally enough, to the endorsement of the White Paper.

In his address he referred to the Simon Commission's Report being dropped, and he said: "The Government of the day, however, for reasons which I am not here to examine, virtually shelved the Report." Well, I think that was a very discreet remark. It was very obvious that it was dictated by party considerations in the House of Commons.

I do feel that in the future, whatever Constitution may be set up, the less the House of Commons has to deal with the affairs of India, the better. It would be better to set up some other form of authority in this country which would deal directly with Indian Government and the Crown. It seems to me absolutely essential that there should not be this possible interference with the great Indian question by a body which may be elected on quite a different issue from anything to do with India.

As regards the other point of the possibility of a Viceroy in the future who may go out of this country ignorant of Indian life and character, I do not believe in the future it will be possible to appoint anyone from this country unless they have had previous experience in India. They must understand the people and be able to rely on their own judgment. Otherwise a man goes out to India absolutely at sea. Tremendous questions are put before him, administration most complex, and he will have to rely upon his Executive Council. But how would he know the personnel of the Executive Council sufficiently to rely upon the opinion of any one particular member or of them all together?

I only want to make those two points, and to express again our thanks to Lord Meston for having taken the trouble to prepare this paper. Also I should like to thank Viscount Goschen for having come here and presided, and for having told us about his experience of the working of dyarchy in Madras.

The President put the vote of thanks to the meeting, which was carried by acclamation.

Lord Meston: The evening is far spent, and I am afraid that we must come to a conclusion. In a sense the discussion has been a little disappointing. Coming before you, as I did, as a very obvious mugwamp, I expected to receive the treatment which those undesirable animals generally are accorded, and I certainly anticipated that the extremists on both sides would
unite in rending anyone who attempted to pursue a middle course. So that in that sense anticipations have been disappointed.

Nevertheless, I would express my gratitude to you, Lord Lamington, and to the speakers as a whole for the kindness they have shown to the attempt I made to put before them a moderate and considered view of the marvelously difficult problems which now confront our nation. Particularly I am indebted to you, my lord Chairman, for your endorsement of much which I attempted to prove, and to that veteran administrator Lord Lamington for his very generous remarks.

We had a very interesting speech from my old friend Sir Prabhaskar Pattani. He and I have faced considerable perils together in the past, and he himself, I am sure, is ready to face still more in the future. But it is always a solace to hear from one with his wide experience and sound judgment such an expression of confidence in the wisdom of the general lines upon which we are proceeding.

Then we are indebted to the Pandit Acharya for his Vedic benediction, and, I hope, although I did not quite follow some parts of it, his absolution. To Sir Hassan Suhrahwady we all agree in offering congratulations upon the high legal distinction which the London University has just conferred upon him, and which his speech this afternoon would seem very fully to justify.

As regards Mr. Thombre, I trust that he will not go away under the misapprehension that, although Federation may not arrive tomorrow morning, it will not be one of the pillars of the new Constitution as laid down in the forthcoming legislation. There is, I think, in the White Paper, and certainly in the pronouncements of our public men, right away from the beginning of the negotiations which are now in force, the clearest evidence of the intention, whatever step may be taken for the moment, to make it perfectly clear that a Federation in the future, though without reference to the precise time at which that further step will materialize, is an integral and an essential part of the new Constitution.

There has been this afternoon no serious divergence of opinion on the general lines of the action which ought to be taken by Britain at the present crisis, and all good friends of India, as we are here in this room, most warmly hope and most confidently believe that a wise and happy solution will be found for the enormous issues which are now before our country.
THE SUMMER RECEPTION

The President and Council gave a reception at Grosvenor House, Park Lane, on Friday, July 21, 1933, to meet the Maharajah Gaekwar of Baroda. Viscountess Melville assisted Lord Lamington in receiving the guests. The Secretary of State for India, who was accompanied by Lady Maud Hoare, took part in the proceedings. More than 300 members and guests were present, including many members and delegates to the Joint Select Committee on Indian Reforms; also some of the witnesses and others from India in connection with the inquiries on the future Constitution of India.

Lord Lamington gave messages of regret for inability to be present from a number of prominent members. He added:

There are two names which I particularly wish to mention. Our invitation was accepted by Lord Burnham, who thereby showed his continued interest in the welfare of India, and whose death in the midst of his activities we so much deplore. The other name is that of the Governor-Designate of Bombay who had intended to be present with Lady Brabourne, but now finds this to be impossible.

On behalf of the Council I welcome the many guests we have today, and particularly His Highness the Maharajah Gaekwar, the Secretary of State for India and Lady Maud Hoare, and the King's Indian Orderly Officers. (Cheers.) I have enjoyed the close friendship of His Highness the Maharajah Gaekwar for thirty years, and can speak from personal observation not only of his solicitude for the welfare of his own people, but also of the great share he has had in the changing and widening of the general Indian outlook. For more than half a century the Maharajah Gaekwar has exercised a formative influence on public opinion in India. You can gain some measure of that influence if you turn to the biography by Mr. Stanley Rice, a former Honorary Secretary of this Association, and also to the collection of speeches by His Highness issued only this month by the Oxford University Press. It will be seen from these volumes that the Maharajah Gaekwar has been consistently ahead of opinion in social, educational, and administrative ideas and plans. (Cheers.)

It is a striking fact that so long ago as 1917, before the Montagu-Chelmsford inquiry took place, His Highness declared his conviction that the future Constitution of India should be founded on federal lines. It is but natural that a Ruler who has exercised so strong an influence on the thought of India should have taken close interest for many years past in the work of the East India Association, which exists for the welfare of that country and to stimulate thought and discussion upon its problems. Even before I went out to the Governorship of Bombay thirty years ago he was a Vice-President of the Association and remains so to this day. Now we are indebted to him for a generous grant, spread over a period of five years, which gives us opportunity to exercise hospitality and thus to promote the social
contact between Britain and India in this country which is of so much value. I take the opportunity to express to His Highness our warm gratitude and our best wishes for his own health and the prosperity of his great State. (Cheers.)

I have also to thank Sir Samuel Hoare for finding time to be with us this afternoon in the midst of his manifold preoccupations. (Cheers.) If possible this has been a more busy week for him than usual, for on Monday he was in charge of a debate on the Indian Estimates in the House of Commons, and he has spent the normal working hours of three days in undergoing the exacting ordeal of examination by the Joint Select Committee on the perplexities of the White Paper. Yet immediately on leaving the witness chair this afternoon he comes to us fresh and smiling, and he adds to our indebtedness by bringing with him Lady Maud Hoare, who by her charm, courtesy, and tact, is the worthy helpmeet of a statesman engaged upon a momentous constitutional task. (Cheers.)

We meet when another great stage in that task is in progress. It is right that every point of view should be brought under the consideration of the Joint Select Committee. Whatever our opinions may be on the subject, I am sure that you will share my view that no good could result from disappointing the expectations that have been reasonably raised nor from allowing any substantial justification for the allegation that we have not fulfilled our undertakings. I was in the House of Commons in the eighties of last century, and, recalling the long-drawn-out struggle for Home Rule in Ireland, I cannot but regret deeply the fact that party spirit prevented reconciliation and a judicious settlement forty years ago or more in place of the present unsatisfactory condition in relation to Ireland. No one could wish for another such protracted struggle, but with party spirit and motives now laid aside my own personal opinion is that if a Constitution, in which experienced British officials work with representative Indians, is set up India can be made a contented unified entity under the British Crown. (Cheers.)

The Maharajah Gaekwar of Baroda, who was warmly received, said: I must, in the first place, say how grateful I am to the East India Association for the honour it has done me in inviting me to be its chief guest this afternoon. As my old friend Lord Lamington has reminded you, I have been connected with the Association for over thirty years; and I have watched, with much gratification, the steady growth of its influence in this country and in India. If I may say so, the Association has rendered, and is rendering, valuable service to both countries. (Cheers.) It provides a common platform on which Englishmen and Indians can meet and exchange views on the important questions of the day in an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual understanding; and through its Journal and its meetings it has helped to create an instructed public opinion on Indian questions. I need not remind you that India has 350 million people with an ancient heritage. We are studying your heritage and institutions. Will you not study ours? Partnership implies mutual respect and understanding. Would that there were more such institutions both in India and England! (Cheers.)

Secondly, I am sure I am only giving expression to your feelings when I
say how sincerely we appreciate the presence of Sir Samuel Hoare with us. The Secretary of State for India has at all times a difficult task, but today, with the momentous issues involved in the framing of a new Constitution for India, the office carries with it a burden of responsibility which, I venture to say, is as arduous as any under the Crown. (Cheers.) We recognize in his presence evidence of his interest in the great work which the Association is doing.

Sir Samuel Hoare's presence here possesses a deeper significance: it is an evidence of the increasing recognition of the position which Indian States occupy in the Commonwealth. If I may be pardoned a personal note, I may say that during all my fifty-five years of public life I have endeavoured to obtain for Indian States their rightful place in the polity of India. (Cheers.) I have fought for their rights, I have never ceased to insist on their duties. Let us insist on both rights and duties. Federation without frustration, development without domination—let this be our motto. A partnership of free peoples—this is the Commonwealth. To me therefore it is a gratification that, in the Constitution that is now being set up for India, the fundamental principle has been recognized of an All-India Federation, in which Indian States shall have their legitimate share in the formulation and execution of policies which will affect the well-being of India as a whole. For many years I have been convinced that it is only along these lines that a proper solution can be found for India's problems, and that the edifice of a self-governing India within the Commonwealth must be built on these wider and deeper foundations. (Cheers.)

Just after the Great War I voiced this main principle, which I had long held, and I am glad that today the details of such a scheme are being worked out by expert committees. This principle has now found firm adherents everywhere, and I earnestly hope and pray that soon—very soon—we may see the new Constitution at work which shall give it full and fitting expression. And, if I may repeat here what I have said elsewhere, I am convinced that, in this new order, Indian States, with their distinctive tradition, can play a notable part—a part which will redound to the benefit of India and of the Commonwealth. (Cheers.)

As in a well-governed State the individual enjoys much freedom to develop his true self, so in the Commonwealth the success will be judged by the freedom of the parts to live and develop their true genius. India within the Commonwealth, the States within India, demand to live a full and true life and to realize their hopes and aspirations of regeneration in their own way.

I shall now conclude by thanking Lord Lamington for the kind words in which he has referred to me today, by wishing Sir Samuel success in the great task on which he is engaged, and expressing my gratitude to the East India Association for the honour it has done me. (Cheers.)

Sir Samuel Hoare, who was cheered on rising, said: Our distinguished Chairman expressed his surprise that I should have come to this delightful entertainment, and that I should have come to it smiling at the end of a rather onerous week of work. My Lords and Gentlemen, how could I have
avoided coming to an assembly so representative as the assembly I see before me, and how could I have avoided coming smiling when I see around me so many friends both Indian and British?

My Lord Chairman, your Association for many years past—indeed, for almost two generations—has provided a wonderful Round Table and the gathering together of the friends of India of all schools of thought. You have provided the first example of a really big Indian Round Table, and tonight I seem to see around me representatives of almost every school both of Indian and of British thought.

One of your distinguished officers, Sir John Kerr, I have had at my right hand in the Joint Select Committee during the last two days. (Applause.) I was going to give evidence upon the Franchise, and, feeling rather a lightweight, I looked round for a good heavy-weight to go with me before the Committee, and accordingly during the last two days, including today, I have had his very valuable assistance.

Tonight I am here for two reasons. First of all, to pay a tribute to the work that your Association has been doing, and particularly to the work of distinguished public men like Lord Lamington and Sir John Kerr, and, if I may mention him also, my friend and associate in many Indian questions, Mr. F. H. Brown. (Cheers.) We are fortunate in having such an Association in London, and you are trebly fortunate in having three such very distinguished and useful officials.

But the other reason why I am here today is to pay an equally sincere tribute to His Highness the Maharajah Gaekwar. I suppose that His Highness is one of the senior princes not only of India, but in the whole world. He succeeded to his great inheritance almost sixty years ago. Looking at him tonight, hearing him speak, we could not believe that those dates were true did not we see them set out in black and white in all the directories. Throughout all this long period, covering two generations of time, His Highness has ruled over one of the greatest States in India; and, if I may say so, he has ruled over it consistently, not only with great knowledge and with great sympathy, but with great forethought for the future.

The last thing in the world that I would do tonight would be to say a word about Constitutional problems. All I would venture to say is that the speech we have heard His Highness deliver tonight shows you with what foresight he regards the Indian problems of the future, and how, although he has ruled so many years over his State, he is keeping himself in the closest and most continuous contact with the modern movements both in India and in this country. I understand that the title that he bears means "The Shepherd." What better shepherd could a community have in these difficult times than he? And what ruler more careful of the present, and more foreseeing of the future?

I am sure you would wish me to associate with him in the tribute that I amventuring to pay Her Highness the Maharaneec. (Cheers.) We wish that she were here tonight. We wish that she could hear the words of tribute that we are all paying to her distinguished husband. I remember the Maharaneec in conditions somewhat different from these. I have a curious habit of taking exercise very early in the morning, and one of my
habits is to go to Queen’s Club and play tennis sometimes almost in the
dimmess of the dawn. The only other individual that I have ever found
playing tennis at so early an hour at Queen’s Club has been Her Highness
the Maharane of Baroda. I wish that she were in London today to give
me the great pleasure of having a game with her.

Now tonight we are here not only to pay His Highness a tribute, but to
give him especial thanks for the generous gift that he has made to the East
India Association. I feel sure, looking around this great assembly this
afternoon, that no gift could have been more apposite, and no gift will prove
more useful to the Association in the future than His Highness’s gift.
Your Highness, we are most grateful to you, and I am glad to be here
tonight to express my own personal thanks for your beneficent act. (Cheers.)

I would end with this one observation. During the course of the last few
days I have been giving evidence before a committee and delegation com-
posed of sixty very acute British and Indian gentlemen, and one of my
friends said to me, "What a risk you are taking!" I comforted myself by
remembering what once happened to a prisoner in the dock at the Old
Bailey. Perhaps he had not too good a case. None the less he went into
court with an air not only confident, but cheerful, and throughout the
evidence he maintained both this cheerfulness and this confidence. When
the trial was ended one of his friends said to him, "How did you remain
so confident and so cheerful in all this difficult time?" He replied, "It was
quite all right. Every member of the jury was a personal friend of mine!"
(Laughter.) Well, after the very difficult week with which I have been
faced, I hope my British and Indian friends on the Joint Select Committee
will allow me to make a similar claim. (Applause.)

Having made these observations, and having made them with all the
sincerity that I can command, once again I thank His Highness for his
munificent gift to the East India Association.
THE LANDED CLASSES AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION

BY RAJA SAYID MOHAMMED MEHDI OF PIRPUR, M.L.C.

A few weeks ago I had the honour to be one of six representatives of landowning interests in various parts of India who appeared, under the leadership of the Maharaja of Burdwan, to give evidence before the Joint Select Committee on Indian Reforms. Last week Sardar M. V. Kibe and others appeared before a sub-committee, as representatives of landowning interests in the Bombay Presidency, which differ in some important respects from those of other provinces. But from whatever part of India we come we take our stand unitedly on the broad general ground that there should be provision in the forthcoming Constitution Act, and in any rules that may be made thereunder, for the preservation of our old-established rights, and for us to play a due share in the political and local administrative life of India.

No one can challenge the reasonableness of the claim that in a great sub-continent where agriculture is and must continue to be the main industry of the vast majority of the people, provision must be made, so far as humanly possible, for a contented and prosperous rural population, whether they be owners or tillers of the soil. To this consideration recognition has been given by a long line of British statesmen entitled to speak with the fullest authority. I need only quote in this connection a reply made by the late Viceroy three years ago almost to the day to an address presented to him by a deputation representative of the landholders in India. Lord Irwin said:

“Families like yours, which have—some of them from ancient times—their roots deep in the broad acres of Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihar, and other parts of the country, and whose interests depend, perhaps more than those of any other section of the community, upon peaceful and orderly administration, should from the very nature of things be one of the chief and most stable buttresses of the Government, which, either now or in the future, has the welfare of India’s many millions in its charge.”
You will be in a better position to appreciate the truth of this observation if I give you some description of the countryside with which I am best acquainted—viz., that of the United Provinces. I was one of the landowning witnesses before the Joint Select Committee in my capacity as Secretary of the British Indian Association of the Taluqdar of Oudh, while the sister province of Agra was represented by my friend Nawabzada Llaqat Ali Khan, speaking for the Agra Zemindars’ Association. I may remind you that the Statutory Commission wrote of the United Provinces as the most typically Indian of all the provinces. It follows that a description of the conditions of life and the people inhabiting the Indo-Gangetic plains is applicable more or less to the whole of India. Though there are a few great cities in this part of Hindustan, the life of the people is essentially rural, and thus typical of India generally. In times of normal employment a highly industrialized country like England has 58 persons out of every 100 dependent on manufacturing industries, and only 8 dependent on agriculture. But in India 73 per cent. of the people depend on agriculture and only 8 per cent. on industry, transport and trade.

**Tenant and Landlord**

The simple life of the Indian countryside has always impressed those who have seen it closely at first hand. The people make their humble dwellings of mud more than of bricks; and are able to spend most of their time in the open air. They are industrious and thrifty, but spend very freely on events of family importance such as weddings. This means, unfortunately, resort to the money lender. It must not be supposed that there is a wide gulf between the owning and the cultivating classes. Not infrequently there is little difference between the standards of life of the well-to-do tenants and those of the smaller landowners. Indeed, you may sometimes go to the dwellings of the tenants and find there evidences of more prosperity than in those of small zamindars. Nothing could be more mistaken than the picture sometimes drawn of zamindars as exacting capitalists whose only relations with their tenants are those of rent collection. The
fact is that they are connected with the tenants through the strong
ties of blood, caste, and religion, as well as those of a mutual
interest in agricultural welfare. This observation is more or less
applicable to the larger landholders. The Montagu-Chelmsford
Report, written fifteen years ago, made observations on this sub-
ject which still hold good in every respect.

"The natural and acknowledged leaders in the country are the landed
aristocracy. They generally represent ancient and well-born families and
their estates are often the result of conquest or grants from some mediæval
monarch. By position, influence, and education they are fitted to take a
leading part in public affairs."

The Statutory Commission fully confirmed this judgment,
observing that the great landowners are marked out as persons of
authority and prestige in a society which is far from objecting
to social distinctions. In respect to the class I more particularly
represent, the Report pointed out that while the estates of the
Taluqdars of Oudh number no more than 260, they comprise
two-thirds of the area of Oudh and pay about one-sixth of the
land revenue of the whole United Provinces. I may here remark,
in passing, that the Taluqdars entertain feelings of the warmest
regard for our Chairman, Sir Harcourt Butler, and when he
vacated the Governorship of the United Provinces in 1922 con-
ferred on him the unique honour of election as an honorary
Taluqdar of Oudh. In the words of the Simon Report, some of
the Taluqdars represent the old conquering Rajput families with
an ancestry dating back to the ninth century:

"The most powerful of the Taluqdars own hundreds of villages and enjoy
very large incomes. Their wealth, their social status, and the control they
exercise over their tenants give these 'Barons of Oudh' a position of very
great influence in their area. They comprise numbers of both the major
communities, and their common interests cut across the communal divisions."

**Rural Society**

I must now say something of the people of the countryside
generally. A characteristic of the cultivating masses which has
impressed many observers is their credulity. They are no excep-
tion to the rule that credulity and lack of education go hand-
in-hand. It must be difficult for people in this country, with all the facilities they possess to be informed of the course of events, to understand how rapidly the wildest and most fantastic rumours gain currency among the people of rural India. This characteristic has been the origin of many a village dispute leading to violence and communal rioting, with marked tendency to spread from district to district. But linked with this credulity there is a quickness of apprehension in matters affecting their own interests. In times of excitement and unrest the cultivators show acuteness in detecting weakness and want of decision on the part of those who are called upon to exercise authority. Indeed, they appreciate and quickly respond to resourcefulness and calmness of judgment, such as was shown by our Chairman in the unrest in Oudh fomented by Congress agitators in 1920 and 1921. The cultivators are more than ever the prey of credulity when there is a lack of certainty as to the action which will be taken by Government.

Another characteristic of the people having a strong bearing on the problems of India's future is their innate conservatism and their attachment to family ties. They dislike sudden changes and are suspicious of sweeping innovations. They are reluctant to leave their village homes, even under the glamour of the promise of good wages in manufacturing industry. If they are persuaded to go to the towns, they do so only to replenish family resources by working in factories or some other urban employment, but with the full intention of returning to their villages. The Royal Commission on Labour in India recommended that this tendency, instead of being hampered and condemned, should be encouraged and regularized as a not undesirable feature of the industrial system. In a sense, the system springs from one of the most worthy of human motives. The factory worker in Cawnpore never ceases to recognize that though he may be absent from his own folk, he has responsibilities towards them, and must do his best to save for his family and to return in due time to his own humble roof. The ideas underlying the joint family system are deeply rooted in the Indian mind, and though the system may be undergoing substantial modification under present-
day conditions, the basic principle remains that those members of the family who are unable to work are to be maintained by those who can earn a living.

**Present-Day Changes**

It is not my purpose to discount or belittle the extraordinary changes which are coming over the countryside and which have been indicated in the evidence of Sir Charles Innes and others before the Joint Select Committee. Living, as I do, among the village people, I can testify to the rapidly-growing signs of their awakening in the last dozen years. I can recall the time when they took little or no interest in events outside their own villages. They still make matters which have some bearing on their economic and general welfare their chief interest; but under modern conditions they have come to recognize that such matters depend in no small measure upon the play of events and policies shaped outside the village. They are quick to detect and lament any rural grievance—such, for instance, as the economic difficulties arising from the continuous fall of prices in the last few years. Political agitators make use of this trait of character to claim that the people are in agreement with their often subversive political views and are to be ranked among the supporters of Congress. But we have had not infrequent evidences that when a genuine grievance has been met in a sympathetic spirit the people have shown no disposition to attach themselves to the political programmes of agitators. One reason for this has been that the programmes have been drawn up by people not in real touch with the rural masses.

The vernacular press, conducted mostly by men who are opposed to landholders, exercises great influence in shaping the ideas of the people. The writers know how to play upon the credulity and ignorance of the villagers by painting pictures of the allurements of revolutionary change. There is little effective machinery to counterbalance such insidious efforts to wreck the whole fabric of agricultural society in the country. Those who could really influence the minds of the people, by reason of their standing and knowledge of conditions, have been slow to adopt
counteractive efforts; but some at least of them are now coming forward to explain the real facts of the situation to the people.

In this connection I may express keen satisfaction that a most important daily newspaper, having behind it great traditions of influence and standing, has been acquired by a group of representatives of the most stable elements in Indian life. The transfer of the Pioneer from Allahabad to Lucknow, which is now being made, will give the paper a direct link with the landed interests of Oudh. An English daily of such distinction is a great asset; but it is to be hoped that the problem of establishing sound and fair-minded vernacular papers will be taken up in earnest and solved in the near future. It is essential that papers of reasonable views should be published in languages used by the humblest people of the countryside.

**Leadership**

It is a matter of common remark that the urban politicians are far less in touch with the agricultural classes than their contemporaries in Western countries. Yet every effort is made to induce the masses to believe that such political propagandists suffer for upholding the interests of the cultivators. Nothing suits them better than to be surrounded with a halo of martyrdom. Subversive organizations have penetrated every district and for a time seemed to be strongly established. No doubt the people were carried away by the excitement arising from such activities. It may appear on the surface that politicians holding the most extreme views—promoting, for instance, ideas of communism—enjoy popularity among the masses, but this is not the fact. India is in a real sense a conservative country and has been so for centuries. Under good leadership the cultivators are capable of forming a sound judgment.

**The No-Rent Campaign**

I can illustrate what I have said by a reference to the agrarian trouble in the United Provinces issuing in the no-rent campaign of 1930-31. I had occasion to visit some of the worst-affected districts in Oudh, and I am also familiar with conditions in the
eastern part of the Agra Province where I hold property. It might have been supposed by any outside observer reading the Congress-owned newspapers that the discontent was due to the neglect and mismanagement of the landowners, and that the entire rural population had thrown in their lot with the apostles of the no-rent campaign. The fact was that, owing to the economic world depression, the price of grain was so low that it was impossible for the tenant to pay full rents, and, therefore, for the landowner to pay full revenue. There was a feeling of great anxiety throughout the province.

As soon as Government announced substantial remissions the people were satisfied and the situation grew calm. Happily, we possessed in Sir Malcolm Hailey a Governor who has a penetrating knowledge of all aspects of Indian life, and will rank with our Chairman, Sir Harcourt Butler, as one of the very ablest and most far-sighted administrators who have ever had charge of an Indian province. The United Provinces Government had grave Budgetary difficulties owing to poor trade, but His Excellency had the mingled prudence and courage to place the welfare of the agriculturalists above other considerations. As a result of the remissions he boldly decreed, the situation was eased and the way opened for a return to normal conditions. The rapid subsidence of the no-rent campaign proved that many people who took part in the demonstrations and the rioting were not enamoured of the subversive political programme put before them by the agitators, but simply sought the relief which was necessitated by economic conditions and partial failure of crops. You are well aware that the world still awaits economic recovery, and this fact has an important bearing upon agrarian problems.

RURAL ORGANIZATIONS

Last winter the conditions in the United Provinces again became difficult, owing to the partial failure of rain and the damage caused to the crops by hailstorms. The British Indian Association recognized that it could best help to relieve the anxieties of the people by establishing local branches in various districts of Oudh, and even in sub-divisions of districts. An
appeal was made to the people to come forward and establish local institutions and hold meetings. The response to this appeal was so great and marked that even the most optimistic among us could not have imagined the success which was ultimately achieved. We had remarkably large attendances at the meetings, reaching on one occasion no less than 15,000 persons. An organization consisting of landowners and tenants was formed under the experienced and inspiring leadership of our President, Raja Sir Rampal Singh, who is looked upon throughout Oudh as a "father of the people." All joined to do their best in helping those who suffered from the bad times and poor crops. A particularly gratifying feature has been the attendance at our meetings of the military pensioners and their families, for men with army service behind them have considerable influence among their neighbours. We have made a good beginning, but there is no doubt that we must continue these activities to bring our organization to a high level of value and influence in all parts of the province.

The success of our efforts and the response received from the masses provide eloquent testimony to the fact that the people prefer to listen to the advice and to follow the lead of those who, as owners of property, belong to the countryside themselves and understand the condition of the people rather than to professional agitators from the towns. This success provides hopeful augury that under the new Constitution the natural leaders of the people will be able to exercise an increasingly beneficent influence on the welfare of the countryside. The people will more and more realize that the interests of the owners and the tillers of the soil are closely identified; and that those interests will not be promoted by revolutionary changes.

I have not attempted in this lecture to outline the suggestions made by the landowning witnesses before the Joint Select Committee as to the methods by which the influence of the zamindari class can best be preserved and made effective under the new Constitution. Our suggestions for the maintenance of a reasonable proportion of seats for landholders in the Legislatures, for specific statutory safeguards, and for the provision of Second
Chambers, not only in Bengal, Bihar, and the United Provinces, but also in other provinces, are set forth at length in the Minutes of Evidence (No. 7) which have been made public. Moreover, some light will be thrown upon our proposals, no doubt, in the course of the discussion which is now to ensue. My object has been to seek the sympathetic support of public opinion in this country for the claims we have made by showing from personal experience and observation that the landowners constitute a most important stabilizing element in the India of today, and that, if their rights and interests are duly conserved in the Constitution Act, they will be able to make a most important contribution to the functioning of the new system of government on soundly progressive but reasonably cautious lines.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. I, on Friday, July 28, 1933, when a Paper entitled "The Landed Classes and the New Constitution" was read by Raja Syed Mohammed Mehdi of Pirpur. Sir Harcourt Butler, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., was in the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present:

Sir John Kerr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir Malcolm Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Sir Abdul Qadir, Lady Abbas Ali Baig, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Rao Bahadur M. V. Kibe, Mr. F. G. Pratt, C.S.I., Mr. H. M. R. Hopkins, C.S.I., Dr. M. B. Cameron, C.I.E., and Mrs. Cameron, Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan, Mr. H. R. H. Wilkinson, Major G. W. Gilbertson, Nawabzada Muhammad Azum Khan of Toru, Swami B. H. Bon, Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Mr. A. Carlyle, Mr. M. Naim, Sirdar Hardit Singh, Mr. E. Bloomfield, Mr. C. Anwas Ali, Mr. Paul King, Mr. C. R. Corbett, Mr. K. C. Roy Chowdhury, Mr. J. H. Benton, Mr. M. M. Jee, Mr. H. Jehanjiani, Dr. Ruschl, Mr. H. P. Sukla, Mr. J. M. K. Mackenzie, Mr. E. Coleman, Mr. S. Y. Hashmy, Mr. Mohamed Yamin Khan, Mr. R. P. Sinha, Mr. M. K. Acharya, Mr. L. M. Deshpande, Mr. H. L. W. Matters, Mr. T. Mardy Jones, Mr. H. K. Sadler, Mr. J. B. Hall, Mr. M. Bonnevie, Mr. B. K. Sinha, Mr. B. D. Mirchandani, the Misses Anderson, Miss Hopley, and Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The Chairman said : It is a great pleasure to introduce to you my old friend the Raja of Pirpur, a well known and much respected Taluqdar of Oudh. From the earliest days of my service I was convinced that we ought to encourage the landlords of Agra and Oudh. They represent stability and conservative feeling. It is right to protect the tenants, and I can claim that it was largely due to my relations with the Taluqdars of Oudh that we were able to pass with their consent a Rent Act giving large reasonable privileges to the tenants. And in my experience—I speak only of Agra and Oudh, and especially of Oudh—the most prosperous tenants are to be found on the estates of the large landowners. As a body, the large landowners are good landlords. Poor landlords cannot afford to be generous.

It has been said that the landlords are a dying class, largely in debt. Thanks to the beneficent operations of the Court of Wards, many large estates have been saved. The majority of estates are not in debt. A rough enquiry made under my orders when I was Governor of the United Provinces showed that about 60 per cent. of landowners paying Rs.5,000 revenue a year or more were free of debt. I doubt if any country could show such a prosperous landowning class.

One reason why the landowners have not gained more general recognition is that they have not combined. The Taluqdars of Oudh have a powerful Association which protects their interests. It has always been my desire to see greater combination between the landowners of Agra and Oudh and of other parts of India. Distance and provincial jealousies have frustrated this,
and the landowners of the United Provinces are as a result dissatisfied with their position under the reform proposals. I do not wish to enter into any controversial matter, but this I do urge on the landowners of my old Province, and if my voice will reach them outside also, to sink differences, to combine, and so to protect and promote the interests of their order. The Raja of Pirpur has done much public-spirited work in this direction, and I will now call upon him to address you. (Cheers.)

(The Paper was then read.)

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan: My friend Raja Sayid Mohammed Mehd of Pirpur has, in his well-thought-out paper, described very fairly the condition of the rural population in India. He has told you the object of our visit to this country. We have come here to place before the Joint Select Committee and the people of Great Britain the views of the land-holders of India as regards the future Constitution that is intended to be given to that great country. We gave our evidence last month before the Joint Parliamentary Committee, and we are grateful to this Association, and especially to the Honorary Secretary, for having afforded us this opportunity of placing our views before the British public.

There are two main demands that have been placed before the Joint Parliamentary Committee on behalf of the land-holders of India. They are, firstly, their increased representation in the legislatures of the country; and, secondly, the safeguarding of their proprietary rights in land and other privileges which they have enjoyed for centuries and which they have always held very dearly to their hearts.

Now it may be said that in democracy there is no such thing as special representation. The people of this country may find it difficult to understand this demand of the land-holders, but it is not so difficult to understand it if we take into consideration the conditions that prevail in India today and that are to prevail in that country for some years to come. India, and especially the United Provinces, is mainly an agricultural country. As has been pointed out by the Raja Sahib, 73 per cent. of the population depends on agriculture alone. In the future legislatures of the country agricultural problems are to be the most important ones, and I boldly put forward this claim, that we who are directly connected with the welfare of the agricultural classes of India are fit persons to represent their interests in the legislatures. This may be considered a very bold claim, but if I can show by the experience of the past few years that we have safeguarded their interests most zealously, then I am sure you will agree that my claim is not unfounded.

During the last ten years the majority of the members of the United Provinces Council has consisted of zamindars, and more has been done for the tenants than was ever done before. That shows that we are more concerned about the welfare of the tenantry than any other class of people. Certain legislation has been passed which has given tenants rights which a number of Provinces have not conferred upon the cultivators, and this has been done when the zamindars were in a majority in the Council.

Then during the last three years we have had very great economic de-
pression. Every country has suffered, but the fall in agricultural prices has made the people of India suffer most, since 73 per cent. of the population depend entirely on agriculture. We have been passing through most difficult times, and it is to the credit of the zamindars that they have done what no other class of people, what no other interest in the world has done—that is, they have remitted rent of their tenants to the extent of nearly fifty millions of rupees every year, and thus have given great relief to the tenantry of the United Provinces. (Applause.) I would like to know what other class of people have foregone their dues to any such extent. On the contrary, every day we hear of countries demanding their pound of flesh from those who owe them money. The relief that we got from the Government in the remission of revenue has been only about eleven millions every year. In other words, zamindars have given out of their own pockets about forty million rupees every year to the tenantry in the remission of rent. These facts, unfortunately, are not known to the people at large.

Now, sir, it can be said that in the future most of the constituencies will be rural. Therefore, if the zamindars have done so much for the tenantry, they have every chance of being returned to the legislatures in greater numbers. But those who are acquainted with the conditions in India know that illiteracy is very great. Only 6 per cent. of the population is literate, and, as has been pointed out by my friend the Raja Sahib, the villagers are carried away for the moment by those people who carry on dishonest propaganda against the zamindar class and against the established form of government in that country. They go round and tell the poor tenant that, "if you support us, you will not have to pay any dues," and the poor tenant is misled. It will take him some time to understand that no government can be run without money, whether it be the British Government, the Zamindari Government, the Congress Government, or the Bolshevist Government. Whatever kind of government you have, you must have money to run it.

For that reason we feel that during the course of the next few years, until a tenant is able to realize the position and to understand fully the significance of the Constitution that is being given to India, the representation of the agricultural interest in the legislatures should be guaranteed. This step is most essential for the transitory period. After a few years it may not be necessary.

We feel that a great injustice has been done to the land-holders in the White Paper. At the present time in the United Provinces out of 100 elected members, the zamindars have six special seats. It is proposed to have a house of 228 members in the future. All of these members are to be elected, and the number of the seats given to the zamindars is the same—i.e. six. Our demand before the Joint Parliamentary Committee is that, in justice and in fairness, our number should have been increased proportionately. That is to say, we enjoy representation to the extent of 6 per cent. now. The same percentage should be maintained in the future Constitution. (Applause.)

Now, Mr. Chairman, in the United Provinces zamindars have been running the Government for the last ten years. You, sir, will testify to the claim I put forward that they have run it well. There has been political
agitation. There has been agitation to overthrow the ordered form of Government, and we zamindars have always stood up for the maintenance of law and order. No Government can suppress a movement of this kind unless and until it has the support of the people behind it, and we gave our fullest support to the Government in the maintenance of law and order. It is sometimes said that our demand for special representation is based on the mistrust of the people. It is nothing of the kind. The object in increasing the number of members in the future legislatures is that every interest should be adequately represented, and I contend that our interest has not been adequately safeguarded in the White Paper as regards our representa-

The other demand put forward by the land-holders from all over India before the Joint Parliamentary Committee was for the safeguarding of their proprietary rights in land. Everyone who has any regard for the sanctity of proprietary rights will support this demand. Unless and until the whole world, the Government in every country, is run on Bolshevik lines, where there is no property, where no property belongs to anybody, this demand cannot be fairly challenged.

It is sometimes said that the zamindars do not want the progress of the country—that the zamindars in their own interest do not want the political emancipation of the masses. The evidence given before the Joint Parliamentary Committee by the zamindars coming from all over India has given a direct lie to that statement. We want the progress of the country. We want political emancipation of the people, but we do not want chaos in the country. The evidence that was given by the zamindars before the Joint Parliamentary Committee supported the proposals in general as embodied in the White Paper.

You, sir, and everyone of us here, reads every day in the papers about the various safeguards embodied in the White Paper. To my mind the best safeguard that can be in any Constitution is to ensure stable elements in the legislatures—elements that stand for orderly progress of the country; no other safeguard will work. If you are sure of having people in your legislatures who stand to lose by chaos in the country, then you may be sure of the satisfactory working of the Constitution. You may give special powers to the Governors, you may give special powers to the Governor-General, but if those people who stand for orderly government are weeded out, the satisfactory working of the Constitution will be greatly endangered.

Sardar Rao Bahadur M. V. Kibe: There is nothing, I think, which I can add usefully to the two able speeches that have been delivered. In the faithful, accurate, and beautiful picture of the rural India which the lecturer of this evening drew, there is much which is common to other parts of India. The same is the case with regard to the aspirations and the demands, if I may say so, of the landowning classes of all the Presidencies.

As was stated in the memorandum submitted by the Taluqdar class, their demand is for guarantees of the sanads. The Bombay land-holders have also been given sanads by the British Government, and they desire and they have submitted their representation that these sanads should be respected
and guaranteed by the future Government. In fact, it is an obligation on
the present Government to see that the terms of these sanads are respected,
and not, if I may say so, tampered with by the legislatures of the country in
the future. Because the provision of a second chamber has been assured to
the United Provinces, neither the lecturer nor the Nawabzada said anything
about that subject. I think it is very necessary in the interests of stability
and so many other things that there should be a second chamber in all the
provinces, and particularly in the Bombay Presidency, because the land-
holders of that Presidency are not so united nor so strong as the land-holders
of Agra and Oudh.

It is said that Second Chambers are a clumsy machinery and are not
wanted in a Government which has a Federal Government at the Centre.
But it must be remembered that it is also said that the Federal Government
at the Centre will have a few subjects, and the bulk of the matter for the
amelioration of the condition of the people and the advancement of the
Provinces will be centred in the Provincial Legislatures. If that is so, it is
very necessary in the interests of stable government in those Provinces that
they should have Second Chambers. Therefore this is a demand which we
have very strongly made for a Second Chamber in the Bombay Presidency.

As regards increased representation of land-holding interests, I think that
a demand which will be regarded as just and will be granted. As has been
shown by the second speaker, the land-holding classes are not unmindful of
the progress of the country and of the interests of other people. In fact, I am
certain that in every province they will always come forward to relieve and
help the people.

Sir Malcolm Hailey: I am sorry that owing to engagements with the
Joint Select Committee I was unable to be here during the reading of the
paper, but I have just had the advantage of seeing a copy of it, and I wish
to express my accord with what the Raja Sahib has said regarding the im-
portance of the landlord classes in the two provinces which I know best.

You can regard that importance in two aspects. It is often impressed
upon us that their assistance and their loyalty has been of great value to
Government. I acknowledge that fully, and I need say no more on that
subject in the presence of one who knows them so well and has appreciated
their loyalty so highly as Sir Harcourt Butler. But there is another aspect.
We are now entering on a new order of things, and I myself should prefer
to regard the landlord class, not so much as an assistance to that somewhat
vague entity known as "the Government," but as an element of stability in
the Constitution. With the influence they possess in the countryside, with
all the traditions they have had in the past, and the hold they still have on a
very numerous tenantry, they can make a most important contribution in
directing on the right lines the power which is now being placed in the
hands of popular representatives.

In the future everything depends not so much on the form of our Con-
stitution as the hands in which authority is placed. (Applause.) You can
frame Constitutions in many forms and in many different ways; but the
essential factor always is, where does the power lie? It may be a good
thing to place authority in the hands of elected representatives, but that is not enough in itself and does not in itself secure good administration; it is the quality of these representatives which counts. If we are to utilize for the good of the province the influence which the landlords can bring to the new Government, it is essential that the landlords should so organize themselves that they can take their due share in the Provincial Councils of the future, and ensure to these Councils the benefit of the conservative element—
I am not using the word in any party term—which they represent. That is to our advantage, as well as theirs, for they have shown in the past that they are capable of taking political views which extend far beyond their own interests.

How is it proposed that we should give that class their position in the Constitution? Admittedly the institution of Second Chambers in three of the Provinces will give them some considerable weight. They will also secure some direct influence by special representation; they have asked for more, and I know that their claims will be carefully considered by the Joint Select Committee. But let us assume for the moment that they will get a larger representation than it has been proposed to give them; there still remains much more. The Second Chamber can only be in the long run revisory. Special representation on the scale they have been given, or even on the scale for which they have asked, can only give them a voice in affairs, not a voting power equivalent to the interest for which they stand. It is essential that they should, by organization and full use of the influence which they have among the voters, secure a greater authority in the State than could be secured to them by these two constitutional devices.

Many efforts have been made in the United Provinces to form associations and to combine landlords in a movement for this purpose. Anyone interested in the future of the Indian Constitution must wish all success to these efforts. There is in the future which we can foresee much that ought to appeal to them particularly and to add an additional stimulus to their activity. Let me explain my point. We have of late seen a general economic change, which will have particular effect on the position of landlords in India. In the big landlord provinces the rentals hitherto depended on two predominant factors—namely, a great congestion on the soil and a low standard of living among the cultivators. It was the combination of these factors, creating a great competitive demand for land, that regulated rentals. The congestion on the soil will still continue, but, on the other hand, you have a great increase of the standard of living among cultivators, and with their access to political influence this is bound to mean that great political pressure will be exerted on the side of the tenant in order to secure adjustment of rents as against the landlord. That is a new factor, for hitherto the claims of the tenants have been directed mainly to secure stability of tenure.

You will remember that in Ireland—which affords something of an analogy, though not a very close analogy—the first claim was for fixity of tenure, which was followed by a claim for fair rents, and ended in a claim for land purchase. Are we to follow the same course in India? It is conceivable that it may be so; but I only hold that out as a prospect which
must be before the eyes of the landlords, and, apart from our desire to see them as a powerful element in the Constitution for the good of the Constitution itself and for the good of India, I would point out to them the necessity of organization in order that they may adjust themselves to new political conditions which may involve a possible attack on their own position in society and their influence in the province. Any sudden or drastic change in that position, diminishing the influence which they can exercise for good in the life of the province, would prejudice the future of the province itself.

(Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan): I am very sorry I was late because I was attending a meeting of the Joint Select Committee. I have read the paper by Raja Sayid with the greatest interest; it deals with a problem with which almost every citizen of my province is acquainted.

Within the last eleven years, from 1921 to 1933, our Province has been faced with what is called the tenancy problem. I remember in 1921, when practically the whole of Oudh was in confusion and Sir Harcourt Butler brought order out of chaos and restored peace. The new Constitution demanded qualities of the very highest form of statesmanship, and it was under the Chairman's guidance and inspiration and advice to the zamindars that the Tenancy Act of 1921 was passed. That Act forms a monument alike to the statesmanship of our ex-Governor, who is presiding today, and to the generosity, vision, and foresight of the great Taluqdars of Oudh.

Then from early in 1924, when I entered the Council, till 1926, for three years the tenancy problem in the Agra Province became very acute indeed. In almost every sitting of the Council we had discussions on the principles on which tenancy legislation should be passed, and for the next two years the Council devoted considerable time to the discussions of this thorny problem in the committees that were appointed in connection with it. I believe it will be admitted by all who attended the meetings of the Council in the summer of 1926 that we dealt with the question in a spirit of give and take, and the Council was not unfair to the tenants at all. We sat for about ten to twelve weeks continuously, and used to start at about eleven and go on sometimes till about six p.m. As was only natural, some of the amendments to the various clauses aroused fierce controversy, but ultimately it was admitted that the zamindars not only of the Agra Province but also of Oudh showed a remarkable example of generosity of vision and statesmanship.

Then we had a very serious problem again in 1931—that of the No-Rent Campaign. Organized attempts were made by the most powerful political body in India—viz., Congress. The ramifications of the Congress could be traced in two or three districts of almost every village, in almost every house in every village. The campaign was intensified and the propaganda was carried on according to the latest devices of publicity, with the result that in some districts it seemed for a moment that the whole of the administration had gone over to the hands of the tenants. I have attended meetings addressed by leaders of the tenants in which the undiluted and unadulterated doctrines of Sovietism were preached from the house-tops;
the audience attended and drank in every word, and all the tenants were asked to carry the message to the remotest home and village.

It was at that particular time that our popular and efficient Governor, Sir Malcolm Hailey, took the lead. I am not exaggerating when I say that, but for Sir Malcolm Hailey's initiative and statesmanship, society in the whole of Oudh—at least in the latter half of the year 1931—would have been reduced to its elements. It was Sir Malcolm Hailey's wonderful initiative which prevented the conflagration from spreading.

I am afraid I can express no opinion on the various points which have been raised by the speakers today, because in the last three years of attendance at the Round-Table Conference and the Joint Select Committee, I have made it a rule not to commit myself or to speak out on any questions which are the subject of discussion at the meetings of the Committee. But this I can say, that the land-holders' deputation, which appeared before the Committee, produced a very good impression indeed, and that almost every member of the Joint Select Committee came to know then that such a problem as the problem of land-holders did exist in India. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that so far as in me lies I will do my very best to safeguard the position of the class to which I belong myself and of whose political future I have formed very high hopes. I feel that that class is going to produce leaders who will ultimately serve as a noble example of the landlord class—leaders who will impart an element of stability to the new Provincial Constitutions that are going to be introduced, on the one hand, and who will not regard and confound stability with stagnation, but will combine progress with stability, as they have done from 1921 to 1933.

For the successful working of the policy we hope—I hope at least—that we shall continue to have a succession of the brilliant Governors with whom our province has been blessed during the last eleven years, and that the new reforms will be inaugurated under the auspices of a Governor whose name is a household word in India. It was our good fortune, Mr. Chairman, that the reforms in the United Provinces were inaugurated under your auspices. I am sure that but for your experience, your great statesmanship, and your care for the legitimate interests of the landlords the reforms in my Provinces would never have been a success. And I do hope that next year or the year after, when the new Constitution is inaugurated, we shall have the advice, the guidance, and the direction also of our Governor, Sir Malcolm Hailey.

Justice Sir Abdur Qadir: I have been asked, as an old member of this Association, to say a word or two on this occasion. I need hardly say that, so far as any of the political aspects of the questions discussed by the Raja Sahib today are concerned, I am precluded, by virtue of my present office, from saying anything about them, but I make bold to say this much, as a non-zamindar, who has always been in touch with the zamindars of his province and is in sympathy with their aspirations, that I appreciate fully the desire expressed by the two first speakers for a due share in the administration and in the legislatures of the country being given to the zamindars of the country. Before I went on to the Bench, I was a member
of the Council in my own Province. I represented an urban constituency, and am myself not a landowner. Therefore whatever I say on this point is quite disinterested.

As has been so aptly observed by Sir Malcolm Hailey, who has a great experience of the administration of two important Provinces in Northern India, the Punjab and the United Provinces, the better representation of the landed classes would mean more stability and more durability to the new Constitution which is now being formed.

I may add that I am very glad to notice in the remarks of the first two speakers who represented the cause of the landlords of the United Provinces before us this evening, that they are landlords who are fully alive to the needs of their tenantry. They have assured us that the landlords in their Provinces have done all they could to help their tenants, and are prepared to recognize their rights. If this tendency continues, then, as was said in the lecture, there will be no conflict between the landlords and the tenants.

Just as it is essential that there should be no conflict between landlords and tenants, in the same way there should be no conflict between the rural and the urban population. While wishing the zamindars well, I must add that the movement for the organization of the zamindars and for the betterment of their condition should be worked in such a way that there be no clash between the rural and the urban interests, and it may be recognized that both classes are essential for the progress of the country, both want to serve a common cause, and should advance together to a common goal.

Mr. R. P. Sinha: Much has been said about other Provinces. My little province, Bihar, has been left out. In Bihar and Orissa there has been a large measure of co-operation between the land-holders, and this fact is evidenced because of the fact that the same ministers have been in power continuously during the last ten or twelve years.

In order to bring the theories into practice an Association called the Indian Conservative Association should be formed to look after the interests of the landowner class, and as London is the nerve centre of the Empire it should be here. I propose that Sir Harcourt Butler, a Taluqdar, be its first Chairman. (Cheers.)

Mr. K. C. Roy Chowdhury: I am not familiar with the conditions in the United Provinces. I come from Bengal. But it was a pleasant surprise to me to hear that the relations between the capitalist landlords and the poor tenants are not so bad as was thought by the whole world. I thought the relations were similar to those between capital and labour in many lands. I am equally surprised to hear, and I hope it is true, that the United Province landlords have remitted something like five crores of rupees to the tenants and the Government's share was only one crore. Unfortunately in Bengal most of the zamindars are very apathetic towards the tenants, and 90 per cent. of them are bankrupt on account of their extravagance.

I strongly suggest setting up Conciliation Committees in the United
Provinces. They are working beautifully in Japan. I would also wish them to copy the example of British landlords. I had the good fortune during my student days to visit Chatsworth, the seat of the Duke of Devonshire. I found the Duke of Devonshire was an ideal landlord. He was looking after every scrap of well-being of the tenants. I do hope that some of the zamindars who are now here on holiday will go into the country and see how the British landlord's relation with the tenants exists.

RAJA SAYID MOHAMMED MEHDI OF PIRPUR: I am afraid I do not know very much about the conditions of the zamindars of Bengal, and still less of Japan. I protest against the last speaker suggesting that the relations between landowners and tenants in the part of India which I come from are similar to those which exist between capital and labour in other countries, because I think, if he goes and studies the conditions in India, he will find that there is not the same distinction between a zamindar and a tenant. You may find a rich zamindar admiring the wife of one of his poor tenants. A zamindar is not only a capitalist, but is also—I do not know about Bengal, but in other parts—head of the most important clan in the neighbourhood. So they are looked upon as the natural leaders.

What I have read about Bengal is that owing to the succession law the old class of nobility has disappeared, and I think the estates have gone to a certain extent to some people who live in the towns. The majority of the zamindars in the United Provinces live with their tenants, and if you go to these you will find a tenant's house showing greater signs of prosperity than that of his small zamindar. That zamindar probably is related to his tenant. I think it is very hard to say that we resemble the capitalist.

I am grateful to Mr. Chowdhury for the advice he has given, but I think instead of taking holidays in Europe he should go and study the rural conditions of which he speaks.

Sir JOHN KERR: My primary duty this evening is to express on behalf of the East India Association and on behalf of this audience our very grateful thanks to the Raja Sahib for coming here tonight and giving us this very interesting lecture on the landed classes.

Before I do that I must dissociate myself from the remarks that have been made by my friend from Bengal about the zamindars of Bengal. Mr. Chowdhury and I are old friends and old opponents, and if it were a question of the labour conditions in Calcutta, the conditions of the tramway men or jute workers, there is nobody whose opinion I would sooner have than his. I do not say I would agree with him even on those points, but I should be glad to have his opinion. In regard to the Bengal zamindars, however, I do not think that he has any very detailed knowledge or any actual experience. If he will allow me to say so, I think that he is wrong, I might say fundamentally wrong, in his attitude towards that problem.

I am very sorry indeed that we have no representative of the Bengal zamindars here this evening, because the zamindar problem in Bengal is unfortunately different from that in most other parts of India. There is that fatal mistake of the Permanent Settlement, which has poisoned the
relations of landlord and tenant and made it very difficult to reach a satisfactory solution. But I must not go into all that now. I am not starting a lecture on my own account on conditions in Bengal.

Elsewhere, in the King's Robing Room of the House of Lords, the problems of constitutional reform are being gone into in a manner which is, I suppose, necessary, but is at times very dreary. Here tonight the Raja Sahib has brought us back to the realities of the case: the landlord and tenant, proprietor and cultivator, or, to use the old Indian phraseology, the zamindar and the ryot. For the way in which he has brought that problem before us and for the very interesting discussion that we have had we owe him our grateful thanks.

We also owe our thanks to Sir Harcourt Butler for kindly coming here today. As the lecturer has reminded us, he is an honorary Taluqdar, and nobody could be more suited therefore to preside over a meeting where the question of the landed classes is under discussion.

I ask you to pass a very hearty vote of thanks to Sir Harcourt Butler and the Raja Sahib for coming here this afternoon. (Applause.)
"INDIA—1983"

BY SIR MALCOLM HAILÉY, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
(Governor of the United Provinces)

The title I have chosen may appear to be somewhat fantastic; but I do not pretend to have found any dark passage in the Book of Revelations which I can claim to predict the future of India. The sole value of a forecast such as this lies in the study of the factors which may operate in deciding that future. The historian of fifty years hence may find that they have operated in a different direction to that which we may expect today; he may indeed find that new forces, now invisible, have come into operation, or events have occurred which have disturbed (as the Great War disturbed) the course of normal and predictable developments. But we ought at least to be able to estimate the character and strength of the factors now visible and to form some idea of the direction in which they will move.

Let me, by way of illustration, assume that a reader of Sir John Strachey's well-known book on India (which he commenced to write in 1884) had used that work to attempt some kind of forecast of the factors then operating or likely to come into operation within the fifty years now concluding. He would have found in that book an admirable description of what the administration had achieved for India, and he might well have formed the impression that the picture which the country would present at the end of the next half-century would in the main be the result of activities initiated and controlled by Government. These activities had proved their strength for the particular ends to which they were operating, and had found on the whole a sufficiently plastic material in India itself. Our reader, stirred to a spirit of further speculation, might have proceeded to an assumption that material conditions would improve on lines already charted out; thus communications would be extended, and new sources of irrigation brought into use, though perhaps he could hardly have foreseen that we should by this time have the largest irrigation system in the world. On the other hand, industries would only expand slowly, for only slow growth was possible under the restrictions of a system of free trade and in face of well organized foreign competition. The country would continue to settle down under the system of order with which we had provided it; we should gradu-

* Based on an address delivered before the Royal Empire Society Summer School at Oxford.
ally improve rural conditions under a land revenue and settlement system which (save perhaps for that very debatable Permanent Settlement) was well suited to the country, and needed only adjustments in detail, which it would assuredly receive, to meet varying agricultural and climatic conditions. Education would grow, though here again his vision would be tempered by recognition both of the narrowness of finance and of some lack of enthusiasm on the part of the administration for universal primary education. Political interest would undoubtedly grow; but it would centre mainly on the moderate objectives which characterized the earlier aspirations of Congress—namely, some lessening of direct control from England and the grant to Indians of a larger share in the service of a bureaucratic form of government.

Up to about thirty years those speculations would have been correct; he would have rightly estimated the factors which would operate up to the end of that Augustan period of official rule, the Curzon régime. For the remainder of the period new factors supervened; but I will not dilate on them here, for my object is only to suggest to you that in looking at the factors which must operate in our own future, we must lay emphasis on dynamics of a different class to those which would have counted with the reader of Strachey's book. India is no longer in the same plastic state; certainly the chief word does not rest with the administrative forces; and it is not on these forces that our attention must in the first instance concentrate. One must first clear the ground by making certain assumptions. One cannot speculate here on the accidentals of history—irruptions from outside or chaotic upheavels within. Fifty years ago there was a background of impending menace from the north-west; so far as that menace came from Russia we should today approach it with a fuller recognition of the limits of modern warfare over long lines of imperfect communications. As for the frontier tribes, the extension of our own communications in that area has placed us in a far stronger position than before; if the task of guarding the frontier still remains both a military commitment and a burden to our finances, we have circumscribed its scope. As for that secession of the Muslim provinces in Northern India into a federation with neighbouring Muslim states, of which there has been much talk, I rank this as part of the material produced in the interest of one side or another in the Hindu-Muslim dispute. We have for our present purpose to assume that India, safeguarded as in the past by the British connection, will keep its framework intact, and our interest here must be in depicting the elements and the forces which affect its internal development.

It is not easy to schedule elements of this kind; it is more convenient to deal with them in the fields in which they operate.
In the economic field we have, in the first place, a great growth of capital available for use in industry. Capital is leaving the traditional recesses of hoarding and money-lending, and has a fluid use for larger purposes. It is not possible to illustrate this better than by the fact that the deposits in joint stock banks, which in 1883 were about $3 million pounds, are now 50 million pounds; and that the rupee debt of India, which had stood at 90 million pounds at the earlier date, is now 434 million pounds. This growth of capital has a new significance with the entry of India on a protective policy. The rapidity with which Indian capital can respond to such a policy is shown by the recent development of the white sugar industry. A few years ago we were importing a yearly average of between 600,000 and 1 million tons of foreign white sugar; since then we have guaranteed a period of protection to the white sugar industry, and it is estimated that within a year's time we shall have plant which can supply about 750,000 tons of white sugar manufactured from India-grown cane. It seems now likely that India will continue to move along definite lines of protection, with an increasing absorption of her own raw materials. On the other hand, the standards of consumption are not at this stage high enough to support a growth of manufacture on a really large scale; it is difficult to assume that India will, in the period we are contemplating, become industrialized to an extent that will sensibly affect the character of the population. We can confine ourselves to saying that we shall see in social life a good deal more of the manufacturing interest, and we shall lose something of the outlook which characterizes the predominance of agricultural classes. In politics we are likely to see a more definite move on the part of the consuming classes to safeguard their interests. This has already begun to show itself, and will gain strength with any change in the constitution which adds importance to the rural as against the urban vote. The composition given to the Central Legislature will have an important bearing on the issue of this conflict of interests.

Secondly, we have to reckon, in the economic field, with the result of the general increase in the money value of raw produce which has marked the last thirty years. This has led to a noticeable increase in the standards of living in the general population. That has not merely given the Indian people a new value in the world's markets (Indian imports were valued at 39 million pounds in 1883 and at 189 millions in 1929) but has had powerful reactions in other directions. There has been a marked change in the attitude of the cultivating class, presenting a new problem in rural economics. Previous tenant movements were in the main confined to demands for stability
of tenure on the part of the cultivator; we shall now probably see an increasing movement for State intervention in the adjustment of rentals. It will be remembered that in Ireland the initial demand was for fixity of tenure and right of transfer of tenant rights; it was followed by a demand for fair rents, and finally for land purchase. The parallel is not complete, but there is a suggestive analogy. In the landlord provinces of India the decisive factors have hitherto been a great pressure of population on the soil and a low standard of living in the cultivating class. The former factor persists, and has not been affected by a draw-off into industry; but the change in the standard of living among cultivators, and a general growth of consciousness following access to political influences, will produce a new situation. It is already being argued that the landlord class has lost its economic value in that it does not make a contribution to the soil or to the protection of the cultivator proportionate to the share of produce represented by the rentals; and there is likely to be increasing pressure on the part of the vast cultivating population for State assistance in adjustment of the relations of landlords and tenants to correspond with economic facts. The weight of industrial opinion, interested rather in the consuming power of the tenant than the maintenance of the landlord, will be against the landlord class. Even if we do not proceed to the final stage of land purchase, we are likely to see legislation in favour of the tenant in the matter of rentals which will reduce materially the position and influence of a class now occupying an important place in social and political organization, and we may see the rise on a large scale of a class having the characteristics of small peasant proprietors. It would be difficult to over-estimate the effect of this change both on the economic and social life of some of the larger provinces of India.

There is a third point in the economic field which calls for notice—the position of industrial labour. Though the number of men employed in industry has risen greatly, it is still small in proportion to the total population. Its importance lies mainly in the fact that industrial labour is apt to acquire a solidarity which gives it an influence beyond its numbers. Hitherto such labour has been slow to acquire the true characteristics of an industrial class, since it has moved backwards and forwards to agricultural pursuits; but with the demand for work of a more skilled nature (as shown, for instance, by the progressive production of finer counts in the cotton industry or the later developments in the steel industry), it is assuming a more permanent character, and it appears certain that India will before long have to face increasingly the incidents arising from combination of labour of this kind. These incidents may be tempered to some extent
by the existence of a large agricultural over-population in the background, ready to flow into a vacancy caused by strikes or the like; but this is a check which will operate fully only where there are large casual elements in employment, and not in the more skilled lines of industry.

But though these developments may all have their effects in the next fifty years, one cannot help feeling that the dominating fact in the economic picture will be the continuing poverty of India. Some considerable industrial progress there may be, and, we may also hope, some considerable improvement of agricultural processes. There is hardly likely to be an expansion of canal irrigation equal to that of the last generation, for we are reaching the limit of the use of the waters of our great rivers by "flow" irrigation; we shall have to turn to the use of electricity in drawing up the subsoil water or to the expensive expedient of making reservoirs in the hills to imprison the monsoon supply for winter use. Improvements in agriculture will come rather by way of intensifying than by expanding cultivation. But can we hope that any improvement of these processes, in the presence of climatic conditions which are often catastrophic, will give us standards of living in India that are comparable to those even of the poorer Western countries? The census shows a gradual increase in the population of India, already heavily congested in many areas, and it is hardly likely that the doctrine of birth control will supervene in our generation to adjust the disproportion between the capacity of the soil and the mouths which it has to feed.

I pass to what may be conveniently called the social field, of which in India religion forms so large a part. Here we find factors less determinate in direction but nevertheless of great moment. The strictly religious side presents some complexity. On the one hand we have many proofs of the breakdown of orthodoxy—the success of dissenting movements such as the Arya Samaj, or the patent effects of outside influences in loosening the restrictions of the caste system. On the other hand the world has been presented with striking and indeed painful evidence of the growth of religious solidarity produced by communal animosities. There appear, therefore, to be two opposite tendencies, and their real import requires some analysis. Communal animosities are largely due to secular causes; the closing of the ranks of the Sikhs against Hindus, or of the Hindus against Muslims, does not necessarily imply the growth of religious force within the life of the community itself. It is indeed compatible with a decline in the strength of religious feeling and observance. The dominant factor, to my mind, is not the particularism which these religions are manifesting under the influence of exterior causes, but the rapidity with which they are reacting to moderniz-
ing influences. Hinduism now presents a picture of a gradually disintegrating caste system and the dissolution of the joint Hindu family, its two most distinguishing features.

Islam has been equally accessible to new influences, though the effect has been seen in a different form. The narrowing down of Islamic strength in the outside world has turned the eyes of Indian Muslims to India itself as a centre of Islamic culture. They look now to maintain this culture largely by access to political influence. But at the same time the growth of secular education has had its own effect on their modes of life and thought; Islam is no longer a purely religious interest. The importance of these developments lies in the fact that India is losing what has hitherto been the chief focus of interest for the bulk of its population. There is not merely a potential source of mental unsettlement, but a vacuum is being created for the inflow of fresh ideas, political or social, many of which may be of a very disturbing nature. In the case of Hinduism, it does actually amount to the gradual break-up of a social organization. On the top of this we have to reckon with two movements, both of recent origin: firstly, the movement for the uplift of untouchables, partly originating within those classes themselves, but largely fostered from outside for a variety of motives; and secondly, the growth of a Women’s Movement among women of the educated classes. The initial effect of the former has been to rally the more orthodox elements in Hinduism to the defence of the caste system; its ultimate effect will inevitably be an addition to the forces which are disintegrating the Hindu organism. The issue of the Women’s Movement depends in part on the political authority which women can acquire. If that authority is considerable, we shall see attempts to achieve reformist legislation which will provide a further solvent of religious conservatism. In Islam, the attempt will be to legislate for monogamy, for giving more practical effect to the Islamic precepts regarding the division of property among women, and for giving to women the divorce right now possessed by men. In Hinduism, the attempt will be to recognize intercaste marriages, to secure the right of divorce, and to enforce the grant of maintenance to widows; in both religions we shall have efforts to make more effective the regulations regarding the age of marriage.

It is a commonplace which might have been repeated with justice at any time during the last fifty years, that we have no longer to reckon with a static India; but I think that it is only now that we can really promise ourselves the sight of an India swept by these somewhat convulsive reform movements. If there is one feature of modern India which is more striking than another, it is the revelation of its accessibility to mass movement.
Hitherto this has shown itself largely in political matters, and has more easily been directed towards attack (which is indeed the most characteristic direction of mass impulse) than to any constructive effort. But the field for mass influence in India is only now being explored, and we may conceivably see strange things happening in the attempt to secure social reform. It at all events touches a sphere which possesses for the great mass of people an interest which merely political movements cannot attain.

Finally, while these factors in the social field are distinguishable, there is one general factor less definable but nevertheless of much importance. In the last generation, control of such public opinion as existed, or the exercise of influence in social affairs, was in the hands of a small class, partly intellectual, but partly composed of people of recognized position. Today, a great mass of men who could not be described as intellectuals, and who are socially of a lower status, have now come into the field. They reflect in their attitude the circumstances in which their class finds itself; economic conditions press with particular hardship on this class in the East, for it has rising standards of living, and in a non-industrial country has small hopes of satisfying these standards. Its members tend to be radical in politics and in some degree also in religious and social matters. Their outlook is urban, and they are little interested in rural development. All indications point to a rapid growth in the controlling influence of this class; and when we think of the future direction of social and political movements we must remember that they will be largely what this class will make them. Both direction and methods will be very different to those which they would have taken under the influences which prevailed a generation ago.

I have purposely left for last the political field. At the moment it engages an embarrassing amount of our attention, but it is not my intention to deal with the immediate issues now before us. Politics and administration ought for our present purpose to engage our consideration only so far as they can affect or direct the forces for change now afoot in the general population. But in the modern world political institutions react widely on social and economic conditions; and we cannot neglect this element. The possible reactions of political developments on India are the more difficult to forecast because the institutions which we are introducing are not an organic growth from movements taking place in Indian national life, but find themselves there in pursuance of concepts which have their roots in European experiences. It will be realized that I necessarily approach this matter in the most objective way; I will view political developments purely on what may be described as the dynamic side. For about a century India has had a government of which the most
prominent characteristics were that it proceeded from a single centre, and thereby constituted a strong unifying force; it based itself on its own acquired authority, and not on any form of popular support, in the constitutional sense, though in other respects it earned (and, I think, earned on its merits) a general acquiescence in its authority; and thirdly, though it adapted itself to Indian conditions, it represented in the main ideas and standards which were European rather than Oriental. We have for some years now followed a policy which, by giving increasing importance to provincial centres of administration, has encouraged centrifugal forces, shifting the focus of attention from the centre and dividing authority with it. More important, we are substituting for a form of government dependent on its own authority one in which the administration will in its main activities be definitely based on a popular vote. I am not concerned in the extent to which immediate proposals may carry that substitution; but clearly we are about to see now a definite advance in the substitution of popular for non-responsible government, and for the purpose of a forecast ranging over fifty years one is bound to assume that this process, when once firmly established, will within the course of that period be carried to very considerable lengths.

It is not merely a matter of interest to speculate how far the type of government we are substituting will prove to be suited to Indian conditions; its suitability or adaptability is an essential element in arriving at a forecast of the effects it may have on Indian developments. In so far as the previous régime was self-sufficient in the sense that it did not base itself on representative institutions, it was a form of government to which the East was well accustomed. So far as it was alien in composition and in some of its ideas it may have become unacceptable to a people rapidly advancing in education and self-esteem; it may, to that extent, have become unsuitable to modern conditions; but at least as a type of government there was nothing in it foreign to Eastern traditions. Earlier political movements in India were not indeed directed to securing a change in the type of government; they were mainly designed to secure a larger share for India in the administration in the form in which it then existed. That movement, it is true, has been replaced by a widespread demand for representative institutions and responsible government, but the mainspring of that demand is not anything that India has drawn from its own traditions. One is indeed at times driven to feel that some of those who have been advocating a responsible form of government have failed to appreciate the fact that, for the English people, that form of government has only one meaning —namely, the grant of executive authority to the representatives of the majority of a widely based electorate. So far as we know
the spirit of India at present, it is fair to say that it would probably prefer some form of government not definitely responsible to a majority vote. There are even members of the extreme Left wing who do not seem to think in terms of responsible government, but of utilizing for their own purposes the field of authority prepared for them by a previous official rule, just as Lenin and his circle stepped into the field of authority ploughed and levelled by two centuries of Czardom. I do not mean by what I have said on this point to join with those controversialists who ask why we are introducing democracy to India at a time when democracy is coming into discredit in the West. To my mind the question and the implication it carries are both mistaken. We are not discarding democracy in the West, though events may have brought into disrespect certain forms of Parliamentary institutions in which democracy expressed itself. The modern "directorate" everywhere stands on some form of popular support; indeed, it is an instrument for giving a direct response to the body of opinion which supports it, unhampered by the restrictions which had grown up round the earlier forms of Parliamentary institutions. Probably every "directorate" now existing could stand the test of a referendum, either because it has a majority behind it, or because it can by its own methods secure such a majority. I suggest, therefore, that arguments based on the suggested breakdown of democracy do not apply; and, indeed, I only referred to them here because they doubtless came to your minds in connection with what I had said as to the suitability of responsible government to Indian conditions. I suggest to you that the real justification for the introduction of that form of government in India lies in the faith that India must pass through the educative and formative influences of representative institutions before she can evolve the form of government best suited to her own conditions. That, if I may say so, is a very reasonable theory on which to work; it should allow India gradually to evolve her own proper form of government under influences making for the maintenance of order, instead of proceeding by a series of catastrophic experiments.

But in the end it may very well be that India may find herself best suited with something different from Parliamentary government in our form—something, that is, in the nature of a directorate sufficiently responsive to popular needs and ideas to gain general acquiescence, but not dependent in the constitutional sense on a majority vote. I suggest this for two reasons: first because this conclusion would be in line with what we know of previous Indian tradition; and, secondly, because India seems to have acquired a peculiar talent for looking to State guidance and control in every form of activity. The current Indian mind
thinks of the State in terms more common in some Continental nations than in Great Britain; it does not seem to suffer from the shock which we should feel, or at all events used to feel, when faced with proposals that the State should regulate the most ordinary transactions of every-day life. Now the further you progress in State intervention or State management, the more certain is it that you will seek means to eliminate that compromise of opposing forces on which our Parliamentary institutions depend. In English political theory, the existence of a strong opposition has been held to be an essential element in arriving at correct action; but the English theory of politics has not hitherto contemplated a thorough-paced system of State management.

I offer this merely as a long-range speculation about the way in which Indian political forms may ultimately shape themselves. But we are concerned now with more visible developments. We may anticipate one thing with tolerable certainty; as I have already implied, it will be progressively difficult to maintain that unitary control of policy from the centre which characterized the past. That will not necessarily be due to the adoption of the form of federation now proposed or any alternative form of confederation; the process began when a measure of responsibility was given to provincial governments, and it will gain fresh impetus in proportion as provincial self-government completes itself. Moreover, physical facts add weight to the tendency produced by constitutional changes; provinces so large that some contain populations of 40 to 50 millions, and an area equal to Spain or Italy, cannot be controlled from the centre in any but the most elementary matters. When once they begin to interest themselves in the problems of their own internal development, attention concentrates on the local aspects of affairs, provincial patriotism intensifies, and central influence declines. The ultimate tendency may not necessarily be towards complete separation from the centre, but it will certainly be towards diversity of policy and resistance to any effort of the centre to impose uniformity. This process might be delayed were it possible now to break up the provinces into a number of smaller units, for an aggregate of small units would exhibit far less centrifugal force than the small number of large units with which we have now to deal. A second and consequential development may also be foreseen. The pressure of the various economic and social forces which have been described will have a more pronounced effect on a provincial than they would on a central field of administration. Local solutions are likely to be sought for economic and social difficulties, and in some cases perhaps will be less well considered than they would be under unitary control. All this, let me add again, is not a criticism of the grant of provincial responsibility—that has its own
value in the political sphere and in the development of initiative and responsibility which I fully accept—I am only pointing to some of the natural developments. Thirdly, the substitution of popular for official control of administrative activities will, quite apart from any change of personnel in the State services, alter in many ways the standards and methods of administration largely established under European influences.

An administration based on a popular vote yields more quickly than a purely official Government to pressure for expenditure on projects of internal development. How narrow is the financial basis on which provincial administration is now conducted is shown by the fact that one of our great provinces spends only 1½ rupees, three spend between 2½ and 3½ rupees, and the most costly of the provincial governments spends annually only 8½ rupees per head of the population. The field of provincial taxation is limited by circumstances, and there will therefore be a constant effort to find money by reducing the cost of administrative agencies, and this, apart from any other consideration, is bound to modify previous administrative standards. We are not here considering any question of values, nor are we weighing the merits of what we can foresee in the future against what we have known in the past. We have not here to ask ourselves whether the future administration will or will not conform with the ideals or the methods which characterized it in the past. The question is, whether the change will be such as to produce visible effects in the India we are attempting to forecast. A general breakdown of order, or a gravely impaired confidence in justice, or a widespread prevalence of administrative corruption would certainly do so. We have heard many anticipations that we must expect this result, just as we have heard, from the Indian side, confident assurances of the betterment which popular government will produce on the type of administration. It is difficult to prevent our forecast from being coloured by prepossessions on the one side or the other. That the administration will be widely affected is certain; the full extent is not easy to estimate. I would here only put forward one consideration. Much importance attaches to the momentum which a State machinery acquires during a long course of settled and authoritative administration, and my speculations do not at present go beyond the expectation that this will continue for many years to exert a full influence.

We come now to the last of the forces which present themselves in the political field—one hard to define, but certainly one of the most potent with which we shall have to reckon. What will be the reaction of India to that Nationalistic spirit which has gripped every other people of the world? It is not necessary to debate here the old question whether India is a nation. Our
friend Strachey began his book on India by stating roundly that there was no such country as India. There are many today who, pointing to the diversities of her peoples, languages, and creeds, make a strong point that India cannot claim to be a nation; or, rather, they seek to deny the deductions which might be drawn from admitting that claim. The question of what constitutes a nation may be left for political philosophers to decide; in any case, the problem whether India falls within any formula they may adopt is largely an academic point. On the other hand, recent world experiences leave us in no doubt of the results which follow when people comprised in any political unit exhibit a nationalistic spirit, and no one can deny that such a spirit has of late been evident in India. You may at your choice view that as the product of a growing self-esteem, or the revolt of a conservative people against modernist ways, or—as some would have it—as the outcome of our own influence in politics and education. But it is the dynamics rather than the ethics of this feeling which matter to us now. If it is not easily definable, it is certainly ponderable. It would be a mistake to imagine that it is confined to the intellectuals; if it is not by any means universal, yet it is common among great numbers of ordinary people, and it is the type of feeling which is bound to widen and intensify.

Of some things we may be certain. However much on its literary side it may seek to recall the glories of a fabled past, or to advocate the virtues of purely Indian institutions, it will not impede the rapid adaptation of modern scientific or mechanical improvements, nor check the influences they entail. Whatever it may do for the Indian languages, it will not stop the growing use of English as a common language. On the economic side, it will here, as elsewhere, add support to a protective policy and perhaps to attempted discrimination against non-Indian commercial undertakings. On the political side, it will involve a growing pressure for the reduction of the visible signs of British authority, and, in my opinion, we shall before the end of our period see its effects in the reduction of British personnel and an increasing measure of Indianization of the Army. But while we can count on these more or less objective results, can we foresee that this spirit will so permeate India as to produce a mentality of a "national" type? Other peoples have been at times galvanized by such a spirit, particularly when accompanied by a new sense of political independence; but this result has been seen more often where the area has been smaller and the social elements less diverse. One may speculate with interest on the possible use by the new administration of those modern agencies for direct communication of ideas—broadcasting and the like—
which have aptly been described as shortcircuiting the slow processes of education. But on the whole one may be permitted to feel some doubt whether the world will at the end of our fifty-year period see that ultimate development on which intellectual India sets its hopes—an India united in those bonds of common sentiment and ideas which make real nationhood. There is much to hamper this—the centrifugal forces which the new politics are creating, the difficulties of a vast geography, the persistence of social organizations which, even in some process of disintegration, will still maintain a basic resistance to cohesion.

Now it may be thought that I have done an unwise and perhaps irritating thing. I have dealt rather vaguely with tendencies and movements, but I have not been able to define their conclusion. I have attempted to show the threads that may make warp and weft, but have not the craft or the courage to weave the fabric. But those who care for India cannot stop at pondering over her immediate problems. On the background of her ancient civilization we have already painted many new colours. Time seems about to work on the canvas with a more rapid and more heavily laden brush. What is the picture which her civilization will present in the future? It would be a bold mind that claimed to give a complete answer, but we have gained something if we can feel that we have seen our way even to part of it.
COMMERCIAL PROSPECTS IN MUSLIM ASIA*


It is perhaps not generally known that our Holy Prophet started life as a trader and merchant, and up to the moment when he received the divine call he was active as one of the leading merchants of Mecca. In numerous passages of the Koran not only the vital importance but the blessedness of commerce, industry, and trade are impressed upon the faithful. Many passages deal with trade by sea and land, with agriculture, with mining, with all the wonders that Nature has placed at the disposal of man for his material comfort and enjoyment.

In the golden age of Islam's civilization, reaching down to the sixteenth century, the Muslim countries were in the van of all that we consider the world's economic life. But a great change came with the discovery of the Americas and the Cape route to the East. Sea-borne trade to the Far East and India replaced trade through the Muslim countries. It developed and became the great source of wealth for the world in general. This process went on with ever-increasing momentum till the outbreak of the Great War. The vast millions of China and India were brought into touch with the advanced countries of Western Europe and America by direct communication. What can be conveniently called the big Muslim square from Samarkand to Sind and from Egypt to Constantinople diminished in economic importance for the world in general and for Europe in particular. This process went so far that, although here and there attention was paid to those countries by houses that had hereditary and historic connection with them, they were ignored by the general trend of commercial enterprise in Great Britain.

Then came the War with its immediate reaction of fictitious prosperity, but with its present consequences of worldwide depression and economic languor. The old and familiar sources of trade and commerce are proving themselves insufficient to meet the productive activity of the post-war world. New sources must be found; new economic worlds must be conquered. It is fortunate that, now the opening-up of the economically backward Muslim countries is most needed, science has placed at our disposal means

* This article is based on an address at a meeting of members of both Houses of Parliament and visitors convened by the National League at the House of Commons during the sittings of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Reforms.

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and methods by which that end can be achieved. We have only to consider the conditions which have led to the World Economic Conference to see that the fulfilment of the task is imperative for the welfare, not only of Islamic countries, but of the world at large.

One of the main causes of the diminished economic importance of Muslim lands before the war was the absence of cheap means of transport. They were essentially land-locked continental areas with—here and there—a window to the sea. Bays and channels and inland seas were rare, if not wholly absent. The great rivers such as the Nile, the Indus, and the Euphrates were far apart and were separated by vast continental areas. When railways came in other countries the initial cost of that form of communication made it difficult, if not impossible, to build and equip sufficient lines to give Islam a due share in the nineteenth century prosperity of the West.

Today new and cheap forms of communication have revolutionized the outlook upon the geographical and economical conditions of these undeveloped lands. Motor traffic—for which vast amounts of petrol can be found in the very heart of the land of Islam, in Persia, and Arabia—has made it possible, with the development of roads, once more to bring commercial prosperity to the furthest interior of these countries.

The aeroplane is replacing the camel as "the ship of the desert," and cheap aviation will make every part of these countries easy of access. Overland travel from Europe to the heart of Asia is far quicker, safer, and more convenient, and is held to be much more pleasant and interesting than the sea voyage.

Thus the process started after the sixteenth century is being reversed, and once more the great and populous lands of Eastern and Southern Asia can communicate with Europe over land rather than by sea. The immense importance of this transformation to all concentrated and quick forms of trade is obvious. The world depression, which has shown the insufficiency of markets for West and East alike, will lead every manufacturing country to turn its eyes to this new world of Islam which again, after 400 years, takes its place among the great markets of the world.

Political and territorial adjustments that followed the war have placed Great Britain and her Empire in a peculiarly advantageous position to benefit to the full from these developments. The old bureaucratic Ottoman Empire has been broken up and replaced by the nationalistic States of Iraq and Arabia and by Turkey. Persia has been freed from the political dominance of Russia. The old Empire of the Czars which—with the help of protective tariffs—hoped to dominate the markets of Western Asia with dumped goods has disappeared. The new Communist
Socialist Soviet Republic has not so far shaped an industrial and economic system by which it can seriously compete with the export trade of a highly organized and experienced commercial community such as exists in this country.

It may be argued by some of my readers that the countries of Western Asia are poor. But I would point out that since the war there has been a radical change in this respect. Afghanistan has no public debt. The capital debt of Persia is less than the receipts of the Shah’s Government in one year from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Arabia has no external debt, and in Iraq the debt commitments are very small. The bearing of these facts on the question of trade relations is obvious. The countries I have named are not among the nations which must export goods for the purpose of paying debt and interest charges. Consequently they can buy our British and Indian goods by the mutually beneficial method of exchange of commodities.

Great Britain has today very friendly relations with Egypt, and her moral influence in that part of the world is greater than ever in the past. I think this can be said with equal truth about all Arab lands, and I have every hope that a fair and equitable adjustment of conflicting claims will be made in Palestine. With the new kingdom of Iraq and her ruler this Empire is happily not only on terms of friendship, but of intimate co-operation. There are no serious political differences with Persia or Afghanistan. Of the 80 millions of Indian Muslims a large proportion inhabit the borders of these very States, and thus come within the geographical limits of the solid Muslim economic block to which I have referred. The Muslims of North-Western India can become the great bridge-head for further trade development, economic improvement, and healthy, peaceful, commercial rivalry both for the manufacturers of this country and for the producers of India and Burma.

There used to be a saying when I was young that “trade followed the flag.” Today we can go further and say “Trade follows friendship.” The Muslims of India are happily placed in being the link alike in friendship and in trade between the people of Great Britain on one side and those of Islamic lands on the other, and also between the vast Hindu population of India and Muslim countries to their west. But this friendship can hardly grow as quickly as the economic needs of the world require today, nor can it be built without a full and complete understanding of each other’s mentality.

I desire to place some practical suggestions before you as my British fellow-subjects for expediting the process which we should all welcome. It is urgent because it will go far towards the economic regeneration of Muslim countries on the one hand and the
improvement of export trade and employment in this country on the other.

I could give many practical illustrations in respect of the opportunities for business which are available. But I will mention only one of these. We all know how great a place insurance fills in modern business life. The development of this branch of business in South America enured to the benefit of well-established insurance companies in Great Britain and the United States. But it does not seem to be realized that in the Islamic countries to which I have referred the insurance business is non-existent. In all these lands there is hardly a house, or life, or packet of merchandise owned by the inhabitants which has been insured. In this field alone there are enormous possibilities which have never been touched. It is not an over-estimate to put the potential capital value of insurances to be effected in these countries at £200,000,000.

Some years ago it was usual to hear fathers of families of nearly all classes in Britain say that they would like their children to learn Spanish and Portuguese so as to be prepared to take advantage of the economic development of South America then in sight. But the Muslim countries to which I refer have potential wealth and trade possibilities which can favourably compare with those vast regions of South America, the development of which has proved insufficient for the business enterprise of the people of this country. Might it not be possible for at least some of the younger English people to learn Persian, or Arabic, or Urdu? In addition to the stimulus knowledge of these languages would give to mental and spiritual understanding between East and West, the practical and commercial advantages would be great. Incidentally, anyone with a knowledge of one of these languages can easily familiarize himself with the other two, since they are intimately related. As a knowledge of Spanish is necessary for those who go out for trade in South America, so for trade with Islamic countries a knowledge of at least one of the three principal languages there spoken is essential for the realization of all the possibilities.

Another thing which has so far been neglected in Muslim lands (perhaps through the want of cheap and easy communications hitherto) is the supply of commercial travellers suited to the conditions of today. Such men ought to be able to sell the goods that are required and for which markets are needed and, on the other hand, to buy the local goods for this country.

Many of you know the regular commercial traveller on the Continent and in America. I have seen him in wayside inns all over Europe and found him both modest and efficient. A great many not only sell, but also buy, and a number bring back news as to the kind of material needed and the kind of manufacture
required. The same methods applied to Muslim countries by an efficient corps of commercial travellers would, I am sure, give most satisfactory results. In this great work the Muslims of India can become coadjutors and partners, they can become the helpmates of their British fellow-subjects of the King as well as of their co-religionists throughout the rest of the Middle and Near East.

There is no wish on our part for exclusiveness, and no jealousy, but an intuitive yearning after an understanding and co-operation for mutual benefit. I know very well the feelings and sentiments not only of my Muslim countrymen, but of Muslims generally. Everywhere they show not only willingness, but a sincere desire for political, cultural, and, above all, financial, economic, and commercial co-operation with the people of this land.
INDIAN MUSLIMS AND THE REFORMS

By Sir Muhammed Yakub, M.L.A.

None who are acquainted with the present condition of India will doubt the urgent need of expanding the Indian Constitution in order to meet the legitimate demands of all classes and communities of her people.

The Musalmans are not behind any other community in India in their desire to see their country holding an honourable position and a respectable status in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Indeed, it is inevitable that they should hold this view, since the very essence of Islam is that ideal of brotherhood and human equality which sums up all we mean by democracy. It would not, therefore, be right to think that the Musalmans of India are a stumbling block in the way of the progress of their country. Having ruled in India for about ten centuries, and having lost their empire through the blunders of their monarchs, and having suffered immensely since the Mutiny of 1857, the Musalmans are naturally anxious that trust and freedom should not be misused. They are determined that the germs of anarchy and revolution, which brought the overthrow of the Muslim rule in India, shall not again destroy their country. A wise man always takes a lesson from the miseries and misfortunes of his predecessors, and I hope that the British will not lose sight of the causes which brought about the downfall of Muslim rule in India.

My next point is this. Today, all over the world, in Europe, America, and Asia, after a long period of political stability and quiescence, ideas, policies, and institutions are in the melting-pot once more. Political constitutions are being moulded to the new conditions set up by the war, the progress of mechanical, scientific, and industrial discovery and development, and so on. These great forces are at work in India also, and we Muslims who are essentially "political animals" naturally desire that they shall be recognized in our new Constitution. A constitution based on a priori notions or outworn conditions is doomed from its birth.

To the Musalmans of India the British connection is a matter of the utmost importance; their sympathies and interests extend far beyond the limits of India, and the peaceful maintenance and development of all they value depends on England retaining her predominant place in the world. It is therefore essential for us to associate ourselves wholeheartedly with the maintenance of law and order, to co-operate loyally with the servants of the Crown in promoting the welfare of the country, and to put aside
any wild and visionary dreams about India's sudden emergence to independence. At the same time, far be it from us to recommend that we should cease to urge our claims to our fullest share of the benefits of British rule, or forego our right in the general advancement of the world.

Let me make it quite clear that I, and those who think with me in India—and I assure my readers that their number is very large amongst the educated classes of my community—are most grateful to the Prime Minister and the Right Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, for their sincere efforts to meet the wishes and satisfy the aspirations of my countrymen. I wish also to make it clear that we, the Musalmans of India, are not actuated by any ill-will or antagonism towards any other community. We are animated with the single desire of safeguarding our rights and interests in such a form as will give us an assured position in the political institutions of the country without making any encroachment upon the legitimate rights of any other community.

Now it is clear that India is going to enter on a period of much fuller experience of the actual working of democratic institutions than any she has known in the past. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the engineers who will handle the machinery which is about to be set up shall possess some expert knowledge. Consequently the association of the foreign engineers and mechanics who have been working at it for centuries is very essential. Of course, to continue my analogy, many of the engineers and mechanics of the future will have to be selected ultimately by the rough and ready method of democratic election. The question of the franchise is, then, of fundamental importance. In my opinion no case has been made out for any sweeping extension of the franchise at present, and the balance of argument is against it. Under the system of administration that is proposed greater responsibilities will devolve upon the various Governments than ever before. And it is imperative that the electorate should be capable of understanding the value and use of their vote. All experience goes to show that the extension of the franchise should keep pace with, but not go ahead of, the spread of education and the development of political knowledge. In Great Britain it was a very gradual process, covering a long period of time. In 1832 only 3 per cent. of the population were enfranchised; 9 per cent. in 1868, and 16 per cent. in 1884. Since the introduction of Reforms in India, since 1921, there has not been such a great change in the educational knowledge, economic conditions, and political experience of the people as would make it desirable to lower the franchise too much. Any undue lowering would inevitably mean the complete transfer of power to the illiterate and
the inexperienced, and would tend to exclude from the Legislature men with a sense of responsibility and experience of administration. To my mind the franchise should remain for the present substantially as it is, and I favour giving to the provincial Legislative Councils power to alter the franchise in each province as their experience makes it expedient. It must be remembered that India is not a country but a sub-continent. The difference in the conditions prevailing in the different provinces in India is as great as, if not more than, in the different countries in Europe. Would it ever be within the range of practical politics to frame one single Constitution for the whole of Europe? How could it therefore be possible, or even prudent, to frame one single Constitution for the whole of India. Different provinces must therefore have different qualifications for franchise and different systems of election.

Now as regards the enfranchisement of women, far be it from me to impose any inferiority of status on the womenfolk of my country. Indeed, as a Musalman, I am compelled to allow her full equality of status. I would therefore like to place women on the same level as men and I would have the same qualifications for them relating to property or education as for men. I think it would lower the prestige of a woman if she were placed on the electoral roll only because she happened to be the wife of a certain male elector. Then again in India polygamy is not very unusual, and it would be highly illogical to give the vote to one wife and not to the other, having the same legal and social status. Then again I consider it to be very unjust to deprive a woman of her vote, after using it for a very long time, as soon as she loses her husband. Also, I do not see any reason why the wife of an ordinary voter should have the right to vote while the mother or the wife of a soldier or policeman, who has rendered invaluable services in the defence of his country, or lost his life in the service of the Crown, should be deprived of it. I am therefore strongly opposed to creating any artificial qualifications for women other than those, or in addition to those, of men.

It is the provincial administration rather than the Central Government which comes into close contact with the lives of the people, and it is in them that the most important devolution of power can immediately be made. I should not be considered as being opposed to the introduction of reforms in the Centre for an indefinite period, but for the reasons given above I contend that the immediate establishment of full provincial autonomy and responsibility, under conditions which will guarantee the security and stability of the administration, is essential. I am convinced that the surest means of establishing political peace and contentment in India lies in establishing at once, in the
fullest possible manner, real and effective responsibility, which would rally all the best elements in the country to the Government and induce them to put their shoulders to the wheel. This leads to the important question of law and order. I recommend that the transfer of law and order should be accompanied by two conditions essential to secure the stability we have in view: they are, the placing of the judiciary under the control of the High Courts, and the appointment of a head of the police force from the All-India services to assist the minister in charge of this portfolio. The complete independence of the judiciary from any possibility of political control or bias is the hall-mark of a constitutional state. My recommendation, therefore, is that the minister for law and order should be relieved of responsibility for the control of the judiciary, which should be vested in the jurisdiction of the High Courts, and through them be made directly responsible to the Crown. I also consider that the heads of provincial police forces should be members of the All-India services, because that will guarantee their complete freedom from any trace of provincial patriotism or communalism and bring to the control of the department the wide official outlook which comes from experience in the superior services. I cannot agree that by the imposition of these conditions the transfer of law and order will be incomplete or a sham. The tradition of the All-India services is one of complete loyalty to those set in authority over them, and I have no doubt that the heads of the police so appointed will be fully loyal to the Government and the ministers they serve.

Turning now to the Central Government, I submit that, for the great majority of us in India, Federation originally was conceived as the Federation of British Indian provinces. The Indian Princes were not included in the picture. I have the greatest regard for our Indian Princes, and consider the existence and stability of Indian States in India very essential in order to maintain the ancient glory and civilization of the country; but the association of the Indian States with the Federation has created innumerable difficulties in the establishment of our Constitution. In the first place, the linking up of democracy with autocracy is a very uncongenial combination which has never before been tried and is obviously very liable to set up dangerous strains and stresses. I am therefore of opinion that in starting the construction of our federal structure the British Indian provinces should first be brought within the compound, and room should be left for blocks of the Indian States to be added afterwards. Otherwise the introduction of Reforms in the Central Government will come only after long suspense and uncertainty. Then responsibility in the Centre must come under conditions securing
the safety of the framework of administration. The question of defence in India is an extremely important and difficult one. We have a very long and wild land frontier extending along the north, through which all the conquerors of India have entered in the past except the British. The establishment of great maritime Powers has also made the defence of India by the sea very difficult. Therefore Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Political Relations should remain outside the domain of the transferred subjects.

All that the Indian Musalmans want is fair treatment and bare justice. They do not want to be given a share in the administration for which they are not fully equipped. They do not wish to be placed in charge of difficult and delicate offices if they are not thoroughly qualified for them. The Muslim claim is not for spoon-feeding, but for not being kept out on the ground that they are Musalmans. The strained relations between the Hindu and Muslim communities arise in no small measure out of the desire of the young men of each community to secure Government posts. Partly owing to the greater economic pressure to which they are subject, and partly in consequence of their past history and traditions, this desire amongst the Musalmans is a matter of life and death for my community. The paucity of careers for educated Indians has accentuated the trouble. It follows that if we Indians want to avoid jealousies, intrigues, and incessant friction an effort should be made to define each community's share in the public services. The number of posts allotted the Musalmans will obviously vary from province to province. And it seems that in the absence of a more workable basis we might fix it at the figure assigned to each community for the purposes of representation. It is obvious that the population basis, in this connection, would be highly unsatisfactory and misleading. The late Sir Antony (subsequently Lord) MacDonnell, sometime Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, who was regarded by the Musalmans as hostile to their interests, had to admit the Muslim claim for a larger number in Government service than that to which they would have been entitled on a population basis. In a speech in 1900 he said:

"I must say that, subject to the general rule, the best man for an important post should get it irrespective of creed or race, the Muhammadans could not fairly claim more than three appointments for every five appointments going to the Hindus."

And his policy was initiated for a province in which the Musalmans are only 14 per cent. of the population.
The next point on which the Musalmans lay the greatest stress is the preservation of their culture, religion, and laws. The violent utterances of certain Hindu leaders have made the Musalmans extremely nervous about this matter, and therefore it is very necessary, from the Muslim point of view, that guarantees as regards the above-mentioned two points shall be by statute. Sir Samuel Hoare’s evidence before the Joint Select Committee makes it quite clear, “that nothing can be inserted in the Instrument of Instructions that is not within the framework of the Act.” And as Lord Reading is reported in the Press to have observed:

“Although letters of instruction might be referred to by a court of law in trying to construe what was intended, it did not affect the position. No rights of the subject were founded upon it that could be dealt with by a court of law. The rights to be construed by the court were the rights which were prescribed within the statute itself, and could not travel outside.”

A mere mention in the letters of instruction, therefore, is not sufficient. These are the two special demands of the Musalmans, upon which they cannot accept any compromise or alternative.
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE IN INDIA

By Dr. P. P. Pillai

It is now about five years since the International Labour Organization of the League of Nations began its experiment of having an outpost established in India. Ever since the inception of the Labour Organization, it has been making every effort to keep in living touch with the day-to-day developments in industrial and social matters taking place in the more important countries of the world. For this purpose, it has been found necessary to appoint permanent representatives at London, Paris, Washington, Berlin, Rome, and Tokio, and more recently at New Delhi and Nanking; and national correspondents in eleven other capitals. The opening of the first few branch offices of the Geneva organization suggested to the Indian representatives to the Labour Conference the desirability of having a similar branch started in India as well. There were, indeed, many reasons why a representative of Geneva had to be posted permanently in India. In the first place, the claim of India to take rank with the eight leading industrial countries of the world having been upheld by the Council of the League of Nations, and India having thus established her right to a permanent seat on the Governing Body of the Labour Organization, it was but natural that the Government of India and the leaders of Indian industry and labour should desire that closer and more intimate relations should be maintained between India and Geneva.* There was also the feeling on the part of the Government and of the employers of labour in India that such closer relations, which must necessarily lead to a fuller knowledge of the economic conditions of India at Geneva, would help considerably to influence the decisions taken at the International Labour Conferences, in so far as they had a reference to India. One of the clauses of Article XIII. of

* Thus, for example, Sir B. N. Mitra, the Chief Delegate of the Government of India to the Conference of 1932, referring to the importance of securing the close co-operation of all non-European States, said: "It is indeed a pleasure to find that, so far as India is concerned, the necessary means for establishing contacts now exist in the shape of a branch office of the International Labour Organization in Delhi, which is doing most useful work—work which I am glad to find is appreciated by the Employers' and Workers' Delegates from India" (page 241, Record of Proceedings of the Sixteenth Session of the I.L. Conference. See also pages 82 and 234 of the same volume for the opinions expressed by the Employers' and Workers' Delegates).
the Peace Treaty clearly lays down that due recognition ought to be given to the differences of climate, habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial traditions, in the attempt to enforce uniformity in the conditions of labour throughout the world. Nevertheless, the suspicion lurked in certain quarters that, in the zeal for social progress which is one of the most hopeful features of the Labour Conference, the special conditions prevailing in a particular country might be overlooked in the endeavour, however altruistic it may be, to establish uniformity in labour legislation. The workers of India, on the other hand, were apprehensive that, in the absence of an impartial observer in their midst, too much stress might be laid on the backwardness of the existing social system in India, and that any undue emphasis on the "special conditions" prevailing in this country might put off to the Greek Kalends all prospects and programmes of social reform. Early, therefore, in the history of the Labour Organization, Mr. N. M. Joshi, the universally respected champion of Indian labour, pressed before his colleagues in the Conference the necessity for having one of Geneva's own men permanently stationed as an economic and social "observer" in India. All the Indian labour representatives who attended the International Labour Conferences till 1928 added their voices to that of Mr. Joshi, including, among others, men of such opposing schools of political thought as the late Mr. Joseph Baptista and the late Lala Lajpat Rai. The request put forward by the exponents of Indian labour opinion was strongly supported by the representatives both of the Government and of the employing classes. Sir Atul Chatterjee, who represents the Government of India at Geneva, was enthusiastic in his support of the idea, and the views of Mr. G. D. Birla and the late Seth Narottam Morarjee welcoming the idea of an Indian branch may be regarded as fully representative of the opinion of the Indian commercial and industrial community. A considerable part of Mr. Birla's speech in the Conference of 1927 was devoted to the proposal for the establishment of an Indian branch which he regarded "as a move in the right direction"; and his successor as Indian Employers' Delegate "noted with pleasure" the decision of the Governing Body to have an outpost of the International Labour Office set up in New Delhi.

I started my work as the representative of Geneva in India on November 15, 1928, and in the light of the experience gained during the past five years, an attempt may be made to trace the possible lines of useful activity which lie open before the Indian branch of the International Labour Office. To deal satisfactorily with this aspect of the problem of India's relations with "the world's industrial parliament," it is necessary briefly-
to recall the objects which the framers of the Peace Treaty had
in calling into existence the new international organization. The
preamble to Part XIII. of the Treaty may here be referred to; it
runs as follows:—

"Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the
establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be
established only if it is based upon social justice;

"And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such
injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people
as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony
of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those
conditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the
regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment
of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of
the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the
provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the
worker against sickness, disease, and injury arising out of
his employment, the protection of children, young persons
and women, provision for old age and injury, protection of
the interests of workers when employed in countries other
than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of
association, the organization of vocational and technical
education and other measures;

"Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane
conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other
nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own
countries;

"The High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of
justice and humanity as well as by the desire to secure the
permanent peace of the world, agree to the following."

It was felt that a mere enunciation of principles of social
reform, however generous, would mark no advance upon the
past unless provision was made at the same time for getting those
principles effectively translated into practice. The main object
of the International Labour Organization is thus to keep the
principles enunciated in the Peace Treaty in the foreground, and
to see that they actively influence the social legislation of each
country. But it would be wrong to imagine that the only
function of the I.L.O. was to legislate for the industrial classes.
Though started primarily to improve social conditions all the
world over by gradually levelling social legislation up to the
standard prevailing in the most advanced countries, it has
become, in addition, a great international research institution.
By ascertaining the facts of industrial life and progress and by
disseminating this knowledge by means of its numerous publica-
tions, the I.L.O. is attempting to create public opinion, both national and international, which will stand for social justice in all its forms.

One of the main functions of the Indian branch is to aid the central office in the collection and distribution of information on all subjects relating to labour conditions, whether in this country or abroad. The Geneva Office, which attaches the highest importance to the collection of the most recent and up-to-date information on these subjects, has established contacts with all important government departments and employers' and workers' organizations in each country; and its research department contains sections and services dealing, inter alia, with statistics, industrial legislation, unemployment, industrial health and safety, social insurance, disablement, agriculture, technical and vocational education, etc. In short, no aspect of the industrial problem is overlooked at Geneva; and in keeping themselves au courant with the latest developments in this sphere they are considerably assisted by the numerous publications, both official and unofficial, which are every day reaching Geneva in large numbers. There is, however, an important limitation to the value of information gathered exclusively from printed documents, and the representatives of the International Labour Organization are expected to provide the necessary corrective to the abstract, bookish conception of social conditions gathered from documents alone, a conception which is liable to lose touch with reality, and might consequently lead to ill-advised action. In order to overcome this limitation, the Indian branch has already established valuable contacts with the relevant Government Departments, and the leading employers' and workers' organizations in the country. The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and the Associated Chambers of Commerce of India and Ceylon, which represent the Indian and the European commercial and industrial interests in India respectively, are already maintaining close touch with this office. Similarly, the various sectional organizations, such as the Indian Mining Association and the Indian Mining Federation, the Bombay and Ahmedabad Millowners' Associations, the Indian Jute Association, etc., have also been sending us their published literature and keeping us informed from time to time of their views on current economic problems. Nor should I omit to mention in this connection the hearty co-operation we have been receiving from the executives of the various Chambers of Commerce. The problem of keeping in touch with the agricultural industry has

* The All-India Organization of Industrial Employers and the Employers' Federation of India, both of them started during the year, are also keeping themselves in close touch with us.
not proved capable of a ready solution, but thanks to the collaboration of the South Indian Planters' Association, and the sympathy of representatives of the Assam tea industry, it has been found possible to follow the trend of events in the organized planting industry. As regards maritime workers, the various port trusts have been sending us their official publications, and in the inquiry which we undertook some time ago into the question of seamen's welfare in ports, not only these bodies, but also the various institutions connected with seamen at Rangoon, Calcutta, Karachi and Bombay, proved very helpful in supplying us with the data needed. The workers' organizations have been even more eager to co-operate with us and give us of their best, though it may now be confessed that, at the time of starting the I.L.O.'s branch in India, we were rather dubious as to the reception we would meet with from the side of organized labour. It will be remembered that the leaven of communism was very active in the Indian labour world of 1928, and that this communist element has as one of its principal tenets the inculcation of a spirit of hostility towards all persons with "reformist" tendencies and programmes. In spite of this, I was received with equal cordiality by friends belonging to both the extremist and the moderate wings of labour politics when I attended the Trade Union Congress meetings of 1928 and 1929. On the public platform, some of the extremists advocated the severance of India's connection with the I.L.O., but in private, a good many of them were prepared to co-operate with the I.L.O. in its various spheres of beneficent activity. The arrests in connection with the Meerut case removed from the scene the more vocal of the extremist leaders, and it was therefore impossible to judge how far persons like Messrs. Dhondi Raj Thengdi or Sripad Amrit Dange could have helped or hindered our work. However that may be, the I.L.O. in India was assured, from its very inception, of the unstinted support of that vast mass of organized labour which had sought union under the standards of Messrs. N. M. Joshi, R. R. Bakhale, Jamnadas Mehta, and Syed Munawar in Bombay, V. V. Giri and B. Shiva Rao in Madras, Mirnal Kanti Bose and Aftab Ali in Calcutta, Harihar Nath Shastri in Cawnpore, and Diwan Chamanlal in Lahore. Thanks to the loyal support received from this section of Indian labour, as opposed to the dissident minorities with communist leanings scattered here and there which still want to boycott the I.L.O., it has been possible for Indian co-operation with our work not only to maintain its continuity, but also to expand its scope and character. The leaders of the three most important labour units in India—the National Federation of Trade Unions, the All India Railwaymen's Federation, and the Seamen's Organizations of Bombay
and Calcutta—have represented Indian labour at Geneva on several occasions; and from these organizations, as well as from the various individual unions with which we have had the privilege of establishing relationships, we have invariably met with the most generous measure of sympathy and assistance.

In return for the cordial co-operation that we have thus all along been receiving from employers’ and workers’ organizations, we have tried our best to be of service to them by giving them information on various points intimately concerning them in their own work. Here it is possible to draw a line of distinction between the requests for information received from employers’ organizations, and those that were made by workers’ organizations. The employers as a rule wanted enlightenment as to the prevailing conditions in other countries in the industries in which they were interested. The cotton millowners were among the first employers to avail themselves of our service, and the problems which interested them most were conditions in the competing industries of Lancashire, Japan, and China. Particular stress was laid on the conditions of labour and the amenities provided for it in other countries; and it was with real pleasure that this office undertook to obtain for them the information they wanted, as the nature of their inquiries clearly revealed a genuine desire to improve the conditions of Indian labour. It is pleasing to us to note that our efforts in the direction of satisfactorily responding to the enquiries addressed to us have been generously recognized by our correspondents. One of the foremost employers of labour in India wrote to us some time ago: “I see the great possibilities of your office and the valuable information that Indian industry can obtain from it,” and offered even to reimburse the office for the expenses it may have been put to in collecting the information he wanted. Reimbursement, of course, was out of the question, since the raison d’être of our organization is to serve industry and labour; but we must confess we were pleased with the offer, for when a hard-headed business man offers to pay for anything, it is because he finds the thing really worth paying for. “Unsolicited testimonials” of a like nature have been coming in from many other sources, and we should have been less than human if these have not encouraged us to pursue our work with greater enthusiasm.

As contrasted with the demands from the employers’ side, it is significant that the requests received from Indian workers’ associations are mostly concerned with the question of organization. This does not by any means mean that the problem of organization is the only problem in which they are interested; it was but natural that conditions of wages and service should also have been dealt with in many of their communications. The
fact, however, remains that the Indian worker of today is more vitally interested in the ways and means of creating class-consciousness and class solidarity than in anything else. He feels that organization is more than half way to victory, and that it is imperative for the preservation of his own interests that he should belong to a body fully and unchallengeably representative of his class, in order that his case may be convincingly stated and adequately defended before the whole world. The cross-currents of labour opinion in this country perplex and bewilder him; the times are out of joint; and in his efforts to reason out a policy for himself and his brothers, he is now slowly learning that the path marked out by Geneva—the path of progressive improvement—is the only one that can lead him to his desired end. He also finds that the war-cry of his class—"Workers of the World! Unite!"—has approached its nearest realization under the aegis of Geneva. For, though the International Labour Organization consists of the representatives of governments and employers besides those of his own class, the workers who meet together at Geneva are in fact, if not in name, the representatives of the largest and the most coherent labour organizations it has yet been possible to call into being. In the workers’ group of the Geneva Conferences, the International Federation of Trade Unions of Paris and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions at Utrecht, together with the representatives of certain national movements not affiliated to either, work in unison, and in fact act as an ad hoc organization of over thirty million workers. In allying himself, therefore, with this mighty organization under the auspices of Geneva, the Indian worker feels his class consciousness satisfied, while at the same time he obtains the moral support of labour throughout the world for any just battle he may be engaged in.

A review, however cursory it may be, of the nature of the enquiries that flow into the Indian branch of the International Labour Office will reveal how varied and multitudinous are the problems for the solution of which the general public looks to Geneva. A few cases may here be cited. It would appear that some building contractors in a certain part of India habitually employ coolies for seven or eight days and then dismiss them without paying for the work already done. Has there been legislation in any country to prevent this kind of injustice, seeing that the coolies are too poor to sue their employers even in a small cause court? Can we supply information regarding the constitutions of the Board of Commissioners or trustees of the more important ports of the British Empire? What are the terms of employment of textile workers in Lancashire? What are the collective agreements in force in the major industries of Great
Britain? Are there any countries where strikes without notice are penalized by law? What are the prevailing rates of piece and time wages in the cotton mills of Lancashire and Japan? What is the general practice in other countries as regards recognition of labour unions? What are the hours of work on board ship while in harbour and at sea? Can this office supply information as to how the new Japanese Factory Act Amendment is being enforced? What are the social amenities usually provided by textile manufacturers for their employees? How can unemployment of the educated classes be prevented? What are the conditions of labour prevailing in Indian States? What is the economic condition of graduate employees in England and Germany? Can the International Labour Office take steps to better the conditions of the elementary and second grade teachers in India? Can we draft a Memorandum and articles of Association for a Labour Bank in India? These, to take a few examples, indicate the range and amplitude of the enquiries coming into the Indian branch; and though the amount of research which this sort of work entails has often reduced me and my colleagues to exhaustion, none of us has ever had occasion to feel that the work lacks either variety or interest. Occasionally, we also get a comic touch as when some enterprising university student naively suggests that we might prepare for him a thesis on an economic subject which he might submit to his university.

Altogether the response which the Indian public has been giving to the Indian branch of the I.L.O. has been distinctly encouraging. Apart from our duty of disseminating accurate information on industrial questions, the Indian branch has also to win for itself and its parent institution public sympathy and support. The late Lord Burnham once advised us "not to advance under a smoke screen," but, in view of the humanitarian interest which actuates the work of the I.L.O., to spread by every legitimate means accurate knowledge of the kind of work it is undertaking. Already, during the first decade of its life, it has succeeded not only in getting a more or less apathetic world to accept its new ideals of social justice, but has also been directly instrumental in persuading various industrial countries to adopt practical measures of far-reaching social reform. In India there had been, for long, the feeling that the League and the I.L.O. were bodies the orbit of which lay in Europe, and that non-European countries were roped in only to create the semblance of universality for these institutions. But this charge is no longer levelled against Geneva, since even countries like the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., which have so long ostentatiously refused to participate in its work, have now made it a practice to send their representatives to Geneva Conferences. As regards the I.L.O., its
composition is even more universal than that of the League of Nations, and the system for national representation, both in its Governing Body and in its Conference, which it has evolved, enables the voice not only of Governments but also of the leading spokesmen of labour and industrialism to be effectively heard. In its editorial of July 6 last, the Leader of Allahabad points out how, in this respect again, the I.L.O. stands ahead of the League; and refers to the Government of India being represented on the Governing Body of the I.L.O. by a permanent member in the person of Sir Atul Chatterjee, while the interests of Indian industries and labour are there looked after by two deputy members, Messrs. D. Erulkar and N. M. Joshi respectively. Sir Atul has indeed been India's representative at several Imperial and international conferences, but it is undeniable that it is through his connection with the I.L.O. that he has made his most effective contribution to raise India's status in the comity of nations. In 1927 he was unanimously elected President of the Tenth International Labour Conference—the first time that the honour of guiding the work of an international deliberative body has been conferred on an Indian. An even higher honour was in store for him and for India, for, in 1932, he was unanimously elected the Chairman of the Governing Body, and by virtue of his position, stood second only to the President of the Council in the hierarchy of the League.

While this sentimental consideration has played its own part in rebutting the charge that the I.L.O. was not really universal in character, there is the even more remarkable fact that, under the impulsion of Geneva, the countries of the East have displayed a surprising readiness to undertake and carry out progressive social reforms. India has already ratified no less than thirteen Draft Conventions and adopted a great many Recommendations passed by the various Labour Conferences.* The atmosphere necessary for the carrying out of these measures of social reform was generated under Geneva's direct influence. The passing of the amended Factories and Mines Acts, the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Trade Unions Act, etc., is by itself sufficient to prove the value and usefulness of our connection with the world-currents of social progress which converge at Geneva. Several other schemes for social betterment are now engaging the attention of the Government which is anxious to implement, as far as it can, the various recommendations of the Royal Commission on Indian Labour, so ably presided over by Mr. Whitley. What is even more important than the measures for the redress

* For a detailed study of what India has gained through her membership of the I.L.O., see *India and the I.L.O.*, Banailli Readership Lectures, 1929-30, University of Patna."
of labour grievances which the Indian legislature has already passed is the spirit that has been introduced into India as a result of our contact with the I.L.O. Public interest in the entire question has been actively stimulated and measures are now being initiated which might not otherwise have been even thought of. This is full of significance, for the International Labour Organization is not so much an institution as the symbol of the hopes and aspirations of humanity; and Geneva connotes to the thinking mind not a group of offices, but a new temper, a new spirit, a new mentality. It stands for concord instead of discord; and in the industrial world, particularly, it has taught us to think of Government, employers and workers, not as elements fighting with one another, but as joint partners in a glorious enterprise.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATES OF THE LEVANT UNDER THE FRENCH MANDATE

BY CAMILLE FIDEL

(Member of the International Colonial Institute)

Although geographically the States of the Levant under the French mandate seem to be more homogeneous than the Asiatic countries under the British mandate, the problem of their status and evolution presents much the same diversity, as well as a certain parallelism. In the hinterland, the kingdom of Iraq is no longer under the British mandate and has become an independent State, connected, however, with Great Britain by a treaty of alliance which includes certain guarantees of an imperial character; the Syrian Republic, also in the hinterland, is still under the French mandate, and the political unsetlement which has hitherto marked that State explains why attempts to substitute a Franco-Syrian treaty for the mandate have hitherto been unsuccessful. In the Mediterranean, just as there is no question of making a change in the British mandate over Palestine, where the method of direct rule allows Great Britain to play the indispensable part of arbiter in the rivalry between Jews and Arabs, nor in the British mandate over Transjordania which is now a constitutional monarchy, so also in the Lebanon and the other small States under the French mandate which have been given constitutional forms it does not seem practicable, owing to the differences in race, religions, and aspirations which separate their peoples from the Syrians, to contemplate, in any near future, a radical change in the present state of things. It may be added that in the States under the French mandate there is, in the form of an organization for their common interests, a bond of law, the like of which is not to be found in the countries under the British mandate.

Geographical Sketch

The States of the Levant under the French mandate have a total area of about 150,000 square kilometres and include, on the Mediterranean, the Republic of the Lebanon; the States of the Alaouites; the Sanjak of Alexandretta which is an autonomous part of the State of Syria; in the hinterland, south, the small district forming the State of the Jebel Druses; and the State of Syria, the most important of these territories, comprising the ancient vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo; and east, a great region
including the Syrian desert and reaching to the upper valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris (the Jezireh). The population is about 2,700,000, not including the nomads of the Syrian desert who are about 200,000; it is greatly diversified as regards race and religion, and the administrative divisions correspond. In Syria, with 1,500,000 inhabitants, the mass of the population are Sunni Muslims; but in the Sanjak of Alexandretta a large part of the population are Turks. In the Lebanon out of a total of over 800,000 inhabitants nearly half are Christians of various sects, of which the Maronites are the most important community; the rest of the population are Muslims and Druses. The people in the jurisdiction of the States of the Alaouites (350,000) and the Jebel Druses (60,000) belong respectively to the sects of the Ansariehs and the Druses. Since the beginning of the mandate the population has been constantly increased by foreign elements: one may reckon at about 200,000 the Armenian refugees from Turkey, and for several years Kurds and Tcherkesses have made their way across the northern frontier and have settled in the plains of the upper Jezireh. The population is very unevenly spread, owing to the difficult character of the soil and the differing climatic conditions: in the coastal region with a Mediterranean climate, on the western slope of the lofty chain of the Lebanon, there are eighty inhabitants to the square kilometre; on the plains in the interior, with a very dry continental climate, the density decreases to fifteen, and falls still lower in the solitudes of the Syrian East. This is explained by the fact that nearly half the population of the State of Syria is grouped in four towns—Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama.

The natural products are very varied: cultivation of vegetables in the coastland and the oases; fruit cultivation in the orchards and vineyards of the hill districts; rich industrial cultivation in the low plains; cereals on the high plains; grasses on the vast steppes of the east, where the nomads pasture their numerous flocks, the breeding of which constitutes an important source of wealth.

The Small States under the Mandate

In accordance with the duties imposed by the mandate the French High Commission endeavours loyally to prepare these populations for governing themselves, to set them gradually on the road to independence. With that aim it has undertaken to endow them, on the one hand, with the equipment necessary for the development of the country, and on the other hand, as far as practicable, with the instruments of government and with representative institutions. The steps to be taken, however, were not
the same everywhere in territories whose populations are more or less advanced and are distinct in race, religion, interests, aspirations: and on the other hand, it was necessary to afford them the possibility of an apprenticeship for political liberty and to avoid premature haste in leading them along the road to emancipation.

What has just happened in the Lebanon goes to prove this. The Mountain is by far the most advanced part of the territories under the French mandate; and Lebanon society, thanks to the numerous schools and the two universities at its disposal, has reached the highest intellectual level, perhaps, of all the Asiatic Orient. In 1926 the Lebanon Republic received its constitution. But this new system, with the machinery of government and parliament and bureaucracy that it involved, proved far too burdensome for the little State; the yield of the taxes, with which the people were overloaded, served chiefly to maintain over-numerous and partly useless officials, and the public works were neglected, though the budget had been doubled in six years. Faced with the general discontent and with the menace of bankruptcy M. Henri Ponsot, the High Commissioner, had to decide to suspend the constitution provisionally; the President of the Republic, M. Charles Debbas, whose functions were extended, obtained full power to make decrees having the force of law, and he has now taken in hand the task of simplifying the administrative machine and putting the finances right.

This step back may obviously retard the freedom of the Lebanon; people, indeed, are facing a revision of the Lebanon constitution on models better suited to the local needs, with institutions less liberal perhaps, but certainly simpler. Although the eventual making of a treaty between France and the Lebanon in the future is not abandoned, the maintenance of the French protection in this coastal region is held to be an absolute necessity. Even granting that the annexation of districts peoples by Muslims has disturbed the original cohesion of a society which formerly was in large majority Christian, still the Mountain forms a distinct entity—geographic, ethnographic, economic—turned towards Europe and Mediterranean civilization, and, with the exception of some Muslim elements in the recently annexed districts, the people of the Lebanon, especially the Christians and, above all, the Maronites, desire to safeguard their nationality, under the mandate of France, and are resolutely opposed to any annexation to Syria, with its Muslim mentality.

At the other pole, so to speak, of the social evolution in the countries under the French mandate are the two small territories, the Jebel Druses and the State of the Alaouites, which have been placed under direct administration. The former, which has been under military control since the end of the revolt in 1926, is
governed by the General in command of the forces, aided by a council of government; the restoration of security and the improvement in the economic situation, thanks especially to road construction, testify to the success of this administration. The State of the Alauites, called also the government of Latakia, has had at its head a French governor, aided by a representative council; the inhabitants, who are of the sect of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, are now protected from the religious persecutions they suffered from the Sunni Muslims, and would not on any account become part of the State of Syria, the less so because the French administration has transformed the country by endowing it with a network of roads and a harbour, and by encouraging its agricultural development by suitable measures.

North of the State of the Alauites, also in the coastal region, the Sanjak of Alexandretta includes among its inhabitants a good proportion, 30 to 40 per cent., of Turks. Stirred by a violent campaign inspired from Angora, the aim of which was to get the district of Antioch and Alexandretta considered purely Turkish, they had a tendency to look to the other side of the frontier, but this is gradually diminishing. Numerous also in the Sanjak of Alexandretta are the Armenians, refugees from Cilicia; the Arabs there are only a minority. On account of its special character resulting from this composition of the population, the Sanjak of Alexandretta, while forming an integral part of the State of Syria—it has lately elected some Moderate deputies to the Damascus parliament—has been endowed with a wide administrative and budgetary autonomy; and the mutessarif, aided by an administrative council, exercises, by delegation from the President of the State of Syria, the functions of a head of the State. The economic progress of the country and its improvement in sanitation are proof of the good results achieved in the Sanjak under its special system.

**Syrian Politics**

The State of Syria received a Republican constitution on May 14, 1930. The elections to the Syrian Parliament, which took place in December, 1931, gave a substantial majority to the Moderates, who were in favour of an agreement with France, and fifty-two of their party were elected, while the Nationalists obtained only seventeen seats; but among the Moderates elected thirty represent the north of Syria, which has its centre in Aleppo, where not one Nationalist got in, while the seventeen Nationalist deputies represent the electors of Damascus, Homs, Hama, etc. Now, at the time of the election by the Chamber of Deputies of the President of the Republic, a coalition between the Nationalists and Moderates of the south secured the victory of the Damascus can-
didate, Mohamed Ali bey el Abed, over the Aleppo candidate, Soubi bey Barakat, the antagonism between south and north taking the place on this occasion of the struggle between parties. The government formed after this election was presided over by Hakki bey el Azem, Moderate, who took for himself, together with the Presidency of the Council, the Ministry of the Interior. But while one portfolio, without any political character, Public Works, was assigned to a Moderate, Selim bey Jambart, two Nationalists were put at the head of the most important departments—Mazhar pasha Razlan, Justice and Public Instruction, Djemil bey Mardam, Finance and Agriculture.

The question was: what would be the fate of this government markedly Nationalist in character, in a parliament where the Moderates have an enormous majority? It was expected that the agreement which had been in force at the Presidential election would be renewed, and at first this optimism seemed to be confirmed. The Nationalist minority appeared to give up their barren system of abstention, and on November 7, 1932, the Syrian Parliament, almost unanimously, voted confidence in the Government, and granted it full power to negotiate with the French Government a treaty of alliance. The High Commissioner, M. Henri Ponsot, on his side, had received instructions to open negotiations, and he was able to make known before the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations the intention of the French Government to encourage, by the conclusion of a treaty with a Syrian government with constitutional responsibility, the evolution of Syria towards independence and sovereignty.

Here it must be pointed out that the question is one of concluding, as in the case of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, a treaty between France and the single State of Syria, in order to satisfy the aspirations of the Syrian people for independence, whilst the mandate system should not cease to be applied to the other States, in accord with the opinion of their respective peoples. Now the negotiations have been used, from the Syrian side, to raise with greater urgency than previously, the question of unity; not indeed Arab unity—a loose phrase and elastic when expedient—but Syrian unity; in other words, practically the incorporation into the State of Syria of the small States of the Alaouites and the Jebel Druses without prejudice to certain reservations affecting the Muslim territories annexed to the Lebanon.

A Nationalist congress held at Aleppo definitely put forward this claim to unity as the only possible basis for the Franco-Syrian treaty, but the Alaouite chiefs and the Druze notables demanded anew, with the utmost plainness, the maintenance of the autonomy of their country under the mandate of France. It may be added that the chief authorities in the Sanjak of Alexandretta
have asked for the maintenance of the present system and for separation from the State of Syria, and that even the chiefs of the Jezireh, the district between the Euphrates and the Tigris peopled with Kurds and Arabs, have declared themselves opposed to Syrian unity and in favour of autonomy.

The Nationalist ministers of the Syrian Cabinet, faced with this formal opposition to their annexionist proposals as contrary to the rights of the peoples to self-determination, tendered their resignations, and were replaced by Moderates. Hakki bey el Azem retained the Presidency of the Council and the Ministry of the Interior, Selim bey Jambart retained Public Works and obtained also Public Instruction; the portfolio of Finance was given to Chaker bey Nimat ech-Chabani, deputy for Aleppo; that of Agriculture and Commerce to Yahya bey el Atahli, deputy for Antioch; and that of Justice to Soliman el Djoukhdar, formerly President of the Court of Cassation, not in parliament. So that it is probable that the Franco-Syrian treaty will be concluded by the French Government with a Moderate Syrian ministry, even though the Moderates themselves are partisans of Syrian unity, but do not make it a sine qua non of the conclusion of the future treaty.

COMMON INTERESTS

One of the reasons for which the Syrians advocate the incorporation of certain small States which are under the French mandate is that the coastal regions include the ports and ways of access to Syria. Beirut, the capital of the Lebanon, the chief maritime and commercial centre of the States under the French mandate, handicapped, however, by the proximity of the Mount of Lebanon, connected with Damascus, the capital of Syria, by a narrow-gauge railway, partly plate-laid, giving poor traffic returns, but also by a good motor road; Tripoli, port of Lebanon, connected with Homs in Syria by a railway of normal gauge, at the end of the French branch of the pipe line which serves to bring to the Mediterranean the petrol of the Mosul region, where it is proposed to construct an air-port, together with an anchorage basin protected by a breakwater; Latakia, capital of the State of the Alaouites, where a small harbour has been constructed; Alexandretta, the capital of the autonomous sanjak of that name, the port of Aleppo and outlet for Northern Syria, with trade little inferior to that of Beirut. But in the absence of political unity there is among the States under the mandate an economic unity of real and practical usefulness; they form a common customs territory, without internal barriers, and Syria is able freely to use all the ports mentioned above.

As has been already said, the States under the French mandate
have common interests. A conference of delegates of the different governments, associated with the High Commissioner, assists him in the preparation of the administrative accounts of receipts and expenditure for the services of common interest. The common receipts are derived mainly from the customs; of the common expenditure, the main item is for the upkeep of the local forces; the annual surplus of receipts over expenditure is divided among the States. Now the ending of the mandate as regards one of the States cannot alter its position with regard to the others nor affect the economic life of the whole; it will be for the mandatory power to settle all questions that may arise between Syria and the States left under the mandate.

FRANCE AND SYRIA

The fluctuations in Syrian politics, together with the recent change in the High Commissionership, have slowed down the negotiations for the Franco-Syrian treaty. It may be assumed that the essential arrangements in it would have a certain analogy with those in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, for France has, like England, imperial interests to safeguard, a material and moral situation to protect in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East.

In the course of an enquiry in the Levant in September, 1932, I gathered from Syrians of high position, Nationalists as well as Moderates, the expression of their desire to see concluded between Syria and France a treaty guaranteeing the reciprocal interests of the two countries. They all agreed that France should continue to Syria, when independent, her economic, financial, intellectual, and military help. Following the example of certain clauses of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, it would especially be agreed that the Syrian Republic should call upon the French for technical advisers and military instructors, that French garrisons should be maintained at certain points, and lastly, that bases of French military aviation should be installed.

Speaking generally, it is of importance that the progress achieved in every direction under the mandatory system should not be endangered. France, in addition to her credits and the large material interests represented by the creation of economic equipment and the enterprises of her citizens, ought also to protect in Syria the moral and secular work of teaching and assistance to which is due the intellectual influence which has greatly developed since the operation of the mandate. The French missions, through which the language, culture, and spirit of France have penetrated to every class of the population, without distinction of race or religion, should be enabled to pursue without hindrance their fruitful activities.
A well-defined system of agreement, settled upon such principles, to replace the French mandate over Syria, would give satisfaction to the desire of the Syrians for independence, while satisfying the material and moral interests of France in the Levant. There, as at so many other points on the globe, following different models but in complete agreement, Great Britain and France will pursue side by side their work of development and uplift.

(Translated.)
JAPAN'S POPULATION PROBLEM

By Hugh Byas
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It might be said without much risk of exaggeration that none of the problems of Asia is more important than that of the pressure of population in Japan. It is the driving force behind Japanese expansion; and whether that take the form of expansion of resources, as in Manchuria, or of trade, it raises dangerous and difficult questions. The Manchurian affair was hardly over before the British and Japanese Empires found themselves engaged, almost by inadvertence, in economic warfare, the British abrogating long-standing commercial treaties and imposing prohibitory tariffs on Japanese goods, the Japanese retaliating with a boycott of the kind which their Government had declared to be a form of war when practised by Chinese. Indignation against Britain was expressed with a warmth which startled British residents in Japan. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was forgotten, or, if remembered, only its usefulness to England was recalled. In the Manchurian affair the Japanese people had instinctively closed their ranks and driven out ministers whose nationalism it suspected. In the Indian tariff dispute it showed itself instinctively sensitive to the danger involved in any obstruction of Japanese exports. The ultimate cause was in each case the same—pressure of population on the means of subsistence, pressure of imprisoned national energy for an outlet. Far from relaxing, this pressure has not yet reached its maximum.

The number of babies born in Japan last year, according to the Cabinet Bureau of Statistics, was 2,182,743. The number of deaths during the same period was 1,174,875. The natural increase of population was 1,007,868. The round million had never before been reached in Japan, and only in Russia has this figure been exceeded. It seems, though the statement cannot be statistically proved, that a natural increase of one million in one year is a record held by Japan and Russia over all other countries. The United States, with a population of 120 millions as against Japan's 66 millions, had in 1931 a natural increase of only 800,163. The highest American year was 1927, when the excess of births over deaths was 961,031. Even India, with a population of 315 millions, increases only at an annual average rate of about 380,000. More babies are born in China than in Japan, but the
positive checks of Malthus—famine, war, disease, and death—are formidable in operation there, and it is questionable whether China's population is increasing at all. At the other end of the scale, the Japanese death-rate was last year the lowest recorded—17.72.

It is true that the birth-rate is slowly decreasing and has fallen from 35.1 per 1,000 in 1921 to 32.16 in 1932. But as the population as a whole is always growing larger, and as it is predominantly a young population with a large number of boys and girls reaching marriageable age every year, the actual number of babies increases. Owing to this factor—the large proportion of young people who in the next few years will marry—the increase must be expected to continue for some time. Yet there is a social cause at work which, in the opinion of Japanese statistical authorities, will bring about equilibrium within say twenty years from now, the population becoming stationary at between 80 and 90 millions. The age of marriage is gradually growing later. Middle-class families no longer hasten to marry their sons at 21 and their daughters at 18 or 19. The married student is a rarer bird than he was even ten years ago. In 1921, 519,193 marriages were registered; in 1931 the number had fallen to 496,754. The Japanese student to-day, as he leaves the university with his hard-won degree and tightens his belt for the struggle to capture a "white collar" job, may look forward to equilibrium about 1953. But even when equilibrium is reached it will be at a level 10 or 20 millions above that of to-day. And the question is: If 66 millions are straining Japan's resources to the uttermost, how is she to cope with an additional 10 millions?

It is generally admitted that emigration is at best a palliative and not a remedy for over-population. But even as an effective palliative it is denied to Japan. The countries which could absorb any considerable proportion of her surplus—America, Canada, and Australia—have banged and bolted their doors. Manchukuo may provide useful openings for Japanese traders and technicians, but there can be no colonization in the real sense, for Manchuria is inhabited by Chinese and, low as the Japanese farmer's standard of living is, that of the Chinese farmer is lower still. Brazil received Japanese settlers, but the number has never exceeded 12,000 a year. The sale of contraceptives is illegal, and the birth-rate is sufficient evidence that birth control is not practised. By a process of exhaustion, therefore, we come to industrialization as the only means by which Japan can provide food and work for her people. Industrialization is a difficult task since it means that Japan must pit her cheap labour and frugal standards of life against the machines and capital of the
West. But up till now it has succeeded. Japan has been able to rectify her narrow political frontiers by an expanding economic frontier. Subsidized shipping lines, State-aided banks, Government assistance in many forms, plus readiness to learn, capacity for organization and tireless initiative, have enabled her year by year to extend her markets. But now, when the value of money rises and falls like the mercury in the barometer, Japanese industrialization is met with a zareba of tariffs and quotas hastily raised to protect markets from her cheap goods. India, Malaya, East Africa, West Africa, Egypt, and Turkey have taken fright one after the other.

There are certain important factors in Japan's favour, and it must be said that up till now the problem has not been acute. The rapid increase of population is a modern phenomenon, due, as in Europe and America, to the rapid increase of wealth brought by the modern industrial system. In old Japan saturation point under the feudal economy had been reached. For at least 150 years the population remained stationary at about 30 millions. From the census of 1721 to that of 1846 the increase was less than 900,000. Babies were born, but they died. Famine occurred periodically. Epidemics could not be checked. The death-rate was high and the high birth-rate was controlled by abortion and to some degree by infanticide. The first census of new Japan, taken on the last day of 1871, showed the population to be 33,110,285. The 33 millions of 1871 had become, in the census of 1930, 66,392,183. The annual increment has risen from 200,000 in 1871-72 to a million annually.

The children who came so rapidly were born to comparative plenty. New Japan was a land where two people could live where one had lived before and live better. No longer had the farms to provide for every child born on them. Cities grew and factories multiplied. Between 1890 and 1925 the number of people living in cities of over 10,000 inhabitants rose from 5,504,000 to 21,853,000, an increase of 300 per cent. In the same period the rural population increased by only 7 per cent., though the productivity of the farms was doubled. The new industries employed the new millions as fast as they left school. Food supply kept pace with population. Feudal restrictions on the use of land and the mobility of the peasants was abolished, and greater economic freedom brought increased productivity. The output of rice in 1880 was 4,46 bushels for a population of 36,000,000. In 1928 the population had increased to 66 millions and the rice yield to 4·67 bushels per capita. Calculations in other lines as to numbers and resources give similar results. Savings bank deposits are as good a test as any other of the working man's prosperity. Taking 1912 as the basic year represented by the
symbol 100, we find that fourteen years later, in 1925, the population had risen to 112, but the number of depositors to 236 and the amount deposited to 586. The wealth of Japan was increasing more rapidly than population.

These facts must be remembered as a corrective to the pictures sometimes drawn of the density of Japan’s population. The uncorrected picture is terrifying. Japan, a land of farms, comes next in density of population to such intensively industrialized countries as Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain. If population and cultivated land are compared, the fields of Japan are the most crowded in the world. Belgium, the classic example of close human settlement, has 394 inhabitants per square kilometre of cultivated land; Japan has 959, according to the latest issue of the Japan Year Book. The State of California, with a population of five and a half millions, has double the cultivated area of all Japan.

Such parallels are useful to illustrate the degree of population pressure in Japan, but certain imponderable realities of their life have protected the Japanese from the sufferings which the contrast between numbers and resources would seem to imply. The civilization of Japan was and still is an inexpensive civilization. Sheep and cattle cannot live on the bamboo grass of Japan, and, therefore, the Japanese are not a meat-eating people. Rice, fish, vegetables, and millet cost little. The climate is for the most part moderate and the Japanese people need comparatively little fuel. During half the year little and cheap clothing is adequate. A Japanese gentleman these summer days may be well and comfortably dressed in the costume of the country for what a pair of gloves would cost him in Regent Street. It has been relatively easy for the Japanese to maintain decent standards of life on small means. It may be literally true that some Japanese textile workers are paid only one-eighth or one-tenth of the money wages earned by the corresponding workers in England (at the present abnormal rate of exchange), but it is entirely fallacious to suppose that their standard of living is therefore ten times worse. The Japanese standard is lower in the sense that it is simpler and far less expensive, but it would be impossible for anyone who knows the country to argue that the Japanese worker is more degraded or more dissatisfied than the European.

Some American sociologists trace the social and economic malaise of the United States to the fact that the frontier has disappeared with all that it meant as an escape and a safety valve. Japan’s population problem boils down to the question whether her industrial frontier can continue to expand and provide work for the coming millions. Her agricultural frontier has been reached. The land, subdivided into minute farms of an average...
size of 2.7 acres, can employ no more. It is super-saturated. Can the factories continue to absorb the increase? The answer seems to be that if international trade is given at least no less freedom than in the past, if industry retains the form of relatively free enterprise, Japan can face the future with confidence. Industrially, the Japanese are the first nation in Asia. They are capable of organization on a large scale, and, though their industrial efficiency is still below that of Britain or America or Germany, it is superior to that of India or China. Japanese industry has many things in its favour, amongst them moderate capitalization, the cartel buying and marketing system, good machinery and hydro-electric plant, freedom from trade union restrictions, low costs of production and transport, and relatively low taxation. As Lancashire begins to see, it would be foolhardy to set a limit to Japanese technical efficiency. Japanese labour is cheap, and its cheapness is solidly based on climate and inherited simplicity of life. It should not be entirely a wild dream to suppose that an industrious and ambitious people, equipped with machinery and versed in modern industry, should be able to sell a sufficient quantity of their manufactures to pay for their raw materials and the marginal supplies of food they need to import. They are part of Asia, whose millions need the cheap goods which Japan can supply. A free-trade economist of the old school would see something providential in the fact that the cheapest manufacturing country was beside the poorest market.

The unplanned economy of the past has, in fact, provided quite tolerably for Japan’s new millions as they came. But the momentum of increase has never been so great, and, just as the load on the economic machine is growing heavier, economic nationalism threatens to throttle its expansive power. India, Egypt, Malaya, East and West Africa are raising tariffs, cancelling trade treaties and devising other measures to check the importation of Japanese goods. The economic frontier may be fixed, may even contract. If Japan’s cheap shirts, rubber shoes, electric bulbs and what not are no longer to be accepted by other markets in increasing quantities the outlook is dark.

The risks must be pointed out. Japan’s population will continue to increase at the rate of about a million a year for not less than ten and perhaps not more than fifteen or twenty years. There is no way of providing for these children but by employing them to manufacture goods and selling them chiefly in Asia. If economic nationalism means a blocking of economic frontiers, it seems hardly worth while troubling the Disarmament Conference further.

But there will be nothing inevitable about the catastrophe if it comes. It is more in accord with Japan’s experience during the
past fifty years to expect that a growth of productive power will not prove destructive. A supply of cheap shirts cannot intrinsically be a bad thing for millions of unclothed men in Asia. The immense unsatisfied requirements of these millions are Japan's strongest allies. As the world's demand for their primary products revives, so will their purchasing power. Industrialization at a rate which will provide for a population increasing by a million a year is a hard but not an impossible task. But the exigent nature of the Japanese problem should be understood.
WHEN AND HOW MUHAMMADANISM ENTERED CHINA*

By ISAAC MASON, F.R.G.S.

To those who have read much about the Chinese, or who have resided in China, it is well known that Muhammadans form an appreciable part of the population of that land. Yet comparatively few know much about the Far-Eastern followers of the Arabian Prophet, and perhaps even less is known of their origin and their introduction into China. It may therefore be a matter of interest to set forth here some of the results of investigations along this line.

Others have laboured in this field, and much useful information is available to those who know where to look for it. I have made use of such of the published results of the labours of others as I have found helpful in preparing this paper, with due acknowledgments. I have, however, made independent investigations of the sources of information, and prepared my own translations of documents and inscriptions, and hope that I have succeeded in putting together a trustworthy account of when and how Muslims first entered China.

Estimates of the present number of Muhammadans in China vary all the way from four millions to thirty millions. There can be little doubt that the larger figure is excessive, and, on the other hand, the estimate of Commandant d'Ollone, which is the lowest, is probably much too low. After considering the various figures available, and in the absence of a reliable census, I believe we may safely assume the number of Muslims in China to be about eight millions, scattered over the whole country, but found in larger proportions in Kansu, Yunnan, Szechwan and Chihli, of China proper, and in Sin Kiang and Chinese Turkestan on the north-western borders.

When and how Muslims first entered China are matters of uncertainty about which differing views have been held. The traditions of the Muslims are interesting, but mostly rest on very slender foundations. We do not know of any Chinese-Muslim book now extant which was written as long ago as three hundred years. A bibliography of over three hundred and fifty titles is known to exist—of which I have collected about two hundred and eighty—many being small tracts or leaflets, but quite a number are books of considerable size. Some of these books profess

* Lecture delivered before the China Society on December 7, 1932.
to be historical, and tell of Muslims reaching China over thirteen hundred years ago, but no satisfactory proofs are given for such claims, and the absence of contemporary documentary evidence must be regarded as unfavourable to the claim. There exist a few monuments which are referred to in support of the early-entry claim; the most famous of these is a stone tablet in a mosque at Sianfu, and it is dated A.D. 742. This will be referred to later.

It will be interesting to first give some attention to Chinese-Muhammadan traditions before entering upon the consideration of historical documents.

Among Muslims themselves there are two lines of tradition: one is that the introduction of Islam to China was overland by the north-west route; the other says it was introduced by way of the sea to Canton. Both stories refer to the same individual as being the pioneer sent by Muhammad, so they may be variations of a common tradition.

At Canton there is a famous mosque known as the Hwai Shêng Szù (Prophet-Remembrance Mosque), the original of which is said to have been built by the apostle Sa'd Wakkas; and nearby is an ancient tomb which is said to be the resting place of that pioneer. The Muslim traditions gather round the coming of Sa'd Wakkas, about whom we must set forth all that has been ascertained.

The most famous Chinese-Muslim writer was Liu Chih (Liu Chiai-lien), whose standard Life of Mohammed* was completed in 1724, and was published later. In that work Liu Chih, by a chronological error, sets the time of Muhammad’s birth in the Ping Yin year of Chung Ta T’ung of the Liang dynasty (A.D. 546 or 547), which is twenty-three or twenty-four years earlier than the correct year, A.D. 570. This will be referred to later, but meanwhile should be borne in mind as we consider the traditions. Liu Chih says, respecting the first entry of Muslims into China:

“In the sixth year of K’ai Hwang of the Sui dynasty (A.D. 586), which was the first year of the Prophethip of Muhammad, there was seen in the sky a strange star. The Chinese Emperor Wên Ti commanded the Chief Astronomer to divine its meaning, and he said that an extraordinary person had appeared in the West. The Emperor sent an envoy to investigate if this was really so, and after about a year he arrived at Mecca. He desired the Prophet to accompany him back to the East, but he declined. The Prophet sent Sa’d Wakkas (his maternal uncle), and three others, to go with the envoy to China. Muslims first entered China in the seventh year of K’ai Hwang of the Sui dynasty.”

* Translated into English by I. Mason, with title The Arabian Prophet. (Luzac)
Liu Chih continues: "The old statement that the entry of the religion of the Prophet to China was in the reign of Hsüan Tsung of the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 713) is an error. As for the other account, which tells of Chen Kuan of the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 628) sending an envoy to the West to obtain a Koran, resulting in Muslims entering China overland, that was subsequent to the period of which we are writing, so is not recorded in this Life of the Prophet."

It is to be noted that the "maternal uncle" in the above is a gloss on the text. It may not have been in Liu Chih's original manuscript, as, on other occasions, he describes Wakkas otherwise than by family relationship.

Elsewhere Liu Chih says that an envoy was sent in the time of Wên Ti of the Sui dynasty, with a request for Canonical books, in response to which the Prophet, in the seventh year of K'ai Hwang, "sent his minister Sa'd Wakkas and others with the Koran in thirty volumes. They entered China from the Southern Seas to Canton, and first built the Prophet-Remembrance mosque, and subsequently spread the faith through the empire." Liu Chih says this is proved by records in certain books; but it may be said here that neither the Sui nor the T'ang official histories have any mention of Sa'd Wakkas, nor of any entry of Islam at this period.

One more extract from Liu Chih says that, "In the fourth year of Wu Têh of the T'ang dynasty, after a remarkable dream, the Emperor sent an envoy of several men to the country of the Prophet, who commanded his disciple Sa'd Wakkas to bring the Koran of thirty volumes, comprising 114 sura, 6,666 paragraphs, to give to the Emperor, who had it transcribed and promulgated throughout the empire."

The tradition concerning Sa'd Wakkas is found in several Chinese-Muslim books, and in a previous paper I have given a full translation of one of these named Hsi Lai Tsung P'u, so I will not repeat here. Briefly, it is a Muslim tradition of the first entry of the Muslims into China, which is stated to have been in the second year of T'ai Tsung of the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 628). It is said that in consequence of a dream of the Emperor, a deputation was sent to Mecca to invite Muhammad to come to China. He declined, but sent three followers to represent him, and to explain the Faith. Two of these died on the way, but the third, Sa'd Wakkas, had an interview with the Emperor and was able to converse with him, having acquired the language through the influence of the Prophet in a miraculous way—namely, by taking a pinch of the native soil and smelling it. This tradition also tells of a proposal by the Emperor to exchange 3,000 of his own soldiers for 3,000 Muslims, which resulted in 800 Muslims being
selected to go to China to assist Wakkas in propagating the Faith, and these married Chinese wives.

It will be noticed that though there is forty years of difference in time between this account and that of Liu Chih given above, and though one tells of the entry by sea and the other by land, they both claim that Sa'd Wakkas was the apostle.

It will be of interest to quote from another Muhammadan document entitled *A Record of the History of the early Sage and Sahabi*, which says:

"The early sage Wan Ko-shih (Wakkas), after coming to China in obedience to command, requested permission to return to the West on three occasions. The first time he went to obtain all kinds of Canonical books to give to his Chinese co-religionists. The second time he went to secure a Koran, that his disciples might recite it and study it. He also requested the Prophet to indicate to him where he would die. The honourable Prophet commanded him to take as much of the Koran as had then been revealed, and said that as more followed he would send it by a messenger to Wakkas. 'As for the place of your death,' said the Prophet, 'that shall be shown by the head of an arrow.' He then pointed with his finger towards the East, and ordered a man to fix an arrow in his bow and pull the string to the full extent, and then let go: in an instant all trace of the arrow was lost. The Prophet then said to Wakkas: 'By virtue of my influence, the arrow will fall at the place where you will die; get you back quickly to China, and in the course of time what I have said will prove true.'

"Wakkas went aboard a ship, and with propitious winds he was at Canton almost before he knew it; and there he found the mark of the arrow, outside the north wall, in the north side of the Liu Hwa bridge. He had the place walled round as a burial ground, and asked permission to build a 'Prophet-Remembrance' mosque, which permission was granted, and there was also given a portion of land for the upkeep of the mosque and the support of those in it. The mosque is called the 'Prophet-Remembrance' mosque because it is meant to cherish remembrance of the Prophet. Inside the enclosure there was built a smooth pagoda or minaret, one hundred and sixty Chinese feet high, and of unusual appearance. Inside the minaret there was a spiral staircase, and Wakkas used to go to the top of the minaret, morning and evening, and repeat the call to people to come to the mosque.

"The third time that Wakkas returned to Arabia was because he had a dream, in which he saw a tall man, who said to him: 'The honourable Prophet is soon about to leave the world; if you hasten back to the West you may see his face, but if you delay it may be too late.' On awakening, Wakkas was greatly
agitated, and the next day he set off for Medina; but when he arrived the Prophet was already dead. He died at 63, in the twentieth year of Chên Kuan (A.D. 647).*

"Wakkas learned from the eminent sages that the Prophet had left command that he was to return to China to propagate the Faith. There was also given to him a complete copy of the Koran, 6,666 paragraphs, divided into 114 chapters, made up into thirty volumes. This book Wakkas carried back with him to China, and gave to the Faithful, to be kept for ever.

"Not long afterward Wakkas died at Canton, and was buried by the believers inside the walled enclosure. A stone pavilion was erected, surrounded by mounds of earth, and the centre of this was subsequently used by people as a place for offerings and sacrifice, on which account it is called the 'Hsiang fên' (the Tomb of Offerings). On the outside of the door is written, 'The ancient tomb of the early sage.' Such are the historical records of the Sahabi Wakkas."

This interesting record must be regarded as apocryphal in the light of investigation, as will be shown presently.

The story of the entry by land is recorded in another Chinese-Muslim work entitled Hui Hui Yuan Lai, of which there are various editions, differing in details. M. Deveria had a copy bearing the date 1712, and Wylie mentions one of the date 1754. My own copy is much more recent. The book is supposed to have been given to one of his Muhammadan Generals by the Emperor K'ang Hsi (A.D. 1662-1722). A partial translation is given in Broomhall's Islam in China. It is obviously a work of Muslim propaganda, giving imaginary dialogues between the T'ang Emperor and the "turbedan man," these being a vehicle for conveying Muslim teaching. It is of very little value as history, and must be regarded as apocryphal.

In this story, as in the other, it is the Chinese Emperor who makes the first move, sending to Arabia for apostles. It is distinctly said that these came by land stages, enduring much hardship. Two died on the way, the only one who arrived being Sa'd Wakkas, who, in this story, is called Ko Hsin. An interpreter was found necessary for the interviews in this case. In conversation with the Emperor, Wakkas refers to the complete Koran, which he said consists of 6,666 sections, and the Four Books and Five Classics of China do not equal half the amount! But the Koran was not completed at the time when this interview is dated (A.D. 628), and the complete book is nothing like so voluminous as the Chinese books mentioned. The record also says that the term "Hui Hui" was discussed at that in-

* Muhammad died in A.D. 632. The Muslim writer of the above post-dates, while Liu Chih ante-dates.
terview. But this term is not known in Chinese history until some centuries later. These anachronisms mark the book as apocryphal.

The tradition about Sa'd Wakkas is found in various other places, but these need not detain us, so we may proceed to our conclusions about the story of this pioneer of Islam to China. The Chinese characters used for his name vary, but there is sufficient similarity to lead us to believe that all refer to the same person. In the legends he is styled "Saḥābi," which would mean that he had seen the Prophet, and associated with him in his lifetime.

A maternal uncle of Muhammad was named Abu Wakkas, but there is no record that he ever left Arabia. His son, Sa'd ibn Wakkas, was also called Sa'd ibn Malik ibn Wahb az-Zuhri. He was the seventh person who embraced Islam, and he was present with Muhammad at all his battles. He died at 'Aliq (A.D. 675) at the age of seventy-nine, and was buried at Mecca. He never visited China, so was not the apostle of the legends.

Turning now to the dates given in the traditions. We have the definite statement that the arrival in China was in the seventh year of K'ai Hwang (A.D. 587). Muhammad was born in A.D. 570, so was only a youth at the time mentioned. He did not receive his first revelation until he was forty, and the Hegira was in A.D. 622. The sending of an apostle of the new faith in A.D. 587 is an impossibility.

There is an error in calculation which will be dealt with when referring to the Sianfu tablet, which is probably the source of the errors in these legends. The point that is of importance now is that many writers commit themselves to definite years of the emperors of the Sui and T'ang dynasties which are absolutely incorrect. The Sui dynasty ended before the Muhammadan Hegira began, and the year given for the bringing of the Koran to China was five years before Muhammad's first revelation, and long before the Koran was completed. Historians who make such glaring mistakes in their dates are likely to be wrong in their other statements.

As there is no reference to the arrival of Sa'd Wakkas at that early date in any Chinese history, nor in Arabic records, but only in Muslim writings of a much later date, we are bound to regard the whole story as untrustworthy. The legend is rejected by such authorities as M. Deveria, E. H. Parker, A. Wylie, J. Dyer Ball, and Marshall Broomhall. The last-named says, "The tendency of the Muhammadan traditions to find some personal link with Muhammad for the sake of added glory, and the apocryphal account of the Emperor of China's dream for the same reason, do not help the student of Muhammadanism in China to accept
the very improbable, if not impossible, story of Muhammad’s maternal uncle.”

Of the stone monuments relating to Muslims in China there is only one which need be dealt with in the limits of this paper, and that is the Sianfu tablet, which claims to be the oldest, and which is probably responsible for perpetuating the legend about the very early advent of Islam to China. This remarkable monument is dated A.D. 742, thus claiming to be older than the famous Nestorian monument.

I translate the inscription as follows:

“A Monument to Record the First Building of a Mosque.

“Inscription of the monument recording the first building of a mosque, written by Wang Hung, Graduate of the Third Degree, Secretary of the Board of Revenue, and Censor.

“I have heard that what remains undoubted after a hundred generations is Truth (the Path); and that by which men are mutually influenced though distant a hundred generations is mind (heart). Now sages have one mind and their principles are the same, so they influence one another and remain undoubted through a hundred generations.

“In all parts of the world sages have arisen, and their being called sages was because they had this similarity of mind and principles. The Western sage Muhammad was born later than Confucius, and lived in the country of Arabia. I do not know how far removed in time and place he was from the sage of China. Their language differed, yet their principles agreed. Why was this so? Their minds were as one, therefore their principles were the same. The ancients had a saying, ‘A thousand sages have one mind; and a myriad ages have one governing principle.’ This may be believed as truth.

“But though the times and generations are distant, and the men have passed away, their sacred books have survived. From what has been handed down we know that the Western sage was born with supernatural intelligence; he understood the laws by which heaven and earth produce all things; he also understood what was said about the obscure and the apparent, about life and death. Among his teachings were such things as the purification of oneself by bathing; to nourish the mind by having few passions; to inure to endurance by means of fasting; to depart from evil and turn to the good as the essential of self-cultivation; to regard absolute honesty and no cheating as the radical thing in influencing people. At weddings all should mutually assist, and at funerals they should be in attendance. From the great matters of the moral obligations and the laws of natural relationships down to the small things such as rising or resting, eating and
drinking, and so forth, there are none which have not their proper principles, none for which there is not proper instruction, and nothing in which Heaven should not be feared.

"Although the articles of the teaching of the sage were multifarious, yet they may be brought together into one whole, which is to acknowledge the Heaven (God), which created and sustains all things, as Lord; and the way of serving God may be comprehended in one word, which is no other than the 'reverence' of our hearts.

"The Emperor Yao said, 'Reverence accords with Heaven.' T'ang said, 'Saintly reverence daily advances.' Wen said, 'Intelligently serve God.' Confucius said, 'He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray.' These, in a general way, are points of resemblance, and are sufficient to prove what has been said about sages mutually influencing one another and remaining undoubted through a hundred generations.

"Although the teaching of the sage (Muhammad) was the same as that of the others, it prevailed only in the West, and China had not heard of it, until the time of the Emperor K'ai Hwang of the Sui dynasty (A.D. 581-601), when it entered China, and gradually spread throughout the empire.

"His Imperial Majesty T'ien Pao, of our present dynasty, considering that the doctrines of the sage of the West are consistent with the doctrines of the sages of China, and that the religion is established with its roots in what is correct, therefore commanded the Superintendent of Public Works, Lo T'ien-chio, to take charge of workmen and build this mosque for the accommodation of the followers of this religion. Their leader is Pai-tu-er-ti, who is well versed in their Canon; he will be able to lead them in all the exercises of their holy religion, reverencing Heaven wherever they worship, and praying for the long life of the Emperor, in this place.

"This work was begun on a lucky day of the third month of the first year (of T'ien Pao), and was completed on the twentieth day of the eighth month of the same year.

"Lest, as time goes on, this incident might be forgotten, and no evidences of it remain, this tablet is set up as a remembrance, and the circumstances inscribed thereon; the tablet being erected on a lucky day of the second month of Autumn (eighth month) of the first year of the Emperor T'ien Pao (A.D. 742).

"Engraved by Shih Kung, at Wan-nien-hsien, Kwan Chung."

The inscription on this stone makes an impossible claim when it states that Islam entered China in the Sui dynasty, prior to A.D. 601, after having already been prevailing for some time in the West. We have seen that Muhammad did not claim to have
his first revelation until A.D. 610. The year of the inscription is given as A.D. 724, yet terms are used which are not found in history until much later. T’ien Fang is used for Arabia, though this name is not found in histories earlier than A.D. 1258; the term in use during the T’ang dynasty being Ta Shih. At the period mentioned Sianfu was known as Ch’ang-an, but the stone bears the name Wan-nien-hsien, which, according to Playfair’s *Cities and Towns of China*, belongs to the posterior Chou dynasty, A.D. 951-960.

The evidences against the genuineness of this monument are so strong that its claim cannot be accepted. It is to be regarded as a forgery, and it is certainly misleading in its statement that Muhammadanism entered China in the Sui dynasty, which has been seen to be an impossibility. It is quite possible that a mosque was built or repaired at Sianfu in the year mentioned, as there had been visits of Muslims earlier than that. But an Arab traveller, in A.D. 878—more than 130 years later than the date of this monument—says nothing about either mosque or monument, nor of meeting co-religionists there.

Presuming that the monument is a forgery, it is still a question of interest how the forgers made such an anachronism as to state that Islam entered China before A.D. 601. Marshall Broomhall, in his *Islam in China*, shows that there has been an error in calculation between Chinese and Arabian years. He says:

“The calendar in China is based upon a luni-solar year, the interjection of an extra month every two or three years rectifying the lunar with solar time. A similar arrangement had prevailed in Arabia for some two centuries before Muhammad, but the Prophet, for some reason or other, altogether prohibited intercalation; so a simple lunar month was reintroduced in Arabia. As the Muhammadan calendar stands today, it consists of twelve lunar months of twenty-nine or thirty days alternately, with an intercalary day added to the twelfth month at intervals of two or three years, making eleven intercalary days every thirty years. This gives a difference of almost exactly eleven days a year between the Arab lunar and the Chinese luni-solar year, or, roughly, three years a century.”

“M. Deveria has suggested that at some date, perhaps A.D. 1351, when the mosque at Canton was restored, the Chinese Muslims transmuted their Arabic chronology into Chinese, and being ignorant of the variations between the lunar and solar years of the two systems, simply counted back the Arab years since the Hegira as so many Chinese years, thus antedating by twenty-three or twenty-four years the date they had in mind.”

This was an ingenious suggestion, and gave the clue to what I believe to be the real solution of the problem. Not being quite
satisfied with the restoration of a mosque as being the occasion of the transmuting of the chronology, I looked for a more probable reason, and found it in the record that in the second year of Hung Wu—the founder of the Ming dynasty—which was A.D. 1369, there was a Muslim Chief Astronomer, who, with a number of Muhammadan officials, was employed in rectifying the Chinese calendar, and at the same time they apparently essayed to co-relate the Muslim calendar with the Chinese. The year A.D. 1369 would be A.H. 770, and by counting back that number of Arab years without considering the variation between lunar and solar years, the period A.D. 599 was arrived at as the year of the Hegira, which, however, is twenty-three years before that event took place, in 622. The addition of three years per century to the shorter lunar years would bring the chronology to be about correct. There can be little doubt that it was in A.D. 1369 that the calculation was made.

The year A.D. 599 having been officially fixed as the time of the Hegira, Muslim historians and writers appear to have accepted it without realizing the mistake, and Liu Chih simply counted back the years of Muhammad’s age at the time of the Hegira, and thus arrives at 546 or 547 as the year of the Prophet’s birth, which is stated to be in the time of the Liang dynasty, while actually it was in 570, at the time of the Sui dynasty. Muhammad’s death is given as occurring in 608 or 609, which was long before his removal to Medina and his subsequent career.

It should be mentioned in passing that the Chinese cycle method of calculating a year does not quite coincide with the Western system of months, so a particular cyclical designation may cover parts of two A.D. years; hence the hesitation in definitely fixing the A.D. year for a particular event.

Returning now to the Sianfu monument, I arrive at the conclusion that it was engraved subsequently to A.D. 1369, as it adopts the transmuted chronology above referred to. The mosque itself was probably built much earlier, as records show that it was repaired as early as A.D. 1127, and again on subsequent occasions, one of these being in the reign of Hung Wu (1368-1388), and it is extremely probable that this last-named occasion was the one when the monument was erected.

We may now leave traditions and erring monuments, and come to the safer ground of history. It is probable that commercial intercourse between China and Arabia dates back to very early in the Christian era. Travellers by the sea route arrived at Canton, or at Kanfu, by which name may be meant the ancient port of the famous city of Hangchow. It is very likely that soon after the Hegira, when Islam spread throughout Arabia, some of the traders to the East had become converts, and these
would observe their religion at the places where they visited or resided in China. It has been shown in the foregoing that the Chinese-Muslim claim for the arrival of their faith in A.D. 586 is untenable, and even when the chronological error of twenty-four years is corrected, and the date made A.D. 610, it is still too early.

It was during the illustrious T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) that Muhammadans first came to China. In the New T'ang History, chap. 221, the name Ta-shih for Muhammadan Arabs is first met with, in connection with the Persian king Yezdergird, who was slain by them in A.D. 652. His son Firuz had previously fled to Tokharestan, and from there he sent a messenger to the Chinese Court to appeal for aid. This was in A.D. 650, when the Emperor Kao Tsung had succeeded to the throne. Kao Tsung made excuse that the distance was too great for him to send troops to Persia, but he sent to the Muslims to plead the cause of the fallen power. In response to this the Caliph Othman sent an envoy, with presents, who arrived in A.D. 651. It is not stated by which route he travelled, but as he would start from Medina, the sea route may have been quicker, and possibly was the one chosen. The brief account in the T'ang History is as follows: "In the second year of Yung Hui (A.D. 651) the Ta-shih king 'Amir-al-mumemin' (Prince of the Believers) first sent an envoy to Court with tribute, who said that the kings of Ta-shih had possessed the country for thirty-four years, through two successive generations."

It should be noted that Othman was the fourth ruler, Omar and Abu Bekr preceding him in the succession from Muhammad. Also, thirty-four years from the Hegira would mean A.D. 655 or 656, instead of A.D. 651.

The History follows immediately with a leap of sixty years to the next envoy, and says: "In the beginning of K'ai Yuan (A.D. 713-742) an envoy was again sent, with a present of horses and a magnificent girdle. At the audience the envoy stood, without doing obeisance; he said that in his country they only worship God, and do not do obeisance when seeing the king. The civil officials reproved him, and then he did obeisance. In the fourteenth year (A.D. 726) another envoy was sent, named Soleiman, with presents of local products, who did obeisance and was given a red robe and girdle."

Other embassies are mentioned in the T'ang History, but there is nothing said about the introduction of Islam as a religion. Abu Jafar, the builder of Bagdad, and the second Caliph of the Abbassides, sent an envoy in A.D. 756.

Shortly before that time a great rebellion had broken out in China, led by An Lu-shan, a man of Tartar descent, who held high office and had been much trusted by Hsüan Tsung. The
Emperor fled to Ch'engtu, and the rebels took possession of the two capitals Sianfu and Honanfu. The heir-apparent was proclaimed Emperor in Kansu, with the title Su Tsung, and in order to put down the rebellion he secured the help of mercenaries, under promise of great rewards. From the regions west of China a miscellaneous army was gathered, including Uigurs, T'u Fan, Nan Man, and Ta-shih, who helped to put down the rebellion. Ta-shih is the term used at that period to denote Muslims of Persian or Arabian origin.

It is not clear how many Muslims were included among those who first responded to Su Tsung's call for aid, but the total of Uigurs and others from the West is given at over four thousand. It seems very unlikely that troops would be sent from Bagdad or Arabia on the long and perilous journey to China. Probably they came from some frontier garrison in Turkestan. It is said they did not return, but remained in China and married Chinese wives, and became the nucleus of the Chinese Muslims of today. It is probable that such infiltrations occurred more than once or twice, and that they account for the large Muslim populations of Western China.

The T'ang History was written, in part, by writers contemporary with the events recorded, and was revised in the eleventh century. The Sianfu stone monument claims to have been erected in A.D. 742, and a mosque also built at what was then the capital, where the historiographers would be; yet they do not mention this tablet, nor do they give the coming of Muhammadans as prior to A.D. 601, as the stone does. The name T'ien Fang for Arabia, which is used on the tablet, is unknown to the History; while Ta-shih, the name of the period for that country, is not found on the stone. These considerations strengthen the conclusion that the monument was erected later than the eleventh century.

It is not proposed to give here more about the various embassies and other entrants mentioned; but before leaving the T'ang History it will be useful to translate what is said about Muhammadans, under the heading of Ta-shih, as follows:

"Ta-shih was originally part of Persia. The men have high noses, are black, and bearded. The women are very fair, and when they go out they veil the face. Five times daily they worship God. They wear silver girdles, with silver knives suspended. They do not drink wine, nor use music. Their place of worship will accommodate several hundreds of people. Every seventh day the king (Caliph) sits on high and speaks to those below, saying, 'Those who are killed by the enemy will be born in Heaven above; those who slay the enemy will receive happiness.' Therefore they are usually valiant fighters. Their land is sandy
and stony, and not fit for cultivation, so they hunt and eat flesh.

"About the middle of the Ta Yeh period of the Sui dynasty there was a Ta-shih man shepherding on the hills of Medina, and a beast spake to him, saying, 'On the western side of the hill there are three caves (holes), in one of which there are sharp swords, and a black stone with an inscription in white, saying that whoever possesses it will become king.' The man went and found everything as stated. The inscription on the stone said that he should rebel, so he gathered followers together at the stream Hên Ko. They robbed merchants, and fortified the western parts, and the man made himself king. He removed the black stone, and regarded it as precious. The people went to punish and suppress him, but they were all badly defeated. From this he became still stronger, and destroyed Persia and Fu-lin, and invaded India and other countries."

It will be seen that fact and fiction are very much mixed in the above account. The time mentioned is about the time that Muhammad received his first revelation, in a cave at Mount Hira—at Mecca, not Medina. The finding of the swords may be an echo of the tradition of Muhammad's grandfather rediscovering the Zem-Zem well, and finding some armour and other things there. The Black Stone mentioned was not found by Muhammad, but was built in the Kaaba long before his time, and again at the rebuilding, before he received his revelations. There are no white characters of the kind mentioned on it. The story of rebellion and very sudden rise to power does not indicate the twelve years of hardship and quiet propaganda between his first revelation and the Hegira in A.D. 622, after which his career at Medina began. It was not made clear that Muhammad died, and the days of extensive conquest were those of his successors.

It is evident that, even in the eleventh century, when the T'ang History was revised, the historians actually knew very little about Arabia and Muhammadanism.

We come now to the important witness of the first Western travellers to China who have left accounts of what they saw. Two Arab travellers, who reached China over one thousand years ago, left records in Arabic, which have been translated, and are available to us. The first of these travellers was in China in the year A.D. 851. His name does not appear, and there is a page missing in the account when he begins to tell of China. Speaking of Kanfu (Canfu), he says:

"Canfu is the port for all ships and goods of the Arabs who trade in China. Soliman the Merchant relates that at Canfu, which is the principal sale for merchants, there is a Muham-
madan appointed judge over those of his religion, by the authority of the Emperor of China; and that he is judge of all the Muhammadans who resort to these parts. Upon festival days he performs the public service with the Muhammadans, and pronounces the sermon, or khutbah, which he concludes in the usual form, with prayers for the Sultan of the Muslims. The merchants of Irak who trade hither are in no way dissatisfied with his conduct, or his administration of the post he is invested with; because his actions, and the judgments he gives, are just and equitable, and conformable to the Koran, and according to the Muhammadan jurisprudence."

One other extract is of interest to our present investigation: "I know not that there is anyone that has embraced Muhammadanism, or speaks Arabic." That was two hundred years after the authentic account of Muslims being officially received in China, and allowed to propagate their faith. There may have been converts from among the Chinese at various places, but at the large port of Canfu, with a considerable Muhammadan population, our traveller implies that he did not meet any, but only Muslims of foreign extraction.

The second traveller was Abu Zeid al Hafan, of Siraf. He was in China in A.D. 878. He tells of a revolution during which the city of Canfu was besieged by a rebel leader, the year being A.D. 877:

"At last he became master of the city, and put all the inhabitants to the sword. There are persons fully acquainted with the affairs of China who assure us that besides the Chinese who were massacred upon this occasion, there perished one hundred and twenty thousand Muhammadans, Jews, Christians, and Parsees, who were there on account of traffic."

This writer tells a remarkable story of an Arab he met in China who had had an interview with the Emperor at Sianfu. Some extracts from the story are of sufficient interest to be given here as follows:

"There was a man of the tribe of Koreish whose name was Ibn Wahab, and he dwelt at Busra, and when that city was sacked he came to Siraf, where he saw a ship ready to make sail for China. The mind took him to go on board this ship, and in her he went to China, where, in the sequel, he had the curiosity to travel to the Emperor’s Court; and leaving Canfu, he reached Cumdan (probably Sianfu), after a journey of two months. He stayed a long time at the Court, and presented several petitions, wherein he signified that he was of the family of the Prophet of the Arabs. Having waited a considerable time, the Emperor at last ordered him to be lodged in a house appointed for him, and to be supplied with everything he should want. This done, the
Emperor wrote to the Governor of Canfu, commanding him carefully to inform himself, among the merchants, concerning the relation this man pretended to bear to the Prophet, and the Governor, by his answers, confirming the truth of what he had said touching his extraction, the Emperor gave him audience, and made him rich presents.

"This man, when we saw him, was well advanced in years, but had his senses perfectly about him, and told us that when he had his audience, the Emperor asked him many questions about the Arabs, and particularly how they had destroyed the kingdom of the Persians.

"Ibn Wahab made answer that they did it by the assistance of God, and because the Persians were idolaters, adoring the stars, the sun, and moon, instead of worshipping the true God."

The story then relates that the Emperor showed his visitor some pictures which had come into his possession, and Ibn Wahab recognized the representations of certain Old Testament patriarchs, and of Jesus and Muhammad. This was followed by questions regarding Muhammad and his religion. The traveller Abu Zeid then goes on to say:

"We asked Ibn Wahab many questions concerning the city of Cumdan, where the Emperor keeps his Court. He told us that the city was very large and extremely populous; that it was divided into two great parts by a very long and very broad street; that the Emperor, his chief ministers, the soldiery, the supreme judge, the eunuchs, and all belonging to the Imperial Household, lived in that part of the city which is on the right hand eastward; that the people had no manner of communication with them; and that they were not admitted into places watered by canals from different rivers, whose borders were planted with trees and adorned with magnificent dwellings. The part on the left hand westward is inhabited by the people and the merchants, where also are great squares and markets for all the necessaries of life."

This is interesting as probably the earliest account we have by a Western observer of a Chinese capital. For our present study, it is remarkable that in the account given, Ibn Wahab makes no mention of any mosques or Muslim population at Sianfu. There was an interpreter who could speak Arabic, but it is not clear whether he accompanied Ibn Wahab from Canfu or was already at Sianfu. The stone monument above referred to, professedly commemorating the building of a mosque at Sianfu, is dated a.d. 742—that is, one hundred and thirty-six years earlier than the time when Ibn Wahab was telling of his visit—and yet he makes no mention of meeting with co-religionists, or uniting with them in worship during his long stay there. It may, however, be regarded as established that some Muslims had visited
Sianfu two hundred years prior to Ibn Wahab's visit, and it is possible some were living there at the time referred to; but it is strange that no mention is made of any.

I venture to suggest that there is probably some more or less close connection between Ibn Wahab (Wahb) and the ancient tomb at Canton. The myth of Sa'd Wakkas and the sixth century having to be discarded, the ancient tomb still remains to be accounted for. Ibn Wahab was probably the most notable Muhammadan in China in the early days, and although the Arab traveller Abu Zeid met him at Canfu, there is no reason why he should not also have been identified with Canton, and he may have died there. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that some regard the name Canfu (Khanfu) to refer to Canton.

The Muhammadan legend uses the name Sa'd Wakkas, and says that he was related to Muhammad. The Arabic records say that Sa'd ibn (son of) Abu Wakkas was also called Sa'd ibn Malik ibn Wahb. The early visitor to China was called Ibn Wahab, descended of Heber, the son of Al Asud; and he was of the Koreish tribe, and claimed relationship with Muhammad. He came by ship, as Wakkas was said to have done, and also went to see the Emperor at Sianfu. The Emperor made him presents, and he returned to Irak. Apparently he went back again to China, as he was a man well advanced in years when the Arab traveller Abu Zeid al Hafan conversed with him in A.D. 878. There is considerable agreement thus far with the legend about Sa'd Wakkas.

The time would be more than two centuries later than that claimed for Wakkas; but, as we have seen, that story is quite untenable. Muslims came to China earlier than Ibn Wahab, but none that we know of claimed to be related to the Prophet, nor to have been so venerated and so highly honoured. So it is possible that the tomb of the saint at Canton is the resting-place of Ibn Wahab, who may have died near the close of the ninth century; in which case it would still be over one thousand years old, and sacred enough to account for the pilgrimages and the legends.

It is significant that neither Ibn Wahab, nor the Arab travellers, nor any other ancient and authentic authority mentions Sa'd Wakkas and the tomb, which, on the theory of the earlier entry, should have been well known in the ninth century. Absence of mention is not absolute proof, but it is a strong presumption that the tomb was not there, nor the seventh-century apostle known anything about in the ninth century. The legend probably arose subsequent to the death of Ibn Wahab, who might very well be the historic figure about whom the fables and miracles have gathered. It is possible that the name Ibn Wahab, and the
claimed relationship to the Prophet, led Muslims of a later date mistakenly to make the ninth-century visitor to be a contemporary of Muhammad who had reached China during the Prophet's lifetime.

The results of our investigations may now be summed up briefly. We conclude that the earliest authentic accounts show that Muhammadans were first known officially in China in A.D. 651, when the embassy from Caliph Othman was received. It is not recorded whether the messenger reached China by sea or by land. As the sea route had been used for a long time by traders, it is very probable that some of the merchants from Arabia, who had become Muslims, took their religion with them to Canton and other coast cities at about the same period; but apparently they were not concerned with propagating their faith among the Chinese.

The progress of Muslim conquests in Central Asia brought Muhammadans to the frontiers of China on the landward side, and it seems certain that the larger numbers entered China from that side. It is said that some Muslim Zaidis, fleeing from the Omeyyads of the same religion, probably entered Chinese territory. It was about the middle of the eighth century that Muslim soldiers arrived in numbers, and subsequently settled down to family life in China. It is probable that more than one contingent of soldiers arrived at different times.

The two routes by which Islam entered China were quite different in character and in object; the land route brought Islam into the Western parts only, and did not send colonies to the coast. The sea route founded colonies in many parts on or near the coast, but made little or no attempt to advance into the interior. In course of time, travel and infiltration resulted in smaller or larger groups of Muslims being settled in all the provinces of the country.

The preponderance of the Muslims on the western frontiers of China is doubtless connected with the rise of the Mongol dynasty. Khublai Khan (1260-1294) appointed many Persian officers of Court and State, and they were probably Muslims. The Persian words found in Chinese Islam indicate the overland entry via Turkestan. One outstanding appointment was that of Saiyid-i-Adjall 'Omar, a reputed descendant of Muhammad, known to Chinese Muslims as the Prince of Hsien Yang, who was made Governor of Yunnan by Khublai Khan, and acted from 1273-1279. His son, Nasir-al-Din, is even more famous, and there is every reason to believe that these two were responsible for considerable immigration of Muslims into the western parts of China.

Mosques would be required where groups of Muslims gathered, and these were probably very simple places at first, not deserving
mention in the official histories of the period. Muslim traditions are so confused and uncertain that they cannot be relied upon as giving the correct period of entry, nor of the erection of the first mosques. We know from Arab travellers that in the middle of the ninth century there were Muslim places of worship at which services were held. The famous pagoda, or minaret, at Canton, according to Dr. Kerr's *Canton Guide*, was built about A.D. 900. This may have been about the time of the death of Ibn Wahab, for whom the famous tomb may have been made at the same time.

It will be seen that there is much uncertainty and some conjecture when we leave the reasonably safe ground of the T'ang History; and one of the purposes of this study has been to show that it is not wise for anyone unreservedly to accept traditions as facts concerning when and how Muhammadans first entered China.
JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

By Lieut.-Col. H. St. Clair Smallwood, F.R.G.S.

The intended withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations in 1935 does not render her foreign policy less interesting or less important to the rest of the world.

Although a section of the English Press writes of the possibility of war between Japan and America, there is little that either country would have to gain, and very much to lose, by recourse to war. It is sometimes little realized in England that Japan is one of America's best customers and that America is in the same position vis-à-vis Japan. America's export of raw cotton to Japan and Japan's raw silk exports to America are two very cogent reasons against war between the two countries. The League of Nations exists to prevent war, but self-interest is also a valuable war-preventative. It is no doubt possible that both these countries might place their raw material elsewhere, but in these days of the world's undigested bounty of raw materials markets are not easy to find.

When considering Japan's foreign policy one must look at those countries where she is best able to market her manufactured goods. One of the direct results of penning Japan within her own frontiers is the menacing of markets previously held by our own and other manufacturing countries.

Let us consider dispassionately Japan's situation. She has a rapidly increasing population in her small island empire. Her population increases at the somewhat alarming rate of about a million a year. She looks westward to America; the door is closed. She looks southward to the sparsely populated wastes of Northern Australia; she finds no welcome in either quarter. In whatever direction she looks there is either an excess of population or there is a prejudice against her immigration. How often have I heard it said that Japan's demand for increased opportunity of emigration is met by the existence of Manchuria? But how far is this from the truth when one realizes that there are only a quarter of a million Japanese in the whole area of Manchukuo, and in a population of over thirty millions of people? True there are three-quarters of a million Koreans who are Japanese subjects, but who have come from Korea and not from overcrowded Japan. Korea absorbs but few Japanese; the same thing applies to Formosa and to the Marshall Islands. It is to mass emigration that Japan would have to look for any serious
relief from her troubles of over-population. Manchukuo is closed
to her mass immigration by the vast numbers of Chinese agri-
culturists who, with their lower standard of living, making it im-
possible for the Japanese agricultural classes to emigrate to Man-
churia. It is only from these agricultural classes that emigration
in any numbers can be expected. The penetration of the Japanese
into other Eastern countries is largely analogous to British pene-
tration into India, Burma, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements:
British emigration is confined to the governing and commercial
classes. You do not see British porters on Chowringhee in Cal-
cutta, nor working on the land for Zemindars; neither do you
see Japanese coolies on the Bund at Shanghai or Japanese cul-
tivators in Chinese fields. It is unlikely that this situation will
change for a good many years. Societies exist in Japan, chiefly
in military circles, for the encouragement of emigration to Man-
chukuo, but as yet with little practical result. A certain number
of Japanese rice farmers have gone to Manchukuo, but it is diffi-
cult for them to work alongside Koreans on equal terms.

The turning inwards of Japan’s emigration stream has there-
fore resulted in industrialization and super-industrialization, and
the very countries which have blocked Japan’s immigration,
rightly or wrongly, are now faced with the keen, even cut-throat,
competition resulting on this industrialization. Idle looms in
Lancashire follow in the wake of Japanese competition. Japan
buys India’s short staple cotton which is not suited to Lancashire
mills and ships it back to India in the form of cotton textiles.
For several years, until 1932, India had a favourable trade balance
with Japan, but in 1932 the balance swung from a favourable one
of twenty-two million yen to an adverse one of seventy-five million
yen. As recently as 1925 there was a balance favourable to India
of four hundred million yen. This rapid decline has alarmed the
Indian Government so much that it has abrogated the Indo-
Japanese Commercial Convention of 1904. This has caused very
hard feeling between the Japanese and Indian Governments, also
between Japan and Britain. Japan complains about discrimina-
tion and the Japanese Cotton Spinners Association demands a boy-
cott of Indian cotton. This latter step would be serious for India
in that Japan’s purchases amounted to one hundred and thirteen
million yen in 1931 and ninety-one million yen in 1932. It is sug-
gested that this boycott of Indian cotton is to be replaced by
bigger purchases from America.

The reasons for Japan’s success in the cotton textile markets
of the world, particularly in the East, are not far to seek. Namely,
his low scale of factory wages, compared with those of Great
Britain and other manufacturing countries, allied with the depre-
ciated yen. In addition, of course, British shipments to the East
suffer under the high Suez Canal dues, whereas Japanese shipments go all over the East in their own bottoms and free of any Canal imposts. I have stressed this cotton question as Japan's foreign policy is likely to be shaped, vis-à-vis Great Britain, by her economic interests in the world's cotton textile markets. There are already suggestions that she should buy her wheat and wool from outside the British Empire as a retaliatory measure for the abrogation of the Indo-Japanese Commercial Convention. Simla, it is devoutly to be hoped, will find some modus operandi and will successfully initiate some sharing of markets and some means of avoiding the hard feeling which exists at present. There is no doubt in my mind that Japan still cherishes a deep friendship for Great Britain as her former ally. Despite strained relations which have arisen owing to the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in deference to American sentiment, the construction of the Singapore base, the sympathy extended to China, and the lack of it to Japan, in the disagreement between those two countries, the keen competition in Eastern textile and electrical markets, the adverse vote at the League of Nations—in spite of all these I feel there is common ground between the two nations and that the rift separating them can be bridged with goodwill on both sides.

The countries with which Japan's foreign policy is chiefly concerned are China, Russia, America, and Great Britain. I have dealt with her policy with my own country, which mostly has to deal with commercial questions, though there may be questions arising sometimes in China owing to the large interests that both countries have there; these are usually capable of local adjustment.

With Russia in the recent past there has been the nervousness engendered by Japan's fear of Bolshevism and a few incidents chiefly connected with the Chinese Eastern Railway. Negotiations now proceeding will probably result in the Chinese Eastern Railway becoming the property of the Manchukuo Government or the South Manchurian Railway. This will probably remove the most fruitful source of friction. One of the results of these negotiations will be that Vladivostock as the terminus only of the Ussuri-Amir Railway will lose its importance and South Manchurian and Korean ports gain correspondingly. It is reasonable to expect that the wide gauge of the Chinese Eastern will be altered to conform to the standard gauge of the South Manchurian lines. It is also likely that Harbin will become less Russian and more Japanese. Land purchases by Japanese in Harbin have been made for some time past. Perhaps the foregoing may be rather outside Japanese foreign policy, but they may be amongst the results of Japan's influence on the Government of Manchukuo. If Japan's interest increases in Manchukuo
one feels she will regard with complacency the downward thrust of Soviet Russia into Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.

Japan's policy in China is surely one of peace; she cannot regard with indifference the loss of her markets there. True these have been largely replaced by her successful penetration into other Eastern spheres, particularly India and the Dutch Indies, but China's four hundred millions of people, with their immense potential purchasing power, must be ever present in the mind of commercial Japan. Peoples cannot be forced to purchase goods presented to them on the end of a bayonet, and trade must follow the flag of friendship rather than the flag of war. There is in China a movement to bring about a cessation of the strained relations between the two countries, and when these efforts bear fruit Japanese trade will no doubt revive in China proper. A suggestion has been made that Japan is prepared to give up her extra-territorial rights in exchange for a guaranteed ending of the boycott. If this happens it might create an awkward situation for those Powers who still have extra-territorial rights.

In North China, where many of the inhabitants have relations and friends in Manchukuo, the enmity for Japan is giving way to understanding and an appreciation of the more settled conditions obtaining in that country. This feeling may be gradually extending to the centre and south of China, but it must be remembered that for the Kuomintang to stretch out the hand of friendship to Japan would involve a violent change of policy and consequent loss of face. I have no doubt that there is a section of the Nanking Government who would welcome a rapprochement with Japan, and which Japan urgently desires, but as against this there is a political group which maintains itself in power by appealing to the patriotism and anti-Japanese feelings of the people; also there are professional propagandists and employees of the anti-Japanese boycott movement. Japan's policy is to arrive at a peaceful solution of their disagreements with China by direct negotiation. It has long been my view that "assistance" rendered in negotiations between these two peoples is a hindrance rather than a help. These two great Oriental peoples can surely more easily understand each other better than can we Westerners.

There is no doubt that Japan means to uphold the independence of Manchukuo. Though it has so far failed to absorb Japan's surplus population, it certainly continues to supply Japan with the essential raw materials of coal, iron, and soya. With regard to the latter, it is well-known that Japan's rice fields and mulberry trees need the fertilizing which they get from the residues from the soya bean oil presses, but a new situation has arisen recently. An increasing amount of soya beans is exported to Germany
and re-exported to Japan in the form of fertilizer. This has resulted in a falling off in the direct export of soya bean cake to Japan and a glut of that commodity in Manchukuo. In time, no doubt, Japan will treat this cake herself, but for the present the trade is almost entirely in German hands. The development of the manufacturing of soya flour may relieve the situation, but for the time being it is becoming increasingly difficult for Japan to absorb the soya production of Manchukuo.

Mr. Hirohito, the new Foreign Minister, the other day announced in no uncertain terms that Japan had no intention of lessening her interests in Manchukuo, and this is easy to believe when one remembers the enormous effort, expressed in terms of money and lives, that she has made in that country. Any settlement with China must of necessity recognize this. Japan has made an immense effort to get rid of the bandit element in Manchukuo, and there is no doubt that she has been partially successful. Manchuria has always had its bandits, but their ranks have been largely increased by ex-soldiers of Chang-Hsueh-Liang, and from other armies. Bandit control is by no means easy in Manchukuo, and the entire stamping-out of banditry will take some time. A stable government, allied with rehabilitation of bandits who have only become so by stress of circumstance, are the two most likely preventatives of banditry.

There are various stages in this bandit suppression. The first was the defeating and dispersing of the regular troops under such leaders as Ma Chang Shan and Su Ping Wen. This was the task of regular Japanese troops, but that phase may be regarded as at an end. It can be assumed that there were two hundred and fifty to three hundred thousand bandits when Japan began her campaign against them. The elimination of the "soldier bandit," supported by arms and funds from outside Manchukuo, has to be followed by the suppression of the professional and "part-time" bandit. An important step has been taken in this direction by the forbidding of the planting of kowliang—or millet—near the railways. The construction of many miles of road will necessitate a similar precaution in their neighbourhood. To the uninitiated, the growing of kowliang does not appear to have direct relation to bandit suppression, but this grain grows to a height of twelve feet and more, and forms ideal and almost impenetrable cover to wrongdoers who desire to conceal their whereabouts. Granted that the soldier-bandit menace is dealt with, there remains the fifty thousand, possibly increasing to over one hundred thousand in the summer season when the kowliang is high, which can be dealt with by an increasingly efficient force of police backed up by Manchukuo troops. True it is that in the background there are Japanese troops scattered throughout
the country, but it may be said that bandit suppression is becoming a matter for police rather than military action. As long as bandits are a perpetual menace the general trade of the country is bound to be held up, and the looked-for development of Manchukuo may await the ending of that menace.

Japan's policy in Manchukuo was summed up for me the other day by a Japanese official in the words, "Peace and the open door." Peace is most certainly the spear-head of her policy—if such an expression is not a contradiction in terms—but there is an uneasy feeling abroad that the door to trade will be held a little further open to Japan than to other nations. Though Japan has never made any official pronouncement to the effect, it seems probable that business will largely be conducted in Manchukuo through the Japanese as intermediaries, rather on the compadre system as in China proper. It is, however, difficult to be didactic on this point while the presence of banditry holds up the development of the country and the increase of trade.

In 1935, when the revision of naval pacts must come up for consideration, there is no doubt that Japan will voice her dissatisfaction with the ratio of 5:5:3. How America will view the naval parity proposals that Japan is likely to make, it is difficult to say, but it is reasonable to suppose that naval parity is likely to meet with less opposition in England than in America. America may look forward with uneasiness to the time when she abandons the Philippine Islands to Philippine self-government, but it appears clear that Japan will be content with nothing less than parity.

Japan's policy with relation to the mandated islands is quite firm in that she contends the mandates were given to her by the Treaty of Versailles and were only confirmed by the League of Nations. It is by no means certain that the League contemplates a change or removal of mandate, but it is certain that any such démarche on the part of the League will be strenuously resisted by Japan, who will contend that her mandate can only be terminated by a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. It is not easy to foretell what the attitude of the League will be to a mandatory country which ceases to be a member, as will be the case with Japan in 1935.

It may be said in conclusion that the more one studies the foreign policy of Japan the more reasons there are for believing that her future policy must be a peaceful one. The only way she can keep her teeming industrial millions employed is by devoting her attention to her growing markets. A warlike policy cannot help her in this direction, and her present undoubtedly increasing success in the world's markets is likely to convince her of the extreme importance to the economic life of her country of peace.
and industry. In order to keep the peace of the world a sympathetic understanding of Japanese difficulties in England is most desirable. Japan’s statement of her own case is not always well put. The Japanese are a proud and reticent people; facile speech and easy propaganda are not their strong points. Commercial competition does not oil the wheels of understanding, and the present loss of British markets to the Japanese is bound to make for hard feeling.

The conference in Simla on the subject of Japanese trade in India, it is to be hoped, will result in a reasonable working agreement being arrived at, and one may hope that a policy of mutual forebearance will emerge.
LINKS IN THE IMPERIAL CHAIN

By Sir M. de P. Webb, C.I.E., C.B.E.

Among many unforeseen consequences of the Great War, none gives more food for thought than the tendency to separation and disintegration which has recently shown itself in certain parts of the British Empire. The itch for "self-determination" and "independence" which untutored democracy has here and there developed can only be assuaged and finally cured by that greater knowledge which more frequent (and, if possible, personal) contact with other parts of the Empire, and with the rest of the world, can effectively give. No quicker or better way of establishing these more frequent contacts (and so acquiring the vitally essential additional knowledge) has yet been devised than by the various air services by which British enterprise is gradually linking all parts of the Empire.

To my personal knowledge many efforts were made in Karachi to discover the secrets of human flight (by aid of clockwork models and experimental full-sized gliders of V-shaped design), as far back as 1894 and 1895. A few years later, Sir Hiram Maxim conducted experiments in England with large planes affixed to power-driven light trolleys travelling on railway lines, the experiments being designed to test the lifting power of planes of different sizes, moved through the air at different speeds. But the honour of constructing the first machine to fly, carrying its pilot, goes to America. Wilbur Wright first flew in 1903. Bleriot first flew across the English Channel in 1909. Hawker flew around the United Kingdom in 1911. Three years later came the Great War, 1914-1918, during which the art and mechanics of flying made immense progress. An Englishman, the late Captain Alcock (afterwards Sir John William Alcock, D.S.O.), was the first to fly across the Atlantic—America to Ireland—in 1919. Five years later two (out of four) U.S.A. aircraft successfully flew around the world, 27,534 miles in 351 flying hours.

In 1918 the first aeroplane, one of the large Handley-Page biplanes designed for bombing Berlin, appeared in India, at Karachi, much to the amazement of the local population. The following year four British aircraft companies commenced work. The distance flown by these companies, which was 225,000 miles in 1921, increased to 794,000 miles by 1924, in which year the four concerns were amalgamated into "Imperial Airways, Ltd.,"
whose services now extend to Rangoon in the East and Cape-
town in the South; and will probably reach Singapore (en route
for Australia) this year, and Canada via Newfoundland in the
near future. The mileage flown by Imperial Airways, Ltd., last
year was 2,030,993.

The development of the British air-route across Europe and
Asia in the direction of Australia has not been without
difficulties—almost entirely political. Immediately after
the conclusion of the Great War, the United Kingdom advocated
the same freedom of the air as the nations of the world enjoy
in connection with the navigation of the ocean; but the attitude
of certain Powers has, up to the moment, defeated this good
intention. Indeed, the growth of "economic" nationalism,
which has so greatly hindered the progress of the world in
general in recent years, has seriously delayed British Imperial
civil air developments; and even at this moment British air
mails are carried the whole length of Italy (and, until a few
weeks ago, across the whole breadth of India) by train! The
Persian Gulf, which, like the Suez Canal, is a link of vital
importance in British communications between East and West,
has been a source of anxiety owing chiefly to the difficulties
created by the Persian authorities. On the last occasion on
which I flew via the Persian coast, Persian officials at three
consecutive Persian ports—Jask, Lingeh, and Bushire—examined
passports, medical certificates, and luggage. The electric fans
that had just been fitted in the little rest house at Jask had
lain for many months in the local Customs House before the
Customs authorities could be persuaded to allow them to pass.
With Customs, medical, and other departments to deal with,
the obstacles created by the Persian authorities decided Imperial
Airways, Ltd., to transfer their regular weekly service to the
Arabian side of the Gulf. The outward air-route now taken
is via Basra, Koweit, Bahrein, Sharjah, and Gwadar (on the
coast of Baluchistan); and thence on to Karachi—India's chief
airport.

The fear that a British air company might in time acquire the
same position of economic superiority and intolerance in India
which, in the opinion of some Indians, certain leading British
mail steamship companies have exhibited, has led to strong
opposition in India to Imperial Airways being granted permission
to run local air services in India, or even across India as a
portion of an Imperial through air-route to Australia. Opposi-
tion has been shown in Australia also to the granting of any
monopoly British mail contract, or even of any local mail
contract to a purely British company. In the case of both
countries, "economic nationalism" has, no doubt, added fuel
to the local opposition. However, after much discussion and negotiation, all difficulties in the way of forging the urgently needed links in the Imperial air-chain have now been overcome. Local companies have at last been formed in both India and Australia which, aided by the experience and co-operation of Imperial Airways, Ltd., have now brought Calcutta within seven days of London, and will very shortly make Australia only eleven days distant.

Indian pilots have for some time past been successfully flying the English mails between Delhi and Karachi Airport, and between Madras, Bombay, and Karachi Airport; in the former case in the machines of the Delhi Aero Club, and in the latter case in the planes of a purely Indian company. The new Indian company recently formed to carry the mails between Karachi Airport and Calcutta and Rangoon will probably work the oversea air service as far as Singapore, at which point the Australian company will link with the Indian company, and fly the mails between Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane and the Singapore air base.

Today the weekly mails from India are timed to leave Calcutta on a Monday; Karachi, on Wednesday; Sharjah, on Thursday; Baghdad, on Friday; Alexandria, on Saturday; arriving in London on Monday morning via Brindisi, Milan, and Paris. From Brindisi (where Imperial Airways flying boat arrives on a Saturday afternoon) mails and passengers are conveyed to Paris, as before mentioned, by train. The last two hours, Paris to London, are spent in the air—quite a short trip compared with the runs of four and five hours across the Arabian Sea from Gwadar to Sharjah, or across the Mediterranean from Alexandria to Athens.

These longer runs, however, are pleasantly broken by frequent diversions in the shape of breakfast, or it may be luncheon or tea. In place of a hasty and somewhat sketchy meal in a tent or primitive building in the wilds of Baluchistan or Persia, elaborate meals are now served during flight on board the aircraft, at tables for two or four, in much the same way as in a railway refreshment car. These are the more appreciated when it is realized that the new route over the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf is ordinarily quite smooth; whereas flights overland, especially over hilly country, are sometimes "bumpy" in places.

With the object of personally comparing the present Arab coast route with the former Persian coast route, in what is perhaps one of the worst months of the year in the Persian Gulf—June—I booked a passage to London from India by Imperial Airways four-engined flying monster Hanno, leaving
Karachi Airport at 8.30 a.m. on May 31 last. This type of machine is larger, faster, and more comfortable than the previous City of Baghdad type in which I flew in 1931. There are two spacious saloons—fore and aft; and the provision of tables makes it possible to write, if required, whilst flying. The rhythmical hum of the propellers is no longer loud enough to interrupt conversation in ordinary tones; indeed, the effect, after a while, is soothing, and conducive to sleep! Gwadar was reached in about three hours. Here we descended to take in petrol—a forty-minutes' job. The next "hop"—440 miles, mostly over the Arabian Sea—was the longest in the journey, concluding with a twenty-minutes' tossing in a sandstorm whilst climbing over the rocky mountains of the Oman Peninsula, preparatory to alighting at Sharjah—once a notorious Arab headquarters on the pirates' coast, but now a peaceable little town and port.

Sharjah is today the main key of the new Arab coast British air-mail route. An excellent rest house, of the fortress type, erected by the Iraq Government at Rutbah Wells, affords the traveller the amenities of a good Eastern hotel, and a cool night's rest in quietness and security. It is in wireless communication with the shipping at sea, aircraft flying eastward and westward, and so, with the whole civilized world. The aerodrome and adjoining rest house are guaranteed the protection of the Sheikh of Sharjah. There has been no occasion during the past year to invoke his good offices, or to make other than prudent use of the chevaux de frise and barbed wire defences within which the air liner rests during its night's stay alongside the fort.

The Arabs on this coast, though very friendly with the British, are conservative in the extreme. The outlook of the local Sheikh may be gathered from the fact that motor vehicles are not allowed in Sharjah, as no mention of them appears in the Koran. Nor are gramophones; possibly because the Arab's conception of music may not fit in with the strident jazz noises which nowadays seem to form so large a proportion of our "canned" music. The Sheikh of Sharjah insists on his own national flag being flown over the British wireless station. The flag is exactly similar in design to that in the British signalling code, meaning, "We are short of water." But there is no shortage of water (or anything else), so far as I could see, in the new Imperial Airways rest house. Indeed, its erection and equipment, in surroundings the reverse of hospitable, is a triumph for British enterprise and organization.

From Sharjah to Bahrein is 330 miles, all over the sea. Hanno made a perfect landing on the fine, flat sand surface of
Muharraq Island, where the contents of a hillock of petrol tins were quickly pumped into our fuel tanks. Enterprising local merchants endeavoured to sell us pearls which one fertile-minded Arab salesman suggested (in English) we should take home as “Christmas presents” for our “girls”!

Bahrain to Koweit is 269 miles. Here we met the full force of the north-westerly shimal with its fine dust from the plains of Iraq. This somewhat obscured the view and delayed our progress a little. At Koweit a large number of motor-cars, driven by Arab traders and sightseers, dashed recklessly out of the gate of the trebly-walled town as soon as we landed, and spent a quick quarter of an hour of inspection and friendly conversation, whilst official mail and airway business was being carried out.

From Koweit to Basra is only 75 miles. After which, the former route—Baghdad, Rutbah Wells, Gaza, Cairo, Alexandria, Athens, and Brindisi—is followed.

The passage from Alexandria across the Mediterranean, and over the mountains of Crete, to the Piræus (Athens)—580 miles—occupied, in the flying boat Silvanus in which I travelled, only five hours, an astonishing contrast to the two or three days, and more, that the journey by steamer used to take not so very long ago. The selection by Imperial Airways of Cairo as the air base for their trans-African service to Cape Town makes it very convenient for passengers from the East to visit Khartoum, Kenya, Tanganyika Territory, Rhodesia, and South Africa; and, vice versa, for African residents and travellers to visit India, Burma, and the Far East. The journey from Cairo to Cape Town is timed to take under a week—2½ days to Nairobi, 3½ days to Tanganyika Territory, 4½ days to Salisbury (Rhodesia), 5½ days to Johannesburg, and 6½ days to Cape Town.
THE CHINA SHADOW PLAY

BY W. NUNN, M.P.

The stage has little apparent connection with the political situation in the Far East; yet the imaginative and industrious, but not generally too well informed, persons who create stage characters often serve as the unconscious instruments which indicate how important and far-reaching changes are moving. Thirty years ago the rare Chinese character in an English play was almost invariably cast for light relief, a comic figure walking oddly and expressing himself in a quaint idiom which was accepted light-heartedly as reasonably true to life. Today the Chinese on the stage takes a very different role. Often he plays a leading part, and he is always sinister; a strong, inscrutable, dangerously urbane and dominating personality.

The same striking change has been noticeable in our fiction. Why? Is it merely an accident that this change should be coincident with the change which has come over the face of China since 1911? Or is it that, without knowing how, the caterers for our amusement have registered the tremors of the distant disturbances, and have realized, without knowing why, that China is no longer so remote nor her problems so negligible that she and they can be dismissed with a smile?

From the early seventeenth century, when the first Englishman set foot in China, until nearly the end of the nineteenth century, China, to most Englishmen, was merely a shadow dimly seen in the distance. From that shadow came occasional flashes and rumblings of trouble; into it went enterprising Englishmen, few in number, and mostly humble in rank, taking with them British goods and bringing back, in due season, their profits; but there was no Chinese problem to engage the earnest attention of British statesmen, except at odd moments. Normally, in Downing Street, China lived behind a shadowy curtain which was opened only occasionally and, being drawn again, left her obscure and forgotten.

It would be absurd to blame British statesmanship that a definite policy was not laid down to deal with a shadow so filmy and low on the horizon as China up to the end of the nineteenth century. A civilization which could claim that its roots sank four thousand years into the past; which, among its less ancient evidences of culture, could look back along an uninterrupted system of official training and selection extending over thirteen
hundred years; which, even in its later years, had had contact with the West only in a very limited degree; and which, throughout its long history, had never been conscious of any doubt that it was the one supreme power in the universe; was not one with which any Western nation could get into close touch, nor whose development might seem to have any importance, other than commercial, to the rest of the world.

England's attitude, therefore, towards China throughout two hundred and eighty years or so was influenced almost entirely by commercial considerations. By sheer accident, or perhaps because the considerations were purely commercial and, therefore, single-eyed, England did, in fact, achieve some continuity of policy. There was, generally speaking, strength and decision in such action as she took, although it must not be overlooked that those qualities were easier to put into operation then than they are now.

It would have been expecting too much of British statesmanship, with its long record of good fortune in the avoidance of ordered planning, that from 1900 to the end of the War some attempt should have been made to determine the lines upon which this country's policy towards China should run. Business was going on not only as usual but in increasing measure, assisted by well-established British official and commercial connections. It was true that the Boxer trouble set the sky blazing and drew all eyes for a time, but the clouds soon closed down again. There was talk of the Open Door. Spheres of interest began to appear, under various thin disguises. Western influences began to press more and more closely upon China in the interest of trade and commerce; and where Western men and women, engaged in works of charity, pressed forward, the trader trekked steadily at their heels. None seems to have been particularly concerned with the growth of a new type of Chinese, nor with the growing strength of new ideas, largely imported from America and encouraged by well-meaning Americans in the country. Even the emergence of Sun Yat Sen was a matter of indifference; so much so that the opportunity he sought to obtain some Western co-operation and guidance in the work to which he had set himself was disregarded. Downing Street had an occasional sense of uneasiness, which it relieved from time to time by the utterance of good wishes and pious sentiments, while it continued to keep an alert eye upon its competitors for favourable commercial openings. The Revolution of 1911 shook the Eastern sky, but the resultant oscillation of the chairs in Downing Street merely produced a passing qualm. China was, in fact, still a shadow, although higher above the horizon, growing darker in hue, and showing more frequent flashes from behind her
piled masses. England, like other Western nations, was engrossed in matters much nearer home. The idea of the smallness of the world had not yet been forced upon her, and she was only dimly beginning to understand that there were undeveloped people outside the limits of her own Empire whose welfare might be her welfare and whose progress might affect her own fortunes. Later, the greater shadow of the War obscured all else; but it has been sheer folly that England, since the War, should have continued to employ hand-to-mouth methods.

By the time the War was over the old China had passed away. The Imperial régime, corrupt, tyrannical, and obstinately unprogressive as it had been, had at least held China together. The sacred character of the Throne had sufficed to give such authority to its occupant as to guarantee the remittance to Pekin of a proportion of the revenue sufficient to meet the requirements of government. The old system by which all members of the official services entered at Pekin, and renewed their contacts there at regulated intervals, ensured continuity of practice and an invaluable means of control. But the spread of Western education and the rapid growth of Western ideas had swept away the old controls; and when the Western Powers drew their breath and had time to look about them at the end of the War, they found themselves faced with a China in turmoil, with no recognized central authority. The new China, passionately desiring to express itself, yearning to attain an ideal state whose perfection seemed all the more desirable because it was veiled, attempting with indifferent success to reconcile the conflicting elements of personal ambition and pure patriotism, had unleashed forces which were beyond control. Vast areas of the country lay at the mercy of contending war lords, most of whom had embarked upon military activity as a profitable undertaking. Sun Yat Sen's influence had practically cut off the South, and his disappointment in failing to secure the support of the Western Powers had forced him into communion with Soviet Russia. Soviet agents were busily engaged in sowing propaganda, and were for a considerable period actively directing affairs. In Manchuria Japan was consolidating her position in competition with Russia. Rival politicians and war lords were disputing in Pekin.

It was under these conditions that the West realized that something of more than ordinary importance was going on behind the China shadow, and that the shadow was, in fact, growing ominously greater and blacker.

It was the obvious duty of England to take the lead. Her contact with China, throughout three hundred years, had been close. Her nationals had played a great part in the development
of the country, and her political influence was still strong. But a new spirit of internationalism, by which each nation attempts to shift the weight of its responsibility, had come over the world, and in a multitude of councillors there was none to give a strong lead.

This new spirit, added to fatigue, and helped by the hope that he who gave most would reap the greater reward, set the Powers upon a competition in placation. It is no wonder that the success of the Chinese politicians went to their heads, and that the more they were given the more they demanded. They are not to blame for failing to realize that what they were achieving was the mere shadow of good government. They were dealing with unfamiliar affairs, under conditions of extreme difficulty; they were anxious to gain the admiration and approval of their fellow countrymen by spectacular successes; and, naturally enough, in their haste and inexperience the production of impressive shadowgraphs seemed to them to be more useful than the slow building up of realities.

The proceedings of the Powers encouraged the Chinese politicians in the projection of their shadow play. The Customs Conference met and debated, under almost opéra bouffe conditions, while all round about them and in their hearing the contending Chinese forces demonstrated the folly of belief in the stability of the government. Fiscal autonomy was granted upon the express condition of the abolition of likin, but no steps were taken to guarantee the fulfilment of the condition; so that today it is not uncommon that merchants find themselves mulct in as many as fourteen extra transit or passage charges when their goods pass up-country. The recession of extra-territorial rights would have become a reality but for the Shanghai tragedy of 1932; and England, at any rate, would seem to have been prepared to place her nationals and their interests at the mercy of courts which are notoriously susceptible to political or military influence, possibly not without a shudder of apprehension but apparently without making any real effort to avert the danger. Shanghai, raised upon a valueless swamp by the energy, brains and capital of foreigners, and now one of the greatest trading centres of the world, in the building up and control of whose fortunes the British have played the leading part was threatened and is still under threat, despite the fact that, as the one efficiently governed and stable centre in China, it provides the only safe anchorage for the financial and commercial welfare of the country.

There is no need, in these days, to argue that the granting of fiscal autonomy, the abandonment of the concessions, the recession of extra-territorial rights, and the regulation of the
government of Shanghai are essential to the attainment of that state of independence which will make it possible for China to feel that she is shouldering the full responsibility for her own affairs; but, in dealing with these matters, the helter-skelter blundering of the Powers has done serious harm to China, and has retarded the basic work of reconstruction without which government can never function. Timorousness and sloppiness have enabled leaders who would otherwise have been obscure to pose before their people as heroes, impeding the work of better men; while even the best minds in China have been decoyed from their troublesome and disheartening duties on to the international stage, where the heated atmosphere of intrigue, and the glare of publicity, have given them the feeling that they are doing great things with comparative ease. While the political leaders of China have been making shadows on the world stage the reality of a united country has slipped away. The South and West, and to a great extent Mongolia, are either under communistic control or inspired by communistic ideas. If they ever again come under the authority of a central government at Nanking or elsewhere it will not be for many generations. In many areas the conditions are deplorable. Late news from Szechuan, for instance, tells of misrule, military aggression, and oppression of the gravest character. The poor, patient, industrious people, whose only interest in their government is that it shall be good, are pillaged, starved and ravaged by flood and famine in appalling manner, while the national progress, which should have been in orderly march, marks time.

The indecisive policy of the Powers might still have been going on, with the efforts of the handful of men in Nanking who were tenaciously hanging on to the last vestiges of their authority growing weaker and weaker, if it had not been for Japan. The attack on Mukden, indefensible in principle, sent a gust of reality through the shadows. Japan had lost patience. She had decided upon action. The tragedy of Shanghai followed. No justification under any of the accepted rules which may govern affairs between country and country can be admitted. Yet, deplorable as the incident was, it served a purpose which, in all probability, will reveal itself as in the interests of China. Broken and disheartened at Shanghai, China could offer little effective opposition to the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese forces. In the operations there a Chinese general, whose presence to the north of Nanking could never have been anything but a cause of apprehension, was broken, and his source of revenue in Jehol wrested from him. The Manchukuo government was set up, and Nanking lost its nominal control of that great northern area. Nanking has survived the shock, which is a clear indication,
if such were needed, that the government is composed of men who are not mere political puppets, but are statesmen in fact; and Nanking, having been forcibly concentrated upon itself, is now in a position to apply its energies to the work which lies definitely within the bounds of possibility.

It is not likely that Japan will attempt any further aggression south of Pekin upon Nanking's sphere of control. It is not likely that Manchukuo itself will take any action independently of Japan. Japan cannot entertain any hope of making Manchukuo an effective Japanese state. There is no people in the world less likely to be absorbed than the Chinese, and no area where the population is predominantly Chinese today will be anything but Chinese in fact tomorrow. Even if the Emperor Pu Yi should be set upon the throne of a northern empire, Nanking should still remain the nerve centre of the great Yangtse basin. There lies its work, in the consolidation and extension of good government, in the building up of a state which will extend its influence little by little westwards and south, to the recovery of control over those areas which are now existing in anarchy. The north may be left to work out its own salvation and to establish, in its own way, similar conditions of good government; and, in the distant future, it may not be impossible that China may once again be united under some form of federal government.

A great work lies at the hand of the Nanking government. The forcible concentration upon that work which circumstances have brought about has lessened, in some degree, the difficulty of the task; but the Japanese aggression in Manchuria served another purpose which may prove to be quite as useful. China has always had great faith in its diplomatic skill. The presentation to the League of Nations of her case against Japan gave her a great opportunity, of which she was quick to avail herself. Here was her chance to attain by the art of diplomacy the towering success which the drudgery of routine work at Nanking was so slow in bringing. She may actually have entertained a hope that justice would triumph. No effort was neglected to secure that triumph, and, week after week, the Chinese mission at Geneva was engaged in expert, and undoubtedly attractive, propaganda. But the end was bitter disappointment, and China has now withdrawn upon herself fully conscious that only by her own efforts and by unremitting application to the difficult work which calls for attention in Nanking can she establish herself in the eyes of the world.

However good for her soul it may have been to pass through the valley of affliction, and however powerfully it may have operated to show her the stony and difficult country which lies beneath the clouds, it might have been possible for the Powers,
and for England in particular, to spare her that humiliation. From the beginning it was obvious that Japan, as yet little attracted by the cult of internationalism, and not yet having refined away the power of knowing her own mind, had a definite purpose in view, and that her strong individualist spirit was not likely to be cowed by any fear of the consequences of defying the League. She knew that while a multitude of councilors may make for wisdom it does not make for decided action, and, barely concealing her scorn for the wavering and voluble West, she went on her way, confident that the strength of her position as the one party having a definite policy would carry her through.

Had England retained anything of the influence and prestige in China which she held during the days of Sir Harry Parkes and Sir John Jordan, and had she had the courage to exert that influence, the Manchurian dispute might have been negotiated to a settlement which, while almost certainly resulting in the setting up of some form of separate government in Manchuria, would have saved the face of China.

The report of the Lyttton Commission was admirable as a literary production, but for all that it contained in the way of special evidence it might have been written in London by anyone reasonably well informed.

There were available sources of information, one of which should be the archives of the British Foreign Office, which would have disclosed the fact that Japan was not merely playing her own game, but that she was making use of a strong monarchist movement. Mr. Pu Yi had been approached at various times for some years past to allow himself to be set up on a new Imperial throne. The original objective, probably as far back as the days of Yuan Shih Kai, had been Pekin; and at one time Marshal Chang Tso-lin himself had favoured the enterprise and would probably have engaged in it but for the fact that a sudden onslaught by Feng Yu-hsiang drove him back again to his Manchurian fastness. Later, the monarchists turned their attention towards Manchuria, and it is significant that when Pu Yi became Chief Executive of Manchukuo the title assigned to him deliberately indicated the temporary character of his standing. The fact that, after his public investiture by a colourless modern ceremony, Pu Yi received, in strict privacy, some seven or eight leading Chinese who thereupon performed the ancient Kow Tow ceremony, goes a long way to prove that Pu Yi in Manchuria is fulfilling in some measure the aims of the monarchist section of the northern Chinese. Those aims are just as legitimate, if they make for good government, as the aspirations of the believers in pure democracy; and it might well be for the good of China that two separate forms of government, linked by
blood and language ties, should exist side by side in friendly relationship within the borders of that vast area.

The difficulty in dealing with China is to get away from the shadows and face the reality. The welfare of some four hundred millions of people is in the hands of a few small groups, of whom the strongest and most efficient is the existing government in Nanking, controlling actually or virtually the most highly developed area, and having nominal authority over even greater contiguous areas. The future of China rests in the hands of Nanking. The instruments by which good government can be fashioned are there. Ability of a high order, will to work and steadfastness of purpose, experience gained in the past years of trouble, shrewdness and patience all the stronger because they are typical Chinese qualities, and real statesmanship, are available. There remains to be added the genuine friendly co-operation of those Powers whose interests are linked with the country.

Can that co-operation be counted upon? By all the signs discernible, Nanking is ready to welcome it, if it is offered honestly. The moment is propitious, but the overture must not be expected from Nanking, nor must a people to whom "face" is a matter of vital importance be expected to respond to any crude and public offer. There would be possibilities in concerted action by England, France, America and Japan, if it were not that such action would be likely to lead China back again to the stage, to enact the shadow play of high politics. If Nanking is to be assisted to get down to the solid work of administration the greatest hope seems to lie in action by England.

A new British minister is going out shortly to take up his duties in China. If he can see beyond the possibilities of his ordinary diplomatic rôle he has a great mission in his hands. If he can put something of the spirit of Sir John Jordan into his work, burn his paper and destroy his pens and typewriters, establish his headquarters at Nanking, and rely upon personal contact and the friendship he will be offered, he may help to do great things not only for China but for the world. The world cannot afford to have China a festering centre of distress and unrest. England can afford it least of any country.

The essential steps which seem to be required if England is to take a part in the rehabilitation of China are: that she should know her aim and adhere to it; that she should carry the other interested Powers with her, if possible, but, if not, should continue upon her own line until the others join in; that she should deal honestly; and, above all, that she should not be weak-kneed.
TRENDS IN COLONIAL POLICY: THE PROGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE

BY PROFESSOR J. COATMAN
(Professor of Imperial Economic Relations, University of London)

A recent speech made by Prince Leopold of Belgium in the Upper House of the National Legislature deserves notice, both because of its own intrinsic merits and because of the importance of its subject—namely, the Colonial Question. For all colonizing powers this latter question is doomed to overshadow in increasing measure their national and international policies. It is one of the roots of the world economic problem, and as national state planning becomes universal, as it assuredly will, the relations of all kinds—economic, political, and human—between metropolitan countries and their colonies will become part of the very essence of national plans and policies, and so will have tremendously powerful repercussions on international relations also. Moreover, inside the colonies, the human problems now raised by the question of the native economic and political development are of an almost alarming formidableness, and call for the exercise of the rarest skill and the deepest knowledge on the part of the statesmen and others concerned with their solution. Students of comparative colonial administration are aware that in the approach to the solution of some of these "human" problems Belgium leads the world. The Belgian Congo Labour Policy, and the whole-hearted and altruistic attempt to restore on sound modern principles the old native institutions destroyed in the period of ignorance, before their vital importance to native welfare was understood by anybody, stand out as models of statesmanship, and will, it is to be hoped, be made increasingly widely known by Belgian workers in, and students of, the colonial field. For these reasons we welcome Prince Leopold's wholly admirable speech and draw attention to its salient points.

We might, however, first explain that under the Belgian Constitution the sons of the King on attaining their majority become members of the Senate, which is the Upper House in Belgium. It is customary for the heir-apparent to the Crown to make use of this prerogative, and to take part in the business of the Senate by making speeches there intended to draw the attention of the country to questions in which he is specially interested. In pursuance of this custom Prince Leopold of Belgium lately made a speech in the Senate on the colonial question, which roused
considerable attention in the country, and is both an example of civic courage and a notable statement from one aspect of the colonial problems which occur in the Belgian Congo. In that speech he stated the conclusions which he had reached after his recent travels for study in that colony. The views expressed by Prince Leopold relate, of course, to an African colony, but we feel sure that they also find their application and their proof in many Asiatic colonies. Prince Leopold by his speech has once more shown the deep interest he has in colonization. He is, moreover, an authority on colonial science, for he has gained a wide knowledge of colonial problems by his many travels abroad, chiefly in Asiatic colonies—Netherlands Indies, Federated Malay States, Indo-China. He is a member of the International Colonial Institute, and was, in fact, the President of its meeting at Brussels.

The Prince began by drawing attention to some of the weaknesses inherent in the policy of rapid development of the economic resources of the Congo which had marked the early stages of Belgian rule. Such a rapid development was, however, unavoidable in view of the pressing need under which Belgium lay in order to make effective her occupation of the whole region of the Belgian Congo, and also in order to give practical proof of her capacity as a colonizing power. Private capital, mostly European, was the prime agency used in this development—as in all other colonies of European powers—and, as elsewhere, the native was regarded as merely an instrument for this work. But the success of European enterprises could not be regarded as the final goal of Belgian activities in the Congo. The circumstances of the war and post-war period have led to the retention of an agrarian system which has been generally condemned, and also to the creation of increasingly numerous industrial enterprises and ever more ambitious programmes of public works. In the above we have a state of affairs in which the native can continue to be regarded as a mere productive instrument. But nowadays Parliament itself was awake to the dangers of this system. In 1926 the Medical Service had drawn attention to certain aspects of native labour conditions, and valuable measures had been taken in that connection. And now the Colonial Commission of Parliament had made a candid examination of faults committed in the past. He then showed by implication the mistake of supposing that the future of the Belgian Congo depended solely on the success of private enterprise. Nevertheless, it was no good thinking that a total reversal of policy would be made in one day. Existing conditions had to be taken into account in anything which Parliament might do, and certainly the State had a duty to help those enterprises now imperilled by the economic crisis. But certainly in future reservations must be made. The Prince
did not desire on this occasion to discuss the mining industry, but would confine himself solely to agriculture, which should always be given an important place in colonial activity. New methods of procedure were desirable in future which called for a dual policy. Firstly, the agriculturists should be organized on sound principles, and it should be open to the natives to become property owners and have that economic liberty which is guaranteed to them by the Belgian Colonial Charter. Secondly, note should be taken of the present position. Some European enterprises could continue to keep themselves in their present shape, whilst others, harder hit by the depression, would have to enter more into partnership with the natives in some form or other still to be settled, such as, for example, allowing natives to have small areas to develop, with the promise that their produce should be marketed at fixed prices. But, of course, all existing rights should be preserved, and Government should not grant any new concessions for some years to come in regions capable of agricultural development. He drew attention to a passage in a speech delivered to the members of the International Colonial Institute at Lisbon by M. Armando Monteiro, the Portuguese Colonial Minister, in which he said that the application of foreign capital should take into account first and foremost the actual needs of the region concerned and not those of the industries and financial interests of the metropolitan countries. Prince Leopold insisted that the future belonged to those colonies where development could be most economically carried out and this involved the partnership of the natives. He did not wish to exclude Belgians from agricultural activities in the Congo, but he thought that their most fruitful work lay in the sphere of scientific research, purchase of produce, in the processing of the latter, and in its transport and export. He then showed by specific examples that the most favourable financial position was held by those colonies where the development of the soil was in the hands of the natives themselves. Thus there were two schools of thought on colonial questions. The first believed that the policy of concessions to Europeans should be maintained. The other held that exploitation should be done directly by the natives. The time had come to face the dilemma which had arisen and courageously choose a policy.

The Prince’s reference to the International Colonial Institute serves as a timely reminder of the increasingly important rôle now being played by the latter in the study of colonial affairs, and it will interest readers to know something of the valuable literature which it publishes.

Among the many publications which the International Colonial Institute at Brussels regularly brings out, and which are highly
appreciated by all who take part in the study of colonial problems, its *Year Book of Comparative Colonial Documents* takes first place. This work, which appears annually in three volumes, brings together the documents—legislative, administrative, political, social, and economic—which have been published in the chief types of colonies throughout the world. Vol. I. relates to the Belgian Congo, Netherlands Indies, Italian and Portuguese colonies; Vol. II. the French colonies—colonies generally, Indo-China, Equatorial Africa, West Africa, Madagascar, Togoland; Vol. III. the British colonies—colonies generally, Ceylon, Burma, Bechuanaland, Gold Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda.

The documents are of two kinds: (a) Official reports, speeches, statistics, notices giving information on the various aspects—political, administrative, social, economic—of life in the colonies concerned; and (b) the texts of laws, decrees, ordinances, decisions, and regulations of a general character. All these documents are given in their original language either with a French or English translation or with a summary only, according to the importance and character of their subject. This publication is therefore unequalled as a source of information. It has the advantage of making known, not the personal impressions of some colonials, but from official sources the practical results of the action of the governments.

The first volume, for the year 1932, has just appeared. Among the documents therein collected we may draw attention to those relating to the Netherlands Indies, which are indeed of a kind to interest all who follow the movements of Asiatic colonization, and especially the extracts from the speeches or reports of the Governor-General on the crisis and the financial situation. The effects of the crisis have been cruelly felt in the Indies, and it is of interest to learn how the Government there has faced the difficulties it had to meet. The report of the Bank of Java, also given, has for the same reason considerable interest. We note, further, the statistics taken from the Bulletin of the Official Bureau of Statistics published by the department of Agriculture, Industry, and Labour, which show the representative shares in the exports from the Netherlands Indies, of the produce of capitalist agricultural undertakings and of native cultivation.

In legislation we note as of special interest the ordinances relating to marriage under Muslim law, and repudiation; private unsubsidized school teaching, taxation of income and capital; and also those reforming the judicial code for Europeans and natives.
The name of Professor Kielstra is well known to the readers of the Asiatic Review, as he has written articles in it on various colonial subjects. He has now been appointed Governor of Surinam.

Johannes Coenraad Kielstra was born on November 13, 1873, he studied Law and selected the career of a judge in Dutch East Indies, leaving Holland to take up his work in 1903.

In the East Indies he filled various positions as judge, as a civil servant, and as assistant secretary in the Government Railway Department at Bandoeng.

He returned to Holland on sick leave in 1915 and his colonial career was terminated by his appointment as professor in Colonial Civil and Penal Law, in East Indian Agricultural Economics, and in East Indian Agrarian Law. He accepted this appointment on October 7, 1917, and now, fifteen years later, he has been accorded the honour of the appointment of Governor of Surinam on the departure of Dr. A. A. Rutgers.

Professor Kielstra is the fifty-sixth Governor to rule over Surinam or Dutch Guyana since Anthony Rowse acted as Governor in the colony founded by Willoughby in 1651. His task will be arduous. The colony is economically in great straits, scantily populated (2.87 per square mile, less than in all surrounding countries), with a large corps of officials, an unfavourable position compared with other West-Indian colonies as regards commercial routes, and a lack of any mass product for the world market, with a population with Western ideas and culture, yet where a native communal bond is lacking. So far no Governor has been successful in developing the colony; lawyers, engineers, officers, both naval and military, agricultural specialists (some with great reputation) have all done their best. Kielstra is the first professor to devote his gifts of heart and intellect to this ancient colony which has belonged to the Netherlands since 1667 (with the exception of three short intervals). He will find there entirely different circumstances from those prevailing in the East Indies with its native population, though he knows the land from his special study journey in 1925, in the reports of which he has given his impressions of the land and its people, both in writing and in lectures.
He may be expected to prove a strong leader and practical organizer. Professor Kielstra is a Colonel in the Dutch Reserve Army and is greatly interested in the training of youth. Both as a former ruler in the colonial empire in Asia and as a scholar he will be enabled to place his gifts at the service of Surinam and its progress, which is indeed of great interest to him.
To see in its true perspective the struggle of the French with England in India, the drama must be thrown upon the background of European history. The English Company had been founded in 1600, and its early fortunes were to some extent affected by the rise of Sivaji and the Maratha power in the latter half of the seventeenth century. The French Company was established in 1719, and thus, so far as the struggle was a battle of commercial rivalry, the English had the start of more than a century. But in the eighteenth century France was beginning to show the signs of exhaustion which eventually culminated in the revolution. The soaring ambition of Louis XIV. had already involved the country in the War of the Spanish Succession, and this was followed later by the Seven Years’ War. Nor was this all—there were complicated affairs to be looked after within the country. Europe itself was in a peculiar state, it might almost be called, of ferment. Hassall says, “Solemn treaties carried no weight; national boundaries and race limits were held to be of no importance; the condition of the labouring classes was little considered. Jealousy and suspicion marked the dealings of States with each other. . . . Adventurers were found at every Court; spies inundated each European capital. Atheism was rampant, the financial condition of every country was rotten, and self-interest was the only guiding motive.”

The French, like the English, thus started their career in India as traders, and just as the English Company was reluctant to interfere in Indian quarrels, and so to take on a political connection, so its seems the French Government had no desire to become a power in India. “The Crown,” says Professor Dalgleish in his learned study of the French Company,* “was interested not only in the Company’s government but also in its domain. The French Government had only disdain for colonies,” so it used

its influence to curb the expansionist tendencies of Dupleix. In this the Paris directors co-operated most heartily." But Dupleix had to be reckoned with: there apparently was not room for the two Companies in India, especially when the ambitions of the Frenchman turned in the political direction. The clash of commercial interests drifted into armed opposition; each party sided with its chosen Indian chieftain, and the dominance of European military powers practically left them as protagonists, fighting the battles of their respective countries whenever these were at war.

All this is well enough known to any student of Indian history. Everyone knows how Dupleix, badly supported by a lukewarm government, finally failed, and how the star of France sank lower and lower, until the ascendancy of England could no longer be disputed. But though the struggle itself was hopeless, there were still men who, fired by that spirit of adventure already mentioned, as well as by the desire for individual gain, joined themselves to this Prince or that, and with one eye on their private fortunes, flattered themselves that they were serving their country against the hated national enemy. Perron, de Boigny, Walter Reinhardt, du Drencé, Raymond, Madec—these are names which now flit across the page of Indian history, though at the time each of them played an important part. They could not change the destiny of India: perhaps they did not try to. Attracted, most of them, by the romance of mysterious India, finding themselves at last in a position of which they could never have dreamed, they were generally true to their salt, and fought with the companies they had raised, often drawn, so far as the Europeans were concerned, from very questionable sources, but highly trained, well organized, and brave to a fault, for the Prince to whom they had attached themselves. Mr. Maurice Besson has been at pains to tell these romantic stories in detail: * he may be pardoned for the occasional intrusion of national pride, but he has unfolded with a skilful pen what must have seemed to contemporaries a fairy tale. What are we to make of the ragged Breton gamín, René Madec, who haunted the quays of Bordeaux and on whom the fine ladies took pity, and who yet lived to play his part in India, to surrender at Pondicherry and to receive a special safe-conduct which enabled "M. Madec, Captain in the service of his Most Christian Majesty," to travel to Mauritius and thence to France? More famous still is the free lance Walter Reinhardt, whose fame is bound up with and largely eclipsed by his wife, the ex-courtesan known to history as the Begum Sumroo. A strange figure this Begum—a sort of combination of Catherine II. and Cleopatra—a woman for whom men fought and quarrelled and were ready to


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die—a capable woman who, converted to Christianity, endowed church and seminaries and who left a legacy to the Pope.

Two of these adventurers stand apart from the type. Claude Martin took service with the English and was a friend of Englishmen. He made a fortune rather by a natural gift for finance than in the less reputable ways common in those days. Far different was Paillebot de Saint Lubin, a humble citizen of Lyons, who somehow seems to have ingratiated himself with the Court of Louis XV., but who was essentially a rascal. Full of his own importance, a man around whom, in his own estimation, the world revolved, a man, moreover, “of courage and intrigue, and a thorough-paced liar,” he might have served Molière as a character for a comedy had he lived in time. He died in the obscurity from which he should not have emerged after exchanging the glories of India for the more suitable profession of a hair-dresser. And so these adventurers fade out of history. France had no more need of them, and the steadily advancing power of England left no room for the romance of adventure and of fortune-making at the expense of Indian Princes.

By 1830 British power was supreme. The French had given up the hopeless struggle, and even the adventurers by whose help some of the Indian Princes, notably Sindia (or more properly Shinde) and Holkar, had been able to put up a resistance had disappeared. Everywhere except in the Punjab the British ruled the country, although then as now they recognized within limits the independence of the States. But they had hitherto been too busy consolidating their power to have contributed much towards the general well-being of the inhabitants. Railways were yet to come: and the great irrigation systems. Macaulay and the famous minute of 1835 were not far off, but as yet education went on the old way. There was still a pretence that a descendant of Timur sat upon the throne at Delhi, but he was a Samson with his hair shorn, and figuratively, if not literally, blinded. It was into an India so constituted that M. Jacquemont arrived* in search primarily of science, but eager to record, in a desultory and inconsequent fashion, his impressions of the country. Waterloo had been left behind some 15 years, and it is in no spirit of hostility that he writes of his English hosts who seem to have received him with such cordiality as they were capable of. And that, speaking generally, was not much. For Jacquemont, like so many other continental observers, was chiefly impressed by the coldness, the formality, the rather terrifying reserve of the Englishman, the unimaginative maintenance of his own customs.

* État Politique et Social de l’Inde du Nord en 1830. (Paris : Ernest Leroux.) This is an extract of relevant passages from the diary of Jacquemont, written a century ago.
and habits in spite of climate and circumstances, the want of anything that could be called conversation. "They pass the time smoking and lying on the sofa, which combined induce sleep easily, and make a pretence of reading some novels and newspapers: some drink spirits and water: in the evening a ride or a drive without any purpose, and so back to dinner and bed after a more or less long session of hooka and grog." Such, it seems, were the men who made India part of the Empire.

Outwardly there is much that persists in Hindu custom to this day—with a difference. M. Jacquemont, to do him justice, was in India for scientific research and not to study the people, so that what he sets down—in all honesty and simplicity—is but the rather superficial observations of a tourist. He nowhere attempts any analysis of esoteric Hinduism, does not, in fact, seem to be aware that it exists, though he does notice that some at least of the superstition can be paralleled in the Roman Church. That was the time when Lord William Bentinck passed the memorable ban on the practice of becoming sati, but the writ of the Governor General did not run beyond the left bank of the Sutlej, and we read without surprise that when Ranjit Singh, the Lion of the Punjab, had married two little girls in his old age, "les pauvres petites à la mort de leur vieux mari impuissant, seront obligées de se brûler avec son corps. C'est de rigueur dans leur famille, qui est de la plus haute caste." The practice has all but disappeared now, and it has at all times been difficult for the Western mind, with its insistence on the sanctity of human life, and its different conception of womanhood, to appreciate the idea that the woman was irrevocably part of the man, and in dying with him she did not so much sacrifice her life (which was of no value) as avoid the break in spiritual continuity which the bonds of living flesh must occasion. M. Jacquemont does not take this view. He thinks that women, to whom this kind of death is an ever-present possibility, grow accustomed to the thought of it, so that when the hour has struck they can face the ordeal with indifference. It is an instance of observation, not of study, for there can be little doubt that the indifference is brought about by spiritual exaltation, like that of the Christian martyrs.

The sense of dignity—that "izzat" of which writers so frequently speak—seems to vary with the reality of power. The poor shadow of an Emperor, permitted with almost contemptuous kindness to play at being an Emperor, kept up a shadow Court with strangely elaborate shadow ceremonies. One might almost be reading of the establishment of Mr. Turveydrop. Salaams, then a short advance, then more salaams. Presentation of gifts, and more salaams. Presentation of a robe of honour, further salaams and more ceremonies, and that was all. Very
different was the reception by Ranjit Singh, who not only made his visitor sit beside him, but entered into a conversation which is a curious mixture of shrewd insight and of childish simplicity. Something of the kind may be seen today. Durbar are after all tedious ceremonies, possibly as tedious to the Prince as to his guests, and perhaps not more tedious than a European levee. Visits of ceremony from Prince to Viceroy and Viceroy to Prince, are nothing more than visits of ceremony. It is when the Prince puts off his trappings of State and becomes, as the Maharaja of Baroda remarked, "an ordinary mortal," that one sees the true man, and it is only the Prince who is without power who tries to conceal the nakedness of his impotence.

In another way, too, this visit to the Great Mogul is not without its lesson. It has sometimes been remarked that the English in India do not appreciate the value of pageantry. Granted that to a man who takes his chance with a London crowd fighting for a bus it seems ludicrous to be escorted by outriders or even a mounted company, or again to find a sentry mounting guard with fixed bayonet. These things nevertheless count: they are expected and to "ride in triumph through Persepolis" in a bullock-cart seems to the Indian mind undignified. They ordered this matter better a century ago: they order it better now in the States. Like the Maharaja, you learn that there is a time for relaxation and a time for ceremony and that to possess power is not enough. You must also be content to display the visible signs of it: that is due, if not to yourself, then to your position and the Prince you serve. Jacquemont travelled in a palanquin with elephants and cavalry and police through saluting lines of infantry, as became one who was accompanying the Resident, the visible symbol of the English power.

Women were of no account. As in ancient Greece, the honest women were left to mind the house and the feminine part of society was furnished by the courtesans. These were, however, more respected and, it would seem, respectable than their corresponding sisters in Europe. Jacquemont, however, it may be repeated, was not studying the Indian, and he did not observe that the women in the background had a great deal of influence over their menfolk. He cannot be held to blame for recording the mistake into which so many others have fallen. Today we know better: the women are coming forward to take their part in public affairs, but perhaps those are wiser who still refuse to discard the spiritual sari for the spiritual dhoti.

And what of the people themselves? Let it always be remembered that there were but fifty-eight years between the time when the Company "stood forth as Diwan" in Bengal and the date with which we are concerned. During that time there had been
war with Haidar Ali and then with Tipu; but the French, though no longer serious rivals, were able to hamper British operations both by the assistance they gave to Indian Princes and by naval descents under the brilliant Suffren: Sindia had to be reckoned with and the Marathas, both the Peshwa and Holkar. It was not until the arrival of Wellesley and Hastings that the policy of non-intervention was abandoned, and Hastings left in 1823. The policy of Wellesley apparently had to be stated: a policy “which promises to improve the general condition of the people of India and to unite the principal native States in the bond of peace under the protection of the British power.” Little wonder, then, that Jacquemont found much to blame: there was little or no sympathy for the people. “Les Anglais n’ont pas cette sorte de magnificence qui tient au sentiment national et tourne au profit de pauvre peuple.” There were excellent roads made by and for the English, but no wells were sunk nor any village tanks made; nor, he seems to imply, was anything else done for the people to whom “they meant nothing.” Apart, however, from this want of sympathy—apart from a life like that of “étrangers campés au milieu du pays qu’ils ont conquis”—apart from their contempt for the people which makes the Englishman say “I am alone,” raised in Olympian seclusion above the rest, where the Frenchman would say “Je suis le premier”—apart from these things M. Jacquemont has nothing but praise for English qualities of administration—“fidèles à leur parole toujours, provés, équitable”—but the one thing wanting is sympathy. “They enjoy their conquest with moderation, with equity, because both are indicated by their own interest, if not inculcated by their European education; but they have no sympathy with a conquered people.” Security of life and property, moderation and justice, the absence of caprice which inspires confidence, were not enough to make the administration popular. Our author notes with some surprise that more people crossed the Sutlej from the left bank to the right than the other way, though Ranjit Singh ruled the Punjab with all the caprice of an unfettered autocrat.

Opinions will differ how far such sentiments are true of today. There can be no question of an immense advance in the care for the material and moral welfare of the people. Everyone—not only Europeans but Indians also—knows that the first care must be for the ryot, for his marketing, his irrigating channels, his means of transport, his health; and not only directly by schools, but indirectly in these and other ways, the means of raising him morally—in the somewhat cant phrase of the day his “uplift”—is constantly borne in mind. How far M. Jacquemont would admit that such things show an increase of sympathy and how far he would ascribe them merely to an improved administra-
tion—to a higher conception of duty rather than to an access of affection—is another question which each must answer for himself. In spite of a higher plane of government and of generally lower taxation, the people of an Indian State do not, in fact, migrate into British India, nor does the contrary happen, but if any deduction is to be made from this it must be that everywhere the ryot is attached to his own soil and that conditions are not so startlingly different as to support a change in face of that attachment. This want of sympathy of which the author complains was perhaps natural in the conditions out of which British rule was evolved: like some other traditions, it has persisted, probably more than the present attitude justifies. M. Martineau, in his Preface, remarks that "toutes les difficultés actuelles ont peut-être leur source dans ce divorce initial entre associés qui se sont méconnus." That is how it strikes a foreign observer: the words are there for the Englishman to take or to leave according to temperament.

One curious fact seems worthy of mention, since it is so completely at variance with what one sees today. It is true that it occurs in the diary during the travel through the Punjab which, as I have said, was not under British rule, but since the expressions "dans l'Inde" is used, and since the diary does not profess to be a consecutive story, but is a desultory record of experiences from day to day without compression or revision, it is not unreasonable to suppose that this particular entry is of more general application. It appeared, then, that, contrary to the usual experience, the population avoided the main roads and canals and preferred to live in the more remote parts. There, it is cynically remarked, they might be subject to their master's oppression, but to no one else's. Along the highway they were the prey of every traveller who had the power. When you arrived at your camp there was litter for the horses, but nobody paid for it; soldiers and servants in the retinue of any person of consideration lived on the villagers; guides were taken at night and received never a copper; elephants and camels were fed on the surrounding trees and hedges and no one thought of the damage done.

When one thinks of the great irrigation systems in the Punjab and Madras, when one considers the vast populations which crowd the fertile valleys of the rivers, when one remembers that in the wastes of Ladak in Kashmir the population is about five to the square mile, the enormous difference which confidence and a sense of security and fair play have made can be appreciated. The morality of the British and, to some extent for this cause, of the Indian has undergone a complete change. It is recognized now, not only that the villagers have rights, but that those who contribute most to the exchequer are entitled to get some
return. Only the other day when a large scheme for the benefit of the capital of a State was in contemplation, it was ultimately postponed, though good in itself, on the ground that enough had been spent on the capital and it was time something were done for the villages.

Incoherent though the narrative is, the picture is on the whole sombre when compared with that of today. The villagers, we hear, were miserably poor and lived miserably: the one consolation was that they were still more wretched in the years that went before. Now they are still poor, but in spite of what missionaries and philanthropists say, they do not live miserably. They have gained enormously, not only in material ways—in the provision of water, in the care of health, in education, and in security—but what is perhaps even more valuable than all these—in self-respect. The Indian ryot is a gentleman: he expects to be so treated, though he does not expect a foreigner to enter into all his customs and idiosyncrasies. His offer of hospitality is always sincere; it may be given to a superior as from an inferior, but not with cringing. He will put out deck chairs—the best he has—for his visitors, and take one himself if invited, and will talk as man to man over a cup of tea. How many an Englishman can recall days when, after a hot and tiresome journey for the sole benefit of the people in his charge and with no thought of his own comfort or reputation, he has been amply rewarded by the unsought kindness of the simple village folk?

The days of indifference have passed and are passing. In the towns, maybe, the Englishman will still remain aloof, yet even there, partly owing to the reasonable laxity of rigid custom, intercourse is freer and more cordial. Another hundred years will pass, and when the commentator compares that time with this he will perhaps record with satisfaction how the old colour prejudice and the old aloofness on the one side, the old suspicion and the old rigidity on the other, have completely disappeared and and all things have become new.
THE PROFESSOR AT THE ROUND-TABLE

THE KEY TO FREEDOM AND SECURITY IN INDIA. A constructive study of the elementary principles of civic freedom and security with reference to the establishment of stable free institutions in modern India. By An Indian Student of Political Science. (Oxford University Press.) 6s. net.

 Reviewed by Sir John Kerr.

The author of this book is unduly modest in his description of himself. It is clear that he has been a diligent student of his rather arid subject, but he is now a master of it, and if he is not a professor, he ought to be. He has the proper academic virtue of lucidity, and the proper academic disdain for the pusillanimous politicians and administrators who hesitate to follow the path so clearly marked out for them by logical theory. It is a good thing that such people should from time to time take stock of their position, and, while so engaged, they might do worse than listen to the words of wisdom contained in this book.

The author begins, as is right, with a definition of his political objective. "The mere consent of the governed is not sufficient to protect and ensure the freedom and sovereignty of the people: their active participation and voluntary decision must lie at the basis of all legislative and executive authority in the really free state." The author admits that this ideal state has not yet been reached in any country, and it may be questioned whether the great majority of people in any country really want to undertake active participation in the legislative and executive measures of government. So long as they are free to pass upon their lawful occasions without undue interference or restriction on the part of the officers of government, and so long as they are not unduly mulcted in the matter of rates and taxes, they are not greatly interested in the persons who govern them or in the details of governmental action. In western countries, since the war, this happy state of affairs has been somewhat disturbed by doubts as to the capacity of the politicians to cope with the conditions which have arisen; but the persons whom our author terms the "governed" or the "people" show no signs of wanting to take on the job themselves. They prefer to have it done for them by a Mussolini or a Hitler. In India, in spite of the efforts of the late Mr. Montagu and of those who have tried to wreck the constitution which he set up, the placid, pathetic contentment of the
peasantry persists, and it is clear that not for many years, if ever, will they be ready and willing to play the part which our author wishes to assign to them in the government of their country. Even, therefore, if we accept his view that his ideal is a good one, it is too remote to serve as the basis of a working constitution at the present time.

There remains, however, what the author calls "the urgent practical question of how these people are to be stimulated to take an interest in public affairs." He accepts the view of the Lothian Committee and the White Paper that adult suffrage, either direct or indirect, is impracticable and undesirable at the present time for elections to the legislatures. But he proposes its adoption for elections to village councils, which are to be set up, where they do not already exist, "for the actual control and management of all internal village affairs." Alas! the experienced administrator has been down this path already, and has found that it leads nowhere. The author’s eloquent description of "a small body of experienced and competent elders chosen annually by all the adult residents of each village or natural unit of habitations" who "would undoubtedly form the most natural and the best body for dealing with all matters of local concern and interest and would act as the village tribunal of justice dealing with all civil or criminal cases," recalls the speeches made by the late Lord Sinha fifteen years ago or more when he introduced his scheme for rehabilitating village self-government in Bengal. He hoped much from that scheme and nothing grieved him more than its failure. The fact seems to be that in no country does the villager take more than a very mild interest in the village pump, while in India, at any rate, he greatly prefers to submit his complaints and disputes to a distant but impartial tribunal, even if it is relatively dilatory and expensive, rather than to the village elders who know too much about him and his affairs. Even a kindly observer like Lord Irwin has felt constrained to refer to these little village councils as "all that has survived of the rich promise of the first Aryan political genius, the arrested germs, as it were, of parliaments which might have been, and now the object of scientific study, much as atrophied organs in the human body, which once were vital parts in the structure of ancestors very different from ourselves, today engage the attention of physiologists."* Not by such bodies are the Indian masses to be stirred into political consciousness and life.

In the case of higher forms of political organizations the author proposes "progressively restricted franchises through a graduated scale" for taluq and district boards, and for the provincial and federal legislatures, therein differing from the Lothian Committee.

* Political India (1932), p. 6.
and the White Paper, which have proposed in the main to adopt the franchise for local bodies as the basis of the franchise for the provincial legislatures. It is not clear in what way our author would graduate this scale for the various bodies, but he would apparently accept in all cases property and educational qualifications on the lines put forward in the White Paper. He would supplement them by a progressive scale of various forms of public service as qualifying persons for a higher franchise. He proposes that "the younger generation of citizens should be encouraged to join a local civic guard and undergo voluntary training in police duties, so that they may share in the opportunity and responsibility of local defence and relieve in part at least the necessity of the State to maintain a large, expensive, paid police force adequate for effective protection of person and property." Service of this kind for a specified period of three or five years would qualify those who have rendered it for the higher franchises for the provincial and federal legislatures, while shorter periods would make them eligible for the taluq vote or the district franchise. Similarly voluntary service on arbitration boards or village committees or in fighting epidemic diseases would qualify for a vote. The experienced administrator will remembered that civic guards of various kinds have been formed in the past and have not been a great success, except occasionally during temporary emergencies; while it may be doubted whether voluntary public service would enfranchise many people who would not already be entitled to the vote under one of the qualifications enumerated in the White Paper scheme. The author, by the way, seems to underestimate the extent to which that scheme enfranchises the small cultivator, the agricultural tenant, the labourer, and the depressed classes.

The author has not overlooked the communal problem. He gives an excellent account of its origin and complexities, and has no difficulty in showing that it has not been solved by any of the authorities who have tackled it so far, from the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme and the Simon Commission down to the Prime Minister and Mr. Gandhi at the present day. His own solution is "a statutory division of the electorate into two classes, one consisting of majority community constituencies, and the other of minority communities' constituencies." The number of constituencies in each class would be initially fixed "on a population basis, or better still on the basis of the relative voting strength of the two sides." The division would not be final like the present division into Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies, but "on the eve of a general election or at the end of a limited period of three or five years, as the case may be, it would be open to any person or section on either side to change
over to the opposite side, if it deemed it desirable or expedient to do so,” the number of constituencies allotted to each class on the population or voting strength basis being modified accordingly. As an example, the author suggests that in a province with a large Hindu majority, the Brahmans or the depressed classes or both, dissatisfied with their treatment by the non-Brahmin caste Hindus, might decide to throw in their lot with the minority constituencies, which would thus receive such an accession of strength in the legislature as to enable their representatives to take over the government. Or, conversely, in the Punjab, where the Muhammadans would normally be in the majority, economic issues might cut clean through communal ranks on both sides and lead to entirely fresh groupings. It is not for the alien observer to pronounce on the practicability of a scheme of this kind. Let the author submit it to the Hindi Mahasabha and to the Muslim League, and then reconsider it in the light of the opinions he receives from those bodies.

In dealing with the defence problem, the author gives an excellent account of the main elements of the situation, and points out with justice that the policy of Indianization in the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army will not by itself solve the constitutional problem of the relations between the army and the civil government under the new conditions. He throws out an interesting suggestion regarding the danger of a military dictatorship being set up by the Punjab if recruitment continues to be made predominantly from that province. His remedy is the reduction of the regular army and the creation of civic guards in the villages, of district and taluq “reserves,” and of a provincial and national “militia.” These matters will doubtless be argued in the new legislatures.

The chapter on finance is perhaps the best in the book. The conclusions of the authorities who have investigated this question during recent years are clearly set forth, and the author does not conceal his own view that the assessment and collection of income tax may well be tightened up, that the exemption of agricultural incomes is a mistake, that death or succession duties might justifiably be imposed, and that local taxation has been inadequately developed. It is to be hoped that the author’s views on these points will be made available to the new legislatures, and that the new elements in the electorate will insist on a thorough overhauling of India’s financial resources on the lines suggested in this book.

The chapter on the services is disappointing. The author insists strongly that British co-operation and help were never more needed in India than at this time and that the masses would generally prefer a neutral British officer to Indian officers with
local prejudices. But in view of the difficulties likely to arise under the new conditions between Indian ministers and services recruited in England, he would abolish the services as such, and substitute "a new type of British public servant made available for India on special short term contracts." An arrangement of this kind would be suitable enough in the case of scientific experts or academic appointments, but the Indian minister has already discretion in regard to posts of this nature. For administrative posts, some preliminary training and knowledge of the language are essential, and a man brought out for five years would only just be getting fit for his job when the time came for him to depart. If Parliament decide to retain for the present a certain British element in the higher administration, the Indian ministers and the services should not find it impossible to adjust themselves to the new conditions.

The chapter on the Indian States is sketchy and the author has apparently no personal acquaintance with any of the States. But there is food for reflection in his conclusion that "the whole idea of setting up undiluted autocracy in the States and democracy in the provinces into one federation is fraught with the gravest danger for both alike. The net result will be an unholy alliance between the propertied upper classes in British India and the representatives of the purely autocratic rulers of the Indian States." He urges that no State should be allowed to enter the federation unless and until it has adopted constitutional government by means of which its subjects can choose their representatives to sit in the lower house of the federal legislative. But it is for the States to decide whether they will enter the federation, and, if so, upon what terms. It is extremely doubtful whether they would agree to any stipulation of this kind, or whether it could at present be worked in many of the States.

Whatever view may be taken of the author's concrete proposals in regard to various subjects, his work as a whole is of great value at the present time. It summarizes clearly, accurately and adequately the discussions on most of the controversial matters that are at present outstanding, and the appendices contain critical reviews of the most recent reports on a number of technical questions, such as the franchise, finance, the position of the army, the services, and so on. There is also a useful summary of the author's own proposals. Finally, as has already been indicated, the author's point of view is one that the practical politician or administrator may profitably ponder, even though in the end he may find himself unable to adopt it.
THE UNIVERSE AND MAN

By Ranjee G. Shahani

I

Among men and women we find two opposing types of mentality which, though grading into one another by intermediary instances, are, in their typical extremes, sharply contrasted. At one extreme we have the men and women who seem formed entirely by their social surroundings. They think, feel, and act "like everyone else," as they would say. Here "everyone else" means, of course, the people with whom they commonly associate. Persons of this type are essentially plastic and imitative. In those of little mental capacity there may be no awareness whatever of the forces at work on them; but the type by no means excludes minds of considerable intelligence, though the exercise of this intelligence is confined within strict bounds. To our present type questions of conduct and valuation are solved by an appeal to some constituted authority to which they have been accustomed to bow down.

At the other pole we have the "independents," who do not passively reflect their immediate social environment, but strike out paths of their own. I do not mean to imply that their natures are not receptive: the point is that they choose among different influences and are more or less indifferent to mere contiguity. If they are readers, they will listen to Plato or Sankara, perhaps, with as much deference as to a member of their own family circle. They draw from a larger world. In matters of conduct, they may or may not be "rebels" in outward action, but they will tend to question all institutions and will refuse to accept any claim to authority as valid if nothing more can be urged for it than general acceptance. In fact, they "think for themselves" in all things, and are a constant source of surprise, apprehension, and disapproval to their conventional friends. "Wherever did you get such ideas?" is one of those questions which, when addressed by one person to another, tells us a good deal about the character of each. On the side of the questioner it is an unconscious confession of faith, implying, at any rate, the assumption that one cannot have an idea without getting it from someone else, also, very possibly, that the opinion has been obtained from some ineligible source. Needless to say, a mind
may be *independent* without being *original*, except in so far as originality can be shown in selective *choice*. The material must in general be given, though it is a certain fact that a new thought is occasionally born into the world.

As regards the "independents" and the problem of conduct, a man may heartily despise the standards and ideals that prevail around him and yet, for one reason or another, outwardly conform to them. There is no necessity that he should "run amok" against the conventions.

I seem to find, in the non-independent type, a singularly invincible obstinacy. "Wax to receive, and marble to retain" are the words that seem exactly to express their condition. Reason and argument cannot move them, and it comes as a surprise to them for anyone to hold that reason has anything to do with the matter. "I was taught so" is with them the final word. They are what might be called the slave type.

To persons of this description any disturbance of conventional valuations is abhorrent. They are content to abide by the customary envisagements. It is not for people of this type that the present work* is intended. The author belongs to the class of "independents." It is to kindred spirits that he addresses himself. This is not to say that he is an intellectualist. He would probably be one of the first to repudiate this ascription. Indeed, before justice can be done to this book, we are forced to examine the place of intellect in human experience.

II

However highly the function of intellect may be esteemed—if only to redeem our universe from chaos—it is not uncommon to find the profounder spirits referring to intellect in a certain tone of disparagement. I think there is some justification for this attitude, though the reasons usually advanced are far from satisfactory.

If we look at intellectual eminence as we actually find it among men, we must be impressed, I believe, by the fact that with the possession of great intellectual grasp and subtlety we sometimes, perhaps not infrequently, vaguely feel that something is lacking that plain human beings, of no pretensions to this dialectical facility, seem to possess. For this missing element I know no fitting name, though "touch with reality," "soul," "intuition," "mystical experience" dimly shadow forth what is meant. There is much exquisite thinking that we feel disposed to call "mere empty cleverness," a mere *tour de force* of logical *expertise*.

* *The Living Universe.* By Sir Francis Younghusband. (John Murray.) 10s. 6d. net.
Looking back in the history of thought, perhaps the much-abused Scholasticism may be held to give us abundant illustrations.

Now, what is the ultimate function of the intellect? "It seems," says Taylor, "as if the function of mere intellect were always that of a necessary and valuable intermediary between a lower and a higher level of immediate apprehension. It breaks up, by relations and distinctions it introduces, the original union of the what and the that of simple feeling, and proceeds to make the what, which it deals with in its isolation, ever more and more complex. But the ultimate issue of the process is only reached and its ultimate aim only satisfied so far as it conducts us at a higher stage of mental development to the direct intuition of a richer and more comprehensive whole in the immediate unity of its that and what." In other words, intellect is not creative but critical. In its functions it might well be equated with the performance of a weighing-machine.

Indeed, the prominent quality of intellect I would describe as "mechanical." It is fundamentally concerned in bringing coherence and consistency into a "given" that, qua intellect, it is not called upon, or is not accompanied by any impulse, to transcend. Of course in this connexion we are minded of Bergson and various older "intuitionists"—for example, Jacobi. But the most daring exponent of the creed in our own times is undoubtedly Léon Chestov. In tome after tome he has tried to establish the limitations of intellect. Despite his Russian volubility and exaggeration, his last book, *In Job's Balances*, is a work of real importance. It tells us that the really "important, eternal things" lie beyond the pale of intellect. Reason, we are aptly reminded, is a Hellenic deity. This Kali of the Western world has no such claim on our allegiance.

Now this may be true. Nevertheless, a qualification seems called for. Chestov, for instance, tends to forget that reason itself is rooted in instinct. Not its suppression, but its controlled use, is what we would urge. Reason plays the same part in life that the *douane* plays in commercial affairs: it can sift the goods that are presented but cannot create them. This is a point on which we must be very clear.

From another point of view, intellect would seem to be entirely concerned with practical interests. All mentality can be reduced, say the Evolutionists, to the type of reflex action. "Cognition," says William James, "is but a feeling moment, a cross section at a certain point of what in its totality is a motor phenomenon." Such, it would seem, is the conclusion of Pavlov too. The fact is, no living organism, as long as it is alive, is largely under the sway of intellect. The organism comes within the purview of intellect only after death, when it has become a mere aggregate
of chemical elements. Then, and not till then, do the laws of intellect apply. This implies that intellect is only visible post mortem.

We can now understand why the purpose of the creative process cannot be fathomed by the methods of science. The raison rasonante, by itself, is a purely destructive force. Pushed to its logical extreme, it offers but one goal to mankind: collective suicide. The life and writings of Mainländer are a case in point. But the larger spirits—a Pascal, a Shakespeare, a Dostoievsky, a Nietzsche—seemed to have denounced reason as an imposter. It is an impertinence, they appear to say, to foist on God or universal life concepts developed by the mind of man—concepts issuing from partial and limited experience. Not being of the same dimensions as the mind, life will not fit any intellectual mould. It is as a child enjoys it, or as a mystic apprehends it, that life consents to yield up its secret.

III

This brings us to The Living Universe of Sir Francis Younghusband, a book by a modern mystic who also happens to be a thinker and a man of action. It gives us the quintessence of a lifetime’s research connoted by the title. Having experienced life in different rôles, the author puts before us the cumulative findings of his spiritual adventure. The promise is rich and the performance is adequate. The questings of a many-sided mind cannot but be of supreme interest. This is why I have devoted so long a prelude to my notice of this book.

It is divided into two parts, entitled respectively: “Mainly Facts” and “Mainly Inferences.” The first section is essentially an attack upon the Second Law of Thermodynamics. But, unpleasant and unwelcome as this Law has been felt to be, it seems the only deduction from empirical facts. It appears ineluctable. Of course, if we agree with our author that the universe is governed by spiritual rather than by physical laws, then the “running-down” theory no longer appears inevitable. Sir James Jeans has asserted that there is a Mind—of a mathematical order—behind the universe; Sir Francis in turn tells us that this Mind is endowed with a sense of beauty—indeed is the Mind of an Artist. The student of physical science finds no foundation for either supposition. It is a matter of approach: we can accept the one or the other as our particular bent inclines us. But, as we have seen reason to believe, the point of view of the man of science—strictly limited in its range and scope—must not be expected to yield what it is unfitted to give. We must seek illumination from other sources. I may perhaps mention that the Eastern,
particularly the Hindu, would wholeheartedly accept Sir Francis' point of view. For him, Creation is *Prem Leila*: the Play of Divine Love. And this too, in essence, is the teaching of our author, just as it is that of another great spirit—Baruch Spinoza. In fact, most of the choicer spirits, whether Western or Eastern, have spoken thuswise. It is the God of Love that they worship.

This is the ultimate verdict of the mystic based on his own intuitional experience. That the mystic is the consummation of the human adventure is our writer's final conclusion. And in this conclusion the entire East will agree. Not only the East, it would seem, but the entire race of humanity. Has not Bergson, in his *Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, asserted the same thing? This leads to a direct comparison of the two writers. Superb as Bergson often is, he seems to suffer from a sad limitation: the God he worships is a French Dieu. Sir Francis suffers from no such limitation—he takes the whole world into his ambit. His tribute to Ramakrishna is the most splendid that I have met with outside the pages of Romain Rolland. It shows a rare degree of insight of what we may call catholic appreciation to have apprehended the uniqueness of this solitary sage, who was, we can scarcely doubt, the most significant personality of the nineteenth century and perhaps one of the few truly free spirits that the world has ever seen. It is now easy to understand why Sir Francis finds Wordsworth tepid, lacking in the real mystic intensity. These asides, even if taken alone, serve to make the book memorable. My only complaint at this point is that a deeper exposition of the much- and ill-used term mysticism would have been invaluable.

Section two deals with what the writer calls "Inferences." The universe, he tells us, is without beginning or end. . . . The Vedas say the same thing. . . . This universe is like the intermittent play of a fountain; each efflux gives significance to the source and to the jet; the same energy accounts for both. This energy, whose other name is creative love, manifests itself in the tiniest grain of sand and in the flaming ramparts of the world. The entire universe, then, is to be trusted. Holy is the raindrop, holy the river, holy is the mighty ocean. In a word, the whole Creation moves to the music of Krishna's lute—his Song of Love. It is this that pulses through all things. This creed is voiced in all climes and all tongues. Browning's *cri du cœur* is typical:

God! Thou art love! I build my faith on that.

Such is the *credo* of our author too.

We have not mentioned Sir Francis' delightful fantasy concerning the Altairians, "beings far higher than man—beings
reputed to be the highest in the whole universe—beings who in the highest degree embody the Cosmic Spirit of the Universe." Here is something to startle the lethargic intelligence of the mere terrene consciousness. But, to my mind, a serious book loses nothing by a certain infusion of playfulness. For example, H. G. Wells is perhaps at his best when he seems least serious. *The Food of the Gods* is superb, just because its apparent frivolity covers a great depth of thought. Which suggests that there is something worthy to be called cosmic even in the irresponsible play of fancy. In our author's picture of the dwellers in the "lucid interspace of world and world" we have a mystic's anticipation of the human consummation. We may say that it reveals the inmost core of his own thought. The universe, he seems to be saying, is not solely reserved as a playground for soccer and rugger, or even for the St. Leger and the Ebor Handicap, but as a training ground for the Sons of God. It is to be feared that the average Englishman will find such a prescription unpalatable.

In some such way does a mystic seek to justify his existence. Anyway, this is how he regards the universe. If his envisagement appears inadequate, then let the critics suggest a better way.

In all sobriety do I believe the author of this book to be the most celestial in vision, the most fearless in the adventure of thought. These are high-sounding words, but I have seriously weighed them.
REVIEWS OF BOOKS

CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA. Vol. VI.

(Reviewed by J. C. FRENCH.)

The first sentiments of the reviewer of this volume are admiration for and appreciation of the experience, knowledge, and research which have combined to put it together. Here is a perfect mine of information for future historians of India. For the record is something very much more than the usual "history" produced nowadays, a paste and scissors product from other people's work. The writers of many of the chapters have taken part at some period in the development of the events they describe, and all the chapters but one bear the unmistakable marks of such experience. But for all this the book remains a mine from which the golden ore of popular history is yet to be extracted. A reader who knew nothing of India would make very little of the present excellent work. The way in which the chapters dodge about from province to province, and from subject to subject, is all right for the expert, but will leave the average unspecialized reader, "the man in the street" (to use a modern political phrase of power and might), in a state of bewilderment. The remedy is for a future historian frankly to recognize that India is an empire and not a country. The only way to get a clear view of its history is to take the provinces, which are really countries, separately and give their story in each case from start to finish. When this has been done, the various great dynasties that have succeeded in uniting the divergent countries of India into an empire should be dealt with. This is the only way in which the history of India can be presented to the public in a comprehensible form, for the very good reason that it is the only one that corresponds to reality.

Where the general standard of work is so good it would seem invidious to single out particular authors, but I cannot omit all reference to Sir Verney Lovett's excellent contributions and Mr. J. C. Lindsay's careful and practical account of local self-government.

Though the first Afghan and Sikh wars are dealt with in a previous volume, the present work has a chapter on the Indian Mutiny. The story of that sombre drama draped in the dark tints of ferocity and treachery, the last great struggle of the older Indian world against the strange new empire from across the seas on the one side, and on the other the heroism and the brilliant feats of arms, assisted by the loyalty and devotion of the newer India, is one of an enduring interest. The causes of the Mutiny are well known, and there is a fair measure of agreement about them nowadays. But what is still entirely obscure is the machinery by which such a sudden widespread outbreak was engineered. It is known that shortly before it the Moulti of Fyzabad visited certain centres, and the Nana Sahib made some extensive journeys and pilgrimages, but no trace of a real directing centre has yet been discovered, and the probability is that it never will be.
To anyone who has had practical experience of the extraordinary capacity in India for suppression and concealment on an extensive scale, this will not appear surprising.

The author of this chapter rightly attributes the extensive spread of the trouble to the indecision and weakness of Lord Canning and judges that Lord Dalhousie could have suppressed it promptly (p. 175). He also shrewdly notes how, whenever British rule was overthrown, the great anarchy which dominated eighteenth-century India raised its head again. But the rest of his treatment of his subject is less satisfactory. He falls into the facile habit of recording what is to the disadvantage of the British troops. When they got drunk, when they ill-used camp followers, when they ill-treated villagers—such incidents are noted. Now this is all very well, but if the historical picture presented is to be a correct one proportionate attention must be paid to the atrocities of the mutineers. The author has failed to do this on the plea that it is more important to describe how the people responded to the novel conditions than to give actual details of occurrences (p. 179). The result is that a misleading impression of undue and excessive British severity is produced. I am particularly disposed to quarrel with the author’s statement that the atrocities of Cawnpore were reprisals for Neill’s shooting of mutineers in Benares, and for some severities of English and Sikh troops on villagers (p. 184). Neill has been criticized in recent works, but from Malleson, his contemporary historian, he receives high praise. It can be fairly maintained that Neill did his duty adequately in the terrible crisis with which he was confronted.

Now the mutineers in Cawnpore were soldiers and could have been under no illusion as to the penalty which mutinous troops invited. Shooting down mutineers was not peculiar to the British Army. The Sikhs indulged in it freely less than twenty years before 1857. So this could not have been a cause. As regards the second reason, severities in villages, it would have been difficult to excel the mutineers themselves in this respect. Their cruelties to the local population were frequent and terrible. So this second reason also is of no weight. When the events of the Mutiny are reviewed as a whole in a correct perspective of time and place, it will be apparent that there was no undue severity in the suppression of it.

But this unfortunate occurrence, this “Devil’s Wind,” as it is correctly named in India, was no more than a temporary break in the great story of imperial development and achievement described in this book. One is tempted to linger on the various points and phrases of intense interest, but to do so would be to expand this review to the limits of this magazine. But it may be of interest to glance for a moment at its conclusion in the reforms of Lord Morley. The present volume brings out very clearly the great importance of these reforms. It is not so much what Lord Morley did—namely, to admit Indian members to the Viceroy’s and Secretary of State’s Councils and to increase the size and elective character of the Provincial Councils. Previous Oriental despots have enlarged the field from which they accepted their advisers. What is important is the way he did it. As this volume points out, no previous Secretary of State ever browbeat a Viceroy or ignored a Council to the extent Lord Morley did. In a letter to
Lord Minto, Lord Morley vigorously described his “holy rage” at certain Lieutenant-Governors who had the temerity to show some independence. The autocratic changes announced in the Royal Declaration at the Delhi Durbar of 1911, about which even Parliament had not been consulted, are the product of the same policy, which amounted in a word to the supersession of the Government of India by the Secretary of State as the direct governing authority in India. This revolutionary change occurred silently and almost unnoticed. Did Lord Morley like the results of his innovation? These words which he said on January 21, 1921, will show:

“Montagu calls himself my disciple. I see very little of my teaching in him. This dyarchy won’t work. As for his strange plea for rousing the masses of India out of their ‘pathetic content’ by reforms for which they do not ask, and which they cannot work, it’s a most unwise remark. My reforms were quite enough for a generation at least.”

But with the mention of the reforms of 1919 we are in politics, and are far removed from the great administrative task of which this book treats, a task which in future ages will be regarded as not the least of the mighty monuments of imperial achievement which the British Empire has contributed to history.

Incomparable India. By Colonel R. J. Blackham. (Sampson Low.) 12s. 6d. net.

(Reviewed by Arthur Duncan.)

Field-Marshal Sir William Birdwood, in his Foreword, says that Colonel Blackham “has tried to describe the peoples, their manners and the customs of the great sub-continent with sympathy and understanding.” I think he has succeeded admirably.

Colonel Blackham has written a very readable and instructive book, which is well illustrated. In twenty-seven short chapters he discourses pleasantly on such subjects as Indian religions, ascetics and saints, temples and shrines, holy cities and sacred rivers, magic and mythology, fairs and festivals, caste, women, crime, and drink.

The attentive reader will realize four main facts: (1) the janao, or sacred thread of the Brahman, is the symbol of a divinized attribute; (2) Indian religion is a complex mass of cult and philosophy with a rich vein of mysticism, of a florid and luscious kind, running through it; (3) theocracy is the greatest obstacle in the way of political progress; and (4) many Indian customs are now so far behind the times as to be distinctly harmful to the national welfare.

The author touches the political situation in the last chapter, in which he traces, very briefly, the march of events in post-war India. “Democratic ideals and self-determination,” he says, “are due to the fertile brains of gifted Europeans, but they have been absorbed by Indian minds and have swept over India, changing the whole political fabric of the country.” There is now grave anxiety throughout England about Indian policy. The objections to self-government in India are not generally based on doubts of the integrity or capability of influential Indian leaders who are
loyal to the Empire and, left to themselves, would uphold the British traditions that have served India well in the past. The doubt is whether these leaders will be able to succeed against the narrow loyalties of the people and the tenacious Oriental tradition of partiality, nepotism, and corrupt administration.

The Indian question seems to have divided us into two camps. All who are not "diehards" are "mugwumps." The mugwumps favour the maximum advance in reasonable proportion to such insurance as can be provided. They are inclined to trust Indian affairs to the better-informed judgment of the men on the spot rather than to vacillating political sentiment in Great Britain. The diehards, on the other hand, look backward and argue from the logic of events. But logic has never provided the key to our more serious Indian problems, and in this one we may conceivably have to exercise a faith that is greater than fate.

FICTION

Quinlan. By A. M. Westwood. (Murray.) 7s. 6d.

When you start with a policeman who, though English, was brought up in early youth by Muslims, you may expect a story brimful of exciting incidents. Mrs. Westwood, however, is artist enough to distribute the thrills, and her novel is a very good example of Anglo-Indian, surrounded by the darker side of Indian life. In spite of the somewhat conventional theme, she rises above the too frequent presentation of the dummy or the hackneyed Indian, and her Indian characters are really alive.

Anne, the heroine, comes out from England to join her sister, Quinlan's wife. She gets engaged to Jimmy Crane, with whom she is not in love, and accepts him at an evening party just before a bomb explodes which kills a favourite dog and threatens to blind Jimmy for good. She is, however, really in love with the Collector, a good-humoured, Newfoundland-like Scot, and the story is worked out to that end. Then she is kidnapped, and Mrs. Westwood makes the most of her rescue. The catty Mrs. Hickory (the Judge's wife), the plethoric planter, and the explosive railwayman are all well drawn, though in each case the drawing amounts to little more than a sketch. One does not know quite what to make of Anne. The impression she leaves is that of a minx who wanted smacking, but the Collector, and presumably the author, was not of that opinion. Quinlan himself is a somewhat sardonic person, full of zeal for his work, but full also of a certain love for his foster-family.

Is this India? Yes, and no. There is the treacherous old butler, loyal and devoted till greed took him; the foster-brother, with lust and murder on his hands; the wicked old foster-mother, hoist with her own petard when she lets loose the masth elephant to destroy others. These are Muslims. Of the Hindus we have Surendra, the signaller who consorts to his own undoing with terrorists, the conventional money-lender, and the magic worker, Surichi. With the single exception of Surendra, who is more
sinned against than sinning, they are all more or less villains. That is Indian life if you search for it in the purlieus of crime and intrigue and treachery. It is not the Indian life of the village or of the towns and cities. If you want a good story, vividly told with a considerable knowledge of Indian life, *Quinlan* is to be recommended. But we must not imagine that the story of the courts, civil and criminal, is typical of a kindly, usually virtuous, and altogether amiable folk.

**Stanley Rice.**

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**Kamut.** By Sir Jogendra Singh. (Lahore: *Uttar Chand Kapur and Sons.*)

Sir Jogendra Singh is Minister of Agriculture in the Punjab, and he modestly disclaims the title of novelist. All that he claims is that his work is an accurate picture of village life. The heroine, a barber girl, is living with her father quietly when famine overtakes the village. They are starving, but eventually the man gets some work with a dissolute Raja, with the obvious result. The girl escapes, and is finally taken up by an English missionary lady. A young Brahman falls in love with her and is set upon marriage, but the girl dies.

An unpretentious story that rings true. It need hardly be said that Sir Jogendra Singh knows well what he undertakes to describe. It is, one supposes, a kind of protest against certain customs—against the wild life of certain men who have more money than brains, against the spurning of the poor because of their poverty. Incidentally it would seem that the English are so woven into modern Indian life that even an Indian tale cannot avoid the European.

**Stanley Rice.**
THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF ARCHÆOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN THE INDIAN STATES*

By John de La Valette

Early Beginnings

The study of Indian antiquities may be said to have received its first impulse from Sir William Jones, who in 1774 founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal, which counted Warren Hastings among its first members, a connection in which we may, perhaps, see the first step on the path which would eventually lead to official patronage of archaeology and the arts in India. The collection and deciphering of Sanskrit and other inscriptions; the study of Hindu law and other work, largely of a literary kind, was the main concern of the pioneers of those early days and of the fifty or sixty subsequent years.

About 1835 a new period opened with the activities of James Prinsep, whose official position was that of Assay Master of the Calcutta Mint, but to whose penetrating sagacity and intuitive perception epigraphists in India owe an immense debt of gratitude for removing, once and for all, what Cunningham has called "the thick crust of oblivion which for so many centuries had covered and concealed the characters and language of the earliest Indian inscriptions which the most learned scholars had in vain tried to penetrate." During the thirty years which separate the commencement of Prinsep's activities from the appointment of the first Archaeological Surveyor, a number of men, in various parts of India, did valuable work in a private capacity and on a voluntary basis, the results being largely connected up through Prinsep. Among these early "field archaeologists" and "traveling antiquarians" should be mentioned James Fergusson, Markham Kitchin, Edward Thomas, and Alexander Cunningham in Northern India; Sir Walter Elliot in Southern India; Colonel Meadows Taylor, Dr. Stevenson, and Dr. Bhau Daji in Western India, the latter being one of the earliest enthusiasts among Indians.

Archæological Survey of India

With Major-General Alexander Cunningham begins a new and vitally important chapter in the history of Indian archaeology.

* Being an extract from a paper entitled "The Encouragement of Archaeological Research and Art in the Indian States" read before the Eighteenth International Congress of Orientalists at Leyden.
In 1861, whilst still a Colonel, and Chief Engineer of the North-West Province, he impressed Lord Canning with the advisability of organizing a systematic "investigation of the archaeological remains of Upper India" for a start to be gradually extended to the whole of India. What was aimed at was "an accurate description—illustrated by plans, measurements, drawings or photographs—of such remains as most deserved notice, with their history and a record of the traditions that were retained regarding them."

There was at first no suggestion of establishing a permanent department; in fact, any department at all, the appointment of Cunningham being merely that of "Archæological Surveyor" to the Government of India, any assistance of which he might have need being supplied by the existing departments of the local Governments. Some ten years later, however, it came to be realized that it was essential to direct the researches in a more systematic manner than had been attempted at the outset, and of concentrating the supervision of the entire system in one department. This led in 1871 to the establishment of the Archæological Survey of India as a distinct department and to the appointment of General Cunningham as its first Director-General. The preservation and repair of ancient monuments and an epigraphical survey were in due course also provided.

In 1885 Cunningham retired as Director-General and was succeeded by Dr. Burgess, who carried on the work during the next four or five years, when he, too, returned home. His retirement, coinciding with an era of retrenchment, led to a prolonged suspension of the department, and it was not until the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon that its activities were revived and expanded.

**Modern Developments**

Within a few weeks of his landing in 1899, Lord Curzon struck a fresh and welcome note by accepting the encouragement of research, the promotion of archaeological study and the preservation of the relics of the past as "a part of our Imperial obligation to India." Before the close of that year definite proposals had been sent to the Secretary of State which, upon being sanctioned, resulted in the sending out, in 1901, of the new Director-General Mr. (now Sir) John Marshall. With his arrival begins the modern chapter in the history of the Archæological Survey of India.

Two developments of special interest in connection with the subject of this paper took place during the directorship of Sir John Marshall. The recruitment of Indians for the various branches of the Survey was systematically fostered, and the relations with the Indian States in regard to matters of art and
archaeology were developed into a most happy, mutual collaboration.

Until about 1900 there were no facilities in India for the study of archaeology, and the Government of India had no option but to seek recruits in Europe. In 1903 it was decided to encourage the pursuit of archaeology among Indians by the offer of State scholarships. The results may be seen, not only in the number of Indians who are now employed as experts in various branches of the Archaological Survey of India, but also in the fact that the present Director-General is Rai Bahadur Daya Ram Sahni, who received his training under Sir John Marshall, and, after serving a number of years in the Archaological Survey of India, was lent to the Government of Kashmir. His useful work in that State resulted in scholarly contributions to the official Reports of the Survey.

In the interim period between the retirement of Sir John Marshall and the appointment of Rai Bahadur D. R. Sahni, Mr. H. Hargreaves was at the head of the Survey, a great deal of whose important work was done on the North-West Frontier, where he discovered the pre-historic remains at Nal.

CO-OPERATION WITH THE STATES

In another way, too, the action of the British authorities has had a direct effect upon the States. In 1901 the Government of India invited the systematic co-operation of the Indian States in the task of rescuing from decay and repairing the national monuments of the country, seeing that such monuments were not confined to British territory. This invitation met with an immediate and warm response from the Indian Rulers. As a result many important measures of conservation were carried out by the Darbars of Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore, Kashmir, Gwalior, Bhopal, Udaipur, Dhar, and other States, whilst in several States archaeological departments were established or reorganized, and these now employ Indian archæologists who have received their training in or through the British service.

Hyderabad

Among the important work so achieved, that carried out in India's premier State, Hyderabad, in connection with the cave temples at Ajanta and Ellora, ranks very high indeed. Already in the days of Fergusson and Burgess the Nizam's Government had furnished valuable assistance towards their investigation and preservation, and many of the Ajanta frescoes were carefully copied under the direction of John Griffiths, Principal of the J. J. School of Art in Bombay, by his pupils. Some twenty years ago, when
the late Lady Herringham, assisted by five young Indian painters, all of whom have since become artists of great repute, set out to produce large-scale copies of the Ajanta frescoes, generous support was once more afforded by the Hyderabad Government. Further assistance was again supplied to the India Society when, in 1913, it undertook the publication of the results of Lady Herringham’s expedition.

But the rôle of this State in promoting the study of archaeology and the practice of the arts was not limited to collaborating with British undertakings. In a State which annually spends between £800,000 and £900,000 on education, these matters were unlikely to be permanently left to British initiative.

In 1914* an Archaéological Department was established, of which Mr. G. Yazdani, m.a., is at present the Director. This Department set to work to preserve the country’s ancient monuments, in particular the frescoes at Ajanta, for which latter purpose it requisitioned the services of Signor Cecconi, the Italian expert, who succeeded in preventing further decay in a manner which, it is expected, will be permanent. The Hyderabad Archaéological Department publishes periodically important works dealing with the inscriptions and works of art of the country. The latest of these are the monumental volumes of a monograph on Ajanta by Mr. Yazdani, the illustrations to which are of the greatest accuracy and beauty. Among the more popular publications intended for the instruction of the general public may be mentioned Mr. Yazdani’s Antiquités of Bidar, the Guides to Ajanta and Ellora, and a Memoir by M. Foucher, being a Rapport Préliminaire sur l’Interprétation des Peintures et Sculptures d’Ajanta.

Side by side with these official activities there may be noted those of the Hyderabad Archaéological Society, of which His Exalted Highness the Nizam is the patron.

Kashmir

From the early days of archaéological study in India Kashmir has been visited by many Englishmen, who have written accounts of its monuments. Among these may be mentioned Garrick, Cunningham, Cole, and Bishop Cowie during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and more recently Sir Aurel Stein, whose intimate and unrivalled knowledge of the geography and antiquities of that country is revealed in his Ancient Geography of

* For reference, it is here mentioned that these and the following figures and facts concerning the Indian States are, unless otherwise indicated, derived from the official publications of these States, such as Annual Reports, Archaéological and other special Reports and Gazetteers.
Kas‘mir and his translation of and commentary on Kalhana’s Rajatarangini: A Chronicle of the Kings of Kas‘mir. In his preface to the latter work, Sir Aurel Stein acknowledges the “generous interest” in his labours by the Maharaja,* which included “a grant towards the publication of the Chronicle.” But it is to a Dutch scholar, Professor J. Ph. Vogel, at that time in the British Indian service as Superintendent of Archaeology, Northern Circle, that the Government of Kashmir owes the detailed advice on the basis of which it established an Archaeological Survey Department in 1903. Considerable progress in the department was made under the direction of Mr. Ram Chandra Kak, who had been trained under the Director-General of Archaeology in India. A remarkable find made under his supervision was the site of the Buddhist colony at Harwan, where the remains of several stupas and an apsidal temple have been cleared, the latter being surrounded by a fine floor of terra-cotta tiles stamped with figures reminiscent of Sasanian art. As a memoir of the Archaeological Survey of India, Mr. Kak published an interesting account of a survey tour in Bhimber and Rajauri, two districts of historical interest in Jammu Province, and an illustrated description of the two rarely visited valleys of Marev and Wadwan in Kashmir. His Handbook of the Museum deals with the evolution of the sculpture of Kashmir and with the history of the country as evidenced in its coins. The latest contribution to the archaeology of Kashmir is Ancient Monuments of Kashmir which Mr. Kak has recently completed and which is published for the Government of Kashmir by the India Society. Of interest to the general public as well as to scholars is the collection of some 1,200 photographs of monuments, sites, excavations, etc., made by the Department, copies of which can be supplied to the public.

**Mysore**

In Southern India it was the abundance of important inscriptions rather than the existence of architectural monuments which gave rise to the earliest archaeological studies. Thus in Mysore the beginnings of the archaeological survey may be said to date back to the year 1865, when Major Dixon was deputed to obtain photographic copies of inscriptions in various places in the State. On the basis of these, Mr. Lewis Rice, then Director of Public Instruction in Mysore, issued a volume entitled Mysore Inscriptions. In 1884 Mr. Rice was appointed Director of Archaeological Researches, and in 1888 a permanent Archaeological De-

* H.H. Maharaja Pratap Singhji, then Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, is referred to here.
partment was formed under him. The exploration and copying of all the inscriptions found in the country was now systematized, and the results were published in the successive volumes of the series known as *Epigraphia Carnatica*, whilst separate volumes on epigraphical subjects also appeared.

Attention was further paid to the collection and transcription of ancient manuscripts of works in Kannada and Sanskrit, the results being from time to time published in the *Bibliotheca Carnatica*.

At the same time, even before Mr. Rice's retirement in 1906, care was beginning to be bestowed upon the ancient architectural monuments in the State. Steps were taken for the restoration and preservation of some of them, and contributions concerning Mysore were made to the Indian Monumental Series of the Imperial Government.

Upon Mr. Rice's retirement in 1906 an Indian, Mr. Narasimhachar, his former assistant, was appointed Director of Archaeology, and was in his turn, in 1922, succeeded by another Indian, Dr. R. Shama Sastry. It would lead too far to enumerate all the work that has been carried out in Mysore during these last twenty-five years. In addition to continuing the epigraphical and numismatic work and collecting and publishing manuscripts, an increasing interest was taken in architecture and sculpture. Several Dravidian and Hoysala temples were described and illustrated in the Annual Reports, and a large number of studies of individual works of art were also published. Excavations on a small scale were conducted in several places, and the conservation of ancient monuments was systematized from 1920 on. Finally a careful ethnographic survey was undertaken and successfully completed.

**Travancore**

In Travancore the Archaeological Department goes back to 1891, but it was materially reorganized in 1908, when a "Superintendent of Archaeology" was placed in charge of the Department and supplied with a staff consisting of a "Pandit Assistant," one photographer, one clerk-typist and four peons. The work of the Department is made available to the public through the publication of the *Travancore Archaeological Series*, of which one or two volumes appear every year. The main activities of the Department have hitherto been in the field of epigraphy, but, in addition to these studies of valuable sources for the history and philology of the country, the Department has devoted considerable efforts to the study of the *Mutts*, or Vedic, colleges which were attached to the monasteries and were for a long time a powerful force in the religious and social life of Kerala.
In the sphere of the fine arts the present Archaeological Superintendent, Mr. R. Vasudeva Poduval, has recently been devoting attention to the fine wood-carving and the mural paintings in the temples in Travancore State, some of which can claim a fair degree of antiquity as well as of beauty. Through age, exposure, and neglect these works are fast decaying, and it is hoped that the care now being bestowed upon their preservation may cause to be retained what is left, and that the result of these studies may soon be made available.

In addition to the preservation of the temples and forts in the State, a valuable contribution to the history of architecture in Kerala is being made by the study of the numerous manuscripts on the science of architecture which, together with published works in Sanskrit and Malayalam, will, it is hoped, enable the special architecture of Malabar to be studied with the thoroughness it deserves.

Baroda

Important contributions to the study of the ancient literature of India, as well as to the popularizing of knowledge, have been made in the progressive State of Baroda. The Maharaja Gaekwad's Oriental Series has acquired a worldwide reputation by its publications of original texts with English translations, several volumes of which are brought out every year. Recently the Sanskrit section of the Central Library at Baroda was expanded into a separate organization known as the Oriental Institute and placed in charge of Dr. B. Bhattacharya, M.A., Ph.D., as Director. In addition to supporting scholarly learning, the Baroda Government, under the initiative of the venerable Ruler of that State, who throughout his long reign has taken the keenest personal interest in all endeavours to promote not only the material, but also the mental and spiritual welfare of his people, has made a deliberate and effective attempt to spread the result of the work of scholars among the general public. A comprehensive system of district and travelling libraries has been established, even in those districts of Baroda which are not in easy communication with the centre. To supply these libraries with up-to-date books, a constant stream of translations into the vernaculars is being maintained at the rate of from twenty to thirty volumes a year. It is the proud achievement of this organization to have brought public libraries within reach of the whole of the populations of the towns in Baroda and of 62 per cent. of the inhabitants of the rural districts. The Museum and Picture Gallery at Baroda, under the curatorship of Mr. S. Ganguli, includes, in addition to Indian and European pictures, an archaeological and an ethnographic section. Special care is
devoted to the temples at Dwarka and Bet in the Okhamandal District of Baroda, which is situated in Kathiawar, and which are every year visited by thousands of pilgrims.

**Bhopal**

Bhopal has long attracted the attention of archaeologists on account of the famous site at Sanchi, which contains, perhaps, the most beautiful of the early Buddhist monuments still extant. By arrangement with the Darbar of Bhopal, the Archaeological Survey of India were placed in charge of the excavation and preservation work connected with the Sanchi site. The magnificent results are there to testify to the skill with which the work has been carried out. Sir John Marshall's *Guide to Sanchi*, and his bigger work on the same subject now in course of preparation and written in collaboration with Professor Foucher, will form a lasting record of this work. After the completion of the excavations and the restoration of the monuments at Sanchi, the Archaeological Department of Bhopal was established in May, 1919, the Superintendent of Archeology, Professor B. Ghosal, M.A., being also appointed Curator of Sanchi. There are many other places of archaeological interest in Bhopal in addition to Sanchi and a detailed account of these by the late Colonel Luard was published in the *Bhopal State Gazetteer*.

**Gwalior**

Gwalior, one of the principal fragments of the once great empire of the Mahrattas, has long attracted archaeologists by reason of the fine cave temples at Bagh, to mention only one example. These were cleared and the buildings and paintings as far as possible restored and preserved for the Gwalior Government by the Archaeological Survey of India. The results were embodied in a finely illustrated volume published for His late Highness the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior by the India Society in co-operation with the Department of Archeology in Gwalior. Unfortunately, neither the Maharaja Scindia nor Colonel Luard, who had taken such an active part in the preparation of the volume, lived to see its publication.

**Dhar**

At Mandu, in the small State of Dhar, as at Sanchi and Bagh, we may witness an instance of collaboration by the Archaeological Survey of India with an Indian State to restore and preserve monuments of archaeological value. Paths have been cut through the jungle to the principal monuments, and the latter, as far as possible, cleared and protected against further decay. The in-
interest of this group of monuments, and especially of the Jami Masjid, the chief and least injured among them which dates from A.D. 1454, lies in the fact that it is probably the finest and largest specimen of Afghan architecture to be found in India.

The foregoing examples of effective steps taken in various Indian States, both big and small, are by no means a complete list of such activities, but will probably be sufficient to convey some idea of the wide and varied field which these cover and the measure of success which has crowned these efforts.
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MONUMENT TO J. B. VAN HEUTSZ, GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE NETHERLAND EAST INDIES, 1904–1909, AT WELTERREDEN

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ANOTHER VIEW OF THE VAN HEUTSZ MONUMENT AT WELTERREDEN

Architect: W. M. Dudok. Sculptor: H. A. van den Eijnde

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