Encyclopædia
of
Religion and Ethics
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Ibn Gabirol, Inheritance (Jewish), Liberal Judaism.

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Incarnation (American).

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King's Evil.

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Ibn Tunart.

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Hymns (Greek Christian).

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Ibn Hazm, Ibn Taimiya.

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Incubation, Informers, Interpretation (Veidic and Avesta),_IRQOIOUS, Jesus Christ in Zoroastrism, Jews in Zoroastrism, King (Indian), Law (American), Letters Celestial and Infernal.

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Leibniz.

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Leibniz (Mathematics).

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Law (Primitive).

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Ibsen.

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Member of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland; President of the St. Andrew Society, Edinburgh; author of *Ancient and Modern Britons; The Jinns; Finish, Fairies and Picts; Scottish Gypsies under the Stewarts*, and other works.

Images and Idols (Lapps and Samoyeds).

Margolouth (David Samuel), M.A., D.Litt.
Fellow of New College, and Laudian Professor of Arabic in the University of Oxford; author of *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam, Mohammedanism*; editor of many Arabic works.

Hymns (Ethiopian Christian, Muslim), Ibadia, Kalam, Khawarij.

Margolouth (George), M.A. (Cantab.).
Member of the Board of Studies in Theology at the University of London; formerly Senior Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS in the British Museum, and Examiner in Hebrew and Aramaic in the University of London.

Hymns (Hebrew and Jewish, Samaritan and Kenite).

Mabb (Hamilton Clelland), M.D., C.M., F.R.F.P.S. (Glas.).
H.M. Commissioner of Control for Scotland; formerly Medical Superintendent of Glasgow District Asylum, Lezlie; MacIntosh Lecturer on Insanity, St. Mungo's College, Glasgow.

Hypochondria, Illegitimacy.
MELLONE (S. H.), M.A. (Lond.), D.Sc. (Edin.).
Principal of the Unitarian Home Missionary College, Manchester; Lecturer in the History of Christian Doctrine in the University of Manchester; Examiner in Psychology in the University of Edinburgh; author of Studies in Philosophical Criticism, Leaders of Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century.

Immortality.

MENZIES (ALLAN), M.A., D.D.
Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of St. Andrews; author of The Earliest Gospel; editor of The Review of Theology and Philosophy.


MITCHELL (ANTHONY), D.D.
Bishop of Aberdeen and Orkney; formerly Principal and Pastorion Professor of Theology in the Theological College of the Episcopal Church in Scotland.

Laud.

MOOD (SHAMS-UL-UMRA JIVANJ JAMSHEDE),
Fellow of the University of Bombay; Dipl. Litteris et Aribus (Sweden); Officier d'Academie, France; Officier de l'Institution Publique, France; President of the Anthropological Society of Bombay; Vice-President of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

Initiation (Farsi).

MORGAN (CONWAY LLOYD), D.S.C., LL.D., F.R.S.
Professor of Psychology and Ethics in the University of Bristol; author of A History of Psychology, Instinct and Experience.

Instinct, Laughter.

MORRISON (JOHN), M.A., D.D.
Formerly Principal of the Church of Scotland College, Calcutta.

Kalighat.

Sometime Fellow of King's College, Cambridge; Greenwood Professor of Helenistic Greek and Roman Philology in the University of Manchester; Tutor in Didsbury, Wealden College; author of Grammar of New Testament Greek (3rd ed. 1903), Religion and Religion (1912). Early Zoroastrianism (Hibbert Lectures), 1914.

Iranians.

MURPHY (ROBERT), M.A., M.D., LL.D. (Edin. and St. Andrews).
Founder of the Munro Lectureship on Anthropology and Pre-historic Archaeology; past President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association; author of Ancient Scottish Lake-Dwellings, The Lake-Dwellings of Europe, Palaeolithic Man and Terramare Settlements in Europe, Pre-historic Britain.

Lake-Dwellings.

MURRAY (JOHN CLARK), LL.D. (Glas.), F.R.S.C.
Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy in McGill University, Montreal; author of A Handbook of Psychology, A Handbook of Christian Ethics.

Idleness, Ignorance.

MURRAY (ROBERT HENRY), M.A., Litt.D.
Minor Canon, St. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin; Lecturer in History at Alexandra College, Dublin; author of Revolutionary Ireland and its Settlements; editor of The Journal of John Stevens.

Hypocrisy.

NAXAMAR (FIMANICH),
Professor of Civil Law in the Imperial University, Kyoto.

Law (Japanese).

NICHOLSON (REYNOLD ALEKNER), M.A., Litt.D., LL.D.
Lecturer in Persian in the University of Cambridge; sometime Fellow of Trinity College; author of A Literary History of the Arabs (1907), The Tarjumân al-A'lm (transl. and commentary 1912), Saladin's Poem (1912), The Tarjumân al-A'lm (transl. and commentary 1912).

Jalal al-Din Rumi.

NIESE (BENEDIKT), Ph.D.
Late Professor of Ancient History in the University of Halle; editor of the Works of Josephus.

Josephus.

NIVEN (WILLIAM DICKIE), M.A.
Minister of the United Free Church at Blairgowrie; Co-examiner in Mental Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen.

Ideal.

NORTHCO (STAFFORD HARRY),
Viscount St. Cyres; author of Francois Pététion (1903), Firisat (1903).

Jansenism.

OTTLEY (ROBERT LAURENCE), D.D.
Regius Professor of Pastoral Theology, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; author of The Doctrine of the Incarnation (1908), Aspects of the Old Testament, The Religion of Israel (1908), and other works.

Innocence.

PATON (LEWIS BAYLES), Ph.D., D.D.
Nuttleton Professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Criticism, and Instructor in Assyrian, in Hartford Theological Seminary; formerly Director of the American School of Archaeology in Jerusalem; author of The Early History of Syria and Palestine, 'Esther' in the International Critical Commentary, Jerusalem in Bible Times, The Early Religion of Israel.

Ishtar.

PEARSON (A. C.), M.A.
Sometimes Scholar of Christ's College, Cambridge; editor of Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, Ennius' Helena, Heracleides, and Philemon.

King (Greek and Roman).

PERLES (FELIX), Ph.D.
Rabbi at Königsberg.

Law (Jewish).

PHILLIPOTT (BERtha SUETZ), M.A. (Dublin).
Lady Carlisle Research Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford; Fellow of the Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries (Copenhagen); formerly Librarian of Girton College, Cambridge; author of Kindred and Clan: A Study in the Sociology of the Teutonic Races (1910). Inheritance (Teutonic).
AUTHORS OF ARTICLES IN THIS VOLUME

PINCHES (THEOPHILUS GODRIDGE), LL.D. (Glas.), M.R.A.S.
Lecturer in Assyrian at University College, London, and at the Institute of Archeology, Liverpool; Hon. Member of the Société Asiatique.

Hymns (Babylonian).

POPE (ROBERT MARTIN), M.A. (Camb. and Manchester).
Author of Cathemerion of Prudentius.

Kindness, Liberty (Christian).

POUSSIN (LOUIS DE LA VALLEE), Docteur en philosophie et lettres (Louvain), en langues orientales (Louvain).
Professeur de saeculæ à l'université de Gand; Correspondant de l'Académie royale de Belgique; Co-Directeur du Museum; Membre de la R.A.S. et de la Société asiatique.

Identity (Buddhist), Incarnation (Buddhism), Jivanmukta, Karma.

POZNANSKI (SAMUEL), Ph.D. (Heidelberg).
Rabbiner und Prediger in Warschau (Polen).

Karaites.

RIVERS (W. H. R.), M.A., M.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.
Lecturer in the Physiology of the Senses in the University of Cambridge; Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association in 1911; author of The Todas.

Kia, Kinship.

ROBERTSON (SIR GEORGE SCOTT), R.C.S.L., D.C.L., M.P.
Former British Agent at Gilgit; author of The Kalpas of the Hindu-Kush and Chitral, The Story of a Minor Siege, and other works.

Kashmir.

ROSE (H. A.), I.C.S.
Superintendent of Ethnography, Panjab, India.

Jat.

SCHRADER (OTTO), Dr. phil. et jur. h.c.
Ordentlicher Professor für vergleichende Sprachforschung an der Universität zu Breslau; author of Prehistoric Antiquities of the Arya Peoples.

Kafiristan.

SCOTT (WILLIAM ROBERT), M.A., D.Phil., Litt.D.
Lecturer in Political Economy in the University of St. Andrews; Vice-President of the Economic History Section of the International Historical Congress, 1912; author of Francis Hutchison: His Life, Teaching, and Position in the History of Philosophy (1900).

Industrialism, Insur ance.

SEATON (MARY ETHEL).
Medieval and Modern Language Tripos, Class I, 1909 and 1910; Lecturer at Girton College, Cambridge.

Images and Idols (Teutonic and Slavic).

SELL (EDWARD), B.D., D.D., M.R.A.S.
Fellow of the University of Madras; Hon. Canon of St. George's Cathedral, Madras; Secretary of the Church Missionary Society, Madras; author of The Faith of Islam, The Historical Development of the Qur'ān, The Life of Muhammad, The Religious Orders of Islam.

Images and Idols (Muslim), Inspiration (Muslim), Islam.

SHOREY (PAUL), Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D.
Professor and Head of the Department of Greek in the University of Chicago; Roosevelt Professor at the University of Berlin, 1913; Member of the American Institute of Art and Letters.

Isocrates.

SHOWERS (GRANT), Ph.D.
Professor of Latin in the University of Wisconsin; Fellow in the American School of Classical Studies at Rome, 1930-1931; author of The Great Mother of the Gods (Dissertation), 1901, With the Professor, 1910; translator of Ovid's Heroides and Amores (Loeb Classical Library), 1914.

Iris.

SIEG (EMIL), Dr. Phil.
Ordentlicher Professor des Sanskrit und der vergleichenden indogerma nischen Sprachwissenschaft in Kiel.

Ituhasa.

SIMPSON (JAMES GILLILAND), D.D.
Canon and Precentor of St. Paul's; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Argyll and the Isles.

Irving and the Catholic Apostolic Church, Justification.

SMITH (HENRY PRESERVED), D.D.
Librarian of the Union Theological Seminary, New York; formerly Professor of Old Testament Literature and the History of Religion in the Meadville Theological School, Pennsylvania.

Inheritance (Hebrew).

SMITH (VINCENT ARTHUR), M.A.
Of the Indian Civil Service (retired); author of Aoko in 'Rulers of India,' Early History of India, A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon.

Jalandhara, Kaniska, Kapilavastu, Kusinagara.

Élève diplômé de l'École des Hautes Études; Archibishop of Upsala; Prochancellor of the University of Upsala; formerly Professor in the University of Upsala and in the University of Leipzig.

Incarnation (Introductory, Paris).

SPIGHT (HAROLD EDWIN BALME), M.A.
Junior Minister of Essex Church, Kensington; formerly Assistant Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen; sometime Fellow of Manchester College, Oxford.

Lessing.

STARBUCK (EDWIN DILLER), Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy in the State University of Iowa; author of The Psychology of Religion.

Intuitionism.

STAWELL (FLORENCE MELIAN).
Certificated Student of Newnham College, Cambridge (Classical Tripos, 1892, Part I. Class I. Div. L.); sometime Lecturer in Classics at Newnham College.

Ionic Philosophy.

Lecturer on Greek in the University of Birmingham; author of English Thought for English Thinkers.

Incarnation (Greek and Roman).
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Specialty</th>
<th>Institution/Location</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stokes (George J.), M.A.</td>
<td>(Trinity College, Dublin)</td>
<td>Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of Philosophy and Jurisprudence in University College, Cork, National University of Ireland.</td>
<td>Intellect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steahan (James), M.A.</td>
<td>Edinburgh; Cunningham Lecturer; author of Hebrew Ideals, The Book of Job, Thecaptivity and Pastoral Epistles.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inspiration (Protestant Doctrine).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takakusu (Jyun), M.A., D.Litt. (Oxford), Dr. Phil. (Leipzig)</td>
<td>Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Tokyo.</td>
<td>Initiation (Buddhist), Kwan-yin.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasker (John G.), D.D.</td>
<td>Principal and Professor of Church History and Apologetics in the Wesleyan College, Handsworth, Birmingham.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intercession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tritton (A. S.), M.A. (Lond. and Oxon.)</td>
<td>Assistant to the Professor of Hebrew and Semitic Languages in the University of Edinburgh.</td>
<td>King (Semitic).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troeltsch (Einstein), Dr. theol., phil. jur.</td>
<td>Professor der Theologie an der Universität zu Heidelberg; Geheimer Kirchenrat.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Idealism, Kant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnel (Joseph)</td>
<td>Prêtre; ancien Professeur de Théologie au Séminaire de Rennes; auteur de Histoire de la théologie positive, Histoire du dogme de la Pente de l'extase aux origines à la fin du quatrième siècle.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Immaculate Conception.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turner (Ralph Lilley), M.A.</td>
<td>Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge; Professor of English Literature in Queen's College, Benares.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karma-marga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vagnard (Elphège)</td>
<td>Docteur en Théologie.</td>
<td>Annointer du Lycée Corneille, Rouen; Chanoine de la Cathédrale; Laureat de l'Académie Française; Officier de l'Instruction publique.</td>
<td>Inquisition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinogradoff (Paul), D.C.L. (Oxford and Durham), LL.D. (Cambridge, Liverpool, Cuttata, and Harvard), Dr. Hist. (Moscow), Dr. juris (Berlin), F.R.A.</td>
<td>Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Oxford; Fellow of the Academies in St. Petersburg, Copenhagen, and Christians; Corresponding Member of the Academy in Berlin.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Law (Greek).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webb (Clement Charles Julian), M.A. (Oxon.).</td>
<td>Tutor of St. Mary Magdalen College, Oxford; sometime Wilde Lecturer in Natural and Comparative Religion in the University of Oxford; editor of John of Salisbury's Politica.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wiedemann (Alfred), Dr. Phil. et Litt. h.c. (Louvain), Litt. D. h.c. (Dublin).</td>
<td>Ordentlicher Honorar-Professor der altorientalischen Geschichte und Aegyptologie an der Universität zu Bonn.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Winternitz (Moritz), Ph.D.</td>
<td>Professor of Sanskrit and Ethnology in the German University of Prague.</td>
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<td>Jataka.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wissowa (George), Dr. jur. et phil.</td>
<td>Ordentlicher Professor an der Universität zu Halle; Geheimer Regierungsrat.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indigitationa, Invocation (Roman), Law (Roman).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woodhouse (William J.), M.A.</td>
<td>Professor of Greek in the University of Sydney, New South Wales.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inheritance (Greek, Roman), Keres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu (Chao-Chu), LL.B.</td>
<td>Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of International Law and Roman Law in the University of Peking.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Law (Chinese).</td>
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CROSS-REFERENCES

In addition to the cross-references throughout the volume, the following list of minor references may be useful:

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<td>Degeneration, Development (Mental)</td>
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<td>Kak-gyur, Kanjar</td>
<td>Lamiam</td>
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<td>Kanchatkans</td>
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<td>Kanarese</td>
<td>Dravidians (North India)</td>
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<td>Khilktsi</td>
<td>Men of God</td>
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<td>Khusrau, Nasir ibn</td>
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<td>Lhasa</td>
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<td>Liberality</td>
<td>Charity, Hospitality</td>
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# Lists of Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ak.</td>
<td>Akkadian</td>
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<td>Alex.</td>
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<td>Amer.</td>
<td>American</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apoc.</td>
<td>Apocalypse, Apocalyptic</td>
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<td>Apocrypha</td>
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<td>Aqu.</td>
<td>Aquila</td>
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<td>Assy.</td>
<td>Assyrian</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Altes Testament</td>
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<tr>
<td>AV</td>
<td>Authorized Version</td>
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<td>AVn</td>
<td>Authorized Version margin</td>
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<td>A Y.</td>
<td>Anno Yezdagird (A.D. 639)</td>
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<td>C.</td>
<td>circa, about</td>
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<td>Cf.</td>
<td>compare</td>
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<td>English Version</td>
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<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td>and following verse or page: as Ac 10:36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ff.</td>
<td>and following verses or page: as Mt 1:20</td>
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<td>H.</td>
<td>Law of Holiness</td>
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## II. Books of the Bible

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<th>Book</th>
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<td>Job</td>
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<td>Ps</td>
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<td>Pr</td>
<td>Proverbs</td>
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<td>Ec</td>
<td>Ecclesiastes</td>
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### Apocrypha

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Book</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Es.</td>
<td>Esdras</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Es.</td>
<td>Esdras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tobi.</td>
<td>Tobi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jth.</td>
<td>Judith</td>
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### New Testament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mt</td>
<td>Matthew</td>
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<td>Mk</td>
<td>Mark</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>Luke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jn</td>
<td>John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ac</td>
<td>Acts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ro</td>
<td>Romans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Co.</td>
<td>Corinthians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Th.</td>
<td>Thessalonians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Th.</td>
<td>Thessalonians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Ti.</td>
<td>Titus</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Ti.</td>
<td>Titus</td>
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<tr>
<td>He</td>
<td>Hebrews</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ga</td>
<td>Galatians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eph</td>
<td>Ephesians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ph</td>
<td>Philippian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Colossians</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Jn.</td>
<td>John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jn.</td>
<td>John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jn.</td>
<td>John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev.</td>
<td>Revelation</td>
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</table>
LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

III. For the Literature

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

Baethgen = Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch., 1888.
Barth = Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen, 2 vols. 1880, 1891 [*1894].
Benzerger = Heb. Archäologie, 1894.
Bruns = Sachs = Syr. - Röm. Rechtbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert, 1890.
Durenmatt = Die um de art. gr. et rom., 1897-1900.
Denninger = Enchiridion Symbolorum, 1911.
Deufft = Arabis Deserta, 2 vols. 1888.
Grimes = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 3 vols. 1875-1878.
Heider = Arabischer Sprachschwiele, 1891 ff.
Howitt = Native Tribes of S. E. Australia, 1904.
Jubainville = Couru de Litt. celtique, l. x., 1875 ff.
LaGrange = Études sur les religions sémitiques, 1904.
Lamn = Arabian-English Dictionary, 1853 ff.
Lepsius = Denkmäler aus Ägypten u. Äthiopien, 1849-1889.
Lichtenberger = Enecy des sciences religieuses, 1876.
Liddel = Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik, 1898.
Mair = Sanskrit Texts, 1858-1872.
Pauly-Wissowa = Beiträge zur Altertums-Wissenschaft, 1893-1905.
Perrot-Chipiez = Histoire de l'Art dans l'Antiquité, 1871 ff.
Premier = Römische Mythologie, 1898.
Revilhac = Religion des peuples non-civilisés, 1888.
Riehl = Handwörterbuch d. btl. Alterthums, 1893-1894.
Robinson = Biblical Researches in Palestine, 1856.
Röhr = Letz. d. gr. u. röm. Mythologie, 1884.
Schenkel = Bibel-Lexikon, 5 vols. 1899-1875.
Schürer = JVP, 3 vols. 1898-1901 [JVP, 5 vols. 1893 ff.]
Schwalbe = Leben nach dem Tode, 1892.
Siagfried = Heb. Wörterbuch zum AT, 1893.
Smith (G. A.) = Historical Geography of the Holy Land, 1896.
Smith (W. R.) = Religion of the Semites, 1894.
Spencer (H.) = Principles of Sociology, 1897-1898.
Spencer-Gillen = Native Tribes of Central Australia, 1899.
Spencer-Gillen = Northern Tribes of Central Australia, 1904.
Swete = The OT in Greek, 3 vols. 1895-1897.
Tylor (E. B.) = Primitive Culture, 1891 [1903].
Waller = Ägyptische Theologie auf Grund des Talmau u. verwandten Schriften, 1897.
Wiedemann = Die Religion der alten Amygter, 1900 [Eng. tr., revised, Religion of the Anc. Egyptians, 1897].
Wilkinson = Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians, 3 vols. 1878.
Zunz = Die jüdischen Vorträge der Juden, 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopedia, and other standard works frequently cited.

AA = Archiv für Anthropologie.
AAOJ = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
AE = Archiv für Ethnologie.
AGG = Abhandlungen der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
AHR = American Historical Review.
AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
AJP = American Journal of Philology.
AJP = American Journal of Psychology.
AJRE = American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
AJTH = American Journal of Theology.
AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
APES = American Palestine Exploration Society.
APF = Archiv für Papyrusforschung.
AR = Anthropological Review.
AWB = Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
AS = Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).
ASG = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
ASOC = American SocioLOGICAL Association.
ASSW = Archeological Survey of W. India.
AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
BAG = Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
BAS = Beiträge zur Assyriologie. Sprachwissenschaft (ed. Delitzsch and Haupt).
BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique.
BC = Bureau of Ethnology.
BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
BJ = Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
BL = Eamon Lectures.
BEE = Bulletin de Litérature Ecclesiastique.
BH = Bab. and Oriental Record.
BS = Bibliothea Sacra.
BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
BSA = Bulletin of the Soc. archéologique à Alexandre.
BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. de Geographie.
BTS = Buddhist Text Society.
BW = Biblical World.
BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAIL =</td>
<td>Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBTS =</td>
<td>Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE =</td>
<td>Catholic Encyclopedia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF =</td>
<td>Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGS =</td>
<td>Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI =</td>
<td>Census of India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL =</td>
<td>Corpus Inscription. Atticarum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CILS =</td>
<td>Corpus Inscription. Grecarum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CILS =</td>
<td>Corpus Inscription. Latinae.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISO =</td>
<td>Corpus Inscription. Semiticae.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUTF =</td>
<td>Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT (Eng. tr. of KAT); see below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR =</td>
<td>Contemporary Review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRJ =</td>
<td>Celtic Review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRJL =</td>
<td>Classical Review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQR =</td>
<td>Church Quarterly Review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSKL =</td>
<td>Corpus Script. Ecclesiae Latinarum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DACL =</td>
<td>Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cargil).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB =</td>
<td>Dict. of the Bible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA =</td>
<td>Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Cochran).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCB =</td>
<td>Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCG =</td>
<td>Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI =</td>
<td>Dict. of Islam (Hughes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DN =</td>
<td>Dict. of National Biography.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPAP =</td>
<td>Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAW =</td>
<td>Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBD =</td>
<td>Encyclopaedia Britannica.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI =</td>
<td>Encyclopedia of Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIR =</td>
<td>The present work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESR =</td>
<td>Expositor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETT =</td>
<td>Expository Times.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCH =</td>
<td>Fragmente Historiaea Græorum (coll. C. Müller, Paris, 1885).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL =</td>
<td>Folklore.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLJ =</td>
<td>Folklore Journal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLK =</td>
<td>Folklore Record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA =</td>
<td>Gazette Archéologique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB =</td>
<td>Golden Bough (Frazer).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDA =</td>
<td>Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIAR =</td>
<td>Grundriss d. Indisch-Armenischen Philologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIV =</td>
<td>Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GV =</td>
<td>Geschichte des Volkes Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA =</td>
<td>Handbook of American Indians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBB =</td>
<td>Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE =</td>
<td>Historia Ecclesiastica.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HGLL =</td>
<td>Historical Geography of the Holy Land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI =</td>
<td>History of Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HJ =</td>
<td>Hibbert Journal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HJFP =</td>
<td>History of the Jewish People.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN =</td>
<td>Historia Naturalis (Pliny).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HWB =</td>
<td>Handwörterbuch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA =</td>
<td>Indian Antiquary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC =</td>
<td>International Critical Commentary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICO =</td>
<td>International Congress of Orientalists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICR =</td>
<td>Indian Census Report.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG =</td>
<td>Inscription. Greece (publ. under auspices of Berlin Academy, 1873 ff.).</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGSA =</td>
<td>Inscription. Graecia Antiqvissima.</td>
</tr>
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<td>IGI =</td>
<td>Imperial Gazetteer of India (1885); new edition (1909-1909).</td>
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<td>IJE =</td>
<td>International Journal of Ethics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITHL =</td>
<td>International Theological Library.</td>
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<td>JAJ =</td>
<td>Journal Asiatique.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAF =</td>
<td>Journal of American Folklore.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAIA =</td>
<td>Journal of the Anthropological Institute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JASBS =</td>
<td>Journ. of the As. Soc. of Bengal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBL =</td>
<td>Journal of Biblical Literature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBTS =</td>
<td>Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JD =</td>
<td>Journal des Débats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDTA =</td>
<td>Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JE =</td>
<td>Jewish Encyclopedia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHC =</td>
<td>Johns Hopkins University Circulars.</td>
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<td>JHS =</td>
<td>Journal of Hellenic Studies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLT =</td>
<td>Jenner Litteraturzeitung.</td>
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<td>JPH =</td>
<td>Journal of Philology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPT =</td>
<td>Jahrbücher f. protest. Theologie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPTS =</td>
<td>Journal of the Pali Text Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JQR =</td>
<td>Jewish Quarterly Review.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRAI =</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRB =</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRBSC =</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRBSC =</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon branch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRB =</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean branch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGGS =</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTRM =</td>
<td>Journal of Theological Studies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAT =</td>
<td>Die Keilschriften und das AT (Schrader).</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAT =</td>
<td>Zimmern-Winkler's ed. of the preceding (really a totally distinct work).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG =</td>
<td>KTB = Keilschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGF =</td>
<td>Keilschriften und die Geschichtsforschung.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LBIT =</td>
<td>Literarisches Centrallblatt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOPA =</td>
<td>Literaturblatt für Oriental. Philologie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOT =</td>
<td>Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPS =</td>
<td>Legend of Perseus (Hartland).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSS =</td>
<td>Leipziger sem. Studien.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M =</td>
<td>Mémoires.</td>
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<td>MABIL =</td>
<td>Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGH =</td>
<td>Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Pertz).</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGJ =</td>
<td>Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFI =</td>
<td>Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Westermarck).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNPD =</td>
<td>Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen palästina-Vereins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBB =</td>
<td>Methodist Bevieuw.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVG =</td>
<td>Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWJ =</td>
<td>Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBAC =</td>
<td>Nuovo Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCE =</td>
<td>Nieuwlands Wörterbuch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NQ =</td>
<td>North Indian Notes and Queries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZC =</td>
<td>Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO =</td>
<td>Notes and Queries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR =</td>
<td>Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTZG =</td>
<td>Neustatbardenzeitliche Zeitgeschichte.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLZ =</td>
<td>Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS =</td>
<td>Onomastica Sacra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTCC =</td>
<td>Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W. R. Smith).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTP =</td>
<td>Oriental Translation Fund Publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB =</td>
<td>Polyglotte Bible (Engliah).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

PBE = Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.
PCC = Primitive Culture (Tylor).
PFEFM = Palestine Exploration Fund Memoirs.
PFEFS = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement.
PG = Patrologia Graeca (Migne).
PJB = Preussische Jahrbücher.
PL = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
PNQ = Punjab Notes and Queries.
PE = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).
PRE = Prof. Realenzylopädie (Hertzog-Hanck).
PRI = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
PRSE = Proceedings of the Royal Society.
PRSE = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
PSBA = Proceedings of the Soc. of Biblical Archaeology.
PTS = Pali Text Society.
RA = Revue Archéologique.
RAR = Revue d'Anthropologie.
RAS = Royal Asiatic Society.
RASSY = Revue d'Assyriologie.
RB = Revue Biblique.
RBW = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).
RC = Revue Critique.
RCD = Revue Celtique.
RCh = Revue Chrétienne.
RLDM = Revue des Deux Mondes.
RE = Realenzylopädie.
REB = Revue des Études Grecques.
REEG = Revue Egyptologique.
RELJ = Revue des Études Juives.
RETh = Revue d'Ethnographie.
RHLE = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses.
RHLR = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.
RN = Revue Numismatique.
RP = Records of the Past.
RPPh = Revue Philosophique.
RQ = Romanische Quartalschrift.
RS = Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Histoire Ancienne.
RSA = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.
RSI = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.
RTAP = Recueil de Travaux relatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.
RTP = Revue des traditions populaires.
RThPh = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.
RTv = Recueil de Travaux.
RB = Realwörterbuch.
SBAB = Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.

BB = Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
SB = Sacred Books of the East.
SBO = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
SM = Sitzungsberichte der Münchener Akademie.
TAPA = Transactions of American Philological Association.
TASJ = Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.
TC = Tribes and Castes.
TETS = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
THZ = Theologische Litteraturzeitung.
TI = Theol. Tijdschrift.
THS = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
TRESE = Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
TS = Texts and Studies.
TSBA = Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archaeology.
TU = Texte u. Untersuchungen.
WAI = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
ZA = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
ZH = Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.
ZATW = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
ZCK = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
ZCP = Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.
ZDA = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
ZDPV = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
ZE = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
ZKF = Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.
ZKG = Zeitschrift für Kritischen geschichte.
ZKT = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
ZM = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
ZNTW = Zeitschrift für die neueste Wissenschaft.
ZPAP = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
ZTK = Zeitschrift für Theologie u. Kirche.
ZV = Zeitschrift für Volkswagenkunde.
ZV = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
ZWT = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as KAT, LOT, etc.]
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
OF
RELIGION AND ETHICS

H

HYMNS.

Avestan.—See AVESTA.
Buddhist (T. W. RHYS DAVIES), p. 3.
Celtic (J. A. MACGOLLOCH), p. 4.
Chinese (J. DYER BALL), p. 4.
Christian—
Greek (A. BAUMSTARK), p. 5.
Etruscan (D. S. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 15.
Latin (G. M. DREWES), p. 16.
Irish (E. HULL), p. 25.

HYMNS (Babylonian).—In the extensive literature of Assyria and Babylonia a considerable number of hymns are found, most of them in the old Sumerian language, and generally accompanied by renderings into Semitic Babylonian. Several examples of this class of literature, however, are known to us only in the Semitic idioms, and do not seem to have been based on any Sumerian original. These compositions are generally in praise of the gods, and are such as might be expected from a nation so appreciative of the benefits showered down upon them from on high as the Babylonians. Hymns to heroes are exceedingly rare, unless those addressed to Marduk, Tammuz, and other deities who are stated to have been originally kings may be regarded as poems of that nature.

Though the Sumero-Babylonian hymns are addressed to various deities, it cannot be said that they vary greatly. They sing the gods' praises, exalt their might, and descant on the glories of their temples. They also speak of the gods' mercies, their places in Nature with regard to man, and the benefits which they conferred on the world as the Babylonians knew it. The wording is often well-chosen and even elegant, whether the idiom is Sumerian or Semitic.

The poetical form is somewhat monotonous, variety in these compositions, whether Sumerian or Semitic, having apparently not been aimed at. This is probably due to the fact that most of them were composed by the priests, with whom all religious forms originated, and who copied the style of older compositions.

Christian—
Modern (T. G. CRIPPS), p. 28.
Egyptian (J. BAIRIS), p. 38.
Greek and Roman (T. W. ALLEN), p. 40.
Hebrew and Jewish (G. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 42.
Inca.—See ANDEANS.
Japanese (M. ANESAKI), p. 46.
Manichean.—See MANICHISM.
Muslim (D. S. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 47.
Vedic (A. A. MACDONELL), p. 49.

Naturally many theories concerning the nature of primitive Sumerian poetry are possible, but in all probability it was the root-syllable, or the principal root-syllable, which was accentuated, the others being passed over lightly. The lines are generally divided into two parts by the caesura, indicated by a space so arranged that the text seems to be written in two columns. The Sumero-Babylonian hymns are often of considerable length, but among the shorter compositions of this nature may be cited the hymn to the setting sun, from the temple-library at Borsippa—a gem in its way:

'Sin the midst of heaven, at thy setting
May the bolt of the limpid heavens speak thee greeting;
May the door of heaven shine thee;
May the earth, thy beloved minister, direct thee;
At K-babbar, the seat of thy lordship, thy supremacy shall shine forth;
May As, thy beloved spouse, joyfully receive thee;
May thy heart take rest;
May the feast of thy divinity be set for thee;
Leader, hero Sinak, may there be praise to thee;
Lord of Eshbar, may the course of thy path be straight;
Make straight thy road—go the direct road to thy resting-place.
Then art the country's judge, the director of its decisions.'

The above being part of a series (the next was a hymn to the Sun-god on his rising), the composition deals only with the satisfaction and peace that the god experienced when, after fulfilling his task in the sky, he was greeted by his home and his spouse, and, having been refreshed, thought over all that he had seen on his course above the earth, the decisions of whose tribunals he directed. The first four lines are alternately of 11 and 15 syllables, while the 5th and 6th contain 15 each. At this
HYMNS (Babylonian)

point are again four short lines (10-12 syllables), followed by two long ones (18-19 syllables). Evidently this regularity of form is intentional.

The Sun-god was one of the deities whose influence the Babylonians could appreciate, hence the tone of the above composition addressed to him. Enil, the older Bel, however, was a divine personage who aroused more interest, and in some of the compositions addressed to him there is noticeable a tone of reproach. This is exhibited by the text beginning Ame sumanatu 3egg368 nippin (G. E. B. 3egg368, sumanatu-babylon). Hymnen, 1896, p. 130 ff.) - a composition in dialect, where the god is called Mulil:

"The hold of the lord bitterly lamenteth:
The fold, the fold of the lord, bitterly lamenteth.
O lord of the lands, honoured one, lord of the lands:
O lord of the lands, whose word is faithful;
He does not turn - with regard to his command he does not turn;-

The honoured one, Mulil, changeth not his utterance.
Troubling the waters, he caught the fish, he scattered the birds, he sent the 'son of the plain' up to the mountains, and he sent 'the son of the mountain' down to the plain, etc. -
O lord of the lands, heart-remote Mulil, how long wilt thou not hearken?
Father Mulil, who regardeth, how long wilt thou not hearken?
Who coveth thine heart with a garment, how long?
While thou art entered into the city of Sinrib, how long? -
Who coveth thine heart like a reed, how long?
Honoured one, who placeth thy fingers in thine ears, how long?

A kind of litany closes this long and interesting enumeration of 'the older Bel's' inattention to the work of gardening under his auspices. It contains much hidden teaching of the Babylonian priesthood.

Before the rise of Merodach, the worship of Enil was probably more favoured in Babylonia than that of any other god except Ea, and the importance of Nippur, which was originally his city (before the adoption of Ninip as patron), always maintained Enil's supremacy. This is shown by the descriptive hymn published in FSBA, March 1911, p. 86 ff. After describing the district wherein the temple of Enil and his spouse Ninlil lay, the text continues as follows:

"The god Enil, the lord of heaven, Mulil, the god Enil, to be taken to the reception-hall. Enil, may the sodothu (7) go forth from the city; Nippur, may the sodothu (7) go forth from the city - O Enil, for the fate which thou hast decided; O Ninlil, for the fate which thou hast decided. Enil cometh, Ninlil descendeth -
Nanunnur cometh - the king. Enil calleth to the man of the great gate: 'Man of the great gate, man of the lock - Man of the bell, man of the holy lock - Thy lady Ninlil cometh!"
If (anyone) set thee for my name, Then shall not reveal to him my place. Enil calleth to the man of the great gate: 'Man of the great gate, man of the lock - Man of the bell, man of the holy lock -
Thy lady Ninlil cometh -
The handmaiden who is so bright, so shining! Let none wax her, let none kiss her -
Ninlil so bright, so shining!"

Enil, the bright, the fair, will pronounce the decision.

In contradiction to the 'heart-remote Enil,' or 'older Bel' is his younger representative, Bel-Merodach, 'the merciful one,' who later, took Enil's place. The hymns to Merodach are naturally, for this reason, ascribed to that deity, among the most interesting:

'The merciful one among the gods -
The merciful one who loveth to verify the death -
Marduk, king of heaven and earth, king of Babylon, lord of E-Sagris,
King of E-sagis, lord of E-mahs, and Heaven and earth are thin,
Marduk, the great one, the strong one,
The incarnation of life is thin,
The philtre of life is thin.

Marduk, the powerful one, is thin,
Marduk, the powerful one, is thin,
The living creatures, as many as there are, which bear name in this land;
The four regions, as many as there are;
The Sun-god, which are the host of heaven and earth, as many as there are,
To them do they (turn) their ear.'

More popular than other deities of the Babylonian pantheon were in all probability Tammuz and Istar, whose worship goes back to the fourth millennium B.C. Hymns to them are here composed in dialectic Sumerian, and are, therefore, of comparatively late date. As examples of Semitic Babylonian hymns to these deities will be found, further on, an extract from the exceedingly well-preserved bilingual hymn to Istar, excavated by George Smith, is given here:

'The light of heaven, which dawnteth like fire in the land, art thou.
Godess of the earth, art thou:
Shes who, like the earth, widely advanced, art thou.
As for thee, a path of righteousness blesseth thee.'
The goddess then answers:
'The twin sister of the sun, the abodes of the heavens,
To produce the omens I exist - in perfection I exist;
To produce the omens for my father Sin I exist - in perfection I exist;
To produce the omens for my brother the Sun I exist - in perfection I exist.'

Though daughter of Anu, the god of the heavens, Istar is here called daughter of Sin or Nannar, the Moon-god, probably because, like the moon, the planet shows phases. She was regarded as the sun's sister because she accompanied him on his course, sometimes at his rising, at other times at his setting.

One of the gods of war and also god of pestilence - Nergal, patron-deity of Cutha - was worshipped as one of the sons of Enil, the great divinity who, as the author of the story of the Flood informs us, desired to destroy mankind to prevent them from increasing too quickly on the earth. Notwithstanding Nergal's unsparing nature, hymns were addressed to him, and he was glorified therein with every confidence that harm would not overtake the Babylonians at his hands, but would benefit their enemies:

Let me glorify the hero of the gods, the powerful, the brilliant one, the son of Enil;
Ura (i.e. Nergal) let me glorify, the hero of the gods, the powerful, the brilliant one, the son of Enil;
The beloved of Enil, the supreme leader, the avenger of his father;
The offspring of the Lady of the gods, the great queen, the son of the king, who trusts in his might;
The clever one of the gods, the sublime oracle-priest, the great hero, the trust of Enil.

He is, after this, addressed as the one who overcomes evil devils and fates, the evil and powerful foe, subduing the evil gods, and loving the saving of life. Bel-šarrummi, who seems to be mentioned as the composer of the hymn, asks for the god's favour upon the city of Marad, where the god was worshipped; and for the saving of his own life, which was threatened by some hostile fate. Another noteworthy Sumerian hymn addressed to Nergal is in the form of verses chanted by the priest, and repeated by the people, as follows:

Priest: 'His bright image, /overshadoweth the demons right and left,'
People: 'His bright image, etc.'
Priest: 'The long arm whose blow (i.e. disease and pestilence) is invisible, the evil one with his arm [the amulet],'
People: 'Nergal, the long arm,' etc.

This text, which is very mutilated, was of considerable length when complete, and is important not only on account of its form and the words used, but also because of the light which it sheds upon the Babylonian conceptions of life and death.

Another Sumerian hymn (WAJ iv. pl. 28, no. 8, and 27, no. 3), regarded as being in the form of a 1

1 The holy incantation, the word (from) the Abyss, so called because communicated to Merodach by Ea, king of the Abyss and lord of wisdom.

3 Cf. 1 K 13, 13. 6 Possibly another name (or title) of Enil
2 The temple of Bel there.
HYMNS (Buddhist), differs widely from the above. To what god it is addressed, however, is uncertain: Priest: *In affection of heart, in evil weeping, in sighing of his sin.*

In bitter crying, affection of heart,
In evil weeping, in sighing,
He seems like a dove, in anguish night and day.
To his merciful god he bows as a wild cow—
He constantly makes.
To his god in supplication he has bowed down his face;
He has looked up without weeping.
Penitent: *I will tell my deed—my unpeachable deed!*

I will repeat my word—my unpeachable word!

(These lines are repeated, after which the text is broken away.)

From the other inscriptions of a similar kind, it would seem that the gods of Babylonian loved to hear the confessions of their worshipers, which, composed in poetic form, were regarded as having weight with them to the penitent's advantage (cf. also the Confession [Assyro.-Bab.], vol. iii. pp. 825–837).

The above extracts show the nature of the Semero-Babylonian hymns, composed, apparently, in that ancient idiom, and generally, on the tablets which have been preserved to us, provided with a Semitic (Assyro-Babylonian) translation. Those composed in the Semitic Babylonian (Assyrian) idiom only were modelled, to a certain extent, upon the Semitic hymns in the canons. Naturally, as the language is a widely differing one, the poetical form departs from that of the old writers of Sumer. The personal and prepositional inixes of the Sumerian verb, and the use of post-positions instead of prepositions account for such differences as are noticeable.

As far as can be judged, the diction of Semitic Babylonian poetry is more regular, and, therefore, has the appearance of greater dignity. Each half-verse has four principal accents, as a rule, though this is by no means without exceptions. The following will give an idea of the nature of the Semitic compositions:

*Thou, Sitar, whose spouse is Tammuz,
Daughter of Sin, the heroines traversing the land,
Shes who loveth reproduction, she who loveth all men art thou.
I have given to thee thy great gift—
A suit of lapis-lazuli, a suit of gold, the adornment of thy divinity.

To Tammuz, thy spouse, take my pledge—
May Tammuz, thy spouse, take away mine indisposition.*

After this the supplicant addressed Tammuz him- self:

*Tammuz, the lord, shepherd of Anu, son of En art thon; Spouse of Sitar, bride, ruler of the land; Clothed with the scarf (bearing) the staff; Producer of all things, lord of the fold; Eater of pure food, the adnake:*

*Deeper from the seven skins, etc.*

In certain of the Semitic compositions a similarity with the Hebrew psalms has been pointed out. The following is from a tablet of this nature:

*God, my lord, maker of my name;
Keeper of my life, causing my seed to be:
My angry god, may this heart be appeased;
My acharit goddess, be at peace with me.
Who knoweth, my god, thy test?

Thine holy dwelling-place, thou holy abode, have I never seen.

As for Illuc (7), let it pass from me—
I will be removed with thee,
Abbot to me then the lot of life;
Let my days be long—grand (one) life.*

Among the most noteworthy texts of the nature of hymns may be mentioned also those which accompanied the new-year ceremonies in honour of Marduk. The lines are complete, the first of each being dialectic Sumerian, and the other Semitic Babylonian. Though the second is regarded as a translation of the first, it is only an exact copy. One of the comple test reads:

*Celestial king of men, celestial king who beseechth;
Lord of kings, bestower of gifts,*

and every other line at most merely reflects the sense of that preceding.

Among the royal hymns are compositions containing the names of Nebuchadrezzar r. of Babylonia (about 1200 B.C.), Sargon of Assyria, Esarhaddon, and Assurbanipal. The last name only occurs in a dialectic bilingual psalm. A hymn containing the name of Nebuchadrezzar is an acrostic upon the name of the god Nebu.


T. G. FINCHER.

HYMNS (Buddhist).—The word 'hymn' is ambiguous. It has been defined as a 'song of praise,' a 'religious ode,' a 'sacred lyric,' a 'poem in stanza form written to be sung in congregational service.' In the last of these various senses the Buddhists, who have neither churches nor chapels, neither congregations nor services, have consequently no hymns. In the other senses there are quite a number of hymns scattered throughout the longer prose books; and in the supplementary Nākya we have twelve anthologies, mostly short, of religious poems of different kinds. These are collected in the anthologies either according to the subject (as in the Vaddana and the Nittipakk), or according to the kind of composition (as in the Udana and the Iti-vuttaka).

An example or two will make this clear. In the Sutta Nipata, undoubtedly containing some of the very oldest of these hymns, we have seventy-one lyrics of an average length of sixteen stanzas each. These are arranged in five cantos (each of which existed as a separate booklet before they were brought together in one book) and in them the arrangement and order of the lyrics have little or no reference to the subjects of which the lyrics treat. Quite the opposite form of arrangement is found in the well-known Dhammapada, where all the verses are arranged according to subjects—such as Earnestness, Thought, Wisdom, Foolishness, the Path, Craving, Happiness, and so on. The title means 'Verses of the Norm,' the Dhamma, the Dhammapada. This word is often rendered 'religion;' but the idea is not the same, and the word 'religion' is not found outside the European languages. More than half of these 'Verses of the Norm' have been traced back to the extent that they can be traced. The rest were verses current in the community at the time of the rise of Buddhism; and some of them may even be pre-Buddhistic, belonging to the stock of moral sayings handed down in verse among the general body of Indians interested in such questions. This will, however, always remain doubtful, as no verse has as yet been traced in pre-Buddhist literature. We can only say for certain that quite a number of the verses are reproduced, in either identical or closely similar words, in the various sectarian books of later speculation. We cannot be sure that these verses were not first composed among the Buddhists.

The fact is (though it has not been noticed anywhere in the voluminous literature on the Dhammapada) that the 'Verses of the Norm' deal for the most part with the lower morality of the unconverted—man—that is, with the ethics more or less common to all the higher religions. This may explain the great vogue that this anthology

1 See, on the growth of the Sutta Nipata, R. D. Davids, Buddhist Indis, London, 1903, pp. 177–180. The whole work has been translated by V. F. Russell (J.B.E., vol. x., 1889), and a second edition of the text by D. Anderson appears in the P.T.S. for 1908.

2 For the details see R. D. Davids, JRAS, 1900, p. 309 ff.
recital of ancestral deeds; and they may have been a kind of spell ensuring the help of the gods. Chants were likewise sung by the 'priestesses' of Sema for the purpose of raising storms (Mela, iii. 6).

Such hymns were used also by the Irish Celts (cf. Coll, vol. iii. p. 298). One curious chanted, preserved in the Book of Leinster, is said to have been sung by Amaigren, the poet of the Milesians, as they approached Ireland, and by its means the magical dangers raised against them were overcome. It is an invocation of Nature or of the natural scenery and products of Ireland, and was evidently a ritual chant used in times of danger. The following represents the translation given by H. d'Arbois de Jubainville (Cours de litt. col., Paris, 1883-1902, ii. 230; Book of Leinster, 12, 2; cf. the gloss on these lines cited by E. O'Curry, Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish, London, 1875, ii. 100):

1 I invoke the land of Ireland!
2 Shining, shining sea!

Fertile, fertile hill!
Wooded valley!
Abundant river, abundant in waters!
Fish-abounding lake!
Fish-abounding sea!
Fertile earth!
Irruption of fish!
Fish there!
Bird under wave!
Great fish!
Irruption of fish!
Fish-abounding sea!'

Such arcaic formulas, unhymned and alliterative, which have parallels in savage ritual, may have been in common use. There is a similar one in the words spoken after the destruction of Da Derga's host, by Mececht on his finding water. He bethes in it and sings (ROD xxii. [101] 409):

'Cold fountain,
Surface of strand,
Sea of lake;
Water of rath; stream of river;
High spring well; cold fountain.'

At a still later period there is a trace of hymn-invocations in Highland folk-custom in Lewis. A man waded knee-deep into the sea and poured out an offering of ale or wassail into the waters, chanting:

'Of god of the sea,
Put weed in the drawing wave
To enrich the ground,
To shower on us food.'

Those on shore took up the strain in chorus, their voices mingling with the noise of the waves. F. Carmichael, Carmina Gadelica, Edinburgh, 1900, i. 163; cf. M. Martín, Doctr. of the W. Isles of Scotland, London, 1716, p. 28). In Ireland, the Scottish Highlands, and Brittany many charms still survive and are sung or chanted in connexion with magical rites, usually for healing, or as invocations for a variety of purposes. In these, names of the Persons of the Trinity, the Virgin, and the saints have taken the place of those of older divinities (for these see Charms and Amulets [Celtic] and reff. there given). Scanty as these data are, they prove sufficiently that the pagan Celts must have had a large number of hymns, chants, and the like in common use.

LITERATURE.—C. Jullian, Recherches sur la religion gauloise, Bordeaux, 1902; J. A. MacCulloch, Religion of the Ancient Celts, Edinburgh, 1911. J. A. MACCULLOCH.

HYMNS (Chinese).—It must be premised that idolatry is not social in its service in the way in which Christianity is. The worshippers and not gather together in a congregation to hymn the praises of the gods, nor is singing employed by those who go into the temples to present their solitary petitions and prostrate themselves before the images.

In ancestor-worship there is an approach to a united service, but it is confined to the family or
Hymns (Greek Christian).

The old rural processions in Greece and Rome, which were mixed with religious ideas, had a counterpart in China among the songs of the Buddhists. Their hymns and folk-songs some hymns or sacred songs of filial piety, which were in use in ancient times in the worship of ancestors. The following is one used at one of the services and addressed to the progenitors from whom the king descends, the Shao dynasty (1122-249 B.C.) traced their origin:

'G. thou accomplished great Hau-chi; To thee alone was given To be, by what we owe to thee, The corollae of Heaven.
On all who dwell within our land Grain-food didst thou bestow Tis to thy wonder-working hand This grace we have been. God had the wheat and barley meant To nourish all mankind None would have fathomed his intent But for thy guiding mind.
Man's social duties thou didst show To every tribe and state From thee the social virtue, flown That stamp our land 'The Great.' 1

A hymn in honour of his ancestors was sung before the sacrifice of Cain when he performed the ancestor-worship. It was divided into three parts, and was begun when His majesty stood before the table or altar on which were placed the representations of the ancestors. The second part was sung while he performed the kow-tow; and, after the offerings had all been made, the third part followed, during which the spirits of the ancestors were supposed to return to heaven. The hymn was accompanied by music of a slow and solemn nature, played on a number of instruments. The solemnity and pomp of the occasion were increased by grave men who postured, and by their motions and attitudes expressed the feelings which the Emperor should evince at such a time, while the singers also expressed in the words of the hymn the sentiments that should actuate him. The first stanza of the second part was as follows:

'To you I owe my all, as I willingly confess. Your body is the source of this body I possess. The breath I breathe it comes from you, From you the strength to dare and do. When my deep gratitude I wish to make appear And promulgate, which duty devoutly I wish nay, I rejoice, Paternal Spirit, that you are present here, Desirous to bestow upon me your glorious home on high.'

In the worship of Confucius—a State-worship performed at stated times by high officials of government—a stanza adulatory of the Sage was chanted by a chief man:

Confucius! Confucius! Great indeed art thou, O Confucius. Before thee None like unto thee; After thee None equal to thee. Confucius! Confucius! Great indeed art thou, O Confucius.'

Hymns are also used in the worship of Heaven and Earth. In the Taoist cannon there are several hymn-books containing hymns of aspiration and of repentance, and hymns to the 'Three Pure Ones,' as well as to other deities, such as The Dipper,' or 'Charles's Wain,' and certain other constellations and stars. 4 In the Buddhist books used in worship there are also stanzas which are chanted when the priest is employed in the services. In both Taoist and Buddhist tracts hymns of praise to deities are to be found.

5. G. 0., Alexander, Confucius, the Great Teacher, London, 1900, p. 597.

The celebrated Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, in his account of funerals at the city of Kinsay (the modern Hang Chou), says that the mourners follow the corpse to the sound of music and singing hymns to their idols, and that 'the instruments which they have caused to be played at his funeral and the idol hymns that have been chanted shall also be produced again to welcome him in the next world, and that the idols themselves will come to do him honour.'

Literature.—This is cited in the footnote.

HYMNS (Greek Christian).—The vast accumulation of Christian hymns in the Greek language falls, in respect of form, into three sections differing widely in magnitude and importance. Thus we have (1) the prose hymns of Christian antiquity; (2) Christian hymns in the ancient metres; and (3) the new rhetorical compositions of Byzantine hymnody, the metre of which depends upon the enumeration of syllables and the stress accent.

1. Prose Hymns.—The first prose book of Greek-speaking Christians was the Psalter in the LXX version. This was at an early period supplemented by an appendix containing other passages, nine of which, already brought together in the Codex Alexandrinus, form the group of so-called Songs, viz. (i.) and (ii.) the Songs of Moses (Ex 15: 21-31 and Deut 32: 46); (iii.) that of Hannah (I Sam 2: 7-10); (iv.) Hallelukkah (Hab 3: 18-20); (v.) Isaiah (Isa 26: 5-6); (vi.) Jonas (Jon 3: 8-9); (vii.) and (viii.) the Three Holy Children (Dan 3: 26-30 and 3d: 40-58 LXX [as Three 1: 41-59]; and (ix.) Mary and Zechariah (Lk 1: 46-55 and 56-57). Here we should note that the mode of rendering these Biblical lyrics was of decisive importance for the development of Greek hymnody in the centuries to follow: they were recited by a single person, who was the congregation, or, as representing it, the choir, simply responded at the end of every verse with a short refrain, the hypopaulina. Such hypopaulina (a list of which, as used in Constantinople in the early Middle Ages, is still extant (D, CL. 1. 3043)), or; cf. 240 and 251) may be said to constitute the simplest form of Christian prose hymnody in the Greek language.

Even in the 1st cent., however, we can trace the production of new Christian hymns, for which the Greek text of the 'Psalms of David' served as a model; and, as that text has no regular metrical structure, the imitations likewise were composed in prose form. Now and then we hear the echoes of such psalms and spiritual songs in the Epistles of Paul and the Apocalypse (see Eph 5: 1, Tit 2: 11; Tit 3: 5, Jas 3: 5, 1 Peter 1: 17) (Julian, "dict. of Hymnol."? London, 1877, p. 4589); and in the 2nd cent. we find a non-Christian writer, Pliny the Younger (Ep. x. 97), speaking of the 'carmen' in which—as an essential element of their worship—the Christians of Bithynia glorified Christ as their God before their assembly, i.e., probably, in some kind of antiphonal song. The statement of the heathen writer strikingly recalls the 'psalms and hymns written by the brethren from the beginning,' which, on the testimony of a work quoted by Eusebius (HE v. xxvii. 5) as by an unknown writer of the early part of the 3rd cent.

1. Legge, Chinese Classics, I. 97.
praised 'Christ the Word of God, calling Him God.' The hymn which was composed by Athanasius, who suffered martyrdom in the reign of Septimius Severus (193-211), and to which St. Basil appealed (de Spir. Spong. 9) in support of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, was probably one of those primitive prayers on which in early Christian hymnology of this kind—the 'Odes of Solomon'—fragments of which had long been known in a Coptic translation, has been recently re-discovered, almost complete, in a Syriac version. But whether the Gr. text upon which the two versions undoubtedly rest, was the original or was itself a translation from Hebrew; whether these spirited lyrics are, as a whole, of Christian origin, or simply a Christian redaction of a Jewish original; whether they are Gnostic or Montanistico productive of the Church—these questions are still in dispute, and may perhaps never find a definite answer. It may at all events be taken as a fact that a type of religious poetry designed to compete with the OT Psalter was zealously cultivated in Gnostic circles. Certain pieces in the Syriac Apocryphal Acts of Thomas and Acts of John give us an idea of the nature of such heretical compositions, although in the case of those in the Acts of Thomas the Syriac text is probably the later version.

The favour enjoyed by such non-Biblical pieces among heretics naturally led the Church to make a stand against them and their use in Divine service. John Paul of Samosata, writing not later than A.D. 290-297, sought to justify the suppression of certain 'psalms' in praise of Christ, to which he objected on the ground that they were of quite recent origin (Enochs. HE VIII. 11. 10). Nevertheless, in the 4th cent., still held in high regard various prose hymns which were undoubtedly a legacy from the pre-Constantinian period, and at least of these two maintain to the present day an important place in the worship of the Greek Church. (a) The evening hymn sung at the close of vespers, the άος, ἰσαρίης, is attested c. 375 by St. Basil (loc. cit.) as a universally known form of Evening Prayer, the origin of which was altogether unknown. (b) The corresponding morning hymn, the Ἀλατείας τοῦ τάφρονος, called 'the Great Doxology,' an extended form of the original on which the Western 'Gloria in excelsis' is based—has, on the other hand, been ascribed to the Codex Alexandrinus, and also in a more archaic redaction at the end of bk. vii. of the Apostolic Constitutions. In the former place is found another evening hymn and a hymn-like grace before meat. Moreover, the Gr. original of a short hymn to which the Rule of St. Benedict (ed. Weisflin, Leipzig, 1896, p. 25. 28) gives a place in the monastic Morning Office of the Western Church is, at least, not of later origin than these. A relatively early origin must be assigned likewise to another prose text having the essential features of a hymn, viz. the 'Prologue,' which in the consolations of water at the Feast of Epiphany preceded the solemn prayer proper, and is a glorification of the day upon which Jesus was baptized in the Jordan, in tune to the Easter 'Exultet' of the Roman liturgy. Of this there are, besides the Greek, a Slavonic and a remarkably interesting Armenian version. Certain Gnostic features still adhering to it show that its composition was long prior to the days of St. Sophronius (see E. H. 2. 383), to whom it is ascribed, apparently without MS authority, in the printed add. of the Gr. Euchologia.

Hymns in classical metres.—Besides the fragments here with the Gr. version of the OT, we find also, from the 2nd cent., a Greco-Christian hymnody employing the ancient poetic forms. It is in accordance with the general position of Gnosticism in the religious sphere that it took the lead here, and guided the development along fresh lines.

We are unable to say whether the 'psalms' or 'odes' of Basilides and a psalm-book of Marcion or the Marcionites attested by the Fragm. Muratorianum belong to the Gnostic or the Pseudepigraphic type. But a hymn of the Roesus and a specimen of the psalms of Philotheus, preserved in Josephus' Philotheus in his Philotheoumenon (V. 10, vi. 53), both exhibit logiean anapests, and lines, in spite of a certain irregularity of treatment, show undoubtedly that here the Gnostic hymnody, if not completely, was at least closely followed the traditional forms of ancient lyrical composition.

In the sphere of Catholic Christianity the new style appears in the hymn to Christ with which Clement of Alexandria closes his Protreptich. Apart from its introductory lines, which are of very doubtful authenticity, this hymn is manifestly composed in anapests, and, as compared with the Gnostic survivals, exhibits an even more rigid adherence to the laws of classical metre, while its contents do not seem to preclude the possibility that compositions of the kind were actually used in the service of the Alexandrian churches about the beginning of the 2nd century. The further stages of a development which doubtless begins at this point are certainly very obscure.

The list of the works of Hippolytus inscribed upon his statue in the Lateran makes mention of 'Odes,' and the Gnostic bishop named Nepos as a prolific writer of psalms about the middle of the 3rd cent. (Euseb. HE VI. 24. 1). But its date is still uncertain; and we may assume that all these works written upon the lines of the development in question, and the whole body of historical facts are not sufficient to substantiate the hypothesis.

To the hymn of Clement, however, is closely allied in a formal way a fragment preserved in a hymnary of the Amharic Collection of the 4th cent., which is in the 5th anapestic metre, and dates probably from the 3rd rather than the 4th century. It has been described as a versified ethical catechism of early Christianity, although it might quite as fitly be regarded as a hymn forming part of the liturgy of initiation, and addressed to the newly baptized. By reason of the formal characteristics which differentiate it from Clement's hymn to Christ, it is of great interest in the development of Greek hymnody.

Its anapests, e.g., are constructed with much regard to accent, as to quantity, and it thus marks the transition from the older metres of quantity to the new system of accentual metre, while its verses are linked together by the tripe-repeated articulation of the alphabetical acousis, which was to form so prominent a feature in the rhythmical hymns of the Church.

This artifice is also the connecting medium between the strophes of a hymn—likewise in anapestic metre—intended for use by a girl entering after death into the enjoyment of eternal bliss, and the conclusion of which is found in a Berlin papyrus. Although all the historical facts are without significance, the relationship between the strophes of the 'psalms' of the virgins with which St. Methodius of Olympus (I. c. 311) concludes his Hypothesis. The latter is perhaps not entirely unrelated to the ancient Pneumatiic of Abanun and Eulogius. But in the expansive freedom of its laudable rhythms it conforms not less closely to the acousis of the classical metre thans to the anapestic text of the Ambrose papyrus, and in the ephebos unexposed after each strophe there appears for the first time another feature which came to be of great importance in this kind of composition. We may, therefore, regard this production, which was in the first instance purely literary, as the representative of really vital elements in the development of hymnody.

An altogether different type appears in the archaic Greco-Christian lyrics of the subsequent part of the 4th and the beginning of the 5th century. While it is explicitly said of the heresiarch Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea from A.D. 301, that he sought to win acceptance for his doctrines by composing short metrical lyrics intended for the use not only of the community in public worship, but also of individuals in their household worship (Soc. HE II. 10), yet in general this type of lyric took a course which from the outset diverged widely from the sphere of congregational worship. This is true not only of the lost 'Odes' in which the younger Apollinaris (rather than his master) tried to emulate the art of Pindar, and of the
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extant hexameter paraphrase of the Psalms which bears its name; it holds good equally of the hymns like poems which are found in the rich and varied literary heritage of St. Gregory of Nazianzus, by far the most eminent representative of this school (491-523). A devout expression of personal piety, these compositions of Gregory, which in their learned perfection of form are closely akin to the Hellenistic poetry of the Ptolemaic period, have naturally been regarded as liturgical prayers uttered by a Christian assembly. Of the ten extant 'hymns' in the Doric dialect composed by the Neo-Patonian philosopher Synesius, who became bishop of Cyrene in 406 or 409, not more than five in all (nos. 5 and 7-10) belong to the Christian period of their author, and these, no less than the poems of Gregory, exhibit an individualistic spirit and a technical structure incompatible with their liturgical use.

In the Byzantine period the classical metres sometimes employed in hymnody as in other kinds of poetry came to be reduced in effect to two, viz. the Anacreontic strophe and iambic trimeter. Hymns to saints are first found among the Anacreontic hymns to a pagan god, such as Dionysus, in which the artistic devices and forms of the new rhythmic poetry appear in the linking together of the regular strophes by the alphabetical acrostic and the framing of a stanza with a different metrical structure after every four strophes. As regards the poems which are so called, no exact style may be compared with the hymns of the Western writer Prudentius, there is, again, good reason to doubt whether they were ever actually used in the liturgy. Synesius also shows himself clearly implied by the note indicating the ecclesiastical tone to which the Anacreontic personal hymns of certain Synesius tell us was to belong and here, too, the strophes are connected by the alphabetical acrostic. The iambic trimeter was used by Georgios Paphitios, dedicated to the Church of St. John in Constantinople in the reign of Heracleius (610-641), in an Easter hymn of 159 verses; through the dactylic hexameter line clearly implied by the note, indicating the ecclesiastical tone to which this artifice was never held a place in the liturgy. As regards a truly liturgical type of composition in rhythmical verse, we find that St. John of Damascus (cf. below, 3 (c)) makes use of ancient dramatic metre in his three canticles for Christmas, Epiphany, and Pentecost respectively—in which the initial letter of the stanzas forms an acrostic of two elegiac distichs. It is true that this artifice produced no imitations worthy of note, and it was left for a much later writer, Manuel Chrysaeus, in the first half of the 14th cent., to commit the barbarism of recasting in quantitative iambic trimeters one of the noblest examples of accentual sacred song in the early period, the hymn Athousia (cf. below, 3 (d)).

3. Rhythmic hymnody.—The earliest examples of Greek-Christian sacred poetry in a metrical form based upon the accentual system are found in two of the poems of St. Gregory of Nazianzus, where they appear strung outly of keeping with their surroundings. One of these, at least, an evening supplication addressed to Christ in the nature of a hymn. The fact which conditioned the development of the new type of hymnography was that Greek had in ever greater measure lost the quantified distinction of its vowels. The development was prepared for by the artistic prose of the rhetoricians, and was in an equal degree influenced by the example of Christian Semitic poetry, which was accentual from the outset. Besides the abandonment of quantitative metre, there were two artistic devices which had an important influence upon the new genre, viz. rhyme and the acrostic. The purely rhetorical use of rhyme enervated unquantitative free versification, which in the hands of Christian preachers made use of it with increasing frequency; while the employment of the acrostic was based essentially on Semitic models, though, as has been pointed out, occasional use of this artifice can be traced in the earlier poetic composition. Whether and to what extent, in addition to the influence of the ancient literary period, that of ancient quantitative metre made itself felt in the extraordinarily copious and artistic forms assumed by the new rhythmic poetry must be left an open question.

(1) The simplest type of rhythmic hymnody is a type of the two coincidentative pieces in the poems of St. Gregory of Nazianzus form a direct link of transition—found in a class of hymns with lines of equal length, in which attention has been paid only in recent times and in primitive compositions of this type one example, found in a papyrus of the 6th or 7th cent., has permanently maintained a regular position in the 'Great Antiochus,' the liturgical song of Lent in the Greek rite. The other compositions of this group must also have been actually intended for a place in the liturgy. One of them is a special form of Eudosson for the twofold festival of the Birth and Baptism of Christ, still celebrated on the 6th of January (cf. att. CHRISTMAS, EPIPHANY).

Another begins with what are in reality the opening words of a hymn after communion, of which a piece in the Antiphonary of Burying (ed. F. E. Warren, London, 1883-86, i. 32 e, Ad communicant, 'Corpus domini accepimus') may be a Latin translation. All these were probably composed in the 6th century.

To the same period belongs a song in adoration of the Cross on Good Friday which is found only in MS liturgies of the Italian Basilians. Its two-line strophes, which already indicate the beginnings of a less simple metrical structure, are connected by means of the alphabetical acrostic, which it has in common with several other kindred poems (on the Mother of God, for Christmas, for the festival of the Presentation in the Temple).

(2) Dependence upon the Semitic poetry of Syria, of which St. Ephraim (+ 373) was the chief representative in Nisibis and Edessa, appears in the principal form of ancient Byzantine hymnody, viz. the kontakion. Here the Eastern Aramaic class of sogdian was of fundamental importance, though this, again, in its characteristic features can be fully understood only as a product of Hellenistic influence. Its fruitifying effects upon the work of Greek hymn-writers, according to a recent theory, were of great extent mediated by Greek preachers. The use of the (originally alphabetical) acrostic, an introductory stanza of a different metrical structure, the refrain, or epbynion, sung by a choir, which, breaking in upon the solo parts, bound together the procession or kathisma and the ordinary (klypses, or odes), and a highly dramatic treatment of the subject—such features were borrowed from Syrian hymnody. The rhetorical splendour of the diction, and an artistic structure of line and stanza which was intimately related to the melody and did not need to fear comparison with the most elaborate metrical examples of ancient choral lyric poetry, were contributions of the Greek genius. Of Greek origin likewise were these forms of the acrostic, which, instead of being alphabetical, gives the name of the writer, or the theme, or the liturgical purpose of the piece—forms which, it is true, are found also in the Carmina Vista, the collection of Ephraim.

If the Versus Passus of Methodius may be regarded as a transitional form between the hymns imitative of ancient models and the kontakia, there are other two early compositions which show how the new mode was related to the prose hymn. These are (1) a purely prose composition noted upon a parchment in the John Rylands Library, and which, in its alphabetical acrostic and its short epbynion (Kipia, 664 cm.) exhibits two essential features of the Kontakion, complete intonation for Good Friday, which, however, surrenders the place of the prose form for an accentual mode which, like a related poem for Palm Sunday, is known thus far only in the Italo-Greek liturgy. The Good Friday kontakion is in the first also as regards its theme, because of a lamentation supposed to be spoken by the suffering Saviour, after the style of the Western liturgy.

The new species of poetic composition is first met with in its full maturity in a series of hymns and fragments of hymns which, like the earliest
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e xamples just specified, are anonymous. The oldest extant is probably a kontakion on the first man, showing a four-line strophe and the alphabetical acrostic. A lamentation of Adam for the loss of Paradise, as also a kontakion (dating from before 530) on the 'holy fathers' of the earliest century, are fragments of another on Elijah and the widow of Zarephath. In the latter a double rhythm of the iambic system is employed with compositions of singular vigour and beauty. If Cyril, the writer of a hymn on the raising of Lazarus, endowed with confidence be identified with the Palestinian ascetic whose name he bears, the testimony of his biographer, Cyril of Scythopolis (A.D. Sept. viii. [1865] 151), acted as choir-master (episkopos) in the Laura of St. Chariton for thirty-one years (443), and is known to have regarded him as the earliest writer of kontakia known by name. But the unrivalled master in this kind of composition was Romanus, the deacon, who in the center of a text and disdained by the epistle of the 'Mourning Man.'

Romanus, born at Ensas of Jewish parents, removed from Beirut, where he had laboured in the Church of the Resurrection, to Constantinople in the reign of the Emperor Anastasius II. He went to the city, and filled the magnificent churches of Justinian in the multiple splendour of his hymns. His sacred poetry, according to a notice that is probably legendary, numbered over six hundred octoi. One primary among those might be a feast he bears his name, even though he is, says the calendar, has nothing much that is springs and inferior. The poet's Daminus and Anastasius, may be regarded as nearly contemporary with Romanus. Of the octoi in Justinian's time the most outstanding part is the festal hymn for the second dedication of the Hagia Sophia. (462).

In this first and golden age of Byzantine hymnody, however, as in later times, it was not customary to create a new form of strophe and a corresponding meter for each new composition. On the contrary, the metre and melody of older pieces were frequently adopted. The typical strophe used as the pattern either of the koulition or of the koloi of a later song was called its hieros ("series"). The hieros (from hieros, sacred), in his time the most celebrated part of Romanus, and the meter of that hymn must therefore have been composed as early as the 6th century. Thus, the most natural form in the first third of it. Tradition assigns the highly esteemed Song in honour of Mary variously to Romanus himself and to a considerably later writer, Sertius, patriarch of Cappadocia († 673), while Georgius Pselles and even as late a writer as Photius have also been credited with its authorship.

Actually a kontakion on the Annunciation, this production of the 7th century, is largely transformed by the addition of a new ekdoxa into a song of thanksgiving delivered to the Most Blessed Virgin in the city of Constantinople for deliverance in the stress of war, in all probability when the change was made at the time when the city was threatened by the Avars in 626. It was at this period also that twelve of its twenty-four strophes were furnished with dogmatics beginning with the word \\
"Latin", and even at a late writer the Protassio have also been credited with its authorship.

A kontakion was occasionally imitated, as in a lyric on St. Sabas the Younger by a melodont named Orestes, and in others on the Falling Asleep of the Most Holy Mother of God and on the Holy Cross by unknown authors. Even in later centuries, indeed, certain writers added not a little to the store of kontakia in the Greek Church. Writers whose compositions belong in the main to another and a later poetic type, such as Theodorus of Byzantium and Joseph the Hymnographer (cf. below, 5), cultivated also the older form. But in genuine poetic qualities the productions of the later period, destitute as they are, above all, of dramatic power, are of inferior quality. But on the 10th cent. the kontakion itself lost the place which it had held in the liturgy.

The book known as Kontakia (hymns), in which the hymns of this class were collected, fell more and more into oblivion. Only a few strophes of the older hymns, and at length—apart from the ekdoxa—generally but one, retained a permanent place in the daily office. These ekdoxa are found in the public service under the names of kontakion and koloi (or odes) were mere imitations of such multitudinous survivals of ancient Christian hymns for Christmas, however, continued to be sung annually on the 25th of December, even at the Emperor's festive board, and on the 12th of January, even at the imperial court. The Abbot of Mount Athos still forms the nucleus of a festival service dedicated to the Mother of God on the Saturday of the third week after Christmas. The popular religious sentiments of the Orthodox East it the place filled conjunctly by the Liturgy of Loreto, the Canticle, and the Te Deum in the Roman Catholic West or the impressive funeral kontakion of Anastasius—though in a much modified form—is used to the present day in the office for the burial of priests.

(3) As compared with the kontakion, which in the zenith of its vogue appears to have been called also the troparion, a diminutive of the latter word, signified a shorter form of what was essentially the same thing: it was a single strophe constructed generally of accented lines of various kinds, the part performed by the precursor being, at least originally, accompanied by an epiphany sung by the congregation or the choir.

We learn the nature of this species of sacred song in its earliest form from the troparia with which St. Axintius, a prominent representative of the monasticon, enriched public worship in Bithynia and Constantinople in the first half of the 5th cent., and specifically those composed by the eighty-piece which bears his name, have survived, though with a legacy of authentic materials. Prefixed to the Chersonese treatises thus collected much that is superb and inferior. The poet's Daminus and Anastasius, may be regarded as nearly contemporary with Romanus. Of the troparia, in Justinian's time, the most outstanding part is the festal hymn for the second dedication of the Hagia Sophia. (462).

In the rich development which this form of Hagiastical poetry likewise speedily attained, more especially on the native soil of the mainland, it is especially the case in the eastern church speaking Syriac, can still be seen in the so-called ecclésiology of Severus of Antioch—a complete hymnbook, the ground-work of which was laid by that celebrated exponent of the 5th century in the years 512-518. This invaluable liturgical monument, lost in the original, is preserved in the revised form which Jacob of Edessa re-constructed in 675 from the older Syriac translation executed by a bishop of Edessa named Paul. Its component pieces, 306 in number, are, without exception, lyrics of a single strophe, and in their general structure are all to be classed as troparia, although they exhibit several characteristic features in the fact that by far the larger number of them are related to be sung in connection with a verse from the Psalms. Many of them already show an affinity, in manifold respects, with the numerous troparia found in the later liturgical books of the church, a group of its texts, meant for use in the celebration of the eucharist and called prophecies, bear a formal resemblance to the troparia of Axintius. Besides Severus, two contributors of special importance are John bar Apaṭonya (+ 538), and John surnamed Pseudes, both archimandrites in the monastery of Qa-nesi in the Emirate. A terminus ad quem even for the latest poems in the original collection is found in the date of the translation, which may be assigned to 619-629. A number of very short pieces seem to be of even earlier date than those of Severus. Two of these, lyrics in this Syriac hymn-book are definitely called 'Alexandrian.'

In point of fact the ancient Greek liturgy of Egypt also must have had its own stock of troparia. To find, from the first, the results of hymns for the Feast of Epiphany found in a papyrus of the Archbishop of Alexandria Collection in the British Museum, probably belonging to the first half of the 5th century, it is not possible to trace that of any troparia, devoted to the celebration of the Epiphany, which is contained in the martyrion of the Greek Church and on the Synaxis, is furnished by fragments of the earlier Syriac and Coptic translations. The almost indecipherable state of neglection in which these have been subjected to the lapse of a considerable interval between the date of the archetype and that of the surviving transcripts. Nevertheless, a terminus ad quem is indicated by the fact that several of them are based...
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on the Trignon in its distinctively Monophyletic expansion. Those writings which may, therefore, be regarded as of contemporary origin with those of the hymn-book of Severus.

The rapidity with which the entire public worship of the Church was characterized by the troparia, the chanting of such pieces, each of which was sung but once by either of the choirs, and thus, when these troparia were welded into an integral whole either by an acrostic or by an ekphrasis, a common to all, there arose a distinct artistic type of antiphon. It may be assumed that the use of this form of choral art was not altogether infrequent at an earlier stage of liturgical development. An exact example is furnished by the third of the fifteen so-called antiphons of Good Friday, which an undeniable tradition ascribes to St. Cyril of Alexandria. Generally, however, what we find here in the early period is a combination of verses of psalms with troparia which have no distinct inner link of connexion, and at the present day even the verses of psalms formerly so employed have disappeared, so that only the name of the antiphon now survives. The name 'antiphon' came also to be associated with the so-called monosticha, which had a recognized place in the matins on Sundays and important feast days, as also in the office of burial. The monosticha are two series of poetical passages of the Psalms beginning and ending with a pause after the final word in two troparia, to which was attached, as a sequel to the Order of Troparia, an ekphrasis of theody, and in private prayer in the praise of the Holy Spirit. It must be taken for granted that these very ancient forms Eusebius were originally intended to be used in an antiphonal rendering of the clear of the Great Doxology.

Finally, special significance seems at one time to have attached to an antiphonal rendering of Ps. 118. That psalm, sung antiphonally in combination with a hypopompa of very short length, remained a regular feature of the burial service. In similar manner the sticherarion (see below, (6)), called from their opening words αἱ ἄγγελοι τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ, which come before us as the work of Hormisdas and divided into short groups, are used at the present day in the matins for the 20th, 24th, 28th, and 30th of December for quite a different purpose-forming a peacrous festal hymn on the Redeemer's birth. In the stable at Bethlehem—must originally have been the poetic investment of an effective three-fold antiphon constructed with the aid of the same psalm. On the other hand, a lyric in its own way not less magnificent, though many years later, is now combined with Ps. 118 in a peculiar antiphonal rendering for the matins of Easter Even.

These are the so-called enotriba—composing a markedly poetic element at the Salvator's bier—which, surviving in various reconstructions, and varying after Communion (Διακονησιά τοῦ σταυροῦ) is assigned to the year 624, and of another (Ὡς αὐτὸς τῷ ἄγγελῳ), which takes the place of the Cherubic Hymn in the Mass of the Pre-sanctified, to 645.

(4) The early Antiochene troparia of Severus, their hymn-book, perhaps because they are essentially connected with verses from the Psalms, are assigned to a certain class, the antistrophe (Syr. ma wilid). On the testimony of the Western pilgrim Ethelao, or Eucherius (Pecosprag, xxiv, 5, xxvii, xxix, xxxi, xxxv, xxxvii, xi, xiii, 5, xlvii), in which bearing that title, together with hymns and psalm passages, has an important place in the worship of the churches in Jerusalem towards the close of the 4th century. They are the troparia of the following period: a hymn formed of a Biblical passage or troparia is sung. As a rule, two verses by two different choirs alternately was regarded as 'antiphonal.' Here it was customary at first to render whole psalms in this way; later, with increasing frequency, a few verses only, and also, in extending beyond the narrower limits of the formulae originally employed, developed first of all into a somewhat longer prose formula, as frequently the three strophes of the antiphon, and the conclusion of the liturgical poetry of the liturgical psalm, the hypnotoma, again, a particular model strophe of which correponds to the number of verses in the associated Biblical song. A composition essentially of this kind is actually found in the early Greek, penitential psalm, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, penitential poem of two hundred and fifty troparia.
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which, notwithstanding its rhetorical embellishment and its wearisome diffuseness, is of a most incomparable character, and is now recited annually on the Tuesday after the sixth week in Lent, in exactly the same way as the hymn *Athos athitos* two days later.

The author was Andreas, archbishop of Crete († 749), a native of Damascus, who, trained in the religious circles of Palestine, became in his youth secretary to the patriarch of Jerusalem, and remained so until he retired to a monastery, where he dedicated himself to composition. As it is not known to what church he belonged, it is not possible to say whether he was the same as Andreas, bishop of Crete, who is mentioned in the Life of the Virgin. This Andreas is said to have written the hymn *Athos athitos* and also the *Hymnos* of the Virgin. The author of the *Hymnos* of the Virgin is said to have been a monk named Theodotus, the latter by the Emperor Theodosius II.

Ceremonial and liturgical, the two churches of Constantinople and Alexandria, the former by the name of the former, to which was applied the same of 'Canon,' hitherto given to the whole morning, or to its most important part, viz. the four Biblical songs.

Certain other compositions of Andreas, e.g., the *canon *Myrophori, sung on the second Sunday after Easter, and one of 180 *troparia* on Simeon and Anna, approximate in length to the Great Canon. But, in general, the practical necessity of limiting the duration of public worship soon led to the practice of attaching not more than three or four poetical strophes to each Biblical song. The same requirement held here, as in other parts of the office, gradually to the entire omission of what was originally the cardinal feature, i.e. the Biblical text, in the form of literal paraphrases restricted to a few verses. Thus the essential nine sections of the poetical canon—to which the term 'odes' is hereafter specially applied—accordingly fell to the lot of the fifth of the fifteen, the reason being that the second Biblical song had been previously lost out of the actual recitation—from a supersitious dread, it was said, of uttering the imprecatory things contained in it. Then, besides complete canons, *diaclasia, triodia, and tetradia* were composed to be sung with groups of two, three, and four Biblical passages respectively. Of special importance are the *triodia* and *tetradia* of the Lenten season, which owe their existence to the circumstance that during Lent one of the Biblical songs, e.g., was recited on week-days from Monday to Friday, and nos. vi. and vii. on Saturday, to which it was followed each day nos. viii. and ix.

The term *heirmos*, conformably to what was noted in the case of the *kontakion*, denotes here the model strophe which was most in cases borrowed from an older canon, and with which the *troparia* of each ode had to conform both in metre and in melody.

The entire mass of compositions which follow the norm introduced by Andreas of Crete comprises two strains differing in date and place of origin. The earlier strain had its origin in the ancient Byzantine form of worship formed in Jerusalem, and embraces the lyrics of Passion Week, and of the Christian Year, the morning canons of the so-called Oktosich, which contain the ordinary Sunday office arranged for the eighth ecclesiastical times. The basis of this group was the *Hymnos* of the Virgin, the so-called seven-strophe of rhythmical poetry called the *hymnos* to the *theotokos*. Of the two strains, the first, now called the *kathisma*, interrupts the continuity of the canon after the third ode, just as at an earlier period it interrupted the series of Biblical songs as a corresponding point, while the second was superseded by *kontakion* and *ode*. The *linguadrausica* sung in connexion with the ninth ode of the canon at the chief festivals of Christian and the Mother of God recall the troparia and one other of the *magnificat* (Lk 1:46-55).

Next to the canon, the most important element in an *akolouthia* are the *stichera*, which almost always occur in groups. They derive their name from the fact that they are combined with verses of Biblical passages or *paideia*. Before the Psalms the stichera have been usual taken from the Psalms. The *stichera* to the Psalms is *ístico* to the *neutis*, and to the *neutis* is usually identified with the *troparia* which in the 6th century, were attached to these Scripture passages; and the present usage of reciting *Mater Theresia* and *Gloria Patri* on the whole of Ps 149-150, but only a few verses in *Stichera* with the appropriate *stichera* is merely a later abbreviation. Another class of *stichera*
however, which are rendered towards the close of vesters, just before the canon, in the hours of prime, tierce, sext, and none, in general, and, in particular, in the so-called 'great hours' of Good Friday and of the vigils of Christmas and Epiphany, at the Greek Church. Outside the regular Daily Office, were meant from the first only to be inserted between two stichoi separated by the Lesser Doxology, and appear to have been so used originally for the Divine Office. Antiphons, which are the last type of troparia, are only known to us in the liturgical books from the 13th century, and single incises were incorporated in the liturgical books at a still later date. Mention may be made of the manuals of the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries, as authors of such later elements of the liturgy.


In Byzantium and the East, hymnography as an active and living development virtually came to an end. In a book on the codification of the definitive liturgical books of the Greek rite, viz., the Octochos and the Parakletikos, and, above all, the Triodion, the Penetkostarion, and the Menologion, which were so popularly used and so extensively preserved for Lent and Passion Week, for the period between Easter and Pentecost, and for the fixed feasts of the Christian year. Only in the Iberian-Greek West was the revival of liturgical hymnody. The art was assiduously cultivated in the famous and still surviving Basilian Abbey of Grottaferrata, near Rome, till well into the 12th century. The founders of the abbey, St. Nilus the younger († 1004), and his successors, Paulus and Bartholomew, were the heads of a school to which Arsenius, Germanus, Joseph, Procopius, and others belonged. Within this school, the hymnus, the stichos, and the troparion, as well as the coloni and the melodia, were the most important authors of the liturgy. At a still later date, mention may be made of the manuals of the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries, as authors of such later elements of the liturgy.

HYMNS (Syriac Christian).

Our knowledge of the hymnody of the Syriac-speaking Churches has been greatly increased during the last 25 years by the publication of much literature in that language, which formerly existed only in MSS, and in particular of many of the East Syrian or Nestorian service-books in Syriac, with English translations. But much still remains to be done, and until a similar work is effected for the West Syrian, or Monophysite (Jacobite), service-books, some considerable gaps in our knowledge will remain.

1. Early Syriac hymnody. — The earliest known writer of Syriac hymns was Bar-daisân (Bardeanes), whose book of 150 hymns after the number of the Psalter was in the hands of Ephraim the Syrian (see below). Bar-daisân was born at Edessa (Syr. Ur-hâlî), the capital of Osrhoène, A.D. 155 (for the date, see DCB i. 250), and was deceased by his successors to be heretical (for this and similar dating see Eusebius, HE vi. 30). Sozomen (HE iii. 16) tells us that his son Harmonius was learned in Greek erudition, and "was the first to subdue his native language (Syriac) to metres and rhymes, and to render verses he delivered to the church, and even now the Syriac frequently sings, not the precise copies by Harmonius, but the same melody..." As these verses were somewhat infected with Bar-daisân's heresy, Ephraim applied himself to the understanding of the metres of Harmonius, and composed similar poems in accordance with the doctrine of the church... From that period the Syriac sung the odes of Ephraim according to the law of the code established by Harmonius" (cf. Theodore Horm. iv. 29).

From these statements of Sozomen it has been deduced that the hymns ascribed by Ephraim to Bar-daisân were really written by Harmonius, or at least that father and son worked together. It is clear, if Sozomen is to be trusted, that the Syriacs derived their method of hymnody from the Greek Christians in the first instance; and we know from Ephraim that the latter used sacred poetry at an early date. That hitherto ascribed to "Bar-daisân" (HE vi. 25) the "many psalms and hymns, written by the faithful brethren from the beginning," celebrating "Christ, the Word of God, speaking of Him as Divine (βασιλεὺς βασιλέων), is a clear indication here that these hymns were sung in church; but there is such an indication in Flinian's famous letter to Trajan (Ep. 66): --

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In Eusebius (HE vii. 24), Dionysius of Alexandria (†249) is quoted as praising the schismatic Nepos, an Egyptian bishop early in the 2nd century, for his "extensive psalmody," and saying that his compositions still delighted many of the brethren. Probably Antioch led the way in the use of hymns in church. Socrates (A.D. 410) describes the origin of singing antiphonal hymns in Ephesos, and the nghty, who "saw a vision of angels hymning the Holy Trinity in alternate chants."

The most famous hymn-writer of the Syriac-speaking Christians was Ephraim (Edessa, A.D. 306), a native of Mesopotamia. He is always represented as a deacon, and his words "Christ gave me the talent of the priesthood" (Op. Syr. iii. 467 D; DCB ii. 188) are not really against this, for the Syriac κάθοδα ("priesthood") includes all ranks of the ministry (A. J. Maclena and W. H. Brown, Catholicon of the East, London, 1892, p. 185); so the E. Syr. Sînêdâdûn (Book of Canon Law), vi. 1. In addition to his numerous other works, he composed metrical homilies and other religious poems, including commentaries in metre on Holy Scripture; and he also wrote a large number of hymns for liturgical purposes, and many of his hymns are still sung (see below, § 4(a)). He made use of hymnody to spread orthodox doctrine, just as Bâdîshân and Harmonius had used it, and as the Arians did, to spread their erroneous tenets. For the latter, see Socrates, HE vi. 8, where we read that they went about Constantinople at night chanting antiphonal hymns to support their heresy, while the Catholics imitated their example. Ephraim seems to have done much to promote and improve ecclesiastical music, and his compositions became extremely popular (for an account of his writings see H. Payne Smith, in DCB ii. 157). His metres are irregular, and, as is the case with most of the early Syrian poetry (see below, 3), his lines do not rhyme. There is no good reason to suppose that he ever wrote in Greek; his extant works in that language are doubtless translations. His very interesting and newly published Syriac metrical homilies by him on Bâdîshân may be seen, with English translation, in Tjus. v. 1904 §466 ff.

After the separation of the Nestorians from the Nicene Church, the most famous Syriac hymn-writer was the Nestorian Narsai (Narses), known as the "Harp of the Spirit" (kîdâd d'rûkhâ), who, after spending 20 years at the great school of Edessa, left it A.D. 477 to preside over his less celebrated school at Nisibis; he died A.D. 502. His metrical compositions include 360 homilies; of these 47 have been published in Syriac by A. Mingana (Mead, 1905), together with 10 short poems (sîyghâthâh); and four of these homilies, dealing with the Liturgy and the Baptismal Office, have been translated into English by R. H. Connolly, with illuminating Introduction and Notes (The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai, TS viii. 1, Cambridge, 1909). These homilies, however, were not meant for church use, and for the hymns by this writer used in the services reference must be made to the East Syriac office books (see below, § 4(a)). Narsai's favourite metre was the six-syllable line (see E. A. W. Budge's ed. of Thomas of Marga's Book of Governors, London, 1893, ii. 300 n.), but hymns by him in other metres are found. Of other early Syriac hymn-writers may be mentioned Isaac of Antioch, a native of Amida (Diarbekr), who was an Orthodox priest at Antioch c. A.D. 450, and a disciple of Zenon, who himself had learnt from Ephraim (DCB ii. 315). Also the Jacob, bishop of Batnûn (Batnaye) in Syria (Samg), a district of Osrhoène, in the 6th cent. (1 A.D. 521 or 522). Two volumes of the Hymnology of the latter have been published by Bedjan (Paris, 1906, 1908), and some account of them may be seen in Tjus.
gives from Cardakh (see in Literature) a list of 9 or 10 writers of the 13th cent., who wrote in an artificial style, with a pronounced 'Syriac' accent, in Monophysite Bar-hebraeus, and the Nestorian An-dishā' (Abdisho, Ebedjeus) the bibliographer, Khāmis (West Syr. Khams), and George Wardā. From Wardā and Khāmis, hymn-writers of great reputation, have been named two Eastern service-books, containing 'propers' for festivals, etc., several of them probably having been written by these authors.

These later writers are distinguished by an extremely artificial style, and by a profusion of Greek words and strange forms. For examples of their compositions reference may be made to the anthems at the Blessing of the Months, sung at Evening Service on the first day of every month except February (A. J. Maclean, East Syrian Daily Offices, p. 230). The stanzas attributed to Mar Abraham of Sinak (Seleucia) on the Tigris contain the following: 'Abīyūlā = Nyw, 'Tākūn = Ibrū, Aghātātūs = Augustus, the reigning king, and 'Tulūgh = Ibrūyū, the reigning patriarch (these stanzas rhyme in -ād). In the anthems given on p. 221 ff, each line of a stanza ends in -ād, -ādān, -ādū, -qādū, -ādina; while the last four stanzas are non-rhyming. The authors of these rhyming stanzas are of the 13th cent. or later. A good example of a hymn of this period may also be seen in the highly artificial prayers said before the psalms in the East Syrian Morning Office on festivals, composed by Mar Eliya (Elijha), Catholics, surnamed Abakhalia (J. S. Assenean, Bibl. Orient., Routledge, London, 1903, i. 224); they are given in an English translation in Conybeare-Maclean, Rituale Armenorum, Oxford, 1904, pp. 577-579. They are taken from the book called Abakhalia after Eliya; they abound in foreign words to such an extent as to make them quite unintelligible to the Syrian. The famous Audishū (see above) was a great composer of hymns of praise (tishkbatā) and anthems (Payne Smith, The Syrian Syriac, ii. 402 ff; Assenean, Bibl. Orient., i. 191), but his style is greatly disfigured by its artificiality.

Hymnody in the present service-books. — In what follows the East Syrian service-books are those principally dealt with. They were largely re-modelled and systematized by Iahwah III. (Isahyāhū, Jesuabas, lit. 'Jesus gave'), who was the Nestorian Catholicos from A.D. 647 to 658. Till his time the theophania, or symposium writer accepts Bernard's correction (JTAS xii. 31) of his own suggestion in the English edition of the Testament (Edinburgh, 1902) that the Song of Songs is meant, and adopts his view that the Odes are here referred to. Now, though it has been suggested by Abbott (Light on the Gospel, and JTAS xiv. 441) that Syriac, or some Semitic dialect, is the original of the Odes, yet the argument by Connolly (JTAS xiv. 314 f, 530 ff), that our Syriac text is translated from the Greek, appears to be very strong (see also JTAS xv. 1913-14 44 ff). If it be sound, we have here a good example of the use by Syriac-speaking Christians of Greek hymns. Another example is the Syriac version of the Greek hymns of Severus, Monophysite patriarch of Antioch (A.D. 510-529), made by his bishop of Edessa, A. (A.D. 510-529), see DCB iv. 259), and revised by Jacob (see above). The Syriac has been edited by E. W. Brooks in Patristica Orientalis, vii. 5 (Paris, 1912).

V. Hymns in prayer. — The metrical compositions alluded to are not rhymed, but about the 12th cent. the Syrians learnt from the Arabs the art of rhyming. A. Minangia states (Connolly, Narr. ii. 319 ff), that when the poet has this characteristic; and Connolly (p. xxxviii.)
East and West Syrian, of prose hymns like the 'Gloria in excelsis' (called by the West Syrians the 'hymn of praise of the night' and by the 'Song of the Three Children' (called by the East Syrians the 'hymn of praise of the company of Ananias').

The usual 'hymn of praise', however, is a metrical composition consisting of a number of stanzas sung alternately by the two choirs (which are called respectively 'the former' and 'the latter'), and usually of two lines each, though occasionally of four or more. Rarely these hymns of praise are acrostics, beginning with the letters of the alphabet (ESDO, 251, 283), or with the letters of a name, as Ištraš Shakhā (Jesus Christ) or Shināš-sahā (sun and moon) or the like (ESDO, 167, 230).

The East Syrian service-books frequently (but not always) ascribe those hymns of praise to definite authors. The following, among others, are mentioned: Ephraim and Narsai (above, § 1); Shināš (Shimān) Barashā (Simeon Barabba), Catholicos in the 4th cent.; Awa (Abba, Abba), Catholicos in the 6th cent.; Thomas of Uqrah (Edeza), contemporary and friend of Awa; Bawā (Babbā, Babacān) the Great, Abbot of Mount Ida early in the 7th cent. (see Budge, ii. 90; Budge, ii. 55); Ahmad al-Maqari (Bawā), b. 1212, he was famous for his beautiful voice; George, Monophysite metropolitan of Nisibis (7th cent.; see DUB ii. 942, Asemanni, iii. 456); 'Abraham, Doctor' or 'Abraham of Ida', i.e. Abraham of Kaschara, the revealer of monasticism in the 6th cent., the head of the monastery of Mount Ida near Nisibis (Budge, ii. 37); Abimilech (Ido); 'Abraham of Nithpar, whose life was written by 'Sarvahān Rishān (Saharūsho Edōmān, Saharūsh Jostām), a disciple of Narsai (above, § 1); Bago, b. 528, a disciple of Bawā the Great, Abbot of Mount Ida (see Budge, ii. 108 n.); John of Beth Raban (6th cent.), founder of a monastery in Daisin, a district on the Great Zab south of the modern Qahārān, the seat of the present Nestorian Catholicos Mar Shimun (Budge, ii. 67, 301; DUB iii. 405); Sarurāš, Catholicos e. A. D. 500; Barasamī (Barasmanis) of Nisibis (6th cent.; Kūnāma of Khādyāw (Khādyāwah, Addīnī; a district east of the Tigris, between the two Zabs (Asemanni, iii. 51). The ascriptions are in some cases doubtful, and the scribule himself sometimes hesitates, and gives two names as alternatives.

(§) The Madrāshā (lit. 'commentary', Payne Smith, Thes. Syr. i. 956; pl. Madrāshā, said to be a later word) is a less common form of hymn. It consists of an antiphon (šāntāq) and two or more verses (bātāq; these two names are used by the West Syrians also). The antiphon is said first, and the two choirs then sing the verses in turn. There is a daily Madrāshā at Compline (which is uncommon as a daily service, but is used, combined with Evensong, on saints' days and in Lent; it is, however, used by the more religious as a private devotion; see Maclean-Brown, Catholicos of the East, p. 234); two Madrāshās are said at the Night Service on Feast days of our Lord; one is said on Sundays, on saints' days, and on week days in Lent. A Madrāshā is sometimes called a 'station' (Syr. šatāpūnā).

(c) The Anthem ('sāntāq, pl. šāntāqā; this word sometimes denotes a stanza of an anthem) is at once the most characteristic and the most common form of East Syrian hymnody. It consists of a number of stanzas; each stanza is prefixed by a clause from the Psalms (occasionally from other books of the Bible) said in monophone; then the metrical stanza is sung to a chant. No Anthem usually ends with a stanza prefixed by 'Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost,' and often with another prefixed by 'For...'

The length of the stanzas varies greatly; but they are usually short, consisting of 2, 4, or 6 lines; the lines are often of 4 feet (spondees or dactyls), sometimes of 3 or of 5 feet or more. Under the heading of the 'Gloria' and of 'Let all the people' there are frequently grouped several stanzas, and these are sometimes elaborate and probably late compositions; they often commemorate the East Syrian martyrs and other noteworthy events. (ESDO, 134 ff., where several other groups of stanzas are added after the 'Gloria'.)

As this form of hymnody is unknown in the West, it may be useful to give a specimen, taken from the Ferial Evening Service of First Tuesday (ESDO, 24):

Our help is in the name of the Lord (Ps 124). Our help is from God; who by name of His mercies chastiseth us all; for He is the giver of our life. The hope of the salvation of our souls shall never more be cut off: but let us cry and say: Keep us, O my Lord, in thy compassion and bare mercy upon us. And one helper in times of trouble (Ps 40). Our help, etc. (Ps 40).

Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. O Christ, who dost reconcile us thy loving creation with Him who sent thee: pity the Church scattered by heretics and bring to an end within it strifeful divisions: which allow the devil in sorrow to the wonderful dispensation of thy manhood: and raise up in it priests to preach the sound doctrine. Amen.

In the Anthems some of the stanzas inserted before the 'Gloria Patri' are often called 'Of prayer' (see, e.g., ESDO, 145, 195); but the meaning of this heading is not clear. Some are 'occasional' stanzas, as for a journey or a storm (p. 149). The Anthems at the Night Service, especially on Festivals of our Lord, are extremely long; the translation of those appointed for the Epiphany takes 84 octoechos verses printed in 44; but the daily Anthems are only of from 3 to 6 stanzas. The 'Martyrs' Anthems' in praise of the heroes of the past, which are sung twice daily on ferial days except in Lent (according to the rubrics, they are appointed for Sundays also), are somewhat longer. They are a great feature of the services.

The martyrs are called architects, the beams of a building, combatants (ṭabābatā, ḏānīnā); merchants buying the pearl, such as they are, valiantly in the name of the Rubāīya (p. 225). In almost every one of these Martyrs' Anthems the following are mentioned: St. George, the famous martyr under Diocletian (DUB ii. 645); St. Cyrus, the boy-martyr in the same persecution, and Julitta, his mother (T. Eutbert, Acta Sanctorum Martyrum, 2. Amsterdam, 1713, p. 477; St. Pithyous, who opposed the magi and was martyred by Adōnir-præs ḡalār (for a detailed account see the anthem in ESDO, 139); St. Sephina, martyr in Syria under Maximian or Maximin (DUB iv. 618; sometimes his companion, St. Bacchus, is mentioned, for whom see DUB i. 236); and the sons of Shomōn (the seven martyrs of Ṣ Macq 2), and Eliāzār (Eleazar) their teacher (4 Macq 5f.); their names are given (ESDO 111) as Gadiā, Mawā (Maqābi, Macbacus), Tarsai, Khūrūn (Khūrūn, Hebron), Khūqūn (Khūqūn), Bakas (Baccus), Yasāwā (Yāsāwā, Yūsādāh, Yūsādāh, Yūsādāh, Yūsādāh), in the Latin paraphrase of 5 Macq 8f., published by Cranmer (The Rule of Reason); the names are given as Macbacus, Aba, Machar, Judas, Achas, Arēs, Jacob; and the mother's name is Sālamah (Cranmer, Uncanonical and Apocryphal Scriptures, London, 1884, p. 572f.).

Anthems are used at each of the four daily services (Evening, Night, Morning, and Compline—for the last, see above, (6) and also the Eucharistic Liturgy, in the baptismal service, and in large numbers in the occasional offices such as marriages and funerals. Many of the anthems at the burial of the dead are of great beauty, and are highly dramatic. Those used at the Eucharist
HYMNS (Ethiopian Christian) — Hymns enter largely into the services of the Abyssinian Church, and in catalogues of Ethiopian MSS the names of certain hymn-books are usually found, viz., the *Degsos*, the *Lagrigher ayeseg* ("The Lord is king"), the *Mekäl* ("Chapter"), and the *Macwåshåt* ("Responses"). Like other hymns, they are dedicated to particular persons, and intended for special occasions; a complete hymn-book is one which contains hymns for every solemnity in the year. A specimen of a Response or Antiphon is given by A. Dillmann in his *Christianitatis Ethiopianic* (Leipzig, 1886, §§ 10); it consists of Scripture texts, chanted by the minister, and partly repeated by the choir; their response is called *Melōna*. Although it bears the title *Widēm Hyån* ("The Holy Hymn"), which resembles ("metre"), it bears no trace of rhythm or rhyme. Other hymns exhibit rhyme similar to that used in Arabic versification; i.e. a series of lines all terminating in the same consonants and vowels: but, whereas in Arabic rhyme pervades the poem, in Ethiopian it pervades the strophe, which is ordinarily of five lines (see examples in

are: the 'Anthem of the Sanctuary,' sung after the Gospel service; the 'Anthem of the Gospel,' sung after the Gospel is read; the 'Anthem of the Mysteries,' sung after an unnamed and fixed: optional antiphon; an Anthem at the Fratation; and the 'Anthems' of the Mass said by the choirs during the communion of the people, which is unlike other anthems, and more nearly resembles a Matrah, consisting of an antiphon and verses (for mention of the Mass anthems see *LEW*, 297, 298). The Mass anthems are found in the *Epiphany* (ff. 320v-31), and are remarkable for including four unique verses in an old Persian dialect, in metre of lines of eight syllables. D. S. Margoliouth finds them to belong to a dialect of Christians in Persia before the Muslim conquest (*JFRS*, Oct., 1905, and *RA*, 397 n.). Another instance is a Canon the *Lakâhâ sâtrâ* (lit. 'Thee, Lord'), named from its first words, and sung at almost all the services.

"Thee, Lord of all, we confess: thee, Jesus Christ, we glory: for thou art the quickener of our bodies, and thou art the Saviour of our souls.

This is used as a form of a psalm-clause with 'Gloria Patri' (see *ESDO*, 3, 104, etc.; *LEW*, 249). Yet another instance is the 'Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal,' which is also sung with the 'Gloria Patri' (*ESDO*, 10; *LEW*, 250). These two compositions, however, are not called 'Canons' in the service-books. It may be added that 'farsing' is a favourite practice of the East Syrians; the psalms, and even the Lord's Prayer, are farsed (for the last see *LEW*, 292; *ESDO*, 11).


Besides the works mentioned in the course of this art, reference may be made to Gabriel Cardacli, * Liber Thesauri de Arte Poetica Syriacorum*, Rome, 1879 (an anthology of poems of different dates); G. Felix, *Syriaco-Hebraica Historia Der Stämme der Syrer*, Vienna, Leipzig, 1886; J. Julian, *Dictionary of Hymnology*, London, 1907, s.v. 'Syria Hymnology.' Some hymns have been rendered in English verse by R. M. Moorman, *Renderings of Church Hymns*, London, 1901, and by others.
HYMNS (Latin Christian)

E. A. W. Budge, *Miracles of the Virgin Mary*, London, 1880; sometimes, however, it is only of their general character that we can be sure, for they do not appear to correspond exactly in other respects, and at times vary considerably in length and sequence of syllables. The chanting is of three styles: *Gece* or *Zeno*, which is the early chant, and *Netser*, which is the later and more developed. The names of the second are identical with the Arabic *Ghazal*, *love songs*, but the others are obscure. The *Dopu* is supposed to be the composition of one Yared of the 8th century; but this ascription is probably valueless. The matter contained in these hymns does not differ from the content of analogous compositions in other branches of Christianity.


D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

HYMNS (Latin Christian).—I. EARLY CHRISTIAN HYMNS. — The language of the Western liturgies was originally Greek, not Latin, and the numerous Greek expressions in the present Roman liturgy are, in all probability, of this original dependence. Greek, moreover, was the written language of the early Fathers and ecclesiastical writers till Ter- tullian, so that it is not surprising to find that no original and independent Latin hymns were composed before the 4th cent. after Christ.

Isidore of Seville designates Hily of Poitiers as the first hymn-composer of the Latin-speaking West, and, according to Jerome, compiled a whole book of Latin hymns, but had apparently no decisive success. The reason of his failure was that he made no attempt to convey to the uncultivated Gallic populace, but tried to raise them to his own level.

Regarding the hymns of Hilary there was no certain information until quite recently. The *Liber hymnorum* of which Jerome spoke was lost, and the other compositions which circulated under his name in anthologies and literary histories either could not be proved authentic or were associated with his name only through an error which has found its way from Daniel's *Theologiae hymnologicae* in the works of his compiler. In 1884, G. P. Gaminour discovered fragments of the missing *Liber hymnorum* in the public library of Arezzo, and published them in 1887 in the *Bibliotheca ecclesiastica* (vol. iv), under the title, 'S. Hilarii Tractatus de Mysteriis et Hymni et S. Silvii Aquitanis Perigrinatio ad loca sancta.' Unfortunately, the hymn-book is a mutilated condition; it contains only three hymns, which are all incomplete, two being defective at the beginning, and one at the end; two of them are acrostics, or alphabet-hymns. In spite of this mutilation, the hymns are of priceless value to us, for they help us to estimate the oldest Latin hymns, and the poetical attempts of the great Gallic Church Father. Their contents—especially those of the first hymn, which deals with the doctrine of the Trinity and the consubstantiality of the Son—are not very clear, and have no popular character. They are metrical in form, but show no artistic taste; and great liberties have been taken with the texts.

Although Hilary was the first Western writer to compose hymns in Latin, Ambrose may be rightly called the Father of Latin hymn-composition, and, indeed, of all Christian hymnody and popular song. There is far more evidence of the activity of Ambrose as a hymn-writer than in the case of Hilary. Many of his hymns are still extant, and are characterized by distinct individuality, among which his own takes the first rank, assure us of his poetical activity as well as of his striking success. Augustine, his younger contemporary, has preserved quotations from the hymns of Ambrose; we have his good authority for four of them, viz. 'Eterna rerum conditor,' 'Dens, creator omnium,' 'Jesum surgit hora tertia,' and 'Intende qui regia Israel.' If, by means of these four hymns, which are the oldest extant, we examine the characteristics of Ambrose's style of thought and poetical expression in language and metre, we may be able to prove his authorship of a series of other hymns in the collection of the Church of Milan.

The first fact that strikes us in connexion with the success of Ambrose is that his influence as a hymn-writer was as strong as it was lasting. Both Augustine and Ambrose himself describe the inspiring and even fascinating effect which these hymns exercised when they first appeared. They were songs for the people and the congregation in the fullest sense of the term, being not only popular in content, form, and melody. Of course, the population of an imperial seat of residence like Milan stood at a higher level of culture than the people of a Gallic provincial town like Poitiers or Bacanius, the authors of Hilary, and those who could follow the sermons of Ambrose with intelligence and affection would also appreciate his hymns, and sing them with enthusiasm.

The hymns of Ambrose spread rapidly over the West, and became popular everywhere. The ancient Latin hymns were also folk-songs, and they continued to be so as long as Latin remained a living tongue. When it became the language of liturgy, the sphere of influence of these hymns naturally became narrowed; instead of being the property of a whole people, they became, as poetry of the Church and cloister, the possession of a privileged class. But, later on, a popular form of poetry was evolved from this poetry, which continued to exist, and even flourished luxuriantly, in a dead language—an evolution which took place not in one, but in many languages; and thus we have the surprising phenomenon of a popular form of composition passing through an artistic stage to return again to the popular level. In this sense, also, Ambrose is the father of our present national and popular hymns; even to-day some of his poems and melodies are sung by the people. It is impossible now to discover the stages through which the popular hymn of Ambrose passed in its development into the clerical and monastic hymn of the Middle Ages, or the time when the transformation was completed. The want of liturgical records, and especially of MS hymns, reduces us almost entirely to the expedient of combining fragments—an untrustworthy method when the data are scanty and uncertain. With the exception of a few MSS, such as the *Vaticanae Reg.* 1, and the *Antiphonary of Bangor* (ed. F. E. Warren, London, 1803-05), which, however, belong to quite a different environment and a different kind of composition, we have hardly any hymn-collections before the 10th century. In half of them the transforma-

2 1 De Vir. Illust. 58.
3 This is the aim of Breyer's *Antiquitates Ambrosianae*. Following the example of F. Biraghi (Inni sacro e carmi di S. Ambrogio, Milan, 1803), he proves fourteen hymns to be authentically Ambrosian, and four others to be probably composed by Ambrose (see *Annu. Amb.* pp. 133-140, and *Annu. Hymn.* 11, 21). Breyer is also the first to attempt to ascertain the original meaning and musical method the melodies which we are justified in regarding as originating from Ambrose (Annu. Amb., p. 139 ff.). His statements on both points have not been contradicted or disproved.
tion is complete; and they also show another change—the hymn governed by quantity and metre has evolved one governed by rules of ascent. The hymnal tradition in fact is a composite one, derive from the monastic rules of Benedicite, and of Aurelius and Cassarius of Arles, which show us a small number of hymns as existent in the 6th cent., and the Latin hymn almost completely transformed in the monastic hymn.

Contemporary with Ambrose, although his hymns appeared later, Prudentius introduced a new kind of religious poetry; the non-liturgical hymn form, in fact, was both reinvented and developed alongside of the liturgical; to the poetry expressing official and public congregational devotion was added the poetry of personal and domestic edification.

Besides its greater works (he wrote in all over ten thousand verses), which are mostly didactic and polemic, Aurelius Prudentius Clemens composed two works of mixed lyric and epic content, the Cathemerinon and Peristephanon, which have given him a name a leading place in the history of hymnology. The first is a collection of hymns for the different hours of prayer in the day and the festivals of the year; the second consists of a series of poems of Notitia Christianorum, suffering of martyrs, especially those belonging to Spain. These compositions belong to epic rather than to hymnic verse, but some of them were adapted into popular use as hymns.

Prudentius presents a striking contrast to his immediate forerunner Ambrose, writing as he did from an entirely different point of view and call for private reading. Among the early Christian hymn-writers, Ambrose may be called the Classic and Prudentius the Romantic. While Ambrose everywhere betrays the genuine Roman character, with its sustained dignity and strenuous self-control, in the poems of the hot-blooded Spaniard there is a sparkle and glow, a thrill and enthusiasm unknown to the ancient Roman poets. The contrast between the Liturgist and the poet is also obvious in the external form chosen by the two writers. While the hymns of Ambrose invariably consist of six stanzas—a number which remained the rule till far into the Middle Ages—Prudentius are much longer, a restraint, and the other as a stimulus; the influence of Ambrose has been the more permanent, and that of Prudentius the more extensive, as he did not confine himself within the narrow limits of liturgical hymn composition. Further, the influence of Prudentius on posterity was as great as that of a compositions of his has ever been, because, like the poets of classical period, he was the more comprehensive and property of all nations who shared the intellectual wealth bequeathed by ancient Rome.

In comparison with these two masters of ancient Christian hymnody, the other Christian hymn-writers belonging to this period fall back into the background. We possess merely a few of their works; a most distinguished exception is the De Synagoga of Pope Damasus (+384), which are distinguished by elegance of expression and artistic polish. The hymns attributed to him, however (one in praise of Agatha, and a hymn commemorating his death, which has long been in liturgical use), apparently do not belong to him; the former is probably of Mozarabic, and the latter of Gallo-Frankish origin.

Augustine (+430) also touches the province of hymnology in so far as he composed a 'rhythm' against the secular hymns of the Donatists, each strope beginning in alphabetical order from the voc. He himself calls it 'Paulinus contra partem Donatit liber unus.' It was intended for popular singing, in order to make the common people better acquainted with the distinctive teaching of the two parties, and had a refrain (antiphona). Although the form is lyrical, the contents are so pronouncedly didactic that the poem can hardly be counted among sacred lyrics; but it is of the highest importance for the history of rhythm Latin poetry because of its indisputable authenticity. Pontianus, Aegidius Paulinus, has his Carmen Pontinum (+431), composed a whole 'book of hymns.' Either this refers to the Carmine Natalicio or St. Felix or the book has been lost. Among the extant poems of Paulinus, all that can be called hymns are the 'Prayer' (Carm. iv.) and three paraphrases of Ps 70-73; Calixtus Sedulius, who flourished about the middle of the 6th cent., has left two poems besides his great 'Carmina Paschali.' These he himself intended to be hymns, although the first is really a combination of didactic and lyrical poetry; and the second, the famous 'A solis ortus cardine,' is a poem in iambic dimeters, the initial letters of whose strophes form an acrostic. This hymn was used in the Mozarabic liturgy, where it was divided into six sections for the Festival of the Annunciation, of the Virgin Mary, the Birth of Christ, the Epiphany, Innocents' Day, the Feast of Lazarus, and Maundy Thursday; it is also used in the Roman liturgy, but in a condensed form. Some verses from the 'Carmen Paschale' have a place in the Roman Missal, in the Introt of the votive Mass of the Virgin. Pope Gelasius (+461) also composed hymns in the manner of Ambrose. Unfortunately his hymny is lost, and we cannot authenticate any single authentic piece of his literary property.

II. MERovingian Hymns.—Between, early Christian and mediæval hymn-composition there are two transitional periods—the time of the Merovingians, which shows a further development from metre to rhythm, and the Carolingian period, which is a time of artistic renaissance, and which also inaugurates a completely new epoch.

Ennodius, bishop of Pavia (+291), like Gelasius, belongs in time to the Merovingian period, although in his whole character and tone of thought he is a product of the former early Christian age. We possess a complete hymnary written by him containing twelve hymns, most of which have survived only in a single Brussels MS. Ennodius was obviously roused to poetical activity by the example of Ambrose, and at any rate he used his hymns as archetypes of the Mass for the use of the Church there. His hymns, with the exception of the eighth, are in the same measure as those of Ambrose. He always divides them into eight

1. Og. Blume, Der Cathemerinon Beneediticoa (Berlin, Leipzig, 1908), pp. ix-xii.
2. F. L. xlii.

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stanzas, and chooses only subjects that had not already been treated in verse by Ambrose. The Church of Milan, however, did not respond to his desire; his hymns were not adopted in her liturgy, and only three of them came into common use. The first of these is one of the poems on which, as a rule, literary historians pour out the vials of their wrath. His hymns hardly deserve the censure generally heaped on them; in spite of being modelled on the models of Ambrose, they are not entirely devoid of originality, and, notwithstanding their obscurity of style, they do not lack a certain inspiration. We must mention here Pope Gregory the Great († 604) — not as a hymn-writer, but as a supposed hymn-writer. Just as all the reforming energy of this Pope with regard to the Liturgy lies in obscurity, so nothing is known about his poetical activity. All that we read about hymns which he is said to have composed is either the product of private supposition (such as that of Mene), or derived from an anonymous manuscript in the Bibliotheca Corviniana in Vienna. In any case, the authenticity of these hymns is doubtful. After the time of Gregory, the number of hymns in the liturgy decreased. The first to assign a few hymns to Gregory, without any reason. During the whole of the medieval period, down to the time of Gregory himself, absolute silence prevails on the subject.

The greatest and most conspicuous figure of this period is Venantius Honorius Clementianus Fortunatus, who was made bishop of Poitiers in 579. His poetry, with the exception of the few books of his *Life of St. Martin*, is 'occasional poetry' in the narrow sense of the term. According to Paulus Diaconus, he also composed a number of hymns for the various church festivals, but these have not been handed down. In his collection of hymns, there are three hymns on the Holy Cross and an occasional poem on Easter, which, in an abbreviated form, was used as a processional hymn. Besides these there are other three hymns ascribed to Fortunatus: the baptismal hymn, 'Tibi laus, peregrini aucter'; called 'Versus Fortunati presbyteri'; in an 8th cent. office-book from Poitiers preserved in the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal in Paris, the Christian hymns of the Roman canon are presented, and the well-known hymn in praise of Mary, 'Quem terris, pontus, aetheria.' 3 In spite of all the artistic form, the hymns of Fortunatus belong to the ancient Western Christian literature. Hymns like the 'Pange lingua' and the 'Vexilla regis' have never been surpassed, and will remain immortal. They had a great influence on both text and music of later hymnody.

Among the contemporaries of Fortunatus we may mention Eugenius of Toledo († 655), who bestowed special care on Church-hymnody, and revised the Church office-books; but, as no ecclesiastical hymns have come down under his name, we cannot ascertain his probable share in the hymn-composition of the Mozarabic liturgists. After Venantius Fortunatus the most conspicuous poet of the period is the Mozarabic Bede († 735). In the last chapter of his Ecclesiastical History of England, in which he inserted a synopsis of his own works, he says that he had also composed 'song' for these various verse-measures and rhythms. We have to lament the loss of this book as a whole; but eleven hymns have been handed down to us under Bede's name by Georgius Cassander in his *Hymni Ecclesiastici* (Cologne, 1556), regarding the genuineness of which there has been much controversy. Besides these hymns we have an attentive study on St. Editha's in the Ecclesiastical History (iv. 20), and two Psalms paraphrases preserved in various MSS. Bede's hymns are of unmistakable sobriety, corresponding with the whole character of his writings. They did not circulate widely, however, and exercised no lasting influence on later Latin hymn-writing; only a few of them occur in liturgical MSS. The hymn on St. Editha was imitated in a large series of Anglo-Saxon and Irish hymns, e.g. those of Wulstan of Winchester (cf., further, below, p. 209).

We may mention here a double series of hymns, which began in the Merovingian period, and have a decidedly national character, which is strikingly evident in the national form of writing: the ancient Irish and the Gothic or Mozarabic hymn collections. The ancient Irish hymns were discussed in art. HYMNS (Irish Christian). More important than these, however, are the hymns collected in the Mozarabic Liturgy. This Liturgy, which differs very little from the Roman, was first entitled 'Old Spanish', then, with the union of the Goths, 'Gothic', and, finally, after the conquest of Spain by the Arabs (A.D. 711) 'Mozarabic', i.e. the Liturgy of Christians living among Arabs. The liturgy of Seville seems to have been for this Liturgy what Gregory the Great did for the Roman, but the facts of the case are equally uncertain. The hymns, numbering about 250, which can still be collected out of old Mozarabic manuscripts, are by no means the product of one period; on the contrary, there are some in the classical metre of the early Christian period, some which show the gradual transition from metrical to rhythmical composition, and some displaying all the linguistic barbarism of the 10th century. The Mozarabic Liturgy is much richer in hymns than the Roman. It has a whole series of hymns for special occasions, such as the consecration of a bishop, a bishop's birthday, a coronation, a king's birthday, marriages, etc.

With the demise of the Mozarabic Liturgy this mass of lyrical poetry became obsolete, and found its way from the Church into the libraries and archives.

III. THE CARLOVINGIAN RENAISSANCE.—The empire of the Carolingians, with its Cesaropapism, often resembling that of Byzantium, brought in a new epoch for Latin hymnody. During this period, two tendencies appear which afterwards run parallel through the whole of the Middle Ages, viz. the artistic reproduction of the old and the obsolete, and the preparation of the new and original. Charlemagne was not only a warrior but a patron of art, and under his rule artistic Latin poetry received a new impetus which has been called the 'Carlovingian Renaissance.' The central focus of these efforts was the 'palace-school' of Charlemagne, with which the most famous learned men of the time were connected. It must be admitted that, considering the numbers and their poetical activity, the authors belonging to the learned circle of the palace and its 'school' composed few hymns—no doubt because the introduction of the Roman Liturgy into the whole empire of the Frankish church and the Liturgy towards hymn-composition. Still, the majority of them made small contributions towards the treasury of Church hymnody.

The most important was Paul the Deacon († 799),

1. See *Anl. hymn. L. I. s., ff.
2. *Ib. I. 2d.
3. See *ib. xxviii., for Centogene's attempt to recreate it. The Liturgy is found most conveniently in *PL* lxxxvii.

2. *Ib. I. 2d.
3. *PL* lxxxvii. 35.
4. *Ib. I. s., for Centogene's attempt to recreate it. The Liturgy is found most conveniently in *PL* lxxxvii.
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who from 732 to 749 stayed at the Court of Charlemagne. Besides a hymn on the miracle-worker, Benedict of Nursia, in his History of the Lombards (i. 26), we have the immortal poem on John the Baptist. Paulinus I., patriarch of Aquileia (c. 646-653) was an effective composer. His best known and most popular hymn was that on the Apostles Peter and Paul, beginning 'Felix per omnes festum mundi carinae.' Alcuin (+ 860), a central figure in this group and one of the most prolific hymn-writers, is represented only by two hymns—one on Vesasant and an evening hymn. Legend says that Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (c. 821), from his prison-window greeted the Psalm Sunday procession in Angers, in which King Louis the Pious took part, with the improvised hymn 'Gloria, laus, et honor,' fragments of which are still in use in the Roman Liturgy. The only other extant hymns of Theodaldus are those for 'The Salutation of the King.' In Adventus Regis. In this circle of poets we may also include Florus, the deacon of the Lyons Church, and Secundus Scotus (+ c. 754), the scholar of Liutgar. We have some hymns of Florus (d. middle of 9th cent.), composed in elegiac verse, and some free translations of psalms in heroic metre (one Psalm-paraphrase is written in iambic dimeter). The poems of Secundus Scottus belonging to the rank of hymns are very few. 

Beside this group of poets of the early Carolingian period, there is another in the later period—the poets of the school of Abbot Gall. The two groups are connected by Rabanus Maurus, who was a pupil of Alcuin, and Walafrid Strabo, who came from St. Gall to Rabanus at Fulda, and later on became abbot of Reichenau. Walafrid, who also wrote two, is the better and more artistic poet, Rabanus the more productive and influential. The poems of Rabanus (+ 856), especially his hymns, are known chiefly from the ed. of C. Brower (Mainz, 1617), who took them from a MS which probably belonged to the Fulda monastery. A small portion of this MS is preserved in the monastic library at Einsiedeln. In his hymns Rabanus is more original and inspired than in his other works. The immortal 'Veni Creator Spiritus' is assigned to him by a Breslau MS now in London. Walafrid, nicknamed Strabo or Strabos (+ 'the cross-eyed'), abbot of Reichenau (+ 849), seems to have been the author of Hymnorum Liber unus (J. Pitsen!), but it has been lost. Only a few hymns of Walafrid are known—a Christmas hymn, a hymn on Gallas, well known in Germany in the Middle Ages, hymns on Mammes, Januarius, Sergius, and Bacchus, and poems to welcome the Emperor. Another pupil of Rabanus—the monk Gottschalk of Orbais (+ 890)—composed hymns, or, rather, spiritual songs. Two of them are specially interesting because of their original rhythms. The 'School of St. Gall', to which we now pass, produced two classes of writers—the first class being an offshoot of the Carolingian Renaissance.

1. From the opening words of this hymn, 'Ut quassat luxis resorubris floria,' Guido of Arezzo borrowed the tonus 'Us. re, iu' for the Roman hymn in Pfeiffer's Chorpersammlung (1857). See also E. Dümmler, 'Zu den Gedichten des Paulus Diaconus,' in Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde (1860) ii. 345-47, and J. A. Wieland, ib. 117 ff.


On the genuineness of the poems assigned to Rabanus by Brower, see Dreyen, 'Hymnologische Studien zu zweien Denkmalen Romanischer Pfarrschatz,' pp. 50-130.

8. Anal. hymn. I. 128 ff.; for the hymns see also PL xii. 751 ff.


10. Ibid. I. 107 ff.

11. Ibid. I. 219 ff.


cal, poetical, and musical innovation—as the hymns of Ambrose had been, and their circulation and influence find no parallel except in the case of the great Milanese. Rome alone showed little appreciation for the Teutonic innovation of Notker—a circumstance which afterwards, at the Council of Trent, proved momentous for sequence-composition. Besides his sequences Notker composed a series of hymns on St. Stephen.

Next to Notker the Stammerer, Tuttilo († 989) is the most influential member of the St. Gall school; for he ranks as the first writer of "tropes" (i.e., additions in prose or verse to an already existing liturgical text). These insertions were afterwards more frequent in Missals or Graduals than in Breviaries or Antiphonaries. In the former we find them in the Kyrie, "Gloria," "Sanctus," "Agnus Dei," and in the Epistles (Epistolaria) as well as in other fixed or changing parts of the Mass (Introit, Offertory, Communion); in the latter, as a rule, only in some of the Responsories.

Only a few tropes composed by Tuttilo remain, and those are mostly in prose, and therefore interesting to liturgists, not hymnologists. As regards hymn-writing Tuttilo is important, not on account of his compositions, but for what he inaugurated and suggested: the composition of tropes, introduced in German territory and cultivated to a moderate extent in Germany, spread into France, Italy, and England, where it attained a much fuller development. The 'School of Saint Amand' (Schola Etinonensis) also flourished during this period. Milo († 872) was one of its most celebrated teachers and a prolific hymn-writer, but none of his hymns have been preserved. The most distinguished, however, was Hucbald († 930), one of the first composers of harmony. He discovered the organum, or art of accompanying a melody in perfect fifths; and his name is also connected with the introduction of the metrical or rhymed office (Historia rhythmica), i.e., a daily liturgical prayer-office, comprising the seven canonical hours, in which the hymns and everything else sung, except the Psalms and lessons, are composed in metre, rhythm, and rhyme. Besides hymns on St. Theodoric of Rheims and St. Cyriacus of Nevers, he composed rhymed offices on St. Richard of Marchienz and others. At any rate, the district of St. Omer, St. Amand, and Liége may be rightly regarded as the birthplace of this kind of composition.

IV. THE EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIOD.—When treating of the school of St. Gall as a whole, we have already touched on the early medieval period (10th and 11th centuries). The 10th cent. faces up the task—interrupted and postponed by the Carolingian Renaissance—of liberating the Latin hymn from ancient metrical laws and of bringing it under the government of rhythm. During the process, which is tedious and confusing, the hymns which appear are neither metrical nor rhythmical; they have neither accent nor metre; in fact, the composers seem simply to have followed the principle of counting syllables. Rhyme appears in a subsidiary manner in the Carolingian period, in Rahanes and Gottschalk, but throughout the 10th cent. it remains weak and imperfect. It was not till the 11th cent. that both accent and rhyme reached the pitch of perfection which they maintained in the 12th and 13th centuries. At the same time the art of writing sequences, begun by Notker, continued to be cultivated, although it never again attained Notker's depth of thought and mysticism. In the 11th cent. sequences appeared in France which, re-constructing Notker's trope in rustic form, and his syllable-counted cadences in rhythms and strophes, introduced a new type of sequence. They constitute—to borrow a figure from architecture—the transition-style, in which Romanesque blending with Gothic elements. During this period, as throughout the whole of the Middle Ages, metre holds its ground, but, like rhythm, it is re-modelled and re-modelled in the disguise of the most variable and purely ornamental forms.

One of the most famous hymn-writers of this period is the Anglo-Saxon Wulstan, precentor of St. Swithin in Winchester. We have several ecclesiaries composed by him in elegiac measure on local saints of Winchester—Athelwoald, Binin, and Swithin. They are modelled on Bede's hymn on Edithhilda, and have been revised by Ordericus Vitalis. The monastery of the reformed Benedictine order at Cluny, which at this time influenced not only France but all the Christian kingdoms of the West, is represented in hymn-composition by the two most celebrated abbots that it possessed—Odol, the best known in his time († 943), and Odilo († 1048). Only a few fragments of their hymns remain. Odol celebrated St. Martin of Tours; Odilo panegyzed St. Majou, abbot of Cluny, and the empress St. Adelheid, consort of Otto the Great. The German poet-pope Leo IX., a count of Egisheim († 1048), is closely connected with the Cluny group. Besides two hymns he bequeathed a rhythmical office in honour of Gregory the Great.

More famous than all these, however, as theologian, schoolman, and poet, is Fulbert of Chartres († 1028). The comparatively few poems of his which are extant are composed in the most varied metres and rhythms. The more widely-circulated of his writings were the sequence 'Sonnet regni rati', the Epiphany hymn 'Nunc ritum vocis', and the Easter songs 'Chorus novus Jerusalem' throughout Christendom. Other French hymn-writers of this period are Adhemar of Chabannes, a monk of Angoulême († 1053), who panegyrized in hymns the patron of his monastery, St. Etienne; Bruno, Bishop of Angers († 1081), who composed a number of rhythmical religious poems, of which one on St. Stephen became the common property of the medieval Church; and Anselm of Canterbury († 1119), the composer of some pious prayers. It is to be regretted that we cannot give more substantial proof and a more detailed description of Anselm's activity as a hymn-writer. In a MS of the poems of Eusibius Bruno there is a poem of Berengar of Tours († 1088), 'Juste Judex Jesu Christi'.

In Italy, besides pope Leo IX. just mentioned, there are two conspicuous poets, who in other respects differ as widely as two writers can—Peter Damiani († 1072) and Afanis of Salerno († 1050). One writes in medieval rhythms; the other might be designated as a herald of humanism.

Peter Damiani belongs to the prolific hymn-writers of the Middle Ages. As regards artistic form, his poetry can hardly bear comparison with that of the exquisite sonnets of Jacobin verses with its elaborations and artifices, the versus caduati and the "cadet," "cruciat," and "cruciat'li" etc. (Ansal. hymn. xxvii. xxviii. xxx, etc.); and yet there is a great deal of humanism in his work. Peter Damiani belongs to the prolific hymn-writers of the Middle Ages. As regards artistic form, his poetry can hardly bear comparison with that of the exquisite sonnets of Jacobin verses with its elaborations and artifices, the versus caduati and the "cadet," "cruciat," and "cruciat'li" etc. (Ansal. hymn. xxvii. xxviii. xxx, etc.)
the more polished and elaborated compositions of the succeeding age; but under its bald exterior with the feeble assonantal rhymes are hidden a genuine poetic genius, and a warmth of feeling which is not in the least detracted from by the three stanzas of six rhymes apiece, with a refrain, 'Varietiam paschali laudes.' This sequence is of special interest because it is a classical example of those transitional sequences in which the old forms keep abreast of the sciences and arts, and not least in the form of religious Latin poetry. There are no more writers of reputation; the forms of composition show a richer variety; the rhythms are more correct, the language more tuneful, and the rhymes purer. Good writers of the 13th and 14th centuries obey the rule that the masculine (imberbe) rhyme must be twice-syllabled. The writers of this period may be arranged into several groups. The first group is formed round Hildegard of Lavardin and the second round Abelard. The whole mass of liturgical composition, however, remains as a poet, the popular songs of St. Victor. Another group is dominated by Philippe de Grève. Finally, there are several less celebrated writers.

(1) The chief members of the first group are Marboe, bishop of Nantes (+1150), Baudri (Baldricus), abbot of Bec, and Richard of Dambray (+1180), and Reginald, monk of Saint Augustine's, Canterbury (+1190). All these writers have two characteristics in common: they cultivate classical and metrical poetry, although Marboe and Reginald also write Leonine or rhymed hexameters; and in their poems they incline towards worldly or religious - epic or didactic poetry. Marboe wrote a series of hymns and prayers (the latter partly in metre and partly in rhythm). Of Baudri's compositions only a few hymns on St. Samson of Dol remain. The form which he prefers is that of the poetic epistle, and in the selection of his letters is of great importance from the point of view of the historical student. Reginald of Canterbury, in the last book of his chief work, the Life of St. Hild, has collected a series of hymns addressed to God, to Christ, to the Holy Spirit, etc.; all of which he puts in the mouth of his hero. These hymns show unmistakably a feeling for poetic form and a certain energy of sentiment which secure for their author a place in the great throng of mediæval writers.

Hildebert himself (+1133), archbishop of Tours, belongs to the most careful cultivators of form among the mediæval poets. Some of his verses were actually included by modern philologists in the anthology of Latin classical authors, and taken for genuine productions of antiquity, until Hauréau drew attention to the mistake. It is unfortunate that there are no liturgical compositions of Hildebert known. But, even if Hildebert had given us nothing but the single Oration de Très Personas SS. Trinitatis, 'Alpina et magnum Deum,' this one poem would win a claim to be reckoned with the greatest hymn-writers of all ages and tongues.

(2) Of an 'Abelardian' group we cannot, strictly speaking, say anything, since Abelard does not belong to any one school or tendency; but, considering the fact that the two men most deeply and permanently affected his life—Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter the Venerable—we are both engaged in hymn-

Mention must be made of one more contemporary composer, Wipo, a Burgundian Court-chaplain to the Emperors Conrad II. and Henry III., and, according to a marginal note on an Einsiedeln MS, author of the famous Easter sequence still kept abreast of the sciences and arts, and not least in the form of religious Latin poetry. There are no more writers of reputation; the forms of composition show a richer variety; the rhythms are more correct, the language more tuneful, and the rhymes purer. Good writers of the 12th and 13th centuries obey the rule that the masculine (imberbe) rhyme must be twice-syllabled. The writers of this period may be arranged into several groups. The first group is formed round Hildegard of Lavardin and the second round Abelard. The whole mass of liturgical composition, however, remains as a poet, the popular songs of St. Victor. Another group is dominated by Philippe de Grève. Finally, there are several less celebrated writers.

(1) The chief members of the first group are Marboe, bishop of Nantes (+1150), Baudri (Baldricus), abbot of Bec, and Richard of Dambray (+1180), and Reginald, monk of Saint Augustine's, Canterbury (+1190). All these writers have two characteristics in common: they cultivate classical and metrical poetry, although Marboe and Reginald also write Leonine or rhymed hexameters; and in their poems they incline towards worldly or religious - epic or didactic poetry. Marboe wrote a series of hymns and prayers (the latter partly in metre and partly in rhythm). Of Baudri's compositions only a few hymns on St. Samson of Dol remain. The form which he prefers is that of the poetic epistle, and in the selection of his letters is of great importance from the point of view of the historical student. Reginald of Canterbury, in the last book of his chief work, the Life of St. Hild, has collected a series of hymns addressed to God, to Christ, to the Holy Spirit, etc.; all of which he puts in the mouth of his hero. These hymns show unmistakably a feeling for poetic form and a certain energy of sentiment which secure for their author a place in the great throng of mediæval writers.

Hildebert himself (+1133), archbishop of Tours, belongs to the most careful cultivators of form among the mediæval poets. Some of his verses were actually included by modern philologists in the anthology of Latin classical authors, and taken for genuine productions of antiquity, until Hauréau drew attention to the mistake. It is unfortunate that there are no liturgical compositions of Hildebert known. But, even if Hildebert had given us nothing but the single Oration de Très Personas SS. Trinitatis, 'Alpina et magnum Deum,' this one poem would win a claim to be reckoned with the greatest hymn-writers of all ages and tongues.

(2) Of an 'Abelardian' group we cannot, strictly speaking, say anything, since Abelard does not belong to any one school or tendency; but, considering the fact that the two men most deeply and permanently affected his life—Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter the Venerable—we are both engaged in hymn-
composition, it is perhaps justifiable to bring them together in a group. Bernard of Clairvaux (+1153) composed hymns in honour of saints Virgil, Malachias, and Malachias, which are not very remarkable in contents or form. All the other works ascribed to him in the medieval period have been proved by B. Hauréaux2 not to be his, unless well known. John Peckham3 (+1295), who composed the lovely nightingale-song "Philomena pnevin," a hymn of the Holy Trinity, which displays deep thought and warm feeling with the most elaborate Graviti expression, and some widely celebrated hymns in honour of the Virgin, etc.4 Julian of Speyer (+1178), the author of rhymed offices in honour of St. Francis of Assisi and Antony of Padua, remarkable for both contents and form; and Constantine of Orvieto (+1257), the author of an equally elaborate office in honour of St. Dominic, and Thomas of Celano (+1250), the author of some sequences and of the Inmonnal sequence on the Last Day, the "Dies Irae," so often translated and set to music.

This was originally composed for private devotion and ended with the words, "Gere agents uti Deus." The "Dies Irae" was sometimes adopted as a sequence in the Mass-books of the Franciscans. The opening words (which are not consistent with the rest either in contents or in form) were appended to it. It was not till towards the end of the 16th cent. that the "Dies Irae" was used more frequently as a sequence. By that time it had been forgotten that a Mass without an "Agnus," such as the Mass for the dead, ought to have no sequence. All these writers, to whom a large number of less importance might be added, are surpassed by a man who still remains as the recognition and honour which he enjoyed among his contemporaries—the chancellor of the Church of Paris, Philippe de Grève (Philippus Gravitas +1298). From his hand we have a Studenta Theologica (unfortunately still unprinted) and three collections of sermons—for feast-days, on the Psalms, and on the Gospels appointed for Sundays. These sermons of a still for the most part unpublished. In spite of his zealous and deep theological studies, Philippe de Grève found time for copious poetical activity. His chief poem was the 'Canto,' a sacred song intended for social performance. The liturgical in contents and origin, it found its way into the liturgy and pervaded it, while it also prepared the way for the sacred popular song in the vernacular. We have a whole series of the songs composed by him on subjects arising from hymns to the Virgin, of a child-like simplicity and devotion, to verses of keen wit and satire. He also wrote some hymns properly so called; and there are few hymns in the great treasury of the mediæval Church with which his hymn on Mary Magdalen will not bear comparison. Henri d'Andel on, in his poetical panegyric of Philippe de Grève, called him the most valiant and wisest "qui fat in la cristenité."5

(5) We have still to mention a series of writers belonging to this period who produced some fine religious lyrics: the 'doctor universalis,' Alain de Lille (+c. 1230), on account of his Anticolonaeus, ranks among the most famous and widely read poets of the Middle Ages; Alexander Neckam (labeled as Nequam), abbot of Clarendon (+1217), also one of the most skilful authors in verse of his time, composed fine hymns to the Virgin and in


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honour of Mary Magdalene; 1 John Hovenden (+ 1275), Court-chaplain of Queen Eleanor of England, mother of Edward III., composed a series of mediocre religious lyrics, and a narrative lyric poem, didactic and sufferings of Christ entitled Philomena, which is of conspicuous excellence; 2 Guy de Baschoes (Guide de Bascose), precentor of Chalons-sur-Marne (+ 1250), in his collection of sacred songs, which is important for the literary history of the period, has interwoven numerous hymns and religious poems; 3 Adam de la Basse (Adamus de Esesine), canon of St. Pierre de Lille (+ 1258), composed songs of the most varied kind, suited to existing liturgical or popular melodies; 4 and Orgius Scaccabrazzi (+ 1293), the archbishop of Milan, wrote several liturgical offices, hymns, and Masses, which, however, are not remarkable either for contents or for form. 5

We must specially mention two female writers: 6 St. Hildegard, the abess of Rupertsberg in Bingen (+ 1179), and Herradis of Landsberg, abbess of Hohenbourg in Alsace. Hildegard, the greatest seeress of the 12th cent., also composed hymns and sequences, as well as rough, bold, and coarse songs of hymns and sequences, which are corrected by another hand in the Wiesbaden MS (the only one which they occur) these rough drafts are set to music—whether by Hildegard or some one else we do not know. 7 The compositions of Herradis of Landsberg (+ 1179) are of a different kind. She enriched the library of her convent with a MS which is equally interesting for the history of art and the history of literature. The Hortus deliciarum, as it was called, seems to have been inspired by the Theological Encyclopedia, and was illustrated by interesting miniatures which are quite famous. On 23rd August 1879 the MS was destroyed by fire. This Pleasure-garden of Herradis also contained a series of poems composed for the anthology. 8 Whether these are her composition or not, she certainly wrote poetry, and so far mastered the Latin tongue as to be able to clothe sentiments of simple piety in an unadorned and pleasing garb. We must here merely mention the fact that a number of hymns had been appearing anonymously during these early centuries, and, in fact, these far exceed in numbers the compositions whose authors are known.

VI. THE LATER MIDDLE AGES.—In the 14th and 15th centuries Latin hymn-writing slowly and steadily declined from the high level at which it was attained in the 12th and 13th centuries. There were many writers interested in the further development of the art, but they do not raise our admiration. And the great stream of anonymous poetry increased. Some works of first-rate quality appeared, but the gradual falling-off continued. The focus of hymn-writing seems to have undergone the most rapid eclipse in France, where it had reached its most perfect development. Word-accentuation, which constitutes the basis of rhythmical composition, did not even with Abelard attain the perfection to which Adam of St. Victor brought it, and in Philippe de Grève's work it perceptibly declined. The process of deterioration went on rapidly until hymn-writing was at last reduced to the system of syllable-counting from which it had begun to emerge in the 10th century. In England, and perhaps more gradually in Germany, the same deterioration took place. In Italy it had never reached the perfection which it attained in France.

This period begins with Jacopone da Todi (+ 1306), the Franciscan poet, who composed many celebrated Italian religious hymns. He is considered monightly regarded as the author of the world-renowned 'Stabat Mater,' the most beautiful medieval elegy in honour of the Virgin. Like the 'Dies irae,' the 'Stabat Mater' was originally a hymn for private devotion; but it occurs in many of the 15th cent. books of prayers, and before the end of the century it found its way into the Liturgy. Cardinal Jacobus de Stephanescis (+ 1340) displayed activity as a liturgical writer and as a composer. Among his acknowledged compositions, one of his most famous is his 'Georgius,' an antiphon in honour of pope Celestine V. (Petrus Moreone), and a few other liturgical and extra-liturgical pieces. 9 Another cardinal, Guillemur de Mandagato (+ 1281), more famous as a lawyer than as a poet, composed services which his nephew (of the same name) included in the Missal of Uzes, and thus handed down to posterity. Faultless in form, these poems are greatly lacking in the glow of inspiration. 10 These writers are succeeded by two Austrian poets, the Cistercian Christian of Liliennfeld (+ before 1339) and the Carthusian Conrad of Gaming (Gemmenstein; + 1390), who is also called Conrad of Hainburg, after his birthplace. From the pen of the former we have a great many hymns of a high rank, offices and prayers in rhymes, which are all remarkable for their carefully-cultivated form and the tone of deep piety. His rhymed prayers are short; they nearly all contain five stanzas, each beginning with the word 'Ave.' 11 Conrad of Gaming has left liturgical compositions, chiefly hymns in honour of the Virgin and the saints. They are, as a rule, rather long, but reveal a childlike and touching piety. 12 Conrad of Gaming was more widely read in Germany than his model, Christian of Liliennfeld, whose poems are preserved almost exclusively in the MSS of his own monastery. There were other imitators of Christian of Liliennfeld besides Conrad, e.g. the Carthusian Albert of Prague (first half of 14th cent.), who compiled a book of devotions entitled Scilla Ceili, in which there is a series of his own compositions. They are inferior in style, and of rare prose. 13 The prolific writer, Ulrich Stocklin of Rottach, abbot of Wessobrunn (+ 1445), shows skilful manipulation of the forms, but suffers from the same weakness of barren verbiage. He followed the lines marked out by Christian and Conrad, and may therefore be mentioned here, although he properly belongs to the 15th century. Turning from this group of South German writers to the North, we find in the 14th cent. a small group of Scandinavian hymn-writers of some importance. The oldest of them is Brynolf, bishop of Scania (+ 1317), the author of a rhymed office on St. Helena of Skotisio, with the hymns belonging to it, and probably also of a rhymed office in honour of St. Nikolas of Linköping.

To Birger Gregersen (Biericus Gregori; + 1389), bishop of Upsala, we owe five rhymed offices in honour of St. Birgitta and St. Beutidos, with accompanying hymns. 14 The hymns of both these writers are distinguished by carefully modelled poetic forms, showing the influence of the third northern writer, Petrus Olavi, attendant of St. Birgitta and confessor in Vadstena (+ 1378), seems more careless regarding cadence and rhyme. He arranged the choral office of the monks of the order of St. Birgitta, and composed a whole series of new hymns for it. 15

In the first half of the 14th cent. there flourished in France Guillaume de Deguileville (Guillermus de Deguileville; + after 1350), prior of Chaalis,
known through his epic didactic poems in his mother tongue, "Pélerinage de la vie humaine," "Pélerinage au Père Jean Hainms," and "Pélerinage à Jean-Christ. He has also left several very long Latin poems, in which is noticeable a vanishing of the word accentuation. Along with him should be mentioned the Dominican Juan de las Fuentes, a Franciscan poet († after 1367), who composed several hymns in honour of the Virgin, in carefully-handled forms. At the end of the 14th cent. lived the two poets who are closestily connected through the Feast of the Visitation of Our Lady, which was just then beginning to be observed—Cardinal Adam Easton, also called "Adam Anglais" († 1367), and Johann of Jenstein, archbishop of Prague († 1400). An illuminated edition of Jenstein's works, which he himself revised, appeared in Rome. This is the present Codex Vaticanus, 1172. It also contains the ecclesiastical compositions of Jenstein—sequences, tropes, rhymed offices, hymns, and rhymed prayers, which are very unequal in content and form, his worst being the hymns on St. Wenzel. Jenstein was the first to introduce the observance of the festival of the Visitation of the Virgin into his Archepiscopal see, and urged Urban VI. to introduce it into the whole Church. The festival was prevented by death from carrying out the suggestion; but his successor, Boniface IX., in 1389 issued the bull commanding the observance of the festival. The office prescribed by Jenstein, however, was not adopted into the Roman breviary, for that honour was reserved for a rhymed office composed by Cardinal Adam Easton. It begins with the words: "Aequum laudes virginis," and exhibits an acrostic on his name, which, however, has fallen into disorder. This office was handled severely, and not altogether justly, by the Humanist Jakob Wimpeling in his Cantigas ecclesiasticæ et divinis officiis deum praebentor (1500). The festival of the Visitation of the Virgin caused great activity on the part of poets. There are no fewer than ten different rhymed offices in honour of it. One of them, used by the Dominicans, begins, "Collatentur corda fidélium," was composed by Raimund of Capua († 1399), confessor and biographer of St. Catherine of Siena. Another Dominician, Marius Arbelle († 1473), wrote acrostic hymns in honour of Saint Vincent Ferrer.

We have already entered the 15th century. Among the works in the earlier part of it is the unfortunate fanatic Johann Hus († 1415). Only a few of his hymns remain, composed partly in Czech and partly in Latin. The most widely celebrated was his "Jesus Christ, nostra salus," which shows his name woven into an acrostic, and which is still occasionally sung. With the name of Hus we may connect the host of anonymous Bohemian poets who zealously cultivated a special kind of Church hymn, the so-called "canzoni," Next to France, no country has so delighted in this form of vocal music as Bohemia. Their form—dubbed stanzas, and a concluding song to follow, sometimes similarly doubled—often very artistic; their rhythm and rhymes, however, show every sign of decadence.

This form belongs to universal history marks the end of the 15th cent.—that of Thomas a Kempis († 1471). He wrote a number of hymns and rhymed prayers, sometimes of the prayers seem to have been provided with melodies, most of them not for public but for private use. The compositions of the famous mystic are not of great poetic value. Somewhat younger than a Kempis, and following in his track as a mystic and poet, is

Johannes Mauburnus († 1503), abbot of Livry. Most of his works are still unprinted. Those which we know to be his are found in his Rerum exercitationes spiritualiæ (first ed. 1504). With those two mystics we may associate a third, Henricus Pistor, canon of St. Victor in Paris. John Cechtoues has preserved in his Evangeliarrum speculum a sequence of his composed for the festival of St. John the Baptist. One of the most prolific theological authors of this period is Dionysius of Rigel, known also as "Dionysius Carthusianus" († 1471). He has been given the cognomen, "Doctor Ecclesiastical," as a matter of fact, his character appears to have been the prosaic one of compiler. He also composed some Latin hymns. There are extant long poems on God and the Holy Trinity, or, rather, rhymed dissertations and reflections which are wearisome from their proximity. They are known only from the author's Opera Minora, Cologne, 1582. A few other religious poets of this period deserve mention. Matthias Ronto, a monk of the Olivetan convent at Siena († 1449), wrote some hymns which are preserved in a MS of the Wilhering monastery.

Hieronymus de Verdec (as he was called in the convent, though christened John), prior of Monem († 1479), wrote religious poems (which never take the form of liturgical composition) celebrating Christ and the Virgin, Ignatius Benedict, Florian, George, etc. Considering the period in which he wrote, their form is well managed, but there is no genuine poetical inspiration in them. We may also mention Wynandus de Stega, priest at Bauern, who has left hymns and sequences in honour of St. Werner. A Vatican MS has preserved two other poems of his, one in a German adaptation. At the close of the century stands the Franciscan Johannes Tiscarrad, who founded an order of Magdalens in Paris in 1463. A Paris MS has handed down some of his poems, whose form reminds us of those of Guillaume de Deguileville. He composed the Acts of Bernard de Corbié and the five martyrs of Morocco, and possibly also the rhymed office which exists in honour of these martyrs.

Summary.—It would be easy to add to the foregoing list of hymn-writers, but the purpose of this article has been rather to indicate only the principal figures and most significant tendencies at work. We have seen that all through the Middle Ages metrical as well as rythmical poetry was cultivated, while poetry modelled on that of ancient Rome was never entirely extinct. But towards the end of the medieval period the character of this poetry changed; and the so-called humanistic poetry, the product of the Renaissance of classical learning, appeared. It is distinguished from the metrical poetry of the Middle Ages, not only by greater purity of language and poetical form, but also by greater independence on the common models—a dependence which is sometimes repellent. This kind of composition first appeared in Italy in the beginning of the 14th cent., but soon passed over into Germany. At first it was only partly in the form of religious poetry or hymns, but later it became quite an important branch of religious lyric poetry. As this humanistic poetry seldom found its way into liturgical use, for the exigencies of which the period of rhythmical poetry had made ample provision, we have here disregarded it. It was a new art, allies and hostile to the Middle Ages. Although medieval composition in its offshoots reaches far past the Council of Trent, we may designate the Council of Trent as the dividing line between

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1. Liturgical hymns. — The use of hymns in the offices of the Church seems to have been an ancient custom in Ireland. In Adomnán’s Vita S. Columbae, a hymn called Liber septemannisuis sanctorum Columbae is mentioned. In the Fita of Vercelli, the hymn for use on each of the days of the week is mentioned (il. 9), and we learn from one of the prefaces to St. Columba’s hymn, ‘Altus Proctor’ (p. 794), that the gift of the hymns was a donation to St. Columba of the Hymns of the Week. We find also that, on the morning of the death of the Saint (9 June 597), hymns were sung in the monastery of Iona; *hymnis mortuorum terminatis* is the phrase used by Adomnán. By a directive of St. Columba, portions of hymns in the offices of the Church were sung from this at least as early as 576. The collection of *Liber Hymnorum* of Bangor dates from the end of the 7th cent., and twelve hymns used in the Church offices are given in it. Again, in the directions given in the liturgical fragments of the end of the 9th cent., a copy of the Gospels called the Book of Monkwell, portions of three (possibly four) well-known Irish hymns are directed to be sung, with certain supplementary stanzas, in the course of a short office which seems to have been designed as a service of intercession against the yellow plague, a pestilence which decimated Ireland at frequent intervals during the 7th and following centuries. An office practically identical with this is appointed in the tract entitled *The Second Vision of Adamnan* (Leabhar Béinne, p. 258² f.), for special days of fasting and prayer; also on the first three leaves of the 10th cent. (4) Greek Psalter at Basel (A. vii. 3), which contains some odes and directions for what appears to be a monastic office in Irish handwriting, three Irish hymns are found.

In the largest existing collection of Irish and Latin hymns, that known as the Irish Liber Hymnorum, of which two MSS, slightly differing from each other in manuscripts, exist—one now in the Franciscan Library, Merchant’s Quay, Dublin, which belonged to the Librarius of the 12th cent., and now in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin (classed E. 4, 5), a MS of the 11th cent.—the material does not appear to have been arranged in any order of service. It contains in the main body of the collection 17 hymns and poems in Latin and 39 in Irish, also the Te Deum, Benedictus, *Magnificat*, *Glória in excelsis*, an abridgment of the Psalter, et al. and among the extra matter added at a later time in the Franciscan MS are found two other Latin hymns and the *Lorica* of Gildas, with the Bene dictes, *the Quieronymus vulgat*, etc.

From the manner in which the material is thrown together and the elaborate introductions in which it is accompanied, it would appear that this is a miscellany of religious pieces rather than an actual choir book. The editors suggest that it may have been composed by the monks of St. Columba when they were giving place to the use in England, in order to preserve all those pieces which were most cherished in the memories of the monks, as connected with a system of the mass and the office which was being superseded by a new and less national order of religious services.

Several of the poems contained in the Liber Hymnorum are ascribed to saints of the 6th and 7th centuries. Besides the *Lorica*, or hymn of protection, ascribed to St. Patrick himself, there are hymns by St. Sechnall (Secondarius), a contemporary and disciple of St. Patrick, by St. Columba (+ 597), by St. Ultan (+550), by St. Brocna (+630), by St. Cummian Fada (*the Tall*) (+681-2), and by other saints of the 7th and 8th centuries. That many of these hymns are of great antiquity is shown by the use of them in pre- Hieromonic texts in both the OT and NT quotations, and stanzas as found in Sechnall’s *Audite omnes* in honour of St. Patrick, and in St. Columba’s *Altus Proctor*.

The surprise of St. Patrick, expressed in the Preface, at the use by St. Sechnall of the word ‘maximus’ in the phrase *maximus namque in regno caeliolum* is also interesting, as this is the reading of St. Cyprian and of the Rushworth Gospels, the Vulgate (Mt. 59) having ‘majus.’ It shows that the hymns preserved a reading of the word, the time of the composition of the Irish prefaces, which are probably in all cases later than the hymns.
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themselves, and that the author of the preface was perplexed at the use of unstudied Latin.

The ascension of the ‘Lorica’ to St. Patrick (+461), and of the hymn ‘Auditae omnes’ to his contemporary St. Sechnall, is confirmed by their rude Latinity and by the use of unequal grammatical forms of the language, as well as by the structure of both poems. The ‘Lorica’ is not metre, and, though constructed with a sense of proportion, it shows no knowledge of either Irish or classic form—forms appear as a result of accidental practices, and is evidently the direct descendant of the native pagan rite or charm. The hymn of St. Sechnall is unmetered, and quantity and elision are completely ignored; nor does it show acquaintance with the Irish poetic rules of composition, which required a certain fixed number of lines and syllables, besides alliteration, rhyme, and assonance. It would seem that these poems were composed before the native poetic metres had reached perfection, and this is in accordance with their early legendary origin. In St. Columba’s great poem, the ‘Altus Proserat’, we are carried a step forward, for some more definite effort at structural conformity. It is formed by a word or three or more syllables, with a rhyming sound in the last syllable and a careful choice of the concurrent vowels. This hymn recmits in an alphabetical progression of sounds, addressed to the Trinity, the creation and fall of angels, the creation and fall of man, the foundations of the earth and the world, and the second coming of Christ. It is a monument of the last, and shows curious affinities with the Book of Enoch and may be compared with the ‘Sultair-a-Buann’, the longest Irish medieval poem on any religious subject, which contains sections treating of the same questions in astronomy and speculations of the system and fate of the universe. It is found in many MSS among works ascribed to Prosper of Aquitaine (498–546); in three cases or more it follows on the work de Fide contemplationis, now known not to be a genuine work of Prosper. But its subject and character, its barbarous Latinity, and its use of words found only in a few pieces which have Celtic origins (see below, §3), as well as its use of an O. Latin text similar to that in early use in Ireland, tend to confirm the traditional ascription of the hymn to St. Columba. The inclusion of a long portion of this poem, the hymn by Rabban Marqar, bishop of Mauvinus (785–856), and its appearance among the works of Prosper, testify to its popularity. It is said in the preface to have been written in Hi (Iona) and sent as a gift to Pope Gregory, who found no fault with it except the scantiness in it of praise of the Trinity per se, though the Persons were praised through their creatures.’ This reproach reaching St. Columba, he wrote the hymn ‘In te Christe’ to amend this lack in the former composition.

A gradual approach to a more perfect form of verse-structure according to native Irish ideals is seen in the hymn of St. Cummian ‘the Tall,’ ‘Colubha Jeda,’ which has a rich end-rhyme or harmony of two or more syllables, with a careful correspondence in the vowel sounds and occasional alliteration and internal rhyme. In the later hymns of St. Columba, such as the praise in praise of St. Michael, and in St. Cuchulain’s hymn to the Virgin, written about the middle of the 8th cent. (at a time when we know from the fragments of manuscripts that there were verses that remain to us that Irish poetry was approaching its highest perfection), we find this verse-system developed with the richest and noblest effect. The prosody of the classical language is replaced by accent and rhyme, and the verses still espouse the same high aims, with its rich trisyllabic rhymes, its alliterations, cor-

responsesesses, and harmonies, could not easily be surpassed;

aeterna posuit praestare
ut possidam cum Christo
(regis regni aula
paradisi gardia)
(Hymn of St. Columba (+ 733),
or again:
cinctibus in usu die
consilisactis Dei
circulatibus variis
(Hymn of St. Cuchulain (+ 465),

The only hymn in the Ir. Lib. Hymn. not by Irish saints is that ascribed to St. Hilary of Poitiers, ‘Hymnus to pagan rites, a primitive unrhymed poem which is praised by Bede (de Arte mel. 23 [PL xc. 1733]), but without naming any author. It is not accepted as Hilary’s by Daniel or Drees; the latter considers that only the three hymns found in the Gamarrini MS in Airezzo are genuine works of Hilary. Yet there is much more solid ground for accepting it as his than there is for receiving the seven hymns printed under Hilary’s name by Daniel and accepted by D. S. Wrangham in Julian’s Dict. of Hymnology (London, 1907, p. 522), the authorities for which are very late. The ‘Hymnus dicat’ is expressly ascribed to Hilary in the Antiphonary of Bangor, 7th cent., in two great codices of St. Gall (cod. 567 and 377) of the 8th and 9th centuries, and in the two MS copies of the Ir. Lib. Hymn.; it is also so named by Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims (+888), twice (de Vita et morte Tho, Li., 7, and xii. [PL xxxv. 446, 560]); it forms part of the offices in the Book of St. Mulling, in the Second Vision of Adamnan, and in the Book of Cerne—the last a document which has clearly been formed under Irish influences; in the Second Vision of Adamnan, as in ‘de Arreis,’ an old Irish tract (for which see R. Col. xx. [1894] 283–289, it is directed to be repeated as a spiritual exercise, and the value attached to its recitation is shown by the story of the three clerics (W. Stokes, Lives of the Saints from the Book of Lismore, Oxford, 1888, pp. vii. IX). It would appear from the Buli of St. Ailbe of Emlyn (+473 [2]), and from its place in the Book of Cerne, that it was sung in the early morning; but one of the prefaces suggests another purpose. It says hic nobis conventus canone post praemunium, and the St. Gall MS no. 597 directs its recitation omnis tempore.

The lines seem to be an addition by an Irish writer. Among the addittamia copied into the Liber Hymnorum, the well-known ‘Christe qui lux es et dies,’ and a poem in praise of St. Peter and Paul, ‘Christi Patris in dextera’; the latter poem is not found elsewhere, and it is probably a native composition. Among the hymns in Irish, the poem in praise of St. Brigid, variously ascribed to St. Columba and to St. Ultan (+930), beginning Breigit e bhatmanach—‘Brigid, ever-great woman—is the most perfect, and shows a complete mastery of the difficult technical laws which governed Irish verse.

In the Antiphonary of Bangor are found twelve Latin hymns, ten of them placed close together in the first section of the book, and two at the end, but probably sung at intervals during the recitation. For we find the musical rubric ‘Post Hymnum’ attached to four of the Collects. Besides these hymns proper, there is a whole series of rhyming Collects for the hours of the day (nos. 17–26), and similar Collects are found elsewhere interspersed among the prayers and antiphons of the Twelve hymns, two, the ‘Hymnus dicat’ of St. Hilary and St. Sechnall’s hymn in praise of St. Patrick, ‘Auditae omnes,’ are found in the Ir. Lib. Hymn., and elsewhere. Three (nos. 14, 95, 129) are personal to the monastery of Bangor (Co. Down), from which the service book originally emanated; they celebrate the praises of this important foundation and of its first abbots. It con-
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tains also a hymn in praise of a St. Camalec, of whom very little is known. Of the remaining six hymns, one, 'Medine noctis tenuas est' (no. 10), is also given both here and in the Mozarabic Breviary (see PL lxxxvi. 382 f.) for 'medium noctis.' It is cited in the Rule (xlii. 89) of Cassarius of Arles (f. 542; AS, Jan. ii. 18) for use at the first nocturn of the 5th antiphon of the Mass of All Souls for use at Nocturns on Sunday. Daniel (i. 45, iv. 26) thinks that it is an Ambrosian hymn, and that it is distinct from the hymn 'Jesus defensor omnium' with which it has often been printed. It does not seem to be Irish in origin.
The remaining five hymns are not found elsewhere, and nos. 3, 8, 9 are almost undoubtedly Irish. Nos. 11, 12 do not show sufficient indications to pronounce upon their origin, but they are found in no other copy, which argues in favour of their local origin. The hymn of the Apostles (no. 3) was very popular in Ireland and is mentioned with St. Sechnall's hymn 'Audite omnes, St. Colman's hymn' in the Trinitarian Breviary, and the 'Hymnum dictum' of Hilary as among the penitential hymns recommended in The Second Vision of Adamnan (c. 1096). It consists of 42 stanzas beginning 'precedentiae quae sunt praegatae in Easterday or Sunday hymns. Daniel thinks, and J. D. Chambers (in Julian, p. 642) agrees with him, that it bears evidence of having been translated from a Greek original.

The beautiful hymn, 'Sancti venite, Christi corpus sumite' (no. 8), is entitled Hymnus quando communicant sectorii, and was sung during the communion of the priests who formed part of the monastic body. According to Daniel's argument (i. no. 160, iv. 160) that the administration of the sacrament in both kinds to the laity is implied in such lines as 'hoc sacramento corporis et sanguinis' falls to the ground so far as this hymn is concerned. Tradition says that, when Patrick and Sechnall were passing a church, they heard this hymn chanted within by a choir of angels at the offering. It is still used in the offices of the Western Church, and is familiar in Neale's translation, 'Draw nigh and take the Body of the Lord.' The hymn 'Ignis Creator igneus' (no. 9), entitled Hymnus quando sacerdos benedictur, seems to have been sung at the daily lighting of lamps at the 'Hora Vespertina' or else at the annual festival of the benediction of the Paschal candle on Easter even. The custom of lighting a Paschal fire was very ancient in Ireland, and it has been observed from there to other countries (Christian Worship, London, 1912, p. 390 f.). The hymn to martyrs, 'Sacratisanmi martyres summi Dei' (no. 11), is rhythmical rather than metrical. No. 12, 'Spiritus divinae lucis gloriae,' is for use at matins on Sunday. Its origin is unknown.

It is to be remarked how common was the use of alphabetical hymns in the Irish Church. Nos. 1, 2, 14, 25, and 26 of the hymns in the Tr. Lib. Hymn. were of alphabetical hymns, and nos. 13, 14, 15, and 129 in the Antiphonary of Bangor. In some instances, as in no. 14, the hymn to St. Congall, abbott and founder of Bangor monastery, the trilingual poem is a tour de force; almost every line in the stanzas of 8 or 10 lines each begins and ends with the same letter or syllable. The hymn of Ceiunu Sedulius, 'A solis ortus cardine,' is also trilingual. Among the Latin poems of St. Columbanus (i, 548) and Sedulius Scotorum (f. after 874) are several on religious subjects. Drexel includes seven hymns by Sedulius in his Antiphonal, and there are several others by Irish authors (Ansel. Hymn. i. [Leip.

2. Hymns used as charms.—A large number of the Irish hymns were composed as charms, the recitation of them being supposed to ward off disease, fire, or pestilence, or they were used to safeguard against evil. Codex Rhynianus has such directions. Such are the 'Noli Pater' of St. Columba, the 'Loricas' of St. Patrick and St. Columba, the hymn of St. Colman mac Úi Chusainigh (Sén Dé), the hymn of St. Cuichmaine, 'Loricas', the hymn of St. Colman mac Murchon, 'In Trinitate spes mea,' and many others. The recitation of such hymns was supposed not only to confer protection on the author, but to be a safeguard against similar perils to all who recited them afterwards, besides in most cases securing heaven to those who kept up the practice regularly (see prefaces to these hymns in Tr. Lib. Hymn.). In several instances, where the hymn was long or difficult to remember, the same benefits were obtained by reciting the last three stanzas only. For instances of this practice see the office in the Book of St. Nualing, in which the stanzas 'Audite omnes,' 'Celebra Judae,' and 'Hymnum dictum' only are given. In one instance, 'Christes in nostris,' only the last three stanzas of one of the hymns have survived either in the Tr. Lib. Hymn. or in the office in the Basil MS. (A. vii. 3), where also it is found. A similar custom is the recitation of 365 verses gathered from the Psalms, which was held to be equivalent to that of the whole Psalter.

3. Loricas.—Among these charm-hymns, the Loricas or Loricas, Hymns of the Breast-plate, which were composed as a protection against danger or disease, form a group by themselves, showing special peculiarities. Ten of these are known, but they are, doubtless, only examples of a common form of religious invocation. They usually fall into two or three parts, the first invoking the power of the Trinity and of the angels and heavenly hosts, the second enumerating at great length and with extraordinary minuteness the members of the body which might be subject to injury, with often a third part detailing the dangers to which the body is exposed, as in St. Patrick's 'Loricca.' A common feature of all these charm-hymns is the repetition of the same phrases and invocations, often at great length. Sometimes the whole is repeated three times.

The following are the most important of these Loricas: (1) The Loricas of St. Patrick is of early date, though it is not found in Muirchert's Life of the saint. It was traditionally composed as a protection when the saint and his companions were in flight before the king of Tara, and is said to have rendered them invisible. It is uncouth in language; but in spirit and structure, as in religious fervour, it is by far the finest of all the charm-hymns.

(2) More pagan and very fatalistic in tone is an ancient and rude Loricas of St. Columba, in which God is addressed as 'King of the White Sun' and Christ as 'My Druid.' It is said to have been composed as a protection when the saint was journeying to Donegal after the Battle of Caldermach.

(3) The authorship of the long Loricas of Celladas (called also the Loricas of Lachadóc or Celladóir) is uncertain. In the oldest document which contains it—the Book of Stummernach (Man. H. 3048, 3195)—the 5th century, it is attributed to Lorcus in the year of danger, and that the virtues of the hymn are great if it is chanted three times a day. It was translated into Latin by Mene, weapon spirit, and was composed of 236 lines (ending 8th cent.), and is the earliest. 'Hymnum sanctum Loricas Sceínotius genuit,' and the Book of Céna (5th cent.), 'Lorcus sung this Loricca three times a day.' The copy in the Liber Gardi (fol. 121v) is more explicit. It has Lorcus sedit arma ubi spectabant the words: 'Lorcus sits among the arms which watched...
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The great interest attaching to this ‘Lorica’ arises from the number of peculiarities of language that it contains, some of the forms being found elsewhere only in the Psalterium Hebraicum, a fragment containing an abstract of rare and difficult words from a continuous Latin text, with portions of an enlarged recension of the tract Hesperius jamina (first published by A. Mai in vol. v. of his Classici Antiqui, Rome, 1823-38), pp. 479-500, from P. F. V. d. *Lett., Reg. lxxi. ; cf. also Migone, XL xx. 1197-96.

The same pomposo and artificial Latin, interspersed with Greek and Hebrew, is found in the Lorica of Jambula, date of which resembles that of the Lorica of Gilgas in its detailed list of the parts of the body as well as in the obscurity of its word forms (V. H. Fricke, ZCP ii. 1883-84).

It will be seen that the two prominent features of all these charm-hymns are (1) the tendency to repetition of words and phrases, and (2) the use of uncommon words and forms. These peculiarities occur in a greater or less degree in the two remaining ‘Loria’ charms here published, the Lorica of Mugron, successor of Columbella (c 900) (K. Meyer, Hibernica Minor, Oxford, 1894, pp. 42-44, from MS Raw. R. 512), and a ‘Lorica’, classed 23. E. 18, p. 227, in the Royal Irish Academy (partly translated by R. Wynn, in *Ir. Lib. Hymn*. ii. 210; text printed by R. Meyer, *Archiv für Celt. Lexikographik*, iii. 1907; cf., from MS. 23 N. 10, p. 19, Royal Ir. Acad., and by A. O’Kellahan, in *Erna*, iv. 1910, 236), with translations by *Allan Proctor* of St. Columba shows similar peculiarities of language, while redundancies of expression are a common feature in prayers, confessions, etc., proving that the language used was intended primarily for public recitation.

To any one familiar with the ancient pagan charms of incantations universal among the pagan charms, and runes are still found in the highlands of Scotland and in Ireland, and a group of some of these collected in A. Carmichael’s *Carmín Gadael* (Edinburgh, 1696), or in Hyde’s *Religious Scourge of Convall* (London, 1696) will show that their form is patterned after the ‘Lorica’ of St. Patrick or of Mugron. Incantations were taught and practised as a regular part of their profession by the bardic schools of the 14th-15th cent. or later, and the black books of incantations on the same model found in the St. Gall MSS show that they were also used in the monasteries. The pagan charms were Christianized in tone but their forms remained unchanged (see, for instance, HYMNS [Coltic] above, p. 4). It is also to be remarked that all charms contain large numbers of words that have become so corrupted by constant oral repetition that they remain as mere meaningless sounds; they are simply spell-words essential to the charm. Is it not probable that some of the ancient spell-words found in the ancient ‘Loricas’ of Ireland may be explained in this way?


ELIANOR HULL

HYMNS (Modern Christian).—The rise of modern hymnody may be regarded as synchronous with the rise of Protestantism, and in the earliest hymns is mirrored the antithesis between the old faith and the new.

1. German hymns.—The earliest hymns of the Reformation were those of the Bohemian Brethren, of which a collection of 80 was printed at Prague in 1501, and another, of about 400, in 1505; but these were so effectually suppressed that only one imperfect copy of the former is known to exist, and none of the latter. For practical purposes the history of modern hymnody begins with the publication, in 1524, at Erfurt and Wittenberg respectively, of two small books of German hymns, in each of which about three-fourths of the contents were from the pen of Luther. Altogether, Luther’s hymns and sacred songs number 38; of these 11 are wholly or partly translated from the Latin, 4 are revised from re-formation hymns, 6 are metrical psalms, 6 paraphrases of the Holy Scripture, and 11 original. At least 24 are still in more or less common use.

The hymnody of Protestant Germany is the richest in Christendom, and by 1525 it was known to include more than 80,000 hymns of varying merit. The great majority of the authors were members of the Lutheran Church, whereas the hymn-writers of the ‘Reformed,’ or Calvinistic, Church were comparatively few, and their efforts were generally more suited to private devotion than to public worship. This is due to a belief, strongly held by Zwingi and Calvin, and generally accepted by their adherents, that the Biblical Psalms furnish a complete manual of Jewish public worship, and the only one divinely sanctioned. As a result of this belief, more than 130 German Matrical Psalters, more or less complete,
are known to exist, and seven-eighths of them were composed by members of the Reformed Church.

The great German hymn-writers may be conveniently grouped into three chief periods, each of which has its own distinctive character.

(1) The first group consists of Luther and his contemporaries, from about 1517 to 1560. Their hymns are neither didactic nor poetic, nor are they recondite, or obscure; and they were certainly not popular or churchly. As long as the German language endures, men will sing Luther's "pathetic "Aus tiefer Not, bis ich heut noch du kennet:" Ich bin der Welt zu wert: Ein festes Burg." With him must be associated Michael Weiss (1480-1534), who translated many of the Bohemian Brethren's hymns into German, but who is perhaps best remembered for his funeral hymn "Nun lasst uns das Leib begraben," Paulus Speratus (1494-1551), Nicholas Hermann (+1551), Paul Eber (1511-69), Johann Zwick, of the Reformed Church (1496-1543), and Hans Sachs, the cobbler-bard of Nürnberg (1484-1570).

(2) The second period, 1560-1618, is one of transition towards the subjective style of later times. There are occasional references to personal experience and didactic matter is sometimes introduced. Many worthless compositions of this age have come down to us, and the best authors were too prolific. Among these may be named Bartholomäus Ringwalt (1534-88), Johann Michael Altenburg (1584-1640), and, above all, Philipp Nicolai (1556-1608).

(3) The third period is that of the Thirty Years' War, 1618-48. The Psalms may become the model and type; brutality and tawdryness give place to enlargement of thought. From this estimate one hymn must be excluded, the "Nun danket alle Gott." Of Martin Rinckart (1586-1649), which is almost the only one of his voluminous writings which has escaped oblivion, and which has become the national doxology of Germany. Martin Opitz (1587-1638) was a literary man of no very decided principles; but he greatly influenced German hymnody by his literary style, and as a reformer of the German prosody. This influence operated chiefly on writers of what is called the "Pietist School." Of these the foremost place belongs to Johann Heermann (1586-1647), the author of 400 hymns, including "Herr Jesu Christ, du walst uns Ruh" and "Heißt lebtest Jesu, warst du vor uns schamlos." Johann Pfeiffer (1625-97) was also a prolific writer. Others of the school are Josua Stiegemann (1658-1692), Paul Flemming (1609-40), Matthias Apelles von Löwenstern (1649-1648), and Johann Matthias Meyhart (1590-1642). To the contemporary school of Königsberg belonged Simon Dach (1605-59), Georg Weisell (1590-1635), Heinrich Alberti (1604-81), and others.

(4) The fourth period reaches from the peace of Westphalia to the outbreak of the Pietistic controversy, 1648-90. Hymns of this period assume more and more of a subjective character, the objective features tending to disappear, while hymns relating to various circumstomtaneous and events in life—affliction, consolation, death, the family, etc.—become more numerous. There is often a tendency to excessive length, a common fault of mediative verse. The chief singer of this generation is Paulus Gerhard (1607-70). Foremost among his 120 hymns is the incomparable "O Haupt voll Blut und Wunden," and not far behind it come the ever popular "Beließ du deinen Wein," "Nur dich, mein Jesus, lieb," and "Seligst du, mein Jesus Schatz." To the same school belong Ernst C. Homburg (1605-81), Johann Franck (1618-77), Georg Neumark (1621-81), and Johann Georg Albinus (1624-79).

Contemporary with these is a group of poets whose hymns are, in general tone, mystic and contemplative. Foremost among these is Johann Jakob Schöfler (1624-77), who, becoming a convert to the Roman Communion in 1653, assumed the name of Angelus Silesius. Many of his hymns, written both before and after his conversion, display a marvellous sweetness, in strange contrast with the bitterness of his controversial writings, e.g. "Ich will dich lieben, meine Süße, 'Liebe, die du mich zum Bilde,' etc. With him may be associated Christian Knorr von Rosenroth (1639-89), Michael Franck, Sigismund von Birken, Christoph Wegleiter, and others of less note; and in the Reformed Church Joachim Neander (1650-80).

(5) The fifth period is that of Pietism, about 1690-1750. The hymnists of these two generations are far too numerous to be particularly specified, but they may be classified in five groups. (i) The contemporaries of Spencer, persuaded by a healthy and sincere piety. Spencer himself wrote few hymns of any value, and those produced by the rest of the group are noticeable for quality rather than for quantity. We may mention Adam Dross (1620-1701), Johann Jakob Schütz (1640-90), Cyriacus Günther (1649-1704), Samuel Rodigast (1649-1708), Laurentius Laurentei (1660-1729), and Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714).

(ii) The older school of Halle. Their hymns are of a scriptural, practical, and devotional tendency, and are mostly for individual edification and for the closet, rather than for the church. Most worthy of notice are Wolfgang Christoph Deissler (1660-1707), the author of more than 100 hymns, of which the best known are "Mein Jesus lend dem die Sächerinhä" and "Ich lasse dich nicht, du musst mein Jesus bleiben," Johann Andreas Freylinghausen (1670-1739), Johann Heinrich Schröder (1687-99), Bartholomäus Crus- culus (1674-1724), and Johann Joseph Winckler (1670-1722). (iii) To these succeeded a younger school, representing the decline of Pietism into sentimentality and trivialities. The better writers of this school are Johann Jakob Rambach (1655-1736), Johann Ludwig Conrad Alselendorf (1653-1728), Carl Heinrich von Bogatzky (1690-1774), and Leopold F. F. Lehr (1709-44).

(iv) Side by side with these is a group of poets devoted to strict Lutheran orthodoxy, and fore unsympathetic towards Pietism. Three of these composed, among them, nearly 2000 hymns, many of which, though not of the highest order of merit, are of great and permanent value. Salomo Franck (1659-1726) is best remembered by his hymn for Easter even, "So ruhest da, O meine Ruh!"; Erhard Neumeister (1671-1776) was the author of many cantatas for use in church, and re-modelled a number of older hymns; Benjamin Schmelck (1672-1737) was the most prolific of the school. (v) The school which is represented in theology by Bengel and Ursinus, mediating between Pietism and orthodoxy, claims a few sacred poets. The chief of these are Johann Mentzer (1658-1734), Johann Andreas Rothe (1688-1758), P. F. Hille (1699-1799), and C. C. L. von Pfeil (1712-94). Two distinguished hymnists of the period appear to stand apart from all these various groups. Gerhard Tersteegen (1669-1770), brought up in the Reformed Church, but from early manhood a mystic and a separatist, has been identified with Schüller than with any other poet. His numerous hymns were long restricted to a limited circle, but during the last 70 years have been represented in most German hymn-books as well as in the Reformed. 'Gott ist gegenwärtig' is the most popular; but 'Siegesfahrere, Ehrenkönig,'
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‘Gott rafet noch,’ and others are of sterling value.

Nicholas Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700-60), patren and afterwards bishop of the Moravian Brethren, wrote upwards of 2000 hymns of almost every possible degree of merit, even at the lowest displaying deep personal devotion to Christ. His extraordinary aptitude for improvising led to the production of a huge mass of rhyme, of which sincerity and piety is the only redeeming feature. The use of his hymns is now restricted to the Moravian Church; but ‘Jesu, geh voran’ and ‘Christi Blut und Gerechtigkeit’ are hymns that Christendom will not willingly let die; and a few cents, translated into various languages, are current.

(6) The sixth period, from about 1750 to 1830, is that of the ‘Enlightenment’ (q.v.), whose effect on hymnody was for the time disastrous, especially in the dilution of the church hymn-books and sacred poetry in general. During its earlier years the orthodox tradition was worthily maintained by Christian Furchsiegelt (1715-69), who in 1757 published 56 hymns characterized by rational piety and good taste, but generally individual rather than churchly. Many of them are still in use, the most popular being ‘Jesu lebt, mit ihm sah ich.’ Friedrich Klopstock (1724-1803) produced in 1758 modernized re-casts of 29 earlier German hymns, apparently without any doctrinal motive. Of his original pieces, mostly emotional and subjective, few if any are in the triumphant funeral song ‘Aufersteht, ja, auferstewirst em.’ Modernizing of standard hymns, without doctrinal purpose and with undesirable results, was undertaken by Johann Andreas Cramer (1723-88) and Johann Adolf Schlegel (1724-93). The one spiritual singer who stands conspicuous in this dreary time is Johann Caspar Lavater (1741-1801). Of his 700 hymns the best known is ‘Jesus Christus, wascht in mir.’ Georg F. P. von Hardenberg, commonly called Novalis, was a religious poet rather than a hymn-writer.

(7) A seventh period, one of Evangelical revival, may be dated from the publication by Christian Karl Josias Bunsen in 1833 of his Verzeichn von einem allgemeinen evangelischen Gesang- und Gelehrtblacks, containing 506 hymns, followed in 1837 by the Evangelischer Liederzonten of Albert Knapp, with 3590. Bunsen endeavored to restore, as nearly as possible, the original text of each hymn; Knapp, under the pressure of less scrupulous; but from that time the countless hymn-books of the preceding age gradually disappeared; and those now in use usually contain the best productions of evangelical singers from the Reformation downward. It would be impossible to pass in review the original compositions of the last three generations. Five names are specially worthy of mention: Ernst Meritz Arnold (1799-1860), Christian F. H. Sachs (1782-1850), Johann Wilhelm Meinhold (1797-1851), Albert Knapp (1798-1864), and Carl J. P. Spitta (1801-69), of whose Psalter und Hymne 55 editions were printed in as many years.

Hymns. Even in the 15th cent. a number of macaronic hymns, partly Latin and partly Dutch, and generally of a Hassite character, were current in the Netherlands. A collection of them was printed at Keppen in 1590. The Reformation in these regions was of so strongly Calvinistic a type, however, that several synods forbad the singing of any hymns except those found in the Liturgy. A collection of metrical Psalms, with music, was printed at Antwerp in 1593; and two complete metrical Dutch Psalters appeared in 1596. To another Psalter, published in 1598, were added metrical versions of other Scripture canticles, together with the Ten Com

mandments, the Lord’s Prayer, the Creed, and the ‘Gloria in excelsis.’ Altogether between 30 and 40 Dutch Psalters appeared before the end of the 17th cent. Each year the Synod of South Holland issued an authorized version, which is still commonly used in the Dutch Reformed Church.

The Dutch Lutherans, in 1615, published at Utrecht a collection of 58 hymns translated from the German. The suppression of these was attempted by the Synod of Dort (1619); but a few years later lost synods authorized their use on festival occasions. In 1629, Willem Elbing published a volume entitled Psalmen, Gezangen en godsdienstige Liederen, which, together with a posthumous volume of hymns by the same author, was long in popular use for domestic worship. The first religious bodies in Holland to authorize the use of hymns in public worship, however, were dissenters from the Dutch Reformed Establishment. The Anabaptists published an Appendix to the Psalter in 1713; a hymnal for a separatist congregation, compiled by Jacob Greeuwegen in 1751, ran through several editions; and a large volume of Metzatene hymns appeared in the latter half of the 18th cent. It was not until 1799 that the first authorized hymn-book of the Dutch Reformed Church was offered to the public. It contained 192 hymns, of which a large proportion were translations. An Appendix, which had been in preparation for 20 years, was authorized in 1869. This hymn-book and appendix are still in common use both in Holland and in South Africa; and nearly all other Dutch hymnals have borrowed largely from them.

Of the older Dutch Lutheran hymns almost half were appropriate only to festivals. It was not till 1836 that the Lutheran Synod of Holland published its own hymn-book, containing 1500 hymns, of which 150 were from the older Lutheran books, and 100 were new compositions. Some serious omissions were supplied in an Appendix 24 years later. The other most important Dutch hymn-books are the modern Baptist hymnal, a volume of translations from the Latin by R. B. Janse (1860), and a volume of revival hymns, translated from English and American originals. Very few Dutch hymns are original compositions; according to the best authority, the whole number does not much exceed 3000, of which at least two-thirds are translations.

3. Scandinavian hymns.—The Reformation in the Scandinavian countries was, to a great extent, a work of the rulers rather than the people. The national Churches of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway were thoroughly Erasmian. The Reformation these churches, at least on their publication and use in public worship.

The father of Swedish hymnody was Lars Peterson, archbishop of Upsala (1570-1610), who, in addition to original pieces, made many translations from Latin and German hymns. His brother, Olaf Peterson, also has some repute as a hymn-writer. They were assisted in their poetic work by two other brothers, Lars and Peter Anderson. Those, in 1588, published Swenske songer eller visor nu paa nytt pandrade, forbrakte, och under en annan titel De svenska festlig kyrkomusik (Swedish Songs or Hymns, now newly printed, enlarged, and published in a different shape from the former); what that former book was we are not informed. Two kings of Sweden—Erik XIV. († 1577) and Gustavus Adolphus (slain at Lützen, 1632)—added the national hymnody; the latter, shortly before his death, wrote the renowned battle-song, ‘Förråras ej, da lilla hop.’ The number of Swedish hymn-writers is not great. Of the 15 who wrote within the 16th and 18th centuries the greatest was Johan Olaf Wallin.


(1779-1839). In 1819 he published *Den svenska Psalmbooken av Konungen gislad och stansfattad* ("The Swedish Hymn-book, approved and confirmed by the King"), which is still in common use throughout the country. To it he contributed about 150 original hymns, besides translations and revisions.

In 1837 there was published at Rostock, in the Danish language, *Een nyt Håndbog*, and *Psalmier af aendelige Sange*, written off then helige Skrift ("A new Hymnbook, with Psalms and Spiritual Songs of Praise", derived from Holy Writ). This contained translations from the Latin, German, and Swedish, and some originals. Its principal author was Claus Martensen Tondel-binder (1809-70); and it was the hymnbook of the Danish and Norwegian Lutherans for more than a century. In 1863, Thomas Kingo, bishop of Funen, whose *Aendelige Sjusage-chor* ("Spiritual Choral-Songs") had attracted attention, was commissioned to prepare a new hymnbook for the churches in both countries. The first part appeared in 1869; it contained many of Kingo's own compositions, and was greatly admired by some, while others, of the Pietistic school, unsatisfactorily decried it as rationalistic. The controversy was so violent that the completion of the book was entrusted to a committee, who, however, worked on its lines, and included many of his hymns. The resultant *Forordet af kilke-Pietistisk-Bog* ("Authorised New Church Hymn-book"), in its complete form, appeared in 1869. Several attempts were made to supplant it by collections on Pietistic lines. Especially noteworthy was *Salmebog* (New Hymnbook) edited in 1740 by Eric Pontoppidan. This contained a large number of hymns, both original and translated, by Hans Aclof Bronson, bishop of Ribe, whose views were definitely Pietistic. Another attempt in the same direction was made by N. H. Balle, bishop of Seeland, who in 1767 produced a revision of Kingo's book under the title *Evangelisk-Kristiog Salmebog* ("Evangelical Christian Hymn-book"). The attempt failed, however, because of the feebleness of the verse; and more than half a century passed before any real improvement was effected. This at length was brought about, mainly through the influence of Nicolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783-1872). This eminent scholar, true poet, and fervent evangelist waged war for many years against the prevailing Rationalism and Einaudism among the national Church, and suffered accordingly. While under ecclesiastical suspension he wrote and compiled *Sang-Vårk til danke Kirke* ("Song-Work for the Danish Church"). His moral influence at length prevailed so far that his worth was appreciated, and steps were taken to prepare a new *Salmebog til Kirke og Hus-Andtgift* ("Hymn-book for Church and House Worship"). This was sanctioned for general use in 1853, having been edited by the poet Bernhard Severin Ingemann (1758-1862). It was based on the old book of Kingo, but contained many hymns by Bronson, Grundtvig, and Ingemann.

It is closely bound to Denmark by political relations. For a long time the only hymn-book in use there was the *Graduale or Mess-sang-bok* ("Mass-Song-Book"), consisting of translations from the Old Norse of a few of the earlier hymns of Martinson's collection. The last edition is dated 1773. Since then local translations of the Danish books have been in use. In 1851, Thorsen of Roskilde issued *Ny stor og aendelig Salmebog* ("New Contributions to the Evangelical Psalm-book"), much on the lines of the Danish book of 1855.

Norway, until 1814, had been politically united with Denmark; and Danish hymn-books, or revisions of such books in modernised language, have been in common use—the churches allowing themselves considerable freedom. The books now most in use are *Kirke-Salme-Bog* ("The Church Hymnbook"), edited on the basis of older books by Magnus B. Landstad, and authorized in 1869; and *Christelige Psalmier til Haus og Uebel* ("Christian Hymns for Domestic Worship and for Use in Schools"), published in 1851 by Johan Nikolai Frantzén. A very large proportion of the Scandinavian hymns are translated from German Lutheran authors. The older hymns are generally doctrinal or invocative; those of later date are rather subjective, expressing personal sentiments, hopes, and fears. As to the characteristics of individual singers, it is commonly said that 'Kingo is the poet of Easter, Bronson of Christmas, and Grundtvig of Whitsunfeast.'

4. French hymn-books. — The earliest known French hymn-book was printed in 1527. It was entitled *Hymnes communs de l'année*, and consisted of translations of Latin hymns by Nicolas Maunoy. In 1533 appeared the *Motel d'une dame pittoresque*, by Marguerite de Navarre, which was appended by sectarian collections, by Clément Marot, of the Creed, Lord's Prayer, Ave Maria, Grace before Meals, etc. Between this date and 1567 nine small books of Hymn-music were published, containing arias, canons, ballads, and paraphrases of Scripture. Meanwhile, in 1542, Marot published his 50metrical Psalms, which, being sung to ballad tunes, became widely fashionable. In hope of suppressing these, several other volumes of devout songs were produced by Huguenot writers, such as Nicolas Denisot, Charles de Navères, Etienne de Mainz Fleur; but none of them were designed for public worship. The Reformed Church in France, as in Germany and elsewhere, limited its church-song to Biblical Psalms and Canticles. Various writers, therefore, sought to supply what was lacking in Marot's work; and in 1560 a complete Psalter was published in Paris, consisting of Marot's versions, with others by Gilles d'Aurigay, Robert Brinoulé, C. R., and Cl. B. This was generally supplanted by the Psalter printed at Clermont Montet Théodore de Bess, 1562. Of this at least 24 editions were printed within the year, at Paris, Caen, Lyons, Genoa, and other places. Until the early years of the 18th cent., this Psalter alone was used in the public worship of the Reformed Church; and beyond the bounds of that community its influence has been far wider than that of any other metrical Psalter.

The Lutheran Church in France, besides using the Psalter, made free use of translations of the best German hymns. *Psalmes, hymnes et cantiques... mis en rime française selon la maniére allemande*, Frankfort, 1612, contains 68 hymns or paraphrases. Successive enlargements or developments of this book appeared under various titles in the 17th and 18th centuries, that of 1759 having 381 pieces. The rigidity of the Reformed Church also gave way in 1705, when Benedict Pictet published *Cinqante-quatre cantiques sacrés pour les principes civilisés*. Twelve of these were authorized for use in public worship, while an appendix to the Psalter throughout the Reformed Church. Some of them are among the finest hymns in the French language.

The French Roman Catholic hymnists of the 17th cent. are not numerous. *La Philomèle séraphique*, by Jean l'Evangeliste, 1632, consisted of hymns of
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This seems a fitting place to mention a group of French Roman Catholic poets of the 17th and early 18th centuries, who wrote in Latin, and whose hymns are to be found in the Parisian Library of 1736 and other Gallican Breviaries. The foremost of them in merit is Charles Coffin (1678-1749); he must be ranked Jean Baptiste de Santeuil (1639-1697) and his elder brother Edme, both of whom are honoredly associated with Gaullist tradition. The spiritual poems of Vittoria Colonna (1490-1547) were highly esteemed, but there is no evidence that they were ever used in public worship.

From this time to later in the same century, no religious poet of eminence arose in Italy. But in 1888, Matteo Cofarea, a priest of Florence, edited a collection of about 350 hymns, under the title Corona di sacre canzoni, or Laude spirituali di più divoti autori. The author’s names are not stated.

This is the earliest known Italian hymn-book.

Bernardo Adimari, a priest of the Oratory of San Filippo Neri, was the author of 212 hymns, published at Florence in 1739.

The most noteworthy of these is Cantiques populaires, which with its supplemental contains upwards of 60 translations of English and American ‘revival hymns.’

An undeniational hymn-book with music, appeared in Paris in 1834, under the title of Chants chrétiens, edited by Henri Lutteroth. Its aim was to collect the best hymns of the older poets, as Racine, Pascal, Bossuet, Voltaire, together with others of recent date. It was much modified in successive editions, assuming its final shape, with 200 hymns, in 1857. Its influence has been wide and beneficial. Tracts have been sung with numerous of great merit. Its chief blemish is that it is too didactic—an unusual fault in French hymnody. Which is, for the most part, intensely subjective. French, Corneli, rarely or never have the strength of good German or English poetry; but the best of them have much sweetness and tenderness, while some are highly picturesque, and others of delightful simplicity.

5. Italian hymns.—The religious revival initiated by St. Francis of Assisi in the 13th cent. called forth a number of religious songs in the Veronese and Umbrian dialects, some of which were sung by the Flagellants in their processions. Towards the end of the century Jacopo da Todi (to whom is usually attributed the ‘Seiati Mater dolores’) wrote many vernacular songs extolling the divine love, which, though never used in the regular church services, were much sung during the two following centuries by members of the religious orders. Towards the middle of the 16th cent. G. Savonarola wrote Hymnus de Praise and Contemplation, which, however, were not suited for use in public worship. Two of his contemporaries, Maffei Balotti and Girolamo Beneveniti, wrote hymns which were widely known and used. The spiritual poems of Vittoria Colonna (1490-1547) were highly esteemed, but there is no evidence that they were ever used in public worship.

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served in MSS. of the 14th and 15th centuries, some of them of no little merit, they are all—except a few of them—too elegant to have been used in public worship. The earliest printed English hymns are probably those in Marshall's Primer of 1536 and the Saram Primer of 1538. These are translations from the Latin, and their verses are in the form of the Latin antiphon.

The first English hymn-book, properly so called, is the Goodye Psalmes and Spirituall Songs of Miles Coverdale, 1539. It contains 41 pieces, all of which, except one or two, are adaptations from the German—17 being from Luther. There are versions of 13 Psalms, the 'Magnificat,' 'Nunc DIMITTIS,' 'Gloria in excelsis,' the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments. Efforts were made to suppress this book, but in 1545 Henry VIII. authorized a new Primer, which contained 8 hymns, smoother in versification than the former primers. In the Creamer is believed to have had a hand, and it was his desire that English versions of the old Church hymns should have a place in the projected new service-books. It is thought that the influence of Calvin and Bucer had to do with the abandonment of this project.

During the interval between the death of Henry and the accession of Elizabeth the 'old version' of the Swiss liturgy was used. The chief contributors were Thomas Sternhold, John Hopkins, Thomas Norton, William Kethe, and William Whittingham. To several successive editions a few hymns were prefixed or appended: the complete edition of 1569 has 23, including 'The Lamentation of a Sinner' and the earliest known non-Roman Communion hymn in the English language, 'The Lord be thanked for His Gifts.' The next really significant hymnological publication is the Guide and Godlie Ballaties, which bears the same relation to the Reformation in Scotland as Coverdale's Goodye Psalmes does to that in England. The principal, not the only, authors were the brothers John and Robert Woodburne, clergymen of Dundee, who became exiles on account of their Protestant principles. The earliest editions have been entirely perished, and their date is matter of conjecture; the oldest known perfect copy was printed at Edinburgh in 1578, with the title An Eopenhous Book of godlie Psalmes and spirituall Songs concernyng Christ and his contayners. Besides the 22 metrical Psalms, 8 Scripture paraphrases, the Creed, 34 hymns, 8 graces, and 43 ballads, some devotional and some satirical. More than a fourth of the whole is translated from the German, and a few pieces are borrowed or adapted from Coverdale. Several of the devotional ballads are remarkable for their beauty and tenderness, while the satirical pieces, some of them coarse as well as humorous, attack the Roman Catholic clergy with considerable vigour.

It may seem surprising that, of about 130 English writers of religious verse in the latter half of the 16th century, scarcely any connect themselves with the worship-song of the Church. The explanation lies in the fact that—largely, no doubt, through the Calvinistic influence brought to bear upon the formative period of the English Book of Common Prayer—only the sonorous and noble form was allowed for hymns in public worship, an injunction of the first year of Elizabeth granting merely that 'in the beginning, or in the end of the Common Prayer, either the Psalms of David or other Psalms may be sung; or, such like song, to the praise of Almighty God.' It was not until the revision of 1661-92 that the insertion, after the thirdcollect at morning, of the 23rd Psalm, was made, and the anthem opened the way, even though slowly taken, to a true hymnody. In modern times a few English hymns have come into common use, e.g., the earliest original English morning hymn, 'You that have spent the evening in the Holy of the holies, and the delightful 'Jerusalem, my happy home,' of which the author, 'F. B. P.' has not been satisfactorily identified.

Between the death of Elizabeth and the outbreak of the Civil War the conditions were much the same; and the sacred poets of the day, such as John Donne, George Herbert, and Phineas Fletcher, for the most part offered no contributions to public worship. Their devout lyrics have found a place in modern hymn-books. A few attempts were made to supplant the Sternhold and Hopkins Psalter, but with little success. The very meritorious version of George Sandys failed to win the public ear; that of William, Earl of Stirling, though put forth in the name of King James, had no better success; and the faithful but indubitably harsh version of Henry Ainsworth found favour only with the Separatists.

To this period, however, belongs the first really great English hymn-writer, George Wither (1588-1667). His poetical works, sacred and secular, are numerous. His noble version of the Psalms has been undeservedly neglected. His Hymns and Songs of the Church was printed in 1629, with 'the particular approbation both of the king and of all persons that diet in church worship,' but the chief of the publishers, I. W. Company, frustrated the intentions of the king and clergy, and practically suppressed the book. It contained all the OT and NT Canticles, the Song of Songs, the Lamentations, versions of the Lord's Prayer and 'Ven Creator,' and 44 original hymns for various ecclesiastical seasons and special occasions. In 1641, Wither published Malabarish, or Britton's Second Remembrancer, with a dedication to the Parliament, his sympathies being at that time on the popular side. The book contained 233 hymns, classified as occasional, temporary, and personal; 22 of them were taken from the former book, often with alterations which are not always improvements.

The Sternhold and Hopkins Psalter had become unacceptable to the Puritans, not because of its rugged versification, but because it was not, in their opinion, sufficiently close to the original. They conceived the impossible idea of a literal translation from the Hebrew in an English metre that could be sung, and in the Scottish dialect. There were 22 metrical Psalms, 8 Scripture paraphrases, the Creed, 34 hymns, 8 graces, and 43 ballads, some devotional and some satirical. More than a fourth of the whole is translated from the German, and a few pieces are borrowed or adapted from Coverdale. Several of the devotional ballads are remarkable for their beauty and tenderness, while the satirical pieces, some of them coarse as well as humorous, attack the Roman Catholic clergy with considerable vigour.

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Between the fall of the Monarchy and the Revolution several poets produced lyrics which, though not designed for use in worship, were utilized by later compilers of hymn-books. Such were Henry Vaughan, Richard Crashaw, and John Quarles. There were also at least three genuine hymnists: William Blacklock has been unaccountably neglected, Samuel Crossman, and John Mason, whose best productions are still deservedly popular. Mention must also be
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made of two rhymesters, whose verses are undistinguishable doggerel, but who did excellent work as pioneers. Abraham Cheare, a Baptist minister of Plymouth, who died in prison in 1668, is the first known English author of hymns for children. Robert Blyth had been set at the pillory for seeking to propagate his opinions through the press. His Spiritual Melody (1691) is poor; but by it, and by a couple of vigorous pamphlets, he practically broke down the prejudice with which the art then existed among Baptists against singing in public worship.

In 1699 was printed the first edition, unauthorized and incorrect, of Bishop Thomas Ken's Morning and Evening Hymns. It was the first book written for the scholars of Winchester School, they have won an abiding place in the esteem of all English-speaking Christendom. Ken's other hymns, for the festivals of the Church, were a posthumous publication, and have been little regarded.

At the time of the Revolution the Psalms of Sternhold and Hopkins, already archaic, were still almost exclusively used in the Anglican Church; the well-meaning attempts of W. King, John Patrick, John Denham, and others had totally failed to supplant them; and the noble versions of Sanders and Warburton, and the popular Carey, were not published until 1698. A New Version, by Nahum Tate and Nicholas Brady, was put forth under royal patronage, and soon became immensely popular. Its one merit is that, smooth and unimpeachable, it is an easy taste of the day. For 150 years it held the field against all rivals; at present about half-a-dozen of the psalms of the 'New Version' continue in use, the most popular being the 34th and the 67th.

In 1712, the General Assembly of Presbyterianism after the Revolution, the General Assembly considered the question of an authorized appendix to the Scottish Psalms. A year later, a letter from Robert Lyon to John Dunlop, of Edinburgh, six books of Spiritual Songs or Holy Poems, consisting of versified parables of all the poetical parts of Scripture except the Psalter. The work is of a dogmatic, solstitial character, the rendering being fairly close, without that rigidity which marked the Scottish and New English Psalms. In 1663, Simonson being Moderator, the Assembly appointed R. Cohn also a Moderator, to write a version of the Scottish Songs; but the business was delayed year after year, and in the end nothing was done, so that the Scottish Psalms continued in exclusive use for about two more years.

Among English Nonconformists the manuals of Church Song chiefly in use were the Scottish Psalms, a revision of the New English Psalter, and, occasionally, Baxter's. During the last decade of the century several ministers—Robert Fletching, Joseph Boys, Thomas Shepherd, Richard Davis, and Joseph Stennett—produced hymns for the use of their own congregations, some of which found wider, though very limited, acceptance. Nearly all these hymns are personal rather than congregational; and most of them are more Calvinistic theology in rhyme. The first selection of hymns for Nonconformist worship of which we have found any trace was published in 1694 under the title A Collection of Divine Hymns upon several Occasions. To this seven authors contributed, among whom were John Boys, Richard Baxter, and Thomas Shepherd. The next selection, Matthew Henry's Family Hymns (1690), consisted entirely of cantos from various metrical versions of the Psalms.

In 1697 Henry presented a list of objections to the metrical form, and was challenged to produce something better. The next Sunday the spirited paraphrase 'Behold the Glories of the Lamb Amidst His Father's throne' was 'lined out,' to the delight of the worshippers. The young man was Isaac Watts, in after years renowned as pastor, philosopher, and poet. In 1707 he published Hymns and Spiritual Songs, in Three Books, containing 223 pieces, which in the second edition had been increased to 360. These were followed in 1715 by Divine and Moral Songs for the Use of Children; and in 1719 by The Psalms of David imitated in the Language of the New Testament. Other publications, in the same volume, were followed; and Watts's various works contain at least 750 hymns, of which nearly 200 are still in common use. Before his death, in 1748, fifteen or sixteen editions of his hymns had been circulated; and for many years the years of their use, with or without a supplement, was almost universal among Congregationalists and Baptists. His meditative hymns are not usually superior to those of Cowman, Ken, and Mason; but in hymns of praise fitted for united utterance he has no superior and few equals. His theology is in the main Puritan, without the Puritan rigidity and intolerance.

Watts was the first who could be deemed the founder of a distinct school of English hymn-writers. Among his followers may be reckoned, in addition to a multitude of inferior rhymers, Simon Brown (1680-1728), Philip Doddridge (1702-1751), Charles Wesley (1707-1788), Thomas Gifford (1712-58), Thomas Gibbons (1725-83), Samuel Stennett (1737-1806), and Samuel Hinton (1784-1835). The influence of Watts extended into Scotland. In the hymns of John William (c. 1750), and in the Spiritual Songs of John Erskine (1726), he is plagiarized almost as directly as in Watts's own books. The Translations and Paraphrases prepared by a committee of the General Assembly in 1774, 49 of 51 pieces, are based on Watts and on Doddridge, the last 12 or basis of the Translations, even to the praiseful or unison parts. The most successful of these alterations is the fine paraphrase transmitted from one of Watts's best known hymns—'How bright those glorious spirits shine.'

Of writers more or less contemporary with Watts, but outside the sphere of his influence, we may mention John Dryden (1631-1701), who is believed to have translated from the Latin most of the hymns which appear in the Roman Catholic Primer of 1706; Nahum Tate (1711-1801), already mentioned, the chief author of these hymns and alternative versions which appeared as supplements to published works. Matthew Prior (1664-1721); Samuel Wesley the elder (1730-1816), and Joseph Scott (1765-176), most of whose hymns are strongly Calvinistic.

We come next to the greatest of all English hymn-writers, Charles Wesley (1707-1783), the poet of the Methodist revival. The exact number of his hymns is doubtful, because of an arrangement with his brother John (1703-1761) that in works for which they were jointly the author, the name of John should not be distinguished. The poetical publications of the two brothers number 62 distinct issues, ranging from single leaflets to stent volumes, 9 of which include pieces by other authors. In the lowest estimate these works contain 4395 hymns by the Wesleys. Of these 100, including all those translated from the German, are certainly the work of John, while of 225 the authorship is uncertain; so that 2970 pieces at least may be ascribed to Charles. His general tone is strongly Arminian. At least 500 of Charles Wesley's hymns are in use in the Methodist Churches, and a large proportion of them are equally valued in other communions. The unapproachable greatness of Charles Wesley seems to have had a repressive influence on hymn-writers. Christ Church, Oxford, has a collection of 1400 volumes of hymn-books, and is perhaps the richest repository of hymn-books of all denominations. A large number of these are dedicated to Charles Wesley; indeed, no other hymn-writer, with the exception of Thomas Olivers, is so fully remembered by the great hymn, 'The God of Abraham praise.'

A difficulty to the argument is represented by a succession of writers who seem to have derived their inspiration from the Moravian Brethren. The German Moravian hymns are too often characterized by a kind of uniformness, with a sort of sonorousness, and the same feature is found, in a mitigated form, in many English hymns of the same denomination. John Gainsdon (1747-1771), sometimes called Stenton Harcourt, and afterwards Monseigneur, bishop, edited the great Hymn-book of 1754, containing 1153...
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Hymns of the Children of God in all Ages, which, expurgated and revised, furnished most of the material of Moravian hymn-books till quite recent times. Its influence is evident in the hymns of John Cennick (1718-53), of James Allen (1764-1804), of Walter Shirley (1725-58), and of Jonathan Evans (1740-1809). Other Moravian hymns are also found in the works of Augustus Montague Toplady (1740-78) (‘Rocks of Ages, call for me’); but they are modified by his militant Calvinism.

The first edition of the Olney Hymns was published in 1779, the joint work of William Cowper (1731-1800) and John Newton (1725-1807). The romance of Newton’s adventurous youth, and the pathetic story of Cowper’s intermittent insanity, are well known; the effect of each on their respective contributions is easily traceable. The features common to both resemble those of J. Mason; Cowper is remarkable for his tenderness, and occasionally for expressions or thoughts that seem suggestive of Moravian sources; Newton is sometimes gloomy, and sometimes descends to mere doggerel, but at his best he exhibits a strength and joyousness to which his colleague is a stranger. His hymns number 250, of which 50 or 60 are still in use; Cowper produced 60 (besides his translations from Stocholm, of which nearly half have a place in modern hymn-books). To the Olney may be referred Thomas Hauis (1732-1820), John Flavell (1740-1817), John Ryland (1753-1826), and many others of lesser note.

A few writers of the 18th cent., who cannot be classed with any particular school, are remembered as the authors of single hymns; while the rest of these latter, however good, are all largely forgotten. Such are Robert Seagrave (1693-1750) (‘Rise, my Soul, and stretch thy wings’); James Fanch (1704-67) (‘Beyond the glittering starry skies’); John Bakewell (1721-1819) (‘Hail, Thou once despised Jesus!’); Edward Pernott (1726-92) (‘All hail the power of Jesus’ name!’); and Robert Robinson (1735-90) (‘Come, Thou Fount of every blessing’).

Two small sects which originated in Scotland about the middle of the 18th cent. yielded hymns of some literary interest. Among the Christian Societies of Scotland, the latest is the One Hundred and Sixty-five’s; and a number of hymns were produced by Robert Sibbald. Of similar importance is the Society of the Holy Name. The hymns of the latter are especially designed for secular tunes; and this idea was still more vigorously carried out by John Barclay (1734-98), the leader of the Berens. Some of Barclay’s hymns, set to familiar Jacobite and other Scottish tunes, possess real beauty. Similar adaptations occur in A Collection of Spiritual Songs, published in 1761 by John Geddes, a Roman Catholic clergyman. Here, too, may be mentioned the Christian Hymns, Poems, and Sacred Songs of James Reilly, the Universalist (1729-58), published in 1777; these display a good deal of rugged vigour.

It seems fitting to notice also some of the more important selections of hymns that appeared in the 18th cent. The first of any note offered to the Church of England seems to have been the Collection of Psalms and Hymns, 70 in number, published in London in 1717. This excited little interest, and was not reprinted. More important was George Whitefield’s Collection of Hymns for Social Worship (1735). The hymns were mostly from Watts and Wesley, often freely altered, and some compiled by an Anglican clergyman, were chiefly used in ‘Tabernacles’ and Meeting-houses for Nonconformist or undenominational worship. This collection passed through many editions, the last being dated 1781. Martin Madsen’s Collection of Psalms and Hymns (1760) had a great influence on subsequent developments of hymnody, chiefly through his very skilful alterations and corrections. Other collections were those of Drye (1761), R. Conyers (1767), Richard de Courcy (1779), and Toplady (1779). All these editors were Anglican clergymen of the Evangelical type, and the tone of their books was distinctly Calvinistic. So were the various collections used in the Continent of Europe from 1735 till 1780, when they were displaced by her own Select Collection. A strong Evangelical Arminianism, on the other hand, pervaded the selections made by John Rippon (1761), and the General Baptist Hymn-book (1776) and Dan Taylor’s (1793) were just as distinctively Arminian. The Scottish Baptist books also deserve notice: the collection made by Sir William Sinclair of Keiss (1761) and A Collection of Christian Songs and Hymns (Glasgow, 1796).

The growth first of Arminianism and then of Socinianism in the English Presbyterian Churches necessitated a special provision for worship. This was usually made by eliminating from the hymns of orthodox writers all allusion to the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement. The earliest selection made on this principle was published in London in 1727; but it not till 1790 that such books appeared at various places before the close of the century; one of them, by William Enfield (Warrington, 1778), proved to be ‘unmixed with the disputed doctrines of any sect.’ Most of these books contain little that could not be sung by a pious Jew or Muhammadan.

The earlier years of the 19th cent. were barren of new or striking hymns; but before long these burst forth such a flood of sacred melody as England had never heard before. It is quite impossible to review, within any reasonable limits, the production of the English and Scottish hymnologists of the century, of whom more than 550 are enumerated between 1800 and 1890. A few points may be briefly noted.

1. The large number of women writers who produced not merely sentimental, but genuine hymns of lasting worth. Prominent among them are Cecil Frances Alexander (1823-90) (‘The golden gates lift up their heads’), Sarah Flower Adams (1803-88) (‘Nearer, my God, to Thee’), Charlotte Elliot (1799-1871) (‘Just as I am, without one plea’), Frances Ridley Havergal (1836-79) (‘Take my life, and let it be’), Adelaide Anne Procter (1825-64) (‘The way is long and dreary’), and Anna Letitia Waring (1823-91) (‘My heart is resting, O my God’). Others have displayed remarkable skill as translators, especially from the German, as Jane Borthwick (1815-97), Frances Elizabeth Watson (1823-96), and Catherine Winkworth (1829-78). Others, again, are unrivalled in adapting themselves to the capacities of children, e.g., Cecil Frances Alexander (‘There is a land far away’), Jane E. Leeson (1807-82) (‘Saviour, teach me day by day’), and Jennie Luke (1813-1906) (‘I think when I read that sweet story of old’).

2. The appearance, for the first time, of really good hymns for children, child thought in child language. Isaac Watts had led the way, but for two generations he had no followers. Even
Charles Wesley's efforts in this direction were far from being a complete success; his famous "Gentle Jesus, meek and mild," needed explaining, to make it intelligible to children. But Jane Taylor (1738-1824) and her sister, Ann Gilbert (1732-1806), understood child nature; and, though sometimes chided in theology, their songs for children usually excelled those of Watts as far as his did the efforts of Abraham Cheare. The path they opened up was worthily followed not only by C. F. Alexander and Jennifer Locke, but by John Newton (1725-1807), John Wesley, H. W. Neale (1815-66). Among these may be associated a few Roman Catholics, especially Edward Caswall (1814-78). The foremost translator of the late Latin hymns of the Dominicans was Isaac Watts (1674-1748), first urged on public attention by J. M. Neale, and his versions are still most in favour; but many others have been effectively translated by John Brownlie.

The early anthologies, and revival hymns, mostly subjective or hortatory, and many of them set to the tunes of popular songs. These became common in connexion with the great religious revival of 1842, and were augmented about 1873 by hymns of a more humanitarian origin. Some of them were valuable, but many were sentimental and, when judged by strict canons, not always in the best of taste. It must be owned, however, that the Anthologia of this class, used in evangelical bodies, like the Salvation Army, have often availed to call forth genuine religious emotions in persons of the most degraded type. The hymn-books of the 19th cent. are literally innumerable. No fewer than 160 were compiled for use in the Anglican Church alone between 1800 and 1860, to which in the next 30 years 90 more were added. The use of many was merely local, while others are fairly representative of distinct schools of thought within the Church. Of the collections in use prior to 1850 by far the greatest number represented the Evangelical school; and it is estimated that these were used in nearly three-fourths of the English parish churches. The most popular books of this class were William Mercer's Cathedral Psalter and Hymn Book (1804), Charles B. Sneyd's Songs of Grace and Glory (strongly Calvinistic, 1879), and Edward H. Bickersteth's Hymnal Companion (1876, revised 1876). Of the later Hymn Books of the High Church type was Hymns Ancient and Modern (1861, revised 1875; a reissue 1899; another revision 1904), which has become the most popular of all English hymn-books. To the same school belong William Cooke and Benjamin Horden's The Churchman's Aid (1854), Hymns (1871, revised 1903). To the advanced Church party belong The Hymnal Noted (1852), with its many supplements, James Skinner's Daily Service Hymnal (1858). Hymns (1857), Hymns Ancient and Modern (1861), revised 1875; a reissue 1899; another revision 1904), which has become the most popular of all English hymn-books. To the same school belong William Cooke and Benjamin Horden's The Churchman's Aid (1854), Hymns (1871, revised 1903). To the advanced Church party belong The Hymnal Noted (1852), with its many supplements, James Skinner's Daily Service Hymnal (1858).
HYMNS (Modern Christian)

than that year. Two Universalist collections were published in 1792; Lutheran and Unitarian collections in 1795; the first Congregational selection and the National in 1796, were by English authors. In 1838, the most extensively used hymn-books of the Episcopal, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, Congregational, and Reformed Churches, published between 1836 and 1880, less than 14 per cent of the hymns are of American origin.

Until the great religious revival which commenced in America about 1858, and extended over a large part of English-speaking Christendom, very few hymns of American authors were included in English collections. Since that time, however, many have gained great popularity, especially hymns embodying the Gospel call, hymns of aspiration, and such as relate to the future life. A common fault of American hymns is a too great tendency towards sentimentalism; and many of them seem to owe their popularity to the light singing of the tunes.

8. Welsh hymns.—There is some evidence of use in the Early British Church, of hymns in the native language; but no specimens remain, and by the time Protestantism arose the apathy of the Church had apparently given the gift of composing hymns. Early in the 17th century, the celebrated Vicar of Llandyfriog, Rees Pritchard, published a volume of religious poems, largely didactic, entitled Cantedig y Cywyngor ("The Welshman's Cup"), portions of which were commonly sung as hymns. It became immensely popular, was many times reprinted, and its influence is not yet extinct. In 1621 Archdeacon Williams, F.R.S., produced his metrical version of the Psalms, which is still in use, though partially supplanted by the more modern version of William Morris. Skill in poetical composition is so widely diffused among Welsh-speaking people that the number of hymn-writers is very great, while the peculiarity of family names makes them somewhat difficult to distinguish. Two poets of the 17th cent., Rowland Vaughan (c. 1620-58) and Ellis Wyn (1670-1734), are held in immortal remembrance, each by a single hymn. As early as 1703 a collection of sacred hymns was published by Thomas Baddy, a dissenting minister. A few years later, 1707, Charles Wesley, the celebrated educationalist, Griffith Jones of Llanddowror (1683-1731), but it is not certain whether it included any of his own compositions.

The great outflow of Welsh sacred song began with the religious revival initiated by the early Calvinistic Methodists, in whose ranks are the greatest of all Welsh hymnists, William Williams of Pantycelyn (1717-91), his contemporary David Williams, Morgan Rhys (+ 1776), and Ann Gruffyth (1776-1805). Outside that circle we find the names of David Jones of Caio, who in 1763 translated into Welsh Watts's Psalms, and afterwards his Divine Songs. He was a Congregationalist, as was Ieuan Thomas of Rhaeadr (fl. 1779-86), many of whose hymns are still in use. The great hymn-writer among the Unitarians was Edward Williams, 1718-78, the founder of the Unitarian movement in Wales. The first Baptist hymn-book in Wales was compiled by Joseph Harris, called "Gomer," in 1812; it contained many of his originals.

The best striking characteristics of Welsh hymnody are depth of emotion and abundant use of metaphor—every kind of natural object being enlisted for the illustration of things spiritual. The hymns are in general long, and the doxology, the Benediction, or the Last Supper, is the subject.
HYMNS (Egyptian).—The religious literature of ancient Egypt is fairly prolific in the department of hymnology, and a considerable amount of religious poetry has been preserved and translated. In these, it cannot be said that the quality is on the same level with the quantity. To a great extent the hymns which have survived bear the stamp, not of a genuine personal religious feeling on the part of the writer, as in the case of our own best hymns, but of a merely official and stereotyped attitude towards the deities whose praises are celebrated. Religion in Egypt, as we know it, was far too much of a business of caste-ridden ritual to leave much room for any natural outpouring of thoughts and feelings of devotion and affection. If there were such outpourings, they were probably not on account of the great gods, whose position was infinitely removed from that of the ordinary worshipper, but rather of some of the minor deities, whom, as we know the common people of Egypt took to their hearts in particular, are frequent and unpretentious figures of the great gods and goddesses. Such effusions were not at all likely to survive in any quantity in comparison with the stilted official odes which had the sanction of the priesthood, were multiplied in an infinity of copies, and were continually used for ritual purposes.

In the time of the New Empire, however, there were signs of a genuine feeling of impatience with the stereotyped formulae of the official religion, and one or two of the hymns which have survived from this period give us what is otherwise very unusual—the expression of a personal and living interest in religion. Thus, from a hieratic papyrus of this period we have the following:

'Amen-Ra, I love thee and unfold thee in my heart... I do not fear anxiety in my heart; what Amen-Ra saith cometh to pass.'

To the same period also belong a hymn which gives us one of the very few evidences that the devout Egyptian ever realized his own sinfulness: 'Christ, forgive me not,' says a writer whose poem is preserved in the Anastasi Papyrus, 'according to my sins.' A hymn to Thoth from the Sallier Papyrus presents another character, and contains an interesting nature of true religion totally alien to the beliefs of the upholders of the great religious cults of the nation, who emphatically seem to have thought that they would be heard for their much speaking:

'O thou sweet spring for the thirsty in the desert; it is closed for those who speak there; it is open for those who keep silence there. When the silent man cometh, he finds the spring.'

Such natural expressions of love, confidence, and inward intercourse with God are, however, quite exceptional in Egyptian hymnology. Taking the ordinary run of the hymns to the great gods, we find a constant repetition of the same cycle of ideas in practically the same phrase—a repetition which becomes wearisome, and gives a very poor idea of the song, which any genuine devotional feeling can have entered into Egyptian religious Erman's opinion (Life in Ancient Egypt, p. 389 f.) is amply justified:

'There seems to be no question of devotional feelings on the part of the singer; in fact, the greatest number of stilted phrases, which could be adapted to any of the mighty gods, have been used in adoration of the king.'

In fact, the average Egyptian hymn seems to have been constructed on a certain definite recipe. It was essential that the writer should say that the gods—Upper and Lower Egypt—Together show honour to the god, that his fear is in all lands, that he has subdued his enemies and received the dignity of his father, that he is praised by the great cycle of the gods, that all creatures are full of delight at his coming and adore his beauty, and so forth. All this belonged to any of the gods. In order to make the effort appear characteristic to Ra or Amen, there were added the name of the god in question, and perhaps one or two allusions to the myths associated with him and to the particular temple or town to which he was more or less attached; the result was a standard hymn which had this advantage, that with a few alterations it would do equally well for Ptah or Osiris.

Thus we have the following from a Hymn to Ra when he riseth (Papyrus of Nebhepet):

'Hymn to thee, O thou glorious being, thou who art dowered with all sovereignty... The regions of the north and south come to thee with homage, and send forth aclama-
tions as they riseth in the horizon of heaven... The goddess Nun doth homage unto thee, and the goddess Madu embracing thee at all times... The company of the gods rejoiceth at thy coming, the earth is glad when it beholdeth thy rays.'

Ani (Papyrus of Ani) can find nothing more original to say of the solar deity:

'Hymn to thee, O thou who hast come as Flappers, the creator of the gods... Thy mother Nut doth an act of homage unto thee with both her hands. The land of Manu receiveth thee with satisfaction, and the goddess Maat embraceth thee both as mora and ne.'

Osiris fares no better than Ra at the hands of his devout worshipper:

'Glory be to Osiris Unessef, the great god within Abydos, king of eternity, lord of the ever-living. He is the King of the North and South, and the white king, Lord of the throne of Nut, lord of the crowns of the north and south, lord of the white chaps, As prince of gods and of men he hath received the crook and the shepherd and the dignity of his divine father. Thou art crowned lord of Abydos and ruler in Abydos.'

The great bulk of Egyptian hymn literature consists of poems in praise of one or other of the three great gods, Ra, Amen, and Osiris.

1. Hymns to Ra.—A certain amount of real religious feeling was apparently awakened in the Egyptian mind by the contemplation of the rising and setting of the life-giving sun, and this was transferred to the Sun-god, though its expression is often very stilted.

'Hymn to thee,' says an interesting hymn in the Papyrus of H中介, 'O thou who art Ra when thou risest and Tum when thou settest; thou risest, thou risest, thou risest, thou risest, thou art crowned king of the gods... Thou didst not create the earth, thou didst not create man, thou didst not make the watery abyss of the sky, thou didst not form the Nile, thou didst not create the deep, and thou dost give light unto all that therein is... Thou art unknown as a god, but one thing is worthy to declare thy greatness: only thou thyself... Millions of years have gone over thee; all the gods, or at least of those through which thou hast passed. Thou didst pass over and travel through space requiring millions and hundreds of thousands of years; thou passest through the watery abyss and thou art revered thy way across the watery abyss to the place which thou lovest. Thou art in the midst of the moment of the hours, and thou dost sink down, and dost make an end of the hours.'

Thus Ra is here adored as the Creator, the Inexplicable, and the Eternal, and in this hymn, at least, there is a distinct vein of genuine poetical feeling in the description of the Sun-god's swift journey over space. But even in such hymns the constant reiteration of the creation formula and the endless repetition of the solar journey in the morning and evening boats become very tiresome.

One of the most important of the hymns to Ra is that series which is sometimes called the 'Litanies of Ra.' It exists in the form of a long text sculptured at the entrances of the royal tombs in the Valley of the Kings at Thebes. Its importance lies, not in its poetical merits, which are certainly far from great, but indeed, in the fact that throughout the hymn Ra is successively identified with 75 various gods or cosmic elements. They are all forms of the god, who, as primordial deity, exists still, and from whom emanate all the other gods, who are only his manifestations.

'Hymn to thee, Ra, supreme power, who dost ascend into the sphere of Amenet, his form is that of Tum. Hymn to
c. Hymns to Amen.—Next in importance to the Ra hymns come those addressed to Amen. Of these perhaps the best is that found in a hieratic papyrus (no. 44) in the British Museum. It contains, of course, the usual formulas, which belonged to Amen, as they belonged to Ra, to Osiris, or to any of the great gods, and were mere matter of habit, so many lines to be filled according to the usual recipe, such Chief of all the gods, Lord of truth, father of the gods, creator of beasts, maker of men, lord of existence, creator of fruit from things, maker of herbs, feeder of cattle, and it expressly identifies Amen, not only with Ra, but with Tum, Min, and Khepera. Yet it contains also here and there traces of that realization of divine power in the sustenance of living things which characterize Egyptian hymn-writing.

The verses, with their minute description of the divinity as the smallest creatures, suggest a far-off anticipation of Coleridge’s "I prayeth best who loveth best/ All things both great and small;/ For the dear God who loveth us/ He made and loveth all.”

At the same time, the writer’s sense, somewhat unusual, of moral quality in his god. To him, Amen is a god who "listens to the poor, who is in distress, gentle of heart when one cries to him, who has power over the crafty of the evil man from the vident, judging the poor, the poor and the oppressed, Lord of wisdom, whose precepts are wise, Lord of money most loving, at whose counsel men live.”

The pantetheistic tendency of Egyptian religious thought is clearly seen in the late hymn found in this same papyrus of Amen at the Oasis of Kharghes. The hymn is specifically addressed to Amen; but we find that the god is completely identified with the other great gods of Egypt: “I am the god of the earth, the god of the sky; I am the god who dwells in all things, the revealer who was from the beginning... I am the god of the earth... I am the revealer in truth.” This god is Amen, who is the only one who is present in all the gods.”

Hymns to Osiris.—Of all Egyptian hymns, those addressed to Osiris are perhaps the most disappointing. Here, anywhere, we should have expected to find the evidence of sincere religious feeling. For the cult of Osiris was one of the most popular and long-enduring of Egyptian cults, but so precisely because of the human elements in the life of Osiris, the sympathy which these created between him and his worshippers, and the ethical character of many of the beliefs regarding him. If any personal relationship existed between an Egyptian worshipper and any of the great gods, it is to be looked for in the Osiris cult. Yet, we find that the Osirian hymns we find, almost more than anywhere else, only the multiplication of bombastic and meaningless epithets.

The hymns to Osiris, sun of Min, son of Horus, son of Nut, son of Iunu, son of the horns, and don lean upon shigah pillar; to whom the crown was given, and joy before the nine gods. Great in power in Rosetta, a lord of might in Abydos, a lord of might in Zemrut, great of appearance in Abydos, before whom the great ones of power rose up upon his mats. To whom Upper and Lower Egypt come bowing, because his feet are so great and his might so powerful. This is the song of Amen (Zemrut, p. 49). This praise seems to find nothing to say of this most human god of all the gods. A certain amount of human feeling does, however, enter into the funeral hymn known as the "Lamentations of Isis and Nephthys", in which these goddesses are supposed to bewail the deceased Osiris:

- "Come to thy house, come to thy house, Osiris!... He is beautiful youth, coming to me... I am thy sister whom thou lovest; thou dost not abandon me... Come to thy house, come to thy house, Osiris, Osiris, Osiris!... I am thy sister whom thou lovest; thou dost not abandon me... Come to thy sister, come to thy sister, his house is in truth still... I call to thee and wist so that it is heard in heaven, but thou dost not hear my voice; and yet I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovest none beside me, my brother, my brethren, my kinsman, and dost not love me, but I am thy sister, whom thou lovest upon earth. Thou lovet
HYMNS (Greek and Roman).—I. GREEK.—The term σάρξ (first found in Hom. Od. viii. 429, and Hesiod, Works and Days, 637), of unknown and probably (like ὥραμα, ναός, δόρυ, etc.) non-Greek derivation, was applied to poems addressed to the gods, as σαμαίος was used to denote eulogies of human beings. In its widest sense it included such species as dithyrambs, odes, hymns, nomes, threnoi, etc.; but, according to the definition of the grammarians, it was appropriated to narratives of or addresses to divine personages, without dancing and without music, other than that of the cithara (Pindar, Chremonichth, p. 644, ap. Pho. Did. 320 A 12, Bekker: έκ 1νήδων δέ καθεσί τάυτα τοις υπερφερέντες τε καὶ τοις πρώτοις καὶ τα καλά τα φαινόμενα, φαινόμενα ἄνευ καθήλωσεν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς φανέοντες). It was convenient to distinguish Greek hymns according to their metre, since the character of the hymn varied materially with the metrical form.

1. Hesiodic hymns.—These originally constituted a kind of department of epos, and were in the hands of its executants, the rhapsodes. They were of different dimensions: some, such as the greater Homeric hymns (see below), were as long as a book of the Odyssey; others consisted of a few lines. The latter were known as χοιροί and were used by rhapsodes as a preface to their recitation (Find. Nom. ii. 1-3; Apoll. Tith. iii. 104, to the Homeric hymn to Apollo). The lay of Demodocus upon the loves of Ares and Aphrodite (Od. viii. 290-306) appears to be an imitation of a hymn of the first period; the first ten lines of Hesiod's Works and Days are the earliest specimens of the second. In the same poem (604 ff.) Hesiod says that he won a three-legged pot with ears at the wake of Amphidamas at Chaleis with a hymn; and a quotation from an unknown Hesiodic poem (fr. 386, Rasch) represents Hesiod and Homer competing at Delos with 'new hymns' to Apollo. Another hymn which we can refer to an early period is the χοιρός written by Kambyses of Corinth (8th cent.) for a Messenian pilgrimage to Delos. Two Doric hexameters are quoted by it from Pausanias, iv. xxiii. 2.

Hymns began with a formula of invocation—usually to the Muse: Μόης... δόθη δ' ἄφετος (Hes. Works and Days, 1 ff); Εὐρυπό τε Μόης, Δίς καὶ Μανθίνος τοῦ (Hym. Homer. in Herm. 1); ἄρης τε ἔρημα φῶς γίνοντες, Μόης (Hym. Homer. in Parn. 1) (this last opening was so frequent in the dithyramb as to give rise to a verb ὀμηνικοῖν [Suid. s.v.])—and ended with one of farewell and transition to another theme (λέγω, ματά, μετά χειρός [Zephos, v. 291]; τοῦ δ' ἄρχα μετεπεισθεὶ πρὸς [Æneas Dionysius, ap. Euth. 380]; καὶ πάντα ὑπὸ χειρός, σύν τε γεωργίαν, σύν τε καὶ ἐξ ἄρα μεταβαίνεις μέν [Hym. Homer. in Apoll. 145 ff.]).

The extant hexameter hymns may now be considered.

(a) Homeric hymns.—This name is applied to a collection of 22 poems handed down by the tradition of the rhapsodes with the hymns of Callimachus and Pindar and similar poetical literature (ed. A. Baumeister, Leipzig, 1860; A. Gemoll, do. 1877; E. Abel, do.).

1 It is possible, however, that σάρξ has arisen from φυσίς, and is connected with φυσώ, πάχος, etc. "to tell of, etc." (pass. of φύειν, φυεῖν; Brugmann, Gr. Gram., Munich, 1913, p. 88, and the ill. there cited).

2 This statement is confirmed by the hymnal language of Tuscarius, xvii. 1; Aristotle, Poet. 1. 22. 330 B 1; Theocritus, v. 33. 1; of Hesiod, ch. 15; Nonnus, xiv. 174, 182; Sapph. ap. Pho. 176, Ann. Poet. 16.
HYMNS (Greek and Roman)


By the hymnologists the collection of the eighth hymn (to Ares) and cannot at earliest be fixed much before the Christian era.

The hymns in the collection were on a large scale, and of them a short account may be given. The hymn to Dyonysus (No. 74) is said to have been composed by the neo-Orphic character of the eighth hymn (to Ares), and cannot at earliest be fixed much before the Christian era.

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HYMNS (Hebrew and Jewish)

literary quality, but they are quite meagre and frankly modern, and, like the Alexandrian epics in general, find their interest in their subject-matter alone. (c) Orphic hymns.—These poems (ed. G. Hermann, Leipzig, 1908; E. Abel, do. 1885), 88 in number, have nothing save the name in common with the older Orphic hymns and poems. They are supplementary to the Orphist religious literature. According to A. Dietrich (De hymnus Orphici, Marburg, 1891, p. 24), they are of different dates; the extremes are, on the one hand, the allegorizing dithyrambs; on the other hand, the briefest and most incisive inscriptions (A.D. 100-150) in which the hymns are quoted (see also Petersen, Philologus, xxvii. [1888] 385-431).

(d) Hymnus of Proutus.—This philosopher, the head of the Academy († A.D. 438), composed, amongst his many other works, 8 hymns of a Neo-Platonic character (ed. A. Ludwig, Königsberg, 1886). Like the Orphic hymns, they are contained, for the most part, in the Stobaeus, amongst the Homeric hymns. Their literary value is not great.

(e) Hymnus xenon-stoicorum.—Among hexameter hymns which are no longer extant the following are the best known:

(1) Olen of Lycia wrote hymns to Eleutheria, Hera, and Achaim, which were in use at Delos. According to Pausania (ix. xxvii. 2), he was the oracle of the Lycia, which is not Greek, confirms their Lycian origin, and Lycia is the most probable source of the Apolline worship. It is remarkable, therefore, that Herodotus (vii. 114) mentions his hymn extant in his edition of the Apolline influence, viz. the legend of the Hyperborian tribe, which, as we have seen, is passed over in the Homeric hymn. As Suidas calls Olen xenon-stoicorum, we may infer that his hymn were in hexameters.

(2) Pampchos (Παμφόχος), whom Pausania (ix. xxvii. 2) puts between Olen and Orpheus, wrote hymns for the Athenian sacred family of the Lycomides, who had the hereditary function of performing worship to Demeter at Pitya in Attica. He wrote about Demeter, and perhaps also on other divinities. Two hexameters (on Zeus) are quoted in Philostorus, Hierocles, ib. 124, ch. 11, p. 536.

(3) The quotations of the hymns and hymnal poems which go under the name of Orpheus are collected by E. Abel, Orphica, Leipzig, 1885, pp. 224-251 (see also De hymnus Orphici, ii. Diels, Fragmenta der Vorschriften, Berlin, 1906-10, pp. 473-492). According to Clem. Alcr. (Strom. i. 21), the greater part of the Orphic corpus was composed by various hands in the 6th cent. A.D., although both the hymns and the poems were universally believed to be older than Homer. These hymns, like those of Pampchos, were written for the Lycomides for temple-worship at Pitya, and were used also at Eleusis. They were more devotional and less literary than the Homeric (Pausania, i. 12. 12), short and few in number (18), and appear incredible and anachronistic to the uninitiate (Menander, de Encom. v. 41). The poem dealing with the rape of Perssephono (fr. 209 cf.) illustrates this criticism, and, compared with the Homeric, shows the difference between the Orphic and the Homeric treatment of myth.

(4) Similar to the Orphic hymns were those of general, mythological nature. The most important are: Phaedo (60 D); a beautiful imitation (to Adonis) is inserted into Theocritus’s 16th Idyll; and the existence of many short ritual hymns in the classical period is inferred from imitations in drama by Adriani, Jachet, & k. klass. Philol., 1891, p. 213 ff.

2. Melic hymns.—The poem is as old as the Homeric (I. 473, xxvii. 201); the Aphabetos also (Eurip. Her. Furi. 607) and the Cretan minstrels of Delphi (Hymn. Hom. in Apoll. 519) sang a poem; and, if we took the word literally, would find the following material for the making of the hymns: Alceus, Alcmene, Anacreon, Castor, Lasus, Simonides (all in T. Bergk, Poetar lyr. Gr. 2, Leipzig, 1882, iii.), Findlar, and Bachylides, as well as Ion of Chios (ib. ii. 251, with a kind of elogia hymn to Dionysus) and Aristophanes (to Aret. ib. 300, of uncertain classification). All these, however, have perished, so far as direct tradition is concerned. A certain number of hymns or similar compositions have been preserved on stone; among these are Ilyiad’s poem on Aespleus (IG Pol. Ins. i. 690) of about 300 B.C., of unusual literary merit (see von Wissowa-Remmendorf, Ilyiad von Euthydme, Berlin, 1890); three hymns discovered by the French at Delphi (BCH xvii. [1894] 651, xviii. [1895] 71, xix. [1896] 39) by Araisamos, Cociheus, and Philodamus; a hymn sung by the Cretans (IG II. ii. 484, with commentary by Boanquet and Murray); a hymn to Aespleus (UB viii. 171 [3rd cent. A.D.]). See in general the article “Hymnen” by S. Heinach in Daremberg-Saglio, Lex. des ant. gr. et rom., Paris, 1896 ff., p. 357.

II. LATIN.—Hymns play a very small part in Latin literature. The aecumen, hymns of the Sibyls were not unintelligible even to the priests (Quintilian, i. vi. 40), exist only in a few quotations (see Tenföö-Schwabe, Gesch. der röm. Lit. 1, Leipzig, 1899, § 4). The hymns of the Fratres Arcates, however, are preserved in inscriptions first dug up in 1595 in the Via Cassareci, near Magliasa, on the road from Rome to Porto. They are edited in CIL vi. (1886) 2223 ff., and by Heinzen, Acta Fratrum Arcatium (Berlin, 1874).

In literature proper we may point out Ovid’s 34th poem (‘Diasme sumus in fade’) and his invocation of Venus (xxxvi. 11-16), and Horace’s Carmen sacr.

LATEINER.-Besides the sources mentioned in the article reference may be made to the usual Histories of literature, c.g. G. Baudard, Grundzüge der griech. Literaturgesch., Berlin, 1867, i. 246 ff., K. Sitt. Gesch. d. Litt., Munich, 1884, ii. 124 ff., 282 ff.

T. W. ALLEN.

HYMNS (Hebrew and Jewish).—It will for the present be best to adhere to the boundary line between Hebrewism and Judaism provided by the destruction of the Temple by the Romans, A.D. 70, and the consequent substitution of synagogue worship for that of the Jerusalem sanctuary by the Jewish leaders assembled at Jannia. We shall thus have to consider (1) the hymns embodied in the OT and the apocryphal and pseudographical writings, which stand in some degree of relation to the Hebrew Canaan, and (2) the hymns that appear in the Jewish liturgy and other literary sources belonging to synagogue times.

1. Hymns of the OT and Hebrew writings related to it.—The ancient Hebrews were endowed with a high degree of poetical sensitiveness which often showed itself in quite literary utterance reflecting the inward emotion with wonderful force and vividness; and, as the select and most refined spirits among them were also pre-eminently gifted with religious feeling and intuition, it was only natural that their literary faculty should have exercised itself in strains of sacred song. Such song, moreover, though in each case naturally
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issuing from an individual spirit, generally expressed in the feeling and thought of the national or tribal circle to which the poet belonged; for the sense of communal oneness, which is to the present day a marked characteristic of the Jewish diaspora, was the strongest among the Hebrews than among any of the nations surrounding them, and the religious poet, as a rule, gave genuine utterance to the emotions which at the moment swayed the community to which he belonged, or we are supposed to have swayed it in the historical period which his song was intended to celebrate.

The three outstanding national songs of victory inducted by some of the most gifted poets of the race are the Song of Deborah (Judg. 5), which critic generally admit to be the earliest source for the history of the events which it celebrates; the Song at the Red Sea (Ex 15), which, though apparently composed in the time of the monarchy, may embody a nucleus from very ancient times; and the Song of Victory contained in 2 Sam 22 and Ps 18, supposed by some critics to be in part a genuine product of the Davidic age. The sense of Jehovah's might and of gratitude to Him for victories vouchsafed is a dominant note in all the three songs, but in power and intenseness of expression that of the Song of Deborah stands unequalled.

With mightiest tread thou onward, O my soul! (v. 2, E.)</p>

The outstanding anithesis to these strains of triumph is the Book of Lamentations, or Tears, which is traditionally ascribed to the prophet Jeremiah, and for the most part undoubtedly reflects the mournful attitude of the community in the early years of the captivity. In the highly finished five elegies comprised in the collection, Israel is seen heartbroken and weeping with bent head in the presence of Jehovah, who has allowed judgment to fall on the sinful nation. The book thus consists of five dirges of a type akin to 'Dies Irae,' written, not in the dread contemplation of future judgment, but in actual sight of the havoc wrought by the 'wealth and glory' of the offended Judge whom the nation, in a flood of tears, nevertheless implores to allow His love and pity to reassure its ancient away.

Striking instances of lyrical utterance occasioned by events, real or supposed, in the life of individuals, but affecting the community by reason of the great significance to it of the persons concerned, are the triumphal hymn of Hamah (1 Sam 5:10-12), the lamentations of Hosea (13:2-14), and what may be called the Psalm of Jonah (Jon 2:1-11). The literary prophets, with their soul wrapt in the contemplation of things supra-mundane and hid from ordinary sight in the counsel of the Eternal, also naturally break out at times in longer or shorter hymnal strains in the midst of scathing admonition or description of happiness to come (so, e.g., Is 9:2, 12:44, Jer 16:16, and note particularly Hab.3); and the controversies of the Book of Job regarding the justice, power, and providence of God are as naturally apt to lead to occasional outbreaks of hymn-like utterance (so, e.g., 35: 36: 42: 50: 66: 103: 113—119).

Apart, however, from the pieces named and others of a similar nature to be found in different parts of the Hebrew Canon, the Book of Psalms is the great book of spiritual training of the Church, embodying the typical expression of all possible religious moods, and ranging historically from David and the Davidic age down to the re-awakening in the time of the Maccabees. Beside the compositions which were primarily communal in character (as, e.g., Ps 33: 47: 50: 66: 103: 113—119), many Psalms appear to have been originally lyrics of individuals; but personal experience of whatever kind—whether of penitence, exaltation, prayer for help, or even of violent remembrance of oppression and thirst for vengeance—is there, so far as it was not to represent a true aspect of Israel's relation to Jehovah and the world, fully owned and echoed by the community at large, so that the original 'I' of the poet has everywhere become the voice of the great community of which he was, in truth, the genuine mouth-piece, uttering individually the religious emotions of the great body to which he belonged.

The titles most in use to denote a hymnal composition are Shir, Shirah, Mismoreh, Chalil, and T'fillit. The first three terms point, in one way or another, to the rhythmic and musical character of the pieces concerned; Chalil denotes a hymn of praise; and T'fillit, which primarily means 'prayer' or 'supplication,' sometimes bears the general sense of liturgical composition (see particularly Ps 90). 'Lamentations' or 'Tears' translates the term Checel, though not so styled in the Hebrew Canon, the Synagogue name of the Book being Qinn ("How!"); which is the first word of the first chapter.

Regarding the question of rhythm, a subject which has been much discussed of late (for reference to summaries see Literature at the end), one can say that there is now a sufficiently general consensus of opinion in favour of the view that it is the accentual beat which mainly, if not exclusively, counts in Hebrew versification, the intervening number of syllables having (within limits, of course) no determining effect on the poetical structure. The 'parallellismus membrorum,' though 'not a constant phenomenon of Hebrew poetry' (G. B. Gray, 'Israel i.-xxvii,' in TIC [1912], p. 121), is yet almost everywhere as striking a characteristic in hymnal pieces as in gnomic composition. The only special kind of rhythm so far definitely established in OT poetry is the elegiac or end form (first pointed out by K. Budde), in which the second hemistich of a line is shorter than the first, the turner being supposed to break off his plaint in a sob.

The proposition, however, that this rhythmic form had its origin in the ancient lament for the dead performed by women mourners (see, e.g., HDB iv. 5) is so far incapable of verification, and it is, moreover, true that 'it can no longer be maintained that the rhythm is peculiar to it, though it may be said to be characteristic of it' (Gray, op. cit. p. xiii, note).

The question of strophic arrangement in Hebrew hymns and OT poetry in general has also been much discussed in recent times (for a summary see HDB iv. 71). A decisive factor in favour of, at any rate, occasional strophic structure is the refrain that is sometimes found (see, e.g., Ps 42: 99); and there is, besides, a strong auxiliary argument for fairly frequent strophic arrangement in the undoubted fact that music, both vocal

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1 The question of the individual element in the Psalms has been discussed in recent times. But we have something very similar in Middle English ballad collections. Tolkien's 'Book of Ages, cleft for me,' and Newman's 'Lead, Kindly Light ... lead Thou me on,' for instance, were primarily utterances of personal religious emotions, but they at the same time express the genuine cry of all Christian believers, that is to say, of the whole community. Hebrew Church's striking modern instance of the patriotic emotion of an individual poet becoming truly national in character is that of the Tenth King of Israel, while fighting for the liberation of Germany. In the Psalter the national and religious spirit is one and indivisible, so that the hymn-writer is a national as well as a religious poet, and nationalist.

2 For the places that are used more or less rarely the reader is referred to the Introduction and Commentaries on the Psalms.

3 Cl. the classic elegiac metre, in which the pentameter alternates with the hexameter.
and instrumental, regularly accompanied the recital of hymns (besides the headings of Psalms, which are by themselves quite conclusive, see 1 Ch 25:7, 2 Ch 29:3), for the musical tune is naturally either repeated with the successive longer units of the poetical composition, or else changes its character at the beginning of a part meant to express a different strain of poetical inspiration, or at certain intervals, for which there is some evidence (see Ps 105:4), would seem to lead to a similar conclusion. A composition like Ps 186, in which the second hemistich is throughout the antiphonal responses to the first, has, of course, no bearing on the question of strophic arrangement.

The poetical compositions embodied in the Apcerypha stand on a lower level, both with regard to inspiration (using this term in its widest sense) and to their bearing on the national life; yet they do in some limited, and partly sectarian, manner continue on lines similar to the hymns and pieces contained in the Canon.

The Song of the Three Children (the Benedicticles) has a grand liturgical effect, notwithstanding the deliberate artificial attempt to enlist every part of the congregation. Among the other notable examples are the Prayer of Manasseh, portions of Baruch, 2 Mac 13:4-15, Wis 9. The praise of Famous Men in Ecclesiasticus (44:20-50) is in reality almost the anthem of a hymn, and among other similar passages, the Psalms, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, the famous Nishmah ("The breath of all things living") in the Sabbath and festival prayers, and several compositions of the Psalter (Ps 69:1-31, 110:1-4) which is the starting point, however, whether these verses formed part of the original composition or not.

The most notable hymnal section of the psuedopigraphical writings connected with the OT is the collection of 18 pieces belonging to the time of Pocaply's invasion of Palestine, which are known as the Psalms of Solomon; but shorter or longer hymn-like strains are also found in the fourth Book of Ezra and the Book of Enoch. The Greek hexameters of the Sibylline Oracles, iii., of which there are some in Latin form, follow the prophetic writings with regard to the presence of an occasional hymnal strain.

Apart from the Psalms of Solomon, which have the same characteristic historic importance, the poetical portions of these writings are, as may be expected, as much removed from actuality as the prose frameworks in which they appear; yet they sound a genuine note of the religious idealism by which the Psuedopigrapha—largely sectarian in origin—were called into existence.

2. Hymns of the Synagogue. — After the destruction of the Temple by the Romans, Judaism definitely succeeded the ancient Hebraism. The bulk of the Hebrew people could not see their way to adopt the form of Christian adoration which, in the minds of its true devotees, was expressive of the most real inwardness of the religious life. The Jews, therefore, clung to their own ceremonial and devotional forms, which, indeed, enshrined a genuine note of the inwardness of their own, and it is this special Judaic religious inheritance that was perpetuated and developed—very often in beautiful language of true devotion—in a long series of hymnal compositions, which have become more or less closely attached to the general framework of the daily and festival prayers. The great model in the earlier stage of this liturgy was naturally the Psalter, which, as in the Temple services, was itself largely drawn upon for purposes of synagogue and individual devotions, and to which the present day provides the ritual with some important constituent elements (so particularly the Hallel in the festival services and the series of Psalms in the earlier portions of the daily prayers). The liturgy, moreover, in its general idea as well as in its prevailing form, is a systematic elaboration of the Bréhhé, or Benediction, which is in its simpler form well represented in the OT (see On 246, 1 K 19, 30, 29, Neh 9), but in the specifically Jewish period gradually developed into a system of prayers and doxologies, to some parts of which the lyric-religious genius of the race could not but give a high poetical form.

Among the finest and most important of the poetical Benedictions which thus came into existence are the pieces which precede and follow the recitation of the καὶ (Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord, etc.) in both the morning and evening services, the former having two Benedictions before and one after the SHAMM, and the latter two before and two after this central confession of the Divine Unity (see Mishna Brébheth, i. 4). Among the earliest times is attested by Talmudical references the famous Nishmah ("The breath of all things living") in the Sabbath and festival prayers, and several compositions of which the first 14 are modelled on the antiphonal strains of Ps 136. It is a disputed point, however, whether these verses formed part of the original composition of the "Sons of Sirs.

The most notable hymnal section of the psuedopigraphical writings connected with the OT is the collection of 18 pieces belonging to the time of the Geoniin, which followed the Talmudical period, are the famous Ehrlich Schémer of the morning service, and the equally famous En Kédém hémé, which stands in the modern Ashkenazi ritual at the end of the Sabbath service, but is recited every day by the members of the Spanish and Portuguese congregations scattered in different parts of the world. The Aramaic Treaty Purim inserted in the Sabbath services, which also belongs to this period, may be classed as an interesting and characteristic congregational application in poetical prose.

The earliest synagogue hymn-writer known by name is Jose ben Jose, who appears to have lived in the 6th or 7th cent., and among whose compositions is an Apódé (on this term see below, p. 455) which is still used in Piedmont and other places. His pieces exhibit no rhyme, whereas Yannai, as well as his famous pupil and successor El'azar ben Jacob Kalir, adds the use of rhyme to the acrostic and other earlier marks of poetical form. Kalir opens a new and most prolific epoch in the history of synagogue hymnology. On his date and birthplace widely conflicting views have been held, but Zunz, who is the highest authority on questions of this kind, places him in the latter half of the 10th cent., and names southern Italy as the place of his nativity. He composed no fewer than 390 pieces, scattered over various portions of the Ashkenazi and Italian forms of the Mishach, as used at the present day. His subject-matter is derived mainly from Talmudic and Midrashic sources.

1 The question as to whether Hebrew or Greek was the original medium of composition for this and the other pieces named is not important in the connection, the spirit pervading them being in all cases Hebraic, though no doubt influenced by Hellenistic tendencies.

2 He has also been maintained by some that the so-called Odes of Solomon, of which J. Benda Harris discovered a Syrocan origin, were originally Hebraic, but this opinion is not likely to gain many adherents.

3 Zunz (Gottheitentheologische Verträge, p. 382.) considers that in their present form these pieces show later additions, but the rhyme of some parts, e. g. the Hebrew prayer of Ps. 119, 60, is accidental.

4 On the Yadéth, which is also Aramaic, see vol. i. p. 460.

5 So in Gottesd. Verträge (pp. 370 and 392); in Liturg. geschichte, p. 51, however, the first half of the 9th cent. is regarded as the earliest possible date.
HYMNS (Hebrew and Jewish)

His language is very often obscure and to the ear of the Hebraist at least strange and even uncouth, but his hermeneutical inspiration is of so high an order that the impression which he made on his contemporaries has— notwithstanding much influential opposition—continued its sway down to the present time.

An impetus to an entirely different style of liturgical poetry was given by Saadaya Gaon (891-941), whose original home was Egypt, but who spent the most eventful part of his life as head of the Academy of Sura in Mesopotamia. He cannot be said to have been the founder of a liturgical school in the same sense as Kair. His poetical compositions are not very numerous, nor was he strong as a poet, his genius enabling him rather to shine as philosopher, commentator, and controversialist; but, on the other hand, he brought to his task the best literary and scientific training of his age and surroundings, and he was in this way able, among his greater successes, to give an important fresh direction to liturgical efforts, which later on developed into the finest poetical achievements of medieval Jewry. Acquainted as he was with the pure classical themes and forms of Arabic literature, he naturally aimed at similar purity of language in his Hebrew compositions; and the subject-matter of his poems rested for the same reason on philosophic contemplation rather than on Talmud and Midrash. His strophic system is elaborate, and he also uses rhyme besides the alphabetical acrostics.

There arose two distinct schools of liturgical composition, Kair representing the more exclusive Jewish spirit of nationalism which found its chief nourishment in Talmudic and Saadaya paving the way in the direction of general human culture and the philosophico-scientific aspect of religion; and so deep-rooted as well as far-reaching were these tendencies that each in its turn became the starting-point of one of the two main divisions of the Jewish liturgy, the Romano-Germanic order of festival services prevailing, in the main, to the school founded by Kair, whilst the Hispanic-Arabian liturgy has been built up by the great poets who worked on in the spirit of Saadaya.

No wonder, therefore, that the names of the leading writers of the last-named school, such as Solomon Ibn Gabirol (fl. 1090), in whom the Spanish school reached its most classical development, Moses ben Ezra (11th to 12th cent.), Yehuda Halevi († about 1140), and Abraham Ibn Ezra († 1167) sound more familiar to the cultured Europe of the present day than the, in their own way, also highly distinguished names of men like Moshulam ben Kalonymos of Lucca (10th cent.), Gershon ben Yehuda (fl. first half of 11th c.), Solomon Yehiyya († 1103), and his son-in-law Samuel ben Meir.

It was, however, on account of the general bond uniting all synagogal communities into one great organization—inevitable that the poetical compositions of each school should exercise an influence on the other. The Jewish liturgical writers of each country were, moreover, naturally to some extent affected by the surroundings amidst which they worked; nor could individual poets help importing into their compositions their own intellectual, doctrinal, or emotional peculiarities. Among the later (post-classical) writers of a more peculiar reason or another, become entitled to particular mention in even a brief historical survey of the subject are Abraham ben Bezalel (13th cent.), his son Ye'adaya (entitled Ha-Pinai), Yehezkel ibn Moses (fl. 12th century), Isaac Luria (1534-1572), and the Yemenite Shalom ben Joseph Shabbeii (17th cent.).

The most prolific author of short hymnal compositions among those just named were Israel Nagar, the Shalom Shabbeii, though of the former there is a few penetrated into the liturgy; and of the others apparently none.

Among the most important terms used since early times in connection with this synagogal liturgical poetry are (besides Piyut and Piyutim, respectively denoting 'poet' and 'poetical piece of devotion', the significant part of both words coming no doubt from the Greek eurýomai): (1) Kaddish, which is sometimes used in the general sense of liturgical poetry (the word denoting coming near in prayer), but in the plural usually bears the more restricted meaning of pieces accompanying the Prayer of Eighteen, or, rather, its festival representative; (2) Yigdal, i.e. Piyutim accompanying the benediction Yigdal Or ('Creator of the Lights'), but sometimes also used in a more general sense; (3) Piyutot, or pendentival pieces; (4) Kaddish, or elegies; (5) Akedah, a species of elaborate composition for the Day of Atonement descriptive of the Temple Service as solemnized on that day, the account being based on the Mishna Yoma; (6) Ashkenazi, the Pontifical commands; (7) Hoshannah, i.e. pieces with a Hoshannah refrain, used on Hoshana Rabba (the 7th day of the feast of Tabernacles); and (8) Widdus, or composition of this character. The entire collection of the festival services is entitled Mezuzah, i.e. (annual) cycle.

The introduction of hymns into liturgical poetry poetical may, with regard to the use of acrostics, it is important to mention that, besides the very frequent employment of the alphabetical device, the authors of Piyutim were very much in the habit of forming their compositions with the stress of their own names, themate underly under this practice being, not vanity, but the desire of linking their own personalities with their sacred compositions. In the case of Kair, it has been shown (see Zunz, Gottheitsdienstliche Vorträge, p. 398), that he also often achieved this object by means of Gematria, i.e. by the equation of the numerical value of his name with that of a sentence from the poem. Of special interest is the fact of which which has been employed in Hebrew hymns— and, indeed, Hebrew poetry in general—from the time of Solomon ben Gabirol onwards. The motive rests in the quantity of the syllables nor on the accent, but on the difference between a simple syllable (vowelled) and a syllable beginning with a moving shadow (called yiqrah, i.e. 'tent-pi' or 'tent-pin'). The simple syllable is in modern editions of Hebrew verse marked — irrespective of quantity in the usual sense of the term, and the yiqrah is marked . Seventeen different forms of verse founded on this principle are generally counted, but it will here suffice to give examples of two only, represented by the opening melodies of the well-known hymns respectively beginning Adon Olam and Yigdal: 1

1. לְדוֹן | עֹלָם | יְהֹודָה | מַלְכָּה. 1
2. יִギャל | אוֹלָם | בִּין | יִギャל | יְיֶחֶשֶׁק | טַנְסָפָה.

In the first case the line is described as consisting of a yiqrah and two וֹתָלִית, followed by another yiqrah and two וֹתָלִית. In the second case the scansion is two yiqrah and two וֹתָלִית, followed by another yiqrah and two וֹתָלִית.

Among the most popular pieces attached to the daily services are Adon Olam and Yigdal (just referred to), which was probably not composed before the end of the 13th cent., lays special stress on the

The post has, however, allowed himself considerable licence in this piece.
Divine Unity, and was in this way probably meant to enforce the Jewish side of a polemical religious topic. The *Pyg valley*, written in Italy by Daniel ben Yehuda Dayyan in the early part of the 14th cent., composed in a form of poetic form the thirteenth articles of faith formulated by Moses Maimonides in the 13th century. The *Lekh Diqah*, composed by Solomon ben Moses al-Kabish (16th cent.), is a fine poetic description of the *Bride of the Sabbath*. It recited at its entrances in every Friday evening service. Of considerable popularity are also the *Habadatim*, i.e. poetical pieces recited in the home at the Sabbath, some of which embody legends of the prophet Elijah. Solomon ibn Gabrio's great philosophico-religious poem entitled *Keter Malkhit* deserves special mention; it may be described as a great Hymn of Adoration and Penitence, though only attached, and that loosely, to some of the rituals.

The number of *Pyyáshim* of various kinds for fasts and festivals, and more particularly for the festival of the Day of Atonement, is so large that much space would be occupied by the mere enumeration of its titles, and it is impossible to specify even a careful selection. But it should be remarked in conclusion that the note of sadness that is so prevalent in the recital of the nation's manifold sufferings and its desire for redemption, as well as the strain of joy in other parts of the liturgy, is very often conveyed with such intense lyricism that musical expression becomes almost a necessity, and it is for this purpose that the profession of *Bacadimim*, or Synagogue Cantors, came into existence in early times, and has remained an institution down to the present day.

HYMNS (Muslim)  

Music and verse have no place in the ordinary worship of the Muslims, so that it might be difficult to find in Islamic literature anything precisely analogous to the Christian hymn. The Qur'an is hostile to the poets, and the Prophet was at first careful to dissociate himself from them; he 'had not taught versification' (Qur. xxxvi. 69), and seems never to have had any appreciation of it, though towards the end of his career he employed a court-poet, and allowed poetical eulogies on himself to be recited. Still it is asserted that his troops inspired themselves on the field with war-songs, which, owing to the religious character of their cause, might be called hymns; and the songs of triumph which celebrated the early victories of the Prophet's adherents to deserve the same name; an example is to be found in the verses of the poet 'Allī celebrating the victory of the Muslims over the apostates of Bahrain (Aghnī, xiv. 49). In the early poetry the verses had ordinarily little more than an artificial connection with each other, so that the same poem might contain edifying and unedifying matter; but, with the establishment of the Arabian State and the consequent development of study, the departments of poetry came to be separated, and two which bear some analogy to hymns are encomia of the Prophet and his Companions, and the subject called ziyād, i.e., contempt of the world. The composition of the former sort began, as has been seen, in the Prophet's lifetime, and has ever since been popular. Perhaps the most celebrated poem of this kind is the Burdah of Sharaf al-dīn Muhammad b. Sa'īd al-Butīrī († A.D. 1250), in 170 lines. Miraculous powers are supposed to be attached to this work, which has been frequently interdicted and translated. An example of a poem in praise of the Companions is that by the inventor of the magāhā, Bādī' al-amān al-Hamadhānī († A.D. 1068); see Yaqtī, Dict. of Legend, 1897, p. 114–116). The Shi'ah naturally have poems in praise of 'Ali, Fātimah, and their family; an author of celebrity in this line was 'Ali b. 'Abdallāh al-Nāshī († A.D. 976), one of whose lauds on Husain was chanted by a professional mourner in a mosque (Yaqtī, v. 349). The beginnings of ascetic poetry are found very early; the author who is usually regarded as the best representative of this department is Abū Atāiyū († A.D. 829, 837, or 826). His Risād (published at the Roman Catholic Press, Beirut, 1880) is mainly devotional and introspective; and, since the ode rendered into English, much of its content would be found to resemble that of many a hymn-book.

The use of music for the purpose of stirring religious emotions scarcely appears in the various lands of Muhammad, but appears to have commenced early in Islam; 'Abū b. Aḥmad Rabi'ī († A.D. 784) is said to have introduced the practice at Mecca during the days of the pilgrimage, month called Muharram. Many of the early poets have kept up singing during these occasions (Qūt al-gūlāb of Abū Ta'llīl al-Makki, Cairo, 1310, ii. 62), and the custom was maintained in the Hījās. Probably the verses
HYMNS (Samaritan and Karaite)

The dates of the leading writers of the 10th and subsequent centuries cannot, in the present state of our knowledge, be fixed with much certainty; but Cowley, whilst fully appreciating the confused character of the reference found in the chronicles and elsewhere, considers that the style of the compositions assigned to al-Dustān suggests a date in the 11th cent., that Abīl-Hassan of Tyre also belongs to some part of the 11th cent., and that Ab Gelugah and Tabīsh b. muvaflīr flourished in the early part of the 12th cent. Firmer ground is reached in the allocation of dates in the third period. The founder of the new school of writers was apparently the high priest Pinhas (582–63), and the talent and zeal shown by him remained hereditary in his family for some generations. Of his two sons, Eleazar and Abisha, the former, who left only a small number of liturgical pieces, succeeded to the office of high priest, whilst to the latter, who enjoyed a great reputation as a writer, seventeen pieces can be assigned with certainty, and seven others with a high degree of probability. Pinhas, the son of Abisha, who succeeded his uncle Eleazar in the high priesthood, and died in 1442, was also a liturgical writer.

There is, on the other hand, considerable uncertainty regarding the date of the liturgical works of B. Ithamar, who was high priest at Damascus. Cowley is inclined to accept A.D. 793 (A.D. 1391) as the beginning of his term of office, but he acknowledges that the possibility of his having flourished about a century later is not excluded. There is also some uncertainty about the dates of several other hymn-writers connected with Damascus (e.g., Abraham Ḥazin, probably about the middle of the 13th cent., perhaps Aaron b. Isaac, probably about the same date). Of the hymn-writers of later times, chiefly belonging to the Levitical, the Danites, and the Marṭūb family, only a few representative names can be mentioned in this place. A prolific writer of the first-named family was Tabīsh (or Ghazuʿl) b. Isaac († 2105), and among the latest hymn-writers of the same stock was Pinhas b. Isaac († 2130). The Danite names which most frequently occur are Marjūn and Musliḥ (Me Ḥazin), and the latest member of the Marṭūb family to write liturgical compositions was Abīraham b. Išma’īl, who flourished about 2150.

For a list of the services (which, as may be expected, follow mutatis mutandis the order of the Jewish liturgy) and the manner in which they are developed in the liturgical poems, see Cowley’s edition of the Samaritan Hymnary, which includes an ‘Index of First Lines’ of the pieces published in the work (Intro., pp. xxiii–xxvii). With regard to metre in the poetical compositions, writes Cowley, ‘no certainty is possible, since pronunciation varied at different periods and we know little about it at any time.’ Yet, however, agrees that some pieces seem to be metrical, though the majority exhibit only some sort of rhythm. The alphabetical acrostic has been very usual since the time of Marqāḥ, and the acrostic giving the author’s name, which is found once in Marqāḥ (piece beginning meṣaḥḥaḥ), is very usual in later pieces. Rhyme, which is used by neither Marqāḥ nor Darah, becomes very common in the later periods, when it is not infrequently (in the long hymns) employed up to a high degree.

1 The high-priestly family of Aarocin descent died out in 1226–27; from that date onward the office seems to have been reserved to members of the family of Uziel, a younger son of Kohath. 2 The services are praised of the prophet Moses, as exemplified by the British Museum MS Additional 29051 (Arabic copy) in 553 by the Shabbat ha’Ezri Ḥaṭzai, the Rabbinah, should be added to the list embodied in Cowley’s edition. It should also be noted that the Samaritan order appears to betray at some points conscious imitation of the Jewish liturgy (so, e.g., the frequently occurring form of ḥaṭzai).
degree of tediousness, a long row of lines ending in the same rhyme.

2. Karaita hymns.—At the foundation of Karaitism, about A.D. 750, the traditional liturgy of the Jews was, as a part of Talmudical legalism, discarded by the sectaries, and the Pentateuch, the Psalter, and other parts of the OT were henceforth to constitute the only sources from which, besides lections, psalms and devotional songs were to be drawn. The totally unimaginative and stationary attitude toward the Bible on the part of the Karaites and of his followers could not, however, be maintained for very long; and, just as the abandonment of Talmudical hermeneutics and general Halakhah led to the gradual development of an almost equally involved system of Karaita legal hermeneutics, so also in the course of time, the Rabbinite liturgy was replaced by a Karaita ritual running on parallel lines with the Rabbanite services. As, moreover, the Karaita leaders possessed the knowledge of a much higher degree than the poetic faculty, they for the most part not only found it necessary to imitate the hymnal models of the Rabbanites, but even could not help admitting Rabbanite compositions into their liturgical collections (as by Solomon ibn Gabîrîd and Yehuâchâh ha-Lôvî)

The most prominent among Karaita liturgical authors was Darî, who also was successful as a writer of secular poems. He is believed in Karaita circles to have flourished about the middle of the 9th cent., and it, accordingly, claimed that Solomon ibn Gabîrîd, Moses ibn Ezrâ, Yehuâchâh ha-Lôvî, and others, had worked on the models provided by Darî. Investigations—principally by Steinmechin and Geiger—have, however, shown that the position must be reversed, Darî having really been the borrower from the Rabbanite poets referred to, so that the end of the 15th cent. is the earliest date that can be assigned to him.

The greatest name connected with the develop- ment of the Karaita liturgy is that of Aaron b. Joseph (called Aaron the Elder to distinguish him from Aaron b. Eljah of Nicomedia), who flourished at Constantinople (though born in S<ulhat in the Crimea) in the second half of the 13th and beginning of the 14th cent., and who is often affectionately referred to at the head of his poetical compositions in the printed Karaita Service Books as the Master, may his memory be for a blessing). The impression made by Aaron b. Joseph's personality and work (which includes a series of poetical pieces for the pericopes of the Pentateuch as liturgically recited throughout the year) was, indeed, so great that his reduction of the liturgy remained, under somewhat varied forms, the norm of the Karaita services down to the present day. Traces of other rituals, in some cases actually exhibiting different sets of liturgical poems, and in other cases also having no doubt contained pieces by other authors, are, however, not lacking. Joseph b. Mordecai Troki, writing to his countryman Elijah Bashiatski (both of them having belonged to the Byzantine body of Karaites) towards the end of the 15th cent., states that there were at that time three different rituals in the Karaita synagogues, and that the early liturgists (גוחים), (2) by Ascan b. Joseph, just mentioned, and (3) by Joseph, the father of the same Aaron (see Neubauer, *Aus der Petersburger Bibliothek*, Leipzig, 1883, pp. 176, 180). More definite evidence about the development of different ritual forms is afforded by the British Museum MSS Or. 2051 (dated A.D. 1700), 2530 (16th-17th cent.), and Or. 675 (written before A.D. 1700), the first representing the ritual of Damascus (see for full descriptions, with lists of pieces, see Margoliouth, *Catalogue of the Heb. and Samaritan MSS in the Brit. Mus.*, ii. nos. 720-727).

Among the other noted Karaita authors who, for the most part in addition to works of larger compass—composed liturgical poems, is Eljah b. Eljah of Nice), (a) formerly referred to, Israel b. Samuel Râfâ (early 14th cent.), Samuel al-Maghrîbi (i.e. of North Africa; in this case, Cairo or early 15th cent.), Elijah Bashîtsak (already referred to), Caleb Efendîosko (latter half 17th cent., first at Adrianople, then Constantinople), Yehuâchâh b. Elijah Gibbîr (author of *התרע* = a series of poems on the pericopes of the Pentateuch; beginning of the 16th cent.), Moses Póreòs (living at Damascus in the last part of the 17th cent., where he also composed an introduction to the Damascene ritual), Isaac b. Shalom (end of the 18th cent.), and, finally, a writer of the same name (presumably resident in the Crimea, now the only important part of the Karaita settlements), who edited the Karaita Service Book printed at Vienna in 1845. In the Museum MSS referred to the name Samuel very frequently appears as the author of hymns, and other names (such as *בנה* = Muslim or Mashhâli, and *מעניר* = a series of poems on the pericopes of the Pentateuch; beginning of the 16th cent.) occur there also await further investigation. Among the topics dealt with are the praises of Moses, Aaron, Samuel, and Elijah. In the hymns occurring in the MSS, Hebrew is sometimes intermixed with Arabic, and occasionally Arabic only is employed. It is further remarkable that in the order of the Karaita services corresponds (again, of course, *mutatis mutandis*) to the Jewish Synagogue services, and that in point of metre, rhyme, acrostics (i.e. the order of the letter bearing the names of Jesus, Joseph, etc.), the Karaita liturgical poems run on parallel lines with the Rabbanite *Piygâthim.*

**Literature.**—I. SAMARITANS.—The most important work to consult is *The Samaritan Liturgy,* ed. A. P. Cowley, Oxford, 1916, on which the section dealing with Samaritan hymns has been based. Other works (or articles) are: W. Gesenius, *Carthina Samaritana in ostensionem et cotitasse,* Leiplig, 1854; M. Heldenaum, *Die samaritanische Liturgie,* Leipzig, 1858 (in *Bibliotheca Samaritana, ii.*), and *Die liturgische literatur* in different parts of Deutsche Vierteljahres- schrift für religions-Theol. Forschung und Kritik, 1900-1; A. J. Noy, *Carnina Samaritana e codicum toscandi et gallice,* Rome, 1907; L. Rapoport, *Die Liturgie samaritaner,* in *Ann. d. Acad. Europ., Rome,* 1897; 1900; G. Margoliouth, *"As Ancien MS of the Samaritan Liturgy,"* (i.e. the Brit. Mus. MS 3264, referred to in the article), *in ZDMG.* ii. (1897) 499; J. A. Neudorff, *Samaritana,* Philadelphia, 1897, where also a number of additional details on this literature will be found (bibliography, pp. 322-340).

II. KARAITES.—The two principal editions of the Liturgy (both reposing forms of Aaron b. Joseph and of the early liturgists) are (1) by Aaron the Elder, as published in the *Liturgie amazigriques,* Vienna, 1544, *and סנהדריה ליגuria,* Odessa, 1868-72. Complete lists of hymns found in the Brit. Mus. Karaita Biblical and Religious manuscripts, and the *Liturgie amazigriques,* *Aus der Hebr. der Liturgie amazigriques,* *Aus der Hebr. der Liturgie amazigriques,* *Samez.* 1900; *Aus der Petersburger Bibliothek,* by A. Neubauer, has been referred to in the body of the text, and scattered information on liturgical matters will be found in the works named in the bibliography appended to *Av der Herbauer* text.

**Hymns.**—I. Importance.—The body of literature comprising the *Hymns* claims a very high place in the history of civilization; for it supplies the investigator not only of Indian but of Aryan life with his most ancient data. The language in which these hymns are composed possesses the oldest and most abundant material. From the information contained in them can be constructed a fairly detailed description of the ancient conditions of the earliest Aryan inhabitants of India. In them we find the sources of Aryan mythology and religion; here alone can be traced the process of personification which leads from the one mental natural phenomena, and the stages by which polytheism was transformed into the pantheism that for far more than two thousand years has domi-
nated the thought of the Hindus. In them can be
discerned the foundations of the indigenous Aryan
religions of India—Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism—
and in the faith of four-fifths of the Indians
of to-day, the last a world religion that has pro-
foundly influenced the civilization of the Farther
East. Without a knowledge of these later
religions cannot be understood any more than the
NT without the OT.

2. Definition.—Owing to the somewhat different
sense attaching to the word in other literatures, it
is necessary to say what is meant by the term 'hymn' as applied
to the Vedas. Here it means a ritual poetical
verse, on the higher side of religion, in praise of the
gods, and generally accompanied by a sacrifice
offered to them; or, on its lower side, in spells or
charms, addressed to hostile powers, and accom-
panying some domestic practice of a magical
character. Hymns of the former type, in which praise of one or
more of the gods is associated with prayers for all sorts of worldly
interests, is the chief feature, are collected in the Rigveda, the oldest
of the four Vedas. Hymns of the latter type constitute the main contents of the later
four, the Atharvaveda. The use of the term 'hymn' is also extended
as to include a certain number of poems, philosophical or even quite secular
in character, that have found their way into the canons of both Vedas. These two
collections alone consist of hymns.

The two Vedas are formed of disconnected
verses or spells employed solely for application to special
ritual purposes; the Upanisadas contain hardly any independent
matter, all its verses (except 76) being borrowed from the Rigveda and used
exclusively in the ritual of the Soma sacrifice. These verses are
strongly poetic, without any intentional connection, being
fundamentally applicable to any particular rite when they are
employed in the various melodies collected in certain
song-books. The Yajurveda consists solely of ritual
verses, about one-half being in prose, which, unlike
the verses of the Samaavedas, are successively
applicable to the whole sacrificial ceremonial.

One-half of its metrical portion is borrowed
from the Rigveda, the sacrifice was regarded as possessing, its formulas
viewed as specifically religious ideas; they are
dedicated to the Soma sacrifice, and are not
sacrificial spells, not differing fundamentally
from the domestic spells of the Atharvaveda.

3. Chronology.—According to the native tra-
ditional authorities, the Vedas were the creation of
Brahma, and were only revealed to, or, as they express it, seen by
various seers (rishis). Scientific investigation, however, has shown from internal
evidence that not only the four Vedas but parts of
the same Veda differ in age, and that they were
composed by seers who belonged to various families,
and who often refer to the skill with which they
have endeavoured to fascinate a new hymn to win
the favour of the gods. But, although the relative
ages of the various Vedas are known, we have
nothing in the nature of exact chronology in
record of them. All that we can say is that the lower
limit of the period covered by the Vedas is probably
about 800 B.C. For Buddhism presupposes the exist-
ence not only of the Vedas themselves, but of the
interwoven theological and theosophical literature
if the Brahmanas and Upanisads (see Vedic Rel-
igion, 2, b, c). Since that literature is extensive and
lacks the characteristic unity within its limits, it cannot be assumed to have
begun later than about 800 B.C. Again, the
evidence of their language, their religious ideas, and
their geographical data proves that the Vedas vary
greatly in age. Thus we find that, between the
earliest and the latest of the Vedas the hymns were composed, the Aryan invaders had spread
right across Northern India from Eastern Kshat-
tristan to the delta of the Ganges. Similar evidence indicates the existence of successive chronologi-
al strata within each Veda. To allow for all this
gradual development it is necessary to postulate a
period of some centuries, decidedly longer, for example, than that between Homer and Greek.
Hence the age of the Vedic hymns cannot be
assumed to begin later than about the 13th cent.
B.C. In the opinion of the present writer, which
practically agrees with the earlier moderate esti-
nated of Max Müller, in his Ancient Sanskrit
Literature, five hundred years are amply sufficient
to account for the gradual changes, linguistic, reli-
gious, social, and political, that this hymn litera-
ture reveals.
4. Growth of the hymn collections.—When the Indo-European entered India, the personages of the Hindu-Kush, they brought with them a religion in which various powers of Nature were personified and worshipped as gods, of whom a few, such as Indra, Agni, and Varuna, became the chief deities of the Harappan period, and several others, such as Mitra, Varuna, Indra, to the Indo-Iranians period. A comparison of Veda and Avesta shows that they also brought with them the cult of fire and of Soma, and were acquainted with the main religious lyrics in several metres. The object with which most of these ancient hymns were composed was to win the favour of the gods by praising accompanying the offering of melted butter in the fire and the offering of the juice of the Soma plant on a litter of grass. Doubtless many hymns of this character composed in the earliest period of the Aryan invasion have been lost. Those which have survived were composed almost exclusively by singers of the hereditary priestly class. They were handed down in different families by memory, not by writing, which cannot have been introduced into India before 800 B.C. at the earliest. These family groups of hymns were by gradual stages brought together till, with successive additions, they assumed the earliest complete form of the hymns as they are contained in the Rigveda, which is the oldest text of the Aryan religion, with which the second period of their textual history begins, and in which they have come down to us. The constitution of the Sanshitä text of the Rigveda must have taken place in the second half of the period of the Brahmanas or about 800 B.C. but before the appellations to those works, called Upanisades (see Vedic Religion, 2, c), came into being. The editors of the Sanshitä did not alter the diction of the text already in existence, but merely applied to it certain later euphonic rules, by which, in particular, vowels are contracted or changed to semi-vowels in such a way as to obscure the metre. On the completion of this work extraordinary precautions were taken to preserve intact the sacred text fixed in this manner. The first step was the constitution, by a grammarian named Saunaka, of a commentary text in which all the words of the Sanshitä were separated and given in their original form as unaffected by the rules of euphonic combination, and all compounds are analyzed. This text, which postdates the earliest commentary on the Rigveda, was followed by others of a more complex character devised to prevent the possibility of any change or loss in the sacred collection of hymns. The result of all these safeguards is that the text of the Rigveda has been handed down for 2500 years practically unmodified, with a fidelity elsewhere unparalleled. There is evidence showing that even in the earlier period of the text the hymns of the Rigveda were preserved with such care that, if the Sanshitä text is pronounced with due regard to metre, it represents the hymns almost in the very form in which they were composed. This text, which postdates the first, is a commentary, and its compilers, called the authors of the Sanshitä, are not the original composers. The Sanshitä of the other Vedas were also provided with Pada texts and other safeguards, but the tradition in their case has been a good deal less trustworthy than that of the Rigveda.

5. Language and metre.—The language in which the Rigveda (and to a less extent the other Vedas) is composed represents the oldest stage of the classical Sanskrit, a language thus far set by the grammarian Panini (c. 300 B.C.), differing from the latter about as much as Homeric from Attic Greek. It is much richer in grammatical forms. Thus it possesses a

subjunctive in frequent use and some twelve forms of the infinitive. The former has entirely died out in Sanskrit, while of the latter only a single form survives. The language of the Vedic hymns also differs from Sanskrit in its accent, which is marked in all the Indo-European languages of the ancient Greeks, is of a musical nature, depending essentially on the pitch of the voice, not the stress. This accent was, some time after the beginning of our era, exchanged in Sanskrit, as in later Greek, for a stress accent.

All the hymns of the Rigveda are metrical. They consist of stanzas mostly of four verses or lines, but also of three and sometimes five. The line, called pada ("a foot"), forms the metrical unit, consisting generally of eight, eleven, or twelve syllables. A stanza is usually composed of lines of the same kind; but a few of the rarer forms of stanzas consist of a combination of different lines. The metres are about fifteen in number, but of these only seven are at all common. Three of them, the triishtû (four lines of eleven syllables), the gâtrâ (three of eight), and the jogathā (four of twelve), are by far the most frequent, accounting for two-thirds of the total number of the stanzas in the Rigveda. The metres of the Vedic hymns, compared with those of Sanskrit, of which they are largely the foreshadowing, are longer and more irregular: only the rhythm of the last four or five syllables in the line is fixed, while that of the first part is not subject to any fixed rule. They occupy a position intermediate between the free verse of the Indo-Iranian period, in which (according to the evidence of the Avesta) the metrical principle was the number of syllables only, and those of Sanskrit, in which (according to the Rigveda, called śloka) the quantity of every single syllable in the line is determined. Generally a Vedic hymn consists of stanzas in the same metre: a typical variation of this rule is to mark the conclusion of the hymn by a stanza in a different metre. A certain number of hymns are strophic in their construction. The strophes in them consist either of three stanzas in the same simple metre, usually gâtrâ, or of the combination of two stanzas in different mixed metres. The latter strophic type is found chiefly in the eighth book of the Rigveda and is called prâvanathās.

6. Extent and divisions of the Rigveda.—The Rigveda consists of 1017 (or counting eleven that are recognized as a later addition) 1029 hymns, containing altogether about 10,600 stanzas. The average length of a hymn is thus rather more than ten stanzas. The shortest hymn consists of only one stanza and the longest of fifty-eight. The Sanshitä text, if printed continuously like prose in Roman characters, would fill an octavo volume of about 600 pages of 33 lines each. The Rigveda is divided into parás in two ways. The one division is a purely mechanical one into agatyas, or 'eighthists,' of about equal length, each of these consisting of eight adhyayas, or 'lessons,' each of which is subdivided into varyas, or 'groups,' of five or six stanzas. The other division is into ten mandalas, or 'books' (literally 'cycles'), and sūtras, or 'hymns' litig of these ten. The Rigveda was also divided into Padas and other safeguards, but the tradition in their case has been a good deal less trustworthy than that of the Rigveda.

7. Arrangement.—Of the ten books, six (ii. to vii.) are homogeneous. The hymns contained in each of them were, according to the present day ("seen") by singers of the same family, which handed them down as its own collection. This tradition is supported by the internal evidence of the seers' names mentioned in the hymns and of
the refrains occurring in these books. Hence they are generally designated the 'family books.' The principle of arrangement which prevails in them is uniform, each of them being divided in the same way into groups addressed to different deities. Books i., vii., and x. are not the composition of families, but of groups of which they consist are the productions of different individual seers. Book ix. is peculiar in that all its hymns are addressed to one deity, Soma, while their arrangement is in no way connected with their authors, for the groups within it are constituted by identity of metre. In the family books the first group is always addressed to Agni, the second to Indra, and the third to less important deities. The arrangement of the hymns within these deity groups is in the diminishing order of the number of stanzas. Thus in bk. ii., the Agni group of ten hymns begins with one containing 16 stanzas, the last having only six. The first hymn of the Indra group here has 21 stanzas, the last only four. The entire group of family books, again, is arranged according to the ascending number of the hymns they contain, if later additions are allowed for. Thus the second book has 43 hymns, the third 62, the sixth 75, and the seventh 104. The homogeneity of these books renders it probable that they formed the nucleus of the whole, which grew to its final extent by later successive accretions. The first of these additions seems to have been the second part of bk. i., which, as formed of nine groups each by a different author, composed of collected and prefixed to the family collections, following the latter as their pattern in their internal arrangement. The eighth resembles the family books, inasmuch as it is composed for the most part by members of one family, the Kāṇrputas. But it differs from them in other respects. Thus it does not begin with a group of hymns addressed to Agni; and it is peculiar in the predominance of the strophic pradhāna metre. The fact that it contains fewer hymns than bk. vii., indicates that it was not included in the collection of family books; but its somewhat analogous character makes it to be the first to be added at the end of that collection. The hymns forming the first part of bk. i. (1–50) have various points in common with those contained in bk. vii.; more than half of them seem to have been composed by seers of the Kāṇrputa family; the strophic metre affected by that family reappears in them; and many similar or identical passages are found in the two. The present state of research does not enable us to decide the chronological priority of the two collections or to explain why they were divided. The fact, however, remains that they were added at the beginning and the end of an older collection.

The addition of bk. ix. was the direct result of the formation of the first eight into a unit. This book consists entirely of hymns addressed to Soma and recited while the pressed juice of the plant was 'clarifying' (paramāṇa). Their composers were seers belonging to the same families as those of bk. i.—vii., as is shown, among other evidence, by the occurrence of refrains peculiar to those families. The hymns to Soma Pavanāma have all been extracted from the family books (in which no Soma hymn of any kind occurs), as well as from bk. i. and vii. (they contain only one and two hymns respectively to Soma in his general character), being gathered into one book as the hymns proper to the Udāgatr, or chanting priest (while the rest belonged originally to the Hoir, or reciting priest), and added at the end of bk. i.—vii. There is no ground for supposing that these Somali hymns were of later date than the others. On the contrary, the presumption is that the hymns belonging to the Soma ritual, which goes back to the Indo-Iranian period, date from early Vedic times. It has not as yet been possible to detect differences of chronology in this book. As to the arrangement of the order of its first 60 hymns depends on the number of their stanzas, which decreases from 10 to 4. In the remaining 54, some of which are very long (one having as many as 38 stanzas), this principle is not observed. The two groups of 27 stanzas are composed except for stanzas in gāyatrī, nearly all the rest consist of groups in other metres: thus 65–66 form a gāyatrī, 47–57.

Book x. was added last of all. It is undoubtedly, as its language and contents show, of later origin than the rest of the Rigveda. Its composers were evidently acquainted with the older books. Not only the position that it occupies at the end of the whole collection, but the fact that the number of its hymns (196) is made up to that of bk. i., is an indication of its supplementary nature. It consists of hymns by a large number of seers of different families, the names of some of which occur in other books. But the traditional names of the authors of a great many of these hymns are very doubtful. Though this book is in general more modern than the rest, it contains some hymns as old, and at least as poetical, as the average of those in other books. Such hymns perhaps found their way into this supplementary collection because a some reason been previously overlooked. As a whole, the tenth book approximates in language and general character to the Atharvaveda, with which it is also closely associated. For of about 1350 stanzas from the Rigveda incorporated in the Atharvaveda more than 40 per cent are taken from bk. x. Here, in contrast with the other books, we find earlier grammatical forms and words growing obsolete, while indifference in abstract ideas and philosophical speculation, as well as the introduction of matter connected with witchcraft, such as is characteristic of the Atharvaveda, has much increased.

8. Subject-matter.—The great bulk of the hymns of the Rigveda consist of invocations of various deities. Their content are, therefore, largely mythological, and furnish the main knowledge of the Vedic religion. The gods to whom most hymns are addressed are Agni (about 200), Indra (over 250), and Soma (over 100), who thus between them claim considerably more than one-half of the whole Rigveda. Only a few hymns (not exceeding 38) are not intended for the worship of gods or deified objects. About a dozen of these, almost restricted to bk. x., are concerned with magical practices, the proper sphere of the Atharvaveda. Two such (li. 42, 83) deal with anger; two others are directed against poisonous vermin (li. 191) and the disease called gāndhara (x. 163); two (x. 58, 69, 7–12) consist of invocations for the preservation of life; one (v. 55) is a charm to induce sleep; two (x. 183, 182) are spells for procuring offspring or for warding off a demon destructive of children; one (x. 185) is directed against enemies, another (x. 145) against rival wives; one (x. 159) is a song of triumph over rivals; another (vii. 103) a paenegyric of frogs as magical bringers of rain.

Some 20 others are more or less secular poems, concerned with social customs, moral questions, riddles, and cosmogonic speculations. Several of these are especially important as throwing light on the earliest thought and civilization of the Vedic people. Though much information of this character may be gathered from incidental references scattered through the rest of the collection. One of the most noteworthy is the long wedding hymn connected with the marriage ceremony, though containing a large admixture of mythological
HYMNS (Vedico) 53

matter. There are also in bk. x. five hymns (14–18) dealing with funeral rites. Four of them, however, are addressed to deities concerned with the life beyond the grave. The last, being quite secular in tone, supplies more information than any of the rest about the funeral usages of early Vedico India. 

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Hindu].

Besides several mythological dialogues in which the speakers are divine beings (iv. 62; xxii. 51, 52, 89), there are two in which one or both agents are human. One is a somewhat obscure colloquy (x. 95) between a mortal lover Pururavas and a celestial nymph, who is on the point of forsaking him. The other (x. 10) is a dialogue between the twins Yama and Yami, the ancestors of the human race. This group of hymns has a special literary interest as precursors of the dramatic poetry of a later age.

Among the secular hymns of the Rigveda are to be included the dānavadāyī (‘praises of gifts’), which are represented by one complete hymn (i. 120) and appendages of 3-5 stanzas to over 50 others. They are poems of a semi-historical character, being panegyrics on liberal patrons in whose behalf the singers composed their hymns to accompany the sacrifice. They furnish interesting glimpses of the ideas about the seers and their employers, as well as about the names and habitat of the Vedic tribes. They are late in date, belonging chiefly to bkbs i. and x., and to supplementary hymns of bk. x. 4.

Four of the secular hymns are of a didactic type. One of them (x. 34) is a remarkable poem, being the lament of a gambler who, unable to resist the fascination of his vices, deplores the ruin he has brought on himself and his family. The other three, describing the various ways in which men follow gain (ix. 112) and praising wise speech (x. 71) or the value of gold, are also didactic in character; the forerunners of the sententious poetry which was so assiduously cultivated in post-Vedico Sanskrit literature.

Two of the hymns of the Rigveda consist of riddles. One of them (viii. 26) in ten stanzas describes various gods by their characteristic marks, leaving it to the hearer to guess who in each case is meant. A far more elaborate collection of riddles is to be found in a separate theme (143) consisting of 52 stanzas. These propound, in mystical and symbolic language, a number of enigmas, many of them connected with the sun. Thus the wheel of order with 12 spokes, revolving round the heavens and containing within it in couples 729 sons, means the year with its 12 months and 360 days.

Lastly, there are six or seven cosmogenic hymns containing speculations regarding the origin of the world in connexion with a Creator (called by different names) as distinct from any of the ordinary gods. Only one of them (x. 129), however, treats the subject in a purely philosophic spirit, as an evolutionary process from the non-existent (a-sat) to the existent (sat), and thus forms the starting-point of Indian philosophy.

The historical data furnished by the Rigveda, especially the numerous rivers mentioned there, we are justified in concluding that at the time when these hymns were composed the Aryan tribes had the possession of the territory drained by the Indus river system lying between 35° and 28° northern latitude and 70° and 78° eastern longitude, and corresponding roughly to the North-western Frontier Province. This conclusion is borne out by the references to the flora and fauna of the country in which they were settled.

From the historical data of the hymns we further learn that the Aryans were still engaged in warfare with the original inhabitants. Many victories over these foes are recorded, and once 1600 of them are said to have been bound and 30,000 slain with the aid of Indra. That the Aryans were still best to conquer is to be inferred from the mention of rivers as barriers to their progress. Though split up into numerous tribes, they were conscious of religious and racial unity, for they contrasted the aborigines, whom they called Dāsas, with themselves, designating them as non-sacrificers and unbelievers, and calling them ‘black skins’ and the ‘Dāsa colour’ as opposed to the ‘Aryan colour’. This racial contrast appears to have been the starting-point of the later system of caste (g. v.); the Sanskrit name of which (candra) means ‘colour’. The enslaved Dāsas became the Sudras, the fourth or lowest caste, first mentioned in one of the very latest hymns (x. 90) of the Rigveda.

The names of many of the Vedic tribes are mentioned. There was no political cohesion among them, for, though they sometimes formed confederations, they were constantly at war with one another. A coalition of several tribes is referred to as taking part in the battle of the ten kings,’ when Aryans fought against them daily on the banks of the Panjū river (now Ravi).

The hymns also furnish material for a fairly detailed account of the social conditions of these early days. Thus we find that the family was the foundation of society with the father as its head, and that women held a freer and more honoured position than in later times. Mention is made of various crimes, of which robbery, chiefly in the form of cattle-lifting, seems to have been the commonest. Indolence was known, mainly as a result of gambling, and reference is made to the clearing off of debt by instalments. Various details are given about clothing and personal adornment. Thus we see that it was usual to wear an upper and lower garment, which were made of sheep’s wool and were often decorated. Bracelets, anklets, necklets, and earrings were used as ornaments. Hair is mentioned as worn in different ways. Men usually wore beards, but occasionally shaved. The usual food consisted of milk, clarified butter, grain, vegetables, and fruit eaten only on ceremonial occasions, when animals were sacrificed. The commonest kind was apparently beef, since bulls were the chief offerings to the gods. But the sacrience of the cow which prevailed, having round the pracating, was done in the Indo-Iranian period, gradually grew in strength till in later times beef in general came to be absolutely forbidden, and has remained so among the Hindus down to the present day. Two kinds of spiritual liquor were made: soma was restricted to religious ceremonies or festivals, while sura, made from some kind of grain, was that in ordinary use.

That one of the main occupations of the invading Aryans was warfare is only natural. He fought either on foot or from a chariot; but, as far as can be seen, not on horseback, as in later times. The usual weapons were bows and arrows, but spears and axes were also employed. Cattle-breeding seems to have been the chief means of livelihood: cows are the most prominent objects of desire in the prayers to the gods. But tillage was also practised to some extent. Fields were furrowed with a plough drawn by bulls. Corn was cut with a sickle, and then threshed out and winnowed. The mention of chakli, an agricultural tool, in the water seems to indicate that irrigation was not unknown. Wild animals were trapped and snared, or hunted with bows and arrows, sometimes with the aid of dogs.

Navigation in boats (doubtless of a very primitive
HYMNS (Vedico)

The average degree of literary skill is in fact remarkably high. This is perhaps partly due to the fact that these early singers felt the necessity of producing a hymn composed with the highest art in order to please the gods. A poet often says, generally in the last stanza, that he has praised the deity according to his knowledge or ability; that his hymn is the most wondrous, well-woven garment, or a bride adorned for her lover.

The hymns in which literary merit is most conspicuous may be briefly indicated. The group of over twenty addressed to Usha, goddess of the morning, is the most poetical in the Rigveda. It will probably be admitted by all who read them, even if only in a good translation, that their beauty is quite equal, if not superior, to that of the descriptive religious lyrics of any other literature. Some of the hymns to Indra (esp. i. 82) show much graphic power in their account of the conflict of that god with Yrtra, the demon of drought; those to the Maruts, or storm-gods, often depict with much striking imagery the phenomena of thunder and lightning, and the mighty onset of the wind. One hymn to Purjanyu (v. 83) paints the devastating effects of the rainstorm with great vividness and power.

The hymns addressed to Varuna, the most ethical of the Vedic gods, describe the various aspects of his sway as moral ruler of the world, in an exalted strain of poetry. Several of the hymns to Pratya, the Sâmanas, also addressed to Varuna, are religious poems in which the poet expresses his love and admiration for the god, and his longing for the protection of his wise counsel. These hymns are characterized by their simplicity and directness, and the prayers are often accompanied by the melodies in which it was chanted were numerous, and are already often referred to by their special names in the Brâhmanas and Upânishads.

9. Literary merit.—The diction of the hymns of the Rigveda, is, on the whole, simple and natural. The moderate use of compounds, which are practically restricted to two members, contrasts with the freer and more elaborate style of the later Vedic literature. The frequent and inordinate use of as many as five or six words in a single phrase was a feature of the diction of the Rigvedic hymns. This tendency was probably aggravated by the necessity of ringing the changes on a limited range of ideas throughout a large number of hymns, comprising nearly one-third of the whole collection. Here we already meet, in its earliest form, that partiality for subtle and difficult modes of expression which prevails in post-Vedâk literature, and which one of the Brâhmanas already indicates by observing that the gods love the obscure. In spite of such words, the Rigveda contains much genuine poetry. Since the gods addressed are, for the most part, personifications of natural phenomena, and their connexion with the hymns is still felt, the praise addressed to them gives rise to much beautiful and even nobil imagery. It is, however, only to be expected that the literary merit of so large a body of poetry should vary considerably. In the case of cosmological and mechanical verse, while others attain a high level of poetic excellence.
by practically all Western scholars. Roth proved
that, though the Ayākṣas were invaluable guides in explaining the theological and
ritual texts of the Brāhmaṇas and Sutras, with the atmosphere of which they were familiar, they
did not possess a continuous tradition of the
true meaning of the Vedic hymns. They could not in fact
possess any such tradition, for interpretation began only
when the meaning of the hymns had become obscure.
That the gap between the poets and interpreters was wider in Yāsaka than in Ayākṣas must have
been considerable is shown by his predecessor's
opinion quoted above. That Yāsaka's own
interpretations are often merely conjunctural appears
from his frequently giving two or more alternative
meanings for a word. Yet he must have had more
and better means of ascertaining the sense of various
obscure words than Śāyana, who lived nearly
2000 years later. Śāyana's interpretations, how-
ever, sometimes differ from those of Yāsaka. Hence
either Yāsaka is wrong or Śāyana does not follow
the tradition. Again, Śāyana often gives several
inconsistent explanations of a word in interpreting
single passages or commenting on different
passages. In short, it is clear from a careful ex-
amination of their explanations that neither Yāsaka
nor Śāyana possessed any certain knowledge about a
word, the sense of which is fixed in the Rig Veda.
Hence their interpretations can be treated as de-
cisive only if they are borne out by probability,
by the context, or by parallel passages. For the
traditional method Roth therefore substituted in
the epoch of interpreting the difficult parts of the
Rigveda from internal evidence by the minute comparison of all passages parallel in form
and matter, while taking into consideration con-
textual, etymological, and comparative philology.
In the application of his method, Roth attached too much weight to
etymological considerations, while he undervalued
the evidence of native tradition. Pischel and
Geldner, on the other hand, emphasized the
principle of Indian character of the Vedic hymns,
connect the interpretation of them too closely with
the literature of the post-Vedic period and the
much more advanced civilization which is described
there. The results achieved is good reason to hope, from the
results already achieved, that a steady adherence
to the critical method, by admitting all available evidence, including that of etymology, and by avoid-
ing the excesses just indicated, will eventually
clear up a large proportion of the obscurities and
difficulties that still baffles the translator of the Vedic hymns.

II. The Atharvaveda.—The Atharvaveda, re-
garded as a whole, deals with the lower side of
religion as represented by witchcraft, the word
itself meaning the 'lore of the Atharvans or
magicians. The oldest designation by which this
Veda is known in Indian literature is Atharvāvi-
girasth, 'the Atharvans and Angirases', the names
of two classes of pre-historic fire-priests, referring
respectively to the two kinds of spells, the propiti-
ation and the hostile, that form the main content
of the collection. Very different from the world
of the Rgveda is the sphere to which we are now
introduced. There we have moved among the
beneficent spirits of the world, of which the
sorcerer seeks to win over by flattering or to drive
away by imprecations. The priest and the magician,
the sorcerer and the witch, all work for the same
end, that is, the making of spells, and the unenlightened
man, from the beginning of the Vedic period been separated, the
functions of the former being concerned with the
gods, those of the latter with the unenlightened world of
went a process of growth by successive additions until it assumed the form in which it has come down to us. It is clear that the first eighteen books had been combined before the last two were added. That older collection consists of three main divisions, in the first two of which, bks. i.—vii. and viii.—xii., the hymns are arranged according to the number of stanzas they contain while the guiding principle in the third, xiii.—xvii., is unity of subject-matter in each book. The first group comprises short hymns (none exceeding eighteen stanzas), the second containing but more than twenty stanzas, the subjects in both being miscellaneous.

There can be little doubt that the first six books of the first group formed the nucleus of the Atharvaveda, their hymns consisting of its characteristic matter, charms and spells exclusively in metrical form. These six books are arranged primarily according to the amount of text they contain in an ascending scale, the first having 153 stanzas, the sixth 454. This principle is supplemented by the arrangement of these books according to the normal number of stanzas contained in their hymns, also in an ascending scale. Thus bk. i. contains hymns of 4, ii. of 5, iii. of 6, iv. of 7, v. of 8 stanzas. Book vi. contains hymns of only 3 stanzas, occupying this position because the secondary principle here is subordinated to the primary one. Book xii. is to be regarded as a supplement to this group. This is indicated by the fact that it infringes both principles that govern the arrangement of the preceding books. This book consists of hymns containing at least one stanza only, and which, therefore, hardly be accounted hymns at all.

The next division, bks. viii.—xii., the hymns are arranged according to decades, each of the first four containing ten hymns of 20 to 50 stanzas, while bk. xii. has five of more than 50 stanzas. This group thus consists of its characteristic matter in two special points. As contrasted with the mainly popular matter of the group it is clearly of a hieratic origin, its sphere of thought being that of the Brahmanic priesthood. It also conforms with the first group in each, of its books containing an extensive passage of prose like that of the Brähmanas.

The third main division, xiii.—xviii., distributes its hymns among its six books according to their subject-matter. Thus xiv. deals with the wedding ceremonial, and xviii. with funeral rites, both borrowing most of their stanzas from bk. x. of the Rigveda, and thus not being specifically Atharvan in character. Bks. xiii. and xvii. consist of hymns addressed to the sun, in the character of Rohita, or the Buddha one, in the former, and as identified with Indra and Vivas in the latter. The whole of xv. and most of xvi. consists of prose resembling that of the Brähmanas. The former treats mystically of the ēkātya, probably meaning the religious mendicant; but it is hard to say exactly what unity of subject-matter connects the hymns of the latter.

Some time after these main divisions had been formed into a collection of eighteen books, the nineteenth was added to it as a supplement. That this was the case is proved by a considerable amount of cumulative evidence. The most striking is that the book supplies a sort of table of contents to the eighteen preceding books, and presupposes their existence practically in their present arrangement. It is also to be noticed that the first eighteen books have been handed down in an almost unaltered state, in contrast with that of the earlier collection. Last of all was added bk. xx., which consists almost entirely of extracts from the Rigveda taken over unchanged (while the material borrowed from the Rigveda at an earlier stage had undergone considerable modification), and is in no way related to the rest of the Atharvaveda. This supplement was appended simply in order to bring the Veda of spells into connexion with the sacrificial Soma ceremonial of the Brähman priesthood. It is a significant fact that two of the most important auxiliary works belonging to the Atharvaveda and dating from the latest period of Vedic literature, its Prātiśaṅkhyā and its Kāṇḍikā Sūtra, ignore bks. xix. and xx.

It now remains to give a brief survey of the various contents of the Atharvaveda. A large number of its hostile spells are intended as remedies, together with the use of different herbs, against a number of diseases, ailments, and injuries, such as fever, jaundice, scrofula, leprosy, dropsy, cough, baldness, opthalmia, impotence, poisoning, snake-bite, wounds, and fractures ('Disease and Medicine (Vedic)'). These incantations are addressed to the demons personified as demons, or to whole classes of demons supposed to cause them. This Veda, supplemented by its Kāṇḍikā Sūtra, is thus our earliest source for the history of Indian medicine. Allied to the remedial spells are the charms which invoke or praise healing plants, the purifying water, and the most potent elixir of all—the sun. Among the auspicious spells are many prayers for protection from the various forms of death and disease, and for long life, often expressed in the form of a desire to live 'a hundred antaras'. Others are prayers for the prosperity of flocks and the produce of the fields, or for luck in undertakings, especially in gambling. Another group aims at the attainment of harmony and concord or of success in the arts and sciences. A large class is concerned with wedlock and love. Several of these are of a pacific character, being charms for the obtaining of a husband or bride, blessings on a new marriage, and the like. A still more miscellaneous group of hymns concerns the person of the king. They consist of spells to be employed at the royal inauguration or intended to secure for him the attainment of power, fame, and especially victory in battle. There are, again, a few hymns consisting of spells for the expiation of sins or moral transgressions, such as the non-payment of debts. Finally, there remain three or four classes of hymns which, being alien to the true Atharvan spirit, date from a later period in the growth of this collection. One of these comprises the hymns composed in the interest of Brähmans. Though the later literature frequently refers to witchcraft and sorcerers in a hostile spirit, their use is even sanctioned when employed by Brähmans against others. In these hymns the inviolability of the person and property of Brähmanas is emphasized, while imprecations are hurled against their oppressors. They also contain exaggerated panegyrics of the sacrificial fee (dašāśīna), the liberal bestowal of which is pronounced to be the highest gift, group prayers of a less interested nature, as for wisdom and theological knowledge, are rare. Sacrificial hymns and spells, besides those borrowed wholesale from the Rigveda in bk. xx., occasionally appear in other parts of the Atharvaveda. The group of cosmogonic and theosophical hymns doubtless constitute the latest additions to this collection. Their speculations and terminology indicate a development of philosophy according to that which appears in the Upaniṣads. They are not to be regarded as forming a connecting link between the philosophy of the Rigveda and
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that of the Upaniṣads. They are mystical productions not of genuine seekers after truth, but of sorcerers who utilize the philosophical notions current in their day mainly to subserve their practical purposes. Among the hymns of this class the Samaveda is the most important. In the four stanzas of the sacrifice (xi. 7), are defined as the Supreme Being.

The literary merit of the Atharvaveda is, as may be expected from its contents, much lower than that of the Rigveda. But a few of its hymns, besides many isolated verses scattered throughout the collection, furnish specimens of true poetry. Such is the long hymn (xiv. 1) in which the Earth is invoked as the supporter of all living things and the bestower of all blessings. Another (iv. 16), though concluding with two verses essentially Atharvan in character, exalts the omnipotence of Varuna in language unsurpassed by any hymn addressed to that deity in the Rigveda. The geographical data found in the Atharvaveda indicate that its composers lived in a region much to the north of the Aryan Indians. The information we derive from the former supplements in a remarkable manner what we know from the latter about the religious and social conditions of the times, especially the side of domestic life, the regulated form of which is preserved by the Grihya Sūtras, or manuals of domestic ritual, belonging to the latest stratum of Vedic literature (c. 500-200 B.C.). Between the two, there exists a body of material which is of inestimable value, not only for the early history of India in its various aspects, but for the study of the development of human institutions in general.

12. Though the two liturgical Vedas cannot be said to consist of hymns, it is perhaps advisable to describe as briefly as possible their form, their arrangement, their contents, and their relation to the other Sāhkāras. The Sāmkaveda consists of 1549 stanzas chanted in various melodies, called sūman, to accompany the Soma ritual. Its stanzas are nearly all borrowed from the Rigveda, chiefly from books viii. and ix. The 72 stanzas not derived from the Rigveda are to be found in other Sāhkāras or in ritual works. Its stanzas are mostly composed in the gīyagītri metre or in the sāmkaveda stropāya, both of which metres forms were originally meant to be sung (their names being derived from gā, 'to sing'). It is divided into two parts. The first consists of 585 stanzas, the second, arranged in groups of stanzas, closely connected and generally three in number, which follow the order of the main sacrifices. Internal evidence shows that the second book is secondary in character as well as later in date. As regards the age of the Samaveda, it is at least certain that the divisions of the first book are known to the Sāmkatḥa Brāhmaṇa. There is also some ground for believing that as a collection the Samaveda was as early as the recensions of the Yajurveda, the Taittirīya and the Vājasaneyi Sāhkāra. The two parts of this Veda supply only the words. The melodies of the chants were doubtless long, very ancient only. They were later collected in gīyagītri, or 'song-books', which indicated in musical notation the manner in which the words were to be sung. These stanzas received special names in very ancient times, two of them, the Bhāg and the Rājñatha, being even mentioned in the Rigveda. They are indications that the oldest of them may have been of popular origin and connected with the rites of pre-Brāhmaṇal sorcerers. Thus the second part of the Sāmkatḍāna Brāhmaṇa, a ritual work belonging to the Samaveda, is a manual of witchcraft which prescribes the employment of various sūman for purposes of sorcery. The injunction of the Brāhmaṇal law-books, that the recitation of the Rigveda and the Yajurveda must cease on the sound of a sūman being heard, is, perhaps a reminiscence of the kind of sorcerers. Thus, though the contents of the Samaveda are worthless from a literary point of view, they are of some value for the history of sacrifice and witchcraft, and decidedly important for that of Indian music.

13. The Yajurveda is the prayer book of sacrificial formulae (gāyitas), from which it receives its name, and which are in present use. The prājñapāta, or 'trumpeter of the sacrifice', the Brahman, and the sāhkāra give the formulae of the various sacrifices, which are taken over singly or in groups for application to a particular ceremony, but a few entire hymns, such as the puruṣasūkta, 'Hymn of Man' (x. 90), have found their way into this collection. In the characteristic prose formulas and prayers of the Yajurveda, the gods are not always invoked or prayed to, but various sacrificial implements or rites are brought into connexion with the invocation of the gods, in offering or in oblation, says, 'Then is the body of Soma, take (I offer) to Viṣṇu'; or, in taking hold of some utensil, he exclaims, 'At the stimulation of god Śāvitr I grasp thee with the arms of the Áśvins, with the Imāc.' The object of most of these formulas is not to worship the gods, but to force them to fulfil the desires of the sacrificer. Many of them are in fact nothing else than spells in prose. Among them inscriptions like those of the Atharvaveda are also to be met with. Here, too, we find the beginnings of that form of prayer which seeks to influence a god by the repetition of his various names and which was greatly developed in later times. This is represented by the Sātaśurūdra, or enumeration of the hundred names of the god Rudra. A similar tendency appears in the frequent employment of sacred but unintelligible or meaningless words, especially the syllable oṣa, which, having originally been a particle of assent, is somewhat analogous to the Hebrew 'Amen.' Thus prayer in the Yajurveda shows deterioration as compared with the Rigveda and a proclivity to revert from the domain of religion to that of witchcraft.

The language and the metre of the prose formulae and of the original verses of the Yajurveda agree on the whole with those of the Rigveda, but represent a distinctly later stage. The internal evidence of the subject-matter points in another direction. It shows that the country in which the Yajurveda was composed lay much farther east
than that of the Rigveda, having as its centre the tract between the two small rivers Sarasvati (Sar-
sutri) and Dhyandvati (Chautang), somewhat to the west of the Jumna. The organization of society
more than in the Rigveda, the caste system in particular having
grown up and been consolidated in the interval.

The Yajurveda has come down to us in six rec-
censions. One of the now more connected group, called the Black Yajurveda, the texts of
which are often identical word for word. They
agree in mixing up, to some extent, explanatory
matter with their sacrificial words for usanae and
ulesas. The two other recensions, which are very closely
alike, form the so-called White Yajurveda.
This contains the prose and verse formulas to be recited
at the sacrifice only, the explanatory matter being
collected in the Brahmanas. It is divided into 40
chapters, in which several chronological strata may
be distinguished. It appears to have originally
consisted of the first eighteen aneke, for this is the
only portion explained word for word in the Brahmanas
and recurring in the Taitytirya reci-
sion of the Black Yajurveda. To them were then added
the next seven chapters. These 25 chapters
together make up the first part of this recension and
contain the prayers for the most important great
sacrifices, which comprise food offerings on the one
hand and soma offerings on the other, both being
necessary for the life of five. The remaining
fifteen chapters are evidently of a supplementary
character. The forties, being an Upanigad,
was added last of all. Even the original part of this
recension is not clear, having been cut off at a later date
than any of the recensions of the Black Yajurveda,
because the separation and distribution of its matter
are more systematic than in the latter.

Though the Yajurveda, as a body is said to
display any literary merit, it is important and
even interesting to the student of the literature,
especially with reference to the signifi-
cance of prayer.

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HYPNOTISM.—Hypnotism is the name now generally given to the study of, and the practice of inducing a peculiar abnormal state of mind which in some respects is allied to sleep, this being the name under which it was, and is still, usually called. The modern practice of hypnotism has been developed from the practice of magnetic or sympathetic healing, which enjoyed a great vogue in France and especially in Paris in the latter half of the 18th cent., owing chiefly to the labours of F. A. Mesmer (whence the term 'mesmerism,' still in popular use). Until the middle of the 19th cent. almost all practitioners of mesmerism followed Mesmer in attributing the effects produced in their patients to the passage from the operator to the patient of some subtle physical influence or fluid, generally called the magnetic fluid, or by means of this unverifiable conjecture largely accounts for, and to some extent perhaps justifies, the extreme scepticism and hostility with which the arts of the mesmerists were regarded by the great bulk of the medical profession until almost the close of the 19th century.

To a French physician, Alexandre Bertrand, belongs the honour of having first pointed out (Travédu savanitnitude, Paris, 1853) that the therapeutic and other effects attributed to animal magnetism are (in so far as they are genuine, and not, as in the early days so many were, errors due to fraud or to malobservation) to be regarded as in the main produced through the mind of the patient working upon the organism, as effects of expectation induced in the mind of the patient by suggestions given either directly or indirectly by the operator. These effects being generally favoured and intensified by a peculiar mental and bodily condition of the patient induced by the mesmeric procedures. Bertrand's great discovery was, however, almost neglected by the medical world; and twenty years later James Braid, a surgeon of Manchester (Neuropsychology, London, 1843), arrived independently at the same conclusions, and by his success fully established the theory that the measures in his practice secured for them, under the name of 'Brainism,' a certain consideration even in medical circles. But it was not until the truth was discovered and published independently for the third time in 1884 by H. Bernheim, Professor of Medicine at Nancy, that it began to gain general acceptance in the scientific world and (under the name of hypnotism,) which Braid had been supplied by medical men in all parts of Europe without serious risk of loss of their professional reputations. In the last decade of the 19th cent. it became generally recognized that hypnotism was a legitimate means of a therapeutic practice, extremely useful in many cases of nervous and functional disorder.

When Beralinheit published his work (De la Suggestion, Paris, 1884), he took the view that the therapeutic effects he recorded were secured by creating in the mind of the patient the expectation of the disappearance of symptoms; and the process of inducing such expectation, which generally took the form of confident affirmation on the part of the physician, he called 'suggestion.' He realized that such suggestions operate more powerfully if the patient to whom they are directed is first brought into a drowsy or half-sleeping state. But he did not recognize that this state, so favourable to the operation of suggestion, differs essentially from a normal state of drowsiness, on the other hand, Charcot, the celebrated physician who extensively applied the hypnotic methods in the Salpêtrière Hospital at Paris (in the eighties), taught that the hypnotic state is a peculiar and abnormal condition which can be produced in persons suffering from certain nervous deficiencies. These two views of the hypnotic state were opposed to one another in a lively controversy prolonged through many years. It is now generally recognized that the truth is to be found by adopting the middle way. Hypnosis (as the hypnotic state is now generally called) is a peculiar state of mind, involving some abnormal condition of the nervous system, as Charcot maintained; but this condition is one which can be temporarily induced by a skillful hypnotist in the great majority of normal and perfectly healthy persons. The only constant, feature or symptom of hypnosis is the increased suggestibility of the subject; for, although in most cases, especially in cases of deep hypnosis, the subject presents the appearance of drowsy passivity or even prostration, this is not always the case; and in this respect much depends upon the methods used for the induction of hypnosis and the general handling of the case by the operator.

In a typical condition of hypnosis of moderate depth, the subject appears completely plastic in the hands of the operator. He remains unresponsive to, and apparently unaffected by, all persons and things of his environment, except the operator and those things or persons to which the latter may direct his attention. But, in relation to the operator, his mind and senses seem to be peculiarly alert and responsive; and he obeys implicitly the slightest indications of the operator's wishes or expectations. This responsive obedience, however, which is the essence of the abnormal 'suggestibility' of the subject, is not necessarily obedience; it differs from the most subject voluntary obedience in two important respects. First, the hypnotized subject may, and sometimes does, exert his will to resist the suggestions of the operator; and, though such exertion may be attended with more or less success according to the depth of the hypnosis, the degree of training of the subject, and the extent of the personal influence exerted by the operator, the measure of its success is very much less than in the normal condition, or the effort required for success is much greater.

Secondly, the subject's obedience to, or acceptance of, suggestions is much more complete, unhesit-
ing, and uncritical, than in the normal state. He accepts with conviction suggestions so improbable and against all common experiences that in his normal state he could not accept them or believe in them even though he should endeavour to do so. For instance, he may be told that he cannot lift his hand from his knee, and forthwith he finds himself unable to perform this simple action. And in a similar way he may be prevented from performing any movement or be made to execute any 'suggested' movement. In both cases it is argued that the essential condition of the effectiveness of the 'suggestion' is that the notion suggested to the subject shall be accepted by him with complete conviction, and shall prevail firmly in his mind without being subjected to the criticism or opposition of other notions. There is good reason to believe that, if any person in a normal condition could be induced to accept apathy or suggestion with complete conviction, the notion thus established in his mind would be just as effective in controlling his movements as is the suggestion now described. We occasionally observe instances of such control of movement by an idea suggested under peculiarly favourable conditions to a person in a normal state. And not only control of bodily movement, but many other effects of the phenomena of hypnotism, notably the induction of hallucinations and delusions of all sorts, and the abnormally increased influence of the mind over corporeal functions such as sleep, the action of the bowels, and the circulation of the blood, these plausibly be brought under the same type of explanation.

According, then, to one view widely prevalent among the more orthodox psychologists and practitioners of hypnotism, hypnosis is essentially a condition in which the suggestibility (the tendency to accept any proposition imparted) normal to all minds is temporarily increased such that the peculiar condition of the patient's brain induced by the process of hypnotizing him; and this condition of the brain is held to be one of 'relative dissociation' (i.e. a certain degree of isolation) of the systems of neurons (the anatomical elements of which the brain is composed) is rendered less free and lively than it normally is, so that, any one system being activated, it vetoes out its effects in an untrammeled and thorough manner.

But there is a class of hypnotic phenomena which does not easily lend itself to interpretation of this sort. In various ways the subject's behaviour may seem to express two independent and simultaneous streams of mental activity, and this peculiar condition seems in many cases to be prolonged beyond the period of hypnotism into the fully waking state. It is, in fact, the influence of commands or suggestions given during hypnosis, but designed to take effect after the termination of that hypnosis (post-hypnotic suggestions), that the dual stream of mental activity is most clearly revealed. For the waking subject may be quite unable to recall to consciousness any incident of the period of hypnosis or the nature of any suggestions made to him during that period, and yet he may carry out such suggestions with minute accuracy; and these post-hypnotic suggestions thus carried out by the waking subject, without conscious recollection of the instructions given, may be such that their execution implies complex intellectual activities. For example, the subject may be instructed to perform some simple action after the lapse of a given number of minutes; and in some cases the number of minutes so named may be so large that the accurate determination of the appointed moment may necessitate either continuous counting of the passage of the minutes throughout hours, days, or even weeks, or the carrying out of complicated arithmetical operations which seem to be beyond the ordinary powers of the subject. Such post-hypnotic exeクtions of suggestions are typical of a large class of phenomena which seem to render necessary the notion of subconscious or semi-conscious mental activity.

Some of the effects of the hypnosis of neural dissociation attempt to apply it to the explanation of the facts of this order also. Others, notably Pierre Janet, attempt a rather different line of explanation, but it must be said that the notion of any productive mental process is always fully conscious and involves the activity of a centre of synthetic mental energy, the subconscious processes are always of the nature of semi-mechanical or automatic repetitions of processes previously achieved by true activity.

To many students of hypnotism it seems that both these attempts at explanation are wholly inadequate. It may be admitted that neural dissociation of various degrees is characteristic of the hypnotic state, while yet it is recognized that this dissociation affords but a partial interpretation of a part of the facts. By those who take this view it is urged that, according to both these theories, hypnotic and subconscious mental processes must be considered on a relatively low grade of efficiency (and many of them, no doubt, answer to this description). In some cases, it is pointed out, they far surpass in intellectual level or in range of control over bodily functions the normal mental processes of the subject; and it is insisted that these features of hypnotic process must be considered in relation to a wealth of facts which have been recorded in the course of modern studies of hysteria, spontaneous trance, mediunism, genius, religious and mystical experiences and ecstasy, and other unusual mental states and processes in which the bounds of normal mental activity seem to be transcended.

When hypnosis is regarded in relation to the larger field of manifestations of obscure but wide-ringing powers of the mind, hypnotism appears as a means of experimental investigation capable of greatly extending and deepening our conception of human personality; and it is from this point of view that many of the most effective students have pursued it, and that many interesting speculations have been made for the purpose of rendering the facts in some degree intelligible. Such speculations are, in the main, of two types. On the one hand, the psychical constitution of man is regarded as infinitely richer and more complex than it is revealed by the control over our normal mental life, as comprising potentialities or faculties which normally find no expression owing to the limitations imposed by our bodily organization, and which find only partial and very incomplete expression in the super-normal phenomena of the abnormal states of which hypnosis is the experimental type. Of speculations of this group, the conception of the subliminal self put forward by F. W. H. Myers (Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, London, 1901) is the boldest and most elaborated.

Speculations of the other type (best represented by William James in A Plurality of Universes, London, 1909, and other writings) attempt to account for the super-normal phenomena by conceiving human individuality as relative only and as conditioned by the nature of the bodily organization. Each human mind or personality is conceived as a fragmentary and temporary expression of some larger personality, and it is sought to explain the super-normal phenomena by assuming that they are rendered possible by some temporary union or breaking down of the conditions by which the isolation of the individual mind is commonly maintained, so that for the time being it may share in
HYPochondria.

—In the literature and practice of medicine, hypochondria is regarded as one of the many forms of mental affection embraced under the term melancholy. Any uneasiness or disease of the regions on either side of the abdomen beneath the cartilages of the false ribs, of the hypochondriacal regions in short, was, from the earliest times, associated with those feelings of profound depression and sense of ill-being which constitute the basis of the affection. This is well illustrated in the old Folio frontispiece of The Anatomy of Melancholy, where Hypochondriacs is depicted leaning on his chest.

Underlying all signs of hypochondria are functional disorders, less frequently organic disease, of any portion of the intestinal tract from the stomach downward or of the larger secretory glands in the abdomen, especially the liver and the sexual organs, or a combination of these conditions. Consequent on deranged chemical processes incumbitated by the aberrations in the functional distribution of the abdominal organs and the absorption of poisonous substances thus elaborated into the blood stream, all parts of the body may be functionally disturbed, and more particularly these organs and tissues which are predisposed.

There is a consensus of opinion that hypochondria is induced by poisons arising from the deranged chemical processes above mentioned (metabolic origin); but recent researches suggest that the virus in the blood may be due to the presence of micro-organisms, which find a footing in the disordered walls of the intestinal tract; cases of hypochondria have been recorded in which the mental illness has disappeared with the elimination of such organisms under appropriate treatment (microbial origin).

Sense impressions received by way of the several intestinal and abdominal organs do not intrude on the mind in healthy states save as vague, and not clearly distinguishable, pleasurable emotions. Where disordered or diseased functioning occurs, they become so prominent that the mind area of more or less painful nature. Further, where there is an insane or neurotic inheritance, such as is commonly found in hypochondria, varied manifestations are seen from worry, shock, or mental stress and strain of any kind.

Hypochondria is more prevalent in men than in women, and is usually met with in middle age; it is rarely seen in persons under thirty. It is preceded, as a rule, by dyspeptic and ascetic conditions, is insidious in its origin, and develops slowly. The attack may be slight, and take the form of mild depression. In such circumstances it does not interfere with work or health, and in recovery after a few weeks or months of proper attention. In many cases, especially where there is a hereditary taint, the disease develops and may pass the limits of sanity. Here the disturbed general sensations are referred to force themselves on the attention, gradually arrest it, and occupy the whole mental domain. The affected person becomes fearful and anxious. There is marked mental depression and particularly, want of power. The sensations perceived are much exaggerated; thus excessively painful spots are pointed out, shooting pains are complained of, and loud lamentations are made of loss of power or want of sensation in various parts of the body. The trouble grows worse until the hypochondriac thinks of nothing but his many ailments, and believes he is the subject of some frightful malady. He seeks relief in all sorts of remedies, and consults all kinds of persons in the hope of finding help. He is constantly searching his excrescences for signs of serious disease; he reads medical and quick literature in order to diagnose himself. Any mild disorder he has, or change in his appearance, is magnified into a grave malady; spots on his skin are signs of syphilis; vague pains and throbbings in the head tell him that his brain is dissolving or breaking up. He points to well nourished limbs and says they are wasted or dead. He believes he is the source of infectious disease, and recons all his ailments are contagious. The sensations arising from the disordered or diseased organs of the body are falsely interpreted, and are, therefore, to be classed as illusions. These illusions constitute prominent symptoms of the affection, and the most striking examples of the serious effects of illusion are seen in this connexion. The misinterpretations thus referred to pass insensibly into false conceptions and judgments. Hallucinations, i.e. the experience of sensations, when the terminal sensory organs are not excited, are not common. When they do occur, they are generally auditory and incidental (see, further, art. HALLUCINATION).

A lady known to me, in an advanced stage, believed that an egg, which she had partaken of, had developed into a chicken. She heard the chirp of this chicken for some days coming through the walls; and, believing this to be her stomach. As the chicken grew the chirp was no longer heard, and the belief changed into horror based on the illusion that a foul was located somewhere in the intestine, and that, whenever food was taken, this bird poked itself up. The sensations of the act of picking were graphically described, and an ulcer, subsequently discovered in this patient, accounted for the sensations and the beliefs experienced, as they disappeared with the surgical treatment of the ulcer.

The mental pain felt by the hypochondriac is more apparent than real. He may look the picture of grief when detailing his distresses, but, unlike the true melancholic, he can for the moment be diverted from his troubles to talk rationally and act brightly. Defective will power and loss of memory are associated with hypochondria. The memory defect is due to the concentration of the mind on the bodily troubles. All other thoughts for the time are excluded, and so the experience of recent events not obtruding on his limited mental outlook is lost.

Hypochondria is not easily confused with other mental affections. Though it differs in degree only from true melancholy, which is more concerned with morbid thoughts than with sensory impressions, there are obvious differences: the hypochondriac is restless, always seeking for sympathy and the ear of one to whom he may detail his sorrow; the
This intense eagerness to conform can easily be seen in such arrested civilizations as those of the East. The hardening of the cake of custom became too much for India, and men were so stereotyped by this hardening that they were unable to break through it. There is a tendency in descendants to differ from their progenitors, but the Indian discouraged variation from the original type. Among successful peoples the children dissembled at first, they became strong enough to soften the cake of custom, though they pretended to themselves that they had changed nothing.

This course, however, was the exception, not the rule; for the propensity of man to imitate what is before him is one of the strongest parts of his nature. In early times it was a case of 'that which has been is that which shall be; and that which has been done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun' (Ec. 1:). This extreme propensity to imitation forms one great reason of the amazing sameness which every observer notices among savage nations. No barbarian can bear to see one of his nation deviate from the old barbarous customs and usages of his tribe. All the tribe would inevitably expect a punishment from the gods if any one of them retracted from what was done, or rejected what was new (cf., farther, art. CUSTOM).

Comparative sociology at once reveals a substantial uniformity of genius. The habitual existence of chiefship, the establishment of households, the transfer of war, the rise everywhere of the medicine-man and the priest—these are evident in all early organizations. It is true the old order changes—leaving some room for assemblages—yielding place to the new, but the new does not wholly consist of positive additions to the old; much of it is merely the old very slightly modified, very slightly displaced, and very superficially re-combined. If you want, remarked Swift, 'to gain the reputation of a sensible man, you should be of the opinion of the person with whom you are conversing.' It is obvious, then, that all primitive men were profoundly sensible. When Lord Melbourne declared that he would adhere to the Church of England because it was the religion of his fathers, he was acting upon one of the most deeply rooted maxims of his ancestor.

Conduct in the olden days was never individualistic; it was always corporate. To early man all his acts were tribal, for all the acts of the tribe involved him in their consequences. Hypocrisy to him was abhorrent, for he could not bear any divergence from the observed ritual. When the street statutes of Hermes were mutilated, all the Athenians felt afraid; they thought that they would be ruined because one of their corporate body had mutilated the image of a god. The mind of the citizen had been so permeated by the ideas of the day that they were part and parcel of its mental furniture. His brain, not merely his actions, was so cut and marked as to conform to the orthodox type. His habits, his superstitions, and his prejudices were absolutely those of his fellow-tribesmen. In the Fiji Islands, for example, a chief was one day going over a mountain path followed by many of his people, when he happened to stumble and fall. All his followers, save one, also stumbled and fell. Immediately they beat the defaulter, asking him whether he considered himself better than the chief. The Greeks and the Romans possessed the seed of adaptiveness, and were therefore unable to free themselves from the cake of custom. This, however, made possible the existence of the hypocrite, and Astylos (Agam. 788 ff.) analyzes the traits in his character:
The Pand (ix. 321 f.) speaks even more plainly:

... and another... and another... and another...

With this passage may be compared Od. xviii. 392 f., and Theog., Eteg. 87. So far has the Greek travelled from the old conception that Plato lays down in the Republic (π. 394) that our guardians ought not to be imitators, and that the productions of the initiatory arts are bastard and illegitimate (π. 603 f., Lws., xi. 915 f.).

During the last two centuries of the Roman Republic the superposition of superstition and scepticism is very noticeable. With the unreality of human literature was combined the unreality of education. The teacher often selected questions of casuistry for discussion by the pupils. Such discussions inevitably developed the tendency of the age to abstractness and loss of reality. To this Lucan, Seneca, Statius and Velucius bear witness. In the pages of the first writer we meet the sham philosophe, speaking loudly of virtue while his cloak covers all the vices of the age. Cicero (De Nat. Dei, i. 28, 70, i. 17. 43, De Div. i. 3. 6), Seneca (frag. 39), Fanucius, Polybius (vii. 86), Quintus Scroda, and Varro (Aug. de Civ. Dei, vi. 4) regarded religion as the device of statesmen to control the masses by mystery and terror. It had become impossible for these men to believe in the old faith, yet the people continued to take part in a gross materialistic worship. According to Gibbon, all religions were regarded by the people as equally true, by the philosophers equally false, and by the statesman equally useful. Cicero quotes a dictum of Pontifex Maximus that there was one religion of the poet, another of the philosopher, and another of the statesman.

Stoicism maintained the idea of a "double truth"—one truth for the intellectual classes and one for the common people, the climax being reached in the phrase, "It is expedient for the state to be deceived in matters of religion" (expedit ignem fallior in religiis civilibus). Thinkers in the community adopted this attitude towards religion in the last century. It is too much to say that they were hypocrites, but the outcome of their thought was hypocritical. Sulla used religion for State purposes, and with him it became merely another department of political activity. In Cicero's time old women had ceased to tremble at the tables about the infernal regions (De Nat. Dei, ii. 2-5). Even boys, according to Juvenal, disbelieved in the world of spirits (Sat. ii. 140-152). Cicero was an anger, yet he quotes with approval Cato's saying that he wondered how one anger could meet another without laughing. On the whole, however, the people still retained their faith in the old gods, which the educated had lost. The latter, in spite of their diablerie, attended carefully to the details of ritual. In their case creed and practice were utterly divorced, and the effects of this divorce on moral conduct was manifold. The Spirit of the age could be easily imagined in commenting upon the life of Seneca, Macaulay remarks:

"The business of a philosopher was to declare in praise of poverty and virtue; to meditate on the virtuous life lived at leisure; to meditate on the consequences of the evils of luxury, in gardens which would interest philosophers; to rant out liberty, while frowning on the haughty and oppressed freemen of a tyrant; to celebrate the divine beauty of virtue with the same exultation with which he had written a defense of the murder of a brother by a son" (Essays, p. 360).

Just as many a sturdy beggar in the Middle Ages donned the cowl of a beguining friar, many an idle vagabond and profligate called himself a Stoic, and brought discredit upon the name. (See Tacit., Ann. xvi. 32, for Egnatius, a hypocrite of this order). A. Grant, Ethics of a Stoic, London, 1866, 231; J. B. Lightfoot, Ep. to Philemon, London, 1878, p. 284, note 5.)

The last day's philosophies of Greece proved to the Roman that the foundations of his religion were baseless, yet its existence had been invaluable for the preservation of the State. This conflict between private belief and public conduct can be seen, for example, in Ennius. He wrote treatises, embodying advanced sceptical doctrines, and he also wrote patriotic poems in which the whole cycle of Roman gods was exhibited and most reverently treated. From Augustine's De Civ. Dei (iv. 27) we learn that Quintus Scroda develops the "double truth" of Ennius into the familiar triple one—the religion of the philosophers, of the statesmen, and of the people. The writing of Scroda and Varro came too late, for Sulla's control of religion by the State had killed it.

Contemporary with the classical possessors of "double truth" and "triple truth" were the Pharisaes, the people often taken as typical hypocrites. Their hypocrisy was a consequence of their desire for commerce with the people. In the catastrophe of the Exile Ezra perceived the danger of associating with the neighbouring peoples. The policy of splendid isolation was that best fitted to save Israel; it was necessary to do all that is written in this book of the Torah, that is, what is contained in the five books of Moses.

The importance of the Torah forms the central point in the outstanding religious creation. Henceforward the Jew felt, as he had never felt before, that he had a guide laying down a detailed code of conduct; it was an honest attempt to guard the religious life of the people from the danger of intercourse with strangers. The strict Jew became the Pharisee, "the separate one." As his strictness increased, he explored the Torah more thoroughly, and came to see that by analogy its precepts applied to cases not originally contemplated. The Scribes, the Sophrén, interpreted the Divine teaching so widely that many traditions came into being; the Responsa Prudentium, the answers of the learned in law, furnishes a parallel case from Roman law. The Sophrén worked out rules applying to particular cases, much after the fashion of the Jesuits. Their system inculcated deliberation in judgment, which is the casuistry of the Talmud. Moreover, the Scribe and the Jesuit equally urged that this deliberation proceeded from the desire to do justice to every possible aspect of the question at issue.

Under the princes of the Maccabean house there was a steady tendency towards a stricter enforcement of the Torah. The Pharisaic (Pirahārin, "separated") frowned upon the worldliness of the rest of the nation, and formed themselves into distinct societies pledged to observe certain rules in the matter of meat, drink, and clothing, according as the Torah or traditions derived from it allowed or forbade these points. The rules of right conduct, the Halahkah, increased so much in scope that they practically covered all the actions of a man's life. It is plain that the Halakoh imposed upon the Goyim with all their codes, but the result was hypocrisy, and formalism became prevalent. The tithing of mint, anise, and cummin was performed, while the motive of these actions was not sufficiently scrutinized. Then long speech contained in Mt. 23, when he said: "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!" In their case the letter had killed the spirit. They had played
a noble part in Jewish life, but their hypocrisy (of the seven classes of Pharisees, of whom fire are hypocritical or foolish, Saatik (22) had destroyed their usefulness. They had been truly patriarchic, truly scrupulous, but their social ritual forced them into a pluralism of sins. It is the degeneration of the best which makes the worst, and the sincere observer of the Torah in the days of Ezra left for his successors in the days of Christ the most treacherous of men.

Most men want their lives regulated for them, and what the Sfôhûm had done before the Christian era the Christian Church undertook to carry on. Cases of conscience had rules formulated for them, and in the writings of Thomas Aquinas we find an elaborate code of morality. In the Summûm Theologica, II, 2, the question of hypocrisy receives careful treatment.

Qu. 1s. 1. sa. "Is all sinulation sinful?" Simulation, we learn, is properly a lie enacted in certain signs, consisting of outward signs, which consist of the identity of which that which is meant is not, so it is simulation when by outward signs, consisting of a pretense, Pihrat the Positist expresses it, that which is meant, but not when one enacts to signify that which is; hence without any inward character no sin may conceal his sin.

Art. II. "Is hypocrisy the same as simulation?" Augustine says: "As actors (hypocrites, geonpa) pretend to other characters than that of which they really are not, so in the churchmen and in all human life, whatever which is done by the one is not by the other; for he is not a hypocrite or actor; for he is not pretended to be just without rendering himself such." So, therefore, hypocrisy is simulation, not; however, any and every simulation, only by which a person pretends to a character as his own, as when a man pretends to the character of a just man by the mere \

Art. III. "Is hypocrisy a mortal sin? There are two things in hypocrisy, the want of holiness and the state of possessing it. If, therefore, by a hypocrite we are understood one whose intention is carried to both these points so that he cares not to have holiness but only to appear holy—this is what is usually seen in Holy Scripture—it that understanding it is clearly a mortal sin; for so one is totally deprived of holiness another by mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we are understood one who intends to counterfeit the holiness which mortal sin removes from him, then he is not in mortal sin, but the more prudence on his part is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes only venial. To tell when it is venial and when mortal, one must consider the soul of the person, for it is inconsistent with the love of God and of one's neighbor, it will be mortal sin when one pretends to holiness in order to dissemble false doctrine, or to gain some ecclesiastical dignity or public favor, or to gain something by other worldly, or any other temporal good, placing his last end in them. But if the end intended be not immorality with charity, it will be a venial sin, as when one finds pleasure and satisfaction in the name and more a caracterization of a character that does not belong to him: of such a one it is said that there is more vanity than malice in him.

This analysis is noteworthy because it is the presentation that dominated medieval life, and in the Summûm Theologica Latin Christianity received a definitive form, covering all the transactions of life. The relationship between law and custom, thought and action, lies at the very root of all forms of hypocrisy, and literature bears witness to this divorce of creed and life.

The term "Platonism" expresses the corruption of the times, while Chaucer's Canterbury Tales does not overlook the essential hypocrisy. The reformers devote much attention to this particular vice. Bradfield describes a hypocritical profession of the gospel (Sermons, Cambridge, 1844, p. 430). Ridley speaks of the "holy men and hypocrites" (Dissent, 1844, p. 62). Deacon points out its prevalence (Early Writings, 1848, p. 39), analyzes it (Propers, 1844, p. 60); cf. Bulleiner, Decades, v. I, p. 327. Pelham exposes the danger of God's word (Chalcedian, 1844, p. 463), the liability to fall in time of persecution (The Martyrs, 1849, p. 38); and the danger of the age (The Early Years, 1859). Bulleiner compares hypocrisy to craft and rotten meat (Dissent, 1844, p. 327). Lamplin emphasizes the difficulty in knowing them (Reminiscences, Cambridge, 1844, p. 62), dwells on their subtlety and conduct (Sermons, 1844, p. 298) and their desire to sell their works, their "opera superorganica" (89, 422; Reminiscences, 200). John Woolton notes their observation of rites and ceremonies (The Christian Remains, Cambridge, 1851, p. 45). William Tindal observes that they extol their own works above the law of God (Expositions, 1843, p. 137). William Dean observes their outward abstraction from sin (p. 80), their impurity in heart (Expositions, 11, 125). Their judgment of others (v. I, p. 247—8). And on the world on their aids (Dissertationes, 123), that they must be rebuked (Expositions, 41), and their wisdom must be turned to foolishness (Dissertationes, 184).

A perusal of the works of the Reformers proves how conscious they were of the relaxation of moral discipline in the 16th century. Moreover, where persecution overrages, it transforms a man into a hypocrite. The weak bent to the intolerant policy of the time by the use of the weapons of intrigue and falsehood, and both then and ever since this has frequently been sought from censure—whether ecclesiastical or social—by a feigned compliance which is the mark of hypocrisy.


E. H. H. NAYR.

HYSTERIA.—Hysteria (hêsteria, 'the womb') is a psychical, or at any rate a functional, nervous disease, which is so much more frequent in women than its consideration as regards the male sex may for the present be omitted. The chief clinical feature of the disease, which, however, is not manifested by the majority of the subjects of the affection, is the hysterical fit; the other symptoms are either preliminary or subsequent to the fit, or they occur as isolated symptoms with a tendency to neurasthenia in the fit. The fit may succeed a period of great excitement, or it may come on spontaneously, but is either preceded by or coincident with epilepsy; and it usually takes place when other people are present. Consciousness is never entirely lost, as may be ascertained by touching the conjunctivi, which is a sign that the left part of the eyelids will at once occur. The eyelids are always turned up, so that the pupils are concealed under the upper eyelids. The hands are clenched, and the thumbs inverted. These are due to the laryngeal spasm of the muscles, and the patient struggles and throws herself about. She may moan or cry and breathe stertorously, but there is no bitting of the tongue or blood, and nothing about the mouth, as in the epileptic fit. The paroxysms generally terminate with crying, laughing, sighing, or yawning, and is followed by a feeling of exhaustion. Various mental, motor, and sensory symptoms appear in hysterical subjects, in The Scorn of Egypt, in the fit, associated with it, or independent of it.

1. Mental symptoms.—The subjects of hysteria are neuropathic, and a hereditary tendency to nervousness or the neuropathic condition is often found in their family history. They manifest prominently those symptoms of instability which are described by modern writers as mental degeneracy. Chief among these are a loss of the power of intellectual vigour, excitability, ostentation, vanity, depression, and a deadening of the nerve fibers, and a craving for sympathy and notoriety. The subjects are extremely susceptible to suggestion by stronger wills than their own, and exhibit
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a feebler resistance to various insinuative promptings or temptations to which they may be subjected. As a medicine, they are not to mean deficient in intelligence, and the ingenuity they display in attracting attention to their supposed maladies, or in simulating diseases, is often phenomenal. Upon such a psychical basis it is easy to see that the slightest symptoms may assume many and diverse forms. Some of the patients are depressed and moody; others gay, excited, and reckless in their conduct. Many of them are restless, irritable, incapable of patience or self-control, or to live with the morbid ambition of others leads them to such means of attaining notoriety as protracted fasting, the invention of improbable tales of assault upon themselves—usually of an indecent nature—or the simulation of various forms of obscure diseases, of which paralysis of motion is the principal.

2. Motor symptoms. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that true hysterical paralysis is a simulated affection. This paralysis is distinguished from ordinary organic forms in so far as sensation in the paralyzed limb is never abolished, and the nutrition of the affected part is not impaired. In hysterical hemiplegia the face and tongue are rarely implicated, while in hysterical paraplegia the two lower limbs are usually unequally paralyzed.

3. Sensory symptoms. The principal sensory disturbance is a condition of hyperesthesia, or over-sensitiveness, which involves both the special senses and the general sensibility of the patient. She feels a sensitiveness of the skin; the cutaneous pressure produce undue and exaggerated effects upon the nervous system. Neuralgic pains in various parts of the body are often complained of, and the most common is the globus hystericus, described as a choking feeling or a constriction in the throat or chest, as if a ball were passing up or down the cavity. Anesthesia of different parts of the body, sometimes confined to one side, is not an unusual symptom in advanced cases. The patient may be unaware of the presence of the symptom, and the anesthesia may either be complete or partial. Generally speaking, in hemianesthesia the condition is permanent, but fluctuates in degree from time to time. Charcot attached great importance to tenderness of the orav, usually the left, in hysterical hemiplegia, and ascribed it to pain in the lower part of the abdomen, corresponding in site to the position of the affected ovary. This pain may be so extremely acute that the slightest touch on the part is dreaded, while in other patients firm pressure is required to elicit it. Firm pressure has usually a decisive effect in checking the advent of the hysterical fit. In other cases it tends to bring out certain sensations which are known as the aura hysterica, prominent among which is the globus hystericus already referred to. The hyperesthetic ovary is usually upon the same side of the body as is affected by the various sensory and motor disturbances which have been mentioned.

4. It is necessary to refer briefly to three phenomena which are associated with hysteria. These are the trances, the catalepsy, and the ecstasies. These three phenomena are so intimately associated with one another that the one may merge into the other in the same subject. In catalepsy there is a condition of stupor accompanied, or not, with loss of consciousness, and followed or not by a recollection of what took place under the condition. The will to move is in abeyance, and the movements of the patient when he is brought out of it are prosaic, and as far as an observer, it remains in any position in which it may be placed. In the state of trance the patient lies as if dead—some persons have even been 'laid out' as dead in this state; the skin assumes a deathly paleness; and the functions of respiration and circulation are so attenuated as to be almost imperceptible. In the ecstatic state the patient becomes so vividly hallucinated that complete scenes which she is able to describe fluently pass in sequence before her mental vision. The nature of the 'visions' changes according as the mental condition of the patient varies emotionally from grave to gay. The ecstatic state is accompanied by posturing and gesturing of an exaggerated character, and it frequently terminates in dancing movements such as are practiced by certain religious communities.

5. Estimated by its universal diffusion over the world and by the frequent references to it in the writings of travellers, lay and medical, hysteria must be the most common of all the nervous. In the very oldest Brahmanical writings, which preceded the Christian era by thousands of years, mention is made of it among the diseases of the nervous system (J. Jolly, Med. J. G. I. A. P. iii. 10 (1901), p. 119). The origin of the word, derived from the writings of the Greek physicians, is also very ancient. Coming down to comparatively modern times, we find it constantly referred to in the writings of travellers. Judging from the comparative frequency of these references, one can form the opinion that one of the principal seats of the malady is the group of countries in the Arctic latitudes of the Eastern Hemisphere, including Iceland, the Faeroe Islands, Lapland, and the parts of Europe in Russia in the farthest north. From the last of these we have information of the truly endemic prevalence of hysteria among the women of the Samojeds . . . and of the Yakuts and other Siberian tribes (G. E. and Hist. Pathol., Eng. tr., London, 1833-38, iii. 610). Among the inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula a peculiar manifestation of the disease, known as leprous, is very common. A more detailed description has been given by Ellis (Journ. of Mental Science, 1897, p. 32).

6. When we turn from endemic to epidemic hysteria, a wide and difficult field of inquiry presents itself. As hysteria is a transmissible disease, the latent in otherwise apparently normal populations is to an enormous extent. This latent potentiality may suddenly become active, under the influence of any powerful exciting, moral or spiritual, acting on a people. It is generally believed that these powerful emotional excitants sharply delimit the neuropathic from the normal elements in a population. The history of religious hysterical epidemics is inextricably associated with the history of the human race, so far as we know it, and can be traced, through the records of the Asiatics and other Eastern races, down to the accounts of the Mad Mullahs of our own day. In Europe, during the Christian era, the most remarkable instance of it was the 'dancing mania' of the Middle Ages. An account of it is given by Raynal, as it was witnessed at Lausanne in 1724, is as follows: 'They formed circles hand in hand, and appearing to have lost all control over their senses, continued dancing, regardless of the bystanders, for hours together, until exhausted as well to the ground in a state of exhaustion. . . . While dancing they neither saw nor heard, being insensible to external impressions through the senses, but were haunted by visions, their fancy conjuring up spirits whose names they shrieked out. . . . Where the disease was completely developed, this was accompanied with epileptic convulsions. . . . They soared at the moon, and suddenly springing up, passed by a recollection of what took place under the condition. The will to move is in abeyance, and the movements of the patient when he is brought out of it are prosaic, and as far as an observer, it remains in any position in which it may be placed. In the state of trance the patient lies as if dead—some persons have even been 'laid out' as dead in this state; the skin assumes a deathly paleness; and the functions of respiration and circulation are so attenuated as to be almost imperceptible. In the ecstatic state the patient becomes so vividly hallucinated that complete scenes which she is able to describe fluently pass in sequence before her mental vision. The nature of the 'visions' changes according as the mental condition of the patient varies emotionally from grave to gay. The ecstatic state is accompanied by posturing and gesturing of an exaggerated character, and it frequently terminates in dancing movements such as are practiced by certain religious communities.' (quoted from J. P. C. Heccker, Epileptology of the Middle Ages, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 37).

Those interested in this peculiar form of psychic...
patology will find a very full description of it in J. F. C. Hooker's *Epidemics of the Middle Ages*. That such epidemics are not necessarily associated with religious fervour alone is seen from the similar outbreaks of hysterical excitement which occurred in Paris during the Revolution and after the close of the Franco-German war. In Madagascar, in the year 1864, an epidemic of hysteria occurred among girls and young married women between fifteen and twenty-five years of age. The occasion of the outbreak, which began at one point and spread gradually over almost the whole island, was the death of a depot, caused among the people by the violent death of the king, and the consequent changes in the form of religion and laws. The morbid phenomena were almost identical with those of the dancing mania of the Middle Ages (Hirsch, loc. cit. p. 529). See also art. DEGENERATION.

From the above facts and many others that might be cited, it appears probable that in every population there is a certain amount of hysteria; that it varies in amount in different communities or races; and that in predisposed individuals the disease varies in intensity—from those subjects who without known cause present the pronounced clinical symptoms of conversion, hallucination, mental aberration, or disease-mimicry, up to those who only under extreme excitement manifest perversions of feeling and conduct of a pathological nature.


JOHN MACPHERSON.

I

IBADIS.—The Ibadis were a Muslim sect, a branch of the Khwārījī (q.v.). They were called after 'Abdallah ibn Ibad, who figures in the *Chronicle* of Tabari (ii. 417) in the year 65, as separating from and young from 'Ali, founder of the Khwārījī, (founder of the Azārqiā), and taking a more lenient view of the treatment to be accorded the monastic Nāṣr, but less lenient than that of 'Abd al-Most, caused among the people by chronicles otherwise say little about him, and in- indeed confuse him with other personalities; but, in an Ibadite treatise excerpted by E. Sachau (*Mittheil. des Seelsorger für Orient. Sprachen*, ii. (Berlin, 1899) 47–58), two letters purporting to have been written by him to the Umayyad Khalif 'Abd al-Malik are preserved, and his birth and death are said to have taken place in the mosque of Masjīd wa 'Ali (A.D. 681–680) and 'Abd al-Malik (685–706) respectively. These letters are homiletic in character, and contain little that is definite respecting the special doctrines of Ibn Ibad, though insisting on the political prorame of the Khwārījīs, who were responsible for the assassination of Othman, and afterwards for that of 'Ali. There is probably little reason for supposing them to be genuine, and analogous forgeries are common. Ibn Ibad appears to have devised a new interpretation for the word kafir, 'denier,' which ordinarily means 'unbeliever,' but may also signify 'ungrateful'; according to him, a Muslim who committed a capital offence might be described as a kafir in the latter sense; and the consequence to be deduced was that the good of Muslims might not be appropriated as spoil, though their lives might be taken. This doctrine, which is sketched by Tabari (loc. cit.), is afterwards said to be characteristic of the Ibadis by writers on sects (b. ‘Abd al-Qahir (461–459), in *al-Faraj bain al-Madhahib*, Cairo, 1864, p. 307; and ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilūnī (461–459), in *al-Ghayyab*, Cairo, 1888 A.H., i. 76, 19).

By the end of the Umayyad period the views of Ibn Ibad appear to have found adherents, since the Ibadi 'Abdallah b. Yahya, who headed an insurrection in A.H. 130, found support in Bagn, Hadramaunt, and Yemen. A detailed ac- count of this revolt is given in the *Agkari* (1st ed., Beirut, 1865, xx. 97–114); and perhaps the most authentic documents which we possess about the tenets of the sect are the sermons which in that narrative are ascribed to the heads of the rebellion, which was shortly crushed by the Umayyad forces, after the Ibadis had enjoyed brief supremacy in both Mecca and Medina. Early in the Umayyad period they gained adherents in Khurasan. From 708 they founded Sijilmassa, and held Qairawan from 765–762. They became prominent again be- tween A.D. 942 and 947, but were defeated by the Fātimid, and the survivors took refuge in Jebel Nefusa, where they were to be found in the time of Ibn Hanqal (461–466), and where the community still survives. From Africa they spread to Spain, where in the time of the author last quoted they were represented in Castille, and an author of the 9th century, who speaks of the Ibadis in that country rejecting meat slaughtered by Jews or Christians. In the somewhat earlier treatise by ‘Abd al-Qahir they are divided into four sub- sects, called Hafsiyyah, Šarīḥīyyah, Yazidiyyah, and ‘believers in pious acts not done for God the sake’; they differ on a variety of subjects, but almost agreed on the interpretation of the word kafir given above, with the consequences deduced.

From an early time they appear to have been dominant in Oman, where their religion is still official. There they were found by Ibn Battuta in the 14th century; he observes that at midday on Friday they have a prayer of four inclinations, and something like a khutba (‘sermon’). They ask God’s favor for the first two khalsīs, but say nothing of the third or fourth, and indeed speak of the last as the ‘man,’ whereas they call the assassin at whose hand he fell ‘the faithful servant’ (ed. and tr. Derémy and Sanguinetti, Paris, 1853–54, ii. 228). J. R. Wellsted (*Travels in Arabia*, Lon- don, 1838, i. 322) claims to be, after Sale, the first European to give any account of their tenets; he appears to have been burn up by a contemporary dervish, which he imperfectly understood; the statement that the Ibadis deny that the Deity will be seen in the next world (as the other hands think) is, however, confirmed by Sachau’s treatise. The account of W. G. Polgravo (*Travels*, London, 1865, i. 366) is even less accurate than Wellsted’s. Other places, besides Jebel Nefusa, where Ibadi communities continue to exist are the island Zemla, and the Curie Laghouat in Algeria, where the M'zab profess this doctrine. L. Rinn (*Marabout et Khawān*, Algiers, 1884, p. 142) states
that this settlement dates from about A.H. 400, and that those who started it had originally dwelt south of Yavat al Kharma, Sofara, and Jebel Ibad. These Algerian Ibadis, who in 1884 numbered about 49,000, are, according to this author, more like an ascetic sect than a political community. He speaks very highly of their honesty, morality, and religious devotion, which resembles many respects of the Sufi confraternities.

The most accurate account hitherto published in Arabic is that excerpted, as stated above, by Sufi Mahmud Nafis, who is only a specimen of a large Ibad literature, little known in Europe. The treatise is evidently late, and appears to be modeled on the manuals in use among the larger Muslim communities; and the differences between the Ibad doctrine and the Sunni do not appear to be very numerous; moreover, the author, in his polemic against the Sunni doctors, seriously misrepresents them. Like the Sunnis, the Ibadis believe in predestination; they define faith as "word and deed," and declare that repentance is only for unintentional omissions. The bulk of their polemic is directed against views which are associated with the Shafi‘ah, the Mu‘tazilis, and the Mu‘tazilis.

Owing to the French annexation of the Mzab confederation in 1883, the legal system of the community has been studied by French scholars, and a manual of Mzabite legislation was drawn up by E. Zayes (Alger, 1886). This is based on a work called the Nih by the Shafi‘i ‘Abdal-Aziz, of the second or beginning of the 13th century. Furthermore, the list of Ibadite works enumerated by A. Imbert, Le Droit abkhita chez les Musulmans de Zanzibar et de l’Afrique orientale (Algiers, 1900); the early 19th-century work Belal bin Shur’i ("Explanations of the Code"), in more than one volume, written by Muhammad b. Sulaiman al-Mazhar (d. A.H. 588), while the most authoritative is of about the year 1840 A.D. (Muhammad b. Shur’i ("Ocean of the Law"), in more than 90 volumes. Imbert gives an account of the peculiar features of the system in the matter of inheritance, based on a monograph by Sacken ("Mahomedanisches Erbrecht," in SBdW., 1884, p. 188).


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**INB EZRA.**—I. Inb Ezra, Abraham ben Meir (Aben Ezra, Avenares), Jewish philosopher, poet, grammarian, and exegete, and one of the most widely-known Jewish scholars of the Middle Ages, was born in Toledo, Spain, during the last decade of the 11th century, and died c. 1167. The first part of his life was spent in his native country, which he seems to have left in the year 1140. From that year until his death he was a continuous wanderer, his way leading him to Egypt and through Northern Africa, Italy, and Southern France, and to England. His place of death is variously given: some authorities contend for Rome, others for Calahorra on the frontier of Navarre. Ibn Ezra was a prolific writer; his roving life did not prevent him from composing works upon a variety of subjects. His style is always precise—sometimes so precise as to be slightly unintelligible, especially in his commentaries; and at times hurried—owing to the circumstances of his life.

As a poet, Ibn Ezra is a work representative of the Hispano-Jewish Hebrew poetry, which was modeled upon that of the Arabs. While not possessing the simplicity and naturalness of its great objects, Hisayyib’s, Ibn Ezra’s style is always precise—sometimes so precise as to be slightly unintelligible, especially in his commentaries; and at times hurried—owing to the circumstances of his life.

Their way into the prayer-book of the Synagogue. His discs, or collected poetic works, comprises about 209 different pieces, and contains many that are of a purely vocal character, but he arranged them with numerical relations, as he was much interested in mathematics. As is the fashion in Oriental literature, he clothed a variety of subjects in poetic garb. Not only do they incorporate short poems in the introductions to his various commentaries on parts of the Bible, but he versified treatises on religion, on calendar-rules, and on chess.


In philosophy, Ibn Ezra shows distinct traces of Neo-Platonic and Pythagorean influence. His Neo-Patonic ideas he seems to have adopted from his earlier contemporary Solomon Ibn Gabirol (p.54); the Pythagorean from the writings of the Arabic "Breviarum de Pythar," According to Ibn Ezra, the whole universe is made up of substance and form—with the exception of God, who is substance alone; though substance is defined as that of which being can be predicated. God is further described as the power of the universe, the source of all that is felt and thought. He is incorporeal and spiritual, knowing in a sense very different to the knowledge of man, since He is not and cannot be known. But God knows only general ideas—those permanent and permanent species, not the individuals that go to make up the species. When we attribute wisdom, goodness, and righteousness to Him, we are describing His actions or effects. When we speak of God's creative act, we refer only to the sublimar world; the rest of creation— heaven bodies, angels, spheres, and stars—have neither beginning nor end. He is thus opposed to what became the official theological doctrine of Judaism, the *creatio ex nihilo*. God determines the species, to which He gives the power to fashion the individual. The sublunar world is created through the instrumentality of the angels. In fact, God acts upon the world through the angels, and through certain human beings who have not entirely lost the character of angels, prophets, sages, and the righteous. He also uses the intermediaries the heavenly bodies, which, by their conjunction, work good or evil upon mankind. But, in order to give his religious conceptions, Ibn Ezra holds that God can overpower the workings of the heavenly bodies; and that this interference depends upon the moral condition of the subject affected, thus making free will possible. It is accomplished through the angels. Ibn Ezra does not rationalize the wanderers in the Bible, though he warns against exaggerating their importance. The universe is composed of the highest world (angels), the Middle world (sun, moon, and stars), and the Lowest world of Nature (made up of the four elements and the three kingdoms). With the exception of his *Avagot ha-Be‘olah* and *Pardas ha-Mizamarin*, written in Arabic, Ibn Ezra has left no work of a peculiarly philosophical character. His ideas are scattered throughout his other writings.

See Korn, in "Vierteljahrschrift für Gesicht und Wissenschaft des Judendoms, xiii. (1889), 156; xvi. (1890), 144; Hamburger, "Zur Geschichte des Judenrecht in der Judenwissenschaft, iii. (1890).

Two theological-religious works of Ibn Ezra deserve mention. The first is the allegory *Hasen ber Ma‘ban*, a rhymed prose description of the Supreme Being, composed upon the lines of Avicenna's *Hasen ber Yebina*, and to be classed with Ibn Gabirol's *Keter Maktib* (best text in Egger's ed. of the *Dinwut*). The second is his *Yeshur Mora*.
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(ed. and tr. by M. Croizeau, Leipzig, 1840), a book which was written in England, in which he treats of the study of the Law and of the nature of the divine commandments. But Ibn Ezra, not only gives semasiological explanations; he tries to find the ethical foundations for the various commandments.

As a grammarian, Ibn Ezra was the first of the Spanish school to write in Hebrew, though his method of treatment and his terminology are still wholly dependent on his Arabic prototypes. His wish was to popularize the Arabic system among the Jews and to make them acquainted with the works of his great predecessor, Judah Hayyaj. His largest work on grammar is his Sefer Shabot, written in 1145. To this must be added a number of smaller treatises: Yosef ha-Dagglul, Sifat Berith, Yosef ha-Kham, Sefer ha-Yikar, and a popular treatise entitled Masmugan, a sort of terminological dictionary of Hebrew lexicography. Most of these works are poor and hurried in their arrangement, and written probably merely as textbooks.

See W. Bacher, 'Die hebräische Sprachwissenschaft,' in J. Winter and A. Wünsche, Die jüdische Literatur, ll. (1892-95) 190.

Ibn Ezra is best known as a commentator of the Bible. His commentaries were always popular among the Jews, being usually printed together with the works of his other commentators. The following books are among the most important: Pentateuch, Isaiah, Twelve Minor Prophets, Psalms, Job, Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Koholel, Esther, and Daniel; and, of course, the commentary on the Psalms, Canticles, Esther, and Daniel. As a commentator Ibn Ezra opens up a new era among his contemporaries because of his judicious aloofness from the claims of tradition when they cannot be substantiated by the plain meaning of the text. In the introduction to his commentary on the Pentateuch he discourses upon the methods hitherto employed in explaining the Biblical text: the degenerative, the anti-traditional, the allegorical, and the Midrashic. All of these he rejects in favour of his own method, which he characterizes as a combination of both tradition and free research. In this manner he supplies the criticisms of his predecessors, which causes him to reject the theory of the verbal inspiration of the text, to lay minor stress upon the miracles, and, exegetically, to emphasize the distinction between scriptio plena and scriptio defecta as indicating a difference of meaning. Whenever he himself departs from this level, it is either with the object of finding a deeper end, more philosophical meaning or of indulging in astrological speculations, to which he was much given. Free research, however, leads him to take up positions on certain questions which, though on a line with currents which were not strange to the Synagogue (see Gotthilf, 'Some Early Jewish Bible Criticism,' JBL, xxii. [1903] 1-12), would have rendered him an object of suspicion, had he not at times veiled his real meaning, at times given his reader a choice of explanations by adding such expressions as 'the reader will adopt the opinion which recommends itself most to his judgment,' or 'the difficulty should keep silence.' Thus, because he does not believe that the writers of the Bible anticipated history, he holds that the latter part of Samuel was written by Samuel himself; another instance is that the second part of Isaiah was not written by the author of the first part. His influence upon Spinoza's theories in this respect (Tract. Theol. Pol. viii.) is evident.

See M. J. Joël, Spinoza's theolog.-pol. Tractat, Breslau, 1870, p. 54; and, in general, Bacher, in Winter and Wünsche, Die jüdische Literatur, 11. (1892-95) 190.

In addition, Ibn Ezra wrote a number of works on mathematical subjects, e.g. Sefer ha-Mispar and Yosef ha-Mispar on arithmetic; Sefer ha-Abbor on the calendar; and Kelé ha-Nehoshet on the astrolabe, as well as a treatise on the construction of the calendar. Despite his tendency to rationalism, Ibn Ezra was a child of his times, and, as mentioned above, was much interested in astrology. As many as eight small treatises on this subject have come from his pen. See M. Sontheimmer, 'Abraham ibn Ezra . . . zur Gesch. der Mathen. Wissenschaft, in xii. Jahrhundert, in Abhandl. zur Gesch. der Naturwiss., Leipzig, 1890, pp. 57 et seq. W. Bacher, Abraham ibn Ezra als Grammatiker, Strassburg, 1888, also in JBL xxii. 230.

2. Ibn Ezra, Moses ben Jacob, Jewish poet and philosopher; contemporary and relative of his greater namesake Abraham ibn Ezra; born in Granada c. 1071, died c. 1138. He was the most fruitful writer of religious poetry, which is all characterized by gravity and a touch of pessimism. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 229 such poems ascribed to him the greater part are to be found in the rituals for the solemn festival of New Year and the Day of Atonement. Of his secular poems, which do not possess the wit and sparkle of Abraham ibn Ezra, a large number (500) are found in his Tik'ah, which is still in existence. He is also the author of a remarkable poem, variously styled Torah and 'Anak, containing some 1210 verses and written in the style of the Arabic tajmû'a, in which the lines of each strophe end in words similarly written and pronounced, but differing in meaning (homonyms). Ibn Ezra intended by this tour de force to show the possibilities of the Hebrew language in the working of such literary conceits. The poem is divided into ten chapters, in which the tajmû'a-rhymes are arranged alphabetically. The first chapter is occupied with the praise of some great men, who are supposed to have been the learned astronomer Abraham bar Hiyyah of Barcelona.

Even in his secular pieces, Moses ibn Ezra preserves his seriousness; but so varied is the Hebrew language that these propositions are often preferred to those of Jehudiah Halevi and Abraham ibn Ezra.

The Torah has been inadequately edited by David Ginsberg for the society Berenstein. See, however, T. Lewenstein, Prolegomena zu Moses im Ezra's Buch der Torah, Bielefeld, 1895.

The most important work that has come down to us from Moses ibn Ezra is his Kitab al-Muhadarah, written in Arabic. It is the only work of its kind written by a Hebrew scholar, and contains a detailed treatise on Hebrew prosody, a history of Hebrew poetry, and a mirror of the history of the Jews of his time. It is evidently fashioned closely upon the model of the Arabic Adab-books.

Only a portion of it has been edited by P. R. Eckstein, in Poldermania, 2d series, 1910, pp. 183-289; but a general account of its contents has been given by M. Schreiber in 1911, 227-231. Moses ibn Ezra also wrote a philosophical work under the title 'Arugáh ha-Bosem. Only fragments of this composition have been published, so that it is impossible to understand the system to which be adhered. He cites a number of Greek philosophers, al-Farabi, and, of Jews, Sandia Gau and Ibn Gabirol. It is evident that this work must be of inferior importance, for it has left little trace in the literature of the time.

A few selections have been published by L. Dukes in the Hebrew periodical Hayyin, 2. (1942) 127 ff.

RICHARD GOTTHEIL.

IBN GABIROL—IBN HANBAL

IBN GABIROL.—Solomon ibn Gabirol (Gabirol) enjoyed two distinct reputations. To the Synagogue he was known as a hymnologist, to the Church as a philosopher. It was S. Munk who, first, in a periodical in 1848 and later in his Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe (Paris, 1857–60), proved the identity of Ibn Gabirol with Avencebroc or Avicebron. This name seems to have arisen by successive corruptions of Ibn Gabirol into Avencebroc, Avencebroc and the other forms occurring in the medieval Scholastics. E. Renan (Arsenio, Paris, 1832, p. 76) describes Munk’s discovery as an “eminent service to the history of philosophy.” For the obvious implications of the identification, compare the remarks of Ueberweg-Heinze, Gesch. der Philos. (Berlin, 1838) ii. 296.

Ibn Gabirol was a Spanish Jew, who passed the years 1040–50 in Malaga (M. Steinschneider, Die heb. Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters, Berlin, 1893, § 219). It is commonly supposed that he was born about 1020 and died about 1070. Some authorities fix his death in the year 1088. The picture drawn of his personal life by H. Graetz may be found in the later History of the Jews (Eng. tr., London, 1891–92, vol. iii. ch. ix). There are no authentic details of his literary activities, however, we are better informed. Many of his Hebrew poems have been preserved in the Synagogue liturgy. Among these may be particularly cited his Psalms of Creation, which has been more than once rephrased into German, and is to be found fully in English prose in the Prayer-Book of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews (ed. M. Gaster, Day of Mourning, Oxford, 1894, p. 16). A number of his poems are to be found in English verse in Alice Luce’s Jewish Year (London, 1898), p. 140. It is an interesting fact that Ibn Gabirol, famous philosophically as a Platonist, should in this poem, the cornerstone of the new Church, have gone for inspiration to Aristotle’s short treatise On the World. Gabirol’s text is Aristotle’s saying: ‘What the pilot is in a ship, the driver in a chariot, the coryphaeus in a choir, the general in an army, the lawyer in a city—that is God in the world’ (de Mundo, ch. vi). Where Gabirol differs from Aristotle is not merely in the moral optimism of his outlook, but in the surviva of his inversive. There is, moreover, a charm of ‘youthful freshness’ in his verse, a quality which led to the erroneous belief that the poet died young. Many others of Gabirol’s poems are to be found in the Prayer-Book; a short invocation of his, translated by Mrs. R. N. Salaman, is now included in the ‘German’ service-book (see Authorised Hebrew Prayer-Book, annotated ed., London, 1913, p. cxvi). Gabirol also wrote didactic hymns, such as his Ashkith (Ehortsations), poetical summaries of the Biblical Laws, for recitation on Pentecost. Another long poem of his is termed ‘Asfag’; this is a linguistic treatise. Others of his poems previously unknown have been recently published. Ibn Gabirol, like other medieval Hebraic authors, wrote secular as well as religious poems, and several of his epistles have come down to us. His command of a pure Hebrew style is as remarkable as is the elevation of his thought. He stands very high among post-Biblical writers of Hebrew.

Beside his poetical works, Ibn Gabirol composed ethical and metaphysical treatises, some of them of minor importance. A full account of these may be found in the work referred to above. For a most popular collection of moral maxims, the Choice of Pearls, is attributed to Ibn Gabirol, though authorities are divided as to the correctness of this ascription. The book was translated into English by E. H. Asher (London, 1859). More authentic is the Improvement of the Moral Qualities, written in Saragossa about the year 1045 (ed. S. S. Wise, in Arabic and English, New York, 1901).

On two respects the "Ethics" (by which abbreviation the work may be cited) is highly original. In the first place, as compared with Saadia, his predecessor, and Bahya and MAIMONIDES, his successors, Gabirol took a new and unique approach to the problem of the individual and the State, of the unity of the religious, ethical, and political principles which are the foundation of the universal order. Further, he substituted the idea of the solidarity of the soul, in embryo, for the idea of the physical, and therefore the medi eval, soul of the Scholastics. E. Renan (Arsenio, Paris, 1832, p. 76) describes Munk’s discovery as an ‘eminent service to the history of philosophy.’ For the obvious implications of the identification, compare the remarks of Ueberweg-Heinze, Gesch. der Philos. (Berlin, 1838) ii. 296.

By far the most important of Ibn Gabirol’s philosophical treatises was the Arabic work of which the original is lost, but which is known in Hebrew as Ma’aroq ha’Elyon and in Latin by the equivalent title Fons Vitae. The fullest edition of the Latin is by C. Buxuncker, Aenecbrodica Fons Vite (Münster, 1685). Mysticism naturally attaches itself to Platonism; hence the Fons Vitae, being Platonistic in spirit, easily influenced the Jewish Gabirol, especially in its theory of emanations. On the other hand, it did not affect the progress of Jewish scholastic theology, partly because the latter assumed an Aristotelian garb, and partly because about the Fons Vitae, though it essentially, is an attempt to harmonize the Jewish monotheism with Platonism, is based on extra-Biblical foundations. The Fons Vitae is, however, frequently cited by the later Jewish Scholastics. Albertus Magnus cites it as an Arab (Ueberweg-Heinze, 206). Duns SCOTUS, whose hostility to the Jews is notorious, had no suspicion that the author whom he so admirably imitated himself was a Jew. Of Duns SCOTUS the historian just cited (p. 291) says that ‘many Platonic and neo-Platonic ideas penetrated into his thought by the channel of the Fons Vitae.

Holding that every created substance, whether spiritual or bodily, possesses matter as well as form (a position contested by Albertus Magnus and Thomas AQUINAS), Duns SCOTUS asserted: ‘ego sum qui sim ad positionem Avicebronae reduco.’ He agrees with Ibn Gabirol in holding ‘quod nihil ad nihil moved’ (p. 286). Platonistic realism and an underlying hyperrealization of Ideas have obvious relations with Ibn Gabirol’s materia immaterialis, though, unlike Socrates, the Gabirol does not identify God with the materia immaterialis. On the contrary, he absolutely excludes God from any such category. The identity of substance coming through the universe of spirit and body is a hypothesis of far-reaching interest, and in all Gabirol has been revived in recent and the new turn which has been given to mythical and monistic conceptions.

IBN HANBAL.—Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the founder of the Hanbalite school, was born in the month of Rabî the first, A.H. 164 (A.D. Nov. 780) in Bagdad. His lineage was of pure Arab stock, from the great tribe of Bakr ibn Wâil. Hanbal was the name of Ahmad’s grandfather. His father, Muhammad, died when Ahmad was still in infancy. Rarely the student is called to such a task. His father, named Ahmad ibn Hanbal. When 15 years of age, he began the study of tradition and other Muslim sciences. To acquire a full knowledge of the holy texts, he visited Medina, Yemen, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kufa, and Basra, and studied under Suzan ibn ‘Uyain, Abu Yasa, Al-Shâbāb, and many other famous teachers of those days. During this time he showed a remarkable ability in the study of law and the sciences, and was exalted as a soldier in matters of public business. The Hanbalite school was held in reverence as an authority in matters
of Muslim tradition. Al-Shâfi‘i too seems to have had a great respect and affection for Ibn Hanbal. It is told that, when al-Shâfi‘i went to last to Egypt, he said: ‘I do not leave behind any one greater as a faqîh or more pious and learned than Ahmad ibn Hanbal.’

After the long and arduous task of travelling, Ahmad continued to reside in Baghda’d. Soon he was regarded as one of the greatest teachers of tradition and faqîh. During his whole career he was a great defender of his faith and religion. In his pomoc and sales he was scrupulous in his adherence to the ritual observances. It is said that he was wont to pray every day 300 rd’s at least (every prayer consists of a certain number of rd’s). It was his custom at night, after the last prayer of the day, to sleep only for a short time, and then to arise and offer prayers of supererogation until the morning. He recited the whole Qur’an once every seven years. His needs were so extremely few that his life might seem a continuous fast. His demeanour was that of a man abstracted from the common concerns of life.

Ahmad’s maintenance of the integrity of orthodox faith, during the inquisition (shari‘a) ordered by the Khalîf al-Mut’tam and his successors, is looked upon as one of his greatest merits by his Mâlikî and Shâfîî brothers. Al-Mamûn had adopted in the year A.H. 212 (A.D. 827) the doctrine of the Mu’tazîlites, that the Qur’an was _created_. The Khalîf made this tenet obligatory upon his subjects. Ahmad was sent letters to all the provinces, ordering that his governors should cite the gullas and learned men and demand of them a clear answer as to Allah’s _creation_ of the Qur’an. Those who were unable to produce such an answer were frightened by threats and tortures. But Ahmad ibn Hanbal remained firm in the orthodox faith that the Qur’an was Allah’s _uncreated_ word. He was sent a repeated order to come to Baghda’d, and a refusal to assent to the Khalîf’s doctrine. In the year A.H. 219 he was scourged in the palace of the Khalîf Mu’tasem, Mâmilûn’s successor. Finally, as the sword’s edge became moved with anger and was preparing to attack the palace, the Khalîf ordered the suspension of the punishments, and soon after set Ahmad free.

After the scourging Ibn Hanbal was left alone. It was the first time he feared a popular outbreak if any further action was taken against the holy man. In the year A.H. 234 (A.D. 849) the Khalîf al-Mutawakkil stopped the application of the law. Ahmad was commanded by the Khalîf to undertake the teaching of the Mu’tazîz, his favourite son, in the palace at Surrammamn; he excused himself, fearing that the Khalîf was going to make him an attaché to the court.

As a faqîh and a traditionist, Ibn Hanbal bore a great reputation among his own and the following generations. He was a man of great influence among the people, and the leading representative of the strictest orthodox party in those days. He died on the 12th of Rabî‘ the first, A.H. 241 (A.D. 31 July 855), at the age of 77 years. When the news of his death became known, there was general grief over the city of Baghda’d and even in distant countries. It is told that many thousands presented at his funeral.

In regard to Ibn Hanbal’s works we know very little. Only one book, the _Musnad_, his great work, is well known. It is a compilation containing 20,000 or 40,000 traditions relating to the _munah_ of the Prophet, and which was compiled by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, only the traditions in it were a reliable basis for argument in _fiqh_ and other Muslim sciences, whilst the traditions omitted therein were not at all to be regarded as a sound basis. The _Musnad_ is not arranged with any reference to the subjects of the traditions it includes, but only according to the earliest authorities of the cited traditions. The work has always had a great reputation in Muslim circles; it has been used by many traditionists, but its immense size and the inconvenient method of its arrangement prevented it from becoming a popular book. A printed edition was issued at Cairo in 1896.

After the death of Ibn Hanbal, his pupils and admirers continued to form a society, known as the _madrâsah_, one of the four Muslim schools of _fiqh_, which still exist at the present day. The _Hanbalites_ have always distinguished themselves by their aversion to liberal theories in matters of faith, and their enmity against the Muslim rationalists and freethinkers (see further, art. _SECTS_ [Muslim]).


**TH. W. JUYNBOLL.**

**IBN HAZM.**—Ibn Hazm (Abû Muhammâd ibn Abî Muhammad, 'All ibn Abî Ahmad), a celebrated and influential Mu’tazîz, was born A.H. 384 (A.D. 994) in a suburb of Cordova, the Umayyad capital. He belonged to a Spanish family of converts (mukallât) of the Umayyads. He was the nephew of Ibn Abî Ahmad, the brother of Muhammad ibn Abî Ahmad, and nephew of Al-Hâmid b. Abî Ahmad, the brother of Al-Hasan b. Abî Ahmad, and of the famous philosophers and theologians of the Umayyad period, Al-Hasan b. Abî Ahmad and Al-Walid b. Abî Ahmad, both of whom were conspicuous figures in Andalusian Islam. He died there A.H. 456 (A.D. 1063).

His literary work was of a varied character. His son, Abû Râfî’, estimates that he was the author of some 400 compositions, consisting in the aggregate of 89,000 pages, and there is no doubt that he was a most prolific writer. He was a tasteful poet, and his love poems are often quoted. He composed a belittling monograph on love, entitled _Tawq al-hamma fil-ulfa wal-nilaf_ (‘the dove’s necking on sociality and the sociable’), still extant in a single MS (in Leyden), of which is being prepared for publication by a Russian scholar. From this work a charming love-experience of his author has been translated by Dyrn. Ibn Hazm, _An Accidental Study_. A short treatise of a historical character, _Nujud al-‘urûs_ fi wanirikh al-khalifâ, was recently edited from the sole surviving MS (in Munich), and published with a Spanish tranla-
tion ('Regalo de la novia sobre los anales de los califas') in the Revista del Centro de Estudios Históricos de Granada y su Reino (1 [1911] 160-180, 236-248), by C. F. Seybold. Of more importance is a paper, the 'Jamhurat al-anāb' (in Magzīn, Kitāb ut-tā ḍal-humāfī ('History of the Valimids'), ed. H. F. Ems, Leipzig, 1939, p. 8, n. 4, the title appears as Kitāb al-anāb, Ms. 7 of the Berlin Library). Taking of the genealogy of the Arab and Berber tribes, with special reference to the branches of the family in the Maghrib. This work, a section of which has been published in India by S. Khudai Bukhsh, was highly praised, and left an influence (cf. Subhi, Zanāqīl al-Shāfi‘īyya, Cairo, A.H. 1324, iv. 78), and were seldom quoted. This explains why most of his works are lost, and why some are extant only in rare MSS. Under the Abbāsid ruler Mu‘āhid, indeed, his books were publicly burned in Seville—a proceeding upon which Ibn Ḥazm commented in an epigram carved with supreme disdain:

'Though you burn the paper, you cannot burn what the paper contains, for it is laid up in my breast;

It goes with me wherever I go, it is in every part of my body. I cannot burn it, I will be burned with me in my grave;

Let me alone with your burning of parchment and paper, and speak rather about science, so that the people may learn which of us knows anything; if not, to school again! How many secrets has God beyond the things you aspire to!'

In his increasing isolation he was summoned even by students. Of the few pupils who availed themselves of his oral teaching the best known is Muhammad b. Abl Naṣr al-Ḥumaydī (A.H. 488 (A.D. 1095)), who speaks in laudatory terms of his learning, and his moral and religious character.

Amongst his pupils, it included still an extant satirical poem of 137 couplets in which he holds up Christianity and its institutions to derision by way of a rejoinder to a 地线ist writer whom had taken the rejection of the non-traditional sources for the deduction of the Laws in a special work (Kitāb al-maṣūb) first made known by the present writer, so, in the Zāhirī school, in the Ottoman schools (medrashī), in the special chapters of his work al-Muḥaddīlī, which deals with the religious law, while in various editions in each of the Zāhirī synods he is the method in its broadest application. In one direction, however, he advanced beyond the normal position of the Zāhirī school; for, whereas they had had an identical place of their principle to the science of law (fikh), and had regarded the province of dogmatic theology as indifferent, Ibn Ḥazm applied their method to the latter as well. In contoversing, on the one hand, the Asrārists held the Qur‘ān and the Sunnah as the source of all law, Ibn Ḥazm continued the Zāhirī tradition and taught the principle that this source was the Qur‘ān. He teaches that there are two forms of knowledge, the first is held by the Zāhirī school, and the other is held in the Asrāristic school. He, however, in his criticism in his best known work, the Kitāb al-maṣūb, fī-mī‘āl wa-l-ḥakīm wa-l-mī‘āl—a title usually abbreviated to Kitāb al-mi‘āl wa-l-ḥakīm—of which a printed edition is now available (4 vols., Cairo, A.H. 1317-21; on the Mokhtar, cf. ZDMG vii. [1912] 160).

In this treatise the first of all, for polemical purposes, as an account of non-Mohammedan religions and their doctrines, and then a critique of the doctrinal divisions of Islam. The first part of the work is devoted mainly to Judaism and Christianity, and to criticisms of the Qītim and the inconsistencies and absurdities thereof, his design being to confirm a view already expressed in the Qur‘ān and elaborated with increasing distinctness in later Islam, viz., that the alleged documents of revelation in the latter have no connection with the events narrated in the sacred writings given by God. He deals also with later religious writings of Judaism and Christianity, and, in particular, he submits the Talmud to severe criticism. This side of his work would never of itself have aroused the animosity of other theologians, but it forms a very different matter with the bitter and merciless spirit in which, alike in the work before us and in his writing as a whole, he adorns himself with the most eminent authorities in Muslim jurisprudence and dogmatics.

In his theological writings his tone is immo-}
IBN TAFSIR.—Ibn Tafasir, also known as Ibn Taimiya, was a prominent legal scholar and theologian of the 14th century. He was a leading figure in the development of Islamic jurisprudence and had a significant impact on Islamic legal and religious thought.

IBN TUFAYL.—Ibn Tufayl, also known as Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Abī al-Mālik, was a philosopher, writer, and scientist. He is best known for his philosophical work, "The Book of Knowledge," which discusses the nature of reality and existence.

IBN TUFAIL.—Ibn Tufail, also known as Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Abī al-Mālik, was a philosopher, writer, and scientist. He is best known for his philosophical work, "The Book of Knowledge," which discusses the nature of reality and existence.

IN PRISON.—Ibn Tufail was imprisoned in 1222 Dhu al-Qa‘dah, 728 (29th September 1328).

Though a stringent interrogator was laid upon the acceptance of his doctrines, he was not left without champions. Even after his death, pamphlets were written on the question of his orthodoxy, and to be regarded as an arbiter ('ulama') or as a genuine representative of orthodoxy. The tradition of his teaching was continued by his followers, and the conception of Ibn Tufail as the opponent of the School of Ibn al-Jauziyya (cf. A.H. 723 (A.D. 1328) in numerous works. At a much later period his views enjoyed a reviving interest, and it is interesting to note that the most striking historical result of his teaching is the fact that in the 18th century the founder of the powerful Wahhabite (Qa‘dah) movement in central Arabia derived his inspiration from the writings of Ibn Taimiya (cf. Goldziher, ZDMG iii. (1896) 156).

His name is the abbreviation of the Wahhabite ancestor's (Abu Bakr) and the controversy with the orthodoxy, who in turn take as their watchword the name of Ghazali.

As regards the influence of Ibn Taimiya at the present day, it should be noted that the party championed by Muhammed Rashid Rida in his periodical of Maudud in its 16th year— a party which rejects the Twelver (a) orthodoxy schools, appeals to the land, and is opposed to the worship of saints and the superstitious practices associated therewith—draws its constant inspiration from the writings of Ibn Taimiya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyya. It is perhaps true to this side and the acceptance of Ibn Taimiya's views that within little more than a decade so many of the kibrisi much neglected works of the great Wahhabite theologian have been issued in printed form in Cairo and Haidarabad.
thought, he aspires to ascend to the highest,—i.e.,
to the state of ecstasy, in which the soul experiences
what the eye has never seen, the ear never heard,
and the heart of man never imagined. Just because
such a spiritual process cannot be described easily,
or accurately at all, it must be
represented allegorically. The persons in his allegory,
so far as their names are concerned, are borrowed
from the mystical treatises of Ibn Sina (Avicenna).
In the 'Asâl, he derives his knowledge of man and
the universe from the field of Hel lenic-Jewish tradition,
while 'Hâyy' recalls the first syllable of 'Gâyomâr,' a
mythical king of Persia. Many features of Ibn
Tufail's work are of legendary origin, but the
arrangement is doubtless his own. The theme
proposed was a practical question in Western
Islam at the time, just as it had been in the East
at an earlier day. The problem was, in fact, the
relation of the individual to society, or, to state it
more precisely, the relation between the
philosophical reflexion and intuition of the individual
and the traditional belief of the multitude.

The author seeks to portray as clearly as possible three
distinct types: (1) the philosopher, who by natural endowment
and his own reflection and self-education is fitted to receive
experiences of the divine, truth, etc., which rise step
by step to a mystic unity with higher spirits, and ultimately with
himself; (2) the uninitiated individual ('Hâyy'); (3) the man
who, like the 'Salman'; and (2) the speculative theologian,
who interprets the figurative language of revelation,
as given in the Koran, and proceeds to 'Abîl, the
'source' of his reason. 'Abîl is 'the starting-point
of his development, which completes itself in 747
years. He has an intense desire to learn. The
skein that such a man does and shrivels afterwards he begins to
disseminate, continuing till he comes to the conclusion that
the heart is the central bodily organ, the seat of the
principle of life. Having discovered how to produce fire, and
having fixed a lamp at the upper end, he proceeds to dissect various
other animals, either dead or alive. Then, just as he studied
the animals of his island, even turning a number of them, so he
investigates its plants and minerals, its atmosphericphenomena,
and, in a word, the whole philosophy of Nature. He is struck
by the interdependence of all these phenomena, and he endeavors to fit
them into a unity in all—the unity of the organism, that of the
species and the genus, the unity of its production by the fatherly
propensity of the world. From his study of physical Nature, in every part of which he
notices the distinction between matter and soul, he proceeds to
unify in the 'Divine Spirit' the existence of a pure and inviolable Form as the
cause of his own being. He is not satisfied with this, however, and
works. The existence of the Divine Spirit is inferred also
from the fact that space must necessarily be conceived as
finite. Thus far he has recognized the Creator of the world only as the
most perfect spiritual being. He now proceeds to study
these superpowers of the minds of Bodhisattvas, the
whirling dervishes. He restricts his physical wants to what is
strictly necessary for the maintenance of his body,
and only in case of necessity resorts to animal food,
with a consequence that he finds himself a
true ascetic. This asceticism becomes
the basis of his whole
home. He aims at scrupulous cleanliness, and in his
movements on the island, he sees himself as those
who have had God's grace, and in the knowledge of those
of the heavenly bodies. By these means he is gradually
enabled to raise his true self above the heavens and the earth,
and to unite himself in the Divine Spirit; and at this stage, in place of
his earlier logical proofs of God's existence, he enjoys the ratio
sense of the body, not only as a transcendental, but
mathematical-logical categories of unity, plurality, etc. So far as
the world still exists for him, he regards it only as a reflection
of the mind, a dream.

Ibn Tufail has often enjoyed the raptures of ecstasy, when at length
his body has been released. Upon a neighboring island lives a
people who, though adherents of the Mamluk faith, are given
to sensuous pleasures. A friend of Salmane's, the ruler of this
island—an individual named Asâl—desiring to devote himself
to study and self-denial, sets out for Hâyy's island, which he
supposes to be uninhabited. Here, then, by dint of
sterling perseverance, and, when the latter has at length acquired human language,
the two become convinced that the religion of the one, in its
spiritual interpretation, and the philosophy of the other, are essentially the same. With a view to proclaiming this
true version of the truth to the adjacent island, accompanied by Asâl. But their design
is not discovered; and the two friends ultimately to admit that
Mohammed had acted wisely in giving the Koran a garment
under a veil of ayyabulh language. They, therefore, go back
Hâyy's island, the uninhabited island, probably that they may further give
themselves to a life consecrated to God.

The greater portion of Ibn Tufail's book is devoted to the
course of Hâyy's education, and it is not to
be wondered at that those who first translated the
work, and gave an account of the author's philosophy,
were mainly concerned with the person of Hâyy.
But the central theme of the allegory, as
has been indicated, is a religious one, in the
sense that the author's and philosophy, and the principle that philosophy
is one with religion properly understood. This
has been specially emphasized by Geuthner, though
perhaps somewhat one-sidedly. For certainly it is obvious that in several passages Ibn Tufail is on
Hâyy's side: the eyes of Asâl are opened to the
profound mysteries of the Spirit, not by the
immediate revelation of the Divine, but through
Hâyy's philosophy of enlightenment; and at all events
the work permits the inference that man may attain to supreme salvation by the inner light
of the soul, without the mediation of Christ. This point of view
was enough of itself to render the book objectionable to the Christian theologians of the
Middle Ages, while, in particular, the
monopoly of the author's work was stigmatized by
Albertus Magnus (see also 'souls

The Happy Ibn Yaqût has at first but few readers. The Neo-Platonists of the Renaissance seem not
to have known it, else they would have found it acceptable,
insanely as they taught that there were rays of the one Divine truth in all religions and
to which the connection between Hâyy and Ed Crüden, a work by the Spanish author Baltasar Gracián, published in
1555-56—links recently pointed out by Menéndez y Pelayo—'have not been
published during the time of the original
Literature.—1. TRANSLATIONS OF HAPPI Y AQI K. The
Arabic text with a Lat. tr. by E. Pococke, Jr., and an
English version of the work of the 20th century,
revised and reprinted in 1796. The first Eng. tr. (1674; from the Lat.)
was the work of George Keith, who, during the
guad of the apartment of a revelation. A second Eng. tr. (also from the Lat.), by George
Auchurch, appeared in 1755. The Dutch
version of the original, by van Dyck,
was published a new English version from the original, and this was recently
revised with few alterations by J. G. Eichhorn.
for the use of his pupils (Cairo, 1800). Of Dutch translators
probably the first was J. Bouwezen, a friend of Spinoza,
who rended (Amsterdam, 1677) was executed from the Lat.
by Pococke, and this work was re-published at Amsterdam in
1791, while in the same year another Latin, collated with the
original Arabic and translated by the oriental scholar
H. Beer, a professor in Utrecht, was published at Rotterdam.
The earliest Germ. tr., by J. G. Fritius (Frankfort, 1790), was
based upon the English of Ockley; that of J. G. Eichhorn
(Berlin, 1792) is more independent. The Spanish text
have appeared only in recent times (see below).

Pococke's designation of the work, 'Philosophiae Autodidactus,'
appears on the title-page of the first edition, and is repeated in
1606. Blum (1701) has 'De naturales philosophiae ('The
Natural Philosopher'), and this
name, in the 17th century, even the Spanish
of 1600. Calderon (1701) has 'De naturales哲学家('The
Natural Monarch'), and this
name, in the 16th century, even the Spanish
of 1600. Calderon (1701) has 'De naturales philosophy, and
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II. DEMOCRACY, etc.—A. Marx, 'Eine mittelalterliche Erkundungen,' in 'Die politischen Länder für d. G. d. E.'
327-194. T. de Bree, 'The History of the Philosopher's Stone,'
253-287. T. Jonas, 'Philosophie de un pueblo padron de
Collected Editions in a preface to Menéndez y Pelayo's 'Dramatum, etc.'
IBN TUMART—Ibn Tumart was a famous Muslim reformer of Morocco, surnamed 'the Madhhab' or the Almohada. According to the Khaludin, his name was Aaghar Berber for 'the chief.' The names of his ancestors were also Berber. The date of his birth is unknown; but it must have taken place between A.M. 470 and 490. He was born in a village of Sús called Jijli en Warghán. His family were Israshins, a section of the Hitata, one of the chief tribes of the Atlas. Ibn Khaludin says that they were celebrated for their kindliness, and that Ibn Tumart seemed easier to learn, and frequented the mosques, where he burned so many candles that he received the surname Aaghar (Berber), 'the fire-brand.' It was probably the thirst for knowledge that drove him to the East.

At this time the Almoravid dynasty, which ruled in the Maghrib and a part of Spain, was declining, and corruption of morals had followed closely on conquest. One of the strictest Muslim sects, that of Malik ibn Anas, was in power; it confined its attention to the study of fiqh, the manuals which had been written on the Koran and the hadiths. Ghazali had strongly opposed its doctrines in the East in a chapter of his Ihya 'l'din al-din—the Kitab al-'Ilm, which called forth the hatred of the lawyers for he censured such as the qudri 'llay, and even Alshairi, like al-Turtashi, who did not admit independent minds into its sects. His works were burned by order of the Almoravid amirs. Further, the grossest anthropomorphisms (tajaddud) were discarded; and the allegorical expressions of the Qu'ran were taken literally, and God was given a corporeal form.

Ibn Tumart started his travels in Spain, and it was undoubtedly there that he began to modify his ideas under the influence of the writings of Ibn Hazm (q.v.). He then went to the East, but the chronology of his travels is not certain. If, contrary to the opinion of al-Marrakushi, it was during his first stay in Alexandria that he imbibed the doctrines of Abu Bakr and Turtashi, the latter—a believer in the Ash'arite teaching, although opposed to the Ummayyads—must have imparted it to his pupil. He afterwards made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and studied at Bagdad and perhaps at Damascus. There he became imbued with the ideas of Ghazali. Later writers say that it was under Ghazali's influence that Ibn Tumart decided to reform the beliefs of his country; but the two men never met.

During ten years of travel and study had transformed the Maghrabs. If his plan was not yet fixed in all its details, he had at least thought of it. On the vessel in which he sailed he preached to the crew and the passengers, who in obedience to his words, set themselves to read the Qu'ran and to pray. Thoroughly inspired with Ash'arite doctrines, he continued his preaching in Tripoli, in Mahdis, where the ruling sultan, Yahyá ibn Tumart, showed him kindness; and he received lettres of pass, which he was to present to the Sultan in Granada. There he played the part of moral reformer without restraint, making liberal application of an early maxim of his: 'Whoever among you sees anything reprehensible must change it with his hand; if he cannot, he must do it with his tongue, if he cannot, he must do it with his heart. This is the minimum of religion.'

The Hamadad sovereign was annoyed at this impudence of his authority; the people themselves rose up, and Ibn Tumart fled to the Real Grisgold, a neighbouring Berber tribe, who took him under their protection. The Sultan, who was well pleased with the man who was capable of continuing his work, 'Abd al-Mumin, a poor Sabbath, to the north of Nedroma, who, like himself, went to the East to study. Legend, which ascribes to Ibn Tumart a knowledge of the qibla, which he learned in the East, claims that he recognized, from certain signs in this young man, the person for whom he was looking, just as Ghazali had recognized the future reformer in him. All that we know is that he had an interview with 'Abd al-Mumnin, that he questioned him minutely, and that he ended by making him decide to give up his travels in the East in order to follow him. He then returned to the Maghrib by way of Waranis and Tlemcen, out of which he was driven by the governor; and then he passed through Fez and Meknés, where the people received his remonstrances with blows. At last he arrived at Morocco, where he asserted more than ever his role of uncompromising reformer of morals and doctrines. The Lemtuna women, like the Turegues and Kabyles of the present day, did not veil their faces. On this account Ibn Tumart insulted them, and even assaulted Sura, the sister of the Almoravid amir 'Ali. 'Ali himself was not free from his insults. He rebuked him even in the mosque. 'Ali, who was more patient than than the reformer, did not punish him as he deserved; he merely summoned a conference at which Ibn Tumart had to argue with Almoravid lawyers. They examined an important point of each other's, as: Are the ways of knowledge limited or not? The principles of the true and the false are four in number: knowledge, ignorance, doubt, and supposition. He had no difficulty in defeating them, although among them there was a Savan and a Sufi, and as obstinate as himself—Malik ibn Wuhailb, who advised 'Ali to put him to death, but in vain. The amir spared him, and Ibn Tumart fled to Agnim, where he took part in further discussions, and thence to Aginil, where he inaugurated his apostleship in a methodical way. At first he posed simply as the reformer of morals in so far as they were contrary to the Qu'ran and the traditions; then, when he had obtained a certain influence over his followers, he went on to preach his own doctrines, inveighing violently against the dynasty that followed agreed doctrines, and which he called 'inside' any who transgressed his teaching: it was a preaching of holy war, not only with pagans and polytheists, but also with other Muslims. He chose ten companions, 'Abd al-Mumnin among them, and, after preparing their minds by a description of the characteristics of the Mahdi, he made them recognize him as such, and composed a genealogy for himself which made him a descendant of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib. His doctrine was not pure Ash'arism; it was mixed with Shiiism. The historians mention tricks of jugglery and perey which to his resorted in order to justify his claims. He rallied round him all the Herigs and a large section of the Masmada, who had always been hostile to the Lemtuna (Almoravides), so much so that Ya'zein (ibn Tashfin) had founded Marraksh in order to keep them at a safe distance, and had written various treatises for them in Berber—a language which he spoke very well. One of them, the Tashfin, is preserved in an Arabic version, published at Algiers in 1903. He completed the organization of his followers, and died 1According to the Rawd al-Qur'ain, this meeting took place at Taja, the birthplace of 'Abd al-Mumn in.

2 The Berbers knew so little Arabic that, in order to teach the uneducated Masmada the Fa'ilun (first verse of the Qu'ran), he named each of them by a word of this verse; 'Abd al-Mumnin's was al-Hamda Kifsh ('praise to God'); the second, Fubbh ('lord'); the third, al-Adhim ('of the world'). By asking them to repeat their names in order, he succeeded in teaching them to recite the sura.
into categories: the first was composed of the ten who had been the first to recognize him; they were called the jumua’a (‘community’). The second was made up of fifty faithful ones; these he sometimes called ‘believers’ (and slaves) and sometimes ‘united’ (from which came the name ‘Almohads’). His authority, however, was not recognized all over, as was shown particularly by the inhabitants of Timmâl (or Timmâli). The latter set up a military strategy on a scale of 15,000 men; took the towns as slaves, divided the land and homes among his followers, and built a fortress. He converted the neighbouring tribes with their consents, or by force, and in A.H. 557 he sent an army against the Almoravids under the leadership of ‘Abd al-Mumin. It sustained a terrible defeat, and the Mahdi found himself blocked in Timmâl. Some of his followers suggested surrender. Ibn Tamrî had recourse to charlatanism with the complicity of ‘Abd al-Allah al-Wansharisi, whom he had brought from Wasiq, and, having regained his prestige, he massacred those of whom he was not sure. ‘Abd al-Mumin, however, in this evidently exaggerated number of 70,000 men, and disabled its effect. The cause of the Almohads revived as the power of the Almoravids was weakened and was even reversed upon itself, where the Mahdi died in A.H. 624 (522 according to others), ‘Abd al-Mumin, whom he had chosen as his successor, was ready to re-commence the struggle. His tomb is in Timmâl, but his name and his history are completely forgotten.


RENÉ BASSET.

IBSEN.—Hennik Ibsen (dramatist and poet) was born at Skien, in southern Norway, on 29th March 1828, the eldest son of Knud Ibsen, a substantial merchant. Scotchman, German, and Danish strains predominated over Norwegian in his ancestry. While Henrik was still a child, his father failed in business, and the family removed from his first home, a stately house in the marketplace, to a humble suburban dwelling. His education was law and, distinguishing chiefly by a bent for art. This could not be induced, and he was apprenticed at fifteen to an apothecary at Grimstad, a place still smaller and more remote. Here he spent seven years (1832-1839), his time of storm and stress. The revolution of 1848-49 quickened his instinct of revolt and quickened his lyric power. He wrote fiery odes on behalf of struggling Ibsen had been the first to recognize him; Catiline (1860) excited no attention whatever; but its importance is great. Ibsen re-published it in 1875, with a preface which forewarns the reader of the tone of his later drama — ‘the conflict of will and power.’ And he is already a dramatist; in spite of his revolutionary sympathies, he has not idealized his hero in Catiline. He is a tragically mixed character, who owes his ruin more to his own inner corruption than to the power of his foes.

A few months before its publication, Ibsen, having completed his apprenticeship, had come to Christianity. Here a second book, The Viking’s Bark (Kjærnesø, 1887), was acted with some success. He lived precariously by journalism, editing, with two friends, a short-lived periodical. In Nov. 1851 an appointment as stage-poet of the theatre at Bergen brought him a practical training in stage technique of the utmost value to him. Besides staging numerous plays by other men, he produced four new pieces of his own — in particular Dame Inger at Ostrea and The Feast at Solthouse. Enthusiasm for the national past was in the air at Bergen, and Ibsen did not escape it. But his mind was utterly unhistorical; history, even the national history, attracted him only as a source of dramatic or psychological problems, and these he was soon to find were furnished in greater abundance by contemporary society. Even when he was shaped it freely to his needs. The historical Dame Inger was a spirited and high-handed, but not a tragic figure; Ibsen involves her in a harrowing conflict of ambition and motherly love, which ends in her involuntary murder of the son for whom she has dared and endured. The Feast at Solthouse (1856) was the first result of his study of the sagas of Iceland. Something of their trappings was already reflected in the heroine Margit. But the lyrical form of the dialogue echoes the Norwegian ballads, and the temper of the play has a romantic and mediæval air. There were other pieces written and performed at Bergen — St. John’s Night and Olaf Liljekrans, both based upon Norwegian legend. Both remained till recently unprinted.

In the summer of 1857, his contract at Bergen having terminated, Ibsen accepted a similar post at the Norwegian theatre in Christiania. A few months later he brought a wife to his new home, Susannah Daae Thoresen of Bergen.

The theatre had been recently established expressly to combat the dominant Danish taste by presenting a national Norwegian repertory. With The Vikings at Helgoland (1857), Norway definitely acquired an original and very noble drama of her own. But the resources of the Norwegian theatre were unequal to sustaining it, and the old churches both at Christiania and at Copenhagen rejected it with scorn. Danish poets like Oehlenschläger had dramatized the heroic saga in elegant laments, and with a persistent effort to assurance and refine. Ibsen kept the rude strength of persons and situations, and the sinewy unadorned prose of their speech. Hjôrdis, the passionate young woman, who slays in deliberate vengeance the man she loves, is a tragic creation worthy of her prototypes in myth and saga, Brynhild and Gudrun.

The rejection of The Vikings, which was not played anywhere before 1861, increased Ibsen’s estrangement from Christiana society. Conservatism in politics, orthodoxy in religion, and devoted to Danish ideals of culture, the official and mercantile circles of the capital offered a stolid resistance to the young and restless idealist of the Nationalist cause. Four years later Henrik Ibsen’s junior, a born orator, and already the author of Synnøve Solbakken (1857), stood above the taciturn Ibsen both in persuasive power and in public repute. And Ibsen’s next drama was a satiric comedy which ridiculed well-to-do society at its
most sensitive point, and turned its apathy into furiously indignant. Love's Comedy (1862) is, on the surface, an amusing exposé of the foibles into conventional courtship and marriage; a plea for the subjection of these relations to calm good sense, undisturbed by sentiment and romance. But this attack upon 'romance' was inspired by a conviction that a great drama is an extreme. Love's 'comedy' concerned only the shallow sentiment which society called by that name. The plight of genuine love in marriage could only, in Ibsen's eyes, be portrayed as a case of the cares of household and children, vulgarized, he thought, the passion of souls. Falk, the young poet who preaches this doctrine, is at once ardent and shallow enough to make it, in his own case, plausible. The heroine, Svanhild, one of Ibsen's loveliest and most pathetic creations, gives him her heart, and they are on the point of adopting the conventional solution when the representative of calm good sense, an elderly merchant, intervenes, poses the young lovers with their own forgotten principles, and offers his own hand to Svanhild, who, sadly accepts it. The play is written with abounding wit in ringing rhymes, and is now popular on all Scandinavian stages; but its imperfect technique and impossible ethics have hindered its vogue elsewhere. Love's Comedy is, in any case, an improvement in the Ibsenian line of the modern 'social' drama. A second saga-drama followed. The Pretenders to the Crown was written in a few weeks of the summer of 1863. Lisa, the heroine, is a Norwegian, and Ibsen, the historical, but is at once less unhistorical and more Ibsenian. The two figures, whose prolonged duel for the throne of Norway we watch, are admirably individualized and drawn; the bent ruler, clear-sighted and strong-willed; Skule, paralyzed by his own doubts. In Skule, Ibsen's own still hesitant faith in his powers may be reflected; but it is realized by a structure and a power of build of this striking play.

Early in 1864 Ibsen's affairs reached a crisis. His outward circumstances, always precarious, had been seriously embarrassed by the failure, in 1862, of the Norwegian theatre. A small appointment as 'esthetic adviser' at the Christiania theatre was given him. His inner estrangement from society grew more bitter and intense. Sensation in Norway ended; Brautigam, the editor of On the Fields' (1860), an autobiographical confession shot through with the passion of Faust and the cynicism of Meisterlinphizes. The outbreak of the Dano-Prussian war in the spring of 1864 added a new and more definite provocation. Norway and Sweden declined, as in 1849, to support their Danish brothers; and the poet, who as a young man had then strenuously roase them, felt their abstention yet more bitterly now. Some enthusiastic students went to the front as volunteers, but the government remained neutral; and service in the Norwegian army remained, as Ibsen intimated in his mocking verses, 'The Ground of Faith,' one of the safest of callings. He sought to leave the country, and applied for a travelling pension, as had already been granted to Björnson. But Love's Comedy was too recent, and the favour was refused. In April 1864, Ibsen left Christiania for the south. Off Düsseldorf he heard the Prussian drums; at Berlin he saw the Danish triumphs, and the first idea of a great retributive poem upon his unfaithful fellow-countrymen flashed into his mind. It was the germ of Brand. In May he settled in Rome. The project at first made life easier, and his health improved. Brand was formerly a narrative poem, but the few cantos executed are laboured, and they were finally thrown aside and lost sight of. Thirty years later the Danish col-

lecto Pontoppidua discovered the MS in an antiquarian shop at Rome; it was published at Copenhagen in 1871. Meanwhile Ibsen, better inspired, had reverted to the dramatic form in which he was a master, and to a swift, flexible, ringing verse; he now wrote with fire, and in three months of the summer of 1867 he poured out the colossal poem. Brand, the prophet of 'All or Nothing,' hero and fanatic, is a great tragic figure, subtly, but not quite consistently, conceived; and the drama itself is something less and something more, and excels, like the plays of Norway which it set out to be. Types of her prevailing weaknesses—of compromise, sentimentality, faint-heartedness—are drawn with brilliant and incisive touch; peasants and artists, officials and clergy, come under the satirist's stroke; but the final upshot is in the spirit of Agnes the devoted wife rather than of Brand, of love rather than uncompromising will. Brand has language, but in its greatest moments, such as the close of the fourth act, it reaches a tragic intensity unsurpassed in the literature of the century. Contrary to the expectation of both author and publisher, it was received throughout the Scandinavian world with rapturous applause; its fierce invective counted for nothing with readers who recognized that the poet who dashed his country passionately loved it, or who hated it, meant them to be touched by his religious romance. With Brand, Ibsen's Scandinavian name begins.

A yet greater work was immediately to follow. In Peer Gynt (1867) Norwegian home and history is celebrated in a banal and wordy style; a style of saying essentially the same thing. The hero, instead of being the prophetic assailant of Norwegian failings, is their embodiment. The sombre tones andibel called the best ruler, clear-sighted and strong-willed; Skule, paralyzed by his own doubts. In Skule, Ibsen's own still hesitant faith in his powers may be reflected; but it is realized by a structure and a power of build of this striking play.

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Part he is too far degraded to rouse genuine tragedy.
Ibsen, for the first and last time, appears not compiled by master of his material. In both the contending forces, Hellenism and Christianity, he saw the seed of failure, and looked forward, like Heine, to the coming of a 'Third Kingdom,' superse-
deeding and surmounting both.

The passage containing this prophecy is deeply interesting; but Ibsen never reverted to it. It suggests a belief in the permanence of some form of religious community, which events were rapidly sapping in his mind. His fervid championship of Scandinavian brotherhood, of a union of the Northern States, had for years held in check his native individualism, but had allied himself with the Norwegian conservatives, and, not without astute arrangement on their part, had received flattering attentions and distinctions from the Swedish king, as an illustrious pillar of the Union. He was thus drawn into a false position.

To political and ecclesiastic institutions as such he had at no time attached value. He had defied them in the persons of the mayor and the dean in Brand. His letters of the early seventies express a yet more radical antagonism. 'The State must go!' he wrote to Brandes in the crisis of the fate of France, 1871; 'all religion will fall!' The picture which he presented was, he was convinced, rotten; and the hope of humanity lay in a revolution which would alone make possible the free development of the individual. That such a revolution was imminent in Europe Ibsen for at least twenty years (1864-84) believed. One who thought thus could not long remain in alliance with the conserva-
tives; in 1877, Ibsen cut himself off from the old

It may pass in some sort as an antithesis to The League of Youth, he wrote to his publisher shortly before its appearance. The satire is now aimed, not at the democrats, but at the men

test of truth, in the person of Lena Hessel, upon the fabric of an imposing but shallow respectability is represented with extraordinary force. The coming evening, his reputation only, expected a blow. One yet more searching followed. A Doll's House (1879) probed the roots not merely of social status, but of the family unit, and what women want, when men are individuals, and to share men's claim to self-development, was now

In marriage this claim seemed to be all but universally ignored. Ibsen's ideal for women had hitherto been the selfless devotion of an Agnes or a Solveig to husband or lover. Even the emancipated Lena shatters the 'Pillars' only that she may vindicate her brother. Nora is the first to discover that she herself has a person-

Social status and the children! Ibsen replied in the terrible drama Ghosts (1881), a work far greater in technical mastery, far more in intellectual reach, than any of his predecessors. In laying bare the horrible possibilities of inheritance, Ibsen discovered a new source of tragic terror and pity, analogous to the antique destiny, but indefensibly real; he also struck the tragically beautiful blow for the cause of woman-

But Ghosts only redoubled the scandal of A Doll's House. Ibsen, provoked by what he took to be a general conspiracy to ignore ugly facts, re-
torted the next year with An Enemy of the People (1882), an insincere and brilliant satire, in which

'With this challenging cry, however, the pol-

emical phase of Ibsen's drama closes. In his eight

remaining plays the temper of revolution is still present, but it no longer altogether reflects his own; on the contrary, he probes its weaknesses as remorselessly as those of conservat

ism and orthodoxy; and his attitude is now that of the imperial observer who putes

searching questions everywhere and answers none. To find answers, as he said, was not his business. The Wild Duck (1884), a masterpiece of construc-

tion, is a wonderful study of the disasters wrought by the blundering idealist; Gregers Werle is a

liminary Stockmann, Hjalmar Ekdal a mean and

shabby Peer Gynt. Romeo and Juliet (1866), perhaps the greatest of the prose dramas, paints the guilty passion of an emancipated woman, and her purifi-

ication by love and in death. No other modern

play is informed with so deep a sense that sin may be

forgiven, but must be atoned for; the one white horse of Rosenholm gleam eerily in the

background, foreboding the fatal issue; and The Lady from the Sea (1888) is a study of such revolt as Nora's, inspired by no doctrine of self-develop-

men, but by the spell of the unseen. Contrary too, to

Ibsen's wont hitherto, the spell is finally

mastered; Eline is reconciled to her husband. In

Reddik Gobler (1890), even more than in The Wild

Duck, he is occupied with the inner types of emancipated character; Hedda is a pitiful

romantic of revolt drawn with merciless

power. The Master-Builders (1892), which shows a

growing use of symbolism, portrays a man in

form at once more fascinating and more
dangerous; his old theme of rivalry by youth and

maturity is resumed but in other terms. Solness

merits no longer the young men's revolt but the

too stimulating homage of a girl. Little Eyolf

(1894) and John Gabriel Berkenheide (1896) painted

other tragic issues with diminishing power. Finally, in 1899, When We Dead Awaken, more

than an eccentric parody of an Ibsenian play, closed

the great series. In 1901, Ibsen suffered a nervous

collapse, from which he never recovered. On

23rd of May 1906 he died. He was buried with

national honours.

The fierce controversies once provoked by Ibsen's name have long subsided, even in England, where they survived longest. It is premature to de-

termine the final rank of his work; but there can be

do in doubt that it will count among the most potent

and original literary forces of the 19th century.

The wealth of ideas in the plays of Ibsen is endless, but, apart from his individualism and to their brilliant imagination artistic con-

science, method, and will. Drama was for him from the first a means of expressing his power a

preoccupied apprehension of the dissonances of

modern society; but he fashioned the instrument to his purpose with deliberate and calculated

precision. In mastery of dramatic invention, as of

his technique, without disdaining tradition, was

shaped essentially by the need of presenting with

utmost cogency and elegance a moral story to

say. This meant, however, a wholesale rejection of

conventions, stage situations, and stage
ICONECLASM

1. Origin.—The source of Iconoclasm is much discussed. Just before the Roman Emperors began to persecute image-worshippers, their rivals, the Khilifs at Damascus, had started a similar campaign, among their Christian subjects (Yazid I., 680-683; Yazid II., 720-724). The Iconoclast movement in the East, was warmly approved by the Musulims; yet it is unlikely that it should have been caused solely, or even chiefly, by the influence of the great emperors of the Eastern Emperors. Undoubtedly in the 8th and 9th cent., the worship of images in the East had arrived at an extreme point, and it was not even by long usage, and we guard the medicine.

2. The first Iconoclast persecution.—Iconoclasm throughout was no government movement; the chief secondary issue all the time, indeed, from some points of view, the main issue, was the right of the Emperor to legislate for the Church. On the other hand, the monks were always defenders of images. The lasturian dynasty of Emperors were the Iconoclasts of the first period, and the first of this dynasty, Leo III. (A.D. 716-741), began the campaign. As soon as he had made himself Emperor, he developed a policy of strengthening the Empire by enforcing uniformity and centralizing the power. He persecuted Jews and Paulicians cruelly. Then he was persuaded by the party opposed to images that they were the chief obstacle to the conversion of Jews and Muslims. There was also a certain rationalizing tendency in this dynasty which helps to explain his attitude. Constantine of Nalos's party persuaded the Emperor that the worship of images was the great hindrance to the unity of the Empire, that it caused superstition and divisions, and that it was forbidden by the first commandment (in the Byzantine numbering). Seeing the coming trouble, John of Synnada wrote to warn the Patriarch of Constantinople of Constantine's views; and the Patriarch, Germanus I. (A.D. 717-730), wrote a treatise in favour of images, addressed to Thomas of Klaudiopolis. But the Emperor, having now made up his mind to forbid image-worship, began to enforce their destruction ruthlessly. In 723 he published an edict declaring that image-worship was idolatry, and commanding all images in the churches to be destroyed. The soldiers began to carry out his order, and there were disturbances throughout the Empire. Germany was especially against the edict and appealed to the Pope (Gregory II., A.D. 772-731) in 725, whereupon the Emperor declared him a traitor, deposed him, and set up an Iconoclast, Anastasius, in his place (730). Leo had already written to the Pope, commanding him to accept the new edict, destroy his images, and summon a general council to forbid their use. In 727 Gregory answered by a long defence of images; he also blamed the Emperor's interference in Church matters, denied the need of a council, and demanded that Leo should cease his policy in this matter. A correspondence between the Emperor and the Pope followed in which each maintained his position, Leo claiming the right to legislate for the Church, on the strength of both the apostles and their successors. Meanwhile the persecution of image-worshippers raged in the East, and the Emperor repeatedly interposed against them, as being the chief defenders of images. Monasteries were destroyed, monks punished, tortured, and put to death. The Iconoclast movement took its first lines of rejection.


2. The cult of icons in the Byzantine Church just

3. One of the earliest forerunners of Iconoclasm was

4. See Gregory II.'s letter to the Emperor (Mansi, xii.

5. Harduin, iv. 223 ff.

and destroying relics, and denying the intercession of saints. These two further points, though not necessarily involved by Iconoclasm, became generally identified with it. At this time St. John Damascene, safe from the Emperor's anger at the Khalif's court, wrote his famous defenses of icons. 1 In the West, too, the people rose against the Emperor's Edict. In 727 there was a revolt in Greece against the Iconoclast Emperor, and a council met at Ephesus, with the purpose of calling the Patriarch to Constantinople and not to put down the worship of icons. But in 727 the Emperor sent a synod of 93 bishops to Rome, who excommunicated all who destroyed pictures of Christ or the saints. 2 This time the legate was sent to Constantinople with a copy of this decree which was not obeyed and imprisoned in Sicily. The Emperor then sent a fleet to Italy to punish the Pope; but it was wrecked by a storm on the way. He confiscated all the property of the Holy See on which he could lay his hands (in Sicily and Southern Italy), and affected to withdraw Illyricum from the Roman Patriarchate and to join it to that of Constantinople. To make the Byzantine Patriarchate more powerful he left before his Empire was part of his general centralizing policy. He continued an active persecution of all image-worshippers till his death in 741. His son, Constantine V, was a more enlightened, not a persecutor, but an Iconoclast than his father. At Leo's death there had been another rebellion when Artabasdos, a Patriarch of the West especially, there was much angry feeling against the Iconoclast Emperors. Irene first deposed the Patriarch of Constantinople (Paschal I), 3 780-784, naturally a partisan of the late government, and pronounced image-worshipper, Tarasius (784-806), an uncle or cousin of Phocas, 4 was appointed to succeed him. Then the Emperor renewed relations with the Patriarch of the East, and sent an embassy to the Pope (Adrian I., 772-795) begging him to come himself or send legates to a synod which should undo the work of the former one. 5 Adrian in answer sent two legates, one for the Empire and one for the Patriarch. He is not pleased with Tarasius' succession to the Patriarchate, but prays his orthodoxy about the images. He expostulates with him about the restoration of Illyricum to his Patriarchate. He sent a Bishop of Syria to the Pope to the Pope (Adrian I.) 772-795) begging him to come himself or to send legates to a synod which should undo the work of the former one. 5 Adrian in answer sent two legates, one for the Empire and one for the Patriarch. He is not pleased with Tarasius' succession to the Patriarchate, but prays his orthodoxy about the images. He expostulates with him about the restoration of Illyricum to his Patriarchate. He sent a Bishop of Syria to the Pope to.

1 Three apologies Against those who destroy holy images
2 3 Muli, xii. 297 ff.
3 The acts of the Iconoclast synods of 754 are contained in those of Nicæa II., Mantzik. viii. 203-36.
4 Paschal I., 756-784, was elected to the vacant see of Constantinople, and the government at once published the decrees of this synod, demanding that all bishops in the Empire should sign the acts and in their dioceses. Instead of pictures of saints the churches were then decorated with those of flowers, fruit, and birds. The Paulicians were well treated, but the monks were tortured and put to death. A great number of the martyrs of the Iconoclast persecution come from
6 Muli, xii. 394-396.
7 Jaffé, Reg, nos. 2446 and 2449; Muli, xii. 107 ff.
and is given for the sake of their prototypes. There is nothing new in this. It is what the defenders of image-worship had said throughout the controversy. The synod then anathematized the chief Iconoclasts, and, in opposition to the principle of the other council, declared that the Trinity has made these three (Germanos, John Damascene, and George of Cyprus) gloriouis. Twenty-two Canons were drawn up, of which the first five laid the condition of going to the Western bishops. Copies of the acts were sent to the Pope, who approved them and had them translated into Latin. Then the images were restored in all the churches, and the first Iconoclast movement came to an end, although there remained a strong Iconoclast party, especially in the army.

4. The second Iconoclast movement.—Twenty-seven years later Iconoclasrn broke out again. In 718, after the death of Constantine V., the line of the house of the Emperor was continued by a son of Theodosius II., Leo V., the Armenian, who desired to inaugurate a new Iconoclast movement, although there remained a strong Iconoclast party, especially in the army.

5. Iconoclasts in the East. At the end of the 8th cent. there was a slight echo of the great Iconoclast movement in the Frankish kingdom, caused by two misunderstandings. First, the Frankish bishops misunderstood what had been decreed at Nicaea II., and knew its acts only through a grossly inaccurate version.

For instance, in the 3rd session of the council a bishop had declared: "I receive the holy and venerable images, but I give that worship which is real adoration (cadalexia) only to the consubstantial and life-giving Trinity." This phrase was mistranslated into Latin. The Frankish bishops misunderstood the word "worship" (cadalexia) to mean "adoration," and the Frankish bishops thought it meant what we understand by the word "adoration." Further, they were not used to, and did not understand, Byzantine etiquette. The Byzantines prostrated themselves before the Emperor, kissed his feet; they even gave these marks of respect to his image. The Frankish bishops understood these marks of respect to be a natural form that they should do the same to portraits of the saints. Really all such forms have no absolute nor inherent meaning. They mean just what the custom of the time and place assigns to them. But the Franks, unused to such ceremonies, interpreted them according to their own custom; they thought them idolatrous. Lastly, there was the tradition of the Greeks and the deep distrust of all that they did (the Franks were just about to break with the Eastern Empire altogether and to set up their own king as rival Emperor). Yet it should be noticed that the Council of Nicaea II. had never meant to take the side of the Eastern Iconoclasm. If they for a time condemned the second Council of Nicaea, they also condemned the Iconoclast Council of 787. Already, in 797, Constantine V. had tried to gain the Frankish bishops for his views, but without success. A synod at Gentilly sent a declaration to the Pope (Paul I., 757-767) which quite satisfied him, 2 but, when Adrian I. (772-795) renewed the acts of Nicaea II. (wrongly translated) to Gaul, the bishops sent back a rebuttal of them (795) in 85 chapters (790). This answer, expanded later, is the famous Capitulare de imaginibus, or Liber carolinus. 2 In it the bishops admit that images and relics should be kept in churches and treated with due respect; but God only can receive adoration. The images are to have opportuna veneration, not adoration. Except for the misunderstanding of the word adoration (ποιησθήσεις), this is exactly what Nicaea II. had declared. In 794 they held a synod at Frankfurt in the presence of two papal legates, who seemed to have done nothing to improve the misunderstanding. This synod formally condemned Nicaea II., while showing plainly that the bishops do not understand what there is here decreed. They report it as a synod held by the Greeks at Constantinople (they do not even know where Nicaea II. sat), in which the 'Greeks' had declared that the same service and adoration are to be given to images as to the holy Trinity; and, accordingly, the Franks at Frankfurt, not sorry to}

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1. The acts of Nicaea II. in Mant. xii. and xiii.
2. His writings against Iconoclasrn in P.G. c. 201-400; Vita Niconesii Patriarch, by the dean Ignatius (ed. C. de Boor, Leipzig, 1890).
3. 1 Cor. 13:18. 417.
8. L. 101-1019; in Pl. xxviii. 999-1088. The authenticity of the Liber carolinus, once disputed, is now admitted.
be able to condemn 'Greeks,' declare that they 'despire and condemn that synod.' They sent their acts to Rome with a petition that the Pope would confirm them, which, of course, he refused to do. He had already written a long explanation of the acts of Nicea II.; but this did not arrive in Gaul until after the synod of Frankfurt. These matters rested for a time. When the second Iconoclast persecution had broken out, Michael II. wrote to Louis the Pious demanding that the Greek insignia of the monks who had died to the West should be handed over to Byzantine justice, and also arguing at length against the images. Louis then begged the Pope (Eugene II., 834-837) to receive from the Frankish bishops a collection of texts from the Fathers bearing on the subject, and to prepare this document they met in Paris in 825, where they again attempted a middle way, but, though not quite towards Iconoclasm. The treaty was sent to Rome with every possible expression of respect, as useful material for consideration in the crisis. Nothing is known about the result of this document, except that it made no change in the attitude of the Holy See. Then gradually the Frankish misconception was cleared up, and the movement in the West died out. Pope John VIII. (872-882) sent a more accurate translation of the acts of Nicea II., which helped to allay the suspicion of the Franks.

There are a few later isolated cases of opposition to the veneration of images in the West. In 884/885 Charlemagne destroyed all pictures, crosses, and relics in his diocese; for which action he was reprimanded by a number of other bishops and by a Frankish abbett, Theodemir. He was condemned by a local synod. Agobard of Lyon at the same time was very critical; but Walther of Strassburg and Hincmar of Rheims defended the attitude of Nicea II., and so explained it that we hear little more of Frankish Iconoclasm. Still, as late as the 11th century, Iconoclasm was severely reprimanded by Pope Alexander II. for Iconoclastic ideas.

6. The cult of images. — Both the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches accept the decrees of Nicea II., with their distinction between εὐκαρπία προκοινούμενος and σαρκία. But there is a practical difference in their application. The Orthodox have in mind both after the synod even heretical beliefs, which they treat with great reverence. But they have no solid statues, and are very much disposed to regard these as idols. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, sees no difference between a solid statue and a flat picture. Except the Nestorians, all the other Eastern Churches agree with the Orthodox in this matter. They, too, have pictures, but no statues, though some of them (notably the Armenians) are more reserved in their forms of reverence towards pictures, and sometimes blame the Orthodox in this matter. The Nestorians now have no pictures of any kind, only a plain cross, to which they pay the greatest reverence. They alone among the Eastern Churches make a principle of not venerating images, although there is evidence that formerly they did so; and according to the usual Eastern custom.


ADRIAN FORTESSO.

IDEA. — This word has been used by philosophers to denote (a) eternal natures or essences, the objects of true and abiding knowledge; (b) such natures considered as contents of a Divine mind, and archetypes of the things we perceive with our senses; (c) the contents, or some of the contents, of the human mind or consciousness. The present article will be devoted to tracing the historical origin and connexion of these several usages.

I. In Greek philosophy. — The importance of the word in the vocabulary of philosophy is due to Plato, and its earlier history concerns us mainly in its relation to the kindred term éidos, from whose history its own is, down to the time of Aristotle, inseparable, are derived from the root of deo, 'to see,' and originally had the sense of 'look,' 'gaze.' Already in Homer (Od. xvii. 454) éidos is used for 'beauty.' The primary sense of 'appearance' passes easily into that of 'form' or 'kind,' and in such passages as Thucydides, ii. 50 ("éidos ryvo), the reference is plainly so much to outward appearance as to true structure or essential nature, and this meaning seems to have established itself in scientific circles before the time of Plato. A. E. Taylor has recently contended (Fabia Socratowia, Oxford, 1911, p. 178 ff.) that it is independent of the meaning 'kind,' and is derived from a Pythagorean use of the word for geometrical figures, conceived as the ultimate elements of reality (cf. Plato, Tim. 53 C) and then extended to such elements (érosia) however conceived. The evidence seems insufficient to support this conclusion (see C. M. Gillespie, in Classical Quarterly, July 1912).

We learn from the patricians of Meno (see J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, London, 1906, p. 355 n.) that Plato's contemporary, Philiscus called Eupolemos 'idea,' but this may only have meant 'kinds of body.' The fact that Democritus called his atoms éide (see Sext. Emp., Math. vii. 187; Plut. adoro. Col. 1114a; see Burnet, p. 388 n.) is explained by his view that the atoms differed from each other only in shape (Aristotle, Met. A. 4, 1055 a, 26, de gen. et corr. 1, 2, 336 b 7). On the early history of the word see C. A. Brandis, Greek. der gr. und rom. Phil., Berlin, 1858, pp. 545, 569, 587; H. Fleischer, Philologie Elementar, Leipzig, 1899, p. 26; Burnet, op. cit., p. 388, and the rest under éidos, etc. in the index; Taylor, op. cit., p. 173 f.; Constantin Ritter, Neues Untersuchungen über Platon, Munich, 1905, p. 229 ff.}

The full examination of Plato's doctrine of Ideas and of the question of the priority of the forms, or as far as it was once thought, the priority of the common inheritance of the Socratie circle (see Burnet, p. 354 ff.), and what changes it underwent at different periods of his life, lies beyond the scope of this article, which will confine itself to a general description of his usage, especially in relation to the later history of the word. Aristotle (Met. A. 6, 987 b 29 ff.) tells us that Plato, when young, learned from Cratylus the doctrine of Heraclitus, that everything sensible or corporeal is such things alone Heraclitus referred, according to Arist. Met. N. 4, 1073 b 11) was involved in a process of perpetual flux or change; and that Plato, who perceived the deadly consequences of this doctrine for knowledge, sought a way of escape suggested to him by his intercourse with Socrates, who, in dealing with attempts to show the purely conventional nature of all ideas, whether forms of justice, courage, and the like, had attempted, by defining these terms, to reach fixed objects of moral approval. For the very statement that what was just under those becomes meaningless unless what is meant by 'just' is the same in both cases. Plato, by extending this principle beyond the ethico-political sphere, reached his doctrine of ideas—permanent
realties or natures corresponding to general terms. Such permanent natures are not objects of sense; they are apprehended by understanding. Others, e.g. Democritus, had thought that such truly existent natures, ousia or Idea, must underlie the showings of the world; but this was not recognized by Plato (and, it would seem, first by him) that they must be incorporated.

Aristotle, by giving this account in close connection with a treatment of the theory, usual with him, of the purification of the Pythagorean doctrine that Numbers are the ultimate realities, suggests that the Pythagorean influence on Plato was not independent of the Socratic; and there are other indications (collected and insisted upon, not without exaggeration, in Taylor's Varia Socratica) that Socrates stood in closer connexion with Pythagorean circles than has always, despite Plato's Phaido, been recognized.

Aristotle's account brings out clearly the fact that Plato's ideas are objects of thought (noéai); they are not 'concepts' or 'thoughts in the mind' (noýeta). The latter explanation is actually put by Plato (Parm., 132, 29 ff.) into the mouth of the youthful Socrates, only to be dismissed by Parmenides with the pertinent inquiry whether there could be a thought which was a thought of nothing (nothingable). Platonic philosophy has been regarded as the case of who, at first, a 'conceptualist,' went on to 'substantiate' or 'hypostatize' concepts. Such a gratuitous proceeding could not be regarded as an indication of the mythology here (see Lotze, Log., Leipzig, 1874, iii, 2, § 313 ff., Eng. tr., Oxford, 1888, ii, 200 ff.). We should rather approach his theory by considering that, while we should actually admit that the eighteen and the number of the alphabet may be about the motive of an act we thought just, or the beauty of a face which affection predisposed us to love, or which had been injured since we last saw it, we could not claim even this slight acquaintance with us, we do not know what justice or beauty is. So, too, a judgment that two visible lines are equal to one another can never express more than an opinion; but if we did not know what equality is, no such judgment could have any meaning at all. One could not doubt what was just in a hard case, or correct a wrong definition of justice on the production of a case not in accordance with it, except in very rare cases ability of the person who thought of the 'form.' It is no notion in my mind: I have a notion or knowledge of it, but for that very reason it is distinct from the notion or knowledge which I have of it. We may legitimately ask how this Idea is related to particular instances of it, or to the sensible phenomena which exhibit it, or to the mind which apprehends it; but in all such questions we are talking and thinking of it as something real, permanent, known; and, whatever it be, it is certainly neither a body nor a mode of consciousness; if it is less plain that it is not a spirit, it is certainly not plain that it is so.

Aristotle held that Plato was wrong in assuming that this Idea was ousia, separable and separable from the particulars which might be said to 'copy' it or 'partake of it.' The former metaphor Aristotelian, 1877 (11) ascribes to the Pythagoreans, the latter to Plato. The difficulties of both are exhibited by Plato himself (Parm., 130 Ef), But Aristotle did not hold that it should have been developed permanent natures are not objects of sense; which we think; and 'conceptualism' is at least as open an Platonism to the charge of ousia, 132 D, 111, the separation of the universal from the particular.

What Aristotle denied was that the Platonic view that certain intuitions of 'separate' Ideas (Post. Anal. i, 11, 77, 35 ff.), whereas it only required the possibility of universal predication. What Plato called an Idea Aristotle called a concept, or a conceptually real thing, as Plato (but see Meno, 77 A) and implying the Aristotelian criticism. The ousia ousia is for Aristotle 'one beside the many' (τὸ τὰ πολλά ἑν), like Plato's Idea (Post. Anal. ii, 106, 7), but as thus separated from particulars it is in the mind only. Any other separation is not necessary for science, and involves inescapable difficulties. Aristotle, then, did not take Plato for a conceptuалиst, who 'substantiated concepts,' but for a realist who placed the essence of individual substances outside of them, and supposed that in predicating universally of them we were ascertaining another substance beside them, which possessed their common predicates without their distinct individualities. This had led to denial that the individual substances were substances at all, because they were not this additional substance. Hence Plato's ousia or Ideas to which Aristotle had good-by (ὑν τὰ πολλά [Post. Anal. i, 38, 35 ff.] were mere idle sounds (εἰσαγωγα); but Aristotle himself held to ousia otherwise conceived. For Aristotle ever had it that thought and had what was said on the subject of 'form,' that of that of the group of beings of whom the same essential predicates hold, the in the species ιδέα (croup ιδεα). Where one individual is (like a planet) eternal abstractions, and of individuals of that kind. Eventually 'form' has come to be the usual rendering of ousia in the sense of the essential or fundamental characteristics of a substance; species in that of a group of substances, whose essential characteristics are not to be distinguished. But this differentiation has been only gradual. Cicero preferred formae as a rendering of ιδεα, because it could be declined throughout, while species is used only of the individuals of a species, the equivalent term, and signifies 'form' rather than 'kind' or 'class.'

Cf. P. Notary, Plato's Idealism, Leipzig, 1860, 21; Ritter, Neue Untersuchungen, p. 355 ff. In consequence of the fact that Aristotle rarely used ιδεα in its philosophical sense except when referring to Plato, while ousia is used by him to less when expounding his own views, Idea has become the recognized name for the Platonic Form; and, even when it has come to be used in very un-Platonic fashion, its Platonic associations have constantly led either to a misinterpretation of Platonic Idea, because so-called, or to such a modification of the word's non-Platonic meaning as will bring it into closer accordance with Platonic usage.

In the Rhodians (the earliest Platonic dialogues in which the word occurs) the Idea of holiness is to be used as a πολυπερίγραφον (6, 3). This is important, for much of the subsequent employment of this expression by Plato himself (e.g. Resp, p. 427 C, ix, 598 E, Parm., 132 D) and of the fact that it is as a proper term to Phenomena things that are trite.

For passages illustrating the Platonic concepts see G. A. F. Ait's Lexicon Platonicum, Leipzig, 1856-66 (until superseded by Brinton's). Note the very full essay (21) in his History of Antiquities, and see his discussion of terms with respect to specific characters, and Campbell, Republic, vol. ii. As Campbell shows, the transition to specificity Platonic use is from the Rhodians. 131 E, 132 A, and the frequent combination πλατικά is deserving of notice.

On the question whether, or not, to all or any of these terms there correspond Ideas, see Parm., 135, where the young
The essential features of the Platonic Idea are that it is (1) an object of thought, not a thought (νόημα, not νοήσις); (2) an object of thought or knowledge, not of sense (νοεῖν, not ἀνοεῖν). Plato’s philosophy is not Idealism in the sense of a doctrine which resolves the phenomenal world into facts of human consciousness. Lotze’s explanation (Log. iii. 2) of the νοεῖν of the Ideas as ‘validity’ ( Gültigkeit) or Natorp’s description of the ιδέα as ‘realis’ is useful. If not understood as making them mere attributes of something else, considered in abstraction from their substances; but J. A. Scott’s expression ‘points of view’ (Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas, Oxford, 1969; see esp. p. 4) so plainly makes them ways of apprehending, not realities apprehended, that its use is fundamentally incompatible with the account given of νοεῖν.

Aristotle’s abandonment of the word to Plato determined its subsequent history, although instances of its use which involve no reference to Plato’s doctrine are to be found in many later writers, and even in the Middle Ages (see Du Cange, s.v.).

Among the problems about the Ideas beaconated by Plato to his successors historically the most important was that of their relation to the Divine mind. A doctrine of a personal God in the Christian sense forming no part of Plato’s theology, he himself freely varied his language to suit his content. Thus (Tim. 38 D) he ‘contemplates’ them (Phaedr. 247 D, E), ‘uses them as models’ in creation (Tim. 39 E). Such expressions are mythical or imaginative. More philosophically Plato’s doctrine is interpreted by S. 240 A, Philol. 23 D. The Ideas cannot be ‘of inferior nature to the soul which finds its chief good in knowing them; they must themselves possess life and thought. Again, as the material elements of our bodies are derived and replenished from the matter masses of like nature in the great world, so must our souls be derived from the ‘royal soul and royal reason’ in the nature of Zeus, wherein dwells the wisdom to which the order in the world is due. The relation of the Ideas to this world-soul (for which see also Phaedr. 245 ff., Tim. 34 ff., Laws, x. 892 ff.) is a genuine problem for Plato’s Speculum. So to suggest that in order to solve it Plato would have surrendered the sovereignty of the Ideas. Rather they inform us and our souls, which are parts of it, ‘as a light to enlighten and a guide to govern’ (Acts, xiv. 13, Hist. Fr. ed. Frasor, Oxford, 1871, ii. 496). It was their indwelling of the soul as the ἠγοίεσθε (Aristote, de An. 429a 27) that proved Platonists that it was immortal.

Of course, it is not with Ideas, his speculations influenced the development of thought respecting them, which led to the view of them as Divine thoughts. While no idealist in the later sense, he held that the Divine mind cannot be (like ours) in a position of dependence upon its object; still less can it exercise itself in knowledge of what is inferior to itself: thus its object must be what it is, and its activity νοεῖν ἀνοεῖν (Met. A 9, 1074a 34).

After an interval of five centuries Plotinus stands in the direct line of succession from Plato and Aristotle. While in sense-perception the perception conforms to an object other than itself, νοεῖν or understanding, can only be an object external to itself. Its object must exist in it, but such an inaccessibility νοεῖν, just because νοεῖν is higher than anything but the One or the Good which transcends (like Plato’s ἀκάλλυτος the distinction between subject and object, is a higher kind of existence than the independence which the objects of inferior faculties enjoy over against the apprehending faculties. The intelligible natures of all things, which, of course, are no other than the Platonic Ideas, thus form the content of the eternal νοεῖν, which is the ‘second person’ of Plotinus’s Trinity (the One, the νοεῖν, and the World-Soul); see Enn. v. ix. 8. Here we reach the interpretation of the Ideas as Divine thoughts which became traditional in the Middle Ages; but the νοεῖν of Plotinus is not what we should call ‘a personal’ God.

In mediaeval thought another step is taken under the influence of Christianity, which seriously concerns God as ‘personal’. A passage of Augustine (De Dio, qu. 83, xlvii.) became the Dogma of the Middle Ages that the Ideas are eternal. This is quoted as such by Albertus Magnus (Sum. Thol. i. xiii. qu. 53, 2, § 3), Alexander of Hales (Sum. Thol. i. qu. 23, 2, § 4), Thomas Aquinas (Sum. Thol. i. qu. 15, 1, ex in Sent. iii. art. 1, de Veritate, art. 3, ‘de Ideis’); Bonaventura (in I. Sent. dis. 35, Comp. Theol. i. 55, Sum. Thol. qu. 11, art. 1), and Duns Scotus (Op. Oxon., in I. Sent. dis. 35, art. 1). Augustine could reconcile his earlier conviction that we must suppose Ideas as eternal and immutable patterns of phenomenal things with his Christian belief in one eternal Being, the Creator of all things, only by supposing the Ideas to be eternally dependent on the Divine mind but its eternal pattern, the world of Ideas, is an integral part of the Divine nature. Augustine assists himself by the analogy of the designs in an artist’s mind. To make a more direct analogy appeared in Philo (as a Jew was also accustomed to regard God as personal). See de Opificio Mundi, §§ 16, 25, pp. 4, 5 (the Divine Logos, as one with the world of Ideas, the κόσμος Ṽοιος, is called by Philo Ἰδεῖς Ἰδεῖς; the phrase, however—which occurs in Origen, c. Cels. vi. 64—is bracketed by Colson). The same metaphor of an artist’s designs had been used by Seneca (Ep. 88, § 10) in exposition of Plato; and we may compare with it a passage (in which, however, the word Ἰδεῖς does not occur) in the Introd. Arist., of the 1st cent. mathematician Nicomachus of Gerasa in Palestine (i. 6). The Phaedo Plato’s Ethics is nothing (Gr., Berlin, 1879, p. 309) already assert that Plato held the Ideas to exist et τοι Ἰδεῖς καὶ τοῖς Ἰδεῖς Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ τοῖς Ἰδεῖς τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις; the use of such language was encouraged by the Christianity laid on the thought of Divine personality. Hence the importance of Augustine’s adoption of the analogy with the artist’s designs. In the earlier period of Western medievalism, Augustine’s influence was paramount, and to the same still powerful influence it was due that even after the triumph of Aristotelianism in the 12th and 13th centuries the Platonic Ideas, as interpreted by Augustine, retained their place in the
philosophical tradition beside the Aristotelian Forms.

In the 12th cent. we meet with an explicit Platonicism which regards the Ideas as eternal patterns; e.g., in Bernard of Chartres (John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, ii. 17, where the author traces the history of the doctrine of Ideas, and, it may be noted, apocalypses the standing *Ne in the relation of exemplum to exemplar*). We find other examples in the *Megalographos* and *Micrologos* of Bernard Silvester (sometimes identified with his probably older namesake of Chartres) and in the *Antisthenes or Helen of Italy*. This Platonicism depends not only on Plato’s *Timaeus* (the only accessible dialogue) and Augustine, but on such writers as Boethius, Macrobius; and Martianus Capella. After the triumph of Aristotelie the acceptance of Ideas was still, as we have seen, general. It was a subject of controversy whether they were Ideas of individual things (Thomas Aquinas) or of universals only; whether they were practical or only speculative (Henry of Ghent); whether they were in God’s essential nature as *ratiocina cognoscendi* or only in His intelligence as objects of His knowledge (Ockham). The answer to such questions depended, of course, on the general philosophical and theological position of the thinker concerned.

3. Transition from the medieval to the modern uses have now to trace the process by which a word hitherto associated with eternal nature and archetypal Divine designs came to be commonly employed for the thoughts and even imaginations of human beings. This, perhaps carrying on a Cynic tradition; see E. Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, Eng. tr., London, 1898, p. 254) interpreted the Platonic Ideas as mere concepts (e.g., *Platonism*), or objects of sensible things (Plat. *Philo*, 382 B, Stob. i. 15, p. 332 H; Diels, *Dox. Gr.* pp. 309, 473). Great as in certain directions was the influence of Stoicism (esp. through Cicero, Seneca, and Boethius) on medieval thought, it is doubtful whether this interpretation of the Ideas affected the fortunes of the word before the Renaissance, when a general revolt against Aristotelianism brought into favour a word free from Aristotelian associations, which at the same time attention was drawn to the Stoic logic as the chief ancient rival of the Aristotelian. Thus the habit gradually eroded in using *idea* where the originally equally explicit *spécies*, *idea*, *forma* etc. (species intelligibilis, *sensibilis*) of Aristotle’s *de Anima*. We find Pietro Pomponazzi (1460-1529) passing from the Divine Ideas to the idea *qua est in mente nostra, quae est species* (de *Continentibus*, Basel, 1567, p. 36). Melanchthon identified *ideas* with the *actus intelligendi*, which is best described as the formation of an image (de *Anima*, Lyons, 1555, p. 187), and characteristically attempted to reconcile Plato and Aristotle by interpreting Plato’s Ideas as *imaginum* (*Érot. Dial.*), in *Corp. Reform. Halle, 1584-60, xiii. 233), or (in an exposition of the *Ethics*) as *commissae notions*. In the latter interpretation he was taken to task by J. C. Scaliger (de *Sublt.*, Frankfurt, 1576, vii. 4) on the ground that *notiones* are accidents, whereas Plato held the Ideas as *species* and *notiones* are defined by Godenius (in *Exercit. J. C. S. de Sublt.*, Marburg, 1599, p. 98), whose *Lexicon Philosophicum* (Frankfort, 1613), s.v. *idea*, is worth consulting.

The 16th cent. physician François Duquesnoy (de *Intellencis*, i. [Opera, Venice, 1574, p. 139 A, 139 A]) uses *idea* as equivalent to *universalis*, and the so-called Spagyric school of medical writers affected the word, from which their master Paracelsus formed a number of technical derivatives (see B. Castellio, *Lex. Med. Benov*, Nuremberg, 1682, pp. 705, 756). The Paracelsian terminology was the source of Jacob Boekhout’s, to whom the word ‘ideas’, when he heard it from Cranach and Warnica, ‘proved vastly agreeable’, suggesting to him ‘a beautiful, heavenly, chaste virgins’ such as is Sophia or Wisdom in his theosophical system (*Memoria of Life, etc.*, tr. F. Okeley, Northampton, 1717). In the 18th cent. we find ideas in both the *Mémoires de la Société des Arts* (1782, p. 3), which is being illustrated by examples from the *Mémoires de la Société des Arts* (1782, p. 3), which is being illustrated by examples from the *Mémoires de la Société des Arts*. The word *idea* as the source of Jacob Boekhout’s, by whom it is the source of Jacob Boekhout’s, ‘proved vastly agreeable’, suggesting to him ‘a beautiful, heavenly, chaste virgins’ such as is Sophia or Wisdom in his theosophical system (*Memoria of Life, etc.*, tr. F. Okeley, Northampton, 1717). The word *idea* as the source of Jacob Boekhout’s, by whom it is the source of Jacob Boekhout’s, ‘proved vastly agreeable’, suggesting to him ‘a beautiful, heavenly, chaste virgins’ such as is Sophia or Wisdom in his theosophical system (*Memoria of Life, etc.*, tr. F. Okeley, Northampton, 1717).

Outside the Schools the tendency at this period to give the word a wide extension of meaning may be illustrated from *Shakespeare*. Here the general sense of ‘pattern’ or ‘model’, ‘idea’ as the source of Jacob Boekhout’s, by whom it is the source of Jacob Boekhout’s, ‘proved vastly agreeable’, suggesting to him ‘a beautiful, heavenly, chaste virgins’ such as is Sophia or Wisdom in his theosophical system (*Memoria of Life, etc.*, tr. F. Okeley, Northampton, 1717). The word *idea* as the source of Jacob Boekhout’s, by whom it is the source of Jacob Boekhout’s, ‘proved vastly agreeable’, suggesting to him ‘a beautiful, heavenly, chaste virgins’ such as is Sophia or Wisdom in his theosophical system (*Memoria of Life, etc.*, tr. F. Okeley, Northampton, 1717).

4. In modern philosophy before Kant in the technical language of the *proposition of idea for species* served to some extent to conceal the fact that the difficulties of the old theory of ‘representative species’ passed unsolved into a later psychology (cf. Reid, ‘Human Mind’, ch. vii). In *Hume, Work*, ed. Hamilton, ii. 140; H. W. B. Joseph, in *Mind*, Oct. 1910). These difficulties are traceable to Aristotle’s statements in *de Anima*, ii. 12, 3, about the relation of the perception of the form of an object to the object without the matter, which easily lent themselves to a quasi-materialistic interpretation, and in any case tended to make the immediate object of perception and ultimately the sensation itself, an image or representation within the mind of the real thing without. This substitution becomes generally current through its adoption by Hobbes and Descartes. In his *Hib. Anima Humanae* (Paris, 1636), P. P. Buchan frequently uses *idea* as the equivalent of *species* for the immediate objects (objecta interna) of human consciousness. There is no evidence that he enjoyed personal intercourse with Descartes, but it is clear that he made the possibility; his *idea et liquida idea* (p. 339) reminds us of the Frenchman’s ‘clear and distinct’ perceptions. With Hobbes *idea* is synonymous with *phantasm* and signifies in the brain the impression of external bodies upon the organs of the senses. Such appearances, if they represent external bodies where they are not, are properly ‘ids’, ‘false ideas’. How the false idea or *idea* is to be distinguished from the true Hobbes leaves obscure; but it is clear that ‘idea’ and ‘id’ alike are something in the brain or mind. Thus we have different ‘ideas’ of the same thing in succession when what we first saw at a distance to be some material object we see on coming nearer to be a living thing, and on coming yet nearer to be a human being.

As an instruction controversy arose between Descartes and Hobbes over the use of the word ‘idea’. Descartes had spoken freely in his *Meditations on the Idea* of God; Hobbes objected that he had laid no such ‘idea’. He did not mean that there is nothing to suggest to us the existence of a God; but that we have no means of our minds a desire of a mind in God, that the idea of the admirable order of the world leads us to suppose exists. Descartes submitted and said that by ‘idea’ he meant the concept of ‘images of material things in the corporeal phantasy’, but always ‘anything of which the mind is directly aware’; that, when we perceive ourselves to be, e.g., that we have a body, we call the volition or the fear ‘idea’. He adds: ‘I have made use of this word scetticaly and philosphically’ (de *Intellencis*, 177). Descartes accustomed to it to signify the forms of the perceptions of the divine mind, although we do not suppose any phantasm (sensible imagination) in God. Thus the history of the word shows the difficulty of the word with the Divine thoughts recommended it to Des-

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1 Bacon had already contrasted *hominis mentis idea* with *human mentalia* and philosophical ideas with *cerebrum Ocrium* (Nov. Op. i. 22, 124).
out of this very un-Platonic theory of ideas a more Platonic one is developed by Berkeley in the much later *Siris*. Among the *ideas* of Locke and Berkeley, *Hume* (1717–76) distinguished direct perceptions or sensations as *ideas*, while *ideas* are confined to reproductions of these, which are known as such by their inferior *liveliness*. This has become, on the whole, the tradition of later English philosophy. *Spencer-Peirce, Principles of Psychology*, London, 1872, pt. vii, ch. 16 [vol. ii, p. 434 f.]; cf. *Baldwin, DFM 1, s.v.* *'idea'*. *Hume*’s contemporary *Johnson*, who in his *Dictionary* defines *idea* as *'mental image*, branded (erroneously) as *'modern cant'*, the use of it for a notion or opinion of which there can be no such image (*Boswell, Life*, ed. Oxford, 1826, iii, 176).

5. In modern philosophy since Kant—This use of *idea* as primarily denoting a sensation reproduced in memory or imagination passed with the English empirical philosophy to which it belonged to the French free-thinkers of the 18th cent., among whom *Condillac* (1715–80) uses *idée* for sensation remembered and related to an external object, except in the case of a sensation of touch, where the sensation by itself is an *idée* because directly relating itself to an object (see *Encyclopédie* [1751–89], iii, 123). Not altogether dissimilar is the account of *'idea'* given by *Wolff* (1679–1754), in *Psych. Emp.*, Frankfort, 1732, § 46, as a mental representation in relation to the represented object. This use of *'idée'* was not confined to Germany. *Kant* (1724–1804) set himself ([Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Transl. Dial. i 1 [Werke, ed. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1867, iii, 256 f.]) to restore the word from its derogatory connotation, in which it could be used for *'the representation of the colour red' to its original Platonic use of a *conception* transcending the possibilities of experience. Of such conceptions, which Reason inevitably forms, but which cannot be verified in experience, he recognized three: the soul, the world, and God. To *Kant*, that we necessarily think a thing to be so and not by any means implies that it is so (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. Hamburg, 1787, ii, 229 ff.). For the use (or uses) made of the word by *Spinoza* (1632–77) the reader must be referred to Spinoza himself (see esp. *Eth. ii*, ch. 3, 4, prop. 48, 49, ch. 6, prop. 69, *Treatise on Religion*, *Ethics of Spinoza*, Oxford, 1901). As the spiritual or psychical correlate of an extended thing or body, a man's mind is described as the *'idea'* of his body.

*Locke* (1632–1704) and *Leibniz* (1664–1718) both make *idea* the immediate objects of the understanding in the widest sense (*Locke*, *Ess. i*, i, § 8; *Leibniz*, *Nouve. Ess. ii*, i, § 1 [ed. Erdmann, Berlin, 1849, p. 229]). *Locke* held, against *Descartes*, that they are never *'innate'*, but always derived from experience or from reflection upon experience. For *Leibniz* all ideas are innate; if distinct, they represent objects. Thus for both *Locke* and *Leibniz* they represent objects from which they are themselves distinct. With *Berkeley* (1685–1735) ideas, though conceived, after *Locke*, as the immediate objects of the understanding, do not represent objects beyond themselves. They are themselves the only objects; of everything, except spirits or minds (of which we are said to have no *'ideas'*, but *'notions'*, the case is percipi; thus the object of a *sens perception* is called an idea rather than a thing, because things are generally supposed to denote something existing without the mind; and also to include *spiri*s (see *Princ. of Human Knowledge*, i, § 39 [Werke, ed. Fraser, Oxford, 1871, i, 175]).
humanity. This Schopenhauer holds to be in agreement with Plato’s true meaning, while Kant’s three Ideas of the Reason have nothing in common with Plato’s except a transcendence of experience which they share with the nearest chimeras. The Idea, thus conceived, Schopenhauer holds to be the object which the fine arts aim at representing (it is to be observed that Kant recovers aesthetic Ideas of experience Kritik der Urth. i. §§ 17, 49, 51 [Werke, ed. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1867, v. 233, 324, 338]). Such a view gives to art a higher rank in the scale of values than is assigned to it by Plato, who, although sometimes describing the apprehension of the Ideas in language suggestive of aesthetic contemplation, regards the productions of the artist as an imitation not of the Ideas, but only of the sensible copies thereof (Epic. x. 368).

Following Kant, who had taught that the Ideas, which were mere problems for the Speculative Reason, became postulates for the Practical, sufficient grounds for action though unvaried in experience—thus we can, and indeed are bound to, act as though free, yet a speculative proof of freedom is impossible—Herbert (1776–1841) speaks of objectified Ideas (Idee, Idealität, etc.) springing from judgments of value (Kurse Enzyk. der Phil. § 47 [Werke, Leipzig, 1852, ii. 79]). A similar usage is found in Wundt.

6. Ambiguity of the word ‘Idea.’—Some of the difficulties which have beset the word ‘Idea’ are merely verbal, and may be removed by careful definition. Such is that arising from the application of the word at once to eternal principles which encompass the universe and are discovered by the exercise of reason, and also to varying modes or states of a finite consciousness. Less easily kept apart are the sense of ‘mental image’ and that of ‘concept’. The latter is more readily derivable from the ambiguity which the word ‘idea’ inherited from the word species when, in the 17th cent., it took its place in the philosophical vocabulary. Used now for an activity of the mind and apprehending an object (cf. the phrase ‘I have no idea’ = ‘I do not know’), or the occasional use for ‘the faculty of apprehension’, as in the well-known line in Thomson’s Season, ‘heaven and earth, and spring’! (1720), now for the object immediately apprehended (even where, as in Berkeley, this is not treated as representative of anything beyond itself), it inevitably comes to suggest a tertium quid internal to the mind as compared with the external object it is supposed to represent, yet not the mental process or activity of apprehending, but its immediate object. The assumption of such a tertium quid is rendered plausible by the difficulties due to a comparison between the experiences which different individuals, or the same individual at different times, have of one and the same object. Even just seems to be done to all of these if each be considered as an apprehension of a different ‘idea’ of the same thing, which is itself in no case the same object of the experience. This may seem to be supported by the fact that we can seldom, if ever, think without imagery—a fact expressed by Aristotle in the saying, ἀφετέρου ρούτ τίνι δέν αὐθεντάρι, gen. § προτετ, an αὐθεντάρι a transcendent thing without an image—even when, as in the instance of a chillogian or of the Roman Empire, any image that may present itself is plainly not that of which the apprehension is the taking. In thinking, however, of a sensible thing not actually present to the senses, but remembered, it is easy to confuse the image with the object, to talk as though it were the object of our thought, as though it were what we remembered (and yet, as it is here in our imagination now, it is clearly not what represents, that we remember); and, lastly, as though, even in perceiving an object actually present to the senses, it were such an image, and not the object, that is before us. A fuller discussion of talking which, when used of others, comes naturally enough, because we do not share their perceptions, but picture to ourselves what we take them to be perceiving, forgetting that this is not what they perceive, but only a picture of it in our imagination.

The assumption of such a tertium quid between the apprehending mind and its object appears to be confirmed by the existence of hallucinations and of dreams, where what seems, as presented in consciousness, to be indistinguishable from a real object is afterwards judged not to have been such. This suggests that, just when a real object is present and when it is not, what we actually perceive is not this object, but a ‘mental image’, which may or may not be representative of a real original. But this assumption of the difficulty; it is so more easily understood how, on the hypothesis that our immediate object is always such an ‘idea’, we can become aware of all of an external object represented by some of them and not by others (cf. Berkeley, Prince of Human Knowledge, § 8), than how in any case we sometimes come to think we perceive external bodies when we do not. These disadvantages of a word as ‘idea’ (which are not removed by substituting, with J. Ward, ‘presentation’—a literal rendering of the Vorstellung of Herbart and Wundt) make it a hindrance rather than a help in discussing the nature of our experience prior to any such reflective discrimination between the respective shares of subject and object as must appear in any account which can be given of it. It is significant of the confusion of this word by English psychologists that W. McDougall avoids its use on the ground that most who have so named features distinguished in the stream of consciousness have tended to regard it as confusing, and Green’s Introduction to Psychology (Oxford, 1923) the word ‘idea’ and its scarcely less misleading synonym ‘syneymes do not occur at all.


C. C. J. WEBB.

IDEAL.—I. Use of the term.—The term ‘ideal’ is perhaps one of the most used in common use. In popular usage it signifies sometimes what is excellent of its kind, e.g., ‘we had ideal weather’; sometimes what would be perfect if it could be attained, but as a matter of fact is utterly unattainable, as when we speak of the ‘ideal’ State; sometimes what is regarded as unworthy of serious attention as being curiously fanciful and oblivious of the facts of the case. With the last two usages in mind, Hegel speaks of

the popular fancy that ideals are nothing but chimeras, and the very different fancy that ideals are something far too excellent to possess reality, or anything like it, which is to procure them for themselves (W. Wallace, Logic of Hegel, Oxford, 1882, p. 8). From philosophical language, too, there comes an ambiguity, for the adjective ‘ideal’ may correspond either to either of the two nouns, ‘idea’ and ‘ideal’; and in the former case, corresponding to ‘idea’, in the
sense in which the English psychological philosophers from Locke to Hume made the term current, 'ideal' is apt to be interpreted as in contradiction to what is actual. The 'ideal' and the 'real' are in some degree, and the distinction becomes an opposition, and the tendency is intensified to think of what is ideal in any sense as nonexistent and permanently so—something that is 'all in the air.' Furthermore, this notion of ideals derives strength from consideration of the ideals of the artist. His ideals, the types of beauty which he depicts, are commonly taken to be representations of a beauty which never and nowhere existed, nor can.

'The light that never was, on sea or land, 
The consecration, and the Poet's dream.'

(Wordsworth, "Pied a Terre").

Turning from popular usage to writers on psychology and ethics, one's impression that 'ideal' is a word of vague import is strengthened. Some have no use for the word at all. Some introduce it casually in the course of discussions without any explanation. Some use it as synonymous with 'end.' Some draw a careful distinction between ideal and end, and, having drawn it, seem to ignore it. Various questions as to the nature, character and characteristics of the ideal; few think it necessary to define the term or give a connected treatment of the topic. It is difficult to understand why 'ideal' should not be handled with something of the care which, e.g., 'motive,' 'intention,' and 'desire' receive.

2. Definition.—An ideal in general may be defined as a conception of what, if attained, would fully satisfy; of what is perfect of its kind, and, in consequence, is the pattern to be copied, and the standard by which actual achievement is to be judged. The ideal is the standard of value, and the standard of worth in so far as it embodies the ideal. (For a general discussion of ideals and their significance, see Epistemology, § 20 ff., in vol. v. p. 332 ff.)

The moral ideal is what we are now concerned with; and a moral ideal is a conception of what, if attained, would completely satisfy man as a moral being. It stands, as what ought to be, over against what is in character and conduct, and constitutes the standard by reference to which character and conduct are estimated. The ideal is not synonymous with the end. It is a product of constructive imagination in which the end is anticipated, and is conceived as one that can be attained, embodied, and expressed. Individuals who agree in their way of defining the end may differ widely enough in their ideals. The ideals of a hedonist, for instance, may be high or low. On the other hand, it seems quite erroneous to say, as has sometimes been said, that difference of conception of the ideal determines the difference between various schools of ethical speculation. For men who differ profoundly as moral philosophers do not necessarily differ widely as moral individuals. They may approve, condemn, seek after, and avoid the same things; their ideals, therefore, are not dissimilar. It will appear that difference of ideal—the kind of difference in view in the statement which we are considering—marks, not school from school of ethical theory, but stage from stage of moral progress.

3. The nature of ideals is part of man's nature. It is given with his power of retrospect, forecast, and choice. All men have an ideal of some kind, for all rational beings distinguish what is and what should be. The most elementary and only formally defined as a conception of man with his powers at the best, using them for the best. It cannot be concretely defined. For man is a developing being, and does not know what his powers at the best may be. And conceptions of 'for the best' may differ, and do differ. Further, a particular individual may find that, in constructing his ideal, the peculiarity of his circumstances requires that there is a conflict of some kind between 'at the best' and 'for the best.' It is a serious question for some, e.g., whether, in view of all their circumstances and obligations, they are justified in or not in taking a University course, or going into a certain career for which they are fitted, the result of which requires an expensive training which will mean hard sacrifice for others. Hence it is that 'ideals are relative to the lives that entertain them.' (W. James, "Talks to Teachers on Psychology," London, 1889, p. 292.) An ideal, however, is not conceived to be something purely or essentially individualistic. He who holds it is not impressed with the relativity of it, but with its universality. It is not something which he alone should seek after; it is what he conceives all should follow.

There is an infinite variety of ideals as held by different individuals. They may be low or high, good or evil, or simply not the right ideals for a person. They may be held for a short time or for a long time. They may be changed over time as one's beliefs and experiences change.
looses in colour but gains in clearness. It comes down from the skies to common earth. While it remains something singular, peculiarly our own, we lay more stress on its universal character. (On the contrast between the 'idealism' of youth and the 'realism' of mature years, see H. Lotze, Microeconomics, Eng. tr., R. Kightley, 1889, ii. 335 ff.)

4. Is the ideal realized?—To this question the answer is Yes and No. (a) On the one hand, we must hold that the ideal is attainable and is realized. An ideal which is absolutely and inherently unattainable cannot be an ideal; for, as we have said, the ideal is our conception of what should be, and, as Kant says, 'an ought implies a can.' If a thing cannot be, there is no sense in saying it should be. And, unless we are prepared to deny that men ever act rightly, or that there is such a thing as moral progress, we must hold that the ideal is realized. The moral ideal may be said to be realized every time we truly act. (J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, p. 29.) We know, too, that multitudes find their ideal realized in some individual; their effort is to try to be like him. What would be the think of this is their standard of judgment? (b) On the other hand, most men are constrained to admit that the ideal is never attained by them. Strive as they like, it remains ahead of their accomplishment. The fact is that man is a defective being, and that moral progress means, not only that in achievement the individual is ever coming nearer an ideal, but that the ideal itself is progressing. Like character, the ideal is only relatively fixed and permanent. If, as we have said, the ideal gives coherence to the moral life, it must obviously have stability of a kind. But we have to think of a stability in progress—a moral triumph. As we progress in the moral life, the ideal unfolds and expands.

5. Change of ideal.—Apart, however, from the change of ideal which proceeds in every life gradually and imperceptibly, probably the majority are familiar with a change of another kind, when the cleavage between old and new is distinctly marked, and the change is not merely one of sharper contrast. There are times when one can say, 'The old things are passed away; behold, they are become new' (2 Co 5:17), when one feels oneself to be a new creature, a creature of a new world. This may come about under a manifold variety of circumstances in which little, if any, general rule may be discerned. It may happen that needs of our nature of which we had not previously been conscious should make themselves felt, so that what formerly satisfied is no longer adequate. Needs which were weak or suppressed may become relatively stronger. Or we may find that what we thought would satisfy proves unable to do so. It may happen that our call to, and assumption of, fresh responsibilities give a new vision of what life and character ought to be. We see that the old ways are unprofitable, that the old habits must be broken, and our whole scheme and view of life revised, as Henry Y. found when he assumed the dignity of kingship. A new bond of friendship or love may mean a similar new vision. The ideal may be, and often is, concomitant with a religious experience; 'if any man is in Christ, he is a new creature' (2 Co 5:17).

In some cases the phenomenon admits of explanation; in others, especially when religious elements enter, it is too recondite; obscure factors are involved which the individual himself can give no clear account of, and the case defies psychological analysis. We cannot explain our tastes, our likes and aversions; it is a cold-blooded sort of love if one can explain why he prefers one person before others. And of that change of ideal which means a revolution in the moral life, and comes, or seems to come, suddenly, an adequate explanation is seldom possible. 'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit' (Jn 3:8).

When a new vision of the ideal comes to us, it may affect us in a variety of ways. We may feel at once a peace and satisfaction like that of the merchant who has long been searching for the goodly pearl, and, having found it, sells all that he has and buys it; we may yield to intellectual and spiritual inspiration. More often, especially when we do not merely get a new conception of the ideal, but see the ideal realized or approximated in a new actual life or ideal, we may experience a sort of despair; we may feel overwhelmed with a sense of the contrast between what we are and what we now see we ought to be (on this topic generally, and the value of self-abasement, see French, The Other Side of Greatness, serm. 1). Or we may for a time be involved in a conflict of ideals, undecided as to how we can proceed. Sometimes we see more or less clearly which is the new 'better' is, sometimes we have nothing but a sense that what we used to regard as best is not good, and that a 'better' there must be, though we cannot yet say what it is. We have to grope our way, 'moving about in worlds not realized' (Wordsworth, Intimations of Immortality).

6. The teaching of ideals.—It may be said to be the duty of every moral being to unfold and develop an ideal to those who are morally undeveloped, or are searching for an ideal, and to propose something better to those who are plainly following a low ideal. In various aspects of this, it is the special task of preachers, teachers, and parents (see art. EDUCATION, MORAL, vol. v. p. 216 ff.). We may note some of the most important principles which must be kept in mind in this connection. Regarding the kind of ideal which should be commended for imitation, some remarks by L. T. Hobhouse are worth noting:

*It is just worth nothing, as we pass, that Ideals are interesting or valuable according as the element of construction or abstraction preponderates in it. Proves in which differences are left out, in which you try to get down to the pure, free from all incorporation of other shares in proportion as their delineation is successful. This kind of Idealism* "gives us the heroes and heroines who live to utter
moral platitudes, and spoil whole chapters of good writing. It
inspires the morality which tries to make all life a study of what
you ought not to do. The bare, generalized picture of the idealism, on the other
hand, is an artless satisfaction always in incompleteness, and finds
completeness only in the mind as well as character and the varied
life (The Theory of Knowledge, p. 111).

It is very important that the ideal exhibited
should be positive, and not negative. Otherwise a
boy will get the impression that a good man
does none of the things that an average boy
wants to do, and at any age one will conceive of
virtue as a negative thing, and goodness as essen-
tially some form of abstinence. Further, the aim must
be to make the ideal concrete, not abstract, to show
moral and blood examples, not merely to lay down
precepts, to point to lives or deeds in which the
ideal has been approximately embodied, to show
that, as actual occurrences prove, virtue is not in-
capable of attainment. (On this topic see S. M.
Bligh, The Direction of Desire.)

7. The unrealized ideal.—We have seen that
the ideal is unrealized and unrealizable in the
sense that it is a noble thing which constantly
keeps ahead of us in our moral progress. It ever
appears as 'a better beyond the best.' But, apart
from this, every one who is earnest in moral
endeavor must deny that the ideal is not realized in
another sense—in the sense, namely, that in his
conduct he comes short more or less, and usually
more rather than less, of what he purports to be
seeking at any moment, and the ideal as it is
then presented to us, and striven after, there
is often a wide gulf between what was to be and
what is. This may be due to our failure to
realize the ideal, or our failure to realize the
good ideal we would do not; or the evil that
we would not do (Ro 7:9). Or in ignorance we
may adopt a wrong means of realizing our ideal.
Or we may find that circumstances are in
consanguinity against us, and forbid the realization
of our purposes, that we are barricaded, thwarted,
hauling by the force majore of practical facts
which we cannot circumvent or remove. Besid-
es, we must take account of our general in-
ability to give adequate or appropriate expression
to the deepest things of the spirit. Take the case
of emotion. We can only stammer to the
peanut, or to an unresponsive or uninterested ear
indiscriminately, about our love. We search in vain for an
adequate mode of expressing contempt or hate.
In an excess of joy we are moved to
weep, and the expression we can give can
to heart-breaking disappointment or despair.
So with the ideal which in our highest moments
may be revealed to us. Unutterable thoughts,
expressible and attainable may come to us; we feel
we know, that they are the most valuable of our
possessions, though neither in word nor deed
can we fully reveal them. They are among the
trust riches of our nature though we cannot ex-
hibit them:

'Thoughts hardly to be packed
Into a narrow act,
Fancies that break through language and escape;
All I could never be,
All men ignored in me.'

(Browning, 'Rabbi Ben Ezra'.)

The familiar words of Kant respecting the good
will may be applied to the ideal:

'Which could desert it, which
Whole lack power to accomplish its purpose,
This, I was worth to God.'

'And you that love the truth,
As a jewel, it would lose its
In the abode of its own light, and
Of its own value.' (T. K. Abbott, Kant's Theory of
Ethics, London, 1830.)

A lover of paradox might well say that a man's
real worth depends on what he fails in.

'Thou didst well that it was in thine heart.' (2 Ch. 69)

The ideal in some cases is doubly ideal; it is
a conception not of what would but of what should
satisfy. The individual does not feel the needs
which it would meet, but in some sense he ac-
knowledges that he ought to feel them, or that
they ought to be felt generally, and that
the individuals of which they are immoral, or even
criminal, will hiss the villain of melodrama, and
applaud the triumph of long-suffering virtue.
One who makes no attempt to realize it in
his own conduct may be very exacting in de-
manding them of others, or very earnest in con-
mending them to others. Ideals which are not
realized in conduct may thus still be very useful
as a form of character; though ineffective to shape conduct,
they do have a share in making the individual
what he is. Further, ideals which he never seeks
to realize as a private inducement to his own
conduct, his public duty, his moral and social obligations.
We may regard such a man as we please, but we
cannot say that the ideals he never seeks to real-
ze are altogether valueless to his own development, and
for society. Conduct is at the best but an imperfect
expression and revelation of an individual's
deals, and, similarly, institutions and customs
are imperfect embodiments of the ideals, the moral,
and the moral standpoint of a community.

'That which gives life its keynote is not what
men think good, but what they think true.' True, this is not the part
of belief which is embodied in conduct; the real man
is able to know only what is visibly wrong; the best man does
not always make us aware that he is striving after what
is right. We do not see people growing into the resemblance
of what they admire; it is much if we can see them growing into
the likeness of that which they condemn.

But the dominant influence of life lies ever in the unrealized.
All that we discern is the negative aspect of a man's ideal, that ideal itself
lives by admiration which never clothes itself in word or deed.
In seeing what he avoids we judge only the least important part of his
standards. It is that which he never even attempts to
realize in his own person which makes him what he is. He
by the average secular man. To-day is a
Christendom has hallowed the precept to give the poor
to whom he asks the cost; it would be easier to argue
him for what most would regard as his virtuous acts
—his income is injurious than that it has been
impossible. Christianity has moulded character, where
we should vainly seek to discern
that it had indifferent conduct. Not the criminal code,
but the social perfection shows us what a nation
and he who cares on any act of daily the shadow of the second
best, so far as he is successful, does more to influence the moral
deals who succeeds in passing a new law? (The Moral
Ideal, p. 573.)

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IDEALISM.—i. The term.—'Idealism' is a
term of very varied application. As a state-
ment it may denote the whole of human
life which all utilitarian and endemistic considerations
are

operative to the objective ideals of
life, and in which the mind is the cen-
trity in the face of all determinism and material-
ism. This is the type of idealism the attainment and vindication of which find recognition in.

Carlyle's Sartor Resartus.
Again, the term may be applied generally to philosophical and religious systems, to views of the universe and poetic creations, in which the world is depicted as being dominated by spiritual ends of a moral, religious, or aesthetic character. An idealism of this kind is found in all the great national religions, in the most diverse philosophical systems, in the Commedia and Goethe’s Faust; its antithesis are sceptical relativism and hopeless pessimism. But these rather general applications of the word have no place in a scientific terminology, and have not much significance even in the inexact speech of everyday life, as everything turns upon the particular ethical, religious, or aesthetic sense in which the nature of the ideal and its authority over personality are conceived. As a technical term, idealism concerns us only as denoting a distinct type of metaphysical thought, and in that sense alone will it be dealt with here.

2. The fundamental position of idealism. In order to determine the philosophical import of the term ‘idealism,’ it will be necessary to fix the place which the corresponding theory occupies among the various fundamental philosophical positions; and as these positions may be combined in the several systems of philosophy, but they always remain separate and distinct as regards their starting-points. No single or solid property of subject can be ascribed to the metaphysical philosophical relaxation. On the contrary, the data of experience form from the outset the subject of various problems, the very variety of which renders any answer to a real one impossible. Thus we have, first of all, the question as to the ultimate reality given in experience; secondly, the question as to what the thinker expects to attain by a logical elaboration of the given; and, finally, the question regarding the attitude to be assumed to the facts of becoming and change, and therefore also to the existence of ends and values, in the data of experience. These three questions, even if the answers to them can be harmonized and combined, cannot, as has been said, be reduced to one another. To begin with the last: we note that from this question arises the systems of pantheists and the others. The two sides of the antithesis being exemplified by the Eleatics and Heraclitus respectively. In the second question, on the one hand, the systems which by logical elaboration of the given find a more specific and certain reality behind or above the manifold of experience—as, indeed, the basis and explanation of all other systems on this hand, and the systems which seek merely to explain psychologically the formation of the concepts actually applied in experience, and thus to regulative such application. These systems are respectively the dogmatic a priori theories of which Platonism is the type, and the empirical pragmatic theories represented by the Sophists. The first question, again, gives rise, on the one hand, to the systems which regard material reality as the primary element of experience, and find in it the explanation of consciousness; and, on the other, to the systems which begin with the individual consciousness, and pass thence to the idealistic reality as they are respected by the realistic systems represented by materialism and by a naturalistic pantheism of the Spinozistic type, and the idealistic systems framed by Descartes and Hume.

Now the place of ‘idealism’ among philosophical conceptions lies within the confines of the last of these antithesis. It denotes the metaphysical theories of the primary and most certain datum of experience, takes its stand upon consciousness and its contents. In its most uncompromising and self-consistent form idealism is solipsism, and finds its initial and most difficult problem in the question regarding the trans-subjective reality of knowledge, or the reality of the merely subjective element from elements which are super-subjective and universally valid. This problem, which had been touched upon by the Greek Sophists, Dante’s Divine Comedy, and the medieval Nominalists, became the real axi of Descartes and Malebranche, of Locke and Berkeley, and it is impressively expounded by Fichte in his Voraussetzungen des Menschen. This idealism is often called ‘Phenomenalism’—a designation which implies that consciousness and its content of phenomena must form the starting-point of all philosophical reflection, that the entire range of physical and psychical reality is given as a mere phenomena to a consciousness which carries the whole within itself. Whether the phenomena thus immanent in consciousness have correlatives of an objective character, and what such correlatives may be, are questions left entirely unanswered. Of late it has become common to speak of this view as ‘Immanence’—a etcifying that all reality is comprised in consciousness as sensation, perception, and idea. All these views are less than metaphysical idealism in the only technical sense that we can ascribe to the term. Hence, to put the matter shortly, idealism implies that the relation of subject to object is that of the essential starting-points of philosophy, and in its view of that relation it lays down the decisive principle that objects can exist only for a subject, and that the subjective realm within itself is the higher category, and as such must determine the process of philosophical thought.

3. Various developments of the idealistic principle. As thus understood, idealism is simply one of the essential starting-points of philosophical thought. But if it further development as a system it may assume a vast variety of forms. It really implies a method, not a school of opinions and beliefs with a definitely fixed result, or, at most, it involves such a result only in so far as it is opposed to materialism, according to which consciousness has its source in material reality, and arises from it in certain conditions, as was maintained by the ancient materialists and their successors, as well as by the naturalists and agnostics, who often refer to them; and, of course, it similarly opposes every kind of objectivism which would derive personal consciousness and its contents from some such supposed primordial datum as God, nature, the All, or cosmic law, as was done by Neo-Platonism and the ecclesiastical philosophy, by Spinoza and his modern followers. So far, it is true, idealism means something more than a mere method: it signifies a mode of thought whose subject-matter is fixed and defined from the standpoint of consciousness and the ego. Even so, however, the most varied lines of systematic development lie open to it.

a) Various attempts to reach trans-subjective reality from the idealistic standpoint. Thus we may, with Descartes and Malebranche, begin with the idea of God, as an other world than the experience of the objective world, and then from that position explain consciousness, or the ego. Or we may, with Locke, assert merely the probable existence of objective contents to the contents of consciousness, and upon that probability, whether subject-matter is fixed and defined from the standpoint of consciousness and the ego. With Berkeley, we may attribute our experience of phenomena, primary and most certain datum of experience, to the divine will, and thus attain to a theological theistic, or, with Hume, Comte, and the Pragmatists, we may hold the
relation of subject and object to be inexplicable and inscrutable, and so content ourselves with what can be based upon the laws of phenomena. Some, with Schelling and Hegel, derive from experience the identity of subject and object, and with their theory of consciousness a basis elucidate the being and evolution of all things. Others, again, with Leibniz, Herbert, and Lotze, derive from the facts of consciousness a pluralistic concept, be it corresponding these to y, while some, finally, with Schopenhauer, derive from the individual consciousness the theory that it subsists in the unconscious, from which subject and object severally arise, only to fall back again into the unconscious after their activity. This extraordinary variety in the systems evolved from the fundamental position of idealism. Some of these approximate to materialism, or else to objectivism; some do not pass beyond the subject; while some propound an objective reality corresponding to it. But in virtue of their common starting point they are all rigidly opposed to pure materialism or pure objectivism.

(b) Idealism combined with epistemological theories.—Further specialized forms of the idealistic theory present themselves, however, when this metaphysical starting-point is combined with concepts developed from the epistemological starting-point. Here we meet with the great main divisions of idealism related to the second source of philosophical reflection (as noted in § 2 above), viz., the rationalistic and a priori realistic idealism—a distinction which, as represented by the Greek Sophists and Sceptics on the one hand, and by Plato on the other, differentiates idealistic systems as between the present day.

1. Nominalistic idealism culminates in Berkeley's Phenomenalism, in Hume, in Pragmatism, in James's Voluntarism, and in the entire psychological school of modern times. It employs the a priori idealism, and affirms that not only the facts of mind but also the facts of nature are phenomena of consciousness. Here consciousness becomes simply the stage on which the facts of nature are exhibited; the movements and associations and dissociations which take place according to the laws of nature and the psychological laws of social life are the material of which our so-called knowledge—and, therefore, also our philosophy—is built. Here philosophy explains the genesis of the conceptual world as a process of moulding the contents of experience, of consciousness, and distinguishes itself from any trans-subjective world and those that pertain to the ego, and it ascribes to both groups of conceptions a power of continuous self-direction and of progressive self-adaptation to the ends of practical life. What these ends really are is a question that cannot be decided from the standpoint under consideration; it belongs to the ethico-theological series of problems (see (c) below). But, if we bring the modern doctrine of biological evolution within the epistemological circle of problems, then the theory of empirical idealism resolves itself into the doctrine of the continuous adjustments, invariances, and selections according to which the contents of consciousness group themselves conceptually with reference to the ideal ends realizing themselves therein. We have here, in fact, a psychological theory of the idealistic method and its pre-condition, but it entirely avoids the metaphysical endeavour to reach absolute reality, and abjures even from a metaphysical interpretation of its own starting-point. At the same time, however, it leads to the systems which it embraces an anti-materialistic bent that does justice to the mystery of existence and of spirit. The idea of the great mystery which Comte recognizes in his 'Idée de l'Humanité,' Spencer in his 'Unknown,' and Simmel in his hypothesis of a relativistic Pantheism unites with the idealistic starting-point.

ii. The idealism directed by an a priori and realist epistemology, i.e., Tionism in its various forms, proceeds in a directly opposite way. From the psychological data of consciousness and the psychologically explicable laws of association it distinguishes a specific inner capacity of forming conceptions. This capacity, derived from, anything else, but, on the contrary, is itself the necessary condition of all explanation and derivation. It is a spontaneous and creative faculty of spirit or reason, and is independent of the soul as such, of its contents and their interaction under the operation of psychological laws. This independence finds expression in the attributes 'a priori' and 'autonomous,' which imply that the faculty does not originate in experience, but that, on the other hand, experience is spiritually permeated and so rendered intelligible by it. Thus a priori idealism does not merely differentiate between the bare elements of phenomena and their associative combinations, but also distinguishes from the latter the conceptual faculty, which follows its own logical laws. As valid, self-consistent, and essentially knowledge results only from an elaboration of the data of consciousness in conformity with these laws, it is the conceptual faculty that transforms the chaos of mental phenomena into a reality systematized by means of concepts. True reality is generated only by a process of thought governed by autonomous a priori principles. Hence this type of idealism is also designated realism, and it is the role of the really real by means of concepts. Such an idealism, by reason of its epistemology, stands at the opposite pole from nominalist-empirical idealism. But in this very circumstance lies the peculiarity of the position, viz. (1) the dependence of all conceptual activity upon experience, and the observed variability of the views advanced—facts even in conflict with the authority and autonomy maintained by the theory; (2) the very idea of a reality which is attained by means of concepts—an idea which led Plato to hypostatize the concepts as absolute entities, and has led others to regard them as the Divine mind acts; (3) the question as to how far the entire manifold of consciousness can be rationalized by concepts, and whether the process does not leave a residue of elements that remain outside our philosophy; (4) the doubt which has re-asserted itself in fresh forms from Plato to Schelling and Schopenhauer; and, finally, (4) the difference between the purely theoretical concepts, on the one hand, and the practical ideals or values whose inherent a priori necessity coincided, in Plato's view, with the cognate necessity of theoretical knowledge, but whose genuinely practical and theoretically inexplicable character could not permanently remain unrecognized. Thus, while the subsuming of idealism under the a priori epistemology corresponds to a certain importance of knowledge and of the conception of truth—since, of course, every sceptical and relativistic theory must likewise find its warrant in autonomous and logical evidence—yet this idealism, in setting up a reality which is approximating to idealism, and which stands higher than the reality of immediate experience, involves all the difficulties of rationalism. The idealism which is interpreted on nominalistic-empirical principles, lies closer to mediocrity, and does more justice to the changes that occur in the separate sciences and their presuppositions, but precisely on that account it surrenders the autonomy of truth, and falls into scepticism and sophistic relativism.

(c) Idealism combined with teleological theories.—
Idealism assumes definite forms of yet another type, and encounters fresh problems, when it is brought into relation with the third main philosophical position (cf. § 2 above), i.e. that from which Hegel derived the anarchy of pluralism, monism, of change and immutability. In itself idealism is not exclusively bound up with either of the alternatives, but may take both directions. In its negative aspect it leads to the one as well as to the other. But, once it becomes involved in the two antitheses, it manifests a very different character in each.

i. Thus, when it proceeds from the individual consciousness, it encounters at the very outset the fact of a variety of consciousnesses. The joint action of these and the dialectic of their common discovery of the concepts are here held to be the necessary conditions of a kingdom of knowledge.

From this point, then, idealism becomes pluralistic; and, moreover, when the question is raised as to the possibility and probability of an extra-human consciousness, idealism must, on the higher plane, admit the existence of a plurality of intellectual realms, and, on the lower, must regard it as probable that the sub-human, and perhaps even the inorganic, world is endowed with a spiritual life. Where movement and reciprocal influence, consciousness—conceived as a subjective activity seeking to reduce its contents to clearness and order—contains also the impulse to strive and advance towards self-comprehension and organization. Then, as ethical and practical values are at length recognized in this striving and developing subjective principle, there arises the ideal of personality and of a kingdom of individual minds. This form of idealism finds typical representatives in Augustine, Nicolas Cusanus, and Leibniz. Further, this multitude of spirits must, of course, remain united in their common starting-point—in consciousness in general. But this in turn brings us naturally to an absolute relativism, as in Heraclitus; or to a pan-psychism, as in Averroes; or to that unreconciled opposition between the cosmic consciousness and finite personal spirits which is characteristic, above all, of European idealistic thought.

ii. At this point, however, we touch upon the other factor of the antithesis—that which presses towards monism and changelessness. The cosmological point of view confronts here with the casual finite consciousness at all, the latter being indeed simply its representative. The individual consciousness represents consciousness in general, inasmuch as it is a consciousness of the simplest metaphysical conditions. Here ‘being’ means being for a consciousness; esse est percipi. Then, as consciousness in its individual aspect cannot perform this function except on the absurd supposition of solipsism, and as, moreover, the individual consciousness has its genesis and its decay, its own ‘being’ can exist only for and in an absolute consciousness. In this way the individual person, like all else, becomes an element in the divine mind. Here then we find ourselves within the sphere of monism—the monism of consciousness.

If, however, we begin with the absolute consciousness, it is difficult to find a place for becoming and movement, as these can be predicted only of particular, finite, and relative things. Hence, either the absolute consciousness is completely determination, i.e. as a being who creates, inverts, and directs the movement of things, or else movement is altogether denied, and the finite consciousness becomes a more illusory abstraction, as the plural consciousness. With the surrender of plurality and movement, in fact, the ego and consciousness themselves disappear, and become the unconscious. From the mysticism of Brähmanism to Schopenhauer runs a quite intelligible line of development, which Western thought, under the influence of Christianity, has been able to avoid only by tracing the human personality in somatization, i.e. by stepping into the well-known antinomies in the idea of God.

We thus see that the bare adoption of metaphysical idealism does not lead to the one as well as to the other. But, once it becomes involved in the two antitheses, it manifests a very different character in each.

4. Transcendental idealism, which flows from the experience of consciousness, as from the source of the whole range of phenomena as the ideas of the penetrating power and the empirical-nominalistic idealism of Hume, as well as that of Berkeley—certainly no less empirical, but corrected and supplemented by a metaphysical theology. The characteristic of this idealism is its clearest expression in the distinction which Kant drew between his own views and the empirico-nominalistic idealism of Hume, and the dogmatic opposition between the metaphysical theology and the empirico-nominalistic idealism of Hume, as well as that of Berkeley—certainly no less empirical, but corrected and supplemented by a metaphysical theology. The characteristic of this idealism is its clearest expression in the distinction which Kant drew between his own views and the empirico-nominalistic idealism of Hume, as well as that of Berkeley—certainly no less empirical, but corrected and supplemented by a metaphysical theology. The characteristic of this idealism is its clearest expression in the distinction which Kant drew between his own views and the empirico-nominalistic idealism of Hume, as well as that of Berkeley—certainly no less empirical, but corrected and supplemented by a metaphysical theology. The characteristic of this idealism is its clearest expression in the distinction which Kant drew between his own views and the empirico-nominalistic idealism of Hume, as well as that of Berkeley—certainly no less empirical, but corrected and supplemented by a metaphysical theology. The characteristic of this idealism is its clearest expression in the distinction which Kant drew between his own views and the empirico-nominalistic idealism of Hume, as well as that of Berkeley—certainly no less empirical, but corrected and supplemented by a metaphysical theology.
victions by a practical postulate on the basis of the moral reason; and, finally, the reconciliation of the metaphysical postulate of moral freedom with the theoretical-natural law of an ordered totality of experience by the doctrine of the purely phenomenal character of the latter—these are the leading features of the Kantian idealism. It is, accordingly, a philosophical fabric sui generis, which, by its very nature, must come into existence at all until the several starting-points of philosophy had been adequately developed, and until, in particular, the idealistic principle had been fully wrought out. Still, it is, essentially idealism—idealism within the sphere of consciousness as embracing all experience, and in it the individual consciousness represents consciousness in general. But it does not sanction any advance beyond the idea of representation, or any reaching forth towards what is represented. The rational articulation and valuation of the contents of consciousness—that and that alone is its aim. How consciousness itself comes into being, how it is related to what transcends it, how the theory comes to embrace a plurality of consciousness and the possibility of their mutual intercourse—these are for it unanswerable questions. The metaphysical range of Kant's idealism does not, however, include the fundamental thesis of a system outside the limits of conscious experience.

The nature and deduction of the principles by means of which the contents of consciousness are reduced to order and valued need not concern us here. But it is necessary to point out that the Kantian system is also a form of personal idealism, i.e. that in its recognition of ethical ends and imperatives, and its corresponding conception of the All, it rests upon practical judgments and postulates which lie wholly outside its metaphysical idealism as such, and are admittedly drawn from interests of a non-logical character. Hence it is possible, by divesting the system of its practical aspect, to interpret it in a decidedly naturalistic way. In point of fact, however, Kant himself, by thus expanding his system, has burdened it with a dualism which brings in its train all the old antinomies and perplexities of philosophical thought.

Whatever significance is to be ascribed to the Kantian idealism, it at all events broke away from the practice—inherited from Greek philosophy—of all a priori theoretical and metaphysical with personal and ethical idealism, and of extending the consistency of the former to the latter. Theoretical procedure and practical procedure, logical and ethical, are in Kant's system, natural law and moral imperative, though both members of each pair have a common idealistic foundation, are rigorously differentiated by Kant. While necessity and validity are predicated of either side, yet they are not of the same type in both, and are in each case demonstrated on different grounds. The personal idealism of the ethical, religious, and aesthetic sphere must, accordingly, be clearly distinguished from the ethical idealism that ranks consciousness above all its phenomena, nor is it to be identified with the logical and theoretical articulation of these phenomena. Thus a fresh source of philosophical principles is required, not only in a philosophical, but in an ethical sense, whereas in the Kantian system the moral imperative adds to the logical, and logical, on the other hand, and a noumenal, intelligible, and personal, on the other, is obviously unsatisfactory, as human experience exhibits, and, for a true interpretation of demands, not expressed, even, by a special position, but the settlement, of the two aspects. This explains why Kant's subjective idealism of logically ordered experience and moral freedom soon fell back again into an objective idealism, i.e. a theory which derives reality from the absolute or divine consciousness.

5. German idealism. — The objective idealism evolved from the Kantian system is usually called 'German Idealism'—a term covering the movements which, in the first place, extended from Schopenhauer and Herbart, of the last of whom, again, such thinkers as Lotze, Fechner, and Windt, notwithstanding the independent character of their contributions, may be regarded as the legitimate successors. But this type of idealism has spread far beyond the confines of Germany. In France it is more or less independently represented by Cousin, Renouvier, and Maine de Biran; in Britain by Coleridge, T. H. Green, Hutchinson Stirling, the Cairds, and the Seths. It thus forms one of the outstanding phases of modern philosophy. It is impossible to deal here with the movement in detail. Suffice it to emphasize its most vital feature, viz., that in all cases its starting-point is the individual consciousness, and that, as this is treated as representing consciousness in general, it forms the bridge by which thought advances to the consciousness of the universal will—the internally organized process of the former, or the active movements of the latter, being then the source of the world of subjective consciousness, which, in turn, is the universal consciousness or universal will. Of the utmost importance in this connexion, accordingly, are the several interpretations of the idea of God which is disengaged by analysis from the subjective consciousness, as being, in fact, its necessary foundation and pre-condition. Thus we have theistic, pantheistic, or pessimistic interpretations, corresponding to the various leading conceptions of the subjective consciousness. This form of idealism, in reality, a revived Platonism or Neo-Platonism, except in so far as, on the lines of Descartes and Kant, the idealistic factor depends upon the principle of a philosophy of consciousness, and all laws and values are regarded as respectively but the processes and ends of the absolute consciousness which is deduced from that principle, whereas in the older systems their idealistic character rests, not upon any central element abstracted from consciousness, but upon the hypostatization of the general concept readily evolved from it. This expansion of the central idea of Kant—a position which was of set purpose narrowed by the judgment, nature, law, and moral imperative, and which all the antinomies and perplexities which in his conscious and studied agnosticism he had so ingeniously got rid of.

6. 19th cent. development. — The remarkable advances of physical science and the concrete study of sociological development which mark the 19th cent. brought about the collapse of this idealistic metaphysics in the grand style, and thus gave materialism once more pre-eminence. This is a counternutation of the law of physical and psychological phenomena; the mind has no creative power of its own, but has only a capacity of adaptation by means of which, in its differentiations and integrations...
tions, it may maintain and further the existence of human beings. To that existence itself no independent
spiritual content is ascribed; there is nothing which
embraces the occurring capacity for existence. Here the
mind is not derived from matter,—and so far an idealistic ele-
ment is retained,—but it is divested of all specific and
immanent content, it is elevated from the
surrounding world. Hence the relation
between subject and object, and thus also the
problem of idealism itself, together with all the
fundamental views which serve to determine its
degree, can now only be grounded and of
practical utility, be relegated to the sphere of
the unknowable. This positivism, it is true, was
challenged by a revival of the Kantian idealism—
in the form of Neo-Kantianism, in which, how-
ever, Kant's ethics, his doctrine of freedom, and
his philosophy of religion were for the most part
set aside. Strong opposition came also from the
nominalist-empirical idealism which, in the hands of
G. Simmel, produced a type of thought as
definitely idealistic as it was relativistic.

But the modern or German idealism, as a philos-
ophy based on consciousness, met with a very
serious and powerful criticism from the side of
modern psychology, with its experimental investiga-
tion of consciousness. This psychology
demolished the conception of the ego, the soul, and
the unity of consciousness, and thus made it
difficult to deal with and make use of the individual
consciousness as the representative of consciousness
in general. Still more effective were the investiga-
tions regarding the relation of supraliminal con-
sciousness to the subliminal or unconscious (or the
unconscious). Consciousness now became a mere
series of isolated movements associated by con-
tiguity—a mere fortuitous intensification of the
subconciousness. It is in the latter that the real
continuity of consciousness lies, and in it likewise
subsist the most important movements and forms,
of which only a few ever come into the light of
clear consciousness. This being so, supraliminal
consciousness cannot be regarded as the primordial
metaphysical datum, or as representative of the
universe, or of reality in general. It should be
remarked, however, that the subconsciouse, in
which Schopenhauer and E. W. Hartmann find the
principle of the cosmos, is itself no immediate
datum of thought—no ultimate reality of experi-
ence.

But, as a matter of fact, these psychological
theories of consciousness do not shift, and do not
subvert, the foundation of idealism. Even the
Kantian idealism—like the earlier Leibnizian
theory of petites perceptions—took as its basis an
unconscious or pre-conscious activity of reason,
and his entire system was based upon the develop-
ment of the occurrences due to that activity into the
consciousness of principles, and upon the self-
reflexion of reason which it rendered possible.
Hence we should probably distinguish between a
kritico-transcendental conception and the
psychological conception of consciousness. The
latter alone need be taken into account by the idealistic
psychology, and for that concept the distinction
between the psychologically subconscious and the
psychologically conscious fusion of subject and
object does not really matter; in fact, that fusion
and the preconception of the object over its con-
tents are thought of here as only relative, as more
or less complete. But, even if the foundation of
the philosophy of consciousness is thus maintained
and the same principle is therefore confronted with
new problems. Account must be
taken from the outset of the distinction between
the two grades of consciousness, and consciousness
in the ordinary sense must be regarded as in itself
inadequate, and as capable of being supplemented
by elements and ideas which emanate from the
subconscious. Above all, the higher concept,
which embraces both the consciously
subconsciousness, becomes something which lies
beyond the possibility of experience, and the true
conception of reality is detached from experience
and thought in quite different ways from Kant's
method in the doctrine of the antinomies. To
enable us to grasp that conception, in fact, we
must fall back upon an imaginative and poetic
intuition of the feeling of life and reality—a feeling
of the object of which cannot be known and is
experience or grounded in thought. Idealism thus
becomes intuitive, as in the most recent school,
viz. that of Bergson—a school whose influence is
steadily increasing—and the conclusions drawn
from that fundamental position confirm less and
less to the idea of a homogeneous and complete
system.

7. The significance of idealism for religion.

Having thus surveyed the development of the
idealistic conception of things, we are now in a
position to determine its significance for the veri-
ification and valuation of the constitutive ideas of
the Christian religion, however it must always bear in
mind that idealism is concerned with only one of the
fundamental problems of philosophy, and that, whatever its contributions
to religious thought may be, it does not thereby
solve the problems associated with the other main
starting-points of philosophical reflexion. Thus it
in no way furnishes a solution of the questions
arising from the antithesis of an empirical-relative
versus a rational-absolute theology, or from
that of pluralism versus monism, for these ques-
tions lie outside its range. Nor, again, does it
decide anything with reference to practical and
personal idealism, inasmuch as the question re-
garding the import of ideas and values is not solved
simply by ranking consciousness above all its con-
tents. What is of importance in personal idealism
is rather the question as to the practical ends
which we must recognize in the mind—ends that
always have a spontaneous character and are not
to be established by formal reasoning; here, in
point of fact, the decisive factor is the personal
individual will.

Still, even with due recognition of all these
reservations, idealism is of immense significance
for religion. It invalidates all materialism and
semi-materialism. It maintains that consciousness
cannot be derived from matter, but that matter
cannot be derived only for consciousness—
that its essence is perception. Nor does this imply that
matter is simply given in consciousness, for in that
case it would be of no consequence whether we
started from the one or from the other. But in the
fundamental relation between the two, according
to idealism, consciousness is the formative and
regulative principle—that which contains in itself
meaning and life, and is, therefore, pre-eminently
and intelligibly to itself. Idealism asserts the
mind's supremacy over the real. But the convic-
tion that mind cannot be explained by matter,
and that it is the formative principle of the real
a fundamental scientific postulate of religious life
and thought, and is recognized as such wherever
religious thought is consciously directed upon its
possibility and its rights. It is true that the
idealistic theory cannot in itself determine the
direction in which the mind's supremacy will assert
itself, or the ends and values which that supremacy
involves. Idealism regards the mind merely as a
formal principle, the materials of which are given
and the ends of which are revealed to the will in
the process of spiritual development. What par-
ticular ends the mind will choose are determined
IDENTITY

in part by the solutions of the other two groups of philosophical problems, and, above all, are drawn from the supreme convictions of the mind itself. No more than any other concept can identity itself develop into religion; it must ever be supplemented by independent elements of religious life, and from these receive a concrete determination. But in so far as mind and the spiritual idea are not to be reduced to the condition of religious belief, idealism is to that extent the utmost significance for religious life and thought.


IDENTITY. — x. General (logical Law of Identity).—Any discussion of the problems connected with Identity must necessarily begin by a definition of what is meant by Identity as a concept of pure logic, and what is the precise sense of the so-called Law of Identity. This is the more needful since Hegel at least presupposes the Law of Identity, and some of the most eminent of our modern philosophers, have, in consequence, been led to minimize the significance of the formula, though they have usually stopped short of actually denying it. There are several ways of defining sameness or identity as a notion in pure logic, but all of them are logically equivalent (on the meaning of 'equivalence' a few words will have to be said farther on). Thus, in a logica which, like that of Boole and Peano, is founded on the notions of class, of a member of a class, and the relations of inclusion in and exclusion from a class, we may conceivably begin by defining the identity of individuals, and proceed to extend the identity between classes as derivative; or we may first define the identity of class with class and then deduce an expression for individual identity. Taking the first course, we may say that if $x$ and $y$ are terms (i.e., determine individual objects of thought represented in language by singular names or denoting phrases), $x$ and $y$ are the same term when every assertion which is true of $x$ is also true of $y$, and every assertion which is false if made of $x$ is also false when made of $y$. Or, to put it in other language, if $x$ and $y$ are not to be the same, there must always be at least one assertion which is true of the one but false of the other. Now, this definition of identity will also hold good if $x$ and $y$ are not individuals but classes. For classes are identical only when they comprise precisely the same members, and in that case it is clear that whatever can be truly asserted of class $x$ and no else can, may be truly asserted of class $y$. But again, we may reach an equivalent result by first defining identity as a relation between classes; thus, the class $x$ is identical with the class $y$ when, and only when, for every member of $x$ is a member of $y$ and every member of $y$ a member of $x$. Bearing in mind that for every individual term there is at least one class of which the term in question is the only member (as, e.g., Thomas Hobbes' name of the class 'author of Leviathan,' 2 the only member of the class 'even prime number,' and so on), we get the result that,

if $x$ and $y$ are both classes of one member, the one member of $x$ is the same term as the one member of $y$. This obviously reduces to our previous formula for the identity of individuals. For, if $a$ is the same as $b$, and there is a proposition which is true of both $a$ and $b$ but not of $c$, such as 'the $x$ is $w$,' it must be true that ' $a$ is $w$,' but false that 'the $y$ is $w$,' contrary to our previous deduction from the condition of identity between the terms.

When we say of anything that it is 'the same' or is 'identical,' our statement is manifestly incomplete, and, as it stands, without significance, unless we say what it is the same as or identical with. It is thus a relation of some kind. Further, it is a symmetrical relation, i.e., it is its own converse, since, if $a$ is the same as $b$, $b$ is always the same as $a$. Also, the relation is transitive, i.e., it is always true that, if $a$ is the same as $b$ and $b$ the same as $c$, $a$ is the same as $c$. Again, identity, like self-love, self-support, suicide, is a self-relative, since everything is always 'the same as itself, or, to put it more technically, the same term which is antecedent, or first term, in the relation may always be present, or last term. It is this that is expressed in the abstract formula known as the Law of Identity, $a = a$ (for some remarks on the meaning of the symbol '=' see immediately below). It should be noted that the formula of itself does not state that the asserted identity excludes the co-existence of difference or variety, and that the attacks which have been directed against it on this ground thus arise from misapprehension of its precise purport.

Thus, if for $a$ we substitute 'the crosser of the Rubicon,' the formula in no way denies that the person who crossed the Rubicon is the same person who was killed by Brutus and Cassius; all that it denies is that the person who crossed the Rubicon can be identical with a person who never crossed the Rubicon, or who did not cross it in the circumstances described in the proposition. This consideration of itself largely invalidates the Hegelian attack on the principle. There is, however, a further peculiarity about the relation of identity which is not taken into account by the formula, but has now to be mentioned, and does afford more plausible grounds for raising metaphysical difficulties. Self-relatives in general are relations which may subsist between a term and itself but may also subsist between one term and another. Thus, a suicide is one who kills himself, but the relation of killer to killed may, and most often does, hold between distinct persons; a man may govern or love himself, but he may also love or govern other persons. But absolute self-sameness, or identity, can subsist only between a term and itself. If $a$ and $b$ are numerically distinct terms, then it is never absolutely true that $a$ and $b$ are identical—a point which is perhaps most clearly brought out when we consider such relations as those studied in pure mathematics, where, e.g., it is fundamental that a point or an integer is never identical with any point or integer which is not itself. And, as we shall see directly, the same consideration that a thing is never identical with anything but itself is really of no less moment in the study of human moral and mental nature.

Summing up, then, we may say that identity is a relation which is symmetrical, transitive, and self-relative, and that in its strictest logical sense it is the only relation which can exist only between a term and itself. We have now to mention the objections which have been urged against admitting the reality of such a relation. But per-
IDENTITY

haps it will be well first to say a word about one or two possible misapprehensions which arise from the ambiguity of the commonly adopted symbol = to denote relations.

It must be remembered that the symbols which represent relations and operations are, in the first instance, arbitrary. Such symbols as +, -, x, or = of themselves tell us nothing of the relations or operations for which they stand. The person who first introduces them is at liberty to put what sense he pleases upon them. He is only under obligation to make the symbol and its usage clear to those for whom it is intended to be used. It is perfectly clear and that the symbol = remains, so long as no other = in a given context, the same = as given in the first place. In the same way it is, so far as possible, clear that a certain relation or operation is denoted by the same symbol in one context as in another; i.e., it is clear that the symbol = is given the same precise sense every time it is used. This follows, further, that there is no objection to the employment of an already familiar symbol in an extended or otherwise new and novel context, provided two conditions are observed: the relation or operation for which the symbol is henceforth to stand must have certain formal logical characteristics in common with that for which it had been formerly used; the same symbol must not be used for relations and operations which have essentially different consequences.

Thus, in arithmetic, if the symbol = has first been defined for the domain of natural numbers and multiplication of one natural number by another has thus received an unambiguous sense, we have no right to use the same symbol = to denote an operation with rational fractions, or with 'abstract' or real numbers in general, without first fixing its sense by re-defining the symbol = for the new domain in which it is henceforth to be employed. It follows that, taken apart from its definition, a symbol of relation or operation is usually ambiguous, and some at least of the criticisms which have been passed on the formal expression of the Law of Identity in the stage of the acquisition of the symbol =. It has been said, in support of the view that the relation symbol in mathematics unless it relates two distinct terms that the whole point of such expressions as a = b + c, or (a-b) = c, would be destroyed if the sides of the equation were reduced to different elements. It must be replied that this is the first case, where we are dealing with a genuine 'equation.' the symbol = signifies logical identity (in other words, identity of magnitudes). The symbol = here stands for a number, as yet supposed to be unknown, but such that, when is added to itself, the result is equal to it. If we replace = by the only value which satisfies the equation, viz., 1, the statement becomes 1 = 1, which is a strict identity. Its meaning is that the self-same number which results from the operation of adding 7 to 3 is the number which results from adding 1 to x. The two operations are distinct; but, since each integer occurs only once in the series of natural numbers, the result of the operation is clear: no number than one of the two, (i.e., the result of the operation to which we are to speak. There is only one 10 in the whole universe of thought, and it is this unique object 10 about which we are making an assertion. If there could be two different numbers 10, one of which resulted from the addition of 1 to 9 and the other from the subtraction of 10 from 11, then arithmetic would be impossible. Thus, if we take 3 + 7 = 9 + 1 as a statement about the results of two different operations, we are asserting the identity of a term—10—with itself; if we take it, as we are also at liberty to do, as a statement about two operations of addition, the symbol = no longer signifies identity, but rather that the two operations (i.e., the operations of adding 1 to 9 and of adding 7 to 3) are not identical, but they yield a result which is identical. So in an algebraic formula, like a + b = b + a, which contains no variables, though it is often convenient to speak of the formula as an 'identity,' or to say that b and a are 'identically equal,' this is usually a phrase that is really stated is an equivalence. The meaning is not that the expression (b + a) by itself is the same as that of multiplying a by itself, b by itself, and 5, a, b by one another, and then adding the results, but that the two processes yield a final result which is the same.

It may still be urged that, at any rate when we make significant judgments of identity, there is always an assertion of difference included in our statement. For when we say 'the apple is the apple' of the view, hence criticized, that two terms are required for the relation of identity, see particularly Varisco, Conosci te Stesso, p. 147, note.) Thus, it may be said that, even in the 'identities' of which we have spoken, there is still our own admission of what we assert is that different operations determine one and the same result, and that, apart from the difference of the operations, it would not be possible to speak of identity of the results.

Who, for instance, would be the wiser for knowing that 10 = 16, or, to take Hegel's example, that 'a plant is a plant'? And yet it may even be urged, as by Bradley, that the so-called Law of Identity or the principle of judgment or proposition at all, since every significant proposition is a synthesis of different elements. Yet neither criticism seems to go to the root of the matter. It is not true to say that 10 = 10 (the symbol = being here taken as meaning 'is identical with') is an unmeaning or otiose assertion. For it means that the number 10 is unique in the series of natural numbers, e.g., in counting, when one has once passed 10 he will never come back to it; or, to use other words, that the series of integers is non-recurrent. If we do not usually think it necessary to mention this, it is for the simple reason, not because of its familiarity; in a logical study of the properties of number the peculiarity of the series of integers is an important one, and the proof of it a highly elaborate and complex affair. Hence it is not strictly true to say that, whenever we assert identity, we simultaneously assert or, at any rate, imply difference as well, though this is, no doubt, most commonly the case. And reductio will show that, where we assert 'identity in difference,' there is always an assertion of absolute self-sameness involved. Thus, if we say 'the wall-paper in Mr. X's study has exactly the same shade as that in Mr. Y's dining-room,' we do state, in fact, that the paper is on the same shades, but one. Or, if an actio-scope scene explains, 'That person is my long-lost son,' it is implied, of course, that the long-lost son has changed in many ways, but there is something of which absolute identity is asserted; he is numerically one and the same person. If personal identity were the fiction that Hume asserted it to be, such a statement as 'This is my long-lost son' would always be false. Hence, wherever a statement of identity in diversity is made, it will be found to include as part of its meaning an assertion of the form a = a. This is not to deny that physical things change or that organisms grow; it is merely to state that, unless the change or growth is a process within something permanently self-identical, the very statements 'This changes,' 'This grows,' cannot be true.

With respect to the statement that an expression of the form a = a, if it means what it says, is a genuine judgment, one may say that the matter is partly one of arbitrary definition. If, in Bradley's fashion, a judgment is defined in such a way as to make the presence of distinct terms part of the definition, then, of course, with such a definition, no affirmation in which there is only one term will be a judgment according to this definition. But this obvious consideration does not detract from the question whether there may not be true and significant statements which fall outside the limits of this definition. Thus 10 = 10, according to what has just been maintained, is significant and true, since it disposes of the conceivably possible view that the number-series may be recurrent; but it would not be a judgment according to Bradley's definition. And certainly the abstract schema of all such propositions, the formula a = a, cannot be an actual judgment, for the simple reason that a has here no determinate signification, but is merely a blank form standing equally well for any actual term, but not itself a term at all. And, where there is not even one term, there clearly can be no judgment. But this criticism has of itself no more direct bearing on the Law of Identity than upon any other pure logical schema of possible judgments, such as, e.g., 'All a's are a's.' As the present writer understands it, none of the so-called formal laws of thought claims to be more than a rule or formula according to which true propositions can be made, and in violation of which the whole system of propositions can be made. The real function of the Law of Identity is thus simply to assert that every object of thought has a definite character. Simi-
identity of the stockings is not preserved unless at least some part of the material has remained all through the processes of mending; but we have no fixed standard by which we can determine whether the material must be preserved, and thus the question admits of no determinate answer. What we may learn from it is that in any concrete case the question of identity cannot be answered unless the exact respect in which the identity is sought. It is possible to have, for instance, absolute identity of material constituent without identically of formal structure, or, again, complete identity of formal structure and whatever it may be, shall possess a definite and recognizable individuality. Since each of the three ‘laws’ is required to guarantee this result, it seems impossible either to deny the logical value of the Law of Identity, or, in Hegelian fashion, to maintain that an actual thing is only identical with itself because it is also different from itself, and vice versa. Indeed, we have seen that, in the case of such objects as the natural numbers, there seems to be a self-identity which excludes all differences whatsoever. To revert to our example, 9 + 1 = 10 = 8 + 7, there is undoubtedly a difference between 9 + 1 and 3 + 7, but it is a difference not in the result of the operations, the numbers 9 and 10, but in the number 9 which is obtained. What is identical here, the result, has no element of difference within it; and what is different, the two operations, is not identical, but merely equivalent. So, when we say that two different men, A and B, see the same sun, the whole situation exhibits identity in difference; but the identity belongs to one thing, the object seen, and is absolute down to the utmost particular; the difference to some other particular by which the perception of the object is effected in the case of A and of B respectively. So more generally, if it is said of A and B that they are ‘the same and not the same,’ meaning, e.g., that their formal structure is the same but their material different, it is clear that identity is asserted about one constituent element of A and B, and difference about quite other constituent elements. The common form of formal structure, e.g., in respect of which A and B are pronounced the same, is strictly and numerically one and the same with itself, and it is precisely this that is expressed in the affirmative part of the statement.

2. Application.—It is no part of the business of logic to formulate criteria of identity, or to say when any particular assertion of identity is correct. Still it may well fall within the logician’s province to utter some warning against one or two popular fallacies, which might, if unnoticed, present the recognition of identity where it exists. The chief of these prejudices is perhaps the invertebrate tendency to assume that identity, wherever it is asserted, means the presence of an identical material constituent or constituents in a complex. This, of course, need not be the case: the point of identity in a given case may lie entirely in the formal structure of the complex, as when a melody is said to be the same, though it has been transposed into a different key. Or we may mean to assert identity of formal structure together with identity of matter, but it is very uncertain whether the pair of stockings which had been darned so often that no part of the original silk remained were still the same or a new pair. The point is that, in a case like this, we must be careful to assert something more than the formal or structural identity of the pair of stockings; we feel that the identity of the stockings is not preserved unless at least some part of the material has remained all through the processes of mending; but we have no fixed standard by which we can determine whether the material must be preserved, and thus the question admits of no determinate answer. What we may learn from it is that in any concrete case the question of identity cannot be answered unless the exact respect in which the identity is sought. It is possible to have, for instance, absolute identity of material constituent without identically of formal structure, or, again, complete identity of formal structure and whatever it may be, shall possess a definite and recognizable individuality. Since each of the three ‘laws’ is required to guarantee this result, it seems impossible either to deny the logical value of the Law of Identity, or, in Hegelian fashion, to maintain that an actual thing is only identical with itself because it is also different from itself, and vice versa. Indeed, we have seen that, in the case of such objects as the natural numbers, there seems to be a self-identity which excludes all differences whatsoever. To revert to our example, 9 + 1 = 10 = 8 + 7, there is undoubtedly a difference between 9 + 1 and 3 + 7, but it is a difference not in the result of the operations, the numbers 9 and 10, but in the number 9 which is obtained. What is identical here, the result, has no element of difference within it; and what is different, the two operations, is not identical, but merely equivalent. So, when we say that two different men, A and B, see the same sun, the whole situation exhibits identity in difference; but the identity belongs to one thing, the object seen, and is absolute down to the utmost particular; the difference to some other particular by which the perception of the object is effected in the case of A and of B respectively. So more generally, if it is said of A and B that they are ‘the same and not the same,’ meaning, e.g., that their formal structure is the same but their material different, it is clear that identity is asserted about one constituent element of A and B, and difference about quite other constituent elements. The common form of formal structure, e.g., in respect of which A and B are pronounced the same, is strictly and numerically one and the same with itself, and it is precisely this that is expressed in the affirmative part of the statement.

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always individual differences; no one oak is a mere replica of any other, and no mere general formula applicable to all oaks alike is an exhaustive statement of the living law of development or 'form' of this special oak). From this it follows that any concept presupposed in such a formal identity, it seems to follow at once that identity would be destroyed if there could be an instantaneous change of all the material constituents of the organism. Wherever there would be no sense in speaking of a structure in which all the material constituents were simultaneously replaced as a growth or development. It would be in the strictest sense a new creation. Finally, a word or two may be said about personal identity. Does it reside solely in the soul or mind, or does it involve identity of the physical organism? In actual practice, of course, life does not present us with cases in which personal identity is found apart from such an identity of the organism as has just been spoken of. But we can at least imagine such a possibility.

Suppose, for example, that the Pythagorean doctrines were true, and that the soul of a man could become associated with the body of a parrot. If it were possible for the supposed parrot to convince us that it retained the psychical character which we have already known as that of a friend, it is difficult to see how we could refuse to believe that we were dealing, not indeed with a bird, but with a human being. We should, e.g., be morally bound to treat the parrot, not as a mere parrot, but as having the same moral claims and rights as our friend. And we should accordingly regard the belief in personal immortality as capable of refutation by the mere consideration that there can be no identity of organism between an embodied and a disembodied spirit.

And, again, though many theologians would maintain that complete immortality involves a "resurrection of the body," it is hard to see in what sense of the term are we to understand that the 'glorified' body is the same organism as the 'corporeal' body. Personal identity would thus seem to be essentially psychical and, in its concept (whatever the full concrete facts may be), independent of bodily identity. Once more, as in the case of the organism, it is important to understand that personal identity is, primarily, identity of form. It does not require the permanent and unchanged persistence of any special material content, such as a group of sensations or thoughts or feelings, throughout the course of personal existence. It is not more required, in order that a man may be the same person at the present as at any time, than that some mental 'contents' should have persisted unchanged, during the twenty years, than the same-ness of his body requires that some of its particles should still be the same as twenty years ago.

What is required is the preservation of the continuity of changes in mental and moral character should be linked together as a continuous development according to a law of growth which in its concrete fullness is characteristic of the person in question and of no other being in the universe. A man's present experience is his experience, because it fits on to his past experiences as it does not fit on to any other series of individual experiences. It is thus an abuse of language, which may easily lead to the gravest confusion of thought, to speak of personal identity as involving anything in the nature of an unchanging psychical 'substratum.'

The doctrine which attempts to express the difficulties raised by Hume about personal identity, his difficulty is real only if we assume that personal identity means the permanent persistence of some internal mental 'contents' in a well-defined group of states. If this is conceded, it is, of course, easy to show that we have no evidence for the existence of any such permanent 'impressions' or 'ideas.' Even Bradley's suggestion that the 'grounding' core of consciousness is something in which it is very hard to believe. The difficulty vanishes when it is seen that personal identity is primarily identity of form, not of content or matter. The same mistaken demand for identity of content as a basis of personal identity seems to lie at the bottom of the contemporary tendency to exalt the "subliminal" self into all psychological difficulties. It is, of course, a fact capable of establishment by careful observation, even if it were not already presupposed in the conception of the mind as a thing that grows and changes, that mental 'states' do not arise and vanish instantaneously; they have a period of 'marginal' existence which may exist both before and after their occupation of the 'centre' of attentional consciousness. But the doctrine of the 'subliminal' self extends this conception of the 'margin' surrounding the 'focus' of consciousness beyond the limits within which its validity can be submitted to experimental tests. The 'subliminal' is thought of as a region in which mental contents of all kinds still persist as actual, though unconscious, when they have disappeared from even the 'margin' of consciousness, and from which they can be brought again in the processes of recall. As a symbol for the truth that the actual condition of consciousness may be largely determined by experiences which are no longer present to consciousness, there is no difficulty of any kind. But when the attempt is made to regard the symbol as an explanation—for instance, to explain recollection by the supposed persistence of a percept or idea 'below the threshold,' or to convert a mental tendency into an actual conjunction of 'subliminal' states—and, most of all, when personal identity is supposed to rest upon such an actually existing body of 'subliminal' mental contents, it should be clear that any attempt to deal with the Humean fallacy in a new dress. An identity which is really one of form and law is being illegitimately converted into one of material constituents. If we are right in holding that personal identity requires no notion of an unchanging 'substrate,' the theories which may be formed of the character of the supposed 'subliminal' self will have no bearing upon the problem of identity. In fact, the very problem to be solved, in what the identity of a person consists, obviously breaks out again when we ask what is meant by the unity and self-identity of the supposed 'subliminal' personality itself.

Without introducing any reference to the 'subliminal,' we may simply state the facts of which it appears to give a mythological account thus. Since personal identity would appear to depend on the unique linking up of past with present mental states in virtue of the law of mental development, it seems to involve as a consequence at least the possibility of a recall in memory of whatever experiences have belonged to a self. That we in all probability forget most of our experiences so completely that they are never recalled, at least in the life that we know, is no objection to such a view. For it may well be that they are not recalled simply because further experience does not provide us with the appropriate cues. From abnormal cases, such as those of persons who have survived the very near approach of death and have recorded their experiences, it would seem unsafe to extend any experience that it has certainly passed beyond all possibility of recollection. On the other hand, it is hard to see how the kind of continuity in mental development which is implied in this meaning in speaking of certain past experiences as mine, and not those of another person, could be preserved if all possibility of their actual recovery were precluded. If the experiences would not be 'linked up' with any personality at all, and, if they could be supposed to exist, would seem to have become ownerless. But an owner.
IDENTITY (Buddhist).

IDENTITY (Buddhist).—I. We find the notion of identity principally in material objects which preserve the same aspect for a long time, and which may be moved in space without change of form. The Buddhists have carried the doctrine of non-identity so far that they have come to deny movement. According to them, when a body seems to move, it is really being continually renewed, and is, so to speak, reborn of itself—reborn each moment in a different spot. Such is the opinion of the orthodox (Skt. Abhidharmaka). The Vaisāpastriyas, who are heretics, believe that a gesture is a movement, whereas, according to the orthodox opinion, gesture is but a new disposition of a body, which is the same as it was before. Yet, like all Buddhists, the Vaisāpastriyas admit begetting their faith on Scripture and experience—that a flame is always being renewed, and that it never reaches the same moment identical with itself. The flame of the last and third watch of the night is the continuation of the flame in the first watch; these two flames form a series (suntati); the first is the cause (hetu) of the second, for they have both the same aspect; the wick and the flame are not causes, but only coefficients (pratyayanī). This series may be developed in space while it lasts: when there is a prairie fire, the flame of the

Northern extremity of the prairie stands in the same relation to the flame of the Southern extremity as the bird arriving in the South to the bird which has come from the North. But we may follow the problem still more closely. It may quite well be the case that flame, sound, and thought are essentially 'momentary,' 'persisting from moment to moment,' and yet that certain objects and the events constituting all objects remain identical. Certain things remain in existence as long as there is no cause to destroy them.

If things (sunnatayatā) are momentary, then they perish of themselves, without any cause. It is denied that the flame dies because it is blown out, or that sound dies because a hand is laid on the bell. The cause which is in opposition to the existence of the flame does not destroy the flame; for how can we destroy what exists, or how can we destroy what does not exist? This prevents the new flame from springing up to replace the present one, it interrupts the series of the flame by paralyzing the forces which made it last. From all existence, it is the same with wood.

Are we to think that wood perishes by contact with flame? Yes, for we no longer see wood, because the condition of the new flame is reasoning is worth the evidence of our senses. No. It is a matter of reasoning: for even if we no longer see the wood, that may be the outcome of the first flame. What it has ceased to be, it has ceased to be something new. The non-existence of the wood, which you see, is caused by the fire, and is not due to the new flame; the wood and the fire do not coexist. They are two distinct entities, and fire and wood cannot be caused to be the same thing.

If things perish without cause, from their very nature—as objects thrown into the air fall—they must perish in the very moment of birth, and they cannot exist beyond the moment in which they actually receive being; they perish in the spot where they are born, and they cannot pass from one place to another.

If destruction, being without cause, does not take place at the very birth of the thing, it will not take place later, for the very thing remains what it is. But, one may say, the thing changes into ripe fruit, it grows elder. What grows older and what changes is a series, for the notion of change is by its very nature contradictory: 'That the same thing should become other than it is, is absurd; that the thing should remain the same, and its characters become different, is still more absurd.'

There is much discussion over the example of water which disappears by evaporation. The fire prevents the atoms of water, which disappear every moment, from procuring new atoms. Thus the mass of water is reduced more and more, until it entirely disappears, and finally does not exist in its series, or in its being.

2. The point of view of the Digambara school (6th cent.) is too well known to require more than brief mention here. By existence is meant the capacity for producing an effect (arthakriya-kriya). Now, a permanent thing is inactive. Does it possess, at the very moment when it is accomplishing its present act, the power to accomplish its past and future acts? If so, then it will certainly accomplish them at once, for it is not usual for anything capable of an act should postpone it. If the old school believes that things are eternal, 'fragile'; but it does not say that they are all Arjuna, momentary, 'instantaneous.' Buddha says: 'It is evident that this body lasts one year; . . . a hundred years, or even more. But that which is called mind, intellect, consciousness, keeps up an incessant round by daily production, and is as one thing and springing up as another' (Samyutta, II, 99).

Sunnatayatā—what is composed, composed. The sanskrit alone is not a name.


not, it will never accomplish them, just as a stone, which is at the present moment incapable of producing a bud, will never produce one. It may be said that the permanent thing produces such and such an effect by reason of the co-operation of additional factors. If these factors remain ex-
tended, it is they that are active. If they give some new capacity to the permanent thing, then our point is proved: the primitive being, who had this capacity, has perished; a new being has been born who possesses this capacity. It is very difficult to attribute to a non-mortal thing, to a thing which is permanent and identical with itself, a successive activity. That which produces no effect—space or time—is not a thing, since it is incapable of action or reaction, and incapable of being caused.

3. If we consider in a series (samsatā) two moments which are very close, the one 'cause' and the other 'effect', we shall have no difficulty in understanding ourselves that they are neither identical nor different. The philosophy of Nagāra-
juana (1st cent. A.D. [1]), arguing from the fact that the cause has no effects, that the relations of cause and effect are 'inexpressible', grants the primacy in fact of the relative character of the idea of causality; there is, in absolute truth, no cause and effect. A more moderate or less critic-
ical philosophy admits a certain identity in the series. Every atom of water, according to it, is finiteness; every atom of fire, heat.

With regard to the most interesting of all series, the mental or intellectual series which constitutes our pseudo-individuality, our substantial and permanent personality, the Mēlindaṇājī remarks that the murderer deserves to be punished, although he is, at the time of punishment, no longer the same being who committed the crime; just as the married woman belongs to the man to whom she has been promised as a little girl. Thus the series which constitutes our soul is divided into an infinite number of existences (nākṣatras, jām-
man), each one of which is prepared to make retribution for a certain lot of actions (see act),

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Buddhist).

In each of these existences the soul really remains identical with itself: its acts, with the exception of the external acts, will not be required till a future existence. There is no reason for surprise over the fact that it makes retribution (siṃha), for its past acts, or that it is disposed either to good or to evil by reason of the 'having' (nāgara) of its past acts, although there is nothing per-
manent in itself. It is a parallel with the flower which receives the counter-flower from the sub-
stances on which the seed has fallen.

The Saṃhatikas believe that acts bring about a certain modification in the series, i.e. in the soul—a spiritual modification, if we may call it so, from which retribution springs. The school of Abhidharma believes that the act creates a subtle sensitivity (nayavāpa), which develops in an uninter-
rupted series, forming part of the series of the human beings, just as the series of thoughts or the series of grown elements does. So the past is perpetuated in the future; and the being, although developing, yet remains to a certain extent similar to itself.

1. H. Taine: De l'Existence, Paris, 1879, p. 9; "There is nothing real in the ego, except the train of his events."

2. Mēlinda, ii, i, ed. V. Trinchieri, Lond., and Edinburgh, 1880, p. 244. Davids: "Questions of King Milinda, in SEB. xv. (1905) 63: 'The king said: 'He who is born, Nagasena, does he remain the same? Is the son his own? of the same source? Of the same body? Give me an illustration.' 'Now what do you think, O king? You were once a baby, a tender thing, a little thing. In that state you used to ask things to be taken back. Was that the same state as you are now growing up? No. That child was one, I am another. "If you are father also, neither father nor mother, neither teacher."


IDleness.—The essential idea of the word 'idle' seems to be empty or unoccupied. This idea may be applied vaguely to what is called an innumerable, trivial, useless, fruitless. More definitely it may refer to time that is not filled with occupations. In English the latter is the more prominent meaning; in the German eitel, the former. Probably the German meaning refers to the original meaning of the word, and the prominent English meaning is derivative; but it is this meaning that gives definite import to idleness as descriptive of a condition in the moral life of men.

In this sense idleness presents an aspect that is not necessarily unfavourable, but is at times even favourable, to morality and happiness. It offers an agreeable relief from the incessant and occasional attendant on nearly all the occupations of life. This does not mean that W. Morris speaks of himself in The Earthly Paradise as 'the idle singer of an empty day,' and that Johnson named one of his well-known series of papers The Idle. But its higher popular idleness is commonly denoted by 'leisure'; it means such relief from the occupations that are necessary for physical existence as leaves time and energy for the higher interests of life. In a practical shape this idea of idleness has found embodiment in the holidays or festivals of all races. Of those the highest type is the Hebrew Sabbath. But the Greek mind embodied the idea of the Sabbath in its own way. The name for an institution designed to cultivate the higher life—

the name from which our 'school' is derived—is the common Greek word for 'leisure,' xólas. In his blunter fashion the Roman called a school ludus, 'play' or 'sport.' Both of the great races of the ancient pagan world thus saw, like the Hebrews, that the culture of a higher life becomes possible only when men have secured a certain relaxation from the serious labour for physical existence—such relaxation as appears comparatively like playful exercise. As Gray puts it, life must 'leave us leisure to be good' (Hymn to Adver-
sity, 89).

But this is not the most prominent feature in the moral aspect of idleness. The truth is that in this higher aspect idleness is conceived as idleness only in a relative sense of the term. The idle man enjoys relief from one class of occupations only that he may be free to occupy himself with others.

1. How various his employments when he is not so busy!—so busy?

2. What a busy world an idle one! (Cowper, Task, III. 262-264).

Accordingly idleness, as such, is never viewed by the moralist in a favourable light. Even Thomas, though the praise of industry in his second canto is a very palpable failure to neutralize the drowsy spell of the first, has yet to describe idleness as 'a most enchanting wizard, ... than whom a secret more full is nowhere found!' (canto i. 2). The ethical literature of the world is therefore full of warnings against the evils to which moral character is exposed by a life of idleness. The moral character of the moral life, that of personal character and that of social relations.

1. Personal character is injured in various ways by an idle life.—(1) Even if morality be interpreted in the spirit of a moral code, the following of no worth or aim beyond personal pleasure, it is clear that this aim itself is defeated by idleness. What-
ever theory of pleasure and pain may be adopted, it is self-evident that they are but emotional products of the activities that make up life. Pleasure, therefore, can be obtained only by a sufficient degree of occupation to counteract the fatigue of work. If the interest of life is not sustained by adequate employment, there is apt to grow up an emotional desire for life-lessness—sloth or idleness—which may become so intolerable as to drive its victim, if not to suicide, at least into some escape from idleness by means of laborious sports or feverish excitements like gambling.

(2) But not only is activity necessary to enjoyment; it is necessary also to maintain our energies in vigour. Bodily organs become atrophied from lack of exercise, and all the powers of life become encrusted if not constantly employed. Consequently a general featability of character is the inevitable result of idleness.

(3) Probably, however, the malign aspect of idleness, which is mainly emphasized by the moralists, is that it leads to the unoccupied mind open to any seductive influences of evil. We have seen that sheer idleness becomes intolerable by eliminating all interest from life, leaving nothing to strive for, and so worth living for in some direction becomes irresistible; and, if it is not found in useful occupations, it will be sought in occupations that are frivolous, if not positively pernicious. This is such an obvious teaching of common experience that it has found expression in many a familiar proverb, as well as in the homely lessons of popular moral and religious literature.

The larger aspect of idleness, as of ethical problems in general, is that which bears upon social relations. By its very nature idleness connects itself with the economics of society, and it draws its significance for social morality from a familiar commonplace of economical science with regard to the production of wealth. All those commodities—the necessaries and comforts and luxuries of life—which constitute wealth are producible only by labour expended on raw material furnished by nature. Every human being, therefore, who lives in unproductive idleness, who is merely a consumer without being a producer of wealth, requires others to work and to suffer in his subsistence. But this also for himself. This fact forms the foundation of that sturdy moral sentiment to which St. Paul gives expression, that, if a man will not work, he has no right to the means of subsistence (2 Th 3:9). This principle is a peculiar feature in the moral ideal of the Hebrews. They stand almost alone among the nations of the ancient world in their appreciation of the moral value of industrial labour. On this subject there is nothing in all literature more noble than the utterances of some of their Rabbis (some are quoted in E. Deutsch's essay on the Talmud, published in the volume of his Literary Remains, London, 1874, p. 9).

The sentiment with regard to industrial labour took a very different course. The ideal of uncivilized tribes is well known. It is often illustrated by Herodotus's description of the savage life, which is accounted to be the most honourable thing, and to be a tiller of the ground the most dishonourable. To live by war and plunder is of all things the most glorious.' This ideal was undeniably confirmed by slavery. The institution of slavery is generally regarded as indicating an advance upon a more savage practice, by which captives in war are ruthlessly slaughtered, if not eaten, to gratify hunger, or revenge, or some horrid superstition. Instead of this, captives came to be adopted by their victors, and forced to undertake those peaceful, steady labours which are out of harmony with the bodily and mental habits of a warlike race. The result was that such labours came to be viewed as appropriate occupations only for persons of an inferior rank in society. As slavery was universal in all the later and higher civilizations, the prejudice against industrial labour became deeply engrained in the moral sentiment of the ruling classes everywhere. Cf. M. H. Lescot, 'Rationalism', London, 1877, ch. vi. ad init.; see also his Hist. of European Morals, 2nd ed. 1869, i. 277; the fullest exposition of the varied influence of slavery upon the free classes will be found in H. Wallon, Hist. de la salavage dans l'antiquité, Paris, 1876, especially bk. ii. ch. xii., and bk. i. ch. ix.

The great pagan races of the ancient world, in general regarded most forms of industrial labour as incompatible with the highest morality, and more particularly with the moral character of a free citizen. It is not indeed to be understood that the great States encouraged idleness, and in some the law required every citizen to show that he had some honest means of living, and failure to do so was punishable by death (Herod. ii. 177). According to Herodotus, this law was imposed upon Athens by Solon; but, according to Polybius (Hist. of Greece, London, 1846–56, ch. xi.) rightly judges this to be improbable, it may be taken as implying that the great reformer did provide some measure to protect the State against idle vagrants. Herodotus, however, himself indicates the sweeping qualifications by which such condemnations of idleness are to be interpreted. For he takes care to inform us that, among the nations with whom his researches had made him acquainted, barbarian as well as Greek, the prejudice against trades (travas) was almost universal, those persons being held in highest rank (perasati) who kept themselves aloof from such occupations, and especially those who devoted themselves entirely to war (ii. 166, 167). The truth is that the ancient States were in their whole sentiment military, not industrial, societies. The strength of their prejudice against trade, as Herodotus observes (loc. cit.), went at times so far as to prohibit their citizens from engaging in trade; i.e. tradesmen were not allowed the full rank and rights of freemen. This remarkable prohibition is taken by Montesquieu (Cours de loi, Genève, 1748, iv. 7) to illustrate the prevalent conviction of ancient legislators, that the trading spirit is incompatible with the moral character necessary for civil freedom. It was for this reason that philosophers sometimes justified the institution of slavery as being the only means by which industrial labour could be carried on in a free State. It is, moreover, significant that the moral treatises of ancient paganism, being designed to exculpate the moral life of freemen, not only ignore the industrial virtues, but, when they do touch upon trade, are in general opposed to the recognition of it as a legitimate sphere of life for the common man. The only great teacher among the Greeks who had surmounted this prejudice was Socrates (Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, ii. 7, 8, iii. 9); and his wholesome teaching on the subject throws a light, which has been accounted to be the most honourable thing, and to be a tiller of the ground the most dishonourable. To live by war and plunder is of all things the most glorious. This ideal was undeniably confirmed by slavery.
While holding that the best democracy is that of an agricultural country, and that of a pastoral, he declares democratic government by a town population to be far inferior, because 'there is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics, or traders, or labourers' (Pol. ii. 69). The fact that the ascendency of Greek philosophy carry the same sentiment to an extreme. Two extraordinary illustrations are furnished in Plutarch's Pericles and Lucian's Domitian of the decline of the arts of sculpture, even in the hands of Phidias and Praxiteles, as merely a manual occupation. In each employment, says Plutarch, op. cit., ad init., 'though we are charmed with the work, we often despise the workman, as we are pleased with perfumes and purple, while dyers and perfumers appear to us in the light of mean mechanics.' It thus appears that the prejudice against manual labour continued down to the beginning of the Roman Empire. Cicero, in fact, during the last days of the Republic, had struck the keynote of Roman sentiment on the subject. After dismissing need of the kind of industry, except agriculture, as 'sordid,' he turns to commerce; and he utters the length he is willing to go is a grudging admission that, if it is conducted on a large scale — if it is 'magnum et copioso, multos undeque apportant, multumque sine vanitate, non sine imparitate' — then it is not to be severely condemned 'non est admodum vituperanda' (de Offic. ii. 42 (151)). Such a state of sentiment accounts for the vast number of Roman citizens who were content to live the parasitical life of clients, or even to accept a daily dole of bread from the Government rather than take up any industrial occupation. Even the learned professional, alike in the law, suffered from the same degradation from the same cause, and were left to men of lower rank, mostly slaves or freedmen (Cicero, loc. cit.). Apparently it was this cause also that prevented a freeman or any of his family from cultivating music professionally. In this connection Aristotle's discussion on the place of music in education is curious. While recommending that the young should be trained in music, he insists that the practice of it should be abandoned in mature years, and must never be undertaken for gain. 'Professional performers,' he says, 'we call vulgar (basarenum), and no freeman would play or sing unless for exercise or making fun' (Polities, viii. 5). It is evidently owing to the same sentiment that Juvenal is shocked at a man of consular rank driving his own chariot. The satirist finds in the incident a proof of the degrading innovations that were invading society, and he cannot palliate the degradation even on the ground of its having occurred by night, for still 'the moon and the stars were witnesses' — sed luna vident, sed sidera testes | Intendunt octolcs (Sat. viii. 144-182).

It is evident, therefore, that, when Christianity began to spread over the pagan Empire, it had to encounter a deeply-rooted prejudice that encouraged idleness so far as most forms of industrial labour are concerned. It is true that Christianity brought with it the more wholesome sentiment of the Hebraic tradition, which is always in the young Christian community industrial labour was elevated to the loftiest dignity by the example of the Master (Mk 6:3). And it is true still further that it would be difficult to overestimate the far-reaching influence of industrial life; in fact this is the slave took equal rank with his own in relation to their common Master (1Co 3:9, Col 3:24). But the conversion of the Empire did not mean that pagan sentiments were dashed out altogether. On the contrary, new tendencies growing up in Christendom itself created some additional forces hostile to the industrial life of the world. One of these was the happy prominence given in the Christian ideal to the gentler virtues, and especially to charity. There is evidence, indeed, that at first careful precautions were taken to avoid the abuse of this expansion of moral and religious life. The best proof of this is the fact that some of the official titles in the Church seem to have been adopted originally to designate those officers who were appointed to administer the Church's charitable funds (O. Ullhorn, Chr. Charities in the 4th Century, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1883, bk. ii. ch. iv.; E. Hatch, The Organization of the Early Chr. Churches, London, 1881, especially Lec. ii.). But, notwithstanding all precautions, there is ample evidence to show that unfortunately the charity of the Church was often misdirected to the encouragement of idle beggary (Ullhorn, op. cit. bk. ii. ch. v.; a glimpse of this abuse is afforded by Lucian's de Morte Pergr., even if it be but a fictitious story of contemporary life). This unfortunate effect was aggravated by the development of the simple conception of almsgiving as a sacrifice into the theological dogma of the sacrifice of the pagans against labour was carried over into the aristocracies of medieval Europe. In fact, it was apparently intensified in the transmission. In many countries a nobleman or gentleman lost all the privileges of his rank by engaging in trade (H. Hallam, Middle Ages, London, 1846-48, i. 191).

It will thus be seen that practically through all the ages and nearly all the race has been an ideal of social rank strongly hostile to industrial activity, strongly favourable to industrial idleness. This inheritance has come down to the modern world, and infects even its most advanced industrial communities. It is still an object of ambition among many of the most energetic industrial workers to attain rank in the leisure class of their community; and all the usages of such a class are based on the principle of avoiding everything that has the appearance of industrial labour — the principle of flaunting conspicuously the fact that they are living in unproductive idleness (T. Vehlen, The Theory of the New York, 1888; cf., by way of antithesis, his The Theory of Business Enterprise, do. 1904). There is obviously but one cure for this condition of things; and that is a revolution in the ideal of social rank, such as was foreshadowed in the memorable address: 'Ye know that in other communities the rulers are those who lord it over them, and the nobles who exercise authority. Not so shall it be among you; but whoever will become a noble among you shall be a servant, and whoever will be your prince shall be the slave of all. For the Son of Man also came not to be served, but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many' (Mk 10:42-45).

In the love of idleness extremes meet. Besides the idle rich who live upon accumulated wealth, there is in every community a vast horde of idlers who have no such habits render steady labour so irksome that they prefer subsistence by beggary or theft. Not only is this class an object of serious concern to moral and religious reformers, but its maintenance and its control impose an immense burden on the working labourers of the world as to form a perplexing problem for the statesman. 

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated in the works referred to above. 

J. CLARK MURRAY.

IDOLATRY.—See IMAGES AND IDOLS.
IGNORANCE.—Ignorance has a bearing on the ultimate problems of philosophy (see art. Axiology); but it has an important significance in moral and religious life as well. This influence cannot be anticipated, has been but gradually evolved. In the moral and jural condition of primitive society there are many facts which prove that ignorance regarding the nature or injustice of action is not recognized, at least not unequivocally recognized, as freeing the agent from responsibility for the injury done. This early confusion of the moral consciousness was evidently connected with the peculiar jural organization of primitive tribes. It is now a commonplace of historical science that society did not originate by previously isolated individuals combining. On the contrary, society is historically prior to the individual. Its primitive unit is not the individual, but some community—a family or clan—in which the individual is born and brought up. The moral life, therefore, is at first associated with the clan and not with the individual. The moral responsibilities of the individual are absorbed in those of his family or clan. The whole family or clan is held responsible for the misconduct of any member, nor is the misconduct of the offender personally even when he is well known. In such a condition of society any individual may find himself involved in responsibility for an action of which he was entirely ignorant; and consequently ignorance is not felt to be of essential importance in determining whether or how far any one can be called to account for an action. All this is abundantly illustrated in societies at the tribal stage of development. It was a striking feature of the aboriginal tribes of North America at the time of their discovery, and it may be traceable still in the conduct of the surviving tribes with which the Government of the United States is called to deal. An elaborate and interesting illustration of this phase of moral consciousness is given by F. Parkman in his Jesuits in N. America, Boston, 1876, pp. 363–369. More familiar illustrations are furnished by the clans of the Scottish Highlands prior to the collision of the clan-system after the disaster of Culloden. It is but a logical corollary from this moral and jural condition that criminal jurisprudence in its primitive crudeness often involves the whole family or kindred of the offender in the punishment of his offence. A well-known example of this, bringing it down even into the folk tradition of a modern age, is the story of Haman in the Book of Esther. War has continued this barbarous confusion of moral ideas to a much later period. Even in the wars of Christendom down to a very recent date it remained the custom to plunder and even butcher indiscriminately not only the combatants, but also the unoffending civil population of a conquered town or an invaded country.

The tribal organization, with its limited moral ideas and sentiments, has not always vanished at once on the welding of tribes into a nation. Among the ancient Hebrews tribal distinctions remain clearly marked long after the attainment of a larger nationality. Greek civilization copied the Hebrew ideal that the various tribal alliances and tribal feuds continued to the very last to complicate and fetter all nobler political aspirations, so that they never succeeded in establishing any unity of national life. In actual history, therefore, the morality of the great nation is still narrowed and hampered by the moral ideas of tribal life. In the States of the ancient world generally the individual finds his chief solace in being a citizen. Man exists for the State, not for the State for man. It is true that with the loss of political freedom individuals in the ancient States took to personal culture as the supreme object of life; and this explains the virginal vitality which for generations was imparted to the ancient schools of philosophy, to the Academies and Peripatetics, the Stoics, Epicureans, and even the Cynics. But the absolute worth of the individual finds distinct recognition for the first time in the teaching of Christianity that it is impossible for man anything in a whole world, if he himself be lost (Mt 16:4). Still, the significance of this teaching did not make itself felt at once in the reorganization of society after the conversion of the Roman Empire. The old ideas of social organization continued to dominate the minds of men and modified the whole medieval interpretation of Christianity itself. Under that interpretation the individual lost his direct religious responsibility and entered into relation with God only as a member of the religious community, the Church. The great revolution of the 16th century was a new assertion of the independent worth of the individual, and that not in his religious life alone, but in all his relations, social, economical, and political as well (this is illustrated by many interesting facts in the monograph by E. Belfort Bax, On German Society at the Close of the Middle Ages, London, 1894).

But, if the narrow ideas of a tribal society continue to cramp the larger life of nations, on the other hand the ideas of a more spiritual morality begin to purify the moral life even in the communities. Then the import of ignorance for moral responsibility comes to receive more or less explicit recognition. Thus among the Hebrews, while the tribal custom of blood-revenge is still recognized in law, there is an explicit distinction drawn between the deliberate murderer and the man who happens to slay another 'ignorantly' ('De 19', 'unawares and unwittingly' (Jos 20; cf. Nu 35). For the latter, the law makes the equitable provision of cities of refuge where he can find protection from the avenging kinsmen of the person slain. Moreover, Deuteronomy (24') explicitly abolishes the custom of punishing a whole family for the misconduct of a single member, limiting the penalty to the actual transgressor. This enactment is given as the ground in law why the children of the murderers of King Josiah were not put to death (2 K 14:5). On this point, of course, the prophets represented the higher morality, and it finds eloquent expression in a singularly noble passage of Ezekiel (18:2): 'I will judge you according to your ways, O man of blood.' Athenian law had a similar civilizing influence to that of the Hebrews. At an early period it had drawn a distinction between φόνος ανάφλους and φόνος τρομάτως (Smith's Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant., s.v. 'Themos'), recognizing the fact that actions done in ignorance do not belong to the same moral category as those done in full knowledge. It is true that some of the old Hellenic myths, like that of Oedipus, point to a state of moral confusion which does not discriminate between an unwitting transgression of law and an intentional wrong; yet the handling of these myths by the great dramatists of the 6th cent. B.C. indicates in general a complete emancipation from the perverted morality of the old myths themselves. In fact, the two great tragedies of Sophocles on the Oedipus myth, especially the Oedipus in Colonus, might be interpreted as taking for their leading motive the vindication of an unfortunate transgression on the idea of ignorance (see esp. lines 392–270, 540–547, 957–988).

While the import of ignorance in relation to moral responsibility was being brought to the light by the great drama of Greece, it received at the same time a more explicit recognition by the philosophic teachers. This was specially the case with Socrates. The one definite doctrine which can with certainty be ascribed to him seems
to give an exaggerated value to knowledge and ignorance in the moral life. This is the doctrine that in its essence virtue is knowledge, and vice ignorance (Xen. Mem. iii. 9, iv. 2; cf. Plato’s Laches, Protagoras, Meno, and numerous references in other dialogues). In later ethical systems the Stoical type there has been generally and logically a tendency to the same view. The view is criticized by Aristotle on the ground that virtue is not a question of an act or of any other kind, but a habit (q.v.) trained by repeated action. The Socratic doctrine undoubtedly fails to recognize sufficiently the fact that virtue implies something to be done, not merely something to be known. But, as Aristotle himself points out (Eth. Nic. vi. 13-3), though all virtue is not knowledge, there can be no virtue without knowledge (epistémē). That is to say, in order to do what is right a man must know what is right; and therefore knowledge is an indispensable factor of virtue. A very fair plea may also be made for the contention that at the critical moment in a vicious action the agent is so blinded by passion that he does not really know what he is doing. To this extent also Aristotle recognizes a certain truth in the Socratic doctrine (Eth. Nic. vii. 3, 14).

But the truth implied in the doctrine is not the whole. The criterion looks at least to two other truths: (1) that knowledge does not necessarily involve will to do what is known; (2) that ignorance is not always or wholly involuntary.

(3) Socrates assumed that, as virtue is knowledge, and vice ignorance, a man needs only to have his ignorance removed—to learn what virtue requires—in order to become virtuous. That would be the doctrine which follows with certainty the knowing of what is right. Now it may be admitted that a scientific psychology does not allow us to regard knowledge and feeling and will as absolutely dissociated in actual life. Not only is there an element of will in all knowledge, but without knowledge will becomes merely the blind impulse of emotion. The power of will is thus so intimately dependent on knowledge that to common thought they appear at times identical. We say, in Bacon’s phrase, that ‘knowledge is power’; in many a popular phrase in different languages the knowledge how to do a thing is spoken of as equivalent to being able to do it; and equivalent to the ability to act upon it, to know and experience it. Yet, while every allowance may be made for these significant facts, a scientific psychology also obliges us to admit that at times even the knowing of what the agent desires, of feeling or will—may so predominate as to make the others practically negligible quantities. There is often a cool inert contemplation of bare fact without any response from the emotions or the will. There are even morbid conditions of mind, in which the patient has a perfectly clear conception of what it would be wise for him to do or not to do, while his will is so enfeebled that he has no power of constraint in the one case or restraint in the other. The pathology of mind furnishes strange illustrations of this practical dissociation of intelligences and will. (T. Ribot, in his Les Maladies de l’esprit, Paris, 1883, a detailed exposition of the subject; H. Maudsley also treats it in Body and Will, London, 1883, p. iii., ‘Will in its Pathological Relations.’)

(4) This phenomenon exhibits an exaggerated form that disintegration of mental unity which in less injurious forms is a common characteristic of imperfect mental action in general. For that intellective life is that in which intellect and emotion and will harmoniously cooperate. Moral and religious teachers therefore have found it necessary to distinguish that mental state which represents merely an intellectual activity from that knowledge or faith which carries the whole mental nature with it, involving the assert of the affections and the will as well as of the intellect. But all this implies that virtue cannot be identified with knowledge, nor vice with ignorance, in the ordinary sense of these terms.

(2) But there is another invalid assumption in the doctrine of Socrates. It is not true that a man may not be willing to do what he knows. Knowledge is not a state of passive reception; it always implies active effort, even if it be only the effort of attention. Consequently, as a man cannot do his duty if he does not know what his duty is, he is bound to put forth the voluntary effort required to obtain a knowledge of his duty. If he does not make the necessary effort, then he is to be blamed not merely for having done wrong, but for the ignorance that led to his wrong-doing. Such ignorance may relate either to particular facts or to general principles.

(a) To discern what is right in particular cases, the facts must be known; the agent may fail to learn the facts because he makes no effort to know them, possibly even because he makes some effort not to know them. In such cases his is properly said to be evilful ignorance; and, if it is pleaded as an excuse, it pleads with the reply that he ought to have known better.

(b) Often moral ignorance extends to general principles. In the moral life of men there is no fact more familiar than the experience that conscience is kept clear by a consistent course of virtuous conduct, while it is darkened by persistent indulgence in vice. Men may come to prefer moral darkness to moral enlightenment because their deeds are evil (cf. Jn. 36). As this darkening of moral intelligence is a natural penalty resulting from habitual disregard of its teaching, the condition has been described in old religious language as judicial blindness. Such moral ignorance, so far from being an excuse for sin, may be its most heinous aggravation. In an extreme form it may become that fixed habit of resisting the enlightenment of the Divine Spirit—that ‘sin against the Holy Ghost’ (Mt. 12:31)—which by its very nature cannot be forgiven.

But ignorance is often involuntary. Not only individuals, but whole races and classes of men are placed at times in such a condition that it is practically impossible for them even to conceive any lofty ideal of morality. In particular cases, also, the most cultured moral intelligence may be so captivated by a wrong habit as to yield to a correct judgment; and consequently it is not an infrequent reflection of good men that they would have acted differently if at the time of action they had known better. Under such conditions ignorance is, in the technical language of the old moralists, spoken of as invincible; and it forms a valid apology for faulty conduct. The same principle of justice demands further that all moral judgments on the conduct of men must be multifaceted by a regard for the opportunities of enlightenment which they have enjoyed. This principle is made peculiarly explicit in the teaching of Christ (see esp. Lk. 12:48, Mt. 11:21). Cf. INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE.

The problem of the moral import of ignorance is thus seen to be by no means simple. The external circumstances and the internal motives of moral action are so complicated that human judgment practically breaks down in attempting to determine how far in individual cases ignorance is a moral flaw. It remains, of course, one of the sustaining assurances of religious faith that in the final account all the misfortunes of every man’s career are not to be lightly condemned and justly appreciated by an Omniscient Intelligence. But the perplexity arising from these com-
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Applications has naturally opened a wide field for casuistical ingenuity. Unfortunately the science of casuistry, which might be made a valuable discipline for the enlightenment of moral intelligence, has been made merely a pretext to the side of moral safety, but rather to try to find how near action may go to the brink of the precipice of sin without actually slipping over into the abyss. But, and probably, there is a humbler attitude; and in the problems connected with the moral import of ignorance probably the jurists will be found more helpful even to the moralist than of the casuists. It is true that the juridical point of view differs from the moral. Still it is based upon it; and, as jurisprudence demands specific statement of the conditions under which an action is done, it can hardly fail to impart some of its own definiteness to the moral aspect of the action as well. In regard to our present problem, jurisprudence is in general governed by the maxim that 'ignorantia faeti excusat, ignorantia juris, quae in eorum persona est, nemo excusat.' It is specially in medical jurisprudence that the problems of moral ignorance take their most interesting and important shape. For the largest section of this science is that which deals with insanity in its medical and legal aspects. 'To accept definitions of insanity generally made moral ignorance its test. It was a common judicial decision that, unless a person was at the time ignorant of the moral quality of the action for which he was called to account, he should be held legally responsible (Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease, pp. 88-98). Obviously this involves the assumption, which has been shown to be involved also in the Socratic doctrine of virtue, that the knowledge of what is right implies will-power to do it, and that the knowledge of what is wrong implies will-power to refrain from doing it. But this assumption has been shown to be upset by psychology, especially in its analysis of moral phenomena. It is now, therefore, acknowledged that mere ignorance of wrong-doing is not a sufficient criterion of insanity. Nervous or cerebral disease may generate an impulse which the patient knows to be wrong, but which is so irresistible that he cannot, in justice be held responsible for yielding to its power. There is another class of actions arising from ignorance, on which the moralist may receive some guidance from the more specific definitions of the jurists. These are the actions coming under the general category of malas praeteritae, of which there are instances in the professions or trades. In all the occupations of life, injury may be inflicted by the ignorance of practitioners or by that negligence which, as etymology indicates, is a peculiar form of ignorance, a temporary lapse of intelligence. In cases of this kind, while allowance must be made for a certain amount of ignorance or negligence as 'invincible,' yet justice also demands that every man shall be more tenacious of innocence in mastering and applying the knowledge which he possesses in his occupation. But the complications of modern professional and industrial life run this general principle of justice into an infinite number of details, for which the legislation of all countries has been obliged to make elaborately minute provisions.

It may be added that a peculiar modern phase of semi-professional life raises a curious question of moral responsibility. The body of knowledge is always growing, for believing that in their abnormal condition 'mediurn' indulge at times in trickery or deceit, although in their normal consciousness they are not aware of what they have done. It is therefore very important to see how such persons are justified in allowing themselves to lapse into a condition in which they lose intelligent self-control, and become capable of doing unwittingly actions which in their normal state they know to be wrong.

LITERATURE.—On the doctrine of Socrates, the original sources of information in the works of Xenophon and Plato have been given above. Reference has also been made to Aristotle's critique, and it may be noted also that three chapters in the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics are of interest in this connection. The casuistry of moral ignorance is discussed at length in J. F. Gury, Compendium Juris Gentilis Moralis, Paris, 1856, which is illustrated by his companion volume of Cases Quotidianes, do 1855. In this work Tractatus i., de Actibus Humanis, has a section (cap. ii. art. iii. 11) de Ignorantiis, and Tractatus ii., de Conscientia, also bears on the subject. These passages should, of course, be read in the light of Gury's cases of insanity. On the relation of ignorance to legal responsibility the maxim quoted above finds a discussion in some interest to the moralist in A Selection of Legal Maxims, Classified and Illustrated, by H. Broom (pp. 263-277, 2nd ed., London, 1898. On the connection of insanity with responsibility, moral as well as legal, valuable aid will be found in any of the greater works on medical jurisprudence. H. Maudsley's Responsibility in Mental Disease, London, 1874, has been already referred to, and with it may be mentioned his Pathology of Mind, do., 1866, which devotes nine out of its eleven chapters to insanity. It must always be remembered, however, that Maudsley's psychological and ethical views are deeply moulded by an extreme determinism. In The Juridical Review for March, June, and September, 1894, the present aspect of the problem of insanity is discussed from both the medical and the legal points of view in a series of articles, by J. B. Buck and C. R. A. Howden, jointly on 'The Relation of Insanity to Criminal Responsibility and Civil Capacity.' On the moral aspect of negligence there is a discussion in W. Whewell's Elements of Moral, London, 1843, art. 114, Responsibility for negligence is the subject of a vast juridical literature, but it is mostly an exposition of the details of civil law on the subject. In legal legislation. In T. Bevan's elaborate work, 'Negligence in Law' (1st ed. Principles of Negligence, London, 1885, &c. may be referred to as a whole. The law of the Mediator, in T. O. Peacock's Law of Tort, London, 1857, is treated under chapter 6. Negligence is a matter of the law, F. Pollock's "The Law of Torts," London, 1894, discusses two chapters to negligence. In the Mediator an attempt at psychological and ethical analysis of a peculiarly subtle condition of mind, while it cannot be accepted as based on a fair study of facts. Of recent and ethical value, however, is the discussion of the same mental condition in F. Pedmore's Modern Mediators, London, 1877, pp. 235-252.

J. CLARK MURRAY.

ILLEGENITY.—The subject of illegitimacy, in general, presents a number of complex problems which demand the close attention of the sociologist. No single explanation can account for all causes, still divers causes have as their reason the wide variations in the rates of illegitimacy in civilized communities. Differences of religion, of mental range, of social conditions and aptitudes, of race, and of the marriage laws in different countries, must all be taken into consideration. The importance of the subject, so far as it concerns Great Britain, is shown in the fact that 43,517 illegitimate births were registered in the British Isles during the year 1907. As far as the present statistics are available those for Great Britain and Ireland, a detailed examination of the prevalence of illegitimacy in the separate parts of the United Kingdom will throw light on some of the problems before mentioned. Taking the countries in the order of an ascending scale of frequency of illegitimacy, and estimating the percentage of illegitimate births to the total number of births, unless otherwise stated, the percentage for Ireland is 28, for England 43, for Wales 54, and for Scotland 70.

The percentage of illegitimacy in Ireland varies in the four provinces from 0.7 in Connaught to 3.7 in Ulster. The latter province is the only one which has been above the mean for Ireland (2.8) during the quinquennium period 1896 to 1910. Of the counties of Ulster, ten out of the twenty-two percentages are above average (Ann 2.6) and Down (4.6), the two with the lowest percentages are Donegal (0.9) and Cavan (1.1). In Antrim, the district of Ballymena had 7.7 per cent of illegitimacy, in the district of Newtownards 7.3 per cent; Down, the district of Ballymena 7.3 per cent; in Donegal the district of Newtownards 5.5 per cent of illegitimacy, and Banbridge 5.2 per cent. The percentages of illegitimacy in the cities of Dublin and Belfast were 25

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and 3-3 respectively. As an analysis of those varying rates in the different parts and districts of Ireland points to the prevalence of illegitimacy in large market towns subserving agricultural districts, and the populous rural and maritime districts of North East Ulster—a condition deriving from that obtaining in England, Wales, and Scotland, where illegitimacy is most common in thinly populated rural districts. At first sight racial differences may appear to account for the discrepancies noted. In the eastern half of Ulster the majority of the inhabitants are of Scottish descent, while in Connacht the race is almost wholly Celtic. Illegitimacy, however, as common, if not more so, among the Celtic population of Scotland as among the Teutonic, and commoner in Celtic Wales than in Teutonic England. Probably the explanation, so far as Ireland is concerned, is to be found in the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, which has a wholesome effect in preventing illegitimacy.

Of the ten districts into which England is divided, those which are under the mean rate of illegitimacy (4-3 per cent) are the South Midland (4-0 per cent), the East Midland (3-9 per cent), and those which are over it are the North Midland (4-9 per cent), North Western (4-5 per cent), Yorkshire (4-5 per cent), and Northern (5-5 per cent). Eight counties of the Southern, Midland, and Northern districts, of these four of these (Middlesex, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire, and Northamptonshire) illegitimacy is on a relatively low scale; in the remaining four the percentages are: Berksf. 4-1, Oxford 5-1, Huntingdon 5-6, and Oxford 5-7. In the Thames district of Oxfordshire, which comprises Lewknor and Thame, the high percentage of 8-2 is attained. This rate is higher than that obtaining in the highest of all the districts, the Northern, and exceeds by 2-9 per cent that of the County of Westmorland, which is the county with the largest amount of illegitimacy in the Northern district. In London there is 4-0 per cent of illegitimacy. It will be noted that illegitimacy is more prevalent in the rural and agricultural districts of England, and especially where these districts are not thickly populated. The relatively low rates in London and large towns are undoubtedly helped by the steady influx of well-doing and enterprising young people from country districts; the same cause adversely affects the country districts. In this connection it is noteworthy that in the low country districts, the illegitimacy and immorality are not synonymous terms. In large cities, sexual immorality is prevalent, and opportunities for its practice are more abundant and less exposed to the force of public opinion than in the country. In large cities, moreover, illegal means to prevent the fulfilment of pregnancy are not uncommonly used, and can be resorted to with less risk of detection, injury, and punishment. On the other hand, the system of cohabitation, especially in the poorer districts of large cities, is a source of illegitimacy, and such a mode of life is not necessarily associated with sexual immorality.

Wales affords, in contrast to Ireland, the example of a Celtic race with the presence of a large amount of illegitimacy in its midst. The average percentage for the whole of Wales is 5-4, or 1-9 per cent higher than that of England and 3-6 per cent above that of Ireland. In the country districts of Wales, the highest levels are reached in Anglesey (8-7 per cent), Radnor (6-1), Denbigh (5-9), Montgomery (6-0), and Glamorgan, has the low percentage of 2-8. When subdivisions of counties are taken into consideration, Bala, an inland rural district of Merioneth, shows a rate of 18-1; and Anglesey maritime-rural district, has 11 per cent of illegitimacy. The same remarks which were made on England with respect to the prevalence of a high rate of illegitimacy in a rural and thinly scattered populace apply to Wales, and, as the sequel will show, to Scotland, with this proviso regarding the last two countries affairs quite differing from that obtaining in England, Wales, and Scotland, where illegitimacy is most common in thinly populated rural districts. At first sight racial differences may appear to account for the discrepancies noted. In the eastern half of Ulster the majority of the inhabitants are of Scottish descent, while in Connacht the race is almost wholly Celtic. Illegitimacy, however, as common, if not more so, among the Celtic population of Scotland as among the Teutonic, and commoner in Celtic Wales than in Teutonic England. Probably the explanation, so far as Ireland is concerned, is to be found in the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, which has a wholesome effect in preventing illegitimacy.

Of the four countries, Scotland has the highest percentage of illegitimacy, namely 7-2. The percentage varies from 14-51 in Banffshire to 4-49 in Dumbarton. All the Scottish counties, towns, and cities have an average illegitimacy rate above the English mean of 4-3 per cent. In the principal towns, there is a variation from a maximum of 9-79 in Edinburgh to a minimum of 3-08—the percentage found in Govan and Coatbridge. It is worthy of notice in passing that Govan and Coatbridge are two large industrial centres, whose populations are mostly members of the working classes. The percentage for the principal towns in Scotland is 7-35. Large towns have 5-74 per cent of illegitimacy; small towns 6-63 per cent; mainland rural districts 7-24 per cent; and insular rural 8-14. Both with a more fertile soil and better adapted for agricultural purposes than the Western, show a greater prevalence of illegitimacy than the Western. The Northern and Southern districts have the highest rates of 8-7 and 11-26 per cent respectively. When a comparison of county districts is made, there have been an unusually high percentage of illegitimacy—Banff 14-51, Elgin 14-27, and Wigtown 19-41. These three counties, obtaining with a large admixture of seafaring population. More than one-fourth (25%) of the male population of Banffshire are engaged in agricultural pursuits, and more than one-fifth (41%) are fishermen or seafaring men. Almost similar conditions to those prevailing in Banff with respect to the occupation of the population are to be found in Elgin and Wigtown. On the other hand, in counties with the lowest number of illegitimate children, such as Dumbarton (4-29 per cent), the populace is to a large extent occupied in shipbuilding, foundries, engineering, and calico-printing works. The housing of farm servants of both sexes in both—such a condition is regarded as a fruitful source of illegitimacy, especially in those districts where the rate is high.

The decline in the birth rate of the majority of civilized countries throughout the world has been very marked. If the quinquennium 1901-1905 is compared with that twenty years earlier, the fall in the birth rates in Switzerland, in Ireland, and in Spain has been about 3 per cent; it reached 14 per cent in France and Italy; 16 per cent in Servia, England, Wales, and Hungary; 25 per cent in the Australian Commonwealth; and 25 per cent in New Zealand. Except in the cases of the Ottoman Empire, Sweden, France, Belgium, and the Australian Commonwealth, the decrease in the number of illegitimate births is greater than the corresponding fall in the general birth rate. This marked decrease in the majority of European and other civilized countries has been almost continuous during 20 years. With the exception of Sweden and France, where there has been an increase of 1-7 and 2-9 per cent, the decrease has varied within wide limits. Thus it has been 3-1 per cent in Spain, 9-7 per cent in England, 32-4 per cent in Scotland, and 13-6 per cent in Ireland. The proportion of illegitimate births per 1,000 marriages and widowed women between the ages of 15-45 years of age and for the years 1900-1922 reached
its highest points in Austria and the German Empire; the numbers in those two countries were 40.1 and 37.4 respectively. Calculated on the same basis, the smallest number of illegitimate births took place in the Netherlands and Ireland, where the numbers were 6.8 and 3.5 respectively.

Countries (arranged in order of rates in 1900-1902)

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Proportion of illegitimate births per 1000 unmarried and widowed women aged 15 to 45 years</th>
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<td>Austria</td>
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The causes underlying the almost universal decline in the amount of illegitimacy are difficult to determine. Beneficent legislation, social activity, and the spread of education and extended practice of the Christian religion are undoubtedly at their root. In the discussion of illegitimacy throughout the British Isles, reference has already been made to the influence of race, religion, and in some social surroundings and conditions. It now remains to refer to these more fully and add other factors which exert a modifying power.

There are differences in laws relating to illegitimacy which have a restraining influence on the reverse on its prevalence. By the law of Scotland and in accordance with the laws of most of the Continental countries, an illegitimate child is fully legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents. Such laws were intended to benefit the child by removing its dishonour and disgrace; but a subsequent marriage does not always take place, and a woman is often led into immoral courses by the promise of marriage, which the man either refuses or never intended to fulfil. In Scotland at any rate, this state of the law, combined with a common custom among the lower classes in country districts and fishing villages, whereby the child is not taken place until the woman is with child, is mainly responsible for the high position it takes with respect to illegitimacy. This conclusion is justified when the effect of the existing state of the law in other portions of the British Isles is considered. By English common law, an illegitimate child cannot be legitimated, though the civil and canon laws legitimize children whose parents subsequently marry.

A factor that cannot be disregarded in the production of illegitimacy is the state of the law towards the fathers and mothers of such children. In Scotland, the mother has legal custody of the child until the age of 10 years, and the father is legally bound to contribute from 2s. 6d. to 5s. weekly towards the aliment of the child; in England, the putative father may be summoned and compelled to make a proper allowance not exceeding 5s. per week. Here also the maintenance of the child devolves on the mother, who is bound to maintain the child as part of her family so long as she remains unmarried, or until the child is 16 years of age. In the event of settlement in her own right, or, being a female, is married. Thus a man is penalized for having an illegitimate child to the extent of, at most, a meagre pittance of 5s. per week, and is often allowed to go so free, either from fear of the eye of the mother to sue for alimony, lest such action might spoil the prospects of a future marriage, or by the facilities afforded of escaping his obligations by emigration to another country. Even when all the legal obligations are undertaken by the parents, an illegitimate child is only bound to earn its own living and take care of itself at the early age of 18. Social legislation tending to guard child life from immorality, and providing for the better care and training of such children, sought to embrace more suitable provision for the illegitimate child as well as sounder measures for combating illegitimacy. Already the Children's Act in this country has had a beneficent effect in these directions, and it is rather to be regretted that the mortality of illegitimate children is compared with that of legitimate. It cannot be doubted that the illegitimate child is life less fitted physically for the battle than the legitimate. The deaths from all varieties of disease are greater among illegitimate children under one year than among legitimate children of the same age. With reference to statistics applicable to England and Wales for 1910, the proportion of deaths among illegitimate infants to 1000 illegitimate births, and among legitimate infants to 1000 legitimate births is seen in the following table to be greater for the illegitimate in all varieties of disease, and with respect to diarrhoæ and tuberculosis it is double the deaths from similar causes among legitimate infants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause of death</th>
<th>Imaginary. Legitimate.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Common infectious diseases</td>
<td>7.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Diarrhoeal diseases</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Watery diseases</td>
<td>7.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Tubercular diseases</td>
<td>7.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Miscellaneous diseases</td>
<td>7.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in Great Britain, so it is elsewhere. In several European countries, new legislative measures have been adopted or are in the course of being promulgated which will have a material effect on the existing amount of illegitimacy. In Germany, where the illegitimacy rate ranks next to the highest amount, that shown by Austria (see Table 1.), the laws which allow the father of an illegitimate child to be freed from his responsibilities by a small monetary payment have been widened in their scope so that such a father, in addition to monetary whereby, is now required to provide training for his child such as will fit it to earn its own living in after life. Further, if the child should be physically or mentally unfit to earn its own livelihood after the statutory age of 16 years, the father must then support it all his life. The governing principles of recent legislation, both in Germany and in Austria, are for the betterment of the illegitimate child. It is generally recognized that neither the mother nor the father is the most suitable guardian for an illegitimate child: such parents make the interests of the child subservient to their own, and in general they have not the moral strength to retrieve the position which they have lost by giving the same attention and care to the child which it would receive had it been born in lawful wedlock. On these grounds an official guardians— the Vormund— is appointed to enforce the law. In the event of the mother being married, the Vormund may be—who is seldom—appointed guardian. In Austria, it is illegal for the mother to be appointed to this position. The reasons given for forbidding the mother to be Vormund are those already mentioned, in addition to the fear that she might not like to displeasure the father by putting into force the laws protecting the child, and this might lead to the child's being neglected. Again, the Vormund must be some person other than the father of the illegitimate child, or the father's relatives, or any one who may have an
interest in saving expense to the father. In the
case of his or her duties, the guardian is
assisted by voluntary agencies—such agencies as
the Vigilance Societies of Britain. The guardian
appointed by law is usually the president of one of these
Societies, and the duties which are
required to be performed are the proper direction of
aliment so as to educate and train the child to be
self-supporting, and the legitimation of the
child by inducing the father to marry the mother.
In practice, over one quarter of the illegitimate
children have become legitimated in this
way through the influence of the **Formund** and
his voluntary helpers.

In France, where the let of the illegitimate has
been made extremely hard by the existence of
article 349 of the civil code containing the well-
known clause, 'La recherche de la paternité est
interdite,' an Act to remove the hardships and
amend the existing law has been announced.
There are many points in this Act which find
general acceptance throughout France; and, should
it become law, it will tend to diminish illegitimacy
and to make the legitimation of the illegitimate
child easier. A process at law a mother may establish legal
responsibility on the father for the child if the action
is brought within two years of its birth. Such
an action may also be brought by the Court which,
according to the law of July 1907, acts in the
capacity of the conseil de famille.

One source of illegitimacy has not been referred to,
but is worthy of special prominence—that which
occurs as a result of the following: (1) the feeble-minded
person who is under the provisions of the Mental
Deficiency Act is guilty of a misdemeanour.
Legislation such as has been described is being under-
taken in many countries other than those referred to
in the previous paragraph. It is to this reference
which has already been made. There is good reason
to believe from experience that it will not only reduce
still further the general prevalence of illegitimacy,
but also, where the latter occurs, will remove or
alleviate the disgrace that clings to the illegiti-
mate throughout life.

**ILLUSTRATIONS.** The statistical information and the tables for
Great Britain and Ireland are taken from the Annual Reports
for 1910 of the Registrar-General of the several countries. The
Report of the Registrar-General of England and Wales for
1910 contains much valuable information relating to foreign
countries. See also Reports by the Presidents of Statistical
Departments or Bureaux of European countries. Reports of the
Registrar-General of the British Colonies, and Reports of the
Chief Statisticians of the principal states of the U.S.A.
**H. C. Smith Rosace, The Love Child in Germany and
Austria,** Eng. Rev., June 1912; O. Spann, Die Lage und das
Schicksal der Kinderlädchen, Leipzig, 1909; A. Keller and
H. Ketscher, Die Fürsorge für wissenschaftliche Kinder, Vienna,
1909; F. Jahnke, Die österreichische Sittschar für die um-
heilichen Kinder, ibid. 1908; Memoranda on 'A Social Evil in
Glasgow,' by J. R. Morton and J. Lindsay, Glasgow, 1911;
Act of Parliament such as The **Children Act** (1906), 'Criminal Law
and Procedure Act' (1912), and "Mental Deficiency Bill" (1912–13).

**HAMILTON MARK.**

**ILLUSTRATIONS.**—See **Encyclopedists.**

**ILLUSTRATIONS.—By the common usage of psy-
chology the name 'illusion' is now reserved for
certain special anomalies of sense, which do not
necessarily involve any process of cognition in the
strict sense of the term.

For the most part our senses provide us with a
well ordered and steadily integrated system. This
is the general position (convention, convention) of
differences that are known as the attributes of
sensation. States also occur that are dependent
upon variations in these attributes, and that pre-
sumably are founded upon them or consist of them.
These are known as the states of perception
and usually constitute variable series. Examples
are found in the series of distances of increasing
length in any of the three dimensions—in the line
of sight, or vertically or horizontally perpendicular
thereto—in the series of motions of increasing
speed, in the series of surfaces of increasing area,
in the series of positions 'round the head' of
auditory space, and so on. These series become
associated with one another in the sensory experi-
ence of ourselves, and presumably of all other
creatures in proportion to their complexity and
development. In these higher developments at
least the order of the series is unchangeable. But
fails to respond coherently, by action or by thought,
to the integration of apparent size with distance
from the point of observation. To unocular vision
the apparent surface of an object varies inversely
with the square of the distance. In unocular vision this rule holds good with modification
only from beyond a certain distance from the eye.
For nearer distances, within which differ-
ences in optical position converge, divergence
are effectively distinct, the apparent surface tends
to retain one and the same size. We do not
notice differences in the apparent size of equally
tall persons seated in the future, either of them
facing each other or of both facing the same
direction, and yet, in the distance of the eye itself,
the apparent size of the persons is greatly reduced.
In various circumstances various integrative processes, based upon a mani-
fold of simpler sensory data, guide us, or rather
our cognition. From their own point of view,
however, our sensory processes are simply har-
monic and systematic. It is a common sound of a motor horn, I can usually locate
it in a position in the horizontal plane round my
head with considerable accuracy. If my head and
eyes are impelled to turn towards this point, its
source, they will turn rapidly and accurately. If
the motor horn is a familiar one, I shall have
some idea I shall experience some mode) of the
distance of the motor from me, even before I see
it. And, when I see it, this auditory distance will
be confirmed by the visual distance at which it
will appear, and that again by its apparent size.
In a sense there is, of course, no confirmatory
process here at all, for that strikes upon the
intellection, anticipatory belief, and judgment
of coherence. It is rather merely the fact that
all the more complex and usual sensory processes are
adjusted to one another, integrated and related in a systematic way. It is also true
that, if sense is stripped of cognition, it can never
be illusory, in so far as illusory is taken to include
a reference to the realities of the world.
For, stripped of cognition and the memory where
it involves, sense can refer only to sense, both
being actually present and given, linked to one
another by integrative processes. A reference to
a permanent object means at least a reference to
the contents and implications of experiences that
are not actually present. Nevertheless, every
cognition of the outer world implies and
involves such an integration of sense as will make it
possible. And sense must be systematic for
scientific knowledge to be possible by means of
it.

In the major part of the complex integrations of
sense, then, the combining factors and their
references and attachments to one another are
patent and manifest. An illusion, on the con-
tary, is a 'departure' from these generally pre-
vailing schemes of sense by reason of the operation of
of 'hidden' factors — factors which do not them-
selves fall within any of the main integrative
schemes of sense. As their effects, however, ap-
pear in sense and within a common integration,
they get wrongly attributed to the operation of
that process which in the course of ordinary in-
tegration would bring them about. Thus arises
a primitive kind of error, which has much interest for
epistemology, just because it is so primitive.

It provides a case of natural and possible error,
which is, none the less, erroneous and misleading.
This peculiarity gives special importance to the
study of illusions, and raises them far above the
triviality which any practical considerations would
attach to their study.

Thus in the case of retinal irradiation whereby
a bright surface looks larger than a dark surface
of the same real size, the unformed mind will act
and think as if the bright surface were really
larger. Such a mind is guided by the habitual
integration of distance from the eye and apparent
size of surface, according to which two surfaces of
the same apparent size and at the same apparent
distance should be of the same real size, i.e., should
give the same results by the method of visual
superposition through the medium of, say, a foot-
rule. The hidden cause of this illusion is sought
on the retina, where its presence is hardly verifi-
able, because there is no psychological difference
between the two cases which might account for the
effect. Similarly the red letters of a coloured
lamp sign appear farther away than the green or
blue ones, because the cause — a mere matter of
the difference of refraction of coloured lights, and
hence of retinal 'disparity' — is hidden (cf. the red
and blue patterns on many rugs).

We see distinct differentiation in this case when we see that the
frame of the sign or the glass upon which the
letters stand is flat. Still it is to be noted that
we discover this only in virtue of the correlations of
the experience which we suppress.

In the illusions of reversible perspective there is
no retinal distortion. The cube that appears solid,
though merely drawn upon a flat surface, makes
identical impressions upon both eyes. This is
proved by the fact that the paper upon which the
cube is drawn still appears flat, that the illusion
holds also for uniocular observation, and that the
illusory solid changes its aspect from moment to
moment, all the then familiar points now appearing
to be near and vice versa.

If there is thus no change in the outer or in the retinal impressions to account for
the apparent solidity and its reversal, the cause of these will lie in some more central physical
forces, or in a purely psychical factor. Thus fatigue is said to determine at which moment
the reversal shall happen, when the psychologi-
dal determinations of change of fixation and
thinking of one or other form of the solid have
become too intense.

Under certain circumstances, e.g., subjective
momentary exposure, suppressions of background, etc., the illusion can be greatly
increased. The cube will appear to be 'really'
solid. Here, of course, we have succeeded in ex-
cluding only the integrations of sense which in
ordinary circumstances make the illusion obvious,

viz. that we see the object looked at — paper and
drawing of cube upon it — as if it were at one flat
and solid. The hidden cause of this probably
lies in the nature of stereopsis as a purely
psychical process. Possibly a primitive form of
integrative recall operates here. It is not sur-
prising that the cause of the illusion is such, whether it be found is the process of
redintegrative memory or not, should be hidden;
for the fusion that characterizes stereopsis almost
entirely obscures any psychical integrative factor
it may contain.

We are not usually aware of the double images that all vision involves, but only of
their integrative result.

The other illusions of sense still await definite
classification. Much research has been done on
them, but the discovery of their causes is per-
plexingly difficult. A familiar example is one
of the most pronounced is the Müller-Lyer illusion,
in which the lengths of two equal horizontal
lines are distorted by the addition to their ends of
two arrow-heads, pointing, in the one outwards
(←→), in the other inwards (→←). The
former line seems much shorter. The amount of
the illusion has been measured under various
circumstances. Anything that tends to let the com-
pared horizontal lines become prominent reduces,
or destroys, the illusion. Certain primitive people
are not subject to the illusion; their visual
capacity is probably absolute.

If an analytic habit of vision is practised, the illusion can like-
wise be suppressed. But the synthetic attitude is
the usual one in oneself; for the illusion appears
even when the exposure is momentary. If a regu-
lar series of Müller-Lyer figures is prepared in which
the arrow-head lines revolve harmoniously
about the two end points of the horizontal line,
and if this series is shown in the stereoscope
(projection by the cinematograph would be the
equivalent of this), the illusion will show its pre-
sence most emphatically, for the horizontal line
will appear to shorten and lengthen, and the end
points will appear to move up and down.

Many theories of this and other similar illusions have
been given, but most of these — especially such as
involve a reference to the physiology of the retina
or of the optical muscles — have been shown to be
untenable. The final explanation, however, is not
even yet quite clear. Though we are told to com-
pare the lengths of the horizontal lines, we seem to
be compelled by the hidden cause of the illusion
to compare the spaces enclosed by the two figures
instead, and to refer the result of this comparison
to the comparison which we were instructed and
endeavoured to make. Of course, it is easy to
learn that it is the end lines which are ultimately
responsible for the illusion; but it requires very
little insight into psychological science to discern
that this most patent factor is insufficient to account
for the illusion. There is nothing in the side lines
which should alter lengths (or the cause must lie hidden in psychical processes, built upon
the skeleton of lines given in the figure, but not
patent in it; for the illusion just consists in the
difference between the size of the line and the size of the line as an element in a
complex of lines and spaces.

Much remains to be discovered before we can
fully explain the illusions. Apart from this discov-
ery of special facts, the greatest contribution
towards their solution will probably be made by
the progress of general psychological theory re-
garding the interconnections of sensory states of
different complexity.

In the illusions of perception proper, we have
dealt with the redintegrative completion of a
sensory presentation that forms a part of two or
more of the perceptual complexes of an individual.
IMAGES AND IDOLS (General and Primitif)

General and Primitif (G. D'ALVERILIA), p. 110.
Babylonian (W. L. KINGS), p. 117.
Buddhist (A. S. GEDEN), p. 119.
Celtic (J. L. GREIG), p. 127.
Chinese (J. DYER BALL), p. 130.
Christian.—See ICONOCLASMs, IMAGES AND IDOLS, and Christian. Worship (Christian).
Egyptian (J. BAIRIE), p. 131.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (General and Primitif).—There is a theory that certain species of animals have the instinct of proportion and even a feeling for art, as shown by the habitations which they make for themselves, the way in which they ornament them, the influence of the plumage or the song of the male on the female, etc.; but it must be admitted that man alone possesses the gift of making images, i.e., of creating figured representations of beings and objects for a utilitarian or sentimental purpose. This kind of representation implies not only that man reasons about his onrul impressions, but also that he claims the power of externalizing them accurately and even of reproducing them after they have disappeared from his vision.

I. CLASSIFICATION.—Images having a religious value may be divided into three classes: (1) purely representative images, (2) magical images, and (3) idols.

1. Purely representative images.—This class includes drawn, carved, sculptured, or painted images of beings, objects, or edifying natures, i.e., whose only aim is to reproduce the features of a real or ideal person, the shape of a well-known object, an episode taken from history or legend, the appearance of a sacred spot, or the celebration of a rite. Every one likes to have near him whatever reminds him of the beings whom he loves or worships—especially their images. The child will suffice to explain the frequency of figures representing either persons who have played an important part in worship, such as priests, reformers, miracle-workers, scholars, theologians, and martyrs, or the superhuman beings to whom the worship is rendered. J. B. de Rossi,1 analyzing the different kinds of

1. Images and Idols (General and Primitif) (General and Primitif).—Thus a shadowy form seen at the roadside on a dark night might be the outline of a bush, a brigand, or a beast. One would suffer ill in the illusion if one took it for anything but the harmless shrub. But the mind sometimes makes clear though hidden motives. What is seen and heard, and felt and known all suggest the ordinary wayside objects, but the fears that more or less assault us all in the dark help to shape what we see. To children, who instinctively dread the darkness, the terrors of the way to bed up the dark stair through the unlit halls are very real indeed. We need not appeal to special traumas for an explanation of the origin of these fears. Children naturally fear darkness, strangers, and animals separately; and these fears are sufficiently similar to be able to induce one another where that is possible. Of course, many a child knows that there is really nothing to fear in the unlit home, but revived images combine so readily with the data of perception of the same sense which evoke them the shadow of a purely constituted, to the casual observer of the latter. Their own cause thus becomes hidden. In the illusions of suggestion we also see the operation of hidden causes which, of course,

may be either emotional or merely associative and cognitive, or both.

In general, then, true illusions all owe their being to the fact that incidental integrative and fusional coherences of (broadly) simultaneous experiences may obscure or usurp to themselves the references which parts of these experiences possess and would otherwise plainly reveal. True illusions are, therefore, all of psychical origin. There is no sense or purpose in speaking of the disparity between the psychical and the material as being illusory. For the same reason, illusions caused by the association of sensations, imitated by the sense-organ hardly deserve the name. They enjoy it only in virtue of the fact that the anomaly which they represent exists both on the material and on the psychical side.

LITERATURE.—For a very broad treatment of illusion as equivalent to error, see James Sully, Illusions, London, 1883. For an introduction to the experimental investigation of the illusions, see any good text-book of experimental psychology, e.g. C. S. Myers, A Text-book of Experimental Psychology, Cambridge, 1911, ch. xii., or E. B. Titchener, Experimental Psychology, New York, 1910, p. 161-173, and p. 220-229, where numerous references to the experimental literature will be found.

HENRY J. WATT.

The image may be realistic, but interpreted in such a way that it becomes a pure symbol—e.g., among Christian images, the lamb and the dove; in Buddhism, the wheel and the lotus-flower; among the Egyptians, the crocodile, the winged globe, etc. Some of these symbols are so clear as to require no comment; the representation of the moon by a crescent, of the sun by a disk or a rayed face, the scales of Justice, the bannerage over the eyes of Love, the aureole hand coming forth from

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1. Apocryphal scenes (General and Primitif).—Greek and Roman (P. LARDNER), p. 133.

Images found in the catacombs of Rome, makes a classification which might be applied to the figured representations of religions in general: (1) hieratic portraits, (2) ideographical symbols, (3) allegorical paintings illustrating parables, (4) historical scenes drawn from OT and NT, (5) scenes taken from the history of the Church, and (6) reproductions of ritualistic ceremonies.

The maker of an image may either content himself with imitating an accepted type as inspiration for the treatment of his subject in the character and rôle ascribed to his model by tradition. As a matter of fact, the resemblance to the original person and the accuracy with which scenes are represented are secondary points: all that is necessary is that people should believe in their accuracy or convention sanction them. It is a short step from this to purely allegorical images—representations of abstractions or ideal beings, such as Faith, Hope, Charity, Virtue and Vice, Religion, in forms borrowed from life. Even God Himself has been treated in this way. A. N. Diderot, a famous 18th-century figure, wrote a volume on the iconographical history of God.1 As an antithesis to this we might mention the capricious iconography of the Devil published by Paul Carus.2

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a cloud and brandishing a weapon; others are so complex that they become resebes or hieroglyphs, the origin of which is lost. In Greek (τραγος) gives the anagram of Christ. These remarks are still more applicable to the representation of religious groups. Every great historical religion except Judaism and Islam has attempted to express its legends and myths in images. These representations may have only a commemorative or explanatory intention; but we must remember that certain religions used them especially for the purpose of education and edification.

All the pictures that we see in the Church tell us as plainly as if the image spoke the story of Christ's coming down among us, the miracles of His Mother, or the struggles and exploits of the saints, so that we may imitate their wonderful and ineffable actions.1

No religion can rival Christianity in the multiplicity of its images. In some large churches, such as the French cathedrals of Paris, Chartres, Reims, and Amiens, there are as many as two, three, or four thousand statues; and in the cathedrals of Chartres, Bourges, and Le Mans, three, four, or five thousand, especially attributed to Medici.2 The foot quite a number of these are merely figures of unimportant personages, nevertheless we have here what has been called a whole Bible for the use of the unlettered. Next to Christianity comes Buddhism, which has covered India, Ceylon, and the Malay Archipelago with its bas-reliefs, and flooded Tibet, China, and Japan with its painted images; in this it has been imitated by the other religions of the Far East, including Hindooism. It is superfluous to mention here the service rendered to art by the mythological compositions of Greco-Roman sculpture. Of less importance from an aesthetic point of view, but none the less interesting, are the bas-reliefs and paintings of Egypt, and the sculptures of Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. It may be said that the region where religious images are found forms a belt on the surface of the globe which includes the Northern hemisphere from Japan to Mexico, while in the Southern hemisphere there are only some rudiments of art.

The desire to be permanently in touch with venerated objects has led man, in his own images in places where everything evoked the memory of his Divine patron; hence the effigies of private persons which were so frequent in the sanctuaries of pagan antiquity. In the same way the desire to see the sanctuary was almost entirely confined to the images of the Pharaohs, the Pates, and the Great kings; even the most favoured citizens never aspired beyond having their features reproduced on a stole or in a statue placed near their tomb. In Greece, the privilege of seeing the temples was accorded to the images of the most illustrious citizens or of private individuals who were rich enough to prevent a general stoutness along with their effigy. The sanctuary chosen for this purpose was generally the one belonging to the god who had watched over the professional occupation of the donor, or to the god who was the patron of his trade. The aim of having the gods near oneself and being near them were frequently combined by placing religious images on objects of everyday use—jewels, pendants, whips, clothing, weapons, tools, vessels, fish, seals, and coins. The discovery and interpretation of which have contributed so much to our knowledge of the principal ancient religions. For a still closer combination the faithful engraved the portrait or the symbol of the god on their very bodies. Tatting has enabled man to assume this

Divine uniform, and examples are found all over the world, from the Australian to the European. On his breast he bears the image of his totem to the Breton or Italian sailor who has the image of the Madonna or the Sacred Heart figured on his arm. It is now admitted that everywhere the tattling of the uncivilized has a religious significance.

2. Magical images, i.e. images having magical properties.—Recent etnology has thrown light on the close connexion which primitive intelligences established between a being or object and the modifications they produced. This is an application of the laws of similarity and contiguity, in which J. G. Frazer has found two of the chief sources of magic belief. Primitive man believed that, by tracing an image, he was producing the reality, and that, when he acted on the image, he was also acting on the thing itself. From the quaternary age onwards we find, on fragments of stone and bone, and also on the walls of caves, sculptured, carved, or painted images, representing animals of the period. Salomon Reinach1 reproduces more than 1,200 of these figures, and points out that they nearly all represent species of animals which formed the food of the people of the time, and the people would naturally desire to favour their multiplication—mammoths, reindeer, horses, goats, etc.

As a result of observations made in our own day among the savages of Africa and Australia, it has been proved that among the magical proceedings for promoting the development of species which provide clans with their totem and their food there is a certain worship of the chimeras, i.e. blocks of stone or pieces of wood which previously have been traced the schematic image of the totem and which are placed underground in sacred places. In other places, these same figures are painted on rocks, and become the centre of ceremonies for furthering the multiplication of the totem.2 Another hunting people, the Bushmen of S. Africa, painted on the walls of their caves very good likenesses of the animals that they hunted, or carried off from their neighbours, the Kaafs.3 Finally, similar paintings have been observed on the rocks of California and North Africa.4

Even among the figural representations of prehistoric times, man has found some images of harmful and undesirable animals; but these exceptions may also have a magical import. Thus the negro of West Africa cuts out figurines representing crocodiles, tigers, and the serpent monarchies, which have been made by his black images by totemism, but it is simpler to account for them thus: the negro thinks that, possessing the copy, he will be able to compel the original to go away or even destroy it altogether.

The Kailhas of Australia believe that the rainbow prevents the rain from falling or makes it stop prematurely. They therefore draw a rainbow on a shield, which they hide far from the encampment, thinking that they will prevent the phenomenon by making its image invisible. The natives of Malaysia used as preservatives bamboo sticks carved with representations of the serpents and centipedes which infest the country; but they set the remedy and the scourge side by side by also carving on the bamboo the image of the peacock which devours this vermin. Among the Bismarck, the natives of the Shan States use the concept of a plant two heads, which has the aim of having the gods near oneself and being near them were frequently combined by placing religious images on objects of everyday use—jewels, pendants, whips, clothing, weapons, tools, vessels, fish, seals, and coins. The discovery and interpretation of which have contributed so much to our knowledge of the principal ancient religions. For a still closer combination the faithful engraved the portrait or the symbol of the god on their very bodies. Tatting has enabled man to assume this
Durkheim has even extended this formula thus: "Anything that affects an object affects also whatever has any relation of proximity or solidarity to that object."

As a general rule, the portrait of an object is supposed to give its possessor control over the original. This is the belief of savages, who usually refuse to be photographed or sketched, and who in nearly all countries make use of this kind of spell to increase the influence of their magic. The idea of using a relieving saporce which have come down to us are perhaps the figured representations discovered on the walls of the grotto of Niaux (Ardeche), where we find figures of men with back arrows. We have here, combined with the solidity of the image, the idea that the realization of an event may be brought about by simply sketching it. According to the practices of the Middle Ages, when one wanted to wound, paralyze, or kill an enemy, it was sufficient to make a figurine more or less like him, have it blessed by a priest on some pretext, and then prick it with a needle in the heart or in a certain spot. It was desired to harm the original. Similar spells were in use among the Chaldeans, Egyptians, Hindus, Greeks, and Romans. They are also found among most uncivilized peoples who employ the arts of black magic.

The same idea of artificial solidarity is found in ex-votos, where imitations of legs, arms, other organs, and even of whole bodies are placed near sacred images by believers who have been granted or are praying for the cure of certain ills; in one case the donor hopes that, on account of this proximity, the god will act on the injured member through the medium of the image; in the other, the desired effect having been obtained, he expresses his thanks to the deity by offering up the organ, of which the deity has already in a sense taken possession by expelling the malady. These same images, which abounded in the temples of Aesculapius and other gods of healing, are found on the continent of Europe, without any modification of material or form, even in the smallest chapels of Roman Catholic rural districts. Often the possession of the image is sufficient to ward off illness and all kinds of calamities. Each image has its special charm; some guard against fever, others against plague, others against lightning, the pangs of childbirth and thus shot, and so on. There are even some which show where lost objects may be found, as, e.g. certain of the Congo fetishes. Some have still wider scope, as talismans for appeasing fate and mastering destiny.

In Central Africa is the promised land of fetishism (g. v.); yet the negro, according to a statement made by Albert Réville, which seems to be well founded, distinguishes clearly between fetishes, which he believes to be inhabited by a spirit, and amulets, which he wears about his person, but does not worship, even when they reproduce the form of a living being. Schoolërt also speaks of domestic fetishes in human or animal form found in the huts of the American Indians, but they were more of the nature of talismans, for they were not worshipped in any way. We may place in the same category the amulet of the Antilles, i.e. figuration of wood, stone, or bone, representing fish, turtles, lizards, serpents, and even men. These were so numerous at the time of the discovery of the Antilles that the Benedictine monks who founded them. In this, however, Columbus boasted of having destroyed single-handed more than 170,000 of them at Hayti. To the same class belong the teraphim of Laban, which Rachel concealed in the camel's furniture (Gen 31:28-34) and the statuettes which abound in ancient tombs from Aegean times to the end of paganism.

Large statues are as highly prized by communities for their magical services as small ones are by individuals and families. The desire to possess them frequently gave rise to armed conflicts, which took place as often between the cities of antiquity as between the towns of the Middle Ages; the desire was not so much to have the monopoly of paying homage to the divinity or the saint as to gain possession of a talisman of repute. This is proved by the bas-reliefs which in the incised sometimes received, either to punish the original for having refused a demand, or to compel him to fulfill it. It is not only in the Congo that nails are hammered into the sacred image to command its attention.

In a church in Louvain there was until quite recently an old statue of Christ, the red velvet robe of which used to bristle with pins. Now worshippers stick their pins into two contours placed at the feet of the image, over which is the inscription in French and in Flemish: "Please do not stick pins into the robe." This practice, however, may be explained in another way: it may be a case of getting rid of an illness by ridding it into the image, or of removing the cause of pain by pleasing it or by passing it in another way on the image lines which have been in contact with the injured member. Fraser, following Mannhardt, gives sufficient evidence in his Golden Bough of cases of fertility cults among savage and barbarous populations, having manufactured an image or a manikin representing the spirit of the last harvest and to its destruction and burial of the image the spirit is supposed to come to life again. This is the sort of thing we have seen in Egypt, and it is just such a thing that we are told of the Grecian cults at Athens where a statue of Dionysus was vanquished, it is true, for a year, and sometimes for longer periods, if the citizens were ever so sparing in their donations.

Just as the copy procures the services of the original, it may replace it on every occasion; the offering of the image instead of the reality thus becomes both an attenuation and an extension of sacrificial rites. Thus the Egyptian offerers, in the temples of the gods, offer them the offerings intended to maintain indefinitely the posthumous existence of the deceased, or depicted experiences that they would like him to be able to continue or repeat; they even added figurines representing his wife, slave, and workmen so that in the life beyond the grave he might have all the co-operation that he enjoyed on earth. It seems now to be admitted that this was also in many cases the aim of the bas-reliefs and paintings decorating the tombs of Thebes and ancient Greece.

3. Idols, i.e. conscious and animated images.—The talisman, the fetish, and the idol form an ascending scale. The talisman is a material object endowed with marvelous properties, either because of its nature or of some magical operation it has undergone, or because it is invested with supernatural properties by some external Power. The fetish is a talisman in which resides the spirit that gives it its power. The idol is a fetish representing the supposed form of the spirit dwelling inside the image.

Idols are formed in various ways. (1) By the natural association of natural objects with the human features which they resemble, e.g. the rocks resembling human beings worshipped by Negros, Pijjans, Chippewaans, Lappe, etc. In all peoples inhabiting hilly countries—not to speak of other similar ludi naturae. (2) By forgetfulness or ignorance of the significance originally attached to an image. This is the most ordinary form of idolatry. In most cases, it is only a question of the transfer of an image from one cult to another. Sometimes belonged the teraphim of Laban, which Rachel...
and he gives several examples of it: the child Horns, who becomes among the Greeks the god of silence, because he holds his finger to his lips; a Farnese Bull, or bull's head on a column, which formed the prototype of Cacus slaying the three-bodied Geryon, etc. Examples of legends which originated in misunderstood images are no less frequent in medieval Christianity. It is asserted that the stories of cephalophorous saints (i.e., saints who are pictured with their heads in their hands) had their origin in the figured representation of their decapitation. The martyrs and saints were in this way transformed into objects of awe and adoration. Thus in the bas-reliefs of pagan sarcophagi are too numerous to be quoted. By simply manufacturing an image representing a superhuman being, the artist, choosing his subject either according to his own taste or in obedience to orders, may conform to tradition; but it is the popular voice alone that ratifies and sanctions his work. Sometimes the idol is an ancient fetish of wood, stone, or brass charged to the worshipper with some magical power. By the supposed command of the divinity whom the image represents. In the Antilles, the tree in which a spirit dwelt revealed to the sorcerer how to set about manufacturing a statue with the wood of the tree which the Corinthians, in compliance with the command of an oracle, had worshiped under the name of Dionysus. In France, Italy, Spain, and the East there are frequent examples of images of the Virgin which are said not to have been made by the hand of man. We might mention in passing the Buddhist legend that the portrait of Maitreyana, the future Buddha, was drawn by an artist temporarily transported into the special division of Paradise where Maitreyana was awaiting the moment to descend on earth. Among the Greeks the same reputation was enjoyed by many of the most venerated statues, including the palladium in the Acropolis at Athens, representing the protectress goddess of the city. By means of some magical operation. Among the Negroes of the West Coast there are regular shops for fetishes and idols, kept by sorcerers. The purchaser makes his choice, and the sorcerer who causes the spirit to descend into the idol. Among the New Zealanders, the priest makes the souls of the dead pass into statues which he shakes up and down as if he were rolling a sleeping man: if the operation is unsuccessful, the soul may pass into the body of the officiating priest, who then falls into convulsions. In Finland a kind of doll, or puura, made out of a stick and some rags, is carried nine times around the house and then burned. 'Live, Parru, the puura then begins to live, or, rather, a spirit comes and dwells in it. Towards the end of classic paganism, the operation was more complex, but its nature remained the same. According to Anned (Inscr. der. Rel. v. 293), Hermes Trimest- gius speaks of it in the following terms:

'To unite, therefore, a certain art those invisible spirits to certain statues which were none other than the animated bodies, dedicated and given up to those spirits who inhabit them—this, he says, is to make gods, adding that men have been deceived by this art.'

The last upholders of paganism met the taunts of the Christians with the reply that they did not worship the bronze, gold, or silver of the statues, but the divinities that had passed into them on consecration (Aug. de Civ. Gent. vi. 15; adu. Gent. xiv. 8). Nevertheless, an explanation is needed as to how this unlimited multiplication of the person of the divinity, and the belief in his actual presence in each of these images, could be reconciled with the unity of his person. Often, too, in the cults of the偶像, we are in the domain of things sacred, where a lack of logic is overlooked, or, rather, a particular logic is admitted which applies the principle of contradiction in a different way from the classical logic. According to a rudimentary idea, a superhuman individuality may be doubled or multiplied ad infinitum, and yet remain an unbroken whole in its original type and in each of its manifestations. II. HISTORY.—A favourite theory among 18th century theologians and philosophers was that idolatry was a degeneration. Man was supposed to have begun with a very high and pure idea of the divinity. Then, desiring to have a material picture of his deity, he represented him by the noblest and most elevated thing that he knew—his own image. Gradually he came to regard these symbolical images as real and to attribute to them individualities. As early as the time of the author of Wisdom (13:26) it was held that idols were originally the images of deceased ancestors; and Herbert Spencer has revived this idea. It may be right to show, however, that history, pre-historic archaeology, and ethnology are agreed in giving an entirely different explanation of the origin and evolution of idolatry. Undoubtedly there may be found in more than one religion periods of decadence in which idols, which had been more or less outgrown, re-appear in the worship. Thus, Judaism, which had shaken the very foundations of idolatry, judging from the quasi-philosophical doctrine of its founder, re-installed the ancient idols of Hinduism and even of Taustism, merely surrounding them with a new mythology created specially for them. But these are cases of inflation or retrogression, not of logical and spontaneous development.

Strictly speaking, idolatry is neither a general nor a primitive fact. It was entirely unknown in India in Vedic times. We have to come far down in the history of China and Japan to find any traces of its development. It was not practised by the nomadic tribes of the Semites. Among the Jews it appeared only in exceptional cases (e.g., the Golden Calf and the Serpent, Exodus 33:4). Caesar de Bell. Gall. vi. 21) and Tacitus (Germ. ix. x.) assert that there were neither temples nor images among the Teutons. In Rome, according to Varro (Augustine, de Civ. Del. v. 21) the Romans lived for 17 years without representing their gods by images. Even among the Greeks we find scarcely any traces of idolatry in the time of the Peloponnesian War. The question is whether this absence of idols is due to the fact that these peoples were too spiritualized a conception of their gods to give them material forms. It will be sufficient answer to note that idolatry is equally unknown to most of the peoples who are still on the lowest rung of the social ladder—Bushmen, Hottentots, Fugisians, Eskimos, Akkas, etc., who are at the first stages of intellectual and religious development. This seems to have been the mental condition of mankind up to the period of which we have just spoken. Even
among the nations where idolatry has been pushed to its extreme, the Egyptians, Chinese, Greeks, and Hindus, it came into being only with their progress in the arts of civilization. In the case of the aborigines of the New World, while idolatry flourished in the civilized States of Mexico and Central America, it was encountered but rarely among the savages of the two American continents. Laistian recognized this fact as early as the 17th cent.: "We may say in general that these people have no idols." In Japan, idolatry was equally unknown before the spread of Buddhism. Even to-day, broadly speaking, Shinto has no idols. With a few exceptions, the pictures of the gods sold at Shinto shrines in the present day are owing to Chinese or Buddhist influence. But, as the same author shows, this is simply due to the arrest of development which made itself felt, more than a thousand years ago, in the ritual as well as in the theology of the old national religion of Japan.

This absence of idols from Shinto is not owing, as in Judaism and Islam, to a reaction against the evil caused by the use of anthropomorphic pictures and images, but to the low artistic development of the Japanese nation before the awakening impulse was received from China. It indicated weakness rather than strength."

We may conclude, then, that idolatry is but a step in religious evolution, and that it even represents a step backward. From the time of its first appearance onwards, man appeals to art—or, rudimentarily, the attempt may be—to aid him in giving material shape to his religious ideal. Several authors have given reasons of religion that the plastic arts originated in the service of religious or magical ideas (see Amy, vol. i. pp. 817-827). The oldest images that have been discovered are the sculptures and paintings mentioned above, which go back to the rein- deer period, in the second half of the quaternary age. For a long time before that, man had probably imitated the attitudes and movements of the animals he wished to capture or cause to multiply. Then it suddenly dawned upon him that approximate images of them existed in certain fragments of stone, bone, or wood, or in some seed or shell. In his magical excitations he may already have become familiar to his infantile imagination seeming like living beings, and for this purpose he naturally employed the natural or chance products most favorable to his illusion. He would thereby increase the resemblance by clamping touching up the object. Examples of this have been found in the primitive sculpture of various entirely different peoples. The next step would be to carve, or directly manufacture with the help of suitable materials, the image which he wished to possess and utilize. The fig, represents an object, now in the Oxford Museum, which was used as a charm by seal-hunters in the Queen Charlotte Islands. It is simply a pebble roughly resembling a seal, but sufficiently like it for the natives to have tried to increase the resemblance by scratchings in the eye, mouth, and nostrils. It was probably a similar idea that inspired the first figured representations of the superhuman beings whom man desired to have within reach to be able to invoke the intercession of the gods. Among the Chinese, it was the Q. G. K., the way of the man, which is known by the expression "Le Religions chinoises, Paris, 1889, p. 182. Among the Japanese, W. G. Astor, Shinto, the Way of the Gods, London, 1901, see also M. Revon, "La religion japonaise," Paris, 1905, p. 221.

Mysterious forces which he conceived of as being, on the one hand, embodied in certain natural or artificial objects, and, on the other, situated at the very source of the phenomena of nature. The first image which seems to have been formed was that of real worship occurs long after the quaternary age. These are the rudest sculptured female figures in the caves of Moreno in France, found side by side with the representation of an axe, just as in the pre-Mycenaean pictures discovered in Crete. As a matter of fact, statues of women have been found belonging to the reinder age, with the abdomen, breasts, and hips exaggerated out of all proportion; but these very probably represent pregnant women—a magical means of ensuring the increase of a tribe. At any rate, it is certain that man began at a given moment to make his fetishes in the form of the spirit which he believed to dwell inside each one. Examples of the transition from fetish to idol may be found among the most widely differing peoples. The first step seems to have been the representation of upright stones or more or less conical stones, found among the aborigines of India, the tribes of the Upper Nile, the Ostkans of Siberia, and in some small tribes of Oceania and North and South America—note to speak of the ancient populations of Western Europe. Elsewhere the natives set themselves to manufacture a kind of doll. The idols of some of the Siberian tribes consist of skins stuffed with grass. The Cree of the United States worship bundles of sticks topped with a head made of rags. The Brazilian sorcerers make idols out of calabashes which they set on a stick and bore with a hole to represent the mouth. In the Society Islands, fragments of columns dressed in native costume are worshipped. In the Fiji Islands, the natives decorate conical stones with a girdle and assign a sex to them. In the Deccan, the head at the top of the figures is represented by a round mark painted red. Among the Indians of Virginia, a head was carried at the top of the staff, as is seen in a curious illustration in Laet's work. The head once formed, the rest must have followed rapidly. Arms and legs still joined to the body were sketched, and then finally these were separated off to give them the necessary appearance of life and action. These facts are nearly all given in Lord Avebury's The Origin of Civilization, so it is not a little surprising to find, even in the seventh and last edition (London, 1912, p. 284), the following assertion: "Fetishism is an attack on Deity. Idolatry is an act of submission to him, rule, no doubt, yet humble. Hence fetishism and idolatry are not only different, but opposite; so that the one cannot be directly developed out of the other."

As a matter of fact, fetishism is a direct antecedent of idolatry, and is everywhere co-existent with it. The fetish and the idol are both conceived of as the body of a spirit; they are used for the same purposes and employed under the same conditions, except that idolatry lays more stress on the anthropomorphic, or rather zoomorphic, conception of the divinity, and so lends itself to a more accentuated development of the cult. There exist, on the one hand, domestic idols, and, on the other, tribal or village fetishes. There are even fetishes that fill a still higher role, e.g. the black stone of Pessinus, which represents the Mother of the Gods in the Palestine temple. No occurrence is found of an intermediary state between fetishism and idolatry; on the contrary, the history of art makes it clear that idolatry is the direct and immediate outcome of fetishism. Nowadays this continuity more evident than in Greece, from the thirty stones of Phæa, which in..."
the time of Pausanias (vii. xxii. 3) were regarded as the most ancient images of gods, down to the masterpieces of Phidias and Praxiteles. Among the first idols, representations of animals or monstrous proportions, as is still the case with the uncivilized peoples of to-day. All that can be maintained with certainty is that the tendency to invest supernatural beings with human shape increased the growth of the growing conception of the personality as a type of emboiled manhood. At the same time the animals which originally represented these beings did not entirely disappear from iconography; they became the companions or slaves of the divinities whom they used to embody, as, e.g., the owl of Athene, the eagle of Zeus, the hind of Artemis, the dolphin of Poseidon, and the dove of Aphrodite. In other cases, the bestial or reptilian forms have been left to evil spirits, the enemies of gods and men; examples of this are too numerous to be mentioned here. A third combination has helped to give rise to a new type, sometimes with a human head on an animal's body, sometimes with an animal's head on a human body. The Egyptian pantheon is formed almost entirely of these curious figures, and they are found in nearly all ancient and modern forms of polytheism. Peoples such as the Egyptians, Assyrians, and Chinese, who had left barbarism far behind, undoubtedly believed in the actual existence of such monsters. Their written traditions testify to this belief, and traces of it are found even among French authors of the Middle Ages.

We must remember, however, that, when the sculptor in ancient times represented Janus as a god with three faces, to mark his faculty for seeing the present, the past, and the future all at one time, he was probably as fully conscious of making a pure allegory as the sculptor who in Christian times symbolized the Trinity by a three-headed being. It is questionable whether the Greeks, or before them the Phoenicians, when reproducing the image of a spirit with two pairs of wings, the one raised and the other lowered, really aimed at representing perpetual movement and not at simply reproducing superhuman beings who for the Assyrians had an actual existence. Again, it is a most point whether, when the Buddhists assigned to their future Buddha, Avalokiteśvara (q.e.), an infinite number of arms, it was really, as they say, that he might the better save all his creatures, or whether it is not rather an expressive imitation of the numerous pairs of arms attributed to the Hindu Siva.

We must, however, take into consideration another factor, viz. the possibility of the fusion of two types. There is a law in symbolism which holds good for all kinds of images. When two signs or two plastic types in any given neighbourhood express the same or similar beliefs, they are inclined to amalgamate, if not to unite, and form an intermediate figure. An attempt has been made by the present writer 1 to show how symbolic images differing as much as the wheel, the winged globe, the rose or the lotus, the conical stone, the cross, or the key of life, the cuneiform star, the sacred plant, and even the human outline, have changed their forms and passed into each other, making composite types, in the different features of which the various originals may be recognized. These phenomena of plastic hybridization are rarer in the case of the representation of living creatures, but even here some examples are found. Dusoir, referring to the totems in use among the Indians of North-West America, says:

2 In The Migration of Symbols, London, 1894, ch. v. and vi.

"When the descendant of the "hawk" carries off a wife from the "pigeon" tribe, a totem representing a fish with a hawk's head for a time keeps alive the occurrence, and finally becomes the deity." 2

This emblem is just as odd as the hawk-man who represented Horus among the Egyptians.

We have already reckoned upon various types which continue to exist after the disappearance of the worship to which they originally belonged. In present-day iconography, we may still find representations of subjects which have originated among the sculptures of ancient Chaldaea, five or six thousand years ago, and which have come down to us through two or three intermediate religions and still retain at least a symbolic value. Such, e.g., is the sacred tree between two monsters facing each other, which has passed, on the one hand, to India, Persia, China, and Japan, and, on the other, to Greece, Rome, and the Christian countries of the West, where sculptors used it in cathedrals to represent the tree of the Garden of Eden. The transmission of images does not necessarily imply the transmission of the beliefs to which they were originally attached. When in a new religion it is desired to represent personages or traditions already figurative yet been expressed in plastic art, the artists naturally treat the subject on the principles of the only art within their reach. In the catacombs, Christians did not scruple to use, the taming the wild animals with his lyre, to symbolize Christ teaching men. Psyche being teased by Cupid came to represent the soul guarded by an angel. The ram-bearing Hercules, who originally figured in the sculptures of Asia Minor as a priest bearing the sacrificial lamb, furnished the essential Christian type of the Good Shepherd, and we know from the sculptures of Gandhāra that this subject passed into Buddhist India about the same time. 2 The first representations of the Heavenly Father as an old man seated in a cathedra were inspired by certain statues of Jupiter; it is even possible that their prototype may be found among the Assyrian images of seated divinities which occur among the rock sculptures of Maltai.

Again, we have to reckon with the deformations which in the long run always appear in the reproduction of images. It is somewhat difficult to recognize in the classic type of the thunderbolt two tridents soldered together at the base. Joachim Menant 1 has shown that the Greek Sagittarius has its prototype in the winged figures in the Assyrian palaces, which became among the Persians the image of the mythical bull Gāyomart, half transformed into an archer; and, by a series of easily discernible modifications, the East of Apollo has become the simple eponon found upon coins. Among the paddle carvings exhibited in 1872 at the British Association for the Advancement of Science, there was a crouching human figure and next to it a crescent placed on the point of an arrow. No one who did not possess the whole series of intermediary figures could possibly have imagined that the latter was the outcome of the former. 4

Inversely, there are examples of the transformation of a linear image into a human figure. The sacred baetyl which figures on the coins of Bybios reappears, modified in form through contact with the Egyptian cuneiform, in certain representations of Astarte and Venus which depict these goddesses in a conical form with their elbows close to their sides and their forearms outstretched.

It must be borne in mind that a religion, more

1 NR III. 97.
2 A. Grünwedel, Buddhist Art in India, Eng. tr., London, 1901, fig. 44.
4 For other examples of the same kind see H. Balslev, Evolution of Decoration Art, p. 32 f.
5 Cf. RRR xx. (1899) 142.
especially when it has just superseded another, has often to tolerate the worship of images and even of sanctuaries belonging to former gods. When it is unable to destroy them altogether, it finds that it is more advantageous to appropriate them. By adopting the Kabarmam, Constantine wittingly chose an emblem which could be accepted both by the worshippers of Jesus and by the worshippers of the Sun. Even today, Leroy-Beaulieu speaks of an old Buriat idol, preserved in the Monastery of Possokh on Lake Baikal, which has been transformed by the monks into a staiine of Saint Nicholas, and is adored by men, human or pagan and Christians alike. The Buddhists are still less scrupulous about appropriating the images of the religions which they have succeeded in suppressing by the spread of their propaganda; the solar wheel becomes the wheel of the Law; the feet of Vishnu are transformed into the feet of Buddha. When the Buddhists gained possession of the sanctuary erected at Bachelot by tree- and serpent-worshippers, they simply appropriated the Isis-relief for their own religion by attaching to each scene an inscription giving it a Buddhist interpretation. The followers of Hinduism acted in the same way when they had succeeded in expelling Buddhism from India. It is sometimes rather difficult to judge whether the image of a superhuman being should be considered as an idol or as a magical or purely commemorative representation. Even the people who use them are not always clear, the on this point. When the priests of Hierapolis explained to Lucian (De Dea Syria, 34) that they had not placed the Sun and the Moon among the images of the gods in their temple, because he was accompanied see and worship them directly, it is possible that, at least to the priests, divine images were merely representational signs. But, when the Tyrians, besought by Alexander, chained up the statue of Baal Melkart to keep the god from escaping to the enemy’s side (Curtius, iv. iii. 21 ff.), it is evident that they considered it and treated it as an idol. The same idea recurs in Sparta, where, according to Pausanius (iii. xv. 5), the statue of Ares was chained up to prevent its escaping.

Speaking generally, we may include in the category of idols all images that open or close their eyes, gesture, utter forth sounds, or move on their own or on other’s command, or converse with their worshippers. On the other hand, it would be an exaggeration to maintain that every image worshipped or even venerated is necessarily an idol. Nothing is more natural than to set up in a conspicuous place the images of the beings loved or esteemed, and to take as a personal insult outrage perpetrated on them. Later, the image is regarded as an intermediary in all dealings with its original, and it is invested with the supernatural faculties attributed to the original. This tendency is co-existent with the mental state, mentioned above, which confuses the copy with the original and leads to investing the images with a personality of their own. In the time of Pericles, Stilpo was banished from Athens for having maintained that Phidias’s statues of Athens and of his image of the goddess herself (Diog. Laert. ii. 12). In Buddhist iconography, Gautama’s entry into Nirvana was represented at first only by an empty throne or a Footprint of Buddha. Gradually his image was introduced, and it finally achieved innumerable miracles and became a regular object of worship. In order to escape from these superstitions certain monarchs, religions, such as Judaism and Islam, have entirely forbidden the representation of the human figure or of any animate being.

**Gorbl d’Alvilia**

**IMAGES AND IDOLS (Dgegna).** It was thought a few years ago that Dgegna religion was animistic, that the Mythological figure worshipped in certain deities in all forms, and that these deities in all forms, and that with a sublime simplicity they confined their worship to trees or stone monuments in which the divine spirit was supposed to take its residence, or to be placed in sacred spots as single stone seals, an empty throne, for the god to sit on, unseen by his worshippers. This view, however, always seemed rather improbable to some observers, who were convinced that the phenomena of religion being prehistoric, the same in every country and all over the world, the Dgegna would eventually be proved to have been no myths so lofty in their ideas as the “animistic” view would have us believe. This has come to pass; Dgegna now know that the Dgegna made idols and venerated them as did every other people of their time. Whether D. G. Hogarth is right or not in claiming (EBE i. 148, 147, EBS ii. 249) that the Aryan worshipped only two deities, Mother Rhea and the son Zeus, or whether we should rather say that these were the two primary objects of worship, it is at least probable that the “Sun” and the “Mother”, which he postulates was accompanied by the veneration of spirits of wood and water, sky, sea, and land, as in every other country of the world. In later Greek religion there is many a trace of these Hellenic worship; and, though we may say that Atenism, Dityism, or Britonartis of Crete is but another form of Rhea, yet we may doubt whether the worshippers themselves thought so. They surely would have considered that they were venerating different goddesses. And in the representations of deities which we have on seal-rings, etc., we do doubt see different forms of the goddess. We have representations, too, of deities, like the Tanuris-headed water-carriers, no doubt deities of streams, who must be regarded as, if not gods, at any rate supernatural beings worthy of worship and distinct from the two primary deities.

We have not, however, an idol of other gods than Rhea and Zeus, although we may yet find them. The few images of the gods that have been found in the Cretan and other excavations are almost exclusively female, and represent different forms of the great goddess, who is usually associated with the snake, no doubt to mark her chthonic character. The faience images of her, or of various different forms of her (or of different but closely-related goddesses), are well known. They are found at Knossos (EBE i. 138) are well known. One figure has on its head a spotted cat curled up. This is a hienar attribute of the goddess, and may perhaps connect with Egypt. (Ae a we to see by connection also the panther of later Greek iconography?).

The ruder figures of the goddess found at Knossos and Gournia, with their accompaniment of votive clay trumpets, are well known. They are common with the equally rude ‘owl-headed’ figures from Mycenae, also representing a goddess.

*Primary Rhea and Zeus certainly were, one only doubt if they were the sole objects of worship. Such monarchism is, after all, an artificial development of later times; the actual man is polytheistic and idol-making. Monarchism is a product of high spirituality. We have now no more spiritual beings with the same at all a spiritual people: it is highly probable that they were nothing of the sort; and, if Egyptian and Hittite worshipped gods, it is probable that Agwe did so too.*
One cannot say more as yet of Minoan iconography; but more light will doubtless reach us with the further progress of study, and we may be able to distinguish between different forms of different deities. For, though one may consider that Hoehn's fundamental characterization of Egyptian religion, its special worship of Rhea and Zeus, is without doubt correct, yet one may doubt whether their "Dual Monothism" excluded all other deities. It is certain, however, that the figures of the goddess and the god were not included in the representations of deities, and that the representation of the human form which we have in fresco and other materials are really meant to portray men, and that the representations of the human form which we have in fresco and other materials are really meant to portray men, and when many are intended to shadow forth the god's head. One would expect, as one obtains in the case of Rhea and Zeus, complete anthropomorphism.

The theomorphic deities look exotic. The likeness to Thesus may have some special reason of which we are ignorant. Can it be referred to the most ancient days, when the Ægeans first came from the Nile-delta (as they probably did) to Crete? They might have brought with them a memory of the great hippopotamus, a beast associated in their minds with water. This is but a suggestion. The cat on the head of the Knossian goddess points, as we have seen, to Egyptian influence, and the sphinx has certainly been traced in their art. One cannot say more as yet of the Minoan religion, and the development of the Minoan art is not contradicted by the Greek mosaics and sarcophagi, since we know from the treaty of Kames II. with king Khattusil of Khatti (1279 B.C.) that the Minoan religion is not contradicted by the Greek mosaics and sarcophagi.

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and changing phases precluded the possibility of such a limitation in his case. The god of lightning must surely leave his temple, since he is seen riding upon the storm-cloud, while the true dwelling of the Sun-god himself must obviously have been in the abyss of waters below the earth until he was translated to the Southern heaven. We have no means of dating this association of some of the greater gods with the Sumerians. It is possible that if the Sumerians had passed this stage of thought before their arrival in Babylonia, and also that they found some of the ancient religious centres of the country already associated with sun- and moon-cults and with other divisions of nature-worship. However that may be, it is quite certain that during all subsequent stages of Babylonian history the divine images never degenerated into mere symbols of divinity. They continued to enjoy a very real, though mystical, connection with the gods they represented. Without consciously postulating a theory in explanation of his belief, the Babylonian never lost his faith in his god's actual presence within the image, and he found no difficulty in reconciling such a localization of the divine person with his presence at other cult-centres and with a separate life in the heavenly spheres. It is actually the case that even if we refer to a few historical examples of image-worship taken from different periods.

Of the Sumerian epoch it is unnecessary to speak at any length, as Gudea's cylinder-epitaph proves the sacrosanct character of a city-god's image even in the latter half of the period. The elaborate ritual and purification of both people and city, preceding the removal of Ninurta's image from the old shrine at Lagash to the new, are a sufficient indication that the god and his image were still identified. With the rise of Babylon we note the important part which the actual image of Marduk played in each king's coronation-ceremony and in the renewal of his oath at every subsequent Feast of the New Year: the hands of no other image than that in Esagila at Babylon would serve for the king to grasp. In the reign of Hammurabi, the real founder of Babylon's greatness, we see the Babylonian's conception of his visible gods reflected in his treatment of foreign images and in the limits set to their appropriation. It was not mere professional bootsy, but in order to gain their favour, that Sin-idinnam and his army carried off to their own land and the images of certain Elamite gods. As for the Near Eastern monarch's veneration for foreign gods, it is not argued here that they were assimilated to his own native divinities, but simply that the foreign gods were represented by his own native divinities. The land of Mitanni and Egypt were on friendly terms at the time, and the city of Nineveh was under the former's control. So, when Assurbanipal II requested Tashratta, king of Mitanni, to send Ishtar of Nineveh to Egypt, he consented, and with the image sent a letter which throws light on the relation which the goddess was believed to bear to her image.

In the letter the goddess Ishtar herself is ready to declare her intention of going to Egypt: Thus saith Ishtar of Nineveh, the lady of all lands. 1 unto Egypt, thus will I go.2 Tashratta exhorts Amenehopis to pay her due honour and to send her back, saying: Take her (her) and she is gone. Indeed, in the time of my father, the lady Ishtar went into that land; and, just as she dwelt (there) formerly and they honoured her, so may you also honour her ten times more than before. May my brother honour her, may he allow her to return to her native land, and there no question of the image being a mere symbol of the goddess; the image is the goddess herself.

It is clear from Tashratta's letter that this was not the first occasion on which Ishtar had paid a friendly visit to Egypt. Indeed, we may infer that, at any rate at this period, the custom was not uncommon for the image of the goddess to accompany the deity himself to be sent on a ceremonial visit to a foreign country, where, if properly treated, he would, no doubt, exert his influence in favour of the land in which he was staying. And this conclusion explains the great value that was always set on the capture of another race's gods. The captured images were not valued simply as symbols of victory; they constituted the conquering nation's chief weapon of offence. Not only were the conquered deprived henceforth of their god's assistance, but there was a very great probability that, if the captured image was pleased with its new surroundings and the deference paid to it, it would transfer its influence to the side of the conquerors.

This explains the care with which captured images were preserved both by the Babylonians and by their more civilized neighbours, and the joy which marked any subsequent recovery of them. It is needless to cite instances; the most striking is Ashur-bani-pal's recovery of the goddess Nanna's image from Susa in 630 B.C., by which Elamite king had in the reign of his father Sargon made a tour of the Near East some sixteen hundred and thirty-five years before.1 During this long period the Elamite king had lavished over the image, for their civilization and their religious cults had much in common with those of Babylonia. It is probable that, even when a barbarous nation who was conquered, and whose sacked, its divine images were never destroyed, but carried off and preserved in the temples of the conqueror. This close connection between the god and his image endured into the Neo-Babylonian period, and Nabonidus' offence in the eyes of the priesthood, which rendered Cyrus' conquest of Babylon so much more easy, was simply the fact that he ignored this feeling. With his natural instincts blunted by archeological study and a philosophy of civilization in these new regions, he allowed the images to be destroyed that were sacred to the gods of the conquered peoples.

Far less close was the connexion between a Babylonian deity and his sculptured symbol or emblem, by means of which his authority or presence could in certain circumstances be invoked or indicated. The origin of such emblems was not astrological, nor is it to be sought in liver-augury; the emblems were not derived from fanciful resemblances to animals or objects, presented either by constellations in heaven or by markings on the liver of a victim. They clearly arose in the first instance from the characters or attributes assumed by the gods in the mythology; their transfusion to constellations was a secondary process, and their detection in liver-markings resulted not in their own origin, but in that of the omen. The spear-head of Marduk is a fit emblazon for the player of the demon of chaos; the style or wedge of Nabu suits the god of writing and architecture; the lightning-fork was the natural emblem of the weather-god, and the lunar and solar disks for the moon-god and the sun-god. Some divine emblems were purely animal, such as the dog of Gula, the walking bird of Bau, the scorpion of Ishkara. In these cases there is nothing to indicate a totemistic origin, and the source of the symbol is not to be sought in one of the gods of the Deep or the Deep, suggests that they
are not to be traced beyond the mythological stage. In the earliest period the emblem of the city-god was that of a lion, and might sometimes symbolize the city’s power, as in that of Nirgiris of Lagash, represented by a lion-headed eagle grasping lions. Images of divinities, when adopted as symbols of the city, acquired a new and independent significance, ensuring that the monument was under the protection of the deities to whom the sculptured emblems belonged. Legal documents concerning ownership of land were protected in this way from the law courts and brought the owner into contact with a similar object that the later Assyrian kings carved at the head of their stele the emblems of the chief gods of their pantheon. Divine emblems, in addition to the figures of patron deities, were also engraved upon cylinder-seals, and both were, no doubt, intended to ensure the owner’s protection.

Another class of animal images entered very largely into the Babylonian religious scheme, and, though not the emblems of gods themselves nor the objects of direct worship, are entitled to be referred to in this connection. The colossal lions and winged bulls which flanked the doorways of Assyrian palaces and were borrowed for the Persian palaces at Persepolis, the enameled lions of Sargon’s palace at Khorsabad and of the Sacred Way at Babylon, and the brick bulls and dragons of Ishtar’s Gate were not merely decorative, but symbolized protective influences under animal forms. Texts of earlier periods also describe the lion, the bull, the raving hound, the serpent, the dragon, and other mythological monsters as characterized by religious protection. In two instances at least, the lions of the Gates of the Sun on whose backs their pivots rest, we may undoubtedly trace their origin to the noise of the creaking gate; and it is probable that the lion, rather than the serpent, was the more important factor in determining the outward form of many mythological creations, whose protective qualities were portrayed in images which were often strange and ferocious. Other Babylonian images of regal form represented evil and not beneficent beings, and spells engraved upon them were intended to ensure the employment of their powers in the owner’s favour, or, in any case, to his detriment. The clay images of gods, along with those of demons, were also buried near the gateways of palaces and temples to ensure their protection; but these, again, were not objects of worship, but mere images of the flesh and blood-figures. Thus the dances of the Babylonians in sympathetic magic, see MAGIC (Babylonian).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references given in the footnotes, works dealing with Babylonian religion and cult may be consulted, such as M. JASTROW, Religion Babylonian and Assyrian, London, 1895 f., with Bilderdarstellungen [1901]; R. W. ROGERS, The Religion of Babylon and Assyria, New York, 1905; or L. W. KING, Babylonian Religion and Mythology, London, 1893. For a convenient survey of the religious literature (which has a close bearing on the subject), see O. WEBER, Die Literatur der Babyloniener und Assyrier, Leipzig, 1897.

LEONARD W. KING

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Buddhist).—It would naturally seem as though, of the great religions of the world, Buddhism were the least likely to have developed a system of idol-worship and image generation for images. The doctrine, as it was set forth, in the form of lectures by the Buddha, was essentially negative: it deplored the rendering of any special honour or reverence to himself, made no claim to divine prerogatives or rights, and ignored, if he did not distinctly repudiate and deny, the presence and influence of the supernatural in human society. What he had done in the way of the attainment of perfect knowledge and of achieved deliverance or salvation, every man might do by the force of his own will and his own deeds. Consequently, the Buddha was but to show the way. Each man must travel the road and win the goal for himself, none helping or hindering him in the supreme task. In a system of philosophy controlled by such principles there would appear to be no room for adoration or worship, and no authority to whom such worship might be addressed. Ultimately, however, and after no great interval of time, the tendency to create or conceive supernatural beings to whom homage might be rendered and from whom assistance might be hoped for reasserted itself. Apparently the conception of the deification of the Buddha himself began to take place in the thought of his immediate disciples even during his lifetime, and thus a system in intent and purpose non-theistic, neither postulating nor requiring the divine, became endowed with as extensive and varied a system of idol-worship, which in concrete and visible presentation embodied and satisfied the desire of the worshipper for a substantial object of his adoration and regard.

1. Deification of Gautama himself.—It was upon the person of the Buddha that this reverence and worship concentrated itself; and throughout the entire history of Buddhism the figure of the founder remained central for all art and imagery. The degree of prominence assigned to him, however, varied greatly in the different countries in which Buddhism found a home. In some instances the influence of pre-existing faiths, with their popular deities, proved too strong for the doctrines and principles of the imported creed, and the figure of the historic Buddha was in effect superseded by forms of gods or goddesses, to whom a more sympathetic and helpful rôle was assigned. Theoretically, for the Buddhist, Gautama Buddha is supreme; and in general it is his image that occupies the place of honour in the temples, and is indelibly multiplied in the halls of the monasteries, and in all places where an opportunity offered itself for a work of merit in erecting an image designed to embody in actual concrete form the gentle spirit and teaching of the founder of the faith.

The tendency, therefore, to regard Gautama as more than human, and to endow him with some at least of the attributes of divinity, began to develop itself during his lifetime, and therewith the tendency also to represent him in a spiritual sculpture as an object of adoration. The earliest sculptures, however, do not yet venture apparently to depict him as a man, but his presence is symbolically indicated by the sacred wheel (Dharma-chakra), the Bodhi-tree, the fire, or a dagoba, etc. In the older representations also, the more important figures of the Hindu pantheon retained a place, especially Sakka (Sakra, Indra) with his thunderbolt, who was associated with one of the celestial Buddhas, Vajrapani, and to the end occupied a considerable place in Buddhist legend and tradition. It is not possible to determine at how early a period this desire for concrete and visible por-
traiture of the Buddha himself did in fact find expression in art. Images of him were certainly known to the Chinese pilgrims Fa-hian and Huen Tsiang. Their narratives suggest, if they do not assert, that such images were neither rare nor a novelty. A more or less conventionalized figure also was adopted by the Chinese artists of the Gandhāra and the North-West. Its artistic development, however, was checked and limited by the historical conditions of Gautama's life and character, and the need to preserve a general identity of aspect and feature throughout the wide area to which the Buddhist faith had gained access. The type, therefore, became stereotyped, the conventional and recognized form under which the Buddha was depicted. Almost the only variety permitted to the artist was in the pose of the hands (mudrā) and, to a less extent, the arrangement of the feet. The Hellenic character also was always symbolical, designed to create not noticeable especially in the expression of the face and the disposal of the folds of the robe. In the earliest and oldest representations this is most apparent; in the later there is a distinct approximation to Hindu forms and ideals. The figure thus delineated is that of a young Indian in the garb of a monk, with gentle and thoughtful countenance. In frescoes and paintings the head is often surrounded with a nimbus or halo, the symbol of deity and of the claim to adoration, a feature which is derived from Greek model and precedent. The type adopted was severely simple, and afforded comparatively little opportunity for the development of artistic taste or display of artistic skill. These found a limited opportunity for expression in the figures of the Buddha's disciples and, more widely, in the extensive pantheon of divinities, Bodhisattvas and others, of the Mahāyāna school.

The character of the type was thus determined, and is easily recognizable. From whatever part of the Buddhist world the figure may be derived, the general features are the same, and convey the same impression of calm dignity and untroubled repose. The painter or sculptor had, as it were, the main outline and framework of his subject pre-plotted and comparatively little latitude was admissible in the filling in of details. Three attitudes or poses of the figure are represented—sitting, standing, and lying or recumbent. Within each of these there are varieties of type, which are usually associated with events of the Buddha's life or offices which he performed. The ascetic ideal was maintained in all, and in all the dress and outward appearance were plain and decorous, contrasting strikingly, on the one hand, with the richly ornamented figures of the Bodhisattvas and other divinities, and on the other with the nude statues of the Jainas. The difference in the three attitudes are by no means equally common on the sculptures or in the temples. The sitting posture is most frequently represented in all Buddhist countries. The recumbent figure, on the contrary, is hardly met with in the monasteries of the north.

2. Types of sculptures.—There are three main types of the seated Būdha as

In all of them the Būdha was represented sitting cross-legged, the right foot resting on the left, the soles usually turned up and bearing one or more of the auspicious marks which indicated the Buddha's Buddhahood. The body is clad in the conventional robe of the monk, which leaves the right shoulder bare, and in some examples is very lightly indi-
Gautama Buddha himself should have been preserved. The presentation of face and figure is entirely ideal, and that of a young Indian prince of noble birth, embodying the conception of gentle, thoughtful, deeply mystical and religious character, which tradition associates with the name of Gautama.

3. Ancient images. —The Chinese Buddhist pilgrims never wrote much about the existence of images, which were believed to be authentic and, in some instances, contemporary portraits of Gautama himself. The earliest of which mention is made by Fa Hsien, a sandal-wood image which Prasenajit, king of Kosala, had caused to be carved and placed in the Jetavana vihāra in Śrāvasti in the seat usually occupied by the Buddha, but now vacant during his absence in the Trayastriṃśa heaven. On his return Gautama is said to have recognized the image as a faithful copy of himself. Not long after, the monastery was accidentally set on fire and consumed. The image, however, was preserved unscathed, and later was restored to its place. 1 A second and even more fanciful sandal-wood image about 20 ft. high is described by Huen Tsang, erected by Udayana, king of Kausambi, a replica of which the Chinese monk carried with him on his return home on his body. The royal city was in ruins at the time of Huen Tsang’s visit, but the statue stood within an ancient vihāra, a stone canopy above its head, having resisted, as it was said, every attempt to remove it. This image also had been carved in the Buddha’s lifetime, the work of an artist who had been transported to the Trayastriṃśa heaven that he might there observe the appearance of the Buddha and take note of the sacred marks on his body. The miraculous and bright light shone forth from it intermittently. 2 Mention is made of other images, and, in addition to sacred relics and books, Huen Tsang took with him on his return a considerable number of statues of the Buddha in silver and gold as well as in sandal-wood.

4. Hinayāna school. —With the exception of the figures of the Buddha thus stereotyped in normal and regular form there is no uniformity in the number, character, or disposition of the images worshipped in the different Buddhist countries. No general or comprehensive description which would unite the diverse traditions is practicable. It will be most convenient, therefore, to give a brief account of each of these separately, in regard to the nature and variety of the images recognized, followed by a note as far as possible on the geographical order. The pantheon of the Hinayāna is usually simpler in form, of a more severe and restricted character, than that of the Mahāyāna.


of ivory and wood. Formerly in all Buddhist countries and for many centuries the manufacture of the images was almost entirely in the hands of the monks, who were able to bless and consecrate their handiwork. It is now for a specialized occupation or trade, and the work is done by skilled artisans. Some of the more ancient and famous idols were traditionally said to have been self-produced. The temples also contain frequently a specimen of the sacred footprint (ēripada), to which adoration is paid. Of these footprints the most renowned is the hollow upon Adam’s Peak, held sacred for Hindus, Muslims, and Christians alike, as well as by Buddhists, and explained in accordance with the creed of each as the footprint of Gautama or Siva, of Adam, Muhammad, or St. Thomas.

By the side of the principal image in the vihāras are frequently represented one or more of the Buddha’s chief disciples, especially Moggallāna and Sāriputta, or, with the recumbent Buddha in the nirvāṇa scene, Ananda. They stand on either side or at his feet in attitudes appropriate to the image of the ancient Hindu deities, especially Brahmā and Viṣṇu, are found, usually in buildings (dvaradāla) attached to the vihāra itself, and representations of icons, demons, etc. The image of a Buddha is equal to the images of the gods equally with the Hindu deities. The images of the image, and therefore the representations of the Buddha and other gods, are distributed in a temple the same as the divinity of the temple, and of the Hindu gods Viṣṇu, Śiva, and Ganesa. In the temple of the sacred Tooth also, at Kandy, either side of the central shrine is occupied by images. In the country vihāras, where the worshippers are few in number and poor, the images are often used as a refuge and little heed is paid to them even by the priests or monks themselves.

The sites of ruined cities which have been excavated in Ceylon have supplied many ancient and remarkable figures. It is evident that in former times the concrete representations of the Buddha for purposes of worship were no less numerous than at the present day.

One of the oldest is a dark granite statue of the seated Buddha, 8 ft. high, carved from a single block of stone, believed to be more than 1500 years old, now deserted and lonely in the jungle near far from Anuradhapura. In the rock temple at Polonnaruwa also are three colossal images, that of the Buddha lying at full length, 46 ft. long, the head resting on the right hand on a bolster, and the details of the robe carefully and skillfully rendered; the erect image by the Buddha’s side on a pedestal ornamented with lots of woodwork, high, probably represents Āruṇa, the favourite disciple. Within the temple is a large seated Buddha, carved in high relief, about 15 ft. high, and at the further end behind the altar a similar figure, 15 ft. high, on a pedestal with lion ornamentation, in front of a carved and decorated screen. As a rule, all the great temples and monasteries were possessed of countless images; and numbers of monastic images still exist there, preserved on the ground, or standing amidst the ruins. The greater statue by the side, 10 ft. high, represents King Dutthagamani, of whom legend tells that he caused a golden image of the Buddha to be made, and set up near the sacred B-tree of Anuradhapura.

(2) Burma.—In the monasteries of Burma the principal hall or room set apart for the reception of the images contains usually a large central figure of the Buddha against the further end,
while others stand on either side or are ranged round the walls. Smaller figures are placed on brackets or shelves. The material employed is brick, wood, or alabaster, or, for more costly images, brass, silver, or gold. The process of casting and an image is accompanied by religious ceremonies, and the occasion is made a public holiday. Formerly, and perhaps in some places at the present day also, offerings of silver, gold, and jewellery were made to the image by pious devotees to whom much merit accrued, as their gifts were thus incorporated in the body of the image. Similar offers are said to have been made at the casting of bells for the temple.

The same three positions of the figure are found as in Ceylon, but the seated Buddha is more usually in the ‘witness’ attitude. Kneeling in front of the figure of the Buddha, the two disciples, Sariputta and Mogallana, are frequently represented, worshipping or listening to his words. Gantama’s three predecessors also, the earlier Buddhas of the present age, Kakusanda, Konhamana, and Kasenakan, sometimes find a place, and Dipankara, the first of the 24 great Buddhas, his forerunners. In the larger temples and viharas other buildings beside the central hall are filled with images. Great and important temples like those at Pagan contain monasteries with many hundreds of images of different sizes. These are, for the most part, the gifts of Buddhist laymen, presented as an act of merit. It is prescribed also that the offering of the images must be made in a definite order, first the standing figure, then the seated, and, finally, in the recumbent attitude. In the courtyard of the temple will often be found, as in Ceylon, a demesne of the sacred elephant, with its mats. The steps that lead up to the temple or shrine are ornamented with fantastic figures, in platter or stone, of lions, dragons, and other monsters.

Offerings of incense, flowers, and plain or coloured candles are made before the images, with prostrations and prayers. The more enlightened Burmese declare that worship is not thereby intended, but that the image serves as a reminder of Gautama himself, and excites in their minds similar feelings of reverence and devotion. It is only in the temples of Lower Burma that considerable numbers of images are seen. In Upper Burma few except those of the most important attitude to be found. In these the standing figures in the attitude of preaching are often of great size, some of the Pagan images reaching a height of over 40 feet. A Buddha in marble at the foot of the hill at Mandalay is 25 ft. high; and around the dimly-lit building in which it stands are smaller shrines, the gilt images in which direct their gaze towards the central figure. In Burma, as elsewhere, the recumbent attitude is the least common; but very large figures exist, usually constructed of brick, as at Pagan and Ava. These are often surrounded by the figures of the disciples, or of mythological rulers of the heavens or other deities.

It is comparatively seldom that the images are found in the open air. There exists, however, a large seated statue at the ancient capital, Amarapura, which is judged to be 80 ft. high; small statues are grouped around. At a few river-side places on the Irrawaddy, rock-cut statues may be seen, facing Ava, and a few miles below Prome, some of which are colossal size. Opposite to Pagan and elsewhere, with the aid of bricks, the rocks themselves have been moulded and shaped into the form of enormous Buddhas. These, for the most part, are now crumbling to ruins, and are overgrown with vegetation.

(3) Siam.—The images and worship of Siam are entirely similar to those of Ceylon and Burma, and further description of them is therefore unnecessary.

5. Mahayana school.—In the pantheon and imagery of the Mahayana school new developments of the native character have been introduced. In some forms of the faith and doctrine, Gautama Buddha himself has ceased to occupy the central and most important position; and the sculpture and temple furniture reflects the views of the worshippers, who address his prayers to one or another favourite divinity, and in practice ignores the personality and claims of the founder of the faith. In the result, the Buddhism of some of the northern countries has become endowed with perhaps the largest pantheon in the world. The imagery and cult, however, vary in the different lands, in each of which the introduced worship of the Buddha has blended with the native religion, and more or less completely taken over the native gods to form a composite whole, the characteristic features of which are seen in the figures and images with which the temples are provided. The refined and ascetic type of the image of the Buddha himself is preserved unchanged. The artistic sense of the worshipper, however, finds its opportunity in the variety and lavish adornment of the figures of the divinities around him, whose multiplicity and influence exceed that of Gautama himself to a very marked extent. The source and home of all these developments and varied types, as of the legends and traditions on which they were based, are to be found in Northern India, and especially the districts of the North-West and the border-land of Afghanistan, where the Greco-Buddhist art of Gandhara was responsible for more or less rigidly determined forms under which the principal gods should be delineated. These chief types or classes of images, therefore, which are more or less common to all the northern Buddhist countries, account for the greater detail account may then be given of the features in which the imagery and worship of the different countries vary from that which may be supposed to be the original form, the modifications which have been introduced, or the actual additions that have been made to the accepted figures of the pantheon.

Reference has already been made to the adoption by Buddhism of the principal Hindu gods. These retain their distinctive attributes and appearance in the carved representations and idols. The most ancient images found in India are Buddhist. In the older Buddhist sculpture, however, at Sisachal, and on the Buda relief of the 2nd century a.d., the Buddha himself is not depicted, although the figures of other gods appear. Only in the early centuries of our era do images of the Buddha become common. Their existence at a previous date cannot, however, be disproved; and it would appear most probable that as the attractive centre of worship the Buddha early dispossessed the ancient Hindu deities. Later carvings at Ellora and elsewhere exhibit numerous figures of the Buddha, among which are some of great size. Occasionally a triad is found, in which Brahma and Indra are represented on either side of the Buddha, as if guarding him. This is not rare, and the lesser deities or semi-deities also of Hinduism, as the Nagas, etc., sometimes find a place.

The sacred triad of the Buddha, the Law or Religion, and the Order or Society (Dharma, Dhamma, Sangha) found early and frequent representation, and, although Gautama usually occupied the central place, the relative order seems not to have been invariable. It has been suggested indeed, perhaps without adequate justification, that in this triad Buddhist thought first gave concrete expression to its feeling of reverence to the person of its founder,
and the personified doctrine and order in which he embodied and perpetuated his teaching. Ancient examples have been found at both Gayā and elsewhere.

The Sañjā is usually depicted as a male figure with the right hand resting on the knee, and holding a lotus flower in the left. The hands, the drapery, and the lotus in the hands of the Buddha and the Buddha image itself in India (in Orissa and western Bengal), a solitary survival and witness to a faith once widespread and influential throughout the Indian subcontinent. In some of these districts images of the Buddha are common, before which animal and other sacrifices are offered by the lower classes of the people, and in parts of Bengal a temple stands in nearly every village. A figure of Buddha, recently discovered at Daula in Orissa, exhibits a position of the arms and hands which seems designed to be a compromise between that described above and one or more of the medallions of the Buddha. The hands are placed on the knees, the right pointing downwards; the other, upturned to the level of the head, bear a rosary and a bell in the left hand, a characteristic of the Daksinakuru, or district to which the Kachcheras are assigned. The actual image of the Buddha is, or was, worshipped as Dharma.

In the elaborate and extensive pantheon of the Mahāyāna the favourite figures are those of the Bodhisattvas (q.v.) and the Dhyānibuddhas, none of which find a place in the south. The general type of the Buddha is that of a young Indian prince, with turban or crown on the head; and the richness of the dress and ornamentation forms a striking contrast to the severe plainness of the monk’s robe in the statues of the Buddha. The principal Bodhisattva is the Buddha in the ancient Indian sculptures; and in the Buddhist caves of Ellora Avalokiteśvara and Vajrapāṇi are represented in attendance on Gautama. These two with Mañjuśrī form a kind of second group of figures, the members of which are sufficiently distinct to be recognized. For the most part, without much difficulty, in the sculptures. For others a general character or type is made to serve, and it is often impossible to determine which particular Bodhisattva is intended. It is worthy of note also that, in scenes before the ascertainment of bodhi, the figure of Gautama where it appears is always depicted after the Bodhisattva model, not according to that of the Buddha. The usual position of the hands in the Bodhisattva images is the full-blown lotus, or sometimes a bunch of blossoms. The presence of the flower is due not only to the fact that it is the emblem of purity, beauty, but also to its constant association with offerings and worship. Figures of Padmapāni Avalokiteśvara are the most common, and are frequently mentioned by the Chinese pilgrims, who state that the images were found on the summit of the high hills. The portraiture of this Bodhisattva seems to have been borrowed from that of the ancient Indian deities, especially Vīṣṇu. It appears usually with several faces, with two or four pairs of arms, and bears on the front of his crown a small figure of a Buddha. Two of the hands are raised in the attitude of adoration; the others carry emblems, as the lotus or the chakra. Figures of Avalokiteśvara therefore, resemble those of Vīṣṇu, but are readily distinguished by the position of the hands, which in the case of the Hindu god are never in the attitude of worship. Special forms or representations of Avalokiteśvara are known as the eleven-headed; this is especially common in Tibet and Nepal, but is met with already in early Buddhist cave sculptures arranged in pyramidical form, in three tiers of three each, with two single heads one above the other at the upper tier, the prominent head representing Amapāla, the spiritual father of the Buddha. The rows of tiers or of heads sometimes exhibit each its appropriate colouring in the order of the white, yellow, red, blue, green. Other figures have a larger number of arms, and the god is then described as "thousand-handed.

Vajrapāṇi either carries a chakra or a lotus on his forehead, and a sañjā in his hand. Mañjuśrī is represented as a seated figure, holding a book and sometimes a spear. Sometimes his hand is grasped directed towards the head, and the hand supported on a flower which the hand holds. The two great figures of the Mahāyāna Buddhists have each their appropriate emblem or emblems by which they may be recognized. Mañjuśrī, himself the "enlightened," carries the sañjā and the lotus, like Vajrapāṇi; Vajrapāṇi carries a sword resting on his shoulder.

Of the Dhyānibuddhas only Amāmitā, judging from the frequent mention of them in the Chinese fasts, establish the claim to approval and worship. He is depicted seated in the "meditative" pose, the hands laid one upon another, in the dhyanasana. According to a well-known form of the legend, he was born from a lotus flower, and is sometimes represented in the sculpture.

Kṣyapa, the Buddha who immediately preceded Gautama, may be recognized by his close-fitting robe, which hides the right hand in its folds at the level of the breast, while the left, resting on the knee, supports the gomukha, or lion’s mouth, in the sculpture.

Of the series of Buddhas besides Gautama himself, only Maitreya, the Buddha of the future, finds a place in all the schools, and is worshipped by all the Mahāyāna Buddhists. His image is found in North India at the time of the visits of the Chinese pilgrims. Both Fā-hien and Huien Tsang report having seen a wooden image of Maitreya, 80 cubits in height, from which a bright light proceeded. A second figure of sandalwood was possessed of the same light-giving virtue; a third at Bodh Gayā was made entirely of silver. Since he has not yet become a Buddha, Maitreya is not usually represented in the conventional Buddha pose, but appears in the dress and equipment of a young Indian prince. Both standing and seated figures are found, the former being more common; in the latter case, the feet rest on the left knee, while the legs hang down, as though seated in Western fashion on a chair. In standing figures the robe is often drawn up, to leave the left leg bare. His emblems are the wheel of the law, the bell, and sometimes depicted resting upon lotus blossoms, which the hands hold. The latter usually assume the attitude known as the dharmachakra mudrā, in which the hands are raised to the breast with the fingers touching. The hair is abundant, and often curls. His image is also found in the conventional Buddha form, but it returns in all cases the characteristic position of the hands.

Tibet.—A marked feature of the imagery and worship of the Lamasitic type of Buddhism is the prominence assigned to deities of Hindu origin, and to gods and demons derived from the native mythology. ‘The pantheon is perhaps the largest in the world. It is peopled by a bizarre crowd of aboriginal gods and hydra-headed demons, who are almost jostled off the stage by their still more numerous Buddhist rivals and counterfeits.’

The number of images and statues is correspondingly great; and these are not confined, as for the most part in other Buddhist lands, to the temples, but are found everywhere in the open air and in private houses; and in the form of charms, talismans, etc., they are carried on the person. Local forms and diversified as these images are, there are also some which are of universal acceptance. The image of Maitreya is placed in the centre behind the great altar, and on either side are the figures of Maitreya and Avalokiteśvara. The latter is usually present, as would naturally be expected, seeing he is instituted in the Dalai Lama; but Amāmitā not seldom takes the place of Maitreya, and instead of Maitreya there stands the founder of the sect to which the monastery belongs. The trinity of the Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha—is said to be rare.

Waddell apparently does not cite a single instance; in comparison with other countries, therefore, it is little if at all known or held in regard.

The normal attitude and pose of the Buddhist images is hands in the lap, or in the hands, or, when seated, behind and overshadowing him is the sacred *pījata* tree, beneath the shade of which Gautama attained supreme wisdom. Accompanying the larger figures the two disciples frequently appear, Śāriputra on the right of the Buddha, and Maudgalyāyana on his left.

The same general type was employed to represent the earlier Buddhas, the predecessors of Gautama. The more distant and mythical of these were not as a rule depicted, except Dīpaṅkara, whose image is often found, with small holes or sockets in which lighted lamps are placed at the festivals. Of the more recent Buddhas a frequent arrangement is in groups of three. The former consists of Gautama together with his six immediate predecessors; the latter, of the three latest Buddhas, Krākulechchanda, Kanakamuni, and Kāśyapa, with Gautama himself and Maitreya, the celestial Buddha, or Jina, are depicted in general in the same attitude, but they never carry a begging-bowl such as is often seen in the figure of the earthly Buddha. Each, moreover, has his appropriate wheel, or pole of the hands, and a different colour. Amītābha is the only one of the five who receives a popular worship, as is attested by the frequency with which his image meets the eye. He is depicted in the *meditative* attitude, without begging-bowl, and is coloured red. Healing or medical Buddhas so-called are also present and are held in high honour, being resorted to in time of sickness; their pictures or images are held to be possessed of magical healing virtue. Images of these Buddhas, however, are not common in Tibetan temples. A superior or primeval Buddha is also worshipped. He is represented seated in the *meditative* attitude, as Amītābha, but with the body of a blue colour, and often unrobed.

The most distinctive feature, however, of the Mahāyāna, or Northern, school of Buddhism in art and sculpture, as in doctrine and cosmology, is associated with the lotus. In Tibet these images are to be found everywhere, and their cult far surpasses in popularity that of the Buddha himself. The figure of Avalokiteśvara, the Bodhisattva who becomes incarnate in the Dalai Lama, is most frequently encountered; but the others—Mañjuśrī, Vajrapāni, and especially Maitreya—are to be seen in very considerable numbers. The original type is that of the youthful Indian prince as on the Gandharan sculptures, in rich embroidered robes, crowned and wearing earrings, and carrying in the hands distinctive emblems. The typical form, however, has been modified to almost of second recognition under the influence on the one hand of the ancient Indian deities, and on the other of the native gods, tutelary divinities, demons, and others, of the early religion of Tibet. Thus the whole body of the image is represented under various *aspects*, which are distinguished not only by appearance and mien, but usually also by colouring.

The mild or Indian type is coloured white or yellow, and a hair or a little red is often added. A red or black shade is characteristic of the fierce forms, designed to awe and terrify more. These last forms belong more especially to the *Manúrik* type of Buddhism, which has close affinities with the Śāktism of the Indian faith. The figures are tall and slender, and graceful, the latter differing only in the absence of the beard and by the prominent breasts. The head is large, with a small underpinning formed by the centre of the forehead, and the whole expression is severe and unsmiling. They stand or are seated upon a *vehicle*, in the form of some animal. In other instances they are represented trampling upon the bodies of their victims, brandishing weapons, and wearing deformed heads.

During the life of Buddha Mahāvīra, as the personification of wisdom, carries a book and sword. With the latter he displays a monk the breast of the Bodhisattva he has no female counterpart. He is usually represented seated in the *meditative* attitude.

Vajrapāni bears a serpant or rod in his right hand, and a bell or other emblem in the left. His aspect is fierce, and his image is correspondingly colored dark blue or black. Maitreya's figure usually appears seated in the *teaching* attitude with the legs dangling down. Celestial figures of this Bodhisattva are to be seen, carved in the rock, upon the grey cliffs of the Himālaya.

Avalokiteśvara is said to have twenty-two forms. In all he is represented with features or members beyond those appropriate to ordinary men. The eleven-headed figure is the most usual, but a type almost as commonly depicted is four-hands, with the ornaments and garments of a prince. Two of the hands carry respectively a lotus and a rosary; the others are joined in the attitude of worship. As Vajrapāni has borrowed the manner and weapons of Indra, so the figure of Avalokiteśvara is modelled on that of Brahmā.

In Tibetan Buddhism not only Avalokiteśvara but the other Bodhisattvas also frequently bear on the head a small figure of one or other of the Dhyāni-buddhas, who are in the spiritual father of the Bodhisattva represented. Exceptionally, however, Maitreya is found with the figure of a Jina as his head. Instead of the actual figure the symbol or emblem alone of the Jina sometimes appears, placed on the head or seated among the locks of the Bodhisattva's hair.

Moreover, each of the female powers who are worshipped has its characteristic figure or delineation, and appears under a *mild* or *fierce* type. The most common and popular is Tarā, wife of Vairocana, or the consort of Avalokiteśvara, but also the Chinese Kwanyin. Her forms are *green* and *white* respectively; and the two foreign wives of King Sron Tsam Gampo, who introduced Buddhism into Tibet in the 7th cent., are believed to have been incarnations of Tarā, the Chinese princess of the white form, the Nepalese of the green. The latter is depicted as an Indian lady seated, with a lotus in her hand and the left leg pendant; the face is green. The *white* form of Tarā, with a white face, is seven-eyed, the palms of the hands and the soles of the feet being each provided with an eye, while another is placed in the centre of the forehead; her worship is said to be confined mainly to the Mongol period and the southern parts of India, the number of Tarās multiplied almost indefinitely.

Marichi, the queen of heaven, is represented with three faces and six hands, with a sword and weapons. She is seated on a lotus throne, drawn by swines, and one of her faces is that of a sow. The abbess of the Samding monastery near Lhasa, who bears a high character for sanctity, is an incarnation of a sow-goddess who is perhaps to be identified with Marichi. At Lhassa there are shrines of Kail, where the figure of the goddess is black, ornamented with skull masks, etc., and others of a mild type of handsome aspect, wearing robes of silk and adorned with pearls and precious stones.

The four Guardians of the four quarters appear frequently in the temples. Yama also, the god of the under-world, has his house in the hands. His consort, Lhamo, is the tutelary divinity of Lhasa.

The images of local and tutelary deities are to be found everywhere; and the demonic festivals of evil are not less numerous than those of the good. Defaced images and the founders and patrons of local temples obtain considerable worship, and are frequently represented with unnatural features or members in excess of the normal, to emphasize their superhuman character. Of these the Dalai Lāma is the most popular. Padma Sambhava also, the founder of Lamāism, takes a high place.
Of the disciples of Gautama Buddha, besides Sāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, a group of sixteen is commonly found. This name is usually written as the early arhats, or the more important monasteries at Lhasa and elsewhere may be seen statues of Buddha or of other deities, of much value, either from the material employed or the costly precious stones and ornaments with which they are adorned. In the private chapel of the Dalai Lama at the Potala palace in Lhasa there stands an image of Avalokiteshvara of solid gold. The great temple in the same city contains, among many other images, a celebrated gilt figure of Gautama, said to have been brought from Peking by the Chinese wife of Sron Tsham Gampo. Another representation is that of Gautama as a young prince, crowned and robed, at the time when he left his home. The workmanship of the latter figure is said to be poor and inartistic, but the crown and shrine are thickly set with precious stones. In a third temple in the same city, the ‘Temple of Medicine’, is a renowned figure of Buddha, with a bowl of blue lapis-lazuli stone, surrounded by other statues, which are supposed to represent physicians whose skill and fame have won them dedication after death. They are sometimes worshipped as gods (Tibetan).

(2) China.—The Buddhist images of China are similar in character, but not so numerous as those of Tibet, and they are almost entirely confined to the monasteries and temples. In addition to the Bodhisattvas and Buddha, tutelary deities and demons appear, together with patriarchs and saints of olden time who have been raised to the position of gods. In the monasteries there are usually two halls set apart for the service of the gods. The central and more important hall contains the effigies of the Bodhisattvas, with their disciples, and of the Bodhisattvas, placed at the further end of the hall and ranged round the sides. Large monasteries have, in addition, more than one entrance hall, where the figures of the guardian spirits stand, and of the protecting genii of the place, the images of founders or patrons, and of the native popular gods adopted by Buddhism into its pantheon.

Of the Buddhas, Gautama is the chief. His image is most frequently found in the ‘meditative’ pose, sitting on a throne and holding a scripture. This pose is usually drawn over both shoulders so that the arms are also crossed, the neck and chest being exposed. Frequently a halo surrounds the head, on the back of which is a circular screen behind which the image represents the head of the sacred Bo-tree, and serves the purpose of a back and glazed background. Two standing postures are not uncommon: the one as a child, with the arms extended and pointing upwards and downwards; the other as a sitting, with the hands on the knees. Recumbent figures are rare. They are represented in full dress, lying in the usual attitude upon the right side, sometimes even upon an ordinary cushion.

Of the celestial Buddhas, Amitabha (in Chinese, Om-to-fa) is the most revered and popular. The normal Buddha type of figure is adopted for his characteristic gourd. Amitabha is usually depicted in a standing position, with long arms hanging at his sides. Among the Buddha of the past, Dipankara alone is generally recognized. There is often found, with the image, a lamp. The number of these last varies; but usually there are 108, a number said to correspond to that of the sacred books.

With the exception of Gautama himself, certain names of the Bodhisattvas are more widely revered and receive more constant worship than others. The image of Kwan-yin, the ‘goddess of mercy’, the female form of Avalokiteshvara, is universally honoured. There is evidence that in the early centuries this Bodhisattva was often worshipped in his proper maleness, and circumstances under which the transition to a female deity took place are altogether obscure. There seems to be no definite or accepted type for the figure of Kwan-yin. The goddess is known under very varied forms. Universally, however, she is loved, and perpetual offerings are brought to her shrine. Of the other well-known Bodhisattvas of Indian origin, Mahākāyana (Chin. Yama), and Satyanātha (Chin. To-shih-chi) are perhaps the most widely known and most frequently delineated in painting and sculpture. Each is depicted riding upon a vehicle, usually a lion, a horse, or an elephant. They often appear as members of a triad in which Kwan-yin occupies the middle place. A frequent triad also is that of the ‘three holy ones of the western region,’ i.e. the paradise of Amitsābha. In this triad Amitsābha himself is in the centre, Kwan-yin on the left in the place of honour, and the Bodhisattva Mahākāyana (Chin. To-shih-chi) on the right. The Chinese Yama, Ti-tsong, the ruler of Hades, with his twelve subordinate demons, who execute pain and torture upon the wicked, is a familiar effigy in the idol temples and halls.

An altogether strange and anomalous figure is that of the Bodhisattva Maitreya (M-i-to-fa), the Buddha of the future, who does not occupy so prominent a position as in Tibet and elsewhere, and seems to have become identified with a native genius or tutelary deity. He is usually represented in a crouching attitude, the robe thrown back so as to expose the breast, with long pendant ears and shaved head, and with the right leg drawn up and the right hand resting on the knee. In the right hand is a lotus flower or a rosary, in the left a purse or bag, described as containing the ‘lucky six gifts’. The expression of the face is lively and even merry, and the whole figure is reminiscent of a comfortable, well-living friar of the Middle Ages.

Other tutelary deities are the four Guardians of the four quarters, whose images stand in a defensive or protecting attitude on either side of the entrance to the temple or hall of the monastery. Their figures are carved in the round, and are given his own appropriate colour, and emblem or device which he carries in his hand. The Guardian of the South (To-son) is red and bears a sword and a shield; the Guardian of the East (Chāi-fa) is blue, with an instrument of music; the Guardian of the West (Tso-wu) is holding a fan; the Guardian of the North (Kwung-so) is white, and holds in his hand a sword. In the same hall, in addition to the Guardians, two figures are generally placed in the centre, facing in opposite directions, towards and away from the entrance. Moreover, a special deity presides over the kitchen department, and his image is said to be found in the kitchens of most monasteries. The well-known and popular god of war, Kwan-yin, is a deified hero of early Chinese history; and the images of other gods, saints, or demons, of native origin or derived from Indian sources, are very numerous, and are more or less closely associated with Buddhist worship.

Of the disciples of the Buddha, the most commonly figured are Ananda and Kāśyapa. They stand or kneel on either side of the Buddha in a reverential attitude, with upraised hands, and are having the appearance and mien of a young man. The group of the 18 Lohan frequently finds a place in the temples, where their images are ranged along the sides of the buildings. In the older monasteries the original group of 16 disciples is sometimes found, as elsewhere in the Northern school. Comparative rarely a larger group of 500 Lohan is met with, consisting of the most part of deified emperors or other notable heroes and men of former times. Of deified saints, the most prominent and popular are the six present personages of Chinese Buddhism. The first of these, Bodhidharma (Zu-foo), who established the patriarchate...
in China in the 6th cent., is universally known and honoured. His appearance lends support to the tradition of his foreign origin, the face being beardless and possessing very characteristic Chinese features. His image usually stands near the principal altar, at the farther end of the great hall.

In the principal hall a trio of images is often found behind the principal altar. The members of the trio vary. Frequently Gautama is accompanied by Amitabha and Yo-shih-fo, the Buddha of healing; sometimes by other Buddhas or Bodhisattvas. Malavara, Directora, is sometimes to be represented. If the figure of Gautama is unaccompanied by others of his own rank, then the two disciples, Ananda and Kasyapa, stand before him. In front of the altar are smaller images of Bodhisattvas and others. The 18 Lokah, occasionally with other gods, occupy the sides of the room.

The material employed for the images is generally wood or clay. Bronze images are rare and costly; a few are of marble. They are usually straight and a curious ceremony is observed, by virtue of which the deity is supposed to take possession of his habitation. Through a hole at the back of the statue, a strip of paper, tied to an asp or an adder, or to a small creature—is introduced into the hollow interior. The hole is then sealed up, and the soul of the animal passes into and gives life to the image of the god. The last act is the painting in of the eyes. The :-altars may have complete vision. This is known as kai-iwong, the giving of light.

(5) Korea.—There is little that is distinctive of the temple images and statues of Korea as compared with China or Japan. The most remarkable feature is the presence of pictures on the walls of the rooms of the monastery. These are never so found in the two countries named, with which the Buddhist thought and practices of Korea have otherwise been in the closest relation. The images themselves are few in number, and with little or no decoration; they are usually also of comparatively small size, gilded as in China, the material used being wood or clay. The five chief Buddhas are represented, and the corresponding Bodhisattvas, Kwan Yin taking the place of Avalokitesvara. Amitabha maintains a popular worship, which rival, if it does not surpass, that of Gautama himself. Of the celestial beings and deified saints, Indra and other gods recur, and the 16 Lokah; the larger group also of the 600 disciples is met with in Korea. Tertiary deities are common, and personifications of the forces of nature. The mountain god, whose emblem is the tiger, and the kitchen god are well known, and are worshipped with offerings and prayer. Perhaps the most feared divinity, whose wrath is most to be deprecated, and whose image is most frequently set up, is Ti-taeng, the ruler of the lower world. There are traces also of a solar cult, adopted by Buddhism, in the reverence paid to the sun and moon, the Great Bear, etc. For the last a special hall or chapel is sometimes provided within the monastery.

(4) Japan.—The most striking feature of Japanese Buddhism is the extent to which it has asserted its independence of Chinese influence. The independence of thought is reflected in its images and works of art in a characteristic manner in the architecture and arrangement of the temples, and the general disposition of the figures of the deities therein, but in the spirit and in detail a difference is very manifestable. In the principal hall of the temple the chief images are placed, as in China, on the altar at the further end. In front a partition is sometimes erected, and the remainder of the hall remains free and unoccupied for the purpose of worship. There is usually also a chapel dedicated to the founder of the sect to whom the temple or monastery belongs, and separate rooms are provided for the shrines of the Kwanon, Amida, or other favourite divinity. In addition to deities of Hindu and Buddhist origin, Japanese Buddhism has adopted Shinto and Chinese gods also into its pantheon.

Of deities that are definitely Buddhist in origin the five Buddhas and Dhyānibuddhas, and the five corresponding Bodhisattvas, are naturally the most prominent. The Adibuddha is not represented. Of the Dhyānibuddhas Amítábha (Amida), the compassionate ruler of the western paradise, is the favourite, and his figure is to be met with everywhere, especially in the temples and monasteries of the Far East. He is represented in the usual Buddha attitude, cross-legged, with the hands lying in the lap. The ōdō on the forehead is said to be indicative of wisdom. At Kamakura the great bronze statue is said to represent Amida. The figure is nearly 50 ft. high, and is hollow, with a small shrine within to which access is obtained by means of a ladder. The larger dābulata in the Todaiji temple enclosure at Nara is said to represent the Buddha Dipankara (Jap. Dainichi). The image has suffered from successive fires, and has been repaired. It is 53 ft. high, and is seated on a lotus throne, with the right hand raised to the level of the shoulder, the left resting on the knee. The whole is believed to have been originally gilded. Behind is a wooden halo richly girt, and on either side of the principal figure and at the back are images of Bodhisattvas and other deities, of more than life-size.

In Japan as in China Avalokiteshvara has become a female deity, Kwanon, the Chinese Kwan-yin, the goddess of mercy.

She is depicted under various forms, sometimes with three heads and many arms. The hands grasp objects typical of Buddhist doctrine or practice, as the wheel, a peg, a lotus, or an axe, etc. A begging bowl is sometimes held in the lap. The Sanjusangendo temple at Kyoto contains 100,000 images of Kwanon. A thousand smaller figures, each 5 ft. high, and gilded, represent the goddess in her thousand-handed form. On the hands, forearms, etc., of these there are executed smaller figures, the arrangement of which is said to be different in every instance. Besides Kwanon, the Bodhisattvas most commonly represented are Manjusri (Jap. Monju) and Samantabhadra (Fugen). They often appear seated on the left and right hands respectively. The only other Bodhisattvas who commands wide reverence and worship is Daijō-kei, joint ruler with Amida and Kwanon of the western paradise. The figure of Fugen is sometimes seen rock-carved, of great size; but it is not found in the temples.

The temple entrance is usually guarded by the ancient Hindu deities Brahman (Bonten) and Indra (Takshak), who stand in threatening attitudes on the left and right sides respectively. The popular divinity Fudo is by some authorities identified with Siva, but others regard him as representing Vairochana. His appearance is fierce and grim, with black face, and he bears in his hand the sword of justice. Other Indian gods are found, as Vaiśravana (Bishamon), the god of wealth, who has become one of the seven deities of good fortune, and Ganeśa. The real god of wealth is Daikoku, who carries with him bales of rice. The ruler of Hades, Emma-O, is frequently depicted. He is seated with a judge's cap on his head and a staff in his hand, and is usually accompanied by attendants who bear Carthusian forms. This image is probably a corruption of the Sanskrit Yamaraji. Ti-taeng, the Chinese ruler of the world below, is represented by the Japanese Iko, whose stone image is perhaps the most popular object of worship throughout the country. He is the patron of travellers, the guide and helper of all who are in trouble, and is represented in the attitude of a monk sitting cross-legged, with
closely shaved head, holding in his hands a jeweled and a staff.

Of the disciples of the Buddha, Ananda and Kasyapa (phys., Anan and Kasha) are most usually found with Gautama. The 16 Lohan (Jap. Rakan) are often represented, and the larger group of 600, the latter sometimes in a special hall or chapel. Of the Rakan by far the most popular is Benzairin, the healer of disease, whose image in the forepart of the temple is frequently defaced and has its features almost obliterated by the constant rubbing, to which it is subjected, the practical advice and belief among the lower classes being that relief from pain may certainly be secured by rubbing in succession the corresponding part of Benzairin’s image and the affected limb or other portion of their own bodies. The Chinese patriarch Bodhidharma (Doramen) is also present in many instances; and the founders or patrons of the various sects are deified and their images erected in the temple.

Shinto deities that have been adopted by Buddhism are the most popular is Hachiman, the god of war, to whom many temples are dedicated. He is said to have been a deity of the 3rd or 4th century.

Images and Idols (Celtic).—I. Terminology.—A specific Celtic terminology for idols is found only in Irish, i.e., idol, ‘idol,’ being borrowed from Gr. through Lat., while ir. arracht is a native term meaning ‘shape, likeness, specio, or idol.’ A non-Celtic common word is blin-leis or idren-din, ‘hand-god,’ a small, portable idol, a kind of household god somewhat similar to the panthea of the Romans (ZCP ii. [1898] 448). In Cornish’s Glossary (Gr. O’Dowd, ed. W. Stokes, Calcutta, 1898, p. 158), O’Dowd cites the word tromie from an old Irish glossary as meaning ‘tutelary gods, i.e., floor-gods, or gods of protection.’

2. Gauls.—For lack of evidence to the contrary, it has been held to be an accepted fact that the pre-Roman Gauls had no images or idols of their gods.

The reasons advanced in support of this belief are that the Druids, who were pre-Celtic in origin, but who became eventually the priests of the Celts, were opposed to image-worship, which they prohibited in Gaul as early as the end of the paenitetic age (S. Régnier, ‘L’Art plastique en Gaule et le druidisme,’ in Écol. xiii. [1892] 189 fl. = Celtie, pag. 419, note 2), citing the lack of evidence. However, there has been found of the existence of such a prohibition, save that various classical authors postulated a connexion between the Pythagoreans and the Druids, and that the analogy between these doctrines was obviously hostile to anthropomorphism. More recent authorities, who refuse to accept this explanation, claim that the similarity between the two sects is to be found in the common belief in metempsychosis or the immortality of the soul. Since no evidence of the existence of a prohibition against image-worship has been found in the doctrines taught by the Druids, or in the observations of Latin and Greek historians, it is impossible whether there were official prohibitions, or whether by this, houses, of wood only (J. A. MacCulloch, Rel. of the Anc. Celt., Edinburgh, 1911, p. 288). Yet it remains to be explained why the primitive Gauls were able to carve on stone or wood such forms, which may or may not have been objects of worship, but did not make use of the same material to represent their gods—unless one or two figures among those that have been recently discovered belong to the period antedating the invasion of the Romans.

Most authorities seem to hold that, though anthropomorphism was an accepted belief among the primitive Gauls, their gods did not figure in a statue form at the rites performed in their honour because they were considered to be invisible (C. Jullian, Hist. de Gaule, Paris, 1898, i. 359). This was especially true of those tribes who dwelt in other countries than ancient Gaul, whose gods had for a long time assumed a more or less clearly defined human shape in the belief of the people did poets and artists attempt to relate their lives and deeds to give them individuality, that of man (Jullian, Recherches sur la rel. gaul., Bordeaux, 1905, p. 48).

According to Badoian (Bibl. xix. 9), the Celtic chief Brennus, having entered a Greek temple and found there images of wood and stone, laughed loudly at the Greeks who made their gods in their own likeness. This chief was obviously not acquainted with guided images of the anthropomorphic kind; although that fact does not preclude the possibility that he as well as his soldiers worshipped the crude figures of animals painted or scratched on a wall of a sacred grove on stones—a cult that persisted in most of the tribes (D. d’Arbois de Jubainville, Les Druides et les dieux colt. à forme d’animaux, Paris, 1904, p. 159). But in primitive times in Ireland, even these divinities were invisible. Among the many that could be mentioned, the most interesting is probably Sabh, the god of war and murder, who only on important occasions—usually the death of a king—appeared to the human eye, always in the form of a raven (J. Sturman, Stories from the Táin, Dublin, 1908, p. 6; W. M. Hennessy, Eccl. i. 1850-71, 44).

Anthropomorphism arose among the Celts from the cult of trees and stones, principally of those set up over the graves of the dead. The stone associated with the dead man’s spirit became an image of himself, and was perhaps later on usually fashioned in his own likeness (MacCulloch, 284). This is probably the point of departure of the neolithic idol whose artistic history has been so aptly traced by J. Dechelette (ed., Les Origines de l’idole neolithique, in his Manuel d’archéol. préhist. collo et gallo-romaine, Paris, 1908-10, i. 494 fl.). Lucan describes trunks of trees in a sacred wood roughly carved to represent gods—esturius maestus deorum (Phars. iii. 419 ?), and this rude likeness became an image of the spirit or god of the trees. When Caesar states (de Bell. Gall. vi. 17) that there were plurima summiacrai, especially of the god Teutates in his time, he does not mean carved idols.
images, but probably boundary stones, like those of the Greeks and Romans, or shapeless pillars that symbolized the god but did not show him. On seeing them objects of a special cult, he concluded that they were really simulacra of a god (MacCulloch, op. cit.). Some authorities even maintain that these simulacra were nothing else than accumulations of fragments found all over ancient Gaul (Reinach, loc. cit.); and Julian maintains that there is only one statue found thus far that really belongs to the pre-Roman period—a strange, immobile, geometrical figure, avastikas, and the like (Bull. archéol., 1898, pp. 339-401). If this be true, then it forms the sole exception, for not another one has been found anywhere in Gaul belonging to a period previous to the Roman epoch (G. Dottin, Rev. des Celtes, Paris, 1903, p. 32 f.).

The adoration of boundary stones and pillars, or menhirs, continued until well into Christian times. In the time of St. Samson of Dol, written at the beginning of the 7th cent., there is mention of a standing stone—simulacrum abominabile—worshipped by the ancient Bretons (J. Mamillon, Acta sacra, fasc. III); Benedictus S. Benedicti, Paris, 1856-1701, i. 171 f.; 290 f. In the same sense of stopping these heretical practices, the saint carved a cross upon this stone. The fact that many menhirs have been found in France containing dedications to the sun, is an indication that this was the usual method adopted by the Church to oppose such worship (Reinach, Éd. xxvi [1804] 336 = Cœtes, iii. 402 f.).

Later on a terrestrial abode was assigned to the gods, usually an oak-wood, for the oak and the mistletoe were especially sacred, according to the doctrines of the Druids (G. Callegari, Il Druidismo nell antica Gallia, Padua, 1864, p. 58 ff.). Then, when the tribes had more fully developed the custom of apotheosizing their dead chiefs, the divine and the human were brought into still closer relations with one another, which tended to strengthen the belief in anthropomorphism. Thereafter, such gods as Tuterac, Eua, Tarcan, and Belenos not only assumed human form, but, under the influence of other nations, were clothed and armed like the Gauls (Julian, Hist. ii. 152 f.).

The Gauls at Ephesus and Marseilles were the first to take up the practice of idol-worship, due, without doubt, to their contact with the Greeks and Jews (Pavelson, vol. i. 365 f.), and thus, according to the notice of the Celto-Ligurians in the earliest period (Bouc. xiii. 189 ff. = Cœtes, i. 146 ff.); it may be our opinion of this ingenious explanation, it is possible that the Druids did not encourage the spread of this worship; for, according to Luccat (i. 459 f.), that symbolized the notion that they discouraged it as far as they could, because they realized that the moment a man gives to his god a figure and lodges him in his home he has need of the intervention of priests (Bouc. xiii. 189 ff. = Cœtes, i. 146 ff.). Whichever way we may regard the influence of the Druids, or the Gallic influence over it and offers it to his idol gods. He then sacrifices the idol, and if he has not received the illumination before the next day, he pronounces incantations upon his divinity; he then takes his idol gods unto him (into his bed) in order that he may not be interrupted in his offerings. He then places it upon his two cheeks and falls asleep. He is then wakened so that he be not stirred nor interrupted by any one until everything that he seeks be revealed to him at the end of a second (i.e. a day) or two or three, or as long as he continues at his offering, and hence it is that this ceremony is called tabes, that is, the two hands upon him crosswise, that is, a hard over and a hand hither upon his cheeks. And St. Patrick prohibited this ceremony, because it is a species of terras isochridas (another kind of incantation mentioned in the Galley), that is, he declared that any one who performed it should have no place in heaven or on earth (Stokes, loc. cit.; Hyde, loc. cit. 84). It is related also in the Book of Leinster that Dalz, who succeeded Niall of the Nine Hestanes as King of Ireland in A.D. 405, consulted the Druids on the eve of the great festival of Samhain in the seventeenth year of his reign, on the 9th of October, during the next year, for he was then contemplating an invasion of the Continent. Dalh and his ancestors were taken to the plain of Bath Archall, where the Druids had their idols and altars, and there the prediction was made (K. O'Curry, Lectures on the 9th中部年代 in the City of Dublin, 1878, p. 284). As stated above, these passages seem to indicate that the Druids had private images at that time which they alone were permitted to consult. They show also that, whatever may have been the attitude of the Druids on the continent towards idol-worship, there was still some influence in accepting it and adapting it to their own ends.

As for public idols, there is sufficient evidence that they were very numerous throughout the country. To these sacrifices were offered up by the people, or rather by the Druids on behalf of the
people, for the purpose of securing good weather for the crops and an abundance of cattle. St. Patrick is supposed to have introduced Confession (viii) that previous to his arrival in Ireland the people 'worshipped only idols and abominations' (PL iii. 810; N. J. D. White, 'The Latin Writings of St. Patrick,' in Proc. Roy. Irish Acad. xxv. (1856) 270, § 41). According to the Tripitika Life, during a certain year Patrick found no more fitting place to celebrate Easter than Mag Breg, 'in the place wherein was the chief (abode) of the idolatry and wickedness,' called *Inanna drudaihta*—of Ireland, to wit, in Tara' (W. Stokes, Tripitika Life of Patrick, London, 1887, p. 41). Again, when Patrick visited Oengus, the son of Nathriach, in Munster, the morning after his arrival 'all the idols were on their faces—inna arrachta hurla inna righ' (lit. 'in their beds'); ib. p. 195. Furthermore, Jecellius, in his biography of Patrick, remarks that 'idol worship ad vampum S. Patrick in Monemnon' (J.S. Mart. ii. (1863) 553). That the chief purpose of Patrick's sojourn in Ireland would be the destruction of all the images of the idols was, in fact, foretold by the wizards and enchanters at the court of King Laegaire, son of Niail (ib. pp. 92–93); and when, at the end of the Tripitika Life, we are told that, 'after destroying idols and images, and the knowledge of wizardry,' the time of holy fasting drew near, the prophecies were fulfilled (ib. p. 250). So strong a hold had idolatry gained upon the people that two maidens, converted to Christianity, were persecuted and drowned by a petty king named Echaid for having refused to engage in the pagan form of worship (ib. p. 225).

These idols were generally very rudely carved, most of them, in fact, being mere pillar-stones (J. B. Bury, Life of St. Patrick, London, 1905, p. 74). There was, however, in the plain of Moha Sceat, one great idol which apparently was of much finer workmanship. The image, ornamented with gold and silver, was called, according to the Dimnaichus in the Book of Leinster (p. 213), Cromn Crian ("Bloody Crescent"); but in the Tripitika Life of Patrick the name given to it is Cenn Crian ("Bloody Head"); Stokes, 91). This gold-covered idol, surrounded by twelve lesser ones ornamented with gold, was the abode of certain Irish tribes, representing, in all probability, the sun-god ruling over the twelve seasons. According to the Dimnaichus mentioned above, this great idol was a tributary tribute from its worshippers. In return for the beautiful weather they desired for their crops, they offered up to it their first-born children 'with many cries and heart-rending moans for their death, assembled about Cromn Crian' (d'Arbois of Julivertin, Le Cyclo mythologique irlandais, Paris, 1884, p. 107).

The Rennes MS of this poem tells us that Cromn Crian was, before the arrival of Patrick, the vag-idal h-Erinn, or 'king idol of Ireland.' Around him (were) twelve idols made of stone; but he was of gold. Until Patrick's advent he was the god of every folk that colonized Ireland. To him they used to offer the festivals of every year and the chief ales of every clan. And they all prostrated themselves before him, so that the tops of their foreheads and the gristle of their noses, and the caps of their knees and the ends of their elbows broke, and their heads and limbs became a mass of green stumps (K. Mayer and A. Nitt, Voyage of Bran, London, 1895–6, p. 59, in the revised form, see ib. p. 216 ff.). Many were the legends grouped about this idol. The Dimnaichus states that the Book of Leinster informs us that, several centuries before the Christian era, King Tigernach and crews of his people were destroyed in some inexplicable manner while they were worshipping this idol on the first of November, or Samain's Eve (F. Foys, Soc. Hist. of Anc. Ireland, London, 1859, i. 274). According to the Tripitika Life (pp. 91–93), this idol, which was 'very high and had wings,' was worshipped by men and maidens, was overthrown by St. Patrick, who cast his curse upon it. The ground opened, and swallowed the twelve lesser idols as far as their heads, which are interpreted that, when the life of the saint was written, the pagan sanctuary had so fallen into decay that the twelve lesser idols remained above ground (J. Rhys, Celtic Heathendom (UL, 1887), London, 1892, p. 200).

Another famous idol in western Connacht was Cromn Dubh, or 'Black Crescent,' whose name, according to O'Curry, is still connected in Munster and Connacht with the first month of the year (MS Materials, 632). This Sunday, the anniversary of its destruction, is still called 'Cromn Dubh's Sunday' (Donachair Cromn Dubh). There was also an idol called *Lon Parhain na Cruach* (G. Petrie, On the Hist. and Antig. of Tara Hill, London, 1889, p. 84). At the festival of *Bren-Tropin*, i.e. the beginning of autumn, the young of every sort of animal was assigned as an offering to this god (Ecol xi. (1890) 485).

According to another legend, 'a fire was always kindled in Bial's name at the beginning of summer, and cattle were driven between the two fires' (Stokes, Cormac's Glossary, p. 23).

According to the passage quoted above from Cormac's Glossary, St. Patrick abolished the imbas foroarnai and the teinn ledga, because the performance of these incantations needed an offering of some kind to idols or demons. These probably include the An-duis, or 'the pagan form of worship' (ib. p. 225).

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Notwithstanding St. Patrick's prohibition, idol worship in certain forms continued in many places in Ireland far down into Christian times; and traces of these rites exist even to-day in some of the more remote districts of the country.

4. Welsh.—The lives of the early Saints of Britain inveigh frequently against idolatry or even magic-worship to which the British Celts were addicted (MacCalloch, 296). Gildas tells us that in his time there were images 'mouldering away within and without the deserted temples, with stiff and deformed features' (de Escul. Brit. ii. [1891] 457; MacCalloch, 296); and before the lady Cessare decided to make a trip to Ireland, she consulted her hand-god to see if the omens were favourable (ib.). In the account of the Battle of Moutara, mention is made of a speaking sword, which had that power, because at that time 'men worshipped arms, and they were a magic safeguard' (d'Arbois of Julivertin, Le Cyclo mythologique irlandais, 1884, p. 107). Notwithstanding St. Patrick's prohibition, idol worship in certain forms continued in many places in Ireland far down into Christian times; and traces of these rites exist even to-day in some of the more remote districts of the country.

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5. Scots.—M. Martin relates that the inhabitants of the Scottish islands worshipped an image of a god called Bel, without which the Irish god of that name (Descr. of the Western Islands of Scotland, London, 1716, p. 105).

6. Bretons.—The ecclesiastical canons of Brittany mention stones, fountains, and trees as being
worshipped even as late as the 10th cent. (J. Ferguson, *Rude Stone Monuments in all Countries*, London, 1872, p. 24 f.). Proccedions of images were quite common in Britaia until a recent date. St. Martin was the object of one of these processions, because he considered them a form of pagan worship (Sulp. Severus, *Vita S. Martini*, xii). These processions were forbidden by the edicts of various councils, and often, in an attempt to make this method of inveighing against them to be of no avail, they Christianized them. Thus the rogation processions with the crucifix and the Madonnas, as well as the pilgrimage of St. John's image, at the Midsummer festivals, were but a continuation of these ancient forms of worship. The *Großvogel*, or *Venus of Quinquini*, which may date back to pre-Roman times, was for many centuries an object of important rites in Britain (D. Monnier, *Trad. pop. comp., Paris*, 1854, p. 921).

**LITERATURE.**—This has been sufficiently indicated in the article.

**JOHN LAWRENCE REID.**

**IMAGES AND IDOLS** (Chinese).—China is full of images. Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism have all fostered the use of them, and there are to be found in Buddhist and Taoist temples in the greatest abundance, in private homes, in boats, in streets, and almost everywhere.

3. Emperor Wu Yik (1198-1214 B.C.) is credited with having made the first images or idols. The objects of worship then were heaven and earth, the spirits of mountains and streams, etc. The Emperor was believed upon the mythical; and to allow his disbelief in, and contempt for, them, he had images of clay and wood made to represent them, and ordered men to fight with them. As a result, he said that men were stronger than the gods, and it was folly to worship them.

4. The art of sculpture and the making of images of stone do not reach back in China to the high antiquity that they attained in Egypt and some other ancient lands, though the gem was present before the Christian era, and revealed itself in sculpture in bas-relief on the surface of stone. The earliest known specimens were executed in the 2nd cent. B.C. and display a primitive character in their composition, and convey the impression that the art was in its infancy and could not have been in existence more than one or two centuries after the date of the first great monument of art in China was nearly as old as Egyptian and Chaldaean civilization.

5. The mural decorations of buildings were apparently the precursors of the isolated image which later came out, as it were, from the stone stelae of which it had previously formed a part, and on the surface of which it was carved. Chinese art is also greatly indebted to Buddhism in the treatment of animal and human life as we see it revealed at a later period; for it, again, developed the germ of the idea in the Chinese mind, and gave a great extension to it. It inspired the statues which hitherto had only half emerged from the stone, and, copying the examples introduced by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims on their return with the idols which they brought from India, the first Chinese statues were of Buddhist deities.

6. The majesty forms of some of the gigantic images—*one is 100 ft. in height.*—Bear a certain grandeur in their mien; a serenity and calmness appears in their faces in keeping with the conditions on which Buddha should have over the passions. The Indian inspiration is distinctly to be seen, and for some time the Chinese were mere copyists. In the stone work of images there has been no development in an artistic sense. A slight progress has been the type of it, whether seen in the gigantic figures of warriors that line the approaches to royal tombs or in the more common stone idol of Buddhism. Images of animals also appear, cut in stone, at these royal mausoleums, and a pair of lions before temples and official and public buildings, these stone images of lions, as well as clay images of cats on the topmost part of a roof, being believed to act as charms against the malign influences.

7. Clay images placed by evilly-disposed builders and plasterers in the wall of a house are believed to exert an evil influence, since these images, it is said, are imbued with life by the infusion into them of some of the men's own life-blood.

8. Ghosts of idols are not unknown.

9. Straw images are used to injure enemies in witchcraft.

10. Miniature images of white cockels in sugar are conspicuous objects at a Chinese wedding. Bits of them are broken off and given to the newly-married couple to eat. A white cockel, or a paper image of one, is carried on the coffin in a funeral procession to induce one of the souls of the deceased to enter it.

11. Both Buddhism and Taoism have legends of images of their founders being revealed in dreams to emperors, and the introduction of the former into China is ascribed to one of these—a dream of a golden image. As the result of the Taoist dream, a stone image of foreign material, 5 ft. high, was built at Lo-yang, and the P. L. Wiegler is inclined to believe that this image, discovered in 1912 a.d. 741, was Neoclassic, and not that of Loo-lee; for he says that it was a Neoclassic service copy made by seven priests which was held in the palace on receiving the image, and it was the same Emperor who showed a favor to this image.

12. In bronze work (gilded bronze is much used for Buddhist images) copied from Buddhist sources, it was not servile copying, but judicious imitation, with freedom for the artist to carry out his own ideas in the world which he created of gods, goddesses, heroes, sages or patriarchs, ascetics, and others. The technique is such as to call forth the untainted praise of the artist. In the image of Buddha himself the Chinese have adhered most closely and longest to the Indian models which were introduced centuries before, and which give the characteristics of Buddha as told in the sacred books (cf. *Images and Idols* [Buddhist]).

13. Chinese have excelled in their images of the Goddess of Mercy, some of which have been compared to the work of Donatello and Ghiberti.

14. Taoist.—Viewed from an artistic standpoint, the Taoist bronze images as well as some of other materials are most interesting. Here there is a freedom from foreign influence, and a national expression shows itself. The images thus produced are not confined to one type, but much variety is seen. An animated life often reveals itself in the place of the serene contemplative mood of many of the Buddhist images, which have, of course, a beauty of their own. The founder of Taoism, Loo-lee, is often represented with long beard, bushy eyebrows, and huge forehead; and the Eight Great Genii are also often produced. It would be impossible to particularize all the celebrated Taoist deities which are constantly to be seen. One must confine oneself to a mention of only a few of the most notable. One of the most interesting is the Star-god of Literature, who is more a Confucian god and whose attitude is most artistic. Poised on one foot on a sea-monster's head, with outstretched arm and hand holding a pen, he recalls some of the classic statues of Mercury. Another control which is the Northern Ruler, with unbound locks, and bare


**2. Denays, 93.**

**3. Denays, 335.**

**4. Denays, 10, 22.**


**Palaeographes, pp. 47, 50, 52; Rost, p. 36.**
foot, one placed on a tortoise, while his banner has a sombre ground on which appear the seven stars of the plough, or Charles's Wain. There are also the Ten Judges of Hades, and in their courts are images of women—most of whom are emblems of Hell. Besides these, there are the State-gods, such as the God of War, the Patron Saint of the late Manchu dynasty, and a number of others.

3. Confucius.—Statues of Confucius came into vogue during the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618-906). It may be noted here that there is not much scope in China for statues or statues except for religious purposes, since the form which monuments take is not that of statues, but of ornamental arches over roads or streets in town or country. These images of Confucius, however, seem to approach nearer to our idea of a statue than any others; for the tablets to the Sage are retained as well. At one time these images were prayed to for the granting of posterity; but this was stopped. The adoration offered to him is adulatory and not supplicatory in its nature, and the idol himself was allowed images of wood, but in A.D. 960 clay images were used.

In A.D. 1457 a copper statue of the Sage was placed in the Imperial Palace and saluted by ministers before admission on State business. The literati did not approve, and it was done away with. In A.D. 1530 the images were removed from Confucian temples. There are still, however, images of Confucius and his disciples to be found here and there throughout the country. No image of the Sage is allowed in Buddhist or Taoist temples; but there are some temples styled "Three Religion Halls," in which Buddhist, Lao-tse, and Confucius are enthroned as a triad.

4. Images of ancestors.—Images have not been used in ancestor-worship, tablets for one of the souls of the deceased being considered the proper mode of providing an object of worship. But a notable instance of a contrary practice is recorded: one of the Twenty-four Paragons of Filial Piety carved wooden images of his parents, and served them as if alive. His jealous wife pricked the fingers of the images, and they wept.

5. Aboriginal images.—In the south-east of the empire there is a large boat population who are descended from aborigines. They have customs of their own, and one is that of having wooden images made of their dead children, which they worship. As the space on the boats is limited, the shrines, with their small images, are easily carried, and consequently the images are likewise of small dimensions, ranging from about 4 to 8 or 9 inches in height. Most of these images represent what are evidently older persons than mere children. There is quite a variety in the positions and attitudes: some, like many of the gods, are seated on thrones and are clothed in official attire; others are represented as standing, perhaps even on dragons, and clad in warlike robes; and many of them carry swords or daggers and halberds in their hands. One in the writer's collection has English clothes on—blue jacket, light green trousers, and a low-crowned hat. One curious feature of these images is that some of the girls, or women, represented as riding on storks—that bird being supposed to carry the soul to heaven—and some of the boys, or men, on small ponies. In others, not content with one, the image is astir with several; for it is of its feet resting on two of these wild beasts as well.

6. The spirit of the being worshipped is supposed by the Chinese to be present in the image when a ceremony has been performed invoking its presence. At a temple near the writer's house in Canton, where extensive repairs were to be effected, the spirits were asked to give the order of the images; and, when the repairs were finished, another ceremony was held in which the spirits of the gods were invited to return.

Some images are made hollow, and hollowed-out parts of the internal organs are placed inside them. At the same time, a live creature, such as a lizard, is placed inside, and the idol is then apparently considered to be vivified.

There is a niche or shrine or loft in a Chinese house or shop for images, or a red-painted board, or red paper, with the names of one or more gods, in addition to ancestor tablets, unless the eun has an Ancestral Hall; but in Central China this general rule does not hold good, for a considerable proportion of the houses... are devoid of idols or even Ancestral Tablets. The changes now taking place in China are causing a movement towards disbelief in idols among a good number of them.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the footnotes.

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manship, and, among other relics sculptured upon them, have representations of the fetish embossed upon it—a tall pole, adorned with a garland.

2. Images of deity in human form.—Somewhere about the time of the 11th dynasty the Egyptians began systematically to represent their gods by images. The god appears as a man wearing the ordinary clothing of an Egyptian, a tunic, adorned, as in the case of a king, with the tail of an animal. On his head he wore a helmet, or a crown, or a hall plumes. While in his right hand he carried a sceptre or leading staff, the goddesses carrying, as their distinctive emblem, papyrus stalks. From this time onwards throughout the historic period, the use of images, either human in form or human with an animal's head, to represent the gods to the senses of the faithful was constant, save for one short interval, when, in the reign of the reforming King Akhenaten (c. 1355-1353 B.C.), all such representations of deity were forbidden, and the only image tolerated was the figure of the solar disc with outspreading rays ending in human hands.

Of the images of the gods used for purposes of worship, the most important type was that of which, unfortunately, we have no surviving example—the small cultus image which was kept in a costly shrine in the Holy of Holies of each Egyptian temple. This temple was tended day by day by the priests, and exposed to the view of the general public only on great ceremonial occasions. While no identifiable specimen of this most sacred object of Egyptian worship has survived, we can form a fair idea of its style and material from the literary references which have come down to us. The sacred image was in curious contrast to the gorgeous and gigantic temple which was constructed for its sake. It was generally neither of large size nor of costly materials. Thus in the temple of Hathor at Denderah, there were, among others, the following sacred statues: Hathor, painted wood; copper, inlaid eyes, height 3 ells, 4 spans, and 2 fingers; Isis, painted acacia wood, eyes inlaid, height 1 elli; Horus, painted wood, inlaid eyes, height 1 elli and 1 finger. The largest, therefore, was scarcely of life size, the smallest only about 16 inches in height. The reason for this insignificance in size was that for certain acts of worship the images had to be easily portable.

The form and material of these little wooden dolls were, however, attuned for by the splendour of their abodes, and the reverence with which they were served. The shrine of the god was in the innermost chamber of the temple, which was in total darkness save on the entry of the officiating priest bearing artificial light. It consisted generally of a single block of stone; often, especially in the later periods, of enormous size, hewn into a house which surrounded with impenetrable walls the image of the god. The doorway in front was closed with bronze doors, or doors of wood overlaid with bronze or gold-alloy plate, and each day, after the daily ritual had been gone through, these doors were closed, fastened with a bolt, and then tied with a cord bearing a clay seal. On either side of the sanctum sanctorum of the main or principal god of the temple were subsidiary sanctuaries, containing images of the other two members of his triad. Thus in the temple of Amen at Thebes, Amen would occupy the central position, while his consort Mut would be on one side, and the Moon-god, Khonsu, on the other. Within the shrine, the image of the god reposed in a little ark, or portable inner shrine, which could be carried out and placed upon the ground in the temple, or at the home of the deity made his journeys abroad on stated occasions.

The daily ritual of service to the image was in its main outlines the same in all the temples, though there were many minor variations, and in some temples the ritual was much more elaborate than in others. At Thebes the priest of Amen had sixty separate ceremonies to perform each day; at Abydos there were only thirty-six.

Generally speaking, the procedure was as follows. Early in the morning the priest of the day, after ablutions, entered the Hall of Holies, bearing incense in a vase, and a censer, and a file of priests followed him in the shrine. He first loosened the door that closed the shrine, repeating as he did so a stereotyped phrase. The cords of the doors were broken, and the seals removed, and I bring thee the eyes of Horus. Thine eyes belong to thee, O god Horus. The breaking of the clay seal was accompanied by a short phrase, and also the drawing of the bolt. As the doors of the shrine opened and the god was revealed, the priest prostrated himself and chanted: 'The gates of heaven open, the gates of earth are undone.... The gates of heaven are opened, and the nine gods appear radiant, and the god N appears enthroned upon his great throne.... Thy beauty belongs to thee, O god N; thou naked one, clothed thyself.' Taking his vessels, the priest then began to perform the daily toilet of the god. He sprinkled water on the image twice from jugs, clothed it with linen wrappings of white, green, red, and brown, and painted it with green and black paint. Finally he fed the image, by laying before it bread, beer, and wine, and water, and decorated its table with flowers.

This was the regular daily service; but in addition there were great festival occasions when enormous quantities of food and drink were offered to the god. After their ceremonial appropriation, the greater part of these provisions, no doubt, became the perquisite of the priests; but a certain portion was reserved for the use of the distinguished dead who had adorned the temple by the dedication of votive statues. These statues were entitled to share in the food from the altar of the god, after that the god had satisfied himself therewith.

In addition the wrappings of the divine image were taken off, and given as bandages to the mummies of those who had been benefactors of the temple—thereby, no doubt, securing their blessedness in the other world.

On great festival occasions there was one special addition to the ordinary ritual, besides the multiplication of offerings. The chief event of such a day was that the people should 'behold the beauty of their Lord.' The little image was, therefore, taken out of its chapel in its portable shrine, which, carefully swathed in veils, was placed on a barque carried by poles on the shoulders of several priests. This barque was carried through the open court of the temple, and thenceforth through the town. At intervals it was set down upon a stone pedestal, and, when one of these stations of the god was reached, incense was burned and prayers were offered, and at last the hangings which closed in the sides of the ark were withdrawn, and the image of the god was revealed to a moment to the eyes of the faithful. Besides these journeys through his own town for the benefit of his local people, the image was in the habit of making occasional ceremonial visits to the gods of neighbouring towns—voyaging, on these occasions, in one of the ships which were attached to the temple. The visit, which doubtless had its origin in some traditionary intercourse of the two gods, was duly returned by the image which had been visited.

These little cultus images were supposed to be endowed with the power of giving oracles. For a discussion of the consultation of images, see art. DIVINATION (Egyptian), vol. iv. p. 793 ff.

One other attribute of these images remains to be noticed. The images were not only considered to have magical powers of healing, and, on sufficiently great occasions, these powers were brought into requisition. A late legend, composed for the glory of the Moon-god, Khonsu, in the temple of Bekheten, and sister of Nefer-ru, the wife of Ramses II, was possessed by an evil spirit which could not be driven out. In answer to a request
made to Ramses by the prince of Bekhten, the image of Khonsu was sent to the rescue, healed the distressed damsel, and was detained in the land of Bekhten for more than three years. The princess whom Khonsu would fain have kept the wonder-working image altogether, but was induced to send the god back to Egypt by a vision in which he saw Khonsu coming out of his shrine in the form of a goat and flying back to his native land (cf. art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE [Egyptian], vol. iv, p. 773).

These little images were the chief objects of Egyptian worship, and were in all houses; but, in addition, the temples of the various deities were provided with innumerable other images of the gods. These were mainly votive offerings contributed by pious people who believed themselves to have been the recipients of favours from some particular god, or who desired to receive favours. Thus the little temple of Mu at Thebes became, for some reason, a perfect storehouse of votive images, especially Sekhmet, and the bronze and stone images of the gods found in most museums are largely of this votive class. Further, images of the gods were extensively used in connection with household shrines and personal images.

The remains of several houses give evidence of the existence of a recess in the wall of the central hall, whose adornment of religious scenes points to it having been the focus for family worship, and the multitude of little statuettes of the gods in pottery, bronze, silver, and even gold, shows how widespread was the custom of having a tetrality image of the favourite god to watch over the house. In the later stages of the Egyptian religion the image of Horus subduing the powers of evil seems to have been the standard protective figure for the house; but under the Empire the favourite domestic divinities were not any of the great gods, but minor deities. Chief among these were the grotesque little handy-legged god Bes, and his wife, the hippopotamus-shaped Taaret. Images of these very immobile gods had an unbounded vogue, and were supposed to protect against evil spirits. They were found in every household, and were often wrought into the handles of mirrors and other toilet articles, while they were frequently worn, especially by children, as amulets.

The curious little images of deformed children, called paatoua by Herodotus (iii. 37) and regarded as the sons of Ptah, shared in the popularity of Bes and Taaret.

Animals as living images of deity.—It must not be forgotten that, in addition to all their graven and molten images, the Egyptians possessed living images of certain of their gods, and that in the later historical period the worship of these developed to an extraordinary extent, so much so as to have impressed upon other nations the idea, totally erroneous at least as regards the greater part of Egyptian religious history, that the Egyptians were a race of animal-worshippers. Originally, as we have seen, certain deities were conceived of under the guise of animals, and through the whole historic period certain animals were in by living images, incarnations of deity. Chief among these, of course, were the Apis-bull of Memphis, the incarnation of Ptah, and the Mnevis-bull of Heliopolis, the incarnation of Ra. But, while this is so, the development of animal-worship which excited the attention of Herodotos and the derision of Juvæn belongs only to the decadence of the religion. 'It was a reflection on the devotion to the Egyptian religion, but it did not belong to its original structure. In later times veneration for the sacred cat, monkey, sheep, and serpent increased greatly, but the ancient faith of the people knew nothing of this error.' (A. Erman, Handbook, p. 54).

Of one Egyptian divinity alone no image was ever made for purposes of worship. This is Maaat, the goddess of truth, who appears in judgment before Osiris, and whose little figure, crowned with a single feather, is continually presented by the king as an offering to the god whom he is worshipping.

4. Images of human beings used in a religious connexion.—There remains to be noticed the extensive use made by the Egyptians of images of human beings in a religious connexion, especially in connexion with the life after death. The necessity of securing that the ka of the deceased person should have a recognizable habitusation to which to return resided in steps of a very elaborate kind being taken to secure so important an end. First of these was, of course, the mummification of the body, ensuring its continuance for a long period. But the mummy might perish or be destroyed, so there grew up, from a very early period, the custom of placing in the tomb of the deceased an image, or many images, of him in stone or wood. The first requisite of these images was that they should be absolutely faithful likenesses of the person whom they were meant to represent; and the result is a series of statues which aim, not at beauty, but at life-like resemblance—physical deformities being reproduced with as much accuracy as possible. The dress worn by the deceased was copied, and offerings anything in the least corresponding to the series of portrait-statues which has been preserved to us in the tombs of Egypt.

Besides the portrait image or images, the tomb of an Egyptian was furnished with a number of other images, of tiny size, representing the servants who were supposed to discharge for their master any work which he might be called upon to do in the Sokhât-Aaru, or 'Fields of the Blessed.' These tabaltis, or 'answerers,' probably represent the survival from a time when the slaves of the Egyptian grandees were slain at his tomb to accompany and serve him in the other world (cf. further, art. DEATH, etc. [Egyptian], vol. iv, p. 490).

In common with many other nations, the Egyptians believed in the magical power of images of gods and men. These images, made of wax and bound into the house-pillar or shrines of the person to be injured, were believed to 'cripple the hand of man.' The standard instance occurs in the trial of certain conspirators against Ramses III., where it was proved that the 'superintendent' of the temple had taken a magical book from the Pharaoh's own library, and, in accordance with its directions, had made waxen images, and introduced them into the palace for the purpose of injuring Ramses. This belief plainly comes down from a very early period, as a waxen crocodile is used to punish a criminal in the earliest of Egyptian folk-tales, whose action is supposed to take place in the time of the 11th dynasty.


JAMES E. CALKE

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Greek and Roman).

I. Greek.—The cult of images belongs to a later stage of religious development than mere fetialism, or the holding sacred of any object which has acquired supernatural power (montere). It is develop-
opened out of such fetishism by growing anthropomorphism, as the gods become humanized and come into closer relations with the human spirit. Among primitive peoples there is a belief in a near connexion between an image and the person or thing portrayed; so that what affects the image must also affect the original of the image. Connected with beliefs of this kind were some of the customs of early Greek religion. The temple was the abode of the deity, his image being his surrogate, and taking his place. The deity in a measure resided in the image; petitions to him were laid on its knees, incense was burned before it, and the treasures given to the god were heaped about it. Among the most pleasing gifts to the god were other images, whether of himself or of votaries. The notion appears to be that, as the image of a votary stands in the presence of the image of the god, so the god will be near the votary's person to aid and direct him. The tomb rivalled the temple as a place for images, and with the dead were buried a great quantity of terra-cotta figures.

The religious objection to the use of images in the worship of gods and heroes, which was strongly denounced by the Jews, and has been adopted by the Muhammadans and some branches of the Christian Church, can scarcely be said to have existed in Greece. We have learned from the brilliant discoveries of Schliemann and Evans that idols were known in the country many centuries before the arrival there of the Greek race. The chief deity at Knossos in Crete seems to have been a great goddess of nature, of the same class as Mylitta and Cybele, represented on gems as flanked by lions, and in a remarkable statuette of enamelled bronze adorning the necks of her hands. With her was associated a male deity of less importance, who is sometimes depicted on gems, but who was usually worshipped in the symbol of a double axe, which is of frequent use in Crete (see, further, 'Egyptian' section above, and art. AXE).

After the decay of the Minoan and Mycenean civilizations, and the entry of the Greeks upon the scene, still in a barbarous condition, the art of image-making, like all other products of civilization, seems to begin again at the lowest level, and gradually to rise. When a site of an ancient city in Greece or on the coast of Asia is excavated, there is usually found on the lower levels a multitude of rude terra-cottas. The same is true, in a less extent, of graves.

It is a noteworthy fact that the great mass of these images represent the female figure. This may be the result of religious conservatism, as the Greeks probably adopted, from their predecessors in the country, the cultus of goddesses of growth and procreation, the varieties of the great Mother-goddess whose cultus was spread over the whole East, from Babylon to the Egyptian. Figures of the characteristic deities of Greece—Zeus, Apollo, Poseidon, and others—do not appear. Figures of men on horseback and in chariots do, however, occur (fig. 1),1 most commonly in Cyprus, but also in other places. Whether these images represent ordinary mortals or the heroised dead is a question not easily to answer.

Before the 7th cent. B.C. these works are of a very primitive character, and their date is not easy to determine. If of stone, they represent the naked female body in rudest form, the arms and legs being roughly indicated, and the head a mere flat protuberance. These figures are especially characteristic of the limits of the Egyptian. Commoner on all the coasts of that sea are figures of terracotta of conical form. Sometimes they are naked, more often draped, the legs being draped by the garments, the arms mere stamps, the head formed by a few incisions of finger and thumb in the soft clay. Some points, such as the breasts, are roughly indicated. There is the standing type (fig. 2, 3) and the seated type but slightly distinguished from it by a bend in the front of the figure (fig. 4). Jewellery and adornments are added, for the most part in paint. Sometimes the image grasps an infant in its arms.

Such images have been found in abundance on the great religious sites of the Greek world—Ephesus, Argos, Naucratis, and elsewhere. Numbers of them are also found in the early tombs. That they had a religious meaning can scarcely be doubted; but clearly to define that meaning is not easy. In some way they were regarded as a gift pleasing to the gods, and as talismans to protect the spirit of the dead in his journey to the land of souls. The outstanding feature is that they are predominantly female, male figures being almost entirely absent; here we have a point of contact with pre-Greek religion in Greek lands. It seems that the worship which in the Mycenean age adhered to certain sites, and dedicated them to the worship of the ancient goddess of nature, still survived for many ages. It has, in fact, survived in those regions to the present day, when the Mother-goddess of Christianity takes in the beliefs of the people the place of her heathen prototype.

In the 6th cent. B.C. the old generalized type of goddess becomes differentiated in various localities. She merges in the goddesses of the Greek pantheon, and carries their symbols. As Aphrodite she carries the dove, as Artemis the stag (fig. 5), as Persephone the sacrificial pig; as Athene she wears the helmet or the aegis. Excavations, e.g., on the Athenian Acropolis have brought to light a multitude of seated and standing figures which can represent: only Athene herself, and are sometimes armed (fig. 6). In Corfu there is a series extending over a long period, in which Artemis may clearly be recognized. Many such local series may be studied in our museums; and at this time male...
dainties as well as female become common. The terra-cotta figures are now swept from the vague and merely traditional use of the pre-historic age into the full current of Greek Olympian religion.

In the 4th cent. B.C., if not earlier, we may trace a further change of usage. The great mass of terra-cotta from temples and from graves at sites like Myrina in Edolis and Taormina are clearly not religious in character. They represent youths and girls of pleasing type, either simply or as engaged in conversation or in games. Sacred figures are rare among them. When such figures were thrown into a grave, they seem to have been purposely broken, as if to unfit them for any but sepulchral use. The meaning of these images has been much discussed. Some archaeologists would see in them survivals of the primitive custom of stripping with or slave to accompany the dead to the world of shades; others would see an intention to furnish the tomb with pleasing copies from the world without. Probably the true explanation is a very simple one. Figures of terra-cotta were used as playthings by children, and they were part of household decoration. When representing the gods they served as images for domestic worship, and were placed in niches or on pedestals. The Greeks were so devoted to the representation of the human form that they applied it everywhere, even to common household utensils. So they naturally regarded little images as gifts grateful alike to the gods and to the dead, fitted to people alike the temple and the tomb. And they had one very great advantage as offerings—they were extremely cheap.

Meantime, for the larger cultus-images of the gods and goddesses who were brought in by the Greek invaders we may trace another origin. The primitive Greeks have no scruple in attaching divine virtues to stocks and stones; but they must be stocks and stones of a special character, such as the divine powers themselves had marked out and chosen. Trees which for some reason were regarded as full of divine energy, and meteoric stones which had fallen, or were supposed to have fallen, from the sky, easily acquired a sacred character. That mere obelisks, called ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, were even in later Greece regarded as sacred we learn from Pausanias, who saw ranged in the agora of Pharnaces thirty conical stones, each of which received the name of a particular deity. The testimony of Pausanias has been confirmed by the recent discovery in Arcadia of a number of square pilasters, each surrounded by a conical stone, and inscribed with the name of a god—Zeus, Artemis, the Hero, and so on.

As the spirit of anthropomorphism in religion grew strong in Greece and Asia Minor, it was very natural to add something of human appearance to a conical stone or the trunk of a dead tree. The coins struck in the Roman age in cities of Asia preserve for us the outlines of simulacra which can scarcely be said to be of human form, yet are by no means shapeless blocks. Of such a kind were the images at Perga of Anassa or Artemis (fig. 7),

at Ephesus of the local goddess (fig. 8), at Euromus in Caria of the Carian god of the double axe (fig. 9). A head, wearing a tall crown, emerges from the stone; arms are missing; the wooden cylinder is covered with bronze or gold wrought by an artist. The process is well described in Is 40:12. Some,

times rude images excavated from the ground, or brought from foreign lands, were accepted as a kind of revelation of a deity. Their unseeliness was no obstacle; for there is truth in the well-known saying of Goethe: 'Wonder-working images are usually but ugly pictures.'

The origin of idols is similar in most countries. But what is most interesting in the present connection is the way in which Greek artistic taste and the love of human beauty formed out of such promising beginnings a pantheon of exquisite forms. In this the Greeks are almost unique; for, although medieval Europe ran riot in the production of images of angels, apostles, and saints, it was not then in existence the appreciation of beautiful bodies which is shown in Greek sculpture.

In the religion or religions of historic Greece there were several strata or tendencies; and the tendency to religious sculptural idealism does not belong to all of them. To the philosophers the representation of the gods in human form did not appeal; and the writings of Plato and other great thinkers show a steady contempt for plastic art. At the other end of the scale, the uncultured husbandmen and slaves were ready to venerate figures of the gods in proportion to their wonder-working power rather than in proportion to their beauty. The Dionysiac and other mysteries afforded to their religious feelings a more suitable field of exercise than did the staid worship of the great temples. But between the intellectuals on the one hand and the superstitions on the other came the mass of intelligent and art-loving citizens. To them the State-religions, belonging to the cities and great shrines of Greece, centring in the worship of the deities of Olympus, and the heroic ancestors of the clans, afforded full satisfaction. For them

1. An excellent general account of Greek figurines will be found in F. Pottier's Statuettes de terre cuite, Paris, 1890.
2. VII. xxii. 4.
4. Figures 7 to 18 are from coins in the British Museum.
the poets and dramatists worked into beautiful poems the tales of mythology; and for them the arrows and the image were fashioned in bronze or marble or ivory and gold the ideas of the race as to the higher powers. As to the great city festivals, they were of mixed character. The conservative tradition, which was so marked in Greek art, was retained in them much that had belonged to prehistoric and even to non-Hellenic days, spoils of savage religion preserved as if they still existed in amber. For the whole the festivals were transformed by the Olympian religion and filled with Hellenic sweetness and light.

Maximus of Tyre, a rhetorician of the Antonine age, has left us a pleasing, if somewhat verbose, defence of Greek image-worship. Men, he says, who can raise their spirits directly into communion with the divine perhaps need no images. But this kind of man is rare; and it would be impossible to find any whole race conscious of the divine and needing no such aid. The Persians worship fire, and solemnly feed it with logs; the Egyptians regard the animals of the Nile as sacred, poor things though they be; the Celts venerate the caen of the Parians, a small disk set upon a pillar; the Phrygians worship Aphrodite in the form of a white pyramid. But the Greek custom is to represent the gods by the most beautiful things on earth, pure material, the human form, consummate art. The idea of those who make divine images in human shape is quite reasonable, since the spirit of man is the nearest of all things to God and most god-like. If the Greeks wished to the contemplation of God by the skill of a Phidias, and the Egyptians by honour given to animals, while others honour a river and others fire, the variations do not vary much; only let men know God, love him, think of him.

There is a well-known saying of Herodotus, that it was Homer and Hesiod who first distinguished the functions of the gods and assigned their forms. Of course, in the time when the Homeric poems were written, there could be no question of statues of the gods; there can have been none but the rudest images. But it is doubtless true that Homerite incidents and descriptions may have dwelt in the minds of great sculptors of subsequent ages, and inspired them. It is expressly told us that when Phidias made the great statue of Zeus at Olympia, he had in mind the lines of Homer which describe how the nod of Zeus shook Olympus, and how his hair floated out, although he seated the order and personality of the Hellenic pantheon; but, as a matter of fact, he has not a statuesque imagination. We should be mistaken if we took back to Greek times that predominance of literature over art which has been, though of late years less markedly, a feature of modern times.

The great difference between the religious art of the Greeks on the one hand, and that of Babylon, Egypt, and India on the other, is that, whereas the Oriental nations were content with merely symbolic representations, the power of the Greeks were ever struggling to merge more symbolism in anthropomorphism.

The gods of Egypt differ one from the other not in shape but in name. The animal heads which are placed on their shoulders. Isis has the head of a cow, Horus of a hawk, and so on. The attributes of the Babylonians and Persians with wings to indicate longevity, is not meant for real flight, but to indicate their power over animal nature; and the arrange-ment is merely a conventional one; the creatures are not carried up into the air; the varied powers of the gods are indicated by giving them many hands, and many bands of instruments for various purposes.

In the earliest distinctive Greek art, deities like those of Egypt and Babylon sometimes make their appearance. On the pediment of a temple at Olympia, Pausanias saw represented a female figure which puzzled him. It was inscribed with the name of Artemis, but it had wings on the shoulders, and carried a bow and a panther. As it became adult, Greek taste set aside this rude symbolism, and preferred to represent the swiftness of Artemis not by wings, but by the lissness and vigour of her frame, and her power over nature by giving her as an attendant and friend a dog or a stag. In the art of the 4th cent. the Greek deities almost always carry an attribute by which they may be identified—Zeus an eagle or a thunder-bolt, Hermes a herald’s staff, Apollo a bow or a lyre, and the like; but these become less necessary later, when the deity can be identified by bodily type. There is no fear of hesitation whether of the 5th cent. image represents Apollo or Herakles, Athene or Aphrodite, since in each case the qualifications of the deity are thoroughly incorporated and revealed in the bodily form. In mature Greek art external symbolism is not entirely absent. Even in the 2nd cent. B.C. and 1st cent. B.C. still retain their wings, though they use them to fly with, and do not merely carry them. Hermes has small wings on his cap or on his heels, and the river-gods are still winged. These, however, are little more than survivals.

If we bring together Pliny’s Natural History (I, xxxvii–xxxvii.) and the descriptions of Pausanias, we are able to discern the two historic origins of religious sculpture. Just as Homer stands at the source of Greek poetry, so at the source of Greek sculpture we have the figure of Dædalus, who is himself merely mythical, and who was set down as the maker of most figures the actual origin of which was lost in the mists of antiquity. But a number of artists classed by the ancient writers as pupils of Dædalus (Dædalides) really existed, for we find their signatures on existing bases of statues. Beginning about 600 B.C., we can trace lines of descent in a variety of materials. One school in Peloponnese began with work in wood; and so, by inlaying the wood with gold, ivory, and ebony, or clothing wooden figures in bronze, they worked their way towards that technique in gold and ivory which was used in the 5th cent. for the most magnificent of the statues of the gods. Another school, of which Rhicous and Theodoros of Samos were the most noted members, discovered or improved the art of casting statues in bronze, and so made antiquated the earlier fashion of thrusting out plates of bronze into the required shape, and fastening them with nails. Other schools, belonging mostly to the Greek islands, such as Chios, Paros, and Naxos, used their native marble, and superseded the old rude figures cut out of limestone by delicate and beautiful statues of glittering material.

It is impossible here to follow, even in outline, the process whereby the sculptors of the great power of the Greeks were struggling to merge more symbolism in anthropomorphism. The gods of Egypt differ one from the other not in shape but in name. The animal heads which are placed on their shoulders. Isis has the head of a cow, Horus of a hawk, and so on. The attributes of the Babylonians and Persians with wings to indicate longevity, is not meant for real flight, but to indicate their power over animal nature; and the arrange-ment is merely a conventional one; the creatures are not carried up into the air; the varied powers of the gods are indicated by giving them many hands, and many bands of instruments for various purposes. Three statues of Apollo, represented on coins, may serve to illustrate the process: fig. 10 is of the Apollo of...
It is evident that the higher qualities of the deity are much less easy to incorporate than the
lower. Apollo as the god of the gymnasium was easy to render in art, since he had to be only an
idealized athlete. Apollo, the god of music and song, could also be embodied, a rapt and poetic
expression being not beyond the resources of developed Greek art. But Apollo as the prophet
of the supreme Deity, or as the great patron of purification, was a less easy subject for art. In
the same way, Artemis as an archeress or as the
queen of the nymphs naturally attracted the artist,
but Artemis as goddess of moisture and source of
the springing powers of nature was less easy to
depict. Thus the rendering of the gods in human
form did undoubtedly tend in a measure to limit
them, and to throw into the background that
which in them inspired awe rather than pleasant
appreciation. Perhaps, however, we may make
a few exceptions to this rule. Of the gold
and ivory colossal of Zeus at Olympia (fig. 19), Quin-
tilian says that it added something to the accepted
religion; and Dio Chrysostom in the 1st cen-
t. A.D. tells us how it affected educated men.

In the same way, the great statue of Athene
Parthenos at Athens (fig. 14) concentrated about
herself the patriotic adoration of the people of
the city; she was not only the deity who gave wisdom
but also embodied the common life, the destiny, the star of the
Athenians, and all the better because she was as
dignified and majestic as Pheidias could make her.
So also, when, about 300 B.C., Euthydides the sculptor
made for the people of the newly-founded
city of Antioch a representation of the Fortune,
or Tyche, of that city, he represented her as a
most graceful figure seated on a chariot set
in motion by a river god. The statue of Antioch
is one of those copies extant (fig. 15), not
only gained wide admiration, and was copied in
many other cities, but we are told that it was held
in the highest religious reverence. Possibly it greatly helped to make the people of Antioch feel
that they were citizens of no mean city. In Greece,
civic politics and religion were nearly related: the
general or the statesman was often also a priest of
the deity of the city.

A different fate attended another sculptural crea-
tion of the same period—the Sarapion of Bryaxis.
Religiously, Sarapis was of great importance, as he
united the conquering Greek and the conquered
Egyptian in a common cult; since the former
could see in him a form of Hades, and the latter a
modification of Osiris. But the sculptor, if we may
judge from the poor copies extant, tried to intro-
duce into the expression of the face of the deity too
much of mystery and solemnity, and so passed the
bounds of possible sculpture. In a painting he
might have been more successful.

Strict anthropomorphism in the embodiment in
art of their deities was eminently suited to the
Greeks. They were little inclined to mysticism;
their minds were clear-cut and practical; and they
were content to idealize their gods within the limits of
the eminently static or characterized variety of art.
At the best, they could produce images perfectly
adapted to the character of their worship and their
religious festivals—figures which a good citizen of
fine taste could look on with pride, and which he
could with self-satisfaction contrast with the poorer
inventions of surrounding peoples. But in the
latter part of the 4th cent., when the city-State was
falling into decay, and the city festivals were becoming
more pageants, we cannot be surprised that the
statues of the gods lost their high dignity. Sculp-
tors of that age, notably Praxiteles, though they
could still produce exquisite forms, produced them
at a lower level. The images of the gods no longer
embodied human nature at its highest ideal stage,
but rather human nature on the level of the average
sensuous man. The Apollo killing a fay, by
Praxiteles, represents the deity on the model of an
idle and sporting youth. His Aphrodite, though she
cannot be called impure or sensual, is yet little more
than a woman of exquisite form engaged in taking
a bath. The tendency thus began soon after Plato,
and in the Hellenistic age we find representations of male
and female deities which could satisfy only a
sexual and pleasure-worshipping people. Of course,
there were reactions. The great statues of Demeter
and Persephone set up by Damophon at Lykosura
in Arcadia in the 2nd cent. B.C., still extant in a

Our Zeus is peaceful and gentle in all ways, as the
overlooker of an undivided and united Hellenes . . . set up gentle
and stately in form above all grief, giver of life and means of
living and all good things, the common father and suaver and
guardian of men, so far as it was possible for a mere man by
meditating to copy the divine and infinite nature . . . if any
man were utterly hardened in heart, after meeting in life many
misfortunes and troubles, a stranger to sweet sleep, even he,
I think, standing before this image would forget all the terrible
pains and sufferings of our mortal life (Orat. xii. 9).

1 See Orat. xii. 9.
2 See Orat. xii. 10.
fragmentary condition, have much of the ancient dignity. Sculptors who were set to make cult-images for temples went back for their models to the great creations of the 6th century. Some new types, such as that of the Fortune of Antioch already mentioned, had real religious value. But an art which cannot produce original types suited to the genius of a new age must soon decay. In the Roman age the figures of the Greek deities which were produced in unlimited abundance in the workshops of the sculptors have no vitality. They are only elegantly eclectic—charming compositions, but not at all stimulating to the powers of worship. We are not, therefore, surprised to find, from the trustworthy evidence of coins, that many of the cities of Asia Minor set aside the fine Greek statues of their city deities which held the place of honour after Alexander the Great, and re-installed the quaint and ugly figures which those statues had superseded. In the time of St. Paul the people of Ephesus had gone back to the image which fell from heaven. Rome was filled with splendid statues of the gods brought from Greece by conquering generals and by Emperors; but they were cherished mainly as works of art, and not as cultus-images. In fact, the same transition from worship to adoration took place in regard to these statues which has occurred in the change of modern feeling in regard to Gothic cathedrals.

2. Roman. In Roman religious usage, images do not take nearly so important a place as they do in Greek. Neither the anthropomorphic tendency nor aesthetic taste was so highly developed among the Romans. In fact, the primitive deities of the Romans were in nature too vague and abstract to be at all appropriately rendered in plastic art. At least, there were no traditional chthonic forms connected with agriculture, or the pastoral life, or the various activities of man; at highest, special aspects of a great spiritual force. Perhaps, apart from Greek and Etruscan influence, the Romans would not have had any statues of the gods. The early graves of central Italy furnish us with no such population of terra-cotta figures as do those of Greece and Asia. Perhaps the only images of true Roman type, which the Romans themselves called imaginiae, were the naturalistic portraits or masks, in wax or metal, of heroes and ancestors which Romans of birth set up in their houses and carried in funeral processions, and which served to localize the spirits of the departed, and bind them to the living. But Greek influence began at an early period to tell upon Rome, alike radiating from Greek colonies such as Cumae, and coming through the mediation of the Etruscan. As the Greek gods, through the influence of the Sibylline Books, were called to Rome on the occasion of famine or pestilence, or any crisis with which the native deities seemed unable to cope, they must needs have their temples, and Greek sculptors were called in to make images for those temples. On the coins of the Roman Republic we find copies of many such statues. It is little that is Roman about them; they are merely Greek figures of the Hellenistic age. Occasionally the sculptor was called on to portray beings of Roman origin, such as the silens (fig. 10), Saturnus, Janus (fig. 17), Nero, or Acca Larentia; but he fulfilled his task by merely adapting the nearest Greek type in his repertory. The veneration of images, however, by the 1st cent. a.d. had become part of the ordinary devotion of the people. We read of the excavations at Pompeii that many houses had a Lararium, or private shrines, presided over by the Larus (fig. 18), who were represented either by snakes or by the figure of a man. The type of whom was probably taken from the Greek Dioscuri.

The vast crowd of images of the gods which had been constantly increasing in Greece and Italy until the 3rd cent. a.d. met with extreme hatred from the Christians, who were as eager to destroy them as the Puritans of England to break up the sculptured figures of our churches. A few great statues were carried to Byzantium, as works of art rather than as objects of cultus; but they gradually disappeared; and naturally none survived the Turkish conquest.

LITERATURE. In addition to the works mentioned in the course of the text, reference may be made to F. B. Walters, Art of the Greeks, London, 1906, and Art of the Romans, 3 vols., Paris, 1917-1918; G. Wissowa, Rel. und Kultur der Römer, Munich, 1912.


(Lucian, de Dea Syr. 3), and Persians (Deinos, in Clem. Alex. Protrept. 65 [ed. Dindorf, i. 71]; Herod. i. 151; Siraba, XV. iii. 13 [382]).

In fact, the religion of Jehovah at the time of the sojourn in the desert probably did not carry with it such a strict prohibition against the use of images in worship as the first decalogue ascribes to it (Ex 20:24; Dt 5:24); otherwise it would be difficult to explain the freedom with which the most faithful worshippers of Jehovah made use of them down to the 10th cent. (see II. 2).

The much more ancient decalogue of the Copts, as it stands in the dangerous manuscripts, does of course (243) insist that the worship of images (244) is to be prohibited. It is probable that the nomadic Hebrews used statuettes as amulets and in private worship (Gu 312. 35–35–12). Among the Arabs of the time of Muhammad (W. R. Smith, Rel. Semi. 5, London, 1894, p. 293 f.), the Phoenicians, and the Canaanites, images were much more frequently employed for domestic purposes than for public worship. The same is true of the Egyptian peoples (G. Karo, AEW vii. [1904] 153 f.).

II. AFTER THE SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE.—

1. Idol-worship among the Canaanites.—Canaan was a land of idols (Nu 33:5, Dt 7:2, 12:29, Ps 106:30, etc.), which has been confirmed by the excavations recently made in Palestine. As yet nothing has been found in the sanctuaries but steles, and it is probable that the deity was usually represented by a stele (see Urartu, etc.). S. I. Curtis has noted a maqṣūbah, an abūra, or some natural object. But in private houses, in tombs, and in a sacrificial trench at Gezer, statuettes have been discovered in profusion which were carried about in private worship (amulets, ex-voto, etc.). Those of most frequent occurrence are images of goddesses (Astarte) in bas-relief or, more rarely, in the round, tending towards the Babylonian type in the North and becoming more Egyptian in the South. At Atargatis (?) has also been found, some phalli, heads and shoulders of the bull, a brazen serpent, figurines of doves, cows, fish, statuettes of Egyptian divinities—Pthah, Osiris, Thoth, Napūt, Tiunā, and, above all, Bes. Although statues were of rarer occurrence in the public sanctuaries of Palestine, we need not conclude that they were entirely lacking (I 5:7); they were naturally much more exposed to destruction than private ones.


2. Idol-worship in Judah.—After they had settled in Palestine, the Israelites, no doubt taking their lead from the people of the country, procured freely to the fabrication of images of Jehovah (and eventually of other gods), and began to worship them in the public sanctuaries as well as in private. Michæl had in the ‘house of gods’ of which he was proprietor a graven image and a wooden image (according to another version, an ṭeqqād and a ḍāʾrethūt), which afterwards were transferred to the great sanctuary of Dan, where priests of the line of Moses officiated (Jg 17:5-7). Ob-ḏōnū made an ṭeqqād which was worshipped by the whole of Israel (22). At Nōb there was an ṭeqqād served by the priests of the family of El, which was also consulted by Saul and David (see II. 7). David had a ḍāʾrethūt in his house (I 8:19-19).

In the great sanctuaries of the Northern kingdom, e.g. at Bethel and Dan, and perhaps in Samaria (Hos 8:7), there were images in the form of a golden bull (1 K 12:29). The author of the Book of Kings, who looks on the past from the point of view of the prophets of the 7th cent. B.C., did not regard idolatry as innovations of Jeroboam I., but they were quite in keeping with the ideas which were dominant in the Jewish of the 10th cent. B.C. neither Elijah nor Elías, nor even Amos in the 8th cent., thought of censoring the worship of ‘golden calves.’ In the kingdom of Judah a brazen serpent, said to have been made by Moses himself, received sacrifices till Hezekiah destroyed it (2 K 18:4). Ezechiel, about 592 B.C., mentions an ‘image of Jeleus’ set up in the Temple (38). At Gezer and at Taanach several statuettes of Astarte have been found in heaps of Israelite débris (Vincent, op. cit., 163, 164 f.).

3. The meaning attached to idol-worship.—The first Semitic statues were probably stele (maqṣūbah) which had been discovered in the course of certain excavations (Hos 4:14). The status of Panammon is called ṣyb, the same word as sôlôth (a Heb. synonym of maqṣūbah), and the Arab. sūd. Idolatry was thus in principle only a variety of fetichism, practised by the Hebrews and the other Semites (maqṣūbah, ṣôtār, ‘ark). We must, then, consider the image as having been, like all other fetiches, a dwelling-place offered to the god, where he consented to take up his abode only after the performance of certain inauguration ceremonies (Jg 8:27; cf. C. Fossey, La Magie asyrienne, Paris, 1905, p. 1521; M. J. Lagrange, Études sur les religions, 2, do. 1905, p. 390; 329; E. T. Ylger, FCP, London, 1891, i. 168 f.).

4. The rites connected with idol-worship.—In ancient Israel images were kissed (Hos 13:1, 1 K 19:27); cf. Job 31:5; Mish. Sənāq, v. 6; Ap. v. 6; Schick, l. c. 113; S. I. Curtis has noted a Uldül, an image of the deceased (Orients, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 164, 257); incense was offered to them (Ezk 8:27); they were consulted as oracles (see II. 7 and 8); they were placed in a closed cell, differing thus from most of the other sacred objects of the ancient Semites (Jg 17:7; cf. Jp. 12:16, l. c. 5, 1 Mac 10:25, Wis 18:25); they were clothed in sumptuous garments (Ezk 16:12; cf. Jp. 10:12, 16:24, v. 6); Mish. Sənāq, v. 6).

Other customs connected with idol-worship are mentioned, but in passages which refer expressly only to pagan idolatry—e.g. the custom of carrying idols in procession (Am 3:22, Jp. 4:19, of giving them food (Sir 30:18, 30:19, 30:23; Bél and the Dragon), of embracing them, anointing them, wasting them, and sprinkling them with water (Obad. v. 7, 6), of bowing before them (Ob. v. 6), of decorating them with jewels and garlands (Ob. v. 8; Mish. Sənāq, l. c. 5), of fixing them in their place with nails (Is 44:17, Jer 10:14, Wis 15:19) or chaining them (Is 44:19), and of lighting candles for them (Ez 26:7).

5. Names for idols.—The diffusion of the worship of images in ancient Israel is attested by the multiplicity of words used to designate them (cf. HDB ii. 161; G. F. Moore, EzBi ii. 240-242:1. C. Fossey, La Magie asyrienne, Paris, 1905, p. 1521). The Semites (Ezekiel, etc.) sometimes (at least in the case of pagan idols) painted (Wis 13:13, 18) or ornamented with silver and gold (Jer 10:9). This must have been a very common kind of image, for the word pēṭyll (sing. pētill), ‘graven image’ of wood (Dt 7:19; or of stone (Is 21:9, 11; Jer 10:9); Ps 135:15, 16; Vincent, 163, 164 f.) must have been one of the most usual of all images made of metal (Is 44:17, 44:19, Jer 10:14).
There was also (8) the molten image, *masækkîḥ, nesōbîh* (Is 41:19, 49:2, Jer 10:5[6]), *nāšēk* (Dan 11:1), in gold, silver, or sometimes bronze (see II. 6 (2)). According to certain texts, the bulle of Dænos and Bethel were *masækkîḥ* (Hos 12, Ex 32, De 26, Dt 28, 7, Neh 9), made by pouring the molten metal into a mould (Ex 32:5, 15; 11.2 = ‘to cast,’ ‘to melt’ (Is 44:14, 20:17 f.; cf. Jer 51:15 f., 177, 178)). Again, we have (9) the *tewîgevora* and *sairpîh (De 7:2, Is 33:2; cf. also E. Jer. 2:3, 32, 4:21, 15, 25, 25, 26, 27). The frame-work on to which the sheets of gold or silver were hammers and soldered might be of some common metal (Is 44:11); cf. the statue of Osiris, R. A. S. Macalister, PEFS, new ser., xxxv. (1905) 39 or of wood, such as the ‘golden calves,’ according to the evidence of Hos 8 (‘in pieces’), Ex 23 (‘in a graving tool’), 22 (‘burnt it with fire . . . strewed it upon the water’). (10) Figured stones, *eben masōbîh (Lv 26, Nu 33, Ezk 8:2), probably intermediately between the stele and the statue (Lv 26:2), were used as idols, and also (11) images carved out (or according to others, ‘drawn’ (*‘graven images’) on the inner walls of the Temple (*Ezk 25:3). There are numerous textual descriptions of the manufacture of idols, but they are all post-Exilic, and are directed against foreign cults (Is 28:5, 6:22, Ezk 26:14, 465:14, 462:5, Jer 10:18-19, 14:8, 15:21, 32:13, Ps 115:4-5, 15:8-15, Wis 12:13-16).

6. Forms of idols.—(1) Human.—The Israelites, like the Canaanites (see II. 1), the Philistines (1 S 5, and the pagans (Is 44:19, Ps 115:5-7), possessed a host of idols (see Xachbar, Halle, 1896 (n. 282), ‘a carved image and a graven image.’) The sanctuaries of the Nabataeans and in the sanctuary of Noh, there was an *ephod* behind which the sickle of Goliah was kept wrapped up in a cloak (1 S 17:51). This *ephod* was often consulted by Saul and David in their campaign; the priests on those occasions consecrated the metal on the *altar* (2 S 23:18; 28, 32:23); but he was asked to ‘bring it hither,’ and carried it to the person who was committing it (14:23-25 307): he ‘carried it’ (971) ‘to carry,’ not to wear’ (14:2; LXX)

It would be utterly impossible to bring together all the different acceptations of the word *ephod* under one general meaning, by supposing, e.g., that the word had always the signification of ‘pagan,’ one corner of which formed a pocket for holding the *sortes* (*Foote, The Ephod*, pp. 19, 27, 41-44; Moore, EBI, art. ‘Ephod’ [exception made for *ephod* of Gideon], or that it was the golden mask of the divine statues which the priest put on when he was delivering oracles (Dahn, Handkomm. zum AT, Gottingen, 1892, in Is 30:22).

One could rather do well to remember that semantics has disclosed in every language diversities of meaning which are far more singular than those attaching to the word *ephod* whatever its etymological significance, and whether the word *ephod* ‘to cover’ is to be assimilated to *ephod* or not, or mean a ‘garment,’ then a ‘covering’ of precious unity by a covering by a mantle (this is the natural meaning of *ephod* in Is 30:22:1 398), and in the end a ‘covering’ covered with a layer of gold or silver (cf. II. 5). The objection has been raised that a statue does not declare oracles, especially oracles obtained by a sort of drawing lots (see the Urim and Thummim (Is 14:14 (LXX)); yet the *ephod* (Ezk 21, 18, 15 (see, however, II. 8)) and the molten image (Hab 2:20) gave consolations. In Byzantium, questions were apparently ‘whispered’ to newly consecrated idols (Blades, *Rel. Sem.* 3 (1891) 233).

In Egypt there were statues which nodded their heads or spoke, the priests who made them more or less speaking being supposed to be inspired by the god. Another supposed model of the *ephod* was a statuette which, when set in motion by the priest, could stop in two or three different positions, or an idol with a cavity containing sacred lots, possibly like the vases of lamas or other vases found in the Palestine excavations (Vincent, 229, 312).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works quoted above, see C. F. Moore, Judges, London, 1898, p. 381; T. C. Foote, The *Ephod*, its Forms and Use, Baltimore, 1871, with bibliography; H. T. Elliott, *EATF*, XXX. [1910] 236-276.

7. The Teraphim.—It is difficult to draw from the text any coherent idea of what the *teraphim* were.
Rachel steals those of her father Laban, and, when he asks for them, the answer is that the animals are the fruits of hard work and effort. In this context, the sanctuary of Rachel's father, Laban, is mentioned as a place of worship for the Israelites.

The explanation of the difficulty of finding any agreement between the terms in contexts in which 

orpheus may be that the word, for which no satisfactory etymology has been found, is one of the obscure words used by the Jews in recent times in Biblical texts, for the abhorred names of idol gods and false gods (see III. 3). Orpheus may be the plural of the words, in which the Hebrew of the Mishnas means 'foulness', 'obscenity.' Now, in this case, we have no assurance that the word only term was everywhere and always substitute for one single expression. In Zec 10:2 the Peshitta still appears to have read 3722, 'spirits of divination' or 'necromancers', i.e. 0041, 0043, 0028, 0029 etc.; in other contexts there may have been some term signifying idol in general (3711, 3712 LXX; 3722 or 3723 or god (3723). 

Literature. In addition to the works quoted, reference 

may be made to A. Loew, LaOrigine de la vie future et le culte des morts dans l'antiquite Israelite, Paris, 1906, ii. 227, 353, 354; S. Torge, Seelentauflage und Unterleibskühlung im AT, Leipzig, 1959, pp. 141-143.

III. REACTION AGAINST IDOL-WORSHIP. -I.

Before the 8th century B.C.-The worship of images soon became suspect to the upholders of the true religion of Jahweh: Asa is said to have done away with those which his fathers had erected (2 Chr 15:4), towards the 9th century, condemned only the worship of 'molten gods,' i.e. statues whose splendor contrasted too strongly with the simplicity of older times. The history of the Golden Calf (Ex 32) reflects the same point of view. 

2. The Prophets.-Hosea is the first to lay down the principle of the incompatibility of idol-worship with the true worship of Jahweh (Hos 3:1-3, 4-8). 

Josiah forbids the use of images of gods of silver and gold (2 Kgs 23:19, 20); and Hezekiah, apparently at his instigation, breaks the brazen serpent in pieces (2 Kgs 18:4). It was probably about this time that all manufacture or worship of images of the deity was absolutely prohibited (Ex 20:4). The reforms instituted by Josiah (621 B.C.) include a prohibition against all representations of Jahweh—ever unformed ones (Dpl 23:14, 15). 

The line of argument presupposes that it is an accepted Jewish belief that Jahweh has not, and cannot have, any material representation. 

One of the arguments used by the prophets of the 7th century B.C. and later against pagan gods is that they are gods of stone and wood. They describe the manufacture of these idols as pleasant irony, and identify them purely and simply with the divinities that they represent (a frequent theme from the 6th century B.C. onwards; see II. 5). 

The divine images still retained their prestige among the common people to a certain degree (2 Sam 15:27; cf. perhaps Ps 109:27; 110:5). If Yahweh's people are post-Exilic and refer to Jews). In the ruins of Jewish houses at Elephantine some bas-reliefs and statues have been found, which were probably worshipped by the Jewish colony of that town (O. Rubensohn, ZA xvi. [1909] 20; E. Meyer, Der Pappysurfn von Elephantine, Leipzig, 1912, p. 631). But probably idol-worship was not so much of a popular superstition of the Jews, as the author of Enoch (99-104) accuses his Jewish adversaries of following idols, it is apparent to be understood as a polemic exaggeration respecting their tolerance of the pagans and Grotesque arts. Among the Jews who were most rigorous in keeping the law, the Second Commandment was
so scrupulously followed that all manufacture of images ceased, even when the images were not intended for worship at all (cf. Wis 14:30). Thus, while animal representations abounded in the decoration of the pre-Exilic sanctuary (cf. Sir 38:26), a picture of disapproval arose when Herod set a golden calf, the sacred image of the doors of the sanctuary (Jos. Ant. XVII vii. 2-4, BJ i. xxxii. 2-4). Plate also met with great opposition when he attempted to allow the legions to enter Jerusalem in their uniforms (Jos. Ant. XVIII iii. 311, BJ ii. ix. 2 fl.). In A.D. 66 the Jewish insurgents destroyed the palace of Herod Antipas at Tiberias because it was decorated with sculptures representing animals (Jos. Life, 12). It was out of regard for this scruple that neither Herod nor the Romans put human or animal effigies on the as or fractions of the as coined for Judea.

The pious Jew avoided even pronouncing words signifying 'immortal,' ' idols,' 'devils,' and even the name of the God, Pa 159, substituting for them opprobrious terms, which were usually those used to replace the names of pagan gods (Ex 23:12, Dt 12:2, Hos 2:25; 7:2, e.g., was rendered by the singular 'devil,' a proper name), so that it is often difficult to tell whether idols or strange gods are meant: 'idolium,' 'nothingness' (according to others, 'small gods'); 'galaudum,' 'dung' (RV 'abominations'); 'Achel, 'vanity'; 'grotesque figures'; 'Aplòs, 'abomination'; 'meis'eheq, 'object of horror'; 'p ž Qharm (Lv 20:23), 'n'belâ'ì (Jer 19:1); 'carass'; 'mèthim (Pa 105:9), 'the dead'; 'cheese; 'troubles,' 'blackness.' (Jer 16:1, Dc 27:1), 'abominable thing.' Some of these terms of abuse go back to the Prophets (e.g., Am 5', Jer 2, Is 48); but in many cases they were introduced into Scripture at a very late date by Jewish scribes as a substitute for gentiler terms. As a matter of fact this process continued even after the time of the Septuagint version (2 S 5:16, 1 K 11:2.9, 2 K 22:16, Is 19). Cf. G. F. Moore, EB ii. 2148-1950.


ADOLPHE LODI

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Indian).—1. Introductory.—In no part of the world, perhaps, can the practice of idolatry be investigated with more success than in India, owing to the abundance of the material, and the attention given to it since Hinduism and its allied faiths, Buddhism and Jainism, came under the observation of the foreigner. A visitor to one of its sacred cities is at once aware of the prevalence of image-worship. The streets, like those of Athens in the time of St. Paul, are filled to the brim with images dedicated to the gods (Ac 17:14 AV). Writing forty-five years ago, M. A. Sherring estimated that the city of Benares contained 1454 temples, and that the number of idols actually worshipped by the people certainly exceeds the number of the people themselves, though multiplied twice over; it cannot be less than half a million, and may be many more. 'Idolatry,' he adds, 'is a charm, a fascination to the Hindu. It is, so to speak, the air he breathes. It is the food of his soul. It is the foundation of his hopes, both for this world and for another' (The Sacred City of the Hindus, London, 1858, p. 41 ff., since his time, for reasons elsewhere explained (§ 8), the number of temples and images in that and other sacred cities has largely increased. There are in all about sixty temples in Nasik, a number which for the name of the Benares of India (BG xvi. 1833:503). Within the sacred enclosure at Puri rise about 120 temples dedicated to the various forms in which the Hindu mind has imagined its gods' (W. W. Hunter, Oriens, London, 1872, i. 128). At all the Hindu sacred places the minor idols embalmed in little niches along the streets and the entrances to the bathing-places are innumerable.

Among the more primitive tribes only a few, like the Mundas or Konds, are said to practise no image-worship; but this does not exclude the custom of rude stones and stones (E. T. Dalton, Descrip. Ethnol. Bengal, Calcutta, 1872, p. 236; S. C. Roy, The Munda and their Country, do. 1013, p. 232; S. C. Macphen, Mem. Indian Arch., London, 1855, p. 102). According to J. G. Scott, in Burma 'none of the races have, or at any rate admit that they have, idols. There is no bowing down to stones and stones' (Upper Burma Govt., 1900, pt. 1. vol. ii. p. 83). There are, of course, numerous images of the Buddha, but to the Burman 'the ascension of bowing down to stones and stones is intolerable, and the implication is combated with feverish energy. Where there are no prayers, in the technical sense of the word, there can be no idolatry.' The words uttered before his impressive features are not a supplication for mercy or aid, but the praises of the Lord. The contemplation of whose triumphant victory over passions and ignorance the most devout may be led to a better state' (Shway Yoo [J. G. Scott], The Burmans, London, 1882, i. 236). Some later writers, however, recognize that the prevalence of image-worship is not the chief obstacle to the spread of Christianity. The growth of agnosticism, the revival of Vedantism, and the introduction of modern sects, like Sikhism, or the Arya and the Brâhma Samaj (qq.v.), which reject the idolatrous Purânic cults, and seek to revive an earlier and simpler form of worship, are a more serious hindrance to Christian propaganda.

2. The historical development of idolatry.—The universality of image-worship in its more elaborate form is comparatively modern among the Hindus. In the Vedas we observe the dedication of terrestrial objects—rivers, mountains, plants, trees, implements, and weapons; and 'material objects are occasionally mentioned in the later Vedica literature as symbols representing deities (A. A. Macdonell, The Vedic Myth. Strassburg, 1897, p. 167). Existence of idols in Vedic times has been asserted in the cases of a painted image of Rudra, of Varuna with a golden coat of mail, in the distinction drawn between the Maruts and their images (Rigvesa, ii. xxxii. 9, 1. xxv. 13, v. iii. 15, in J. Muir, Orig. Str. Texts, v. [1872] 433 f.). The comparative scarcity of these references, however, does not support the conclusion that idolatry, in its general sense, as contrasted with the lavish idol-worship of a later age, is modern, because, though the higher Vedic religion may not have admitted images or sacred places, there must have been a lower stratum of Animists, who did not confine their worship to the deities of Nature (cf. A. Barth, Rel. of India, London, 1882, pp. 60 f.). Ferguson (Hist. Ind. Arch., do. 1866, p. 181) pressed the point too strongly when he suggested that 'it may become an interesting investigation to inquire whether the Greeks were not the first who taught the Indians idolatry.' The influence of the heroic traditions of Gandhâra on Hindu sculpture is undoubtedly (V. A. Smith, Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon, Oxford, 1911, p. 97 ff.) but it is more than doubtful whether the use of idols can be solely attributed to this influence. Mann (c. A.D. 170) in the present recension, but embodying much more ancient
4. The iconic stage of idolatry; anthropomorphism.—The Hindu forms his gods in his own image, and we can trace the development, by various means, of the rude stone or stock image to the idol.

In parts of the Central Provinces, squared pieces of wood, each with a rude figure carved in front, representing the village goddess with her five brothers, who are credited with the power of sending disease and death, are set up close to each other beside the highways (S. Holop., Papers XXXI., 1893, 35). In many of the hill tracts of the Central Provinces, Nagpur, 1860, p. 15). In Mirmarar, similar figures, with rude heads and faces, represent the woman, the cattle goddess of the Abode of Buddha, if the attitude of the Buddhist to images of the Master can be considered a form of idolatry, dates from the 1st cent. A.D., a devout of lawyers couple to objects of art. Further, the absence of images in the temple, the Indian art does not imply that images of the Hindu gods were then unknown; they were certainly in use as early as the 4th cent. n.C. (Smith, 79 n.; A. Xxviiil.

3. The aniconic stage.—It is needless to discuss whether the stage of aniconism historically preceded or led up to that of pictures and images—an evolution denied by some modern anthropologists (E.Br. xi. 329). In India the two stages exist side by side, and it is possible in many cases to watch the rude stock or stone developing into the anthropomorphic image. The so-called ‘fetish’—to use a term which has lost most of its significance to students of the present day—appears in many forms, included in the two general types of images.

We observe, first, the pre-aniconic type, in which a rude stock or stone, from its quaint or unusual appearance, is looked on as the manifestation of some unknown, vague power. In the second stage, the imagination of the observer.

In the case of stones, this form of belief is more apparent in the great alluvial plains, where stone is a rare substance, and is naturally regarded with a feeling of awe. Thence we pass to the aniconic stage, where the stone, stock, or pole suggests a well-defined form, animal or human, which fits it to be the abode of a spirit. In one type such beliefs the stone is supposed to be a retired man or animal, the conversion into stone being due to the wrath of some offended god or saint, or it is a punishment for the breach of some stringent taboo. Many such peculiarly shaped stones are connected by some ethnological legend with the cults of one or other of the orthodox deities. Some stones, stocks, or poles, again, acquire special sanctity, like the boundary-stone, the guardian stone of the village, the garden, the memorial stones, the stone on which the bride is made to stand so that she may acquire strength and stability, the grindstone used as a fertility charm at birth or marriage. Similarly, among the Portuguese, who, we have the sacrificial post, the wedding post, the tank post, the village guardian post, the death post, the house pillar and posts, the post barn and post, the hut, the temple and the bar, all the burning of the old year (see art. STONES [Indian]; POLES AND POLES [Indian]).

5. The manufacture and consecration of images.

(a) The substances from which images are made.

These are made of the most varied in the Hindu world, the so-called ‘fetish’ the industry is specially vast.

In Bombay, the goddess of the Veil, a forest tribe, is represented by a ball made from the bones of a cow, or by a
small figure of the animal; their household deity, Hirukt, is a bull of peacocks' feathers, or the figure of a hunter with his gun on his shoulder, on which a four-footed monster rides. A tiger (Bh. xviii, p. i. [1887] p. 190). An image of one of the village goddesses in S. India is made of turmeric knotted into a paste (H. Whitehouse, 163). The Madá goddess, Sinhalakumá, S. India, is in the form of a cow made of boiled rice and green grain, dried in the sun, and this is filled with butter, onions, and palse; four lampwick are put into it, a nose being stuck on the outside of the lump, two garlands are tied round it, and the whole structure is decorated with various small flowers (Thurston, 7C iv. 357). Ashes, either from the sacred fire or from coal, are thrown on it, and it is often hung up on a tree as an offering to the gods. Sometimes in the central space, among the Goddess of Madras, an image of the deceased is made on the spot where he was cremated, and to this food is offered (ib. i. 273). Bulls or cows of clay often represent the deity or a sainted ancestor, as among the Aruivas, whose gods are a man and cow in close shape, with an arcub in the stick on the top (ib. i. 60; c. iii. 661 f.). Eight little heaps of brick plastered together, or with clay represent the village gods in the Shabatudh district of Bengal (J.I.C. i. [1891] 183). The household deity of the Kovam of Madras is a brick placed up at random, or the cairn ornamentation (ib. i. 278). The worship of the image of a horse, hanging on a wattle, is common (ib. i. 437). The sacred cow of the household is represented by a plastic model of a cow, hung out to dry in the open air. The house often has a small shrine, or a pot kept at the feet of the family god (ib. i. 398 f.). Clay cows are commonly used by the deity, as among the Mulas of Madras, who represent Laksámi, goddess of prosperity, by a model of a cow. In W. India pots are commonly used as houses for spirits (Thurston, iv. 269; B.G. xv. pt. i. [1893] p. 249 n.).

For anthropomorphic images the material most used in ancient times, as in the case of the Greek gods, was probably wood (J. G. Frazer, Pausanias, 1899, iv. 245 f.; Farnell, C.G. [1896] 141 f.).

Jagannáth, originally a rude block, has, under Buddhist influence, been adapted to represent the God (Dekholer, 163). Dhanu, a Linga (A. Cunningham,瓶颈, Togon, London, 1854, p. 124, fig. 188; S. C. Roman, I. 123, 139). The wood of the ring, or mango tree (Melia azedarsho), is used for the most sacred inscriptions, Bengalese, and the Bokhara; and, in the direction towards the mountains of Belur, there is a wooden block belonging to the goal of the temple (ib. i. 273). Ancient wooden images have naturally, for the most part, disappeared. But there are records of their existence in Káshmir, 'in Kashmir, on the banks of the Jhelum, there are three images of the deity, as in the lake, from which they are thrown out at the three months' journey from the capital, in the direction of the mountains of Belur, there is a wooden block belonging to the goal of the temple' (ib. i. 273). The sacred cow of the household is represented by a plastic model of a cow, hung out to dry in the open air. The house often has a small shrine, or a pot kept at the feet of the family god (ib. i. 398 f.). Clay cows are commonly used by the deity, as among the Mulas of Madras, who represent Laksámi, goddess of prosperity, by a model of a cow. In W. India pots are commonly used as houses for spirits (Thurston, iv. 269; B.G. xv. pt. i. [1893] p. 249 n.).

Many of the images now in use are made of metal of various kinds. Among the more primitive in various shapes are used. If a Sádhu dies of wounds caused by a knife or other iron weapon, a piece of iron or an arrow is thrust into a rice-pot to represent him (ib. xiv. 221). Among the gods and the Gopis are found a spear, sword, or iron bar (H. V. Russell, Census Rep. O. A. 1906, i. 94). Spears often represent the S. Indian village goddesses (D. Chakravarti, 163). Bombay needles are worshipped in the name of dead ancestors (H. V. Russell, 164; S. C. B. 119, 120). For house images and for those carried in procession, brass is usually employed, and, as the brass is pure brass, it is found even among primitive tribes like the Kandis (ib. xiv. 221). A combination of eight metals—gold, silver, copper, tin, lead, brass, iron, and steel—are used in the making of the images of the gods; and, it is said, of the sacred fire, that is, the fire burned in the temple, the image is made of these metals, because the sacred fire is lighted; and without the burning the priest recites verses. The image is kept under the canopy of a roof for about half an hour, and it is then covered with a cloth. The priest the image in all its limbs, and finally breathes into it. The sacred fire is lighted, and the image is then said for worship (ib. xiv. pt. i. [1887] p. 167 n.).

In Bengal, at the festival of Durga, the following Brahman consecrates the image of the goddess, and, placing it in its appointed place in the temple, recites the proper formula. After this comes the giving of eyes and life to the image. With the tip of his right hand he touches the forehead, eyes, and back—of the head of the image, saying, 'These are the eyes and life-long happiness in this image!'.

After this he takes the image (the gods of the rice trees) and rubs it with butter, and holds it over a lamp until it is covered with butter. When he takes a little stick on the altar of another rice tree and fills the cup with the eyes of the rice tree, a lamp is made of cast glass to India, which under the shell of the marble images of the gods, or the gopis, images of various kinds and shapes, with internal organs of dough or clay are sometimes inserted into the bodies of the larger images, but the head is usually empty; and into the more valued ones are put gold and silver of the noble metals, and a few grains of consecrated rice, a sacred bearing "the Buddhist Creed," and occasionally other texts, books, and relics. These objects are sometimes

When the worship falls into the hands of Brahmas, who are influenced by the local inhabitants, the image is often supposed to be a personage, often is a god, and is therefore not worshiped apart from the idol itself. The festival is observed in the same manner as the other, and the image is again treated with respect and awe. The god is then again placed in the temple, and is again worshiped as before.

There are also many other festivals and ceremonies in which the image is used, such as the celebration of the festival of the new moon, when the image is again placed in the temple, and the image is again worshiped as before.

6. The ritual of image-worship.—(a) Forms of worship.—The ritualistic worship of images takes various forms, ranging from that adopted by the more primitive tribes in the cult of the rude stocks and stones in which their spirits, usually malevolent, are believed to dwell, to the more highly organized cult of the village and local deities, up to the worship of the orthodox gods conducted by Brahmans or by members of the ascetic orders.

Among the forest and tribal tribes the worshipers, more particularly the hunters and gatherers or other calumniac messengers, the hunters, make a sacrifice to the stone or collection of stones which represents their local or tribal deity. The victim, usually a chicken or a castrated goat, is taken to the shrine, the worshipper or his priest decapitates it with a single stroke of a axe or knife, the head being used as a ritual implement, being sometimes specially prescribed, and they are placed in charge of the Brahmin who consecrates them down to his successor, at the same time explaining to him the form of the ritual and the invocations which are used at the service. The victim and the head are then sacrificed, and sometimes rude offerings consisting of milk or the fruits of the earth are laid on an earthen plate or altar in the image, the deity is supposed to occupy. After this the victim is cooked and eaten in the immediate presence of the deity by the worshiper and his friends, that it may be better received as a sacrifice by the deity as a perquisite of the priest.

In India the Buddhist tribes, particularly in S. India, the ritual assumes a more refined form. Thus, at the worship of Mariyam in the Bally district, men and women give birth to the images. They are then placed on the ground before the goddess, with the right foot, which is washed in cow’s milk, on the image, and the fourth day of the festival a bock is erected in which the goddess is represented by a brass plate containing sausages, red powder used by women for their adornment, and the head of a black goat, and a black necklace.

The people commemorate this, and a man who possesses a natural image ("okk") brings a small black goat to the goddess. Standing in front of the goddess, he holds the goat in his arms, and seating its teeth with its teeth blows the animal until it kills him. He then takes the goat’s bleating blood with his teeth and holds it in his mouth to the goddess. The body of the goat is then used as a sacrifice to the goddess, and the image is then bathed by the head of the village, who puts a new turban of cow’s milk on the image, and the image is kept in the temple. A pious Brahmin dons a substitute for an older practice of assaying a god by ensnaring the face, and especially the lips, of an idol with the blood of a sacrificial victim (CONS ed. [1969] 243; GEW, pt. 1. The Magic Art., [vol. 111 [1911] p. 175).
(d) Binding the god.—The custom of binding an image so as to keep the deity under control is found in India (FL vi. [1897] 325 ff.).

The Brahman, the monk-god, is sometimes harnessed by means of strips of wood nailed in front of his airies, to prevent him from wandering in the jungle (K. V. Russell, Hinduism, pp. 107, 147, 169; J. G. Frazer, THAI, v. 110). In Kumaun, scenes of the local gods are shut up in a copper vessel or covered with a cylinder, lest they should wander (ibid. 168). Near Madras is a temple where the hermit, Sthulakhrayana, put the goddess Kali down a well, and placed a large stone on the top to keep her prisoner, and it is said that she used to eat a Brahman daily (J. AS, II, p. 251). The Kurnubas of Madura worship their god, Vira, the hermit, in his annual festival, and for the remainder of the year keep him shut up in a box (G. Oppert, 236).

(e) Stolen images.—Images which have been stolen from other people are more valuable than those acquired by purchase or gift, because they bring with them the luck of the former possession, and are more easily prostituted (NYQ ii. [1893] 56; cf. J. Grimm, Teut. Myth., tr. by S. Stallybrass, London, 1895, pp. iv, 1321; On 317).

Among the Mahais, in recent times, a celebrated amulet, was stolen which had been more than once, the subject of a law suit in the British courts. Most recently the Mahais used to plunder and remove to their capital the sacred stones of the Nagas (C. O. Haddan, 1902). The Kalkans, a believing tribe in Mahas, had used to steal sacred stones, if they think they may be of use to them in their predatory excursions (Thurston, ill. 306; Haddan, Teotihuacan, 1907, p. 313). It is not the habit of some Kandas to steal their neighbours' gods in order to acquire influence as priests (S. O. MacGregor, Modern Hinduism, London, 1896, p. 182). With impunity, they would advise in a dream to steal the image of the god Raghunath from the temple, and burn it. The kings who stole the god, were pursued and overtaken, but the god showed such a decided wish to go to Kulu that they were allowed to take him away, and the Rajas were compelled to make a present of him to the king of Kulu.

7. Legends of discovery of images.—Most of the legends of the discovery of images are spurious, invented to explain the rudeness of the temple images of the Mahais, Malabars, and other races. Mnemonics, or other miraculous powers attributed to them.

The image is often said to have been originally a shapeless log which was found growing down a river; or it was discovered on a moun.tain that the image was discovered in a ravine on the river bank (J. Tod, i. 589). That of Jaggannath was discovered by a Savara, one of the jungle tribes (W. W. Hunter, Griesser, i. 92ff.). About a century ago the god Manochari appeared to a K infrastructure in Bombay, and informed him that his image had floated ashore; when search was made it was discovered (BG v. [1890] 31). Many temple images have been identified by a cow dropping her milk on the spot where they were subsequently discovered. That of Balabari still bears the mark of the cow's hoof; that at Jaffna was discovered by a cow which passed over it on its way to the sea, and when it dug out, it sank into the ground, and was thus proved to be the spot where the image was discovered (BG v. [1890] 31). At Bhatimastak, a man, while cutting timber, saw blood oozing from a tree, but the wounded healed when a cow dropped her milk on the stump, and a likeness came out of the tree; at Puskar, a man found a cow feeding a snake in an ant-hill, which, when excavated, disclosed five images (BG i. [1883] 653, xvii. pl. iii, 1904). An image is often discovered as the result of a dream, one which recently appeared to a woman in Bombay, or that at Bherghora on the Nerbudda (BG viii. [1894] 42; W. H. Beeman, l. c.). When the Mysorens attacked the image of the bull Nandi, at Nargunni, or that of Oonkarki on the Nerbudda, blood gushed out, and the assailants were discomfited (BG xvii. pl. ii. [1888] p. 229).

8. The future of idolatry.—The attitude of the Hindus towards their images has been discussed elsewhere (art. HINDUISM, § 35). The influence of monotheistic religions, like Christianity and Islam, has done much to suggest purer conceptions of the Godhead. The Brahman belief in a single, spiritual, omnipotent Providence. A significant effect has been the result of sectarian movements, such as Sikhism, the Brâhu and the Arya Samaj, and other recent movements of the Brahman, which encourage the lowering of the Vedânta, reject the Panurie scheme of Hinduism, and aim at restoring the Nature of the Vedas. Age. But, granting this, idolatry still not only prevails widely among the lower castes, but is actively encouraged by the Brahman hierarchy, and, in particular, by

those priestly classes which act as pilgrimage guides at sacred cities and places of pilgrimage. The growth of a monied class under British influence has largely encouraged the erection of temples, which are still built in great numbers, as the result of religious enthusiasm and superstition, and from the belief that little merit can be gained by the restoration of an old image. It is improbable that a form of worship which is so deep-rooted and universal, and which, in the present state of their culture, meets the wants of the masses of the population, will readily disappear.

To quote A. C. Lyall (Atavist, iv. [1897], 251):

"Idolatry is only the hieroglyphic of what is popular; and the more spirited it is rendered by a medium of the sort of stone and simple imagination of a god; and this manner of expressing the notion by handwork continues among even high-sounding intellectual societies, until at last the idea becomes too subtle and subliminal to be rendered by any medium except the written or spoken word."

LITERATURE.—The vast subject of Indian idolatry has as yet been investigated in no single monograph. The illustrations of images contained in the popular works on Hinduism are, as a rule, taken from the coarse lithographs found in the houses of many castes. It is understood that the Hindu Department prepares the completion of a complete treatise to show the history of the different images, which is a laborious task, and has not been undertaken. But I have seen the existing books on Hindu mythology and calendar, such as E. H. Newbold, History of the Hindu Gods, London, 1904; H. Tagish, Mythology of the Hindu Gods, London, 1835; W. J. Wilkins, Hindu Mythology, Delhi and Bombay, 1904; J. Dowson, Sanskrit Dictionary of Hindu Mythology, London, 1879; R. Ziegler, Genealogy of the South Indian Gods, Madras, 1904, are largely based on Bierczkci's information on local temples, their images, and cultus. The illustrations of these works are, as a rule, inferior. For the earlier period much information will be found in the various series of Archaeological Reports edited by A. Cunningham, J. Burgess, J. H. Marshman, and others. Monocluons, or other miraculous powers attributed to them."

W. COOKE.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Japanese and Korean).

1. JAPANESE.—In the INDIGENOUS RELIGION.

The use of images and idols as objects of worship is not indigenous to Japan, for one characteristic of pure Shintoism is the absence of an image. Among the archaic religions remains of greatest antiquity, however, many clay images of men, and of horses and other animals, known as hanaiwa, have been found in the burial vaults of Imperial and noble families. It had been the custom at a funeral to sacrifice attendants, servants, and beasts of burden, that they might accompany their master upon his journey and attend him in the spirit land. The last instance of such a custom is that of Suinin (C. G. A. D. 23), when the Queen died, Nomi-no-sukune, councillor to the throne, advised the Emperor to substitute clay images for living victims. One hundred potter's vessels were made to represent the court, and these made figures which were placed about the royal tomb. The custom thus established was followed by the nobles and prominent families for a time. The last instance recorded is that of the 7th cent. A.D. Recent excavations in ancient tombs have brought hanaiwa to light in many as 32 provinces of the Empire, thus witnessing to their widely prevailing use. The rules concerning tomb-construction issued in the first year of Taikwa (A.D. 645) make no mention of hanaiwa;
but in special cases their use was probably con-
tinued to a later date. The most complete instance was
in 1212, when haniwa were placed by the tomb of the
Emperor Meiji Tenno, in deference to ancient
custom and sentiment. At no time were these
images objects of worship, though they possessed
rather the attributes of symbols representing the
spirits of the dead (see, further, art. HUMAN
Sacrifice [Japanese and Korean]).

2. Although in Shinto no images are used to
represent gods, the mirror is specially placed in
the holy place within the shrine. The mirror
within the shrine at Ise is alleged to be the
one used by Ama-terasu, the sun-goddess, or
ancestress of the Royal Family. It is octagonal,
although usually the mirrors are round. They
are not strictly objects of worship, but typical of
the human heart which in its purity reflects the
image of Deity; and faithful followers of Shinto
are instructed to bow before the mirror of the
shrine morning and evening in an act of self-
examination.

3. Before the mirror of the Shinto shrine hang
the gokoku, strips of white paper cut into small
squares and draped upon an upright of wood,
supposed to symbolize the ancient offerings of
cloth. Together with the mirror, the gokoku are
more generally used than any other object for
averting evil.

4. About the shrine the shime-sawa, a straw
rope with tufts of straw or cut paper at regular
intervals, is often hung. This rope may be placed
about anything considered sacred or worthy of
reverence. The name "shime" means to avert evil.
The reason is, that its energy and skill almost exclusively to the making of Buddhist images and idols. Among the most famous are those of the Kannon of Ina, Kamakura, and Kyoto. See art. DAIBUTSU.

i. As Influenced by Buddhism.—The begin-
ing of real image-making in Japan dates from the
coming of Buddhism, whose influence is to be
noted even in Shinto shrines, for a gradual mutual
adaptation took place and various images came
to be placed in the shrines.

The most popular of these is that of Sugawara
Michizane (f. A.D. 901), worshipped by the people
under the posthumous name of Tenjin, as the god
of learning, especially of calligraphy. He is represen-
ted in the robe of an ancient court-noble seated
on a litter drawn by oxen.

2. The Ni-o or Dova, as gate-guardians to scare
away demons, are often found before Shinto
shrines as well as before the temples of certain
Buddhist sects; and the images of animals tradi-
tionally associated with specific deities are placed
in their shrines and popularly worshipped as
images of the deity itself. For example, Inari,
called also Uga-no-Mitama, is the goddess of rice,
and hence much worshipped by Japanese, who are
rice-raising, rice-eating people. The fox is her
servant or messenger; and images of foxes are
always found at Inari shrines, being regarded by
many as images of the goddess herself. In the
case of Benkei, one of the seven deities of luck,
the snake, her attendant, is often imaged as an
embodiment of the goddess.

3. Images of Buddha.—For the most part,
images to which religious reverence is paid are
closely associated with Buddhist temples. The
first record of the introduction of Buddhist images
in Japan is in the reign of Emperor Shomu (673).
Shibatani of Ryo (one of the provinces of China at
that time) came to Japan and settled in Yamato,
bringing with him several images which were
worshipped by his subjects. The people in general,
however, paid little attention to the fact. Some
time later, in A.D. 552, the Korean king sent
ambassadors to the Japanese court, who brought
a gilt-bronze statue of Buddha with hanging
canopies and a Japanese Buddhist Scripture. The
new faith gained ground through favour of the
court circle, and the making of images became a
professional art. Shibatake was himself a skilled
sculptor, and was succeeded by his son and grand-
son, the latter, Torinokyo, who is considered one
of the greatest artists in Japan. Several of
the most famous images at Horyuji, the oldest
Buddhist temple in Japan, are declared to be by
his hand. In the reign of the king of Kudara a
present to the court of Japan of a large image of Buddha which was
accompanied by the artist; and in A.D. 555 a
Japanese sculptor is known to have executed two
images of Buddha. The images of this early
period were of wood; but during the reign
of Bintoku a large stone image of Miroku was
presented by the court of Kudara, and set the fashion
for work in stone. Gradually bronze, clay, and
hard lacquer were used; and images were made in
great numbers, especially about the middle of the
8th century. This continued till the 12th cent.,
when the art began to decline. From the 9th to
the 12th cent., many famous sculptors, including
Keibunkai and Kasuga (8th cent.), Esaki (10th cent.),
Kozho, Kokei, and Usuki (11th cent.), and
Yoshinobu and Kudari (12th cent.) came into
the making of Buddhist images and idols. Among the most
famous are those of the daihoto in Nara, Kamakura,
and Kyoto. See art. DAIBUTSU.

ii. As Influenced by Buddhism.—The begin-
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noted even in Shinto shrines, for a gradual mutual
adaptation took place and various images came
to be placed in the shrines.

The most popular of these is that of Sugawara
Michizane (f. A.D. 901), worshipped by the people
under the posthumous name of Tenjin, as the god
of learning, especially of calligraphy. He is represen-
ted in the robe of an ancient court-noble seated
on a litter drawn by oxen.

2. The Ni-o or Dova, as gate-guardians to scare
away demons, are often found before Shinto
shrines as well as before the temples of certain
Buddhist sects; and the images of animals tradi-
tionally associated with specific deities are placed
in their shrines and popularly worshipped as
images of the deity itself. For example, Inari,
called also Uga-no-Mitama, is the goddess of rice,
and hence much worshipped by Japanese, who are
rice-raising, rice-eating people. The fox is her
servant or messenger; and images of foxes are
always found at Inari shrines, being regarded by
many as images of the goddess herself. In the
case of Benkei, one of the seven deities of luck,
the snake, her attendant, is often imaged as an
embodiment of the goddess.

3. Images of Buddha.—For the most part,
images to which religious reverence is paid are
closely associated with Buddhist temples. The
first record of the introduction of Buddhist images
in Japan is in the reign of Emperor Shomu (673).
Shibatani of Ryo (one of the provinces of China at
that time) came to Japan and settled in Yamato,
bringing with him several images which were
worshipped by his subjects. The people in general,
however, paid little attention to the fact. Some
time later, in A.D. 552, the Korean king sent
ambassadors to the Japanese court, who brought
a gilt-bronze statue of Buddha with hanging
canopies and a Japanese Buddhist Scripture. The
new faith gained ground through favour of the
court circle, and the making of images became a
professional art. Shibatake was himself a skilled
sculptor, and was succeeded by his son and grand-
son, the latter, Torinokyo, who is considered one
of the greatest artists in Japan. Several of
the most famous images at Horyuji, the oldest
Buddhist temple in Japan, are declared to be by
his hand. In the reign of the king of Kudara a
present to the court of Japan of a large image of Buddha which was
accompanied by the artist; and in A.D. 555 a
Japanese sculptor is known to have executed two
images of Buddha. The images of this early
period were of wood; but during the reign
of Bintoku a large stone image of Miroku was
presented by the court of Kudara, and set the fashion
for work in stone. Gradually bronze, clay, and
hard lacquer were used; and images were made in
great numbers, especially about the middle of the
8th century. This continued till the 12th cent.,
when the art began to decline. From the 9th to
the 12th cent., many famous sculptors, including
Keibunkai and Kasuga (8th cent.), Esaki (10th cent.),
Kozho, Kokei, and Usuki (11th cent.), and
Yoshinobu and Kudari (12th cent.) came into
the making of Buddhist images and idols. Among the most
famous are those of the daihoto in Nara, Kamakura,
and Kyoto. See art. DAIBUTSU.

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fact that less and less respect is paid to the images which once meant something very real in the life and thought of the people.

So, in these images, the commonest object of worship is the ancestral tablet, $a$ta, which plays a prominent part in Japanese Buddhism. The custom was introduced from China and is universal among all classes of people, and with Buddhists as well as with Non-Buddhists. The tablets are usually of rectangular shape, a slip of planed wood, rounded at the top, and placed on a pedestal. The size differs according to the rank or wealth of the family and the age of the ancestor. On the front side is inscribed the posthumous name of the dead, and on the back the date of his or her birth and death. They are put in a small shrine or on a shelf, not infrequently with the images of Amida or other Buddhist deities, and are placed in a room specially prepared for the purpose or in a sitting room of the family. Often duplicates of the tablets are kept in the Buddhist temples of their own attachment. For a certain length of time after death food and drink are offered, generally until the 49th day, and thereafter on the 100th day and on the 1st, 3rd, 7th, 13th, 25th, 33rd, and 50th anniversary. The idea of the tablets is that before the tablets is not the same as for deities. It is with the idea of feeding the souls in the world beyond, or simply to keep bright the memory of the dead. Priests are invited on the anniversaries to read scriptures before them. In the festival of the $bun$-festival on the 13th, 14th, and 15th days of July (old calendar) the souls of the dead are believed to come to the world in order to visit the members of their family, whose names are written on the tablets. The custom is steadily declining, giving way to the coming in of more intelligent faith.

9. Picture-trampling.—It may be of interest to note that, following the introduction of Roman Catholic Christianity by the Jesuit missionaries in the 16th century, the persecution found expression in a peculiar form of efami, or picture-trampling, all suspected of Christian sympathies being required to trample upon the picture of the Christ. Later, an iron plate was substituted for the picture; and the practice was continued until the beginning of the Meiji era, when religious freedom was allowed to the people.

II. KOREA.—Buddhism was introduced into Korea at a time when the country still formed three separate kingdoms—Shiragi, Korai, and Kudako.

1. Buddhist images.—Korai, being nearest to China, was the first to receive Buddhist missionaries, with whom came the ideals of that faith, in A.D. 343. Soon after there was built a large Buddhist temple called $bunmuji$. Twelve years later, Buddhism was introduced into Kudako, and forty years later into Shiragi, gradually spreading over the entire peninsula. The idols and images in the Korean temples are for the most part not different from those in Japan, images of Bodhisattvas, Kwanon, Amida, Miro, and Rakan being most frequent. The largest Buddhist statue in Korea is that of Miro (Maitreya), in the temple of Kwanchokji in the province of South Chusei (Chung Chong). It was made in stone about 1000 years ago, by a priest called Emyo (Heinjunang), who offered or collected one hundred workmen for thirty-seven years. It is 55 ft. in height, with a width of 30 ft. On the forehead, which measures 6 ft. in width, is set a precious stone.

In Korea, attractions are pictures, and in the city of Kaokakwong-woo is frequently seen. Kaokakwong was an ancient Chinese general; and in the city of Seoul alone there are four shrines to his honour, one each in the north, south, east, and west. He is popular as a household deity with the common people; and the images of Gentoku, Choki, and Komei, three other generals, are often placed near him.

3. The mountain-god.—The image of the mountain-god is that of an old man mounted upon a tiger. He is very popular, and occupies small shrines upon the hill-tops.

4. Post-gods.—Everywhere in Korea, by the wayside and at the entrance to villages, stand demon-posts, rudely cut with grinning teeth and horrible faces. They were originally distant post-stations, which gradually became objects of worship, believed to be strong defences against the countless forces of the unseen world.

5. Ta Chue or the Lord-of-the-place, is made of straw in a hollow secreted in the base 1 ft. long and 1 ft. wide; and within him are placed old coins, bits of pretty cloth, and similar treasuries. He is enshrined in the corner of the roof, in the kitchen or store-house, and offered wood-lice, rice cakes, and, on the 1st and 15th of the old calendar months. He is supposed to avert evil and bring luck to his owner.


TASUKU OKADA.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Lapps and Samoyeds).

—The worship of idols and images of wood and stone appears to have been at one time common to all the Ugric races occupying the Arctic regions of the Kurious continent. This worship still survives among the Samoyeds of the Russian Empire, and has not been long abandoned by the Samelats, or Sameh, of Lapland, otherwise known as Finns or Lapps, the former term being current among the Germans, and the latter in Sweden, Denmark, Britain, and other countries. It is true that the people of Lapland outwardly profess the Lutheran form of Christianity as early as the 17th cent., but even at that time they secretly retained the religious ideas which they had inherited from their forefathers.

Of the condition of the Lapland Samelats in the 17th cent., the best contemporary exponent is John Scheffer, Professor in the University of Upsala, whose $Lappona$ published at Frankfort in 1673 (Eng. tr., Oxford, 1674), contains very precise accounts of the existing religious practices of these people. A striking feature of the Lapp religion was the worship of certain idols.

These were two in number, very popularly known as the wooden god, and the stone god. The wooden god (smora intsm) was called Aijakse, the ancestor; and, alternatively, Thor, or Turors, the thunderer. It may be that the name of Thor, and his association with this particular idol, ought properly to be regarded as a Teutonic intrusion in Lapland, but that is a detail into which it is unnecessary to enter here. The image of Aijakse or Thor was always made of birch wood.

*Of this wood they make so many idols as they have sacrifices, and, when they have done, they keep them in a cave by some hill side. The shape of them is very rude; only at the top they are made to represent a man's head (Scheffer, p. 40, Eng. tr.).

Scheffer's book portrays one of the rudest of these idols, a mere wooden block, but there is also a more elaborate representation of Thor's image, standing upon a table or altar. The trunk is simply a block of wood, with sticks projecting on either side to represent arms. At the end of the right arm is fixed a mallet, intended for the hammer of Thor. Across the chest are cross-belts or handkerchiefs. The head is shaped to resemble a human head, with eyes, and a nose, and mouth. On either side of the skull are two spikes, in accordance with Scheffer's words:

*Into his head they drive a nail of iron or steel, and a small piece of iron to strike the nail, to drive in his head a mind to evil (p. 40).

On the table, in front of the image, is a plate of
bark Birch, containing portions of a sacrificed reindeer. Behind the figure are deer's antlers, and round the base of the table are branches of birch and pine. A Lapp kneels in adoration before the altar.

Gustaf von Dülken, in his work *Om Lappland och Lapparna* (Stockholm, 1873, p. 288), reproduces a drawing from a MS of the year 1671, by Rehn, Södermanland, but not in agreement with Scheffer's contemporaneous picture. Rehn's drawing shows three images of Thor upon one table, and in front of them are three upright sticks bearing portions of the sacrificed animal. Von Dülken draws attention to the branches adorning the sides of the altar, to the two antler-heads between the images of Thor, to the hammers wielded in each hand of these images, and to the hoes encircling their heads. It is noteworthy that the sacrifice of animals is an essential element in the worship of these idols. Scheffer states that the Lapps make a new image to Thor every autumn, consecrating it by killing a reindeer, and smearing the idol with its blood and fat. The skull, feet, and horns are placed behind the image. Part of the meat is eaten by the Lapps, and part is buried, together with the bones.

In addition to 'the wooden god,' the Lapps also worshipped 'the stone god' (*kind kejubel*) in, otherwise, in Swedish, *Storjunkar*, or 'the great Lord.' The term *seita* was also applied, generally, to a stone god. In form, the *seita* sometimes resembled, or was supposed to resemble, a bird, or a man, or some other creature.

The truth is, its shape is so rude that they may sooner fancy it to be something themselves than perceive other people that it is so. Their imagination is so strong that they really believe it. Attempts have been made to identify the *Storjunkar* and *seita* with Thor and Odin, respectively, but this is unlikely since the names are not derived from the names of the gods, and it is unlikely that the Lapps would have made such a connection with the Norse gods.

The last sentence, it will be soon, implies that the *seita* was the medium through which an invisible deity was worshipped, and was not itself an object of worship. Von Dülken shows (op. cit., pp. 236-246) representations of three Lapp *seitas*, one taken from a reindeer-pasture and another from a stream, while the third, of white marble, with a covering or cap of cæloraceous spar, was found in a small island, at a spot known to Lapp tradition as a place of sacrifice, where many horns and bones were found. It may be added that, although the *seitas* are generally quite unworked, there are some instances in which the stone has been carved sufficiently to bring out a resemblance to the head of a man or of an animal.

The ceremonies connected with the worship of *Storjunkar* were very similar to those associated with 'the wooden god.' The animal specially selected for sacrifice was a male reindeer. Its right ear having been pierced and a red thread run through it, the reindeer was killed, and its blood carefully preserved in a barrel. The officiating priest then took the blood, some of the fat, the antlers, the bones of the head and neck, and the feet and hoofs, to the hill where the sacred stone had already been placed. Uncovering his head and bowing reverently, he then anointed the stone with the fat and blood, and placed the antlers behind it, the right horn having the pins of the reindeer attached to it, which when the left horn was an amulet of tin and silver worked together with red thread.

Although not represented by any special image, the *seita* was worshipped by the Lapps of the 17th century. Scheffer states his belief that the sun was incorporated in Thor, who, it may be noted, was sometimes decorated with a nimbus round his head. The set of sun-worship, at any rate, was performed before the altar of Thor, upon which occasion the sacrificial bones were arranged in a circle upon the altar.

In return for the revere paid to them, or through them, the wooden and stone gods were believed to protect their worshippers against misfortune and to aid them in hunting and fishing. Each family had its own sacrificial mount, with its name, and the families possessed *seitas* who were understood to be specially interested in their welfare and to whom they prayed.

Rites similar to these are common to other cognate races in Northern Europe and Siberia.


Among the Samoyeds of to-day the religious practices of the 17th cent. Lapps are still in full swing, as several modern travelers have shown. In 1873 and 1875 the Swedish explorer Nordenskiöld and his comrades visited sacrificial sites on Vaygatsk Island and the Yemal Peninsula. To these places the Samoyeds are accustomed to make pilgrimages, sometimes from a distance of six or seven hundred miles, in order to offer sacrifices and memorial offerings.

At a sacrificial eminence on the south-western headland of Vaygatsk Island, the Swedish explorers found a large number of reindeer skulls and horns, bones of the bear, various objects of metal, and several hundreds of idols, described as 'small wooden sticks, the upper portions of which were carved very clumsily in the form of the human face; most of them from fifteen to twenty, between them 370 centimetres in length. They were all stuck in the ground on the south-east side of the altar. Near the altar there were to be seen pieces of drift-wood and remains of the fireplaces at which the sacrificial meal was prepared. Our guide told us that at these meals the mouths of the idols were smeared with blood and wetted with brandy, and the former statement was confirmed by the large spots of blood which were found on most of the large idols below the holes intended to represent the mouth' (Nordenskiöld, *Voyage de la Vega*, Eng., London, 1881, p. 94).

That these customs are still in force seems quite evident. In 1834, Frederick Jackson, in the course of his expedition to Franz-Josef Land, learned that the Samoyeds of Vaygatsk at that date were accustomed to sacrifice a reindeer to their god, killing the animal by slow degrees. The Samoyeds, moreover, carry small portable idols with them during their sledge-journeys. In 1878, Nordenskiöld purchased four of these gods from a Samoyed woman. Two of them were dolls, one was a miniature garment, and the fourth was 'a stone, wrapped round with rags and part of the corner of the stone forming the countenance of the human figure it was intended to resemble' (op. cit., p. 86).

That this appears to have been identical with 'the stone god,' or *seita*, of the Lapps.

*Professor De Harles thinks it possible that the small domestic idols of felt and rags, used by the Mongols, and mentioned as early as the year 1500 by Armenian authors, may have been introduced by the Buddhist preachers, as the Tartar states without hesitation* (Abercrumby, op. cit., p. 153).

The stationary wooden idols of the Samoyeds seem to have been larger in past times. Martiniere in 1633, Linschoten in 1601, and an old Dutch engraving reproduced by Nordenskiöld (p. 84) all show images as large as a man; and in the last instance the human trunk as well as the head is carved with some elaboration. Probably the earliest written description of Samoyed idols is that given by an English traveller, Stephen Burrough, in 1556 (Hakluyt's *Voyages*, Glasgow, 1903-9, *Principali Navigations*, ii. 338).

Burrough speaks of his visit to 'a heap of the Samoeds idols, which were in number above 300, the worst and the most unartificial works that ever I saw: the eyes and mouths of numbers of them were bloody, they had the shape of men, women, and children, wrought, & that which they had made for other parts, was also sprinkled with blood. Some of their idols were an old
stucke with two or three notches, made with a knife in it. . . .

There was one of their seeds broken, and lay by the heaps of idols, & there I saw a deers skin which the Idols had spred over their images, and their family, which were made as high as their mouths, being all bloody, I thought that to be the blood of the Idols themselves.

A comparison of these various statements makes it evident that the idol-worship of the Samoyeds and of the Lapp Samelats was substantially the same. The only striking difference is that the Samoyeds had not the outstretched arms wielding the hammer of Thor which formerly characterized the wooden gods of Lapland. It is reasonable to presume, therefore, that the idea of Thor and his hammer was introduced into Lapland from the South.

LITERATURE.—Appended to Von Diben’s Lappland (Stockholm, 1873) there is a list of over 200 works relating to Lapp, a considerable number of which include references to their religion. Nearly as ample is the bibliography prefixed to Abromovitch’s Essai historique sur les Lapons, pp. 175 et seq., and to his Mémoire sur les Lapons des îles de l’archipel du Spitzberg, pp. 21 et seq., in the Archiv für Volkerkunde, v. 8, 1895. There are some articles in the Zeitschrift für vaterländische Geschichte, in the Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, and in the American Journal of Archaeology, among which are the articles by E. P. Geist, “Die Lappen,” and by F. S. Franson, “Die Lappen.”

D. MACRITCHIE.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Muslim).—Muhammad protested strongly against idolatry, but other Arab tribes had done so before him. While he was yet a lad, there were men, called the Hamis, who rejected the gross idolatry around them. Some of these afterwards became Christians; some remained unitarians. At the latter, Zaid ibn ‘Amr was one of the chief. He embraced neither Christianity nor Judaism, but said that he worshipped the God of Abraham and Isaac. He even went so far as to declare that all the old and new religion were false, and that he believed in the oneness of God alone. "The last day," he said, "the people will be in the same light in which they died." The mind of the Prophet being set at rest, the revolution came as it now stands in the Qurân:

Do you see al-Lat and al-Uzza, and Manî, the third idol besides? What, shall we make partners with God whom He has created nothing like unto Him? This we, indeed, an unfair partition! These are mere names: ye and your fathers named them then (xxviii. 19, 20).

The Meccans were much disturbed at this, and said, "Muhammad hath repented of his former sentiments, and it behoves the rank and file of our goddesses before the Lord. He hath changed the same and brought other words in their stead." This was commenced, but Muhammad henceforth attempted no compromise, and now and for ever broke with idolatry. He received a solemn warning never to run into such danger again:

Verily, they had well-nigh begged thee from what we revealed to thee, and caused thee to invent something other than what was revealed to thee (xxvii. 59).

The idols of Mecca are derided:

What think ye of the gods whom ye invoke besides Allah? Show me what part of the earth they have created (xxxvii. 89).

Before he left Mecca, Muhammad said to his opponents:

Call now on those whom ye made God’s companions; and they shall call on them, but they will not answer them (xxviii. 64).

The statues of false gods furnish fuel for hell:

Fear the fire prepared for the idolaters, whose fuel is men and stones (xxviii. 52).

Idolaters are likened to the spider who builds her a house; but, verily, failnot of all houses surely is the house of the spider (xxviii. 49).

They are not to be prayed for (ix. 115); their end is to enter into the fire (vii. 36). Marriage with an idolater is forbidden (ii. 221). Idolatry is an unpardonable sin (iv. 51).

An unpardonable sin (iv. 51).

A few converts were gained at Medina, who, when they came to Mecca to perform the annual pilgrimage, took an oath of obedience to Muhammad, in which a promise to give up idol-worship, as with all converts, was an important point. Later, in Medina the Prophet made it quite clear that idolatry was a great crime, an unpardonable sin.

Verily, God will not forgive the union of other gods with Himself! But other than this will He forgive to whom He pleases. And he who unites gods with God hath devised a great wickedness (iv. 61; cf. 1165).
In the year A.D. 629, Muhammad, with the permission of the chief men in Mecca, was able to perform the pilgrimage to the Kaaba, and went through the usual ceremonies—after which he returned to Medina. The times, however, soon came when it was necessary that Mecca should be the centre of the new religion; and so, seizing an opportunity which he so well understood, he marched with 10,000 men against the city. The Meccans saw that the time for opposition was past, and submitted. Muhammad proceeded to the Kaaba, saluted the Black Stone, destroyed all the idols, and Idolaters are heretofore to be severely dealt with:

"When the sacred months are past, kill those who join other gods with God, wherever ye shall find them; and seize them, and lay wait for them with every kind of ambush; but if they shall convert, and observe prayer, and oblige the alms, then let them go their way (lxv 2).

"O Believers! only they are idolaters in your midst who associate with God, let them go their way (lxv 3).

The people of Tบร�; made a stout resistance to Muhammad, and when they finally submitted, begged to be allowed to retain their idols. They received fairly good terms, but this request could not be granted, and the idols were all destroyed by Muslims. Muhammad destroyed the pagan ceremonial of the Pilgrimage and the Black Stone as an object of superstition reverenced by the heathen. The worship of the pagan Arabs is intact. The retention of the Pilgrimage was perhaps a necessity in order to win over all the Arab tribes, by yielding to their reverence for Mecca as the centre of a national faith. Islam was spread as well as preserved, not only by giving undue importance to the mechanical performance of the old pagan ritual, but by emphasizing the idea that Islam was a local and national religion, and that the rituals suited to Arabia in the 7th century, are binding on the most diverse peoples in the 20th.

There is a custom which relates how Muhammad was born in the year 1515 B.C., and how he was called the King of the Jews. He then built a temple in Mecca, and called it the Temple of the Jews. He then went seven times round the idol, kissed its head, and said, "O exalted One, whose weapon is this woman is?" But the idol was so old, and had been so often handled, that the idol-worshippers could not tell which was its greatest idol. So they answered, "It is to be Muhammad, and that is, he is to kill no one, but that all that follow him shall be safe." (Thirteenth century.)

The Wahhâbîs, who are most careful to avoid anything which might seem to impair the dignity of the unity of God, and who look upon many practices of other Moslems as tending towards polytheism, or shirk, have defined the latter in these four terms: shirk al-tasârurī, ascribing knowledge to others than God; shirk al-tasârurī, ascribing power to others than God; shirk al-tasârurī, ascribing power to others than God; shirk al-tasârurī, ascribing to the world of the heavenly streams; yet such an interpretation still awaits more authoritative approbation. (cf. Jackson, op. cit. p. 225, n. 3.)

Other examples of images as effigies, but not as idols, may likewise be cited from Sasanian carvings as referred to in ART (Persian), in vol. i. p. 881 f. The general result is that the inscriptions and the statements of the Greek and Latin authors bear out this fact, as shown by the testimony from the classic writers cited in the following paragraph.


2 The figure is known to represent Ormuzd, because his name appears in the inscription on the stone as describing the purport of the base-relief; for references see G. E. Marilhow, _I. a._, and E. T. West, _Fahami Literature_, in _Ghil, I._, (Strasbourg, 1904) 77.
2. Greek and Latin testimony to the Persian abhorrence of idols and image-worship. — The evidence of this abhorrence is, however, somewhat indirect to the Persian hatred of images and temples is found in Ἀσκληπίου, Περσης, 809 (produced in 472 B.C.), in which the Athenian dramatist places on the lips of the spectre of Darius the statement that they would not worship their gods in images, 'when invading Greece, shrank not from destroying the wooden figures (ဖلاFra) of the gods, nor from burning the temples.'

Though, on the contrary, they love all, however, is the classic passage, which was written a few years later in the 5th cent. B.C. by Herodotus (Hist. i. 131, in which the father of history said of the Persians:

The Church Father Clemens Alexandrinus (at the end of the 3rd cent. A.D.), when referring to the Persian Magi in his Protrep. 5, cites the other authority of Deym in his statement that

The great patriotic writer Origen (c. A.D. 185—233), in his controversy of Christianity in opposition to Celsus, inveighs against all the points made by that Epicurean philosopher, but dialectically, and in the name of the Persians, who had a natural aversion to idols and image-worship. In referring to other peoples who, like the Persians, were non-idolaters, Celsius says of the latter (in Origen, c. Celsum, vii. 22):

'If there are no religions, nor images, or images, and he continues by citing the passage quoted above from Herod. i. 111 as to the abhorrence of such images to which Origen replies (vii. 67) that the Persians do not reject idols for the same reasons as do Jews and Christians.

Equally strong is the statement of the later Greek historian and biographer, Diogenes Laertius (ll. c. A.D. 200), in his reference to Persian Zoroastrian Magi, of whom he says:

The Persians do not erect images (ဖilaFra) and altars, though they do mention, a few paragraphs beyond (tv. ii. 15 p. 725), and in the 7th cent. (c. A.D. 175) in his Description of Persia, viii. xvi. 3, t. xvi. 3.1. Nor, again, did it deter Xerxes from taking to Sardis a Greek statue in bronze of the 'Water-carrier' (Πιναρχη, Πιναρ, 31) or from removing from Athens the famous statue of the Two Tyrrhenicides (see Paus. x. viii. 5; cf. Pliny, HN xiii. viii. 70; Arrian, Anal. iii. xvi. 8; Val. Max. Mem. ii. 16, ex. 1). The significance of these passages in their general bearing upon the religious attitude of Xerxes is discussed by G. F. Quackenbos, in the Deut. Rev. xii, 113, p. 399. In the same connexion it is plain that the procedure of Xerxes is referred to likewise by the Greek rhetorician and Platonist Maximus of Tyre (2nd cent. A.D.) when he upbraids the Persians for their fire-worship and their destroying and robbing of Greek sanctuaries and images (Dissertationes, viii. 4, ed. Fr. Dümker, Paris, 1840, p. 28—Deissert, 36, in the ed. of J. Davis, Cambridge, 1703, p. 302; and cf. the comments on the passage by J. F. Kleuker, Zend-Avesta, Anhang, ii. iii. [Bigot, 1785] 106 f., n. 4 f.).

The late Latin historian Ammianus Marcilullus (c. A.D. 330—400) records, in his History, xxvii. vii. 29 f., that in the latter part of the Parthian period the Arsacids came to the power.

This allusion to a simulacrum Conoci Apollinis may possibly be compared with the existence of statues of Omnes, or Vohm Manah, as referred to by Strabo in the passage (XV. iii. 16) quoted above, and again discussed below. The disasters which afterwards fell upon Rome were regarded by the superstitions as a direct visitation in consequence of this act of apostasy. The bearded god, who sits there, is a finely carved figure image which was taken to Persia by Xerxes, and afterwards sent back to Greece by Alexander the Great.

3 According to Paus. i. viii. 5, the latter group was eventually restored to Athens. It is possible that the statue of the bearded god, which is set up in the temple of Apollo in Athens, in the district of Colophon (in Athens, Deipnosophistae, xii. 69) to "touch the gods with sacred rods" when he speaks of Nius, king of Assyria, as not taking his place among the gods. Certainly, however, he is much less beloved in the passage, however, does allude to the aaron-twigs, or rods, used in the Zoroastrian ritual (cf. art. RASSON).
the ground and is broken in pieces. A parallel text calls the image the idol of the statue (rā ekščaštām). This is held by Mys. to be Ahura Mazda (AS. Nov. i. [1887] 470; cf. also the version of Simeon Metaphrastes, v. p. 496 [= FG cxxvi. 20]). These citations practically exhaust the material that may be considered outside sources; what follows is derived from the Persian sources themselves.

3. Earliest times: before Zoroaster, or at least prior to the 7th cent. B.C.—There is little or no direct evidence regarding the appearance of idols and images in the most remote period of Iranian history, because no truly archaic sculpture of any size has yet been found. It is possible that some of the small terra-cotta images and bronze figurines which have been unearthed from ancient graves or excavated from antique sites may indicate signs of idolatry (see ART [Persian], vol. i. p. 881); but, if so, it would be merely a witness of primitive beliefs or of foreign practices that were later rooted out when Zoroastrianism became the religion of Perseis. Support is lent to such a view by the tenor of some of the passages referred to below, especially in the section on Pahlavi literature.

4. Absence of special allusions in the Avestan.—The Avestan texts, which represent the conditions prevailing in the period of Zoroaster, or before and after the 7th cent. B.C., contain practically no reference to sculpture, and can be construed into a direct allusion to any prevalent existence of idol-worship in Iran. It is true, as already stated, that some of the passages in the Avesta referring to demon-worship (daeva-worship) and sorcerers (ỹšvis) may possibly contain an implication as to idolatrous customs existing among infidels, but, if so, an excursus of such practices is equally implied. 1

An obscure Avestan word barsām (possibly a plural, though its etymology is wholly uncertain), which occurs in the fragmentary Hsamt Naštī, xii. 13, and in the likewise fragmentary Yśtpašt Yašt, 37, has been interpreted as alluding to the sin of idolatry among unbelievers, because its obscure Pahlavi rendering, ẽ h n h k, is glossed by aškā (ٱحکا) ‘ shot (šōt), which, is, ‘the demon-worship of them.’ Possibly some support for this interpretation may be found in the Pahlavi rendering of the word barsēm (as it is there written) in the parallel Avestan fragment, Yśtpašt Yašt, 37, the gloss being in Pahlavi, ažāl-bāt-panamašt, lit. ‘idol-worship;’ but the whole matter remains rather uncertain. 2

5. Presence of special allusions in the Avesta.—In the Avestan literature (see above, § 2) and for other Mathnic monuments, as bearing indirectly upon the whole question in relation to Persia, consult ART (Mathnic) byCumont, vol. i. pp. 575-874. In direct connection, however, as covering the general subject of image-worship during the Sassanian Period, reference may once more be made to ART (Persian); and for numismatic representations of Iranian divinities see M. Stein, in GS, 47, 1887, pp. 135-168.

6. Allusions in Pahlavi literature of Sassanian times and later.—Important in its bearing—as a sequel to and to supplement the material drawn from glyptic art—is the testimony offered by the Pahlavi literature of this period, or the centuries directly preceding and following the Muhammadan Conquest about A.D. 630. The entire subject will be found fully discussed in a monograph prepared for the Persia, Volume of the Sir Jaminot Tejenbhy Zoroasthi Mandressa, to appear in Bombay, 1914. Many of these Pahlavi allusions refer back to an age, a millennium or more, before Zoroaster appeared, and yet the stereotypes slowly emerging under stress upon the fact, of the action of Cambyses in slaying the Apsa bull (Herm. iii. 29), and of his sacrifice of both horse and flesh, sensitive to steel, as well as of Cambyses’ mockery of the idol (lēyš). In the temple of the Egyptian Horapetus (iii. 27).
as the founder of the national religion of Persia, and are the more valuable as showing the traditional attitude of Iran in regard to idols and images. Only the main references need be given here.\footnote{1}

The Dinkort (vii. 1. 19), which is a Pahlavi work based upon very old material, contains an antique legend of Takhmûrâp (a monarch placed by some scholars (e.g. Pahlavî nûmâni n. c.) that names him as a pioni- er who introduced idol-worship (\textit{aštêtê-para-stâkîh}) and promulgated among creatures the reverence and worship of the Creator.\footnote{2} The same words appear in other passages (vii. 4. 72) to the idol-worship (\textit{aštêtê-parastatêsh}) and witchcraft practised by the monster Dâhak of Babylon, whose usurping reign over Iran is assigned by tradition to the 3rd millennium B.C., and whose beneficent influence in this heretical regard was only eradicated two thousand years later by the establishment of the religion of Zoroaster. The passage reads in translation:\footnote{3}

"The man who destroys \dot{\textit{Dhêak}} man, has cast to idol-worship:... but through the words of the triumphant ruler, the man (\textit{Dhêak}) proclaims in opposition to that sectery, it (i.e. the heresy) is all dispersed and disabled.\footnote{4}

Another legend, oft-repeated in the Pahlavi books, is the story of the crusade waged against idol-worship by the ancient ruler Kaê Khusraw (\textit{Kari Housrawv} of the Avesta), who is reputed to have reigned about 800 B.C. By the help of the Kingly Glory (\textit{Pahl. darê}: cf. Av. \textit{draevê}) this monarch demolishes the idol-shrine which his arch-enemy, Frangrišâli of Turân (Pahl. Frâhshâli, Mod. Pers. Frâshâli; cf. Av. \textit{Farsahasan}, has made and on the shore of Lake Chêchast, and substituted for it the great fire-temple of Adhar-gushmâsh, with which his name was afterwards associated.\footnote{5} The Dinkort (vii. 1. 39), \textit{p.}, tells of how Kax Khusraw: \footnote{6}

- "aquituated and anointed Frangrišah of Tur, the sorcerer, and his fellow-murderers, (namely) those of Vakyan, Kewvân, and many other vilâs, and destroyed, and applied himself to the demolition of that idol-temple (\textit{aštêtê-dé} on the shore of Lake Chêchast, which was a frightful thing of sinfulness."

The same legend of the destruction of this noted idol-temple is referred to several times in other Pahlavi works. The \textit{Bûndahîsh}, xvii. 7, \textit{p.}, in telling of this pious achievement adds a detail regarding the help he received from the hero in his work by the demon fire, Atâr Gushmâsh, as follows:\footnote{7}

"When Kaê Khusraw was demolishing the idol-temple (\textit{aštêtê-dé}) of Lake Chêchast, it (i.e. the fire) settled upon the temple of the devilish demons, seizes him with its flames and destroys the idol-temple.\footnote{8}"

Kaê Khusraw's religious act is praised, furthermore, in a long passage of the \textit{Mainâg-Khorâsh} (ii. 93-95 and xxvii. 39-61), which may be dated somewhere about the 6th century A.D. The idolatrous practices of the tyrant Frâshâli (Afrâshâli) are alluded to in a somewhat later treatise, \textit{Sodarek-tâl-i Akrên}, 7, which anathemizes this foe for having transformed each of the sacred shrines in the city of Samarkand, in Sogdiana, into an idol-temple (\textit{Pahl. aštêtê-dé}). the abode of demons.\footnote{9}

A statement has been made about the attitude which Zoroaster in his own time must have held towards anything approaching idolatry, as shown by the tenor of his religion, even though no direct pronouncement by him is preserved in the Avesta itself. Additional evidence is furnished by the fact that in the Pahlavi \textit{Bûndahîsh} (vii. 30 and 31 ff., the hero Pêšyûtan, the son of Zoroaster's patron Vîs-âtar, is shown to have received divine authority from Oramzd, combined with the archangelic aid of the Amâasar; and that of the sacred fires, in his crusade to destroy and smite the idol-temple (\textit{aštêtê-dé}) of the demons", and that that idol was destroyed through the glorious exertion of the illustrious Pêšyûtan." Again, a section in the Pahlavi \textit{Jâmâp Nûvâk} (vii. 1; \textit{ed.} J. J. Moli, Bombay, 1903, p. 78), which is a book probably written some time before A.D. 900 and purporting to hand down the words of the sage Jâmâp, chief-counsel at the court of Zoroaster's patron Vîs-âtar, contains, in its Pâzand version of this chapter, a prophecy of the time (not then wholly future) of the last days and of the rise of the wicked 'idol-worshippers' (\textit{aštêtê-parastatêsh}) in the last millennium of the world when the Saviour (Pahl. Sûûnas, Av. Sadôyant) shall appear before the Day of Judgment.\footnote{10}

There are several general allusions to the hatred of idolatry in other Pahlavi books besides those already mentioned.

The \textit{Artiv Fêrût Nûvâk}, xxvii. 11, \textit{p.}, in an account of an apocalyptic vision, enters upon the roll of the damned a woman whose perverted leer to do the practice of "idol-worship" (\textit{aštêtê-dé}); and the \textit{Sûûnas-I-Sûûnas}, iv. 17, a compilation dating from about the 7th century A.D., though based on older sources, sees a nice fulfilment of the prophecies of the \textit{Zâyân} (Av. \textit{Zâyân}) that the statues were overthrown, and the idols were smote away; and the same thing is said in the \textit{Bûndahîsh} itself (p. 105). The Abûnāh from idol-worship (\textit{aštêtê-parastatêsh}) and demon-worship, because its enormity is "c utils" (\textit{Pahl. hastâs}) among the most heinous sins (xxvi. 10). For this reason the \textit{Dhikâr}, p. 275, sees in the disannihilation of idolatry a sign of the growth of the true religion, on the ground that, "if idol-worship be annihilated, no faith is the god spurious?"

It is easy, therefore, to understand the importance attached to the exploit of Ardašir, founder of the Sassanian empire, in overthrowing an idolatrous temple and killing an idol and called the "Worm" (Pahl. \textit{Kûrim}), a vile practitioner of idolatry (\textit{aštêtê}), as said in the Pahlavi romance \textit{Ahrštakhtâsh}, vii. 11-12; this story presents interesting parallels to the Jews and the Dragon, as discussed, with bibliographical references to the Pahlavi editions of the work concerned, by Jackson, "Notes on OT Apocalypses," in Essays published as a Testament to Charles Augustus Briggs, New York, 1911, pp. 95-97.

The practice of idol-worship by foreign nations, who were outside the pale of Zoroastrian Iran, comes in for a share of condemnation in the Pahlavi texts. For instance, the veneration which the Hindus paid to images, personified as the idol \textit{Bêl} (lit. "spectre, spook", then "image, idol"), is described in \textit{Bûndahîsh}, ed. B. T. Ankelisaria, Bombay, 1908, p. 187) as follows:

"The demon \textit{Bêl} is he whom they worship among the Hindus, and his prayer is in the \textit{bêl}-shrine idols (i.e. golden images)."

A similar damnable practice of the worship of a \textit{bêl} is attributed, according to the Pahlavi \textit{Pãzand Jâmâp Nûvâk}, v. 3-4 (ed. Moli, p. 787), to the people of China, Bârbistan, and the Tájiks—the same people, it is added, whom the Arabs and Franks are hostile to.\footnote{11}

Regarding this regard, which appears in Pahl., \textit{Av}, and Mod. Pers., see Bartholomae, \textit{Das alte Persische}, 2跖, 1893, p. 396, where it is discussed by A. Yohannan, in \textit{Spiegel Memorial Volume}, Bombay, 1908, pp. 150-152.
name of the latter nation probably including the tribes of Central Asia as well as those of their Islamic neighbors. The Avesta, however, declares that territory and may have retained traces of pre-Muhammadan idolatry fostered by the primitive beliefs of the people they vanquished.

7. After the Muhammadan Conquest in the 7th cent., the overthrow of Zoroastrianism as the national faith through the Muhammadan Conquest by the Arabs in the 7th cent. A.D., whatever it may have signified in other regards, meant no significant change with respect to the true Persian hatred of idolatry. Vanquished and vected were at one in this matter, and many of the citations given above from the Zoroastrian patrician works in Pahlavi may, in fact, date from a time after the Muslim victory over Persia, even if the sources on which their standards were based go back to a far earlier period. It must be conceded, however, that the iconoclastic spirit of Islam killed off all progress in the Persian art of sculpture, as being a factor that might lead to encouraging idolatry, despite the fact that there was no such inclination in the Persian heart. This circumstance accounts for the fact that no sculptured portrait was carved after the downfall of the Sassanian Empire through Islam until modern times, when, about the beginning of the 19th cent., Fath Ali Shah (1798–1834) came to the throne, and he has since been sculptured over an antique carving of Sassanian times, thus unfortunately effacing an old bas-relief that had been cut some 1600 years before; but this innovation, or, rather, this resumption of the old practice of carving portraits on rocks, combined with one or two other modern instances, is a matter of recent times (consult ART [Persian]).

8. References in later Persian literature.—The whole tone of later Persian literature, or for the past 1000 years and more, has been strongly against idolatry, and that, too, irrespective of Muhammadan influence as well as under a natural sympathy with the iconoclastic tenets of the Qur'an. Only a few references need be given to show this. The great epic poet of Persia, Ferdowsi (fl. A.D. 1000), e.g., tells with evident zest and in spirited heroics verse how Faridun, 2500 years before, overthrew a talisman (from which is derived the form of an idol which the monster Dahjakh or Dahik, whose idolatry has been alluded to above) maintained in his palace (see Ferdowsi, Sh-khanâmah, ed. Vulcher and Landauer, London, 1872; cf.ols. 161–166). Many instances might be cited from other Persian authors. The poet and moralist Sa'di (c. A.D. 1184–c. 1291) recounts how he discovered in his travels the trick by which the famous idol in the great temple of Somnath in India lifted its hand; and, outraged by the infamous deception, he thereupon slew the priest in charge of the sanctuary. Yet it must be confessed that, in his account, Sa'di has hopelessly confused some of his allusions to Hindu idolatry with the so-called worship of fire in the 4 Avâstâ and Zandâ to which he refers (cf. Sadî, Bistûn, ch. vii., Story 3; tr. A. H. Edwards, London, 1911, pp. 106–109). Sa'dî also makes use of a story of an idolater to adorn a tale in his Bistûn, ch. x., Story 3 (tr. Edwards, p. 121 f.). The great lyricist Hâfez (c. 1315–1390) often makes allusion to his Ghazâlî, or 'Odes,' to 'idol-worship' (but-parast), or likens his beloved to an 'idol' (but or to an 'image' (aron)) but his references are mostly in the private and family love (e.g. Ghazâlî, 301, verse 3; 210, v. 3: 254, v. 8: 297, v. 5: 172, v. 10, in the ed. by H. Brockhaus, Die Lieder des Hafez, Leipzig, 1883, pp. 265, 130, 175, 221, 222). Finally, the last of the Persian poet, Jâmî (A.D. 1414–1492), in vol. vii. of his Hâfez

Aurang, entitled Khiwâ'id-nâmeh-i Iskãndâri, or 'Book of Alexander's Wisdom,' represents Alexander the Great as being so much impressed with the influence of idols. Citations might easily be multiplied from other later Persian writers, but they would all be of a similar character as showing the deep-seated Persian hatred of idolatry. This persistent denunciation of the use of idols and images is as marked as ever in the attitude of the Parsis, or modern followers of Zoroastory, both in India and in Persia.


A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Teutonic and Slavic).—I. Teutonic.—The evidence for the existence of idols and images among Germanic peoples is somewhat conflicting. The pronouncement of Tacitus, that the Germani had no images of their gods, is repeated by later Christian writers; but this is evidently an unceremonial restatement. On the other hand, there is evidence, if not always so direct as to attest the existence of images among the different Germanic peoples, at the several periods of their conversion to Christianity.

Tacitus definitely says of the Germani: 'Ceterum, nec cohorsit parvioribus deos, neque in illius humani cris semper assimilaret, ex maxime ciuisinum arsiterianum' ( Germ. 9); and again, of the Nahanarvali, that they have no simulacra of their twin-gods Alice (Germ. 43). Elsewhere, however (Germ. 7), he tells of the symbols taken from the sanctuaries, graves, or works of art. And in the battle: sigmâ, probably attributes of the gods, as the ship which he names the 'signum Indus' (Germ. 9); and effigies, probably representations of animals which possessed a sacred significance. There might be the ferorum imaginem of the Batavi (Hist. iv. 22). Later examples would be the dragon-heads on poles shown among the spoils taken from the Germani by Marcus Aurelius, and depicted in the Antonine Column (cf. P. S. Bartoli, Columna Antoniniana, Rome, n.d., pl. 37 f.). These are perhaps similar in form to the Dragon of Wessex displayed as Harold's standard by the Bayeux Tapestry. Such representation is described in, in which an image is used (Olafa Saga Tryggvasonar, Forornum Saga, ii, ch. 175). If the cult of Nehalemia, representations of whom were found at Walcheren, contains any Germanic element, they have then very early evidence of the representation of a deity; but, even if she is Germanic, the whole style of the figure shows very strong Roman influence.

It seems probable that the Germanic representation of gods passed through the usual stages of development (cf. R. M. Meyer, Allgemeine Religiousgesch. ch. v. § 24). There is no actual evidence for the shapeless log or stone; but this would probably be the earliest form of idol for the worship of meteoric

2 Hereafter quoted as F.M.S.
stones, as in classical mythology. But it is likely, from what we know of the later use of logs, straw figures, branches, etc., in plough, harvest, and other ceremonies, that this stage did exist (cf. W. Mannhardt, Mythol. Forschungen, Strassburg, 1854, p. 332 f.; Grimm, Text. Mythol. ch. 24, pp. 768, 782, 784); and it is even possible that some such rough image may be deduced from the name-ignis of Nordic. Contemporary evidence does exist, however, for the second stage—the trunk or log, carved with a representation of the head only, or of the head and shoulders. Pillar-worship, of which the reverence was paid by the Saxon Himing, and to the high-seat pillars by the Scandinavians seems to have been a late survival, probably belongs to this stage. For the more artistic stage—the complete reproduction of deities—there is sufficient evidence, especially from Scandinavia; they are represented with their attributes, as Thor with his hammer; or with ornaments of gold and silver. Finally, as with some statues of classical gods, and with Christian images, one finds instances of images that can move, walk, and speak.

The earliest definite evidence for the existence of Germanic idols is connected with the Goths, and dates back to the latter half of the 4th century. The Constantinople Column, erected by Arcadius to commemorate the wars of Theodosius, has representations of German gods, borne on the backs of bears. These are life-size figures of bearded men, of which the head and shoulders only are carefully carved; the rest of the figure is of the zoomorphic type, with slight indications of ornament to represent a robe (cf. A. Bardon, Imperium Orientale, Venice, 1729, ii. 417, pl. ix.).

Sozomen, HE vi. 37, writing of the same period, mentions that Athisaric, king of the Goths, in his attempt to revive heathenism, caused a statue (Ephrem) to be carried in a wagon to the houses of Christians, that they might worship and sacrifice.

The references of Christian writers to the existence of idols among the remaining Germanic peoples are numerous, but reliance can be placed only on those in which images are specifically mentioned or described (simulacra, imaginari). Phrases such as 'idola colere' are not definite enough, nor is the mere mention of images sufficient evidence, as it is possible that Germanic temples did not invariably contain images; the custom of alluding to Germanic gods under the names of the approximately corresponding classical deities sometimes causes confusion.

In the Frankish images, there is continuous evidence. The earliest reference, dating from 491, is the speech of Clotilda to her husband King Clovis, in favour of baptism: 'Nicht mitt diu quois colitis, qui neque sibi, neque aliis potens sustinens; sanctum an tu ex lapide, an ex ligno, an ex metali, alium scripti Gregorii a 4f' (Hist. Franci, i. 39).

In the Constitutio of Childebert, c. 554, punishment is decreed against those who refuse to destroy from off their land, or who prevent the priests from destroying, 'simulacra constructa vel idola danatorum dedicata' (Paulinus, 'MGH', 'Liber I', c. 355 f., i. 1). In the Vita S. Gregorio, contained in the Acta Ordinis S. Benedicti, Paris, 1688–1701, sect. ii. p. 582, we are told that c. 640 the saint 'costum ... simulacra senatoris publici atque ... idola superstitionis eius deceptaque verum auctoritatis legis' (n. 40).

The only definite authority for Saxon idol-worship is to be found in the anonymous Indicentum Superstititionum of the 8th century. With entry 26, 'De simulaculo de comarsa farina,' may be compared the story of the figure of Baldr, which was baked and smeared with oil (Fröls's Saga, 9; Formaldr Sögur, ii.). Possibly such cakes were sometimes representations of a divine attribute, or of an animal sacred god, and not of the god himself. Entry 27, 'De simulacris de pannis (pannis), fictatis, may refer to doll-images for the private use of worshippers (cf. A. Sauppe, Indicentum Superstitutionum, Leipzig, 1881, ad loc.) or to figures in straw and hay images, such as the image of Death, which in later times we know to have been carried round in procession (cf. Grimm, ch. xxiv. p. 771). Entry 28, 'De simulaculo, quod per campos portaret,' shows that the Saxons practised the general Germanic custom of religious processions, probably to secure fruitfulness and prosperity.

There is little definite reference to the practice of idol-worship among the English: the most convincing is the description of the heathen reaction in Essex, c. 660:

'Gocerunt ams, una demelare ærnat, restaurare, at adare simulacras' (Bede, HE iii. 30).

Boniface I, writing to Bishop Mellitus, gives instructions, 'Ipsa quae in ea (i.e. facie) sunt idola, desunterant' (i. 30).

Other references are found in Bede: Pope Gregory, writing to Bishop Mellitus, gives instructions, 'ipsa quae in ea (i.e. facie) sunt idola, desunterant' (i. 30).

Boniface I, writing to Bishop Mellitus, gives instructions, 'Ipsa quae in ea (i.e. facie) sunt idola, desunterant' (i. 30).

The force of these two references is weakened by the fact that the writers of the letters were foreigners, and not immediately in touch with English conditions. Again, in the story of Cuthwig, and of his active share in the destruction of the temple at Goodmanham (Bede, HE ii. 12), no word more definite than ydola is used; but in the poetic account of the incident by Alcuin, 'Ponitilvius et Sancta Bervonica Ecclesiae, 1. 162, Paulunus is represented as saying, 'omnia stomen tur fundo simulacra deorum.' The word wode occurs in Old English in the meaning of 'idol'; thus it is used of Nethuchedræzer's golden image: its most peculiar use is in the phrase Widen worhtes wode (Gnomon Verses, i. 133, Exeter Book). Again, in Beowulf (line 176) the word seinvoroburg, 'honor to idols,' is used in an expression description of a heathen custom: 'At times they ordained worship of the idols in the temples.' For the Frisians the evidence is neither full nor very conclusive: there is no direct reference to an idol in the description of the sanctuary of Pöste on Heligoland given by Alcuin, Vita S. Willibrordi, i. 10 (PL cl. 700); by Altrid, Vita Liudgeri, i. 19 (MGH, 'Scriptores'), Hanover, 1830 f., ii. 410 (PL xxix. 778); and by Adam of Bremen, Gesta Rinberg burg, iv. 3 (MGH, 'Scripto' vii. 369 (PL exvii. 623 f.). Elsewhere (i. 13) Alcuin speaks of Willibrord's arrival 'ad quamdam villam Wulacro burn nomine, in qua antiqui errores idolum renascerat.'

In Willibald's description of the heathen reaction under the Frisian king Rebéd, c. 718, we read:

'Idolum quomque collum, constructa idolum cumus, fucum et is deplorat renovatam' (Vita S. Bonifaci, iv. 12 (MGH, 'Scriptor' ii. 333; PL livt. 611).

The most definite reference is that of Anskar in his account of the preaching of St. Willibald in the middle of the 8th cent. to the Frisians at Hurnebeck:

'Sacerba coepit, primo ... sancta subedit auxilium petere, et a simulacris multa et arcis simulacros superstiti solvat' (Vita Willibaldi, 3 (MGH, 'Scripto' iii. 280; PL xxvii. 103 f.).

Grimm quotes from different lives of St. Gall an incident which would be a proof of the existence of idols in Alamanian, if, as he thinks, it can be referred to Germanum ('Scripto' vi. p. 108). Although there is some confusion in this account of Ratpert, Caes. S. Galli, 1 (MGH, 'Scriptor' ii. 61 (PL exvii. 1038)), it seems clear that on the Lake of Constance, near Bregenz, St. Gall and Colmbon discovered, c. 612, a sanctuary dedicated to
St. Aurelia; it nevertheless contained "trees imagined aeres et debaratas" (Vita S. Galli, i. 6 [Vita B. Galli, i. 6; PL 71, 172]). The missionary sown the tree; these were probably planted in wood. "(Vita S. Galli, i. 6 [Vita B. Galli, i. 6; PL 71, 172]).

The missionaries threw into the water. Walraard Strabo says definitely that they were images of heathen gods; "isti sunt die veteres et antiqui iuvenes morti et " (Vita S. Galli, i. 6 [Vita B. Galli, i. 6; PL 71, 172]). Gramm cites later instances of practical endeavors to retain the ancient gods, probably to consolidate the people's prejudices, and it has approximated parallels in classical mythology (cf. Pausanias, iii. xiv. 5; 'the wooden image [i.e. the archaic image of Thetis is still preserved in secret').

For Scandinavian images there is very full evidence, the most trustworthy coming from Christian sources; the words "skjovoggi" and "tegoggi" are used in Iceland, but the custom prevails of speaking of the image merely by the name of the deity. The most important evidence is the account by Adam of Bremen, in the 11th cent., of the great sanctuary at Upsala, with its statues of Thor, Odin ("Wodan"); and Freyr ("Friedo"). Odin is represented armed, the symbol of fertility, and Thor "cum cepit roem simulam velictum"; this probably refers to his hammer, the attribute of the thunder-god (Gesta Hamaunam, iv. 28 [MGH, Script. Ord. scandinav. iv. 28]). N extraction and Freyr were mentioned (ib. ii. 60, p. 331, iv. 9, p. 371; PL clxvii. 545, 627). The most detailed accounts we owe to the Christianizing expeditions of Olaf Tryggvason and St. Olaf.

Thus at Roskild, Olaf Tryggvason encountered a representation of Thor which could speak, walk, and even make war upon him ("Olaf's Saga Tryggvasonar, 150, F. M. S. i"). At Mori near Trondheim the king found an image of Thor with his hammer, armed with gold and silver; it stood in a chariot drawn by two wooden horses, round the horns of which was a silver chain ("Thorgardolfs, Olaf's S. Trygg, 288"). St. Olaf was opposed in the Highlands by Guðbrandr, a votary of Thor, and a great chief; Guðbrandr's son described Thor's image to the king:

"It has a hammer in his right hand and is great of stature ... he is hollow within, his four leaves are brought to him every day, and therewith meat in the same proportion." The image stood upon a rock, which was adorned with gold and silver; if it was scattered, it came "more as big as cats, and lizards and snakes" ("Olaf's Saga Hápl, 297, F. M. S. i.

Such images have seem to have been particularly numerous; in Njál saga 88 we find, in a temple at Hööf, Thor in a chariot, and with him Þórgestur, Hóljagårdr, and Írpa; each wears a gold adorned with silver, and Þórgestur has a kerchief on her head. Reference has already been made to the story of Freyr, and of his image being borne in yearly procession ("Olaf's S. Trygg, 178, F. M. S. ii."); also to the story of the baked image of Baldi ("Friedo's S. 9"). It seems to have been a common Scandinavian custom to place several statues in one temple; even the temple built by Hrafnkel, who was a special votary of Freyr, contained other gods ("Ivarshals S. Friedo, 15"). Still, the notice of the great temple in Gautland, with its hundred gods, is probably an exaggeration ("Jomsvinna S. 12").

Traces are found of the practice of carrying on the person small images, probably for secret worship, or as amulets; the skald Hallfred carried an ivory likeness of Thor in his pocket ("Hallfred's S. Friedo, 6"); and Ingimund was a silver talisman of Freyr ("Götterbuch, S. 10"). For similar protective symbols Earl Eirikr carried an image of Thor at the prow of his ship ("Friedo's S. ii. 253"). We even find such a familiar use as the image of Thor carried in the arms of a child ("Fosterchild's S. pt. ii. 9"). The walls of Olaf's Pá's hall in Lee-

land were adorned with representations of old stones, probably in painted wood ("Olaf's S. 29"); these were described by Úlfur Ugason in the Hâla, and, from the fragments that remain of the poem, they seem to have depicted the burning of Baldi, Himmel, and his flight with Loki, Thor's journey to Hymir, and his fight with Mýgjarporr. The high-seat pillars were also adorned with figures; thus Thor was carved upon the pillars which Thóðir Móstræskgæg threw overboard on the Italian coast in order to find a landing-place; these same pillars were afterwards set up in the temple built by Thorolf.

To sum up, then, our knowledge of Scandinavian images: they were very numerous, often life-size, generally of wood (cf. "trennjar", "wooden man"), and frequently adorned with gold and silver. In later times the people identified the image with the god, and in this way they were able to believe that the figure had the power of movement; a very clear example of this occurs in the story of Thendorf of Gata ("Fréseyingsa S. 23"), where the statue of Thógerðr loosened a ring as a sign of acquiescence, but clamps it tightly when she denies her favour. The story of Gunnarr and his intercourse with Freyr's priestess proves that the god was identified with his image. The idea of vitality and volition in the image is carried so far that the statue of Thor at Brauðstað is made to compete in wrestling with Ólafr Tryggvason, the object being to hurl the vanquished into the fire; the king proved the stronger, and the wooden figure was burned to ashes.

There is very little archaeological evidence for Germanic gods; the representations of Nehalemnia and of the dea matres are more Roman than Germanic in style, and with them may be related the altar to Mars Thugens, with its representation of the god armed. Although it was found in England on Hadrian's Wall, the votaries, who came from near Deventer, were probably Batavi; the stone dates from the first half of the 3rd cent. (cf. Helm, "Allgerman. Religiongesch. i. 366 ff."). Again, the most important evidence is connected with Scandinavian mythology. The figures on the Gallehus horns are too problematical to count as evidence; and even the figure on one of the plates of the Torlanda helmet may represent a mere warrior, though it is tempting to identify it with Odin, accompanied by his two ravens. The representations of Odin exist on the gravestones of Arde, Habbinghó, and Þjønghive; here we see Odin on Sleipnir, but even these are late representations and show a somewhat specialized aspect of the god (cf. Helm i. 214 ff.; according to him, the majority of them may be considered to represent deities of fertility.

a. Slavic. The discussion of Slavic images is rendered difficult by the fact that much of the early evidence really refers to Scandinavians who were settled among Slavic populations; in particular, the chief god of whom one figure is really Thor, the Swedish thunder-god, worshipped under the same aspect, but under a Slavic name, Perun, thunder-bolt. It is therefore not easy to disentangle the Scandinavian work from the Slavic, and only at one period does the evidence refer incontrovertibly to the Slavs—the period of
Slavic settlements in the island of Rügen, and around the Elbe. The evidence for Poland, however, appears fairly trustworthy.

The 10th century narratives of Arabian travellers, though nominally concerned with the Slavs, in reality treat of the Russians, i.e. of the Scandinavian settlers around the Volga. Ibn Faddlan (ed. Paris, 1851-71, ch. xvi.). Apart from the inherent improbability of his account, it is difficult to know of whom he is speaking, and of what place; Arkona has been suggested, but there seems to be no means of settling the question.

Even some of the early Christian evidence really refers to Scandinavians. The so-called Chronicle of Nestor, dating from the 11th to the 12th century, gives a detailed account of the setting up of idols in 978 at Kiev by Vladimir:

"Perum in wood, in a silver head and a golden beard, and also a throne, Dobog, Sirolog, Smargd, and Mokoch. Sacrifices were offered to him on his throne and their daughters committed to his service as victims to the idol (Chronicon de Nestor, ed. and tr. L. Leger, Paris, 1884, p. 36).

"We hear again of an attempt to force a Christian Vareque to sacrifice to the idols; he repiled: "There are not gods; these are only wood, which is to-day, to-morrow, to-morrow, etc.; they do not eat, or drink, or speak It is the hand of man which has cut them out of wood."(ib. 36)

Ten years later Vladimir reversed his work at Kiev:

"He commanded the idols to be thrown down. Some he had burnt, and the rest cast into the fire. His command to tie Perum to the tail of a horse, and to drag him down ... to the stream; and he ordered twelve men to beat him with staves, not because he thought the wood had any feeling, but to insult the demon who in this form had insulted men, and to punish him; and so he was being dragged along the stream as far as the Dnieper, the heathen went for him. ... Then they threw him into the Dnieper." (ib. 45).

Adan of Bremen's testimony is important as contemporary 11th century evidence; he mentions the town Rethra:

"templum ibi magnum constructum est deo ensibi, quorum principis est Sclavum. Simulacrum eius auro coronatum est et aurea manus举（Gesta Hammaburg. ii. 18 [MGH, Script. vii. 812; PL clxxviii 913].

Thielmar, Chronicum, vi. 17 (MGH, Script. iii. p. 812), gives a more minute description of this sanctuary in Mecklenburg-Strelitz, but differs in some important details, notably in calling the town Riodegost, and the god Zuarasici (contrast Helmold, Chronicum Scavorum, i. 23 [MGH, Script. xxii]). In the temple "dii sicut in sancto, simulacrum nominis incautis, galeis lapis colocavit, vestit, quorum primus Zuarasici dictur. ... Viridem quaeque ruris, nix ad expeditos circumvix." (ib. 813)

Later, he speaks of the Liutici and of their goddess whom they carried with them into battle in verissimam operam" (ib. vii. 47, p. 837); and elsewhere he refers to the general Slavic practice of image-worship:

"Quod regiones sust et in parvis sanctis, totem habebat, et simulacrum dixit eum, nullum sinu Singularis est nasci, ubi infideline arcuato, in sanctum surnum deum de tera habebat, quoniam eum procurat regna, et est cocci, eterni et inferni, et faciem celi aperie pro merito pecuniae hominum suorum patrinis descendit." (ib. iii. 1, p. 829; AS, Jul. i. 988).

Next in chronological order come the references connected with the Christianizing missions of Otto of Bamberg to the Vemarian Slavs, early in the 12th century. The references to idols and their destruction are frequent; unfortunately the value of these lives by Herbold and Ebbo is much disputed. The most detailed description is that of a great temple at Stein, apparently very like that at Rethra:

"Erat autem ibi simulacrum tripedis, quod in uno corpore tria capita habebat, Trigula vocabatur (Herbold, Dialogi de Vita Ottone, 3 [MGH, Script. xi. 707]).

At Gutzkow there was an idol of great size and beauty, which was mutilated and burned (Ebbo of Bamberg, Vita Ottone, iii. 10 [MGH, Script. xii. 869]). Ebbo gives more details on the image of Trigula at Stein:

"Triippetum habebat simulacrum, quod aures ciddari oculis et labia contorta, et simulacrum deorum, in haeretica, in haeretica, in haeretica, in haeretica, in haeretica, in haeretica simulacrum creatum dea tera habebat, quoniam eum procurat regna, et est cocci, eterni et inferni; et faciem celi aperie pro merito pecuniae hominum suorum patrinis descendit." (ib. iii. 1, p. 829; AS, Jul. i. 988).

In the temple at Julin were "statuae ... aure et argento decoratae" (ib. iii. 1, p. 829; AS, Jul. i. 357).
In descriptions of late survivals of Prussian or Lithuanian paganism, mention of the appearance of the images is frequently made; but apparently there is no other reference to images.

To sum up the evidence: Teutonic and Slavic peoples alike seem to have had no idols in early times, but they must have certainly possessed them at a later stage; in their adoption of them they may have been influenced by classical cults. Although individual references by early chroniclers may not always be accepted, the weight of their collective testimony is too great to be disregarded.


M. E. SEATON.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Tibetan).—1. Occurrence.—In Tibet images and idols abound, though not, perhaps, to any greater extent than in other Buddhist countries, even of the 'Southern', or relatively primitive, division of that religion—e.g. Burana and Ceylon. In Tibet, however, the famous image of the Buddha in the supreme moment of attaining Buddhahood, under the 'Tree of Wisdom' ('Bodhi'), in Tibet, on the other hand, as in the other countries of the polytheistic Mahāyāna form of Buddhism, the images represent also a host of defined Buddhas and celestial Bodhisattvas (or potential Buddhas), saints, and demons. Besides the images enshrined in temples and other religious buildings, shrines (g. m.), etc., a large number of miniature images are met with on domestic altars, and worn by the people in amulet-boxes, as talismans. Pictures of many of these divinities are as abundant in the homes of laymen as in temples, and illuminated in a great variety of colours on the title-pages of favourite scriptures and manuals of worship. Consecrated medals are also bestowed by the grand Lamas upon generous donors of alms. The images of the 'primordial' aboriginal religion, the Bon, are now cast in Buddhist form.

2. Divinities, saints, etc., represented.—The great majority of the divinities represented by the idols are those of the orthodox Mahāyāna Buddhism of India, as was first elicited by the present writer, who has also traced the origin of the majority of these divinities and their images to an adaptation of Brahmanist myth, and to the delusion of metaphysical categories and different modes of Buddha's 'Word' (or Logos) by a concrete symbolism. The more commonly prevalent images are as follows.

(a) Buddha, celestial and human.—Of these the most frequently represented is perhaps the divine Āmitābha (Od-dapnjon), or 'The Buddha of Boundless Light' (see ÁDI BUDDHA) of the Western Paradise, and his mode Amithāya (Tie-dapnjon), OD-DAPPNIAVA, 'The Boundless Life' (see AMITĀBHĀ). Other common forms are the Medical or Aṣṭākāpi Buddha (Men-lo), the primordial Adibuddha as Samanta-buddha (Kun-tse-bnan-po), or Vajrādāra (De-rod-chen), or Vajrasattva (De-rod-kun-po). All of these images have a mystical triadens in which they mark their female energies; also the remaining Buddhas of the four quarters of the universe; and—less common than these—the historical Buddha, Sakyamuni (Sākyā- muni).

(b) Bodhisattvas: the coming Buddha, or Mañ-
treya (Byāms-pa), usually figured seated in European fashion, cross-legged, and usually of gigantic size, as a stored image, or carved on carved wooden pedestal (yig-chos-sgra-log) or personified Compassion, Manjushri (Sam-dbyin-pa), personified Wisdom, Vajrapāṇi (P’ye-ma-rdo); Tarā (Skor-ma), consort of Avalokiteśvara, as ‘the wheel of the Law’ (Bka’-brgyud); Māra (Sde-lo rgya-mag); Prajñāparamita, personified Divine Wisdom; ‘the all-victorious Diśam, Uṣṇīṣa-vijaya; ‘the White Umbrella Inviolable in the Conquest of Sin’, Dpal-dam-po-rig-pa-ston-pa, ‘the Great Turner away of Harm’, Mahāvyutthāna, ‘the Flaming Crown’, Umjyodesa.

1. Placed gods (bka’ag) of Brāhmaṇism type: modes of Indra and Brahman, as door-keepers and attendants on Sakyamuni; the four Guardian gods of the Quarters, and Jambhala, the god of Wealth.

2. Demonic tutelaries of the fierce type of Siva as ‘Defenders of Religion’ (Chos-skron), e.g. ‘the fearful Thunderbelt’, Yeru-shaṅgu (iVarge-byi-gyi), a form of Yama, the god of the Dead; ‘the horse-necked demon’, Huyagriva (rTa-mgrin); ‘the Goddess’, Devi or Lha-mo.

3. Gods and demons: chiefly indigenous, namely ‘country-gods’, yul-lha, and earth-demons, sa-bdag, of which the most numerous are red (tson) and black (bdu). (bdu).

4. Saints: the sixteen apostles or ‘the sixteen Ancestors’, who are also the two chief disciples, Mongag-pa and Sar-mo-pa; Padmapāra or Padmasambhava, whom the present writer has shown to be the founder of Lamayuru; also the reformer of Tibetan Buddhism, Tsongkhapa, the founder of the Yellowhat sect, who became the most famous, and to which belonged the Grand Lamas of Lhasa and Tashilhunpo.

The image of Padmasambhava is given the chief place of temples of the Red-cap sect, and of Tsongkhapa in the Yellow. Each of the other sects accords its own particular founder a chief place on its altars.

3. Canon descriptive of images.—The authoritative source for the detailed description of the images of Buddhism is the great body of the Sādhanas (Sgrub-tab) literature of rituals for the worship of these respective divinities. The rituals were composed in India, in the early centuries of our era onwards, during the rise of the bhakti, or devotional movement, which permeated both Brāhmaṇism and Buddhism. They number many hundreds of each part, or to contain minutes of descriptions of the form assumed by each deity on becoming manifest to a votary; the distinctive form, dress, posture, and pose of body and hands, as well as the colour, and the symbols held in the hands to emphasize the functions and attributes, are all detailed therein. Several recensions of these texts are on record as translated into Tibetan. Two large collections are included in the great Tibetan commentary, Langyur, of which the titles have been published by F. W. Thomas and P. Corrèl. It is from these Indian manuals that Tibetan artists form their images. Many of the deities are given a variety of forms, owing, it seems to the present writer, to the apparent incorporation of popular Brahmanist and other aboriginal divinities to whom their functions and symbolisms are thereby absorbed. These polyphonic forms fall into three types: (a) placid, mild, or benign (byel); (b) fierce (bdom); (c) terrible and demoniac (drogpo).

4. Style of art and technique.—The Tibetan artist, so revered to the greatest extent the medieval Indian style of Buddhist art, is especially noticeable in the dress and form of the female divinities, who are represented displaying exuberant charms of figure, according to the Indian ideal of female beauty. This characteristic is strikingly with the Chinese treatment, which tends to repress sexual distinctions. In the conventional treatment of exteriors, such as landscape effects, clouds, water, trees, and houses, the Tibetan images and pictures exhibit a degree of realism in composition rather than Indian, though Tibet has to some extent evolved a special style of its own, intermediate between that of its two great neighbours, and distinct from that of Nepal. Some of the large images in Tibet were cast in Nepal by foreign artists.

5. Materials of images.—The commonest images are composed of plastic material—clay, or a mixture of incense-paste, flour, and clay moulded into shape, dried, painted, and gilt. Other images are fashioned from brass or copper, usually cast from moulds and gilded. The most valued images are inlaid with turquoises and other precious or imitation stones. Some is seldom used for images or statues, though figures are sometimes outlined on rocks. Bas-reliefs and medallions are often made in bronze, in the winter season, for certain festivals. Following the Indian custom, auspicious times must be selected for the preparation of the materials, and for the execution of the work, especially of the principal organs, e.g. the eyes, etc. A remarkable realistic detail is the insertion into the larger images of parts of real human heart, lungs, stomach, and intestines. The conventional colour of Buddha’s hair is dark blue.

On completion of the image, it requires to be consecrated. For this purpose, the image is first recited, and into the hollow interior are inserted small rolls of texts, one of which is often ‘the Buddhist Creed’ or a spell (bhrārāya). Other objects thus inserted are grains of consecrated rice from the altar, bodily relics, hair, nails, etc., and the robes of holy men, and fillings of precious metals. The image is usually wrapped with silk scarfs, giving the impression that it is clothed. Pictures (s’a-l-ba) of images are painted in distemper, usually on cotton, seldom on silk. Sometimes the paintings are executed on the walls of temples as mural frescoes.

6. Worship of images.—The image, as in other Buddhist countries, is popularly worshipped as a sort of fetish, holy in itself, and not merely as a diagram or symbol of the infinite or unknown. Food and drink are regularly offered to it. It is believed to hear and answer prayers, to appear in a common experience to hear the devotions in a temple addressing personal requests for benefits before the image. Certain of the older images of which the history has been lost, are regarded as miraculous in construction, and credited with being ‘self-formed’ or as ‘fallen from heaven ready fashioned’.

See also ‘Buddhist’ section above, esp. p. 123 ff.


L. A. WADDELL

IMAGE OF GOD.—I. General view. (1) ‘God is a Spirit,’ said Jesus to the woman of Samaria at Jacob’s well at Sychar (Jn. 4:24). The plainness of utterance to the deep truth that God is free and self-determining, essentially ethical in His nature. This great idea is the basic conception on which the interpretation of man as made in God’s image, as set forth in Scripture, must proceed. If God is a Spirit, then man, reflecting Him, must be a spirit too; in other words, human nature has more in it than what we find in sensuous experiences, animal proclivities, and fleshly inclinations. He
stands erect, and is by nature allied to the Divine; and his attachments, in the first instance and properly, are heavenwards and not towards earth. He has co-operation with the Son of his being; and his own nature, to the extent that it is pure and unalloyed, may be held as revealing the Divine. The foundation of his being is deeper than anything that may be seen or tasted or handled; it is found in the relation to the eternal and the eternal. Consequently, what the nature of the great God is can be discovered in part by consideration of His image as reproduced in man; and, however much more complex it is than what finite intellect, finite will, finite conscience, and finite love may disclose, He must at least correspond to the reflection of Himself that the higher faculties and emotions of man's soul exhibit: if the human spirit is not the Divine Spirit, at any rate it reflects it, and may be trusted as a revelator to the extent of its capacity.

The line of argument which is suggested by Jesus' utterance is supported by the OT, and especially by the Creation narratives (Pentateuch and Genesis, ch. 2), at the opening of the Book of Genesis. Whatever be the historical or the scientific value of these narratives, they lie at the root of both the Jewish and the Christian view of God, that they are truths that are indispensable for the understanding of redemption. Acccording to them, man is a spirit, being created by God, who is 'the Father of Spirits'; and having the breath of life 'breathed into his nostrils' by God Himself. The image of His Maker: the Divine Spirit is the Source of the human spirit, and the rational creature is thus far stamped with the stamp of the Creator.

(2) Now, if this be the Scripture teaching, OT and NT, what is the practical significance of it? Clearly this—that, if men is essentially a spirit, drawing its being from the great Creator Spirit, the agnostic position that God, even if we suppose Him to exist, is unknown and unknowable is untenable. God cannot be unknown, much less unknowable, man bears in him the Divine image. Even the reflection of a face in a mirror is a copy; and, although it lacks the warmth and fullness of the original, it does, nevertheless, within limits reproduce it, and thus gives a true idea of the original. And the Biblical conception of man's spiritual nature and original heavenly relationship, both natural theology and Divine revelation become possible, and, indeed, are seen to be inevitable; and, on the supposition that man is not a spirit, it is not possible to see how either natural theology or Divine revelation could be. Divine revelation is shown to be a necessity from the fact that, as man's deepest need is God, and as God is a Person, it is only if God reveals Himself that we can come to know Him. It is the characteristic of personality to be self-determining and self-communicative. Even in the case of our fellow-men, who are persons, we cannot know them unless they themselves will to disclose themselves to us. Knowledge of a neighbour depends upon whether he will open his thoughts to us: the motion must come from his side; otherwise, we are powerless. We might, without his revelation, come to learn something about him; but then we should not know him. Now, the revelation of one person to another is also the revelation of that other to himself. We can never know ourselves except in the light of our experiences, and knowledge of ourselves. And knowledge of ourselves, it is plain, comes from the necessities of the case—in particular, from the circumstance that our nature is in the essence of it social, and that imitation is largely our nature. Innumerable times, more, then, is the revelation of God to us also the revelation of ourselves to us! It is only in His light that we see light. But the meaning of this is that humanity is taken up into the Divine; which, again, implies that the very Godhead is taken up into the Divine. Consequently, therefore, the Godward attitude—is the primary fact in man. God and man in union and communion is the same thing as saying that man is naturally allied to God, that the Infinite is not the contrary, but the complement of the Finite.

Still more obvious is the need for revelation if we introduce, as Scripture does, and as our own experience attests, the idea of sin, or voluntary transgression, intention to create a rupture between man and God. There is now not only genuine or limited knowledge to cope with, but also voluntary alienation or estrangement. The understanding is weakened, but the will is also perverted, and the affections are turned away in the wrong direction. A thorough transformation has to be effected in the sinner—clearness of perception has to be brought back to his intellect, strength to his will, purity to his heart, and peace to his conscience. Only a Divine revelation can do this.

2. OT teaching.—(1) The psychology of the OT conceptions of 'body' and 'spirit'. Of these four factors man consists. His body is at first conceived simply as 'dust' (אָדָם, 'adam'), or 'dust of the ground,' i.e. simply as the earthly part of him, composed of dust and resolved at death into dust (Ge 3:19). But it is the part of man that idea of unworthiness or degradation attaching to it. It is a work of the Creator, and, like other such works, it was pronounced at the beginning to be 'very good.' Looked at the spirit-mind, and sentient organism, it is viewed as 'flesh' (בָּשָׂם, 'basham'), devoid, however, of any implication of vitiosity or carnal desire, which so frequently attaches to 'flesh' in the NT. Nevertheless, although 'flesh' is not represented in the OT as the source or origin of sin, it is regarded as indicating man's mortality and frailty, and also the fact that the body may be the instrument of evil desires and passions. Thus, while, on the one hand, it says, 'All flesh is grass' (Ps 103:14), on the other hand, it records the depravity of the race at a particular moment in the significant phrase, 'All flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth' (Gen 6:5), though even then the concomitance of 'flesh' with 'spirit' is not lost sight of, for it is said, in almost immediate connexion, 'My spirit shall not always strive with him, for he is but flesh' (Gen 6:5). The body as flesh is congruent with spirit: hence the Psalmist can say, 'My heart and my flesh cry out unto the living God' (Ps 56:9). The soul (נפש, 'nephesh') is specially the seat of the emotions and the will, although other functions are frequently attributed to it. It is the soul that 'hopes,' 'fears,' 'trusts,' 'resigns,' 'praises,' 'is glad,' and 'longs,' etc.—all emotive and volitional states. To the heart' (לב, 'laba' orלבבות, 'labbabb'; 2. 22) are assigned thought, wisdom, intellect, understanding; so that the heart,' in Hebrew usage, so far from signifying the chief seat of affection, as in English, is the nearest equivalent to the English term 'mind.' It is also the seat of character—the centre of man's being, moral and religious. As the seat of sin, the heart is deceitful above all things, and it is desperately sick; 'it is the door of the mouth' (Ps 21:2). It is deep and hidden from common view, and is reached only by God: 'If the Lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways' (Ps 139:23). This arises, not simply from the necessities of the case—in particular, from the circumstance that our nature is in the essence of it social, and that imitation is largely our nature. Innumerable times, more, then, is the revelation of God to us also the revelation of ourselves to us! It is only in His light that we see light. But the meaning of this is that humanity is taken up into the Divine; which, again, implies that the very Godhead is taken up into the Divine. Consequently, therefore, the Godward attitude—is the primary fact in man. God and man in union and communion is the same thing as saying that man is naturally allied to God, that the Infinite is not the contrary, but the complement of the Finite.

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expression of the vision and the aspiration of the psalmist and of prophet prompted by the longing for purity and righteousness, and poured out of the individual's glowing faith: 'As for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness, when I awake, with thy likeness' (Ps 17:8; 'likeness' = φάτνη, LXX φάτνα, Vulg. gloria). But the objection has been raised that immortality was lost by the Fall; for our first parents were driven out of the Garden of Eden (such is the representation), lest they should 'put forth their hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.' The significance of this clearly is: that an everlasting life to a fallen or sinful creature, in the condition to which his fall had reduced him, would not be a blessing but a curse, and that something better was in store for erring man, even though it should cost him labour, pain, and sorrow. To eat of the tree of life and live for ever just as he was would simply be to prolong degradation and misery. But the whole lesson of the Fall is that of hope for man. The curse of the ground was for man's sake; it was for man's sake that he was expelled from the Garden, and that access to the tree of life was strictly guarded by cherubim and a flaming sword. In a finely impressive way the myth has now realized that his life is to be a battle of the right against the wrong, of good against evil, of strenuous resistance of temptation, of rising to higher things through personal effort; and that through this continual warfare the potentials that are in him are to be actualized, character is to be formed, and spiritual progress secured. And the NT throws further significance into the fact when it insists that the conflict is not confined to men, but is shared by Heaven itself. It is the characteristic of the very Son of God, the Ideal Man, who was made perfect through suffering, and in whose victory over sin and temptation we have the highest revelation of the Divine purpose with men and the truest manifestation of the Father's love.

3. NT teaching. — The fact of sin and the universal degradation and bondage of men on account of it, and the need, nature, and purpose of the remedy offered in Jesus Christ, are the subject-matter of the NT. The worth of the individual image of God in man, which had become corrupted, defaced, and blurred ('How is the gold become dim! how is the pure gold changed!' [Is 48]), and the determination that God is represented as making to Noah, as recorded in Gn 9, the condemnation of murder and the punishment of it are based on this very fact: 'Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made he man.' And in this same spirit St. James, in the NT, tries to curb the unruly tongue, and to show the enormity of slander, backbiting, and the like (all of which are really species of murder), by the very same argument of man's native dignity and celestial relationship: 'Therewith bless we the Lord and Father; and therewith curse we men, which are made after the likeness of God' (Jas 3:17).

(3) In man's spiritual nature, drawn from its heavenly Source, is involved the fact of immortality and never-ending life. This is a logical deduction of the Jew who is fully conscious of the Divine image: spirit cannot die. How far, however, this was understood by the Jews is subject to dispute. What is obvious is that the idea of a future life grows in the OT as the ages run on; and, when we come to the NT, it comes as an intuition of the heart rather than as the result of logical reasoning, and is associated with the thought of communion and fellowship with God. It is the
not of its own will, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. (Ro 8:21-22)

This gives the meaning of the whole teaching of the NT regarding man and God.

(1) In regard, first, to the NT psychology, it is pertinent to remark that it follows largely that of the OT. Neither of them is, strictly speaking, philosophical. How should they be, seeing that religion, not philosophy, is the great end of the Bible? But Christianity is the completion of the OT revelation, and would be unintelligible if severed from it. Yet it must not be forgotten (a) that Divine revelation is a progressive thing, and, consequently, that the terms received new content as time went on; and (b) that Christianity was affected by Hellenism, especially through the LXX. It is only quite recently that scholars have come to realize how much the NT owes to the LXX, not least for its language; and, indeed, it is hardly extravagant, in the face of modern researches, to say that the NT is the Christianization of the Septuagint.

(2) How, then, is sinful man’s nature renewed? Through redemption bought by Christ, and applied by the Holy Spirit.

In considering this, it is well to begin with the fact that Jesus is set forth in Scripture as ‘the image of the invisible God’, ‘the brightness of the glory of God’, ‘the firstborn of all creation’ (Col 1:15). This means that He is Himself a Spirit (for ‘God is a Spirit’), and that, in a special sense, He is ‘the Son’. His ‘Son’, ‘the Image of God’, and not simply, like men, ‘made in it’. On this account He makes to men the supreme revelation of God’s nature, which is that of a Father, whose essence is love—the revelation of a compassionate God (‘not willing that any should perish’), and of a suffering God with love at the core of it, bringing redemption through sacrifice.

He is also said by St. Paul (Ph 2:6) to be ‘in the form of God’ (εἰς μορφὴν ἐστίν). That refers to Christ in His pre-existent state; but it cannot fail also to suggest the Divine image in which man was at first made (Gn 1:26, where ‘form’ might not inaptly translate the Hebrew sehem (‘shadow’). And, agreeably to this, St. Paul, in Ro 5:14, speaks of those who are predestinated as ‘conformed to the image of his Son’ (συμμορφωθέντες τῷ εἰκόνι τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ), where the word ‘conformed’ clearly takes us back to the original Hebrew, even for ‘shadow’, with outline or form as the predominant idea. And it is significant in this connexion that, when St. Luke traces the genealogy of Jesus from Joseph with the words ‘of the house and tribe of David’, he designates ‘the Son of God.’ Thus the Latin pedigree connects the second Adam with the first Adam: ‘it places a son of God at either end of the genealogy, and it has been the tradition of God both by nature and by grace, by birth and by second birth’ (S. Cox, Expositions, 1, London, 1885, p. 27). And so it is well for us to remember that both he that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one origin—ἐν ᾗ οὐκ ἔχετε (He 8:5).

(3) How the image of God in sinful man is renewed is set forth in many ways in the NT. Sometimes we meet with terms that come from Christianity and Greek thought, such as ‘following’ and ‘imitating’—significant words to be found frequently in Plato and among the Stoics and the Neo-Platonists; but, when this is the case, the powerful personal feeling of the Christian that there is a root of the process. It is not simply ‘following’ Jesus that we find, but it is Jesus’ magnetic personality drawing men towards Him as disciples and Himself saying to each, ‘Follow me’ (ἀκολουθεῖ μοι). Hence, it is not the verb ἀκολούθω that is used (that verb never occurs in the NT), but ἀκολουθεῖ, thereby indicating that it is the following of disciples who are also companions that is meant—men who are living in the constant consciousness of the Master’s presence with them. Again, it is not only the command to ‘imitate’ Jesus and take Him as our Example or Model that is issued to us, but it is also St. Paul’s Exposition of the Colossians (3:10). ‘The apostles (μάρτυς ἐμοί), as I also am of Christ’ (1 Co 11:11). In other words, the personal note in this connexion is distinctive and supreme. But there are other modes of Hellenism, and classicizing the fact that the renewal of the image in the individual man is a gradual process, requiring time and life’s experiences, and even looking forward to the future life: ‘Now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is’ (1 Jn 3:2). Yet, although the renewal is a process, in every man who has accepted Christ the new image is there at any moment, needing only to be realized, for ‘Christ is all, and in all.’ This is brought out very clearly in Col 3:10 and in 2 Co 5:17. These passages and many more go to show that the recreation, or the new birth, or regeneration, does not mean a despising or rejecting of the faculties that man as man possesses, or a making of any addition to them, but a taking of them by the Spirit of Christ into a higher influence, imparting to them a new vigour, quickening them in their exercise, and turning the operation of them in a new direction. Intellect, feeling, and will are found in every man that is the result of original creation), but, through Christ and through Divine grace, they are purified and invigorated and dedicated afresh to the service of God.

(4) It is obvious, from the whole tenor of what has now been said, that the renewed image of God in man cannot be restricted to man’s life on earth. We saw, under the OT teaching, that immortality is logically involved in the conception of man as a spirit. But this is explicitly brought out in Christianity and put in the forefront. St. Paul claims for Christ that He ‘abolished death, and brought life and incorruption to light through the gospel’ (2 Ti 1:10). That was the end and aim of His earthly mission: resurrection and immortality are effected by Himself as ‘a life-giving Spirit’ (τούτων οὐρροῦντα, 1 Co 15:45). The assurance of immortality, therefore, is now connected with ‘the image of His Son’, ‘you shall live also’ (Ja 14:2). And the life promised is to the whole man—body and soul, not soul only apart from body. There is more than philosophical and metaphysical implication in the final redemption of the body, as well as the salvation of the soul—complete redemption means complete future existence for the redeemed. Even under the OT, the fact of future life might be said to be indicated, and Himself indicated to the Sadducees (Mt 22:30),
when he reasoned from God's revelation of Himself to Moses in the land of Midian as the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, on the ground that 'I am the resurrection and the life,' and added, 'He that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live,' and that the law of association is quite inadequate to explain the processes involved (see, e.g., H. J. Watt, Théorie des Dérivances, Leipzig, 1904). A more fruitful and full perception of memory and imagination is in the purpose or function of each. The object in memory is to revive a past experience of the individual, something that has already occurred, the 'life' or the event, perception, or thought. In imagination the object is to construct or prepare for a new experience, something hitherto unrealized by the individual; it faces the future, as memory the past; its product is essentially new, spontaneous, original, as that of memory is essentially old, reproduced, imitative. In the history lesson, it is by memory that a child recalls the words of the textbook, or of the teacher; it is by imagination that he pictures, and 'lives himself into' the personalities and events. So I may remember what I have read or heard of Tibet, but it is imagination that makes real to me the country and its people. The two processes are to a certain extent antagonistic to each other: a strong and accurate memory for details is rarely found accompanied by a vivid power of realizing in imagination the events passed through, or of communicating their spirit to others.

Imagination does not work merely with images, but also with concepts—as in the child's play with doll or pet, the artist's work with colours and forms, or the sculptor's work with materials. It combines images and concepts, abstractions, non-presentational meanings and thoughts—as in scientific invention and literary creation. On the other hand, images are used not only by imagination and by memory, but also by every other process of mind, with conscious effort to bring perception itself. Thus images are by no means characteristic of imagination, either as materials or as products. Imagination is a complex power, to be paralleled with reasoning in the use of symbols, with will, not with sensation or feeling. It is the primitive form of reasoning, 'thinking in pictures.' Reasoning works more in the abstract, with verbal image, imagination more in the concrete, with object-images; reasoning is governed by ideas of law and necessity, imagination is free and unlimited; reasoning in the main seeks to determine what is, or what must be, as the necessary outcome of what is, imagination is free to find what might be, or might have been, had other conditions been present. But none of these characters is essential. Some recent criticism would reduce imagination to a sub-process of reasoning (A. Krones, op. cit., 1904). P. C. S. Schiller, Formal Logic, London, 1912).

In all higher thinking, at any rate, imagination is as essential a constituent as reasoning in the narrow sense. Both rest, as Ribot points out (Essai sur la pensée créatrice, Introd.), upon a faculty of perceiving or thinking resemblances—a preponderance of exact resemblances on the one side, or of remote and superficial resemblances on the other, making the difference between the 'thinkers' and the 'imaginators' or 'dreamers.' One may add that vividness and accuracy of imagery may be a bar rather than an aid to imagina-
tion; the French are described by Galton as the keenest visualizers among European races; in science and criticism they are also among the foremost; but none of their own psychologists describes them as dependent on association (A. Krones, op. cit., p. 161). No one would deny that Edgar Allan Poe had imagination, but a study of his poems and tales shows his imagery to have been vague and formless; it is not the pure imagery that matters, but vagueness in a child's imagery, that makes its thinking 'imaginative.'

What most strongly separates imagination from reasoning is, how the latter is an idea of the individual element—the emotional tone, that characterizes
the first, and is absent, in theory at least, from the second. Imagination, like other psychophysical functions, has, in its origin, a purely practical value. It is an extended perception, an anticipation of experience, foresight of the issue of an action, a foreknowledge of the consequences, of the effect from an observed cause, of the outcome of a given situation. Its possession enables the organism to adapt itself to new situations and environments, not merely as actuality, but as potentiality. In this way it retains this practical side, from the earliest attempts to meet physical dangers or to satisfy hunger, up to the scientist's search into the hidden causes of things or the artist's pursuit of the ideal. Its driving force is, therefore, always an emotion of some kind—a want or desire and its accompanying dissatisfaction with the present. In the imaginative mind there is necessarily a combination of strong desires and impulses, on the one side, and a rapid and varied flow of imagery, on the other.

'There may be in the mind an inexactitude as to fact and imagery, yet nothing is created, for example the great travellers who have seen and heard much, and who cannot draw from their experiences anything more than colourless recital, men thought to be the most imaginative or political events or imaginary adventures which leave memories of the dreariest and poorest kind; prodigious readers, living encyclopedias, crushed under the weight of their memory (Gottsched, p. 57).

Equally uncreative, however, is the vigorous active type, with poor imagery and intellect. Two good examples of the contrast referred to are to be found in the two tramps in R. L. Stevenson's essay on Regency.

Several features of imagination are explained by the closeness of its connexion with emotion: (1) the vagaries, the bizarre connections, the inexplicable leapings in jargon forms and experiences. It tends to be revived, not through their direct connexion with other ideas, but through the emotional tingex which they have in common with the exciting ideas; (2) the predominance in emotional nature of the type called 'active imagination'; as opposed to 'passive imagination'; in the former the flow of imagery is spontaneous, uncontrolled by the will of the subject, who is a spectator rather than an actor, while in the latter the subject can alter the imagery at will, but has a far poorer range and vividness (see A. Binet, Étude sur l'intelligence, p. 43); (3) the intensity and concentration of the artistic type's imagination, its richness and deafness of-day-dreams, of play, of the creative mood (see Stanley Hall, Aspects of Child Life); as in all strong emotion, there is a temporary disintegration of the utilitarian. The imagination is always an accessory to some other function. But the disintegration of the imagination is not always bad; it is sometimes a symptom of health. It is the mental effort to the limit, the strain on the imagination, that causes the creative process. The imaginative state suggests conjunction with somnambulism, hypnotism, and with the phenomena of double consciousness; (4) the sense of strangeness, suddenness, 'inspiration', or 'possessiveness', with which innumerable creations of the imagination are accompanied. Much of the elaboration which is embodied in imaginative products takes place unconsciously. R. L. Stevenson's account of the source of some of his plots (see 'A Chapter on Dreams') is paralleled by the reports of many writers, artists, musicians, as to how their greatest creations 'came to them. The most interesting attempt to explain this feature is that of Freud and his pupils (references in Lit.). A dream, as it is experienced by the subject (the manifest content), is the transformed, symbolic pre-sentment of a disintegration of a system of ideas (the latent content) suppressed by the censorship of consciousness; this latent content in its turn may be the suggested realization of some hidden desire, which the conscious subject has repressed, because impossible of attainment, or forbidden, or immoral. These principles, originally formulated for dreams and for some forms of mental disease, are being applied to the materials of poetry, of art generally, and especially to the myths, fairy tales, and legends of primitive imagination.


IMBECILITY. — See Degeneration, Development (Mental), Insanity.

IMMACULATE CONCEPTION. — The Roman Catholic Church teaches that from the very first instant of her conception the Virgin Mary was immune from original sin, this phase of her purity is called 'immaculate conception.' Before the 12th cent. there was no thought of exempting the mother of Christ from the law of original sin. The Feast of the Conception of Mary, however, is from the 12th cent. that the belief in the immaculate conception arose.

1. The Feast of the Conception of Mary originated in a legend circulated by the Protevangelium of James, a 2nd century apocryphal writing. The substance of the book is as follows:

Joachim and Anna had no children, and their unfruitful union caused them to be exposed to public contempt. One day an angel appeared to Anna, and told her: 'Anna, Anna, the Lord hath hearkened to thy prayer: thou shalt conceive and bring forth a child, and thy posterity shall be spoken of throughout the whole world.' At the same moment Joachim, who was tending his flocks in the field, also received a revelation from heaven. An angel said to him: 'Joachim, Joachim, the Lord God hath hearkened to thy prayer: descend hence, in thy sight thy wife Anna has conceived in her womb' (according to other MSS: 'thy wife Anna will conceive in her womb,' but the reading 'has conceived' is thought to be the original; this is the form known and followed by Ephraimus in the Paschale (fhr. 229). Nine months later, Anna gave birth to a child who they called Mary, and who became the mother of the Saviour. The Protevangelium seems to say that Mary was conceived in the womb of Anna in a virginal manner (especially if we follow the reading 'has conceived'). In any case it is in this sense that the story was interpreted for a long time by the Church. But Ephraimus (loc. cit.) and, following him, several other writers explains that the conception of Mary took place according to the ordinary laws, after union with Joachim. Gradually the justice of their explanation was allowed, and the virginal conception gave place to a conception which was no double miracle—for Anna was barren—but at least conformable to the ordinary laws of human reproduction.

Christians wanted to celebrate the marvellous events related in the Protevangelium, and so they held a Feast of the Conception of Mary—of the conception as they understood it, i.e. at first the virginal conception, and later, the miraculous, though not virginal, conception. This Feast made its appearance in the East probably during the 7th cent.; but its first witnesses are Andreas Cretensis and Joannes Eubeensis, who belong to the 8th century. Andreas, in his Carmen (fgr. 1809 and 1812), mentions, under the date December 9th, what he calls the 'conception of St. Anna,' i.e. the conception of Mary in the womb of Anna. Joannes Eubeensis has the conception of Mary (PG xvi. 1459-1500), which concludes with the words:

'On the 9th of December we celebrate the anniversary of the day on which the blessed Joachim and Anna conceived the conception of Mary. We celebrate this festival, which is not universally accepted.'
IMMACULATE CONCEPTION

From the East the Feast of the Conception spread in England. A portrayal of the details of time and manner we are reduced to guess-work. Most probably Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury, was the cause. Born at Tarsus, a monk at Rome, placed by Pope Vitalian at the head of the church of Canterbury, he was consecrated archbishop after less than twenty years (608-690), Theodore was an Easterner dwelling in the West—a combination of the conditions necessary for the solution of the problem before us. The annals of Canterbury previous to 1050 contains a benefaction: 'For the day of the conception of the holy mother of God, Mary'; and two calendars belonging to the abbey of Old Minster and New Minster in Winchester contain under the date of December 8th the following inscription: 'The conception of the holy mother of God.' The Irish Church supplies similar texts, some of which go back to the 10th century. From these evidence it is clear that the Feast of the Conception of Mary was celebrated in England and Ireland long before the Norman Conquest. At the beginning of the 12th cent. wonderful stories of the conception went a round tending to prove that the Virgin Mary patronized this liturgical practice. Supported by these 'revelations,' the Feast of the Conception gradually spread, and was approved by the Council of Lateran in 1123. It spread rapidly across the Continent, penetrated into Normandy, and as far as the church of Lyons, where we find it about 1128. At this date it encountered a formidable enemy—Bernard of Clairvaux. This famous abbot wrote a treatise on the Virgin that came to the canon of Lyons, in which he tried to prove that the Feast of the Conception was a 'superstition' (supersitione dependens) condemned by the principles of theology. His purpose was no longer to honour the virginal, or simply miraculous, birth of Mary; what he celebrated was the exemption of Mary from the law of original sin—an important transformation, the logical development of the realisation of the principle of generation ceased to be original sin, the conception of Mary might be regarded as immaculate, although taking place under the dominion of concupiscence.

Theology had come to terms; but not the theologians. They—at least those of them who were well known—remained firm. It was not until the 14th cent. that scholars took account of the new fact expounded by Thomas Aquinas. Duns Scotus, the Franciscan monk, took the initiative. He was English, and had been brought up in the belief in the immaculate conception which the English monks had harnessed, down from the 11th century. When he became a scholar, in spite of the authority of the scholars, he remained faithful to the convictions of his childhood, and exonerated Mary from the law of original sin. He was the first to be called the order of Franciscans, of which he was the oracle. After that time the immaculate conception ceased to be a purely popular belief; it took its first rank among body and soul were immaculate from the first moment of their existence; i.e., the objection of the opponents of the Feast was met by the proclamation of the immaculate conception of Mary. In a word, the legitimisation of the Feast of the Conception, of reconstituting this Feast with the Augustinian theory of original sin.

For nearly a century and a half scholars were unanimous in asserting that it had not attained its aim. Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard held that Mary deserved for neither the title of Virgin nor of Mother until the moment when the mystery of the incarnation took place within her womb, and they did not concede even to discussion with the upholders of the new belief. Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura—in fact, all the scholars of the 13th cent.—discussed and refuted it. They all taught that Mary had contracted the original stain, and that the hypothesis of an immaculate conception was in contradiction to the principles of the faith. They should, logically, have condemned the Feast of December 8th, but it had become so wide-spread that there was no possibility of suppressing it. Being forced to tolerate it, they found themselves reduced to interpreting it. They said, therefore, that the Feast had as its object not the conception of Mary itself, but the expiation with which Mary had been gratified after her conception at a date which was unknown, but before she came forth from her mother's womb—a false statement, for, wherever the festival of December 8th was celebrated, the homage of the people was offered to the conception of the mother of Christ. In fact, theology and popular piety were in conflict. One or the other had to come to terms with the other.

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IMMANENCE

sympathies of the people were on the side of the Franciscans, who maintained the most glorious theory for the Pope, and the papacy, although very circumstantial, found itself obliged to follow the people. The immanence conception assumed a more and more important place in the liturgy, and in the religious life of the Church, until it was gradually became accustomed to venerate it as a dogma, and were impatient for the day when it would be placed among the verities of the Catholic faith. Their prayers were answered by Pius IX., who enounced the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, which was promulgated on 8th December 1854, wrote as follows:

'We declare, pronounce, and define that the doctrine which holds that the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, from the first instant of her conception, was, by a most singular grace and privilege of Almighty God, in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Saviour of Mankind, was preserved from all stain of Original Sin, is a doctrine revealed by God, and thence to be firmly and steadfastly believed by all the faithful.'


JOSEPH TURMEL.

IMMANENCE.—1. Meaning of the term. The word ‘immanence’ is used in modern theology to denote the immanence or indwelling of God in the world. Its opposite is ‘transcendence,’ which means God’s apartness from or elevation above the world. The two concepts may exist together: God is at once in the world and above it; or they may be mutually exclusive: God is wholly in the world or He is wholly apart from it. The theological use of the words is modern, dating only from the 19th century, but the ideas for which they stand are very old.

2. History. Christianity inherited from Judaism belief in God as a strictly personal being, Creator and Ruler of the world; and, although Jesus in His emphasis upon God’s love for humanity and men’s filial attitude towards Him and His unrestricted sense of His nearness and approachability for the notion of His remoteness and inaccessibility, which had become increasingly common in later Judaism, the idea of Divine Immanence in the full sense of the word, seem to have been far from His thought. At least there is no trace in His recorded utterances of the notion that God is within the world of nature or that the human being is the instrument of God’s will.

In the vocabulary of philosophy the words have had a long and varied history, being employed, though in different senses, by the Schoolmen, Spinoza, and Kant. With the philosophical use of the words this article is not concerned.

When we hear that “God made all things out of nothing,” we used to understand by it nothing else than that God is in all things, that is, subsists as the essence of all things (de Div. Nat. l. 2). Sometimes it was interpreted in terms of activity or power, as, for instance, by Origen, who taught the doctrine of eternal or continuous creation, and by Augustine, who declared that God did not withdraw from the world after the fall, but was always filling heaven and earth with omnipresent power (de Gen. ad Litt. u. 12; de Civ. Dei, vii. 39). This was a very common notion both
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in East and West, it being everywhere believed that God's activity was necessary to sustain the world and keep it from lapsing into nothingness. The idea of God's ever-active will did not exclude the notion of substance, which was always present, at any rate where the influence of Neo-Platonism was felt and with its conception of absolute being apart from God. From both these standpoints the idea of substance exclude that of activity. In the passage just quoted from Eriugena we read: 'In God is there no difference between being and doing, but only one and the same thing? I cannot avoid this conclusion.'

A position similar to Augustine's was held by many of the Schoolmen, e.g. Anselm and Thomas Aquinas. According to the latter, God is the absolute being, apart from whom there is no real existence. He has not only created all men and things, He is in them all, and every event is but an expression of His all-controlling will. Nothing but God has any independent reality or activity of its own (Summa, I, q. 8). God is thus transcendent, existing independently of men and things, but He is also immanent in the fullest sense of the word. In the context of this metaphysical theory of immanence, Thomas was an orthodox Catholic denying the possibility of communion with God here and hereafter to any but Catholic Christians.

A still more consistent and outspoken statement of the theory of immanence is given in the writings of the Protestant theologian, Ulrich Zwingli, particularly in his striking little work entitled De Pravitate. According to Zwingli, God is at once both the being and the will that is real will. All that is exists only in Him, and all that occurs is due to His immediate agency. All the acts of men, evil as well as good, are God's acts; but, as man is under law while God is above law, what is in man is not sin in God. There is nowhere to be found a clearer and more fearless statement of the view that God is the alone being and the alone will, a view in which an extreme doctrine of Divine immanence is associated with the unhesitating recognition of Divine transcendence.

A conception of Divine immanence, no less thoroughgoing but of quite a different type, is illustrated by many of the great modern mystics. Some of them, e.g. Meister Eckhart, were so full of the sense of God's presence that they almost wholly lost sight of the difference between God and the creature, and taught a monistic pantheism of an extreme, if not always consistent, form. Eckhart's pupil, John Tauler, and the author of the famous Theologiae Deutscns, while emphasizing the immanence of God and the possibility of immediate contact with Him, and while making religion consist in the complete loss of oneself in God, yet kept the distinction between God and the creature, insisting upon the majesty of the former and the meanness of the latter. They thus escaped the pantheism of many of the mystics and reached a religious position closely allied to the metaphysical position of Thomas.

Meanwhile in the period of the Renaissance a new conception of Divine immanence became common. It was not due to contempt for the world, which in Neo-Platonism and in the Christian theology influenced by it had resulted in the denial of all reality apart from God; it was due rather to the sense of the world's greatness. A more or less sentimental exaltation of the beauty, sublimity, and majesty of Nature grew universally common and resulted sometimes in its complete or nearly complete obliteration. The way was thus opened for a genuine pantheism in which the world itself is identified with God, and in which Divine transcendence, retained by all the Schoolmen and Scholastics, entirely disappears (cf. especially Giordano Bruno).

A similar tendency to magnify the dignity and worth of the creature—in this case man rather than Nature—a tendency in which the modern age was foreshadowed, did not exclude the idea of substance. Substance, and reacting against the determinism of Augustine, he pushed God out of the universe altogether, and gave the latter a wholly external relation to its cause. Closely allied with this doctrine of Duns was the Nominalism of his successors, which was pluralistic in its interest rather than monistic. As Nominalism gained in popularity in the latter part of the Middle Ages, the transcendence of God was inevitably more and more emphasized at the expense of His immanence.

A conception of Divine transcendence closely allied to that of Duns is found in the system of the Protestant theologian, John Calvin, who interpreted God, as Duns had done, wholly in terms of will. At the same time, sharing with Augustine and most of the medieval theologians a low estimate of man and the world, his doctrine of God as will resulted in the belief that God is the only independent will in the universe and that all the acts of man are caused by Him. The extreme transcendence of Duns was thus supplemented by an immanence doctrine in which the idea of substance was entirely absent or, as he maintained, unnecessary. His views were further developed by the 17th and 18th centuries, which contributed to the development of the doctrine of Divine transcendence more extreme than anything found in earlier days.

In the 17th and 18th centuries the development of physical science led to a further refinement of the doctrine of Divine transcendence, and in the 19th century an entirely new conception of it was made. The steady-growing tendency, indeed, was to find ever less place for Divine activity in connexion with the conduct of the physical universe.

It came to be more and more widely believed that the power of God was needed, not only to start the heavenly bodies upon their courses, but also to keep them in motion. Newton still thought Divine interference occasionally necessary to correct observed irregularities in their movements; but La Place, a century later, showed that such irregularities corrected themselves, and that Newton's assumption was mere conjectures. The steadily-growing tendency, indeed, was to find ever less place for Divine activity in connexion with the conduct of the physical universe.

The idea of Divine immanence, on the other hand, became increasingly popular, and in the 18th century a new doctrine of Divine immanence was developed, in which the idea of God as will was entirely absent or, as he maintained, unnecessary. His views were further developed by the 17th and 18th centuries, which contributed to the development of the doctrine of Divine transcendence more extreme than anything found in earlier days.

In the 19th century, the idea gave way again to a view of Divine immanence, as extreme in comparison with the ideas of an earlier time as was the 18th century's conception of Divine transcendence. The prevalence of the new conception was due largely to reaction against the currents of thought and it was a reaction against many of the leading tendencies of the 18th century, and it was aimed at various influences. The reaction found its most striking expression in the literary and esthetic movement known as Romanticism, which dominated Western
Europe during the early part of the 19th century. Romanticism was a complex phenomenon, but it was commonly marked by emotionalism, subjectivism, glorification of Spinozism, or exaltation of individualism in all its forms, by love of nature, affected if not real, and by the recognition of man as part of a larger whole, in oneness with which and in openness to whose influence he finds his true life. An important part of culture, according to the Romanticists, consisted in learning to appreciate the beauty and harmony of the universe, in coming into more intimate sympathy with it, and in acquiring a sensiveness to the whole world of nature and of man. It was a common tendency among them to try to reproduce the conditions of earlier ages before the modern spirit of enlightenment had taken possession of the world, when every one believed in immediate intercourse between man and the universe about him, in apparitions, fairies, and fables, and when the fancy had free play and was not yet destroyed by the ruthless hand of reason. The effect upon religion was very diverse. Many of the Romanticists felt the religious impulse strongly, but were led by their hostility to the dominance of reason which they believed began with the Renaissance and by their desire for the passionate energy and fervid enthusiasm of contemporary Protestantism, to turn to Catholicism and to seek in it what they could not find in the newer faiths. This was a great activity of Catholicism in Germany and France, and later in England, where the Oxford Movement gave expression to certain elements of the Romantic spirit. Many of the Romanticists, on the other hand, particularly in Germany, felt from their childhood that they were attracted by Catholicism, revolted against religion altogether, which they knew only in its rationalistic form, and looked down upon it in contempt. This was for Romanticists of this class the theologian Schleiermacher wrote in 1799 his famous "A Discourse upon Religion addressed to the Educated among its Desipers." The most important of the Discourses is the second, on "The Nature of Religion." Its general thesis is that religion has its seat neither in the intellect nor in the will, but in the feelings, and consists in the sense of the universal or infinite. Schleiermacher's religious sense was simply a translation into other terms of the artistic sense of the Romanticists. What they called openness to the universe he called openness to God. What they regarded as a sense of the beautiful they denominated as a sense of the Divine. And hence he claimed that the highest culture, of which the Romanticism made so much, includes religion, and that to be without the latter is to neglect an important part of one's nature and to be content with a partial and one-sided development. Religion raises a man above his individual limits into converse with the Infinite, and the religious man recognizes in everything a manifestation of the Divine. Every event is a miracle, a sign of God's presence and activity. The ego, or spirit, or non-ego, or matter, are simply differentiations of the Infinite. In the life of the individual, in the human society, in the world they are separated, but they become one again in every impression of the world upon us. The universal manifests itself only through the individually monistic, and the individual comes to his true life only in the universal; and to be aware of this life is to be religious.

This is a genuine doctrine of Divine immanence, and it illustrates the influence of Romanticism in the sphere of religion. The influence of the great philosophical tendencies of the modern age has also promoted the theory of the immanence of God. Much of modern philosophy, from Descartes down, was frankly dualistic; but now and then monism, evident in the 18th cent., when it became almost everywhere dominant, had its representatives, and resulted in a more or less thoroughgoing doctrine of Divine immanence, as, for instance, in the occasionalism of Malebranche and the idealism of Berkeley, both of whom made God the immediate and sole cause of all phenomena; as also in the Neo-Platonism of Jonathan Edwards, who thought of the universe as an emanation of the infinite fullness of God.

Of still greater historical importance was the system of Spinoza, in which the modern conception of Divine immanence had one of its principal roots. For a hundred years and more after his death Spinoza found little favour. The dominant spirit of the age was radically opposed to his spirit. He first came to his rights in the revolt against the one-sided rationalism and individualism of the century which began to be more and more the common condition of such men as Lessing, Herder, and Goethe. In 1787, in a little book entitled "Gotte" (see art. by A. C. McGilp, in "R/"), 1800, Herder came to the defense of Catholicism in Germany and France, and later in England, where the Oxford Movement gave expression to certain elements of the Romantic spirit, which was in many respects a misinterpretation, but had profound influence upon his contemporaries. He saw Spinoza in the light of the philosophy of Leibniz, he succeeded in showing, at least to his own satisfaction, that the former was neither an atheist nor a pantheist. In substituting forces for extension in his definition of matter, Leibniz had departed not only from Descartes, but also from Spinoza. He had departed from the latter also in substituting multiplicity for unity. The universe, according to Leibniz, is not the embodiment of one great and all-embracing force, but of an infinite number of forces. Spinoza was a monist, Leibniz a pluralist; and hence the two systems represent radically different tendencies. But, unlike as they may seem, they were combined by Herder, who preserved the unity of Spinoza's system without sacrificing the multiplicity upon which Leibniz laid stress, by making force the preponderating principle in the Divine substance. The result was a conception of Divine immanence of such a sort as to prove very attractive to multitudes of thinkers of his own and subsequent generations. The theory was essentially monistic, and yet it did not sacrifice individuality, but rather, so Herder claimed, promoted and deepened it. It thus fell in admirably with the growing Romanticism of the age.

Among others of the late 18th or early 19th cent. whose thought was dominated more or less completely by the influence of Spinoza were the poet Goethe, the theologian Schleiermacher, and the philosophers Schelling and Hegel, and the present writer largely because of Spinoza's influence that post-Kantian philosophy, whether idealistic or realistic, spiritualistic or materialistic, has been so controlingly monistic. Religion, too, has shown the same tendency. Many of the leading religious thinkers of the 19th cent. were completely under the sway of one or another monistic system, particularly Hegelianism. But the problem of Divine immanence is due ultimately, not to the prevalence of any particular system of philosophy, but rather to the general monistic tendency which runs through various systems of thought and metaphysics. Therefore, the problem of Divine immanence is due ultimately, not to the prevalence of any particular system of philosophy, but rather to the general monistic tendency which runs through various systems of thought and metaphysics.
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to have called attention to the revival of Spinozism, and to have pointed out its general effect.
Meanwhile the influence of science, to which modern scepticism was largely due, was also working to promote belief in the immanence of God. As at the time when the belief was natural and rational. By most thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries the universe was looked upon as a machine, and the laws of nature were viewed as necessarily immutable and from without. A classic illustration is found in the familiar passage in Paley's Natural Theology (1803), where the world is represented as a watch. When the universe is viewed under this aspect, God, if He exists at all, can be transcendent only, outside of the machine which He has made and set in motion. But during the 18th cent. evolutionary ideas became common, and in the 19th cent. took almost every field. Whatever form the theory of evolution may take, the general conception means the recognition of immanent energy by virtue of which the universe is continually changing and advancing. The world as we know it has not come ready-made from the hand of God or of any other power; it has gradually grown to be what it is through the play of forces resident within itself. This great change from a mechanical to an organic universe is an invention meant much for religious thought. With the old idea a transcendent God, maker of the world machine, Himself entirely above and apart from it, was a natural assumption. But with the new ideas of the universe as an organism suggests a God within rather than without the world process, and, as a matter of fact, one of the most notable consequences of the increasing preponderance of evolutionary ideas has been the rapid growth of the doctrine of Divine immanence at the expense of the doctrine of Divine transcendence. The following quotations will illustrate the situation:

'Out of all this the modern conviction has arisen that God creates now and will always create; that his creative act is normal and incessant, and that the notion of a definite era at which he brought the world into being is pure and gratuitous as is that of a theatrical "Day" of judgment with God seated on a throne. Hence, whatever matter may be, it seems to follow that it is co-eternal with God, and the thought inevitably presses itself in that the great forces of the universe, gravity, heat, light, and so forth, are the means by which creation and other divine actions are carried on. In fact, they seem to be strictly immanent in the divine existence, if what we call nature is inextricably interwoven with God, we have to make fundamental changes in the classical theory of the world.' (C. W. Newman, Relations of Theism to Modern Thought, Ramsay, 1872, p. 11).

'Theologically, immanence of God, in the present day, is that which represents Him as an occasional Visitor. Science had pushed the deist's God farther and farther away, and at the moment when it seemed as if He would be thrust out altogether, Darwinism appeared, and, under the guise of a foe, did the work of a friend. It has conferred upon philosophy and religion an insatiable benefit, by showing us that we must choose between two alternatives. Either God is everywhere present in nature, or He is nowhere. He cannot be here and not there. He cannot delegate His power to omnicos-called "second causes." In nature everything must be His work or nothing. We must frankly return to the Christian view of direct divine agency, the immanence of Divine power in nature to the end, the belief in a God in Whom not only we, but all things have their being, or we must banish Him altogether. It seems as if, in the providence of God, the mission of modern science was to bring home to us our unmetaphysical ways of thinking of things, and of the Divine immanence in nature, which is not less essential to the Christian idea of God than to a philosophical view of nature.' (Aubrey Moore, in the Spectator, London, 1857, p. 741).

Such passages as these, and they could be multiplied indefinitely, do not show that modern science promotes faith in God, but only that it leads many to substitute Divine immanence for Divine transcendence. Belief in God is not a scientific, but a religious idea. Even in nature there may exist what is religious, which is not less essential to the Christian idea of God than to a philosophical view of nature.' (Aubrey Moore, in the Spectator, London, 1857, p. 741).

The effects of the various influences that have been described are thus seen, and yet in many respects diverse. All have tended to promote belief in Divine immanence, but the belief takes many forms, according as one or another interest is dominant. God is conceived as the chief and universal master of the world, the spirit animating all nature; the universal force which takes the myriad forms of heat, light, gravitation, electricity, and the like; the all-embracing substance of all things; the principle of unity underlying all multiplicity; the infinite consciousness in which all things have their existence; the indwelling personality with whom we
commune when we contemplate nature or look into our own souls. The conception may be coarse or refined, spiritual or material, idealistic or real- istic, but in all of them there is a form of immanence, in the sense, that in the theism, faith in a god of whom the world of nature is in some real and immediate sense a manifestation or expression.

3. Present position.—An important result of the process which has been described is the outflanking of the scepticism of the 18th century. The God who had been read out of the universe by the progressive discovery of natural forces adequate to account for all phenomena has now been brought back into it, not as before to supplement its insufficiencies and incapacities, but to give it spiritual meaning and worth. Science, of course, can never prove the presence of God in the world, nor can it disprove it. The indwelling of God is an object of faith, not of sight. To him who believes in an immanent God the multiplying discoveries of modern science have no terror. Physical forces may accomplish all that is claimed for them, and natural laws be accurate descriptions of their way of working, but they are interpreted by such a believer only as manifestations of Divine activity, the doctrine of Divine immanence evidently offers a refuge for faith which science is powerless to invade, and this constitutes one of its greatest attractions to the religious men of our day. It is in an age of doubt and self-knowledge that the inroads made by the modern study of nature in the theism of the past.

The modern notion of Divine immanence has led to many significant changes in the traditional system of Christian theology. The old chasms between the Divine and the human, God and the world, this life and another, have been bridged by it, and the result has been a profound modification of the old doctrines of salvation, eternal life, the incarnation, the person and work of Christ, the sacraments, religious authority, and the like.

But the conception of Divine immanence is based on the point of view of Christian theism, with serious difficulties. The tendency of the doctrine is undoubtedly pantheistic. In the hands of many of its exponents, indeed, it has been nothing more than a transition to pantheism. But pantheism imperils, if it does not destroy, the personality of God, the individuality of man, and the reality of sin, and hence seems to make religion and the Christian life alike an illusion. As a consequence, many modern theists, while accepting the doctrine of Divine immanence, have striven to distinguish it from pantheism and to safeguard the interests imperiled thereby.

Thus they claim that, while God is immanent in the universe, He also transcends it. All things are pervaded by Him, but He is more than them all. A strict pantheism identifies God with the totality of men and things. The theists referred to recognize God as including this totality, but as more and greater than it. This form of theism has been called, in distinction from pantheism, panneumastic. On the other hand, the German philosopher, K. C. Krause, its formula being not 'all things are God,' but 'all things are in God.' In reaction against the extreme transcendence of the 18th cent. the tendency among Christian theists of the early 19th cent. was to emphasize immanence to the complete exclusion of transcendence. But more recent theologians have tried to make again the necessity and danger of the two views. Krause said that the difference between theism and pantheism lies not primarily in the character or nature of the God assumed by theists or pantheists, but in the assumption of denial of his transcendence (cf. Illingworth, Divine Immanence, p. 82). When, how-
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I. Introductory.

The significance of this term—in that sense of it which has determined the shape of the problem as it has come down to modern reflection—may be stated in the words of Kant: 'The Immortality of the Soul means the infinitely prolonged existence and personality of one and the same rational being.' 1 By 'personality' here meant the comprehensive personality which links together the years of a same man's life on earth; and immortality signifies the continuance of this rational consciousness in secessu anfractuosum—the degree of its continuity at least as great as earthly life, and the duration of its continuity being essentially unlimited.

The purpose of the present article is to investigate the degree of truth and of value involved in this conception. Its adequacy, even as a mere conception, forms one of the primary questions to be raised; we shall have to ask whether it must not be materially modified in order to reveal even the significance of the problem itself. There are, however, certain inquiries which must first be referred to in their relation to the point of view here adopted, although the treatment of them lies outside the scope of this article.

(a) It is said that every form of belief in the power of human personality to survive bodily death is invalidated because it leads to beliefs so absurd; for instance, such an erroneous interpretation of the dream, and similar psychophysical phenomena. Against this, it must be insisted that the validity of a conception is a question entirely distinct from that of its origin or genesis. When the truth or falsity of a belief is under investigation, the question is that of the manner in which the belief arose in distinct ages of time. The latter question constitutes an important historical inquiry, belonging to a branch of anthropology in which valuable work is now being done (see arts. Soul, Animism, Dreams and Sleep, Life and Death, Dreams and Sleeps, Ascensionism, Communion with the Dead); but these historical and descriptive inquiries have no bearing on the validity of the developed forms of the belief in survival. From the historical point of view, we assume that assignable conditions and causes can be found not only for the first beginnings, but for the continued survival of any belief; and we must insist that the causes which condition its continued survival may differ fundamentally from those which originally brought about the belief. 2

(b) The 'animistic' explanation of the origin of belief in the soul as distinct from the body calls for a critical comment which has a bearing on our present argument. The theory is that the dream-images are the product of the primitive man seeing himself and others, together with common objects of experience; and to all these he attributes a spiritual existence. This interpretation becomes specially imperative to the man in whose dreams he sees the images of those who have died (see ref. under Animism, sep. Tyker, FC). This theory needs to be supplemented in one important characteristic. We must not ask: Where and how was the man to attribute an essential life to the moving image which he

1 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, bk. II, ch. 4 (cf. John Watson, Selections from Kant, Glasgow, 1897, p. 294). Kant does not intend to exclude the idea of a ghost; he assumes that the essential element of its immortality is that it forever endures.

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seen in his dream, and which resembles the living body seen in waking life? It is evident that he must have had some vague awareness of his own body before he could recognize the image even as an animated ‘double.’ Hence some writers have spoken of the ‘passing away’ leading primitive man to attribute an inner life, resembling his own, to forms which he recognizes as outwardly more.

(c) It must be distinguished from the so-called ‘corporate immortality’ based on the solidarity and continuity of a human group, which means that the effects of each man’s thoughts, desires, and deeds on his fellow-men are real and permanent. The reality of this permanent influence of every personal life is not in question, but we must insist that it is mere expression of thought to regard this as equivalent to or as an adequate substitute for the belief in personal survival. In truth, the human individual cannot be regarded as a mere means to the survival and improvement of the race. When individuality has risen to self-conscious personality, it cannot be a mere means, existing only to contribute to an end in which an individual personality has no absolute part. If the individual were only a means, the humanity as a whole could be nothing more than a system of means, and, therefore, would exist only for the sake of some end outside itself—supposed ‘corporate immortality’ would prove illusory.

(b) It must be distinguished from that ‘eternal life’ which means experience of the super-personal and eternal, in which we may continue to exist for some time. This is not a question of survival—Does our individuality endure? It is not a question of what is to be. It is a question of present reality, and what is ‘Do we share in the survival and Eternal Life of God, and may this connexion become a matter of experience?’ It is evident that an answer to one of these questions is not necessarily an answer to the other. If man is a ‘re-embodiment’ or ‘differentiation’ of the Eternal Mind, it does not follow that, regarded as an individual spirit, he is eternal; and, if this metaphysical tie is what gives absolute value to human life, the thing of value would remain, however transcient each single life might be.

In the application of it which especially concerns us here, this principle leads us to lay special stress on the idea of growth in reference to human personality. ‘Growth’ is not exclusive of self-destruction. The growth of human personality is, so to speak, an achievement, realized through conscious activity. The essential nature of mind consists in its creative functions, which are inexhaustible, though they work under conditions which are given. From this point of view it follows (a) that the value of human personality must be estimated by considering not merely what men are, but what they have in them to become, and (b) that the future life, if it is to be anything at all, must be not a life of mere sameness, or mere endlessness, but of continued growth; (c) that human personalities as such—not merely the aggregate of what is achieved and of what is achieved and intended—must be recognized as a function of the physical body and perish at death. Here there can be no survival of finite personality. For Schelling, the indivisible reality is the unity of mind and body. Thus there can be no survival of the human spirit, for mind and body are united in the individual spirit, and spirit is the unity of the physical body and the immaterial. Hence Schelling's doctrine of the survival of individuality is that it is a function of the entire human soul, and only the human soul is capable of surviving. Thus there can be no survival of finite personality. For Schelling, the indivisible reality is the unity of mind and body. Thus there can be no survival of the human spirit, for mind and body are united in the individual spirit, and spirit is the unity of the physical body and the immaterial. Hence Schelling's doctrine of the survival of individuality is that it is a function of the entire human soul, and only the human soul is capable of surviving. Hence there can be no survival of finite personality. For Schelling, the indivisible reality is the unity of mind and body. Thus there can be no survival of the human spirit, for mind and body are united in the individual spirit, and spirit is the unity of the physical body and the immaterial. Hence Schelling’s doctrine of the survival of individuality is that it is a function of the entire human soul, and only the human soul is capable of surviving.

The most prominent representatives of this point of view in the history of modern philosophy are Spinoza, Schelling, and Hegel. Whether Hegel also shared it is open to dispute. There is no doubt that for Hegel the essential element in experience is the eternity of Spirit, which is not merely future, but is realized even now whenever the human spirit thinks and wills what is universal; but it does not apply to any distinct premonition as to the survival of the individual soul. With Spinoza it is different. In his early treatise, de Deo, Homo, et anima Politica, the concept of those souls who in love to God had come to have part in His unchangeable being. But in his late work, Ethics, the concept of those souls who have shared in the life of the Eternal Mind, it does not follow that, regarded as an individual spirit, he is eternal; and, if this metaphysical tie is what gives absolute value to human life, the thing of value would remain, however transcient each single life might be.

The vital importance factor in the conception, we repeat, is not mere endlessness, but continued growth. It is true, growth is the progressive fulfillment or realization of latent powers; it involves, and must involve, a process in time. But to suppose that the process is literally endless in time is to go far beyond anything that we have in our experience. We have no complete fullfilment of the purpose or meaning of each individual life. We have no means of knowing how far this fulfillment will carry us; only we know that it is not realized at death.

The survival of personality, so understood (whether as problem or as belief), must be carefully distinguished from two entirely different conceptions with which it has been confused.

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3. Objections to belief in immortality. — The main contentions of those who at the present time reject all belief in personal immortality appear to resolve themselves into three propositions: (a) there is 'no evidence' of the power of human personality to survive bodily death; (b) more definitely, such survival can be shown to be impossible on scientific grounds; and (c) if it were possible, it would have no ethical value.

In connexion with this proposition, we must ask: (1) What kind of evidence is in fact demanded? and (2) What kind of evidence would it be reasonable to expect in the subject under consideration?

If by 'evidence' is meant 'conclusive evidence,' it must be pointed out that of conclusive evidence for anything mankind possesses comparatively very little. What we usually have is a convergence of reasons more or less fundamental in character, which, taken together, may in some cases be overwhelming, but which are not strictly conclusive. Scientific evidence is essentially of the same character, which is why it is in scientific evidence, and has the same elements of strength and weakness.2

The kind of evidence available in the various branches of science is not experiment, but the accumulated results of past experience, which, if applicable, does afford a high degree of reliability in the results, because these rest on definitely measurable facts of sense-perception, constantly and uniformly recurring in our experience. The same can be said of mathematical and physical scientific exactness in measurement. If, then, definite facts of sense-perception are the only kind of evidence admissible, it is true that there is 'no evidence' for the survival of personality. This criterion of what is credible would, however, rule out most of the evidence on which, in this and countless other matters of serious import, we as rational beings are wont to rely, since we can find no principle of logic, or mathematics, or ethics, and no psychological fact in the way of thought, feeling, or will, whose reality and validity can be warranted by reason—perception alone. This may be said to be one of the assured results of modern philosophy, for it is the triumph of the publication of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1779).

What, then, are the actual logical conditions of the argument? The truth of personal survival may be held to be established by particular observations and experiments, but as a reasonable faith, based on the essential reasonableness of the world. The primary facts, which are appealed to, are not definitely measurable facts, and their adequate interpretation is not immediately obvious; but they form a constant and uniform experience. It has been well said that 'within the whole range of the wide world's literature we find no more constant theme than this disparity between man's possibilities and aspirations on the one hand, and the narrow scope afforded them by the brief space of the present life on the other.'3 These possibilities and aspirations are the distinctive features of human life, which is thus planned on a greater scale than earthly life can ever satisfy; hence, if existence has a meaning, human life is an expression of this higher life. This we may call the 'teleological argument' for survival. This is the only avenue of direct proof; and we must repeat that what it establishes is not conclusive evidence of personal immortality, but reasonable faith. From this point of view, the special work of philosophy in the matter is to show the connexion of this faith with the distinctive features of human personality, to demonstrate its value, and to purify it from all comparatively unworthy motives.

In addition to these considerations, there are lines of indirect proof converging to the conclusion which may be held with considerable confidence, namely, that there are no sound reasons for denying the power of human personality to survive bodily death. The purpose of these lines of thought is to show that the apparent impossibility of the annihilation of personality at death, which are supposed to be warranted by some of the facts of ordinary experience, or by some of the conclusions of 19th century science, are only apparent and not real, and break down one by one upon examination. Hence the original conclusion, established as a reasonable faith, remains in possession of all.

The 'indirect proofs' are, as we have already implied, coupled with objections, difficulties, and denials which have actually been alleged against belief in survival. In effect, they amount to a demonstration of the impossibility of a materialistic interpretation of the world.

These constructive philosophical systems which admit personal immortality have usually done so by combining with metaphysical spiritualism a teleological view of personality. That is to say, they have treated 'limited immortality' as an intermediate step in the development of something more than a material soul, which is material in the sense of growth. The more definitely pluralistic philosophy of Herbert Spencer, for whom the individual is alone the real, naturally carried with it a doctrine of the immortality of the individual soul; but an element of difficulty arises because, according to Herbertian principles, the consciousness of the soul springs only from its union with the elements which form the body; hence it is not easy to find a place in the system for the continuance of the same personal self-consciousness beyond death. The teleological argument for survival was revived and restated by K. G. F. Krause (System der Philosophie, Gottingen, 1832); cf. Philosophia, Phil. of Bel., Eng. tr., London, 1857, iv. 464 f.).

Dealing with the assertion that interest in the future life promotes forgetfulness of the claims and values of the present life, Krause observes that 'the claim of our earthly life as such has its distinctive value and justifiable satisfactions, and is not likely to be disregarded in the future life as well. Our earthly life as a whole, when considered in connexion with the experiences of life to come,—Krause observes that, just as each period of our earthly life (e.g. childhood, adolescence, early manhood, mature manhood) has its own peculiar significance and value, so also the aim of existence in the future life is never merely a means to the succeeding period, so this earthly life as a whole, when considered in connexion with the experiences of life to come, is not merely a means to the succeeding period, but is an end in itself.' But the whole life of the individual life now as it will do in the future.

Among the purely metaphysical, as distinguished from the ethical and theological, arguments for the immortality of the soul, there is one of special historic interest, which was elaborately worked out by Moses Mendelssohn in his Phantasm (1767). He declared the immortality of the soul from the abstract metaphysical idea of a simple substance, which idea he regarded as expressing the essence of the soul. A simple substance, from the nature, cannot cease to exist; hence the immortality of the soul follows. If so, we must add, it also follows that the soul must never have been created; it existed from the infinite past and must exist through the infinite future. Even if the validity of this use of the conception of substance be granted, it does not logically involve personal immortality, because the simple substance which constitutes the nature of the soul must have borne, in its past lives, qualities totally different from those which form the personality in which the soul itself, and it may do so again in its future lives. But in any case such a use of the conception of substance is not admitted to be valid. It was attacked by Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781 and 1787), as a serious logical paradox. In a later work, Kant, Critical Philosophy of Transcendental Idealism (1783, vol. ii. p. 200 f.). Kant pointed out that the unity of the soul is not that of a simple substance, but that of a unity of consciousnesses, in which the many different mental activities are held together in so far as they are able to be referred to the common centre, self, as 'mine.' Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1787), made immortality a postulate of the practical reason. Reason prescribes the conformity to the Moral Law as the highest good; this is virtue. Reason also prescribes, as the complete good, the union of

1 Op. cit., p. 44.
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happiness with virtue. The highest virtue is unrealisable in
any finite period owing to the permanent opposition of man's
ambition to the demand of the moral imperative. Further, the complete good (the union of
virtue and happiness) is a matter of fact, unrealised in this
life. Hence Kant formulates immortality (an endless duration of
personal life) as a postulate which must be granted if the
seemingly self-evident truth of ethical reason are to be possible.
The defect in Kant's argument consists in the implicit
demand of moral perfection or holiness. Duty can never
be completely overcome and never be completely reconciled
with natural desire. But nothing less than this victory is the purpose
and meaning of duty; hence an endless life is demanded for
immortality. The idea of immortality is to be realized in
the world of the soul. The creation of a new body is not
the true meaning of immortality. The inner meaning
of Kant's argument is akin to what we have called the teleo-
logical proof. It is necessary that a soul should be
immortal, in addition to achieving perfection—a striving which
Mendelssohn held to be implanted in man by his Creator as his destiny. This destiny
even death cannot hinder him from fulfilling; and, if this
striving is to go on, the soul's essential properties of thought
and will must continue.

It is of much interest to notice that some philosophical
thinkers of the first rank have been prepared to defend a
doctrine of the type described as Conditional Immortality:
that there shall be immortal who are worthy of it. Spinoza appears
to have held such a view in his early treatise de Divino, etc. In
like manner, J. G. Fichte at least held as a possible view that
man's immortal soul, when separated from the body in the life beyond
death, but only those who in this life have developed out
of themselves a character of existing and universal worth.
Similar views were held by Goethe, I. F. H. Fichte, C. H. Weisse,
and Lotze. The spirit of the doctrine is well expressed in the
following passage from J. G. Fichte:

'Everything which has not been a dodecahetron in the world of the soul, and which has not been in the
mind only as a transitory phase of the world's course. That this principle admits of no further application is human
endeavour; all things being given, it is only against the

This is the fundamental assumption of modern
physical science; the substance of the world—however
that substance may be defined—has, as its most
fundamental and essential attribute, motion; and
motion is always a change determined from
behind, i.e., by some other mode of motion preceding
it in time. This is the essence of what
we may call the 'Mechanical.'

This theory has been applied to both the human body
and brain with remarkable results; it is a theory which
has been found to work. The laws which regulate
the constant interchange of material in the brain-
cells—so far as physics is able to determine it—
are found to be of no different kind in the
laws derived from a study of the mechanical forms of
matter. The difference is one of complexity.
It has been computed that there are
the 'grey matter' of the brain (i.e. that portion of
which is specially the 'seat of mind') about
3,000,000,000 cells; and every one of these cells is
an active organ of most complicated internal
arrangements, so far independent of one another, and
each has attached to it as part of it "dendrites" and
means of connexion with other cells and with
the organs of the body. Yet, notwithstanding
this unimaginable complexity, the human brain
becomes merely one small aggregate in the vast
material universe, and as such is swept into the
system of matter and motion to which physics has
reduced the world.

Now the question is not one of the right of
physics and physiology, as special sciences, to
regard the facts in this way and exclusively in
this way. It is clear that only in the light of the
mechanical assumption of physical science that
the laws of motion do not hold good absolutely.

Materialism rests entirely on the assumption
which is here rejected,—namely, that the mechanical
theory is capable of providing a complete
explanation of the facts because it is a complete and
unfailing method of science.

2 Mechanical and Drummond, Elements of Psychology, London
and Edinburgh, 1912, p. 78.
3 For a further development of these principles see
Mellon and Drummond, op. cit. ch. v.

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accurate copy of the fundamental nature of things. This assumption involves a pushing of scientific hypotheses into regions where they have never been wanted before, and demonstrates no in tolerable that we have a prima facie right to deny that such verification will ever be forthcoming. The absurdity of the mechanical theory is seen when we ask how and why it is possible for consciousness to exist in such a universe? The distinctive feature of mechanism is determination a substratum, by previous mechanical movement. The distinctive feature of consciousness is freedom, a *prima facie*: human conscious activity is essentially purposive activity. It involves a specific process in the way of forecasting of ends. Now, in a purely mechanical universe consciousness is useless. Any momentary brain condition is the inevitable result of the condition immediately preceding, and both are only a part of the continuous series of mechanical movements which constitutes the universe. Hence the actions and words of every individual of the human race would have been exactly what they have been in the absence of mind. Had mind been wanting, the same empires would have risen and fallen, the same wars fought and won, and the same literature and art would have been produced, the same indications of friendship and affection given. Thus we have a universe devoid of purpose or rational meaning, continually evolving more and more complex forms of mechanism, and at numerous points producing a kind of existence (consciousness) diametrically opposed to its distinctive properties to those of mechanism—making no progress towards the course of events—yet continually creating illusions as to its own place and importance in the course of events.

Purposive rational action is not the only feature of human experience which is inexplicable if the Mechanical Theory is true. The same may be said of the unit of consciousness. Every retrospect of our past mental life arouses the idea of the ego as the combining centre of the successive states and its temporal succession; these are thus unified by their relation to a being which is in nature one. The unity of conscious life, centred in one single being, is utterly without parallel in the material series; 3,000,000,000 cells, each highly complex and variable, certainly provide no such central unity. Taking into account their molecular constitution and activities, it may be more rational to suppose that they do not even form a physical basis conceivable as the substrate of this unity.

Further illustrations might be given of the intellectual impossibilities involved in Materialism, but it is enough to select out that careful scientific thinkers are aware of these considerations, and have evolved a number of mental activities to mechanical processes are admitted. No effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a machine is more than ever manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition.

The speculative escape some of the more obvious of these difficulties, the speculation has been put forward that to every particle of matter in the universe there is attached an element of feeling or sensation. Clifford, who vigorously defended this doctrine, called these minute particles of sensating *mind-stuff*; and the use he made of the doctrine is shown in the following statement: *When matter takes the complex form of a living human brain, the corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, having intelligence and volition.* This quality of sensation attributed to material particles is, a mere speculation for which there is not a shadow of evidence. Hence it throws a somewhat sinister light on the attitude of some materialistic writers when we find this hypothesis said dogmatically as an assured *scientific* result, as is done by Haeckel in his well-known book, *The Riddle of the Universe* (London, 1893).

Haeckel calls his system *Monism* and repudiates the name *Materialism,* on the ground that the system affirms the reality of *force* as well as of *matter* and assumes the particles of *mind-stuff* to be sentient. The arbitrary hypothesis of mind-stuff avail little in relation to the material of which the material particles are conceived to be combined in the brain according to mechanical laws: now the corresponding particles of sensating substances combine in the brain on the basis of consciousness involved in judgment and self-knowledge, we have a concrete notion of consciousness, the unity of which, must persist, not as an assemblage of particles of sensating substances devoid of intelligence and volition, but to a single central agent or permanent principle of intelligence and volition, which conceals the difficulties of Materialism affected by any distinction between *matter* and *force.* In fact, to conceal the real point at issue—the place of Mechanism in the universe. The Mechanical Theory means that the substance of the mind (whether that substance is materialized or not) *force,* or *mind-stuff*), has, as its most fundamental attribute, freedom, and is determined by it. It is used to hold consciousness in mechanism but also in other modes of activity, this means that there are changes in the universe where mechanical laws do not hold; and the fundamental assumption of Materialism breaks down.

In an Essay to which we have already referred (CR xviii. 1871, 464) Huxley said: *There is every reason to believe that consciousness is in the same sense of art or matter, when that nervous matter has attained a certain degree of organisation, just as we know the other *actions to which the nervous system ministers,* such as reflex action and the like, to be.* We must ask: *What is meant by a *function of matter?* The term is ambiguous in the extreme. It might mean the relations which had William James has called *transmission function,* in connection with the hypothesis that brain and nerves are the instruments of transmission by which the conscious mind is carried to the external world in the spatial and temporal world. The mind is independent on the instrument, but the instrument does not in any sense create or produce the mind.*

Those who use the language of *function* do, however, by no means desire to turn the conception in this sense only. If we keep to assured scientific results, what can the word *function* mean when used of the mind’s relation to the brain? James, in his *The Principles of Psychology,*-answer in the words of W. James: *If we are talking of science positively understood, function can mean nothing more than bare constituent variation. When the brain changes, changes in one way, consciousness changes in another. In strict science, we can only write down the bare fact of nervous activity.* This fact has suggested the famous hypothesis of psychophysical parallelism, that every change of consciousness corresponds to a change in the activity of the brain, the changes in the brain being well grounded as regards the more elementary facts of sensation and ideation but not more. This principle, rightly used, should exclude materialistic and all other assumptions as to the real connection between the mental and the physical series, for there seems nothing. It is adopted by careful writers for this reason, as a hypothesis regulating the study of mental relation to physical facts. But many of the physiological school have given it a materialistic turn by supposing that if the mental state were entirely *dependent* on the bodily, and a unique, the mental state is in explained when the corresponding bodily state is assigned. Hence the Materialist has found it easy to assert that the psychology has proved everything characteristic of human personality to be due to the brain and nervous system, while the truth is that, if such results appear in the end to be proved, it is only because in the beginning they were taken for granted.

In addition to the works already referred to, we may add the following references to literature dealing with the idea of consciousness in soul and body as two separate things, of which the body is necessary to the soul.

2. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology,* London and Edinburgh, 1882, cit. in *J. Ment. Dis.,* Address to the British Association at Norwich ("the passage from the body to the soul")
3. Address to the British Association at Norwich ("the passage from the body to the soul")
4. Address to the British Association at Norwich ("the passage from the body to the soul")
5. H. Bergson’s conception of the relation of mind and brain is essentially in the preceding of this interpretation; see *Matter and Memory,* Eng. tr., London, 1911, passim.
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only in this world of sense. We find it impossible to say where body ends and soul begins; but physiology affords us no means of making clear the distinction between them. And, apart from mere anthropomorphism or teleology as to their coexistence which is not obvious from common experience. We do not need the physiologist to tell us that there is a good deal of the body in the affections and emotions of the soul, that in deep thought the two are more or less blended, and that joy affects the heart, that other instincts affect other organs. There is nothing in all this to prove the identity of the soul with the body, since all the facts are reconcilable with the supposition mentioned above, that the dependence of the soul on the body is the dependence of an agent on the instrument which transmits and expresses its activities. All experience points to the view which may be thus stated: the soul is distinct from the body and has a being in and for itself as the subject of its various activities; the functions of the soul are in many ways dependent on those of the body through which they act, but not dependent in such a way that the soul necessarily perishes with the death of the body; we can conceive the distinction between the two only by saying that the soul is more essential to immortality, and may be more easily destroyed than that life has ever given him opportunity to realize. The 'ethical' objections to belief in another life are not characteristic of any particular school of ethical inquiry, though they appear to be most widely among the followers of Auguste Comte. It cannot be said that the objections are of great weight; but the discussion of them serves to bring out further features of the true meaning of the immortal delight. We may refer to John Caird, Lay Sermons, 1897, esp. p. 276 ff.; H. Jones, Immortality of the Soul in the Poems of Tennyson and Browning (Essex Hall Lectures, London, 1905); and Tennyson, The Immortal Hope, ch. ii.

4. The 'teleological argument' for immortality.

We have already indicated the general nature of which may be called the 'teleological argument' for immortality (§ 3 (a)); and in the absence of any valid scientific or ethical reasons for questioning the possibility and value of a future life, it must be admitted that this argument holds the field. The root of the argument lies in a twofold motive which is specially prominent in forming the desire for another life: that personal affection may continue, and that personal goodness may grow; i.e. that our faculties may be realized and exercised to their fullest capacity. In this life we do not find it possible to be and to do what we know ourselves to be capable of; every element in the life that now is seems rudimentary, incomplete, and preparatory. This principle is applied to the distinctive qualities of human nature. Without entering into interrupting refinements concerning 'animal intelligence' or 'animal conscience,' it is evident that, while human life includes animal life, it rises above the latter; and that those higher things which distinguish man from the animals are his higher rational, spiritual, and moral qualities. It must be admitted that everything that is best in us bears witness in itself to a power of life and growth far beyond the utmost afforded by the opportunities of this world. It is, indeed, true that there are human beings in whom the higher emotional, intellectual, and moral qualities have not yet come into full development; and there are others who seem to show no sign of possessing such qualities. Yet every one who has begun to use the higher gifts of his manhood has begun to find in the power of growth to which no limit can be seen; and, the more truly he does all that this life calls for, the
more he feels that many such lives would not exhaust his powers.

We may make in the sphere of spiritual life an assumption similar to that which science makes in the sphere of physical life; i.e., we may assume that the highest perfection of human qualities has for their proper use and function, which is not realized until they are exercised in all their fullness. Some writers have treated this principle as a self-evident axiom. It is, rather, a consequence or corollary of a more fundamental, which is not a logical axiom but a progressively verified fact—that the world is at bottom a harmonious and completed whole, a rational whole, and not a confusion and dispersion; so that nothing which exists and shares in the universal sustaining life of the whole can remain permanently incomplete and imperfect. Man, as a spiritual being, cannot completely realize his powers in that round of experience which he calls his life in this world. Their complete realization demands another life; and, if all things form, in God, a perfect system, that other life will be granted. Apart from this act of faith in the reasonableness of the world—an act of faith on which the trustworthiness of all reasoning depends, and which is progressively but never completely verified by acting on it or working it out—there would be no reason to suppose that human capacities fulfill any purpose by their growth, or that the incompleteness of life has any meaning.

These distinctively human qualities do not serve any merely physical purpose; they are not useful in the biological sense. As soon as we enter into the inner circle of human characteristics, the interpretation of these characteristics as instruments for the bodily organism utterly fails us. In fact, to explain them, in their present form, by this means is never attempted; but it is supposed that they were manufactured out of primitive animal instincts whose utility to the organism needs no demonstration. Against this whole conception it is contended that such a process of manufacture is inconceivable when seriously examined, and that it rests on a fundamental misconception of all that development can possibly mean. It appears then to be a reasonable assumption that human existence is constructed on a scale such that each man can put forth in his fullness the distinctive capacities of his humanity, and this unceasing the life begun here is continued beyond death, where these endowments may find progressively more adequate scope and employment. At first sight the analogies of nature's ways do not lead us to regard this suggestion as a very hopeful one. What if the undesirable waste in the animal and vegetable world has its analogues in the human world? It appears to involve a waste of resources and a frustration of purpose and capacity; if in the case of man death ends his life, there would only be a similar blighting of promise, and perishing of capacities which have only just begun to unfold.

Granting that the analogy is a true one—i.e. that there is mere waste in both cases—we must observe that in the one case it is a waste of physical capacity, in the other a waste of intellectual, moral, and spiritual capacity. Has there been any special significance? Have we a right to hold the growth of human love and reason as worth more—to expect that, though physical life may be wasted, spiritual life must be wasted? A conviction of the absolute and indestructible worth of these human ideals answers the question. These are the only things that give value to life; and, if we have a right to believe anything, we have the strongest moral and intellectual right to believe that they shall abide for ever. And, if the progress of humanity continues, while the actual human beings whose efforts contribute to it perish by the wayside, then what permanence is the best part of the whole achievement? the effects of such things would which remain in his living, growing self; since all ideals are realized in life only by personal activities which grow by their personal use.

It is at this point that we reach the absolutely fundamental issue of all arguments really relevant to the problem of immortality. In the last resort they all depend on the view taken of the worth of human personality, as such, in the nature of things. The essential question could hardly be stated better than by Pringle-Pattison: 'Man as rational, and, in virtue of self-conscious reason, the free shaper of his own destiny, furnishes us, I contend, with our only indestructible standard of value, and our clearest light as to the nature of the divine. He does what science, occupied only with the laws of events, and speculative metaphysics, which have only the exclusive guidance of the intellect, alike find unattainable, and are fain to pronounce impossible—his acts. As Goodness puts it in a secular phrase, man alone achieves the impossible. But inexplicable, as a sense, as man's personal agency is, may be the one perpetual miracle— it is nevertheless our surest datum and our only clue to the mystery of existence.'

Whatever view may be taken of this question of the significance of personality, if the question is seriously dealt with, its decision will determine the decision of the problem of immortality and, in fact, of all the fundamental questions of metaphysics and philosophy; and this question of personality may be used as a principle of division for the classification of the different schools of thought in philosophy. In this reference, systems otherwise opposed (e.g., extreme Idealism and extreme Materialism) may be found on the same side of the line. This division is not as fundamental as the division of the schools; for, in the first place, the principle of division is not fundamental; on the contrary, it is so fundamental that it brings to light the thing which is in essence the distinction of the philosophical schools. In fact, the division is a natural one, and doesn't appear as an opposition.

We must insist that the primary and fundamental aspect of existence consists in its personal form. Indeed, when we investigate the full concrete meaning of fact as such—we are not fully conscious of even the smallest fact in its full meaning of the word, you have 'a conscious field plus all that as object as felt or thought of plus an attitude towards the object plus the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs.'

5. Conclusion.—From different points of view we are led to the conclusion that 'matter,' as it figures in the literature of physical science, is an abstraction. Some of the prophets of science would admit this, and eagerly assure us that we shall some day and perhaps never shall, know what matter really is. But they would at once repudiate the suggestion that the qualities of 'matter' which we do not yet know should make any difference to us which we do know; i.e., that they should be capable of any efficient action inside the region which is known. It is as if we were shown 'a sort of sunlit terrace where mathematical physics

2 W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience (Gifford Lecture), London, 1896, p. 490.
builds up its constructions of the world; and, where
terrace stops, science stops, and the absolute
metaphysical ground of the world begins (for science
the unworld). Certain views of recent idealists in
 philosophy have done much to encourage this con-
ception, that the teeming universe in which we live
is verily nothing else than a thing of two aspects—
mechanism and causation on the one hand, and
metaphysics or matter and causes of the absolutely
real. If anything," says W. James, "is unlikely in
a world like this, it is that the next adjacent
thing to the mere surface show of our experience
should be the realm of eternal essences, of platonistic
ideas, of crystal battlements, of absolute signif-
2. And we may add: if anything is likely, it
is that the material world contains objects of
many kinds and degrees of reality objective within
it, that there are kinds of matter and sources of
energy subtler and more complex than were dreamt
of, that the universe has in it resources deeper than
any of which we have the faintest inkling, deeper
than anything our thoughts can reach as long as our
bodily senses are limited as they now are. These
statements are in accord with the whole tenacity of
recent science, which is opening up to us a material
understanding of disembodied existence far larger than
that any that science has destroyed.

When, however, we seek for detailed knowledge of
the manner of the future state, we find ourselves
standing before the ultimate mystery, of that which
"eyes saw not, and ear heard not, and which entered
not into the heart of man" (1 Co 91). We have not
any conception, much less any mental picture, of
the conditions of that existence. Dogmatic insist-
ence on any particular representation is nowhere
more blameworthy than here. But it may be
maintained that absence of knowledge is
entirely beneficial. It leaves the possibility open
to every one to frame such a view of the future as
will meet his practical needs; and at the same
time it keeps the inclination (which easily becomes
dangerous) to revel in these representations of
the future to such an extent as to forget the claims
and value of the present.

There are, nevertheless, two distinct ideas, or
ideals, of the future state which may claim con-
sideration. Both are equally based on human nature,
and both have found expression in many
historical types of doctrine. This question, we may
observe in passing, is independent of the problem
of conceiving how willful wrongdoers will be treated
in the world to come. On the one hand, we find
that the dominant thought governing all represen-
tations of the future is that of restful peace;
on the other hand, that of active progress. The
one ideal is that of the Highest which
finds its perfect realization in Vision and Com-
monunion; the highest blessedness is pictured to the
mind as that of the Divine Home, the Heavenly
Fatherland. The other ideal is of rising in an
unwearying progress from one stage of existence
through the countless spheres of labour in the vast
economy of the Infinite Whole. It need not be
said that these are not two mutually exclusive ideas,
but both can be entertained. They
and the same writer’s Essay on ‘The true Conception of Another
World’. See also recent work by Youx and Aschaffenburg.
2. In Memoriam F. W. H. Myers, in Proceedings of the
Society for Psychical Research, London, 1921.

IMPLICIT FAITH. — Implicit in contrast
to explicit faith means believing all that
the Church believes, or may in future believe.
According to William of Auvergne (†1215), in
nearly the first reference to the subject, Credores
eiusque adeo crederes in hoc universali, quia quidam credit eccl.
credere esse verum. He believes implicitly who,
although ignorant of the details, accepts whatever
is taught by the Church or is contained in Holy
Scripture. The concept is similar to the case of the
simplices or minores, i.e. the less
instructed laity and lower clergy. The higher
clergy (doctores et maioris) must believe explicitly,
with knowledge of the books of the Church to
give a reason for their faith. For, as the doctrine
held down by traditional theology became more
complex, it was necessary to recognize an en-
larger number as incapable of really lon-
ging or expressly accepting all the
Church doctrines. Learned theologians soon perceived
the dangers of this.

Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus both in-
sist that the laity must believe expressly these
things in their Doctrinal Sentences, as in the tracts,
an. S. H. MELLONE.
articles of faith which are concerned with redemption through Christ and are proclaimed in Church festivals. This practically means the Apostles’ Creed. Items in the Scriptures, however, for which they admitted implicit faith to be sufficient are: facts as that Abraham had two sons or that David was the son of Jesse. The lower limit of express belief appears to be fixed by He 11. Alarma may have been felt at the statement of Innocent III. (1226) that no holder of an orthodoxy opinion, provided he regards it as a belief of the Church, is a heretic; Innocent further says that by holding it in this sense he actually acquires merit. The scope of fides implicita was later much widened by William of Ockham, who used it to protect himself against the charge of heresy; and Bield took a position which really permits to the implicitly believing ignorant a total indifference towards all specific Christian truth.

The conception has been defended or explained in two ways. (1) The Church believes, and my faith is contained in her, since I am a constituent part of her. (2) The Church is the supreme doctrinal authority; hence whatever the Church teaches, I accept. I give a blank cheque, undertaker to honour it; it is a sum paid. It is dangerous that the notion of fides implicita is derived from the intellectualistic thought of faith current in Scholasticism. If, as with Thomas Aquinas, faith is an act of the intellect impelled to believe, to give it a summum, it will, and it, being the acceptance of doctrinal propositions, is an act of obedience to authority rather than of personal conviction, provision must of course be made for all those who are unable to follow the subtle obscurities of detailed theology.

The medieval discussion ended in opaque and inharmonious conclusions, very various opinions being held regarding the scope of explicit and implicit faith respectively. Roman Catholic writers subsequent to the Reformation tend to narrow the range of the latter. Modern Jesuit divines seldom touch the subject. Rüsch argues that the Vatican Council of 1870, in its determination of the relations between faith and reason, virtually gave a wide scope to implicit faith even in the case of the learned.

A man’s verdict on the admissibility of fides implicita will depend on his conception of faith and of the Church. If it be held that Christ offers a present salvation, in fellowship with God, and that faith means the heartfelt trust by which we take this boon, implicit faith must be rejected as unmeaning. It is indeed a strange suggestion, in that case, that things are made easier for any one by waiving the necessary and appre-henion of the mercy of God in Christ. Nothing but explicit faith can avail, since the trust of others is not our trust. In Protestantism this can be denied only by those who assign a sub-stantial degree of present saving unbelief, or of the unconscious Christian's faith. The fact which has been wrongly interpreted under the rubric of fides implicita is this, that a saving experience of Christ may be accompanied by many degrees of knowledge, but wherever faith is regarded as the obedient acceptance of dogmatic statements, not trustful adherence to a Person, the notion of implicit faith will appear unfaithfully, and piety will so far be gauged by theological attainment.


H. R. MACKINTOSH.

IMPOSITION OF HANDS.—See HAND.

IMPRISONMENT.—See PRISONS.

IMPUTATION.—Imputation is a term which belongs in the first place to law, and in the second to Christian theology, where that has been expressed in legal terms. The meaning is thus defined by Hodge, Syst. Theo. ii. 194: ‘In the juridical and theological sense of the word, to impute is to attribute anything to a person or persons, upon adequate grounds, as the judicial or meritorious reason of reward or punishment.

The theological use of the term belongs (apart from Biblical references) essentially to the Western Church, and may be distinguished as threefold: (1) There is a general usage, in which it has reference to God’s judgment of individual persons on the basis of their own merits or demerits. He is said to impute to them fault or blame (culpa) or merit (meritum). In so far, however, as merits are transferable, the merits of others also can be imputed to a non-meritorious individual (see Merit).

(2) In particular, however, the term is used of the judgment passed by God upon the human race as guilty in view of the sin of Adam. This usage prevails in orthodox theology. Roman Catholic and Protestant alike, from Augustine onward, the view of Pelagius, that Adam’s sin entailed no guilt upon his posterity, having been stamped as heretical.

(3) Feculnarius to the Protestant orthodoxy is the third usage, which speaks of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to believers.

The last two usages demand further consideration.

I. The Imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity.—This forms one aspect of Augustine’s doctrine of original sin, for which see R. Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch., ii. Leipzig, 1910, p. 450:

Augustine conceives the matter thus: God visited Adam’s guilt with punishment. In this state of punishment Adam begat children. On the one hand, these were now involved in the guilt and punishment of Adam. On the other hand, they participated thereby in the concrete condition of Adam, i.e., they received from him a taint of sin in nature, or evil consequence, ignorance, and mortality. Materially, however, the two things are identical, for just as Sanguinis consists of the punishment of Adam, so, therefore, all are placed, through procreation and birth, in the sanguine state of Adam, the punishment visited on him, which realizes itself in them, or his guilt is punished in them, and is therefore also their guilt.

This doctrine of Augustine determined the general view of Western Catholicism. Thomas Aquinas virtually repeats it, but defines further especially the point that, since original sin involves guilt before God, and guilt necessarily implies a voluntary act, therefore it is not enough merely to teach that from Adam his posterity derived a corrupt nature, but they must be regarded as involved in the guilt of his voluntary act of transgression. Cf. Summa Tho. II. i. qu. 31, art. 1:

* All men, who are born of Adam, can be considered as one man, so far as they agree in the nature which they receive from their first parent; just as in civil matters all men who are of one community and subject to one body, are regarded as one man, and the whole community as one man.” Thus all men are to be regarded as members of one body by reason of their common descent from Adam; and just as murder is not imputed to a man except as part of his body, so original sin is not guilt by reason of the will of each individual man, but by reason of the will of Adam. This is a very clear doctrine of imputation.

Aquinas accompanies it with an equally clear statement, after Augustine, that materially original sin is Sanguinis nature (II. i. qu. 82, art. 1).

Aquinas, however, also defines original sin as
Anselm had done before him) as the lack of original righteousness; and this definition opened the way to a more Pelagian appreciation of human nature, which was the accomplishment first in Duns Scotus, reached its full development in the Roman Catholic theologians of the time of the Reformation, Albertus Pichius and Ambrosius Catharinius. Duns admitted a corruption of human nature in such a way as to acknowledge a proneness to inordinate desire. This corruption, however, means for him much less than the longor naturae meant to Augustine or Aquinas. Cf. F. Loos, Dogmengeschicht., Halle, 1861, p. 566.

'The will remains free in spite of the pronata. ... Sin, however, can exist only in the will. ... Original sin is, therefore, for Duns only original guilt or, more properly, a state of condemnation, which God inflicts upon all the posterity of Adam, since they as his posterity sought to possess but do possess the justified original state. de Agatex. pro eum constituere.

Following along this line opened by Duns, Pichius and Catharinius taught that original sin was nothing but the imputed guilt of Adam (see Belharren, 'De Amicis gratae et statuto pecati,' Disputationes, vol. iii, Ingolstadt, 1693, h. v. cap. xvi). It was in opposition to this tendency of Roman Catholic theology of the early Protestant state that the doctrine of imputation was framed. The consequence is that it is chiefly the material side of the doctrine, or the corruption of human nature, that is emphasized in the early Protestant state, while the moral side was taken up by the Lutheran Church. (Spat. Theod. ii. 194, n. 1). The result as regards the Lutheran theology is thus expressed by H. F. Schmid (Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, Frankfort, 1881, p. 104). The doctrine of the imputation lapsus peporuni pereati is first developed by the later doctors, say from Calvin onwards. Though there is no suggestion of it to be found in the sentence of the Form. Conc. (col. 19), quod habetur in inimiciurum naturam et erutus, quoniam propter etiam conscientiam Adam et Hesper in odio apud Deum et natura sibi fruus sumus.

The doctrine is very clearly stated by David Holzau, who says: 'The first sin of Adam, so far as it is regarded as the common parent, head, stem, and representative of the whole human race, is imputed to all his posterity truly and by the just judgment of God, as guilt, and as ground of punishment' (see Schmid, p. 196).

It was in the Reformed Church that the doctrine of imputation was most fully developed and discussed. It was here that the controversy arose as to whether the imputation of original sin was necessary, i.e. whether men were punished directly for Adam's transgression, and the corruption that they derived from him was part of the punishment; or whether, inheriting as a matter of fact the corruption, they are punished directly for this, and only indirectly for the sin which brought it into being. It is to be observed, moreover, that, in the very beginning of the history of the Reformed Church, Zwingle repudiated the doctrine of imputation altogether:

'Culpa originis non vere et metonymica a primi parentis admiso culpae venit' (A. Schleiermacher, Die Geandemlichen der ersteren, Zürich, 1844-47, ii. 54).

As to the other great initiator of the Reformed theology, Calvin's doctrine of original sin certainly leans a good deal on the doctrine of mediocrate imputation that Zwingli asserted.

'Being perverted and corrupted in all parts of our nature, we are merely accused of such corruption deservedly condemned by God. Dei aeterni, nulla siti furtare.

The general doctrine of the Reformed Church, however, undoubtedly that of immediate imputation. B. Keckermann says:

'imputatum (ex peccatorum) est infelic, quatesin in Adamo in razii pristto nostro principio potestatis satis (see Schweizer, p. 54).

To the same effect also J. H. Alsted and M. K. Wulffen (Schweizer, p. 54). The doctrine of mediocrate imputation is especially connected with the name of Placan (La Place) of Saumur, who presented his views in a disputatio de Stato hominis, lapsi ante gradus, and afterwards fully in a treatise de Imputazione prae peccato Adami. But the doctrine was condemned by the National Synod of Charlestown in France (1644-45), by the Swiss Formula of Consensus, and by the theologians of Holland. J. H. Heidegger, one of the theologians of the Swiss Consensus, says:

'The imputation of Adam's sin is immediate and absolute, not mediocrate and consequent. The sin of Adam is not by the mediation of inherent corruption, but the imputation of sin is the cause of inherent corruption. In other words, the righteousness of Christ'

2. The imputation of Christ's righteousness.

This is a form taken by the doctrine of justification by faith in the Protestant theology, though not in its earliest stage of development. The expression "Justitia Christi imputatur" is seldom found in the older documents of the Reformation, and first comes more generally into acceptance through the controversy with' Oslander' (R. A. Lipseus, Dogmatik, Brunswick, 1693, p. 678).

Oslander taught that the forgiveness of sins was the effect of the historical work of Christ, but that justification was more than mere forgiveness, and consisted in the imputation to the believer of the essential righteousness of the Person of Christ. This imputation, however, involves the infusion of the same righteousness in the believer, since God's imputation is necessarily according to truth (cf. Loos, p. 570). This doctrine was rejected by the Lutheran Church as Catholicizing, and in opposition to it the Formula of Concord (col. deel. iv. 16) maintains:

'The righteousness (of Christ) which is imputed before God to faith or to believers, is the obedience, passion, and resurrection of Christ, by which He satisfied the law for our sake and made atonement for our sins.'

If there is, however, considerable difference in the later Lutheran doctrine as to the exact relation of the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of Christ's righteousness.

The Formula of Concord sometimes acts both expressions side by side, sometimes it reduces the content of the justifying judgment to the single expression of the remission of sins (Schmitz, p. 566).

J. Brenz says that the imputation of Christ's righteousness is the reason of the forgiveness or non-imputation of sins (ib. p. 257). D. Hollauz says:

'The remission of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ are acts undivid and intimately united, but still formally distinct, since the former is privative, the latter positive; the former follows immediately from the passive obedience, the latter from the active obedience of Christ' (ib. p. 260).

As regards the Reformed Church, we may take as typical statements those of F. Turrettin (Inst., Edinburgh, 1847, loc. xvi. 3. 9) and Jonathan Edwards ('Justification by Faith alone' [Works, London, 1817, vi. 297]). Turrettin's statement is as follows:

'When we say that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us unto justification, and that we through that imputed righteousness are just before God, and not through a righteousness which inhereth in us; we mean nothing else than that the obedience of Christ, presented to God the Father in our name, is so granted to us by God, that it is to be regarded as really ours, and that it is the one and only righteousness on account of which, and through whose merits, we are absolved from the guilt of our sins and made right to a eternal life.'

Edwards says as follows:

'First, I would explain what I mean by the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Sometimes the expression is taken by our divines in a larger sense, for the imputation of all that Christ did and suffered for our redemption, whereby we are delivered from the guilt, and stand altogether justified, and so implies the imputation both of Christ's satisfaction and obedience. But here I understand it in the imputation of that righteousness or moral goodness that consists in the obedience to Christ. And by that righteousness being imputed to us, it is meant no other than that the righteousness of Christ is accepted for us, and admitted instead of that inherent righteousness in ourselves: Christ's perfect obedience shall be reckoned to our account, so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves.'
of Christ’s righteousness are closely connected. The one is set over against the other, as balancing and counterpointing it: B. de Moor, Commentarius in Marchi Compendium, Leyden, 1676-77. says: *Imputatio justitiae Christi et cupit Adami parum amabilis, et vel utrasque, ut vel utrasque ignoci debet.* (see Hodge, II. 93-96).

3. The Scriptural basis of the doctrine of the imputation of Adam’s sin and of Christ’s righteousness.—This is to be found principally in the Epistles of Paul. In the first place, Paul, following the Rabbinic theology, tends to view man’s relation to God, along juridical lines, though this is by no means his exclusive point of view, nor is his legalism thoroughgoing, even where it exists, in particular, as regards the imputation of Adam’s sin and of Christ’s righteousness the fundamental passage is Ro 5:12-21, where the effects of Adam’s sin and of Christ’s righteousness are contrasted: as sin flows from Adam, so righteousness flows from Christ. When this great passage is examined, however, it is found to lack altogether the sharp formulation of the later doctrine, and it cannot be said that the imputation either of Adam’s sin or of Christ’s righteousness is distinctly taught in it. To Paul, here and elsewhere, an exact systematic theologian must fail; there is always about his statements a breadth and expansiveness in which much is left to the imagination. The whole meaning is suggested rather than precisely defined. In the passage before us, while it is clear that Paul believed in the Divine imputation of sin and in the derivation of all human sin from the first sin of transgression, it is by no means clear that he held, let us say, the doctrine of immediate imputation. In fact, v. 13 is inconsistent with this and with the doctrine of mediate imputation. On the whole, the law was in the world: but sin is not imputed when there is no law. The famous ἄνθρωπος ἤτοι, of v. 12, will not bear the sense put upon it by Origen and Augustine of *in whom,* i.e. in Adam. In that case (i.) *eu* would not be the right preposition; (ii.) *qua* would be too far removed from its antecedent. (Sanday-Headlam, Commentary on Romans, Edinburgh, 1885, p. 133.) Again, v. 15 are by no means theologically precise. It may be argued (v. 14) that Paul traces back in general the condemnation of men to the trespass of Adam, but the intermediary links establishing the connexion are left vague. And so again with the condemnation of the world. The latter half of the verse between the ἐγκυρίαν and the ἀνθρωπισμόν. Besides, the exact meaning of ἀνθρωπισμόν is uncertain, whether the righteous act or merit of Christ (K. G. J. Houben, C. J. Vaughan, B. A. Lipsius, H. B. Liddon) or the justifying sentence (H. A. W. Meyer, E. H. Gifford, W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam). Finally, the exact sense in which we are to understand v. 19 that the trespass of Adam and the obedience of Christ constituted the many sinners and righteous respectively is left vague. It is, no doubt, right to understand Paul to mean ‘constituted’ in the Divine judgment, i.e. imputed: but how the sin of Adam and the obedience of Christ bring about the imputation of sin or of righteousness is left unexplained.

If we turn to Ro 4:5 we find, instead of the doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, that of the imputation of faith for righteousness, which Paul derives from Gn 15:6, perhaps as a result of his Rabbinic training. It is at least interesting to observe that the imputation of one thing for another is known to the Rabbinic theology, e.g. **v. 5** for precedence, willingness to suffer for martyrdom (see P. Weber, *Jed. Theol.*, Leipzig, 1881, p. 55), which Paul also says or God (see also Ga 4:15). Abraham inherited this world and the world to come solely by the merit of faith, whereby he believed in the Lord, and He reckoned it to him for righteousness (see J. B. Lightfoot, *Galatians*, London, 1886, p. 1625).

4. Opposition to the doctrines of the imputation of Adam’s sin and of Christ’s righteousness.—With the above statements in view, it is not surprising that, even apart from the moral difficulties of the doctrines, they should have been challenged on Scriptural grounds, even where the legal terminology of St. Paul has not altogether been abandoned. The Pelagians, and the Socinians after them, entirely repudiated the doctrine of the imputation of Adam’s guilt. The Socinians and Arminians objected to the doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness; the Arminians proposed instead to follow Paul in speaking of the imputation of faith for righteousness. On the last point the opinion of A. B. Bruce, *St. Paul’s Concept of Christianity*, Edinburgh, 1894, p. 155 f., is noteworthy:
The great doctors of the Lutheran and Reformed Confessions employed faith of all moral contents, that no protest might remain for attributing it to justifying virtue, and assigned to it simply the humble service of claiming an interest in the foreign righteousness of Christ. They even went the length of setting aside the scriptural idea of the imputation of sin and righteousness, and maintaining for it the idea of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, keeping themselves right with St. Paul by the ingenious device of taking faith, in the terms of faith, which was felt to be imputed, objectively, so bringing out the meaning that not the act of believing, but the object believed, i.e. Christ’s righteousness, is imputed. This manner of handling the locus of justification is very open to criticism. In the first place, it is unfortunate that the Protestant doctors, in their laudable zeal against neo-legalism, should have found it necessary to become un-Pauline in their terminology, because it is only in their theological vocabulary the imputation of faith as not only imputed but also credited, and employed exclusively a phrase which, however legitimate as an inference from Scripture text, has no express scriptural warrant. This fact is an index that someone they had got upon the wrong track, and had taken into one-sidedness.

Modern theology, as governed by the new emphasis on the Synoptic teaching of Jesus, and especially on His doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, tends away from legal analogies and modes of statement. The consequence is that the term ‘imputation’ has tended, except on account of its historical associations, to be banished from recent theology. So far as concerns, not the term, but the matter of the doctrines of the imputation of Adam’s sin and Christ’s righteousness, it is widely felt to be morally impossible to maintain that men in general are guilty because they are men and also that, as above stated, Paul himself does not distinctly teach this. The usual line of modern teaching, therefore, follows the suggestion made by Paul in Ro 4:13, and, while recognising the inheritance from the past of sinful propensities, admits guilt only where there is conscious and wilful transgression (so e.g., J. Kauten, in his *Dogenlehre*, Tübingen, 1900). As regards the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, the passage above quoted from Bruce is, on the whole, typical. Since Kant’s *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, the doctrine of justification by faith has been commonly stated in the form that God accepts our faith in Christ as the earnest of the Christ-likeness which it is destined to produce, or sees in Christ the full fruition of what in the believer is present only in its germ. It is noteworthy, however, that Ritschl, with his glowing admiration for the principles of the Reformation, here substantially maintains the orthodox doctrine, though without the parallel doctrine of the imputation of Adam’s guilt.

On the other hand, when what we want is to see forgiveness become operative as the attribute of a community, this aspect of it is guaranteed by the community’s Representatives. They are inevitably maintained position towards the love of God, which is distinctive of Sinners imputed to those who are justified. Hence Christ kept Himself in the love of God by His obedience even unto death. God’s forgiving love is thereby secured beforehand to those who belong.
INCARNATION. Introductory. — The term 'incarnation' is applied to the act of a divine or supernatural being in assuming the form of a man or animal, and continuing to live in that form upon the earth. This distinguished, on the one hand, from 'transmigration,' in which the vagrant entity is not a deity, but a soul; and, on the other, alikes from 'possession' (g.v.), in which a spirit or a deity takes up its abode in a human being, but only temporarily, and not for a whole lifetime, from 'emancipation,' which implies a divine source, but not the actual presence of a deity, and from the capacity of deities, or of holy men and magicians, to assume on occasion whatever forms they please, (e.g., Verethragna [XIV. xiv. 7.] and Tishtrya [XII. viii. 168.]; see art. METEMPSYCHOSIS.)

Among primitive peoples there is really no such thing as incarnation in the strict sense of the term. The men and animals worshipped among such peoples are usually regarded and treated as actual deities, or at least divine, and not as the manifestations of certain gods or demons. Frequently, in cases where the men or animals worshipped have been supposed by investigators to be the embodiments of demons or other supernatural beings, a more searching inquiry has disclosed that the animals thus ranked, and were worshipped, as living deities (J. G. Frazer, Lectures on the Early Hist. of the Kingship, London, 1905, pp. 132 ff., 279.). At a later stage, sacred beings of this type might be regarded as the incarnations of a god (e.g., Avatskibesvaras becomes incarnate in the Dalai Lama: see 'Tibetan' section of this art.).

Among primitive races the closest approximations to the conception of incarnation are found in (1) the animals in which the primitive mind traces the peculiar and mysterious force (see art. HOLINESS [Gen. and prim. vol. vi. p. 725] of the dead — now regarded as divine and endowed with power — and which therefore become objects of worship; and (2) the aged and the medicine-men in the parts they play in the performance of the mysteries; here they assume the forms of the great personages of sacred tradition, and the priests are one with these superhuman beings and deities (K. T. Feuss, Die Nayarit-Expulsion, Leipzig, 1912, p. 194.); it is true, of course, that this impersonation or embodiment was not permanent or complete. The sacrificed man-god of the Mexicans, 'our Lord God,' to impersonate whom a young and beautiful man was chosen from among ten picked captives, was regarded as the 'figurer' or representative of the sacrificers.

The approximation was much closer when this power came to be represented as the sacred civilization of Greece and Rome as a migratory individual being.

See, further, art. SIN, JUSTIFICATION.

Inerrancy. — The principal literature has been indicated in the course of the article. It is to be observed that C. Hodge's Systematic Theology, London and Edinburgh, 1875-78, especially i. 525 ff., and ii. 141 ff., is particularly valuable. See also the history of the doctrines of imputation and for an exact statement of their orthodox position.

Robert S. Franks.

INCAS. — See ANDREWS.

INCANTATION. — See CHARMS AND AMULETS, DIVINATION.

INCARNATION.

Introductory (N. Söderblom), p. 183.
Buddhist (L. de la Valley Poussin), p. 186.
Chinese (F. Y. Maclaglan), p. 188.
Christian. — See JESUS CHRIST.
Egyptian (A. Wiedemann), p. 188.

Greek and Roman (St. George Stock), p. 192.
Indian (H. Jacob), p. 193.
Muslim (G. A. Barton), p. 197.
Parsi (N. Söderblom), p. 198.
Semitic (G. A. Barton), p. 199.

Tsuchi, J. E., Die achtzehn Jahresfeste der Mexikaner, in Veroeff. des konst. Museums für Völkerkunde zu Berlin, vi. [1899] 194; see 'American' section. Even as a stage of religious development the craving for the immediate presence of deity gives rise, as a rule, to the practice of deifying men (as, e.g., in the Athenian Hymn to Demeter, Athenaeus, vi. 235 c, or in the culte of the emperors) rather than to the belief in incarnation.

Among Western peoples, again, the idea of incarnation in the proper sense seems to have originated in Egypt (see the 'Egyptian' section), and, then, with Hellenism as its medium, to have reached its highest form in Christianity (see art. JESUS CHRIST] and heterodox Islam. A parallel development is the Indian doctrine of avatâras (see the 'Indian' section) — first mentioned in the Bhagavad-gîta, iv. 71. — which in turn also exercised an influence upon the Muslim sectaries, i.e. in the Shâîte doctrine of the imâm.

The moderate Shi'ites do not teach incarnation in the strict sense; but certainly the Shi'ite doctrine of the right of succession belongs to the descendants of 'Ali, the Prophet's cousin, and of Fatîma, his daughter, in that it is a manifestation of blood-relationship and divine ordinance, and not, as the Sunnites hold, to the khilafahs installed by human election and appointment (I. Goldziher, Vorträge über den Islam, Heidelberg, 1910, p. 310), has some affinity with the idea of incarnation. The theory of the imâm, like Islam in general, rests upon various grounds. The divine sequence of these rulers is guaranteed not only by their legitimate descent from the Prophet's family and by their superhuman gifts, but also by their possession of a divine light-substance (cf. Shahristâni, tr. T. Haarbrucker, Halle, 1850, 1. 172, 206, 217 f.; it is a divine power [217], a part of deity [172, 290], and even the spirit of deity [170, 173]) which had streamed down from Adam in a succession of divine men, passed into the loins of the grandfather of Muhammad and All, and was then portioned out to 'Abdallah with his son, the Prophet, and the latter's daughter, Fatima, on the one side, and to 'Abd-Allah with his son 'Ali, on the other; transmitted thereafter by the offspring of the marriage of 'Ali and Fatima, and by the successive imâms of the Prophet's lineage, it will culminate in the last, the 'hidden,' imâm, who will appear in the final age.

The Sunnite tradition, too, had a place in the mir Muhammad, the 'light of Muhammad,' which rested upon the forhead of Adam, and from which all the prophets have sprung. This light pervades all the ages, falling ever upon the bearers of the
INCARNATION (American) — The notion that the 'life' may be transferred from one body to another is widespread among the American aborigines. It is a conception fostered by that type of Animism which sees in Nature powers rather than things, or, at all events, no sensible thing without its active and concealed potency; and, again, it is a conception already mythically expressed in the frequent cosmogenies which derive the life of the Earth and of Earth's children from that of the demigourge whose transformed body the Earth is.

In Persian Islam, God and man were regarded as more closely related. The identification of the Sufi with deity, which has been fairly common since it began with the great Sufi, Rumi, of Balkh, and with the sect — or, better, the sect — was conceived as a mystic union.

1 The thought originally expressed by the ancient teachers of the Iroquois and other barbaric peoples, writes J. R. R. Hoitze (Zt. d. B. d. W. 1889, p. 190), "was that the earth through the body, or life potential, united and immovable life into a new body, or life personified by Thorobnakawo — by feeding itself to them produces plants and fruits and vegetables which serve of the divine tradition. It went through the forefathers of Islam, with But Shēh Shāhī, and the All-One played a ruling part in the rise of Sufism was already noted by al-Biruni. Such forms of pantheistic extravagance are common in all mystical theories of the kind, and in reality involve an expansive theology that results in mere indistinctness. An incarnation that embraces all religious persons has lost its specific meaning.

The conception of one solitary incarnation of deity is peculiar to Christianity. In India the development of the idea resulted in an exactly opposite view. The earliest incarnation of Viṣṇu seems to have been Kṛṣṇa. Thereafter there was a constant increase in the number of embodiments — we find successively the figures ten, twelve, twenty-two, twenty-four, twenty-eight (A. E. A. Religions of India, London, 1891, p. 171) — until at length they are spoken of as immemorial, so that the great teachers of any religion whatever, as, e.g., Buddha and Jesus, could be numbered among the avatāras. Eventually every guru ('teacher') claimed to be an avatāra. Even the theory of a single incarnation for each age leads here to the idea of an infinite number, as the several ages always recur. In certain schools of the Mahāyāna the doctrine of a Buddha in each of the non-void cosmic entities of the world (Budd.), vol. 1, p. 189 f.) developed into the theory of a celestial prototype for each earthly Buddha, and subsequently into the idea of the one Buddha-god, of whom the various individuated Buddhas are emanations. Schopenhauer (Sämmtliche Werke, Leipzig (Recumb.), 1892, v. 413) and others are of opinion that the idea of a plurality of Buddhas is more rational than that of the one Christ.

The Sīlā and its sects adopted an intermediate position. There is among them no unanimity as to the number of incarnations, officially recognized by the Persian State religion; there are twelve, the last of whom, Muhammad Abu-l-Qasim (9th cent.), will return in the final age as the Mahdi. In the Middle Ages, the 'Sect of the Seven Immortals, the immortals, had a great vogue. They enumerated seven Nātīq ('speaking ones') or manifestations of God, viz. Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Muhammad (with 'All as his atmospheric deity), and the Imam Mahdi, the son of Ima'mī, from whom the sect took its name (A. Christensen, Muhamedanske Stygter og Tænorke, Copenhagen, 1896, p. 77 f.). As Islam, in conformity with the Bible as its literary source, teaches that human history has a consummation, the number of possible incarnations must in any case be limited.

Literature. — This has been given in the course of the article.
as food for birds and animals, all which in their turn become food for man. Hence the idea of the cycle of life is transmuted into that of man and of all living things.

'Tronahniwacouac' is the demiurgic titan, descended from the sky to become the fashioner and dispenser of life. The word means, says Hewitt, 'He grasps the sky (by memory)—a designation which clearly places this being in the pan-mythic group of beings cast down from heaven and brought back to earth for the benefit of mankind (cf. further, Hewitt, in Haij ii. [1910] 718 ff.). Other designations, such as 'Sprout' and 'Spraling,' indicate the reverse consideration of this being, i.e. as already fallen and as incarnate in the vegetable life of Mother Earth. This character appears explicitly in the close of the Onondaga version of the myth, as given by Hewitt (Jl RBEW, pp. 218-230):

'Moreover, it is said that this Spraling, as the manner in which he has life, has this to betial him recurrently, that he becomes old in body, and that when, in fact, his body becomes ancient normally, he then retransfers his body in such wise that he becomes a new man-beating again and again recovers his youth, so that one would think that he had just then grown to the size which a man-being customarily has when he reaches the youth of man-beings, as manifested by the change of voice as by a boy of twelve. Moreover, it is so that transferred the avendia immanent in his body—the avendia with which he is possessed force and potency—is ever full, undiminished, and all-sufficient; and, in the next place, moreover, he has life, and death, and death, and the Great Destroyer, others in itself and faceless, has no effect on him. Moreover, if the avendia, which is in the next place, there is nothing that can bar his way or bar his multitude. Moreover, it is very wise with all the things that are contained in the earth here present, that they severally retransform or exchange their bodies. It is thus with all the things that exist in the next place, with all the things that produce themselves and grow, and, in the next place, all the men-beings. All these are affected in the same manner, that they severally transform their bodies; and, in the next place, that they retransform their bodies, severally, without pain.'

This may be regarded as the general philosophy of those Animists who have not attained a clear conception of personality: life is regarded as fluid, passing readily from one embodiment to another; it has no material totality, but separates in qualities and functions rather than into organisms; into effluences and simulacra rather than into individual spirits. Almost universally in the Indian view—the notion of individual immortality, and even the 'Happy Hunting Ground,' being largely developed under White influence.

This conception of a fluid life permeating all material things finds an early and logical expression in the innumerable sacrificial rites where by the Indians endeavoured to acquire the traits of the body which they wished to possess or of the divinities symbolised in the sacrificial food. Thus Le Jeune (Jesuit Relations, ed. R. G. Thwaites, 1896-1901, ix) 121 notes:

'A savage, saying for the heart of a certain bird, said to him, 'How thou, who art a man, dost thou eat this? If it were people that eat, our enemies would surprise us and would kill us; this is a woman's food.'

The inter-continental custom of eating the flesh, especially the heart, and of drinking the blood, of an enemy who has proved his courage in death by torture, and that his courage might be transferred to the partakers (cf. Ethics and Morality [American]), is but a further, and terrible, illustration of this idea. Indeed, Garcilasso (Royal Commentaries, ed. Paris, 1833, i. xii.) states that some of the American tribes, after having eaten the body of such a victim, dried the nerves and bones and worshipped these remains as divine. In these tribes we find cannibalism fashioned into the likeness of the deity, or of its attributes, or even, in the case of Omacati, into the shape of a bone regarded as a bone of the god, which is then eaten as sacraments. Similar sacrificial initiations imply a sort of ceremonial cannibalism practised by the Aztecs and other Mexican peoples. The hearts of victims were customarily devoted to the divinity, but the bodies were eaten by the worshippers in many; if not all, cases. It seems to be beyond doubt that the partaker was expected to derive some magical or 'holy' power from the flesh of one who had in turn derived it from consecration to the divinity.

In the large number of Aztec sacrifices, the sacrificial victim is regarded as a personification of the god, this is certainly true. The theanthropic idea is everywhere present. Sahagün (Hist. gen., Paris, 1880, vols. i and ii) gives a multitude of examples. Thus, in the worship of the god of merchants, with his five brothers and his sister, 'they sacrificed to all together, or to each of them, one or more slaves, clothed in the garments of the god, as if they were his image.' Slaves were bought for this special purpose, care being taken that they were sound and without defect, they were fed and fattened for the sacrifices and the sacrificial banquet following it, all the while being encouraged to dance and sing and live a life of rejoicing, so that, says Sahagún, 'they made no case of the death that was reserved for them' (i. xix.). The Aztec gods were all richly provided with sacrificial victims and of this time he was sacrificed to the god, while at the same time another youth, beautiful and unblemished, was chosen in his place.

'During the year he [the youth] was to carry flowers in his hands and accompanied by a great following. He painted preciously all whom he encountered, and they, on their part, asking him for the veritable image of the god, they placed themselves on their knees before him and worshipped him.' (v. v.; see also the brilliant description in Prescott's Conquest of Mexico, London, 1874, ch. 11.)

The flaying of the victims and the wearing of their skins was a not uncommon mode of transferring the divine attributes. In the worship of the 'Mother of the Gods' the woman who personated the goddess was flayed and her skin worn by a priest, who, 'thus clothed, traversed the city, where he was the ornament to a thousand inhabitants' (Sahagún, i. viii.; cf. ii. xi.). A curious divinity was Xipe Totec, 'the flayed one,' in whose rites the worshippers wore the skins of the sacrificed victims, assuming that they were clothed in the skin of the god, and expecting thereby to be healed of skin diseases (ib. i. xviii.).

The notion appears to some extent in the northern tribes—at least the Potawatomi 'Story of the man with six sons,' narrated by de Smet (Life, Letters and Travels, New York, 1905, vii. viii.), presents striking analogies.

Ritualistic impersonation of mythical beings, spirits of ancestors, the heroic dead, etc., is to be found in many localities. It is probably a factor in all totemic rites and in symbolic face-painting. In the Pawnee Hako, when the consecrated child has been painted with the lines in which, says the priest, 'we see the face of Tíráwa atins, the giver of life and power to all things,' it is told to look into a bowl which has been filled with running water.

The running water symbolises the passing on of generations, one following another. The little child looks on the water and sees its own likeness, as it will see that likeness in its children and children's children. The face of Tíráwa atins is there also, giving promise that the life of the child may increase in the waters flow over the land' (A. C. Finner, "J RBEW, pt. i [1901], pp. 283, 241).

The most notable development of this conception is among the Indians of the North-West, where masked shamans personate mythical powers, and among the Pueblo Indians, with whom veritable mysteries are enacted by the priesthood. There is some degree of participation in the supernatural character represented
INCARNATION (Buddhist)

(see J. W. Fewkes, 15 RBFW [1897] and 21 RBFW; M. C. Steverson, 23 RBFW [1904]; J. H. Swanton, 30 RBFW [1908]).

It was the common belief of the Shawnee prophet Tekawatwana was regarded by his followers as an incarnation of Manabozo. For Manabozo is the demiurge, the servant of the Good Manitou, through whose labours powers have been brought from heaven to earth, and the life of man made tolerable—and it is in this capacity of creator and mediator that Manabozo holds a central place in the Midé rites. And not only was Tekawatwana himself an incarnation of this demiurge, so that 'his words were believed to be the direct utterances of a deity,' but his body was regarded as transsubstantiated in 'four strings of beans, which we were told were made of the flesh itself of the prophet'; these 'were carried with much solemnity to each man in the lodge, and he was expected to take hold of each string at the top, and draw them gently through his hand. This was called shaking hands with the prophet, and was considered as solemnly en- graving to obey his instructions, and accept his mission as from the Supreme.' (J. Mooney, 11 RBFW, pt. 2 [1896], pp. 675, 6753.)

It is with Manabozo, again, that Longellone identifies the Iroquoian chief and prophet Hiawatha—presumably by some right of tradition, since the Iroquoian demiurge is very similar to the Algonquian god.

The Aztec myth of Quetzalcoatl is a typical case of belief in re-embodiment. This deity—god of wind, maize, leisure, art and the wise—was closely associated in Quetzalcoatl, it is the creator (Pharmacurrion maleus), which was his emblem, was the ruler of Anahuc in a golden age of peace and plenty; driven thence by the conquering Teutanes, he set sail, over the eastern waters, for the land of Tlapallan, promising one day to return and rule again, king of a re-juvenated realm. The appearance of Cortés was mistaken for the return of this deity, re-embodied in his ancient form, for he was traditionally bearded and light of hue—a fact which modified the resistance offered to the Spaniards by the superstitious Montezuma. Possibly Quetzalcoatl is but the personification of the quetzal itself (to which temples were erected as far south as Guatemala), regarded as a symbol of the Sun, and, like the phoenix, periodically dying to be born again. The plumes of the quetzal were brought to Mexico in 1550, and it is an interesting analogy that the Peruvian Inca was a special sign feathers of the 'cornebue,' of which they supposed but a few were necessary to make one of their sun-descended ancestors, Monto Capac and his spouse (see Garcilaso, Royal Commentaries, vi, xxxviii).

The Aztec deity Huiztilpochtli is another deity regarded as having once been an earthly hero, to whom 'after his death they rendered the honours of godship, making him offerings of slaves' (Sahagun, i, l.). A very curious rite in his service was his symbolic slaying, an elaborate effigy being made of cereals, into the heart of which a dart was plunged by a man personating Quetzalcoatl. Afterwards the body was eaten, but the participants in this strange sacrament were compelled to undergo such penance that, says Sahagun, they sometimes fled the country, preferring death at the hands of their enemies (iii. l.).

The other two forms in which this general notion is expressed by the Jesuits (Thwaites, xv. 188). The most primitive and crude form in which the idea appears is in association with the bodies of deceased relatives, in order that their 'life' may be transmited to the partakers. This custom appears only among the lower peoples, chiefly in S. America, one form of it, interesting as probably representing a transition from the cruder forms noted by the Jesuits, is that of the Yapura river tribes, who burn the bones of their dead and then mingle the ashes with their drink.

An interesting custom in this connexion is the rite of bestowing the name of the deceased upon another person, who is then supposed to have assumed the dead person's character: 'It has often been said that the dead were brought to life by making the living bear their names. This is done for several reasons—to revive the memory of a brave man, and to incite him who shall bear his name to imitate his courage; to take revenge upon the enemies, for he who takes the name of a man killed in battle lends himself to avenge his death; to assist the family of a dead man, because he who brings him back to life, and who represents him, assumes all the duties of the deceased, feeding his children as if he were their own father—in fact, they call him their father, and he calls them his children. Mothers or other relatives who love a son, or a daughter, or any of their kindred, cause such persons to be resuscitated, through a desire to see them close by them—transferring the affection that they felt for the deceased to the person who takes their names' (Thwaites, xvii. 399; cf. xxv. 155-58, where the ceremony of reviving a chief is described in detail).

Nor must we forget the Indian messiah of the 'Ghost-Dance Religion,' who taught that the Indian dead were to be resurrected, the old life restored, and even the buffalo and other game of former days to be brought back in the body of the Indian (see 14 RBFW); he, too, was said to have been at work here, but they fell on well-prepared aboriginal ground.

See also Possession, Reincarnation.

LITERATURE.—In addition to authorities already quoted, the article, see last appended to COMMISSION WITH DEITY (American).

H. B. ALEXANDER.

INCARNATION (Buddhist).—I. It has been held that certain Australian tribes deny all connexion between conception and sexual intercourse, and believe that the spirit—an animal totem or the soul of an ancestor—takes its place in the womb of the mother in accordance with certain mysterious laws and under certain trees, without the normal intervention of any physical cause. The savage theories of conception, however, do not necessarily imply such ignorance of physiological facts as it is always productive—οὐκ ἔστω γὰρ ἀνθρώποι ἐνίκησεν (Hom, Od. xi. 449)—and from this it has been logically concluded in Australia and India that sexual intercourse, though it may appear to be the cause of conception, is not the cause of it. A living and intelligent germ is necessary. The Brahmins thought that this germ was a soul descended from the moon through fire, smoke, rain, rice, and seminal fluid. Among the Australians and Hindus the belief was that a kind of spirit, a totem or a gandhara, lay in wait for a suitable opportunity to penetrate the womb of some woman and so become reincarnated.

According to Buddhist belief, three causes are necessary to conception: (1) the father and mother have intercourse, (2) that the mother fulfills her time, and (3) that a gandhara is in readiness. Such is, in so many words, the reply of the Buddha when he is asked how children are born (Majjhima, ii, 156; Digha, 440; Milindapa, 152). It is after death: 'It is a name which is really a description—antarabhava, an intermediary being, succeeding the maranabhava, the being in the dyaging state' or 'death,' and replacing which conception begins in the state of being born' or 'conception.'
A certain sect possesses a sûtra, which is lacking in the Pali canon, where the Buddha speaks of the antarabhava: the Pali canonical sources mention only the pudi-ratana.

2. All sects do not believe in the antarabhava. In this connection we might quote more particularly the case of the Mahābhārata (in the Mahābhārata, Buddhavāsena, 88a; Patañjali, 36, 124, 324, 521; W. L. Wood's *Life of the Buddha*, London, 1884, p. 192) and the school of the Kāśyapa (with the title *Sūtra of the Time of Vajracchedaka*; see also the time of Vajracchedaka, 3rd-4th cent. A.D.) (7). A certain sect in India proper considered the doctrine of the antarabhava as a heresy, and its arguments coincide in many respects with those of the Bhuvanayogis (Kāśyapa); but, while the Pali school preserves the traditional text: "Three causes are recognized: There must be a seed, there must be a seedling, and there must be a tree." The Sanskrit scholars, who deny the existence of the antarabhava, read: "... the seedling in the dying state (antarabhava) ..." They believe that, just as an object projects the reflexion directly and without intermediary on a mirror, so the constituent elements (skandhas) of the dying being are immediately replaced by other elements, situated in a suitable womb, which form a new being which inherits the karma of the dying being. It is in this sense that we must understand H. C. Warren's *formula* (Buddhism in Translations, Cambridge, Mass., 1900, p. 325): 'Rebirth is not transmigration' (see the long and interesting discussion in *Abhidharma-Kosāla*, Fr., London, 1884, p. 161).

3. The belief in the antarabhava, however, is not contradictory to the doctrine of non-identity or to the denial of 'transmigration' (sunnāhāram), i.e. the passage of a person (pudgala), or skandhas (the bodily constituents), from one existent to another. The skandhas do not pass from one existence to another, but, as a flame, continually renewed, sweeps over the wholeprairie, so the skandhas of the dying being engender the skandhas of the intermediary being, which, being continually renewed, finally arrive at the point where they are to enter a womb and engender the skandhas of the new being.

The sûtra (Dhaga, ii. 63), as a matter of fact, speaks only of the "descent of the vijñāna into the womb," i.e. the "descent of thought," the "spiritual element," the "serpent thought," etc., while the new states are told, we must understand by vijñāna the five skandhas. In the sphere of desire and matter (kāma, rūpadhātu; see *Cosmonogy and Cosmology* [Buddhist], vol. iv. p. 180), thought is too weak to exist without the support of matter.

Theopompos, a servant of several European writers, that only the karma is reincarnated, would be of more weight if confirmed by undisputed texts. In conclusion, the existence of the intermediary being is denied, it is believed that the skandhas of the dying being project their substitutes into the womb, and such skandhas indeed—"inert, brute, mindless, or in some form or condition of formation it requires. But it is not to be explained how a karma could exist independently of the skandhas, or produce the skandhas.

4. The intermediary being is "projected" by the same karma as projects the future existence. It will in consequence have the form and aspect of the future being, i.e. it will be inferior, human, divine, and so on, according to the nature of the future being. Its dimensions are those of a child of 6 or 8. Its organs are developed; e.g., the intermediary being which is to generate a Bodhisattva bears all the marks of a Bodhisattva. It penetrates the womb, not along with animals, but by the natural way. This is the second-born, as it is considered the elder. The body of the intermediary being is transparent and mutable and is not susceptible to touch. Nothing can stop its progress towards the place of its birth, since it is armed with the magic power of karmas; it feeds on the aliment called 'involuntary food' (obol, etc.), but only on the subtle part of it, viz. the smell (pudgala), from which it derives its nourishment. So far as we may say there is no fixed rule as to how long this being lasts; it simply exists till the conditions requisite for conception are realized, e.g. till the union of the manas, or, in a higher stage, till divine consorts meet. The masses of flesh in a state of decomposition permit of its incarnation as a worm, and so on. Others maintain that the intermediary being lasts seven days. If, at the end of this time incarnation has been impossible, it dies and is reabsorbed for another existence. These statements (samma-samāhi) do not appear to be definite; it is only stated that it may be reincarnated as an ox, a tree, a black bear, it may be reincarnated as a buffalo, a jackal, or a brown bear. If it is not the season for cows and buffaloes then the animal class may be definitely determined; in this case the karma which has determined the intermediary being has no power about the realization of the causes necessary to incarnation, irrespective of season.

How is the intermediary being incarnated? With an eye born of the forces of karma, it recognizes, even from a great distance, the place where it is to be born and where its father and mother are united. When it is female, it conceives itself in the woman; when it is male, for the mother. Troubled by thoughts of love and hate, it roves round the place of its birth; in its desire for the delights of love, it imagines that it is the apple of the eye. Touched by this imperishable (semenal fluid and blood) already formed in the womb. The skandhas of the intermediary being then grow hard; it dies, and conception takes place. Conception presupposes also the destruction of the elements of productiveness—spem and blood; the first cause of the embryo is the intermediary being, for sperm and blood are devoid of thought. This is how the beings which are to be born out of the chorion or the egg are incarnated.

Those which are to be born of the exudation of the elements are attracted by smell. There is a special category of birth: the apparitional beings (anupadāsita, i.e. "suckling child") which comes to life instantly, as soon as their organs are formed, and all their members and sub-members are formed. To this category belong the gods, the beings of the lower world, the intermediary beings, the men who are born without the aid of blood, seminal fluid, or the exudation of the elements. The intermediary beings who are to be born in this way are attracted to the chorion by a desire to be in a special place or to dwell in a certain abode, e.g. a mother's womb. They do not come to desire to dwell in the lower regions? He is troubled in spirit, his heart is tormented by dry winds and rains, and he is struck by the cries of his son. He no longer seeks for his son, but for another boy, a more energetic. The inverse takes place in the case of the cold intermediary beings (Abhidharma-Kosāla, Fr., London, 1881, p. 166). Incarnation is rapid, for it depends solely on the conditions proper to the intermediary being itself. For the beings born in the mixed (called the "intermediary" or mixed), i.e. they may be born where they will - becoming thus a father of a thousand. He possesses the "mastery" over birth, i.e. he can be born where he wills. Becoming a father of a thousand, he can have as many advantages of being born of the chorion, the advantage of binding the great family of Sikyus by ties of parenthood to the Dharma, the advantage of inspiring with respect the people who would say of him: "He belongs to a family of Sovereign Kings (Mahārājas), the advantage of encouraging the faithful who would say: "He is a man; even men can attain to this perfection." If he had neither race nor family, people would ask: "Who is he? A magical man or a demigod being (piñatā)?"—There is another explanation: nothing remains of the bodies of apparitional beings at death, just as no soil remains in the lamp at morning. Now, the Bodhisattva wanted to leave behind him at death remains through the worship of which thousands of men could gain heaven and deliverance. That is the reason why he was born of the chorion. But this explanation cannot be accepted by the Bodhisattva as he of the three advantages to the Buddha a magic power of creation; he could have created remains." (Abhidharma-Kosāla, Fr., London, 1881, p. 166).

The Bodhisattva, however, is not incarnated in exactly the same way as the intermediary beings destined for the human race. These generally enter the womb under the impression that it is their duty to protect them from rain and cold (in the case of common beings), or a palace (in the case of noble beings). The Sovereign Kings enter the womb knowing that they are entering a body through the length of the period at seven weeks. Instead of being reincarnated as an ox, a tree, or a black bear, it may be reincarnated as a buffalo, a jackal, or a brown bear. If it is not the season for cows and buffaloes then the animal class may be definitely determined; in this case the karma which has determined the intermediary being has no power about the realization of the causes necessary to incarnation, irrespective of season.
alone enter the womb, remain there, and leave it in full consciousness of what they are doing.

The future Bodhisattva does not assume a human form to penetrate the womb of the mother, and does not become big (Máyā) in which the Bodhisattva becomes a white elephant with six tasks) being merely a portent of the future.

(b) The Great Vehicle, in its first stages (viewed from a corrected (point of view), continued to believe that the Bodhisattva is a man, 'not a god.' The Men must not be given the chance to think 'we are only men, incapable of fulfilling this task, incapable of attaining perfection' (Lalitavistara, 87f.). But the blessed or noble (bhadrika) character of his descent into and sojourn in the womb is insisted on; he is not soiled by the impurities of the womb by excrement matter. The question of the 'virtue' of Māyā [Lalitavistara, 42. 9] takes the octuple vow before conception; but the author of the Lalitavistara does not permit this.

The Mahāvagsa, the Suvarna, etc., hold that the Buddha is born as an apparitional being; his body is therefore, defined as 'spiritual' (manomayā), which is introduced by the spirit (ātman) without the aid of the elements of generation. It follows from this that there are no remains of his body after death.

The Bodhisattva was also regarded as a magical apparition (śramota), the unreal reflection of the true body which is resplendent in the Tuṣita heaven or in the distant and colossal empyrean familiar to the later sūtras (Saddharmapuṇḍarīka). 

INCARNATION (Egyptian).—The ancient Egyptians had great difficulty in forming abstract or general conceptions, 1 therein resembling certain negro races who to this day do not use general terms as, e.g., 'woman,' 'crocodile,' but think always of a particular woman or a particular crocodile. 2 Like children, therefore, they found it difficult to think of an ego or self as an integrating conception, and instead of saying 'I see,' 'you walk,' 'he strikes,' they said 'my eyes see,' 'your legs walk,' 'his hand strikes.' Similarly, they lacked originally the concepts 'all' and 'whole'; so that, instead of the expression 'all men,' they used the phrases 'each man,' or, more commonly, 'each eye,' 'such legs,' etc., according to the bodily organ concerned in the particular case. For 'whole' they had no distinctive term, but expressed the idea by such circumlocutions as 'to its limit,' 'to its extent,' 'in its scope.'

This inability to frame abstract ideas operated powerfully upon the formation of religious conceptions among the Egyptians. The thought of a more or less abstract deity, exercising his power in a transcendent manner, was entirely foreign to the Egyptian mind. Even a supreme being was conceivable only as a concrete existence. In order that such a being might conform to earthly norms, it must have earthly attributes, and give effect to its powers by earthly means. The Egyptian deities were accordingly thought of as being embodied in men, or in animals, or, though less frequently, in plants, and even in things fashioned by human hands, such as statues, obelisks, houses, or temples. A deity had to eat, sleep, and die. He was, therefore, always connected with a particular locality. If he went elsewhere, he deserted his previous locality, as he could not in his complete individuality be present in two places at the same time. 3

1 'Made by God' is by some Chinese authorities translated 'made by the sovereign' and so this element of the supernatural is included.

2 Examples, p. 91 ff.

3 According to C. H. Lassen, Denkmäler aus Aegypten und Äthiopien, Berlin, 1851-69, iii. 360, line 15, each of the four obelisks of Thutmose III in Thebes received as sacrificial offerings a hundred loaves and four pitchers of beer.
in different places at one and the same time. If he desired to hear or to see, he required ears or eyes; and while, e.g., ears were ascribed to a deity in large numbers in order that his might penetrate and understand the words and things beyond man’s powers, his reality invocations designed to flatter that particular deity, and to induce him to maintain his reputation as a supreme power by granting his supplicant’s prayer. The conception of a truly omnipotent deity was one that the Egyptians never attained; and that the ostensible references to such are, after all, but phrases to which no real conviction attached is made quite clear by the fact that similar qualities were ascribed to the reigning Pharaoh in the paeans of his subjects.

When the Egyptians sought to attribute a more universal character to a deity in a precise and complete sense, they had to resort to a kind of syncretism. They fabricated a number of figures as manifestations of the deity, and as bearing in that capacity various names (ren-n). To the Egyptian mind, however, the name wasn’t just as in modern languages, a general term. It was something by itself, and independent of the object which it denoted, and it possessed an immortality of its own. It was related in the closest way to what it signified, but was not identical with it. To have knowledge of a name was to have power over its bearer, but in certain cases the name might continue to exist apart from the latter. The name, in fact, was related to its bearer in some such way as the kx, the bs, and other immortal elements were related to the individual human being. In the several ‘names’ of a deity were not simple incarnations thereof, but were generally distinct personalities. Thus, if Isis was designated by, and worshipped under, various epithets, such as Hathor, Mut, etc., these were not regarded as mere evolutions existing in and through Isis, but were figures complete in themselves and endowed with a power and activity of their own. The Egyptians did homage to each by itself, and did not think of such homage as accorded to the central deity. When they wished to worship Isis herself, they required to direct their thoughts specially to her. The primary deity always remained unchangeable, and the regular twelve transformations were brought into relation with the twelve hours of the day by choosing one of distinctiveness to the subsidiary figures, not taking from them any of their attributes or achievements.

In order that a deity might exercise his power at a particular place, he required a material body, which served him for a longer or shorter period as a vestiture or embodiment; and, by way of facilitating such material manifestation, the temples were furnished with statues or symbols which corresponded to his supposed corporeal form, and could, accordingly, be used by him at once as a place of seclusion. When such object had been animated by the spirit of the deity, it was regarded as actually the deity himself. But a material tenement of this kind was not absolutely necessary.

Thus the god of Edfu, in order to help the sun god against his enemies, assumed the form of a winged solar disk, and thereafter some portion of his divinity always inhaled in this effectual manner accordingly, because one of the most potent apotropaic symbols in the religion of Egypt, is exactly the same way statues and symbols likewise permanently retained something of the original divinity. They became separate deities, whose existence in no way interfered with the continued existence of the original deity as an integral entity, or with his capacity to become incarnate in similar fashion at another place. Here we encounter a mode of thinking which is found among many other peoples, viz. the belief that in the painted figure, or even in a mere reflexion, there inheres permanently a part of the personality of the original, though without in any way taking from the latter any portion of his individuality.

Such modes of thought explain the rise of numerous distinct forms of one and the same deity in a single locality, and also, when once he had become embodied there in various objects, their continued co-existence. The several forms were differentiated from one another either by attributes which the deity had manifested in his various emblems or by the sacred localities from which he had been derived under a certain characteristic, and at which he usually resided in a particular form. Each of these forms had a distinct individuality. They were represented side by side in long rows of statues or reliefs, or else were enumerated in extensive lists.

So far as a deity was not compelled by incantations to abide in a particular place in order to serve the purposes of the person casting the spell, the choice amongst the various available forms of incarnation lay with the deity himself. By means of certain spells, a dead man, being endowed with magical powers, could, after his resurrection to life, avail himself of existing embodiments or not, having the power to assume whatever forms he liked, as that of a bird, a serpent, a crocodile, the god Ptah, etc., and was subject to no compulsion in the matter.

What we find here is not mesmerism, but the capacity of the dead to incarnate themselves as they willed. The number of possible transformations was unlimited; but these were merely a selection of peculiarly important forms, and by no means exhaust the series. The fact that a belief in the regular twelve transformations is brought into relation with the twelve hours of the day by the selection of one of distinctiveness to the subsidiary figures, and this selection in fact attempts to reduce the forms to a scheme. But the arrangement of the religious chapters in the Book of the Dead shows no uniformity, and the forms given in that text are not exhaustive, while such a relation between forms and hours is nowhere else referred to.

The dead might also assume a human form. Thus, in the first tale of Setna, Ahura becomes incarnate in Tabubu, and Neferkaptah in an old man. In this narrative, indeed, even the pieces of a game have incarnations as the fifty-two human.
incarnation of Tabubu. 1 The same text tells us that Ahure and her child Meray lay buried in the tomb, and yet that they reposed in the tomb of the husband and father. They declare that their mummies should likewise be brought to the tomb—a desire all the more natural because the mummy was regarded as the principal form in which the dead became incarnate; it was a vesture which he could resign for life, and in which he could once more move about.

The mummy was subject to bodily needs, and the more remarkable in this respect, the more the gods depicted as conveying bread and water to it through the shaft of the tomb. 2 Of equal importance with the mummy were the statues, 3 which in the Old Kingdom were erected in the serdab, and sometimes in the chamber of worship; in later times mainly in the latter. They were sometimes given a place in the temple, 4 where, being near the gods, they could more naturally look for a share in the sacrificial gifts than in a tomb situated at a distance. In particular, statues were placed in temples by kings as marks of special distinction for men of merit. 5

The dead man, moreover, had a singular power of incarnation in relation to the relics in his tomb. When he uttered his magic formula, the incidents portrayed in the reliefs became real. He incarnated himself in his own figure, and at the same time conveyed the other persons and the animals and things depicted in the relief to the body of his followers, and to perform the actions represented. 6 To the same mode of thought belonged the notion that a magician could by means of spells change the wax figures to their living image, and vice versa.

If befuddled men could thus become incarnate in so great a variety of forms, there can be no doubt that the same capacity was assigned to the gods also, and that they, too, had figures which were figures of the forms usually or possibly assumed by the individual deities, or of the magic formula employed by them in order to assume such incarnations.

Of more importance among the forms of incarnation resorted to by the gods were the sacred animals. This idea was not indigenous to Egypt. The god-animals were originally the independent deities of the primitive inhabitants. The normally anthropomorphic and spiritually conceived deities introduced into the country during the Naqada period by the invading and conquering peoples were brought into relation with the old indigenous objects by identifying a conquering tribe that settled in a particular locality was declared to be identical with the sacred animal hitherto worshipped there, and the latter was thereby transformed into a manifestation of the former. 7 But the deity did not thereby surrender his independent existence. Thus we find, besides the Ptah incarnate in Apis, the god Ptah; and, besides the ram, the god Ammon. In these identifications of deity and animal, no attention was paid to possible differences in the distinctive properties of the associated pair, and this inherent disparity, as we might expect, permanently stood in the way of a real fusion between the primitive and the incarnate deity. Even when the similarity of the two was more marked, as in the case of the hawk of Horus and the sun-god, they still maintained a mutually independent existence. The incarnation, in fact, added a fresh and independent by-form to the deity, but the distinct individuality of the latter remained as before.

These ideas emanate directly from the Egyptian conception of what is involved in personality. Man was not in himself an integral unity, nor, by analogy, was any other existent being. Each individual existence was rather a mosaic-like complex of various severally independent constituents which merely happened to be conjoined in a particular body, but was not in its own being dependent upon that body or its continued existence. Thus, in the individual human personality there were, besides the body, the various constituents of the soul—the ba, the bs, the sbem, etc.—which, while conjoined in the man during life, first attained complete independence after death, each of them then repairing to the world beyond in order that, according to the Osirian doctrine of immortality, it might, as a result of the judgment before Osiris, be once more united with the rest in the personality so restored in the realm of the dead. In beings of a higher rank, such as kings and gods, the partition of the soul was carried still further. There they had not simply two but three and even four souls, each of and each in these the various attributes combined in the divine person were at a later date supposed to be severally incarnated. 8

A crucial instance is that of the divine embodiment of these elements is found in the idea that the divinity of the king might be detached even from himself. In this case the divine personality is figured as a man being a general resemblance to the earthly ruler, but sometimes it wears other crowns besides his, and it seldom has even the hawk's head corresponding to the hawk-soul of the Pharaoh. It receives sacrificial offerings from the king himself, and bestows upon him heavenly gifts. 9 The proper divinity of the Pharaoh is embodied in this figure, but such disembogagement of a part of the monarch's personality in no way diminishes his own actual existence. A supporting king remains in himself complete, and is in no sense merely a partial or fragmentary being.

The bs of the Pharaoh is often represented as a little-child—less frequently as a griffin—on a staff, which he holds in his hand and on which, bearing the royal bs-name on his head, and carrying the royal symbols. It sometimes appears also as the human head to the inscription of the bs-name, furnished with arms in order to hold the symbols. 10 Here the incarnation of the sc-element in a hieroglyphic expression is of a different signification. The bs-name is a prerogative of life, power, stability, etc., of the king are embodied in the hieroglyphs for ‘life,’ ‘power,’ ‘stability,’ etc., which are here fitted with arms and legs, and carry symbols of the monarch. 11

Further, attributes which seem to pure abstraction were regarded as becoming incarnate, e.g., the divine protection, which was embodied in the blood of Isis, and is represented by the knot-smulet tft. This amulet likewise is fitted with hands, 12 or, in some instances, with


a head. Similarly, incarnate forms of various senses and ideas, as taste and feeling, hearing and sight, year, eternity, infinity, joy, love and friendship, etc., are met with as deities to whom homage is paid, and who, therefore, expected to manifest an individual activity in favor of the suppliant. Of such forms the most frequent was the tree; in the life of the goddess—of which the Saat was worshipped in a number of temples as a woman with the symbol for ‘truth’ upon her head. Further, the particular truth which dwelt in a particular man or deity could become incarnate in a similar scene, and this type of truth might be eaten or drunk, while the king might offer it to the deity.

The possible co-existence of a number of individually distinct entities in one being which yet maintained an existence independent of them is seen also in a curious conception of the royal person. The Pharaoh comprised in himself the kings of Upper and of Lower Egypt, each of whom retained his own individuality. The monarch not only bore the titles and dignities that severally belonged to the two provinces, and had a double home, in the temples of each province, he also offered two distinct sacrifices, and was not in some instances and two tombs, which, as it would seem, belonged severally to the king of Upper and the king of Lower Egypt.

When first regarded as of divine origin, and even as a god. In this aspect, however, he was not merely the incarnate form of a particular deity, but was a new addition to the pantheon—once a human being born of a human mother, lived as a man amongst men, and yet could associate with the other gods on a footing of perfect equality. At death he discarded his purely human form, and was not completely to surrender his human nature. In the earlier period, he was supposed to eat the older gods, thereby acquiring their peculiar qualities, and so becoming the supreme deity. In later times the process of complete deification after death, by which he became a kind of Osiris, is not depicted in detail.

The Pharaoh owed his divine nature to his having been begotten by a god—Apollo, which is often brought clearly before us. When the procreation of a new deity had been resolved upon by the higher powers, the god Ra or Amun-Heru was born to the wife of an ordinary Egyptian king, and the queen was enthroned in the palace. He revealed to her his divine character; he loved and suffused her person, and he begot the coming ruler, and decided what his name should be. So far, however, the god had implanted in the mother only the divine element of the son, and then adorned the god Khnum with the form of the child’s body, and accordingly that deity fashioned the body of the future ruler, as also that of his ka, which was of like shape with himself, upon the potter’s wheel, while he became a god. The king, therefore, was born in the presence of, and with the aid of, various gods and goddesses.

The circumstance that, when the god begot the child, only the divine element of the latter was created enabled us to understand why occasionally not merely a single deity was impleaded in the act, but why all the gods might claim to have begotten the Pharaoh, and to exist in him. To the purely concrete mode of thought characteristic of the Egyptians such an infusion of deity could be most simply represented after the manner of a procreation. It was only in respect of this divine element, and not in respect of the whole divine personality, that the god became incarnate in the king.

That a mere particle of divinity sufficed to make the newly created king a partial incarnation and a divine person is also implied in the myth of Ra and Isis. Here Isis kneads earth with the spittle of the sun-god, and forms a serpent, which is received by the spittle, may be a source of danger to the god himself. The same idea is found in an extant legend from the XIth dynasty, in which Isis tries to secure a portion of the seed of Seth as a means of gaining power over him. In such instances the implanted particle of deity does not always carry with it the entire range of the divine nature as an incarnation in another being. Sometimes, indeed, it is only a particular attribute that is transferred in this way. Thus the man who sucks the milk of a goddess or a sacred cow absorbs thereby, not her entire divine ego, but only her inherent immortality.

The choice of the reigning monarch’s figure for the act of procreation was determined by the fact that the god, on other occasions of his intercourse as an incarnate being with the king, chose a form which corresponded externally to that of the Pharaoh then upon the throne. Inasmuch as the two homologous figures both existed at the same time, it is clear that the deity did not become incarnate in the king as a whole independent figure of similar appearance. This figure might be designated by a special name, which applied both to the deity and to the reigning king. Thus we read of the Amun of Ramses II, the Sech of Sahur, etc. When a monument, and especially a temple or chapel, was founded, not by a king, but by a private individual, the latter was, equally with the king, regarded as the creator of a new divinity. Thus, e.g., in the reign of Ramses II, worship is said to have been accorded, 1 The ka and its relation to the man have been discussed most recently—with references to earlier works—by Maspero, in Tefnion, vi. (1902) 133 ff.

2 Naville, op. cit. ii. p. 63; Gayet, op. cit. p. 66. On the life-giving frud-deities of Egypt, cf. A. Jacoby and W. Spieritz, in der Schriften, vi. (1902) 153 ff., which (1804) 485 ff., in the same way as the kernel of a nut is germinated, a related idea that frud might be generated from the slime of the Nile, Wiedemann, in OEG XIII. 1889, p. 4; cf. Wiedemann, in Schriften, xiv. (1911) 80 ff.

3 Maspero, in Am Origen, iii. (1902) 208 ff.


5 Cf. the text given by L. H. Metthew in Mittelländischen der deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft, no. xxvii. (Aug. 1898) 59 ff.; Bruckel, Reueln de monumentes égyptiens, i. (Leipzig, 1898), p. 6, 63 ff.
not only to the Ptah of Ramses himself, but also to the Ptah of a certain Menma 1.

Besides real incarnations, however, considerable interest attaches in Egypt to pseudo-incarnations. The adept in magic, when uttering his spells, frequently claimed to be a particular deity, and as such was held in awe. At the same time he threatened the powers that resisted him. 2 It need not be supposed that he actually believed himself to be the god in question, but he was at all events convinced that such a claim would make an impression upon other gods. By way of making the thing more emphatic, the adept in some cases had the name of the particular deity inscribed upon his person. From similar motives the names of Isis and Nephthys respectively were inscribed upon the bodies of the two principal female mourners who recited the dirges in mourning celebrations, and effected the resurrection of the dead person by sympathetic magic. 3 Whether in early times masks of the gods likewise were employed with a view to a more complete identification cannot be decided by the extant records, but the practice is attested in connexion with the cult of Isis in the Hellenistic period, and may well go back to earlier usage.

Again, the glorified dead 4 and the gods might assume the forms of other deities. Thus Isis took the form of a serpent; Harmachis, of a bull or other animal that was sacred to Apis, in order to reach the city of Apis un molested. 5 In this case the incarnation was effected, not in the sacred cow and the Apis bull themselves, but in figures resembling them, and so, of course, commanding a like degree of respect. The story in which Batau is said to have assumed the form of a bull with all the beautiful symbols in its body, and thus to have identified himself with the sacred bull—though it was reality it was not such 6—must be interpreted in the same way. This text also shows the vast variety of possible metamorphoses which the highest might assume in their incarnations. When the bull had been slaughtered, Batau caused two trees to arise from the drops of its blood, and in these he then took up his abode. From the trees, again, he passed, in the form of a swan, into the body of a woman. She became pregnant, and the child she brought forth was his final form of incarnation, i.e. Batau himself. In most cases a particle of the being incarnating himself was implanted in his new form. The most that he adopted, though, as we have seen, this was not absolutely necessary. But certainly the Egyptians, with their concrete habit of thought, persistently sought to invest all beings with a tangible and material form. If the gods, or the dead, or any other entities were to endure and to eviscere their power, they could do so only by means of an incarnate form.

Literature.—There is as yet no monograph on the Egyptian ideas of incarnation. Apart from the passages cited in the article, we have in modern literature nothing to fall back upon. 1 2 3

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1 See a writing-paletine in Berlin, no. 6764. The omission of the carious and the mode of writing the name Menma show that it is not the reference here is not, as Kuno Franke, "Das berühmte Schriftenpapier der Isis und Rahotep" (1907), p. 34, would suggest; to Kung Mena, but to a private individual, perhaps that charioteer of Ramses II. of whom we read in the Ptolemaic Papyri.


4 Attested as early as the time of the Pyramid of Pepi I., in which an ethereal kind of divinity is mentioned, p. 116.


upon every Hellen. All Greek philosophers claimed to be descended from Asclepius, and so from Apollo; and on the same lines Socrates is made playfully to argue in the Euthyphro (11 C) that all sculptures were descended from Dedalus, and so from Hephaestus.

But love was not the only motive which induced divine beings to take human flesh upon them. It was anger at the gods that drove Demeter to leave the earth and incarnate herself as a woman. It was to gratify her boy, Perseus, Heracles that Hera assumed the form of an Amazon. Occasionally, however, it is the censorship of human morals that is the operating motive. Thus it was to test the insolenice of Leomedon that Apollo and Poseidon assumed the form of men; and the great Zeus himself came to earth in the likeness of a working man (Apollo, ill. 98, εκατστείρι ἁρπή γετώρ!), in order to make trial of Lycoaes and his fifty sons, who excelled all men in impiety. The same motive underlies the well-known story of Baudis and Philemon, which has been immortalized by the genius of Ovid, and we know from Herodotus (vii. 69) that the belief was entertained that the gods came to earth in the likeness of men to take note of human conduct. That is the highest moral use that is made of the idea of incarnation in pagan mythology.

The idea of divine birth appears now and then among the Greeks even in historical times. Plato, after he had achieved immortality for his writings, was proud to say that he had been the son of Apollo. He is the only philosopher who has attained the honour of a birth-story. The Spartan king Demaratus, we are told by Herodotus (vi. 69), was declared by his mother to have been the son of the hero Aetes. But there was a malicious counter-statement that the supposed hero was really the donkey-driver. Alexander the Great was believed even in his own lifetime to have been the son of Ammon; and there is a story told by Plutarch (Alex. 3) that the reason for the loss of Philip's eye was that he had peeped through the keyhole of his wife's chamber, and had seen the god in the form of a serpent entwined about her couch. The birth-story of Romulus and Remus is an echo of many similar tales in Greek mythology.

INCARNATION (Indian).—The tenet of incarnation (avatāra) is a fundamental one in medieval and modern Hindu religion as taught in the Purāṇas, the Vedānta, and the Sāṅgīma works; it is so essentially with the Vājñitutes, the greater number of whom worship either Rāma or Kṛṣṇa, the two last incarnations of Viṣṇu, not god in his proper form; the reverse holds good with Siva, who is adored as such, or under one of his various forms which cannot be properly called incarnations. We must, therefore, examine the incarnations of Viṣṇu in order to comprehend the nature of incarnation as conceived in India, and to form an idea concerning the origin and development of the complex body of beliefs on the subject.

The theory of the incarnations of Viṣṇu presupposes an idea of the nature of the world, the god incarnates himself for the purpose of protecting it. This is expressed in two most quoted verses of the Bhagavadgīti (v. 75):

"Whenever there is an increase of iniquity, then I put forth myself (in a new birth).

For the destruction of the pious and for the destruction of the evil,

For the establishment of the Law I am born in every age."

Originally, therefore, the number of these appearances or births of the Lord is regarded as indefinite; but theological speculation tended not only to fix the number of incarnations, but also to define more clearly their relation to the Supreme God. This can be seen from the account of the incarnations in the Bhagavadgīti itself.

It commences with a verse made up of the beginning and the slightly altered end of the passage from the Bhagavadgīti just quoted:

"Whenever there is a decrease of dharma, then the Lord appears for the establishment of the Law."

And it continues:

"One form of him, the best one, for ever in later and encouraging pacts (Nāsaṇa seems to be intended), the second (form) is gone to sleep on his couch, for the destruction and creation of beings, meditating on his mysterious self; who after sleeping a thousand sons becomes manifest for the purpose of smiting at the end of a thousand years, as the god of gods, the Lord of the world (Viṣṇu)." Then some of his incarnations are related, the last of which—that of Kalki—being designated as the tenth (v. 298), proves that the prophecy of his incarnations amounted to ten, as in later times. It is worthy of note that in this place the incarnations are called prakṛtivākṣaṇa, 'manifestation,' and not avatāra, which has since been termed the modern term; thus it is usual to speak of the ten avatāras of Viṣṇu. According to the common belief these are: (1) Fish, (2) Tortoise, (3) Boar, (4) Man-lion, (5) Dwar, (6) Pāsurasūri, (7) Rāma, (8) Kṛṣṇa, (9) Buddha, and (10) Kalki, whose incarnation is still to come.¹

Now, if we examine the various incarnations of Viṣṇu, we shall find that they fall into several groups. First the Vāmana, or Dwarf incarnation is a legend developed from a mythical feat of Viṣṇu frequently mentioned in the Rgveda, viz. the three strides with which he measured the three worlds. Secondly, the Kārṇa, or Tortoise, and the Varaha, or Bear, incarnations ascribable to him dochs which originally were believed to have been performed by Prajapati the Creator (see Satapatha Brahmana, vii. i. 5, 1; Tatātirya Śāstrasā, vii. ii. 42; Tatātirya Aranyak, i. 19; and Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. i. 2, 11). Prajapati is frequently represented as taking one form or other for some special purpose; in our case the reason of his being assumed to have taken the form of a tortoise is not clear, but that of a boar may have been that his primitive worship had been of a theriomorphic character, at least with some classes of the people. When Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu) became the Supreme God, the Creator (see Purāṇa and the Brāhmaṇa, etc.) ²

¹The incarnations (prakṛtivākṣaṇa) are said to number ten, according to Harivaṃśa (loc. cit.). They are: (1) Varaha, (2) Man-lion, (3) Dwarf, (4) Dattatreya, (5) Pāsurasūri, (6) Pārashu, (7) Kṛṣṇa, (8) Buddha, (9) Kalki, which, as stated in the text, is called the tenth. In the Skitīparvan of the Mahābhārata (coxeax, 106-1299, etc.) the following incarnations (prakṛtivākṣaṇa) are enumerated: (1) Badha, (2) Tortoise, (3) Fish, (4) Boar, (5) Dwar, (6) Varaha, (7) Rāma, (8) Kṛṣṇa, (9) Buddha, and (10) Kalki. The Bhagavadgīti (loc. cit.) speaks of the 'many births' (samsāra) of the god; the Mahābhārata, Vaisākha, vii. 387, of the thousands of his manifestations (prakṛtivākṣaṇa). Of the account in the Mārāṇā and Bhagavata Purāṇas, etc. (Orig. and Prep. Texts, B.G. 1.37-41). ²Viṣṇu's incarnations are then enumerated (Mārāṇa Purāṇa, xiv. 199-204, etc.), viz. (1) a portion of him spring from Dharmas, (2) the Narasīha, or Man-lion, and (3) the Dwar, incarnations, which are called the celestial manifestations (mahākāl), the remaining seven being those of his incarnations, or, as his in the Kuria's curse. These seven are: (4) the Dattatreya, (5) Manthārya, (6) Pāsurasūri, (7) Kṛṣṇa, (8) Dharmasya, (9) Buddha, and (10) Kalki incarnations. (Eight instead of seven) seven and eight, except with the Maratha expounder, we understand the beginning of verse 243 to refer to Kṛṣṇa. The Purāṇa gives twenty-two incarnations (i. ili. 19), viz. those in the forms of (1) Purāṇa, (2) Varaha, or the Boar, (3) Kṛṣṇa, (4) Narasīha, (5) Kapila, (6) Dattatreya, (7) Kṛṣṇa, (8) Rāma, (9) Kṛṣṇa, (10) Varaha, (11) Kṛṣṇa, Rāma, or the Boar, (12) Kṛṣṇa, or the Tortoise, (13) Kṛṣṇa, or the Dwar, (14) Kṛṣṇa, or the Pāsurasūri, (15) Vāmana, or the Dwarf, (16) Purāṇa, (17) Yedaśya, (18) Dharmasya, (19) Kṛṣṇa, and (20) Kalki. The last two are represented as the exterminators of the incarnations (avatāra) of Viṣṇu are immemorial, like the riverine trees sawing an incalculable length of time, Mārāṇa gods, sons of Marus, Prajapatis are all portions of him. ³
and Lord of the world, he stepped into the place of Prajapati, the Creator in the period of the Brāhmaṇas, and the deeds of Prajapati were transferred to Viṣṇu. In this class of incarnations we may reckon, besides the Tortoise and Boar incarnations (which are the two Fish, incarnation, which refers to the legend of Manu's being saved by a fish during the Deluge; for that fish, according to the later version of the story in the Agni Purāṇa, reveals himself as the Boar incarnation), the Man-lion, stands by itself, or might be ranged with the Dwarf incarnation; it refers to a popular legend of Viṣṇu killing, in the form of a Man-lion, the demon Hiranyakashipa—a legend which is once alluded to in the Vedic literature, viz. Taśṭhillikā Aranyaka, X. i. 6.

The remaining three incarnations, viz. those of Parāśurāma, of Rāma Dasaśarmā, and of Kṛṣṇa, have this in common, that those heroes had originally no connexion with Viṣṇu. The story of Parāśurāma, as told in the Mahābhārata (III. 115 ff., X. 40), has no reference to Viṣṇu, but the first book of the Rāmāyaṇa, which is a later addition to that epic, contains a story more histrionic than the other, i.e., the story on which the hero was in possession of Viṣṇu's bow and met the young Rāma, so that he could eagerly subdue him; but the latter, who had already broken Siva's bow, now bent Viṣṇu's bow and subdued Parāśurāma. This story, apparently a late addition, is by no means the legendary tradition that holds Rāma are incarnations of Viṣṇu, since then the god would humiliate himself by fighting with another god and losing. It appears that Parāśurāma had, in popular tales, been brought into some connexion with Viṣṇu; and this circumstance, together with the name Rāma, which he shares with the seven famous Man-lion incarnations of Viṣṇu, may have facilitated his reception in the series of incarnations of that god. He was recognized as such at the time of the redaction of the present text of the Mahābhārata (see note on p. 1209), and thus in the introduction of his story there (III. 115) a confused passage is included (v. 30-40) in order to make allowance for the current belief.

The incarnations with which we have dealt seem merely to have been set up by theological speculators rather than to have constituted part of a general and popular belief. It is different, however, with the two next incarnations, those of Rāma and Kṛṣṇa. They are the only ones which have any practical importance in the religion of India; for, as stated above, their worshippers form a considerable part of the Hindus and the great majority of Viṣṇu-worshippers. Hence it will be necessary to enter into more details with regard to these two avatāras. According to the unanimous belief of the Hindus, Rāma came long before Kṛṣṇa, the former at the end of the Treta, the latter at the end of the Dvāpara Yuga. The reason of this belief is, no doubt, the fact that the Rāmāyaṇa, which celebrates the life and deeds of Rāma, does not mention Kṛṣṇa, while, on the other hand, the Mahābhārata, in which Kṛṣṇa plays a most important part, not only frequently mentions Rāma and the other heroes of the Rāmāyaṇa as belonging to a past age, but also relates his adventure in a lengthy episode (Bāmeśpāñkhāyaṇa).

In the case of Rāma we seem to watch an incarnation in the making, for in the original parts of the Rāmāyaṇa, viz. bks. ii.-vi., the poet regards his hero as essentially human, and seems entirely to have left the godly side of him out of sight. The latter, however, is fully acknowledged in bks. i. and vii., which by common consent of all critics are declared to be later additions. Therefore between the composition of the original work and the addition of these later parts the belief that Rāma is an incarnation of Viṣṇu must have arisen and have gained universal assent. Before that time Rāma had been an epic hero, but the Rāmāyaṇa, without making him in any way less a human being, has made him immensely popular. Since the poet has described him as the best of men, the most dutiful son and loving husband, as possessed of every virtue, in short, as a model of morality, he became the favourite of the people at large and so the subject of veneration. There is still another cause for Rāma's promotion to divine rank. His adventures are of such a wonderful character that he certainly appears more than a common mortal; he associates with superhuman beings represented as monkeys and bears, he undertakes an expedition against Lanka over one hundred yojanas of sea, fights and vanquishes the demon race of the Hīkṣṇas, etc. Thus it is not difficult to imagine that the epic hero became a popular god, and that in order to account for his divine dignity, notwithstanding his human character, he came to be regarded as one of the divisions of the highest god—as an incarnation of Viṣṇu.

This belief has a popular as well as a speculative side. The latter is determined by the ideas about Brahmā, the creator god, and by the identification of Rāma with the Navārāṇī. It is the belief that viṣṇu-vanquishes all of the seven famous Man-lion incarnations of Viṣṇu, may have facilitated his reception in the series of incarnations of that god. He was recognized as such at the time of the redaction of the present text of the Mahābhārata (see note on p. 1209), and thus in the introduction of his story there (III. 115) a confused passage is included (v. 30-40) in order to make allowance for the current belief.

The godly side of the belief in the incarnation of Viṣṇu is to some extent founded on that god's popular character as destroyer of demons (dā ṣīvyā); Viṣṇu vanquishes all of the seven famous Man-lion incarnations of Viṣṇu, may have facilitated his reception in the series of incarnations of that god. He was recognized as such at the time of the redaction of the present text of the Mahābhārata (see note on p. 1209), and thus in the introduction of his story there (III. 115) a confused passage is included (v. 30-40) in order to make allowance for the current belief.

The function, ascribed to some minor deity, becomes the bond that connects him with Viṣṇu in popular opinion. The idea of manifestation is here carried beyond the grasp of the mind of the people; they required a more matter link between the god and his incarnation. In fables and epic poetry the connexion of a hero with a god is usually accounted for by a myth relating how the god begets the hero in question with some giri or womán; the hero is the offspring of the god. This relation did perhaps savour of illegitimacy; at any rate, it was not assumed in the case of the highest god and his manifestations, but was replaced by one of a mere mystical character. The story about Viṣṇu's incarnation in Rāma is told in the Rāmāyaṇa, i. 15 ff.

The gods complain to Brahmā about the oppression and violence of the Kālikas Bāvāka, on whom he had conferred the boon that he could not be killed by a god. He was slain by a man, Viṣṇu consents to be born as such in the persons of the four sons of King Dasaratha by his three wives. When that king celebrated his birthday, and sacrificed to the gods, Viṣṇu appears in the sacrificial fire and gives Dasaratha a big vessel filled with divine sacrificial food (jaṭāyus) which he enjoins him to divide among his wives. Kāralīphe goes half of the portion, and Nārāyaṇa and Kauśika the remaining part, but in unequal portions. In due time all the three queens are delivered of sons, Kāralīphe of Rāma, Nārāyaṇa of Lakṣmana and Nārāyaṇa, and Kauśika of Sītā. In accordance with this story, the incarnation of Viṣṇu is not of the same degree in all four sons; but his essence is present to a greater degree in Rāma than in his brothers. Probably Rāma alone was originally considered an incarnation, and his brothers were only later, through their connexion with him, regarded as partial incarnations. By a similar process the wife of Rāma, Sītā, came to be regarded as an incarnation. The gods, however, are apparently

1 In the original story on which Viṣṇu based his epic, the character of Rāma is much less prominent than in the present; the original poem Rāma had been asserted to be Nārāyaṇa, no such passage as the above occurs in the original, but it would be surprising if the author of the original work had deferred till the end mention of the fact that the hero is no other than the highest god. It may be noted that the whole of this passage in this epic is which we meet with a name of Kṛṣṇa.

2 The same story is told in different Purāṇas and other works; but there is no agreement regarding the proportion of the several parts of the passage given to the four sons of Viṣṇu's wife.

the outcome of theological speculations, not of popular belief.

The remarkable change in Rama's position from an epic hero to an incarnation of Visnu, which, as stated above, took place between the redaction of the original Ramayana and the addition of the first and last books, does not appear to be the result of a slow development of religious ideas, but seems to have been caused by the application to him of a theory of incarnation already fully established. In other words, it is not likely that the theory of incarnation was first suggested by the story of Rama; in all probability there was already another similar incarnation of Visnu acknowledged by the people of India. This must have been his incarnation as Kršna, since the preceding incarnations, as appears from our remarks on them, seem to have had little importance as far as popular religion was concerned. In the opinion of the present writer, the widespread worship of Kršna as a tribal hero and demi-god, and his subsequent identification with Nārāyana, the Supreme Lord of creation in that period, gave birth to the theory of incarnation, not as a philosophical speculation of learned mythologists and theologians, but as the great principle pervading and upholding a popular religion. The recognition of Visnu in this sense prevailed in India probably centuries before the beginning of our era, while Rāmāyaṇa, so popular from the 10th cent. A.D. downwards, is a comparatively late development. The incarnation of Kršna is, therefore, the most important one for the elucidation of the problem under discussion—the origin and the development of the theory of incarnation.

The identity of Kršna and Viṣṇu (or Nārāyana) is generally acknowledged in the principal sources of the history of his life and deeds, viz., the Mahābhārata, Harivamsa, and the Purāṇas. References to him in the literature which precedes the redaction of our text of the Mahābhārata are few and short; but they are of the highest interest, and therefore deserve to be examined with great care. In these ancient allusions to Kršna we must distinguish between the names Vāsudeva and Kršna, though in historical times they denote the same person. Vāsudeva is mentioned first in the Taittirīya Aryanukta, X. 1. 6, as a god together with Nārāyana and Viṣṇu, apparently as mystically connected with the worship of the bull. The text next meets us with this name in Pāpīni, IV. iii. 98, where the word of the śloka and the context in which it stands indicate that Pāpīni regarded him not as a Rājput, but as one of the three prominent gods of his time.2

Kršna's name occurs first in the Chidāṃsakya Upanishad, III. xvii. 6, where it is said that Gbharāṅgira imparted a particular piece of secret knowledge to Kršna, the son of Devaki. Here, then, Kršna is still regarded as a man and not as a god. But in a verse quoted in two late Upaniṣads, the Nārāyaṇāthasavitaras and the Atmahodaka Upaniṣad, he, the son of Devaki, is mentioned together with Madhumādana (= Viṣṇu) as having the attribute brhmāṃya; whatever that word meant in this connexion, it is evident that the son of Devaki is here regarded as equal to Viṣṇu, or at least as his equal. The testimony advanced seems to warrant the assumption that when the Vedic period drew towards its end, Vāsudeva was considered an equal of Nārāyana and Viṣṇu, but that Kršna, the son of Devaki, was still regarded in the same way.

The question, then, is this: did Pāpīni not regard Vāsudeva as a Kṣaṇini in the usual sense of the word, since he then would fall under the rule in the next section of the text? Vāsudeva, according to Pāpīni's own rule (cf. III. 55), according to which Arjuna should be regarded as a Kṣaṇini, is an old man, and the invention of the word, if the order in the compound was apparently occupied by Pāpīni's own, is unlikely. Vāsudeva, according to Arjuna, abhīṣṇa, though the rule which assigns the first place to the last member of a compound abhīṣṇa was first given by Kṛśṇa, his successor (cf. III. 24, śūrti 4).

the Vedic period as a wise man inquiring into the highest truth, and only at some later time was he put on an equality with Viṣṇu. We conclude that Vāsudeva, the god, and Kršna, the sage, were originally different from one another, and only afterwards became, by a syncretism of beliefs, one deity, thus giving rise to or bringing to perfection, a theory of incarnation.

Vāsudeva is unanimously explained by all Indian writers as a patrónymic of Vāsudeva, his father according to the epic narrative, but Baladeva, who is likewise reputed a son of Vāsudeva, is never called Vāsudeva. Besides, an old variant of Vāsudeva, noticed by lexicographers and used by Bṛhaspati in the Daśāstvya, v. 6, is Vāsuvhādra, a form which recalls the name of another popular deity, Manibhadra, king of the Yaksas.

Now, as Manibhadra is also spelt Manibhadra (Manibhadra in Jaina-prakrit), and Nārāyaṇa Nārāyaṇa, by an inerter also in the first syllable, so Vāsudeva and Vāsuvhādra seem to have been forms, perhaps popular, of Vāsudeva and Vāsuvhādra—names directly derived from sanskrit, denoting either 'wealth, riches, the gods of that name. If this etymology of Vāsudeva is right, we must assume that the story of his being the son of a knight Vāsudeva and the name of his father have been developed from his very name. But in support of this opinion it may be said that the oldest tradition does not mention Kršna's father, but his mother, calling him the son of Devaki.

If the narrative of Kršna is more closely examined, we find indications that two different persons, a god and a man, are combined in him. For the story seems naturally divided into two distinctive parts: the first, according to the life among the cowherds as foster-child of Nandā; and the second, covering the rest of his life, relates his adventures as the leader of the clan of the Viṣṇus, and his alliance with the Pandavas, especially with Arjuna. In the former part it is easy to recognize him as a cowherd-god (Gowinta, the cow-herder), and in the latter, as a Rājput hero. As infant, child, and youth, he worked many wonders, destroying demons and chariot, and mostly in company with Baladeva, his brother, who is also called Rāma and Bāhāra, 'he with the plough,' or Bahlukas, 'he with the weapon, his plough.' Now, Baladeva too was a popular god—husbandman, as his plough proves. He is called Bahluka, the son of Rohini, but the story is that he was conceived by Devaki and afterwards transferred to the womb of Rohini.3 This story is apparently invented in order to make his brother of Kršna; probably the two names Gowinta-Vāsudeva and Baladeva4 were closely connected, and, after the former was identified with the tribal god, the latter came to be regarded as his brother. They are always found together till Kršna has slain Karna and placed Gandiva on the throne of Mathura. Henceforth he appears as the tribal god of the Yadavas; he is their leader in all important events in their history, he defends their country from their enemies, and when resistance seems hopeless he leads the tribe of the Yadavas to the shore of the western ocean; there he builds Dwārakā, the new capital of the Yadavas. He enters into an alliance with the Pandavas, and with their help overcomes his great enemy Jarasandha, king of Mekhaṇa; and as a child, the latter's general Śatāsikha, king of Āchala. He took part in the tribal feasts of the Yadavas, and at last witnessed their ruin and the destruction of Dwārakā. His death was occasioned by the hunter Jaraś (old age), who mistook him for an antelope and pierced his foot with an arrow. The most outstanding characteristic of this story seems to prove that it has been the subject of an epic or a cycle of epic songs. This epic must have been current among the Yadavas, the Bhājaj race which revered Kršna as its tribal hero: and, as the numerous clans of the Yadavas were settled in Northern India, the assumed epic must have had a wide circulation. The original, if ever they were written down, have been lost, but the matter they contained has been preserved in the Bhājaj poems and some Purāṇas. Their great popularity in so large a part of India seems to have been the cause either of it having, by an epic syncretism to be observed in other literature, been introduced into the national epic of the Bhājaj, where he appears as the friend and counselor of the Pandavas.

Now in the Mahābhārata, the Harivamsa, and the Purāṇas the poets take every opportunity of

1 Taittirīya Aranyaka, x. 1. 7.
2 A similar transfer of an embryo is told by the śvetāśrama Jaina of Mahāvīra, who was born from the womb of Devasiniva to that of Tritakī.
3 Notice the similarity of the names Vāsudeva and Baladeva, and of their variants Vāsuvhādra and Balabhadra.
INCARNATION (Indian)

...as the highest god is that of the Pāścharastras or Bāhuvaras. The oldest account of it is contained in the Nārāyaṇya section of the Mahābhārata (xii. 334-351).

There the Pāścharastra is represented as an independent religion professed by a section of the Śāvetu and Sāvāta religion (cvi. viii. 53, 54, 55); and Vasu Upanishads, who was a follower of that religion, is spoken of as having the same title as the Śāvetu god according to the Sāvāta manner (vi. 12) which was revealed in the beginning of the Sun (vi. cxxix. 19, 54).

It appears from the above quotations that the new religion was not a tribal religion confessed by the Śāvetas. Now, the Sāvātas are an important section of the Yādava race; thus we see that the religion which recognised Kṛṣṇa as the Supreme God was originated in that race to which Kṛṣṇa belonged. On this supposition we can understand that Vasudeva-Kṛṣṇa is not found in the落到阿甘 or the early Buddhist writings; for these works belong to Eastern India and the home of the Yādavas was Northern and Western India. (3) Some indications of the character of the religion professed by Kṛṣṇa may be found in the Mahābhārata Upanīṣads. There (vi. 10) the human life is described under the form of a तोमा-sacrifice, the natural functions—eating, drinking, etc.—are interpreted as elements of the sacrifice, and the cardinal virtues as the reward (जित्यांत). Then the text goes on:

This theory seems scarcely tenable for a very weighty reason: the deeds and adventures of Kṛṣṇa related by the authors of the great epic and the Purāṇas are essentially those of a warrior and a Rājput chief, and these are none which show him in the light of a founder of a religion. All that may safely be conceded, as a surmise, is that this Rājput chief, like some other kings of Upanīṣad renown, took a great interest in the highest theological questions, and thus gave an impetus to the formation of a new religion. Bhandarkar proposes an alternative theory:

"Or, perhaps, it is possible that Vasudeva was a famous prince of the Śāvarta race and on his death was divinised and worshiped by his clan; and a body of doctrines grew up in connexion with that divinity and the religion spread from clan to other clanes of the Indian people."

This theory is, in the opinion of the present writer, more probable than the former, but it requires some alteration. We must keep in mind three significant points. (1) Vasudeva seems to have been regarded originally as a god and as descended from Kṛṣṇa; for, besides the general reasons adduced above, there is an interesting story related in the Sabhāparvan of the Mahābhārata (i. 14) in connexion with the history of Jāraśaadha, Pāndavas, king of the Bāghas, Pūrṇaras, and Kṛṣṇa, pretended and was believed to be Puru-śottama (i.e. Viṣṇu); he was known under the name Vasudeva, and had assumed the emblems of Kṛṣṇa. In the Harivasistha and several Purāṇas, his conflict with and destruction by Kṛṣṇa are related at some length. Now, whatever facts, if any, may underlie this legend, it is obvious that it could not have been invented unless at that time the dignity of Vasudeva was not thought inseparable from the person of Kṛṣṇa; or, in other words, Vasudeva was still regarded as an independent deity, probably a form of Viṣṇu. (2) A religious sect was formed on the worship of Vasudeva-Kṛṣṇa. (3) A good account of the opinions put forward by various writers on this problem is given by Richard Garbe in the introduction to his Grammar of the Upanīṣads (1887). He will find there the references to the original papers.

to the earth and entering the womb of Devaki, the black hair was born as Kṛṣṇa, and the white one as Baladeva. This Kṛṣṇa
names the Kṛṣṇa, 'black,' and Kaliya, facetiously describes him as 'black snake.' It is accounted, moreover, for Kṛṣṇa
being of dark colour and Baladeva light. It is to be noted that the same Vṛṣṇi family is also an incarnation of Viṣṇu, though
he is generally declared to be an incarnation of Śeṣa, the snake.

As has already been mentioned, the incarnations of Nārāyaṇa seem originally to have been termed 'manifestations' (prādūrbhāvam), whereby it is indicated that the god continued to exist in his
true form though at the same time he manifested himself in a term chosen for a particular purpose. However, instead of prādūrbhāvam, another term has become current, viz. avatāra, literally 'descending.' It was imagined that a part of the deity descended from heaven and took bodily form as a man, etc., or was born as such; we find also the word anātavatāra, 'partial incarnation,' and even
anātavatāvakāra, 'incarnation by a part of a part.'

These terms were probably originated by a somewhat
materialistic conception of the process of incarnation, evidenced also in the case of the four sons
of Daśaratha. The orthodox opinion in the case of these sons, however, denies that the Supreme
Deity is not wholly present in him. What the orthodox opinion was will be seen from the following
extract from a commentary on the Viṣṇu Purāṇa which we transcribe from Mār. Orig. Śr. Texts, iv. 228:

"Pūraṇottama is here figuratively said to have become incarnate
with a portion of a portion of himself, because the Kṛṣṇa
incarnation is manifested in a corporeal body in a very cIRCumscribed form of a man, and not because of
any diminution in his form. Even Kṛṣṇa and the other incarna-
tions he is said to have shown himself in every possible form,
and to have possessed all divine power, and so forth. But it is
referred to the whole of a whole containing parts, there is a
degree of power, [in that whole], and that thus the inferiority of power will attach to the portion rela-
tively to the whole, just as when a heap of grain, or any other
such whole, is divided. I answer, No; since such a diminution does not occur in him whose nature is light; for though there is a seeming difference in the individually of one lamp, and of another lamp deprived from it, yet as the identity of a power is perceived in each; agreeably to the text from the Veda, "...That is full, and this a full: a full arises out of a full: if a full be
taken from a full, a full remains;" and also agreeably to such
texts as this, "The Supreme Brahmā with the form, and with
the characteristics, of a man, is a great mystery; but Kṛṣṇa
is the lord of the earth." And the employment of the term "hairs to the world." My hairs shall descend to the earth," and "My
hairs are Kṛṣṇa," etc., are intended to signify that the task of
removing the earth's burdens was such as Brahmā in all his
pressed into his divine service whereby, and not to deny
assert to assert that the two hairs were identical with [Balāaraṇa and
Kṛṣṇa]. Since, however, not being conscious spirits or su-
momiting the bodies of these two persons, could not fulfill their
task. If it be said that the lord occupying the bodies of Balāaraṇa
and Kṛṣṇa must be different, the whole complexion of the
hairs, will do so and we, reply, "Yes; for there is no differ-
ce in the result, and hence be himself said; I (shall)
be born) on the eighth night of the dark fortnight of the moon."

It remains to notice the application of the incar-
nation theory to other gods besides Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa.
We may exclude as alien to the present subject the various
forms under which Śiva is adored as Rudra, Braha, Mahākāla, Anāhāra, etc., and the worship
of his spouse as Gaurī, Pārvatī, Dēvi, Vīndhyāvasini, Ādamnanda, etc.; for these are not
limited and successive manifestations of the deity, as in the case of Viṣṇu’s avatāras, but they may
be said to be co-existent with each other. Different
from them are those avatāra or avatāvakāra of many
gods which are acknowledged in epic or classical
works, and are intended to establish a connection
between a person, famous in mythic or legendary
history, and some god or goddess. In original
everywhere, many of the heroes are supposed to be sons of a god. Thus, in the
Rāmāyaṇa, Hanumān is the son of the Wind-god,
Vāt of Indra, Sugrīva of Śrīra, etc., and in the Mahābhārata Bhima is the son of the Wind-god,
Arjuna of Indra, Karna of Śrīra, Yudhīśhvara of Dīhan, Nakula and Sahadeva of the Āśvins, etc. The
same view still prevails in the first book of the
Rāmāyaṇa (ch. 17) where Brahmā exhorts the gods
to beget sons with nymphs and demi-gods to be sons who as monkeys and bears will be the helpers
of Rāma in his strife with Rāvaṇa. In the Mahā-
bhārata (i. 67, xv. 31), on the contrary, all the
heroes of the epic are declared to be partial incarna-
tions of gods, demi-gods, demi-goddesses, etc. Here it is obvious that the idea of incarnation
becomes mixed with that of re-birth; for only the
latter could apply to the two last named categories.
It may be mentioned that something similar holds
good also in the fully developed theory of Viṣṇu’s
avatāra; for the demon Hīranyakasipu, whom
Viṣṇu slays as Nātha, is born again as Rāvaṇa,
and for a third time as Siṅgala, to be killed by
Kṛṣṇa. But in the case of gods we have true
avatāras, and, in this part of the epic, partial
incarnation is substituted for the original parental;
in some cases, however, opinions differed. Thus
Arjuna is the son of Indra, and should, therefore,
also be an avatāra of Indra, and so he is called in a
passage of the Harivanci (v. 3047); but in the
Mahābhārata he is considered an avatāra of Nāra. The
reason for this opinion, according to one school,
is that he is associated with Kṛṣṇa, and, as the latter is
an incarnation of Nārāyaṇa, who is also named together with Nāra, Kṛṣṇa’s friend was regarded
as an incarnation of Nāra. For a similar reason,
Bāladeva is occasionally regarded as an incarnation
of Viṣṇu, because his brother Kṛṣṇa is one; but usually
he is regarded as an incarnation of the snake-god Śeṣa.

This theory of avatāra has become very popular,
and is being applied in many cases even now. When
a local saint has a proper shrine where he is
worshipped, and his fame continues to increase, a
god is said to be fabricated which declares him an
avatāra of some god or sī. A similar
notion of avatāra is also frequently met with in Sanskrit and Prakrit tales; a hero or heroine of
the tale is declared to be an avatāra of a Gān-
dhara, Vidyādhar, Àparna, etc., in the sense that
the latter has been born as a man or woman on
earth, usually by a curse of some higher god whose
displeasure he or she has incurred, and will resume his
divine state when the cause of the punishment is over.
Finally, the notion of incarnation has occasioned a frequent metaphor in Sanskrit;
a man may be called an avatāra of Kāma, of a girl of Bahī, just as one says that he is an Apollo, or a woman that she is a Vēnas.
Such expressions prove how deeply rooted the idea of
incarnation is in the Indian mind.

LITERATURE.—The necessary references have been given in
the article. The subject has not been treated systematically before.

HERMANN JACOBI.

INCARNATION (Muslim).—Among the Muslims an interesting development of belief in incar-
nation occurred, though it is confined to the Shi‘ites
or Persian section of Islam and is in no sense
Semitic. The details of the belief have varied with
different sects and individuals; but its general
out-
line is clear. It arose out of the fact that Ali,
whose Muhammad desired as his successor, was set
aside by the leaders at Medina until after Abū Bakr, 'Umar,' and 'Uthman had occupied the posi-
tion of Khalif and out of the further fact that Ali
was assassinated in A.D. 669 by a Kharājite dagger.
Abū Bakr, his elder son, died of poison nine years
later, while al-Rusin, the younger, perished at the battle of Kerbel in 680. Since these events led the followers of 'Ali in Persia to regard
him and his sons as semi-divine, or even as
incarnations of God. Thus the Shi‘ites, who are called
ghulām or gholūl (‘ultras) or ‘Ali-ulīl (‘ ultras)

INCARNATION (Parasi).—Incarnation in the proper sense of the term has no place in the religion of the Avesta ('the incarnation of Ahura Mazda' not being a proper designation of Zarathustra [R. Edulji Dasoor, A True Zarathushtra Guide, Bombay, 1913, p. 1823], but the conception of the king's sacred endowment, or 'holiness' (see art. Holiness [General and Primitive]), in virtue of the somewhat vague personification of its supernatural efficacy, developed into something in the nature of incarnation. This khoravanah was the mysterious element which made the gods (Yt. xiv. 2, xvii. 15, v. 89, x. 141; Nac. iii. 9, 11; Nac. i. 1) and the souls of the dead (Yt. xiii. 9, 11, 14-16; Yt. ix. 4) powerful (Yt. xiv. 9) and worthy of worship; which gave the sun (Yt. vii. 1), the moon (Yt. vii. 5), the stars (Yt. viii. 1), the pre-eminent star, Sirius (Yt. vii. 20), the river, the ocean, the sea, the water (Yt. viii. 3, xiii. 65; Yt. xviii. 11, 21) their beneficent influences; which protected the house (Yt. ix. 7, 7) and the nation (Yt. xiv. 64, 65, v. 27), which, as the 'Aryan glory' (Sir. ix. 9), gave the 'glory of the Aryans' (Yt. v. 42; Sir. i. 25), bestowed wealth upon the Aryans, i.e. the Iranians (Yt. xviii. 1), endowed men with vigour and wisdom, with the power of overcoming the natural inclination of the heart and of avarice (Yt. v. 56; Sir. v. 26), and so forth. In the end, however, this kind of 'glory' is regarded as abstract (Yt. v. 36; Sir. ii. 8); it is also the soil of the Soma-plant (Yt. vii. 5; cf. iii. 7). In the Avesta, however, the 'glory' is identified with the name of the god (Yt. vii. 5; cf. ii. 8; Yt. ix. 7, 7). It is, however, compared with the song of a bird (Yt. xiv. 34 f.); it swims and hides in the sea (Yt. v. 42, xiv. 50 f.); it sojourns in reeds and in milk (Bund. xxxvi. 20); in the form of an animal it accompanies the Chosen. 1

The khoravanah of the Kavi dynasty was of a special and distinct type; here the 'Kavi khoravanah' becomes the 'king's glory' (Xt. i. 14; Yt. vii. 21, xiv. 9, 69 f.). It was in virtue of this Kavi glory that the world-rulers of that dynasty acquired their title to their position, and their ability to perform their exploits. Now, as this power-substance manifested itself as a deity, and was invoked and worshipped as such (Yt. xviii. 7 f.; Sir. ii. 9), we may speak of it in this aspect in some sense as an incarnation. The line of the Eloit, the men inspired and possessed by the khoravanah, begins with Hsiaoyian (Yt. xiv. 29), and is continued through Takhuma Urupi to Yima, the ruler of the blissful primal age (31). When once, in foolish arrogance, Yima spoke the word, the power-substance broke forth from him thrice (Yt. xiv. 34, viz., 'glory, as priestly glory, warrior

1 According to the Kāraṇdām, 41ff., and the Sāh-ñāmā (E. G. Browne, The Literary History of Persia, London, 1909, i. 137, 145), "a very large and mighty man" caught up Ardashir and rode beside him on his horse, the fine man being the royal glory."
INCARNATION (Semitic).—One cannot expect to find among the ancient Semites a doctrine of incarnation as the term is ordinarily understood in modern theology. The doctrine presupposes a reasoned conception of the universe, in which the natural and the supernatural, or the divine and human, are set over against one another. The Semites were too primitive in their thought to have made such a distinction. In the period in which their religious ideas took shape they conceived that gods, men, and animals formed a single society, and even plants were sometimes thought to have a connexion with this society. One might, accordingly, expect divine potency to manifest itself in men, animals, and trees. Such a stage of thought is preparatory to that in which real incarnation, and that is to say the process of taking flesh; it is itself too primitive. The Semites did not approach the later conception of incarnation until they came under the influence of the philosophical Greeks. Then their thoughts were coloured by their earlier and less philosophical views.

1. Rocks, springs, and trees. — In its earliest form their thought pictured the manifestation of the divine as exhibited in springs of water, trees, and eres of natural rock. This was, of course, not incarnation, but materialization, or rather the recognition of a divine power as resident in these material forms. It is not really materialization, for they had never conceived the gods as pure spirits separated from these things. Survivals of this stage of thought are seen at the present day in the East, where Moslems hang personal offerings on springs and trees.

2. Animals. — A closer approximation to incarnation was the conception of gods as living in animal forms. This stratum of thought is exhibited in its greatest perfection in Egypt (see Egypt), and in its most degraded form among the Egyptians of modern times. The supposed animals of Egypt were at the beginning but the totems of the originally distinct tribes, and what the ultimate explanation of totemism may be is not yet clear. 1

3. Descent from gods. — It is possible incarnation of a god in human flesh appears to have given rise to two different conceptions. The Semitic conceptions refer to gods; these are the descent of men from gods, and the deification of certain men. Of these two conceptions the former seems to be the older. In Gn 2:9 God is said to have breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul. This implies that man has a kind of kinship to God. In one of the Babylonian myths of Ummes it is said that he mingled his own blood with the soil and thus made man. This myth expresses in this way the sense of man's kinship to the divine which Gn 2:9 expressed. In Gn 6:4 the conception of a divine order (ḥad hēlākalā) married human wives, and that the issue of such marriages consisted of the heroes and men of renown of olden time. This is a recognition of a divine element in men of unusual or heroic qualities. The Babylonian Adapa, a man of unusual wisdom, is called a son of the god Ea. 2

The view that unusual persons were god-begotten was undoubtedly universal in the early Semitic world. It lingered in an attenuated form down to the beginning of the Christian era. Philo Judaeus declares that Zipporah was found by Moses pregnant by no mortal; 3 Isaac was "the result of generation, but the shaping of the unbegotten"; 4 Samuel was "born of a human mother who became pregnant after receiving divine seed"; 5 Tamar was "pregnant through divine seed." 6 It is possible that in the mind of Philo there was no thought of setting aside the

3 D. 345.
4 Elkan, de Nat. anim. iv. 345.
5 Hebraica. T. (1903) 90 f.
8 Ed. Lange, I. 187.
9 Ed. Lange, I. 187.
10 ib. 187.
11 ib. 187.
human father. He may have thought that the divine life-giving power of God was manifested through Abraham and Ishmael, whose language with reference to Zipporah is, however, hardly open to that construction. But, whether he thought of the human father as an agent in these births or not, it is clear that the older conception lived in some form in his mind.

At least as old as this conception is the idea that whole tribes are of divine descent. Thus the Mayans are called the sons and daughters of Chemos (Nu 21:9). Jeremiah (24:5) speaks of the名称 of the Hebrew Semites generally claimed descent from their gods; and, since these gods were represented by idols, he sarcastically refers to them as ‘a tree and a stone.’ Virgil (Aen. i. 729 f.) by the phrase ‘Belus et omnes a Belo’ describes the Tyrians as claiming descent from Bel. As pointed out above, the Arabian tribes who claimed descent from animals probably in reality claimed descent from gods.

This more general conception, that whole tribes were descended from gods, is further removed from what we understand by incarnation than the conception that heroes or eminent persons are god-begotten. The ordinary plane of human life is too commonplace for early men, who are as yet unable to distinguish the spiritual from the material, or to have any strong realization of that which is immortal. It was the more effective because opposed to the general customs of Babylonian thinking.

LITERATURE.—This has been fully cited in the footnotes.

GEORGE A. BARTON.

INCARNATION (Tibetan).—The theory of incarnation attains its most extreme development in Tibet. It is utilized there not merely in the usual Buddhist and Hindu way to explain the re-incarnations which are accepted by the individual, but also as a practical method of regulating the succession to the hierarchy, and even to postulate the perpetual incarnation of Buddhist gods within the bodies of the Grand Lamas.

The theory of hieratical succession by re-incarnation appears to have been introduced by the first of the series of Dalai Lats, called Geden-dup (4 A.D. 1479), the successor of Tsokhangpa who founded the now dominant Yellow-hat sect, the Ge-lug-pa. It seems to have been a device, on quasi-Buddhist principles, to secure stability for the succession, by providing for it against the intrigues of rival party leaders. It assumes the continuous succession to the headship by the same individual under an uninterrupted series of consecutive re-incarnations. This obviously differs from the orthodox Buddhist conception of re-incarnation of an individual, which is not confined to any one particular channel. It supposes that the deceased head Lama is always re-born as a child within the country and often in the neighbourhood of the monastery, and the infant is to be discovered by cranial means and then duly installed in the vacant chair. On his death, he is similarly re-born, and so the process is repeated ad infinitum.

At first this system of selection appears to have been restricted solely to the Dalai Lamas of Lhasa; but about A.D. 1602 it was extended by the then Dalai Lama to the newly formed province of Tashihunpo, and now it has been adopted by nearly all the great monasteries throughout Tibet, China, and Mongolia. It gives opportunities for much intrigue; and China as the monarch of Tibet has found it necessary politically to take an active part in controlling the ‘re-incarnation’ of the Dalai Lamas, the temporal sovereign of the country. In A.D. 1703, China prescribed for the selection of this priest-king a lottery-scheme called the ‘oracle of the urn,’ by which the names of the competing infants are written on slips of paper and put into a golden urn, and, after prayer and other rites, the name first drawn is the fortunate one. The official directions for the working of this scheme are notified in a Chinese imperial edict of A.D. 1808 engraved on stone slabs at the door of the great temple of Lhasa and translated by the present writer. It is a long document, and states near its beginning:

On the passing away of the Lama the individual born in his stead is called ‘the incarnation of the historic emperor’ (Soyud-son), which in Chinese is called ‘Son-sun,’ meaning ‘the accepted and undoubted individual (re-)incarnation.’

The lottery takes place in the immediate presence of the Chinese ambassador, the Amban, and it is also prescribed for the other three Grand Lamas of the Yellow-hat Church, namely at Tashihunpo,
INSECKS.—The custom of burning sweet-smelling substances to focus attention, sometimes as a separate rite, is wide of spread occurrence, especially in the higher religions.

1. Kinds of incense.—While frankincense and other gum resins are more strictly to be called incense, many other substances have been used for the purpose of producing an agreeable odour when burned—various kinds of wood or bark, branches, leaves, flowers, fruits, aromatic plants, seeds, gums, resins, aromatic earths, etc.

Of substances referred to in the Bible which are known to have been used as incense, the following are recorded:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substance</th>
<th>Biblical References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>frankincense</td>
<td>Num 16:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myrrh</td>
<td>John 19:39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aloes</td>
<td>Luke 23:56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sandalwood</td>
<td>Song of Solomon 4:13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sacred incense used in the later Hebrew ritual was a compound of stacte, olibanum, and frankincense, seasoned with myrrh and reded to a fine powder. In later times—the Herodian period—Josephus records that thirteen ingredients (sweet-smelling spices) were used. Plutarch gives a list of twenty ingredients used by the Egyptians in preparing fragrant, sweet-smelling incense, including honey, wine, raisins, sweet-rush, rush, myrrh, frankincense, orris, clove, sawleaf, musk, and both kinds of acacia, cardamum, and orris root. In both cases the compound was of ritual importance and a matter of mystery. Sacred books were read aloud while the incense was being burned.

Frankincense (Gr. λαβάνθομα, Heb. פָּחָן, Mod. Lat. olbanum, labinum in Vulg. of Sir 24:20, 34; is the gum resin of the tree of the genus Boswellia (B. Carterii, B. Frereana, B. Saccardia), and is exported from Somalia and Kenya by the Port of Egyptian incense. Flavius refers to it as a product of Arabia (Hadramaut), and says that the Sabaeans beheld the tree which produces it, and of its usefulness through the virtue of hereditary succession. The trees are sacred; and, while pruning the trees or gathering the resin, men must not contract pollution by sexual intercourse or contact with a corpse. It is carried to Sabata, where the priests claim a tithe of it in honour of their god Sabus; but this is not done, as it may be displeased. Herodotus speaks of winged serpents which guard the trees and are driven off by burning styrax. It was one of the ingredients of Jewish incense, as it is still of that used in Christian ritual. Oiling Lamplighter, in speaking of frankincense, usually refers to its exporting place as the seat of its origin, e.g. Syria and Phoenicia.

2. Purpose of incense.—The use of incense is connected primarily with the psychological aspects of the sense of smell. Pleasant-smelling perfumes, in whatever way they are obtained, are agreeable to men. They were offered to honourable persons in ancient times, and were dispensed over the roads on which they travelled. Incense was also used at banquets as an agreeable accompaniment of food and wine. Hence it was supposed that such perfumes would also be agreeable to gods or spirits, on the same principle as that by which foetid substances were thought which men liked to be offered to them. This was obvious when we consider that the smoke of sacrifice is pleasing to the gods, and that they are thought to seize on the divine fires (J. Grube) then resident in Lhasa in the middle of the 17th cent., which refers to this disciple of the Lama as that devilish God-the-Father who puts to death all who offend him.


3. Egyptian incense.—Egyptian texts illustrate these beliefs. Isis has a wonderful odour which she can transfer to others, e.g. to the dead. Osiris transfers his odour to the dead, his friends, and to his own body. There is a familiar story of the Persians, which is related by Herodotus, and which is told by Diodorus Siculus. The Persians believed that the soul of the dead was transferred to another body and that the body of the dead person was returned to its former residence. The body was then embalmed and put in a tomb. The tomb was then filled with fragrant resin and other substances. The purpose of the incense was to preserve the body and to make it more pleasant. The incense was also used in the funeral ceremonies to honor the dead.

4. Chinese incense.—The Chinese also believed in the power of incense. They believed that the smoke of the incense would carry the prayers of the faithful to the gods. They also believed that the incense would purify the air and make it more pleasant. Incense was burned in temples and at home to honor the gods and to purify the air.

5. Incense in other cultures.—Incense was also used in other cultures. The Hebrews burned incense in their temples. The Greeks and Romans also used incense in their temples and homes. The Egyptians used incense in their burial customs. The Chinese used incense in their funeral ceremonies. The Persians believed that the soul of the dead was transferred to another body and that the body of the dead person was returned to its former residence. The body was then embalmed and put in a tomb. The tomb was then filled with fragrant resin and other substances. The purpose of the incense was to preserve the body and to make it more pleasant. The incense was also used in the funeral ceremonies to honor the dead.

6. Incense in modern times.—Incense is still used in many cultures today. It is used in religious ceremonies, in home decoration, and as a scented fragrance. Incense is also used in aromatherapy to help relax the mind and body. Incense is also used as a symbol of spirituality and as a way to connect with the divine.
with the smoke of the incense, as in the Egyptian view. So in Christian thought incense has usually been regarded as symbolic of prayer, though it also typifies creation, the preaching of the faith, etc. (3) Monomystical views have sometimes been entertained. Plutarch explains the beneficial effect of the Egyptian _kouphi_ by saying that its sixteen ingredients are a square out of a square. Being composed of aromatic ingredients, it is used to make people soon asleep, lessens the tension of daily anxieties, and brightens the dreams. It is made of things that delight most in the night and exhibits its virtues by night. Plutarch also gives medico-mystical reasons for the burning of other substances at other times, e.g. resin in the morning to purify the air, because of its strong and penetrating quality; _myrrh_ at midday, because its hot nature disposes and dispels the turbid qualities in the air. (4) Philo explains the four ingredients of the Hebrew incense as symbolizing the four elements, and thus representing the universe. Josephus writes that of all incense, _myrrh_ is of sweet-smelling things gathered from all places, points to the fact that God is Lord of all. In the Orphic hymns the different substances used and offered to the gods are chosen because of some occult reason in each case.

W. R. Smith (436 f.) considers the religious value of incense as originally independent of animal sacrifice, since frankincense was the gum of a very holy species of tree collected with religious precautions. The right to see the trees was reserved to certain sacred families. While harvesting the gum they used to practice continence and take no part in funerals. The virtue of the gum lay in its being regarded as the blood of a divine plant.

3. Ritual use of incense in ethnic religions. (a) _Lover races_. The use of incense among lover races is hardly known, since they have not been in contact with higher races using it. We may, however, note the American Indian custom of offering tobacco smoke to the gods, and the Polynesian offering of flowers and aromatic substances. Among the Sakai, Semang, Sakun, etc., the only common kind of offering is the burning of incense (benzoic). At a death among the Sakai, the magician waves a censer seven times over the body, recommending the dying man to think of his dead ancestors. As the smoke mounts up and then vanishes, so does the soul. Good spirits love its smell and evil spirits hate it. In sickness, among the savage Malays of Johore, the magician burns incense. The fumes rise to the abode of Jewa-Jewa and gratify him. He welcomes the soul of the magian and grants him medicine for the sick. Incense is burned at funerals, or burning at airways, saints' tombs, etc., among the Malays, and is the usual form of burnt sacrifice, with invocation to the Spirit of Incense. It reaches the nostrils of the gods and propitiates them as a foretaste of other offerings to the dead. It is also used in magical ceremonies, e.g., to make one walk on water or remain under water in an ordeal, in the use of the divining rod, or to cause a spirit to possess a magician. Callaway refers to incense burnt with Zulu animal sacrifices (blood and caul of a bullock) to the spirits, in order to give them a sweet savour. It is apparently some native product and is also used in rites for the cure of sickness.

(b) Among the Semites the use of incense came to be widespread. Its name among the Babylonians was _bintusimun_, and the incense-offering
INCENSE

constituted of odoriferous woods (cedar, cypress), myrtle, cane, and sweet herbs, by which the gods were made to smell a pleasing odour. After the Deluge, its survivor offered cedars, cedar, and fragrant scent as a symbol of the sweet odour and 'gathered like flies round the sacrificer. 1

Incense is frequently mentioned in the texts—e.g., before Samaas he makes an incense-offering—or kings are represented making this offering. 2 It was also used as a libation, e.g., of the gods' table and its necessary and the place where the gods were supposed to come, of houses, and of persons. 3

Evidence of the popularity of incense-offerings among the peoples of Canaan and the surrounding districts is found in the fact that it is the most commonly denounced form of idolatry in Israel. Incense was offered on altars of brick or on the house tops to Baal, the sun, moon, stars, etc. 4 In the temple, the incense was placed in the holy of holies and burned in the form of a cloud, which was supposed to carry the prayers to heaven. 5

(c) In Egypt the burning of various kinds of incense was always an important rite, each ingredient of it having magical properties, and, as has been seen, its smoke was supposed to carry the words of prayer as well as the souls of the dead to heaven. Prayer was made e.g., to Ra, that he would draw the soul up to heaven on the smoke of the incense. 6

The earliest reference to the use of incense in any religion occurs in the notice of Sanch- kara, a king of the Xvith dynasty, who sent an expedition for aromatics through the desert to the Red Sea to the incense land of Punt. Hatispe, a queen of the Xvith dynasty, also sent an expedition by sea to the island. 7 Punt is probably Hadramaut and Somalia. 8 Incense was also obtained from the island of Gleen. 9 A common representation on the walls of temples is that of a king offering incense. He holds a censer in one hand and with the other throws little balls or pastilles of incense upon it, praying the god to accept it and give him a long life. The use of incense is often spoken of as having been offered, e.g., 1000 censers, or, as an inscription referring to Rameses Iii. reports, 1,338,706 pieces of incense, etc., during the 31 years of his reign. 10

It was offered to all the gods, who delighted in its odour, their statues being censed with it and perfumed. Often it accompanied other offerings, greater or smaller—the incense, myrrh, and other perfumes were placed in the canoes of the bullock offered to Isis—or presented by itself, as described above. The censer was an open cup holding fire, with or without a handle, but other censers were also used. 11 At funereal rites the deceased was perfumed with incense. Five grains were twice offered to mouth, eyes, and hand, once for the north and once for the south; then incense from foreign parts was similarly offered, along with the litany of purification. Myrrh, resin, etc., but not frankincense, were placed in the body which was embalmed. 12

(d) Incense, in the sense of a gum resin, does not seem to have been used in Greece until post-Homerica times, and Pliny says that people knew only the smell of cedar and citron as it arose in volumes of smoke from the sacrifice. 13 The idea of a fragrant odour, e.g., of sacrifices, being pleasant to the gods was well known. 14 The wood of odoriferous trees, e.g., a kind of cedar (ro bavar), 15 as well as myrrh, was burned in houses for its fragrant smell.

1 Nu 16:26; 2 Ch. 29:2693.
2 Ex 30:33, 34; a secondary part of P.
3 Ex 29:12, 13, 15, 16.
4 Ex 25:26; Ex 40:34.
5 Ex 40:34. 6 Jos. Ant. xvi. 7. 9.
6 Ex 40:33; Ex 29:32; Ex 40:34.
7 Ex 25:17.
8 Ex 30:34, and see 2 above.
9 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
10 Nu 16:46.
11 Nu 16:46.
12 Ex 29:26, and see 2 above.
13 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
14 Ex 30:34, and see 2 above.
15 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
16 Nu 16:46.
17 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
18 Ex 29:26, and see 2 above.
19 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
20 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
21 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
22 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
23 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
24 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
25 Ex 10:14, and cf. passage just cited.
dust as an offering, or it may simply mean 'sacrifice.' Later it came to mean 'incense,' and was the source of Lat. tus. The word for 'frankincense,' Nardus, was of foreign derivation. In- cette was not used before the 8th cent. n. c., and is first mentioned in Euripides. Schrader is of opinion that it may have been introduced through the cult of Aphroditte, and it was certainly transferred to Greece, thus having come from Phoenicia via Cyprus, where it was used in her cult. 2 It was brought into Greece commercially from Arabia, and imported thence by Phenicians. 3 Incense was used in bloody sacrifices as an offering or to combat evil odours, 4 or with fruits, cakes, wheat, etc., 5 or as a separate offering, both in domestic ritual and in the cult of the gods; e.g., it was burnt to Zeus Melichios, to Demeter before consulting the oracle at Patrae, and to Hermes and Sospolis. 6 The inventory lists of some temples contain evidence of the large quantities which came to be used, and it was sometimes given as a gift to a beloved person to another. 7 Incense of different kinds was also used largely in the Orphic cult, as the hymns show. It was offered along with cakes of honey, olive, a vine-wood, laurel branches, and Sabine herbs. 8 Guns and resin came to be used—frankincense (mox, culrum tus), myrrh, coccus, costum. 9 In the case of animal sacrifices, incense, saffron, and laurel were burned as a preliminary, and, as the animal was led up, incense and wine were sprinkled on the altar. It was also offered with the blood, and burned with the ashes. 10 Incense was also offered by itself in public or private ritual; and this is illustrated by the fact that one method of forcing a rec- nunciation of Christianity was to burn some incense on an altar before an image or to the emperor. Incense was offered to the lar familiares daily. 11 The method of using it was to burn it on the great altar, or in braziers, or in small portable altars (focus, turibulum). It was carried in a casket called averra (much used in funerary cere- monies), whence it was taken and burned. 12 It was also offered for the averter of pestilences. 13, 14 and burned in magical ceremonies. 15 The intro- duction of incense into the cult was connected with Bacchus, the first to make offerings of cinnamon and frankincense. 16—An obvious suggestion of its entrance into Roman ritual through the Greek cult of Dionysos. Elsewhere Ovid 17 speaks of its importation from the Euphrates region, perhaps connecting it with the Oriental cults which intro- duced it into Greece. 18

(g) Hindus have always been fond of pleasant odours, and Indus was already celebrated for its perfumes in ancient times. Incense from Arabia was early imported there, but many native kinds of sweet-smelling materials have long been in use—balsam, benzoin, and other gum resins, seeds, roots, dried flowers, and fragrant woods. These are burned ritually or in ordinary domestic usage. In ancient times sandal-wood was burned as incense in temples and as a fragrant stuff in houses, and in the daily rites the sacred fire was fed with consecrated wood, usually from the Palas tree. 19 In modern Hindism the use of incense is wide-spread in all forms of cult. Thus in the cult of Siva it is daily burned by the priest before the stone representing the god at Orissa, and perfumes are also placed on it. In the Vallabha sect of Vaishnavism the Maharrja's offer incense and swinging lights before the image, and the same act of homage is paid to them by the people. Camphor and incense are burned before the image of Rupas, and in the devotion cults of Western India perfumes are burned in the Siva temple. In the Patshajatana ceremony of the Brahman household perfumes and flowers are offered, and among the sixteen acts of homage is the offering of perfumes, sandal, flowers, and incense (dhupa; see Monier Williams, "Hinduism.")

(h) Incense was unknown in early Buddhism, which was opposed to external ritual, but in the course of time its use has become general. Thus, in Ceylon, perfumes and flowers are offered before the image of Buddha, and in the Pirit ceremony incense is burned round the platform on which the relics of Buddha are exposed. 20 But it is in Tibet that the use of incense is most prevalent, and there it is burned in front of the images of Buddha, together with the mantras and the incantations. Incense and perfume are used in the worship of the five sacred offerings, and figure prominently in the 'presentation of offerings,' which is one of the seven stages of worship. These offerings are 'essential,' and among them flowers and incense occur as early as the 7th century. They bear Sanskrit names, and are borrowed from Hindism. 21 In Japanese Buddhism, incense is also commonly used, and has influenced the native Shinto-religion. In earlier Shintoism incense was unknown, but it is now burned in ceremonies at many ceremonies, e.g., at the new moon, and at magical rites.

(i) In China, incense is much used in public and private cults. It is offered in the temples as part of the daily worship, and it is burned at festivals and in processions. It is also used in burning the ancestral tablets or before the household deities, and is used in consulting the gods and in magical

1 Parnell uses this as an argument against the likelihood of Mesopotamian influences affecting Greece in earlier periods ("Greece and Rome," Edinburgh, 1911, p. 292 ff.).
2 Lucas, 144.
4 Lucas, 144.
5 Lucas, 144.
6 Lucas, 144.
7 Lucas, 144.
8 Lucas, 144.
9 Lucas, 144.
10 Lucas, 144.
11 Lucas, 144.
12 Lucas, 144.
13 Lucas, 144.
14 Lucas, 144.
15 Lucas, 144.
16 Lucas, 144.
17 Lucas, 144.
18 Lucas, 144.
19 Lucas, 144.
20 Lucas, 144.
21 Lucas, 144.
ceremonies. Chinese Buddhism also used it extensively. In Chinese funeral ceremonies the burning of incense plays an important part, both as an offering and as a funerary rite. Tertullian 2 says: "Not one penurious of incense do I offer Him." Athenagoras 4 declares that God commands sacrifice in the form of the sweet smell of flowers or incense. Arnobius 5 referring to the fact that the early Romans did not use it, maintains that Christians may safely neglect it. "Incantations are not desired by God, and agree with Neo-Ptolemaic writers that frankincense is the like should not be offered Him."

The fact that it was a Jewish usage may have tended to make Christians neglect it, but what had probably a more powerful effect was its use among pagans and the common practice during the age of persecution of insisting that Christians should offer a few grains of incense to the gods or on the altar of the Emperor as a token of their renunciation of their faith. Such apostasies as yield in this way during the Decian persecutions were called Tartari 2. Incense was, however, used for fumigations as a sanitary precaution, e.g., at burials or in places with a disagreeable odour; but otherwise its ritual use was almost unknown during the first five centuries. The Apostolic Canons refer to the use of incense (ophylas) at the Eucharist, but this is probably a later interpolation. It was used at the vigil ossaries on Sunday in Jerusalem towards the end of the 4th century. The pseudo-Dionysius 8 speaks of the priest casting the altar and making the circuit of the holy place. In the Liturgy of St. James it is used in the pro- and post-Anaphora portions, and in that of St. James before the Gospel, at the great entrance, at the kiss of peace, and at the commemoration of the dead. In the Liturgy of St. Chrysostom the sacred vessels, the Gospels, altar, priest, and sanctuary are consecrated with incense in the pro-Anaphora, and the altar is blessed in the Anaphora. Evagrius 8 refers to the gift of a thurible to a church in Antioch by a Persian king c. 354. In the West the Ordines of the 4th century describe the swinging of the censer during the procession of the pontiff and his acolytes from the sanctuary to the altar in the church of Rome. As for casting the altar, or the church, or the clergy or congregation, such a thing is never mentioned.

The further use of incense was gradual, since it is not mentioned by writers of this period who treat of ritual, and its use at the elevation and benediction was not known in the West till the 14th century. In the Roman Catholic Church at the present time incense is burned at solemn Mass before the introit, at the gospel, offertory, and elevation, at solemn blessings, processions, and offices, consecration of churches, burial rites, etc.

In the Church of England there is no decisive evidence of its ritual use in Divine service during the period after the Reformation. It was used, however, for sanitary purposes, as a fumigatory, and for the sake of its agreeable odour in churches, at feasts, at coronations, etc. Its ritual use was resumed towards the middle of the 19th cent., but this was decided to be illegal in Martin v. MacMack, 1889, and in Summer v. Wix, 1879. 10

Incense is used ritually in many churches of the Anglican communion, and the practice is certainly spreading as a pleasing adjunct to worship, and as a symbolic rite fumigatory prayer.


2 J. de Groot, op. cit. i. passim.
3 v. 97.
4 xiv. 34.
5 Vind. xii. 29; cf. Haug, pp. 335 f., 355.
6 H. 404, 405, 408.
7 Hist. 40; cf. Strabo (1890) 228.
8 Theophrastus, De Dier. scriptores, 1. 30, 2. 74 ff.
10 See E. W. Lane, Mod. Egypt., London, 1846, 2. 386, 217, 1. 77, 93, 111, 154; Hughes, Diff. 79 ff., 306.

J. A. MACCOLOCH.
INCEST.—See Crimes and Punishments, Ethics and Morality.

INCEPTION.—Inception, a translation of the Gr. technical term ἐκπράξεις, denotes in comparison with the act of sleeping (or at least of passing the night) in a shrine or other sacred place with the object of receiving a Divine revelation or Divine aid; in a still more specific sense it means as was done on one occasion by the one most commonly noted by the word because of the Greek use of the rite—the aid in question is currently held to be the cure of disease, though this limitation is of later development. Naturally, the subject of inception is connected with those of communion with Deity, disease, divination, dreams, omens (qq.v.), etc.

In the state of sleep, when the soul is released from the ordinary trammels of the body, it is particularly subject to Divine stations, and may receive revelations from Divine beings (cf. Gen 28:12; 35:1-5, 1 K 3:5ff. etc.). Indeed, the whole basis of inception could not but be expressed, rather than in the words of Job (28:17):

'In a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, then he showeth them visions in their sleep, and tells them in their slumber.'

It is perfectly true that Divine revelations in dreams may come in almost any place (for examples see art. Seer (Divine)); and, as with the American Indian goes forth in search of revelation (cf. Southworth & Swett, American Missionary, vol. viii. p. 374), yet it is obvious that a godless man will himself more readily in a distinct locality with which he is already associated. For example, in ancient Mesopotamia, the druid was very well known, which has a dwellings provided in the shape of temple or shrine. In some instances this dwelling may be only temporary, and prepared for the special occasion on which Divine revelation is sought.

Thus, among the Malagasy, for a proper site for a house is found, four sticks are laid down to form a rectangle in the center of which a pole is set in the earth, with the prayer to the gods of the soil:

'If it is bad, show me a good one.'

After this, 'wrap the dead up in white cloth, and after funeral rites, place it in the grave.' In the same region, place it at night beneath your pillow, and when you retire to rest repeat the last two lines of the above charms on another to your dream in good provided, with if bad, destitute of your operations (W. W. Skeat, Malay Magic, London, 1899, p. 124; or, see also p. 144; and, for a second class charm, see ibid. pp. 11, 18, 133, etc.). As they have Irish had a kindred practice in the farman, which is usually called 'to pass the sight' (H. P. Wrietz, Grundzüge der magischen Gotteshaltung, 1899, pp. 58, 245; or, see also p. 30). In Stekling Consecrated, 211 (ed. E. Windisch, Irish Folklore, 1888: 211f), we read that the Irish kings Medb, Allia, Conchob, Fergus, and Finn assembled, but did not decide upon a king for Ulster because they were united against that kingdom. Therefore a farman is made there among them, that they might know from it to which of them they should give the kingdom. Thus this farman was done, i.e., a white sheet to be killed, and a man to eat of its flesh and his brood, and申报 for him from this sanctity, and the de ferdil (a certain charm) to be sung over him by four druids, and the sort of man who should be made king there was seen by him in vision from his form and from his description the sort of work he did. The man arose from his sleep, and his dream is told to the kings.' Such principles were the ancestors. In the above passages are pronounced over his palms by him who sought a revelation, after which he brought his palms to his cheeks and fell asleep, being guarded against any interruption. During his slumber the future was revealed to him (see above, p. 132); the text is corrupted and the above passage is very obscure. In other instances, dreams are hallucinated by fasting, vigils (q.v.), and they interest PE 33410 ff.; M. Hamilton, Incarnation, pp. 141, 121, 250, 1041 ff.

The place where such a revelation was vouchsafed would naturally be regarded as an abode of the Divine, and sacred stones and trees might long be held a centre of worship, as in the case of Bethel ('house of God', cf. 2 K 22:19, Am 7:14). Incarnation might also be practised at sacred stones and sacred trees. An excellent example of the former is found in the instance of the pre-Islamic priests who slept near the oval stone of al-Jaisad (J. Wellhausen, Reise arabisch, 1897, p. 55), and of the latter in the practice revived by Alexander the Great as he limbered under the plane tree at Smyrna (Pausanias, vii. 2). Consultation might likewise be sought in grave crises of the STATE, as was also on at least one occasion in Greece (Pausanias, iii. xxvi. 1). The usual locality for inception is the shrine or temple.

Thus, among the Mythians, when the king and his people had been assisted by the gods, who desired to show their power lest they be forgotten in Mehek prosperity, a maiden ('wise woman') gave a message to the king through him: 'Send all the men and women of the country to sleep in the temple of Tashkung (the god of the memory of the gods) and let the wise woman say in her sacred clothes... There in their dreams they were instructed to divide the people into sections, some for one day and some for others... Then, when they had told the king all the wonderful things communicated to them in their dreams, they were bidden to say to his majesty: the god had said' (C. G. Hodson, The Mysteries, London, 1898, p. 131).

Inception in shrines for advice in all sorts of problems of life is common, as in ancient Egypt (cf. E. E. B. 762), and especially v. 53, and among the modern Berbers (cf. E. E. B. 513). Of modern Mesopotamia we are told that 'the sheikah, the Muhammadan mullah, the Kama, and the Amea lie down in mosques or places of pilgrimage, and in ancient convents which formerly belonged to Christians, and to which they give the name of saints (from 120, to visit, go on pilgrimage 1, with the purpose of obtaining good dreams or inspirations suited to his purpose. In Mesopotamia it is not uncommon to find heretical or Catholic Christians who seek salvation in churches or convents to have good and lucky dreams' (C. H. Trench, in Antiquity, vol. 19).

From such consultation as to the proper course to be adopted in problems of various kinds has developed that type of inception which, because of its prominence in Greece, has gained much prominence, though not wholly deserved, prominence in the common parlance of comparative religion. This inception is in the main for the purpose of gaining cure from disease of the most diverse kinds. The object has been so thoroughly disused (see Literature appended below) that the briefest summary will be sufficient here (cf., for some special instances, also E. E. B. 542, 546, 552). There was a primitive American centre at Ismail.

'In their burial, the Aztecs' (the Mayas of Yucatan) raised one altar and temple to each of their gods, and dedicated them as a memorial; and they said that there they carried the soul and the sick, and the healthy.' The medicine man was appointed and healed by touching the hand... And therefore it was called and named Nahual, which means 'satisfied man,' in language, Selection de las cosas de Yucatan, ed. C. E. Brading, Munich, 1804, p. 306, quoted by H. E. Bamber, N.R.E. 173 (1876), 544.

The principal classical accounts, apart from the burlesque in Aristophanes' Phorbas (v. 638 ff.), are the stela of cures at Epidaurus (reading of S. f.; J. Baumann, Stud. auf dem Gebiete des Greek, v. der arischen Sprachens, 1. (Leipzig, 1888) 190-144; Hamilton, op. cit. 17-27); the Sacred Orations of Aristotle (ed. W. Dindorf, Leipz., 1852, summarized by Hamilton, 44-62); and the inscription set up at Epidaurus in the 2nd cent. A.D. by Julius Apellas, a Carian sophist (CIG iv. 936; Baunack, 110-118, Hamilton, 401 f.). In the earliest period there was entire dependence upon the healing, and he might work the cure either by himself acting as surgeon or by advising certain mediocines. Later skilled medical men became connected with the shrines, cooperating with, but not superseding, the revelations given by the gods in visions. Much obscurity exists as to the precise methods of procedure, and details doubtless varied at different times and under special circumstances. The general mode, however, seems to have been as follows:

On arriving at the shrine, the patient probably received instruction from the priest or priests, and was caused to perform
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... some rites and sacrifices to bring him to a thoroughly recipient frame of mind. After successful incubation, during which the patient was kept on the verge of death by the brute with actual cure or with counsel, the person thus healed was required to make certain payments being promised by recurrence of the disease. Your offerings would also be made, and in some instances were commensurate with the cure. The obscurity of these univale offerings, which is to be conjectured, were the earlier mode of showing gratitude, the 'tee being interpreted, in later times, as becoming comparatively elaborate and expensive in upkeep—naturally varied according to the means of those who had been cured. (See Ensign, 9th ed. 1858.) The reality of at least some of the cures resulting from incubation is acknowledged by many of the most prejudiced writers, and there is no doubt that a plethora of incantations and a complete cure of bodily ills.

There is, however, at least one point where scepticism seems warranted. It appears rather questionable whether the rites of incubation can be definitely derived (as by E. Thramer, above, vol. vi. p. 542) from Babylonia by way of Lydia. Incubation in its true meaning is far too widespread to be traced to any single locality for its origin; it is an expression of a religious conviction to a large part of the earlier human race; even the exact relation of the incubation of Asia Minor to that of Greece (cf. E.E.S. vi. 548) is uncertain. It may, in view of the lateness of our sources, have been influenced by the Greek practice; or it may (and this, perhaps, is the more probable hypothesis) have been an independent development.

INDEX.

INDEX (i.e. 'liberum prohibitorum') is the catalogue of books which ecclesiastical authority forbids Roman Catholics to read or have in their possession; by an extension, the name Index is used to cover the rules for the proscription of pernicious literature, and for the examination and censorship of books before publication. The Index is a product of positive ecclesiastical law; it is based on the assumption that bad books are dangerous, and concerns society as such, not the individual. The moral law forbidding the reading of pernicious books is motivated by the real danger lurking in them, and affects the individual directly.

I. HISTORY. It is natural that every religious community should set itself to prevent the publication and reading of such books as might disturb the faith and religion of its followers, or corrupt their morals. In the first centuries of Christianity there were doubtless prohibited the apocryphal and heretical writings (see especially the catalogue known as the Decretum Galliæum 'de libris recipiens vel non recipiens' (PL. lix. 152–164, 175–180)); and commanded pernicious writings to be committed to the flames (cf. Act 19:16); and the burning of heretical works, decreed by the Church, was sanctioned in the imperial law (cf. Juv. 2: 196, 208). Hence, also, the similitude of the 'Conciliar de Somma-Trinitate,' anno 449. Throughout the Middle Ages we find cases of heretical books being condemned. The true history of the Index does not begin, however, until the intercourse between the Church and the state grew into an assurance—when bad books were likely to be multiplied as rapidly as good ones. Before the close of the 15th cent. the University of Cologne passed the measure that finally became the 'Imprimatur,' or preliminary censorship of books; it prescribed the examination of every book before printing, and earned for the University the congratulations of Sixtus IV. and Innocent VIII. (14th Nov. 1487). By the constitution 'inter multis' (1st June 1561) Alexander VI. extended this practice; he forbade the printers of the dioceses of Cologne, Mainz, Trèves, and Mayence to print any book whatever, without the permission of the bishop; as for books already in print, the bishops were required to demand the printers' catalogues, and make them hand over the pernicious works to be consigned to the fire. These consciences became common law at the Lateran Council (Leo X., constitution 'Inter multis,' 4th May 1515).

The prohibition of books by name began in 1526 by Leo X.'s bull 'Exsurge Domine,' condemning all the works of John Hus. Clement VII. inserted examination laterat sententiae in the bull 'Concis,' as the penalty for reading books in support of heresy; this has remained unchanged to the present day. Lists of prohibited books soon began to be published by the Universities (Paris, 1542; Louvain, 1548; Cologne and Venice, 1549, etc.), the bishops (Milan, 1549, etc.), and the Inquisitions (Venice, 1554, etc.). Such an important movement demanded the attention of Rome; Paul IV. ordered the recently established Congregation of the Holy Office to make a catalogue of prohibited books, their first effort, printed in 1557, failed to give satisfaction, and a revised appeared at the beginning of the year 1559—the first official Roman Index. All the books in it are prohibited on pain of excommunication, and they are classified into three divisions: (1) authors condemned, with all their writings; (2) condemned books whose authors are known; and (3) pernicious literature, mostly anonymous. This Index was very strict; a bull of Paul IV. (1563) directed the Congregation of the Holy Office to consider, and, if necessary, issue a condemnation. In the Index of 1559, Cardinal Michel Ghislieri (afterwards Pope Pius V.), published, by order of Paul IV., a modification (moderatio) of the Index (24th June 1561). Almost immediately the Council of Trent took up its interrupted labours. In session xviii. (26th Feb. 1562) it commissioned eighteen fathers, assisted by theologians, to re-cull the catalogue of prohibited books and revise the general rules of the Index. The Commission had accomplished its task when the Council was abruptly concluded; but a detailed discussion of its work was impossible, and the assembly remitted the whole matter to the pope (sess. xxv., 4th Dec. 1563). The catalogue was almost the same as that of Paul IV., with its distribution into three classes; the rules, ten in number, were aimed principally at the books of heresies and heretics, and the editing and reading of the Bible; rule x. demanded the burning of the 'Imprimatur' for every printed publication. These rules, with several additional, remained in force until the time of Leo Xlll. In 1564, the rules of the Council of Trent were published by Pius IV. (bull 'Dominic gradus,' 24th March 1564).

In order to relieve the Congregation of the Holy Office without impairing its competency, Pius V.
established the Congregation of Cardinals 'de
reformando Indice et corrigendis libris' in March
1571. This institution, improved by Gregory XIII,
was included by Sixtus V. in the general re-expansion
of the Congregations (bull 'Immensa,' 22nd
Jan. 1588), with the title 'Congregatio pro Indice
librorum prohibitorum.' This Congregation was
consisting of a fixed number of cardinals, a per-
manent assistant, the Master of the Sacred Palace
(a Dominican, specially entrusted with the pre-
liminary censorship of books in Rome), a secretary
(also a Dominican), and several consultors, and
has continued almost unaltered down to our
own day. Pius X. having retained it in his re-
organization of the Roman Curia (constitution 'Sapienti consilio,' 29th June 1908). It is respon-
sible for the successive editions of the Index since
Sixtus V. and for various additions to the general
rules, as well as for the majority of condemnations
of books deemed pernicious.
A few words will suffice about the successive
editions of the Index. Those of 1559 and 1626,
printed, but not published (cf. Hilgcr, Der Index
der verbottcnen Buckcr, pp. 12, 324, 529), were super-
ceded by the 1566 edition, by order of Clement VIII.
In Alexander VII.'s pontificate, a new edition, by order of Clement VIII.
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retained, he appoints a competent reviewer to make a detailed study of it and indicate the objectionable passages; this report is discussed and the necessary countermeasures taken, and the decision is finally made by the General Council. The Congregation pronounces the condemnation of the work either absolutely or until correction (the condemnation 'doncee corrigitur' is now very rare). There is no injustice in condemning a book by a Roman Catholic, but it is another matter when the condemnation is directed against him but not against his book, which is circulated among the public, and against which readers must be warned. Benedict XIV., however, recommended that the Congregation should inform such an author and receive his defence. The decrees of condemnation are declared and promulgated in the name of the Congregation; the books are condemned everywhere and in every language (art. 45). Below the decrees are published the submissions of the authors received by the Congregation.

3. The preliminary censure of books and their publication. Certain books must be specially authorized; e.g., books put on the Index cannot be reprinted unless the corrections have been approved by the Congregation; official documents and collation lists are excluded. The Congregation cannot be edited except with their permission (arts. 30-33).

(b) Further, there are special regulations for certain classes of persons: missionaries must observe the decrees of the Propaganda; monks must obtain the consent of their superiors, besides that of the bishop; priests cannot publish any work or undertake the management of any periodical without the permission of their bishop (arts. 34, 36, 42).

(c) It is necessary to have the permission to print—the 'imprimatur'—of the bishop of the place of publication for all books on religious topics or sciences, but not for all books, as rule x. of Trent desired. The bishop entrusts the examination of the MS to a competent, upright, and impartial person, who studies it without bias; if, on examination, he sees nothing objectionable, he writes on the MS 'Nil obstat,' and signs; on this evidence, coming even from a censor of another language, the publisher gives permission to print. All this must appear at the beginning of the book, except in Britain, according to a decision of 1897 (art. 35, 38-41).

Preliminary censure of religious newspapers and periodicals was practically impossible; Pius x. substituted for it a special censor to read every publication officially and then submit his report (encycl. 'Pascendi,' 8th Sept. 1907).

4. Penalties. There are two kinds of penalties. Excommunication is incurred by those who write or print without permission a book or part of a book on the Index, as many people say, but not those who apostatize and heretics, countermines hearow, or the works condemned directly by the pope with mention of this penalty. Excommunication is the penalty also for those who without permission print or cause to be printed the books of Holy Scripture, and summaries, or commentaries on those books. For all other delinquencies the penalties are awarded by the bishops according to the degree of culpability (art. 5). The clause 'Opera omnia' put after the author's name does not now include those of his books that are not objectionable.

6. Conclusion. While the rules of the Index are wise and necessary, we must admit that the catalogue leaves room for criticism, owing to the conditions of our time rather than the actions of authority. It is abundantly evident that the Index is unsatisfactory to many people. It was not intended to condemn every harmful book by non-Catholic authors to pass, it seems to reserve its severity for the works of Roman Catholics which expose themselves to condemnation by certain tendencies rather than by definite errors. For this reason, the uniformity of condemnations without any indication of the degree of harmfulness, as if all the books on the Index were equally pernicious, is the more regrettable. Further, the faithful are led to regard the books inscribed in the catalogue of the Index as the most harmful, while they do not pay sufficient heed to the general rules, and think that every book that does not appear in the Index may be read. It would be far more to the purpose to appeal to the conscience and the observation of the general rules; for the Church finds it difficult to sanction its prohibitions in print or publications, and the Bishop is bound to grant permission to read prohibited books far and wide.

LITERATURE.—For the history: J. Hildes, Der Index der verbotenen Bücher, Freiburg im, 1899, Der Index im Papstbriefen, 50. 1907; F. H. Reusch, Der Index verbotenen Bücher, Breslau, 1899-90.


A. BUDDHISM.

INDIA.—See VEDIC RELIGION, BRAHMANISM, and HINDUISM. Caste and other subjects are treated separately, and under each of the great subdivided topics, like BIRTH, DEATH, DEMONS, etc., there is an Indian article. See also the various provinces and the religious cities each under its own name, and the art. MUHAMMADANISM IN INDIA. Christianity in India will be dealt with under MISSIONS.

INDIAN BUDDHISM.—The religion which was founded by Buddha (q.v.) towards the end of the 6th cent. B.C. is one of the three great world-religions, and has been calculated (but with considerable uncertainty) to have 600 millions of adherents at the present day. Its original and essential doctrine is that all earthly existence is suffering, the only means of release from which is renunciation and eternal death. The main importance of the Indian form of Buddhism lies in the fact that it represents the earliest phase of the religion; that it produced all the canonical texts of the faith; that without a knowledge of it the Buddhism of the many countries to which it has spread could not be understood; and that without the evidence of its architecture and sculpture the history of Indian art would be impossible. Though, like Christianity, it disappeared many centuries ago from the land of its birth, it has profoundly influenced the civilization of the Farther East, much as Christianity has done in the West. In India itself, Buddhism deeply affected the spiritual life of the country for over a thousand years, and occupies a prominent place in the historical development of the country.

1. History. Buddhism arose on peculiarly favourable soil, the S.E. half of the Gaugas territo-
450 B.C. This, the earliest approximate date in Indian history, is of the utmost importance in the chronology not only of Buddhism, but of Vedic and Epic Sanskrit literature also.

According to the statements of the Pāli texts, a few weeks after the death of the Master one of his most trusted followers, Kāsiyapu the Great, proposed to the Buddha that he should hold an assembly of monks who had been the immediate disciples of Buddha, for the purpose of reasserting the precepts of the Master, and fixing a new code of discipline (vinaya) and discipline (Vinaya) of the Order. An assembly was accordingly held at Rājagṛha, constituting the so-called first Buddhist Council (see COUNCILS AND SYNODS [Buddhist], vol. IV, p. 180). Buddhist tradition is unanimous in stating that exactly a century after Buddha's death the second General Council was held at Vaisali (ib. p. 183). In the reign of the famous king Asoka (p. 183) a third Council was held at Patalagruha after the schism of Mahāsāgāra (or Achāryāvaśa) had arisen (ib. p. 183).

The reign of Asoka, who ruled over the whole of India except the extreme south, forms an epoch of the highest importance in the history of Indian Buddhism. The patronage of so powerful a king must undoubtedly have supplied a mighty stimulus to the growth and spread of Buddhism in India, for the religion of which it was only one of several sects to the dominant position of a State religion. An era of zealous propaganda, not only throughout India, but in distant foreign countries, was inaugurated. Since all the Buddhist traditions agree on the date of the latter statement, it may be accepted as a historical fact. The conversion of Ceylon (see CEYLON BUDDHISM, vol. III, p. 331) was the most important result of these missionary expeditions. It is ascribed to Mahendra (Mahinda), son or (according to the Skr. Buddhist texts) younger brother of Asoka and a pupil of Tissa Moggaliputta. All sources agree in attributing the introduction of Buddhism into Ceylon to the reign of Asoka. Another prominent apostle was Madhyāntika, who carried the faith to Gandhāra and Kāśmir, while Mahādeva proselytized Mysore.

That a body of canonical texts already existed in the time of Asoka is shown by one of his edicts (that of the Bairat rock), in which he enumerates some of canonical works, and recommends their study by monks and nuns as well as by the laity. Some of these works were probably of both the doctrinal (sutta) and disciplinary (vinaya) type of canonical text were among them.

It is to be noted that, in consequence of his zeal for the faith, there arose in Asoka's reign that religious architecture which furnishes continuous and striking monumental illustrations of the history of Buddhism in India for many centuries till the disappearance of that religion from the land of its origin.

During the 330 years that elapsed between the death of Asoka and A.D. 100, Buddhism steadily strengthened its position in the north of India, though it was not favoured by the kings of the Sāṅga dynasty, the founder of which, Pusyamitra, is stated in more than one Buddhist source even to have suppressed the entire faith. In the 2nd cent. B.C. the doctrine certainly flourished in the N.W. under the Graeco-Indian rulers. There seems no reason to doubt that the most celebrated of these, Alexander the Great (known in Pāli as Müinda-Paśāka, or 'Questions of Menander'). Meanwhile, Buddhist doctrine spread beyond the confines of India to Sāstria and China, while in Ceylon it established that supremacy which it has retained ever since. In India itself, however, dimensions and schisms had been growing to such an extent that by the end of this period eighteen distinct sects were in existence.

With the reign of the Indo-Scythian king Kanishka (A.D. 78), a new epoch in the history of Indian Buddhism begins. The wide dominion conquered by him comprised Kāśmi, Gândhāra, Kāśmir, Sāndh, and parts of Central India. The memory of this mighty monarch was revered by the Buddhists of Northern India almost as much as that of Asoka. Like the latter, he was not originally a Buddhist, but adopted the faith after the fact that most of his coins bear the symbols of an Iranian religion; comparatively few of them have Buddhist emblems, but one shows a figure of Buddha, with the legend 'Buddha' on the reverse. The Skr. Buddhist tradition ascribes his conversion to Sādharma, but we have no evidence as to the probable date of its occurrence. Under Kanishka's auspices, another Buddhist Council was held, probably about A.D. 100 (see COUNCILS AND SYNODS [Buddhist], vol. IV, p. 184). The place where it met is variously stated as Jālandhara (in the Eastern Punjab) or Kaudalavara (in Kāśmi). The traditional accounts given of it are vague and conflicting; but we may conclude that it was attended by representatives of all the 18 sects of the older Buddhism called Śrāvakas or Hinayānists, and that the views of the new school of the Mahāyānists (see art. HINAYĀNA) on the doctrine of the Buddha, not represented or found no support. Yet all the Indian Buddhists, including the Mahāyānists, acknowledged the authority of the Council. The Ceylon bishops were, however, not represented in its deliberations. The main result of this meeting was the cessation of the divisions that had prevailed for a century among the Hinayānists, although it by no means extinguished the new doctrine of Mahāyānism; and the statement of a Tibetan authority that on the occasion of this Council the sacred books were revised, and thus some parts of the canon were then written down for the first time, is not improbable. None of the sources says anything about the language in which the sacred books were now recorded, but the Chinese pilgrim Hsin Tsang appears to assume that they were written in Sanskrit.

Under the influence of Hinduism the Mahāyāna doctrine, combining a fervent devotion (bhakti) to the Buddha with the works of the Buddha, became a kind of theism in which Buddha occupied the place of the personal deity in the Vedānta system of the Brahmans. This doctrine was destined to have a far-reaching influence on the history of Buddhism as a world religion; for by appealing to the sympathies of the masses it ultimately not only absorbed all the Buddhist sects of Northern India, but became the religion of all the countries that derived their faith from Skr. Buddhism. The old orthodox faith of the Pāli canon henceforth became restricted to Ceylon and the countries proselytized from that island. Since even the name of Kanishka is not found in the religious literature of Ceylon, its Buddhism appears to have been cut off from that of India by the 1st cent. A.D.

Many inscriptions, ranging from the time of Kaniska over more than two centuries, show that Buddhism flourished at Mathurā (Maṭṭha) by the side of Jainism. Other sources indicate that the Doctrine propagated in Kāśmi, Kūndālikā, and the N.W. of India. The epigraphic evidence of Nāsh and Kārī proves that there were numerous Bud-

About A.D. 400 one of the Chinese pilgrims, Fa Hien, describes the condition of Buddhism as very flourishing in Udayana (the
Swa territory), in the Pathākh, and at Mathura, though he never lived outside the territory of Nālandā (in Magadhā), the chief seat of Buddhist learning two centuries later. The same author is variously identified as the Buddhism schismatic school of the Mahāyana, which was fully developed; two, the Mahābhāskara and the Sattavākā, who were later, were adherents of the Hinayāna, while the third, the Mahāvijñāna, belonged to the Mahāyāna. The Mahāyānists, whose reputed founder was Nāgārjuna, were purely philosophical, holding that the phenomenal world is a mere illusion, an adaptation of the Māyā doctrine of the scholastic Vedanta of Hinduism. From Pañcāla we also learn that at Mathura the Mahāyānists and the Mahāvijñāna were worshipped, and that at Pāphālāputra the Hinayānists had one monastery and the Mahāyānists another, with 600 or 700 monks between them. Two other Chinese pilgrims, Hsuán Tsang and 1-8, who visited India in 629-40 and 673-80 respectively, tell us much about the state of things in the 6th and 7th centuries. During this period Buddhist scholasticism flourished greatly, the contention between the sects gradually weakening and resolving itself into rivalry between the two main parties of Hinduism and Mahāyānists. The great pentagon of the faith in the 7th and 8th was the famous monk Nāgārjuna of Kāsana (A.D. 550-640), who, originally a Sāivist, became an ardent Mahāyānist, but was tolerant to all sects except the Hinayānists. In fact, such religious rubbish as prevailed existed between Mahāyānists and Hinayānists, while the relations between Hinduism and Buddhism were peaceful. Hsuán Tsang found Buddhism, prospering not only in India, but in Kasmir and Nepal, where Buddhism and Hinduism lived in harmony. The last great Buddhist champion of Buddhism in India was Dānmahākirti, who flourished between the time of Hsuán Tsang and 1-8. In the 9th and early 10th centuries a revival of Hinduism took place, chiefly under the influence of the two great dialecticians Kumārila and Saṅkara (born A.D. 788), whom the tradition of Buddhism attributed to the Pelas dynasty of Bengal (A.D. 800-1050), who were protectors of Buddhism. Under their successors, the Sena kings, who were Hindus, though not active opponents of the Buddha, Buddhism still further declined till it received its death-blow in Magadha from the Muhammadan invasion in A.D. 1290, all the monks either being killed or fleeing. Buddhism lingered on for a considerable time after that date in other parts of India. Thus a Buddha stone inscription of A.D. 1220 from Srawasti shows that the doctrine was not altogether extinct in India in the 13th century. In Bengal it still had a few adherents in the 16th century. In Orissa it died out in the middle of that century, in consequence of the conquest of the country by the Muslim Governor of Bengal. In Kāsimār the accession to power of a Muhammadan ruler put an end to Buddhism in A.D. 1340. In Nepal, however, Buddhism has maintained its existence, in a degenerate form, by the side of Hinduism down to the present day.

2. Literature. — For this see art. LITERATURE (Buddhist).

3. Doctrines. — Since Buddhism arose on the basis of Brahmanism, its essential features cannot be fully understood without clearly ascertaining which of the religious ideas of the antecedent religion it retained and which of them it retained. On the other hand, Buddhism repudiated the divinity of the Vedas and the Vedico-sacrificial system; he condemned self-mortification; he denied the existence both of a world soul and of the individual soul; he discarded the distinction of male and female in the monastic order, though not as a general classification of society; and he was entirely averse to speculation on metaphysical problems, to which the adherents of Brahmanism were so prone. On the other hand, Buddhism held fast to the belief in transmigration (samsāra) and retribution (karma) practically unchanged; he also adhered to the doctrine that the great goal of endeavor is release from transmigration to be attained by means of renunciation. But this more or less residual Brahmanism could not possibly have constituted a new religion.

What, then, were the fundamental features that made the teaching of Buddha a new force in the life and thought of India? Stated quite generally, the doctrine of Buddha, on its philosophical side, was pronounced pessimism: the deep-rooted conviction that all earthly existence is suffering, the only means of release from which is the abandonment of all desire. Even this fundamental doctrine is only a development of the view of life already apparent in the Upaṇiṣads. Buddha may in this respect be regarded as a genuine descendant of the Yajñavalkya of the Brāhmaṇas, who turned with aversion from this unsatisfying world and sought refuge in the hopeless life of the spiritual mendicant. It must also be noted that Jīva and R. G. B. hold that the Sāṅkhya (g.v.) supplied the foundations of the metaphysical side of Buddhism. On the other hand, we know this most pessimistic of all the Brahman systems of philosophy had only been fully developed as it appears in the classical texts of the system, which are posterior by many centuries to the rise of Buddhism. Yet it is possible that, as the Sāṅkhya doctrine and the philosophical side of Buddhism have some common, a much earlier phase of the Sāṅkhya (of the existence of which we have no direct evidence) may have exercised a certain influence on primitive Buddhism in India. In what may be called its religious side — it was rather a religion of humanity — primitive Buddhism was a system of practical morality, the key-note of which is universal charity: kindness to all beings, animals as well as men. It is here that the originality of Buddha’s teaching is chiefly to be found; for the sphere of ethics had been neglected by Brahman thought, which was mainly directed to ritual and theological speculation. To this source is to be traced the profound influence exercised by Buddhism as a world religion.

The whole of the Buddhist doctrines are set forth in the fundamental Four Noble Truths, the first three of which represent the philosophical, the fourth the religious, aspect of the system. These truths are: all that exists is subject to suffering; the origin of suffering is human passions; the cessation of passions releases from suffering; the path that leads to the cessation of suffering is the eightfold path. They already play the chief part in the first address of Buddha, the sermon of Benares, and they continually recur in the sacred books of the Buddhists.

(1) The very first of them shows the thoroughly pessimistic character of the Buddhist attitude. Indeed, the Buddhist scriptures constantly dwell on the transitoriness and worthlessness of all things, and no other religion is so penetrated by the belief in the utter vanity and misery of existence.

(2) The origin of suffering is described as due to thérth (rājya, Pāli taṭhā), or the desire of life, which, until it is destroyed, leads to continued transmigration and retribution. That the origin of ‘thérth’ is explained by the formula of causation (pratītya-samutpāda, Pāli patiḥchchha-samutpāda, ‘origination from an antecedent cause’). This is one of the principal teachings of Buddhism as supplying a solution of the problem of evil.
'Thirst' is traced backward through a chain of several causes to ignorance, 'ignorance' (avidya), or lack of knowledge of the doctrine of Buddhism. From ignorance are derived the latest impressions (samskaras) of former acts, constituting present tendencies, and leading to present acts. While his contemporary Mahatma Gomila, founder of the Ajivika (g.t.) sect, denied the freedom of the will, he who did not know the formula of causation confused the doctrine of rebirth with the notion of a new birth. From the samskaras were produced 'consciences' (vijñāna), then, the views of the individual, regarded as a non-corporeal element that does not perish with the body, but remains along with the samskaras after death, and with these forms the germ of subsequent acts. These views are evolved 'name and form' (nāma-rūpa), equivalent to 'the individual.' From these, again, arise the six organa, that is, the five senses and 'mind' (manas); in other words, the individual assumes a practical form. From the organs are produced 'contact,' 'contact perception,' which is the immediate source of 'thirst'. From 'thirst' arises 'attachment' (upadhi) to worldly objects. This leads to continued 'becoming' (samsāra), an infinite series of new existences. These, finally, are the cause of birth, old age, and death, pain, suffering, sorrow, and despair.

The doctrine next in importance to that of causation is the doctrine of the five ākandhas (Pali khandhas), or elements of existence, of which every thinking being is composed: body, sensation, perception, consciousness, and the mind (ākandhas). In this connexion samskāra means mental powers or emotions, such as reflection, joy, and hate, of which there are 92. Vījñāna as a ākandha signifies critical cognition or judgment, of which there are 99 subdivisions. A being conceived was regarded as not in a permanent condition, but always in a state of becoming, personality being only an apparent, temporary, and transitory endowment. A sense remained the same in the next existence: as only the elements of the mind are constantly changed, like the flames of a lamp in successive watches of the night, he thus suffered the consequences of his deeds in the previous existence.

The Buddha's 'middle view' was regarded by Buddhists as a middle way between the two extremes of asceticism and sensual indulgence. It is the belief that the pursuit of either extreme will lead to neither happiness nor true liberation from the cycle of rebirth. The path to enlightenment involves the practice of the virtues and the cultivation of the mind. The practice of virtue and the cultivation of the mind are essential for the attainment of Nirvana, the ultimate goal of Buddhism.

The practice of virtue and the cultivation of the mind are essential for the attainment of Nirvana, the ultimate goal of Buddhism. This is achieved through the Bodhisattva ideal, which emphasizes the importance of the cultivation of wisdom, compassion, and loving-kindness. The Bodhisattva ideal is central to Buddhist thought and practice, and it is through the cultivation of these virtues that an individual can attain enlightenment.

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Buddha laid great stress on the propagation of his doctrine by means of missionaries, his monks were scattered all over India and beyond its confines, forming many small and remote communities, over which his influence could not possibly extend. There was thus during his lifetime not one community, but very many. His personality, however, gave unity to the Order. But he neither designated nor made personally any visible head of the Church. This necessarily resulted in the formation of many sects, of which, two centuries after Buddha's death, there were no fewer than eighteen, with their own monasteries. The highest authority was the whole Church, or Sanga. 'Elders' (sākhāra, Pāli theragāha) were distinguished, but they were not officials, the term being merely an honorary title bestowed on monks who had long been ordained. This obvious looseness of organization in the Buddhist Church was undoubtedly a great source of weakness throughout its history, and was one of the main causes leading to its ultimate downfall in India.

(a) Confession.—The disciplinary and penal code of the Church was embodied in the Pātimokkha (Sk. Pratīyākṣa), a formulary of confession constituting one of the chief features of the ascetic life. It is a list of sins enjoined by Buddha to be recited twice a month on the days of full and new moon in an assembly of at least four monks. At the end of each section the reciter inquired whether any of these present had transgressed any one of the articles that it contained. These two confessional days are called upavisa, a term originally meaning 'fast-day,' since it was inherited from Brahmanism, in which it designated the Saturday on the eve of the great soma-sacrifice. The eighth day after the first and the eighth after full moon were also upavisa days, though not for confession. These four days together constituted the weekly recurring festivals of the nature of Sak的基础上。On these days laymen put on their best clothes, and the priests refrained from business and worldly amusements. Laymen were also regarded as religious if they did not observe, on the Sabbath, the first three of the five commandments especially enjoined on monks.

(b) Admission.—A man became a Buddhist layman by pronouncing the creed consisting in the words, 'I take refuge in Buddha, I take refuge in the Law, I take refuge in the Order.'—these refrains being called the three 'jewels.' He then had to promise to keep the Buddhist law, and to be ready to sacrifice the life of a monk or nun any one, without distinction of caste or race, could be admitted excepting murderers, robbers, slaves, soldiers, and persons suffering from contagious diseases or certain bodily defects. The act of admission is called pārājikā (Pāli pārājika), by emitting the yellow robe, shaving his hair and beard, and uttering the creed thrice in the presence of an ordained monk.

(c) Ordination...
accepted by the assembly, exhumed him to restrict himself to the four 'requisites' and to avoid the four capital sins. A monk could be temporarily or permanently expelled for committing any of these sins, or for general untrustiness; but he could also voluntarily leave the Order. A result of entering the Order was the dissolution of marriage. The new monk had also to give up all private property, and was debarred from acquiring anything outside the Order. The practice of marriage was forbidden to the Order.

(d) Clothing and equipment. A monk might possess only one suit of clothes, consisting of three parts: an under-garment, equivalent to a shirt; a lower garment, a kind of skirt reaching to the knees and fastened with a girdle; and a mantle which, coming down to below the knees, was thrown over the left shoulder, leaving the right shoulder and part of the breast bare. The colour of the garments in early times was yellow (as it still is in Ceylon), but in the Middle Ages it was reddish. Only a few other articles were required to complete the monk's equipment. One of these was an alms-bowl, which he carried in his hand for the purpose of collecting food. He was also provided with a razor, which he used for shaving his head and his beard twice a month on the occasion of his birthday. The bowl comprised a needle, a water-strainer, and later also a mendicant's staff. Besides regularly paring his nails, he used tooth-sticks for cleansing his teeth.

(e) Housing. Originally the monks had no fixed abodes, but lived in woods or caves, though within easy reach of a village or town, so as to be able to beg food. It was their duty to wander about, preaching the doctrine, but during the rains they went into retreat (vàrājaka, Pali váraṇa), generally several of them together. For their use during the retreat, pious laymen often built shelters to which they annually returned during the rains. These were called vihāras, in which monks later began to live even at times other than the rainy season. In this way regular monasteries gradually grew up.

(f) Food. In early times the monk was allowed only one daily meal, and that at noon, after his return from his begging rounds. The use of pí, or begging, was always prohibited. On the contrary, rice and sugar were permitted to members of the Order only in times of sickness, otherwise it was treated as an offence requiring confession and absolution. Fish and meat were absolutely prohibited under certain restrictions. Thus Buddhist himself is recorded to have eaten pork. Like the Balúman religious student, the Buddhist monk had to beg his food, but he was not allowed to ask for alms by word of mouth.

(g) Worship. In the early days of Buddhism, religious observances were of a very simple character. Twice a month all the monks of a district assembled to celebrate the uposatha, or Sabbath days, at new and full moon. The meeting, having been convened by the eldest among them, was held in the evening at the place designated. It was restricted to ordained monks, but all of these had to be present. It comprises, as has already been said, in a ceremony of confession. The Sabbath in general were days of rest and fasting, when no trade or business was allowed, hunting and fishing were forbidden, and schools and courts of justice were closed. Preaching and hearing sermons were a common feature of the celebration of every Sabbath. But the regular time for this was the retreat during the rains—an institution dating from the very commencement of Buddhism. The retreat began on the day of full moon in the month of Ashada (June-July), and ended with the day of full moon in the month of Kartika (about the middle of October). Its conclusion was marked by the Pāramiṇa festival, held, before the wandering of the monks again began, on the 14th and 15th days of the light fortnight, the latter being at the same time a Sabbath. This was made an occasion for giving presents, especially in the form of clothes, to the monks who invited them to dinner, and for celebrating processions.

In later times there was also a quinquennial festival, called Pañcaviśākha, on a grand scale, its distinctive feature being the presentation of extraordinary liberality to the Order. In the first half of the 7th century, King Harsha of Kanauj regularly consecrated such assemblies. In the 7th century the date of the Nivedana of Buddha was also celebrated as a great festival.

It was not long after the establishment of Buddhism that the worship of relics and the adoration of sacred sites began to develop. Buddha himself, before he died, recommended four sites as deserving to be visited by the places: his birthplace, the place where he obtained enlightenment, where he first preached, and where he entered into Parinirvāṇa. After the cremation of Buddha, his relics, as we are told in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, were divided into eight parts, over which the various relics were divided into stūpas. The veneration of relics later became a very rich developed form of worship. Among these, the tooth relic, with which a whole sect is concerned, played a prominent part.

The records of the Chinese pilgrims show that stūpas were also erected over the relics of Buddha's descendants, and similar monuments in various cities, such as Vaiśali and Mathura. Fa Hian, about A.D. 410, saw Buddha's relics at Bodh-Gaya, near Nāgarāj (south of the Kabul river). In the 7th century, the head-stūpa of Buddha when a boy was to be seen in South India at Kōkhanapuram, where it was displayed on Sabbath days and honoured with flowers. In the same century, shadows, regarded as relics left by Buddha, were shown in caves at Kāśi, Gaya, and Nāgarāj. From the 1st century A.D. onwards, images of Buddha of Pāthakbodhivas and Dhyānabodhis, and Buddha- phenomena began to be made.

5. Art. Indian Buddhist art is peculiarly important, not only because it is of great value as illustrating the fortunes of Buddhism in India during nearly the whole course of its existence there, but because, if it has been lost, there could be no history of Indian art at all. The remains of Buddhist art in India are almost entirely architectural and sculptural. None of them, with one exception, goes back to a period earlier than the reign of the emperor Ashoka (variously fixed at 272-231 B.C. and 264-228 B.C.). The three centuries over which they spread may be divided into three roughly equal periods. In the first, 220 B.C. to A.D. 50, stone began to be employed in India for Buddha. Before this the architectural use of brick was known, as is shown by the stūpas of Pāphāvājana, which date from about 300 B.C. or perhaps earlier. But the ornamental edifices of the pre-Ashokan age must have been made of wood, like the modern palaces of Burma, the substructure alone being stone.

The whole history of Indian architecture points to previous construction in wood, the stone monuments being largely imitations of wooden models.

(a) Architecture. Indian Buddhist architecture may be divided into three classes: (1) stūpas, or reliquary mounds; (2) chaityas, or assembly halls, corresponding to our churches; (3) vihāras, or dwellings for monks.

(1) The stūpa was a dome-shaped structure, developed from the sepulchral mound, in which baked bricks were substituted for earth with a view to durability. This monument served to enclose the remains of an abbott of the early Buddhist the religious edifices. In the earliest sculptures we constantly find representations of the ab Patronage by
cestial beings, men, and even animals, such as elephants. It was also the sacred object always set up for circumambulation in all the early Buddhist monasteries.

(2) The chaitya (q.v.), or assembly hall, is the exact counterpart of Christian churches not only in form, but in use. Till recently only rock-cut examples, to the number of about thirty, were known in India. The type of their style can be followed step by step throughout these nine centuries. The oldest, dating from near the commencement of the reign of Asoka, are at Barabar, 16 miles north of Bodh Gaya. Here, for the first time, we find a structure such as we believe to represent in rock the form of the strucntural chaityas of the age, all the details clearly imitating those of wooden buildings. All the most important examples of chaityas occur at six places in Western India. As we pass from the earliest to the latest specimens, we can clearly trace progress towards stone construction on the one hand and degeneracy in cult on the other. In the later specimens at Ajanta (q.v.) a striking change is the fact that figure sculpture has superseded the plainer ornamental carvings of the earlier caves. The greatest change, however, is that figures of Buddha have now been introduced in addition to the earlier chaityas. In the earlier caves only ordinary mortals are sculptured, but Buddha himself never appears. Now he is the object of worship, his image being introduced in the front of the stūpa itself, which alone was previously adored in the older chaityas. In place of the earlier total lack of images we are here confronted with an overwhelming idolatry, in which Buddha, originally regarded as a human being, is the chief deity. By the latest of the Ajanta caves, dating from about A.D. 600, the sculptures are more mythological, evidently approximating to the iconography of Brahmanism.

The caves of Ellora (q.v.) are particularly interesting, because here the juxtaposition of Buddhist with Hindu and Jain temples throws light on the relation of the three religions. The large Buddhist assembly hall at this place dates from about A.D. 600.

Besides many other evidences of architectural lateness, its most striking feature is the stūpa which, instead of being circular, has a large frontispiece that makes it look like this: and contains a figure of a seated Buddha surrounded with attendants and flying figures in the latest style. In what is probably the most recent Buddhist cave temple in India, at Kholi, the stūpa is no longer solid, but is hollowed out into a cell, in which an image of Buddha is placed, and a successively smaller stūpa is built over it. The stūpa is the latest step in the development of the chaitya. A link connecting this stage with the later Jain and Hindu temples is to be found in the structural Vigna temple dating from about A.D. 700. Here the stūpa is superseded by a cell for the image, but the stūpa still stands as a separate tower, and is separated from the hall by a wall. The transition is completed by making the cell square, as in the case at Petrapole, but with a cell for the Buddha, while in the later Hindu temples of the temples of the Hindu temples of the first class, the cell is in the base and hence not visible.

The archaeological evidence of the development of the Buddhist religion gradually grew later, and came nearer and nearer to Hinduism. It supplies us with concrete evidence showing how Buddhist art was gradually disappearing before the encroachment of the new form of the faith, from an earlier phase of the Chaitya.

(3) Beside the chaityas there arose vihāras, or monasteries, as residences for the Buddhist monks. Our knowledge of these is still more dependent than that of chaityas on rock-cut examples. There are about 900 Buddhist examples of this class in India.

The vihāras, as a rule, of a hall, generally square but sometimes oblong, surrounded by a number of cells or sleeping-quarters, cubicles and hall by a list consisting of a nave and side aisles terminating in an apse or semi-dome. The pillars separating the nave from the aisles are continued round the apse. Under the flames of the pillars in the stūpa, in nearly the same position as that occupied by the altar in a Christian church. The tee was doubtless usually surmounted by a wooden umbrella, which has, however, everywhere disappeared except at Karli, the finest cave of this type in India. The roof is semicircular. Over the doorway, which is opposite the stūpa, is a gallery, and above this a large window shaped like a horse-shoe. This window is constantly repeated on the façade as an ornament.

In the rock chaityas, the excavation of which extended from about 280 B.C. to about A.D. 600, there seems to be little evidence of their style can be followed step by step throughout these nine centuries. The oldest, dating from near the commencement of the reign of Asoka, are at Barabar, 16 miles north of Bodh Gaya. The most important of these is carved so as to represent in rock the form of the strucntural chaityas of the age, all the details clearly imitating those of wooden buildings. All the most important examples of chaityas occur at six places in Western India. As we pass from the earliest to the latest specimens, we can clearly trace progress towards stone construction on the one hand and degeneracy in cult on the other. In the later specimens at Ajanta (q.v.) a striking change is the fact that figure sculpture has superseded the plainer ornamental carvings of the earlier caves. The greatest change, however, is that figures of Buddha have now been introduced in addition to the earlier chaityas. In the earlier caves only ordinary mortals are sculptured, but Buddha himself never appears. Now he is the object of worship, his image being introduced in the front of the stūpa itself, which alone was previously adored in the older chaityas. In place of the earlier total lack of images we are here confronted with an overwhelming idolatry, in which Buddha, originally regarded as a human being, is the chief deity. By the latest of the Ajanta caves, dating from about A.D. 600, the sculptures are more mythological, evidently approximating to the iconography of Brahmanism.

The plan of the third resembles that of the second, but the sculptures are all unmistakably Brahman. This is evidently the earliest Hindu cave, being a close copy of the preceding Buddhist example.

(4) Sculpture.—In the earliest period there are no images of Buddhás or Bodhisattvas. No sculptur of Buddha, in any of his conventional attitudes, that has been executed has been assigned to an earlier date than the end of the 1st cent. A.D. Reverence was paid during the first period to relics, stūpas, Bo-trees, footprints of Buddha, and sacred symbols, such as the thurible and the wheel of the law. These are constantly represented in the sculptures as adored by men, and even animals.

The sculptures of this period are found at Bihārī (now in the University Museum) and at Bodh Gaya, and in the early temples and monasteries of Western India. They appear on the rails and gates of the vihāras, on most bushes, and on the pillars and façades of chaityas and vihāras. The most ancient railings, as they are called, date from about A.D. 700. They soon began to be adorned with bosses, pannels, and friezes. The railing at Bihārī (500–119 B.C.) is covered all over in a part of the sculptures, which is now practically a treasure in stone on Buddhist mythology. The gateways of the vihāras are covered with sculptures, which are generally connected with Buddhist legend. It is worthy of note that both here and at Bihārī occur representations of Lakṣmi, the Hindu goddess of fortune, in the form of a lion or with an elephant on each side of pouring water over her from pots. This is the earliest example in Indian sculpture of worship being paid to any being, divine or human.

The commencement of the second period of Buddhist religious art coincides with the Mahāyāna school. Its history begins in the extreme north-west, the region of Gandhāra.
INDIFFERENTISM

Representations of Buddha and of numerous Bodhisattvas suddenly appear in the Buddhist monasteries of this district for decorative purposes. The current A.D. 599, which is characteristic of this new phase of Buddhism that figures of Buddha occupy the cells originally meant for monks, and that the heads of these figures are always adorned with a halo. In this corner of India was created the conventional type of Buddha images, which, spreading from this source to other parts of India, was finally diffused over the whole of the Buddhist world. From the already stereotyped character of the figure, it was possible to confuse the Buddha with the gods, with several heads and many arms. Probably the earliest image of Buddha is a statue found in the tomb of a monk of the 2nd century B.C. The statue shows Buddha in the lotus position, with two arms raised, one holding a danda, and the other, a lotus flower. This statue is said to have been found in a cave near Bhubaneshwar in Orissa.


INDIFFERENTISM.—This doctrine makes its first clear appearance in Stoic ethics. Virtue consists in living according to nature; but certain things are in our power, certain things are not. The latter are abdāpheres, things indifferent; they have nothing to do with the motives of the virtuous man; he must be entirely independent of them, taking them as they come, but trying to do nothing for, or indeed, if it is really impossible—either to secure or to avoid them. But the former are in our power, such as desire, impulse, inclination; others are not, such as the body, property, reputation. Should you really know what is your own, and what is not your own, you ought to exercise the most moderate restraint over your desires; you will never blame or chide another; no one will injure you, and you will never have an enemy' (Epic. Men. i. 113.). Virtue is nothing but the good will: Epictetus illustrates this by the story of two lads who were sent to fetch Plato: the one sought for him everywhere, but missed him; the other spent his time listening to strolling jesters in the street, and then happened to see Plato passing, and gave him the message. 'Abdāpheres, on the other hand, are things which, properly speaking, 'neither help nor hurt, such as health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, good birth, and its opposites, health, disease, toil, disgrace, weakness, poverty,' etc. (Diog. Laert. vii. 103.). It is this concept of virtue, which is the chief element in the popular view of Stoicism, and it forms an interesting contrast to Aristotle's description of the 'great-souled man,' for whom the things in the first class of abdāpheres as described above are a necessary condition of happiness, and can only be received from other people.

But there are three objections to the conception:

1. It leaves man without guidance in a large part of life; (2) it is too narrow for the average man; (3) it is impracticable, since all life involves a continuous
INDIGITAMENTA

The Roman Indigentia were those portions of the pontifical books (Serv. Georg. ii. 21; and Urbanii Indigentia) whose origin was traced to King Numa Pompilius (Arnob. ii. 73: "Pompianna indigentia"). The citations made from the ancient books go back to the 3rd century A.D., the time of Granius Flaccus (Censor. de die Nat. iii. 2).

INDIVIDUALISM.

The term 'individualism' may be taken either in a generic or in a normative sense. In the former sense it denotes a system which presupposes the existence of a political society and its laws, as well as in the great manifestations of the human mind, creations of isolated or associated individuals; in the latter it denotes a principle according to which the integral and free development of the individual or the community shall be the aim of social life. Individualism in the generic sense has a historical significance; individualism in the normative sense has a moral significance. They may stand independently of each other; but, as a matter of fact, individualism in the generic sense of the word is often allied to a tendency which is individualistic in the normative sense, i.e. individualism in the generic sense only traces back to the origins of societies, which thus form a First Cause, the aim which we claim to assign to them, or, in other words, transfers into the historical mind of the individual the idea of his isolated social and political life. It seems best, therefore, to treat these two notions without separating them; as a matter of fact, they are often united and even confused. We shall discuss: (1) religions individualism, (2) moral individualism, and (3) political, social, and juridical individualism.

1. Religious individualism.—Primitive religions regarded the individual merely as the member of a clan, tribe, or community. Even their deities were not developed individualities, but personifications of forces of nature or of social laws. It was only gradually that the poets gave them more definite and powerful characters. The connexion of the religion of Israel has the same character as the other national religions. Jehovah is the God of a people. It is to this people that He has given His law. For transgressions of this law He demands satisfaction indifferently from just and unjust—those who have not sinned as well as the sinners who are guilty. The individual simply shares the lot of the whole of which he is a part.

The time of the prophecies witnessed the development of ideas in the meaning of individualism. The prophets themselves were powerful individualities who, strong by means of their inspiration and the revelations which they were given, overcame the old religious objects, opposed the people and the national tradition, preaching the religion of justice in opposition to the religion of worship, and realizing in their person an individual communion between God and man. They undoubtedly still speak to the people as a whole; they announce the punishments of God to the people as a whole, but in a different spirit. On the one hand, there appears the idea that the sufferings of the just are not punishments, but dispensations of God in view of the salvation of sinners by means of expiation; it is prominent in the parts of Deuteron. On the other hand, Ezekiel develops the idea of a strictly individual justice: every one will suffer for his own sins; they will no longer say in Israel: 'The father's home sitting to their face, and the children's teeth are set on edge' (Ezk 18).

The book of Job also marks an important stage in the development of religious individualism in Israel. Conscience was still subdued to facts; the Israelites judged themselves according to their faith, and they judged themselves in the same way. This is the point of view of Job's friends; they prove to him that he is guilty because he is unfortunate. But Job protests. To the verdict of
outward conditions he opposes that of his conscience, and maintains that, even if he were to despair of the justice of God, his exceptional misfortunes are not the proof of exceptional wickedness. He does not regard himself as an example of a sinner; his predominant feeling is that his conduct has been upright; and his friends are in the main convinced by God Himself, whose cause they thought they were defending. This is the triumph of the individual conscience over the collective conscience. The victory of individualism is completed by the coming of the doctrine of resurrection and the judgment of the dead which is announced in the book of Daniel and gradually becomes implanted in the mind of the Jewish people. The triumph of this belief was due—at least in the minds of many scholars—partly to the effect of foreign influences on the Israelite mind. Certain religions, e.g., Judaism and the ancient Egyptian religion, in their beliefs concerning the life to come and the judgment of the dead, have a very important individualistic element. As regards Jewish piety, it is more and more assumed the character of an individual effort to merit eternal life, by good works and a strict observance of the law. The ancient idea of national solidarity did not disappear, however, and the hopes still continued to bear a national character. The individual soul is the special object of Jesus. It is the object of His appeals, His solicitude, His promises. To Him the work of saving souls was more important than that of saving His people, although this too is not neglected. He was the real initiator of religious individualism, by the announcement of His filial communion with God and consequent salvation for all sinners, and by His invitation to His followers to enter into a communion with the heavenly Father similar to, if not identical with, His own communion with the Father. With St. Paul the individual soul is predominant; we find him, however, the idea of the Church as the body of Christ. He does not place it above individual souls, but there appears in his Church the notion of a spiritual reality which enters into competition with the individual. Afterwards the Church is regarded as an institution of divine origin, the mediator between God and man, and the regenerator of the thorough-going of the individual. In fact, if not in theory, the individual exists for the Church rather than the Church for the individual. The Christian becomes a member of the Church by a sacrament which is administered to him at a time when he has not the power to reject it, and he remains a member, not because of personal qualities, but because of the sacrament, as long as the Church does not think fit to exclude him from its communion.

Alongside of the Church institution another type of religious association appears in the Middle Ages, viz. the sect—if we may use this word to signify communities to which persons voluntarily attach themselves on account of personal convictions, and membership in which consists in the fulfillment of certain rules or vows. The sects were intolerably, in many cases, the refuge of individual piety and conscience from the hand laid by the Church on the religious autonomy of individuals. The Reformers proclaimed the principle of justification by faith, which is the basis of the soul with regard to the promises of God, and so brought the individual face to face with God, and prepared for the maturing of personal piety and religious thought. The consequences of this principle, however, were of slow development. The two great Churches resulting from the Reformation preserved the idea of the Church-institution on the whole, and took up a position against the sect of Anabaptists, which was based on the individualist principle. But the idea of universal priesthood expounded by Luther did not readily harmonize with the Church's dogma of a special priesthood. On the other hand, the idea of individualism, and perpetuated in the second place the idea of a Church as the guardian of the means of salvation. In the Lutheran Church, Pietism sought to realize the ideal of personal piety, and, without attacking the ecclesiastical institution in general, to revitalize the formation of groups of Christians animated by a conscious personal piety. The Reformed Church gave birth to a series of sects, Baptist and Methodist, which are all founded on the idea that the holiness of the Church and the efficacy of its work depend upon the character of its members—that the Church is an association of living and converted Christians who have adhered personally to the Christian faith.

As the doctrine of the Church came to be contested more and more by criticism, the question of the rights of individual religious thought in the Church was a pressing problem. Catholicism could not solve it except in a negative way; the traditionalist section of Protestantism might do no more concessions; while the reformist section set itself to ensure the independence of individual thought, by insisting on liberty of thought as an essential element of Christian liberty, or by reducing the doctrinal consensus to a minimum, or by making thought and doctrine quite secondary elements of the religious life, and seeking to unite souls in mystical and practical aspirations. In this order of ideas, Schleiermacher was the instigator, religious thought follows religious experience, which by its nature is much more individual than collective. The rights of the individual with regard to every religious doctrine are, therefore, secured, and the doctrinal decisions of the Church have to take account of them. And, in addition, although mysticism properly so called has always offered a protective refuge to individual piety, it is not positively favourable to individualism, as it tends to absorb the human individualities in God rather than to make them independent.

Once at this point of development, religious individualism necessarily generated in the bosom of the official Protestant Churches a movement in favour of ecclesiastical individualism, which the sects had been preparing for a long time. This movement had its reflex action on the connection of the Churches with the State. The Church-institutions were all united to the State. At first the effect of this union was to enslave the Church, but afterwards it produced exactly opposite results. The Western Catholic Church, very soon regarded itself as invested with spiritual glory in Christendom, while the State held the temporal glory under its authority and for its protection. The Protestant Churches too, at first, spoke more or less coldly of the idea of 'Christendom'—a political-religious body, of which the Church (subject, of course, to the State) was the inspiration and the union of Church and State, therefore, was part of a system in which the individual was surrounded in every respect, even intellectually and morally, by society, and in which the Church was the prop of a particular form of the Christian religion. In far as the State, under the influence of the widening of ideas and the enfranchisement of intellect, became more unconformist and even unreligious, the Church appeared to many minds prejudicial to the liberty of the latter, and to the liberty of the individual. The idea of a civilization founded on religion became gradually more vague, and in some places
disappeared entirely. A new notion made its appearance—that of the Church-association, composed of men animated by one and the same faith, independent of the State, and exerting no influence whatever on it or of persons who do not voluntarily belong to its membership. This is the system of the Independent Churches, or of ecclesiastical individualism. The great theorist of this system was Alexander Vines, the promoter of the Free Church movement in the canton of Vaud. According to this system, persons cannot become members of a church except by voluntary adherence to a confession of faith which forms the basis of the Church (Churches of professing Christians). The Churches have no longer anything in common with ethnic or historical groups; they are regarded as free creations of the spirit of God by means of individual souls who, on coming into contact with each other, form religious societies. As a matter of fact, the principle of ecclesiastical individualism has nowhere been carried out to its full extent, even in the communities in which infant-baptism is not practised. It clashes with the existence of the Christian family, which is itself a small church, and which, in reality, constitutes membership of the Church on the children born with it.

From the Protestant point of view religious individualism is legitimate, and inseparable from every higher form of religion, in so far as it asserts the right of the individual to enter into direct communion with God, to think and discuss about religious matters, to join or not to join such and such a religious society, and in so far as it asserts the right of the individual to form its own religious society, to declare its principles, and the like. Religious individualism, however, runs the risk of weakening religion, when it does not recognize its social position or its origin, its beliefs common to all the members of a society, and the inevitable connexions between the religious society and the political society—connexions which are beneficial when they are based on respect for the real nature of the two institutions.

2. Moral Individualism. Moral individualism is seen mainly in three forms: (1) the criticism of national customs and traditions; (2) the view that moral duties are born in the individual conscience, and that the latter is also the basis of the principle of moral duties; and (3) the view that the development of the individual is, if not the only aim, at least one of the chief aims, of the moral life.

We find the first form in antiquity. The Sophists submitted the traditional morality to a dissolving criticism, which appeared individual and national reflection on national tradition. Socrates, building on the ruins, appealed to reason to reconstruct a morality. This may call individualism in its second form. Naturally, this inner individual morality of Socrates is strongly influenced by tradition; it is even more so with Plato, who, when not under the influence of his mystic ideas, places the city above everything, and is equally so with Aristotle. The Epicureans and the Stoics represent the same individual reflection. The Stoics rejected the Epicurean and Epicurean school as the basis of their life.

The second form is the third form of moral individualism. They aim above all at the happiness of the wise man considered 'as himself.' This individualism, however, is very relative, or, rather, negative, for it allows of hardly any variety in the conception of the moral ideal. Each school produces only one uniform type, but this type is no longer that of the citizen who lives for his country; it is now the man who sees his way and his place in the universe and in humanity. The Catholic Church regards morality essentially as obedience to a code of positive laws. In the Middle Ages, Abelard was almost the only one who, in his Sei le spremi, invited man to look within himself for the foundation of morality. The Renaissance was, in theory at least, if not in practice, a very pronounced individualistic movement. Powerful individualisms asserted themselves to such an extent that in many cases they freed themselves from all tradition and all law. Among the Reformers, Luther especially laid emphasis on the internal nature of the moral obligation; he only acted upon it in his eyes were those accomplished by the individual in virtue of this inner constraint; while Calvin insisted above all on the notion of the divine law, not forgetting, however, that this law is inscribed on the conscience. The philosophy of Kant exaggerates the theory of moral individualism, and moral obligation is not only internal, but absolutely autonomous, and this obligation, which proves the liberty of man, is in a way his proper aim: all the contents of morality flow from it. Kant is the most characteristic representative of the second and third forms of moral individualism: morality comes from the individual, and it has as its aim the freedom of the individual and the dignity of the individual. This is similar, although less formalistic. For Hegel, on the contrary, the moral subject is only a stage towards the realization of the objective ideal in the State. The last word of morality for Hegel is the sovereignty of the State, which shows its majesty by sacrificing individuals, if need be, to the maintenance of its independence and authority. Hegelian morality is, moreover, a special type of an anti-individualistic morality, although Hegel had reality no intention of sacrificing the individual and disregarding his dignity. It is the spirit of Hegel that animates Fichte and Schelling when they attempt to make the idea of space (Raum) and the idea of the individual a new goal of science (Natur). Later, however, Fichte passes to individualism so extreme that it was exceeded only by Max Stirner (whose real name was J. Kaspar Schmidt), author of a book entitled Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (Leipzig, 1841), which recommends not only individualism but egoism, and which ends in the paradoxical idea of an association of egoists.

If the philosophy of the second half of the 19th cent. and the first half of the 20th cent. is generally favourable to moral individualism, the literature was equally so. In Germany the Sturm und Drang period, an age of geniuses, was ultra-individualistic; the neo-humanism of the classics also made much of human individuality, disregarding, however, man's social aspirations and work. Romanticism, again, exalted the individual in a way sometimes approaching the morbid, and now and then carried the cult of the individual so far as to forget all moral rules. It was as a disciple of Romanticism that Schiller, with whom he felt the influence of the abstract individualism of Kant, which he utilized with sagacity, developed a concrete individualism which takes account of the difference between individuals, and no longer cultivates the single individual, but individuality. This is the idea of Schiller's essay Phänomenen der romantischen Dichtung (Berlin, 1800), which are all impregnated with the Romantic spirit. If in his later works on morality Schiller, with whom he felt the influence of the abstract individualism of Kant, which he utilized with sagacity, developed a concrete individualism which takes account of the difference between individuals, and no longer cultivates the single individual, but individuality, whose development alone renders possible the complete moral life. Richard Rothe, the disciple of Schiller, defines morality as the penetration of nature by the personality: he was therefore clearly dominated by the idea of the value of the human person. The individualism of these two theologians can be traced back to the Gospel: it is no less connected with the philosophy and literary
movement of their time. Another theologian and writer, Sören Kierkegaard, the Dane, opposed the Hegelian tendencies in his country, and became the defender of a very extreme individualism which he identifies with true Christianity. This individualism is of a character which is both intellectual and practical: subjective experience alone grasps the truth; the suffering which is born of the opposition of the individual to his surroundings is inseparable from moral life. Kierkegaard was driven by the logic of his position into conflict with the Established Church.

In England an individualism which is the parent of German Romanticism, and has yet a distinct character as a way the privilege of the powerful, appears in Byron. Alongside of this great poet we must mention Carlyle, who, in his praise of a sort of hero-worship, sets forth great individualities as the flower and the perfection of humanity.

In France, moral individualism in the spirit of Kant was the distinctive characteristic of the morality of the spiritualist and neo-criticism school. The Positivism of Auguste Comte, on the other hand, was anti-individualistic; it made society the aim of the individual, and ended by preaching a legal maxim of the State which made the selfishness of E. Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl the principal representatives goes still further in this direction. It identifies morality with custom, and submits the individual unreservedly to the laws of society; for man owes everything to society—his development from the animal state, the creation of language, religion, and law.

In opposition to this extreme anti-individualism there is at present a new form of individualism, via, Nietzscheanism. Nietzsche exempts the strong man from all rule, despises moral laws as an invention of the weak in order to triumph over the stronger; he makes the Superman the terminus of human evolution. In the fragments of his last work, The Will to Power (Nachgelassene Werke, Leipzig, 1901), however, there is a tendency to make the superman the creator of a new social rule.

3. Political, social, and juridical individualism.

—Primitive races present the spectacle of the abstraction of the individual which is made or the tribe without a family, in the modern sense of the word, was constituted, it generally exercised, in the person of its chief, considerable rights over its members. The State gradually weakened this family, and by the middle of the eighteenth century the individual was himself more or less in the place of the family, although at the same time recognizing important rights in the individual. Greco-Roman antiquity, to the very end, imposed an official cult on every individual. The Roman Catholic Church afterwards tried to impose a similar conception of society upon the State, and Protestant Churches did not at first proclaim the principle of individual religious liberty. The idea of tolerance and of non-interference of the State in religious matters did not begin to obtain a footing in Europe, and especially in America, until the Revolution in England. Apart from religious matters, which during the Middle Ages, for different reasons, were less concerned about the happiness of individuals than the modern absolutist State, at least at the beginning of the 18th century. It had no hesitation in unsparingly sacrificing the individual, when necessary, for the benefit of the State. At the beginning of the epoch of Cesare Beccaria (1738–

—Author of Del Delitto e della pena, Milan, 1764, there are signs of benevolence even with regard to criminals. From the end of the 18th century, the system of economic guardianship and direction of commerce and industry by the State was gradually attenuated, or even abandoned, in favour of a system of liberty and of free competition, which is often called economic individualism. Adam Smith, Cobden, and Bright in Britain, and Bastiat in France, were the chief exponents of this movement.

As regards the general welfare of individuals, Great Britain was for a long time the only country where serious precautions were taken to guarantee inalienable and inalienable rights of the individual. British traditions, the Anglo-Saxon temperament, and the Calvinist education all tended to the enfranchisement of the individual. The idea of inalienable individual rights was afterwards recognized in several constitutions of the States of North America, whence it passed into the Déclaration des droits de l’homme in 1789. The French Revolution was at first bent on establishing the liberty of the individual, though it was forced in the end to sacrifice it. The Liberal school took up this aim, and reduced the State to the position of guardian of the rights of the individual. This theory, however, could not meet the reality, and to the abstract individualism of the Liberalism socialism opposed a more practical care for the material welfare of all—at the risk, it is true, of compromising their intellectual and physical happiness at the expense of their independence; though idealist socialists claim that this will not follow. Anarchism is the extreme form of political and social individualism. It seeks to put free and contractual association in place of the State, and repudiates all constraint of society with regard to individuals. Down to the present it has not been able either clearly to define its ideal or to put it actively into practice.

We must now consider, independently of these theoretical and practical efforts to make the individual the chief or, at least, one of the chief concerns of the State and social life, the theories according to which governments and societies are the products of the conscious will of individuals. The idea that governments owe their origin to contracts entered into by individuals was known even to antiquity. It is found in the Middle Ages, and later among the Jesuits, with the distinct tendency to break down civil governments, originating as they do from contracts which are always insecure, in favour of the Church, an institution which goes back to God Himself. In the hands of the theorists of modern natural law, i.e. non-religious, the idea of contract becomes, on the other hand, a means of freeing the State from the Church. Hobbes was the first to trace back not only government, but society itself, to a social contract. Rousseau was his disciple in this matter, but with neither of these two thinkers did this theory profit individualism. Both of them, on the contrary, make the individual abide in favour of the society which he has helped to create—with this difference, that Hobbes makes society itself subsist in favour of an absolute monarch, while Rousseau makes society supreme. Rousseau's theory of social contract, treated in the book which bears the same name (1762), shows the wildness of his doctrine about the happiness of the savage, free from all fetters because he lives outside of society, and makes for the support of a civic ideal which is not even compatible with full religious liberty. The French Revolutionary was inspired by him when it instituted an obligatory civil religion, without any regard to the rights of conscience.

There is a kind of individualism also which has attacked the family and the institution of marriage. At the beginning of the second half of the 19th century marriage began to be looked at far more from the individual point of view than from the
social. Under the influence of Romantic ideas, even a theologian like Schleiermacher held for some time that marriage could be dissolved if the two parties no longer suited each other. Free love, or a conception of marriage which is very near to it, has been extolled by a series of writers (e.g. the brothers Marginette, Knebel) who were interested in the interests of individual liberty. It is far from being the case, however, that all the attacks against marriage and the family have been inspired by individualistic tendencies; sometimes they are the result of an anti-individualistic tendency which regards the strongly constituted family as an obstacle to the omnipotence of a society which aims at equality.

With regard more particularly to the idea of law, individualist theories and social or socialistic theories stand in opposition. The former maintain that the essential origin and aim of the law is the establishing of the liberty and dignity of individuals whose spheres of action and of influence are so prescribed as not to encroach on one another. This is especially the theory of Kantianism and French spiritualism. The German historical school, on the other hand, finds in the national spirit holding sway over the individual. Auguste Comte, with his Positivism, opposes the idea of individual rights, and insists on the rights of society and the duties of the individual towards it. This stands in opposition to the Positivism. Every school that finds in law only the expression of the social relations demanded by the character of men and things or by social utility, either limits or frequently suppresses the individual character of the law.

Moral and social individualism is an enormous improvement on the insecure and brutal solidarity of ancient times. But even so, the same time it runs the risk of isolating him, on the one hand, and, on the other, rendering him clever and making him forget what he owes to his community and to its traditions. Individualism is fruitful only when it leads men to accept solidarity with their fellows without reserve, and to make it an instrument of justice and liberty.


INDIVIDUALITY. — I. The term. — The word individuality is simply the last translation of the Gr. ἰδιωτικός, and thus originally signified 'that which cannot be cut,' or 'divided.' In this sense the word is found in Cicero, and Seneca uses it in the same way. Even by the later period of antiquity, however, the word had come to denote a single thing as 'unique,' 'distinct from others,' 'alone of its kind.' The medieval writers adhered to this sense of the word, and, by the 13th cent., at latest, they had also coined the terms individualitics and individualitas. The modern usage of the words in the sense specified is mainly due to Leibniz.

2. Historical survey. — The word individuality has two meanings, viz. that of a 'single' thing, and that of a 'unique' or 'peculiar' thing. The corresponding idea is associated with two main problems, which, it is true, are closely connected. These are: (1) whether human society is to be traced chiefly to the action of single individuals or to a general order which is superior to them; and (2) whether the development of the qualities shared by all or by some existence peculiar to the individual is to be regarded as of more importance in the sphere of education and culture. These two questions are closely related also to the property of history of the individual.

The historical process of human society exhibits a rhythmical tendency; we perceive in it a movement from a general order to the individual, as also a movement from the individual to a general order, and the culmination of either seems to lead inevitably to the other. In the earliest stages of culture the human individual is but part of a social economy which besieges him with inexorable laws and controls his conduct. The progress of civilisation brings with it a more extensive division of labour, and at the same time carries the individual to a position of greater independence; the human units do not now simply hear and obey, but begin to question the authority of the existing order, and at length, feeling themselves superior to it, they repudiate all outward control, and refuse to recognize anything that does not clearly and definitely approve itself to their minds. Such emanicipation, however, tends naturally to bring with it a state of things in which the stability of life is dissolved, and all communal existence is broken, with the result that a counter-movement sets in, and attempts are made, by spiritual means, to restore that relationship of human beings which its natural form had been irrevocably broken. At this stage the distinctive quality of the individual may be duly recognized so far as it fits in with the wider order. But, even when such an order has been attained, it may be that in the further progress of humanity it may be found to be too narrow, too inflexible, and may at length become intolerable. There will then set in once more a movement in favour of the individual, and a consequent transformation of the entire situation.

In this conflict between the general order and the individual the former is usually defended by an appeal to the necessity of a fixed and stable organization, transcending the aims and powers of the individual units, while, on the other hand, the individualists maintain that true human life real up in the individual soul alone, and that life re-

1 Seneca, de Prov. 5: 'quamvis separati et quidem homines non possum, coherent, individua sunt.'

2 The various senses borne by the term individualum towards the end of the ancient period were explained by the commentator on Theophrastus (Basile, 1967, p. 65): 'individualum pluribus duobus modo: sic dicatur individuum quod secum sciret omnia quae sensum in mentem et in ventrem et in locum tenet; et secundum duum praedictorum genus dividitur et quod de pluribus implicatur.' The leading passage in Theophrastus runs as follows: 'græca enim in alia cum eandem', et 'infinitas omni quae in aliam ad se referant, alia omni quae in alteram ad se referant.' This definition held ground throughout the Middle Ages till modern times.
INDIVIDUALITY

quires perfect freedom for its development, and
that a far greater inwardness and fullness of life is
to be looked for from such unhampered develop-
ment by general conditions.

This oscillation between the two sides can be
distinctly traced in the history of European civiliza-
tion. The complete emancipation of the individ-
ual, as manifested in the philosophy of the
Renaissance, was presently recognized as a grave
danger, and the political constitutions drawn up by
Plato and Aristotle are largely dominated by the
idea of once more giving a commanding position to
the State as head of a general order. By Halbert
themselves in particular of the idea of a living
organism, these thinkers illustrated, on the one
hand, the absolute subordination of the individual
to the community, and, on the other, the distinc-
tive function of each individual within the
community. While Aristotle certainly concedes
the individual a position of greater importance
than does Plato, that position must nevertheless
be within the whole; he never admits that the
individual has any rights as against the community,
and sets no limit to the community's claims upon
its single members. Aristotle's view finds still
stronger expression in his assertion that the
State (the organized community) is prior to the
individual.

The idea of the organism was extended by the
Greek philosophers to the universe as a whole. At
the same time, however, the Stoics insisted strongly
upon the unique character of every particular element
in the whole, asserting that no two hairs or grains of
corn were perfectly alike. Thereafter the metaphor
was adopted by Christianity, and was applied
to the Kingdom of God, as, e.g., in the figure of
the vine and the branches, although this concep-
tion is found only in the Fourth Gospel, but which
was strongly influenced by Greek modes of thought.
The endeavor made in the later period of antiquity
to fortify the individual by the formation of per-
manent associations appears also in the rise of
various schools—as, e.g., those of the Stoics and
the Epicureans—the object of which was not
merely unity of opinion, but also a certain
unity of life.

The movement towards a stable organization of
human society, however, attained success not
through the instrumentality of philosophy, but by
linking itself to religion. It was, in fact, the
Church which finally accomplished the task of
creating an organization which united its members
in a firm bond, and imparted truth and salvation
to them individually. The commanding position
won by this organization was largely due to the
rise of new nationalities, which required to be
trained to independent spiritual effort. But philo-
sophy likewise had a share in bringing about the
alliance with religion—in so far, namely, as it
gave the individual a link of relationship with the
cosmic whole. The outstanding name here is
Plotinus, who includes all things in their multi-
plity and variety in a universal life, and regards
all individual existence as being permeated thereby.

Thus, as the universal life is immediately present
in the individual, and may indeed become his own
essential nature, he is undoubtedly raised to a
mu cece: ever constant level, and is dependent upon
the universal, and the development of
his peculiar qualities is left out of account.

This mode of thought was fostered by mysticism.
But while mysticism advanced largely due to the
unanimous efforts of all religious sects, and
to aspirations to realize that unity directly, and while it
therefore admits of a greater freedom than does the
eclesiastical system, yet here too all life is de-
Rivered from the universal, and devotion therefore
prevails over the development of individual qualities.

Of the modern period, again, nothing is more
characteristic than the fact that it came to find
the medieval form of human life too narrow and
restrictive, and to look for new types of free
self-sufficiency in the face of the oppulence of the individual life to their full develop-
ment. The various civilized peoples have furthered
that development in various spheres: the Italians
in art, as is shown by the Renaissance; the
French, in literature and the fine arts; the
British, in the political and economic sphere; the
Spanish, in the structure of social life. These
movements have generated enormous activities,
unparalleled vast forces, and radically altered the
total conditions of life—facts so palpable as to
require no fuller treatment here. In the modern
period, moreover, the full development of individ-
ual characteristics came to be recognized as an
end of the first magnitude. Here, on the theoretic
side at least, it was especially the Germans who
led the way; thus Leibniz enunciated with telling
effect the unconfirmable character of the indivi-
dual 'monads'; Schleiermacher and the older
Romanticism asserted that the great end of life was
to be an individual, a personality, and to
invest every action with one's own personality;
while German pedagogy made it its aim to give
the most careful attention to the peculiar qualities of
individual children, and bring these qualities to
their full development. J. H. Pestalozzi emphasized
the opposition between the individual and the
'collective'; he scoffs at 'collective actions,' at the idea of
a 'collective conscience,' at 'official creeds,' and
asserts that the collective life of the race can only be
the best civilized, if it cannot give it a true culture
('kultivieren'); see Werke, ed. L. W. Seyfarth,
Berlin, 1851, xii. 154. In all this we can trace the
powerful influence of Rousseau, who, as regards
the whole range of human life, was the first to
bring out with perfect clearness the antithesis
between the individual and society.

Valuable as were the results of this individual-
istic tendency, and powerful as it still operates,
nevertheless we cannot fail to see that its limita-
tions and its dangers are being more and more
recognized, and that a counter-movement is setting
in and increasingly asserting its power. Among
those who should note first of all the theory which
from various sides directed attention to the signifi-
cance of society for individuality, and to the individ-
ual's dependence upon them—facts emphasized by his-
tory and the historical mode of thought, to which,
in particular, Romanticism gave an artistic form of
expression; by philosophical speculation, which,
in the hands of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, inter-
preted the manifold of experience as the evolution
of a single principle; and by modern sociology,
which showed that the individual cannot exist at
all except in connection with others, and who
made manifest the close dependence of the indi-

dividual's personal characteristics upon the social
environment—the milieu.

Theoretic considerations, however, were much
These and personal experiences in counter-
acting the preponderance of the individual.

The perils of the unlimited freedom of the individual
manifested themselves, above all, in the economic
sphere. As laborers and technicians, he is indi-
cidual in character, and was more and more concen-
trated in huge factories, and as, in consequence,

1 The term 'milieu,' as comprehending all the external
conditions of life, was probably first used in this
sense by the French eclecticism, and was a
Taine's prediction for the term that gave it general currency.

1 Polite, 1246. 19 (Bekker): πρόδρομος ου πλησίου μονάς οινοσ
κοινέναι και

2 Cf. Cic. Acad. Quaest. iv.: Stoicam est . . . nullo esse
plumum omnium rebus talis quatuor et plus alius, nullo
plumum praestat.etc.
the antagonism between varying interests became increasingly fierce, the evils of unrestricted competition became ever the more marked, and the social problem seemed to be less and less capable of self-regulation. In such conditions some interference of the State was imperative, and this policy has been more and more adopted even among those professing by their character and their history are in a pre-eminent degree the champions of individual freedom.

If a tendency to narrow the sphere of State action was characteristic of the 18th cent., a reversion to the opposite procedure asserted itself strongly in the course of the 19th. If reason and morality were to rule the societial life of man, it appeared to be urgently necessary alike to strengthen the power of the State and to circumscribe that of the individual. No exaggeration of this idea—such as we find very specially in the proposals of Social Democracy—can detract from its rightful claim.

This reaction against a sheer individualism takes its ground, in the first instance, upon the conditions necessary to the mere maintenance of life, and treats the inward interests of man as matters of secondary importance. It cannot be denied that a movement towards a closer association of mankind is increasingly at work in the inward sphere as well—that there is a growing desire for spiritual fellowships. The inner experience furnished by religion has for many people at the present day become all but evanescent, and the spiritual association based on such experience is like to be slowly dissolved. The individual reality that he is thrown upon his own resources, and begins to feel himself isolated; even in what he regards as exalted and sacred he encounters endless inconsistencies. In such a state of things his convictions cannot attain stability or win power over his conduct. The more earnest a man is in the spiritual life, the more intensely does he feel his isolated position to be unsatisfactory, and, indeed, intolerable, and the more eagerly does he crave for some fresh spiritual bond of union with his fellows, and for the support that such a connection would afford. It may be said, in fact, that the unstable nature of things, at this present time proceeds in a special degree from such desires—on a positive reaction against the threatened isolation and the growing apathy of the individual. Hence emerge great problems for the future; the present generation is engaged in the search for a new mode of life and a new framework of human society.

3. The problem of individuality.—On the problem of individuality itself we would add but a few reflections suggested by our historical survey. Mankind is acted upon by two opposite tendencies, each of which has its own strong points as well as its own weaknesses. It is indisputably the case that the immediate sources of spiritual life lie in the individual alone, and thus a system of things which places the individual above all else must undoubtedly prove superior to any other system in originality, mobility, and variety. But, on the other hand, the individual would appear to be incapable by himself of fully developing and consolidating such spiritual forces as he possesses, while, again, the separate individuals tend to come into such opposition and conflict with one another as to threaten the existence of all fellowship whatever. Society then develops a form of organization, but this in turn is exposed to the danger not only of permanently fettering human life to the organized structure of a particular age, but also of seriously hindering the individual and depriving him of all freedom in life and thought. It is thus quite intelligible that in the process of history now the one tendency, and now the other, should gain the upper hand.

It is scarcely to be expected that we shall arrive at a solution of the problem that would avail for all ages, but we may at least discover certain points of view which help towards a decisive conclusion. Such a conclusion will depend, first of all, upon the value attached to the spiritual and moral capacity of the individual person. These two points of view that capacity will base society as far as possible upon the will and ability of individuals, while a pessimistic estimate prompts the demand for a social order higher than, and as far as possible independent of, the individuals. Thus, modern liberalism is pervaded by a vigorous optimism, while pessimists like Hobbes and Schopenhauer were in favour of a solipsistic forms of government. In another aspect of the subject it is important to note the value that is attached to the element of change in human history. Changes are brought about primarily by individuals, and, accordingly, the more human affairs are regarded as being in a state of flux, the greater is the rôle assigned to the individual, while, in societies where human life is felt to be sustained by eternal truths, a social order is as preserving and testifying to these truths, ranks as the higher factor. In any case the actual decision between the two tendencies depends, not upon abstract considerations, but upon the existing conditions of human society.

A question of a different character is how far a particular age does justice to the peculiar nature of the individual. Manifestly the various periods differ very greatly in this respect, some developing more fully the characteristics common to individuals, while others rather foster the qualities which differentiate individuals from one another. The present age finds itself in great perplexity in this matter, its conscious purposes being the social and political, and economic, and ethical, and aesthetic. Against this modern life, with its technical arrangements of labour, its huge aggregations of human beings, its increased power of locomotion and its annihilating nearness, its complicated inter-relations of individuals, its railways and its newspapers, tends strongly to wear down the distinctive traits of individuals and to produce a uniform and average type. The social environment is asserting its power over the more and more man appears to become a mere product of that environment. The dangers involved in this process were clearly recognized by John Stuart Mill, who did his best to counteract them. The immense influence of Nietzsche in our own day is due, above all, to his vigorous crusade against the levelling tendencies of our modern social system. It is true that the positive elements of his polemic, and especially his doctrine of the Superman, are hardly adequate to the task of circumventing the evils against which he fought. In a world of necessary law there can be no freedom or independence for the individual.

4. The educational problem involved.—From ancient times the demand has been put forward that education should inculcate and foster the individuality of the pupil, but men have often failed to realize the perplexities inherent in this demand. To begin with, education must maintain against an extravagant optimism its right to put all individual qualities to the proof that task. It is not simply to recognize, but, if need be, to reject, and hence it must first ascertain which elements of the individual character are of value and worth cultivating. Even so, however, it is not implied that the valuable elements spontaneously combine
to form a rounded individuality; on the contrary, the several characteristics of the individual often hang loosely together and even conflict with one another, so that it is only with great pains that a look of individuality can be won from the materials. A complete individuality is not the starting-point, but the goal; it is no mere gift of nature, but a high ideal that in most cases calls for specific effort. Think of the travail undergone by great masters, as, e.g., Goethe, before they came to a clear understanding of their peculiar gift. Here too, then, we light upon an arduous task in what is often regarded as simple and self-evident.


R. EUCHE

INDO-CINA (Savage Races). The name 'savage' is applied in France to the group of half-civilized races inhabiting Tonking, Annam, Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Laos, and called Muong, Mois, Penongs, or Khao, according to the French, or Muong, Nha, or avarious barbarians' or 'savages.' These races are scattered over a vast district of 130,000 sq. miles, extending from 22° to 12° N. lat., from the frontiers of China to the confines of Siam. The number of the population is estimated at 20,000,000. The length of territory occupied by them is 30 miles between 21° and 22°, 300 miles between 20° and 21°, and 90 to 180 between 12° and 18°.

1. Physical characteristics.—The sages are an immense forest stretching from the plains (where they seldom stay) to the higher slopes and mountains. This forest, which is vast, is also extensive, and affords shelter for all the beasts of the forest, birds, and innumerable insects. The climate varies, according to the season, from 60° to 46° C. during the day, and from 18° (sometimes 7°) to 29° during the night.

2. Orige.—At the present day it seems possible to make the assertion that the Chinese form one race, practically the same in all the districts in which they are found, except for modifications due to admixture with the more civilized Chinese. In Cambodia, Annam, and Tonking, the races are mixtures of these.

3. Physical characteristics and mode of life.—Generally speaking, the appearance of these savages is rather certain physical, psychological, and social affinities, so that the account given of any one of them may be applied to the rest, except in minor details. They nearly all belong to the physical type (with very slight differences) whose characteristics have been summarized as follows by E. Bernard, medical officer to the colonies, in a study of the Khao of French Laos: 'Straight black hair, yellow skin with a tinge of red, smooth body, short stature varying in the different tribes from 1 m. 52 to 1 m. 69, long narrow head (dolichocephalic), average cephalic index 76, flat nose, generally broad, breasts of medium size, transverse nasal index varying between 85 and 94, prominent cheekbones, short broad face (cynocephalic), general shape of head viewed from front and profile, long oval or oblong-shaped; these are the characteristics of the savages of the Tonkinese race.' (Bernard, Les Khais, p. 36.)

4. War.—Although they live with arms continually at hand and are a constant struggle with the animals of the forest, the savages (with the exception of certain races like the Jarais and the Sedangs) do not like war. They hardly ever make war except to avenge some injustice suffered by one of their number, and only after repeated conferences with the enemy with a view to compromise. Nevertheless, they sometimes break into war from sheer want, or even from poverty, in order to steal cattle or elephants, or to get possession of prisoners, whom they then release for a ransom, employ, or sell as slaves, and thus enrich the village. Slavery, in fact, is a pernicious menace to their lives, and war is their means of obtaining those items for which they long, such as civies and weapons.

The savage employs a very clever ruse to start an offensive war: he gives notice, noiselessly across the almost impenetrable underbrush of the forest either to surprise the hostile village—this is a common occurrence—or to carry off women or solitary men who have left their shelter to work in the fields. In any case, old men and children to their terror as they are wonderful. Much more fortunate, or more careful to prevent the return of these invaders, the savages have a large area of territory which makes a great variety of crops. The only thing that roams these from their idleness of body is actual need; when the savage sees his rice-granary empty, and, finding no one near to give him victual, he repents the fact that he is a savage, lays down his eel and pipe, and, with a basket on his head and a pipe in his mouth, toils for hours on end, gets out for the forest to hunt or gather fruit; then no difficulty baffles him, and for whole days he will scour the woods in search of food for his family.

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The savages have no ambition, and are naturally generous. They are, nevertheless, as greedy as children, and sometimes mercilessly impose upon ill-protected strangers who come asking for help, bringing, or simply shelter. Because of their large numbers they are ruthlessly robbed by all the Annamese, Siamese, Chinese, and Laos who deal with them,—in fact, their turn is justified in imposing upon any strangers whose merchandise attracts them. But they are not such thieves among themselves as might be imagined from their poverty, and people of the same village preserve the most absolute respect for each other's property.

They are very suspicious of a stranger, because they firmly believe that he comes with the object of robbing them. Yet they very rarely break their promise to him. They are not cruel, but timid rather, in spite of their innate bravery. They never kill any one unless they believe that he is a spy, or that he is in danger, or when moved by a superstitious terror which urges them to avenge on an intruder a ritual offense, committed; it may be, in ignorance, which would bring misfortunes on the whole village. The perpetual state of tribal war in which they live, always in danger of their lives, and sold as slaves, makes them reserved. Generally speaking, they are sociable, proud, and extremely polite without becoming obsequious. Conscious among their qualities is their love of liberty. They submit to no authority or legal constraint. To agree to any kind of taxation is regarded as an act of slavery. They would rather live in poverty and wretchedness, always on the alert, than obey any authority—even among themselves. Quite unconscious they realize the spirit of perfect anarchy. Their communism is equally striking, for a truly brotherly solidarity reigns among them. Great treatises are common among them. Each man keeps his property, and, if a man's property is kept, he always shares with his neighbors. barbarians' or 'savages.' These races are scattered over a vast district of 130,000 sq. miles, extending from 22° to 12° N. lat., from the frontiers of China to the confines of Siam, taking in Annam, Tonking, and Laos. The length of territory occupied by them is 30 miles between 21° and 22°, 300 miles between 20° and 21°, and 90 to 180 between 12° and 18°.

All the missionaries and explorers who have stayed any time among them are at one in praising the general purity of their morals, exception, of course, being made in the case of certain tribes (Jarais, Bolovens, etc.). Although their rules of morality are not the same as ours in every detail, it is noticeable that they are modest and have a keen sense of decency. These remarks apply specially to those savages who have not come into contact with the more civilized populations. The result of such contact is that they lose the best of their traditional customs, and adopt the vices of the Khmer, Annamese, or Laotian nations.
times in conflict with the prudence of the older men. This council is always accompanied by invocations to the spirits, sacrifices, and a feast. If war is decided on, one of the council members always, according to the custom, gives an announcement of the wrongs which his tribesmen have suffered without reparation. Of this council the time and place are specified, and from this event onwards the two villages live in a state of constant alarm, while their neighbors maintain an anxious neutrality, lest they too become involved in the conflict.

When the war has been bloody and directed against the whole village, the women of one tribe, on the night of the feast, are in proportion to the risks that they have run. Among the Bahans, according to the custom of the Kha-Pi, the "Festival of Victory" is announced every night for a fortnight beforehand by the beating of gongs and warlike marches in the common house. The number of buffaloes to be slain is equal to the number of prisoners taken.

In the event of the war on both sides does not lead to reconciliation by means of a mediator, every expedition is inevitably followed by a series of others, for vengeance is a sacred duty among the savages. The tribes which are too weak themselves will suffer injustice under force, but will never become resigned to it; they cherish the sacred hope of some day being avenged by means of alliances with a more powerful tribe. The savage spirit of independence of each village, however, makes these alliances very rare. The federation attempted in 1894 between the Bahans, Khoongs, and Sedangs by J. G. Gietlueh, director of the Roman Catholic Mission, who assembled almost 1500 warriors of different villages under his command, in order to put an end to the continual and unjust incursions of the Khoongs, failed. The reason was that the extraordinary phenomena that it succeeded in defeating the Khoongs by its moral effect. When these uninviting appeals are made to the more peaceable tribes, which are always the first to receive them, the missionaries try to unite them in order to guarantee them material as well as moral security.

5. Social organization.—The family, constituted among the savages by marriage, as a rule includes the eldest living descendants as far back as great-grandparents, but is not limited to this degree in almost all the tribes though for higher degrees of consanguinity the fear of incest is always felt. The women of the lower classes, who are removed from the belief that in heredity the maternal strain is much stronger than the paternal. Among the Radees it is the woman who occupies the first place in the home. Consanguinity among the savages forms a sacred bond which entails the avenging of each other's injuries, and never permits war with each other.

Marriage is endogamous, although some small tribes, such as the Alak, allow their daughters to marry men of neighbouring villages. It generally takes place at puberty, i.e., at the age of fourteen or fifteen years; and in almost all the tribes, the older girls marry first, the younger, the more skilled in household work, the better marriages they make. Among the Kho-Pi, however, marriages are mentioned where the wife is only eight years old. Among the Halangs, a girl at this age, who continue to live with their parents at the husband's expense until puberty, when the marriage is consummated. As a general rule women are greatly respected among the savages, and everywhere rape and seduction are punished by a heavy fine. It is even forbidden to abuse women prisoners of war. Among the Western savages, sexual relations before marriage are not considered improper, and a woman is often married at an advanced stage of pregnancy. The custom of sending the young boys to sleep in the common house among a strict morality. The Nihbns and the Bolevans impose a fine of three buffaloes for a case of seduction; but, if there is an acknowledged betrothal, the betrothed pair have full liberty of intercourse.

The woman nearly always chooses her husband, and the latter very often pays an indemnity to the woman's family; or he lives for a certain time— for some months to several years—in a kind of slavery, which is only annulled by marriage with his parents-in-law, in order to compensate them for the loss of their daughter. When he does not want to do this, he nearly always offers them a strong healthy slave instead. Under these conditions we can understand how many of the tribes welcome the birth of a daughter with more enthusiasm than that of a son: if the one will afterwards defend the tribe, the other will enrich it. Among the Alak the husband is compelled to provide a dowry, which usually includes four buffaloes and two Cambodian jars. Among the Kha-Pi, custom prescribes that the rich must marry among themselves, and the poor likewise members of their own class.

Among a great number of tribes, the intended husband gives only a few unimportant presents, and works for a year with his future father-in-law. The eldest daughter, however, even after marriage, never leaves the paternal roof. The asking in marriage is almost always done by the youth himself, through his parents or a mutual friend. The length of the betrothal depends on individual circumstances, especially on the time necessary for the making of all the rice-wine for the marriage-festival. The date of the marriage is usually fixed by the chief of the village, who for this purpose examines the entrails of a chicken. After the ceremony relating to the marriage have been received, and invocations and sacrifices made to the spirits, the marriage is celebrated, followed by a feast more or less magnificent according to the resources of the couple, in some among the more peaceable tribes. In the mass of which the wife herself chooses her husband and asks him in marriage.

Although chiefs and rich men marry as many wives as they can support, monogamy is the rule. The savage is generally only one wife, to whom he is very much attached and faithful; but the wife is never in any way opposed to new alliances, which would bring her valuable assistants in her household work.

Divorce is rare, and takes place on either side. The man sometimes seeks divorce on account of incurable illness or barrenness of his wife, when she sees an opportunity of getting a better home, or when her husband requires her to do too much work. The assembly of the old men, or the chiefs of the village, will pronounce judgment. The husband as far as possible avoids seeking a divorce, for his wife represents for him an actual value—the dowry he has paid to get her and the compensation he will have to pay for marrying another. Among the Nihbns this fine is three buffaloes; among the Halangs seven slaves. In a case of divorce the children are divided between the two parents, the mother usually taking the younger ones. As a rule this course of action is seldom resorted to, for the family ties of the savages are nearly always very strong.

Adultery is even rarer than divorce; some missionary reports that during twenty years among the Bahans, Sedangs, and Stiengs they have not recorded a single case of it. Among all the tribes it is punishable by a heavy fine, varying according to the rank of the injured husband, who always has the right to kill culprits when flagrant delicto, and in some cases the right to sell the lover as a slave. Among the Stiengs, only the husband is punished by being sold into slavery, the woman being considered irresponsible. As a rule, in practical life, punishment is limited to a fine paid by the lover; then the husband takes back his wife.

Among the Kha-Pi there is a sort of compulsory ceremony before this peaceful settlement: a pig is killed at the expense of the culprit, and the right foot of the pig is sprinkled with its blood; then he takes back his wife.

Though the moral and legal condition of the
women is based on the principle of complete equality of rights with the men, their material condition is miserable. On them devolves all the labour of the household, the fields, etc. They work from dawn like beasts; they carry water and wood, grinding rice, cooking, weeding, planting, weaving, plaiting, and dyeing, under the calm eye of their husbands, who pass most of their time in drinking, fighting, and the quotidian step of the common house. In spite of real affection for his wife, the savage would feel degraded if he did anything but fish, hunt, or fight. His duty is to protect the home, and to provide sustenance in time of famine, when he can show extreme bravery and devotion.

As a result of the spirit of anarchical independence of these tribes, the authority of parents over their children is virtually non-existent. In cases of serious offences on the part of children, the Khun-Pi performs the expiatory ceremony mentioned above in connexion with adultery.

The old men are very much respected, but in spite of a certain amount of respect for their age, the life of the village is diminished by their physical uselessness. Their number is very small, however, on account of the hardness of the savage life.

The disposal of the dead. —When a savage dies, his family proclaim their grief by cries and tears, and among certain southern tribes, particularly the Bahlarns, by laceration of their bodies and even by the sacrifice of their eyes. Owing to the sweetness of the domestic harmony, parents are honoured by their children, and love them tenderly. In cases of serious delinquency on the part of children, the Khun-Pi performs the expiatory ceremony mentioned above in connexion with adultery.

In the north, under the influence of the Laotians, death soon loses its mournful character; and relatives and friends flock to the house of the deceased in order to prevent the near relatives from giving themselves over to too keen sorrow, as well as to mourn. Hence the Bolovens, Niahous, etc., hold great funerals for the dead. Women are given a quart of alcohol, as the survivors get intoxicated in honour of the dead.

In the south, as well as in the north, burial, not cremation, is the rule; the ceremony is more complicated according to the wealth and position of the dead man.

In the case of the death of a poor man, as soon as he has breathed his last, his relatives or his children wash him, put on his hat, and GRATAS them leaving his eyes wide open, wrap him in a mat, along with several small axes, pots, necklaces, and baskets for his use in the grave. They close the mouth with a strong piece of rattan, and then bury him in a grave with the remainder of his personal goods, within 24 hours, taking care to put beside him two baskets of rice and two litres of alcohol, one at each of his head and one at his feet. The grave is filled up and covered with tree-trunks to prevent wild animals from disturbing the body.

For a chief or a rich man a coffin is always made, hollowed out of a tree-trunk. The use of coffins is becoming more prevalent throughout the south, and the shape of the coffin is improving the nearer the savages come to civilized races. The making of the coffin of a chief requires from 60 to 72 hours, that of a poor man 24 hours: this is what settles the time of burial.

Before burying the dead man in his coffin, the Bahlarns bend up his arms, and with a stick leaving his eyes wide open, wrap him in a mat, along with several small axes, pots, necklaces, and baskets for his use in the grave. They close the mouth with a strong piece of rattan, and then bury him in a grave with the remainder of his personal goods, within 24 hours, taking care to put beside him two baskets of rice and two litres of alcohol, one at each of his head and one at his feet. The grave is filled up and covered with tree-trunks to prevent wild animals from disturbing the body.

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of the South.' If they return, they are feared rather than honoured, and it is not necessary to offer sacrifices except to the names of those who have been very rich or powerful during their lives and able to transmit a little of their good luck to their descendants.

Suicide is very rare, though not unknown, among the savages. It entails, particularly among the Badu and the Reddes, the out-cast of the forest, far from the haunts of men. Those who have buried a suicide must not enter the village again until they have performed certain purificatory rites and a sacrifice.

Eschatology.—If ancestor-worship is vague among the savages, their ideas of what fellows death are even more so. They almost all believe that the personality subsists after death and continues its terrestrial life in another place and another way; but among many of the tribes the idea of a judgment of the dead and a reward for good deeds in this world is very confused. The Badu, the Kha-Pi, and the Rades do not, as a rule, believe in the rewards and punishments of a future life. The Kalangis believe in these things, but without any clear notion as to what they may be.

The Bahnars believe in a whole mang hong, 'kingdom of the dead,' which the dead enter, a year after their burial, by means of a road which then ascends and called must k'ik, 'to enter the cemetery.' This kingdom is hidden in the depths of the earth and is not dangerous to old men. They have eggs in fear and trembling between two huge stones which continually strike against each other. They must slip through at this instant of weakness, for the one which is acting as hammer is raised in the air. They have next to avoid the formidable nations of two gigantic serpents, one black, the other white, whose fangful prescience, a bridge of trunks, stripped of their bark, and animated by a constant rotary movement which makes the smallest step dangerous. And, besides, it does not reach across the whole abyss: there is a considerable empty space, which the dead man must leap across. Only those who have done good deeds on earth can accomplish this leap; thieves and liars fall into the chasm, without hope of resurrection. When a person is victorious from this third trial, he finds himself standing before the cottage of an old witch or sorceress who is busy pounding rice from morning till night, and who in return for glass-ware or little axes provides the names with fire and light, which are absolutely necessary in these gloomy realms. If the ghost cannot pay in current coin, he must allow his ears to be cut off. They immediately attach themselves to the sorceress's ear, which, as a result of all this kind of this kind, reach down to the ground. Equipped with safe fire, the dead man reaches a cross-road—the junction of two roads leading to the two cities.

One of these roads, stream with brambles and briars, is for men who died a natural death; the other, very smooth and bordered with flowers, is taken by those who have met with a violent death—e.g., warriors slain by the enemy, in expedition, or by their own hands, maniacs, suicides, and the like. Members in bright red, because of the blood which they have shed, they dwell in a specially privileged village. In both the cities and the villages the sun sets the same as it was on earth, and the dead are happy proportion to the abundance of the stores of men, foals and cotton, slaves, and necklaces which are the relics of the dead in the coffins or on their tombs, of plumes, paper, and above all, of sar tung. Slaves are represented by rough little figures placed along with pot, crocuses, wooden sabers, etc., at the foot of the tomb.

The Bahnars have no definite ideas of a judgment of men after death, but their traditions imply that only the good can reach the cities of the kingdom of the dead; the wicked succumb to the trials of the journey.

18. Sorcerer-chiefs and sorcerers.—Although the savages of Indo-China do not recognize any constituted power, it is worthy of mention that there are among them three individuals with mysterious names: the wind king and the fire king. We have only vague information about the wind king. The designation sadates, which they receive in Indo-China, is similar to that given to the Khmer sadet, 'king.' They belong to the powerful Jarai tribe. In spite of their title, they have no effective power, and their authority, which is purely spiritual, is not even recognized outside the few villages bordering on their own territory. But all the savages know them by name, and dread them. They seem to offer an analogy with the god-kings of whom Frazer speaks (G.E. 1. 184). Their influence can greatly facilitate the movements of an explorer if he manages to approach them and to gain their good graces. The sadates who most feared is the fire sadate, known especially by the savages of the Annamese slope; the water sadate exercises a less perceptible sway over the Laotian slope; the power of the wind sadate is limited to the Cambodian villages. It is believed that at least those of fire and water are always at hand in a certain pair of families which are related to them, and that they possess objects endowed with magic power. The fire king has a sacred sword or magic blade, badly hewed, and carefully rolled in white cotton rags. No savages would dare to approach it. If the sadate drew this blade half-way, they say it would be enough to make the sun disappear and set fire to the forest. Moreover, a profound sleep; if he were to draw it full length, the whole world would be drowned by flame. The traditions of Champa, Cambodians, and Laos claim that this magic sword was stolen from them long ago. The Cambodians, Mons and Lazămen, and even a rebel chief, it would appear, have several times gone right into these inhospitable regions to ask for it or to try to get it back again. They never returned, because of murder, the savages cry, fire by fire from honest claim.

The water sadate has a magic cup and wand, according to some authorities, and, according to others, a rattle bearing flowers that never fade, and a hindwode saved from the deluge, but still green. Armed with these objects, which the cup is round to anger, is able to bury the earth under the waters.

Although legends of the most confused kind are current about the sadates, and although the savages shrink from giving explanations of the functioning of the spirit, strangers, and their strange powers are very difficult to approach, it seems certain that, in spite of their occult power, they live the simple life of the other savages, and go through the villages, making a tribute of stones, which is seldom refused them, but still more rarely offered. Certain Radè villages, of their own accord, present the fire sadate every year with a little cotton, some rice, and a chicken.

The sadates must never die a natural death. When one of them falls ill, the chief and the old men assemble to examine his condition. If he is judged fit, the man is declared cured; if not, he is pronounced as dead. The sadates, alone among the savages, are cremated, not buried. The ashes are gathered, and honoured for five years. The widow receives some of them, which she has to carry on her back in an um when she goes to mourn at the tomb of her husband.

It is certain that, in spite of its prerogatives, the office of sadate seems to be forced upon the members of families who benefit from it. To succeed the sadate a descendant on the female side is always sought; and the nomination is always made with universal unwillingness from the privileged family. This has given rise to several stories.

It has been claimed that immediately after the death of a sadate, all his relatives eligible for succession flee to the forest to escape this horrid. The village inhabitants set out to look for them, and the first one discovered is nominated. Another tale is that all go to sleep in the common house; an old man enters quietly during the night and wakes the sleepers in a loud voice, "Who will succeed?" The spirits prompt one of them to answer, 'I.' The old man ties a cotton thread, as a guarantee of the will of the spirits, to the wrist of the chosen one, who is thus recognized next day. Surer and more numerous testimonies lead us to believe that the new sadate is chosen by the old men from the appointed family.

Until the time of king Norodom, predecessor of the present king Sisowath, the sovereignty of Cambodia, at their accession, used to send expensive presents to the fire sadate: elephants, silk stuffs to wrap round the sacred sword, etc. The king himself signed the signature. Rice, sesame, and wax were sent to the sadate, or Bokhan priests of the royal palace, who used them in ceremonial sacrifices. In spite of the objections of the sadate, Norodom prohibited sending such costly presents, on the ground that it was of no use, for any reason for his action. Perhaps he saw in this gift a form of disguised tribute to Cambodia, which doubtless recalled either the services rendered long ago to the king, or the annual Epiphany ooc, or a relation of kinship between the sovereigns and the savages.

The sadates or patnas, still so little known, remain, as regards both origin and attributes, one of the most interesting problems to be solved in
the political and religious organization of the Indo-Chinese.

The extremely warlike beliefs and the complicated worship of the savages have given rise also to the singularly cruel practices of sorcerers expert in soothsaying and in nullifying the evil designs of the yang. They may be grouped in two categories: (a) wizard-doctors, who are employed in exorcising diseases and prescribing remedies and sacrifices to appease the yang, the greatest demand, and best paid, but not most influential; (b) wizard-sorcerers; they alone know how to blunt eggs, and their business is to discover by this means theft, murder, or death by witchcraft. Among the powerful tribes, they are very much feared, for their word alone is sufficient to have a man convicted of witchcraft and reduced to slavery. Naturally magic sorcerers abuse their terrible power. Certain wizard-sorcerers practise casting spells by means of wax figures, and belief in the effects of this practice is general among the Indo-Chinese savages.

A man who is either born a sorcerer or may become one; there is, in the one case, direct inspiration of the spirits, and, in the other, preliminary initiation. The wizard-sorcerers who practise divination by means of the so-called casting of eggs receive their mission directly in a dream from the spirit of the lightning. The wizard-doctor (böjau) may also be directly inspired by a special spirit called yang gra.

When the preliminary possession of a man, the latter becomes aware of it from the fact that he can no longer eat certain foods without becoming sick or fevered: dogs, frogs, lizards, and mice, from which he is usually exempt. He then is allowed, with a sort of hysterical delirium, which often lasts five or six days, and then creeps into the forest, to follow the yang; then he has paroxysms of fever, refuses to eat, and holds long conversations with his yang gra, who reveals to him all the diseases with which the village is beset and to be sanitary; and then he goes to sleep, overcome by fatigue. These paroxysms are always accompanied by illness, each time becoming feebler, and at last the initiated one appears to have returned to his normal condition, except that he has become a böjau, fe
cercer and healer. He always has with him in a little bag his special dömm, one of which contains the yang gra, or spirit which inspires him.

The böjau may also be initiated by another sorcerer.

Be first of all feels himself becoming feverish after having eaten the foods mentioned above. An initiated sorcerer examines him, and then, lifting up his eyelids, by the light of a sunbeam or candle, he repeats certain incantations, communicated to him by his yang gra. Then upon the sunbeam makes sure that the initiated man finds several dömmes, and he immediately becomes the executioner of sorcerers. But many of the savages show greater confidence in the sorcerer who has warded off the magic power to him than in one who compels it by means of a fellow sorcerer.

It is a remarkable fact that the majority of these sorcerers, the soothsayers as well as the doctors, are women. The böjau of the Bahmaras, Rönggoas, and numerous other tribes, with their hysterical stamping and their cataleptic sleeps, resembles the papu, the pythons of the Chams.

3. Penal law.—The crime most severely punished is theft, especially of domestic animals or of rice; the latter is sometimes punishable by death. A less serious theft is punished by a fine, almost always equal to double the value of the stolen object. If the thief is repeating certain incantations, his delirium makes him the slave of the man whom he has robbed. Crimes of passion—adultery, rape, and murder—are, as a rule, punished with a variable fine, which is handed over to the injured family or person. The laws of the savages are averse to punishing by death, because a man can always be useful to the village. Crucifixion, however, is practised among certain tribes, and exiling to death is allowed. Should the delirium of a böjau take hold of the sick, he may always regain his freedom by paying the sum due.

10. Oaths and ordeals.—When a person denies his guilt, the savages have recourse to ordeals, which are undergone in the presence of a sorcerer. The most usual, the water test, is a custom still in vogue among the Khmers. The accused and the accuser, both holding on to a post firmly fixed in the river, plunge at the same time underneath the water. If the accused remains longest under the water, the accused is judged to be guilty; if the water remains upon the accuser, the accused is pronounced innocent. The savages firmly believe that the hemorrhage which occurs in the waster of the two at the beginning of ordeals is proof of the real guilt. The results from the fact that the spirit of the waters, indignant at his falsehood, has pricked his nostrils.

Other ordeals consist in making the culprit plunge his hand into boiling pitch or even into molten lead. If his hand remains unhurt, he is proclaimed innocent. A more formidable test, because it allows more scope for manipulation or wickedness, is the ordeal of the 'breaking anything between the thumb and the first finger,' among the Bahnars, Rönggoas, Sedangas, etc. It is used in cases of theft and poisoning; and, especially in cases of witchcraft, it takes place with the aid of a sorcerer or a sorceress.

When, by superstition, ignorance, or brazen-faced falsehood, a savage of any village accuses a neighbor, or more usually, of a neighboring village weaker than his own, of having stolen something from him, or cast over him a spell of illness or of death, the two villages assemble to settle the issue. As a rule the accused is a poor man or woman, one of no lineage; and it is also very often happened that he has no faith in the fairness of the ordeal, and fearing that he will be abandoned by his village or that he may involve it in war, the victim pleads guilty rather than resist, and, in his turn, accuses another, allows himself to be sold as a slave to the Amanass or the Laotians. When the accused is rich and of a good lineage, the attitude of his relatives and of the whole village sometimes makes the accuser feel a rapid retreat. When the parties are about equal in rank, the case is nearly always determined by the geg-test. The böjau takes an egg between his thumb and fore

tinger and asks if it is good. If it is good, the egg, if cleverly pressed, never fails to break if the sorcerer wishes it. Other eggs are then taken and thrown out in which the village defies; generally one of the eggs is cracked and a crackle at the name of the guilty village. A third time the sacred eggs are inspected, and each time, out of a village of these names, the uninjured egg is thrown and, naturally, the guilty village.

Another very repugnant test is to make the accused lick the decomposed corpse of the person he is suspected of having poisoned, while saying: 'May I die within the year if I am guilty of the death of this man, and a model of a toadstone is made with it. This is sprinkled with rice-water and the blood of a chicken, while one of the company pronounces the following invocation: 'Thou! We are making libations of chicken's blood and wine in order that this business may be ended! May the per

current die, slain by the axe or the knife! May he be caught in a snare! May he be drowned in the water! May the lightning strike him! May his enemies pierce him with arrows! May they slay him with his bow! May his sister pull him away! May the blood gush from his nostrils and his mouth! Then they mix the earth, wood ash, and chicken's blood with a little ground stag-horn, each one present swallows some of it, and a 'bouquet of alcohol all round closes the ceremony. According to the savages' ideas, the culprit, if there is one, is sure to die within the year.

The oath of friendship is a complicated one, for if it serves to create a bond as sacred as kinship between those who exchange it.

Intermediaries are chosen between two persons who wish to swear allegiance to each other; but the agreement is only signed after they have expressed their intentions. They receive two jars of rice-water and two chickens from the contracting parties; for their trouble, and the other is required for the ceremony. One of the chickens is roasted, and each of the future friends receives an equal share of the heart, the liver, and the bones.
which he must eat. Then both drink together from the same jar of rice-wine by means of a flexible bamboo tube, while the spectator, too, feasts on the usual impersonal mess. ‘Remember that today you become brothers. . . . If one of you betrays his brother, may he be struck of lightning! May he be reduced to slavery! May he be deprived of his body divinity and his unbroken body become the prey of the ravens!’ In most cases they prick the arm of their partner with the point of a dagger, in order to mix their blood with the wine, which they have to drink together. The solemnity is greater still when not two individuals but whole villages, swear indissoluble friendship after a war. Into the jar of rice-wine are put a boar’s tusk, spearhead, or any curious fragment of a bow, arrow, or serpent’s head. Then the whole assembly drinks, after having uttered the monotonous maledictions against the village which they wish to try the courage of the other.

The savages are somewhat extravagant with their oaths when they wish to affirm or convince. They ‘eat’ their sword, their spear, their pipe, or their clothing—which means that, if they lie, they give themselves over to be killed by the sword or by the spear, or to smoke their last pipe, or wear their last dress in this world.

II. Religion.—The religion of the Indo-Chinese savages appears to be Animism strongly tinged with fetishism and polytheistic naturalism. It is both public and private; demands an infinite number of duties, very often onerous, and constitutes a utilitarian worship based on the fear of evil powers and the desire to conciliate them in order to obtain satisfaction of personal interests. The savages give souls or spirits to animals, objects, plants, and phenomena; these evil spirits take vengeance for wrongs, or are sent out of the way by offerings of rice and sacrifices to make them disappear. Famine, bad luck at fishing, hunting, etc., illness, accidents, and death are the result. Everything that the savage does to guard his wretched lot is pursued by him, or followed by ruses and sacrifices to baffle these formidable powers. These spirits, which are very numerous, are the possessors of considerable but not hierarchical power, and are dependent on one another. Having the same passions as men, they are in constant rivalry, contending for the offerings of men. Among the savages all manifestations of a supernatural power—spirits, ghosts, etc.—bear the generic name of yung, a word of Malay-Polynesian origin.

The spirits, or genii, are divided into two great categories: the good and the wicked. Among the good are those whose mission is to make the fruits of the earth grow, who is fêted with rites of all kinds. In their worship, rain, cold, or wind is the occasion, and who bestow rich harvest, health, and happiness. Although much honoured (for their anger might beget death), they are less powerful than the malevolent spirits, who hate men, and try to torment them in every possible way, or to make them die, and whose neutrality must be conquered by means of sacrifices. These evil genii live in large trees, in huge rocks, or in mountains. A savage would not dare to cut down a large tree or begin to cut wood in the forest without first having killed a dog, dipped some arrows in its blood, and drawn them across the tree. Then the tree may be cut down; the yung has changed its abode.

These spirits vary in power, attributes, and dwelling-places. First of all, they are the most powerful, the spirits of the sky. At their head is the god of lightning, whose voice is the thunder. This god, called by the Bahnars Bok Glang, ‘the Grandfather of the sky,’ is a giant and is supposed to sit at the earth in the guise of the storm, and with a stone axe strikes those who have offended him; hence the veneration among the savages for cut flints and meteoric stones. He is also the god of war, and then he assumes the form of a goat or of a shaggy old man with a long beard. He lives in the sky with the goddess of the harvest (Bahnar Yung Sê, cf. Skr. Sri, and Malay-Polynesian Sêri) and her mother, who has a pair of wings, and is ugly, dirty, and poor, but very fond of the liver of victims, and who comes down to earth to test the enthusiasm of men. The person who gave her a good welcome, in spite of her repulsive appearance, was immediately loaded with fortune’s gifts, but he who turned her away through pride came to misery.

Between the sky and the earth, in a zone of space, live certain ill-intentioned spirits, of whom the most famous is Grandfather, who, without a tag to cover him, tries to snap up the livens of victims, the blood, and the wine offered to other gods. These deities hurl their wrath on the unfortunate savage who is believed not to have offered anything, and becomes the prey of mischance. This spirit is by nature such a thief and so malevolent that it would be useless to attempt to stop his deprivations by heaping him with sacrifices.

The inferior spirits live in holes under the earth. Wounded unwittingly by the savage who is ploughing his field, they have their revenge by inflicting internal disease upon him, which become fatal unless they are disarmed by means of offerings. Along with these should be mentioned the earth-spirit and the water-spirit.

Among the inferior spirits, many become incarnated in the forms of animate objects. There are certain crickets whose cry always foretells a successful hunting expedition to the savage. In order to thank them, an offering is made in the form of a libation of rice-wine which is poured out; and of birds whose singing is taken as an omen. Omens are also taken from the songs of birds during the time of war fills all hearts with joy—and certain sparrows, whose flight, to right, to left, in front, or behind, decides what action the savage is to take. He never goes on an expedition or voyage without consulting the birds.

The savages also worship rocks which have roughly the shape of a man or an animal; they are supposed to harbour a yung. There is nearly always a legend attached to them. Offerings are offered to them, or a leaf from a neighbouring tree is plucked in passing.

Practically all the Bahnars, Sêdângs, Jarais, and Hadongans light a fire to which they add a bar of clay in which they put yung, ‘spirit-jars,’ nor are they honoured as deities, until a dream reveals their value to the savage who possesses them or wishes to buy them. On holidays the mouths of these jars are closed with blood and rice-wine. When a Sêdang makes up his mind to sell a very expensive one, he breaks off one handle of the jar in the hope of keeping the yung in the handle, and continues to worship it in the same way as before.

We have still to mention the protecting spirit of villages. The coarse incense which represents him is made of wood and adorned with a plume of grass, and he is an eternal fire, bounded by his diminutive arms. As soon as the grain is cut and the rice stored, the images of this spirit, carefully sprinkled with the blood of a chicken and washed down to the padi of the village and on the roofs of the houses, with the notion that he will pierce with his arrows the evil genii who might kill or ruin the inhabitants. In the next year the land is not, very much worn out, is replaced by another of the same kind without ceremony, the spirit having left the old one when it became too dilapidated.

More formidable is a malevolent spirit with human form, his body torn with wounds, his en-
trails hanging out of his lacerated body, and his heart visible in his open breast. He wanders and howls among the mountains and forests, chauking and groaning alternately, leaving large bloodstains as he goes. The savages are in mortal terror of him, and never dare to ascend the mountain where his howls are heard. They would pursue him, seize them by craft, and drown them in a sea of blood. Perhaps we may recognize in these spirits, whom the Bahrans call lai ke lom luy br, 'spirits which bar the forest,' the Javanese Gèlèh and the Malay punggai, the barking dog and the mangy cat, which are said to be buried unburied in the forest and covered by wild animals: for these and the souls of women who have died in child-birth are particularly malevolent spirits in the eyes of the savages. This last belief is very wide-spread throughout the whole of the Far East, and is found among the Malaysians, the Khmers, and the Annameses.

The worship of the savages consists chiefly in sacrifices and offerings, varying according to the circumstances and rank of the yang to whom they are offered. Almost every action of their life entails sacrifice: the choice of the site of a village, the building of a house (there are special rites for the erection of the first pillar and for the arrangement of the hearth), the act of drawing water from a well for the first time, birth, marriage, funerals, burial, hunting, reaping, the gathering of roots in the forest, etc. These sacrifices include several ritual actions, an incantation, and the presentation of certain offerings and certain dishes to the gods. They are always concluded by a feast, at which the sacrifices consume almost the whole of the victims and drink rice-wine until they are quite intoxicated. The principal animals offered in sacrifice are the buffalo (for expeditions of war, to celebrate a victory, in cases of serious illness, and at funerals), the pig, the goat (in cases of preparation of a crime or to celebrate a glorious glom par), and the chicken (in all the many daily occasions). The share of the yang is the victim's liver, a little of its blood, and some rice-wine. In sacrifices made after a successful chase, the hunter generally adds to the liver and the blood an ear or the tip of an ear of the quarry. Offerings of food are usually presented to the yang by the sorcerer on a board adorned with little candles stuck on the edge; he then throws several grains of rice on his left shoulder, reciting formuli which the bystanders repeat. In several villages small buildings are erected with a miniature roof and a platform, on which are placed dishes of meat for wandering or hungry spirits.

The Raïès still remember the human sacrifices which they used to offer at the funerals of great chiefs; but this custom has disappeared everywhere except among the Sedangs, who, at the construction of a common house, cast a prisoner of war alive into the hole dug for the first post, and crush him under the post.

12. Cosmogony.—Almost all the savages of Indo-China have ideas identical in their confusion, of the creation of beings and of the world. The sky and the earth existed always, but the human race comes, in their opinion, from the 'grandfather and grandmother,' with the big box.' These two survivors of a deluge which destroyed everybody long ago were saved in a large box, where they took refuge along with a pair of animals of each species. Then they built a nest and a nestling, and a chicken sent by the yang, they came out at last from their floating prison, and, while the animals again spread over the earth, from their union was born one of human beings—a race happy in every way, for another messenger from the yang, a big black ant, had brought to the 'Grand-

parents of the big box' two grains of celestial rice which grew without cultivation, and a single grain of which filled a mountains—a fountain of living water. The yang, being in a无论如何, the fire, which burned without fuel and made savoury dishes—a fire which one of the sons of the Grand-father of the big box had stolen from a powerful fairy—the Golden Angry god, and buried in a great tree, was restored to life in adult state; the earth abounded in happy beings. Then fecundity and the male of the yang deprived them of all, and the magic fire, the celestial violin, and the tree of resurrection disappeared. Since then the savages have been troubled, and suffer famine, cold, and death.

The evil was aggravated by the confusion of tongues which, among the direct sons of the Grandparents of the big box, followed the building of a vague tower of Babel. This confusion led to the dispersion of the races, or, rather, of the different savage tribes.

The legends of the savages still mention the existence of heroes of gigantic size who declared war against the gods. All were killed except their chief, Didong, a Bahrani who conquered Bik Glash, the god of lightning. This Đông also became reconciled with the yang, for he fought the Javanis, who sought a quarrel with him, and by his power over the winds he caused a torrent to flow under their feet in order to allow him to obtain his victory. In order to console the Javan chief, tranquillized in the midst of the battle, the yang presented him into a constellation—an honour granted to several other people famous for their misfortunes or their bravery in the savage traditions.

Although the savages do not know how or why the world was created, they hold that it will come to an end by a terrible fire due to a giant who lives in the cave of the earth.

13. Fetishes.—Pebbles of uncommon shape and colour, pre-historic axes or arrows of flint, and splinters of meteoric stones are the favourite fetishes of the Indo-Chinese savages. When a savage comes upon one of these objects, he picks it up, wraps it in cotton thread, and puts it into a basket which he carefully closes. He waits until the spirit of his fetish manifests itself in a dream and shows him by what sacrifice it wishes to be honoured. If the yang of the fetish-pebble does not reveal itself during the night in human form, or if it demands a sacrifice as costly as, e.g., a buffalo, the savage throws the pebble away in the forest, and there the matter ends. Otherwise he offers it a chicken and a jar of rice-wine; then the pebble, rubbed with the chicken's blood and sprinkled with wine, is put, along with similar objects, into a bag; there the pebble and the bag are attached to one of the pillars of the house.

These fetish-pebbles, which among the Bahrans receive the name of domong, are not peculiar to any individual; the village possesses a large number of them, carefully preserved in the common house, on a little altar placed on the principal pillar, or gorong. They are the city-protectors, and a savage is especially employed to sprinkle them with blood and wine during the ceremonies. Those most revered are the domong of war, which are generally picked up on the return from an expedition, and whose spirits manifest themselves in the form of strong shaggy men. After the return from a successful razzia, they are coated with blood of a sacrificed buffalo.

When fire breaks out, if the flames reach the domong, they are thrown away, for it is believed that the yang must have gone away before the fire had reached it. The city-protectors are the protectors of the rice, of fishing, hunting, healing, etc. Each one has his own particular sacrifice by which the others also benefit, receiving after him their share of his prosperity. By the help of a expert in the domong who is most worshipped is the rice domong, but great care is taken not to sprinkle him with
buffalo's or even pig's blood. In order that he may not get acclimated to such costly sacrifices, he is roasted alive and as a rule, eaten by the chicken. Both male and female domong exist. Their sex is determined by the sorcerer. Their power is equal.

You may add that, according to the missionaries, the savages, amid the great number of supernatural beings to whom they render worship, have an idea of a Higher Being, the creator and absolute master of the universe, who is both good and punishing evil; but this Supreme Being, stripped of all ill-will towards men and inspiring no fear in them, is not an object of worship.

14. Tabu.—Prohibitions are as numerous as offerings among the savages. The words dieong, deng, log, tan, man, kóm, etc., in Lower Laos, "kalam" in Upper Laos, or even tabung, among certain tribes bordering on ancient Champa, mean (see p. 16), abstinence against doing certain things at certain times, certain ritual interdictions—in a word, an ensemble of tabus.

When a village moves to another place, no one is allowed to walk on the road which it followed at its exodus. When a woman is confined, or when any one is married or dies, the village women are not allowed to cook for a variable period.

When there is a famine, the village which is suffering from it is forbidden to strangers, for fear that the rice-pump, already so depleted, should be given to them. When the wind blows in a certain way, hunters must not kill and such an animal in the forest will die either of hunger or by some disorder.

It must be added, however, that among the savages who are neighbours of more civilized races, and especially since the French occupation, the extent and intensity of tabus are on the decline.

15. Totemism.—Properly speaking, food tabustions do not exist among the savages; nor do they appear to render special worship to any animal, and so far no clearly totemistic tradition has been recognized among them. Nevertheless it must be said that all the savage tribes speak of the tiger with timid reverence, and, when they do bring themselves to eat its flesh, it is only out of revenge, and only among tribes which abstain from the flesh of the domestic elephant.

In fact, when a domestic elephant is wounded, they offer him a roasted pig, place some rice on his head, and pour libations of alcohol, all the while reciting prayers. The elephant, however, is taken to the village, where it is killed. A curious legend of the Bahams 'of the first ages of the world' relates that the first man of the world which left the village had gone away on business, and, on their return, found their wives and children transformed into monkeys, doubtless by the vengeance of the yam. In order to restore these metamorphosed beings to their human form, they made a tree of incisions on themselves, and with the blood that flowed they washed all the wounds, until they treated immediately resumed their human appearance. All the savage tribes and the Indo-Chinese in general—like the peasants—have a strong antipathy to killing monkeys.

16. Festivals.—The festival of Victory (see § 4), the Festival of the Dead (see § 6), and the Festival of the Fructification of the Rice.

When rice is sown, a chicken is first sacrificed; but the real ceremony in its honour does not begin until the rice is in the blade. To ensure fructification, the domong are taken down from the granary where they stay, and placed in the house after a chicken's head, and a part of a white or red rice have been offered to them. Then early next day the owner of the field carries them off with a chicken whose head and brains have been washed in the juice of a certain forest-plant, and a tube of bamboo filled with millet-skins. In the middle of the field are dug a hole, into which the domong of the rice are laid; he surrounds this hole with a circle of sticks ornamented with tufts of bamboo and joined together by several strands of cotton thread. The chicken is killed, and with its blood are sprinkled the fetish-pebbles, which are thrown on its grave, a post, a stone, a piece of broom, ashed with tufts of bamboo, and smeared with blood; this post ends in a leaf rolled up into the shape of a horn and filled with wine and other grave goods. and the god of the field is satisfied with a small bamboo tube full of millet, wine, and chicken's blood. The chicken is thus nourished and rewarded, after having adjusted the malevolent spirits to depart from his field.

LITERATURER.—P. Aymonier, Voyages dans la Laos, 2 vols., Paris, 1895-97; H. Ardenne, Dictionnaire bahâno-français, 'Excursions et Reconnaissances,' xii. (1856), nos. 27, 30, and note on the mention of the chicken. Both male and female domong exist. Their sex is determined by the sorcerer. Their power is equal.

1 On the geography and ethnology of the region deals with in this article cf. art. AUSTRALASIA. See also art. FANDOM.
barun and bruwa point to a derivation from ruva, ‘two’ ; so that these names probably mean ‘companion,’ a meaning which we find in ringas-ringas of the inhabitants of Minahassa, koko of the Javanese, katuwah (of the same nature as another) in Luzon, and isamaras of the Ibanan. Among the Batta tribes in Sumatra we meet with tendi and tondi ; and the races which have been strong under the influence of the Hindus, such as the Javanese, Balinese, use Sanskrit words, e.g. yita and sukma. Besides these names for the soul-substance, ojewa, originally ‘breath,’ is often used. The lives of the Javanese on after-death, bear quite different names. A word of frequent occurrence is nitiu, anitiu, onitu, meaning ‘soul’s’ in the Moluccas, but ‘spirits’ in Celebes, Nias, and other islands. The Batta tribes and the Niassians use the word beyo, which means ‘spectre,’ anga in Central and aundo in Southern Celebes. The Dayak tribes in Borneo have words such as hau, angau, luwa, etc. The belief in a life after this life is so vague with the Indonesians, and the conception they form of the soul is therefore so indistinct, that, having come into contact with monotheistic religions, they have adopted words from them. The Dayaks, e.g., have Sanskrit jive among the Malays and Javanese, and the Arabic malak, which all through the Malay Archipelago does not stand for ‘angel,’ but for the idea of magnificence.

The impersonal soul-substance in man.—All parts of the human body, and its secretions, contain impersonal soul-substance. This may be extracted from any part; and then pain is felt at the part.

(1) Many customs show that the Indonesians consider the human head to contain soul-substance. The great object of head-hunting is to possess themselves of their enemy’s soul-substance, in order to increase their own. In the Moluccas, missionaries have sometimes been charged by the natives with having made medicine out of human heads.

(2) Other important storehouses of soul-substance are the bowels and the liver. For this reason it is a general usage in the Archipelago to offer to the gods a piece of the liver of an animal, which means that not only the muscular part, but also the soul-substance of the animal is sacrificed. The Ole-nga of Borneo and other Dayak tribes regard the liver as the seat of all emotions. The Batta and the Negritos of Sarawak, a Negrito woman is afraid of abdominal operations, because they think that then the soul-substance is removed from the body. With the Javanese, the Malays, and the inhabitants of the Mentawai Islands and Halmahera also the liver is the seat of the emotions, with the Papuans the bowels. Among a few tribes (Minafikabianians, Niassians, and Kailans) the heart is believed to be a receptacle of soul-substance. The heart is sacrificed in some parts of the body when the death of the soul of the dead man should take with it all their soul-substance and they should die. Throughout the Archipelago the law holds that the blood of a man guilty of incest must not be spilled, because this would make the soil barren.

(3) The blood is of much greater importance in this respect. It is sacrificed as containing soul-substance. In the consecration of the house it is customary to spill the blood of the tribes. Each part of the woodwork, in order to give it strength. The Macassars smear old sacred objects with blood, in order to infuse new life into them. The Orang Sakai in Siak sprinkle, as para pro tota, a few drops of their blood on a corpse, lest the soul of the dead man should take with it all their soul-substance and they should die. Throughout the Archipelago the law holds that the blood of a man guilty of incest must not be spilled, because this would make the soil barren.

(4) That soul-substance is found in the placenta and umbilical cord appears from the connexion which the Indonesians see between child and afterbirth; the latter is called elder or younger brother. The placenta is carefully preserved or buried. The Battak call upon the soul of the afterbirth. Other peoples (Macassars, Halmahera, etc.) eat the placenta with salt and tamarind. The little piece of the umbilical cord which has fallen off is generally preserved by the Indonesians, and administered as medicine to the child when it is ill.

(5) A great deal of importance is thought to reside in the hair of the head; hence many object to having their hair cut, as this might cause them to fall ill for want of soul-substance. When a Javanese has lost two or more children by death, he does not shave the head of the next child. After their conversion to Christianity, many of the Battak were afraid that they would die if their long hair was cut. In case of accident or disease the mother rubs her child with her hair, to supply it with new soul-substance (Minahassa, Sanii, Central Celebes, Ainkola, Central Nias). Among the Dayaks, parents protest against the cutting of the hair of school children, for fear of disease. Hair is laid at the foot of fruit trees to make them more fruitful, i.e. to aduce soul-substance (Torajas, Malaya, Karo Battak, Timor, Dayaks). The Malays and the Javanese have a great respect for hair, which is considered a human hair to dedicate people by way of medicine. Betrothed couples exchange some of their hair, in order to become one in soul and always to think of each other (Moluccas, Central Celebes, Minahassa, Timor, Battak, Dayaks). With the Karo Battak the hair of bride and bridgroom is knotted together at the wedding. Father and mother give some of their hair to a child, that their child may feel that its parents are near it, and that it may not cry too much during their absence (Central Celebes, Minahassa). Therefore it is a prevailing custom to preserve some hair of deceased relatives, lest they should die with longing for the dead. According to Indonesian belief, a little hair (hence a little soul-substance) taken from a man gives power over all his soul-substance; whatever happens to the hair happens also to the man. This idea is at the root of all the sorcery with hair which occurs among the Indonesians. As a rule the hair is first wrapped up in a parcel with pungent spices, and then buried or hung in a tree; or the owner of the hair is afflicted with all kinds of diseases as the consequence of this. The worst thing one can do is to burn a person’s hair with an imprudence. The person is then sure to die. Hair is also used as a sacrifice when the person has told a lie about the consequences of which he fears. A Boni prince offered his hair when he had delivered his country from the enemy. Dayaks sacrifice some of their hair when they have returned unharmed from war. A general form of sacrifice in the Malay Archipelago is the cutting off of the hair of children. Frequently, however, a lock of hair is spared, as if to retain the soul-substance. The sacrifice of hair at a death is common: the relatives offer part of their spiritual existence, that the soul of the dead may leave them unharmed (Moluccas, Halmahera, Timor, Bata, Dayak tribes, Eilango, Malaya, Battak, Malagasy). This entire or partial cutting or shaving off of the hair is sometimes required only of the widow or widower, sometimes of the nearest relatives, at other times (when a chief of special importance has died) of all the subjects.

(6) Of equal value with a man’s hair are his nails. Hair and nails are therefore generally mentioned together. Great care is taken that the parings do not fall into the hands of people who might do harm with them. Among many of the tribes the nails must not be cut after sunset, because the spirits wandering about them might seize them.
The Indonesians imagine the teeth to be filled with soul-substance. This appears from the knocking out of teeth (as it occurs still in Central Celebes, the Toraja, and the Ilogano), and from the custom of filing off teeth which reaches its height in the skillful way practised by the Javanese and others. Originally this was intended as a sacrifice when entering upon puberty. What is left of the tooth after it has been filed off is blackened—originally for the purpose of hiding from the spirits the fact that part of the sacrifice was withheld. The sacrifice of teeth as a mourning rite is still found among the Indonesians in Kudja in Java, in Banjul in Sumatra, and in the isle of Suleier.

The secretions of the human body also contain soul-substance, as, e.g., the saliva. Many Dayak tribes spit on the objects they eat or drink, that the spirits may know that it comes from them. Spitting occurs as a sacrifice, in order to get rid of something impure or sinful. When the Indonesian bears some unclean sound, he spits; the Battak do so when a corpse is carried past them; the Galeareas immediately spit when they have pronounced a forbidden name. A dying man leaves some of his saliva in his grave, that the survivor may not be too much for him (Macassars, Olo-Dungel, in Borneo, and Javanese). By the possession of a person's saliva one gets power over all his soul-substance; therefore the Indonesians do not spit near graves or high trees, because the spirits might avail themselves of this saliva to take away all their soul-substance. Saliva is used in sorcery also, in the form of a charm (Moluccas, Nias). All the tribes are careful with everything that has been in contact with the mouth (with saliva), e.g., remains of food. That saliva contains soul-substance is proved by the fact that tools are rubbed with it to make them stronger (Minahaka—the especially rifles [Afikola, Kaili, and others]). The Land Dayaks of Sarawak begged Europeans to spit on bits of coco-nut shell, which were then scattered over the land to make them fertile.

Sweat also—and consequently the clothes saturated with it—contains soul-substance. Hence a Javanese thinks that his child will fall ill if an article into his sight has been carried away by the stream; and it is customary among various tribes to ask for worn clothes of European children, that their children, wearing them, may thrive because the sweat in which the clothes contain water. In which persons of high standing have washed off the perspiration of their hands and feet is believed to have the power of making the soil fertile. Urine is taken as a medicine (Dayaks, Macassars, Javanese); and the water in which clothes of certain people have been washed is used to cure all kinds of diseases, especially in cases where the urine is washed) to hasten a confinement. Even earth from footprints, to which something of a person adheres, is sometimes used to injure that person by sorcery (Malays, Battaks, Galeareas).

From the stories current among Galeareas, Torajas, and Javanese relating to deceased persons who were restored to life by means of tarek, it appears that this secretion of man is also thought to contain soul-substance. Urine has similar effects, where it is used as a medicine (Javanese, Kalilas, Macassars, Battaks, Dayaks). The Buginese rub people with urine to make them insolent-proof, while in Apolo and Halmahera a person's urine is used to destroy him; in the island of Kisser a young man urinates on the urine of his heart's elect, hoping that this will make her love him. Moreover, many stories are found among the Indonesians about animals which were impregnated with a human being by drinking human urine. Among the Macassars and Torajas fouses are used to heal wounds. Among the former and the Karo Battak they are also used to practise in sorcery.

In the opinion of the Indonesians the soul-substance discharged above in this way, and the blood, can and should be both increased and decreased. Primitive man was always bent on increasing his soul-substance in order to make his life stronger. He accomplished this by eating and drinking. The Indonesians imagine that the soul-substance of the food is absorbed by him (though he does not always realize this), as may be seen from the food which he forbids in different illnesses. This prohibition is not founded on empiricism, but on shape, taste, name, and properties of the various foods. On account of their form, name, etc., they are considered injurious to the patient, and their soul-substance corresponds to their name, form, etc. The Dayaks do not eat the flesh of deer, lest they should become cowardly (like a deer). The eating of white buffaloes causes leprosy (Central Celebes), etc. The Malays believe that they strengthen their own soul-substance when absorbing the soul-substance of the food. They tell a story, in which a poor man grows strong and healthy by eating the flavour of a rich man's food, whereas the rich man, eating the food itself, grows thinner and weaker. Moreover, many Indonesian peoples call rise the strengthener of soul-substance. If a person's shape is improved, it is supposed among the Battak, some Dayak tribes, and the Papuans; among other peoples we find traces of it in the drinking of human blood, the eating of brains and other parts of the body. That the great object was to add to their soul-substance appears from the parts eaten: the palm of the hand was eaten to get strong hands (Battak, Daoks, Galeareas); knee-caps, to get strong knees (Battak); scrapings of human bones, to make the whole body strong (Olo-Nagau, Macassars, Torajas). In the Moluccas, pieces of the heart, liver, and lungs are eaten to become 'brave'; and for the same reason dogs are eaten (Torajas, Moluccas). It is a general precept that a pregnant woman must not eat pungent, stimulating, hot things, else the child she brings forth will also be hot, i.e., unhealthy.

A way of adding to one's soul-substance is by drinking blood. The Macassar, Buginese, Torajas, Kalilas, Gerontalese, Minahassians, and Teloirese drink the blood of a slain enemy in order to become brave and strong. Who conclude peace drink each other's blood, as well as those who wish to become blood-brothers; some drops of blood from the shoulders or arms of the two parties were mixed and drunk; this betokened that their soul-substance, and so also their wishes and thoughts, had become one. This custom is especially prevalent among the Dayak tribes; but it also occurs among the Battak, the islands of the Molucca group, and in Timor. Among the Olo-Nagau in Borneo, when a child was adopted by others, it was given some blood to drink from the right shoulder of the foster-father and from the right breast of the foster-mother; and a newly married couple on their wedding-day, a man who has been appointed chief, or persons who settle a quarrel are smeared with blood to strengthen their soul-substance. The same customs also occur in the south of Celebes. In Java it is believed that the blood lost during confinement by a woman who has borne a child in jamat lugi or seloloe klawon has a special healing power.
(3) Since saliva contains a large amount of soul-substance, the Indonesians think that they can add to a man's soul-substance by spitting on him. This spitting is very general; sometimes some he has been in close contact with. Many people have themselves spat on by him to become strong and healthy. The Indonesians try to cure a bunamed leg by rubbing it with their saliva, the numbness being, in their opinion, caused through temporary want of soul-substance.

(4) The breath is another manifestation of soul-substance; hence a man may be supplied with new soul-substance by being breathed upon. It is therefore a prevailing custom among the Indonesians to breathe on sick or dying people. This is also done in cases of confinement which do not go smoothly, and when any one faints. With the Muhammadans water is exorcized and breathed on; in some cases soul-substance is also transmitted from one man to another by mere contact. In most parts of the Archipelago the people like Europeans to touch their children; and offerings are touched by the participants. Connected with this is the belief that, if a person has been infected with a skin disease through contact with a person suffering from the disease, the latter will have got rid of his illness.

(5) The personal soul-substance, in man. —The soul-substance of a man is also imagined to be personal; this is specially the case with the tribes among whom the idea of individuality is more prominent. In some cases soul-substance can be passed on by personal contact, and is then received through the personal soul-substance of the deceased. In the case of a community soul-substance is then the personification of all the personal soul-substances of the community. It has the shape of its owner, but the Indonesian always imagines it as diminutive human being, as large as a thumb; hence it is concentrated soul-substance. It can separate from the body voluntarily or by compulsion. Some tribes, e.g., the Toba Battak, endow it even with an independent existence outside of man. This is also found among the Karo Battak, who consider the soul-substance when it is going away, not to its owner, but to his house. A Koto tribe (the Siutemhamer) says that a person who keeps his soul-substance in a bottle. Sometimes people procure a certain object which the soul-substance is supposed to be very fond, and this object is then thought to bind the soul-substance to the house. This custom is specially prevalent among the Battak. Most of the Indonesians hold the belief that, although the soul-substance may carry on an independent existence, it has its home in the body. If it is too long separated from the body, the person falls ill and dies.

(1) The Indonesian sees his soul-substance embodied in his shadow. To the question whether a new-born child has soul-substance, the answer in Halmahera is: 'Of course, for it has a shadow.' Some assert that there are people who have no shadow, or only a very faint one; they will die sooner or later. In Nias (Nias, Macassars, Akoelians). Food on which a person's shadow falls must not be eaten, else the person is harmed, for his soul-substance is eaten (Dayaks, Minafikabians, Javanese, Malays). The person's shadow must stand on a shadow, tread on it, or stab it, lest his shadow fall on a grave or a tree or any other object in which a spirit is thought to reside, as the soul of the dead person in the grave or the spirit in the tree might seize the shadow (soul-substance), and cause the person's death.

(2) There is also a close relation between the name and the soul-substance of a man. If sorcery is practised, then the effect of the saliva. Dayak parents spit on their children daily to promote their growth; sores and wounds also are spotted; the remuneration which a witchdoctor demands for saving a life is called the reward of the saliva among the Madurese. Some years ago there was a holy man in Padang whose saliva was said to be particularly efficacious; many people had themselves spat on by him to become strong and healthy. The Indonesians try to cure a bunamed leg by rubbing it with their saliva, the numbness being, in their opinion, caused through temporary want of soul-substance.

(3) During sleep the soul-substance separates from the body, and wanders about; what it sees while the man dreams, the soul-substance also sees. When the soul meets the soul of the deceased, it is universally assumed by the Indonesians that, when the soul of the deceased receive the dreamer kindly, and give him food, he will soon die. The Dayaks, Torajas, and Javanese court meetings with spirits by going to sleep in places inhabited by them. On various occasions an attempt is made to learn through a dream what the dead say, e.g., in case of marriage (Dayaks, Niassians); when choosing a branch of a tree (Javanese, etc.). Among some tribes a person watching near a corpse must not see the soul of the deceased might easily seize the roaming soul-substance; and a sick person is not allowed to fall asleep, lest the soul-substance should go away and never return. After an oppressive dream, which may have frightened the soul-substance and caused it to depart, it is necessary to bring an offering to call it back. It is wrong to wake a person suddenly, because the soul-substance may not have had time enough to return. The strict prohibition against stepping across a sleeping person, which at present is only looked upon as bad manners, may be traced to the same idea.

(4) Fright, a word for some one or something, fear, and discontent also cause the soul-substance to move to another place, with the result that the person falls ill. Hence it is only when in a passion that Indonesian parents dare to beat their children; when it is beaten the child gets discontented, then its soul-substance may run away and the child fall ill. To prevent the loss of soul-substance, e.g., in times of epidemics, bits of tape are tied round the wrists (Torajas, Dayaks, Minakabians, Niassians, and Battak). The soul-substance goes into and out of the body through mouth, nose, or ears, but usually through the crown of the head, through the large fontanel. Only the Papuans say that it goes in and out at the shoulder, under the collarbone. The soul-substance does not always leave voluntarily; it may be carried off by other people, e.g., an Arab woman, gone (Macassars, Kaillans, Akoelians). The custom of refusing a stranger admittance to mother and child during the first few days after a confinement must be owing to fear of this; the very frail soul-substance of the child might so perish with him (Achinese, Dayaks, Macassars, Javanese). Women must abstain from festivities, dances, and some daily occupations while their husbands are travelling, in order not to hamper them on their journey.
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(Central and Southern Celebes). The fear which most Indonesian tribes have of being photographed arises from the thought that the soul-substance may be carried off with the photograph. The soul-substance of a man is often lured away by the sorcerers for the purpose of injuring him; and in times of war the soul-substance of enemies is lured away. Any fiction that the enemies themselves will follow it—such as the theft of a necklace of skin to fall an easy prey to their lurking foes. Rice and eggs are always used as an enticement (Battak, Niassians, Torajas, Dayakas). Finally, a man's soul-substance may be tempted away by the soul of one of his deceased relatives, either because it longs to have him with him or as a revenge for some offence.

If the soul-sub substance remains long separated from its home in the man, the man must die. When it is suspected that the soul-sub substance is gone it must be brought back. The sick person tells where he first felt ill, and the soul-sub substance is found there. After a burial the soul of the deceased is accused of having stolen the soul-sub substance, and it is brought back from the grave. If a spirit has taken away the soul-sub substance, this is revealed by sorcery or in a dream. The calling back of the soul is very simple, a mother, thinking that the soul-sub substance of her child is gone, calls, 'Come, soul-sub substance,' sometimes accompanying this by the sound with which chickens are called. When the Olo-Ngaju, when a child falls downstairs, the mother scoop up in a string the soul-sub substance, which she thinks has been lost by the fright; and among the Javanese, if a person continues ill, a relative takes one of his garments, and, trailing this along behind him, runs to the spot where the person first felt ill, catching up the lost soul-sub substance in this way. Generally, however, people have recourse to a sorcerer. He goes to the spot in question with an offering and a piece of cotton or a branch of a tree. The soul-sub substance is caught in the piece of cloth or in the branch, carried home, and applied to the sick man's head (Moluccas, Minahassas, Central and Southern Celebes, Timor; among the Dayakas, Javanese, Sundanese, Niassians, Battak, and Cayoos). In Bolaq Molkom on and among the Malay it is sometimes caught in a doll, among other tribes generally in a bowl or in a bag of rice (Southern Celebes, Watusela, Olo-Dusun, Land Dayakas, Karo and Timor Battak, Malay). The priests amongst the Borneo Dayakas declare that they split the sick man's head, and thus open the way for the soul-sub substance; or remove it by placing a beautiful garment on the patient's head. Occasionally the sorcerer uses a ladder for the soul-sub substance to pass along; this is a thread (Timorese) or a string of beads (Land Dayakas of Sarawak). When the soul-sub substance has been caught, it looks like a piece of a leaf (Minahassas, Torajas), a little spider (Timor, Nias), or hair (Dayakas of Sarawak), coal, oil, earth, or blood (Olo-Dusun and others).

(5) Squeezing is generally looked upon as one of the signs that the soul-sub substance is leaving the body or returning to it. The belief is widespread that a sick man will recover when he sneezes, because then the soul-sub substance has come back. The wishes pronounced by a mother when her child sneezes are evidence that the spirit may not take away the soul-sub substance which has issued out of the child (Torajas, Javanese, Battak, Dayakas). The persons of grown-up people sneezing is a sign either that friends think of them or that enemies want to harm their soul-sub substance. In consideration of the latter case imprecations are frequently uttered with sneezing.

When a spirit has caught the soul-sub substance, a doll is often made representing the sick person, and this, instead of the soul-sub substance of the patient, is offered to the spirit (Uliassians, Torajas, Minahassians, Macassans, all Dayak tribes, Malay, Battak, Niassians). The name given to this doll often has the meaning of 'rascal,' 'substitute,' 'price for which something is bought,' etc. The doll is generally brought beforehand into closer connexion with the sick person by adding to it a thread of his clothes, a hair, some saliva, or some of the scappings of skin to fall an easy prey to his lurking foes. Rice and eggs are always used as an enticement (Battak, Niassians, Torajas, Dayakas). Finally, a man's soul-sub substance may be tempted away by the soul of one of his deceased relatives, either because it longs to have him with him or as a revenge for some offence.

5 Voluntary departure of soul-sub substance.—When the sick person continues to be ill in spite of all efforts, this is a proof for the Indonesian that the spirit has taken the soul-sub substance to a spot whence men cannot bring it back. Then a priest or a priestess must be summoned, who is conversant with the spirits, and who can conjure up well-disposed spirits to help them in their search for the soul-sub substance. These priests and priestesses generally intone a litany, in which they record their experiences on the journey to the spirit world. Then the priest invokes the help of the spirits which are well disposed to ma. ust be come for the priest in some vehicle (generally the rainbow), and conduct him (i.e. his soul-sub substance) to higher regions, where after many meetings with good spirits and spirits, and lastly regains the lost soul-sub substance, and, having returned to earth in the same vehicle, restores it to the sick person. The idea which gives rise to this practice is that in sleep the soul leaves freely in the haunts of the spirits. Among the Javanese and Buginese, and in the Moluccas, the priests and priestesses still actually lie down to sleep. Among other tribes it is only feigned. The language used by the priests is a mixture of words of their own, circumlocations, and words derived from foreign languages. All these things have certainly been used to enhance the importance of the priests and priestesses, but among the Indonesians the priests have never practised a secret cult. The above is true of Dayakas, Torajas, Minahassians, Teloiorese, Buginese, Minakabasians, and Javanese.

The personal soul-sub substance may separate from the body in order to harm a person. Those who possess this power are wer-wolves and witches. Some tribes believe that the soul changes into a tiger (Malacca, Sunamata, Java), into a crocodile (Philippine Islands, Lombok), into a dog or cat (Timor); but most of them believe that only the soul-sub substance changes into an animal, and the body remains at home. As a rat, dog, snake, millipede, owl, etc., it penetrates into the houses of people to injure them. When the soul-sub substance leaves or enters the body, it does so in the shape of a mouse (Timor), a firefly (Bali, Central Celebes), or a lizard (Malaya). The harm which the wer-wolf is supposed to do to people is to eat their soul-sub substance; he does this by taking the entrails (especially the liver) out of a man (Bali, Halmahera, Central Celebes, and other places), by drinking the blood (Southern Timor), or by paying upon the heart (Korinchi). A man becomes a lymphoanthrop by inheritance (Central Celebes, Dayakas, Malayis, by pronouncing certain charms (Java), Bali, or by offerings to evil spirits (Halmahera). It is not always possible to recognize a lymphoanthrop; sometimes, however, he may be known either by twisted feet (Atche), or by want of the groove under the nose in the upper lip (Korinchi), or sometimes by peculiar actions, as, e.g., standing naked on his head (Central Timor). When some
one is suspected of being a werewolf, it has to be decided by an ordeal whether he is really guilty or not; if he is guilty, he is killed.

The Balinese (upupa) is a woman, who can sever her head from her body, and make it fly through the air to harm people; the bowels fly along with the head; she uses her ears (sometimes her lungs) as wings. Generally the power (e.g., among most of the Indonesian tribes) the word is connected with the Malay "tanggai, 'to draw out, to pull up.' The witch may be recognised by the noises which she makes on her journeys (represented by ko or po). She works harm in the same way as the werewolf. She can go on her expeditions only by night; if she has not returned to her body before daybreak, she dies. The Indonesians try to protect their homes from visits of witches by all kinds of means, the most common being the hanging up of some thorny boughs. The witch is killed when her guilt has been convincingly proved.

6. Soult-substance of animals.—According to the Indonesians, the soul-substance of animals is similar to that of man. This appears from their folklore.

In the story of creation of the Karo Batkak, men were created from eggs, but through the carelessness of a mythical personage the eggs broke too soon, and animals and plants issued forth. Numerous stories tell that animals were originally men, and that monkeys, crocodiles, snakes, and birds; but also to deer (Macassars, Torajas, Malays) and to dogs (Halmahera). Women give birth to animals, as is generally told of the crocodiles of the islands (Papuan, Madurese), of snakes and lizards (Batkak). Animals also may bring forth human beings, as monkeys (Malays), dogs (Java, Lombok, Southern and Central Celebes, Nias), buffaloes (Macassars, and etc. Dayaks). Men sometimes turn into animals by eating part of an animal, into birds by eating bird's eggs (Minahasses), into crocodiles by eating crocodiles' eggs (Dayaks), into snakes by eating the flesh of snakes (Minahasses, Padang). Animals sometimes play the part of allies of man.

Man uses the soul-substance of animals for his own benefit: the ashes of the milked or of the burnt personal tail of the crows are rubbed between the hands to make them strong in combat (Galelarase); lizards are used in cases of leprosy, on account of their regenerating power (Java); the head and the fat of the bat have a magical effect, if it be set under one's pillow at night, in virtue of its power of drawing in or putting out its head from under its shell (Torajas, Batkak). The bones have special power; bones of cows make a person dexterous in stealing, and in Central Celebes they make a person invisible. Everywhere we meet with stories that miraculous trees grow out of buried bones of animals. Skulls of deer and pigs are hung up in the house to call the soul-substance of their fellows (Macassars, Torajas, Galelarase, Niassins). The blood of animals plays an important part at sacrifices. Sacred heifers are rubbed with blood to give them power (Macassars and Buginese); palm-seeds are sprinkled with blood to make them grow rapidly (Torajas, Dayaks). The Macassars drank deer's blood to assimilate themselves to these animals, in order to catch them more easily. The saying "animals also has power; we find cases where people are cured by the saliva of a cow (Padang panjait), a tiger (Javanese), and dogs (Aëkòla, Halmahera). The saliva of bees is applied to wounds, as is also the venom of serpents and venomous beasts. On the other hand, the animal itself is very often used, burnt and pounded to powder. Animals which are of special importance to man among the Indonesians are also the ones which are most often eaten. Thus among a tribe of hunters dogs are considered to possess personal soul-substance; they have names, and are spoken to and treated as men (Torajas, Galelarase, Dayaks). This continues as long as they are hunted, or at least for some time when they are no longer hunters (Miasàkàbuans, Malays). Buffaloes and cows also have personal soul-substance; they are addressed, their soul-substance is invoked, and offerings are given to them (Minahassees, Achiminoes, Batkak, Dayaks, Javanese, Timoreses, Macassars, Buginese, and Torajas). As a rule one animal in a herd is considered as the leader which keeps the herd together, and is killed first.

7. Soul-substance of plants.—According to the Indonesians, plants too have soul-substance similar to that of man. The close relation between man and plant appears from stories. Sometimes a person going on a journey gives the relatives whom he leaves behind a plant, which will languish when he is in danger or ill. Many tribes plant a coconut at the birth of a child; the soul-substance of the child is then bound to the tree when it grows up. Other stories tell that some trees were originally men, e.g., the Medrozylos and the Arenga saccharifera; others deal with persons who have some form from trees, plants, and even from leaves; others tell how plants are grown from seeds from rotan and bamboo. There are plants to which a particularly strong soul-substance is attributed, on account of their tough vital power. With all Indonesians the Dracaena torminalis is regarded as most among them. It is the sacred plant, which is used by the priests in all their proceedings, and whose strong soul-substance they try to transfer to man. The name and shape of plants characterize their soul-substance, and to this the Indonesia pays heed when seeking for cures for diseases, or for bringing about some change in his body. In Central Celebes there is a tree called "Sundar;" now turns means to turn, and therefore the leaves of this tree are used to alleviate (cause to go to sleep) pain. The soul-substance of the principal trees and plants which are of great use to man is imagined to be personal; thus fruit-bearing trees are often addressed as persons. The rice is fed to the stalks with rice- porridge; wood and leaves of trees with large fruit are laid between the rice, that it may form large grains; all kinds of preparations must be taken, lest the soul-substance of the rice should be frightened and flee. If from the languishing condition of the rice it appears that the soul-substance is gone, then it is brought in by light, in virtue of its power of drawing in or putting out its head from under its shell (Torajas, Batkak). The bones have special power; bones of cows make a person dexterous in stealing, and in Central Celebes they make a person invisible. Everywhere we meet with stories that miraculous trees grow out of buried bones of animals. Skulls of deer and pigs are hung up in the house to call the soul-substance of their fellows (Macassars, Torajas, Galelarase, Niassins). The blood of animals plays an important part at sacrifices. Sacred heifers are rubbed with blood to give them power (Macassars and Buginese); palm-seeds are sprinkled with blood to make them grow rapidly (Torajas, Dayaks). The Macassars drank deer's blood to assimilate themselves to these animals, in order to catch them more easily. The saying "animals also has power; we find cases where people are cured by the saliva of a cow (Padang panjait), a tiger (Javanese), and dogs (Aëkòla, Halmahera). The saliva of bees is applied to wounds, as is also the venom of serpents and venomous beasts. On the other hand, the animal itself is very often used, burnt and pounded to powder. Animals which are of special importance to man among the Indonesians are also the ones which are most often eaten. Thus among a tribe of hunters dogs are considered to possess personal soul-substance; they have names, and are spoken to and treated as men (Torajas, Galelarase, Dayaks). This continues as long as they are hunted, or at least for some time when they are no longer hunters (Miasàkàbuans, Malays). Buffaloes and cows also have personal soul-substance; they are addressed, their soul-substance is invoked, and offerings are given to them (Minahassees, Achiminoes, Batkak, Dayaks, Javanese, Timoreses, Macassars, Buginese, and Torajas). As a rule one animal in a herd is considered as the leader which keeps the herd together, and is killed first.
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spoken to (Torajas, Dayaks, Javanese, Niassians, Battak). In the Moluccas the clove tree is considered and treated exactly in the same way as a woman with child, during the time that it is in bloom; people are particularly careful to avoid anything that might frighten the soul-substance of the tree. The Battak believe that the camphor tree has a spirit of its own to which sacrifices are offered; the camphor-seekers use a language of their own making, less the soul-substance of the tree. But what is their reason for object is and hide its camphor crystals from them. In Sumba the natives call the sandalwood tree of nits, i.e. spirit wood, and formerly nobody dared cut down such a tree. In a grove of coastcherry trees there is one tree which is considered the chief of all, and which takes care that the soul-substance of the other trees does not vanish (and with it the sap); such a tree is never tapped.

8. Soul-substance of objects. — That objects also have soul-substance appears from the use that is made of them. Very often people carry with them iron objects, stones, chins, beads, or hard fruits, as some kinds of nuts, or make their children carry them about, that their soul-substance may be as hard as that of the objects mentioned (Malays, Battak, Gayos, Dayaks, Sundanese, Malabars, Torajas, Galaraese). Brittle objects are brought into contact with hard ones, to make them hard; e.g., an earthen pot is touched with iron or stone (Macassars, Torajas). Objects are also fed: agricultural tools are fed on the new rice (Dayaks, Torajas, Central Timor); the plough gets an offering (Macassars); the loom is given rice to eat (Southern Timor); the rifle gets part of the game (Central Timor); the Javanese offer sacrifices to all kinds of objects — to their cart, their barn, etc. The Indonesian smiths in particular offer sacrifices to their tools. A large piece of gold is supposed to attract other gold (Achinese, Parigians, Torajas, Dayaks), a particularly large diamond to attract other diamonds (Dayaks).

The soul-substance of iron plays an important part among the Indonesians: they sit down on iron to make their own soul-substance strong (Malays, Macassars); iron is used to make people invulnerable (Karo Battak); water in which iron has lain is drunk to produce strength (Nias, Java, Central Celebes, Halmahera). A Javanese woman-doctor tells how iron about with her in order to give additional force to her massage; among the Torajas and Dayaks iron plays an important part in various solemnities. The smith, who handles iron every day, is considered a very important man (Battak, Dayaks, Torajas), and among the peoples who have become Malaysians he has continued to be the representative of heathenism. In those countries where gold is found there are all kinds of precepts not to drive away the soul-substance of the gold (and with it the gold itself) (Malays, Minahassians). The Dayaks believe that the soul-substance of gold can avenge itself on the gold-seeker and make him ill. In the tin explorations among the Malays it is necessary to avoid everything that might frighten the soul-substance of the tin; the tin ore is always heated with great respect.

9. Metempsychosis. — What becomes of the soul-substance after death? Some of the tribes believe that it passes into the soul, but most of them do not. The facts prove that after the death of the body the soul-substance continues to be distinguished from the soul (Dayaks, Torajas, Papuans, Timorese, and others). A general belief is that after death the soul-substance returns to the chief of a house or deity, who doles it out again to other people, animals, and plants; or this animation takes place directly. The conceptions concerning the soul-substance have given rise to the belief in metempsychosis — which in its turn has been superseded by the belief in the soul, man living an independent spiritual existence after death. Even in this earthly life the soul-substance can move to another person. It is universally believed that, when a child resembles its father (or its mother) strongly, it has got possession of that parent's soul-substance, and (he or she) must die. If a child resembles a person who has died, the dead one has been incarnated in the child (Javanese, Balinese, Niassians, Dayaks). The soul-substance of the dead is also transmitted to animals and plants: beasts of prey are ancestors who avenge a violation of moral laws. The dead are also supposed to live on in animals which have something in common with the spirits; the firefly, because of its mysterious light; birds and butterflies, because they can soar up to the realms of the spirits; snakes, because they come forth from holes in the earth, from the under world, etc.; and house lizards and mice, because they live with men in the same house, etc.

The soul-substance of a living person is imagined as a fiery spirit (Torajas, Battak, Niassians); also that of deer and swine (Battak, Dayaks), and of plants (Javanese). Moreover, all the Indonesians look upon the firefly as the incarnation of a deceased person. The soul-substance leaves a sleeping person in the shape of a cricket (Sundaese and Galaraese). The cricket is a dead person placed living the way to the Land of Souls (Torajas). Sometimes a blowfly is an embodied curse which comes to some one (Kailians, Dayaks); generally, however, it is a dead person who comes to announce his visit to the living, a relative to the Land of Souls (Torajas, Javanese, Aikolians, Battak, Niassians); sometimes it is a person who has died abroad, and has come to announce his return to his relatives (Malays, Aikolians). Only in Aikolian and Nias is the butterfly regarded as a dead person; everywhere else it is looked upon as the soul-substance of a friend who has come to announce his visit to his house; sometimes it is the soul-substance of animals (Torajas, Battak). If a butterfly settles on a sick person, the latter improves in health, for his soul-substance has returned (Torajas, Minahassians, and Aikolians). Soul-substance is also supposed to have the shape of a bird, as is proved by the fact that it is summoned back by interjections with which chickens are called (Buginese, Macassars, Malays, Minahassians, Central Celebes). The idea that birds are incarnations of the dead is prevalent throughout Indonesia.

Among the Torajas, Dayaks, and Timorese the mouse is supposed to be the soul-substance of a living person. When a mouse nibbles at the clothes or nails of some one, it is considered by nearly all the tribes as a dead person who has come to take him to the Land of Souls. A snake is generally looked upon as a dead person, whose coming forebodes evil. Among some tribes, e.g., the Dayaks, the soul-substance appears as a snake, but as a rule a reptile represents a dead person. If it enters a house, it is a person who has died and has come to fetch one of the inmates. The soul-substance of a lycanthrope appears among some peoples as a house lizard (Malays). But in other cases this animal is taken as the incarnation of a dead person who wishes to continue living in the same house with his relatives.

Remnants of the belief in the transmigration of souls are found everywhere throughout the Archipelago. Man can pass into all kinds of animals; but in these ideas concerning metempsychosis there is not a trace of any thought of retribution. This is met with nearly only among the Dayaks and Balinese, who have been under the influence of the Hindus, and who try to find charms to secure
for themselves a new birth into a higher being, or lead the life of a hermit for this purpose.

Closely connected with the belief in the transmigration of souls is the worship rendered to some animals by the Indonesian peoples, because they think their ancestors are embodied in them. The animals must not be killed. Examples are the white hen (Battak), or another bird (Tagalis), or a species of monkey (Battak, Dayaks), pig (Barbar), buffalo, deer (Dayaks), etc (in the Philippine islands as in South America). An object of universal worship among the Indonesians is the crocodile. In Java and Sumatra it is believed that the souls of the ancestors have become crocodiles, which protect their descendants. They are killed only by way of revenge when they have killed a man. Mothers place the placentas of their children in a small vessel and let it float down the river, as an offering to the crocodiles (to the ancestors). In Batka good and evil are supposed to be due to the crocodile; it is addressed as 'high lord'; at festivals sacrifices are offered to it; the highest thing imaginable is to become a crocodile after death. Europeans and Macassars see their ancestors in crocodiles, and throw offerings into the water; a crocodile is believed to devour a man only by mistake. Formerly a virgin was offered to the crocodile in the Temese when a new ruler ascended the throne. All through the Moluccas the crocodile is worshipped, and people refrain from eating its flesh. In Celebes and the islands north of it the crocodile is called 'grandfather.' In all the temples of the Torajas figures of crocodiles are found. Many Indonesian tribes consider the lizard as the incarnation of the household gods of the ancestors living in the house. If an offering is put ready for those household gods, and a lizard is heard, this means that the sons of the departed have eaten enough, or that they want more (Halmahera, Southern Celebes, Nias). A worship proper, however, as is found among the Malaysians, does not occur in Indonesia. It is probably because there were no crocodiles found there that the lizard cult has developed so strongly. Wherever lizards are found (Java, Sumatra, and Malay peninsula) they are worshipped as incarnations of ancestors; they are called 'grandfather,' and are never hunted. The Temese Battak believe that only very young men with this much strength change into tigers, and protect their descendants in this shape.

II. Fetishism.—The fetishes of the Indonesians are objects with a soul-substance which is thought to be personal. These objects are used by men to their own advantage. All through the Archipelago stones are found in the shape of men, animals, and plants, but they are not generally fetishes. The Indonesians do not pray to their fetishes, but they feed them on rice, eggs, and blood to strengthen their efficiency and power to bless. The fetish is addressed as a person.

(1) All objects can become fetishes; this depends on their singularity or rarity, or the circumstances under which they are found. Very common fetishes are bezoar-stones, which are found in animals and plants. The Indonesians consider them as the corporal substance of the animal or plant. They are used for various purposes: they are worn on the naked body, to make the strength pass from them into the body; they are supposed to ensure a longer life to the sick; they are used as charms to procure invulnerability. In some parts of the Archipelago a trade is carried on in these stones. So-called thunderstones, objects from the Stone Age, are also treated as fetishes by the Nias and Moluccas. They are considered as the teeth of thunder and lightning. They occur everywhere, and are used to avert the elements and bring about rain or dry weather. They also render a person invulnerable in war. Among the Dayaks stones are also found. The Indonesians look upon stones and mountains as the skeleton, the bones, of the earth; and, just as they consider the bones of man as the most important, the least transitory part, so they think stones to be the most enduring part of the earth; hence their objection to the chipping of stones by explorers. Special stones may become fetishes; sometimes they are indicated in dreams, or their shape or color means something to some one's fancy. Stones as fetishes are found everywhere; the Minahassans have even stones producing sound; they are rubbed with blood to make them efficacious, and fumigated with incense. Stones are used as fetishes mainly in Timor; they tell their owners in a dream what sacrifice they wish; altars are erected for them; they are generally fed on rice and eggs. There are State and family fetishes. The soul-substance of the precious sandalwood is embodied in a stone. Among some tribes a large stone is erected at every village, and this embodies the soul-substance of the whole population (Nias, Minahassa, Borracc). Stones which are said to have brought forth little stones are also found as fetishes (Minahassan, Central Celebes). Fetishes are frequently used as amulets; they are worn round the neck, over the breast, across the shoulder, and consist mostly of stones, twigs or roots of a peculiar shape, or teeth of men and animals. War amulets are in general use as fetishes which give back in warfare. The Toras use a string of horned shells for this purpose. In Timor this amulet is a little bag filled with stones and roots, which is kept at the top of the house, where the ancestors are supposed to live. In Halmahera and among the Dayaks little pots filled with sacred oil are often worn round the neck. The Dayaks also use strings of the teeth of beasts of prey. Other amulets are hung in fruit-trees, to save them from being robbed of their fruit. They are often known by the name of 'red-eye,' and mostly consist of nettles and other things causing itching, which will bring illness to the thief. They have the distinguishing feature of fetishes viz. to act self-consciously like persons. A remarkable fetish is the pangulpabadang, a rough stone image, in which holes have been bored, and filled with a pulpy substance made of eyes, lips, nose, and other parts of a corpse. This mixture is animated, i.e. made into a person. The soul of the corpse of which the mixture has been made has nothing to do with this. These stone images are planted near the villages, and warn the inhabitants of an approaching danger. These stones are also found among the Dayaks, Minahassians, Niasians. Among the first and the last mentioned, life is infused into them by means of blood. The Dayaks sacrificed to them before they went to war, and the captured heads were placed near them. Among the Battak this principle is applied in the magic wands, carved sticks, which are also animated by means of blood, and are used for various purposes—especially to bring about rain or dry weather. The permanaks is a pitcher filled with blood, with a wooden stopper, on which a human figure has been carved as the conjuration. Puasa (string) consists of fetishes prepared in different ways and hung up in the house; these objects guard the owner against all kinds of evil practices and magic spells and poison.

Objects which have gradually become fetishes are old heirlooms, known in the Archipelago as pusaka. They derive their fetish power from the circumstance that in former times they were considered as the teeth of thunder and lightning. It is impossible to give an enumeration of the different pusaka;
their number is continually added to. We need mention only the belomants, or sacred earthen pots, of the Dayaks, seen all through Borneo. These pots are old and of foreign origin—the Dayaks say of supernatural origin. Frequent attempts have been made to copy the pots, but the Dayak easily distinguishes the genuine ones from the imitations. The Dayaks pay fabulous prices for these objects. It is recorded that vessels have been bought for £330, £1239, and one for as much as £2000. When a pot breaks, the shards are sold separately at high prices. These pots are of supernatural power: they bring luck and avert evil. They secure to their owners a flourishing trade, a plentiful harvest, success in hunting and catching fish; they ward off diseases and disasters, and banish all evil spirits from their neighbourhood. Water drunk from them has healing power. They are worshipped like gods; after one has been bought a sacrificial feast is given; frequently they are rubbed with the blood of pigs or of fowls.

Among the puwaka, or heiroombs, the State ornaments call for special mention. Each of the different Toraja districts in Central Celebes preserves some object—as a spear, a lasso, a coco-nut shell, or an earthen pot. These objects are said to have belonged originally to the household of a prince who ruled the whole of the Toraja district. Only the chief himself, who is the representative of the tribe. Among more primitive tribes these State ornaments are no more than fetishes, brought back from the country. They have become of more importance to more civilized tribes, as the Macassars and the Buginese. Their State ornaments consist of all kinds of objects; often they are made to them, and they are fumigated with incense; frequently a vow is made, in cases of disease, pregnancy, childlessness, etc., to sacrifice an animal to these objects. In cases of general disasters, sacrificial feasts are organized for them, at which they are rubbed with the blood of a buffalo. The man to whose care they are entrusted is the ruler of the people. All kinds of wondrous are told about the State ornaments in the Padjad highlands; they are said, inter alia, to emit a glow which is injurious to the health of children. People wash themselves with water in which they have lain. Another ornament killed the person whose shadow was cast upon it. In some regions of the Malay Peninsula the State ornaments at the courts of the Javanese princes are displayed only at feasts and ceremonies; they consist, for the greater part, of solid gold objects representing mythical beings or animals. A cannon was supposed always to warn the prince of imminent dangers, and another cannon could make women fruitful; for this reason barren women made offerings to that feish, during which they sat astride on horseback like men.

(2) Persons may also become fetishes even during their lives, i.e. some persons are considered to be endowed with supernatural power, which renders them objects of adoration. This may be said to be generally true of all native princes in the Archipelago, and indeed to have descended from heaven; they have white blood; their curse alone is sufficient to rain all the land, and so forth. Perhaps the most striking example of this may be found in the singa-maunggo, or priest-king of the Battak: he was said to have been in the womb for seven years; his birth was attended with all kinds of miraculous natural phenomena; when at a more advanced age he slept with his legs upwards and his head downwards, all the rice grew with its roots in the air. His tongue was overgrown with hair, and one word uttered by him could destroy a man or lay waste a region. Another example is furnished by James Brooke, the rajah of Sarawak: water which he had blessed, or in which he had washed his hands or feet, was scattered over the land to make it fertile; and he was invoked by the Dayaks in their prayers.

(3) We know only one example of living animals becoming fetishes, viz. the worship of the turtle-dove by the Javanese and Malays in Sumatra. This, however, is not purely Indonesian, but was introduced by the Hindoos. For the dove with the special marks a high price is paid; it brings its owner all kinds of blessings, averts disease, gives a good harvest of rice, and so on. These birds are tended with great care. Their dead bodies are embalmed and preserved, as they retain their power even after death. (See art. AUSTRALASIA.)

12. Spiritism; the appearance of the soul. — The soul living on after death is to the Indonesians a kind of essence of the dead body, having the same shape and the same defects as the material body; e.g., the souls of people whose heads have been cut off by the enemy enter the Land of Souls without heads.

On this belief is based the practice of tatung, which, as far as the Malaky Archipelago is concerned, occurs only in the Monroe tribes, as the Macassars and the Buginese. Their State ornaments consist of all kinds of objects; often they are made to them, and they are fumigated with incense; frequently a vow is made, in cases of disease, pregnancy, childlessness, etc., to sacrifice an animal to these objects. In cases of general disasters, sacrificial feasts are organized for them, at which they are rubbed with the blood of a buffalo. The man to whose care they are entrusted is the ruler of the people. All kinds of wonders are told about the State ornaments in the Padjad highlands; they are said, inter alia, to emit a glow which is injurious to the health of children. People wash themselves with water in which they have lain. Another ornament killed the person whose shadow was cast upon it. In some regions of the Malay Peninsula the State ornaments at the courts of the Javanese princes are displayed only at feasts and ceremonies; they consist, for the greater part, of solid gold objects representing mythical beings or animals. A cannon was supposed always to warn the prince of imminent dangers, and another cannon could make women fruitful; for this reason barren women made offerings to that feish, during which they sat astride on horseback like men.

Most of the Indonesian races believe that the soul is black. In the case of a funeral they blacken each other with charcoal, soot, or ashes (Torajas, Minahassians, Dayaks, Niasians, Karo Battak, inhabitants of Halmahera and the Aru islands, Papuans), to make the soul of the dead person believe that they also are souls, so that it might resent its own death so much that it would kill its relatives. In Timor people cover themselves with a piece of black cotton for this purpose. There are even cases where the practice of making people black is practised to delude souls or spirits; babies are blackened when they are left alone (Dayaks, Niasians), and the custom is followed during a thunderstorm or other natural phenomena, in which spirits are supposed to have a hand (A’ekelians, Toba Battak, Karo Battak).

13. Man’s fear of the soul. — Now and then we meet with instances of the love for the dead one overcoming the fear of his soul; this happens especially with dead children. But as a rule the Indonesians feel great fear of the soul of a dead person. They naturally think that the dead person represents leaving this earth, and in his resentment wishes to have his fate shared by others. He therefore tries to carry off the soul-substance of the surviving people into the grave, which will cause them to die.

The soul of a woman who has died in childbirth is especially feared. Such a soul is called pontianak with some variations. It has the appearance of a bird with long claws, which utters in plaintive sound. Resenting that she has died in childbirth, she tries to make other pregnant women suffer the same fate that has befallen her. She penetrates for this purpose into the women’s bodies, and drives her claws into it. In this way she kills both mother and child. Some peoples believe that
the pontianak tries to emasculate men (Western division of Borneo, Celebes, Moluccas, etc.), as a safeguard against the pontianak, people hang up thorny boughs (generally of a particular lemon tree) at the entrance of houses in which there are pregnant women. The pontianak will keep out particularly dreaded; thus the Battak and the Balinese of earlier times did so only with the bodies of persons of high rank; in Nias the corpse of a woman who has died in childbirth is removed from the house through the roof. The Minggins throw at a distance. Soul and body are believed to be in close connexion with each other, and it is thought that what is done to the body happens also to the soul. Therefore the corpse of a woman dying in childbirth is bound down to prevent her soul from turning into a pontianak. Needles and thorns are stuck into her hands and limbs, that she may be afraid to stir for fear of hurting herself. Eggs are placed in her arm-holes, that she may not open her arms like wings, for fear of losing the eggs. Besides these measures, which are universal, the Achinese give such a corpse an entangled ball of cord or long needles without an eye; when the pontianak wants to go off, she must first sew trousers from her shroud, but spends the time in disentangling the cotton and seeking the eye of the needle.

The corpses of other people also are bound (Engano, Malacca, Halmahera, Central Celebes, the Moluccas), or the thumbs and the big toes are tied together, that the soul may not be able to run and seize (Battak, Niasians, Dayaks). The openings of the head, eyes, ears, and mouth are filled up, that the dead person may not be able to see, hear, or speak (Malaya, Achinese, Battak, Niasians). The soul's way was from doing harm to throw ashes, by which the soul is blinded (Torajas, Battak, Niasians, Badui in Java, Dayaks, Gallealareas in Halmahera, in Ceram, and in Babar). The Indonesians also feel the need of representing symbolically the breaking of all connexions with the dead person: by splitting or cutting through a piece of rattan (Toba Battak, Torajas, inhabitants of Babar); by hewing a bamboo into two (Taninhar), or a coco-nut (Maccassars); by tearing a leaf in two (Papuans); by tearing the waist-cloth of the deceased in two (Niasians). Among the Karo Battak, if a woman dies, the women split the oblong leaf with which spices are ground or tears a sirth-leaf in two. Another common method of separating oneself from the soul is bathing. Bathing is in general a means of getting rid of any unpleasing, something ominous, especially of something in connexion with the dreaded soul. Among the Olo-Ngaji in Borneo this bathing takes place in a curious way. After the burial the relatives of the dead person sit down in a boat, which is upset in the river, so that they all fall into the water; this is done three times. Among some tribes this rite has been reduced to a partial bathing. Some wash only their hands or their feet (Karo Battak, Torajas, Minahassians, and in Babar). The Dayaks in Sarawak break a stone bottle of water to pieces on the ground after the funeral. The tribes which have adopted Islam generally sprinkle water on the beast before they feed it, others, with its head towards the village, that the dead man, when he rises, may not be able to see the village. Some, as, e.g., the Battak and the papuan, scrape the grave with the knife, every one trying hard not to be the last. Of very general occurrence is the custom of making the dead body lie down in the house through a window or a gap in the wall; it must face the West (Central and Southern Celebes, Halmahera, New Guinea, Borneo). Some peoples carry out in this way only the corpse of special personages whom they particularly dreaded; thus the Battak and the Balinese of earlier times did so only with the bodies of persons of high rank; in Nias the corpse of a woman who has died in childbirth is removed from the house through the roof. The Minggins throw it off to windward of a dead person by running quickly a few times round the house with the corpse. This is probably the origin of the rapid pace at which the Mahum-madans in Jawa and elsewhere in the Archipelago bury their dead. The Niassians make a special path to the burial-place to mislead the soul. It is a common practice, when returning from a funeral, to erect a forked stake or piece of wood behind oneself on the road to keep back the soul (To-buiku, Sea Dayaks, Battak, Niassians). Others block up the road with poles (Buru, New Guinea), or light fires and make a noise (Sunda, Minahassas, Bula Bukmoulong, southern Celebes, Borneo, New Guinea; among Dayaks, Battak, and Niassians). Some tribes make the coffin as narrow as possible, to prevent the dead person from taking one of the survivors with him into it (Torajas, Gallealareas, Olo-Ngaji, Niassians).

14. Mourning customs. — The Indonesians assume that, when a person has died, his soul is angry at renouncing life on earth. Afterwards it is gets used to its new condition, but at first it is in a mood dangerous for the survivors. Therefore great care is recommended for the first few days after a death; this fear has given rise to the institution of mourning customs.

During the first days after a death the inhabitants of a village must keep perfectly quiet. No noise must be made, dancing or singing is forbidden, music must not be heard, rice must not be pounded, nor coconuts thrown down from the trees, nor shots fired; in fact, they go so far as to forbid fishing, sailing on the water, and carrying goods in the usual way. The Intention is that no sound should meet the ear of the soul to indicate the way to its home; people try to conceal themselves from it. Such injunctions are found among all Indonesian peoples.

In the mourning clothing of the Indonesians is embodied the idea of hiding from the departed spirit or making oneself unattractive to it by wearing old, worn clothes; but these clothes have another purpose; the wearer wishes to make himself as much as possible similar to the dead person. Hence the Galealareas wear pieces of the shroud as clothes or as wraps round the wrist. This is found in the Taninhar Islands and in Southern Celebes. It is also advisable to wear old clothes or clothes no longer in use, because the souls of the departed in the Land of Souls are supposed to wear old-fashioned clothes. Thus the rule survives here and there to wear mourning clothes of old (Dayaks, Central Borneo, Torajas), or to return in some way to old times (Ceram, Ambon, Aru, Boni). It is a wide-spread custom to take off all ornaments, or to wrap the cloth round them, to prevent them from being seen.

These mourning customs are observed by the nearest relatives, or by a wider circle when the deceased was the chief of a tribe. Widows and widowers especially adore that the entrance to the village, that the dead man, when he rises, may not be able to see the village. Some, as, e.g., the Battak and the paw-paw, scrape the grave with the knife, every one trying hard not to be the last. Of very general occurrence is the custom of making the...
and among some Dayak tribes the serfs do so at the death of their master. Sometimes this shaving of the head is considered as the laying down of the ornament of the hair, but more probably it becomes a sacrifice of a part of oneself to save the whole.

Widows and widowers must also hide themselves from the souls of their dead mates in a special way, namely, by covering the head with a mat (Torajas), a piece of cloth, or bark (Bahar, Boni, Kenyah, Dayaks, and Batak), a hat or cap (Papuans, Minahassans, Bahau Dayaks, Ole-Ngaju, Etagao, or a net (Papuans).

One of the mourning customs is abstinence from certain food, especially daily food; hence no cakes are eaten instead of the usual sage-porridge (Papuans, Gelaaroe, Tobolese); or maize instead of the daily rice (Torajas, Minahassans, Dayaks); eating in the house of the deceased is not allowed (Silindu, S.E. Borneo, Southern Celebes); eating is allowed, but not cooking (Minahassans, Minakabans); among some tribes the widow's feet (Etagao, Southern Nias). Several authorities regard these customs as a renunciation in order to propitiate the souls of the departed. More probably they are attempts to be taken for souls, and to escape the vengeance of the departed soul. The rationale of these practices is that the souls of the departed do not eat — at least not in the same way as men; what they eat is invisible since those who wish to pass for companions of the dead must pretend not to eat; therefore they leave the house, or the food is put into their mouths by others.

The Melanesians have a short, deep mourning-time and a long, light mourning-time. The former is generally observed by a wide circle of relatives, and lasts from three to seven days (sometimes also till the new moon, as in some islands of the Moluccas). The light mourning is observed only by widow or widower, and lasts till the feast of the dead has been celebrated, when the soul is supposed to have gone to the Land of Souls. Among some Dayak and Toraja tribes the deep mourning is ended by the sacrifice of some animal, which pacifies the vexation of the departed soul. This may have been general in earlier times.

The Human Sacrifice. — The fear that a person who has died, especially when he is of high rank, wishes to have a companion in his misfortunes, has led the Indonesians to kill a human being, that the departed soul may be satisfied. Afterwards the thought has been added to this custom that the victim may serve the dead person in the future life. The Indonesians have also a bloodless human sacrifice. Among the Torajas on the south and east of Lake Poso and among the Balinese, when a chief dies, a family of slaves who are to live in the grave-lot are set apart, and treated as souls; nobody may deny them anything, or talk with them. After the feast of the dead has been held, this family is set free, but they are not allowed to live in the village; they are looked on as dead. This custom must also have been prevalent among the Batak; in former times nobody was allowed to give shelter or food to such slave. Among the Buginese and the Malaccans the custom survives to the present day that the slave, male or female, who receives the water in which the corpse of a high-born person is immersed, is set free. The Badui in the west of Java, who guard the sacred graves of the princes of Pajajaran, are most likely descendants from such a slave-family. It is recorded of many other tribes that for some nights after the death of a person watchers are placed on the grave, that the dead person may not feel lonely. This bloodless human sacrifice might be called the link between the mourning rites and the bloody human sacrifice; it was a preliminary measure, which, however, did not do away with the bloody human sacrifice.

In order to get a victim the Torajas go out head-hunting, or buy a slave from another tribe. The scalp is stripped off the head; with it the people who have captured the head dance seven times round the grave, after which they nail bits of the scalp on the coffin and the post of the hut. The leader of the expedition rips up the widow's or widower's mourning dress in the middle of the back, and cuts off a piece from the other mourning clothes. The Mountain Torajas sing for several days round the victim before they kill him; then the head is placed on the sleeping-wax of the deceased, and the scalp is stripped off and hung up in the house. In former days head-hunting on behalf of a dead person was universal in Minahassa. With the blood of the person killed the woodwork of the grave-lot was painted red, and the heads were buried by the side of the grave. Among the Dayaks in S.E. Borneo the victim was exercised on the evening before his death, to drive the soul out of his body; hence they thought that they were killing a soulless man the next day. The bodies of the victims were burned, and the ashes placed with the corpse in the coffin. The Kinji Dayaks, in the eastern district, boiled the head, and placed the coffin on them. In Central Borneo they generally bought a person of another tribe, whom they slowly starved to death; the body was buried under the grave of the dead person, and the head was placed on the top of it. Among the tribes in the district round Sarawak human sacrifices were of frequent occurrence. The victim was tied to the post, or he was left to starve, or he was slain, or buried alive; generally he was a slave from another tribe. In earlier times the custom of finding victims must have been prevalent as it is still among the Niassans. In Bali it has died out, but there are indications that formerly it was deemed necessary to offer a human sacrifice for a dead person. In Sumba, Savu, and Timor the custom existed, and continues to exist. In the first-mentioned island sometimes thirty men were slain for one chief. Human sacrifice was also universal among the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. Sometimes a slave was earmarked as a companion to the dead person. Under the corpse of a brave man a bound warrior was buried alive. The meaning of human sacrifice is generally held to be that it gave the dead man a servant to attend on him in his future life. Taking into account, however, that originally there were no slaves, this conception must be of later date; besides, the conception formed of the Land of Souls is incompatible with the idea of servitude. No doubt the fear of the disappointed soul of the dead man, which would like to make others share his fate, has been one of the principal motives. But there is another reason; valour secures a foremost place to the departed soul in the life hereafter. The human sacrifice was intended to endow the departed man with a show of power; it must therefore be that the valour displayed in head-hunting by the relatives left behind would profit the departed soul. This is rendered the more probable by the custom prevalent among the Torajas and Dayaks of enumerating the brave deeds (which are much exaggerated) of the deceased on certain occasions, in the firm conviction that these brave acts will benefit the departed soul. That the slaughter of slaves must be of a later stage than head-hunting is proved by the fact that those slaves had nearly always to be from another tribe.
16. Widow sacrifice.—Widow sacrifice occurred only in Java, Bali, and Lombok. (It is also reported in New Guinea, Morogoro-bewa; but this is open to doubt.) It has been said that widow sacrifice was universal, and that the mourning rites are a mitigation of that custom; but this is not probable. In Java this Bali widow sacrifice has undoubtedly been introduced under Hindu influence. In Java women vowed that they would follow their husbands in death, and insisted on being burned with the corpse. The rite was performed at the end of the 18th cent. in the empire of Balambasan in East Java. At that time women were stabbed with a dagger. They carried a turtle-dove with them, in which the soul was supposed to soar up.

In Bali the burning of widows exists up to the present day, in spite of the earnest attempts of the Government to prevent it. Only women of the second and third castes are burned. Among the Brahmins widow-burning is rare; and the fourth caste is too poor to pay the cost required for the ceremony. Widow sacrifice is perfectly voluntary. As soon as they have offered themselves the widows are considered as saints; offerings are made to them, and all their wishes are satisfied; they are in a state of exaltation about all the delights which await them in heaven. Their death raises their family also to the station of the people. Widows are burned alive, or they kill themselves beforehand by falling up a dagger. In Bali also the turtle-dove is used to convey the soul to higher regions.

17. Sacrifices to the dead.—Sacrifices to the dead are not voluntary gifts; the dead are receiving what is due to them, i.e., their own possessions. Originally there was no private property; everything was the common property of a group of people; there was no question of offerings to the dead; they were not necessary, for the feeling of individuality was so undeveloped that there was no thought of an independent existence of the soul after death. The first individual possessions were no doubt hunting trophies and, in a wider sense, all personal adornments. These ornaments were, of course, taken into the grave, as they were supposed to be of no use to anybody but the deceased.

The offerings to the dead are paid from the inheritance of the deceased; sometimes presents are made immediately if this is convenient; more for the sake of the survivors than for that of the dead; these presents are returned later. The Indians exert themselves, therefore, during their lives to provide themselves with clothes and sacrificial animals which may be given to them at their death. The distribution of the inheritance is also connected with the offerings to the dead. As a rule, the inheritance is not divided; but, if it is, this takes place only after the great festival of the dead, because first all expenses must be paid from the inheritance. Generally the dead man receives the mat on which he slept, his clothes, cooking-pan, rice, water, betel, tobacco, valuables, and ornaments.

In earlier times, when giving possessions to the departed soul to take with him, people were prompted by fear of the dead man’s envy; if he should have more, his descendants, rather than by the wish that the gifts might be useful to him in the life hereafter. This fear must have given rise to the custom of giving the dead man something. The New Guineans, some islands of the Moluccas, Minangkabau.

At present the Indonesians are universally of opinion that the departed soul really uses these objects, and that this practice took place at the life hereafter; and in order to detach the soul from the objects, the food offered must be cooked and the objects broken.

It is also usual to give the deceased some trees of his plantation; these trees are then cut down (New Guineas, Monag-bewa; Halmahera, Minahassa, Bornoo, Egan, Nias, Malacca).

The conviction that the departed soul makes use only of the soul of his possessions must have led primitive men to develop the real objects, and to present the dead person only with representations of them. For this reason shrouds and coffins are painted with figures of men and animals; the Dayaks give two heavy cord representations of all kinds of desirable objects are represented. Arms especially, so valuable to the Indonesians, are copied in wood and given to the dead man (Bai Islands, Bura, Halmahera, Batu Islands, Malacca). All other property of the deceased is only exhibited and put away again after the funeral.

Many of the tribes provide the dead person with money (Madagascar, Bataqland, Nias, Timor, Halmahera, Macassar, Central Celebes, Bornoo), which is laid on his eyes, in his mouth, on his breast, or in his hand. It is supposed that he can procure something for the money in the Land of Souls; but this interpretation is of later date. The money may be considered as part of the dead man’s property, which is given to him to take with him, or as an indemnification for all the rest of his property which is not given to him.

The Indonesian thinks it of the highest importance that at least one sacrificial animal should be slain at his funeral, and this is universally done in the Archipelago. Often at the funeral of a man of rank so many animals are butchered that a great many of them remain unused. Among agricultural peoples, like the Indonesians, cattle constitute the greatest riches, and it is in the hands of the people. The rich in the life hereafter the dead man must therefore take cattle with him. Among those that have become Muhammadan the animal slain at the funeral is considered as a beast to ride on across the bridge to the future life. It is also customary to kill one or more horses for the departed soul (Madagascar, Bataqland, Rotti, Timor, Sumba). There are also a few records of dog sacrifice (New Guineas, Leti, Rotti, and among the Bahaus in Bornoo).

18. Lingerer of the soul temporarily near the grave or the house.—The soul of the dead person does not go to Lim, and is done to it; it roves about for some time in the neighbourhood of the grave or the house; therefore the Indonesian builds a hut on the grave as an abode for the soul. In the house of the dead man a kind of bed of state is arranged for his use, near which his property is exhibited and a light is burned every evening. This bed of state is left from three to forty days (Galearease, Ambonese, Thoras, Philippine Islands, Dayak, Minahakban). The third day after death plays an important part among the Indonesians, for they hold the belief that the soul is unconscious of the death of the body, and does not find out before the third day after death. Generally the soul of the person who has just died must first be convinced of his death by the souls of the departed (Dayaks, Galearease, Bataq, Niasians). The native Christians in the Moluccas spend this day, therefore, in prayer and psalm-singing. For the same reason people attach great importance to having the bodies of their relatives with them in their native country, that the soul may have the dead land of his own tribe as companions. When a person dies abroad, his friends, if possible, take his skeleton with them, or only the head. If this is impossible, his hair, or rarely (in Anokola) some earth from the spot where he has died. If they cannot get any part of his corpse,
The doll is sometimes used to represent him (Papuans, Galearese, A’okolians). The objects mentioned are used as a medium to convey the soul of the departed to his native country. The soul remains bound to the corpse, to the earth, till the great festival of the dead has been celebrated. This celebration cannot take place until all the flesh has been consumed; for until then the soul ‘stinks,’ and is not admitted to the Land of Souls. The most important part of the feast of the dead is the collection of the bones of the deceased, which are then buried or put away in a cave (Central Celebes, Am and Key Islands, Ceram, Timor Laut, Ialuma, Buru, Timor, Borneo, Battalond, Nias). Sometimes (as in Nias) all these solemnities are performed only with the head of the dead man. Many Indonesian tribes take the bones to a cavern, which they consider as the entrance to the Land of Souls.

20. Burning of Corpses.—Generally corpses are buried in the ground, or placed on a scaffold or in a tree. One tribe sometimes practises different methods. The essential thing is that the flesh must be decayed before the soul is really soul, and for this purpose corpses are burned among the Dayaks, Batak, and Balinese. The Dayaks in the South and Eastern division bury the bodies, and then at the festival of the dead burn the bones. This custom is also prevalent among some Dayak tribes in Sarawak; corpses of chiefs are often burned in one or two days after death. Among the Batak, the Karo Batak, and some more Northern tribes burn the bones of the dead. The ashes and the remnants of the bones are gathered in earth pots and entombed. One of the Danes of the Karo Batak, the Marga Simbing, put the pots with the ashes into miniature vessels, and let these float down the river. Among the Balinese, cremation is in direct relation to metempsychosis; for this enables a soul to ascend to heaven, and descend from there to the earth to animate another body. The souls of those whose bodies have not been burned become spectres, or ghosts. The corpses of people of rank are sometimes burned only a few days after death. Investigations have made it certain that cremation is not originally an Indonesian custom, but has been introduced by the Hindus.

21. Conducting the Soul to the Land of Souls.—When the soul has got quite clear of the body because all the flesh has decayed, it is not sufficient to give various objects to take with it on its way to the Land of Souls at the feast of the dead; it must also be ‘conducted’ there. This is done by the priests and priestesses whose soul-substance leaves their bodies in their songs, and conducts the soul of the departed to the Land of Souls. Among the Papuans the bones of the departed are wrapped up into a parcel and carried round in the dance; afterwards they are collected and put into a hut, round which the people dance faster and faster till at last they run back to the village. By this dance the soul is led or, rather, driven away. Among the Galearese the feast of the dead consists chiefly in performing dances, which after some days end in the people running forty times round the house of the family, and four times round the grave; on this occasion a daughter or sister of the deceased man arrayed like a warrior; she represents the deceased, and as such is treated with homage and reverence by the guests. The Tobeloese keep the feast of the dead for several dead persons at the same time, whose bones are wrapped up in a piece of cotton and placed in the temple. On this occasion the priests are supposed to deliver the souls from the power of evil spirits and convey them safely to their destination. After the feast the bones are placed on scaffolds round the temple,
tribes believe that it is a dog (Sarawak, Olo-
Ngah) that it is a fox (Minahassa, Ce-
tral Celebes), that keeps watch; in order to pass
the animal the soul gives it a hard nut (Central
Celebes) or a bead (Sarawak) to eat; while the
animal is trying to chew this the soul can pass unmolested.
It is a common idea that
there is a guardian in the Land of Souls who interrogates the souls. In Central Celebes he is
called Lufikoda, and is a smith by trade. Un-
married people or those who have never been
incestuous receive a blow on their knees, which
prevents them from going on; also the souls of
men who have never killed any one are not allowed
to pass undisturbed. Of the same nature is the
kula or of the Dayaks: the soul of a chaste man
is pushed into a ditch, and that of a chaste woman
pushed with a trunk of a tree (the ditch represents
a vagina, the tree a penis). Among the Min-
ahassans the guardian of heaven is Makawalang,
who treats the souls of the rich to a piece of pork,
but sends away those of the poor. According to
the Macassans, the guardian of heaven asks the
duties imposed by Islam. Among the Orang Lom
in Bafka the guardian of heaven is called Ake
Antak. An aged person always whispers to the
guardian, and is dismissed with a blessing. Among the Karo
Batak it is Bapa nubadala, 'the illustrious father-guardian,' who questions the souls, chiefly
concerning the way in which they have died (this
being, in Indonesian thought, closely connected with the order of their earthly life); he makes
the souls pass over a plank which lies across a
precipice; then he draws back the plank, and the
souls are separated from the earth for ever. In
Nias the guardian of heaven is called Kalecaro or
he inquires about the deeds of the people on
earth, and about the number of feasts they have
given. When he judges a soul to be evil, he
makes him cut his head on the edge of a sword; the
soul wounds his feet, falls into the water,
and dies. Many Papuan tribes also believe in
a guardian of heaven; he admits to the city of
souls only those who have performed the most
good deeds.
An idea common to all conceptions of the afterlife
hereafter is that the soul has to cross a sea; this belief
found its origin in the sun, which crossed the
sea every day on its way to the Land of Souls under
the earth. It is only with further development that this notion has begun to play an ethical part
in the ideas about retribution. Originally the
coffin must have been the vessel in which the soul
was supposed to cross the sea. The Torajas,
Dayaks, and Niasians still use words for 'coffin'
which have also the meaning of 'vessel.' Some
tribes put the corpse in vessels even to this day
(some Dayak tribes, Karo Batak, in the Moluc-
cas); the Kayans give an oar to the dead person.
In the Moluccas and in New Guinea the dead
receive miniature vessels in which to make the
voyage.
Many of the tribes who lived far inland, the idea
of the sea gradually gave place to that of a river,
across which a bridge was laid (Central Celebes,
Southern Celebes, Minahassans, New Guinea, Borneo,
Sumatra, Batak). The bridge consists of a plank,
or tree trunk, which jends and rocks violently
when it is crossed, or it is a sword, or at least
something as sharp as a sword (Galleseans, Banaus,
Maasians, Iban). Among the Papuans there is
found the idea of a snake being a bridge to the
Land of Souls.
22. Retribution.—The Indonesians have no idea
of retribution in our sense of the word; yet
they try men by a moral standard. Whether they
will be allowed to enter the Land of Souls is made
dependent on the possession of some virtues:
valour, liberality (and in connexion with this,
riches), the gift of invention, or the presence of
the marriage-duty. Killing an enemy after the
death of a chief had also the purpose of endow-
ing the chief with the character of valour. The
souls of some people were not allowed to enter
the Land of Souls; in the idea of the Indonesians they
either have their own City of Souls or continue to wander about on earth. They are the souls of
those who have perished suddenly by some acci-
dent, of those who have been killed in battle,
of suicides, and of those who have died of smallpox,
leprosy, or cholera. Such a sudden death was
regarded as a judgment of the gods: they had
offended in some way or other, and therefore the
gods had suddenly cut off their lives. People are
afraid of these souls; their bodies are often left
unburied, and, if they are buried, this is done
without any ceremonial. Some Indonesian tribes
have notions about retribution which must have
been borrowed from other peoples — e.g., when
thieves are condemned to carry for ever the things
stolen by them (Battaks, Southern Celebes, Sinitas
in Islam); or when the questions of the spirit.
In Aftoka two spirits are supposed to keep
watch near a trap. If the soul answers to
their questions with lies, the trap comes down
and the soul is crushed to death. Among the Karo
Batak it is Bapa nibdalalana, 'the illustrious
father-guardian,' who questions the souls, chiefly
concerning the way in which they have died (this
being, in Indonesian thought, closely connected with
the order of their earthly life); he makes
the souls pass over a plank which lies across a
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something as sharp as a sword (Galleseans, Banaus,
Maasians, Iban). Among the Papuans there is
found the idea of a snake being a bridge to the
Land of Souls.
23. The Land of Souls.—The course of the
sun, which disappears in the West every day, and
is supposed to take the souls with it to the land
of the dead, gave rise to the belief that the Land
of Souls was situated in the West, and also to the
custom of indicating the age of one's soul by the
different positions of the sun; thus the word for
'setting of the sun' is used for 'dying' (Torajas,
Macassars, inhabitants of Halmahera, Aftoka,
Battaland). Allied to this is the custom of building
houses with the ridge from East to West, the
entrance facing the West, so that a person, on
entering the house, will have his face turned
toward the rising sun. For the same reason corpses are
buriied from East to West; or, in places where the
Land of Souls is no longer supposed to be in the
West, with the feet in the direction where it is
supposed to be. Many peoples think that the Land
of Souls is under the earth, and live in the
chambers and caves as being passages leading to it. Originally all the Indonesians believed in
the under-world, as may be seen from data still extant.
At present many imagine the Land of Souls to be
on the earth — on a mountain or in a valley. Among
the inhabitants of Northern and Central Celebes
it lies in the land which is their original home, so
that the direction in which it is supposed to be
also shows where the people have come from.
The religious conviction of the Tefigerese and the
Badus (both in Java) has had a share in the de-
termination of the Land of Souls; the former
consider it to be the volcano of Bromo, the latter
the tombs of the last princes of the empire of
Pajajaran.

The views about life in the Land of Souls har
monize fairly well among the different tribes.
Two features in them are strongly marked: first, in
the realm of the dead is simply a continuation of
the life on earth; he who was important here is
important there; he who was of no consequence
here is of no consequence there. A second
feature is that there are different divisions in the
realm of the dead; in every division the souls who
have died in the same way live together; those
who have perished suddenly by some accident,
those who have been drowned or committed suicide,
etc., live in others. Certain actions are done in
the Land of Souls contrary to the way in which
they are done on earth: thus the souls give each other a part of their life in the other land: the language of the soul is the same as that of man, but the meaning of the words in the Land of Souls is the direct opposite of their meaning on earth: e.g., 'black' there is 'white'; 'hunger' is 'satiety'; 'hurt' is 'heal,' etc. (Borneo, Ceram, Halmahera).

Some tribes believe that the hereafter consists of layers, generally seven, one above the other. Thus, if a soul is thrown into the first layer, it becomes a cow; in the second, a horse; in the third, it turns to water or dew (Torajas, Macassars, Dayaks, Balinese), a tree or a species of grass, a fruit or a blossom (Dayaks, Koro Battak, Papuans), an earth (Minahassians), an animal (Niasians, Minahassians, Papuans). This belief is another proof of how material the soul is thought to be. When it has died a few times, it finally becomes soul substance, and animates another part of nature. If, e.g., the soul which has been converted into dew or into a fruit is eaten, a new man is animated.

24. Nature of the souls worshipped. — About the land of the souls and the life of soul, general belief the Indonesian are indifferent; but there is frequent intercourse between the souls and the living people, which shows itself in the greater or less reverence with which the people feel for the souls (the difference between the souls of the departed and spirits which have always been considered as such is often hardly noticeable). For the souls of the departed continue to live with their descendants; they are feared for their superior power, but they are also looked to for help in the daily work; they have power over rain, and they accompany the living in war to help them punish bad crops, illness, and death, when the 'Adat (customary law) is not observed. Therefore the living always try to conceal from them careless observance of the old customs. Thus an oath which has been made must be kept. The Indonesians have a strong sense of justice, and, when they know that they are wrong, they do not think that they can rely upon the help of their ancestors. The souls of the departed have a very exclusive character; the souls revered by one tribe will not help members of another. The Indonesians cannot form a conception of a universal God. Strangers may violate the 'Adat without being punished by the souls of their ancestors, and the latter avenge themselves in this case on the inhabitants of the land, or their descendants, over whom they have power; this punishment can be averted only by killing the offender.

Among the Koro Battak the souls of stillborn children, or children who have died before teething, are honoured with sacrifices, which induce them to avert illness from the house and to grant the wishes of their relatives. In the eastern part of the Archipelago it is chiefly the souls of those who have perished in war and who have died by accident that are revered as helps by their living relatives. Very often the Indonesian does not realize what souls he invokes, as he very rarely mentions them by name.

The souls of people who have called into life a new state of things. So in Java every village worships the soul of the man who founded the village or first cultivated the land. At the beginning of every year a village-feast is held in his honour. In many islands of the Moluccas the founder of the village is revered; sacrifices are offered to him when a disaster is imminent. This is found also among the Celebes, Minahassians, and Niasians. An even more natural form for the souls of a man who has brought about great change in the economic or political state of things, e.g., the first tiller of the soil, the first smith, etc.

25. Accidental meetings with souls. — As the Indonesian believes that with souls one can not be certain what really happens on earth, they must sometimes come in contact with them. So there are stories relating how some one has seen a soul, and as a rule the consequence is that he dies soon after. It is generally believed that, when a dog howls without reason, it is seeing a soul or a spirit. This power of seeing spirits is often ascribed to chickens, cats (Macassars and Battak), and pigs (Niasians). Occasionally a spirit or soul speaks when his presence is desired. The result is an 'allah,' a physician who is afraid of the society of his fellow-men and soon withdraws to the wood—or a man endowed with supernatural strength. Some peoples pretend that they can perceive footprints of souls in ashes which are scattered on the floor for this purpose; these footprints are either transverse or only as large as the joint of a finger (Philippine Islands, Central Timor, S. E. of Borneo, Ankois, Batallan). When a soul returns to the house, it generally makes its presence known by imitating the noise of some one moving or dropping all kinds of household articles. When a spirit or soul speaks directly, or bites a person, the consequences are generally bad; a headache, fever, or a feeling of illness ensues. An irritating eruption of the skin, shingles, and similar illnesses are also attributed to contact with a spirit or soul.

26. Incidental worship of souls. — At such casual meetings there is no question of adoration. Reverential acts generally take place in the house, because the souls of the departed are believed to be present in places where they lived during their lives. At least the souls of the departed always get a share; it is placed in the attic, or in the ridge of the roof, the places where the souls are supposed to live. But the souls receive a share not only of the food, but of everything that is made in the village or outside it; if a house is built, the souls get a miniature dwelling (Torajas, Central Timor, Dayaks; the Torajas also make miniature smithies and salt factories for the souls); if a rice field is made, a small garden is specially laid out for the souls (Niasians, Minahassians, Rousals).

27. Worship of souls in houses especially erected for the purpose. — The souls worshipped in the houses are naturally the ancestors of the family living there. Besides these, there are ancestral souls that look after the affairs of the village. These are the souls of chiefs and brave warriors, who protected the inhabitants of their own village during their lives, and continue to do so now that they are dead. For them a home is built—a temple. We find such houses among nearly all Indonesian tribes; and, where they are no longer extant, there are usually indications that they did exist. We sometimes read that souls, battling for the people in war, live in the temple (Timor, Halmahera, Central Celebes, Nias), but the village guardian spirit has joined them. Where, through the influence of the Government, warfare has been made impossible, as among the Macassars and Buginese, only the village guardian spirit is worshipped in the temple. When the people go to war, sacrifices are made for the temple, and the souls are asked to march with them; as the legend says, it is allowed to enter the building till the warriors have returned. But offerings are also made in the temple when a general disaster visits the village, or when the people join in a large celebration. Even among such tribes as the Kolians and the Ibanians in Celebes, who have adopted Muhammadanism, heads of slain enemies are preserved in
the temple, which in other respects has more or less assumed a Muhammadan character.

One of the chief functions of the chiefs is to discuss matters of general interest with their fellow villagers (= relatives). The souls of the departed chiefs, however, must also have a share in the consultations of their descendants; therefore the temple of the village has come to be a council house (Sotor, Halmahera, Central Celebes, Borneo, Nias, Battalando).

The temples are mostly decorated with figures of animals, especially of crocodiles and serpents (New Guinea, Soler, Halmahera, Central Celebes, Borneo). These figures are believed to represent the incarnations of the souls that live in the temple. In the temples are kept the instruments with which the souls are summoned or their attention drawn, such as drums, bamboo speaking-trumpets, and triton shells (New Guinea, Ceram, Sotor, Central Celebes).

28. Corpse and parts of the body as medium in sorcery. — When the Indonesian invokes the souls, he has in view either a certain class of souls or the souls of the departed in general. When he wants to have intercourse with each soul, he does so usually by a medium. The medium must always be something with which the dead person was in close connexion during his life on earth — e.g., the corpse or the horns of a bull. Sometimes it is even the deceased person himself who is sometimes used to find out who is guilty of his death; if the coffin begins to move at one of the questions, this is considered to be an affirmative answer (Babar, Buru). Among the Torajas a skull is preserved in the former home or in the temple to remain in contact with the soul. The numerous graves where the Tumans continue to bring their offerings from year to end to end to obtain the fulfillment of a wish prove that the skeleton is considered as a medium for the soul. Among the Torajas an ancestor's skull is sometimes kept in the house, and on certain occasions people bring it offerings and ask it to heal their sick. Particularly among the Dayaks, preserving the skulls of deceased chiefs is of frequent occurrence. The Battaks consider the loss of such a skull so important that they would sacrifice anything to get it back; all the happiness of the house is intimately connected with it. The Niasians bury the souls of their men of rank before the house; in times of illness a cord is passed from the body to the house, and if this in a chimer is utters calls for the patient's recovery. In the islands of Timor, Ceram, and Buru, and among the Papuans, skulls are often used as mediums. Hair and nails of the deceased are used throughout the Archipelago to get into contact with the departed soul. The Papuans frequently use the teeth and the lower jaw for this purpose.

29. Objects as mediums. — Objects used by the deceased are considered as mediums, for something of its late possessor is supposed to cling to them. Many objects which have now become fetishes must originally have been mediums, which carried on intercourse with the former owners; the State ornaments mentioned above are examples. Besides these old heirlooms which constitute the connexion with the deceased, many other objects are used as mediums, not to get in contact with, but in some other way — experiments, resembling our table-turning, by means of which thieves are found out. The experiment with the rice-pan resembles our table-turning very closely; it consists in placing a pan of rice, and when it begins to tap on the floor, the answer is considered to be affirmative (Luwa, Ambon); among the Macassars the van rolls over the floor and falls at the feet of the chieftain, and, when it begins to tap on the top of their fingers. In Babar, Lelai, and Halmahera a piece of rattan or bamboo is made to vibrate; the Galelarese measure a piece of rattan with the span of the hand, and, if the fingers happen to fall on the ground, this is considered to be an affirmative answer. A lemon, a basket, or a stick is suspended on a rope; the answer is affirmative when the object begins to swing from side to side. Among the Tidorese there are countless experiments of this kind among the Indonesians.

30. Images as mediums. — Making images which represent the departed is certain recent development of the use of relics as mediums. The Torajas use wooden masks, which are bound before the door of the house of the dead; after the door the masks are preserved till another feast of the dead, or are used as mediums, yet people are very much attached to them. An image in itself has no value. It gets its value only when something of the deceased has been transmitted to it. Among the Torajas the masks owe their sacredness to their contact with the door of the dead. In Nias one of the shapes in which the soul appears, namely, a spider, is brought into the house. Between the houses of the New Guineans the Pappans drive the soul into the image, etc. The Pappans call their images korcar; they are hideous things, carved in wood, a foot long; people pay homage to them, and sometimes use them as e.g., when going on a journey. When the questioner is seized by a fit of trembling, the affair looks ominous, and he gives up his plan; in cases of illness the images are placed at the door of the sick bed. When a korcar has predicted something that has not come true, the image is ill-treated or sold. In many of the Moluccas images of the departed are found, which are generally stored away in the attic of the house; in times of need or illness the father of the family feeds them, and asks for their assistance. Sometimes the tribes of the Moluccas do not use images as mediums, but stones and pieces of wood (Wetar, Timory), or palm-leaves cut in the form of a hand with six fingers (Rottili). At every death such an object is made, hung on the roof, and sprinkled with blood; it is left there till it has completely decayed. In Halmahera the souls are gradually lured into an image, but only temporarily. In earlier times the Javanese must have made images of the departed; we meet with a remnant of this in the practice of the wayang golek, in which a doll made in a special way is animated, after which it jumps about in a jerky manner, to the great enjoyment of the children. From many examples of the game it appears clearly that we have really to do with an image used as a medium in former times. The Teugerese have their household gods, consisting of images, up to this day. The Battaks use some images of ancestors which they call desina torop. They are kept among the rafters of the roof, and frequently receive food-offerings. They are believed to give life and to bestow blessings, and are particularly worshipped by barren women. The Niasians always worship their ancestors by means of skillfully carved images called ada. They feed them by rubbing them with blood and egg, and adorn them by sticking feathers and bristles of pigs on them. If an image receives a crack, it is thought that the soul has escaped, and a new image is made. Offerings are made to the images on all important events of life, in particular, when a Dayak tribe in Sarawak keep images, which they feed at stated times, and which guard the village and watch over the work of the fields. Some tribes in the Philippine Islands used images made of stone, gold, and ivory. They were kept in the houses. Here and there, as, e.g., in the
be demonstrated with all but absolute certainty that both these peoples have adopted shamanism from the Mahunnadans.

32. Demonology.—For different reasons souls of dead people may rise so high in the sky that they live among the gods that they come to be regarded as gods. Besides these, the Indonesians have other gods who have never been men. They ascribe the mystery of the origin of man, natural phenomena —e.g., volcanic eruptions, landslides, storms—to gods who have always been gods. With the souls of his ancestors the Indonesian has daily intercourse; he fears them, but at the same time he is familiar with them. With gods and spirits he comes only occasionally into contact—e.g., when he happens to cross their path or offend them; but for the most part he feels indifferent towards them and leaves everything to the priests, who know how to manage them.

33. The Creator and Creation.—In the Archipelago we find some Hindu names for the gods, but it is going too far to say that the gods have been borrowed from the Hindus: the foreign names were given to existing concepts. Thus the name of Batara Guru is found among Battak and Malaya; among the Dayaks in Mahana and Batara or Pitera; among the Balinese in Pitera and among the Tagals in the Philipin Islands in Bathala. In the same way we find the Arabic Allah ditti in Haitiya among the Dayaks, Labata in Buru, and Latalia in Solor.

Among all peoples we find a supreme Being who has created the world; sometimes his functions are divided among different gods. In the Moluccas the creator is often called Upahero, but the connexion between him and the creation of man is very vague. In some islands people are supposed to descend from a woman who came down from heaven. In others the peoples living more to the West we find creation stories. Thus the Buginese say that the first men were born from a union of a son of the god of the upper world with a daughter of the god of the underworld. The children were the first men, who, when their parents returned home, were left behind in this world, which was formed from a handful of earth given by the god of the upper world to his son. This is the poetic expression of an idea current among the Indonesians that man has arisen by conjunction of sun and earth. It is also strongly pronounced among the Minahassans. The first human being, a woman, is nucleated from the earth, and is impregnated by the west wind. She bears a son, who wanders about on the earth, and, meeting her afterwards, but not knowing her to be his mother, marries her, and in this way becomes the progenitor of the first men. The son, Tiar, is merely the sun, who, in the morning arises from his mother, the earth, and in the evening returns to her again as her husband. Among the Torajas of Central Celebes, the departed gods Ili, ‘man,’ and Indara, ‘maid,’ make man. These two again stand for the sun and the earth. They make a couple of men of stone, who are animated by the wind and live. In Sian, among the other peoples, the highest god is called Devata or Dewata, a corruption of the Sanskrit Devatā (‘divinity’). This name is also found among the Macassars and Buginese in Dewata; among the Javanese in Dewata, Debat, and Jut; among the Dayaks in Debata and Juta; among the
Mongondowians in Duatu; in the Philippine islands in Duwata, Duwata, and Disuwata. The Dayaks in S.E. Borneo think that the world was created by Mahata and Jata, who are simply the sun and the earth. The Batak believe that the first men were created from the sex-cord of the chief god Ompa Tuhan mula jadi, who descends on earth, after having moulded it in the world-ocean with the aid of her father. Probably this daughter stands for the light Swift. In the Lauts, the god Lova-langi (Lau-lan-gi) and the lower gods and men are all believed to have come forth from the buds of one and the same tree.

34. The preserver of Creation.—Nature-worship, which is found in the Eastern part of the Archipelago, passes into myths of gods towards the West. The chief god is the sun, and this god continues to exert influence on his creation; he makes the earth fruitful, penetrates with his light everywhere, sees everything, and punishes what displeases him (chiefly incest, sexual intercourse with animals, lies, and theft). On the other hand, this sun-god has entered so little into the life of the people, that he is not worshipped to any extent.

Sometimes creator and preserver are united in one person; but often there comes one or more other gods the task of the administration of created things. Then the creator retreats to the background and he is known only by name, and his servants, to whom he has transferred his task, are worshipped. In the Moluccas, creator and preserver are one person; he is worshipped under the symbol of a lamp. Once a year a great sacrificial feast is held, at the time when he is supposed to descend to earth to make it fruitful. He never interferes with the deeds of other spirits, whether good or evil; he does not rule. In Borneo the chief god is invoked only on special occasions, at oaths, at ordeals, or in general calamities. The Timorese calls upon the preserver when making a vow, or by way of confirmation of the truth of what he has said.

The chief servant of the creator among the Torajas is Pat malaburun; he is the sun, who sees everything and punishes; he receives offerings in cases of general disaster, and his name is called upon when some one takes an oath or is cleansed from sin. The myths of the Minahassans set forth with great clearness how the creator has divided the administration of the world among different gods, but all these different gods may be traced back to him. But the sun of Loale of the Dayaks does not take note of unimportant things; he is called upon only in cases of the utmost need, and then it is always necessary to sacrifice a buffalo to him, the sacrificial rites being performed by seven priestesses. Tamed Tiled is the chief god of the Bauhaus, who punishes misdeeds and gives rewards. Other gods have the charge of husbandry, and are therefore called upon at harvest-festivals. The chief god of the Batak, Ompa mula jadi, has transferred his power to three gods: Batara gur, Soripada, and Manalabulam. The last is a wants, moon, sun, and sick deity. He has the principal share in the conduct of human affairs, and is always able to thwart the good intentions of the other two gods. For this reason the Batak are particularly anxious to secure his favour. The Niugto believe that the god Lantang resides in the sun; he is the owner of mankind, and can kill people at pleasure; therefore offerings are made to him that he may spare them. But Lovalang (Lubang) is even more powerful than Lantang. Lovalang is ever idle; he may be found anywhere, and he is the god of sacrifices, of the dead, of music and poetry; he appoints kings and deposes them; he is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and an avenger of evil. His name occurs in numerous expressions in daily life, but in spite of this the Niugtoans pay very little heed to him.

The administrator often interferes with men by means of animals, which are his messengers. Thus birds of bad omen are sent as the messengers of the gods to warn men. Among different peoples, crocodiles and tigers are sent by the gods to avenge some evil, and by oracles also the gods judge guilt or innocence among men.

35. Predestination. The Indonesian always consider an accident which has befallen a man as a punishment for some evil that he has committed. They also believe that their lot here on earth is predestined, and that they themselves have wanted it to be as it is. This idea is illustrated in a great many stories. There is, for instance, a story of a man who was dissatisfied with his lot, and went to the supreme lord to ask him to change it. The lord consented, and allowed the complainant to choose again, and then it was found that he had chosen the same as had fallen to his share before (Torajas, Batak, Dayaks, Galleh, Javanese, Niugtoans). The way in which a person is to die is also predestined at his birth; to prove this a story is told about a man who was always on his guard against tigers, because at his birth he had been told that he would die by a tiger. He was crushed by a falling wooden image of a tiger; of a child who was killed by a string of crocodile teeth, because it had been foretold that crocodiles would cause its death (Torajas, Batak). The length of a man's life is predestined among the Dayaks and Sea Dayaks by means of a plant; among the Dayaks of S.E. Borneo and the Torajas by means of a rope; among the Karo Batak by means of a measure for rice; among the Minahassans by a burning torch.

36. Moon-worship. At the present stage of development of Animism in Indonesia a definite moon-worship is rarely found. Here and there in the Moluccas the moon is worshipped. In Batak the moon-spirit is supposed to reside in the moon; the Tomorians point out the moon as the abode of the rice-spirit; and they have many songs in its honour. The Mafors in New Guinea receive the crescent of the new moon with shouts of joy, and the women sing in its honour. The Papuans believe the moon to be the abode of a woman. Many Indonesians believe that good health and misfortune are caused by the different positions of the moon—which proves that its influence on their spiritual conceptions must have been much greater in earlier times.

37. Intermediate gods. Just because the gods who have never been men are so far above the inhabitants of the earth, the latter have felt the need of intermediate gods, souls of the departed who have risen to be gods. They can assist man in approaching the original gods. A frequently recurring name for these intermediary gods, and other modified forms. They are of little use to the people, but of infinite use to the priests, who call upon them to assist them in their work, and then the spirits accompany and help them. The Dayaks have the most intimate knowledge of these intermediate gods. According to them these gods are sent to the souls of men, but are allied to men. They used to live with them on earth, but a quarrel induced them to move to the heavens. Every priest (or presider) of a shrine sends them to the man who signs the name of a spirit, worship of whom is forbidden to him, from which it appears that here we really have souls of the departed. This is also seen from the fact that heroic exploits are told of some of these ahatia. In a storm a special spirit is sent out to work for the tribes. These spirits punish their servant (the priest) when he does not fulfil a promise. The Torajas say that their intermediate spirits carry on an endless war-
fare with other evil spirits, who live in the air, and who always lie in wait to fall upon men.

38. Abode and manner of living of the gods.—These gods and spirits are supposed to live in heaven or on high mountains, for in the daytime they always live in the light, they are imagined as white figures, who for that reason require white offerings: white hen, white buffaloes, etc. Stories are current of their departure from heaven and their descent to earth, so that it was possible to reach it with the hand. Grease or oil was squeezed off from heaven, but, in consequence of some injurious action of an inhabitant of earth, heaven was drawn up (Mo-

39. Volcano gods and sea gods.—Volcanoes and

40. Tree spirits.—Besides gods and demi-gods, the Indonesians have lower spirits, who reside in trees, mountains, and rivers. It is only when people cross their paths that they injure them. If a person supposed himself to have been killed by such a spirit, he makes offerings to him; otherwise there is no worship offered to these lower spirits. Among them the tree spirits occupy a foremost place. Every tree has soul-substance, but not every tree has a spirit. These spirits inhabit large trees, generally some species of ficus. If the Indonesians cut down a large tree, they first make an offering to the spirit, and beg him to go to some other place. These tree-spirits are very dangerous. They often carry off the soul-substance of a man, and then a sacrifice is made to reclaim it. The Dayaks believe that they sometimes carry off even living people. They can also cause illnesses. Some tribes (as in Borneo and in Siau) imagine the tree-spirits to be spirits wandering about independently. The Minaaakabans believe what they appear in the shape of animals. The Dayaks of Sarawak hang on a piece of their clothing, as being a part of themselves, as an offering for the spirit.

41. How spirits appear and how they are banished.—We have already mentioned that tree-spirits sometimes appear as animals. This is also the case with other demons, when they reveal themselves to man. They sometimes appear as serpents (Buru, Sundia, Borneo), as fish, as bees, as birds (Minaaakab), as tigers (Sundanes), or as men. Some tribes believe that the spirits may appear in all possible shapes. The universal means of keeping them down are by the use of urgent and bad-smelling things, among which onions and ginger-roots take a foremost place; very often a bad smell is produced by burning something. A custom of frequent occurrence in the Archipelago is to lay women after childbirth near an ambullary

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INDULGENCES.

...indulgences, as employed in the Roman Catholic Church, is a partial survival of the primitive discipline of penance; they are the remission of the penitential satisfaction due for pardoned sins, and are granted by spiritual authority for the performance of optional works of merit. In order, therefore, to understand the true nature of indulgences, we must first trace their historical evolution.

I. History.—The fundamental principle, admirably stated by the Council of Trent (sess. v. n. 5, sess. xiv. ch. i., ii., viii.), lies in the different conditions controlling the pardon of sin by baptism and by sacramental penance. Baptism brings complete remission of all sins previously committed, and entails no further expiation; as soon as he leaves the baptismal font, the adult, born to supernatural life by the sacrament, is no longer responsible to God or to Christ except for any past fault or punishment. But the same conditions do not hold for the remission of sins committed after baptism, in violation of baptismal vows. Remission of post-baptismal sins takes the form of a sort of judgment, comprising a confession of guilt and a punishment—a penal reparation called 'satisfaction' in theological language. The Christian who had incurred sin during the time which he promised at baptism to observe assumes a moral responsibility of which he must give an account to God; and he also renders himself unworthy of the sacred mysteries into which he has been initiated. To recover his former status, to participate worthily once more in the holy mysteries, he must make amends for his guilt before the tribunal of the priest, confess his unworthiness, and ask to be reinstated in sacerdotal authority. Absolution remits his fault (culpa), and at the same time the punishment due for unpardoned sin ('eternal punishment'); but it may only ordain the sinner to undergo a certain penalty, and to earn full reparation by reparations or 'satisfactions' ('temporal punishment' for unpardoned sin). It is to this satisfaction, or temporal punishment, that the concession of indulgences refers. Following the development of penitential discipline, indulgences did not attain their final form until the 11th century; but the essential elements were present from the very beginning, viz. the remission, in consideration of certain good works, of such penances as the sinner would otherwise be bound to perform. In the early centuries this remission would result in hastening the return of the sinner to ecclesiastical communion; later, it would consist in the substitution of easier works or works of shorter duration for the required penances, and the sinner would cease to be individually imposed, they would be remitted all the more readily and generously.

The characteristic feature of ancient public penitential discipline was the indulgences of Pauline Bulls, by way of satisfaction, either from ecclesiastical communion or at least from eucharistic communion, this exclusion being supplemented by penances under ecclesiastical control. But the Church always reserved the right to terminate this exclusion; the bishop, who had judged the fault and given the sinner his penance, could also decide when the penitent had made sufficient satisfaction. The principle is clearly stated by one of the most ancient penitential canons:

The bishops shall have the power, after having tried the conduct of each, to mitigate the penalties, or to extend the time of penance; but they must take care to inquire what has passed before and after their fall, and their clemency must be exercised accordingly (Council of Sardica, c. 6).

These and similar canons were naturally confirmed and extended by the Lateran Councils; Leo IX. (1059) confirmed the indulgences of the Sardica Council; and the subsequent decrees of the Lateran Councils were merely an extension of what had already been enunciated by the earlier canons.

We have facts of even earlier date. If Cyprian denied confessors, imprisoned for the faith, the right of admitting penitents to ecclesiastical communion by giving them 'certificates of peace' (libellus pace), he himself reclaimed this right; for we know that he absolved all the penitents of Carthage en masse at the approach of the persecutors (Cyprian, L. x., xiv., iv., lxiv., ed. Hartel, ii. (Vienna, 1876)); and it has also been shown that the custom to give full ecclesiastical communion to repentant sinners at death. So much for the indulgence in the initial stage of penitential discipline.

In the system of the Palian Council, the most important part of the satisfaction is no longer exclusion of the sinner from communion, but works of reparation, prayer, psalms, fasts, mortifications, and alms, every sin having its penance assigned, and the whole system being reckoned by days, weeks, months, or even years. The priest imposed penances on the various sinners in accordance with the Penitentials, and naturally had the right to see that they were fulfilled. Primitive indulgences were thus a new form analogous to that new form of penance. Not only did the Penitentials allow the priest great latitude in assigning the penance, but they provided various methods of compensation for the satisfaction with a view to mitigating the sufferings required. Thus, a bread-and-water fast equalled two or three law suits which he promised at baptism to observe; a remission of a penance of 50 psalms, or a flagellation, was equivalent to several days of penance; while alms, which could not be prescribed indiscriminately for all, served as a basis for compensation which varied with the wealth and charity of the penitent. This gave rise to 'redemptions' of penance, left at first to the discretion of the confessor, and then officially regulated, in particular by the Councils of Tribor (A.D. 885, can. 30), and Rheims (A.D. 922).

A relief of this method of imposing and remitting penances has been preserved in the scale of indulgences, which are granted for a stated number of days, months, or years, and in proportion to the penances indicated by the Penitential Books, though the scale is no longer employed in imposing them.

The control of penance by the priest who had imposed it gradually fell into disuse, and penitents could proceed to redemptions of penance on their own account. It was then possible to offer them not only compensations, which were calculated according to the amount of their personal debt, but even general reductions, from which all might
INDULGENCES

profit, by performing a work, not prescribed for each one of them, but which all were invited to do, even though they did not know their own exact penitential actions. From the 7th cent. onwards, we meet with reductions of penances, either proportional (a seventh, a quarter, or some other fraction) or absolute (ten, twenty, or forty days), offered to every one on such occasions as the consecration of a church, the translation of relics, the festival of a venerated saint, or a pilgrimage, or even for alms towards the building or upkeep of churches, abbeys, hospitals, etc. This method of reparation or substitution was frequently used, and it covered all kinds of penance, which was done at the indulgence of the Crusade. At the Council of Clermont (1095), Pope Urban II. passed the following decree:

"Whoever, out of pure devotion and not for the purpose of gaining honour or money, shall go to Jerusalem to liberate the Church of God, may count that journey in lieu of all penance." (Can. 2; Mans, Codicilia, Venice, 1782 ed., xx. 860).

Moreover, he preached the same thing to the masses. This was not only an indulgence, but a plenary indulgence — indeed for a long time the type of plenary indulgence — until it was imitated by so many others. Though the work proposed to Crusaders at Clermont by Urban II. did not contain all the constituent elements of an indulgence according to the accepted definition; ecclesiastical authority renews the plenary satisfaction after the consecration of a church, and forty days in other circumstances (by a concession of Pius X., of 28th Aug. 1903, this is extended to fifty days for bishops, a hundred for archbishops, and two hundred for cardinals); it must not be imagined that it was making a great reduction of a right that had hitherto been exercised to a much larger extent. Undoubtedly the Council was aiming at making episcopal concessions uniform and restricting abuses; but the limits which it assigned were by no means excessive at the time.

The whole history of indulgences after this, however, is summed up in constantly increasing concessions, ever more easily obtained, for the most varied acts of piety and charity. By the end of the 13th cent. there were numerous indulgences for the dead; and in the second plenary indulgence, the Jubilee, granted for the first time in 1300 by Boniface VIII. for the pilgrimage to the apostles' tombs in Rome. Originally proclaimed for secular years, the Jubilee was afterwards rendered perpetual; and it was then extended beyond Rome, and imitated on various solemn occasions. Later, plenary indulgences were multiplied and made extremely easy of access; but by this stage the evolution of the indulgence was complete.

2. Theology. — The theology of indulgences was, in early times, complete according to the principles stated above: temporal punishment to be undergone after sin has been pardoned; penance imposed, controlled, and even reduced, by ecclesiastical authority, its concessions being approved by God, as pardon given in His name, but in a degree which cannot be definitely stated. When theologians came to consider, chiefly in relation to God, both the remission of the penalty and the absolution of the sin, they were inclined to ask how this temporal debt to divine justice was paid. This is where the theory of 'treasure' came in — the theory not, as has been alleged, invented by Alexander of Hales, but brought into relief by him and introduced into every thing else. It is no more than an attempt at a consequence of the Communion of Saints: ought we not to pray for one another? If merit properly so called is not directly communicable between the members of the Christian society, at least satisfaction can
be transferred, almost as a man can pay a friend's debts. The infinite satisfaction of our Lord and the superabundant satisfactions of the Virgin Mary and the saints form a treasure which the Church guards and administers, drawing upon it for the payment of the debts remitted to the faithful by indulgences. This explanation pleased the royalist spirit of the scholastics as much as that which the whole school; provided the limits of the comparison with debts between human beings are not transgressed, it is indeed quite satisfactory. Clement vi. was the last pope to issue a bull which in a general way professedly granted the Jubilee of 1350, and the Church upheld against the attacks both of Luther (Leo x. 'bull 'Exsurge Domine,' 15th June 1520) and of the Jansenist 'Synod of Piacca (Pius vi.'s bull 'Auctorem fidei,' 8th Aug. 1754).

Connected with the theory of treasure are the theory and practice of the application of indulgences to the dead, a new form which helped, rather than hindered, the development of the theology for the dead, a custom always employed in the Church. The transfer of indulgences to the dead seemed to clash with the principle that the Church has no control over the evil done by the deceased; but this was not a matter of granting indulgences directly to the dead, but simply a matter of offering to God for them the indulgence which is due to be paid to the Church by the living. In other words, it depended on the mercy of God. On this understanding the application of indulgences to the dead was adopted by the whole school (cf. 'Duns Scotus,' 'V. Tract., art. 3; Bonaventura, 'In IV. Sent., dis. 45, qu. 2, art. 3; Bonaventura, 'In IV. Sent., dis. 20, p. 2, art. 1, qu. 5). It was not included in any official document till 1476 under Sixtus iv. This Pope, the first to apply to the living, explained its significance; and from this time it became official doctrine and general practice (see the response of the Congregation of Indulgences of 28th June 1509: 'Dominus Authent., no. 285)'. The most notable official document was that of the Council of Trent (sess. xxv.), affirming the traditional authority of the Church to grant them (cf. Mt 16:20, Jn 20:28), and that the practice was most salutary for the Christian people.

This decree avoids precise statement, but this is because the real efficacy of indulgences cannot be estimated with precision. Not only is the Christian ignorant of the degree of temporal punishment that is due to the sinner on account of his sins, but also it is not known how God measures this punishment or in what proportion He accepts the indulgence; and this uncertainty is, of course, more marked in the case of the efficacy of indulgences for the dead. At least it is clear what indulgences are not: they are not merits, though some pious persons seem to think they are; nor the remission or suspension of temporal punishment for sin, itself, but the remission of the temporal punishment which, by His justice, He requires of the sinner, together with the prayers of the faithful which are offered for their soul's relief. (From the expression 'cambui et a pena,' we may formulate some conclusions: (a) no single extant text implies the remission of monastic vows; (b) no single extant text implies the remission of a sin not previously expiated; (c) no sin is remitted if the sinner's acts remain unexpiated; (d) a person who, after receiving absolution from his sins, obtains a plenary indulgence is actually free 'a cambui et a pena'; (e) as a matter of fact, this expression is not found at first, except in reference to the two early plenary indulgences, the Crusade and the Jubilee, for which every one was accorded remission of punishment for his own sins; (f) the same explanation holds for letters of confession and indulgence, so frequent from the 14th cent.; (g) the expression has always been correctly interpreted by the theologians; it is no more difficult to explain than such expressions as 'pecatorum remissiones, which continue to appear in pontifical letters without being misunderstood by any body. In other words, the indulgence is remitted so long as it leaves an expiation to be accomplished!}

3. Abuse and reform.—The abuse commonly known as the 'sale of indulgences' was a very real exploitation of the authority of the Church. To be granted the indulgence granted in return for almsgiving to the churches; but it must be remarked that this was always an abuse, never a legitimate custom, and that it was always combated by the Church. The principle that the Church can reward the contributions of the faithful to the temporal needs of the religious society by spiritual favours is unassailable, and requires no justification. The abuse consisted in the exaggerated and inaccurate statements made by preachers in order to encourage generous giving (especially for the deliverance of souls from purgatory), and the partial remission of alms, the deductions made from alms for the benefit of the Church dignitaries and even of civil authorities, and other modes of procedure which gave rise to the appearance of an indulgence as a traffic. It is well known that the granting of indulgences for reconstructing the church of St. Peter in Rome was one occasion of Luther's revolt; if the doctrine was sound, as Tetzel proved, appearances were very unfavourable.

The Lateran Council (1215) and the Council of Vienne (1311) had tried to crush the abuses of alms-gathering, but without much effect; it fell to the Council of Trent to strike at its root by condemning abusive practices, and abolishing the collecting of alms and trading in indulgences (sess. xxix. 'de reforma,' ch. 9; sess. xxxv.); the publication of indulgences was put in the hands of the bishops, assisted by two canon; they had to collect the alms of the faithful themselves, and keep nothing back. A further step was taken; indulgence-alms were completely suspended (except the bull for the Crusade in Spain, which was also freed from all abuse); on the rare occasions when general indulgences included almsgiving, the latter was only one of the prescribed duties, its taxation and employment were left to the free choice of the faithful.

The reform of indulgences was energetically pursued by the popes, and the problems relating to them were entrusted by Clement viii. to a provisional commission of cardinals. Clement ix. re-established it on a stable basis in 1667, charging it to resolve the difficulties that arose. It correct and suppress abuses, to do away with false, apocryphal, and indirect indulgences, etc. This Congregation of Indulgences continued to exist till 1904, when it has been united with the Congregation of Rites; in 1908, at the request of the Roman Curia, indulgences were entrusted to a section of the Congregation of the Holy Office.

4. Practical remarks.—A plenary indulgence is one which covers all penances required by the penitent; a partial indulgence covers a part of the penance, and is counted by days, months, or years. A better distinction would be that the latter is reckoned as a sacrament, the former as a debt of the sinner, but according to the ancient penitential scales, while the former is not. While all indulgences really refer to persons, those which
are granted directly to persons, e.g., to a confraternity, are called personal; those directly and that only for a day, or 'tonties,' whenever the penitential actions are repeated, and so on. The chief indulgences are, as formerly, the Crusade (still kept up by the Holy See) and the Jubilee, which occurs every quarter-century, and is imitated more or less frequently by solemn indulgences called 'in form of Jubilee'; indulgences attached to the most popular devotions, as the Rosary or the Stations of the Cross; those of famous sanctuaries, as Rome, Jerusalem, Compostella, Assisi, Portmorens, etc.; 'apostolic' indulgences, attached by the pope (or the priest authorized by him) to holy objects blessed by him, etc. The Congregation of indulgences published an official collection (Raccolta) of indulgenced devotions (Rome, 1854, and numerous editions), and two collections of decrees (Decreto autorizzato ab anno 1668 ed asmut 1888, Ratisbon, 1883), the other of scripts and summaries of indulgences (Raccolta authenticata. nevem Summaria indurgendia. . . .angers, 1880). Numerous other private collections exist, recognized and approved by Roman or Episcopal authority.

LITERATURE.—(o) HISTORI.


(2) THEOLOGY.

All theologians are occupied more or less with indulgences. The Tractatus dogmático-bibliae de indulgentiis of Theodorus a Spirito Sancto, Rome, 1744, has long been regarded as classical. The best recent practical treatments and collections are: F. Beringer, Die Ablass-H. Paternoster, 1863; Jr. Jr. by H. Magrier, Les Indulgences, Paris, 1859; P. Meccenegian and Monsan, Collectio indulgentiarum, Quaracini, 1837.

A. BUCHHOLD.

INDUSTRIALISM.—The conditions governing the progress of a country in civilization are exceedingly complex. Among these the industry of the people is of considerable importance. Wealth and culture are far from being interconnected; but, at the same time, a very poor country is unlikely to attain to the same status as one in which commerce has developed sufficiently to provide a moderate standard of comfort for the majority of its inhabitants. Thus industrial progress becomes the potentiality from which other agencies can realize a higher stage of civilization. In some recent discussions of progress, there are two forms of description, each of which is liable to mislead. On the one side, industry is spoken of in terms which imply that it is something altogether modern, while, on the other side, it appears to be inferred that industry alone will create a satisfactory amount of national wealth. Against the first theory it is to be noted that among primitive peoples, whose situation is disadvantageous, there are periods of sustained and painful labour. A tribe, trembling on the verge of starvation, is not unfavourably compared to a country, in order that progress may be made—to modify a saying of W. Petty: 'Labour is the father, and natural resources the mother of wealth' (Economic Writings of Sir W. Petty, ed. C. H. Hull, London, 1890, p. 371). But of these two conditions progress it is easy to over-estimate the importance of natural resources. There is some instinct or gift in certain peoples which urges them either to force their way from a disadvantageous situation or by their labour to bring about a change. Industry is almost barren so that it becomes moderately fruitful.

Wherever a society sustained itself for any considerable period of time, its institutions have been participated in by the life of its society. If it existed in a nomadic or pastoral state, there was the care of the cattle, while at the same time there was, no doubt, in most cases the work of providing clothing for the tribe. With the general advance of civilization there came the time when, as in England during a great part of the Middle Ages, the occupations of the people were predominantly agricultural. At this stage, the manor constituted a complete economic unit providing for almost all its own normal wants. In it one can trace the beginnings of organization in the allocation of specific functions to certain workers. The rise of the town involved the development of economic and social consequences. The bringing together of a population of some size and the contact with distant markets enlarged the horizon of the medieval town. Numerous other private collections exist, recognized and approved by Roman or Episcopal authority.
Infallibility

the 19th cent. witnessed a revolution in transport, which is still continuing. The facilities of communication tend to bring distant places into close commercial relationship, and thus to render possible production on a larger and larger scale, with further specialization of industry and increased invention of machinery.

All these changes may be summed up in the word 'industrialism,' and they have profoundly modified not only the mode of production, but also the moral life of those countries where they have taken place. The effects of industrialism by the factory system extend into almost all departments of the national life. Under the domestic system the power required for the primitive instruments then in use was supplied either by the workers or by animals. Now it is drawn from purely mechanical sources. Thus it has become possible to use the labour of men and women for purposes which, on the whole, require greater skill, while the total product can be very many times greater. Real wages are much higher, and the condition of the skilled artisan is certainly much better. The concentration of factories in large towns gives the worker the advantage of city life, and their lives are brighter and fuller than those of their predecessors who worked under the domestic system. These constitute some of the chief gains of the system, as against the disadvantages of its loss of individuality and its evils. During the transition period of the industrial revolution great classes of the population sustained severe hardships, and in the early days of the system the working classes were in a lawless and savage State—a doctrine which reached its most forcible development in the interpretation of leisures faire by the Manchester School. Gradually this attitude was modified by the acceptance of exceptions from the principle of leisures faire, in industry—as, for instance, in the Factory Acts. The pendulum of opinion has tended to swing in the direction of increased State-regulation of industry. And, if this tendency is carried too far, there may be a danger that initiative may be checked. Economic forces are so complex that the prevention of one evil sometimes occasions another no less serious. Thus the problem of the future will be, on the one hand, to correct, or at least diminish, some of the ills of the industrial system; while, on the other hand, this should be effected without the sacrifice of any of its essentially salutary principles.


Industrial Schools.—See Juvenile Criminals.

Infallibility.—I. General: Infallibility in Common Life.—1. Infallibility a universal idea; its basis and general significance; equivalent terms and cognate ideas.—At the heart of every such universal questions as What shall I believe? Whom shall I trust? Whom shall I obey? Where shall I find certainty? What is the foundation of faith? What is the principle on which it can obtain, as in the religion throughout the world which have canonsized the utterances and injunctions of their prophets, priests, and legislatures, but also of innumerable social and political labours which have been inspired with an analogous hope and confidence. Usually, it may be said, it is a practical or working infallibility that men agree to recognize; but just in proportion
as that infallibility is challenged and placed in need of vindication it is apt to be invested with a robe of mystery, and advanced to a dignity which it is fondly hoped will make it absolute and above question.

The word 'infallibility' is late Latin in its origin; but the idea, both religious and political, which it connotes has ancient ascendency in Church and State. As a negative virtue or perfection it is practically equivalent to 'inerrancy' and 'indefectibility,' the root notions of 'stumbling,' 'straying,' and 'falling' representing obvious and kindred defects in the outward truth. As a positive virtue or perfection it has for its counterpart 'reliability,' 'trustworthiness,' or 'trustness.' The same difficulties and problems inher in both sets of terms. In considering them we are brought face to face with an impressive series of ultimate questions, moral, social, political, legal, ecclesiastical, and religious. It is impossible to define, analyze, and weigh the concept of infallibility without recognizing that there are involved in it the foundations upon which human thought has built up its ideas of an absolute authority, a court of final appeal, a majesty of law and government, a divine right of persons or of institutions, a system of errorless acts of ordination, a rule of faith, a code of honour and of duty, a system of truth. To believe in inspiration, in revelation, in illumination, to accept a dogma, to proclaim dogma, to excommunicate a faith in some infallible. Human intelligence may locate this ultimate ground of faith and conduct very variously. A man may be convinced that it resides in the unerring mind or heart or conscience, or in the unbiased faculties of some ruler or official or dignitary, or in the unbiased instinct of some family or corporation or people, or in the contents of a sacred law or law or literature, or in any one of these conceived as dictated or imparted by supernatural instruction. But that an infallible seat and oracle of authority does exist is axiomatic in all the great religions, theologies, or powers not less than in religion, even to the supreme dogma of political faith.

'Oh that I knew where I might find it!' is the burden of a longing for it, hardly to be distinguished from the aspiration after God Himself. It is easy to say that to err is human, that inerrancy as a perfection belongs to God alone, that any human claim to it savours of rank presumption and, indeed, of blasphemy. And certainly it would be insufferable that any mortal mind or will should arrogate to itself an infallible individual possession. But, as we shall see, its claimants in Church and State seek to evade the condemnation which they would otherwise incur, and which they freely inflict upon others in like case, by representing themselves as hereditary or official life centers of a divinely delegated authority and wisdom. Kings or ecclesiasts claim divine right, not as created or won by themselves, but as given irrespectively to themselves. A prophet or a priest claims to express the very will of God, not as a maker but as a recipient of revelation. The maxim of civil law, 'The King cannot err,' is neither more nor less intelligible and defensible than the later maxims of canon law, 'The Supreme Pontiff cannot err.' Each rests upon a philosophy of absolute monarchy as profound, subtle, and elusive as the other; each springs from an infallibility-born in human nature, and satisfies in its own way psychological needs that never fail to assert themselves. It will be the principal suggestion of this article that ecclesiastical or papal infallibility is not to be explained or criticized in theological or philosophical terms so much as in political and practical. Forensic and public rather than academic considerations have defended it during its protracted development. Sentiment and prejudice have done more for it than logic and apologetic. It was no accident that in the Vatican Council of 1870 and in the Roman Catholic Church outside that imposing assembly the conflict resolved itself into a bitter opposition between the scholarly and the administrative genius of the Church, the former as hostile to the definition of papal infallibility as the latter was urgent in its favour. The Curia is a court, not an academy. Its utterances are degrees, not theories. Its language is theological so much as legal, and is to be interpreted and judged as such. To construe it literally, as if its vocabulary were derived from science, is perhaps as imprudent as to insist that court dress be made compulsory in the schools, or that wig and gown be borrowed from the hall of justice and made the dress of commerce and of recreation. It is true, of course, that infallibility, like other dogmatic formulations, has called into being a scholarship, or a scholasticism, of its own. But it rested on grounds distinct from scholarship and philosophy. It had silent reasons superior to the texts of Scripture which it cited. It was the canonization of a practical and essentially political principle. For its ecclesiastical promoters the doubts and hesitations and objections of their learned and eloquent opponents served merely as part of oratorical and polemical debate. The speeches of the ad vocatus diaboli at the canonization of an already venerable saint. They were as shadows to enhance the new illumination. They were the resistance needed to give zest and triumph to a victory.

2. Degrees of infallibility; qualified forms of the idea.—The term 'infallible,' as applied to an individual, an organization, a system of doctrine, or a body of literature, does not, of course, lend itself to qualification or modification. As a thing is either perfect or imperfect, so is a thing either fallible or infallible. But, in fact, the term is confusedly employed, especially in the Church, to express a variety of shades, its extreme asserters having in reserve a censured form of common sense for refuge when their exaggerations have been exposed and made untenable. And the term 'truth' has to sustain a formidable diversity of interpretations, infallibility, as hefts an idea so near of kin to it, has passed through the same experience. It may, as we have seen, be a guarantee of practical immunity from error or failure. At the top of the scale a person may be conceived as in himself so perfectly constituted as not only in all circumstances to be found never to fail of right and truth in any degree, but as to be the very fount of thus failing. At the bottom of the scale one may conceive a person not in himself, but by external influence, saved, on the whole and in the long run, from material or irredeemable error. Between these two conceptions there lies a considerable series of descending degrees of infallibility, each of which is an adequate basis of faith and conduct, though it comes short of the ideal. Viewed scientifically, the pride of infallibility tends more and more to qualify itself. Though real, it is virtual, official, conditional, occasional, derived, or relative, in every claimant except God. The Bible is deemed infallible as inspired and kept pure by divine agency, either in every syllable and letter or as a whole, either in matters of faith and morals only or in matters of historical fact also, either in text or in substance, either in the original or in a particular version, either in the literal, in the historico-literary, or in a figurative sense, either as interpreted by the Fathers, by the Reformers, by bishops and local hierarchies, or in the living Church, and so on. The Church is deemed infallible in its clergy alone or in the episcopate, in councils or in popes, or in its clergy and laity together, either in the sphere of faith and morals only, or in discipline or science or scholar-
ship also, either at a certain era or in its unbroken practice, either in a certain denomination or in its entirety, and so on. But, when viewed through the medium of religious or patriotic faith, infallibility rises in the scale and ascends to the lofty altitude at which truth and authority are absolute and divine. Of infallibility, as of truth, there are ideas in their relations in general and interpretations, and each varies in an individualistic or an institutionalistic direction.

3. Wide range of the idea.—It is important that the whole range of the idea should be recognized. Infallibility is claimed in some measure or degree in a large number of regions of human activity. While the ecclesiastical and political uses are the most familiar as themes of literary and academic discussion, others deserve mention in an article like this, since the analogies they present are valuable, and have undoubtedly lent support to the former. Wherever in human affairs authority is respected and truth recognized, a degree of infallibility appropriate to the circumstances is implied. Usually the quality of perfect trustworthiness is attributed simply to the object, person, or institution in which it is believed to reside. But in reality it is also implied that the mind which recognizes infallibility has itself formed an infallible, an absolutely trustworthy, judgment, whether directly on the basis of evidence before itself, or indirectly on the basis of evidence already accepted by a reputed infallible, external witness or authority, such as tradition, usage, or a living organization. Nothing assists the student of infallibility more effectively in appreciating its essential complexity and subtlety than a swift glance at the less notorious and controversial regions of life in which it is acknowledged to be operative.

(1) In external Nature.—External Nature, upon any view of an ultimate explanation, presents the eye of man with a spectacle of infallibility. Think what you will of her achievements, her products in her wise and purposeful depositions, her catastrophes, her laws operate with a serenity or a grimly perfect regularity, her processes are so absolutely reliable that an alleged suspension of them or exception to them might be a miracle, and no one credits it except a theist whose appreciation of the powers by which his law is enacted is such as to explain it as a divine suspension of a divine custom for divine ends, and thus implicitly leaves intact the general conception of Nature's normally unbroken continuity and harmony. The sequence of the seasons, the alternation of day and night, the underlaying course of physical processes and of natural laws which know no exceptions, have passed into a proverb of unerring trustworthiness. For religious faith Nature is infallible within her appointed sphere, because her Author and Upholder is infallible, and expresses His mind and will, within limits, through her. Failure in her would be failure in Him.

(2) In human Nature.—Trust Nature, says one school, and she will guide you rightly in the end. In other words, instinct is infallible. Convention is artificial and represses Nature. But Nature, though you expel her with a pitchfork, will make her way back and master you. A return to Nature in its primitive sense, however, is not more attractive than a return to his cradle would be to a grown man. The trouble for a sansculotist philosophy of any type is that the great conventions of life are premises profoundly natural; they are the dictates of instinct guided by long experience. It is more natural to the genius born to go clothed than naked, to observe law than to be anarchist. And for the individual the rule to trust one's instincts is a maxim of fatalism, of libertines, of indulgence in all manner of passing whim or fugitive passion. Even the brutes are above that. Instinct, the nature in us, is as complex as the universe around us. Each has required an age-long evolution to bring it to what it is. Nature instinct is a perfectly trustworthy authority, but it needs patience and impartial investigation to know her mind and catch her final mandate. 'Be natural,' a first law of manners and of style in art and literature, and, rightly understood, also in morals and rules of conduct, means 'Play the new-born babe, or play the backwoods savage,' but 'Be true to your real genius and station and mission in life.' Nature is infallible, in the region of human instincts as in her own external province, the world of the elements and forces; but her mind and will are expressed in decrees which are not momentary or intermittent or capricious, but are in time discerned as universal laws making for progress and cohering in consistency.

(3) In human society.—In human social life various degrees of infallibility are recognized under the conceptions of authority and discipline. No one pretends that all parents or that any parents are incapable of making mistakes and misleading their children, yet the will of the parent and the information and the advice of the parent is what is called a time infallible to the child, gladly accepted by him as such, and within limits authorized as such both by law and by public opinion. The rights of the parents in their capacity as such is not the law which the parent possesses of the temperament and capacity of the child and his natural desire to develop the best in him—such considerations make the interference between parent and child discipline. No stage in life profoundly undesirable, and lend at least a temporary infallibility to parental authority. The same is true of the authority of the teacher in school and university not only to command obedience, but to command faith in his instruction. The apprentice in business or in handicraft, the subordinate official in well-nigh every organization in commercial, military, professional, and public service, accepts, and is authorized to accept, within limits as final for him the mandate or advice of his superior. Such infallibility is maintained as socially economical and as conducive to public service, by assurance of its infallibility. It is held to be justified as working well, and flagrant instances of abuse of power are held to discredit the individual, not the system. Democracy itself is not less a form of government, entailing discipline and subordination in its public departments, than a theory of citizen equality. Expediency alone, based on confidence in special knowledge, is the warrant of military infallibility with its autocratic subjection of all ranks to one mind and will, of legal infallibility with its judicial *cul de sac* in a court of final appeal, and of political infallibility with its autocratic or constitutional vesting of all authority ultimately in a sovereign power. The physician in practice is assigned an all but arbitrary infallibility, tempered by occasional appeal to the specialist, and restrained from gross incompetency or crime by the common law and the Medical Council. 'Trust the expert' is a rule in which humanity for the most part has a childlike confidence, utterly misplaced in numerous particular instances, yet based generally on a solid foundation of close observation and long experience. Proverbial though it is that doctors differ, no proverb encourages the patient to consult a second doctor. Proverbial though it is that tastes differ, each generation suffers itself willingly to be
directed in its architecture, art, and music by the experts of the day, in spite of the fact, too clearly shown by history, that their judgment in many cases proves to be as transitory and as unfortunate in its issue as the aesthetic canons and decrees of national fashion.

(4) In reason.—If we turn to reason, the ultimate differential of mankind in the world of life, in search of an infallible principle, our quest is not in vain, but the result is not the discovery of an automatic solvent of all problems. Reason is infallible. It is the organ of truth. But, though it resides in every normal human being, it confers no immediate miraculous identity of judgment or opinion upon humanity. All men reason; but not all reason accurately or consistently. Fortified though it is by increasing personal experience and individual knowledge, and fostered and assisted though it is by tradition and by common intercourse, the individual reason is not delivered from errors and shortcomings. When we speak of reason as infallible, we look beyond the individual and even beyond the aggregate to what is anything but an abstraction, to the common principle of all our thinking and judging, which is not many but one, which guides and directs our science in all its parts, which appeals to men of every race. The rationalist isolates it as a standard and criterion of faith and duty, forgets that it is but an instrument, though the highest in our use, and in its favour ignores other elements in our spiritual constitution which are of no inconsiderable value to life. But reason, by which we discriminate truth from error, religion from superstition, and in great measure right from wrong, as an indwelling principle of human nature, remains from its complete and unimpeded exercise there is no rest to the soul. Through it the observation of nature and its operations rises from a pastime into science, enhancing not more man's knowledge than his power, and approximating his intelligence and his insight nearer and nearer to the divine. But, as with nature or instinct, so with reason—it is infallible as an ultimate principle, fallibly employed by individual intelligences even in the exalted sphere of science, which, outside the somewhat frigid bounds of pure mathematics, is never altogether immune to questionable dogmas and changing fashion.

(5) In conscience.—It is an axiom of all schools and all sects that a man ought to obey his conscience in all circumstances and at all costs. Religion, individualism, and conscience meet the very whisper of the infallible Spirit of God. But what one man's conscience sanctions for him another's sometimes in the same circumstances refuses to permit. The slavery which one generation contemplates with equanimity and justifies without a qualm revolts the soul of its successor. The polygamy which one race practices deliberately as its social duty appears abhorrent to another people. The pride, the ambition, the love of power and wealth, which are the breath of life to one class of men, are as death to the soul of another. Usages and impulses which pass unchallenged in the Old World are regarded as directly approved, are condemned in the New. Yet conscience is not dethroned from its sovereign dignity, nor is it acknowledged to lack essential unity. For the individual, the conscience is final, it is to be believed implicitly, and obeyed. But even conscience can be developed and trained, as in the individual so also in the race. It is the auspicious results of social conditions, in all individuals, periods, and peoples. Its function is the same. Its genius or spirit is the same. But, like everything human, it has to grow, to come to itself, to increase in self-knowledge and in vision.

If it is the whisper of God, it is also a soul, a small voice sounding in human ears amid the cacophony of other sounds, and it speaks a language whose vocabulary, accent, and tones man does not learn at once without education and taking pains. Conscience is not an oracle before which man, tripped the human soul can sink its native intelligence and responsible discernment and resign itself to passive listening. To regard it as an automatic index to duty, operated supernaturally apart from the dispositions of the heart and mind in which it is resident, is to degrade both it and its divine operator. The compass is an infallible pointer to the pole, but science which gave it to the seaman for his guidance has had to toil and search in order to discover its true direction and to instruct him how to use it, how to allow for its deflection, how to strengthen its power and protect it from external interference, how to construe its behaviour in all circumstances. So conscience in the individual, for all its dignity as a divine voice speaking in the soul of man, is no exception to the sacred law that revelation, though it comes to earth from heaven, enters through human faculties entrusted to human vision, human intelligence, and human utterance. Essentially the same conjunction of human and divine which Christological theology has made familiar in the human, is here, as a mystery to faith, and which baffles prosaic analysis in the divine message of the prophets and in the written Word of God, which are at the same time intensely human, presents itself to reverent inquiry in the divine Word which we call conscience. It is infallible for religious faith, though its organs of utterance are in themselves found to be imperfect and fallible. Apropos of the moral world it is better to do the wrong thing under the influence of some strong conviction that it is right than to do the right thing in spite of the conscientious conviction that it is wrong. But in either instance the organ of moral discrimination is at fault, and is in need of further education. Thus the infallibility of conscience, absolute as it rightly is for the individual, is always relative to his enlightenment, and ought to be consciously so, and therefore open to fresh enlightenment. Education and development may modify its actual decrees, but as a principle it represents a consistent attitude towards ethical values as in the course of tests and experience they are successively understood and rightly appreciated.

(6) In the State and in political life.—Again, it is a maxim of good citizenship that the laws of one's country are to be loyally obeyed. They possess a certain majesty more sovereign even than the king in whose name they are promulgated and enforced. They express the genius and spirit of a people, mould its life incessantly, and outline for common instruction a certain minimal suggestion of its ideal of justice. What represents the settled conviction of many generations of experience must, it is readily felt, be true, and has a right to be enforced. Conscience and expediency combine to dignify its authority. But in all civilized countries the development of parliamentary legislation as directly approved, and an amount of legal detail into statutory obligations, and the victories of party which carry legislative programmes into the statute-book frequently represent so much that is short-lived, and doubtful a majority of public opinion in their favor that the majesty which once rightly belonged to the greater and often unwritten codes of earlier days has become at once a moral and a psychological impossibility. Party government is everywhere in just dispute, except among the politically ambitious whose ends alone it serves, because more and more it pressures to employ coercion in
the name of the whole State and with the resources of the whole commonwealth to enforce the will of a section of the people in things morally indifferent. On one plea or another it will not wait to secure moral unanimity, the only legitimate basis of compulsion. It seldom cares to invite an explicit mandate, but prefers to merge a number of separate issues in its appeal to the constituencies, juggling its processes to a conglomerate result. Yet in the Crown, the State, the commonwealth, however organized for government and administration, there resides a real infallibility. Its authority, like that of conscience, articulates itself in different lands and at different periods in very various utterances, and sanctious things which in course of time it would fain repudiate. Even with the best and most honourable intentions it may do wrong, act tyrannically, and retard progress. But such cases constitute to the right-minded reformer simply a signal of the need of education. The just authority of public opinion, and of immemorial tradition, and of the institutions which they have constructed for the public good must not be overthrown if it is to be brought to bear with a freshly enlightened purpose upon the confused, chaotic understanding of the things. Infallibility, therefore, in the State, vested in its head and officers, its government and administration, absolute though it appears from moment to moment when the interests of individuals collide in the conflict of power, is an order of things. Autocracy at its worst has its restraints, and owes the very continuance of its power to them. Democracy is but a readjustment of the distributive responsibilities and authorities. The legal principle that the king or the legislature cannot err holds its own only by the help of the seemingly inconsistent rule that the decisions of the courts are not final. It is a constitutional order. If the interest of common order and public peace demand immediate obedience to the existing law, that obedience will not long be rendered where there is no confidence that the highest good of the people is being or will be promoted by the occupants of official power. Closely as the ecclesiastical claimants to infallibility have modelled their policies upon the theory and practice of the secular, there are analogous claims to infallibility in the Church. If, as the Church has held, they had to live, they have not found in them any example or analogy for an absolute regime whose decrees were not only affirmed to be final for the time but irrefutable and unalterable for all time. It was reserved for ecclesiastical statemen to endeavour to erect a hierarchical autonomy distinguished from all secular organizations by its steadfast and invariable exclusion of innovation even by constitutional means. (7)

In religion.—It is in religion that the principle of infallible authority asserts itself most powerfully. Every religion has its solemn ordinances and obligations, its absolute decrees which rule the public and domestic life of its people. The higher religions, which claim in some sense to have man's very destiny in their hands, use the same order of language and operate with the same instruments of instruction and discipline as the lower, but they leave the lower far behind in the urgency of their appeal, the dignity of their claims, and the variety of means whereby they bring to bear upon mankind for the accomplishment of their lofty purpose. They make explicit and articulate the presuppositions and the conclusions of earlier faiths. They are theoretically and ecclesiastically self-conscious. They are not content merely to proclaim, but feel bound also to explain. They develop organizations for their propagation and diffusion comparable in extent and in cost with the secular politics of history. They are not content to rest on the authority of custom or usage as the valid basis of their law, but affirm their direct origination by divine agency. They describe their authority not only as a prior demanding to be obeyed, but as a power desiring to be obeyed. The truth they preach does not derive its credibility or its cogency from human sources. It is God's Word. It is a divine revelation, not a human discovery. Tradition itself can add no sanctity to it; it can only keep it pure and pass it down the generations. In such a setting infallibility takes on an enhanced solemnity. It is no longer an empirical convention founded on natural right and supported by simple expediency, but rises into an agnostic principle of dogmatic faith. In Christianity most of all it has come to mature self-consciousness, and found expression in a series of transcendent affirmations of faith. Buddhism, Muhammadanism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Parseeism, have precisely analogous dogmae, agnostic regiments of things. Infallibility, therefore, in the State, vested in its head and officers, its government and administration, absolute though it appears from moment to moment when the interests of individuals collide in the conflict of power, is an order of things. Autocracy at its worst has its restraints, and owes the very continuance of its power to them. Democracy is but a readjustment of the distributive responsibilities and authorities. The legal principle that the king or the legislature cannot err holds its own only by the help of the seemingly inconsistent rule that the decisions of the courts are not final. It is a constitutional order. If the interest of common order and public peace demand immediate obedience to the existing law, that obedience will not long be rendered where there is no confidence that the highest good of the people is being or will be promoted by the occupants of official power. Closely as the ecclesiastical claimants to infallibility have modelled their policies upon the theory and practice of the secular, there are analogous claims to infallibility in the Church. If, as the Church has held, they had to live, they have not found in them any example or analogy for an absolute regime whose decrees were not only affirmed to be final for the time but irrefutable and unalterable for all time. It was reserved for ecclesiastical statemen to endeavour to erect a hierarchical autonomy distinguished from all secular organizations by its steadfast and invariable exclusion of innovation even by constitutional means. (7)

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Broadly speaking, infallibility has been sought by Christian faith in a direction either external or internal to the individual. In historical documents, the Scriptures, the Church, and Confessions of Faith, or in sacred traditions embodied in literature or embodied in life, or in the living Church either as a whole or represented by some class or individual, or in the historical Jesus, a fundamental form of infallibility is found. 

In the Christian reason, or in the witness of the Holy Spirit within the individual Christian soul, an inward norm is accepted. But the common presupposition of all these views is that God may be trusted not to fail the believing soul, that His guardian and guiding Spirit is increasingly at work in the Church, bringing infallible conviction to those who, officially or personally, use the means of grace and knowledge available in the Church in reliance upon God. Individuals and Churches emphasize differently the particular instruments and vehicles of infallible guidance, but under all their differences it is clear that they operate with the same elements of spiritual power and knowledge. There is one Spirit, the common ultimate; and His instruments, though they are many, are essentially the same. In the end infallibility are more provincial than the ultra-catholic in so far as they are ultra-modern, and none are more individualistic than the papal since they are added to the organized or visible Church, in the historical Jesus, or in the Christian reason, conscience, or spirit. In that order they are here reviewed.

2. Infallibility of Holy Scripture.—Christianity was born to a new Bible. Its earliest place of worship was the Galilean synagogue, a House of the Book, a provincial equivalent for the distant Temple, whose open Holy of Holies, in the full view of the congregation, contained the Old Covenant, the rolls of the Word of God, in their shrine or ark. Master and disciples had alike learned in the synagogue and its schools to regard the Law in the Prophets as the veritable utterance of the Spirit of God. For them a visit to the Temple at the great feasts owed its impressiveness not less to the Scriptural instruction than to the ritual, for in the Temple promises, the light. Their nation, in the phrase so picturefully used by Muhammad in the Qur'an to describe them, was the 'People of the Book.' The most admired and distinguished class in the nation, according to the popular judgment, were the scribes and Pharisees, whose profession it was, not by birth, but by learning and talent, to be the priests and Levites of the Temple and Cultus of the Book. If the Temple priesthood who served in the sight of Israel principally at the great festivals represented Aaron in their ephods, the Rabbis sat in Moses' seat with the phylactery on their forehead as their symbol, exercising an authority which practically overshadowed the direction of public ritual in the capital alone, since it reached the infinitesimal details of daily life and piety throughout the country. Public opinion invested them in the prestige of the office as they enjoyed an authority in matters of faith and morals which Christian priesthoods with significant and ominous avidity have made the precedent and the model for their own. The Rabbis were the faith in Israel, the rabbis the faithful in the hands rather than the way they handled it that surrounded them with popular veneration. To the almost superstitious awe with which the popular mind regarded the Bible in ancient times, the transcendent character of the Holy Book which they expounded lent vastly added force. If we remember what the OT in Hebrew and in Greek was to Israel, and also bear in mind the profound impression of its foreign atmosphere and peculiar exclusiveness, upon the cultured classes of neighbouring races among whom it gained thousands of disinterested proselytes by its sheer grandeur and spiritual uniqueness, we shall not wonder that from the beginning something verging on Bibliolatry was native to Christianity. The NT, which has no infallible pretensions for itself any more than the OT had for itself, and gains our allegiance none the less readily because of their absence from a depart of its pages, from first to last, a desire that becomes of the OT and defer to it as a treasure of literal oracles of God. The reader of it does not need to recall particular references of Jesus to the authority of the Bible of His people whose 'Scripture cannot be broken' (Jn 10:35)—ignorance of which and of God's power is a cause of error (Mt 22:37)—an authority which was common ground for the strangely different interpretations of it made by Him and by His enemies. The oracles of God, as Paul calls them (Ro 3:4), are as truly in the Temptation and the Transfiguration, the strength of His life, as they are the source of the language and imagery in which the Apostolic writers set forth His teaching and His ideas of the consummate scholarship of our time is only coming to realize fully the minute and profound dependence of the NT upon the OT, Gospels and Epistles, Master and disciples alike. For one and all the OT was the Infallible Book, God's own Word and Revelation through inspired seers, singers, thinkers, statesmen, and anablasts, every word of which was authoritative for the soul, if rightly understood. The composition and publication of the Apostle's writings were necessarily followed by an immediate extension of the Canon, the infallible rule of faith and life. For, apart from their intimate connexion with the Lord Himself as veracious records and expositions of Him composed by men belonging more or less closely to His earliest following, they have a spiritual tone, power, and distinction, and they proclaim a message, which not only raised them at once to the exalted level of the OT, but made them in sober truth its completion and perfection, the crown of its hopes and the prototype of all that was to follow. Those movements, moving shadows as it drew near the world. If the OT was inspired, much more the NT. If the OT formed a Canon, much more without the late Apocalypse, much more the NT, also with or without the later writings, which were painfully marked by waiving power. Detailed examination, sentence by sentence, of these newer writings only served to vindicate the comparison. They preserve, to this day, the same inexhaustible edification and stimulus for religious minds which Israel and the first Christians found unfailing in the reverent perusal and study of the older Bible of their race. Both Testaments remain inextricably bound together as the Bible and Common Rule of the whole of Christendom. Greek, Roman, and Protestant alike use it, and it is the fountain of sacred truth, the unfailing and inerent source of Christian instruction, God's literal Word for all time, dictated by His Spirit and phrased by His chosen servants to be an eternal posession of His Church. For the Greek and Latin Fathers, for the Schoolmen great and small, for all branches of the divided modern Church, the unmistakable teaching of the Bible is infallible. It is written, for the first Christians, is officially final proof, where the Scripture is at
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one and its sense correctly reached, just as 'Thus saith the Lord' is final on the lips of a true prophet.

Then how comes it that there are so many Churches, and so many Biblical theologies at their foundation, it may be asked, if the doctrine of an infallible, and accepted by all Christians? The answer is twofold.

(1) While the Bible is one, its contents are far from homogeneous. It is the creation of religious experience and many various experiences and many types of religious temperament; so that a Book which, on the one hand, involves many very natural appeal to men very differently, some responding to one sense in it, others to others, no single individual and no Church, it must be expected to contain all the errors, all the weaknesses of its own, or, consciously, itself, not unintentionally, to as many interpretations as it finds interesting. The rival Church theologies are neither wrong in themselves nor, as we are apt to judge in haste, destructive of the unity of Holy Writ, any more than the rival tendencies within its own pages, as, for example, of priest and prophet or of Paulinism and Petrism, are subversive of it. Scholarship and the spirit of justice of making the Bible into a code, or a quarry of materials for a code, of statute law which must be rigorously administered if justice is to be done to it and to the illegals. The letter killeth. The spirit giveth life. Faith cannot be legislated; it has to be individual, which is to say, the faith, not a dogma, a supposition, if it is not comprehensible enough to admit of a certain play of freedom and spontaneity in the faith which anciently, the division and subdivision of the Church in all lands, far from disclosing a merely schematic spirit, is in great measure evident in the fact that it has been able up against, that it has demanded a wider catholicity than orthodoxy would acknowledge, and that the many-sidedness of the Christian theologies has received recognition in spite of all legalistic repugnance and restraint. Bossuet's controversial use of the phrase 'the Bible ... is not a code,' is taken quite to the heart of the conception of the Bible, of the infallible, traditions external altogether to the Scriptures have been taken as a conscious and co-ordinated fact of the Church and duty. No Church, however devoted or however learned its Hierarch, has succeeded in eliminating the authority of tradition altogether, for the presence of tradition is as universal as the presence universally felt. But in no Church is a tradition hostile to the plain sense of Scripture welcomed or held in the Roman Catholic dogma expressly co-ordinates tradition with Scripture as a source of merely a conscience, but of truth and duty. This [final] truth and (no] moral discipline, as they call it, is the foundation of the Christian Scriptures, as are the written books and the unwritten traditions as the order of the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or from the Apostles themselves, the Holy Ghost dictating. have come down even to us, transmitted as it were from mouth to mouth, from the first to the last, from each generation to the next, following the examples of the orthodox Fathers, receivings and venerating with a most pious affection of piety and reverence all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament—seems that one god is the author of both—also the holy traditions, as well as the apostle to pass on to as to morals, as has been defined, either by Christ's own word of mouth, or by the Holy Ghost, and preserved in the Catholic Church by a constant succession. And in the 'Decree concerning Original Sin' it professes to follow 'the testimony of the holy Fathers of the most approved councils, and the judgment and consent of the Church itself.' But conflict between them is not conceived of as possible, for the Church is capable of being made explicit as much a sin worse than what has lain implicit in the treasury of ecclesiastical records. But any addition of Church tradition to the letter of Scripture on such terms must increase the room for divergence in men's interpretation of the letter. The inherent and actual infallibility of Scripture, as the opportunity for honest difference of opinion on the meaning of Scripture, it is as nothing to the Church's powers of accommodation and convention it is the Church. It may be difficult, to determine the harmony or 'consent' of Scripture, but will any one seriously maintain that a concordant paraphrase or a consensual tradition with any approach to unanimity could be produced for a similar range of doctrine?

The infallibility of Scripture consists of an absolute immunity from error in matters of historical and scientific fact. Even the Gospels defy the harmonist in some details, misname at first one passage from the OT (Mk. 12, Luke 22), where 'they' is substituted for 'my', and the whole meaning of Malachi as a prophecy. But, as time wears on, and versions into the vernaculars of Christian Europe, Asia, and Africa were made and recorded for use, and the process of manuscript reproduction steadily increased the distance between the current copies and the lost originals, the difficulties with which the men of the Church were faced by the interpretation of the Bible were greatly multiplied. None in its own practical and natural history makes one faint by ordaining that the Greek and Hebrew texts should retire into academic seclusion as antiquarian matter, and that a standard revision of Eusebius' Vorlagen without the use of all the ordinary Bibles for doctrinal and disciplinary and liturgical use. Even the Vulgate has none of this literal textual tradition, and is the result of a biblical Commission. The Scriptural Infallibilists who desire a single authentic text as the basis of his scholarship and dogma might well despair. But it is clear that the kind of infallibility which Jesus Christ and the early Church recognized in Scripture was not textual or linguistic or historical in character, but spiritual, and the Roman Catholic or Protestant controversialist who seeks for an absolutely intelligible, certain, that is to say, that which is infallible Canon, or postulates an infallible authority to be its interpreter, has accomodated to an unchristian panic, and has failed to recognize the true nature of this is a form of infallibility. It must be acknowledged without reserve that scholar- ship has made it is itself a kind of religious experience, admitting of superintend, to point to one text, or one rendering, or one interpretation of the Bible and say, 'This is the one true interpretation,' and not 'This is the interpretation that is most acceptable by the majority of men.' It is self-delusion, and in the strictest sense of the word, superstition, to supplant any authority, whether amateur or expert, and appeal to the Scripture as the primary authority. Further, we may make increasing approximations to the true sense, but nothing is more certain than that a certainty upon which it is beyond question can never be reached. Can Christendom, however, not be content to take up its Lord's position in the matter? to lay down a rule for posterity? About the Mosaic text or the Septuagint rendering. He frames no rule for exegesis. He proceeds without of no court to settle such disputes. The infallency of Scripture for him was compatible with its inclusion of much that was or had become imperfect. He distinguished the elements of this incompleteness from the elements of its infallency. He is not content to take up its Lord's position in the matter? to lay down a rule for posterity? About the Mosaic text or the Septuagint rendering. He frames no rule for exegesis. He proceeds without...
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Biblical learning that God has been at no pains to prevent errors of history and knowledge and defects in the text and its transmission from finding an entrance into the Church. The marvel is, that, truth, that detected errors are so few. The devout reader of Scripture may indeed accept them as they are, if not on accident, on purpose, to protect him from the falsehood of religious instinct which demands infallibility of a literal sort and insists on revelation as an opus operatum and on inspiration as a finished fact. Add together the sum of Biblical insufficiency and human frailty, and, while they do disprove the notion, formed a priori of all divine instruments, the Book contains no blomish, the aggregate is so slight as to be practically negligible. It merely serves to admonish us that Biblical infallibility is not to be sought in the letter, and proves to the discomfiture of our instinctive literalism that texts and tittities can pass away without disturbance of the spirit of the Book. No one will suspect the Westminster divines of disloyalty to the doctrine of Scriptural infallibility, and there is therefore a peculiar impressiveness in their distinguishing actions regarding it. Speaking, as they do, the last dogmatic word of the old Calvinism, they devote a great part of the opening chapter of their Confession to the subject as the key to their whole doctrine.

The authority of the holy Scripture, for which it ought to be beloved and obeyed, depends not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the source of the authority, and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God. We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent veneration of the holy Scripture, and the heauenliness of the mister, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the compass of all the parts, the effect of the whole (which is to give all glory to God, the full discovery & making of the only way of man's salvation, the many incomparsable evidences, and the entire pacification thereof), are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet notwithstanding, our full perswasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with his Word in our hearts.

Those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed, for salvation, are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them. The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself: and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any one article of the Creed, whether in the Confession of Faith or in the New Testament, there must be collected and known by other places that speak more clearly. The examination, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined by the same, not in such an audience as we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture.

Thus, in Calvinistic as in Lutheran orthodoxy, rooted though each is in a thoroughgoing Biblicalism, a spiritual principle of dogmatic authority was resorted to in distrust of all external infallibility. The infallible in Scripture was not to be learned by scholarship nor by application to Church Councils in the wisdom.

As A. R. Davidson says in Theology of the Old Testament, Edinburgh, 1900, p. 355, 'When we speak of the infallibility of Scripture, we must remember it is not a scientific or philosophic infallibility, but the infallibility... of common sense.

It could be divided by the simple through the illuminating grace of God's Spirit. It concerned not secular knowledge but salvation. In the Thirty-nines Articles of the Church of England there is no formal reliance on Scriptural infallibility, but, instead, to the sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures for Salvation.'

4 Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to be demanded in the统属 of faith: and yet it is not forwark the Church to ordain any thing that is contrary to God's Word written; neither may it so expand one place of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another. Therefore, although the Church be a well of living water, of Holy Writ, yet, as it ought not to decree any thing against the same, so besides the same ought it not to enforce any thing to be believed or observed, against the same.' In both these articles the authority of Scripture is drawn upon only so far as relates to the great practical needs of religious life and experience.

3. Infallibility of Scripture, or dogmas. The dogmatic symbols of Christendom, on any view of them, invite discussion in this connection as a sequel to Holy Scripture and as a preliminary to the Church in the sense of accredited authorities; for, on the one hand, like the Bible they are written documents, scriptures, and they are also canonical in their own degree; and, on the other hand, they owe their official authority to the consent of the Church and to unbroken tradition. They are regarded as inspired, but only in a secondary and derivative sense; not as delivered by prophetic men by whom the Holy Spirit uttered fresh truth, but as compiled from Scripture or deduced from Scripture by saints, scholars, and churchmen under the guidance or illumination of the same Spirit. In high theory they are all subordinate to Scripture, and unimpeachable as the primary Canon of Apostolical writings they form an appendix of ecclesiastical dogmas. But in practice they came to receive a liturgical, disciplinary, and didactic deference hardly inferable from primitive times.

Not seldom, indeed, in their character as authoritative summaries of its contents and definitions of the sense in which a Church accepted and construed God's Word, they effectively supplanted Scripture. Scripture was treated as the expression of the Church's liturgical, canonical, popular, its speech, its unconventional freedom, and its infinite suggestiveness, everywhere prompted men to think for themselves and fashion systems of doctrine for themselves. All the hierarchies, great and small, appealed to it. Each of the Churches was convinced that it was founded on it, and could cite a wealth of passages palpably in its favour. Thus, if uniformity was to be secured in Christendom, Scripture was seen to be inadequately narrow and exclusive as a standard of orthodoxy, and Creeds and Confessions (qy. w.) with growing elaboration were employed by succeeding ecclesiastical authorities, ostensibly to condense and supplement it, but in effect, for disciplinary purposes, to replace and supersede it. That has been a virtually universal process throughout Christendom. There is nought but the very face of the question.

Much of it was salutary. It represented a long-continued endeavour not only to exclude gross error and to keep the faith pure by the help, where possible, of Scripture itself, but also to define the essence of Christianity as a faith. The ancient Creeds have a character and a venerability all their own, so impressive as well nigh to disarm criticism. Yet even the simplest of them is scarred by controversy. The Apostles' Creed, the Nicene-Constantinopolitan, the Athenasian, or Quenouque Vul, and the Te Deum form a monumental group of dogmatic symbols, owing less of their authority to formal acceptance by councils and enforcement by discipline than to their willing and, indeed, devout acceptance by the devotion and the scholarship of the Christian centuries. But, different as they are in character, origin, form, and popularity, they are alike acts of faith in Scripture, human responses to the initiatory of revelation rather than inspired objects of faith. Their authority is Scriptural in so far as their clauses are based on Scripture with all the advantages and the limitations of mere quotation. If they gain by leaving out much that can be dispensed with in Scripture, they necessarily lack its intricacy, intensity, and intimate touch with life and experience. What they add to Scripture is controversial in its
origin, and as majority-opinion claims only a questioned immunity from error. What they gain through their approbation or imposition by concilis is but a ministerial and, as compared with Scripture, a secondary authority. Fashioned by the Church—for the most part quite obscurely, since practically Nicene-Constantinian, Molitorian largely consists of pre-consiliar materials—the Creeds differ from formal decrees and definitions like the Confessions, inasmuch as they represent a more apodictic growth and yield an authority less widely resented; but ultimately the question of their infallibility is the same as that of the infallibility either of the Scriptures from which they are drawn or of the Church which gave them birth, shelter, and recognition. Whether one has regard to the Scriptural elements within them or to the theological additions made in the varied interests of orthodoxy, comprehensiveness, and precision, they are one and all to be interpreted historically; their language, vocabulary, topics, and scope must all be understood in the light of their particular times. What Scripture owes to the affectionate patience of Christian scholarship dare not be withheld from the Creeds and Confessions, if they are either to be understood or regarded with affection. No Creed, not even the Apostles’, has the universal currency of Scripture. No Confession has the eminence of the Bible. The same agency which produced dogma is at any time competent to emend, augment, or unmake it. The same authority which gave it sanction is at liberty, if duty demands it, to set it aside. Few such documents make any claim to be infallible, except as far as conviction of their truth may be taken to imply infallibility; and those which do—the Arian Creed, the appendix to the Nicene, and, for example, the Decrees and Canons of Trent—betray, on close inspection, no generic difference, no logical elevation, no religious genius, to warrant such distinction. Though Newman and his school counted it a point in favour of the title of the Roman Catholic Church to be the exclusive representative of the infallible Church Catholic that it persistently and deliberately claimed to be such, nothing can exempt the products of the human intellect from the conscientious scrutiny of a living and enlightened scholarship, or from the practical test of never completed that by their fruits they shall be known. Most of them, it may be freely acknowledged with gratitude, served their original purpose admirably, and were faithful to their ample ends. The results of the learning and experience of their time.

Bul, as W. Sunday says in Christologies Ancient and Modern (1883), p. 127, although they are “great outstanding historical monuments of the faith of the Church,” which we cannot but regard with veneration, and to which we desire in loyalty to conform our opinions, “it is impossible that the thought and language of these centuries should exactly coincide with the genuine, spontaneous, unbiased, scientific . . . language of the present day. We must moderate, whatever we will or not.”

4. Infallibility of the Church.—(a) The Universal Church. Christian faith in the infallibility of the Church has expressed itself in a protean variety of ways. Some of these verge closely upon the theories which have already been considered. All of them rest on principles which have already been touched upon.

Whatever various modes, says W. Palmer in The Church of England, 1839, p. 127, “instructing the authority of the Church there may have been, I believe that scarcely any Christian writer can be found, who has ventured actually to maintain that the judgment of the Church is infallible.” In order to avoid all doubts, and deliberately gives, with the apparent use of all means, might in fact be used, how inconsistent it is to say, in order to the Church’s.

At their foundation is a common appeal to the promises of Christ regarding His Church, and an a priori theory or presumption as to the means which Providence must employ to have them fulfilled. Undeterred by the scantiness of Christ’s allusions to the Church as an organization, by His silence regarding its government, and by the unmistakable immediateness of the communion which He taught and promoted between the individual believer and the Father and Himself, churchmanship has fastened upon a few allusions in the Gospels, and erected upon their slender basis an imposing doctrine of the duty of the Church to the Christians in all matters of faith and morals, to trust and obey the Church. Appeal is made to the dictum of Augustine: “Ego vero Evangelio non crediderim nisi me Catholicae Ecclésiae commissum autori-tas.” The Church, it is urged, is a living institution, linking all the Christian generations together, nourishing and fostering the faith of individuals, bringing the Scriptures and other means of grace to bear upon them, and investing them with authority, whereas the Bible is a mere book, holy but inanimate in itself, requiring the attestation of the Church, requiring authoritative interpretation by the Church, itself indeed originally a product of the Church’s experience and self-nurture as well as a compilation made and adjusted by its care. In the nature of the case, the Church, as the Society which was founded to promote God’s Kingdom, preceded the NT, just as Israel, the older theocracy, preceded the Hebrew oracles, and, as it preceded it, also preceded the Church into being and received from it mysteries to view. Plausible as this theory appears, its inadequacy to fit the facts of history and to bear the inferences which have been drawn from them is becoming more and more evident. It is valid only against a doctrine of Scripture as an unaltered, a mere record and compilation as distinct from the utterance and activity which it records. Thus, for example, though the Gospels as books were composed by members of the Church, and were preserved by the Church from loss, the Church did not utter the words of Jesus which they record. We have to thank the Church for recording and transmitting them, not for their authority. The words and acts of Jesus founded the Church, not vice versa. He preceded both Church and Scripture. No matter how accurate and honest the Apostolic writers were, no matter how careful and trustworthy, transmitting and explaining Church, it would avail nothing for the ulterior authority of the voice which they echo. The Protestant preference of Holy Writ to tradition and Church authority rested upon the simple conviction, derived from sorrowful observation and painful experience, that the two contradicted, and that the Church of Scripture was unapproachably superior to the Church who, they were commanded to believe, spoke through the tainted lips of the Renaissance papacy, or through the very human and variable opinions of Schoolmen and Fathers. And it is significant that Rome itself betrays an unmistakable preference for Biblical authority where texts can be cited in favour of its views with any show of exegetical warrant. It will not do to set Scripture over against Church tradition as a dependent and apologetically inferior authority, and then to proceed to prove the superiority of Church and tradition by appeal to Scripture texts. Both sides in the long controversy have erred. If Protestantism has tended to overemphasize its doctrine of Scripture and to evade the duty of discriminating between its contents in the light of the mind and spirit of Jesus Christ, Roman Catholicism, while guilty of the same fault, has added to it a grave exaggeration of the independence of tradition. The Bible itself is tradition at its highest, supremely valuable and authoritative because of its intimate proximity to Jesus Christ, and its undimmed freshness for all time of the present image. The Bible is not a person, it is true; but
neither is the Church. The Bible is not more dead than the words of pope or council, once they are spoken. Its divine spirit and power are deathless. Wherever its truths are recognized, it is invited to make an inventory of all the truth in Jesus Christ which it has stored up in its treasury apart from Scripture, the aggregate is indifferently meagre and painfully at variance with Biblical tradition. At one time the earth stood fast and the heavens shrunk into a mere office of interpretation. It cannot, it is said, pretend to new revelations. Its inspiration is scholarly, its authority is rabbinical, its office is hermeneutic. Scripture is there. Scripture is God's undeniable Word. But it is in places obscure, and its testimonies are at times divergent. The Church must save the unity of faith by possessing and by exercising the prerogatives of definition. It can say, and it must say, what Scripture means upon any point of controversy. And what by the grace of God it is pleased to say, the faithful ought, without question, to receive as God's very Word. There must be every age, in every dispensation, at any moment, some voice on earth, whether single or conjunct, which can allay mortal questionings by the sincere and lawful use of the formula of faith of this Council: 'It seems good to the Holy Spirit and to us.'

Leaving out of account O'T passages which have been brought to bear upon ecclesiastical infallibility, there is the Preface to the Vatican Decrees, where the prophecy of the coming of a Redeemer to Zion is followed by the divine covenant: 'My spirit that is upon thee, and my words which I put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed . . . from henceforth and for ever,' ecclesiastical infallibility in general is founded upon the following Scriptural warrant: Mt 1613-12 2819-20, Jn 1413-14, and I Th 312-13. In Mt 2818-19, immediately after Jesus' acceptance of Simon Peter's confession of Him as the Christ, which He declares to have been revealed, not by flesh and blood, but by His Father in heaven, He continues: 'And I also say unto thee, that thou art Peter (Hepeta), and upon this rock (petra) I will build my church; and the gates of death shall not prevail against it. I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.' In Mt 2818, the Church: 'All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name . . . teaching them to observe (rheo) all things whatsoever I commanded you: and, lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world.' In Jn 1426, after the words: 'If ye love me, ye will keep (rheode) my commandments,' Jesus says: 'And I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete, that he may be with you for ever, even the Spirit of truth: whom the world cannot receive; for it beholdeth him not, neither knoweth him: ye know him; for he abideth with you, and shall be in you'; and in 1426: 'But the Paraclete, even the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I said unto you'; and in 1624: 'Father, I love thee: sanctify them through thy truth. And for their sakes sanctify thyself, that thy name may be given unto them, and thou hast promised them, what is manifestly the same assistance phrased in two alternative ways, first, His own unfailing and everlasting presence 'I am with them always even unto the world,' that is, His positive help and approval; and secondly, in
answer to His prayer to the Father, the Spirit of Truth is in Christ Jesus. In Mt 10:19-20, the Spirit of God, God's Father is promised to the Twelve Apostles to give them utterance when they are arraigned by their accusers and persecutors, so that they are not to be anxious how or what they are to speak. In Lk 10:17 Jesus says to the Seventy Apostles: "He that heareth you heareth me; and he that rejecteth you rejecteth me; and he that rejecteth me rejecteth him that sent me' and in Lk 10:21, Jesus saith, 'If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?'

As to the passage in 1 Timothy, it is far from certain that 'a pillar and ground of the truth' refers to the 'household of God' which is the church of the living God. Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus make it refer to Timothy, while Bengel links it with the 'mystery or revelation of godliness' which immediately follows it in the text. But, assuming that it does refer to the Church, God's household, and that rhēthos means 'ground' rather than 'stay' or 'support', the passage teaches simply that the Church is a pillar and ground of revealed truth, just as individuals like James, Cephas, and John are called 'pillars' by Paul in Gal 2, and in Rev 3:1, 'He that overcometh shall receive a crown on that pillar in the temple of God'. There is no suggestion that the house of God is the only pillar of the truth, or that the temple of truth is so built that each one carries its own column and base.

It seems clear, upon a review of the evidence of the Gospels, that Jesus gave His disciples to understand that His words would never pass away, but would live forever, and the power of the Spirit of truth, so His Church, built as on a rock upon Apostolic faith in His Messianic Sonship to the living God, would never perish, the gates of death would never close upon it. Faith in His followers' mission was the necessary complement to faith in His own. Faith in their teaching was essential to faith in the future of His own. He would insist that they be as His inspired and taught them in the flesh. His Spirit would lead them aright to the truth which they required. But of the teaching that His Church would never err, would have to learn through experience, that Christ's teaching would be true and that everything教会 in the Church into all truth may satisfy the requirements of its Lord's promises. The providence which makes all things work together for good does not preclude the incidence of evil in the experience and conduct of God's saints. The Church may by the grace of God withstand the gates of death and be guided into all truth, in spite of many partial and temporary local defections and mistakes. It will not help the Church to be circumspect if it is convinced a priori that it is certain that it is unable to carry through that is precarious or debatable. What it needs is to know itself fallible in detail, to be ready to confess error and profit by experience, and to make good the defect by the grace of God in leading it, however deviously, to the truth that it needs. Further, the gift of the spirit of truth is not promised to the Church and denied to the individual. Each of the Seventy, as we saw, was identified with his Lord, so that those who heard them heard Him. The Father in heaven will no more withhold the Holy Spirit from individual believers than an earthly father will deny good gifts to his children. Is the Holy Spirit unable, or unwilling, to bestow the same immunity from error upon the individual Christian that he enjoys upon the Church? Ubi Spiritus, ibi ecclesia. Ubi Spiritus, ibi veritas. The same promise of guidance is given to the individual as to the Church; the same assurance belongs to each. The Church can move mountains, the believing prayer whose persistence will prevail, is not vouchefather to the Church and withheld from the Church-member. The High Churchman or the Roman Catholic and the Quaker are on the same ground when they claim infallible guidance for the Church or the pope or the individual Christian through the inner light or illumination of the promised Spirit, except that the preponderance of evidence derived from the gospels lies unmistakably in favour of the Friends. All Christians are agreed that the Spirit of God can and will guide God's believing children, the humblest, not less than the most exalted or the most learned; but experience has taught most Christians to beware of constructing that faith into an assurance of particular infallibility. History deepens the conviction that a lively sense of liability to err, and a willingness to be corrected and to acknowledge fault, are an indispensable pre-requisite and guarantee of ultimate arrival at the goal.

(b) The universal consent of Christendom.—Few minds would hesitate to acknowledge the impressiveness and authority of the unanimous consent of Christendom to the teaching of faith and morals. We are all so profoundly indebted to authority, voicing the lessons of long experience external to ourselves, that the strongest presumption arises that what all Christians are agreed upon must be right and true. The consensus Ecclesiae Catholicae counts for Christian faith as the argumentum e consensu gentium counts for theistic faith. 'De quo omnium natura consentit,' says Cicero (de Nat. Deor., t. xvii.; cf. Seneca, Ep. 117), 'ilam sequere necesse est. It is the principle, urged by Augustine against the Donatists, which appealed so powerfully to Neoscholastic excitement. It is the principle which finds expression in the Vincentian Canon of faith and practice: quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus creditum est. Unquestionably the main unanimity of all types of Christian belief in every land and in every period of the Church's history could not fail to inspire trust in a doctrine or a usage, and would go far to prove it in advance against any onslaught of scepticism or criticism. But in practice the rule falls us lamentably. Outside the Holy Scriptures, and indeed outside the cardinal elements in their narrative and teaching, it is exceedingly difficult to point to any extensive group of universally accepted traditions and usages. Even the great Creeds and the great Festivals and the great Sacraments fail to satisfy a demand so exacting. Catholicity so comprehensive of a multitude of things in the Christian system.

But short of an extreme form of the Vincentian Canon of infallibility the principle of a 'common sense of Christian belief' is still asserted itself by all Christian lands. Even the Churches which elevate the clergy as authorities high above the laity and use 'church' and 'clergy' as almost equivalent terms, assign, whole or in part, the power of infallibility to the consent of the people. If the clergy have authority as teachers, their teaching gains added force when it carries the people with it, for they
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can bring experience to reinforce and vindicate the experts who are their guides. To a far greater degree than is generally credited the determination of facts and the gift of the popular mind. What appeals to the people, helps their life, stirs their imagination, inspires their faith or satisfies their credulity, or calls forth their good will for their faith or for the faith of their instructors as demonstrably good and right and therefore inherently true. Very often there is divergence between the churchman and the theologian because of the different attitudes which they tend to adopt towards popular ideas and experience. The eclesiastic may value as a help to piety and obedience what the scholar distrusts as promoting superstition and servility. The eclesiastic may be suspicious of the scholar's 'truth' and 'open-mindedness' as savouring of scepticism and private judgment. The vox populi not only enthroned an Ambrose in the cathedral of Milan and procured for a Newman the red hat of his ambition, but it has, not less wholesome though less obtrusively, controlled the selection of many a form of dogma and many a pious usage. What is always said to be bad for the poor, the simple, the humble, the masses of the people, the 'little ones,' the 'babes and sucklings,' as Jesus called them. It has found universities, but no university founded it or fashioned its form. It is the voice of piety. The people may be easily led astray. They may make a poor judge, but they form the best of juries. Like the first Apostles, who receive them in their strength and weakness, they are apt to confound poetry with prose, parable with fact, myth with truth. But their heart is essentially as sound, and their instinct as reliable, to-day as it was then. And so Jesus simply and gave Him His first followers and friends. It is from their ranks that the Christian priesthood and ministry are still mainly recruited. It is for their minds that Christian dogmas and depositions are still primarily framed.

(c) Particular representatives of the Church; the Episcopate; general Councils.—Impressive as is the consensus of Christendom is, and weighty as is the authority of Christian common sense and popular feeling, their movement and utterance are too slow and unwieldy to enable them to be employed for the speedy solution of faith's problems or for their communal interpretation. Infallible direction has been sought in the consensus of office-bearers of the Church. The testimony of the Apostles, or the Fathers, or the Councils, or the Ecumenical, or the Episcopate, or the papacy, has been regarded and proclaimed in certain relations and at certain times as the final organ of infallibility. Even in these groups of official representatives a perfect consensus in every case lacking; as between the groups it is equally hard to find. But the assertion of their claims to implicit credence interestingly illustrates the determination of humanity to leave no stone unturned in its search for an infallible oracle of divine truth. One might have supposed that the Old Dispensation would have taught the Christian Church to beware of trusting either the official or the unchannelled transmission of hierarchical authority or prophetic vision or interpretative insight or governing power. But, as time advanced and the interval which separated each generation from the historical person of Christ steadily widened, it was natural and inevitable that men should cherish with augmented force the conviction that their Lord had constituted the Apostles and their successors in some definitive sense the heirs to His mission, to his parts in geographic infallibility. Had He not laid His enduring hands upon them, bestowing His Holy Spirit upon them for the discharge of their sacred responsibilities, and had they not transmitted to successors the ordination and the gift of the same Spirit? Further, since the Apostles had differed from one another upon occasion and had met in council at the chief seat of the infant Church to confer upon their differences and decisions and decisions for the guidance of the local churches, what more natural than that their successors should do likewise with results as binding upon the Christian conscience, especially if they were similarly unanimous in their decisions? Thus reliance came to be placed on the joint mind and unanimous consent of the Episcopate met upon occasion in duly convened universal councils, or acting through the administration of common creeds and ritual and discipline, or accepting the doctrine of certain great teaching Fathers or Doctors on faith and morals. Faith was turned into dogma; a mission into a hierarchy; a brotherhood into a group of federated but rival monarchies. Unanimous consent became majority-finding raised to the dignity of a creed or a coercive uniformity. The case was always the poor, the simple, the humble, the masses of the people, the 'little ones,' the 'babes and sucklings,' as Jesus called them. It has found universities, but no university founded it or fashioned its form. It is the voice of piety. The people may be easily led astray. They may make a poor judge, but they form the best of juries. Like the first Apostles, who receive them in their strength and weakness, they are apt to confound poetry with prose, parable with fact, myth with truth. But their heart is essentially as sound, and their instinct as reliable, to-day as it was then. And so Jesus simply and gave Him His first followers and friends. It is from their ranks that the Christian priesthood and ministry are still mainly recruited. It is for their minds that Christian dogmas and depositions are still primarily framed.

We bishops are absorbed in our work, and are not scholars. We need not ask the help of those that are. It is to be hoped that the Council will raise only such questions as can be dealt with competently by practical experience and common sense.

They were often not so much leaders as mouthpieces of religious opinion, chosen by their clergy to administer rather than to receive illumination. For that reason they may justly be claimed as representative men, living epitomes of the faith and common sentiment of their people. If they were incapable of seeming freedom from controversy throughout their period, it is not less true of course to Councils in which to confer upon their difficulties, they were at once confronted with the problem of method. The gathering in a theory was an ideal instrument for the determination of the Church's belief and practice appeared in a very different light at close quarters. Councils convened by princes and intended to be ecumenical were seldom, if ever, attended by bishops of racial, or populational proportion. Nicola, the first meeting-place, was con-
venient enough for Constantinople, the Emperor's own seat, but the prelates who came at the Emperor's summons were almost to a man Easterners or Greeks. The Bishop of Rome himself being absent though the occasion was one of extreme gravity for the peace of Christendom. And so it has always been. Ecumenical in name, general Councils have invariably assumed the condition of the region of the Christian world in which the chance to be held. Not seldom the locality was selected with a definite view to secure certain results. Moreover, they were increasingly restricted through the abstention of or exclusion of particular Churches, the Oriental first, and the Greek Orthodox next, until the claim of the latest Councils of Trent and the Vatican to be ecumenical was reduced to the verge of the farcical by the absence of the Greeks, the Protesants, and all but Roman Catholic delegates. The conciliar illusion was yet further discredited by the problem of a conciliar investigation of the dogmas of the Papal infallibility and controversy might take place without substantial disadvantage to any section of the membership, by the problem of rules of debate, of the determination of the procedure of the subjects to be propounded, of the method of voting, and the means of securing "ananimity." The breakdown of the conciliar apparatus of infallibility was evident in the long-drawn-out and continually interrupted proceedings at Trent, when the creed in infallibility was won at the close of the Great Schism by the Council of Constance (A.D. 1414-18), the unmaker and maker of popes, was dissipated under papal and Jesuit influence, and it was remarked by Cardinal Pole that the "inspiration" of the Council, in which, as always, Italian bishops and abbots predominated, was strangely affected by each arrival of the courier from the Vatican. In 1854 the publication by Pius IX., before a mere congress of assembled cardinals and bishops, of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception as a papal decree, and in 1870 the preliminary report of the Council on the business and method of the Vatican Council by the same pope, the adoption of the principle of the sufficiency of majority-findings, and the final supersession of Conclave by the dogma of papal infallibility were signs that, so far as the Church in communion with Rome was concerned, the age of Councils was at an end. Christendom had scarcely ever before witnessed such a truce from the meeting and proceedings of a Council. The dogma of infallibility, wrangling, recrimination, and acrimony that had almost always been unconceivable features of a Council, were removed.

Under the rubric and poetic exaggeration of James Martineau there is a solid foundation of fact when he says: "Catholic infallibility," ch. ii. of his "Essays of Religious Enquiry," London, 1866: "When you tell me of an infallible assembly—so insinuates he—when the voice is neverthe less liable to error, till confirmed by the signature of a certain bishop, I try to vain to conceive where the divine agency can take place, of what separate atoms of inspiration the collective miracle is made up, from what distribution of influence on the faculties of the several parts the diminution of error results. Every individual member in his separate capacity, and before he entered the assembly, is perfectly fallible; when there, he utters the very opinions which he brought thither, and retains the vote which he has previously designed; yet the aggregate of these separate efforts is an inspiration. When I remember the motives which actuate the members of such assemblies, and of the vehement operation of no which no reader of ecclesiastical history can doubt: the anxiety for imperial favor, or dread of popular displeasure; the love of display, the passion for influences, the ambition of promotion—the dread of episcopal mortification, and the hope of party triumph, and the horror of the reputation of heresy,—I look in vain for the resting-place of the divine in its actions. No such impulsion as that of spiritual inspiration moves it, every point on which I gaze; and goes out as fast as those mists and clouds which roll away in the morning, and come again (see "Authority in Religion," London, 1851, p. 67). "No crowd of pigeons can add themselves up into a God." Yet the Church accepts the values of their decisions—and there is to this day no ecclesiastical agreement as to which of them are genuinely ecc-
recognizes subjects and vicars or officials of the Pope, who exercises a power lent them merely during his pleasure, is not a necessary assemblage which would be called a Council in the sense of the ancient Church. If the bishops know the view and will of the Pope clearly set forth in the Church, they would be prudent to be silent and to vote against it; and if they do not their first duty at the Council would be to ascertain it and vote accordingly. An assembly of the clergy of the Church can have no existence, properly speaking, in presence of an ordinarius ordinariorum and superior in faith, though, of course, the pope's per-sonal, spiritual, or temporal authority of a Council may be displayed to the gaze of the world. And therefore the Papal legates at Trent were absent in no way to rebuke bishops as heretics and rebels who ever dared to express any view of their own. Bishops who have been compelled to declare their adherence to the teaching of their Pope—cannot be called free in all those questions which concern the authority and claims of the See of Rome, and very few at most of the questions which need be discussed at a Council do not come under this category. None of our bishops have sworn to man and in the Church and of religion the supreme object of their actions and ends; the terms of the oath provide only for the advantage of the Church. How the oath is understood and the meaning which is attached to it by what preaches a bishop expose himself who once chooses to follow his own conviction against the tradition of the Church, there are plenty of examples to shew. In Risini and Seneca (580), at Ephesus (449), and at Vienne (1311), and at many other times, even at Trent, the results of a whole legation have been disfigured. In early times, when the Popes were as yet in no position to execute compulsion or influence upon Synods, it was the Emperors who sometimes took a leading role. But from Gregory v.'s time the weight of Papal power has preceded ten times more than the moral and sometimes even diabolic authority. With abundant reason were the two demands urged throughout half Europe. In the 15th century, in the negotiations about the Council, first, that it should not be held in Rome, or even in Italy; and, secondly, that the bishops should be absolved from their oath of true men. The reason a proclaimed Council is to be held not only in Italy, but in Rome itself, and already it has been announced that, as the Sixth Lateran Council, it will abide faithfully to the fifth. That is quite enough—it means that, whatever course the Synod may take, one quality can never be predicated of it, namely, that it has been a free Council.

The Hierarchs and Canonists declare that without complete freedom the decisions of a Council are not binding, and the assembly is only a pseudo-Synod. Its decree may, have to be corrected.

Dillingler's words are deliberate, and are based on unrivalled knowledge. But they provoke a still deeper reflection than they intend, for they express the way the question of both papacy and Councils. In neither is true freedom, as such he desiderates and demands, conceivable. To bind the conscience of Christendom is the motive and the office of both institutions. Neither in reality is at liberty to claim the freedom it would withdraw from its subjects. The binder need not complain if he finds himself in bonds. Admit the principle of coercive authority in your Council and you will he able to deny it to the permanent officials of your Church. Better on such principles a living pope than a dead Council, or a Council yet unborn. You cannot indulge in Councils very often, or else you go in for pseudo-Synods. He need not act arbitrarily. He has advisors innumerable, informants innumerable, and access, presumably, to the mind of the vast dominion over which he rules; let him use it, give none but the best pope to His confiding Council, and none but the best advisers to His confiding Viceregent, and pour out His Holy Spirit upon them all to aid them from error and lead them to truth! The basis of the Papal power is as valid as against Councils. For those who believe in a hierarchy endowed with corporate infallibility. But, as we have seen, there is nothing in our Lord's teaching to suggest that God values the Church or watches over the Church as it is more important than over the individual. On the contrary, individual infallibility through perfect faith in God's readiness to bestow His Holy Spirit has a much stronger and more explicit warrant in the Gospels. If it be assumed, though, that Roman Catholics are prepared to acknowledge it, that the Vatican Council of 1870 was ecumenical and ecumenically binding, it is results are interesting in the present connexion. For it, a valid Council, decreed, in assent to the mind of the pope, that the pope is, when pronouncing on faith and morals as cathólica, infallible. It follows, that if the pope is not infallible, neither is the Council which pronounced him immune from error. It does not follow that Councils are henceforth set aside for ever. They remain infallible instruments of authority, obsolete but revivable at any time. Princes or popes may still convokes them, through which it would be strictly unnecessary to do so in the lifetime and health of a supreme pontiff, and might be construed as an insult and act of treachery to the office and prerogatives of the occupant of St. Peter's throne. But henceforth, unless the Council of 1870 is ruled out as merely Roman Catholic and therefore provincial and sectarian, or as morally lacking in unanimity, or as denying the liberty and freedom in voting, debate, and business, it may be maintained that, while a Council is infallible only when its decrees enjoy the adhesion of the Roman See, when it acts in communion with it, and even if, with its chief bishop, the infallibility enjoyed by the reigning pope does not depend upon any consent of future Councils. It may, however, be observed that in a great autonomous institution no law or convention can absolutely fetter the resources of corporate freedom, or destroy its initiative in great crises of its existence. The Council of Constance may serve as an example of an extreme emergency calling out into active service extremes and scarcely contemplated methods of procedure. The Vatican has not yet decreed that henceforth Councils are incompetent, lacking in infallibility, and therefore prohibited. It is one thing to say that the Pope, by acts of freedom, can prevent their resumption; quite another to forbid them altogether or to pronounce them for all time deluded.  

(d) Papal infallibility.—The Church of Rome is not but one of the sects of Christendom, but it is outwardly at least the most catholic of Churches. The most exclusive in its communion, it is the most comprehensive in geographical diffusion and in racial distribution. The most complex in its organization, it is the most rigorously unified in its discipline. Its history, its service to Christian life, piety, and tradition, and its numerical strength lend a peculiar importance to the theory of infallibility with which it has come finally to be identified. The term 'Papism,' which might formerly have been represented throughout Roman Catholic lands, is now, since 1870, at least as accurate a designation as the term 'Roman Catholic.' Since that date the doctrine that the pope is infallible, which had hitherto been repudiated in the strongest terms by the Roman Catholics, has not yet been accepted by Great Britain and in Ireland, has become a dogma of faith, part of the distinctive working creed of the Church. Its evolution is one of the most interesting and, in its significance in significant episodes in Church history. Thanks to the abundant literature which arose out of the controversy in which the completion of the dogma was involved, the story can be studied with

1 For the Roman Catholic position see ART. CHURCH, DOCTRINE OF THE (Roman Catholic), PAP.
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unusual thoroughness and ease. In the present article a review of its broader features and main facts must suffice.

It is beyond dispute that the dogmatic infallibility of the bishop or patriarch of Rome stands in the closest possible relationship to his general authority as a ruler in the Church.

In a letter to Lady Simeon, of date 1967, quoted in W. Ward's Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman (London, 1872, IL 187), Newman writes: 'I believe in Cardinal Bellenarii whether the Pope be infallible or not in any pronouncement, anyhow he is to be obeyed. No good can come from disobedience. His facts and his dogmas must be right or be all wrong; his deliberations may have been biased. He may have been misled. Impediments and checks, terrors and cruelties, may be patent in the conduct of his advisers and instruments. But when he speaks formally and authoritatively he speaks as our Lord would have him speak, and all those imperfections and sins of individuals are overruled for that result which our Lord intends (just as the action of the winds, under the demands of the Church are overruled), and therefore the Pope's word stands, and a blessing goes with obedience to it, and no blessing with disobedience.' And in a letter to Fussey (6th, 277) is the same year he writes: 'Any categorical answer would be unsatisfactory—but I must say so. I should say that the infallibility (for that I conceive you to mean by "powers") is unlimited and suspensive. And I think that is the general opinion among us... There is nothing which any other authority in the Church can do, which he cannot do as at once, and can do as much which they cannot do, so much as the whole hierarchy, and so much as the whole hierarchy... As to the question of its... whether he could be... to make the facts of a doctrine... I do not know—but I suspect it can. Speaking generally, I think I can do anything, but break the divine law... But such a jurisdiction is (1) not so much a practice as a doctrine—and (2) not so much a doctrine as a principle of our system.'

In an institution which rests faith upon authority or tradition and makes belief a duty of obedience, the dogmas or decrees or dogmatic faith is naturally included within the wider right of the rule in spiritual matters. Much of the widespread reluctance on the part of Protestants to regard with seriousness the dogma of papal infallibility is due to their instinctively different attitude towards faith and the means by which it may be secured; they find it difficult to conceive of faith as a product of obedience, as an activity to be ordered. In Roman Catholicism, faith is a dead matter, the belief of the Church, the utterance of his faith in the Church. Not a doctrine, not a belief, but a living person is the basis of a standing Church. The gift or charge of the keys of the kingdom denotes his authority as a teacher; what he 'binds or looses,' i.e., in biblical language, 'affirms or denies,' in teaching spiritual truth is 'in heaven,' i.e., 'divinely;' affirmed or denied. In Lk 229., through the context and sequel are painfully adverse to the Roman Catholic theory, it is said by Christ that He has prayed for Peter that his faith 'fail not,' from which it may be deduced that the prayer has been answered; and the command is laid upon Peter (Lk 229.) not to 'resign his faith.' The risen Lord, moreover, commissions the forgiven Peter to feed His lambs, to tend His sheep, and to feed His lambs and sheep. It is a sign of infallibility, it is urged further, that our Lord intended such a change to terminate with Peter's individual tenure of it. Each successive generation would require at least the same guaranteed infallibility in a living inspired instructor. A living rock-foundation cannot have been withdrawn on Peter's decease; his faith cannot be allowed to fail in any age; his brethren still need stabilizing; the sheep of Christ still need not only to be fed but to be shepherded, which implies guidance and protection from error. The need grows greater rather than less with the passage of time, and, as it tends to cool as distance from its objects is increased.

On the face of these, passages in the Gospels cannot be so construed with any confidence. Since Peter is anything but a model of infallibility either in the Gospels or in the Acts or in the Epistles of the NT. To the same person who received the words 'Thou art Peter' came all too soon the words 'Get thee behind me, Satan.' The 'Rock' of the Church, of whose foundation became a few hours a 'stumbling-block,' a rock of offence.

The same Apostle who confessed the Christ not only denied Him, but endeavoured to deter Him from going to His death, and, as mistakenly though as naturally, tried to defend Him with the sword. It is the faith which it useth that fits him for our Lord's service, since it is recognized by its recipient as divinely revealed. Yet the faith did soon 'fail'; Satan did 'have' him. If he had been ever in any, sense, it is ultimate or practical infallibility, and it does not render him immune from particular failure of judgment in faith and duty. Further, it is brethren that he is to be in us. After his复活, and the restoration, and the duty of stabilizing is plainly enough a duty that each Apostle must discharge; and, however their gifts might vary (cf. the parallel use of confirmation with reference to Paul and others in Ac 14:15-21; 18:19), 'Bonding and loosing' is not a prerogative conferred upon one man alone; it is given to all the Apostles as such, duty as well as the Twelve, as an essential of authoritative proclamation of Christ's message. There is no indication that particular infallibility was given to every Apostle, or that Peter's was goaded in kind from that of the others. It is also unfortunate that Lk 229.28 should follow immediately Christ's rebuke to the disciples in their contention on the very subject of infallibility, and His warning to them not to be like Gentile princes who lord it over their people, and assume grandiloquent titles such as 'benefactor.' Peter's final commission contains no single unique element; it is simply a prayer, whose triple injunction refers to his threefold denial and repudiation of his Master. For the claim that Peter's office existed only in his lifetime, it proves too much for papal theory, since no pope has ever claimed an apostolic authority with this; but it contains a kernel of truth. Apostolic faith, and faithful Apostles, are needful by the Lord of the Church in every generation, and we are justified in believing that they will not fail. But we are still in total ignorance, as was the general Church in the first four centuries, of any evidence that our Lord desired to have Peter's faith and Peter's prerogative confined to one man, and in particular to the bishop of Rome.

"If all the Fathers," writes Dillingham (op. cit. p. 917.), "who interpret these passages in the Gospels (Mt 16:16-19, Mk 8:29, Lk 229.28, not a single one applies to them the Roman Bishop. How many Fathers have hurled themselves with these texts, yet not one of them whose commentary we possess—Origen, Chrysostom, Hilary, Augustine, Cyril, Theodoret, and those whose interpretations are collected by Eusebius—seems to have thought the faintest hint that the primacy of Rome is the commission and promise to Peter! Not one of them has explained the rock or foundation on which Christ would build His Church of the office given to Peter to be transmitted to his successors, but they understand it to be the Apostle himself, or Peter's confession of faith in Christ; often both together. Or else they thought Peter was the foundation equally with all the others, the Twelve being together the foundation-stones
of the Church (d. 330, cxxi. 14). They did not regard a power first given to Peter, and afterwards conferred in precisely the same terms on the other Apostles, as anything peculiar to him, or hereditary in the line of Roman Bishops, and they held the symbol of the keys as meaning just the same as the figurative expression of binding and loosing.

Every one knows the one classical passage of Scripture on which the whole of the Papistry of Rome is based. The symbol is a genuine one, which Peter was actually taught by Christ himself. "When thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." But these words manifestly referred to Peter personally, to his denial of Christ and his conversion; he is told that he, whose failure of faith would have been referred to the whole Church, and the other Apostles, whose faith would likewise fail, it is directly against this case of the passage, which speaks simply of faith, first wavering, and then to be confirmed in the Mystical dignity of Christ, to find in it a promise of future infallibility to a successor of Peter as a vital part of the office of Peter first held in the Roman Church. No single writer to the end of the Seventh Century dared of such an interpretation; all without exception—and there are eighteen of them—explain it simply as a prayer of Christ, that His Apostle might not wholly succumb, and lose his faith entirely in his approaching trial. The first to find in it a promise of privileges to the Church of Rome was Pope Agapetus in 660, when trying to avert the threatened condemnation of his predecessor, Honorius, through whom the Roman Church had lost her boasted privileges of doctrinal purity.

Now the Tridentine profession of faith, imposed on the clergy since 1541, contains a veneration of the Holy Scripture otherwise than in accord with the unanimous consent of the Fathers—that is, the great majority of the Sacred Councils. The Council of Florence and the Council of the Lateran (679-680) were the first to place the authority of the Church above the authority of Jesus Christ as the sole and infallible norm of faith. This was a doctrine of papal infallibility, as it was pronounced in the form of a gift of infallibility promised by Christ to the Pope.

Human nature and political analogy can supply many reasons for vesting in the single holder of spiritual and temporal power such a claim as that of Peter on earth. Yet no traffic in human reason can reconcile the scheme of infallibility with any warrant in the words of Jesus Christ for such a claim. Think what one may about the limits and nature of the ancient spiritual authority, we cannot regard the tradition of the infallibility of the Popes either without a full discussion of the matter, and entirely without a single allusion either to Rome or to its Episcopate. Think what one also may about the legitimacy of a doctrinal 'development', the postulate of natural and moral laws as authoritative to bind men's consciences to Christendom seem to call for a delicate explanation.

The fact is that, while all the world deferred in many ways, especially after Constantine's accession, to the See of Rome, while the frequent dependence of lesser sees upon its guidance and direction prepared for the Western Church's ultimate submission to its authority, and while the bishop of Rome was a great power to reckon with in any ecclesiastical interest, the ancient Church betrayed no sign of any recognition of his infallibility. A patriarch among patriarchs, bishop of a church which came to overshadow, and usurp the Empire itself since it proved itself more lasting and more trustworthy, heir to traditions of office without rival in historical prestige, it was inevitable that to Rome a pope should be given, and should accept, a rank of his own as the centuries attested the permanence and the power of his office. No competent student of history would doubt the authority of the papal name as a historic fact. But it is plain that neither the early popes themselves nor the rest of the world credited their office with infallibility. The apocryphal See of New Rome erected by Constantine in his Eastern capital never acknowledged its authority as overruling its own. Councils, deemed canonical by East and West alike, were convened and issued their decrees without submitting them to the pope or final approval of the ruling pope. No one suggested that the existence of the Romanae See made Councils unnecessary, much less presumptuous and incompetent. How much might have been saved to the Christian world if direct appeal to an oracle in the Eternal City had been recognized as sufficient to decide all controversies in faith and morals! But, as Döllinger (op. cit. p. 64 f.) says:

'None of the ancient confessions of faith, no catechism, none of the pastoral writings composed for the instruction of the laity, none of the books of the Fathers, none of the writings of the New Testament, none of the teaching of the Church, nor can a single dogmatic decree issued by one of them be found during the first four centuries, nor a trace of the existence of any. Even the controversy about Christ kindled by Paul of Samosata, which occupied the whole Eastern Church for a long time, and necessitated the assembling of several Councils, was terminated without the pope taking any part in it. So again, in the chain of controversies and discussions connected with the names of Theodotus, Arsenius, Nectos, Sabellius, Beryllus, and Lucian of Antioch, which troubled the whole Church, and extended over nearly 150 years, there is no proof that the Roman Bishops acted beyond the limits of their own local Church, or accomplished any dogmatic results. In three controversies during this early period the Roman Church took an active part,—the question about Easter, about heretical baptism, and about the oneness of the Church. In all three the popes were unable to carry out their own will, and to impose their decision. The other Churches maintained their different usage without leading to any partition of Christendom. Concerning the dispute between the bishops of Sardica and Liburnia (337-340) the first pope took part in the course of events, but only increased the misunderstanding. The bishops of Sardica not only asserted an arched Sabellian, orthodox at his Roman Synod and Liberius purchased his return from exile from the same concessions to Athanasius, and signing an Arian creed. The apostacy of Liberius sufficed, through the whole of the middle ages, for a proof that popes cannot decide doctrinal questions. The bishop of Rome was ever appealed to for a decision, it was understood that he was desired to call a Synod to decide the point at issue. But at the same time the whole Church never conceded the most important definition of faith since the Nicene, 'by first formulating the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, the Church of Rome was not represented at all; only the decrees were communicated to it as to other Churches. . . . Where the Popes (Sacrilegium) in 1122, as well as other people. . . . During all the four centuries Constantinople alone decided dogmatic questions. The bishop of Rome of course was ever appealed to for a decision, it was understood that he was desired to call a Synod to decide the point at issue. But at the same time the whole Church never conceded that the decrees were communicated to it as to other Churches. . . . Where the Popes (Sacrilegium) in 1122, as well as other people. . . . During all the four centuries Constantinople alone decided dogmatic questions. The bishop of Rome of course was ever appealed to for a decision, it was understood that he was desired to call a Synod to decide the point at issue. But at the same time the whole Church never conceded that the decrees were communicated to it as to other Churches. . . . Where the Popes (Sacrilegium) in 1122, as well as other people. . . . During all the four centuries Constantinople alone decided dogmatic questions. The bishop of Rome of course was ever appealed to for a decision, it was understood that he was desired to call a Synod to decide the point at issue. But at the same time the whole Church never conceded that the decrees were communicated to it as to other Churches. . . .'
times of heated controversy and frequent deposi-
tions. 

It provided that 'as due to the honour of St. Peter, the
Roman bishop Julius shall be informed ... by letter, in
order that, under the presidency of his prebendar, by
a new trial may be held by bishops of a neighbouring
province' (c. 10). 

In the 5th cent., Augustine's macho abused saying
in a sermon (xxxvi. 10), 'Rome has spoken; the
case is ended, had reference to local African con-
troversies, and does not contradict his reiterated
adherence to Cyprian's position. For him, Coun-
cils as well as bishops were fallible, though vener-
able, and appeal might be taken as need arose.

To give his woe an ecumenical application is
unhistorical. But the postscript to Leo the Great
enhanced the dignity and power of the Roman See
in all eyes. In 445 the Emperor Valentinian gave
supreme judicial and legislative power to it over
the bishops of Italy and Gaul, and extended to it
as well the temporal power which his successor
Fridius held in 449 on the death of the exarch. Leo's
Epistle to Flavian in 449 was the first doctrinal utterance
of a pope to be accepted ecumenically; but it did not
receive any canonical force until it had been
announced to the Council of Chalcedon, and examined by
the bishops therein assembled, and ratified by them
in a procedure whose necessity it author acknow-
ledged. But Leo's successors quickly dissipated the
authority which his policies had achieved. The Historia in
466 pronounced orthodox the 'Three Chapters' of
Theodore, Theodore, and Ibas, which had been
announced by the Fifteenth Ecumenical Council, to whose
decree he bowed in 554, saying, very sensibly, that
it was not disgrace to perceive and recall a pre-
vious error. Even more serious was the fate of
Leo's Epistle. In 559, in two public letters to
Eastern patriarchs, he had endorsed the Monothelite
hypothesis, and after his death was solemnly condemned
by a heretic at the Sixth Ecumenical Council without
any dissentient voice, in presence of the legates of
his successors—a sentence which his own suc-
cessors carried out, expunging his name from
the liturgy.

Until the fabrication of the Isidorian decrees
adored, not an episcopal and patriarchal
prerogative was effectively claimed by the popes or
conceded to them; that prerogative no one in Church
or State seriously disputed. The bishop of Rome
could not summon Ecumenical Synods; he had
to petition the Emperor to do so. It was not his
right to preside over them in person or by legate. Rome
was not their usual place of meeting. The
Pope's signature was not required as a final
formality to validate their decrees. His legislative,
administrative, and judicial powers, i.e., his sovereign
crown, did not extend beyond his own province; neither African nor the East acknow-
ledged it. No councillor and no advisor enjoyed the
same acceptance or the same influence; but as yet
there was no Curia or sovereign Court, no tribu-
rate, no grant of foreign dispensations from the
obligations of ecclesiastical law. Of the power
of the keys, the power to bind and loose, the power
to excommunicate, Rome had no monopoly, either
exclusively or conceded. But there was a spirit at
work which operated steadily in the direction of
securing these things. The Sardican canons, the
name, prerogative, and throne of Peter, the
social influence and appellate council of Rome, were
stepped up to increasing accent. As the
Empire weakened, the papacy found its oppor-
tunity and became heir to its secular methods
and spirit as well as to its dignity and power. The
sixth canon of the First Nicene Council had recog-
nized the rights of the Roman See over part of the
Italian Church; but had assigned similar rights to
the bishops of Alexandria and Antioch over their
patriarchates; but the local Saxon canons were
speedily confused with it in the West as the papal
consultant claims were advanced by Innocent I. as
recognized by 'the Fathers' and the Synod. At
the Council of Ephesus it was affirmed by the
Roman legates that Peter lived and judged in the
persons of his successors in the Roman throne.
Leo I. reiterated the same plea. But the Council
of Chalcedon, in its 25th canons, maintained that
Rome owed its primacy to the decision of the
Fathers in view of the political eminence of the
city, and, in spite of Leo's opposition, it recognized
Constantinople as a patriarchate of the highest
rank, second only to Rome in precedence, and
equal to Rome in rights. When Leo declined to
recognize that canon, he did not base his action
upon any complaint of injury to his own episcopal,
or on the lack of his consent, but only on the in-
justices done to the older patriarchates. The East,
especially those of Alexandria and Antioch—the
one founded by Mark, Peter's disciple, the other by
Peter himself before he went to Rome and on
the alteration of the Nicene canon. When dealing
with other than Eastern bishops, he made much of
the 'merit of St. Peter' as a ground of Roman
dignity, and strengthened his disciplinary hold upon
the West. But nothing demonstrated so strikingly
the long distance which the papacy had yet to
travel, before it reached its final claims, as the
re-
buke of Gregory IV. to be addressed formally to
the patriarch of Constantinople, who assumed the
title of Ecumenical Bishop (lib. v. ep. 18; lib. vii.
ep. 33; cf. von Hase, op. cit. i. 225; Salmon, op. cit.
p. 435).

'it is with tears that I say that a bishop, whose duty it is
to guide others to humility, has himself departed from it. Paul
was unwilling to suffer that any one should call himself after
him or after Apollo. What art thou prepared to say to Christ,
the Head of the universal Church, at the last day, when thou
seekest to bring all members of the Church into subjection to thee
by means of the title of the universal ruler? This haughty
name is a copying of Satan, who also exalted himself above all
angels. ... Far from Christian honour be that blasphemous
title, in which all priests have their honour taken away, while
the one foolishly usurps it.'

Gregory did not hesitate to contrast his rival's
pretensions with those of St. Peter, who, although
first of the Apostles, did not place himself in a super-
ior rank to his brethren—a piece of historic-
ally sound pleading which was far from subsequ-
ently embarrassing to the pope's successors.

The subsequent course of the papal development
is a matter of common knowledge. The decreetal
gergories, beginning about the middle of the 13th
cent., many of them motivated by provincial, not
primarily Roman, ambitions, assisted powerfully
the extension of the papal primacy into an abso-
utely monarchy combined doctrinal with disciplin-
ar. powers, required papal confirmation for the
decrees of every Council, and elevated the bishop
of Rome into the sovereign bishop, from whose
hands all other bishops receive their authority
in matters of faith as well as government and order.
It was assumed that the extension of papal dignity
and authority over bishops would liberate them
from secular control and juridiction, a power
which survives at the present time in full vigour.
But, in liberating the provincial bishops from one
yoke, another yoke was imposed. Secular authority
was avenged. The bishops found this delicious and
the grasp of a power once spiritual, now both secular
and spiritual. The power from which they shrank
at the slightest doubts of the doctrines laid its firm hand upon them in
the Vatican. For a papacy which wielded temporal
power as a spiritual prerogative it was impossible
to exclude dogma from the sovereign function.
The papacy accordingly assumed control of synods.
greater and lesser; it alone could convene, secede, and dissolve them. It assumed the appointment and institution of bishops; dealt with vacant sees; made subjects of princes and kings; and claimed the right to override Councils and the teaching of the Fathers. The liturgical achievements of Gregory VII made it easy for the most extreme views of papal authority to impress the imagination of Christendom as a realizable ideal. He did not hesitate to claim personal supremacy as the successor of Peter, and to make the supernatural holiness of popes the foundation of their absolute power. ‘In Peter’ they had ‘power to bind and loose on earth and in heaven. They were subject to no man’s judgment, but answerable alone to God. The forged decreals of Isidore and Gratian were eagerly employed by an age already prepared for them; and in good faith medieval Schoolmen, like Aquinas, drew from them, and frequently from corrupted texts of conciliar decrees and writings of the great Fathers, materials which confirmed their confidence in papal autocracy. In the 13th cent. the rise of the great monastic Orders, under vows of obedience through their generals to the pope, and exempt from episcopal authority, increased yet further the extraterritoriality of the papacy. While the Fourth Lateran Council of Florence, 1439, short-lived though its recognition of the Roman primacy proved, revealed the extent to which dignitaries of the Eastern Church were prepared to abate their claims and their rivalry, understanding of the metrical character of the Christian period which was so soon to cripple them, and leave Rome without an effective rival in the ecclesiastical world. Unfortunately, however, for the papal regime, successive papacy among the Papal States brought with it no guarantee of a noble employment of its pernicious privileges. Instead there ensued a swift deterioration of the papal personnel, and even more of the papal influence. At length Christendom was amazed and shocked by the spectacle of rival popes, and disgusted and revolted by the gross luxury and unconcealed immorality of the Vatican. The secularization of the Roman church was responsible for both scandals. Both combined to make the work of reformation not only an urgent and clamant need, but by their noeticity a thing possible. In an age of new learning and kindled imagination, an age which explored the Apostolic past as enthusiastically as it thought about the future—the papacy proved incapable of supporting its triple crown. The lofty theory of a world Church, and a practical autocracy broke down abjectly before the Great Schism and the Great Scandal. With three claimants of the heritage of Hildebrand in power, the common sense and the reserved energies of Christendom asserted themselves in the Reforming Councils of Constance and Basel. Whatever popes in their majesty had asserted, their subject bishops, met in Council and supported by the conscience of the Christian world, dealt sternly with their rival overlords. The Church’s necessity knew no re- nunciation of law. The Council pronounced deposition. The rival claimed later another, submitted. For a brief period the Councils were to its own again a supreme authority in the Church. In its 4th and 5th sessions the Council of Constance decreed that every lawfully convoked Ecumenical Council representing the Church derives its authority immediately from Christ, and extends it to the whole world, in matters of faith, in the healing of schism, and the reformation of the Church. Without protest, the painfully elaborated doctrine and practice of papal infallibility and mon- archy was cut down to modest proportions by a lawfully convoked Council, which appointed the new pope, Martin V., as well as deposed his pre- 

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for help to the then proscribed Society of Jesus, his policy had been more and more closely identified with the principles for which that Order had worked and had suffered. His first great experiment in the direction of his successor on the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the bull Ineffabilis Deus, read before a Concourse of Cardinals and Bishops in St. Peter's, in the same year, was not only cloaked by other authority, but than that of our Lord Jesus Christ and the blessed Apostles Peter and Paul and . . . our own. Though it was preceded by a formal episcopal consultation of the individual bishops throughout the Church, the Decree was uttered without conciliar assistance, and, with the long succession of dogmatic judgments which were gathered together to form the Syllogism of Errors, immediately the practical advent of consummated infallibility. Nothing was left for the Vatican Council of 1870 to do but to add the ceremonial form of a conciliar sanction, and to furnish the already operative principle with a definitive form of words. For good or for evil, the vision held out before the eyes of a long line of pontiffs seemed to be realized in accomplished fact. The work of Loyola and Loyola and de Cajetan, Bellarmine, and Torquemada, appeared to have been justified. In faith as well as morals and discipline the pope was at last declared, in his own words, as the official preacher of the Christian world, supreme and infallible.

The terms of the Decree and of some portions of its setting, in Manning's rendering, are as follows (cf. his Casuist. System: Three Pastoral Letters to the Clergy of the Diocese, p. 214): the words of the First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ, chs. iii. and iv.):

We teach and declare that by the appointment of our Lord the Roman Church possesses a supreme, universal, and extraordinary power over all other Churches, and that this power of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, which is truly episcopal, is immediate: to which all, of whatever rite and dignity, both pastors and faithful, both individually and collectively, are bound, by their duty of obedience, to submit, not only in matters which belong to faith and morals, but also in those that appertain to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the world; so that the Church of Christ may be one flock under one supreme pastor through the person of the bishop of Rome, both of the faithful and of all prelates, in the same way as the same pope of our Lord Peter, the foundation of the Church, in the exercise of the same authority as that of the Roman Pontiff. The said Council teaches that the doctrine of teaching also is included in the apostolic primacy, which the Roman Pontiff, as the successor of Peter, Prince of the Apostles, possesses over the whole Church, and that his See has always held, the perpetual governance of the Church confers, and Ecumenical Councils also have declared, especially those in which the East with the West met in the union of faith and charity.

To satisfy this pastoral duty our predecessors made unceasing efforts that the military doctrine of Christ might be propagated among all the nations of the earth, and with equal care watched that it might be preserved genuine and pure where it had been received. Therefore the Bishops of the whole world, now singly, now assembled in synod, following the long-established practice of the Catholic Churches, and the allowance of the ancient and sent word to this Apostolic See of those dangers especially springing up in matters of faith, that there the losses of faith might be most effectually repaired, where the faith cannot fail. And the Council, according to the exigencies of times and circumstances, sometimes assembling Ecumenical Councils, or asking for the mind of the Church scattered throughout the world, for the help of the Successor of Peter, which helps which Divine Providence supplied, defined as to be held those things which with the help of God they had recognized in harmony with the sacred Scriptures and Apostolic Traditions. For the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of the Lord to make known new doctrine, but that by his assistance they might invocably keep and defend anything assumed by the resolution or deposit of faith delivered through the Apostles. And indeed all the venerable Fathers have embraced, and the holy orthodox Doctors have maintained, their apostolic doctrine: knowing most fully that this See of holy Peter remains ever free from all heresies, and is always guided by the Holy Spirit as is promised to the Lord our Saviour made to the Prince of his disciples: I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and, when thou art converted, confirm thy brethren.

This gift, then, of truth and never-failing faith, was conferred on Heaven upon Peter and his successors in this Church, that they might perform their high office for the salvation of all; that the whole flock of Christ, kept safe by the patriarchal staves of Peter, and the Apostles, should be subject to them, and as a guardian of the purest food of error, might be nourished with the pasture of heavenly doctrine; that, the occasion of such a grace being granted, the whole Church might be kept one, and, resting on its foundation, might stand firm against the gates of hell.

But since in this very office of the extraordinary efficacy of the apostolic office is most of all required, not a few are bound who take away from its authority, we must bind ourselves solemnly to assert the prerogative which the only-begotten Son of God vouchsafed to join with the supreme pontifical office.

Therefore, faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian Faith, that Jesus our Saviour, the exaltation of the Catholic Religion, and the salvation of Christian peoples, the Sacred Council, in agreement, we teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed: that the Roman Pontiff when he speaks as cathedra, that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church; by the Divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer vouchsafed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals: and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irrefutable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church. But if any one—whatever may God avert—presumes to contradict this our definition, his error is condemned.

It is not necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of the somewhat painful features of the process through which this definition came to light, and of the policy which issued in this long-desired result. Nothing would be easier than to name the Vatican Council more representative of ecumenical Christianity than on technical grounds to pronounce the Vatican Council no true and Ecumenical Council, e.g., because of its lack of unification in debate, in conference, and in final vote, or because of papal interference and directness, or because of its lack of voluntary unaniuity. The result is not merely that the pope, with the approval or submission of the Council. The papal correspondence with the bishops of the Church had been tested in its attitude beforehand, and confronted such an individual with the perspective displeasure of the Vatican as an inevitable consequence of dissent from the policy of their venerable Head. Eminent theologians, like Dillingen and Newman, known to be hostile, were not officially invited to attend. The preparatory delegates of the same mind who had to be invited as officii were harassed throughout the proceedings by papal remonstrances. The proceedings were anything but reassuring to the mind of the reader: Lord Acton's account in the North British Review, litt. [1871], art. 'The Vatican Council'. But, while it is true that learning and ecclesiastical statescraft were in irremediable opposition, the opponents of the dogma were in an impossible position from the first. For 'Decrees' are essentially matters of statecraft, not of learning, science, or philosophy, and are provisorily fashioned with reference to expediency and opportunism, not with reference to truth. The ground on which alone they dare or desired to fight the issue was that the Decree, though true, would be unholy. They were Inopportunists, whose in- tense feeling in debate and in controversy threw grave doubt upon the genuineness of their faith in the doctrine. It is true that the Holy Father, the pope, and of Council to trust the divine illumination and guidance in serious and free deliberation and conference was never more distinctly displayed. For purposes of even religious censorship, the majority were entitled to bring their case of mere timelessness. They knew their own mind; they knew the mind of their beloved and compassionate pope; they were smarting under an acute sense of injustice and humiliation inflicted upon him and upon the Church by the times; they
were practical men bent upon drawing tighter the bonds of unity and discipline; and they, not their more brilliant antagonists, were the true representatives of the genius of the Roman Catholic Church. Without being philosophers, they grasped the logic of the system to which they belonged more easily than such acadiests as Newman and Dillingham. No one can survey the past of the papacy without recognizing that, however undisguised and desperate the method was by which its power was exercised and defended, it was profoundly consistent with the traditions of the papal Church. A Church which gave authority so exalted a place in faith as well as government, whose bishops were bound to a sacred oath to obey the bishop of Rome and accept his conscience and his judgment as their own, a Church which made external unity one of its vital notes and counted coercion when necessary a duty, could not be accused of betraying its past by crediting its visible Head with that infallibility that absolute assurance of divine guidance, without which unquestioning obedience to him was manifestly a crime. In von Hase's words (op. cit. 1, 251), infallibility is "the supernatural condition of the unlimited power." From one standpoint the Decree of 1789 is the redactus ad absurdum of the venerable Roman method of securing unity, a method as old as the Church, and as really a part of Jesus, as the Church of God could forbid those who followed not with them, as old as the contention of the Apostles concerning precedence. From the opposite standpoint it was the consummation of the system, the crown or climax of its development. In normal circumstances the Infallibility of the See, the Vicar of Christ, might have been doubted, but to the Vicar of Christ may intensify the care with which his peers in the Sacred College select him from their number. It is questionable whether the dogma concerning the infallibility of the Church, more distinguished Cardinal prophesied that, as worded finally, it would be such as to prevent any substantial exercise of the power to innovate. Newman's own fears were considerably allayed when he read its terms. In the history of the reception of the authoritative publication, prepared by Fathers Franzolin and Klugten (Ward, Life of John Henry Newman, I., 391), occurs the statement: The Roman Pontiffs, as the statesmen of ages and nations have made advisable, at one time calling Ecumenical Councils and deciding on the opinion of the Church dispersed through the world, at another by means of particular Synods, at another using other means of assistance which Divine Providence supplied, have defined those things to be held which by God's aid they had known to be in agreement with sacred Scripture and the Apostolic Traditions, or the Holy Ghost was promised to the successors of Peter, not that by His revelation they should disclose new dogme, but that by His assistance they might preserve inviolate, and expound faithfully, the revelation or deposit of faith handed down by the Apostles." Newman recognized all that, but based his fears less upon the risk of papal vagaries or arbitrariness than upon the fact that 'there will necessarily always be room about the Pope second-rate people who are not subject to that supernatural guidance which is his guidance' (op. cit. 298). The reason also is that no one but the ruling pope can authoritatively determine what is and what is not 

"cathedra" definition and de fide. Newman, Manning, and a host of theologians tell us, each in his own fashion, what are the tests of this august qualification, and unlimited ingenuity has been expended upon the problem. One by one the awkward instances of historical misunderstanding on the part of popes in the definition of doctrine have been taken in hand with a view to their elimination by hook or by crook. When misunderstanding has to be admitted, it is pleaded that the act was an indiscretion and less than ex cathedra, and that the intention was good, but that the pope was under compulsion, and so on. The result has certainly been to fall, as far as subordinate opinion can curtail, the limits of the pontifical power; but the real foundation for legitimate anxiety lies in the fact that in any crisis the personal will of the pope must prevail by virtue of his unbounded claim to obedience in faith and discipline. It is obvious that matters which pertain to morals and the discipline of the Church, not to speak of faith, may touch at a thousand points the private conscience, the political and social interests and the interests of the civil powers. Gladstone in his powerful and impressive attack upon the
INFALLIBILITY

dogmas has no difficulty in exposing this danger, and in expounding the legitimate cause of the threatened State. But in the statesman for once he forgot or sank the churchman, and his argument is open to the retort that the Church has the same need for autonomy, the same right to legislate for itself with sovereign authority, as the State. By all the principles which fence about the jurisdiction of the Crown, the tithes may constitute the spiritual and temporal enemies with other. With no consistency can civil power reproach ecclesiastical power for copying its own methods and invoking the same instruments of order. The statesman open to the retort that the Church has the same need for autonomy as the State.
does not exhaust Him. His words have not passed away, but are still spirit and life to those whose ears are gladdened and solemnized by them. His Church has not succumbed to the gates of death.

He has never been, and never will be, realized by men at the present time. Social life is reckoning with Him on a scale never previously attempted. He is transforming the world more radically than science and invention can. In all that constitutes spirituality a revelation of Jesus Christ, and His Spirit is the common faith of Christendom.

By the fruits of His contact with us we know Him. Every evidence of His divinity is testimony to His infallibility in thought, word, and deed. He is not only flawless but unassailable.

6. Infallibility of the Christian conscience.—
The Christian conscience, or consciousness, human conscience stimulated, educated, transformed, transfigured, possessed by the Spirit of Christ, is, for the individual, the nation, the Church, the world, the final arbiter of all duty and all faith. Whether we speak of Christ dwelling in the soul, or of the Christian conscience, our meaning is essentially the same.

The seat of judgment on earth is that tribunal within the heart. The Spirit of Christ, the Christian Spirit, is the sum of all revealed authorities. It is the power that animated the Christian Scriptures and breathes from them still, that inspired the Creeds and Confessions, that purifies and sanctifies the nature of that only-known judgment of clergy and laity of pope, bishop, presbyter, and deacon alike. It is invoked to constitute and sanctify and overrule the deliberations of Synods and Councils. Committed to the two or three met in the name of Christ, and promised to the solitary believer whose isolation it extends not less than to the world-wide fellowship of Faith. It is not the monopoly of the individual, nor is it the monopoly of the organization. Its activity is as universal as truth, as various in its embodiments. All mechanical or official oracles of the Christian Spirit are to be regarded with distrust. Our a priori assumptions of the modes in which God must have provided for our need of guidance and enablement are very liable to be overturned in the school of daily exercise. Every Scripture does not necessarily or necessarily kill or deaden faith and discernment but without unreasonable reliance upon the mere word of an official or a caste or an organization, however denominated and dedicated, is the only way in which Church life can assure infallibility exclusively in an order of office-bearers who are human, humanly trained, and humanly appointed forers the very liberty of God to choose His instruments as of old from every class, every race, and every type of men.

One may honour the faith in divine providence and divine predestination which can bind together a great communion of believers, yet recognize the dangers, which inhere in it, of superstition, arrogance, and illusion. To err is human: not to err is a divine perfection. To learn through error is our lot, both Churches and men. Therefore it is not a question of which is the right part of both, but only of how we avoid believing that God's Spirit will not fail us, of how we avoid the presumption of believing that we shall never fail God's Spirit. Timorous mistrust and religious persecution is an attack on the faith. To trust majority-findings in all cases is as fatal as to trust no one but oneself. Genias is greater than majorities or averages. An inspired priest is a higher gift than mere membership or consecration prelate or pope. God has sanctioned and hallowed many forms and instruments of authority in the Church in the world. The teaching of history, which is the sphere of His providence, seems to admonish us to learn from all, to give all their just place in our confidence, to be loyal to their dictates according to our conscience. The promise stands that the Church will not perish, but the promise also stands that the Spirit will not fail the individual believer. The heart of the Master-shepherd goes out to the one shepherd even more than the myriads by fifty and nine. One with God is a majority. Where the Spirit is, there is the Church. Where the truth is, there is the Church. The servant is not greater than his Master. If Christ disclaimed the power of his prerogative, the name of 'Jesus' belongs to God, and if Christ disclaimed or deprecated titular dignity and precedence, interpreting His Masterhood in terms of service, there is surely danger and dissimulation in the claim of particular human infallibility. Earthly authority, even the best, is intended to educe its subjects into independence of its help and its restraint. Every historic authority, as Saltzler justly says, demands at once respect and criticism. One may be loyal without being obsequious. One may be obedient without being a slave. It is as dangerous for obedience as for authority to be blind. For both there is no organ of vision save the eye, no organ of truth save a reverently open mind.

There have always been,' wrote W. E. Gladstone in his Foundations (London, 1870), 'and there still are, two proportions of our race, and those by no means in all respects the same, who are the two distinct schools of Churchmen, in times of religious disturbance, to discharge their spiritual responsibilities by power of attorney. As advocating Houses find Custum in proportion, not so much the body of the people as the resources as to the magnificence of their promises and assurance, so theology is divided into those whose claims are sure to pay, by widening certain circles of devoted adherents, however it may repel the mass of mankind. There are two special encouragements to the former of the two schools of the present day: one of them perhaps unconscious but manifestly leading of some, outside the Roman prelacy, to the ancient claim of Church power; the other the reaction which is and must be brought about in favour of superstition, by the levy of the destructive speculations as widely current, and the notable hardihood of the anti-Christian writing of the day (p. 66).

There are those who think that the craving after an infallibility which is to speak from human lips, in chapter and verse, upon each question as it arises, is not a sign of the strength and healthiness of faith, but of the diseased vitality of its weaknesses. Let it, however, be granted for the sake of argument that it is a comfort to the infirmity of human nature, and that it implies a prompt and clear and unequivocal solution of its doubts, instead of wasting on the Divine pleasure, as those who watch for the morning, to receive the supplies required by the Church's moral trials. A recommendation of this kind, however little it may reduce the morality of philosophy, does not seem to me to have probably a great power over the imagination and the affections of mankind.

One thing is clear: Between the solid ground, the terra firma of infallibility, and the quaking, fluctuating mind of the individual, which seeks to find repose upon the face which it cannot cross. Decrees ex cathedra are infallible; but determinations what decrees are ex cathedra are fallible; so that the private person, after he has with all docility handed over his mind and its freedom to the Schola Theologorum, can never certainly know, never know with "divine faith," when he is on the rock of infallibility, when on the shifting quicksands of a merely human persuasion (p. 108).
INFANCY.

The period of individual life immediately following birth. In law, human infancy extends to the attainment of one's majority, usually the age of twenty-one years. In other than legal usage the term signifies, according to convenience, any number of years from one to seven. The present article concerns a period of about five years during which, in an unusually complete sense, the family is the child's educator.

1. The relation of infancy to moral evolution.

John Fiske has shown that the extreme unripe ness of the human child at birth and the extreme length of his immaturity are crucial points for intellectual and moral development. Here is the opportunity for accumulating experience, and through that experience for forming habits and principles. Applying this to morals, we may say that the prolongation of infancy in the human species makes character possible. The period of the child's life in which the principles of character are formed and then the stable monogenic family. It is chiefly from the family, in turn, that regard for others has radiated. Todd's "Life Begins," fewer 'sets,' and fewer of them are formed early, than in the case with other species of animals. Human societies are formed later, when the individual has already begun to form character.

2. The period basis of the beginnings of character.

At two points the body of the infant has the closest relation to his soul in the moral life. (c) In the presence of the habits and inhibitions of the life, incidental physical conditions, whatever good or ill, have a peculiarly pervasively effect. Wrong feeding, e.g., is a potent cause of depressed states, such as peevishness. Inadequate care, or overstimulation, produces nervousness. The infant's attitudes and position of comfort or their opposites reach far beyond the date of their occurrence, for all of them tend under the law of habit to become fixed as disposition. (d) The acquisition of muscular co-ordinations constitutes the earliest will-formation, which includes self-control and self-direction. Hence each of the following conditions is unfavourable to moral growth: swaddling the body so as to prevent free movement of any part; lack of objects to handle (though toys can easily be too numerous or too complicated); repression of free movement and experimentation; failure of the parents to play with the infant.

3. The moral endowment of infancy.

The individual begins life neither moral nor immoral, but the period basis of the beginnings of character is the birth of the infant. Yet it is true that the moral nature is inherent in the infant, whether unfavourable or neutral. Two questions, however, remain.

(a) Specifically, where, among the instincts and other unlearned tendencies, do we find the infant's moral nature? The answer, in general, is that a complex of unlearned tendencies towards truly voluntary social response is the moral nature. One of these tendencies, the moral sense or conscience, is not found in the same degree in other species. But the two do not of themselves constitute a genuinely moral endowment; otherwise, individuals would be born with this faculty. However, there must be provision, also, for the growth of an individual's will that may erupt into deliberative, discriminative, and generalized ideals the otherwise infallibly exercised social motive. Without individual wills there is no true society. We include, therefore, in the infant's moral endowment, his enjoyment in being a cause, his curiosity, his instinct for collecting and hoarding, and certainly instinctive self-assertions, as jealousy, and what Thorndike calls "nasty and submission" and "avoiding andwarnania behaviour." That is (b) the moral nature grows into moral character only under some sort of stimulus. What, then, is the special condition or stimulus under which an otherwise unlearned character is realized? The principle is that the child is formed through conflict within the same tendencies that have just been described. The character is being constituted by the same process: the same "nasty and submission" and "avoiding" and "warnania behaviour." Whether this is not, as Z., 1917, p. 125, states, that the infant makes a straight line such as might represent a single instinct, but a zigzag from predominating self-regard to predominant other-regard and back again. This is not necessary for an organized group. Thus arises conscience. In its earlier forms, which clearly appear in all well-regulated families, conscience is simply the coincident experience of egoistic and social impulses which have not yet found their unity. Yet the resolution of the conflict may begin very early. Even in infancy, when the.CH. E. L. Thorndike, Education, New York, 1917, ch. v., also The Original Nature of Man, 69 1913, ch. viii., a sense of social well-being, and genuine victories over more egoistic desire. That such victories bring a heightened sense of self-control and of self-realization is an indisputable evidence that a genuine moral nature is growing into moral character.

The common impression that the conduct of every infant is purely egoistic arises from the relative immediacy of his objects, i.e. his lack of social consideration. Such impulses act on the part of an adult would, indeed, occasion selflessness, since adult society depends upon the pursuit of remote ends; but the ends of infant conduct are often social in the sense of pleasure in the pleasure of others, and even, as we have just seen, in the sense of preferring the social good even when it conflicts with egoistic desire.

4. The infant's life in the family.

Not only has human infancy produced the human family; but this is the only social organization that is inherently adapted to the infant's moral needs. The family develops individuality; the members can hardly be dealt with as classes or impersonally. Yet the intimacy that prevails among its members, based partly upon natural affection, partly upon the smallness of the group and the physical conditions of home life, is the most powerful socializing influence in the world. Institutional care of children, in orphan asylums, can save the
conditions of physical health, but not the individualizing and socializing influences that are essential to normal moral growth. It is now an accepted fact that the social worker finds that a child who is deprived of his natural family connection should be placed, as promptly as possible, in another family, not in an institution.

Even the intellectual growth of the infant is best promoted by individualizing intimacy. The reason is that genuine intimacy between parent and child becomes reciprocal—the parent fondles and plays with his child, but also grants him access to nature thoughts, attitudes, and activities. The soundest educational practices provide a rich environment for the child, never fearing that he will partake too freely or extend his interests unduly as long as fellowship with mature mind is part of the situation. To answer a child’s questions in a serious way, to create situations in which his curiosity will lead him to ask important questions, to cultivate his imagination, and to enjoy with him mutual intellectual discovery, this is the proper method of promoting intellectual progress in infancy. Children who have an early intellectual development without forcing or abnormally high demands are admitted to such intellectual intimacy with their parents.

These considerations, to say nothing of freedom as included in the individual’s moral destiny, make it evident that the first virtue to be inculcated in infants is absolute obedience. What parent, moreover, is wise enough to prescribe rules that deserve such obedience? The first moral need of an infant is to act consciously as a member of the family group. This conscious mutuality involves law and obedience, but it gives content to the moral will as ‘absolute obedience’ does not, and it begins at once the process of acquiring freedom.

5. The infant and religion. — No one at the present day looks for innate ideas of God, but there is a common notion that infantile thinking is spontaneously animistic. If the term ‘Animism’ is used in Tylor’s sense of belief in spirits, then Animism is not spontaneous in the infant, for he acquires the notion of spirits just as he acquires other concepts. On the other hand, the abstractions that characterize adult thought have not yet been made; the infant thinks in wholes, and these wholes are of the sense order. Yet emotional this infant thought; it is no longer the anthropomorphic tinge to his objects. The reason is simply that the emotionality of a whole mental situation still inheres in particular objects as they appear in it; i.e., a strictly objective point of view, which implies abstraction of the object experienced from the experience itself, has not yet been attained. The infant’s mind moves freely within stories that attribute language and motives to any object of his experience. As early as the age of four there is delight in dramatic ‘make-believe,’ which, helping the infant to make himself and other persons definitely individual, helps also to differentiate persons from things. At this age, and even younger, one easily believes in God; but the nature of this belief appears in the acceptance of fairy stories, and stories of the ‘black man,’ so wrongly used by nurses to secure obedience.

This god-belief is not yet distinctly monotheistic, for neither the thought-problem nor the moral problem underlying monotheism has yet arisen. The common belief may be polytheistic, or simply vague. (See INFANCE, p. 340.) Further, the idea does not necessarily have any specifically religious value. The writer, after years of child-care, and the recognition of likeness between things, and doc

Inference. — All attempts at logical science assume that inference is a source, distinctive, effective, and authoritative, of knowledge. It is in view of these three characteristics that schemes are framed for the self-conscious revision of it, and that mutual criticism goes on between different logical systems.

1. Distinctiveness of inference. — Inferential knowledge is distinctive because of its dependence on other knowledge and to the child’s scientific and religious growth respectively, see CHILDDOM, § 4.) Further, the idea does not necessarily have any specifically religious value. The writer, after years of child-care, and the recognition of likeness between things, and doc

Infant Baptism. — See Baptism.
innate intrinsically worthy of belief or commended to us by the good and wise (see arts. LOGIC, NATURA). On these infinities is dependent, from its obvious dependence, Aristotle, in his theory of science, argued to the independence of other knowledge, though he could not for science, as he did for mere desire, appeal to the opinion of the good and wise. Hence he lost all sound basis for the share in the complete function of intelligence which should be assigned to sense-perception and intellectual intuition respectively—these being the independent ideas of the mind. Modern epistemology has raised the latter question more definitely. Kant’s logical teaching seems to accept as independent the whole interplay of the two faculties in sensibility and understanding, which are required by his epistemology, until it sinks into the distinct moments of reason and consequent, and then it becomes inference (Introduction to Logic, tr. Abbott, London, 1865, § vii.). Modern psychology has encouraged the growth of a list, such as that given by Mill: perception, conception, memory—the forms of immediate consciousness—by reference to which inference may be viewed. By these it is conceded that reality may be treated as a mere matter of degree. Even the ‘irrefutable datum’ contained in perception exists only through qualifications imposed by judgment, and the datum itself is an element of reasoning, while inference owes its stability to its place in total knowledge, so that the paradox which Aristotle wished to avoid by his theory of independent ideas, is acknowledged as a truth, and the system of our inferences is one that returns into itself as a circle (B. Bosanquet, Essentials of Logic, London, 1885, § ii., and Logic, Oxford, 1888, ii. 7). But this still allows a dependence that is relative.

2. Effectiveness of inference. Inference becomes worthy of its special theory through its effectiveness in sustaining our confidence with truth. Mill acknowledges it only when we believe a fact or statement by reason of some other fact or statement (‘Logic’, 1852, ii. 1. 1). Kant defines it as ‘the manner of thinking by which one judgment is derived from another’ (‘Logic’, § 41). Hamilton, consistently with the stress he lays on the concept as an instrument of thought, required merely a new definition of the relation of whole and part between the two concepts. While Hamilton’s requirement, as Mill urges (Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy, London, 1872, ch. 19), is too slight, in view of the countless riches of truth open to us beyond our immediate consciousness, Mill’s own demand for belief in new facts is too stringent. It sterilizes both immediate inference and the syllogism taken apart from an inductive foundation, and perhaps even scientific induction taken apart from deductive applications in detail. And it might well excise the logical paralysis affected by Meno in Plato’s dialogue (Meno, 80 D) when he was invited to proceed to knowledge out of consciousness ignorance: ‘How will you know, when you light on a result, that this is what you did not know?’ Aristotle, with this affliction in mind, required merely that the manner of knowing should be new: ‘We possess knowledge after a certain fashion before induction or the assumption of a syllogism, but in another manner not’ (Aristotle). On these inference is written: ‘Much of inference consists in demonstrating the connection of matters that as facts are pretty familiar’ (Bosanquet, Essentials of Logic, p. 138).

3. Insufficiency of inference. The despair of Meno in regard to novelty was a sequel to the demand of Socrates for conciseness; and the union of these two requirements constitutes the crisis in pursuing any systematic logical theory. Mill’s insistence on new ‘facts’ hampers him throughout a long labour to show a satisfying authority. He unites the two requirements, as the primitive logic of Gotama did, in the ‘recognition of signs’. And he perversely incidentally the scholastic axiom of intensive reasoning to suit this conception and to mean that whatever possesses any significant attributes possesses the signification of which it is a sign. But that one thing can be a sign of another is not a truth that can be left in this primitive crudity; and Mill only slightly softens the crudity when he appeals to empirical or causal laws. These do, indeed, confer signification on facts, but, being themselves inferences from facts, they appear to have no more title to do so than facts have to assume it for themselves. Signification remains a mere transference from the unseen. In contrast with Mill, Hamilton’s choice of the minimum in his requirement for novelty allows inference to carry with it the full authority of the conceptual faculty, but at the expense of its relativity. With Kant, it has the authority of a law of understanding imposing the relationship of reason and consequent, while other logicians, with doubtful success, attempt some formula which pledges reality more definitely than a reference to understanding can do.

The logical forms and the laws of their application are the conditions through which each particular logical inference finds itself, and brings the connection of its ideas with one another into that form, which for Kant thought itself, is truth’ (Mill, Logic, Oxford, 1884, § 239). And it is sufficient for the reassurance of philosophy is accepted that the Kantian principle of rational consequence ‘is but the side, not the main body, of that whole tendency towards empirical thinking, of the fact that there is in the thought-content such an immutable inter-connection that if something is true then something else is true and something else not true’ (W. Windelband, in Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, vol. i. p. 20; see also Lasskij, iv. p. 240 E).

4. Immediate inference. If the same fact, understood through the same concepts, nevertheless comes to be known in a new way without a new reference to independent sources, there is immediate inference. Kant suggests the forms of such inference, in speech or in writing, the transition from one judgment to another appears as a change in the order of ideas, ‘A is B, ‘B is A’; or in the use of a new one rather than the other form of a pair of contradictory ideas, ‘A is B, ‘B is not A’; or in what may be described as the logical self-consciousness of judgment, ‘A is B’, ‘it is false that A is not B’. ‘Ways of knowing’ are merely schemes for the use of whatever equivalent expressions may be available for the same fact. To Kant they suggest distinct plans of synthesis in the interplay between sensibility and understanding, of which one may be a reason for the other; and he names them syllogisms of the understanding. And other logicians recognize an internal development of the concepts employed in a judgment, which alters the judgment in type, but not in substance. There may thus be a change from a historical import to a scientific, or vice versa. Some sovereigns are tyrannical, a tyrant may have sovereignty, but any contradictory idea may arise as a species complementary within an implicit genus: ‘Lovers are prone to jealousy. Lovers are not indifferent to each other’s friendship. Through the formula for this, ‘A is B, ‘A is not other than B’ is considered meaningless by Kant.

5. Mediate inference. Where the new way of knowing is through a concept of mediators and boundaries, ‘X is Y, ‘Y is Z’, the authoritativeness is due to some mediating idea, and the inference is entitled ‘mediate.’
A scheme of expressions with letters as symbols for concepts has been inherited by current Logic from Aristotle, to which nearly all examples of mediate inference can by ingenuity be made to conform. As a personal discipline in which the mediating ideas that is employed in any example, this scheme has been almost universally commended; but it fails to make clear the ground and hazard of the mediation. And its rules can justify only the classification of the inferences and subordinations of concepts which accompany inferential belief. That 'All men are mortal, and the king is a man and therefore mortal,' reveals the 'human' as mediating idea, and arranges king, man, and mortal in a classificatory or conceptual hierarchy. That 'Alexander, Muhammad, and the other persons of history have died, and these are men, and therefore man is mortal,' reveals the list of historical persons as mediating idea, correlates the list with 'man' as a class concept, and subordinates this to 'mortal.' Nature, however, as Mill contends, has not arranged all the objects of the universe into definite a priori classes (Logic, people's ed., London, 1884, ii. 2, § 2), and we might add that neither does the universe present itself as a museum of permanently assorted attributes. And in the problem of personal identity it already accomplished that enables us to systematize our concepts either in extension or in intension, or to correlate a list with a concept.

6. Inductive Deduction. — A more material value may be given to such schemes as representing a plan of co-operation between different minds in building up a common inferential system. The insight transforming incident into generalization, or the mind that will make a rule, may be accomplished by one mind; and concrete expectation may be framed accordingly. 'The king is mortal,' by another. The rules of the deductive syllogism mark a dividing line between original and interpretative thought in their co-operative function, whether the personality requiring the distinction be that of teacher and disciple, audience and orator, legislator and magistrate, and the like, or otherwise. Mill considered that deductive interpretation does not amount to inference unless there is a reference back to the original datum for the sense. Thus (p. 79, § 4). If, however, the formula of authority be not merely understood as a meaning, but also adopted by the interpreter as a conditioned rule for his own beliefs, and not used simply as the interpretation of the rule, there really arises in the passage from rule to instance a 'new way of knowing.' The traditional maxim for the deductive syllogism—whatever is predicated concerning a class distributed may be predicated in like manner concerning anything contained therein—does not express this. But Kant's maxim does: Whatever fulfills the condition of a rule falls under the rule itself (Logic, § 67). And it is relatively to such inference that Gotama's inclusion of extrinsic authority, as an independent source of knowledge, along with perception and intuition may be still applied.

7. Demonstrative Deduction. — Independently of authority as a source, the deductive insubordination of concepts also represents inference where it is other individual and their fulfillment exemplified, intuitively, that is to say, when the occasion of inference is what has been known in widely separated epochs of philosophy and science that a doctrine (Gotama), primary scientific principle (Aristotle), a priori synthesis (Kant). Mill as an empiricist in epistemology would reduce this kind of inference to the same level as the interpretative—a treatment which is the less plausible in logic because the class extensions so natural and useful in the interpretation of experiential knowledge are here a superfluous gloss on the demonstration. It is as easy to see that a triangle ABC, constructed in Euclid's 'axioms,' is not by definition without referring to anything outside that figure, as with the aid of generalizations.

Where intuition fails us, and, according to empiricists, in all knowledge, the ultimate occasion of inference that the intuitively admitted be the coincidences and sequences of experience, and the 'new way of knowing' converts special features of these into a 'conditioned rule' for our expectations. The universality of the rule is not the 'logical' or a priori universality conferred by intuition (Kant, Logic, § 81), but analogues to it—a reaching towards 'the thought by which all things through all are guided' in the flux of Heraclitus. Intuence here is 'belief' in contrast with strict knowledge (cf. art. BELIEF [Logical]); and Kant entitles it 'syllogism of reflective judgment.'

8. Enumerative Induction. — Where many experiences repeat the conception of some attribute with the instances of a given concept, we infer the concept as the condition for a rule as to predicting the attribute. The concept may be simple, as 'metals conduct electricity.' From perception memory results, and from repeated collections of the same phenomenon come `natural regularities, experience, or from the entire universal which is retained in the mind as a principal element of the elementary principle of art and science' (Arist. An. Post. ii. 19).

Recurrence has no meaning except when environments or specific determinations change, but it is the recurrence, not that change, which calls to our inferential activity. The maxim followed is: Many things do not agree in one characteristic without a reason (Kant, Logic, § 84). The numbered of recurrences is, for progressive intelligence, the primitive mode of inference; and Mill considers that out of it scientific analysis grows as an effort to sustain or correct a narrower enumerative induction by a wider (Logic, iii. 3, § 2). And, converting this psychological precedence into a logical one, he declares that the distinctive maxim of scientific analysis, the Law of Causation, can 'have no better foundation' than our wider faith in uniformity as more recurrences (ib. 31, 19). But, while faith in recurrence is an indispensable factor in our expectations if these are to meet the requirements of concrete life, its authority is less secure than that of the tested and proved belief according to the rule, there really arises in the passage from rule to instance a 'new way of knowing.' The traditional maxim for the deductive syllogism—whatever is predicated concerning a class distributed may be predicated in like manner concerning anything contained therein—does not express this. But Kant's maxim does: Whatever fulfills the condition of a rule falls under the rule itself (Logic, § 67). And it is relatively to such inference that Gotama's inclusion of extrinsic authority, as an independent source of knowledge, along with perception and intuition may be still applied.

9. Eliminative Induction. — Where the instances of a concept differ in their environing circumstances or in their specific determinations that are concurrent with each other may become condition and rule. Friction between stilt and steel is an incident that concurs with the experiments of Eudoxus in the determination of contact; specific determinations of surface that concur in mother-of-pearl, Mill's two types of elimination, entitled 'Method of Agreement' and 'Method of Difference,' are worth of a doctrine (Gotama), primary scientific principle (Aristotle), a priori synthesis (Kant). Mill as an empiricist in epistemology would reduce this kind of inference to the same level as the interpretative—a treatment which is the less plausible in logic because the class extensions so natural and useful in the interpretation of experiential knowledge are here a superfluous gloss on the demonstration. It is as easy to see that a triangle ABC, constructed in Euclid's 'axioms,' is not by definition without referring to anything outside that figure, as with the aid of generalizations.

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descent colouring of a surface cannot be the peculiar chemical composition of mother-of-pearl, for the colour appears also on grooved wax or metal; nor can it be molecular consistency, nor weight. With Difference, on the other hand, an instance or species of the concept is found where the concurrence is isolated even as a passing one. Only a multiplicity and not the moment of use from the moment of rest, in flint and steel. Because eliminative induction infers a rule of change or variation, that is to say, a causal or disjunctive difference, it is so like the natural habitable such. This venture of belief fulfills the same function in practical wisdom as the a priori construction of examples fulfills in demonstrative science. And so in view of this function that Aristotle submerges it in a double syllogism which he entitles ‘Example.’ War between Athens and Thebes would be calamitous, as being a border war, like that between Thebes and Phocis. Gotama classes the ‘recognition of likeness,’ not as an inference, but as an independent source, like perception, that may contribute to inference. Modern Logic allows it as a kind of inference, or at least as an independent source of inductive hypothesis, co-ordinate with eliminative induction (C. Sigwart, Logic, Eng. tr., London, 1885, § 83).

Within a sphere of belief where environments and specific determinations are sustained by purpose or by the power of organic life—e.g., when we follow judicial precedents or recognize physiologically determined and justify analogy by a maxim corresponding to Kant’s maxim for induction: since the many characteristics do not unite in one thing without a reason (cf. Kent, Logic, § 3). But even when a belief unifies a collocation is not definable in terms of purpose or of life, our conceptual faculty still demands, in the spirit of the ancient realism, that destiny shall pre-ordinate the repeated exemplification of limited conceptions, and that the impending shall not be infinite in surprise (see art. Concept; and cf. J. Veenn, Empirical Logic, 1907, ch. 4). It is not sufficient that the world of facts follows, as Mill describes it, ‘from laws of causation together with a primeval collocation of forces that is inexplicable,’ (Logic, iit. 5, § 9).

It is necessary to suppose that not merely do general laws imply a disposition to be comprehended, but actually any of those that can be accounted of which a definite form of actuality flows from the laws is given over to chance, understood by any one, but rather that in the arrangement of the aforesaid also, a principle (that is to say, an ‘idea’) is effective, and that this principle is, in its way, molecular consistence, or molecular correlation of phenoms which are to be actualized (Lotze, Outlines of Logic, Eng. tr., Boston, 1886, § 18).

LITERATURE—This is co-extensive with systems of Logic. Among recent writers, in addition to those quoted above, may be mention of the especially important on the nature of inference: T. H. Green, Lectures on Logic, London, 1870 (Works, ii.); P. H. Bradley, Principles of Logic, do. 1883; L. T. Hobhouse, Theory of acquaintance, London, 1893; J. S. Mill, Collected Works, do. 1909; Edin., art. ‘Logic’; and the several contributers to the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, vol. 1. Engl. tr., London, 1875. Among recent German writers, W. Schlegel, H. Lotze, W. Wendt, and H. L. von Schiller are frequently referred to. There are numerous monographs and essays on species of logic especially connected with philosophy or with particular sciences.

J. BROUGHTON

INFINITY.—The problem of infinity is one of considerable complexity and difficulty, in that it is possible to do in such an article as this to give some account of the place of the conception in the development of human thought, to indicate some of its chief applications, and to suggest methods by which they may be met.

1. The meaning of the term. — There are two senses in which the term tends to be used, and it is very important to distinguish them. It may mean simply that which is endless, or it may mean that which is complete or perfect. One of the simplest illustrations of infinity in the former sense is to be found in the series of cardinal numbers. When we arrange the numbers in order by 0, 1, 2, 3, ... — it is evident that no point can ever be reached at which the series can be regarded as complete. However large the number may be that we have reached at any point, it is always possible to add one more. Hence this series is infinite, in the sense that it never reaches an end. On the other hand, the circumference of a circle may be said to be endless, or semi-infinite. This is not complete. It seems clear that these two senses of the term are not identical, and are even in some respects opposed to one another. Yet they are apt to be confounded.

A simple mathematical instance may serve to bring out the reason for this. The series 1, 2, 3 ... is infinite in the former of the two senses. Each number of the sequence is smaller than the next. The value of $\pi$ is infinite, and the value of $\pi$ is doubled at each successive step. Here, again, however large $n$ may be made, it is always possible to double it. But, in this case, when $n$ is made very large, the value of $\pi$ is very little different from that of $\pi$.

Hence $\pi$ may be said that $\pi$ is the ultimate value to which the series is approaching. This is sometimes expressed in the form that, when $n$ becomes infinite, the value is $\pi$. Here the series is represented as becoming completed when it reaches infinity. The endless series is thus regarded as reaching an end, in which it is completed. A more concrete illustration of this is found in one of the puzzles that were put forward by Zeno with regard to motion. If it is a body moves from the point A to the point B, it is evident that it must first traverse half the distance, and that in order to do this it must first traverse the halt of that, and so on in an infinite number of steps; and, in fact, it would be impossible to set it in motion, indentured. Hence it may be said that, in the motion from A to B, an infinite series is completed. In such instances the two notions of endlessness and endogeneity, which are sometimes opposed to one another, are somehow brought together.

Another illustration, from the sphere of religion, may now be given. God has sometimes been represented as infinite, in the sense of having no assignable and as regards formation of existence in time or possibility of action. He has been said to be Eternal and omnipotent. These attributes may be interpreted as measuring simply endogeneity with respect to two or three variabilities. They may be taken to imply that, however far we may go back in his history, there is something prior to the point that we have reached; and, however far we might go forward, there would be something to come after; and, again, that, however great may be the action that is performed by him, there is something greater that he might do. Here we have simply the conception of endogeneity. But God has also been represented as infinitely wise and infinitely good; and it is clear, on the face of it, that these are qualitative conceptions. They do not mean endlessly wise and good, but conceptions which are perfectly wise and perfectly good. We can hardly suppose in these cases, what is meant is the same as conceptions that are essentially or perfectly wise and good. We can hardly suppose in these cases, what is meant is the same as conceptions that are essentially or perfectly wise and good. We can hardly suppose in these cases, what is meant is the same as conceptions that are essentially or perfectly wise and good. We can hardly suppose in these cases, what is meant is the same as conceptions that are essentially or perfectly wise and good. We can hardly suppose in these cases, what is meant is the same as conceptions that are essentially or perfectly wise and good.
consist of numerable parts, they cannot be said to be either finite or infinite, in the purely quantita-
tive sense of the word. This appears to be true of
goodness, wisdom, beauty, colour; and, in
general, of all things that are essentially quantita-
tive rather than quantitative. But it is common
to apply the term 'infinite' to such things when they have a high degree of perfection—as in such
phrases as 'infinite penetration,' 'infinitely pure,' and the like. As the term means primarily
'endless,' it may be best to use it only in this
sense; but, as the two meanings are not always
easy to disentangle, the more qualitative sense of
the term must also be taken into account.
2. History of the conception. At a very early
period in Greek speculation we find traces of the
conception that the universe is to be regarded as formed from a material that is in some sense
boundless. Anaximander, in particular, took this
as his starting-point, and thought of the different
forms of existence as having been 'separated out'
from a vague and chaotic mass to which no definite
bounds could be assigned. What we have here is
perhaps rather the conception of the indefinite than
that of the infinite; but the transition is easy from
this view to another, in which it is being
made most clearly in the development of the
Pythagorean school. It would appear that the
fundamental view of the early Pythagoreans was the
idea of a two-fold and eternal process: 70 desmos,
received definite form through the imposition of
limits. This may be regarded as the earliest form
of the doctrine that 'determination is negation.'
Against this view we must set the Eleatic doctrine,
which involves the denial of negativity. According
to the view of Parmenides, reality is to be thought of
as always definite, and not boundless. It is
compared to a well-rounded sphere. Here we may
perhaps recognize the first statement of the con-
ception of a perfect whole, as opposed to that of a
chaotic mass. Malissus, however, appears to have
urged that this perfect whole should be conceived as
limitless, if not infinite both in time and in space,
thus bringing together the two conceptions of the
complete and the endless. But it was apparently
Zeno who first realized the difficulties involved in
the conception of a non-finite and infinite
subdivision. His familiar paradoxes—that 'the flying
and the resting,' and that 'Achilles could never overtake a
tortoise'—were evidently intended to emphasize the
same difficulty. The service which Zeno rendered to
exact thought by the statement of such difficulties
can hardly be exaggerated. The Atomists, how-
ever, whose views were developed from reflection
on the points brought out by the Eleatics, do not
seem to have taken much account of the problems of
Zeno when they postulated an infinite space and,
apparently, an infinite number of atoms moving in
the void, though, no doubt, they gained something
by avoiding the conception of the infinitely little.
In the later developments of Greek thought, especi-
ally under the influence of Socrates and his
school, the conception of infiniteness becomes rela-
tively unimportant; and its place may be said to
have been taken by the conception of the
infinite as being is partly due to Parmenides, but appears
to be more directly traceable to the speculations of
Anaxagoras. The view that Mind is to be taken
as the first principle of order was readily interpreted
as implying that determination is not merely negation
or limitation, but is due rather to the effort after
perfection. The 'Form of Good' thus comes to
be seen as that which determines, as it is especially with
Plato; and the material tends to be thought of
only as something by which the working out of the
Good is in some way limited. This may almost
be said to involve the inversion of Pythagoreanism
—an inversion which comes out most distinctly in
the philosophy of Aristotle. The Form has now
become the positive aspect, and the Matter is the
negative by which it is limited; and that which is
thus limited is no longer the boundless, but the
perfect.
This brief sketch must suffice as an account of
the way in which the conceptions of infiniteness and
perfection first came into prominence in Euro-
pean speculation. The most elaborate attempt to
combine the two conceptions is found in the doc-
trines of the Cartesian school. The most funda-
mental doctrine of the Cartesian is that the
absolutely perfect must be thought of as existing.
The grounds on which this is maintained cannot be
considered here. It is enough to say that the
absolutely perfect is regarded as the standard by
reference to which all other things are determined.
This standard tends to be thought of as bound-
less. Space is conceived as an infinite whole, and
all other realities are thought of on the analogy
of space. This is most definitely the case in the
philosophy of Leibniz. The conceptions of the Carte-
ssians are most logically developed. Thus the perfect comes to be
identified with the boundless, and everything determin-
ate is regarded as 'finite.' Leibniz has corrected this tendency by treating space as a
confused mode of thought, and by definitely re-
introducing the Platonic conception of the Good.
On the other hand, he sought to give a positive
significance to the conception of infiniteness; he
little, and thus revived those problems which had,
on the whole, lain in abeyance since the time of
Zeno.
The difficulties involved in the conceptions of
the infinitely great and the infinitely little were
strikingly set forth by Kant in his first two anti-
nomies. The main point there urged is that the
conceptions of the finite and the infinite involve
the recognition of a completed infiniteness,
which is self-contradictory. Reflexion on this led
Hegel 1 to regard the simply endless (schlecht un-
endlich) as an invention that has already
been made to the way in which he brought out the
difficulty involved in the recognition that the
space through which a body moves may be
regarded as being invariable in infinite subdivision.
His familiar paradoxes—that 'the flying as well as
the resting,' and that 'Achilles could never overtake a
tortoise'—were evidently intended to emphasize the
same difficulty. The service which Zeno rendered to
exact thought by the statement of such difficulties
can hardly be exaggerated. The Atomists, how-
ever, whose views were developed from reflection
on the points brought out by the Eleatics, do not
seem to have taken much account of the problems of
Zeno when they postulated an infinite space and,
apparently, an infinite number of atoms moving in
the void, though, no doubt, they gained something
by avoiding the conception of the infinitely little.
In the later developments of Greek thought, especi-
ally under the influence of Socrates and his
school, the conception of infiniteness becomes rela-
tively unimportant; and its place may be said to
have been taken by the conception of the
infinite as being is partly due to Parmenides, but appears
to be more directly traceable to the speculations of
Anaxagoras. The view that Mind is to be taken
as the first principle of order was readily interpreted
as implying that determination is not merely negation
or limitation, but is due rather to the effort after
perfection. The 'Form of Good' thus comes to
be seen as that which determines, as it is especially with
Plato; and the material tends to be thought of

1 Hegel's distinction was partly anticipated by Spinoza and,
more definitely, by Leibniz.
as are many different infinities as there are systems of relations that can be worked out without limit.

A special case of this is found in the conception of a part that is exactly similar to the whole of which it is a part. Thus, if the small square B is exactly similar to the large square A, its similarity implies that it also will have the same relation to C which it exactly similar to itself and to A. C also must have a similar part, and so on without end. The endlessness arises here from the constant repetition of the same relation of similarity; and the constant repetition is necessitated by the statement of the first relation. This particular case has a special interest from the way in which it has been applied by Boyce to the relation between the universe and its parts.

3. Critical summary.—We may now consider more definitively the exact significance which the conception of infinity has for us at the present time. In doing so, we may set aside the conception of perfection and also the conception of simple endlessness, and concentrate our attention on the definite conception of an endlessness that is involved in the working out of a system of relations. It seems clear that certain systems of relations do lead us into an infinite series. The instance already referred to is evidently such a case, and it seems to have a large range of possible applications—perhaps, as a matter of fact, the path of a moving body may be subdivided, and the like. It is important, therefore, that we should consider the exact significance of this conception.

There are three ways in which it may be regarded. It may be contended (1) that such mathematical determinations are essentially subjective, and need not be supposed to have any objective validity; (2) that they express definite characteristics of reality, of which we are acquainted; (3) that they are hypotheses having a certain objective significance, but not necessarily having any direct application to particular existences. To discuss these views thoroughly would involve a meta-physical investigation of the meaning of reality, and of the place of mathematical determinations in it. It must suffice to say here that the first view at least appears to be erroneous. It coincides with such theories as those of Berkeley and Hume and the modern pragmatists; and it falls to the ground along with the general doctrines of subjectivism. The arguments of Frege and others have probably convinced most people that mathematical determinations cannot be regarded as purely subjective. Hence, we are left to choose between the other views. It appears to us that the latter of them appears to err by overlooking the real distinction between the possible or hypothetical and the actual or existent, or, in other words, between what is formally valid and what applies to particular concrete objects. Any hypothesis, or (in Meinong's language) 'Annahme,' is no doubt, in a certain sense, objective. It is a real meaning, and is subject to the conditions that are involved in that meaning. The thought of a centaur, for instance, is subject to the determinations that are implied in a definite union of certain characteristics of horse and man. Nevertheless, so far as we know, centaurs do not exist; and there is no reason why they should exist; or, if a mathematical mode of expression is preferred, we may say that the number of existing centaurs is zero. Similarly, it may be asked, with reference to any other hypothesis, whether it is possible to apply it to any existing things. In some cases undoubtedly a direct application can be made, whereas in other cases this is not legitimate. For instance, any number of members of the series of all possible numbers can be divided into two; but the flocks thus formed could not again be cut into two equal portions without destroying some of the sheep. Yet the conception of such a subdivision has real meaning; and, though it is not directly applicable to the sheep, it may be applicable to some special aspect of them (e.g., their price). Similarly, the conception of an endless number has a real mathematical significance; but the question remains whether, in any particular objects, if any, that conception is directly applicable.

Some illustrations may serve to make this clear. Take the case, previously referred to, of an object that contains a part exactly similar to itself. It is clear that in this case we are led to the conception of an endless series. The meaning of the conception is quite definite and objective. But the question remains whether we can point to any existing object that contains a part exactly similar to itself. It has been suggested that such an object would be provided if within any country a perfectly accurate map of that country were constructed, showing every detail. For such a map, being perfectly accurate, would contain, among other things, a representation of itself; and the map of the map would, of course, contain another similar map within it, and so on without end. But this is manifestly an unusual illustration. A picture always represents something other than itself. Further, no materials could be provided by which such a detailed map could be constructed. At the same time, the conception is no doubt objective, in the sense that it conveys an intelligible meaning. Again, it has been said that, if it is true to hold that when I know anything I know it, then it must also be true that I know that I know it, and so on ad infinitum. This is a matter of fact, in this case, there is no definite limit that can be set to this knowledge of knowledge. The knowledge is actual, however, only in so far as we produce it by reflection; and, as a matter of fact, we should soon tire of this reflective process. Another illustration that has been given is that of two objects facing each other. Each mirror contains a reflection of the other, and in this reflection there is an image of itself, and so on without end. But this also is unusual. The conditions of the reflection of light would not allow the process to go on beyond a certain point. Another ingenious application of the conception of infinity has been given by J. Russell in his statement of the problem which he has called 'the barber.' As we know, he took two years to write the first two days of his life, and lamented that, at this rate, material would accumulate faster than he could deal with it, so that he would be unable to come to an end. Now, I maintain that, if he lived long enough, and not worked at his task, then, object of the life had continued as eventuall as it began, no part of his biography would have remained unwritten. This seems to be a clear case of a reduction of the attempt to apply the mathematical conception of infinity directly to a concrete problem. For, however convincing the mathematical reasoning may be, it is, of course, obvious that the conclusion must be wrong. The longer Trismegistus lived, the more would he be beset with his biography. It would, indeed, be difficult to find a clearer illustration to show that the mathematical conception of infinity has only a formal validity, and that it cannot be applied to concrete cases without considerable restrictions. Every existing thing excludes from itself the abstract possibilities. This is at least one of the senses in which we may interpret the saying that 'determination is negation.'

With this general view in mind, we may now consider briefly some of the chief cases to which the conception of endlessness has been thought to be applicable.

4. Infinite extension.—The conception of infinite extension is commonly thought to apply to things in space, and to events in time, and also to the series of conditions (whether temporal or not) upon which existing things are dependent. It might be supposed to be applicable also to series of degrees and qualities (e.g., degrees of heat or shades of colour). From a formal point of view, it is evident that there is no reason for stopping short anywhere in such relations; and it appears to be always possible to think of a further extension; and it seems quite arbitrary to stop at any particular point. It does not follow, however, that there is an endless number of such cases that can be determined by these formal relations.

5 *Elements of Philosophy,* London, 1908, p. 791.
In the case of the alphabet, B comes after A and before C, but there is no letter prior to A. Here the limitation is arbitrary; i.e., it is dependent on a human convention. On the other hand, grey is darker than white and lighted than black, but there is nothing darker than black or lighter than white. The fact that this particular scale of qualities has two ends is not arbitrary, like the similar limitation of the alphabet; but the limitation seems to be quite similar, red and blue appear to present themselves as endpoints in a scale of colour-qualities. May it not, in like manner, be the case that there is some occurrence that has nothing but it, that there is some star that has nothing due west of it, that there is some happening that has no determining antecedent, and so on in other instances? There are no doubt difficulties in conceiving any such end-points. The difficulty in the case of spatial extension was vividly stated by Laerztius. 1 He supposed himself to stand at an extreme end of the physical universe—say, at its extreme western verge—and to shoot an arrow outwards. What he asks, is to prevent him from doing so? The answer seems clearly to be that there is nothing in the formal constitution of space to prevent him; but, on the other hand, it is physically impossible for him to get to the extreme verge of to shoot his arrow outwards. Though there is nothing in the form of space to prevent him, there may be something in the general conditions of the Cosmos. A more serious difficulty was urged by Kant in the case of time. He contended that we could not suppose a first occurrence in time, because there could be no reason why one event should be at one point in time rather than at any other. It seems clear, however, that this is not a difficulty with regard to the temporal series as such, but rather with regard to the causal series. If causation is conceived, as Kant conceived it, as temporal sequence, the first member in the series of causes would be unexplained. If, however, the causal series is thought of in a different way,—i.e., teleologically,—this difficulty would disappear. In a theological series there may be a reason for beginning at one point rather than at another. What is necessary is only that something should be taken as self-existent or created. If it does not, of course, fall within our present scope to consider whether this is a legitimate hypothesis. It is enough to urge that it is conceivable one. If this is granted, and the series to which reference is made might be supposed to be finite, i.e., not endlessly extended.

But, of course, this does not prove that they are finite. It may still be asked whether there is any real objection to the supposition that they may be endless. The chief objection appears to be the one that was urged by Kant with reference to the particular case of time,—viz, that the supposition of an endless series which is actually completed seems to be self-contradictory. If we say that, however great anything may be, there is always something else that is greater, we seem to be assuming that both is and is not something which is greatest. If there is a greatest —viz, the infinitely great—the series is not endless; if there is not a greatest, the series is incomplete. Similarly, if we say that every ground has another ground, we are saying both that there is and that there is not an ultimate ground. But, it may be urged, does not the conception of a limited whole involve difficulties quite as great? Not, if we could see that the real ground can be assigned for the limitation. In most cases of limitation, the limits seem arbitrary or imperfectly explained. Why, for instance, it may be asked, are there only three dimensions in space as commonly conceived in the interpretation of the physical system? Why is there only a limited number of possible colour-experiences? Perhaps grounds could be assigned for these; but at any rate, there seems to be no reason for assuming that no ground could be given for the limitation of any particular series of concrete things. The conception of limits to existence seems the most difficult. For some considerations bearing upon this, reference may be made to art.

5. Infinite division.—The objection to endless division are even more apparent than those to endless extension. It involves the same difficulty of the completion of an endless series; but it has a further difficulty with respect to the limiting conception that is involved in it. When we think of anything as being divided without end, the ultimate parts have to be conceived as infinitely little. Now the infinitely little seems to be indistinguishable from zero; and zero seems to be indistinguishable from the non-existent. On the other hand, the grounds that lead us to postulate editionless division are in some respects more cogent than those that lead us to accept the conception of infinite extension. We start in this case with a completed whole, so that at least its completion cannot be questioned; and yet there seems to be no reason for stopping at any point in its subdivisions of the Cosmos. Hence Kant urged that in the case of division, the series must be supposed to be actually infinite, and not merely indefinitely extensible. But it is to be observed that Kant's argument depends upon the homogeneity of the whole that is to be divided. And this is where the weakness of the argument lies. If we assume that a given whole is homogeneous throughout, we are assuming that it is divisible throughout. The real question is whether any given whole is homogeneous. Now, at least, is clear, that we are not entitled to make any such assumption in the case of degrees and qualities. An intense heat does not appear to be made up of a number of smaller heats; nor does it seem legitimate to say that the distinction between any intensity and the next intensity below it is the same as the distinction between any other intensity and the next below it. Nor are we entitled to say that the distinction between blue and green is the same as that between green and yellow. Hence in such cases we do not seem to have been made aware that the postulation of an infinite series of homogeneous units within a given whole. Moreover, if we confine ourselves to recognizable distinctions in degrees and qualities, it seems certain that the number is finite. Similarly, modern physical science tends more and more to throw doubt on the view that physical bodies can be indefinitely divided into homogeneous parts. Rather it seems at least probable that physical bodies consist of parts which cannot themselves be described as physical bodies. If so, the argument from homogeneity is not cogent. There may be parts that are not capable of further division; therefore, it may be doubted whether any such conception is applicable to conscious states. An experience of pleasure, for instance, does not appear to be capable of subdivision into a number of homogeneous parts.

The strongest case is probably that of motion, to which reference has already been made. When any body moves from one point to another, it is certainly natural ground can be assigned for the limitation through an indefinite number of intervening positions; and it is here that we come upon the paradoxes of Zeno. With regard to Achilles and the tortoise, however, it seems clear that the motion does not
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consist of homogeneous parts. Both of these moving bodies would presumably advance step by step. This suggests the question whether it may not be the case that all motion is discontinuous. If so, we, of course, come upon one of the other paradoxes of Zeno, viz. that 'the flying arrow rests.' If the flight of the arrow is discontinuous, this may be interpreted as meaning that it is successively at the points A, B, C, etc. and is never moving between them. But is this a serious objection? If it occupies these points successively, it does move from one to another. Its motion would not be made any the less real by the fact that it did not occupy any intervening positions. The fact that there is no cardinal number between two and three does not make the transition from two to three any the less real. Considerations of this kind may serve to show that there is no real reason for denying that the number of parts in the subdivision of any concrete thing may be finite.

6. Infinite attributes. The conception of infinity—especially in the Cartesian school, where it was most freely applied—has been specially used as a determination of the idea of God. In this use it is generally regarded as being applicable to certain attributes, of which the chief are knowledge, power, and goodness. Temporal and spatial infinity have also been frequently ascribed to God; but with these it is not necessary to deal further. The other three forms of infinity call for some notice. The first, as regards its infinity, is the one which has a clear apprehension of number at all. It is a given infinite number. A competent mathematician may be said to know all conceivable numbers, since the formation of numbers depends upon a single principle; and, if it be allowed that an infinite number is conceivable, the mathematician knows that. But he does not consider all the relations that might be ascertained as holding between different numbers. Infinite knowledge would presumably include this. It would also include a full apprehension of the temporal, spatial, causal, intensive, and qualitative orders and of all the different kinds of existence, and of all the relations that could be ascertained as holding within or between these various types; and this kind of knowledge might be held to be boundless. As regards particular existences, the knowledge of these would not be boundless, unless the things to be known are boundless—which is at least doubtful; but it would include the apprehension of every particular thing that actually does exist. In this respect it would be all-inclusive, but not boundless.

Infinite power is more difficult to interpret when infinity is understood in the sense of endlessness. Some writers have interpreted it in a way that seems to lead to absurdity. J. M. E. McTaggart, for instance, takes it as meaning the possibility of bringing about anything, however self-contradictory it may be—of making black white, good evil, the existent non-existent, the infinite finite, and so forth. This, however, seems meaningless. A being infinently powerful in this sense might evidently also be lacking in all power. Such a being would be, in the fullest sense, apriori and undeterminate. We might, however, interpret infinite power as meaning the possibility of accomplishing whatever is chosen. It would then be limited by the condition that what is chosen is not evil or absurd—i.e., it would be taken in conjunction with discontinuous conceptions of infinite goodness and knowledge. Infinite power.

thus interpreted, would be boundless, if there is an endless number of things to be chosen.

Infinite goodness, again, interpreted as boundless, would seem to mean the choice of what is best in every case. If the number of cases is endless, the choices would be endless. In dealing with goodness, however, it is certainly better to regard the attribute as essentially qualitative. The attitude of always choosing the best seems to be in itself a simple determination of will and character. It does not really consist of a number of distinct things. The endlessness lies only in the number of cases to which the one principle of choice may be applied. Hence it seems better to speak of perfect goodness than of endless goodness.

And this suggests the question whether the same is not really true of the other attributes as well. If infinite power means the possibility of bringing about what is chosen as best, this also does not seem necessarily to involve in itself anything that is endless, though there may be an endless number of things in which the potentiality is displayed. Similarly, infinite knowledge might be interpreted as meaning complete insight into the conditions on which anything is to be known. A thoroughly skilled mathematician might in this sense have infinite knowledge within his own limits and not have an endless number of facts present to his mind. It may be argued, therefore, that it is better to apply the concept of perfection, rather than that of endlessness, in the interpretation of all these attributes.

It is perhaps partly the difficulty in the application of the conception of endlessness that has led some writers to postulate the existence of a 'finite God.' 1 If an infinite God exists, it seems an easy task to show that such a being must be thought of as complete; yet it is difficult—if not self-contradictory—to think of anything that is not as being complete. It is, however, mainly from the point of view of perfection that the conception of a finite God has been brought forward. It is urged that what we know about the imperfections of the world forces us to believe that, if there is a God at all, He is either not perfect in goodness or not perfect in knowledge or in power. But the consideration of this question lies beyond the scope of the present article.

7. The Infinity of the Cosmos. It is evident that, in a certain sense, the Cosmos includes the endless; for it includes number, and number is endless. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the Cosmos contains an endless number of existences. This distinction has been partly brought out in the present article; but to explain it fully would require a careful consideration of the distinction between existence and reality. It must suffice to say here that existence seems to present itself as a selection from a larger realm of possibility. If we mean by existence that which occurs in the time order, within which our own conscious experience falls, it seems clear that some things—e.g., perfect knowledge, goodness, and power—may be real, though they do not in that sense exist. Again, there is a sense in which anything that is conceivable may be said to be real. If it is conceivable, it is really conceivable; and the conditions of such conceivability would seem to be contained within the structure of the Cosmos. In this sense it may be said that endlessness—insomuch as it has a real meaning—is contained in the Cosmos. But it does not appear to be correct to say that the Cosmos itself is endless. Rather it

1 One of the best statements of this view is to be found in H. Rashdall's Theory of Good and Evil, Oxford, 1907, ii, pp. 397-404; also McTaggart, Some Aspects of Religion, ch. vi, and J. Ward, The Realm of Ends, Cambridge, 1911, esp. pp. 447.
2 Reference may be made to an article on 'The Meaning of Reality' in Mind, Jan. 1914.
would seem that, if there can properly be said to be a Cosmos at all, it must be supposed to be a complete whole. But it may be infinite, in the sense that it is perfect and all-inclusive. Indeed, to say that it is a complete whole seems to imply that it is perfect and all-inclusive; but whether it is to be really so conceived, and, if so, how, is a problem that cannot be adequately dealt with in such a chapter as this. In this and the following sections, let us try to discuss here how far the conception of such a perfect Cosmos would agree with or differ from the conception of an infinite God referred to in the preceding section.

See also art. GOD, GOOD AND EVIL, HEGEL.


INFORMERS.—One who knows that a crime has been committed is morally, and frequently legally, bound to lodge information of such crime in order that justice may be done. This holds good in the strictest sense in the religious sphere; indeed, in many strata of civilization there is no demarcation between the two. The duty is binding; moreover, not only upon the official classes, whether civil or religious, but upon every one who has cognizance of the crime. Morally speaking, he who conceals his knowledge of, e.g., a murder, and thereby assists the murderer to escape detection (to give the least possible consequences of his deliberation), is parasite criminalis. This principle is recognized in primitive codes, as when, among the Aztecs, one who had cognizance of treason and did not divulge his knowledge was said to be "prudent," or, as in the prudent, Oldenburg, 1894–95, ii. 314, 324, with further instances and lit.). At the same time, there may be limits to this obligation. Thus Cicero of old time made the slave to lodge information, and even punishes with death anonymous informers, if their identity is established, while the African Kru regard as a culprit one who divulges information concerning a crime in which he has no concern (Post. ii. 314 f.).

The important assistance rendered to justice by the informer receives recognition in the usage of giving him a substantial reward, generally from the fine which the convicted must pay, this reward being a ninth among the Kalmucks; and the same code also recognizes the principle of 'king's evidence,' so that he who deserts a robber band and gives information regarding them escapes punishment (Post. ii. 315 f.). Such is the ideal theory of the informer, whose importance in aiding the ends of justice must be frankly recognized. Yet the informer is a hated creature, often despised and frequently proscribed by what he tells. The code of Mann, for instance, places him in the same category as madmen and soffers at the Veda; no Brahman may eat food purchased from an informer. The notion that false information is equivalent to the most heinous sin of killing a Brahman (iii. 161, iv. 214, xi. 50). In Europe any private citizen, who, with the most inequitable of motives, seeks to secure evidence of the violation of the laws of the land, such laws, for example, as those governing the sale of liquor or those regulating houses of ill-fame, may, indeed, further the ends of justice, but will too often be mere contrivances of a less concealed contempt of the official service and almost certainly to the contumely of the public, even of the more enlightened and thoughtful of its members.

This attitude, too, has its justification. The informer may be the most honourable of men; he may also be a thoroughly despicable creature, serving not for the promotion of the welfare of society, but for the mere money that he can make, or he may be influenced by personal hatred. This is why the informer is loathed, with the added factor that all peoples of even moderately advanced ethical development have a predilection for fair play and for open fight, if fight must needs be.

To summarize the ethical aspect of the informer, we may say that in many cases he unambitiously advances the cause of law and justice where without his aid crime could be perpetrated and flourish. That by his means many an instance of unjust punishment has been inflicted does not in the least mitigate against the use of his service so long as it clearly signifies that his motives and evidence need to be tested with more rigour than in the case of official guardians of the law. Indeed, he is a check upon these guardians, who may also be in the habit of using a little leniency (and not always from disinterested motives), just as he may be guided by undue severity (and sometimes from motives at least equally interested). As regards the ethical position of the informer, each case is to be judged separately. If he is convinced that the offence concerning which he lodged information is indeed wrong and that it should be punished, his act is commendable and in the interests of society, even though he may have a sub-motive of personal hate (perhaps in consequence of injury which he has suffered either from the system of crime as a whole or from the person or persons involved in the particular offence). If, however, his motive is merely to gratify personal resentment or to secure the pecuniary or other reward offered, then, while his act may be to the welfare of the social organism, he himself is ethically to be condemned.

The informer does not seem to have become a real problem until the days of the late Republic and early Empire, when the slave was a slave to lodge information, and even punished with death anonymous informers, if their identity is established, while the African Kru regard as a culprit one who divulges information concerning a crime in which he has no concern (Post. ii. 314 f.).

There is also reason to believe that the informer was not far beyond the mark when he said (Paus. xxxiv. 4):

"Videmus delatorum agmen infestum, quia grandissimum, quia latronum. Non portu lanceas illi, non lacer, sed tempestuosum, sed horrendum, sed inaudita, sed insensata. Nulla iure testamentorum, nullus status certus: ne orbis, ne liber prodest. Animis hoc numinum praevia arsita."

While the system of delatio flourished in all its worst forms, repeated efforts were made to curb it. Nero reduced to a fine profit by the Lex Papia (Suetonius, Nero, x.), and in his reign was passed the Senatusconsultum Turritallianum, by which the informer of informers by procuring evidence or suggestions for the lodging of false information is equivalent to the most heinous sin of killing a Brahman (iii. 161, iv. 214, xi. 50). In Europe any private citizen, who, with the most inequitable of motives, seeks to secure evidence of the violation of the laws of the..."
remains (Roman Soc. from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, London, 1904, p. 353.),

the period of its growth in reputation and eminence. It is a melancholy proof of the degradation of that society that the deliberate scepticism of his craft and even envied and ad

hired. Men of every degree, freemen, schoolmasters, petty traders, descendents of houses as old as the Republic, men from the masters of the Roman merchant Valutius to a Scarrus, a Catulus, or a Regulus, flocked to a trade which might earn a fabulous fortune and end in the empire of a prince. There must have been many a career like that of Paulinus, who had fought in the arena in the reign of Nero, who had been disgraced and disgraced and who had formed a nest and preached the gospel of popular government, and, by the help of a girl, had become a praetorian delator, and attempting to found a juristic theory of absolute monarchy.

After scourging delators, Titus either sold or exiled them (Suetonius. Tit. viii.); every possible impediment was placed in their way (Dig. XLVII. ii. 7.1; Cod. Justin. ix. i. 3, ii. 17, iii. 2); in 319 Constantine and Valens forbade anonymous delations (Cod. Justin. ix. xxxvi.); but all these measures proved ineffectual.

Yet in all these enactments attention was evidently directed to the suppression of the abuses of the system rather than to the abrogation of the system itself. It is true that Trajan banished the delator (Pliny, Hist. xxxiv. xxxvii.); but, at least in the provinces, they were not merely tolerated, but their evidence was received. This is admirably attested by Pliny's famous letter (xcvil.) regarding Christians and the Emperor's reply.

Certain individuals were denounced (defendentur) to Pliny as Christians, and he tried each case strictly upon its merits. The Emperor replies approvingly, directing that they [the Christians] are not to be sought out: if they are denounced and convicted, they must be punished: 'conferred non sunt: si defendentur et arguentur, puniendum sunt.'

The early Christians must frequently have suffered from the zeal of informers, whether honest or malicious (whether both types were found). It was not, however, until the early 3rd cent. that the Councils of the Church took official cognizance of them. The 3rd cent. of the Synod of Evora (305 or 306) caused the death penalty on any delation (Cod. Theodos. x. 2); and in 365 Valentinian and Valens forbade anonymous delations (Cod. Justin. ix. xxxvi.); but all these measures proved ineffectual.

Where it was possible to take vengeance on the

informers, he was not spared. This is clearly exemplified by the history of delation among the medieval Jews. Under Arab domination, information was rife in J ewry, as when, about 1089, Khalifa ibn al-Jab and his son Hayyim drove Isaac al-

Fasi from N Africa to Spain: and after the expulsion of the Moors from Spain in 1492, the informer continued to harass the Jews under Christian rule, as was the case throughout Europe generally. No

new principles appeared, but the penalty of death was not merely pronounced upon the delator, but was actually carried into effect, often with the consent of the King, notably in the cases of Joseph Pichon, royal farmer of taxes, beheaded at Seville, 21st Aug. 1579, and of a notorious Jew acquitted by royal authority at Valsengo about 1280. So heinous was the offence of an informer deemed that he might be seized and condemned to death forthwith, and the penalty might even be imposed in his absence. In Germany they tribulation led upon the Jews by the informer (tob, 'traditor,' 'defender,' 'slanderer') were especially severe, as in the expulsions from Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Regensburg; and in Poland, where, with government sanction, an informer's tongue or ears might be cut off, the death penalty is said to have been inflicted as late as the close of the 18th century.

As a survival of that gloomy phenomenon of medieval history, there had long existed in the Ritual of Congregations a prayer, which was recited in accordance with the laws and practices of their places of residence, which the Roman authorities had drawn up in the Emperor's edict (C. J. Hengel, Geschichte des Christentums in Gris, Eng. ed., 2nd, 1834, 1841, 1854). The ordinances previously promulgated by bishops who had turned delators were, however, valid. The following canon of the Synod of Constance by the Emperor's edict (C. J. Hengel, Geschichte des Christentums in Gris, Eng. ed., 2nd, 1834, 1841, 1854). The ordinances previously promulgated by bishops who had turned delators were, however, valid. The following canon of the Synod of Constance by the Emperor's edict (C. J. Hengel, Geschichte des Christentums in Gris, Eng. ed., 2nd, 1834, 1841, 1854). The ordinances previously promulgated by bishops who had turned delators were, however, valid. The following canon of the Synod of Constance by the Emperor's edict (C. J. Hengel, Geschichte des Christentums in Gris, Eng. ed., 2nd, 1834, 1841, 1854).

If, however, the Church condemned those who delated against her, she encouraged those who informed for her, and even bade them do so. In her efforts to suppress all manner of heresy in the Middle Ages, the informer was called into service. To further the extinction of the Catharism, penalties were imposed on all who knew or suspected to be heretics of that type, and delation was regarded as necessary proof of conviction.

How useful this is seen in the case of Sainte Rigaud, whose confession is recorded in 1254, where it is followed by a list of one hundred and sixty-six informers, or who, when criminated by her, their names being carefully tabulated with their places of residence, who then formed a nest and preached the gospel of popular government, and, by the help of a girl, had become a praetorian delator, and attempting to found a juristic theory of absolute monarchy.

From the second cent. the power of the informer was fostered by the practice of introducing him into the lists of the before-mentioned Synods, for the purpose of securing the condemnation of others.

The empirical principle of law that either husband or wife knowing the other to be a heretic and not giving information within a month was held to be a conciliating power without further evidence, and was punishable as a heretic (H. C. Lea, Hist. of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages, London, 1895, i. 49, 48). Where it was possible to take vengeance on the informer, he was not spared. This is clearly exemplified by the history of delation among the medieval Jews. Under Arab domination, information was rife in J ewry, as when, about 1089, Khalifa ibn al-Jab and his son Hayyim drove Isaac al-

Fasi from N Africa to Spain: and after the expulsion of the Moors from Spain in 1492, the informer continued to harass the Jews under Christian rule, as was the case throughout Europe generally. No new principles appeared, but the penalty of death was not merely pronounced upon the delator, but was actually carried into effect, often with the consent of the King, notably in the cases of Joseph Pichon, royal farmer of taxes, beheaded at Seville, 21st Aug. 1579, and of a notorious Jew acquitted by royal authority at Valsengo about 1280. So heinous was the offence of an informer deemed that he might be seized and condemned to death forthwith, and the penalty might even be imposed in his absence. In Germany they tribulation brought upon the Jews by the informer (tob, 'traditor,' 'defender,' 'slanderer') were especially severe, as in the expulsions from Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Regensburg; and in Poland, where, with government sanction, an informer's tongue or ears might be cut off, the death penalty is said to have been inflicted as late as the close of the 18th century.

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Hindu (J. Joll), p. 369.

Jewish (L. Abrahams), p. 309.

Muslim. See Law (Nahmannadah).

Roman (W. J. Woodhouse), p. 302.

Teutonic (B. S. Phyllotis), p. 311.

INHERITANCE (Primitive and Savage).—1. Primitive property and the conception of inheritance. Among primitive races, both religious beliefs and social organization are such as to hinder rather

than favour the origin and growth of the conception of the transfer of estate, by regular succession, to a representative of a former possessor. This is especially the case with material property. In-
individual possessions are confined to a few weapons, implements, ornaments, and utensils. At death these are buried with the owner or destroyed by brent, either by fire if they may serve for his use in the future life, or because of the pollution of death which has made them useless to the living. The hut is pulled down or allowed to decay.

Even when the principle of inheritance is recognized, this custom of destroying property is continued, and may seriously diminish the estate, although not unnaturally there is a tendency to limit the practice to articles of little value.

In Savage Island the heir receives only what remains of the material possessions of the deceased after the greater part has been destroyed in his honor.1 The Ngaju of Manus is said to sacrifice 70 of his pigs on the occasion of his uncle's death.2 It is clear that the practice, whether based upon the idea of continued ownership after death or upon the idea of a limited right to articles of little value, nor are the conditions of land tenure such as to originate or to foster such rights. Among normal human societies it is generally the case that the possession of property is strong enough to lead them to guard their hunting grounds from trespass by their neighbours (which is not invariably the case), rights of individual ownership, while it might be inherited, are, as a rule, not recognized; and the same applies to lands in the occupation of primitive pastoral tribes such as the Yakuts, while among agricultural peoples, where the subsistence of the land and the heir is from the nature of the case of greater moment, it frequently happens that the conditions of tenure and the custom of periodical redistribution are such as to indicate a complete absence of ownership and heredity, rather than an absolute individual ownership. The right to hunt or pasture over certain lands, however, although belonging to the individual in virtue of his membership of a certain group, is hereditary in a somewhat diluted sense,

2. Origin of inheritance.—Although custom and religious belief operate in this way to prevent personal property from passing to those who might be regarded as the natural heirs of the deceased person, it is nevertheless probable, that the practice of inheritance and the rules of succession first grew up in connexion with this rather than with land, rank, personal rights, or calling, and the like, though at this early stage transmitted by other means, are inherited at a higher level of culture (see below, 3 (d)). This seems clear from the fact that inheritance of personal property is recognized while the tenure of land continues to be transmitted by the employment of rights originating in communal tenure; the chiefship or headship of a group is wholly or partly elective; and a profession, such as that of the medicine-man, or an industrial, cult, is transmitted by association rather than by relationship. Further, it arises out of the action of the living rather than the dead. Testamentary disposition appears at a comparatively late stage of development, and gifts inter vivos are frequently rendered void by death. It is the desire of the living to possess some specially valuable weapon or ornament which has overcome religious scruples, rather than the wish of the owner to benefit those who come after him.

Among the Arwak it is not uncommon for the hammock in which the body is laid in the grave to be withdrawn afterwards if it is new and good.1 In New Guinea, among the Kula and Motu tribes, although the house of a dead man is allowed to decay, the floor beams, which are valued as accounts of the deceased's workmanship, are not allowed to suffer the same fate, but are regarded as the most important part of the inheritance.2

The familiar custom of intestate succession to objects or models for objects of utility or value, and of the personal property from destruction, is frequently entrusted to a near relative, who at a later stage is either the heir or takes a considerable share of the estate.

In Samoa only the sister or the sister's child had the privilege of sitting at the head of the grave and breaking the bottle of scented oil to pour over the uncovered face of the dead man,3 while among the Balibung the younger brother, who inherited the chief wife of the deceased, entered her kula, of which he became the master, performed the 'rite of the twig,' and delivered the address to the ancestors.4 If a Kikuyu son refuses to assist in digging his father's grave, he is disqualified from receiving a share in the estate.5 The sons or grandsons chosen by the Baga man to perform the burial ceremony each took a widow from the inheritance, and the sister's son received a woman for performing the ceremonies which brought the mourning to an end.6

3. The inheritable estate.—(a) Personal property.

Material things, such as weapons, implements, utensils, and ornaments are the earliest kinds of articles to be regarded as falling by succession to a man's connections at his death. In ordinary circumstances these are affected by no special rule, but follow the regular line of succession, although certain articles may be by custom assigned to a particular person or class of persons.

The Tube-tube tribes of New Guinea distinguish two categories of personal property. Drums, lime-pots, lime-staves, and canoes go to the sister's children, even if they are girls, but in the case of their children. If the sister has no children, this class of property would pass to the maternal uncle, but with a reservation at his death to a man's own brothers and sisters. Property of the second category, such as arm-shells and the like, and also pigs, was divided between a man's own children and those of his sister. The eldest son is given to a wife by a husband are regarded at his death as the inheritance of his parent, a man who performs certain ceremonies

7 On the primitive custom of intestate succession among alienable and inalienable property see Post, 1. 306.
INHERITANCE (Primitive and Savage)

...at the grave, or his brothers. Among the Baganda, of the two sons, the larger one is given to the grave because, as he is the eldest, he is considered the more choice of the two. He is called the big son, and the other the little son.4 Among the Baganda, the定制 of property belongs to the one who is the eldest, and he is called the big son. The other son is called the little son. Among the Baganda, the ratio of inheritance is determined by the size of the son. The larger son receives the property, and the smaller son receives nothing. This is because the Baganda consider the larger son as more capable of taking care of the property. In the case of the Akaika, the son who is the eldest inherits the property, and the other son receives nothing.

(b) Land—Inheritance of land is closely bound up with the system of land tenure. Individual ownership is a late development, and even among civilised peoples, communal ownership still affects the terms upon which land is held. In the more primitive types of society—the hunting, pastoral, and early agricultural stages—it is the right of the dead and not the absolute ownership that is transmitted. Indeed, in the case of a nomadic community of hunters ranging over a wide tract of country, the term “inheritance,” as has been stated above, is hardly applicable in the strict sense to the methods by which members of the tribe enter into or are admitted to the territorial rights of their group. They obtain and hold their rights primarily in virtue of birth in a group, and not in virtue of their relationship to an individual. The same applies in a less degree to the conception of land held among pastoral tribes, except that the group tends to be smaller or a subdivision of a greater group, such as the sub-clan, or the family, among the Yakuts and the medieval Basques. The land descends through the head of the family as a joint possession and not as the property of a single individual. The strong principle of inheritance is shared by the groups of the north-west coast of America points to group tenure as the origin of the custom whereby the hunting grounds of the tribes and other tribes of that region are the hereditary property of the chiefs or the nobles.4

In an agricultural community, some degree of recognition of individual right of ownership with power of transmission (to heirs is usual. Uganda affords an instance to the contrary. All the land, with the exception of the clan burial-grounds, belongs to the king. The holdings cultivated by a man’s wives are granted him by the chief or directly by the king, who gives estates to chiefs in the several districts of the country. These estates are not inherited, and, on the nomination of the official, pass to his successor without allowance for improvements.5

It is more usual, however, where all land is regarded as the property of the chief, for the custom of giving what is practically a grant in perpetuity from the chief, either with or without an annual payment, the land then being transmitted as hereditary property, but being alienable by sale. This form of tenure was found in ancient Mexico, where, among the Nahua races, the property of the nobles was held directly from the king by the individual, but the land of the common people was the property of the clan, and held from it as inalienable but inheritable property by the individual.6

In Nigeria, land was granted in perpetuity subject to an annual rental and occupation. Although the grantees had no power to alienate, at his death it did not revert to the chief, but descended to his heir, usually a son,7 who held it on the same conditions as his father. Similar rules of tenure and succession are found among the Batanga, with the exception that the grants are made by the chief in the first instance to the local headmen by whom the lots are apportioned among the members of the villagers, without, however, affecting the right of transmission.

The mode in which land may be inherited sometimes varies in the same community, the variation being a matter of difference between group and individual ownership, with the result that the right to inherit is vested in two distinct classes of persons.8

Among the Mafulbo, each man has a house site in the village, which at his death passes to his eldest son, and reverts to the village; it is, or may be, then allotted to another member of the group. In addition, he possesses garden land and bush land, and his children (his eldest sister, her husband, and his cattle, goats, and sheep) all descend to them. In the latter case subject to a right of the villagers to pass over it. The land does not descend to a child by his own will, but is inherited by them and their heirs; it is never divided, so that the number of individuals holding a plot of land in joint ownership in time may become very large. Any house built upon this site remains the property of the family. In Melanesia an analogous distinction is maintained. There is a ‘permanent’ or village lot, in the ancient garden lot (because, it may be assumed, it was originally cleared or maintained by the labour of a group of tenants organised on a kinship basis) descends to the members of the owner’s kin, his sisters’ children, their husbands, and their cattle; but bush land cleared by the owner himself, and made into a garden lot descends to his children and continues to be inherited in the direct line so long as the origin of the clearing is remembered.3 In Fiji, though the bush land was held in common, and the tenure of arable land, descending according to a fixed law of inheritance, was little more than a grant of use from the chief, land in the Bega province, consisting of tracts reclaimed from the delta of the river, was appropriated by individual families, and as such was subject to ordinary chattel law, alienable, and inheritable by the eldest son in the first instance, and not by the eldest brother.3 An interesting parallel is in connection with a case of tenure as apart from land tenure in Melanesia and the adjacent area. Property in the trees being distinct from property in the land on which they stood, they might, and, indeed, frequently did, descend to an entirely distinct class. Trees planted with the consent of the owner of the land were inherited by a man’s children and grandsons; and trees planted on his own land might be declared to be the property of his sons instead of the sons of his brother.5

As the principle of individual tenure becomes more generally recognised, the custom regulating its transmission at a break in continuity of ownership caused by death tends to disappear. This is nearly to the rules of inheritance characteristic of a highly developed type of civilization, and to ignore claims outside the direct line. If any traces of the more ancient system remain in a community, it is sought in the rules for the disposal of the house and the house site, this being the part of the land in which the individual first makes good his claim to absolute ownership, and as such tending to preserve the original form of transmission.

In New Guinea the house site formed an important part of the inheritance, although the house itself was usually moved to make way for new structures. It passed either to the son (Kofo, Motu) or to the brother’s sister or sister’s son (Waguna-waguna, Tobuc-tobuc, Bartheley).9

(c) Women as inheritable property.—Many primitive peoples, especially in Africa, regard wives and daughters as an important part of the estate, to be transmitted in accordance with the regular rules of inheritance with the rest of the property. The explanation is to be sought partly in the economic value which women, whether as workers or as members of the family, in the case of daughters, as potential wealth in the shape of a bride-price; partly in the solidarity of group feeling which tends to regard everything over which the head of the group has a right to dispose of as his absolute possession, and, as such, to be transferred to his successor; and partly in the necessity, where the independent status of women is not recognised, for every woman to be attached by some definite relation to a male protector. As a rule the heir married the widow, except when she was his own mother, and received the bride-price for the daughter on her marriage.

Among the Akaika the son, if adult, inherits his father’s widow, but, as a rule, takes as his own wife only those in excess of three; as it is usual for a man not to marry more than three wives until his son has been received into the tribe, these widows would be of little use to the man. In Nigeria (Kagoro) the son takes any of the widows not taken by his paternal uncle.1 According to the rule of the Wa-Sania, the wife becomes the property of her husband, if he predeceases his wife; but, if he has already three wives, or if the number inherited would give him more than three, the number allowed...

4 Codrington, op. cit., Part I, 1, 231.
5 Seligman, pp. 897, 221-224.
7 A. J. N. Tremeaune, Some Nigerian Head Hunters, JRAI, 2, 1811, p. 183.
8 J. and H. 219321.
9 J. and H. 219321.

For the inheritance of the totem and of tabus, reference must be made to the special articles dealing with these subjects.

Moreover, there is an inheritance of a toad tabu which is found among the Bangala of the Congo, whereby a man who may be said to have fathered a certain toad by the medicine man, as part of the consideration for a disease, transmits the disability to his descendant, while among the Bambal a hereditary class, wearing a distinctive head-dress and a braided tail which passes at death to the successor of the deceased but cannot be possessed, also inherits a tabu against eating human flesh or fowl.†

(c) Debt.—Inheritance usually connotes the acquisition of property by the heir. It may, however, on occasion involve the reverse, as among the Bangala and the Ba-Yaka, where a man's heir is responsible for his debts, even if there is no property, or as among the Jokor Jakun, where the heirs must pay one half of the debt, irrespective of the size of the inheritance.★

4. The heir.—(a) The kin and its members.—An inheritance tends by custom to follow the line of descent, in a matrimonial society the heirs to a man's estate will be his own children, but the members of his kin either as a whole or as represented by those members who are more immediately related to him (see art. FAMILY [Primitive], § 12). The argument used for believing that inheritance by the kin was far more widespread than it is at present, even if it was not at one time universal. It still survives, with or without modification, in a considerable number of instances, of which the following may be regarded as typical.★

Among the Melanesians the normal heir to an heir's property is his nephew, the son of his sister.6 So also among the Kurnai.7 The argument is that a man's property shall pass to the heir of the tribe to which he himself does not belong, i.e., to his mother's, brother's or his daughter's husband.8 In the Lusadas, land is inherited by the owner's brothers, sisters, and children.9 It is also the case with many of the members of his kin. Among the Wag-wag tribes of New Guinea, garden land passes to the sister's children, or, if these are too young, to the maternal uncle, or the owner's father, with provision to the sister's children. On the other hand, a woman's garden property, including coco-nut trees, descends to her children, while her personal property, such as ornaments not given her by her husband, is divided between her children and her sister.10 Among the Nden tribe this rule was followed in the majority of cases. Property was shared among the clans, and chiefly by the kin.11 It sometimes occurs in Africa, e.g., among the Gambals12 and some of the tribes of the Great Lakes.13 The Selangur Sukai choose the successor to a deceased headman from the owners' children.14 Among the仡佬 the chiefship falls to the sister's son.15 Among the Chinese, the chiefship is already mentioned, the priesthood was hereditary in the female line.16 In New Britain, the totemic chiefship could not pass to a son because descent was traced in the female line.17

Only certain classes of property may be hereditary in the female line.

Among the Baghawa, succession to the headship passes to the son of a sister's daughter, to the son of a maternal aunt, though property descends to the children.18 Among the Picas a sister's son likewise succeeded to the chiefship.19 Among the Naira, personal effects pass to a sister's children, and land belonging to the wife is inherited by a daughter or sister.20

Property may pass exceptionally to a sister or her children when direct heirs fail. Among the Bambal a sister holds the property in trust for her own children, if her brother should leave no direct heirs—in this case if no brother survives, the eldest son takes the property, and the female rule of inheritance of the clan chiefship is that, falling sons, if the sons are too young, the property passes to the sister's sons. In the latter case it would revert to the female if they had grown up when their uncle died.21 The heir among the Congo tribes, failing a brother, is the sister's son.22 Further, below, (d).

Some instances of the privileged position of women and of those related in the female line seem to point to an earlier system which has been superseded in general usage.

The peculiar close relation between maternal uncle and nephew existing in the Torsa Straits and in Fiji (where it is known as nora), which allows the nephew to treat his uncle's property with the greatest freedom, suggests that, although such close relationship, these people were case they were the nephew was the uncle's heir. A similar relation in dealing with property as between maternal uncle and nephew (sent to a limited extent between paternal uncle and nephew) is found among the Ngandu and the Masi. In this case it is reciprocal: an uncle may claim any article from the father of his nephew, and the nephew must buy it for him. The nephew, on the other hand, may claim any property belonging to his uncle.23 In Savage Island, where the people are in a transition stage, though the son inherited his father's property, the daughters had a claim on their father's property and the fact that one of the queens is the king's sister and that princesses are not allowed to marry and have children suggests that at one time the kingship was transmitted in the female line.24

(b) Transition from kin to family.—It is not surprising to find that, with the growth of family, as opposed to kin, feeling, an attempt was made to avoid this law of inheritance by various means, either by gifts inter vivos, as among the Melanesians, or the Bantus of South India, among whom, however, these gifts became part of the will and void at death,25 or by adoption of the heir, a common device among the Iroquois, in order to perpetuate the chiefship in their family, or by marriage of the heir—the sister's son—to the daughter, as among the Carriers (Dene).26

Evidence of what appears to be a transition stage is afforded by arrangements such as that which prevails among the people of Yiga Lomangoro, whereby the inheritance is divided equally among the children of the man himself and of his sister.27 A similar compromise between the maternal and paternal branches among the Wolof of Algeria divides the boonemans, waddies, etc., between a man's sons and his brother-in-law.28 Among the Kolo, personal property, such as canoes, is divided equally among the aunts (older brother, sister, or cousin) and res (younger brother, sister, or cousin). The girl's property is left to the eldest son, but is used for the marriage of any young children, while the garden land, assigned out of the clan holding, descends to the children and the house site descends rigidly in the male line.29

(c) The family and its members.—In addition to the father's increasing desire to benefit his own children rather than those of his sister, as the family tie gradually assumes an ascendency over those of the kin, two influences are at work which would tend to divert the line of inheritance to sons in preference to nephews. As the sense of property in land grows stronger, increased importance is attached to residence as a factor determining the heir. Even in Australia, where, as has been mentioned, in the case of the chiefship the idea of inheritance is not highly developed, the hunting grounds are regarded as the common property of the tribe and net of the individual, hunting.

J. S. McClelland, Primitive Marriage, Edinburgh, 1865, p. 147.

5. Ibid., p. 106.26


8. Meggitt, pp. 221, 239.


10. JR I 571, 560.

11. JR I 571, 560.


13. Seliglagn, i. 504, quoting Logan.


15. Brown, p. 172; for numerous other instances see Post, I, 77.


18. Brown, p. 172; for numerous other instances see Post, I, 77.


20. JR I 571, 560.


22. Meggitt, p. 221.

23. Torday-Joyce, JR I 571, 560.


26. JR I 571, 560.

27. Thomson, JR I 571, 560.


INHERITANCE (Primitive and Savage)

rights descend from father to son, because the patrilineal organization, providing a residence for the sisters and daughters with their husbands’ tribe, makes any assignment of these rights to another than the sons an impossibility. 

The common law of property of the Savus. In case of default of sons, of assigning immovable property to the deceased man’s wife, the property devolves on his daughters; and among the Vozdif, the son who is to inherit the patrilineal household and land—usually the eldest—remains with the parents, while the other children marrying and leaving the parents to found a village of their own. 

The substitution of an agricultural for a pastoral life, with the consolidation of individual property in land, strengthens this tendency. Further, where the cultivation of the ground is the duty of the men, the inheritance of land is, as a rule, confined to the male members of the family. Among the Basques, while pastoral pursuits predominated, the estate passed to the eldest child, whether male or female; but with the introduction of agriculture, of which women were unskilled, it became impossible to take charge, and the gradual obsolescence of land taxes based upon the communal line, land inheritance tended to become the rule exclusively. In Nigeria, where security of land tenure depends upon the land being kept under cultivation, women continue to possess their properties, on the ground that they are regarded as unable to comply with this condition. 

The second set of circumstances, which supports the substitution of an agricultural for an pastoral inheritance from the female collateral to the male collateral or direct line, but affects movable as well as immovable property, is that which is connected with the payment of the bride-price. This custom not only bars the woman from the claims which the family or tribe may have over her, but at the same time, by effecting her transfer to her husband, cuts herself off from her children and children from participating in their father’s or brother’s “household property,” or “family (see Art. FAMILY [Primitive]). It is found, accordingly, among most of the African races, e.g., where the bride-price is a regular institution, that inheritance in the male line is commonly the rule. Exceptions; however, are to be found among races in a state of transition or who retain some traces of the institution of matrilineal mother-right (see below, p. 294). 

When once the predominance of the female line has broken down, it does not follow that the inheritance will fall to the sons as a matter of course, nor that the eldest son will take precedence over his brothers. Indeed, there is ground for believing that, in some regions at least, the course of development has been from the female collateral to the male collateral rather than from the female collateral to the direct line; that is to say, the priority of primogeniture or the right to hold good, but it is organized on a basis of male relationship rather than female. This is suggested by the priority or prominence given to the brothers of the deceased. A factor of importance which also helps to support the claim of the brothers or other adult members of the group as against the children is that only those are allowed to inherit who are able to hold the property, by force if necessary, to take their share in the affairs and the defence of the group if required. This leads to the exclusion of women and minors. 

The custom of the tribe of Mina in Maroua, that a clansman should take a part of the estate when daughters inherit in default of male heirs; 2 the trace of clan tenure of burial grounds in Upington; 3 the practice of “land which was regarded as being owing to the king, and for which at the death of the holder, who is a tenant for life, the successor of the clan is chosen by the clansman and the king’s sanction, as well as to the control exercised over the inheritance of personal property by the clan; 5 for the fact that in the semitribal he is not the heir of all his subjects, though in practice he receives only a certain quantity of gold dust on the death of chiefs; 6 the

1 Hodson, p. 105. 
2 Shakespeare, p. 45. 
4 Thomson, Philippes, p. 191. 
5 Hodson, p. 105. 
6 Roscoe, p. 270. 
8 The family tenure of burial lands in Korea; 2 and other analogous customs of which instances could be adduced—suggest that the place of the kin as collective heir is usurped by the clan, and that this group is later narrowed to the more immediate relatives, the brothers. Among the Ba Kwers the heir is a brother; among the Kasogu all the brothers must hold the inheritance before it can fall to the heir, the son. In Nigeria (Kagoro) a group of sons inherits each of the wives as are not taken by his paternal uncles. The Bodo of the Chad assigns the wives to the eldest brother, while personal property is divided into two equal parts between the children and their uncles. 4 The ceremony performed by the Nambas heir before he can assume possession of his father’s property, of which he throws a branch at his paternal uncle, saying, “I pay you before the eldres,” and the ceremonial subordination of the uncles to the eldest brother, seem to be a form of compensation or propitiation of the uncle, either, as is suggested by Hobley, as the representative of the deceased, or more probably, as an heir whose claims have been superseded. In other case it implies the solidarity of the family group. 5 The Wa-Santia chieftainship is inherited by the eldest brother and by the son only in default. 6 In Samoa the legitimate heir was the next eldest brother. 7 In Fiji the chieftainship depended upon a limited election for which the son was eligible only in default, first of brothers, and secondly of sons of the deceased. The normal heir to the house was the eldest brother. Among the Naga, Mays, and other races of Central America, where the succession was strictly hereditary, it descended to the son, but, where there was a limited election, choice was made from among the brothers. 8 The uncle, if the children are minors, is usually regarded as the natural holder of the estate until they are of age, when, in some cases, it passes to the eldest brother with them, 9 and sometimes hands it over to them as a whole. 

When the inheritances passes to the children, the eldest son being normally the strongest, primogeniture is a common but not an irrevocable rule; 10 but, should the eldest son be unsuitable, he may be set aside by his father, or, in the case of a chiefship, by those in authority. A chiefship may descend in a family while the actual member to hold office is chosen by election. A rule of inheritance may definitely set aside the eldest son. 

Among the Naga tribes, especially among the Mose, the youngest son, as already mentioned, inherited the house. 11 Sometimes, as among the Batais, the eldest son, the father’s, the youngest son the mother’s property, or, according to the En Temmu rule, the eldest takes all the mother’s property and the largest share of the father’s. 8 An important feature is the inheritance of the dead child’s property by a child of the deceased, whereby certain classes of property descend to the youngest son. 

11 When primogeniture is the rule, it is generally an obligation on the eldest son to look after and provide for his brothers out of the estate, as a reward for their maintaining themselves, or for holding itself to the estate and not from any direct property, or for holding it for their children. 

In some Naga villages, the eldest son has to maintain his brothers and his children; in Kintu, he supports the rest of the family; 11 at Lasaq, when the eldest son marries for himself and his brothers, the paternal possessions are transmitted on the understanding that the eldest son supports his brothers. 11 Sometimes the younger brothers act as the eldest brother’s assistant, or were virtually “adopted,” as among the Bahimas. 12 A rule which passes a further restriction on primogeniture, not uncommon, especially among the Bantu tribes, confines the inheritance to certain classes, and the eldest son. 

In Uganda the eldest son of the king, who acted as his brothers’ keepers or guardians, was expressly debarred from inheriting. 

The successor to the throne must be chosen from “children of the elder,” i.e., children born after the accession of the father. 17 Frequently only the children of the chief or principal heir are eligible to succeed to the father’s position, as among the Ndili 18 or the Zulus, 19 the chief wife in the latter case being the first of the wives for whom the bridge-price was paid with cattle from the father’s estate and not from cattle earned by the man himself. 

In ancient Mexico at Tenochtitlan only children born of the

2 Junod, l. c., 335.
4 C. W. Hobley, J.R.A.I. xil. 411.
6 Thomson, Fiji, pp. 306, 328.
8 For examples see Petting, l. c., 220 ff.
9 Biscoe, p. 504.
10 Routledge, p. 144.
11 Hobson, l. c., 335.
13 Roscoe, J.R.A.I. xxxvii. (1907) 103.
14 Roscoe, Roscoe, l. c., 130.
16 H. Callaway, "Tribute, Taxation, Traditions, and Histories of the Zulus, Nandi and I. de. 1855, 225 ff."
It sometimes happens that, in cases where there is no apparent transmission of property to a female, it is held upon terms resembling a trust.

The Mafali widow, on the death of her husband, receives a pig from the estate, which does not, however, provide her with security of property, but is kept by her for the mourning rites which take place at the end of a year.

Among the Dyaks, the widow of a man who dies without a son passes to his widow, the reason being that it is her duty to perpetuate the name of her husband. She is provided with an heir to the property by taking a second husband, whose children are regarded as children of the first husband.

Among the Abois, on the death of the husband, the widow retains the plantation and the hut which were hers during his lifetime, together with the goats which he taught her to use in order to enable her to provide for her children; but they are in no way regarded as her absolute property, and, as her son marries, a portion of the land is cut off and transferred to the first wife of each.

Even where there is a distinct tenure of lands, as among the Tubu tribes of New Guinea, the husband and wife work side by side, and the wife has to give one half of her first crop after her husband's death to her relatives as the product of his labour.

(c) Daughters.—Although it is generally true to say that among any of the primitive races of to-day women do not inherit, there is evidence to suggest that at an earlier stage, and in a community organized on matriarchal and matrilocal lines, women were regarded not only as heirs, but as the natural and proper occasion and the legitimate and natural object of such proceedings, and in the early days of the era of the great African states.

In Egypt, a daughter had an equal, or in early times a preferential right to succeed in her father's property.

In some cases, when the daughter does not inherit, she may transmit the inheritance to her husband or to her children; this is especially frequent when the husband takes up his residence with the family of the wife.

Among the Puyumas of Formosa, the son-in-law resides with his wife's parents, and on their death takes possession of the house and property.

In Japan, the descendit of property belonging to her husband's group. A woman may, however, sometimes be allowed at the death of her husband to retain such articles, especially clothes, utensils, and other property, with the consent of his wife, but such property becomes closely associated with her by use, although her right of ownership during her husband's lifetime has not been recognized.

Among the Abois, a man's widows are allowed to take nothing but the yam stalks. The Mafali widow takes the current season's crop, which she has helped to plant, unless she has returned to her own people. On the other hand, among the Wagen-wagen tribe of New Guinea, valuable shell ornaments are given to a woman on her husband's death, and in Nigeria the widows appear to have an interest in the house, if she has no grown-up family and no relatives by marriage. In this case she may marry again, taking her husband's house.

Among the tribes of the Haringo district of East Africa, the property given to the wife at marriage is divided among the children on the death of the husband. Among the Ngoci, Kavirondo, each widow receives a certain number of cattle, which, at her death, pass to her son. Among the Wagana and the Aisunic, personal ornaments are distributed among the female members of the family of the deceased.11

1 Williamson, p. 109.
2 H. O. Sullivan, JRAI, xiv. 172.
3 Rostlidge, p. 144.
4 Seligmann, p. 522.
5 H. Lamont, La Folie de Ville de Syntres, Bruxelles, 1899, p. 17.
6 Poulsen, in Globus, 1877, p. 40.
7 Ibid., p. 160.
8 Nic. Doms, 129 (F frag. III, 161).
9 Whitney, p. 927.
10 Charlet, quoted in Harland, Frants. Patricia, ill, 67.
11 See Hartland, 73 ff., for detailed references.
12 JRAI, 655.
13 McLeod, p. 147.
14 Harl., 226.
15 J. W. Davidson, The Island of Formosae, p. 57.
16 Asee vil. (1910) 428.
18 Hill-Tout, JRAI, xxxiv. 317; Bras, pp. 324-358.
INHERITANCE (Babylonian)

It is possible, in exceptional circumstances, for an estate to fall to a woman, among a people who do not, as a rule, recognize female inheritance.

Among the Babylonians, falling male heirs, a man's sister will inherit his property. Married daughters, however, among the Babylonians, after the death of their deceased father the women who were paid as bride-price for themselves, and have any children, and brethren make presents periodically to their brothers-in-law. In Banaa, land might be held by females when all the males in the family were dead. The inheritance, however, might be revived to emphasize the exceptional circumstances, as in the custom followed at Layy and Layl among the Moos, whereby, in the event of the inheritance falling to girls through lack of male heirs, the clan, the male relatives, or a paternal uncle took a share of the inheritance, usually the house.

Where it is generally recognized that women may hold property, the inheritance is frequently shared among them. Among the Bassa of Northern Nigeria, a portion of the property is assigned to the daughters, twelfths to the sons, and the Jukan of the left-hand division among all the children. The Tuareg children divide equally all lawful property, i.e., property acquired by labour. Among the Kolta and Moto tribes of New Guinea some of the land is divided equally between son and daughter, while the girls, which while the latter inherit a life interest in the land which is covenanted to them, to the Nias, among the Dayaks and other jungle tribes of Borneo, there is a customary allocation of different classes of property to the widow, son, and daughters, the latter obtaining old boats, etc., while among the Dayaks the Chinese jars, which are highly valued, are divided equally among all the children. Artificial brotherhood and kinship frequently involve the rights and obligations of inheritance.

5. Testamentary disposition of property. It is evident from what has already been said that inheritance to the primitive mind depends upon a rule or custom invariable outside the certain limits, over which the deceased person has no control. Property, in so far as it is not acquired by the owner in the life after death, is at the disposal of the living, originally the group-kin—family, village, or clan. Under the law of the Bassa, a woman could as property only clothes and personal ornaments, which, after her death, go to her husband, or are divided equally among her children. Among the Bonu Jako of the Northern Congo the property is divided equally between son and daughter, while the girls, which while the latter inherit a life interest in the land which is covenanted to them, to the Nias, among the Dayaks and other jungle tribes of Borneo, there is a customary allocation of different classes of property to the widow, son, and daughters, the latter obtaining old boats, etc., while among the Dayaks the Chinese jars, which are highly valued, are divided equally among all the children. Artificial brotherhood and kinship frequently involve the rights and obligations of inheritance.

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INHERITANCE (Babylonian).—We must be careful not to assume the implications in English law of words used to translate into our tongue the legal terms occurring in Babylonian and Assyrian documents. The Assyrian civilization and customs were so entirely the same as those of Babylonia that they may be treated as one. The sense in which the term 'inheritor' is here used implies a right on the part of the inheritor to take possession, on the death of the possessor, in virtue of a personal relation between the 'inheritor' and the deceased.

The prime source of information as to inheritance in Babylonia is the Code of Hammurabi, which appears to have remained in force in the close of the 26th century B.C. down to the

1 Weeks, J.A.A., xxiii. 328.
2 Brown, p. 207.
3 1 Kings, i. 32, 33.
4 Ch. the Custom of Baba, p. 193.
5 letburn, p. 305.
6 2 Kings, iv. 46.
8th century. The almost endless legal documents which deal in some way or other with the practice of which the Code records the theory may be noticed as illustrations and occasional exceptions.

The rules as to inheritance differed with the status of the deceased possessor.

1. Father's estate.—On the death of a father his children divided and take equally. But real estate was often kept together and enjoyed in common. It thus constituted the bit abešu, his father's house, on which a son had claims of reverence and dower, and, if possible, to preserve intact and redeem if sold. When portions had been parted with by the family, by way of sale, lease, pledge, or inheritance, to distant branches, it was reclassifiable, and an heir had a right to exercise this power of redemption to the prejudice of another claimant's power to sell. If one son sought to sell his share, another had power to stop the sale by buying it in.

All estates were divided equally by agreement among the heirs, who executed documents asserting that they were satisfied and pledging themselves not to dispute the settlement. Each took a signed and sealed document setting out his items of his share and giving attestations of acceptance. In the case of real estate which could not be conveniently divided, as a house, pond, or even a place of revenue office, etc., the division was often stated formally and liquidated on some convenient sale, or one heir paid off the others. The division was subject to some reservations.

A father might give a child real personal property by executing a deed of gift explicitly defining its extent. In such a case the gift was not brought into 'hotchpot,' and the son so benefited could claim to share equally with the other children in the residual estate.

A father was bound to provide every son with a bride-price, or means to procure a wife, and usually set him up with his 'portion,' which would include both real and personal property. At the division of the residual estate an attempt was made to reserve for this portion already received in estimating the share that was to be taken, unless exempted by deed or gift as above. If a son was still unmarried at his father's death, the others had to reserve him a bride-price and then share equally with him.

A father was bound to provide a dowry for each daughter on her marriage, or on taking vows, if this were done with his consent or at his instigation. Apparently a daughter might take vows without his consent. In that case she was entitled to her dowry on his death. If a daughter was left unmarried, she was entitled to receive her dowry from her brothers and sisters, and in addition they were expected to find her a husband. The daughter's dowry was her portion, but her right in it was only for life, unless she had children, when it passed to them. If she died childless, it reverted to her family—brothers in the first instance, and their heirs after them. A deed of gift might convey real property as well as personal, the dowry usually consisting of the latter. In the case of women the brothers were usually satisfied with her gift. If not satisfied with their administration of her estate, a votary might appoint her own steward.

The sons and daughters, having grown up, been married, and therefore portioned off during their father's lifetime, were bound to maintain him in his old age. But for various reasons this duty might become burdensome to them or their ministra-

2. Mother's estate.—The same held for matutina nustenka for mothers and daughters. In fact, more evidence is available of cases where women, widows or vestals, nuns or votaries, adopted daughters to care for them in their lonely old age and succeeded to their estate. As a rule, women could not transmit estate which had come to them from their own family, but only what was given by their husbands, or purchased with their own money. In the Hammurapi Code expressly gives to a votary of Marduk power of testamentary disposition of whatever estate she received from her father. In some cases, a votary of some other gift did so dispose of real property, which she had received by will from another votary, who had in turn received from yet another. In those cases, however, there was a blood relationship between the women, as aunt and niece, etc.

In the case of a married woman who had inherited or divided what had come to her from her father on marriage, what she had been given by her husband, and whatever she had otherwise acquired during her life.

If, after her death, her husband married again, the children of such a second marriage had no share in her property, nor did her natural sons of her husband by a concubine or a slave wife, even though he acknowledged them as his. If she married again and had a second family, both her families together she had grown up and left the paternal roof. A wedded pair might adopt a child while they still cherished hope of a family. In such a case, they might stipulate in the deed of adoption that the child now adopted should rank as elder brother to the family, if they should have other children.

If a man acknowledged his natural sons by a slave woman during his lifetime, at his death they shared equally with his legitimate sons; but these took first choice at the division of property on his death.
property. In every case half-brothers and half-sisters shared in the estate of their common parents, but not in that of a step-parent.

If a woman died childless, all she had received from her husband went to her father, ‘bride-price’ which her husband had paid for her to her father. If her father had given her that, her husband could keep it; if not, her father or her mother had to repay it to her husband. But, if her father had given her the right of disposal, she could dispose of it where she chose.

A widow would be left in possession of what her husband had given her on marriage, but had only a life interest in it. She could not leave it away from her children. She had the right to live on in her husband’s house, which, however, she could not dispose of, as it must go to her children. If her husband gave her a gift on marriage, she continued to enjoy it; and, if not, she took the same share of his property on his death as a child of his would do, but it reverted to their children. If, however, she preferred to leave her husband’s house, she could return to her own family, but must leave her children the wedding gift she had from her husband, and could carry off what her husband gave her as a new home, when she chose.

But her children by the first husband, if any, retained the right to share equally with her children by the second marriage in her father’s gifts to her in the first marriage. So long as she lived she would enjoy it as her child’s portion of her father’s estate; on her death all her children shared equally. If she had no children by either marriage, it reverted to her former husband.

3. Slave marriages. —If a man married a slave woman, or, being married to a free wife, had natural sons by another woman, he could acknowledge their legitimacy in his lifetime, or, if he died without children, thereby adopting them as his own. Thus, it was possible for a slave to inherit the property of his master, or, after the death of his master, to live in his home and to have his property.

If a slave married a free woman, as well-to-do slaves often did, their children were free. They, of course, inherited the property and half their father’s, the other half going to his master.

The children of two slave parents were, of course, slaves. It appears that custom allowed them to inherit of free, from their parents and masters, if the same laws, but probably the master had a large share also.

4. Vowed women. —Some special features attached to the cases of women who were vowed to a religious life was given her portion as if on marriage, and her brothers were constituted her trustees. If her father chose, he could by deed make it her absolute property and she would enjoy it as she willed it; otherwise it went back to her brothers, like the portion given to a married daughter who proved childless. If her father died without giving her a portion as for marriage, she, like an unmarried daughter, would take an equal share with her brothers, and, whether she subsequently married or not, this would be her brothers’ on her death unless she had children to inherit it.

It is not altogether certain how the various classes of votaries should be distinguished, but in some cases where the father had not given a vowed daughter a share before his death she came in for only one-third of a son’s share at his death. Of this she had the life interest, and on her death it reverted to her brothers.

The votary of Marduk had a special treatment. If her father had not given her a share during his lifetime, she was entitled only to one-third of a son’s share of his personal estate. But she had always the disposition, except her husband, was entitled to two-thirds. Further, she was not responsible for the State obligations which such property usually carried with it. By deed of gift, her father might give her both real and personal property, over which she had absolute power.

5. Concubines. —The children of concubines were free, but did not inherit unless acknowledged. A father might give his daughter to be a concubine, and he might give her a marriage portion and the right of gift. But she had no share in his property on his death. If the father, however, made her no provision, her brothers were bound to give her a proper marriage portion.

6. Disinheritance. — Sons might be disinherit, but only by legal process. If a father intended to disinherit a son, the judges were bound to look into the story of the disagreement, and, if the son had not committed a serious crime such as could be held to justify disinheritance, they would forbid it. Even if the crime was bad enough to justify such a penalty, and the son was bound to pay it, the father and son on the first offence; but, if, repeated, disinheritance was permitted. The exact nature of crime which would be held sufficient to deserve punishment by disinheritance, or any other, was never stated. A man might fall into a natural crime, without the nature of the consequences. It would, however, certainly imply exclusion from share in the father’s estate at his death.

The child was expected to care for a parent’s old age was usually bound to perform certain duties of maintenance personal care. These were specified in the deed of adoption, and a failure to perform them involved the annulment of the deed. This was a cutting off from sonship which amounted to disinheretance.

The adopted son might be repudiated by the adoptive father. In the old Semarian Family Laws this was most heavily penalized. The father forfeited all his estates and the adopted son took them over. Whether this rule continued into the time of Hammurabi is not yet certain. The Code deals with a different case. A man might fail to provide a child to adopt as a son, and repudiate him when he grew up. If he did so, the young man had no claim, probably on account of the advantages he had already received and worked and reared a child and afterwards acquired a family of his own, he was not allowed to send away the young man empty-handed. He must give him one-third of a son’s share, but not of real estate. An artisan who adopted a son was bound to teach him his trade or handicraft, and there his obligation ended. But indentures of apprenticeship were often entered into which strictly defined the obligations of both parties, so that this form of adoption may be merely a legal fiction for apprenticeship.

A man who committed incest was cast off from his father’s house. This, of course, involved disinheretance, but was always more; it was outlawry also.


C. H. W. JOHNS.

Inheritance (Celtic). — As has already been indicated in art. Family (Celtic) and Crimes and Punishments (Celtic), one of the chief features of Celtic society was the existence within it of a social class, and this feature is conspicuous in the case of Celtic inheritance. The
succession to property is here essentially the continuity, with any necessary readjustments on the death of one or more of its members, of a society of joint-owners and tillers. For this purpose, Celtic society, as known to us from Irish and Welsh law in historic times, had been articulated and organized into distinct family groups within the wider group of the tribe (Ir. cendel, Welsh cenedl). In theory the land of the tribe belonged to the tribe as a whole, and doubtless originally the land was so held as a matter of fact, but in course of time, through the evolution of the definite family groups in question, the land of a tribe had come to be allotted in a regular customary manner, and, though inheritance still continued to be regarded from the collective standpoint, cases of liability through contract had often arisen which required the emphasizing of individual responsibility. In medieval times, side by side with the older system, much of the land even of Ireland had come to be held by individual owners. Since the Celtic legal system of Scotland was that carried over by the Dalriad Scots from Ireland, the essential features of Scottish land tenure can best be studied in the Irish laws, especially in some of its earlier phases, such as the original exclusion in Ireland of women from any right to succession. When the Dalriad Scots entered Scotland, the few concessions afterwards made to women in Ireland through the influence of the Church had not been made, and, in the custom of the Highlands, were never made under Celtic law.

1. Ireland.---1. General.---Lands of inheritance were in Ireland technically called orba lands. These belonged in theory to the tribe (cendel), and were divided among the members of the tribe, the tribal land had upon it the dwellings of its members, the share of the chief, which was tilled by his special tenants, portions in exclusive ownership (made as grants), and wider group cultivated by common tillage. The portions cultivated by common tillage would be divisible into those held by members holding through recognized family groups, notably the kinsmen and those held under the chief, as representing the tribe, by others. For the present purpose, the important portion of the land was that held by the recognized family groups (see Panmara [Celtic], called the gelfine, the derbines, the tarfinne, the delfine, the tarna, and the inda, respectively. The gelfine consisted of the group of agnates or male kinsmen comprised in the series father, son, grandson, great-grandson, and great-great-grandson; the derbines were a similar group commencing with the grandfather; the tarfinne with the great-grandfather; and the inda with the great-great-grandfather. Of these, the most important group in practice was the gelfine. This consisted essentially of a group formed of a father with his sons and their descendants, the father occupying until his death the main dwelling of the group, while his sons, beginning with the eldest, would, as they came of age and married, occupy dwellings of their own, until at last, on the death of the father, the youngest son occupied the original family dwelling.

On the division of the gelfine, a fraction of the property, usually one and one-eighth part, passed to the next in point of exclusiveness, viz. the derbines, whose division was made up of a quarter of the gelfine, which received two centuries, and the inda, which received one century. On the extinction of the derbines, a third of its property went to the gelfine, a portion of the other quarter went to the tarfinne, and the inda—since the derbines had one century, while the tarfinne had two. On the extinction of the gelfine, two centuries went to the derbines, the other quarter to the gelfine and the inda, i.e. a century to the gelfine, and one to the inda. On the extinction of the inda, a third of its property went to the gelfine and the inda, and one to the inda. The land held by the gelfine as land held by a community, or, to use the Irish technical term, as cohabite land. The gelfine held the land under claims of the society partly to the fact that it was a union out of individuals, but of householders with separate households.

The right of hereditary succession in the gelfine was not transmissible beyond the fourth generation of the descendants of the original acquirer of the plot of ground on which the gelfine was settled; the sons of the fifth chief or head had no right to allotments; and no more independent households could be formed. The youngest son of the fourth occupier had to divide the original holding, the land of the family was broken up among the members of the various independent properties. It is this that explains a reference to covenants relating to cohabite property, which the sixth century in Ireland confirm, while the power of confirming them was allowed his five immediate predecessors. He was disqualified, because the sixth chief of the family, in whatever way, would be the first who was not a representative of the rights of the original acquirer of the property.

It naturally followed from this system of tenure that a close restraint was placed on the alienation of property; and so we find that the head of a family who owned property could not part with it for his own purposes, to the injury of his descendants. A person's sons, in their father's land, had a sufficient right to restrain the latter to restrain the person of alienation. While the gelfine was in existence, the gelfine chief was necessary for the validity of contracts dealing with cohabite property and with the land of the main tribe, and more importance was attached to correct conduct in the part of members of the family groups in the matter of contracts.

Inheritance lands (orba), outside those which the gelfine had occupied, were called dioch lands. The latter term is a very difficult one, since it appears to be also used for the property that passed from a deceased co-owner to his nearest relative. It is usually supposed that in dioch lands, the heir of the deceased was not held to have succeeded him; and, in the latter sense, it is clearly used to describe the share of a deceased co-owner in cohabite land, when land of that kind passed by succession.

The term dioch seems to stand in opposition to cohabite rather than to describe any specific class of lands. It appears to call attention to the divisible character of land among various persons as tenants in common, and not the members of an associated group. The same land might conceivably be classed as cohabite or dioch, according to the standpoint from which the rights of the individuals holding it were regarded.

2. Tenantry.---This term (Ir. tanaisteach) comes from the Irish tanais ("next"), and refers to the Irish system whereby a king's successor was not his eldest son, but the oldest member of the family, or possibly one from another family. The term tanais was used for the heir-presumptive of a king.

3. Inheritance of suidir-tenants.---These tenants were mainly recruited from those members of the tribes who had lost land and kinship, and who were settled on the chief's share of the tribe-land. In the tribal system they were supposed to form a portion of the tribe, or family, group of the chief; but they appeared, at an early period, to have formed artificial family-groups, based on the principle of reciprocal liability, and among them the custom of the hereditary transmission of property came to be established. They do not appear to have been originally regarded as kinsmen for the purpose of paying compensation for crimes; but, if there were live houses of suidir-tenants, each household having a stock of a hundred cattle, and in receipt of some kind of head chief, they formed an association recognized as a part of a tribe. Each in that way shared in the common tribe-land (doluan), and paid compensation for the crimes of the poorer members of their separate organization. In their case, too, it was said that the father sold nothing to the prejudice of his sons, grandsons, great-grandsons, or great-great-grandsons.

4. Inheritance of an adopted child.---An adopted child (mac foama) could not inherit without the consent of the family. If the gelfine or the derbines had conjoined in the verbal act from which the
adoption resulted, and if the distant branches had not objected, the consent was presumed.

5. Inheritance through the mother.—Originally in Ireland a woman could receive only a dowry (feadhainn), not an inheritance. At the same time, a sister or a daughter of a member of the agnostic group who was married to a stranger with the consent of the tribe could obtain tribal rights for her son and daughter, as described in early Irish literature, La Famille celtique, Paris, 1905, p. 72). Among the Pictish kings there appears to have been a tendency for the crown to be transmitted to a sister's son (W. F. Skene, Chronicles of the Picts, Edinburgh, 1887, p. 7), and in the Welsh Mabinogi stories of Branwen and Math ap Mathonwy there are apparently echoes of such a practice even in Wales. The origin of this custom has been variously explained, but it seems clear that in this custom the vestiges of a decayed matriarchal system. It is possible that the marriage of an acceptable stranger into the tribe was regarded as a partial source of strength, and, accordingly, it would not be unnatural to see provision made for the incorporation of his sons in the tribe. The will was the instrument adopted in Ireland by fathers for enabling their daughters' sons to succeed them in the inheritances technically known as orbacrubocuasislanta. The property, however, which a daughter owed to a father's will was not indefinitely transmissible by her to her heirs, and, in fact, it was in the nature of a woman returning to her father's agnates. When property passed from a mother to her son, care was taken to see that there was a guarantee of concurrence in the payment of the composition for crimes, and also of the share in the private wars waged by the family.

II. WALES.—1. General.—The Welsh evolution of the tribe (cenodol) was essentially parallel to that found in Ireland; and, owing to warriory, it is clear that a form of the family group has been developed which was practically identical with the gafline of Ireland. This family group was known as a gweoly dit, "best"), and the land occupied by it was called tir gweolyg. The members of these family groups were called free tenants in contradistinction to the taxogians, or unfree tenants, of Wales.

On the death of their father or the daughters took nothing, unless there was a failure of male heirs; the sons divided the land among them in the following manner:

When brothers share the patrimony between them, the eldest is to have the principal homestead and all his father's buildings and eight acres of land, his boiller, his full hatchet, and his belt; because a father cannot give them there to any one but to the youngest; and though they should be pledged, they never become forfeited. Then let every brother take a homestead with eight acres of land; and the youngest son is to share, and they are to choose in succession from the eldest to the youngest (Aneurin Owen, Ancient Laws of Wales, London, 1841, I. 543; Wade-Evans, Welsh Medieval Law, Oxford, 1909, p. 320).

When the inheritance had been thus divided among the first generation of descendants, it was again divided among the grandsons, and again among the great-grandsons, after which time there was a brother's son who could be the heir for another.

The right to inherit the share of any deceased relative was not held by any one as a collateral heir of the deceased, but as a direct descendant of the original inheritors. The inheritance, however, stopped short at the fourth generation of descendents. The descendant of the fifth degree had no hereditary claim derived from his ancestor to any portion of the lands of inheritance. Consequently, kinsmen more distantly related than third cousins could not be heirs to each other in the matter of shares in lands of inheritance. On the failure of relatives within this degree, the land escheated to the king. According to the Venedotian (or North-West Wales) Code, the division between cousins-german and their children took place only if they wished to marry a person of inferior rank (Poon, 4c, 2. 11). It will be seen from the foregoing statement that the Welsh equivalent of the Irish gafline did not take into account the great-great-grandson; otherwise the two groups were identical, and are a clear proof of the parallel development of the tribal institutions of the two countries. In Wales there were special provisions for inheritance beyond the sixth degree in the case of the descendants of an exile. The process was called dadanbudd.

2. Succession through the female.—In Wales, as in Ireland, the son of a woman who was married to a stranger that joined her tribe was allowed, under certain conditions, to become a member of his mother's father's tribe, and to inherit along with the tribesmen. In N. Wales, the brothers of a woman who had a son in the tribe of a daughter's marriage were considered a stranger, while in S. Wales (according to the Dinention Code, II. cxxii. art. 7) a woman might inherit in the absence of a son. In a system of tribal law there was an obvious objection to female inheritance, because the property was to be transferred to the sons of the family, and, by marriage with strangers, to transfer them to members of foreign tribes. When the idea of female succession entered into a social system in Wales, the first situation was the emergences of the principle of absolute ownership, in place of the older conception of collective agnostic tenure. In Welsh law, the woman's counterpart to succession was the law of co-inheritance, by which a woman who married a man of another tribe and had children was entitled to an inheritance equal to that of her husband, and in which the property was divided into two equal portions, one for the wife and the other for the husband (Anonymous, Welsh Laws, London, 1841, I. 543). As a brother is rightful heir to his patriarch, so is his sister rightful heir to her paternal, through which she may obtain a husband entitled to land: that is to say, from her father, or from her co-inheritors if she remain under the guidance of her parents and co-inheritors (Anonymous, Welsh Laws, London, 1841, I. 543).

3. Succession to a kingdom.—The heir-apparent to a kingdom is called in the Welsh laws eIgig, a term borrowed from the English 'etheling.' He had to be either the king's son, his brother, or his nephew (brother's son).

LITERATURE.—See Literature under FAMILY (Colicic).

INHERITANCE (Egyptian).— Introductory.—The sources from which we gather our knowledge of this subject are of several kinds: (a) mural inscriptions (or isolated stele) from private tombs, hypogees of the feudal lords of the provinces, sepulchres of high Theban dignitaries, and funerary temples; (b) indirect information furnished by the official temple inscriptions; (c) graffiti; and (d) papyri, referring more especially to the six last centuries of Egyptian history—a more abundant source than any of the other three. Generally speaking, the sources known to us cover a period extending from the end of the 11th dynasty (Ameny inscription) to the Graeco-Roman period (to which belong the Greek texts, which have enabled Revilloud to find the exact equivalent for numerous Egyptian legal terms). As a matter of fact, however, we have no Co-inheritance information subject till about the Saite period. Before that, except in the case of the XIth dynasty, we have only conjecture and analogy to help us, rather than positive sources of information. Discoveries like the Kahun papyri and the more recent interpretation of Memphis inscriptions allow us to hope for better things in the future.

In spite of the inequality and the restricted number of our sources, and the many differences of opinion among authors on this difficult subject, we may give a certain number of sufficiently well-
founded details concerning inheritance (1) in the succession of the nobility belonging to the provinces or 'nomes' (2) in the priesthood; and (3) in private family law. As a preliminary, we might note that, as is the case with everything connected with Egyptian property, the question is dominated by a number of principles more or less fictitiously, yet theoretically, all land of the 'eminent' property belongs to the Pharaoh. Even the cessions that he has made by special act from his nominal right of property may always be recalled. This is a principle which was frequent and in fact often in the Oriental civilizations, with the same consequences.

1. Inheritance among the feudal nobility.—The largest amount of information regarding the laws of feudal inheritance is gained from the documents belonging to the Middle Empire, the theory of investigation being founded on the idea that the laws of the old nobility would preserve more clearly than the laws relating to ordinary private individuals visible traces of the rules of primitive society, and thus furnish a means of guessing what the Egyptian family was like in its origins.

Feudal inheritance must be divided into several different categories. The succession to the exercise of the law and to the position of head of the province, from an administrative point of view, is hereditary from father to son, but is subject to the provisions of the constitution. It bears with it also the inheritance of the princely prerogatives or laws peculiar to the feudal province. Such a succession is entirely distinct from the inheritance of goods, and is affecting the lordly domain. In this case, as is seen from the 'Contracts of Sint', for example, Egyptian law distinguishes between two kinds of property for which the hereditary rights are subject to (1) the private domain, and (2) the feudal fief. In spite of the lack of agreement on this subject resulting from the obscurity or the small number of the sources at our disposal, it would appear that the feudal fief is regarded as forming part of the succession to the dignity of head of the province, and is, consequently, handed down to the one whose investiture is confirmed by the Pharaoh. As for the private domains, the rule seems to have been equal shares for each of the children, carrying with them the same rights for sons and daughters, and again in turn for their sons and daughters.

It is a fact that the patrimony of a daughter is never fused with that of the man she marries, but passes intact to her child at birth. The child inherits separately from its father and from its mother—a characteristic which we find again in the laws relating to private inheritance (see below). This peculiarity of Egyptian law clears up a great deal of the mystery surrounding the difficult feudal inscriptions of el-Bersheh and Beni-Hassan, which have sometimes been interpreted (not without hesitation, however) as signifying that in ancient Egypt there were traces of an inheritance passing to the son of the eldest daughter. This, however, is a confusion arising from the fact that sisters have the same hereditary rights as their brothers, and can pass on these rights as heads of families to their own children. It is a mistake, then, to suppose that there is, in this connexion at least, any text which would suggest the existence of a matriarchate in ancient Egypt. On the other hand, all the acts and other documents known to us establish the independence of the woman in the disposal of her hereditary share, her equality with man, and the high rank that she holds in the Egypt of history. This generosely towards the woman, which is so apparent in feudal law, is found again in everything regarding succession in private family law.

2. Inheritance of priestly functions.—These do not pass to the eldest son by law. As a matter of fact, no charge or function of a priestly character constitutes a property which an individual can dispose of in another's favour de jure.

It is a mistake has been made in taking as a legal assertion of the exercise of this right a series of formulae like the following: 1 shall leave my property to my son, and after the death of the child, to the male heir of his line. This is frequently made, but is merely an ex nunc expression. An even more definite case would seem to be the office left to a son 'between his hands', as an inheritance for ever, but it is simply another example of the preceding. This is seen more clearly if we consider the case of the dead, who in their formulae of adoration make exactly the same promise to those who are faithful to their memory or to their tomb, as those in the office of the Pharaoh. They promise them 'you will transmit your office to your children as an inheritance for ever'. A thing quite contrary to which they have obviously no control whatever.

Legally, the 'titularization' in a priestly charge belongs to the king, as it does in the case of public functions. What really takes place in practice, however, is that the priestly functions are transmitted de facto to the members of the same family, and generally from father to son. The Pharaoh considered that this transmission was desirable, and regarded it as the legitimate reward of services rendered by the father. All the same, it remained a favour, even though the favour came to be the general rule. The formal proof of this lies in inscriptions like those of Rekh-mery, who mentioning that Siphab is handing over his father's charge to him.

3. Inheritance in family law.—The law relating to private individuals offers numerous difficulties, principally as a result of the scarcity of legal documents belonging to the ancient period of Egyptian history. The time of Amasis and the following periods, on the other hand, abound in testamentary acts or acts connected with inheritance, and the unearthing work of Petrie and the de domotic papyri has thrown a great deal of light on these times. For the preceding centuries, no definite statements can be made without the greatest reserve. The discovery by Petrie, however, of the splendid Kahun documents (XIth dynasty) enables us to give a far greater cohesion to the fragmentary indications furnished by certain stela and certain passages of the tomb inscriptions. The combination.
tion of these, already connecting, to a certain extent, the laws of the XXVIIth and following dynasties with those of the Theban and even the proto-Theban period, enables us to interpret the Muraphite mummies far more successfully than formerly, at least in their essential points.

The initial principle that the 'eminent' property always belongs (at least theoretically) to the sovereign (or to the lord of the province, or to the provincial god of the temple) lies at the foundation of every interpretation of the laws regulating inheritance. It explains the registering of testamentary or similar acts in the presence of representatives of the sovereign, the forms if probate, the ratifications given by officers of the crown, and also the mutation taxes collected by them. Revillout has proved at great length the ancient and permanent character of these taxes. As constant characteristics of these laws, we have: (1) the absolute equality of the rights of men and women to will and to inherit, (2) the equal rights of inheritance of all children, whether male or female, (3) the preference given to the eldest, but only as administrator of the real estate, (4) the heres sui character of each of the children, and (5) their rights preserved during the lifetime of the paterfamilias, in the acts disposing of real estate, either gratuitously or under burden of certain conditions.

The disposing of an inheritance is known by the general name of amitopi (lit. 'what belongs to a donor,' taking the Latin word to mean what constitutes 'the family estate'—buildings, gardens, lands, etc.). The exclusive meaning of 'will,' suggesting the idea of gift, did not exist until Graeco-Roman times. Maspero, and Revillout, was afterwards extended by the three last-mentioned to include various acts of donation, cession, constitution of usufruct, etc. The stability of the family unit of the society itself and the legal expressions referring to it have been established by tracing it back from the Saite period to the XIIth dynasty, and even up to a certain extent to the Old Kingdom.

The formality of registering the amitopi attested by the demotic contracts is proved to have existed as early as the Theban period by a passage of the great Rekhmara inscriptions (XIXth dynasty). An examination of the Kahun documents shows that it was in existence even in the XIIth dynasty. This registration of wills is often accompanied by an act of donation to one of the children of the will and to prevent future lawsuits. It consists in a copy or an extract from a copy being placed in the funereal temple of the king or prince to whom the testator is bound, on the one hand, by some function which he performs for him or by a royal pension, or on the other hand, by a religious endowment (analogous to the Arab. waqf). A good example of this is found in the Sommes stele, placed in the funereal chapel of Uadzamun. The copy may also be placed in the testator's own tomb.

The act regulating inheritance ought to be completed, if it is to have its full value, by the production of family registers (usapen), which are necessary to put the heir in legal possession of the property. These registers give an account of relationship, ownership, of the testator and of the legatee's right to inherit. They are submitted to legalisation by competent magistrates, and at the same time the Exchequer is enabled to levy the necessary tax on the deceased estate of the testator, a proving one's right to inherit by authentic documents (2), paying the tax, and (3) registering it. The inherent provisions of such a transaction, on public tablets, on pain of a fine of 10,000 drachmas, is a prescription from the time of the Pharaohs, going back at least as far as the XIIth dynasty, which is as far as our present research can take us.1

The pre-emminence of the eldest son, which has been definitely proved for the whole of the last period of history, from Amasis onwards, is supplied, and not without reason, to have existed from the earliest times,2 or at least from the time of the Kahun papyri.3 Revillout and Maspero have shown that this peculiarity of Egyptian law persisted in modern Egypt, especially in Coptic families, until the insurrection of the civil law emanating from Europe.4 Later, in the time of Nephertis, we find that the shares to be inherited are regulated by the father, who deals exclusively with his eldest son. He, in his turn, has to settle the claims of his younger brothers and sisters. It is he that administers the hereditary domain for the common good. He is responsible for the dividing of the revenue, as his father's will has decreed, into the shares due to his brothers and sisters and the usufruct instituted for his mother's benefit, whether by will, marriage contract, or act of registration during the lifetime of the paterfamilias, of the children. The eldest, as representing his mother, brothers, and sisters, is legally bound to defend their inheritance against strangers. He acts as ab, or 'master.' Revillout has proved that he had even the right to prevent the family property from being disposed of by his father in any way contrary to family law.5 This last point, however, has not been definitely proved. Generally speaking, the eldest seems to have taken the place of paterfamilias at the death of his father, administered the estate, pleaded in the law courts, and been generally responsible for the family estate to each of his brothers and sisters and other members of the family, including his mother, his aunts, and any children who were still minors. At his death the inheritance passed to the second oldest son, who must observe the clauses regarding the usufruct for the benefit of the testator's wife, which he accepted as binding by registered act. The shares to which the eldest was entitled does not seem to have been any way larger than that given to the rest, and the principle of equal shares seems to have been the rule down to the Ptolemaic period, when a law was made entitling the eldest to a larger share coming out of the rest.

In these rules regarding inheritance, we find the same Egyptian characteristic as in everything relating to property in general—the permanence and fixity of the domain (nsw) is set above the claims of individuals. The estate, as we find from the stele, is often preserved intact with the same name, personality, and boundaries for several centuries.6

Two examples of wills belonging to the XIIth dynasty will give us a good idea of the general scheme:

The last will and testament of... named Askharam. All my goods, in the gardens and in the town, are for my brother the priest... Uahun. Everything connected with them belongs...

1 Cf. Revillout, Transcriptions hiératiques (Égypte) p. 175, dec. 87, 88, 89, 90-92.
2 E.g., the Anten inscription and the information about it given by Maspero in his property, and the legatee's right to inherit. They are submitted to legalisation by competent magistrates, and at the same time the Exchequer is enabled to levy the necessary tax on the deceased estate of the testator, a proving one's right to inherit by authentic documents (2), paying the tax, and (3) registering it.
3 Cf. Kahun papyri (XIII dyn.).
4 E.g., the Amenemhat III inscription (XVIII dyn.).
5 Revillout, Dieux des Égyptiens (Égypte) p. 175, 87, 88, 89, 90-92.
6 E.g., the Anten inscription and the information about it given by Maspero in his property, and the legatee's right to inherit. They are submitted to legalisation by competent magistrates, and at the same time the Exchequer is enabled to levy the necessary tax on the deceased estate of the testator, a proving one's right to inherit by authentic documents (2), paying the tax, and (3) registering it.
7 Revillout, p. 99.
8 Ég., l'Égypte (1880) 91, 97 (= Pape, Leyden, 379).
9 J. P. Leyden, p. 99 (1880). 49.
10 J. P. Leyden, op. cit. At any rate it is certain that the father could not by post mortem disposal of property infringe the rules relating to inheritance.
12 Revillout, p. 87.
to the same brother. This was recorded at the office of the second conservator of Acts for the South district, in the year 44, in the 2nd month of Shonu, on the 12th day.

The above is an example of an elder brother's will giving his share to his brother full possession of an immovable estate of all that he had as a member of the common estate. The following is the will of Uahun himself:

The last will and testament of the priest... Uahun. To my wife... I bequeath all that was left to me by Anikrahun, all movable estate which I inherited from him, and any other gifts that I give to anyone of the children she has borne me. I leave her also four slave maids bequeathed to my brother, so that she may give them to any of the children she likes. With regard to the sepulchres where I shall be laid with my wife, let no one, whoever he may be, take away any part of it. Touching the buildings which my father constructed for me and where my wife resides, let no one dare to evict her from there. The Wall Shit will be my son's guardian. (Then follows a list of witnesses.)

Hereditary patrimony always seems to have been kept quite separate. The daughter has the same rights as her brothers. At her marriage, her share remains distinct, as far as we can gather from the contracts known to us. She still has the administration of it and bequests it, separately and with entire independence to her children. The husband may pass part of his property over to his wife, but only in the name of the children born or married to her. 

The marriage contract published up to date lead us to suppose that the widow might receive a usufruct by deciding marriage contract or after marriage. The dowry which is always known to have been the property during marriage was not subject to the 

rigorous rules affecting the family estate. In this case (as we find, e.g., in contracts of the time of Pharaohs) the dowry is not assigned at the time of the marriage, but is regularly paid in the name of the children that the husband will have or has had by his wife.

All that has been said so far concerns the inheritance of family estate exclusively, and has nothing to do with the transfer of an inheritance from any employment or office. This is regulated by a far more complicated law, of which we get some information by the inscriptions of the Memphite period like the nasab that, for instance, of Nof. Generally speaking, the divisible revenue from the fixed or casual income coming from the employment was equally divided, wherever possible, among all the brothers, the eldest son going to the eldest son to divide among his younger brothers and sisters. The remarkable concerning the priesthood (see above) apply to the inheritance of the dignity or functions of office properly speaking (distinct from its material advantages).

The double formality requiring (1) a warrant from the central power (the king, the feudal lord, or the temple administrations), and (2) the presence of the children interested at the signing of the act of partage, has given rise (as, e.g., in the case of testamentary acts or ante mortem acts of cession in connexion with the family estate) to abbreviations which describe the event, in a conventional way, in the form of frescoes or bas-reliefs, and may serve, in case of future dispute, to bear witness to the circumstances by which a transaction of any

1 Mapiero, Journal des Savants, Feb.-March, 1858.

2 This was separate from the indemnity, consisting of moveable estate (natums), money, or income, decided upon in the marriage contract, to be paid in the case of desertion or divorce.

3 This is the main cause for the case of adultery on the part of the woman (see Mariette, Egyptian).

4 C. Griffith, P.B.S.A. xxxi. 218; Revillout, Fréres du droit égyptien, I (1890), pp. 61-190.


7 The emblem or insignia by the paterfamilias, or the holding of a baton, a sistrum, a sceptre (hich), etc., or the wearing of some special article of dress by the inheritance son or daughter, serves in these cases as a sort of reminder of a codification which by long usage might have gone through in the past. There is still a great deal of work to be done in the way of interpreting a number of Memphite and Theban stelae and frescoes of this kind.

Of lawsuits or disputes concerning inheritance, the best example is found in the long inscription discovered by Loret, in 1864, in the tomb of Menthwebis in the temple of the Memphite under Eunennes. This functionary claims and finally obtains a piece of land, his right to which was disputed by relatives. It had been given to one of his ancestors more than a century before by the Pharaoh, who stipulated that it should be the common property of the whole family. The series of lawsuits over this lasted several generations, and exhausted every kind of trial and all the different methods of jurisdiction. An epigram will be found in Mapiero, RC (Nov. 1865, p. 249), of the masterly publication of these texts by Alan H. Gardiner (see Literature).

Inheritance (Greek).—The general unity of Greek law is seen in the rules governing inheritance, adoption, and participation in the blood. 1 Rights of property and succession were universally based on kinship and on the life of the family, in its extended form as yær (gene, clan); they were the outcome neither of caprice nor of policy directed by a legislator or Assembly, being the outcome of certain practices and religious in origin. These primitive ideas, and the rules to which they gave birth, were only slowly subjected to reconstruction as society developed. The course of this evolution consisted in the discovery or creation of the individual as the unit with which the State had properly to deal. In some departments the substitution of the individual for the group was carried out with logical completeness, but in others the older ideas were too tenacious of life and led to strange results. Naturally, our knowledge is chiefly confined to the details of Attic family law, but the Athenian rules were not necessarily in all respects the most admirable and enlightened.

The family property and family cult were conceived as forming indissoluble whole which was not perceptible to the eye and not spoken of as a distinct entity. Consequently the rules of law did not always correspond to the facts, and the one was not always the expression of the other. Under such a conception intestate succession within the family (des) was necessarily the rule, for there was no personal expression of will to direct the devolution of a body of rights and duties which could proceed only along lines sanctioned by immemorial, and

1 See Mitteis, Reichsrecht und Volksrecht, p. 72; ‘Es ist nicht eine Sonderstätte jedes Einzelnen, sondern das Recht eines grossen, weithinreichenden Nationen.'
Inheritance (Greek) 303

At Athens daughters had absolutely no rights of inheritance by the side of their father's sons; but their brothers were under obligation to provide them with a suitable dowry and to give them in marriage (Dem. xiv. 74).1

Failing limbs, will was thought a fair game (Wyse, The Speeches of Isæus, p. 650).

According to the letter of the Solonian law, a man with a legitimate heir of full age could not make a will at all, the devolution of his estate being entirely beyond his control (Pl. vi. 25). Whether he could have any legal means disinherit his son is not by will.2

Nor could be disregarded his daughter's rights (Ins. 41: ὁδὸς γὰρ ἐν ὕπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ συγγενείᾳ τοῦ γιατροῦ, ἐν τῇ συγγενείᾳ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ). Isaäus certainly speaks too strongly, as he practically asserts that the testamentary power permitted to a man, whose only legitimate descendants were girls, still unmarried, meant simply the appointment of their husbands, and did not include the right to bestow legacies outside his family. Usually, if a man wished to divert his estate from his next-of-kin, he would adopt the legatees in his will, with the essential proviso that he must marry the daughter; but it seems clear that he might, if he wished, bequeath her daughter. The original significance of a will being to enable a man without a son to adopt one, thus is effect also enabling him to defeat the anticipations of the next-of-kin, a will which adopted any other as his next-of-kin himself, and a further bequeathing both land and estates, and estates without at the same time adopting the devisee, challenged assault; and a perfectly legal will was always to be regarded as a remuneratory gift or grant of equity.3

If the estate was worth powder and shot, the gift would be more on the lines of a testamentary appointment, claimed at law as 'heirship' (heqaia) by the next-of-kin. Anyhow, the law was explicit that the estate could not be willed away from daughters, but must (Ins. 61) if it was in general usage for a man to try to divert his estate from his legitimate offspring on the one hand, or from his next-of-kin on the other. But custom, if not law, allowed him to give by will a special legacy to a son, even an illegitimate son, or to non-relatives or religious bodies, without such a legacy often being of considerable magnitude. Only the childless man of full age and in full possession of his faculties was at liberty to choose his own heir; and even he was powerless to thwart the application of the traditional rules of inheritance if the caprice of the next-of-kin tempted him to try his luck against the will.4

The right of inheritance of legitimate male descendants, including the son adopted inter vivos (see Adoption), was indefeasible, and was placed on a different footing from all other claims; for collateral and testamentary heirs must claim before the Archon (arkhénarchos), and get an order of him, or ultimately of a Bouleuspeis, before taking possession of the estate; i.e., they must accept their claim to public challenge (Ins. iii. 59). Sons of the body, or one adopted inter vivos, entered on possession without this want of process, and had us against a third party in actual possession an action of ejectment (εἴσωσις). On the other hand, lineal heirs could not escape the inheritance with all its collateral claims, whereas for all other heirs declination was possible.5

Rights of primogeniture were unknown in Greece, although an eldest son had by courtesy, as primum inter partes, a privilege of choice (σχευήσις). The law asserted the principle of equal division (Ins. vi. 25; τὸν υἱὸν κληρονόμον άρα τούτον τούτων τούτως εἶναι τούτων τῶν πατρίων); whether the sons were by the same mother or not was immaterial. If a married son predeceased his father, his sons were entitled to his share in equal parts; i.e., distribution was per stirpes.6

1 At Sparta in the 4th cent. B.C., if the story of the law passed by the Ephors Epitrepontes is true (Phyl. Arg. 5), this was possible.

2 Of the laws, esp. those leading up to the Law of the Dolphins (Law of the Dolphins, which only partially protected the will, see Ins. iii. 58.

3 Of the Speeches of Isæus, being all about claims to property, turn not upon evidence of its legal transfer, and the like, the doctrine is worked out in a way which does not correspond, inasmuch as at Athens.

4 In this line of development Isæus passed to the next of kin so that the son is not only not regarded as a heir, but also is not regarded as a heir. The law is then given in the form that the heir is the heir, in the form that the heir is the heir, in the form that the heir is the heir.

5 Of the use of ἐκτάσεις, one or more at Athens, and also at Athens.

6 At any rate there is nothing in the case of the estate of Isæus, where Isæus, in the absence of Isæus, in the absence of Isæus, in the absence of Isæus, in the absence of Isæus,
organization, perhaps designed to apply not originally to the traditional authority, but to distinctions of religious obligation towards the dead, and community in blood vengeance.

The death of the maxim πατέρα τοῦ δίκαιου was to split each family into two factions, the male excluding the female. Sons and sons' sons inherited before daughters and daughters' issue. Similarly, a brother's son, though a step further from the common stock, was admitted (the died child's father in the case), excluded his own aunt, the deceased's sister. This principle governed all successions, whether in the direct line or as between collaterals. But it has only within each in turn of the order of succession, so that a female in stock (1) excluded a male of stock (2). Thus, a sister of the deceased by the same father (Δηλόφρον δασμαγρεύει), he before his male cousin on the father's side (Δηλόφρον πατράρχα), because the son's daughter or issue from the same point on the stem, not being realized, male preference did not here operate; a female cousin on the father's side (Δηλόφρον πατραρχα) would, on the same principle, exclude the uterine brother (Δηλόφρον δασμαγρεύει). The law called to succession the paternal kindred down to and including first cousins once removed before admitting the maternal kindred. And these in turn ranked as follows: (1) uterine brothers, and issue; (2) uterine sisters, and issue; (3) maternal uncles of the deceased, and issue; (4) maternal aunts of the deceased, and issue; (5) first cousins' children. The symmetry of the table of orders of succession is intelligible; the real difficulty is to understand how precedence of males was so universally the principle of representation. Greek family law does not exemplify the interest or marriage of the widow by the deceased's brother for the purpose of perpetuating the line. The reason, as much, could not inherit from his husband, whose estate, failing lineal heirs, must pass to his father's or mother's relatives. An analogy to the levirate is perhaps to be found in Sparta, where a wife might be commissioned by her husband to bear children to another (Xen. Resp. Leg. 1.7; see M. P. Nilsson, Die Grundlagen des spätantiken Lebens, in Röfo, xili. 1912) 325 ff.).

Did Athens observe the 'monarchical succession of parents to the estate of deceased daughters'? A passage in the Code of Laws (xii. 30) seems to assert that under certain conditions a mother might succeed her son, and perhaps in his time the law was interpreted as containing an implicit recognition of her right; but the contradictory passage in the same speech (xii. 17.) That a father ranked before all collaterals has been deduced from the obligation of sons to maintain parents and grandchildren (Is. vii. 30); but this would be too much if it will bear any inference at all (cf. Ι. H. Littus, Das attische Recht, p. 157; H. Böckh, Abhandlungen, p. 195). If a man, having no son of his body, died without adopting an heir, leaving only a daughter (or daughters), she was in a peculiar position, in that she could not claim her father's estate, but was hereafter residing at law (είκοσι) by collaterals as an appendage there to (Is. x. 5). She was an είκοσιος 'on the estate,' and became the object of a claim at law (είκοσιος), in which a court of 3 decided who was next-of-kin and entitled to take her to wife (πυκνοκοιτα κεκοποιη, Is. viii. 31) with the estate.

The rules of succession to an είκοσιος followed those of intestate succession to the estate (ch. 50).

1 Would representation be possible when the division was amongst cousins' children, and so bring in the fifth generation, which fell outside the είκοσιος? When Isocles (xii. 12) says that male preference really began only with first cousins, he is simply misremembering (see Isocles, p. 560).

2 She might be, and is in fact generally was, related to him by blood.

3 And if the estate was the duty of the kings δυνατος πατεραρχος πατραρχα, he, the last dynast, the last, with the son's son, as δυνατος πατεραρχος πατραρχα, was not considered a man under the law (cf. H. Böckh, Aegyptische Sittensondernisse, p. 356). The law in respect of girls not yet married is not known.

4 The law in respect of girls not yet married is not known. The Gotthilfian Code permits the 'heirs' (ενδοτοι) to be divided into the male and female (ף' מנה שלמה), but this is not known. (cf. Aristele, Ath. Pol. 56. 7, fourteen was the lowest limit at Athens.

5 It must be borne in mind that a female, married or unmarried, without brothers or grandfather became είκοσιος on her father's death, though she had not a brother to succeed (and whatever her age), and had a claim as such upon the next-of-kin. The intention of the institution was important, and sometimes entailed serious consequences for the body politic (cf. Aristele, Pol. 1300A; κατ' ιηνείς είκοσιος εικοσιος, and in Hekatoma, in Phlaks, ib.). At Athens, Krimenes having died δυνατος πατεραρχος, his daughter got the estate (cf. H. Böckh, Aegyptische Sittensondernisse, p. 356).

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concerning the ἐπιλογὰς are a violation of equity' (Wyse, p. 609).

It seems that a man, on becoming entitled to an ἐπιλογὰς by the death of his wife, or at least by bestowing on another, in order to take advantage of his good fortune (cf. Dem. Iulii. 50: ἐπιλογὰς λαμβάνω σὺν ἐκφώνο). II. The interest of the Attic law of inheritance lies largely in its application of the rules governing primitive society to a democratic organization steadily drifting away from the old point of view. The Gortynian Code exhibits these principles as modified in a Doric oligarchical society.

At Gorty interstacy succession is the rule, for testamentary power is unknown, so that the Code in this respect is more archaic than Solon's laws. Male precedence is in force, as at Athens. The estate passes to the following series of heirs: (1) the deceased's children, grand-children, or great-grand-children; (2) his brothers, their children, or grandchildren; (3) his sisters, their children, or grandchildren; (4) failing these, it goes to 'those entitled (οἱ ἐπιλογίζεται ὡς καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφούς τότε τοὺς ἑαυτούς τοὺς τοὺς ἐπιλογίζεται), (5) failing a kinsman, to 'those constituting the next of kin' (τοὺς εἰκόνες τῶν κόσμων, i.e. the serfs on the estate, who are thus a man's heirs in the last resort).

The Code is in advance of the Athenian law in its treatment of women's property, although some have some rights in the house and its furniture, and the cattle, daughters share in the real property only, a daughter's share being fixed at half that of a son. (2) A woman has rights of several property absolute during her lifetime against both husband and children; (3) her property is transmitted in the same way as a man's estate.

The Code contains elaborate rules about the ἀναστάσεις (εἰκόνες τῶν κόσμων). Clearly the original idea of providing male heirs did not mean that the deceased could not be left less strongly than at Athens, and the pecuniary interests of the relatives override the conception of duty to the dead; in especial, the institution of the κόσμως, or chief beneficiary of the inheritance given to women by the Code. The Gortynian ἀναστάσεις is, in fact, a true 'heir', retaining her inheritance in severalty for life, and is not, as at Athens, a mere vehicle of the estate to her son.

The right to marry the heirless belongs to (1) her father's brothers according to seniority—if there are several ἀναστάσεις, the second brother is entitled to the first; if there be no brothers, the second sister, and so on; (2) if there are no living brothers of the dead man, the sons of the senior uncle claim their cousins in order of seniority; but any living uncle excludes his nephew, son, or grandson of a sister. There is nothing to show that the right to marry the 'heirless' passes beyond these to the other collateral; i.e., the conception of the ἀναστάσεις is less than at Athens. The rule is that the deceased carries his account with the ἀναστάσεις (v. 27: μὴ δὲν ἄναστῆται ὡς εἴρηθη οὖσα, πάλιν δὲ μή; i.e., if a compromise is accepted by him, he cannot go on to assert a claim to the next sister; but, conversely, compromise with the senior claimant frees the ἀναστάσεις from all. But, if there is no next-of-kin, she is required to find her husband among her tribe-mens, if possible—giving them the credit of being her 'heirs'.

The Code deals with the situations arising when one or other of the parties is too young to marry, or is unwilling to do so. Neither is, in fact, compelled to marry; the ἀναστάσεις may simply waive his claim, in which case it is open for the next in succession to assert it, or he may accept the legal indemnity of half the estate (which frees the ἀναστάσεις from his father's claims of next-of-kin). It rests solely with the ἀναστάσεις to decide whether she will marry or indemnify the others. The liabilities turn upon the presence or absence of children. (a) The married ἀναστάσεις is not compelled, but is at liberty, so separate from her husband: (1) if there are children who are intestate, all claimants are extinguished, and she may remain in status quo, or, by surrendering one-half of the estate to her husband, regain her freedom to re-marry within their tribe; (2) if there are no children, the rights of the next-of-kin operate, but, at the price of half of the estate paid to him who has first claim, she can either remain in status quo or separate from her husband and re-marry within her tribe. (b) In the case of a ἀναστάσεις who becomes a widow: (1) if there are children, rights of relatives lapse, and she may re-marry, if she pleases, within her lifetime, without penalty. (2) If there are no children, the first marriage is of non-effect, the rights of relatives revive, and she must either marry the next-of-kin or indemnify him, as before. The heirs 'must, therefore, marry under any circumstances; she is not free from that obligation through failure of next-of-kin or by indemnifying. Again, it is not until she has borne a child that she has fulfilled her duty wholly, and is then free. On the other hand, if children are not, as at Athens, forced into a distasteful union.

III. An interesting inquiry is as to what happened when this body of Hellenic legal principles came into contact with the laws of the East and Egypt, and finally with that of Rome. Especially interesting must have been the relations established in the great Hellenistic foundations of the Seleucids. The answer is given here by the Papyri (cf. Mitteil, p. 46 ff.). In the East the Syrian Code shows how the social structure was modified by the combined influence of Hellenic and Egyptian legal ideas in the early centuries of the Empire.

The Syrian Code, in its rules of intestacy succession, exhibits the following chief analogies with Hellenic law: (1) natural right of legitimate children to inherit the estate; (2) a succession of stocks; (3) male precedence; (4) equal distribution within the stocks; (5) rights of inheritance given to relatives of the deceased's mother on failure of the paternal side. On the other hand, the Code exhibits the following departures from the Athenian rule: (1) daughters rank with sons, and sisters rank with brothers of the deceased, for equal share; (2) his mother ranks with his brothers and sisters for an equal share with them; (3) yet issues of daughters and sisters inherit after the agnates; (4) i.e., after his uncles and their sons, but before his aunts and their issue. A fourth divergence would lie in the fact that, by the Syrian rule, the father inherits before brothers and sisters of the deceased—if it were proved that at Athens he could not inherit from a son.

The right of daughters to some share in the patrimony was already recognized in the Gortynian Code; but it seems probable that these divergences from the general Hellenic practice are due to the influence of Egyptian law, and the interference of the law of Constantine (see Mitteil, p. 343 ff.).

1 The date of the actual Code is perhaps not earlier than the 7th cent. B.C., but its basis is very much older. The sections concerning inheritance and heiresses seem to have been given to the code in a universal law on their subject, and to belong to the universal section of the Code (cf. v. 27: μὴ δὲν ἄναστῆται ὡς εἴρηθη οὖσα, πάλιν δὲ μή; i.e., if a compromise is accepted by him, he cannot go on to assert a claim to the next sister; but, conversely, compromise with the senior claimant frees the ἀναστάσεις from all. But, if there is no next-of-kin, she is required to find her husband among her tribe-mens, if possible—giving them the credit of being her 'heirs'.

2 The law says simply, 'parting the estate as laid down by law' (παραχωρεῖται τῷ εἶσόντειν, ὡς εἴρηθεν) and this might mean that in this case and in this particular section of the Code that the Code is an innovation in the Code by the fact that the retrospective limit of its working is given. The definition of a ἀναστάσεις in the same sense as at Athens.
INHERITANCE (Hebrew).—Our word 'inheritance' has no exact equivalent in Hebrew. The various terms which denote possession may be used when the possession comes in the way of succession to a person deceased. But, if this is the case, the context must show how the possession came. When we inquire of the documents in the Canon how this succession was regulated, we find no answer until we come to the latest period of the history. The oldest code of laws is silence, and, at the point where the patriarchal narratives reflect later conditions. The Biblical writers evidently supposed matters of this kind to be regulated by well-known family and tribal customs. For Israel's national stage, therefore, we are left to conjecture. Fortunately the customs of the desert are much the same in all ages, and conjectures based on the analogies of nomad life may claim a considerable degree of certainty. Individual title to land is unknown in this state of society, and personal property is small in amount. The man owns his arms, the woman her ornaments. The cattle, while nominally the property of the sheik, are really common to the whole clan. The spoils of war are divided among the able-bodied men. At a man's death his arms are seized by the next-of-kin, or are divided, like the spoils of war, among the men able to bear arms. Women do not inherit, because they are themselves the property of their husbands and pass to the heirs with the rest of the estate. This was the rule in Israel even after the settlement in Canaan. Manannam's regulation, giving a daughter half as much of the estate as went to a son, was an innovation on the earlier custom, according to which none could be heirs who did not take part in battle. In the nature of the case Hebrew custom must have been the same.

Israel established itself in Canaan partly by conquest, partly by amalgamation with the older inhabitants. So far as the arable land was acquired by conquest it was treated like other spoils of war. Each family group assigned portions for tillage to its able-bodied men, but without relinquishing title. On the other hand, we must suppose the Canaanites to have had private property in land. The cultivation of the vine and olive is hardly practicable under any other system. Light on this point in this period may be got from present custom in Palestine. Here we find private ownership of part of the land, and along with it communal ownership of another part. The land ofiks is laid out in portions of equal value, and then assigned by lot to the cultivators. The frequency with which the lot is spoken of in the OT indicates some such system of allotment. But private property in land is also indicated. Na. 35:4, refused to sell his vineyard, and the narrative shows that there were no restrictions on his title. The patriarchal stories represent Abraham and Jacob as buying land from the earlier inhabitants.

While we suppose that private property in land was fully recognized in this period, it is probable that the right of inheritance was limited to male kinsmen. There is no clear case of women owning land before the time of the Exile, though they had legal possession of property. The mother of Michal saved a considerable sum of money, and her title was recognized by her son. Abigail brought five slaves to David, though this seems to have been the whole of her fortune. Rachel and Leah each received a slave girl from her father. The case of Achan, who is said to have received territory from Caleb, forms no exception, for Achan is only the eponym of a clan. Laban's daughters, just referred to, say quite frankly that there is nothing for them in the house of their father, and that he has sold them and eaten up the price. The language shows conclusively that at the time when these stories were written daughters had no claim as heiresses, and that the most they could hope for from a generous father was some part of the price that he had received for them. The difference between which the Hebrew writers represent the widow as an object of charity indicates that widows were without claim on the estates of their husbands.

The dormant rights of the clan naturally reasserted themselves when a man died. But in the period of the monarchy it probably came to be recognized that the sons were the rightful heirs. Gifts by the father during his lifetime were specified as valid, if we may argue from the conduct of Abraham towards the sons of his concubines. But the inheritance went to all the sons—there was no difference between the first-born and the rest. The sons of Zilpah and Bilhah are on the same footing with the sons of Rachel and Leah. This was always the theory, and we may venture to adduce the Biblical parallel. Here we read, if a man recognizes the son of a slave woman by calling him 'my son,' that son is entitled to a share of the estate. In Hebrew practice the son of a slave woman often suffered injustice. The expulsion of Ishmael is an illustration, and so is the banishment of Jephthah by his brothers.

The first-born son had special rights. The law in Deuteronomy, which probably reproduces ancient custom and guards it from abuse, is as follows: When a man has two wives, one beloved and the other hated, and they bear him children, if the first-born belong to the hated wife, then in the day in which he gives the inheritance to his sons he shall not be allowed to treat the son of the beloved wife as the first-born instead of the son of the hated. He shall recognize the first-born (son of the hated) by giving him a double portion of whatever he has; for he is the first-born of his strength and the right of the first-born is his.
blessing to Jacob, and where Jacob in turn pre-
fers Ephraim to Manasseh. The Chronicler be-
lieves that the birthright was taken from Reuben
and given to Joseph. All these stories are the
reflection of tribal relations, but they show that
the transfer of the birthright was not a strange
conception to the writers. We are now here told
that the double portion given to the oldest son
was to be held in suspense to be given to the widow
and the younger children, though this has usually
been assigned as the reason. That the dependent
members of the family passed into the care, or
rather into the possession, of the heir, we have
already had occasion to note. The right of the
first-born son of a king to succeed to the throne
was not necessarily a part of his prerogative, as
we see in the case of Solomon.

In default of sons the patriarchal system makes
the brothers inherit, and after them uncles, that
is, father’s brothers. Next come cousins in the
various degrees, always on the father’s side; for,
the women being excluded, their descendants have
no rights. The Hebrews, however, always felt it
to be a misfortune that a man should have no
son to succeed him. The root of this feeling must be
sought in the antiquity of the custom. The spirit of
a man is left without sustenance and honour if he has no son to pay these dues. To
prevent the name from being blotted out, custom
called for the levirate marriage, and, as in
other cases, the custom was finally embodied in
the written law. Deuteronomy is specific on this:

1 When brothers dwell together, and one of them dies leaving
no son, the wife of the deceased shall not be given to a stranger.
Her brother-in-law shall come to her and take her to him for
wife and perform a brother’s duty. And her first-born shall
succeed to the name of the brother who is dead, and his name
shall not be blotted out from Israel.

How seriously the brother’s duty is taken is made clear by this story in the book of
Genesis, where the reason given for Onan’s early death is his refusal to raise up seed to his brother,
and where, also, it is held that Tamar, when re-
 fused another husband, is justified in taking a substitute by
deception. In Deuteronomy the recalcitrant brother is put to open shame by the
ceremony of pulling off the shoe.

On the death of a man under discussion is a survival from the time when a man’s wife went to the
next-of-kin. In fact, the levirate was the duty,
et not of the brother alone, but of the next-of-kin, whoever he might be. So Judith was the one upon whom the duty devolved when her husband was in
default. This is also the theory of the book of
Ruth. Ruth offers herself as a wife to Boaz in
the belief that he is next-of-kin to her deceased hus-
bond. Boaz informs her that there is a nearer
kinsman, and he takes her only after this other has refused. Here the connexion with the right
of inheritance is made clear by the statement
that the kinsman has the right of redemption of
such real estate as belonged to the deceased, the
wife going with it. The book is not altogether
clear, because it does not give the first-born son to the
deceased; but in its general conception it agrees with
what we have a right to expect. At the present
day it is Jewish custom to release the brother from his duty.
The subject has a place here only so far as it throws light on the Jewish idea of property, and what was in force so
long as it was thought necessary for a man to have a
male heir. When the right of daughters to
inhere was recognized, the law forbade the
marriage of a woman to her brother-in-law.

The device of adoption, by which a man who has
no heir of his body begotten takes a child from
another family to be his son, seems not to have
been much in use among the Hebrews. Where Abraham expects his slave to become his heir,
however, we think of the slave as having been made a ‘son’ of the clan. In the patriarchal
period we find also the recognition of Ephrahim and
Manasseh by Jacob, which may be called an
adoption; and the reception of Moses into the
family of Pharaoh shows the idea not to have been
unknown to the writers of these stories. At a
later date one of the genealogists tells of an Hebrew
who had no son, and who gave his daughter to his
Egyptian slave to wife, and the children were
counted in the Hebrew line. None of these cases
are adoptions in the historical and Biblical sense.
The right of the first-born son of a husband to
inhere was brought up by Mordecai, came to him not by
adoption, but as his ward by the ordinary law of
inheritances. The declaration of the book of
Proverbs, that a maid may inherit from her mistress,
is too slight to build upon.

We come to a time, finally, when daughters are
allowed to inherit. It would not be strange to

discover that the idea that a woman holding property
rose in connexion with the clan sage. When
the clans were brought into genealogical relations,
those who had feminine names appeared as daughters of the clan.

In all the cases to which we have referred, the
name of the clan was that of the mother, not of the father.

The evidence is that the patriarchs had given portions to daughters as well as to sons.

We must suppose the daughter to have been an heir in the Promised Land, the
Daughters of Zelophehad came to Moses informing
him that their father had died, leaving no son.

In consequence they fear that his name will be blotted out,
for he will receive no portion in the coming
division of the land.

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next-of-kin. In fact, the levirate was the duty,
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male heir. When the right of daughters to
inhere was recognized, the law forbade the
marriage of a woman to her brother-in-law.
daughters are obliged to marry within their own tribe or clan, which has seemed a hardship. It hardly seemed an innovation, it became widespread. Job gave his daughter portions along with his sons, and the author of the last chapter of Proverbs found it natural that a capable woman should buy a field with the earnings of her own hands. Written testaments are nowhere spoken of in the OT, but it is assumed that a man about to die would dispose of his estate by will. So Athithophel gives orders concerning his house before committing suicide; and Itzeziah, when dangerous illness is advised to regulate his affairs.

The last words of a father to his sons would naturally couple advice and admonition with directions concerning property. Hence the character of the testament (though not so called) put into the mouth of Jacob. Ben Sira recommends, that one distribute his goods at the end of life, but not earlier. It is not certain that a will or testament is intended in any of these passages, or in the passage in Tobit sometimes cited in this connection.

The latest portions of the Pentateuchal legislation that limiting the right of testamentary disposition in accordance with the theory of divine ownership. The land being Jehovah’s, and assigned by Him to the various tribes, it should be kept in perpetuity, in possession of those tribes. To this end no man was to have the right of disposing of his property to any one but the next-of-kin. Moreover, in case he were driven by poverty so to dispose of it, he could have a lease for the time to the next Jubilee year, when it would revert to him or his direct descendants. The basis of this regulation is probably the old clan order by which the individual held only what was assigned him by the community. When dangerous illness is advised to regulate his affairs, it is assumed that, when land was sold, it was offered first of all to a kinsman.

Whether a criminal forfeited his property rights is naturally told us. When Naboeth was executed for blasphemy, his estate was seized by the king; but this may have been simply an act of tyranny, and without authority of law or custom. If we argue from Achan’s case, the man guilty of sacrilege had his property destroyed with himself. What became of his lands when he had any is not clear. We should expect them to be forfeited to the temple, as ‘devoted’ to the divinity.

LITERATURE.—The Hebrew law as understood by the traditional authorities is formulated in the Talmud braksheth Saba Bitha and Pemethut. The most thorough discussion and one still valuable, is in J. S. Uffendorf’s ‘De Successionibus ad Legem Hebraicae in Etymologiae Lexicographicae,’ in his collected works, London, 1776, vol. ii. 1-76; J. D. Michaelis treats the subject with his usual learning in his Rechts- u. Geschichte, Frankfurt, 1770. (Eng. tr., Commentaries on the Laws of Moses, London, 1814.) §§ 77-80 and 95: L. Levy, La Famille dans l’antiquité isnotratique, Paris, 1880, and Familiennsnent der Hebräer, Munich, 1809, give good summaries of what is known on the subject. On the levirate, see S. R. Driver's commentary on Dt 25:10, where other literature is cited. The customary relation between parents and son is described by E. Baudouin, in the Synagoga Judaicae, i, 1805, § 12; and G. Bodenmann, in the Schriften zur Verfasstung der heutigen Juden, Erlangen, 1744, pp. 145-150. Heterosex may be made also to the articles (ibid.) in ‘Bibl.,’ in ‘EB’ and ‘EHR,’ in ‘FEB,’ etc., and the various ature rules, such as ‘Heir,’ ‘Inheritance’ in ‘JER.’

H. Preserved Smith.

INHERITANCE (Hindu).—The rules of succession as developed by the Brahman lawyers of India, may be described as to some extent a spiritual bargain in which the right to succeed to another depends on the successor’s capacity for benefiting that person by the offering of funeral gifts (sacrifices). Thus the term saviqida, which is commonly used to denote a kind of peasant or vassal, means literally a relation connected through funeral oblations of food, such as a ball of rice (pippada). The more remote ancestors, viz. the great-grandfather, his father and his sons are offered only the fragments of that ball of rice which remain on the hands of the offerer, were therefore called ‘partners of the wrappers’ (lepa-bhadra). The relationship of vineda, on the other hand, is connected by the mere offering of food, said to extend to the fourteenth degree. In a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, it was declared that ‘there is in the Hindu law a connexion between their religion and their succession to property, that the preferable right to perform aridhaka is commonly viewed as also governing the preferable right to succession of the aridhaka and the indivi-vid (in India, 1792-1823) observes (Hindu Manners, p. 374) ‘that the right of inheritance and the duty of presiding at the obsequies are inseparsable from one from the other. When, therefore, the grandfather dies without direct descendants, a crowd of remote relatives appear to dispute with each other the honour of conducting the funeral rites. The contest is occasionally carried on in courts of law, and it is said that the body of the deceased is in a state of complete putrefaction before a definite settlement of these many pretensions is arrived at.’ And so an old Sanscrit author remarks: ‘The dead man’s wealth presents the funeral obligation, and a son shall present the funeral oblations to his father, even though he inherit no property’ (Institutes of Vives, xx. 44, 631). The spiritual efficacy of the spiritual idea is further developed and relied on as a corroborative argument in favour of certain exceptions of the facts on inheritance, in the Dvayaka family and other leading works of the Bengal School of law. The Mitakshara, on the other hand, which is the leading authority on the law of inheritance for the majority of the Hindus, explains the term saviqida as denoting one of the same body, i.e., a blood relation, and gives it a narrower definition than any other principle than propinquity, or proximity of birth, as regulating the order of succession. Nevertheless, the connexion between the right of succession and the obligation to offer the customary funeral oblations (saviqida) may be supposed to have constantly presented to the Hindu mind. The widow, in particular, who succeeds her husband’s property on failure of male descendants, is enjoined to offer up the regular oblations to him at stated times. The religious element enters largely into the Indian law of inheritance in other respects besides the general rules of succession. Thus civil death i.e., the exclusion of a man from his caste on account of some offence or breach of caste rules, has the same consequences as natural death, and causes the property to pass to the next heir in the same manner, i.e., to devolve on his heirs, and himself to lose the capacity to inherit any property devolving on him. Civil death is now inoperative, as loss of caste, according to an Act of 1850, does not affect a man’s civil rights. Spiritual relationship is recognized as well as blood relationship, the pupil succeeding to his spiritual teacher and vice versa. No relative can, as a rule, claim a property acquired by a man during the time he was a samadhi (ascetic), it is taken by one of his disciples, who should perform the funeral rites according to custom. The succession goes either by nomination by the previous
INHERITANCE (Jewish)—The Jewish law of inheritance based itself on the Biblical regulations (on which see W. H. Bennett, art. "Heir," in HDB II. 340). In the Rabbinic Code these regulations were systematized, and the accepted principles are given in the Code of Maimonides (Hilkhot Nezikin, Nahaloth) and Joseph Karo (Hoshen Mishpat, §§ 250-258 and 276-280). In modern times, Jewish practice naturally conforms to the civil laws of the States in which Jews are domiciled. So far as the older Rabbinic laws are concerned, the rule of inheritance may be summarized as follows:

The order of succession in intestacy is: first, sons (oldest son taking a double portion), their descendants; daughters, their descendants. Falling issue, the father succeeds, then brothers (Wiss. Bab. Bathr. vii. 2), sisters some after brothers and their descendants (§ 6). If a son dies in his father's lifetime, his son (or sons) is appointed to his father's share in the estate of his grandfather (Bab. Bab. Bathr. 123). A man is his mother's heir, the husband is the wife's heir, but the wife is not always his wife (iv. 8). If the wife has, however, her dowry. illegitimacy is no bar to inheritance or transmission. Recognition by the testator is thus made no proof that children are his (iv. 9). Hotchotzoy was not recognized in Jewish jurisprudence (iv. 3). (M. H. Hayman, Monassarot u-Shmorotenu Loqm Koliov. London, 1918, p. 161; cf. J. H. Greenstone, in JER I. 250.)

The owner of property could not depart from this order in bequeathing by way of inheritance, though he could do so if he bequeathed by way of gift. The law of testamentary succession, as laid down in the Bible (Nu. 27:8), is not always, and any attempt made by the owner of property to bequeath it as an inheritance to those who would not naturally inherit it is null and void. No one can be made an heir except such persons as are mentioned in this Biblical law; nor can the property be lawfully divided from the heirs by the substitution, either orally or in writing, of some other persons (Bab. Bab. Bathr. vii. 6); but the owner of property has such control over it that he may dispose of it by sale or gift to any person, to the exclusion of his heirs. This important distinction, therefore, must be noted, that a bequest by way of inheritance to persons other than the legal heirs is null and void, whereas a bequest by way of gift is valid (W. Amram, in JER II. 43).

The Rabbis, however, regarded with much disfavour by the Rabbits (Bab. Bab. Bathr. 123; Keth. 53a), and it was very unusual for the owner to depart by bequest by way of gift from the order of succession (see L. N. Deutsch, J. Am. 31), J. F. B. of the Qur'ans (J. Furst, Gesch. des Geschichtslehrers, Leipzig, 1855, i. § 9) gave the daughters equal rights with their brothers. Nevertheless, in the Pharisaic scheme the daughter had ample rights for maintenance while unmarried. Very significant is the decision of Admon (first half of 1st cent. A.D.)—a decision confirmed by Gandelman's grant of land by Hindu princes and noblemen, their property being vested in the preceptor or head for the time being, generally called mahapat. Though many of the Rabbis were learned doctors, or were not even versed in the first principles of their religion, the acquirement of wealth by trade being their great object, the old rule of succession remains, and the property passes by inheritance to those who does not fill the office. It is devoted to the maintenance of the establishment, but the superior has large control over it and is not accountable for its management.

The two principal Sanskrit treatises on inheritance and succession on which the law as administered by the British Courts of India is supposed to be based are the Manaschari and the Dattayogapa. Oxford. The English translation of these two works was first published in 1810.

Inheritance laws in general The law of inheritance is one of the oldest and most important in Jewish law. It is based on the principle that the property of a deceased person should be passed on to his heirs in accordance with the will of the deceased or, failing a will, the laws of intestacy. The laws of inheritance are important because they affect the distribution of property among the heirs of a deceased person. The laws of inheritance are also important because they are based on the principle of the unity of family and community. The laws of inheritance are a reflection of the values and beliefs of the Jewish community, and are an important part of the Jewish culture. The laws of inheritance are also important because they are a reflection of the values and beliefs of the Jewish community, and are an important part of the Jewish culture.
... or—and this is significant to a disciple (cf. Bah. Bab. Bathra, 116). In particular, it was the father's duty to ensure that the inherit-
ance was passed on through the generations. This thought was based on the example of Abraham. 'I have known him, to the end that he may command his children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord, to do justice' (Gen 18). And, further, he who teaches his son's son is esteemed as though he had himself stood at Mt. Sinai, a personal participant in the original revelation (Ex. 20, Deut. 5).

From the text in Genesis just cited was derived the custom of Jewish fathers writing for their children an ethical testament containing moral instructions; and these testaments were an honoured heirloom (see I. Abrahams, art. 'Jewish Ethical Wills,' in JQR iv. 1881, 436).

For the part played in Judaism by the conception of the child's inheritance by the father's male see S. Levy's volume on Original Virtue and Literature, 1907.

ABRAHAM.

INHERITANCE (Roman).—As compared with the Greek, two features in chief distinguish the Roman laws of inheritance taken as a whole: (1) the testament, a relatively extended, power of devising, by the testamentum talis custos or the testamentum in procul, i.e. the recognition of the individual will as a decisive factor in the ascertainment of the group; and (2) the peculiarly Roman conception of the paternal relationship, the patris potestas.

In the regal period the estate of a paterfamilias was vested in his heir or his descendant as were 'under his power' (in potestate) at the time of his death and became by that event sui iuris. Such were his sons and grandsons (unless they were no longer subject, through emancipation), his daughters (unless they had passed by marriage into manus of their husband, i.e. into another family), and his wife in manus, and, therefore, standing loco filiae. All these were styled sui heredes, 'self-heirs,' as having an inherent right dormant during the father's life. All, including the widow, took an equal share. Failing sui heredes, the gens of the deceased inherited. Of primogeniture there is no trace. Heir from the first the father was able to regulate the succession by testament, if he cared to do so, within such limits as recommended themselves to his peers in the Caria.

Sui heredes, like other agnates as such, was perhaps established by the XII Tables, so as to bring both plebeians and patricians under the same law as far as possible.

Sukkia, a man's agnates were those of his collaterals who were under the same patris potestas as himself, or would have been had the common ancestor been alive. His children (whether of the body or by adoption) in potestate, and his wife in manus, being loco filiae, were mutually agnates; but a wife in manus, or a daughter who had passed in manus mariti, or emancipated children, were not their agnates, nor were they sui heredes to the father—for the tie of the potestas was broken (and in the case of the wife not in manus had never been created). So a man was agnate to his brothers and their children (assuming that there had been no separate minorities on either side); but not to his sister married in manus or to her children, 'for she had become a paterfamilias' (having become agnates of her husband's relatives).

In the absence of a will, succession was now open to the agnate heirs ab intestato (law: 'fi intestato moritur cui suus heres nec esset, agnatus proximus familium habet'). How far the agnates circumscribed is not clear. The order of suc-
cession was established by the XII Tables, as follows: (1) sui heredes; (2) the nearest agnate or agnates; (3) the gens as a body—this last possible only in the case of a patrician. The law of Justinian made a further provision that only the nearest agnate (or agnates of the same degree) could claim, so that, if they declined, the next in degree could not take the estate, and, further, that no female agnate more remote than a sister could inherit.

Sui heredes, whether instituted by will or taking ab intestato, could not decline the inheritance because of the daughter (hence they are called heredes seminum) but a stranger instituted by will, or an agnate heir ab intestato, could reject the inheritance.

The interpretation put upon the clause in the XII Tables—'ubi legatus super pecunia tutelave sui, in sui sequatur, i.e. in order to have together with the growth of that form of testament called per se et librum (originally not a testament, but a fictional substitute for one) made the testator's will supreme, even to the extent of dishearing his sui heredes in favour of a stranger he selected by will, or an agnate heir ab intestato, could reject the inheritance.

The decision of the praetor in the case of the agnates of the old ius civile, it put descendants (liberi), including the wife in manus, sons and daughters of the body whether in potestate or emancipated, and representatives of predeceased sons and adopted children who were in potestate of the deceased when he died; (2) legitimi iurati, i.e. the nearest collateral agnates; (3) cognates, i.e. a class not being precisely defined; (4) survivor of husband and wife. It was open for these classes in turn to petition for honores possessio; but it was for them to maintain the grant, it was any who claimed as heir according to the ius civile.

The above changes were in part the outcome of the doctrine of the ius naturale as embodying a higher ideal of justice than that of the old . The process was carried further in the Tertullian senatus consultum in Hadrian's reign. This gave pre-
ference to the mother over all agnates of her deceased child, except father, brother or sister, father and brother excluding her; but with a sister, and falling father and brother, she shared equally. This right was confined to women with the ius liberorum, i.e. free women who had borne children, or freedwomen who had four. In A.D. 173 the Orphi-

tian senatus consultum gave legitimate or illegiti-
mate children a prior right over all her agnates to succeed a mother. The Code of Justinian made her a mother's right of succession independent of the ius liberorum, and extended that of a daughter or sister to her descendants. In his 118th and 127th Novellae, Justinian wiped away the rights of agnates entirely, except as regarded adopted children, and settled the orders of succession purely on a basis of blood-relationship: (1) descendants of the intestate, male and female alike taking

1 Division between agnates was per annus et agnatus... In the case of a tree reliance his patres and his children took the place of agnates.

2 There were two other forms of honorum possessio—centra tabularum, practically setting the will aside, and ab intestato.
INHERITANCE (Teutonic) — For the last sixty years this subject has been a prolific source of controversy, which at present shows no sign of abating. Thus, it is not decided whether the right of inheritance was originally limited to the near family, or whether the wider kindred reserved it for themselves. The organization of this wider kindred is still a matter of debate, and scholars are not yet agreed as to whether matrilineal inheritance prevailed at the beginning of our era among the Teutons, or whether inheritance fell exclusively to males descended through males. A few facts, however, are clear. The Germanic (Germ. 265) tells us that the Germans had no system of testamentary dispositions, but that they had rules of intestate succession; and his statement holds good of almost all Teutonic countries until far into the Middle Ages. The heir, as some of the laws tell us, is born, not chosen. Adoption during lifetime is the only way of selecting an heir, and this proceeding is hedged about by restrictions. It is permitted only if the adopter is without near kinship of his own, as in the case of the Frankish affotamony and the Langobardian elaim; or else the amount which may be bequeathed to an adopted son is limited in subject to the consent of the legal heirs or kindred (Scandinavia).

Wills, which were introduced by the Church under the influence of Roman law, made their way slowly only, and even the ecclesiastical institutions, which would otherwise have been debarred from receiving bequests of land. In most Teutonic countries such bequests were of necessity given to the Church, and were thereby subject to the consent of heirs or kindred. Among the Frisian inhabitants of the little island of Wangerooog, testamentary dispositions were almost unknown far into the 18th cent., the children, or, in their absence, the nearest kinmen, succeeding automatically by the 'common kinmen' of the parties concerned.

The principle of primogeniture appears to have found no place in ancient Teutonic society. Theetes says (loc. cit.) that the children inherit, he in latter times (with the exception of the feudal nobility) the all the sons, at least, had an equal claim to inheritance. Where there are two heirs, the division of the share usually devolves on the eldest, the younger having the right of choice between them. In the case of a number of heirs, the matter is decided by the casting of lots after the eldest has divided the shares among all the sons or other heirs is still common in many parts of Teutonic Europe, and this feature survives in the Kentish gavelkind.

In many parts, however, the farm is not divided among all the children at the father's death, purely economic reasons or in order to facilitate the collection of dues or taxes. In such cases the farm is either held in common by all the co-heirs—a system which seems to have been common in England before the 16th cent. when the son is allowed to purchase it at a price quite irrespective of its market value, but calculated not to be an undue burden on the farm. This system persists in Schleswig-Holstein. Sometimes this right of purchase is granted to the eldest, but more often to the youngest son, the idea being that, while his brothers have had time to set up establishments of their own, he does so, but has remained with his parents. In the custom known as Borough English, still prevailing (in the case of intestacy) in certain English districts and boroughs, the youngest son inherits land to the exclusion of all the other children.

The inheritance of real property is often limited to males, especially in the case of ancestral land such as the terra avitatica, which appears in the earliest Frankish (riparian) law, and the Norwegiam odal. Frequently the son excludes the daughter, but she inherits in his absence. In other parts—Denmark and Friesland, for instance—receives half as much land as the son. Low Saxon law gives preferential treatment to sons; but, as soon as an inheritance falls to collaterals, it makes no distinction between males and females, nor between the paternal and maternal kindred. On the whole, we may say that a tendency to limit inheritance to agnates (persons descended through males) is observable chiefly in South Germany. The supporters of the mother Right theory lay weight on certain statements of Tacitus (with regard to the privileged position of the mother's brother and to inheritance by children, not by sons only), but find the chief confirmation of their view in the earliest texts of the Frankish Lex Salica, which, in the absence of children, gives all moveable property to the mother, or, in her absence, to her relatives, female taking precedence of males (Lex. Sal. tit. 29). It must be pointed out that it is unsafe to base theories of inheritance mainly on the rules governing the transmission of real property, since individual ownership of land was of late growth among the Teutonic races. Neither Tacitus (Germ. 26) nor Caesar (de Bell. Gall. vi. 21 L.) knows of it; and as late as 674 a Frankish edict, which must have had only recently and partially become heritable.

Moveable property may be regarded under three
heads: (1) cattle, farm implements, etc.; (2) armour and weapons (Haerger); (3) household furniture, also ornaments of silver and gold; (4) weapons, and the war-horse. This form of property was restricted to persons of noble birth, but in certain towns we find the workman’s tools, even the tailor’s scissors, being treated as Haerger as regards succession. (3) Rentenspield is almost the only estate in land now, and in the Old Saxon Sachsenpielt, to women, and generally to those whose connexion with the deceased person is to be traced through women. It cannot, however, be regarded merely as dower, for it can be claimed by unmarried women also in possession of it. It is best defined as consisting of those chattels which are under the woman’s charge. The Sachsenpield enjoins that, on the death of a married woman, the husband or successor to the husband must leave the widower his bed, a table and cloth, and a stool and cushion, so that evidently the entire household furniture is included in it. With regard to (2), it is important to remember that in heathen times a considerable proportion of the personal property of the deceased (weapons, ornaments, cattle, and even alcohol) was owned by or belonged to the original owner. The Arabian traveller Ibn Fadlan says that among the Scandinavians in Russia, one-third of a man’s personal property was burned with him, and another third expended on the funeral banquet. A memorial banquet was common all over Scandinavian territory, and was usually made the occasion for the heir to succeed to the dead man’s property. In Scandinavia this was signified by his taking up his position for the first time in the ‘high-seat’. In Germany the inheritance was usually entered into on the thirtieth day after the death of the predecessor.

In historical times rank is so closely bound up with the possession of land that its transmission necessarily follows the rules governing inheritance of real property. There can, however, be little doubt that in earlier ages the son was heir to the father’s position, and that a son to the rank and title was independent of inheritance of land, indeed probably of any form of inheritance. With regard to the order of inheritance, we must notice the difference between the immediate family (persons related within the first degree of consanguinity) and the wider kindred; for the principles governing inheritance are different in the two groups. The inner group, which is subject to the house-community, consists of children, parents, and brothers and sisters. The Frisian law calls these the ‘nearest six hands’: (a) (1) son, (2) daughter, (3) father, (4) mother, (5) brother, (6) sister. To this group the Salic law added mother’s brothers and sisters, and, later, father’s brothers and sisters. It seems that, if the son was dead, his sons did not originally precede all other relatives, but were regarded as no nearer to the inheritance than grandchildren of the deceased. This, however, is disputed by some authorities. In the wider group the degree of consanguinity is alone regarded: all persons equally related to the deceased have an equal claim, though, as we have seen, in certain forms of inheritance preference may be given to persons related through the father’s or the mother’s kindred. It is necessary to indicate the mode of reckoning kinship which prevailed amongst the Teutons. This is a subject on which there is a storm of controversy still raging; but, without commenting on any theory, we may say that the Teutonic kindred was regarded as falling into groups centring round the person whose property was to be inherited, and that any one tracing his descent through the grandfather of this person was nearer than one tracing his descent from the great-grandfather. Thus kinship was not reckoned by the number of births between the two persons concerned, as in Roman law, but by the number of generations (votum) between one of them and the common ancestor. The first ‘knee’ is formed by the parents: thus brothers and sisters are in the first degree of kindred. The second by the grandparents; first cousins are, therefore, in the second degree, and so on. To describe persons related in the unequal collateral line, Teutonic languages employ circumlocutions.

Sometimes the kindred is clearly thought of as divided on a ‘parental’ system, the first parents being (a) the parents and their descendants; the second (b) the grandparents and their descendants, exclusive of the children of the great-grandparents; the third (c) the great-grandparents and their descendants, exclusive of the children of the great-great-grandparents; and so on. It is the latter which is usually meant in modern times.

In the case of the kindred, the right of primogeniture is the only exception to the rule that there is no difference in degrees. The line of descent in the male line is traced, and the first son is the heir. In the female line, either the first daughter or the eldest son is the heir.

The outer limit of the kindred has been variously described in the early Continental laws as the fifth, sixth, or seventh generation. It is probable that the degree of kinship referred to is the same, the reckoning beginning in one case with the common ancestor himself, in another with his children, and in the third with first cousins. The children being in this case regarded as belonging to the family. When the outer limit of the kindred is reached, as in Norway, popular ideas on the subject have probably been affected by ecclesiastical ordinances determining the prohibited degrees of affinity.


INHIBITION.—Inhibition is a term commonly and loosely applied to certain aspects of physiological and mental processes in which one process is checked or displaced by another. It is thus not a function comparable, e.g., with nutrition, or circulation on the physiological side, or with perception, memory, or emotion on the mental side. It is a condition resulting from the action or interaction of these or other functions.

Whether regarded as a mental or as a physical phenomenon, it is a result of the incapacity of the organism to give simultaneous expression to its many different impulses to action. The organism’s energy being limited, under ordinary circumstances it tends to be more or less concentrated in a few directions. If it is scattered over many goals, it is less effective. If it is concentrated, it is correspondingly more effective. For instance, great activity of one part of the body, while not necessarily or always incompatible with the action of other
parts, may frequently interfere with the action of these other parts through the draining off of needful energy; when, e.g., the forces of the body are devoted to the digestion of a full meal, there is not much energy available for mental work or for vigorous physical exercise. If two such processes involving the large use of bodily force are attempted at the same time, the effectiveness of each is greatly diminished. Then, the type of action may be antagonistic to another. An athlete cannot run a race and observe the scenery at the roadside at the same time. If he wishes to run well, he must suppress the impulse to gaze about.

Inhibition is, then, an incident of the fact that effective action must be relatively concentrated, both because of the limitation of one's energy and because too many disparate processes interfere with one another.

On the physiological side there is some evidence of specifically inhibitory nerves. The best attested example is that of the vagus, which, when stimulated, tends to paralyse the heart of the frog. According to Yerkes, however, "the ease of inhibition which results from the functioning of inhibitory nerves centers, if such exist, are few and unimportant in comparison with those which appear to be due to the central competition of impulses within the nervous system itself. Indeed, in the frog, the inhibition, in other words, which results from the fact that the nervous system can only be excited at any one time to relatively few channels."

Only in extreme cases is this actually due to the limited fund of energy at the disposal of the organism; but every such case is a manifestation, in at least, of the fact of the limitation of the organism's resources. It may in its simplest form be due, however, to the neutralization of one nerve impulse by another when they meet in the same centre, as when "the appropriate reflex of the leg of the frog to stimulation of the foot may be inhibited by simultaneous stimulation of the other leg" (64).

The higher nerve centres, especially those of the cortex, tend to hold in check the impulses emanating from the lower centres. Hence in a broad sense the brain may be regarded as an inhibiting centre. The function of the brain is in part "to hold back or to inhibit the activity which other centres, left to themselves, would carry on" (64).

On the psychical side, there is abundant illustration of the apparent interference of states of consciousness. Within narrow limits one sensation, as an auditory, seems sometimes to enhance the vividness of another, as a visual; but, ordinarily, two vivid sensory experiences interfere with each other, both being diminished in their conscious effects, or one being ignored for the sake of the other. The distraction of attention by some exciting situation will render one suffering from acute pain unconscious of it. Strong emotions interfere with ideation and tend to annul weaker feelings or emotions. One absorbed in thought is unaware of many sensory impulses impinging on his nervous system, as he is when he exercises on the nerve centres controlling the more primitive forms of action; but this means, as we have just pointed out, not that the psychic, as such, inhibits the physical, but that different action complexes are associated with the higher intellectual processes, and that, if the latter are to function, it must be at the expense of the former or lower types of action. It is for this reason that all phases of character development and growth of personality involve a large amount of inhibition. In fact, it is through the capacity of the psycho-physical organism to suppress inconsistent modes of action that is vary for any definite type of behaviour to emerge at all. The growth of an individual from childhood to effective maturity is associated from start to finish with the building up of certain complexes of conduct, the reverse of which is always the draining of energy from the lower, less organized forms of action and their consequent inhibition. Thus the little child has an unlimited, but those which cannot fit into the associative system that is uppermost are suppressed. According to
instincts and impulses. The problem of character development is not that of suppressing the energy in its primitive form, but rather organizing it into more definite and desirable forms. The higher types of behavior, therefore, displace the lower by consuming their energy or by giving it outlets in accordance with more definite and desirable forms and ideals.

The re-construction, which thus takes place so conspicuously in the development of child nature into maturity, is typical of the process which occurs in every instance of change of attitude in the individual. The person who inhibits an undesired act or mode of behavior, he must accomplish it by fixing his attention upon some other mode of action, which thereby has a chance to develop. Nor is this fixing of attention to be thought of as some intervening outside agency. It is simply the expression of the fact that another impulse, or set of impulses, is present which, for the time being, is felt to be more definitely in accord with the real personal character as that has gradually integrated through many previous reactions. The inhibition of one mode of behavior by another is due to the superior power of the then dominant complex of psycho-physical attitudes over those less perfectly organized and for the time being inconsistent with the action of the dominant mode. The re-construction thus effected may be partially removed: 

'... when the suppressed impulse is merely suppressed or ignored rather than utilized. In that case the suppressed factor may drop out of consciousness and be absorbed, but it is still capable of exerting an influence or of causing a stress beneath the level of consciousness which is injurious.'

The strain of merely holding the undesired tendency in check or of preventing its finding expression acts as a drag, though unconscious, upon conscious processes, preventing their attaining their highest degree of efficiency. Moreover, the suppressor in this fixing of attention to be logical effects. In extreme cases, as Freud has shown (J.A.Ps. xxi. [190] 191), it may result in producing the condition of nervous disease known as hysteria. All these modes of training which attempt flatly to prohibit the expression of undesirable tendencies in children incur this danger. The inhibition resulting is not genuine. The better method, and the one which would accomplish real inhibition, would be that which would seek to re-direct the impulse into some more desirable channel. The energy of the impulse could thus be saved and turned to positive account in character formation. The tendency to tell falsehoods is an undesirable, but it is of little avail to say to the child, 'Thou shalt not.' What is needed is to determine the underlying motive leading to lying, and see that it can find expression in a more desirable form. The correction must, in other words, be positive, by opening to the child other lines of action which will afford an outlet to the energy thus far finding expression in an undesired form.

What is true of child-training is true of every phase of character development. Many adults are suffering from excessive inhibitions. The energy they expend, sometimes unconsciously, in holding their undesired tendencies greatly reduces their positive efficiency. The root of the difficulty is that their inhibitions are only partial. The undesired forms of behavior are struggling to assert themselves instead of being assimilated by more approved complexes of conduct. The work of Freud, referred to above, and of his followers in the treatment of these conditions is a step towards the cure of this condition. While some pathological conditions of adults have been traced to the improper suppression of impulses in early childhood, in the majority of cases they are the outcome of the determined repression of intense desires which develop in youth and which are usually connected, directly or indirectly, with the sex impulse. This normal and necessary phase of human nature frequently runs counter to accepted social usages. Desires recognized as improper are thrust into the background of the mind, are ignored or even forgotten, but when thus dealt with are apt to continue to exert a harmful and mysterious influence over the person's conscious life.

Thus, a governor treated by Freud for hysterical tendencies, finally confronted with the question as to whether she was not in love with her music teacher, replied: 'Yes, when the suppressed impulse is merely suppressed or ignored rather than utilized. In that case the suppressed factor may drop out of consciousness and be absorbed, but it is still capable of exerting an influence or of causing a stress beneath the level of consciousness which is injurious.'

The problem presented by this case, which is typical, was to dispose of the energy of the impulse in a manner that would not conflict with the woman's own sense of her function in life. The solution of the serious problems of the education of the adolescent is that of finding ways of using, in sports, in physical and mental labour, in artistic creation of various types, and in social intercourse impulses which, though intrinsically sexual, may thus be transmuted into forces of the utmost worth in the development of a well-rounded character. Here, if ever, it is important to recognize the practical character of the psychological dictum that the most effective inhibition occurs only through the re-direction of the energy into other channels of expression.

INITIATION


Czar (J. E. Harrison), p. 322.

Hindu (J. Jolly and W. Crooke), p. 323.

INITIATION (Introductory and Primitive).

1. Definition and nature of initiation. — Initiation in its general sense is synonymous with 'beginning' (initium), 'training,' 'instructing.' The word is usually applied in a restricted sense to signify admission to ceremonies or traditions of a religious or magical order. The communications made to the initiated are not necessarily secret; they may consist of teaching whose efficacy depends on the authority of the one who gives it, the
character of the one who receives it, and the conditions in which it is imparted. But ordinarily they are a secret carefully guarded from the profane, and so initiation comes to mean 'introduction to a mystery.' When a belief is zealously reserved for a chosen few. Among the Romans initia was a grand form and expression for the mystic bond.

Two exocletic schools, which have often held rival opinions on the subject of the history of religion, differ also in their conclusions as to the origin and function of these ceremonies. According to the one (Dupuis, Creuzer, Guigniant, etc.), initiation furnished a philosophical explanation of vulgar beliefs and led to a rational and moral interpretation of official cults. The other school (Libech, Andrew Lang, etc.) holds that it tended rather to perpetuate, under cover of secrecy, rites and myths of primitive barbarism, which their adepts were ashamed to lay bare to the open day. In either case, these may both be applied to particular cases, but neither of them can be accepted as a general view. Another theory, which is no less founded, is that every initiation is inaugurated by an unscientific representation of old legends or myths. In most cases it is not the myths that have given birth to the ceremonies of initiation, but rather, as has been supposed, some divination. Smith and Frazer, the ceremonies that have been explained by myths, after their original meaning has been lost sight of. In any case, an unbiased study of the history of various nations shows that the principal magical operations are undertaken by the clans for the benefit of the community, each clan acting on its own particular totem.

Among the native peoples of Australia, the aun clan that performs the rites supposed to be capable of ensuring the multiplication of the offspring of its members is the only clan which reaps the benefits necessary for the population, and so on.

In all primitive societies, individuals of the same sex and age, having the same interests, tastes, and occupations, have a tendency to group themselves into particular societies within the general society. Thus arise many classes standing in juxtaposition and including respectively youths, adults, celibates, married men, old men, women in different conditions, totemic groups, clans, phratries, inhabitants of the same territory, strangers, even dead men, and also, as a universal phenomenon, certain social categories constituted by normal though particular and temporary events, such as illness, pregnancy, a common danger, travel, seasonal occupations, etc.1 It was not until the invention of writing and the establishment of professional professions appeared. Now every passage from one of those states to another is accompanied by a modification in the form or nature of the superhuman influences with which the individual has to deal. In each group these influences, whether personified or not, are offensive and even highly useful to those who are within and know how to avail themselves of their help, but dangerous and extremely harmful to strangers. On the other hand, those passing into a new group are apt to bring with them the magical and infectious taints of their old milieus. They must therefore be purified, assimilated, and instructed, which is the threefold object of initiation.

Among initiation ceremonies of this nature, one of the most fantastic is that of the Andes, which marks the attainment of puberty, or rather the ceremony which about that age officially breaks all ties binding the adolescent to children and women, and admits him to the society of men. This ceremony is found, either as an established institution or as a survival of an older ceremony, among nearly all uncivilized peoples—among the Fuegians, the natives of North and South America, to the American, in Australia, Polynesia.

1 Van Gennep, Rites de passage, 12.


3 Fr. Francis Xavier, "Theorie generale de la magie," in
nesia, Melanesia, in New Guinea, and in India—not to speak of the traces of it still found among the civilized peoples of antiquity. Its function is to confer on the adolescent the rights and obligations of an active member of society: i.e., it enables him to take part in war, to lay the foundations of feudal life, and to choose customs and rights necessary for the well-being of the tribe. Initiation, so understood, may be considered as the oldest form of public instruction.

3. The initiation of the Tasmanians of North Carolina when they explained to Lawson more than two hundred years ago that initiation and the ceremonies which accompany it are necessary for the right education of our children to school to be taught good breeding and letters.1

This instruction, nevertheless, retains a magical-religious character which often envelops the whole cult of the tribe. Women also are divided into similar age classes; but with them initiation, even when it is a close imitation of the men's ceremony, is less important because it confers fewer privileges.2 There are many other social transitions entailing rites which may be considered as initiatory—e.g., naturalization, adoption, marriage, the consecration of priests, funeral ceremonies, etc. Sacrifice, too, at least in connexion with cults which regard the period of life as a means of penetrating into the sacred world, assumes the form and functions of initiation. The spot on which all these ceremonies take place is, as it were, a sanctuary, to which society is devoted to the initiated. The organization of the rites of initiation remains in the hands of the old men, who are the national guardians of the tribal traditions, and they lay down as the first duty of new obedience to the ancients and to their teaching.

4. Evolution of initiation. The initiation of adults loses its general character in proportion as the transition from the tribe of war to the tribe of commerce is made; the tribal and legal institutions become separated from the magic-religious rites of which they were at first part and parcel. The age classes tend to become subdivided into a hierarchy of different grades, which fill up their ranks sometimes without regard to age or seniority. The initiated of the higher grade think that they have a right to rule over those of the lower grades. Sometimes even their privileges become hereditary, at least to the extent that their children alone have a right of initiation into the grade. The age class is thus turned into one or more grades, which sometimes recruit their members from various tribes and even open their doors to women, as, e.g., in West Africa and North America.

5. In the district of Gabun, we are told, there was a secret society exclusively composed of women, who, like the ancient Bacchantes, celebrated orgiastic rites in the depths of the forest, and were much feared by men, who ran the risk of death if they surprised them in their ceremonies.3

6. The same individual can thus belong to several ‘brotherhoods,’ especially when they have different aims. Some of these societies become more schools for working magic arts, and thus assimilate themselves to the societies of sorcerers who unite for mutual benefit in the exercise of their art. Most of the societies, however, continue to play some part in the affairs of the community. In Africa they sometimes reinforce and sometimes limit the authority of the chiefs. Sometimes, like the Baumünder of medieval Germany, they form a sort of superior policeactuating with repressive justice, and they are all the more to be feared that they do not confine themselves to the initiates whose function is to members belong to different tribes contribute towards the maintenance of peace, and on occasion we find them performing the function of arbiters. Yet it is through these societies that the social and religious traditions and customs that have come down to them, and transmit them to their successors. As de Jonghe says with regard to the Lower Congo, ‘there is an organized system, a centre of religious instruction and civic formation.’

7. An analogous evolution has taken place among the Kurds, the Polynesians, the Malaysians, and the tribes of New Guinea. Each of the numerous secret societies of the natives of North America deals with some kind of magico-religious elements—the course of nature, the opening of crops, the falling of rain, the success of hunting or fishing, the protection of innumerable individual alliances. In the Oceanic islands and among the American Indians, the ceremonies connected with all these societies are usually kept secret and feared, according as they represent scenes from current mythology or explain to their neophytes the esoteric meaning of these representations.

When belief in the efficacy of magic begins to disappear, or when public cults gain in importance, secret societies gradually develop into mere clubs, from which all mystic elements have disappeared; their old sanctuaries become the social meeting-places of the club, and their rites degenerate into popular rejoicings or mere buffoonery. But we must not lose sight of the fact that these brotherhoods, which monopolize all communication with the domain of the sacred, are able to fulfill the characteristic functions of a cult as well as the magic rites proper to sorcery.

The transition may be seen in the order of the Ares in Polynesia, who accompany the worship of the god Oro with all sorts of magic practices. There were even established different grades, entrance to which was gained by successive ceremonies of initiation. All the great religious of the East had room for initiation ceremonies over and above those of the closed societies. The ceremonies of the Greek mysteries certainly go back to the pre-Homerian period.2 Texts analyzed by Mora, Lethbridge, and others show how, between the beginning of the Greek period, and the period of the passion of Christ, the famous Cadmean poem describing the descent of Bior to the gloomy shades of Hades to look for his lover Tammis presents all the characteristics of an initiation ceremony. From texts edited by A. H. Sayce we learn that certain priests or soothsayers had to submit to a formal initiation; they were made to pass through an artificial representation of the under world, where they were shown the altar amid the waters, the treasures of Ann, Bel and Es, the table of the gods, the delivering of the oracle of heaven and earth, and the cedar-tree, the beloved of the great gods, which their hand has cursed to grow.4

C. P. Zisch has shown that, among the Western Semites, Byblus and other centres of Syrian cults had their mysteries from before the time of the Assyrian conquest of the country.5 The OT has more than one allusion to mysteries reproved by the Prophets.6 In India, a man was a Brahman by right of birth, and could not exercise sacred functions without first having passed through a complicated initiation.

Even the subjectation of a nation by conquerors and the superimposition of their own cults tend rather to develop than to discourage initiation ceremonies. Sometimes the victors organize them for the use of peoples desirous of adopting the cult of the victorious power.

Thus the Macedonian religion, which was essentially a national religion to be born a Macedon or a Persian, was also to be born a worshipper of Ormazd and Mithra,7 who had no initiation ceremony other than the admission of children into the cult; but, when the Achaemenians had extended their sphere of influence as far as the Mediterranean, Macedians had to organize the mysteries of Mithra, which were to become of such importance in the Western world.

On the other hand, the victorious peoples often become converts to the cult of the conquered nation.

After the subjugation of Egypt, the Athenians could not gain admission to the sacred procession of some Egyptian families who had taken refuge in them.

2 K. O. Münzer made that the origin of the Greek mysteries was to be found in old Pelasgian cults, which were turned into sacred cults by the invaders who introduced them in ‘In Allgemeine Encyclopädie, vol. xxviii (1830) sect. 1.
3 A. Muro, Mysteres dyoynis (Cayenne Guimet Lecture), Châlons, 1913, p. 1 ff.
6 W. W. Smith, Rel. Sem., p. 255 ff.
7 F. Cumont, Les Mysteres de Mythra, Brussels, 1909, l. 292.
worded to Demeter, until they had gone through the formalities of an initiation ceremony. This ceremony, which was instituted exclusively for the citizens of Athens, was gradually opened to the other inhabitants of Greece, and even to all the subjects of the Roman Empire, as a sacred common to the whole world. W. Diodorus, Library, Books 2, 329, p. 43). Every foreign religion which spread through the Hellenic world in the form of mysteries owes to all who showed themselves worthy or merely desirous of being initiated into them a new initiation the way for universalistic cults by substituting community of beliefs and rites for nationality as the foundation of religious ties.

The Christian sacrament of baptism (q.v.), the primary rite of initiation into the Church, was elaborately developed by the Gnostics. Two Mss., belonging to the sect of the Valentinians, the Pistis Sophia and the Book of the Great Lori according to the Mystery, give a description of four grades of initiation: the baptism of water, which gives access to the place of Truth and the place of Light; the baptism of fire, which admits one into the company of the heirs of the kingdom of Light; the baptism of the Spirit, and finally, the mystery which forces all the Archons to remove inequities from off the Disciples and make the Disciples immortal. Among the Jews, according to the Talmudic narratives of the Sages and the rabbis, there were no formal rites of initiation among them. They held the meaning of the Kaddish, the real origin of the universe, the immortality of the spiritual creatures, and the idea of all culture as successively taught. The Christian sects of the Middle Ages had frequent recourses to initiation ceremonies, the secrecy of which was always kept up to the last attacks of orthodoxy. The favor which symbolism then enjoyed allowed them to strengthen the bonds of sacred or at least important links with the initiates, and in the symbolism of the mysteries, this was revealed to neophytes. Even such exclusively technical details as the forms used in the ceremonies, the vestments worn by the initiates or the objects used in the ceremonies of the initiation of Freemasons, through freemasonry (q.v.), have been lost.

The importance of the rite lies in that, while preserving its outward form throughout this evolution, initiation changed its object somewhat in passing from magic to the service of religion. What was required of it now was to make the gods better known, and to bring about a closer intercourse with them. As a consequence, we notice among neophytes new feelings of curiosity, anxiety, and even anguish, allied with an ardent desire for communion with their religious and moral ideals. The rites giving them access to the sacred world—whether these ceremonies were originally held in connection with the changing of the seasons, the revolutions of the stars, or the transformations of the body—reared in a rhythm of periodicity and alternation which the initiates applied to their own development. The initiates, in bung, in which he had to play a part, the novice now saw the passion of a god—some divine sacrifice, the benefit of which he was personally called upon to reap. All the symbols of the most ancient mysteries found an outlet in this direction. The aim of initiation thus became once more the attainment of an individual advantage, but this time on a different plan: 'Thanks to these beautiful mysteries which come to us from the gods; we read in an Egyptian inscription, 'death is for mortals no longer an evil, but a boon.'

The question is to discover whether, as Paul Fourier, 18th century, 19th century, and XIX century, in the history of the neophyte with topographical information, as it were, to prevent him from losing his way in the under world, and with magic formulas to protect him from ambush in his path, or whether it insisted also on the necessity of his having led a just and righteous life. It would seem that initiation was sufficient in itself to lead the neophyte to the sources of Sinope without a more or less justified in putting the crucial ques-


2 Andrew Lang, Myth, Ritual, and Religion, p. 282.
3 Van Gennep adds to those which he calls 'magical' rites or periods, the object of which is to facilitate changes of state, without violent shocks or abrupt stops to the abdominal collective life ('Rites de passage', 14).
4 See D'Heriot and Maure, 'Théorie générale de la magic,' in A. Soc. vii, 188.

4. The ritual of initiation. — The formalities of initiation, which lose their ties binding them to the religious or the magical, present striking general resemblances. Andrew Lang notes the following general characteristics: (a) mystic dances; (b) the use of the tunic, or a garment of clay and earth; (c) the washing with clay and washing off; (b) performances with serpents and other 'mad doings.' To these we might add: (d) a simulation of death and resurrection; (e) partaking of a sacrament; (f) the wearing of a mask or other disguise. In any case, we may say that initiation ceremonies include: (1) a series of formalities which loosen the ties binding the neophyte to his former environment; (2) another series of formalities admitting him to the superhuman world; (3) an exhibition of sacred objects and instruction on subjects relating to them; (4) re-entry or reintegration rites, facilitating the return of the neophyte to the ordinary world. These rites, especially those of the first three divisions, are found fulfilling a more or less important function in all initiation ceremonies, both among savages and among the civilized.

(1) Separation rites. — In every initiation of any importance the neophyte has to leave his family, live in isolation, consent to all kinds of deprivation and tabus, and submit to purifications, aspersions, purgations, fasting, flagellation, even mutilation (and, more particularly, circumcision), and, finally, assist at his own burial, or at least, participate in the burying of him who has left this world. Sometimes spirits wearing masks corresponding to their supposed character come and carry him off to some hut or enclosure, or to some isolated spot where he lives in solitude for a certain period, which may be months or even years, as in Africa, America, New Guinea, and other countries. Even when initiation is nothing but a mere transmission of magical powers, the neophyte is supposed to be carried off to the spirit world.

Among the Egyptians, an angel goes through the ceremony of killing the aspirant to magical powers, and the body, thus killed at the depth of the body, which has been lying stretched on this frozen ground, and the patient then becomes an angel in his turn. It would be useless to insist upon the importance of this practice of stimulating death in the initiation ceremonies of the ancients. Many mysteries included, we are told by Janin and others, with Mystical mysteries, something similar to an illumination 'which was described or represented so as to produce unnecessary fear.' There is a story that the Emperor Commodus, filling

The role of mystagogue, one day took his part too seriously and saw daylight through the disinterested candidate. The alluring Apelles to his initiation into the mysteries of his is well known. Even to-day, in the "profusion of voices" in use among the initiates of the Eleusinian Mysteries, the figure of Apelles, a four-candles, and covered with a shining sheet, the service of the obelisk, a sacred symbol, above his body, and the whole congregation chants the Missæns for him.

It is noticeable that among nearly all peoples funeral ceremonies themselves imply a sort of initiation. Only the death of the deceased candidate. The alluring Apelles to his initiation into the mysteries of his is well known. Even to-day, in the "profusion of voices" in use among the initiates of the Eleusinian Mysteries, the figure of Apelles, a four-candles, and covered with a shining sheet, the service of the obelisk, a sacred symbol, above his body, and the whole congregation chants the Missæns for him.

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by partaking of the food of the initiated, become assimilated with them, or, in the case of sacrifice, with the gods themselves.

(3) Communication of the sacra.—The communication of the laws and rites takes place at once the complement and the essential object of the admission rites. It includes: (a) exhibitions, (b) actions, and (c) instructions—a threefold distinction already made by Aristotle (Met. IV, 6). These are: (1) the sacra, "what is shown"; (2) the pravayana, "what is done"; and (3) the anavagya, "what is taught".

(a) The exhibitions include magical or evocatory instruments (amulets, charms, relics, the chariots of the Australians, certain shells, the rattle of the American Indians and Negroes, the contents of the medicine bags, the ephoria of the Egyptians, the fan, the cist, the tympanum of the Greeks); representational and symbolic objects (various images and effigies, masks, animals, ears of corn, etc.); or pictures representing the adventures of superhuman beings or figures from the other world. In this way the novice gets to know the inhabitants of this higher world, to familiarize or identify himself with them, and to live their life. (2) The performances vary according to the goal aimed at, but we must distinguish between the three objects: initiation, properly so called, and which are performed only once for each neophyte, and those which are repeated periodically and form the essential aim of the instruction. (3) The instruction, which often comprises several grades or degrees, bears of necessity on what the neophytes are to gain by initiation, but it generally extends to other matters than the explanation of rites and the teaching of formula. It includes the communication of the real name of divine personages, theogonies, and cosmogonies, mythical history, common law, the exercise of certain arts, moral and social obligations, tabus, and marriage laws.

Among the Bantu, the initiated are adjudged to be men, free from theft, free from adultery, honour your father and mother, obey your chiefs. Here we are reminded of the laws attributed to Agamemnon, and said by St. Jerome to have been carved in the sanctuary of Eleusis. To honour once parents, to worship the gods by offerings, and not to eat flesh.

The revelations may even include, under pressure of a more advanced state of culture, a supposed rational interpretation of vulgar beliefs, or even a religious philosophy agreeing with the most advanced philosophical views of the time. In any case, the instruction is protected by the obligation of secrecy, which the neophyte cannot infringe without laying himself open to the gravest consequences. But, as Seneca says, speaking of the mystics of his time, the secrecy could apply only to the sacra, i.e. to the formula of incantation, the esoteric explanation of symbols, and the signs by which the initiated recognized each other; it could not cover philosophical precepts, if philosophy there was, because they were current among the uninitiated also.

(4) Reintegration rites.—It is only very rarely that the initiated can remain for ever in the realm of the sacred. By some means or other he has to renew his relations with the ordinary world. But he does not return in exactly the same state as he went away. Since he reappears laden with mystic influences, which, are, of course, dangerous for the uninitiated, he has to be, so to speak, "detuned" and readapted to his original sphere. He has, for a certain period, to submit to rules of silence and asceticism, and, yet more, he must, in his new character, pretend to have forgotten all about his previous existence and re-learn everything connected with ordinary life.

In the Congo, he must pretend that he cannot either walk or eat by himself, and has to be fed like a child. In Virginia, he has to learn the language of his tribe all over again. In New Guinea, he has to go backwards into his house. Among the Brunnians, he throws his old garments into the river and puts on new ones.

These precautions are only transitory, yet a man who has once been initiated is, throughout his whole life, subjected to a special and more or less strict discipline. Sometimes he bears a special mark or wears special garments or insignia, e.g., the cord worn by the Brunnians, the white dress of the Essenes and Fytthagoreans, etc.; he must also respect certain tabus and avoid certain ways and means of living. In every case he loses his prestige in the eyes of the uninitiated. When one has visited the infernal regions, even though it is only after the manner of Dante, some trace of it always remains.


GOBEL D'ALVIELLA.

INITIATION (Buddhist).—1. Forms of initiation.—Admission to the Buddhist Order (sāmaṇga) is gained by two forms of initiation, pravrajyā (Pali, pabbajjā), and a higher, upasampadā, though the former is only preparatory to the latter, in fact, a probationary part of it.

(a) Pravrajyā means ‘going out’; and by this ceremony one goes out from a prior state of life, either from the worldly life in the case of an ordinary person, or from a monastic life in the case of one changing to another faith. This is in a certain way analogous with the Hindu ritual prajñā (pravrajya) by which a boy is admitted to a teacher’s hermitage (ārāma) in order to live with him (andevena) as a brahmacharin. With the Buddhists a layman is thereby admitted to the Order, and is henceforth obliged to live with a preceptor, without whose directions he is not allowed to do anything. The lowest limit of age is eight, children under that age being rejected. With this ordination the child begins his life as a ‘homeless one’ (pravrajya, pabbajjā), and is called a sāmaṇga (advayavasa), ‘novice’. The period of novitiate lasts for twelve years, and, on the completion of one initiated at eight, his higher ordination takes place only in his twelfth year.

(b) Upasampadā means ‘arrival,’ and is the entry into the circle of the fully accredited members of the sāmaṇga. This second and full ordination is never conferred on a novice under twenty years of age; but, if he receives the pravrajyā ordination at or after twenty, and is otherwise properly qualified, he can proceed at once to the upasampadā. One who has gone through the upasampadā is henceforth an upasampanna bhikṣu (‘fully ordained mendicant’), and will be called, after four years’ standing, a bhikṣu, ‘elder’, elders only being allowed to instruct others, that is, to become an upādhyāya (upajñāya), ‘preceptor’, or an ācārya (ācārya), ‘tutor’. Those who cannot ordain elders are called dāhara (‘small teachers’), according to I. J. Tsongkhapa, Record of the Buddhist Religion as practised in India, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1906, p. 164.

The name, brahmaṇa (Pali, sāmaṇga), ‘one performing austerities, or ascetic existence, accomplished’, ‘initiation into’ and ‘participation in’ the mysteries, ‘Ch. d. d. voyageur’ in the mysteries (cf. Goblet d’Alviella, Eleusis, Paris, 1906, p. 697).

E. Chassin, Les Béatitudes, Paris, 1890, p. 278.

E. Schurer, Die Religionen des Orients, II, 11.

Sceurche, L., X. vör.
plied to all the members of the Order except the laity, though, strictly speaking, these terms can be applied to the elder, but no one can be designated as an ascetic or a mendicant until he is fully confirmed by the upasampadā and becomes himself responsible for such a mode of life.

While the pravrajya remains in the initiation (upanayana) to the first stage of the Brahmanic life, the upasampadā makes the Buddhist system quite different from that of the Brahmanas. Continuing their course of walking, the bhikkhus, after a few months, becomes a sādhu (‘bathed’) and returns to house hold life (gyanadha), whereas a brahmaṇa becomes by the upasampadā a sōvika, a full member of the Order, or a bhikkhu in the more proper sense of the word, corresponding to the fourth and last stage of the Brahmanic life, i.e. sanyāsins, as an ascetic.

2. Particulars of initiation.—(a) The pravrajya chiefly consists of (1) the investment with a yellow robe, (2) a tonsure, (3) the declaration of the Three Refuges (saraṇāgaṁ), and (4) the imparting of the Ten Precepts (dasanikkhā). A lay person desiring to enter the Buddhist Order first chooses a vihāra (‘monastery’), approaches an elder living therein (bringing with him a suit of yellow roles), and requests to be initiated. If the elder is pleased with the request and instructs him to keep the Three Refuges creed by repeating it:

(1) take refuge with the Buddha, (2) I take refuge with the Religion, (3) I take refuge with the Order.

After this the candidate is again taught to adhere to the Ten Precepts (dasanikkhādānā): ‘Abstinence from taking life, Abstinence from taking things which are not given, Abstinence from immoderate speech, Abstinence from telling a lie, Abstinence from intoxicating drinks, Abstinence from eating out of doors, Abstinence from dancing, singing, and revolving, Abstinence from the application of perfumes, and Abstinence from the use of a high or large couch or seat, Abstinence from receiving gold and silver.’

So far the ceremony. Henceforth the novice lives with his preceptor and acts under the latter’s supervision until he is fully qualified for the next ordination.

The pravrajya is in reality a preparatory ceremony by which one enters into the monastic course of the priestly life. Without this course of novitiate one cannot proceed to the higher Order, the relation between a brahmaṇa and a brahmaṇa being analogous to that between deacon and priest in the Church.

(b) The upasampadā ordination is not so simple as the pravrajya, since it involves the fullest possible enjoyment of the privileges of the Buddhist Order and holds in right of seniority among the younger brethren. Every step of the ordination has to be performed before a chapter of fully equipped elders, the number of the members being in this case at least ten. An ecclesiastical vote of the chapter of elders is called kassevadika, and there are two forms of arriving at a resolution: (1) a summary decision (assattipajñākami), in which a resolution is arrived at by the first reading, and (2) a decision by the third reading (assatticchaththakam). In the upasampadā ordination all questions are decided by three readings. The method of voting is very simple. The assembly, or rather a silent, while those who dissent speak out. Occasionally, however, when there are dividing opinions in case of a difficult question, the chapter has recourse to the use of voting, and the decision is rendered in colours generally white and black, but sometimes of several different colours. The time generally chosen for holding the ordination is the full-moon day of Vaisakha (April-May), and the three successive days of quarters of the month. The proceedings are as follows.

First a preliminary examination of the candidate takes place. A novice is brought by a tutor before the president of the chapter, and an up pada (up pada, ‘preceptor’) is appointed for the candidate. Usually, the same man comes up as a second tutor, or, rather, witness. These two tutors is he questioned as to the preceptor’s name, his bowl, and his robes. All being well, he is placed on a certain spot, while the tutors remain before the president, and, having asked the questions, they instruct the candidate to tell the truth, and further examine him as to his qualifications. He is first questioned if he has any such diseases as leprosy (bodhi), boils (sura), itch (kāla), asthma (saṅghā), or epilepsy (kāraṇa). These questions are answered in the negative, but asked if he is a human being (sasana), a male (maha), and a free man (kāla); if he is not free from debt (saṅga), except from military service (sīha), and permitted by the parents (sasana), and, further, if he is of the full age of twenty. The questions as to the state of the body, the roles, and his name and his preceptor’s name, are also asked.

This strict and searching examination being over, the two tutors go up to the president of the chapter and report the result, and then the candidate is called out (agati) or kasi (kasi). Thereupon he comes out and stands between the two tigers and says: ‘Venerable sir, I ask the chapter to confer upon me the upasampadā. Have pity on me and lift me up (ulampatu).’ He repeats this request three times.

Now the tutors repeat the above examinations once more before the assembly, and finally a motion (Ratī) is proposed publicly with the words: ‘This Niga desires the consummation under the venerable Tissa. He is free from disqualificuations (anavapati dhāna) if any of the venerable chapter approves the ordination of the candidate, let him be silent; but if no object, let him speak.’

This motion also is repeated three times. If all are silent, the president declares that the resolution is carried. As soon as the ceremonies are over, the assembly, or rather a silent, while those who dissent are measured, and the session (utupamā) and the division of the day (tiṣanābhadā) begins, with the details of the assembly (saṅghā), should be recorded.

The four requisites (mukulī, suva and the four interdicts (okaraṇīyā) must be minutely taught.

The four requisites are (1) food collected in the almsbowl (pācātikākara); (2) robes made of bags (pācātikākara); (3) lodging at the foot of a tree (vaha暖心); and (4) a claim of superhuman power (uttaratamunassāna). To each of these several exceptions are given.

The four interdictions are (1) sexual intercourse (mahattham); (2) theft (adnapāt); (3) lying (mamādā); and (4) a claim of superhuman power (uttaratamunassāna). To each of these many exceptions are allowed.

With the instructions as to these two series of important moral precepts the ordination comes to an end.

3. Training of the initiated.—The upasampadā ordination confers on the candidate no mystic power, as is the case in the abhiseka described below; nor is it regarded as an indelible Order imposed upon him, for one’s free will is always respected in the Buddhist Order. But the upasampadā ordination alone does not give a man freedom of conduct, for he has further to live under the supervision of the superiors whom he has chosen.

The superiors are generally two, the being the preceptor (up pada), and the other the tutor (āgati).

1 The full-moon day of Vaisakha is the day of the Buddhist's pācātikākara; see Buhidhāsana's Saranāgacārā, in H. Oldenberg's Vigna Phūkā, London, 1892, pp. 278-282.

2 An elder who becomes president must be of more than ten years’ standing after his upasampadā ordination; see SBE XIII. 178.

3 Cf. Igouz, viii., which is used in the Brahmanic initiation in the Gāthās. The preceptor’s āpātikā, or the chapter’s parisekatā, etc., is received by a candidate, and the second āpātikā is received by the candidate under the supervision of the teacher. Āpātikākā, or ulampatā, are interesting.

4 The ordination is sometimes called okaraṇīyā kāriti (V. F. Church, Vajrayūna, Copenhagen, 1855, p. 119.)

5 SBE XIII. 178.
The duties of the two superiors are very difficult to define; it is perhaps impossible to draw a line between them. Their offices, as detailed in the Mahāvagga, I. 25–33, are exactly identical. Most probably, as the general purport of the two words indicates, the upādhyāya (preceptor) is responsible for his pupil’s study of the sacred texts, while the dāchāya (tutor) takes charge of the pupil in respect of discipline. The latter is sometimes called dācia, the former, meaning, most probably, a tutor in the ecclesiastical act, but personally a tutor in discipline.

The upāsakamāna bhikṣu is dependent on the two teachers. Though the upādhyāya seems to be more important than the dāchāya, contrary to the Brahmanic usage, the duty of giving a nissaya (dependence, protection) properly belongs to the dāchāya. It is prescribed by the Buddha in the Vinaya that a bhikṣu after the upāsakamāna should live ten years in dependence on a dāchāya, and that he who has completed his tenth year may himself give a nissaya to others. Thus an dāchāya is a proper nissaya-do (‘giver of protection’), and his protégé is nissaya-anteviśa (‘pupil in dependence’). The pupil should be regarded as a brother, and the master should be looked up to as a father. Yet it is said in the Vinaya that a nissaya will cease when the upādhyāya and the dāchāya come together. This would imply that, though the pupil is always dependent on his dāchāya, when he is in the presence of his upādhyāya for instruction or otherwise his dependence on the dāchāya would cease for the time being.

In this dāchāya (‘dwelling close by pupil’) towards his bhikṣu, so in a māttivivekārī (living in the same vihāra, co-resident) towards his upādhyāya. Of the two superiors one is something like a private tutor whose duty is chiefly towards the progress of morals, while the others is a professor in the college (vihāra) who is mostly responsible for the instruction of the pupil.

The mystic school of Buddhism (Jainism) is founded on the mystic doctrine of the Buddha in imparted, only by the abhikṣetra (‘anointing’) rite, which is important, as it raises one above the level of ignorance and reveals the real state of nature. The office can only be performed by a true bhikṣu-dithaka (‘mind arising from perfect knowledge’) of the Buddha, unite one’s mind with it, and become blessed and enlightened. An dāchāya’s sprinkling over the water of knowledge (jānatādaka) of the Mahāvibhūsana Buddha (one of the Dīghanikādas) is at once symbolical of dispelling one’s ignorance and one’s sins. The bhadra is in a certain reproduction of the crowning of Indian Ājījas.

In contrast to the upāsakamāna, liturgical elements come to the fore, which are considered to effect a mystical transmission in the candidate’s mind and person. A new name is always given to the anointed (abhikṣetra). In the Buddhist abhikṣetra there are, theoretically, three following forms: (1) the abhikṣetra of signs (mahādī); (2) the abhikṣetra of actions (karmā); and (3) the abhikṣetra of mind (chitta). The māttivivekārī, chiefly consisting of fingerings and vocalizations symbolical of actions, is a certain form of initiation to be conferred on an earnest believer who is short of means, whereas the abhikṣetra-abhikṣetra, which is beyond the scope of special consecration, is conferred on a holy personage (dāchāya), a riyam. The bhikṣu-abhikṣetra is the conferring of the dāchāya’s right to dāchāya in a fully equipped pupil, and is important in proportion as it elaborates in details. The abhikṣetra-abhikṣetra is again divided into three kinds: (a) the abhikṣetra for founding a sacred place (pratirmābhikṣetra-mālābhikṣetra); (b) the abhikṣetra for holding a magical power (vīrabodhisattva-abhikṣetra); and (c) the abhikṣetra for transmitting the law (dharma-samādhi-abhikṣetra).

These ordinations are the steps of training in the mystic school. The most common of all is the pratirmābhikṣetra-abhikṣetra, which may be performed for any person, making no distinction whatever of qualities or defects; sometimes one is forcibly brought to the ordination hall so as to improve one’s character. The object of this particular initiation is to make a connection with a Buddha or a saint in the mālāma (sacred diagram), a fact which in the end will lead one to perfect knowledge. Every one who begins to study must receive this ordination. During the rite the candidate is made to throw a flower over the sacred diagram, and this is the sign of his acceptance by his master. If the flower falls on a Buddha or a Bodhisattva, he is considered to be worthy of the Buddha-god; but, if it falls on the outer circle of the mālāma, as on Vinsaya (Gesapula), he is not allowed to study the mystic doctrine, though, as at the present day, there is no strict adherence to this rule. A pratirmābhikṣetra-abhikṣetra is a step higher than the pratirmābhikṣetra. It is conferred on the best qualified pupils who are able to grasp the highest truth. Vīrabodhi (‘science’, especially ‘cosmic science’) means maṇḍu (‘incantations’), śāstra (‘praise’), dharma (‘law’), and nāma (‘name’). One who possesses this knowledge is called vīrabodhisattva (‘holder of cosmic science’). An dāchāya through this ordination gives his select pupil permission to acquire the edges above specified, and also the kriṣṇa, a religious achievement such as the four paramās (‘perfections’); and this rite is, accordingly, also called the abhikṣetra for the position of a pupil (vīrabodhisattva-abhikṣetra). While the pratirmābhikṣetra-abhikṣetra belongs to the mystic circle, the vīrabodhisattva-abhikṣetra is an introduction to the mystic doctrine, and is therefore placed much higher than the pratirmābhikṣetra-abhikṣetra. The student-abhikṣetra-abhikṣetra, which gives one not the position of a pupil, but the position of a teacher, especially in the teaching of the dāchāya-abhikṣetra, is called anushakṣa-abhikṣetra (the abhikṣetra for the position of a teacher). This ordination is not conferred on a bhikṣu until he has passed the period he may be. This was in any case the rule set forth by Kukai, the founder of the Japanese school of mystic Buddhism.

5. The ceremonial of the Buddhist abhikṣetra.—The object of the abhikṣetra is to symbolize the mystical (a) an ideal religious personage, (b) an ideal religious scholar, and (c) an ideal religious instructor. Consequently the rules of the religious performance preparatory to the abhikṣetra are distinct. First, the samaya practice the candidate should produce a believing mind (‘faith’), a compassionate mind (‘compassion’), deep prabhu (‘wisdom’), and a great bhikṣu (a mind arising from perfect knowledge), and remain firm in determination. Samaya means ‘agreement’, ‘union’, ‘communion’, and the samaya-abhikṣetra is intended to keep a man in true firmness of the Mahāvibhūsana Buddha. Through the efficacy of this preparatory performance the candidate now assumes the position of the Buddha’s son, Vaśrāsa, and enters into the hall of ordinations (Pall, vīrmandalas).

Among the chief objects in use during this rite are a tooth-stick symbolising the cleansing of passion and sins, a bundle of vajra threads in five colours representing the five Buddhas in union, a pot of the holy water indicating the final determination to seek bodhi (‘supreme knowledge’), and so on. This ended, the abhikṣetra blesses the candidate and covers his eyes, meaning to shut the gate of evil so as to open the divine. He is now led into the room of ordination with his eyes covered, and is made to throw a flower as before described, his object of worship being determined in this way. Afterward he is allowed to gaze on this sacred mandala. He is then led into the terrace of the buddhi-mandala, and is made to sit in the pandanvam fashion or on a lotus seat, and wear a diadem of the five Buddhas (raita-muku) and a necklace of vajra. He repeats over his head the holy water of knowledge from five jars (pada-kuwa), and furnishes him with several things, such as a wheel (chakraw) and a torch-shell (dāchāya). While the rite is going on, a homa rite is performed, in which a sacred fire is lighted to burn all the past sins of the candidate.

Each ceremony is performed twice, first for the garbhasodakshākhānanda (or dharmaśākhā), and
then for the vaṣjatāṁsaṇḍha, or vice versa. Without entering into details of these maṇḍala, it is sufficient to say that they contain two quite different in Japan, whereas in Nepal the distinction is very vague, one maṇḍala serving for the other, in spite of the existence of two separate names.

The description here given follows the practices of the Japanese maṇḍāra school which were originally taught in China, by Subhakara Simha, an Indian akṣara, who was active in China A.D. 716–724, and eventually went to Japan by Kitai (A.D. 774–835). The tradition on the whole is no doubt much older than that in Nepal.

6. The pravrajya rites (Nepal).—In the Nepalese abhiṣeka, called the nepal daunting the initiation of the Nepalese bāraṇ (Sr. nāvaraṇa, 'worthy of honour, priest') is again different from those given above. A puruṣa, or representative of the king, prepares pot (kadha) full of water and puts into it a lotus made of gold. Five combustors, five flowers, five threads, threads of five colours, etc., are properly provided. The candidate sits in the vaiṣeṣika (worship) posture, while the priest is seated on a raised platform. The first day's service is over. On the second day the candidate sits on the śrīvaiṣeṣika and the guru gives him (1) the śrīvaiṣeṣika (protection) by placing a śīvai on his head; (2) the ādhi (iron) kālī by placing three iron rods on the head of the candidate, four on the hands, and one on the knees; and (3) the ādhi (consecration) by placing a wine-cup (srūvedhā) on his head. Then comes (4) the nāvaraṇa, the ritual bath, the holy water is sprinkled over his head. The nāvaraṇa bath (head of the śrīvaiṣeṣika) now comes to him and puts a silver ring on the finger of the right hand. To the sound of a bell he sprinkles rice on the papal and on the images of the protecting deities. On the third day the ceremonies of the initiation are made, the papal sita again on the śrīvaiṣeṣika and performs worship of the guru maṇḍala, the śrīvaiṣeṣika (consecrated top), the Three Treasures (Trīśrī, i.e., Buddha, Dharma, and Sāttvika), and the pūjābhaṭṭacāya (worship text), and, lastly, he gives the Ten Precepts. He is again sprinkled with sacred water, invested with a robe, and consecrated with a sceptre. Thereupon a diadem of five Buddha is put on his head, and the holy water is sprinkled on him, maṇḍala being repeated all the while. With an aṃśaṃkā (plush) the ceremony comes to an end, and a new Buddhist name is given to him.

Though maṇḍala, five-coloured threads, the holy water, and the diadem of the five Buddhas are in common with the Japanese abhiṣeka, the Nepalese rite is more Hindu in its appearance. The ceremony of abhiṣekā in Tibet is generally similar to that of the southern Buddhists. The viṇāya school in Nepal also mainly follow southern Buddhism in their ordination. The abhiṣeka belongs only to the maṇḍāra school of the mystic Buddhism.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references given in the articles F. Spiegel, Karmadharma, Bonn, 1811; J. F. Dickson, "Religion," J. R. A. S. (1873), pp. 1–24; E. F. W. Duggan and H. Oldenberg, Vinaya Texts, i. (SBE xii.) (1811); R. C. Child, Buddhism, the True Law, London, 1877; W. P. T. J. P. (1824, 1827), J. H. Kern, Man. of Ind. Buddhists (+JAP Ill. 3), Strasburg, 1892, pp. 76-79.

J. TAKAKUSU

 INITIATION (Greek).—The Greek word for 'initiation,' τέκμαρση, has until quite recently not been rightly understood. The lexicographers tell us that it means 'accomplishment,' 'fulfilment,' 'attaining an end,' a τέκμαρση; hence a rite of accomplishment, hence initiation into the mysteries. But we are left uncertain as to what end is to be accomplished. The τέκμαρση cannot be understood as a word for its gist is best seen in the cognate τέκμαρσος, which means 'full-grown.' A τέκμαρσος ἅλπταις is a full-grown horse as contrasted with a foal. A τέκμαρση ἅλπταις is a full-grown man, an adult; τέκμαρση is the rite of the first human accomplishment, the rite of growing up, of coming to maturity.

This meaning of τέκμαρση is very clearly shown in the myth of the Pròzēs told us by Apollodorus (II. ii. 2). The daughters of Pròzēs, king of Tyrrh., went mad and ranged over the mountains. They were finally cured by the soothsayer Melampus, who healed them by a ritual dance, and eventually married one of them, thereby confirming the theory when they went mad is most instructive: 'when they had grown to maturity' (σὺν τεκμαρσώ). The reason why they went mad is equally so: 'they refused the maturity rite' (σὺν τεκμαρσώ). It is not safe to grow up without the orthodox rites of maturity; the crisis is momentous, and needs rēde de passagē. Not only baptism, but confirmation.

Another version of the story given by Apollodorus says that the maidens went mad because they held the image of Hera cheap. Hera was worshiped in three forms: as child (εῖς), as full-grown woman (παρθένοις), and as our wise mother (σῷοις). The image of Hera represented the three stages of a woman's life. This explains the sequel of the story of the Pròzēs. The maidens who are healed by initiation are immediately married to a demigod, i.e., the sign-manual of maturity. A boy among primitive peoples cannot take a wife till he has been initiated. In some cases initiation is not complete till after the birth of the first child. This explains the statement of Pollux (iii. 38):

'The married are nature'—τοῖς μανήσασιν. This explains also why to the Greeks the Danais were both 'uninitiated in nature' (νάπαρα ἄμαρτα) and became the prototypes of those who were 'uninitiated' in the Mysteries. To the Greeks, as in the English Prayer-Book, marriage is an excellent mystery.

Initiation rites will be discussed under the head of Mysteries (Greek). All that concerns us here is to grasp the important fact that the prōsē, or initiation, is a rite of maturity. This rite was, of course, carefully concealed from the immature, and in sex rites from the uninitiated sex. Therein resided the mystery, which was indeed the social sanctity of the whole proceeding.

How little 'mysterious' in the sense of maturity was as seen from a marble relief, probably funerary, now in the Central Museum at Athens, and dating about the 1st cent. A.D. A manly figure seated on a decorated chair is inscribed 'Increase' (Εἰκαστης). Before her, on a base, is a statue of 'Fertility' (Εὔμηλια), who carries a basket of fruit. Behind 'Fertility,' on a Doric pillar, is a goddess of 'Maturity' (Ματατής). Near her in the field is the inscription Τεκμαρση, 'Rite of Maturity.' Whether this refers to the figure on the pillar or to the whole scene is not very clear. What is clear is that the rite of 'Maturity or Rite of Maturity,' stands both for the fertility of man and for that of the fruits of the earth, for behind the figure on the pillar is a great tree with a fillet hanging from one bough and round the stem a snake, the emblem of the fertility of the ground. According to ancient thinking, the same rites promote and protect the maturity of man and of nature. In the light of this explanation we understand why the great Eleusinian Mysteries were a festival of sowing. In the light of the fact that Τεκμαρση stands on a gravestone we understand those hopes of immortality which centred round the Mysteries. Death was a rēde de passagē to a new life. 'It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.' 'Then fool, that which thou covetest is not quickened, except it die' (1 Co 15. 36).

LITERATURE.—For Greek initiation rites see Mysteries (Greek) and KokKW; for possible survival of initiation rites in the Mysteries of the Mores and the Mysteries of the Mores and the KokKW, J. E. Harrison, Themis, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 1–29; for marriage as an initiation rite, J. C. Lawes, Modern Grecians, 1910, p. 90; for the Danais as an initiation, J. E. Harrison, Proleg. to Stud. of Gr. R., 1895, p. 618; for death as initiation rite, R. Hertz, 'La Representación de la muerte en la literatura griega,' in Asa x. (1906-08) 45; for sculptured relief of
INITIATION (Hindu).—The ceremony of initiation, or girding with the sacred thread, is considered one of the most important events in the life of a young Hindu. Before it he is, under the ancient law, equal to a low-born Śūdra, but the investiture is supposed to confer a spiritual birth in virtue of which he is reckoned a member of the higher classes, and these are therefore called the twice-born (dīnī). It appears probable that the original meaning of this Indian custom has been preserved in those celebrations which take place among wild tribes all over the world at the time when a youth attains puberty, the Indian notion of a spiritual birth in the in lowest-born Śūdra, and the staff is placed in his hand. Money presents are made to Brahmā priests, and fruits and flowers are handed round among the guests. At noon the boy is made to say his morning prayers, and in the evening his evening prayer. He is asked to join in his mother's Sanskrit, and afterwards of his father, and in the way of friends and kin. Each dress is made and silver coins into the boy's cloth wallet. On the following thirteenth day he is taught to say his regular prayers, and is made to worship the sacred fire. On the fifth day he is clothed in new clothes and taken in procession with music to a temple in the village, where he puts on the idol and returns home. Among the Paradesa Brahmans of Travancore, in the extreme south of the Peninsula, the sūdravan consists of no fewer than fourteen parts, which have retained their old Sanskrit names, and correspond in the main to the ceremonies in vogue at Dhārāvār as above described. The actual initiation, however, is performed by the teacher instructing the boy in the holy gāyaṭrī prayer, which he musters in a low voice so that the assembled throng of friends may not hear it. Elsewhere it is the father whoutters the gāyaṭrī, and the ceremonial investiture of the boy with the priest to kindle the sacred fire and to give the boy with the sacred thread. The initiation ceremony entails considerable expense; thus it is said to cost 40 to 100 rupees among the Deshāṭh Brahmans of Biṣāpur, and 20 to 50 rupees among the Patane Prabhās of Pomea. The course of instruction in the sacred books and prayers after sūdravan has in many cases been reduced down to a period of a few days, but the privileges of wearing the sacred thread continue to be highly prized. In the 17th century the valiant Śivāji, the founder of the Mahrattá power, on account of his low origin did not venture to wear the sacred thread till his solemn coronation had taken place. On the other hand, customs precisely analogous to the initiation of the Brahmans are found to occur even among those castes the members of which are not distinguished by the sacred thread. Thus among the Agarvas of Pomea it is customary for every boy at the age of eight or nine to be initiated by a priest once before his teacher, who presents him with a wreath and hence mutters a sacred verse in his ear. The Kamphasts of Cutch, a religious body, give every novice a black woven thread, which he ties round his neck with a knot; and on receiving him into their Order the teacher whispers a certain verse into his ear.


In modern practice only a few of the initiatory or purificatory rites (nāmasakara) remain in force. In the case of a boy, on the twelfth or some other lucky day after the fourteenth from birth the naming rite (nāmakarana) is performed, the name being regarded as a part of the personality. It is selected either by astrological or by adoption of that of some deceased ancestor, or in other ways. In the sixth or eighth month after birth comes the 'food-giving' rite (annaprāṇa), in W. India (bhojan), at which twisted milk and sugar or coarse wheat-flour mixed with sugar and clarified butter is laid on a rupee or gold plate and given to the child by the maternal uncle or by some other near relation (BG, i. 116, 1. 35; Census Reports, Kashmir, 1911, i. 145, 146).
Central Provinces, 1911, i. 156; W. J. Wilkins, Modern Hindustan, London, 1887, p. 13). This is regarded as an initiation into caste, and the child henceforth takes the food tabooed and tabooed to his group. In the Central Provinces, the lower Hindu castes and the Gonds (q.v.) regard the ear-piercing (Skr. karna-vadha, Hind. on-chheda) as the mark of admission to the caste community. It is generally done when the child is four or five years old, and up to this time he or she is not considered to be a member of the caste, and may consequently take food from any one (H. Y. Russell, Ethn. Survey, Central Provinces, pt. viii. Allahabad, 1911, p. 99 ff.).

There have been various explanations of this rite. F. B. Jevons (Introd. Hist. Rel., London, 1896, p. 171 f.) considers it to be a survival of the offering of blood to the deity. A. E. Crawley (The Mystic Rose, London, 1902, p. 135) classes it with other forms of savage mutilation:

1 When we find that the mouth and lips, the teeth, nose, eyes, ears, and genital organs are subjected to such processes, we cannot but feel that the society is in a stage of development where the taste for extra-respect is an embarrassment of riches, by what is practically a permanent amputee or of charm.

Russell (op. cit. 101) suggests that the continuous dissection of the body by women and the suppression of some mystical effect in opening the womb and making child-birth easy. It is claimed that this will refer to the horror felt by women if the fetus surrounding the hole is torn by accident or design. In such cases, women have to undergo a ritual of purification as severe as in the cases where the organs have formed in a wound or sore.

On the whole, the theory that it is intended as a protection to one of the body exits appears most probable (cf. KAPPLAKRIYA).

The initiation of a child of one of the higher castes into the Hindu religion is provided by the ritual purification, which consists in an actual teaching, whispering into the ear of the child a formula containing the name of some god, which henceforward becomes his special personal deity ('qandandh'). By repeating whose name he is to obtain present and future happiness ('W. Ward, A View of the Hist., Lit., and Mythol. of the Hindoos', Saranpore, 1815, ii. 253 ff.). Marriage is the only form of initiation required for a girl, as she thereby enters the group of her husband; but in some cases tattting (q.v.) is an indispensable preliminary to marriage, and is regarded as a form of initiation.


INITIATION (Jewish).—1. Philo of Alexandria regards the assumed allegorical sense of the Scriptures as a mystery. Thus, in a fragment of his Quaestionum in Genesis entitled περὶ θεοῦ λόγων, and preserved by Johannes Damascenus (Sacræ Parallelæ, p. 782; in Philo's Opera, ed. Mangey, London, 1742, ii. 638), he declares that it is not proper to divulge the sacred mysteries to the uninitiated before they have been purified by a perfect purification, and speaks of the words of Scripture as the true mysteries (τὰ ἵππηθες λεξίκα) which must not enter into profane ears (Ἑρμηνεία). These are really metaphysical terms, by which the author does not allude to any initiatory rite of mysteries description, appearing from the conditions he lays down for those to whom the Scriptural mysteries may properly be communicated, viz. (1) piety and holiness, (2) an absolute belief in the one true God; (2) 'to be cleansed by the sanctifying purification, in body and soul alike—by (through)'

2 Secreta Paral. 782 A. : οὔθ θάνατος τοιχῆντος κακάλοις ἔπεμψεν τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ὁ Κυρίων γενέσθαι τοῖς ἁγίοις καὶ παντίς. Of Course they are not to be understood in an exact sense, but as the reason given is that an uninitiated person will laugh at what is not to be laughed at (καμίαν λέγοντας κομικήν).

3 Secreta Paral. 782 B. : ἢ θάνατος τοιχῆντος κακάλοις ἐπέμψεν τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ὁ Κυρίων γενέσθαι τοῖς ἁγίοις καὶ παντίς. Of Course they are not to be understood in an exact sense, but as the reason given is that an uninitiated person will laugh at what is not to be laughed at (καμίαν λέγοντας κομικήν).

the laws and customs of the fathers'; 1 (8) seriousness of mind. Here the 'cleansing of the body' (καθαρισμὸς κατὰ σώματα) can be regarded only as being effected by the purifying baths prescribed by the law (see PURIFICATION [Jewish]), perhaps also by abstinence from forbidden foods, and by observation of the traditional Jewish fasts, while the 'cleansing of the soul' (καθαρισμὸς κατὰ ψυχήν) must be understood as that which is effected by the influence of religious and moral principles. The words θάνατος τοιχῆντος κακάλοις, καμία, require this interpretation, which we find fully confirmed by similar utterances of the same author. 2

2 In another work Philo (de Patieniæ, p. 717; Mangey, ii. 406), in counselling a kind behaviour towards proselytes, says that, having abandoned polytheism, the Jew is 'like men who, once blind, have recovered their sight, having from the deepest darkness deserted a most glorious light.' The context, as we have already seen, shows that the proselytes are not simply a rhetorical simile, for the instruction and baptism of Jewish proselytes cannot rightly be regarded as an initiation into a mystery, nor were they ever associated with any such rite.

3 The 'dreary ordeal' required of the neophytes of the Essene order (δομον... δομον) might perhaps represent the withdrawal of the Essenes, after recognizing the obligations which the candidates were bound by oath to fulfill, continues as follows:

Moreover, they swear that they will communicate the doctrines to no one on any other conditions than those on which each himself received them... and with like care they will preserve the books of their sect and the names of the angels and such... By such oaths do they [i.e. the Essenes] make their proselytes' lives,' etc.

Now, in his autobiography (Vita, 2), Josephus tells us that, when a youth, he became a pupil successively of the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes, and thereafter of an enigmatic named Bandus, with whom he remained in solitude for three years, and then, at the age of nineteen, returned to the city. It is thus clear that he must have parted from the Essenes in his sixteenth or seventeenth year—at an age, therefore, when he could not yet have been received into the full membership of the sect. Accordingly, he had not taken the oath that would have obliged him to maintain the secrecy of the Essene mysteries; he had undergone the consecrating ceremonies or taken part in the initiatory rites of the order, so that, however willing he may have been, as a historian, to speak of these things in detail, he was not in a position to do so.

The present writer is, nevertheless, inclined to believe that, if initiatory rites were now and then again performed among the Essenes, either in converse with the admission of new members or on other occasions, Josephus would certainly have become aware of the mere fact, and in that case would doubtless have expressly attested it. Our conclusion, accordingly, is that, although baptism of proselytes is an initiatory rite, there was among the Jews no practice of initiation in the technical sense; that is to say, no mystical initiation and no initiations into a mystery.

W. BRANDT.

INITIATION (Parsi).—There are two distinct forms of initiation among the Parsis: mājūr, the reception of a child into the Zoroastrian faith; and 1 Sacræ Parallelæ, 782 B. : καθαρισμὸς τῶν αἰγύπτιων καθαράς, τῶν θανάτων κατὰ μάτη. 2 Cf. de Plantatione, c. x. 227 (Mangey, ii. 406); de Plantatione, c. xi. 227 (Mangey, ii. 406) f. 100. 3 See note on the passage cited above. 4 D. E. K. viii. 949. ἡττᾶται ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἐκ τῶν εἰκόνων ἑαυτῷ ἐπετρέπτοντα, ἐκ μικρῶν ἑαυτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπετρέπτοντα. This is not to be understood in an exact sense, but as the reason given is that an uninitiated person will laugh at what is not to be laughed at (καμίαν λέγοντας κομικήν).
nākur and marābīb, the initiation into the priestly order.

1. Naqš-b. The naqš-b is essentially the ceremony of investing a child with the sacred shirt (sudrak) and girdle (kushī), which must be worn throughout the remainder of a Zoroastrian's life, unless, otherwise, he may adopt any costume he desires.

The word naqš-b (Pers. nāqšt) is derived from Avesta *nāha- 'sacred,' because after the completion of the ritual, the Parsi child is held responsible for prayer and for the observance of religious customs and ceremonies. According to another view, it means 'unveiling,' thus implying spiritual re-birth. The modern Persian Zoroastrians term the ceremony "nasjīdī" or "nasūk.

The age of initiation is seven, when, according to the pseudo-Platonic Alevisbades Prisius (121 D.), as confirmed by the Vendidad (xv. 45) and the Dinakart (ed. and tr. P. B. Sanjana, Bombay, 1874 II., iv. ch. 120), the education of the child began[see further, art. EDUCATION (Persian)].

If a child is not sufficiently intelligent to understand the ceremony and to know its responsibilities, the naqš-b may be postponed to any age below fifteen, when investiture must take place, or the child may be claimed by the Evil Spirit (cf. Vend. xvii. 59-64; Šard-dar, x. 1, xvi. 1; Šaft dār-Safvat, x. 13), and is guilty of the sin of frigidity. Full responsibility rests with the guardian of the child, or the adult in his stead.

Both the naqš-b and the kushī bear a symbolic meaning, though the symbolism is not explicit in the Avestas, but only in later Persian works.

The sudrak is made of white cotton, the white colour being symbolic of innocence and purity. It must not be made of one piece of cloth, but be pieced seven together on the sides, so that one may be on the right-hand side and the other on the left, with the sleeves sewn together on the sides, so that one sleeve may be on the right-hand side and the other on the left. The sudrak is worn around the neck and arm, and is tied with a red girdle round the waist. The girdle is symbolic of the new life, the old life being related to each other through the present. The most important part of the shirt is the gurushān ('that which preserves the knot') or kushī-kushī dar-kañāhī ('bag of righteousness'), which signifies loyalty to or faith in the religion. It is made in the form of a bag or purse, a little below the throat. It indicates symbolically that a man has to be industrious, and has not only to fill his purse or bag with money, but also with kushī, i.e. righteousness.

The kushī, or girdle, is made of lambs' wool, which is first combed and then spun into a fine thread on a hand-spindle (or 'kushī') with a little oil, and woven into one, and is woven into the kushī on a hand-loom, the ends of which are measured and made to correspond in length required. The twisted thread is passed round the loops seven-twenty times, so that the kushī consists of seventy-two threads, which are divided into each of the twenty strands. In the process of weaving, a continuous thread is made to pass through each of the twenty strands, which is almost finished, and only about a foot of the threads remains to be woven, the whole thread is removed from the spool and handed to a priest to cut, and it is the privilege of the women of the priestly class to weave and prepare the sacred thread, and it is the privilege of a priest alone to cut and consecrate it.

To consecrate the thread, the priest first performs the pāldūb (see next col.), and then recites the stād-kī (for which see J. Darmesteter, Le Zend-Avesta, Paris, 1858-60, ii. 480-482) as far as the word abahā. He next recites the nirnagī (liturgical formula) for cutting and consecrating the thread, followed by the ašva-ashvī and ganā-ashvī (Ys. xxiv. 15-16), and while reciting the latter he cuts the kushī into two parts as he utters the word spokenādana. On finishing the pāldūb kīdī, he utters a brief Pasand formula, and then finishes the kūy. The women who prepare the kushī generally get it cut and consecrated by the male priestly members of their own families. When they have so many members, and have, therefore, to get it cut and consecrated by a priest, they pay a small sum of money for it.

After this consecration the kushī is returned by the priest to the owner, who now completes it. First, by means of a needle, they stitch the thread inside out, and then knot by knot the remaining part of the thread. Three tassels, each

of four threads, are formed at each end of the woven thread. The kūy is then finally washed before being used.

The kūy, being prepared from the wool of a lamb, is held to remind a Zoroastrian of the purity of his race. A lamb is always to observe; the seventy-two threads comprising the kushī symbolize the seventy-two chapters of the Zend-Avesta; the twenty-four threads which make up each of the three tassels at each end of the kushī symbolize the twenty-four sections of the Pāyān-ītī, a part of the liturgy; the sixty threads, into which the seventy-two threads of the kushī are divided at the time of weaving, are said to represent the religious duties1 of a Zoroastrian; the twelve threads in each of the strands symbolize the twelve months of the year; the six tassels symbolize the six seasonal festivals of the Zoroastrian year; the hollow of the thread symbolizes the space between this world and the next; the doubling of the thread in the beginning symbolizes the connection between the present corporeal world and the future spiritual world; the turning of the knot inside out symbolizes the passage of the soul from the corporeal to the spiritual world; the final uniting of all the threads into one symbolizes universal brotherhood.

The kūy is said to have existed in the pre-Zoroastrian religion, and to have been adopted by Zoroaster, who held it to be a symbol of obedience to God, closing the door against sin, and breaking the power of evil.

Except when bathing, the sudrak and kushī must always be worn, but the latter must be untied and re-tied immediately after rising in the morning, on praying, after eating, and before prayer, after bathing, and before meals. After performing the pāldūb, or alutation of the face and other exposed portions of the body, the kushī is removed and placed in the same position as the mail. When the kūy is put on, it must be fastened with two knots, one on the front and the other on the back. When forming the first half of the first knot, it is explained that in the second round of the thread, a Zoroastian must think that Ahura Manta exists, and that he is one, holy, and is matched with Ahura Manta. When forming the second half of this first knot, he must remember that the Mazdaean religion is in the word of God, and that the knot is full faith in it. In the third round of the thread, while forming the first half of the second knot on the back, he has to remember that Zoroaster contains the seeds of Ahura Manda, and the second half of this second knot he must bear in mind that he has always to attend to 'good thoughts, good words, and good actions' (Šard-dar, x.).

Before a Parsi child is eligible for the naqš-b, it must know a few short prayers, of which the nirnagī kūy is the most important. A short time before the actual ceremony, which may now be performed in the evening, though formerly only in the morning,2 the child, until recently required to be fasting seven days, is now required to fast for six days, when the naqš-b is to be performed. The child, the upper part of whose body is covered with a piece of white cloth, is seated on a low stool, facing the east, with a lighted lamp, new clothes, etc., near him, and with a priest seated near him. After all the priests have taken their places, the officiating priest places a new sudrak in the child's hand, and all recite the pāldūb (for which see art. EXPLANATION AND Atonement [Parsi], § 2., vol. v. p. 694 f.) or Ys. i., the child repeating this or reciting the āshtā ashvī yarīy. The priest and child now rise, and the investiture proper begins.

This consists of four parts: (a) the recital of the Confession of Faith3 by the child, led by the officiating priest, who then invests the child with the kūy; (b) the recital of the nirnagī kūy, prefaced by Ys. vii. 1-10, and accompanied by recitations with the kūy; (c) the recital of Ys. xii. 3 f., as a brief summary of the Mazdaean prayer faith; (d) the recital of the tax darsīt, or of the benefit. The process of donning the kūy is as follows.

The priest holds the centre of the kūy in his left hand, and takes in his right the further end, and forms the knot, the remainder hanging vertically until the recital of the words munīy, gāmān, zāmānī (thought, word, deed) is the

1 The enumeration of these duties differs in different Palavi and Pahlavi books (cf. Šaft dār-Safvat, xiii. 21; Šard-dar, i. 3), but the naqš-b is to be performed. The child, until recently required to be fasting seven days, is now required to fast for six days, when the naqš-b is to be performed. The child, the upper part of whose body is covered with a piece of white cloth, is seated on a low stool, facing the east, with a lighted lamp, new clothes, etc., near him, and with a priest seated near him. After all the priests have taken their places, the officiating priest places a new sudrak in the child's hand, and all recite the pāldūb (for which see art. EXPLANATION AND Atonement [Parsi], § 2., vol. v. p. 694 f.) or Ys. i., the child repeating this or reciting the āshtā ashvī yarīy. The priest and child now rise, and the investiture proper begins.

2 The priest, in the course of the naqš-b, the mozdām, or prayer to the rising sun (see also, see Zoroastrianism, ii. 689-690).

3 See art. Confessions [Parsi], vol. v. p. 687 f.

4 For the text of the Ys. vii. 1-10, see Zoroastrian Liturgy, Pahlavi Texts, Bombay, 1900, p. 101 f.; for the tr., F. Speigel, Avesta Literatur, Leipzig, 1862-63, iii. 293 ff.
function, and in his right a mace or club (Pers. gur, Avesta xerōn) to symbolize his resolution to fight against all evils, physical or moral. If local conditions permit, as at Naosari, the headquarters of the Zoroastrian priesthood in India, the candidate, escorted by the head priest and by other elders of the community, is taken in procession of invited friends of both sexes to the Dar-i Mihir, or fire-temple, in which he is to be initiated.

Where conditions are unfavourable to a public procession, as at Bombay, the candidate lives in the Dar-i Mihir during the āvarana, and the friends assemble there, representing the procession by moving from one part of the temple to another.

The candidate having taken their places, the candidate goes to the yastān-gōd, where he is to perform the yastān, or recital of the Yasna. The assembled priests are generally seated on carpets spread on the floor. The candidate removes his upper garments, performs the pāyōh-bāstāi, and puts on the pādān (mouth-reel), which, at first, is not thrown across the face, but is held up and made to lie on the turban. Thus prepared, the candidate is brought before the assembly by one of the priests, who asks permission to initiate him. The head-priest, after the interval of a few seconds, takes the silent hand of the candidate and lays it on his knees for assent, and nods his head or puts forth with the two hands to signify the acquiescence of the gathering.

If the candidate suffers from leprosy, or if he has a wound on his body from which blood comes, it is expected that he may be rejected, and, accordingly, in order to enable the assembly to see him well, he is presented after the removal of his upper garments.

The candidate now returns to the yastān-gōd to go through the ceremonies of his initiation and to receive the Yasna with its ritual. The visitor issues forth after flowers and rose-water have been presented to them. If the father or the guardian of the candidate is well off, he distributes money among the assembled priesthood. Relatives and friends are, at times, feasted at noon and even at night when the parents can afford to do so.

On retiring to the yastān-gōd the candidate remains seated on the floor until the Vēmprād, with its ritual, he acting as the dīv, and the priest who initiates acting as the rāhūm. In the afternoon he performs the bōj ceremony and takes his meals, after which he performs the āfringān ceremony.

On the second day, on which, as also on the third day, the candidate is allowed only one meal. These three ceremonies are repeated on two more occasions, on the two following dāvās, and the bōj being performed in the morning instead of the afternoon, as on the first day. On the third day they are again repeated in honour of Sā rātāb (the thirty days of the month). On the fourth day, the Yasna is recited with the Vēmprād, the bōj and āfringān being in honour of Ahura Mazda.

Thus qualified, the priest, now called hāvērō (Avesta hēvēryāti, 'teacher'), can perform the āfringān, māyēg, marriage, and such other rites, but not the Yasna, the Vendēd, or the bōj ceremonies.

It appears that the nāhēr has been, from the first, a ceremony of trial of the candidate, with self-renunciation, and self-mortification. (1) The candidate is expected to keep his days during the whole ceremony, which lasts about a month, in a kind of retreat, in order to be free from worldly thoughts and engaged in pious thought. (2) He must not wash, nor eat, nor drink, nor take his meals at stated hours after-prayer, etc. According to the present custom, if the candidate has a pollutio nocturna during the two barāmūnās, he is disqualified and his days are over.  

1. Cf. the name of Mithra, Fr. vi. 6.  
2. On the Iranian word for leprosy cf. Vend. ii. 29 and Herod. i. 238.  
3. On the meaning of Yasa, Vīmprād, and Vendēd in this connection see Darmesteter, Zend-Avesta, l. p. xxii.  
4. On the bōj see Darmesteter, Zend-Avesta, l. p. 121.
through the heretics again, since the outward occurrence is held to show that he was not, passing his time in pure meditation, which he was expected to do, as a would-be priest, but that of worldly matters.4) (3) During the last four days, when he is being initiated and performs the Yama ceremonies, as well as the, he performs one on the second and third days, this also implying that the nābār is intended to prove whether he has control over hunger and thirst, and hence over other passions.

To obviate risk of the special danger just indicated, candidates are now made to pass through the ordeal of fifteen or sixteen years. Furthermore, not only those intended for the priesthood, but many others whose parents plan for them very different walks in life, are thus initiated with the idea that the nābār is a good preparation for anything, whatever the future occupation is to be. In these cases only a portion of the Yama is recited.

(b) Mariṣṭita.—Since the nābār is forbidden to perform for others the Yama, Vendidād, and būj ceremonies, or to officiate at the rites of purification, even though he has himself performed them at his nābār, he must, in order to qualify for these higher functions, undergo a second initiation, called marīṣṭita (Arabic 'high degrees,' pl. of marīṣṭa). For this he must read the Vendidād, in addition to the Yama and Visparad read for his nābār.

In the marīṣṭita the candidate has to go through one barakānān of ten days. On the eleventh day, in the company of a qualified priest, he performs the kāh. The rites of the marīṣṭita are for the mind nābār Yama with its ritual. On the second day, in the morning, he has to recite another Yama in honour of Sraos, and at midnight he recites the Vendidād. This completes his marīṣṭita. He is then entitled to perform and recite any of the Zoroastrian ritual and prayers, and his official title is mōbad (Pahlavi magaght), 'chief of the magi.'

(2) Literature.—The Yaman's quarter of Persepolis, which was there a centre of Zoroastrianism, was given over to the Parsees in 1660 by Zoravaranshir, the last of the Persian Emperors. The name of the place appears to be derived from the Persian word 'Yaman,' which means 'servant,' and is also the name of a tribe who lived in the province of Khuzistan.

INITIATION (Roman).—Although the word initio is used by Latin writers as the chief period of the best period to the same idea as our 'initiation,' the concept of advancement from a lower to a higher stage in cult hierarchy, by means of a rite which often partakes of the mysterious, is not native to Roman religious practice. In early Roman times the worship of the gods was more a matter of State than of private enterprise. It involved a complicated ritual, for the observance of which a trained body of men was required. Naturally this priestlyhood had its method of obtaining and training new members, but this can hardly be classed as initiation. Apart from the State worship, it may be said that the very life of the people was a continuous practice of religion. They imagined themselves surrounded by unseen forces, and practised innumerable means of appeasing those that were evil, and returning thanks for favours received. This was a matter of everyday usage, and required no special training or initiatory rites.

The practice of initiation involves a close organization of a more or less secret character, into which the initiate is received after an examination and ordeal, of which the tendency is to excite the imagination and render of more apparent value than in the case of initiations of any other sort. During the last four days, the candidate called sabātī ('non-existent') and is absolutely rejected as unfit for religious office.

The kūh is of two grades. For the major the recital of the whole Yama is requisite; for the minor the recital of Ps. 119.

(4) It must also be remembered that we ourselves use the word 'initiation' rather carelessly, and that in all probability the Romans did the same. Thus even when we find the word in their literature, without some explanatory context, it is often impossible to determine whether the writer means a distinct ceremony, or merely that the individual referred to has attained some slight degree of knowledge over and above things about him, or is well informed concerning a given subject. Moreover, the border line between initiation proper and cult practices which deal with the admission of new members is very narrow. Thus, in the cults of Vesta and Bona Dea, in which no men were allowed to participate, new followers were of course taken in. For the sake of limiting the subject, the word 'initiation' is here understood to involve a more complicated ceremony, with secret and mysterious rites, by means of which one was admitted to a close organization.

Even at a fairly late period in its history, the Roman religion was not a matter of any such practice before the introduction of the cult of Demeter (identified with the Roman Ceres) in the first years of the Republic. The Eleusinian mysteries connected with the worship of Demeter have almost been known, although they were not officially introduced into Rome until much later. Cicero refers to them in de Leg. ii. 9:

'Let no one be initiated into the mysteries save those of Ceres, and according to the Greek rites;' cf. also ii. 14: 'Certainly I do. I.e. make an exception of the mysteries into which we have been initiated, for among all the excellent and divine institutions which Athens has given to mankind, there is nothing better than these mysteries, which have a sublime, wild and savage state to one more noble and refined. As is made manifest by the example of the Eleusinian, in which we have always the same first principles of life, and not only to live happily, but to die with hope for a better future.' In de Leg. ii. 15 also Cicero insists that the initiation of women into the mysteries of Ceres must take place as it is done in Rome.

These passages bring out the respect in which the Eleusinian mysteries were held, and also the fact that they received some modern modifications in the hands of the Romans. They show indirectly that there existed at the same time other cults of a more harmful nature.

Something of the same import is also found in Varro, de Is Ratione, III. i. 5:

'Not without reason do they call her Mother Earth, and Ceres, and believe that those who worship her lead a vigorous and useful life, and that they are the sole survivors of the ancient Saturnian stock. With this in harmony is the fact that the term initio is generally applied to those rites which are held sacred to Ceres.'

Here, too, initio means the sacred mysteries to which only the initiated were admitted. In this connexion may be mentioned the references to the sacred mysteries of Gnosticism and perhaps S.E. Rome.

In Ep. ad Att. 29 he says:

'These are her [secret] initiatory rites, by means of which she is revealed, not the mysteries of a more than superhuman, but of the world itself, the vast temple of all the gods.' And in loc. cit. 26: 'Thus, just as only the initiates know the most holy of the sacred rites, so in philosophy,' etc.

We learn from Vitruvius that in temple construction account was sometimes taken of those who were to be initiated. In the preface to bk. vii. 7 he says:

'Ve have in mind the Eleusinian rite, which is the most sacred of mysteries, and in which the worshipper has to pass through a number of ceremonies, preparatory to his initiation into the mysteries; and we should have it in mind that the Eleusinian mysteries are the most sacred of all the mysteries, and that they are called the Sacred Mysteries. In order to become initiated into the mysteries, a person must first be initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, and only after that into the other mysteries.'
little ceremony. The boy-candidate is brought to the monastery by his parent or guardian between the ages of eight and twelve. His parentage is inquiry into by a senior monk (not necessarily the head of the monastery) to ascertain that he is not the son of a butcher, smith, or other irregular trade, and that he is free-born; and he is physically examined to ascertain the absence of any disqualifying bodily or mental defect. On passing this examination, he has a tuft of his hair shaved off, as a preliminary tonsure, and is clad in the monastic robes, and made over to one of the senior monks, preferably a relative, as a tutor. He is now a 'pupil,' or ṭā-po (precept) of the monastery. His tutor or teacher (ger-gan, Skr. upādhyāya) takes him to an informal conclave of fellow-monks, and gains their consent to taking the boy as his pupil. The boy is not allowed to take part in the public services, but performs acts of personal service to his teacher. After several years spent in learning to read and write and recite from memory the elementary scriptures, he becomes eligible for the novitiate.

2. Novitiate.—This may not be entered before the age of sixteen years, and the ceremony is more formal and solemn than for the preliminary entrance. In Tibet it has two stages—a lower and an upper initiation. The candidate himself applies for admission into the Order. He is conducted by his tutor to the abbot or prior of the monastery, who examines him and, as a sign of his admission, places on the crown, and he is given a new religious personal name, usually that of some ancient Buddhist divinity. He is taught to repeat the 'Three-refuge' formula, 'I go for refuge to the Buddha, His Word, and His Congregation,' and is exhorted to keep the vows, the first five (or eight) moral commandments (bhāsā and 'the ten precepts' (dika- padā), the transgression of which creates the ten sins.

The novitiate is now of the class called śāstras, the opportunity to take the stage of the lay devotees of primitive Buddhism. The majority of the so-called 'monks' of Tibet do not advance beyond this stage of what is practically a lay devotion, and they still are called śāstras, or 'pupil.'

The higher grade of the novitiate, which is the real novitiate, is attained only by the more intelligent and meritorious pupils and those who can afford to pay the somewhat heavy educational fees necessary. In this stage the neophyte is called gr-tu'd, 'follower in the path of virtue,' the equivalent of the śramanavāna of Indian Buddhism. He must be specially approved by the superior of the monastery, and he solemnly vowed to renounce the world for a religious life, to embrace poverty and celibacy, and to keep the thirty-six moral and disciplinary rules. He is then permitted to mix with the other higher monks in the routine of the monastery, recite with them the sacred texts, participate in the various celebration rites, and take part in discussion. The profession into this grade takes place in a formal chapter or conclave of the monks, presided over usually by one of the higher 're-incarnating' Lamas, who during the ceremony completes the tonsure by removing the remaining tuft of hair, and calls the novice by his religious name, which now is exclusively used as his personal designation. This consecration to the higher novitiate is supposed, in Tibet, to bind the individual to the Order for life.

3. Full initiation or ordination.—Admission to
the final stage of full monkhood cannot take place before the age of twenty and is usually much later. In this stage the monk receives the title of ge-long, 'the virtuous beggar,' the literal equivalent of the Indian bhikkhu, or mendicant friar, the usual lay of the Buddha and his disciples. This stage is attained by comparatively few of the monks in Tibet, owing to the high standard of qualifications, intellectual and moral, demanded, and the educational expense. For this purpose several years of study are required in one of the great collegiate monasteries, at Tashilumpo, Gahidan, Sera or Depung at Lhasa, Kumbum, etc., for the yellow-hat sect, or at Sakya, Mindolung, etc., for the red-hat sects. To reach these centres of learning the novice has to undertake long journeys on foot, and great privations, and be for a time in a very literal sense a beggar of virtue. The examination, which is searchingly severe, is undertaken by a chapter of the most learned monks available, usually over ten in number. The successful candidate formally vows to keep the full rules, 266 in number. The fully fledged monk, or ge-long, is the scene of the Buddhist Order in Tibet. The Dalai Lama himself rejoices in this title. From the ranks of the ge-long are recruited the abbots, teachers, chief celebrants, high priests, and astrologers of the great monasteries and temples. The initiation of nuns is substantially identical with that of the male members of the Order. Into the esoteric theories and practices of Yoga mysticism special personal teaching is imparted by adepts.

LITERATURE.—L. A. Waddell, The Buddha of Tibet (London, 1898, Lhasa and Its Mysteries, 1904). See also A. Waddell, Initiation (Buddhist) and the Holy Books, abbreviated to I. A. WADDELL.

INNER LIGHT.—See CERTAINTY (Religious), EXPERIENCE (Religious), FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF.

INNOCENCE.—There are two words in the NT which, though not uniformly translated in the English versions, seem to convey the ideas suggested by the word 'innocent.' In Ro 16th the word ἄνευ (Vulg. innoxia) is used of a child (1 Co 13th). In ΙΙΙ 7th our Lord is described as ἄνευ, ἄνειαυ, ἄλλονας (cf. ΙΙΙ 7th of Christ) 'guileless.' The other word, ἀνεια, occurs in 1 P 2th, where the Apostle exhorts his readers to long for the spiritual milk which is without guile (ἀνεια). Each word, however, has its own strict sense.

1. The ἄνευ (Vulg. innocens, innoxia) is he who hurts nobody by word, deed, or thought—the character which was described in 1 Co 13th. In ΙΙΙ 7th our Lord is described as ἄνευ, ἄνειαυ, ἄλλονας (cf. ΙΙΙ 7th of Christ) 'guileless.' The other word, ἀνεια, occurs in 1 P 2th, where the Apostle exhorts his readers to long for the spiritual milk which is without guile (ἀνεια). Each word, however, has its own strict sense.

2. ἄλλονας (Vulg. sive dolo, 1 P 2th) clearly connotes the absence of conscious fraud or intention to deceive (cf. ἀνεια). The word may thus be regarded as virtually synonymous with ἄλλονας. Thus Augustine in his Confessions shows himself unblemished and easily deceived. Hence the word ἄλλονας, like ἃνειαυ, tends to acquire a contemptuous sense in some heathen writers, suggesting the notion of one who is inexperienced and readily imposed upon.

3. The ἄλλονας, then, is he who has no malitia in him, and who harms none; the ἀνεια is without knowledge or guilt, and deceit is a sin. The ἀνεια is a fine, childlike simplicity, the simplicity which our Lord requires in the citizens of His Kingdom (Μκ ΙΧ). In fact, 'innocence is specially insisted on by the Indian as the characteristic grace of Christians: 'Neon ergo soli innocenti... Innocentiam Dei docet, et perfecte eam nomivis ut a perfecto magistro revelatam, et fideliter custodiam, ut ab incomtempitibili disceptore [al. dismente] retinet.' (Apost. 49.) Cf. the aphorism of Lactantius, Div. Inst. vi, 'de Vero Cultu,' 1: 'Nihil sancta et singularis illa majestas alii ad hominenceserat quam solam innocentiam; quam si quis olibent Deo, satis pia, satis religiosa literavit.' In a sermon ascribed (incorrectly) to St. Bernard some useful distinctions are drawn.

(i) There is an 'innocentia secundum potestatem,' the innocence which is incapable of committing sin. Innocence in this sense is the attribute of the child alone. He only is without sin; the Evil One comes 'that hath nothing in him.' (Jn 14th) In him only is there 'that absence of all evil which implies the presence of all good.' (I Thess. 5th) because he fulfils 'all righteousness' (cf. Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 100[101] 7: 'Tota ergo institia ad unum verbum innocentiae redigetur').

(ii) There is also an 'innocentia secundum oportitatem,' the 'harmlessness' of those who through weakness of body or simplicity of mind know not how to sin. This is the primal innocence of childhood, a negative state—the state of those who either are untempted or have not yet awakened to the consciousness of good and evil in choice and action. The 'innocence' of the first man was of this kind. He was not 'perfect' in the sense of having reached his full or final development, but 'upright' in the sense that he was on the right line towards the perfection of which he was capable. He had not the perfection either of knowledge or of sanctity (we must not confuse innocence with 'sanctity'); but he possessed those faculties which made him capable of a progressive development, which was to be conditioned, equipped, and secured by communion with God (see G. F. Alison, Outlines of Theology, no. 5, 'The State of Man before the Fall,' in his Works, Oxford, 1846, ii. 82-136; H. Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, Edinburgh, 1878, § 73).

Perhaps it is also appropriate to mention under this head the assertions of innocence and innocence, both personal and national, with which we must in the Psalter. It must be remembered that side by side with language of this tenor we find the most heartfelt acknowledgment of sin (e.g. in such psalms as 150, 50, and many others, together with a deep sense of dependence on the divine mercy (e.g. Ps. 35, 86, 100). The fact is that the consciousness of innocence awakened in devout belief by the study of the Psalms is a sign that in the argument of Ro 4 on the grounds of justification by faith, St. Paul illustrates his point by citing the language of a Psalm (G31).

(iii) There is, finally, an 'innocentia secundum voluntatem,' i.e. the confirmed habitual innocence of those who have retained their purity of heart in spite of temptation, and have conformed their will to be true to their highest ideals. This state is compatible with minor faults of ignorance or infirmity, but it is essentially a Christ-like state. The Christian believer does not incline to sin; he is exceptional, and contradicts the habitual
INQUISITION

tenor of his life, leaving his essential character intact (1 Jn 1: 9 2: 28).

Here, then, we pass beyond the conception of innocence as mere harmless. The innocence which is lost in the fall is restored to us in Christ. He enables men to become what He bids them to become—as 'little children,' and so 'simple concerning evil' (Ro 16: 2; cf. Ph 2: 9). Innocence is practically equivalent to that simplicity or single-mindedness which the old fall, with its many whole-hearted and entire devotion to God. As Augustine more than once insists, innocence belongs to him who injures neither others nor himself: that is, who abstains from the wilful self-injury involved in sin. Innocence, then, means the personal integrity of which the heathen dreamed, but which he had no means of realizing (Hor. Carm, i. 22). Nor does it exclude zeal for the good of another. 'Furtinet ad innocentissimum servum Dei, ut nullum malum inferre, verum etiam cohæret un peccato vel pudire peccatum, ut aut ipsa qui plectitur corrigitur experimento, aut ait terraeitat exemplo' (Aug. de Civ. Dei, iX, 16).

4. The question may be raised whether innocence once lost can be restored. Augustine touches upon this point in his Op. Imperf. c. Julian, vi. 18. The answer is no. This is the result of the true power of repentance so long as the soul is capable of it, and is willing to accept the discipline which penitence implies. There is such a thing as a reconstructed purity and beauty of character. And in this re-creative process a chief agent is the very spectacle of innocence. Christ acts upon the sin of the world, not only or chiefly by unveling and denouncing it, but also by exhibiting to men a flawless pattern of goodness, which exercises its own attractive power and elicits goodness in others. Men are drawn to Christ by what He is, not less than by His words of grace and works of power. The vision of stainless purity, combined with perfect humility and gentleness to the sinner, awakens the longing for holiness; the dumb yearning of the soul for righteousness is kindled by the actual presence and influence of a righteous personality. This power of kindling the desire for holiness is one of the many precious privileges of innocence. Others might be mentioned, such as the boldness and frankness of those as if they had no sin; this ability to be open; the unadorned hearts, open countenances, and untroubled eyes of those who neither suspect, nor conceal, nor shun, nor are jealous' (Newman, Fiz. Rel. Cath., i. 41).—the clear voice of science, strong will, and joyous temper of those who have experienced the renewing power of grace, and have tasted the powers of the world to come (He 6).


INQUISITION.—I. History. —Inquisition was a method for searching out heretics, instituted by Innocent III., in order to root out the heresies of his predecessors. But, if Innocent III. did not add to the canons, he justified them by motives which afterwards served to make them considerably more severe.

According to civil law, "a criminal convicted of treason are punished with death and their goods are confiscate, if even their children's lives are sacrificed in order to save the lives of some. But with much more reason than should they who offend Jesus, the Son of the Lord God, his kingdom, his religion, his people, his Church, be cut off from Christian communion and stripped of their goods, for it is infinitely more serious to offend against the divine majesty than to injure human majesty." Can longe agravius seternum quam temporalis ledens majestatem 

1 For the further history of the inquisition, see art. Office (Holy).
This saying, addressed to the magistrates of Viterbo on 23rd March 1199 (Ep. ii. 1), will live for ever; but the same may be said of the consequences implied in it; and the Constitution which he promulgated on 22nd Nov. 1229 for the whole empire expressly reproduces (ch. vi.) Innocent III's phrase (Mon. Germ. Leges, sect. iv. vol. ii. pp. 272-273) that Frederick's birth, declared by the Compromise, is an act of the Papacy, and therefore that the death penalty is decreed against the Manicheans; and, as the ancient legislation imposes upon them the penalty of death by burning, we may take it that the Roman question, condensed in the Theses of the Dominican prior of Besançon, was in the course of the negotiations in Bourges into the hands of the Dominican prior of Besançon and Fathers Gantier and Robert. This mission, limited at first to a well-defined area, soon extended over the whole of France. On 13th April 1235, Gregory IX advised the bishops of France that he had invested the Dominicans with the office of inquisitors in this country, because the dangers of their multifarious duties hardly left the bishops time to breathe. Finally, by another bull, dated 21st Aug. 1235, the pope nominated as Inquisitor-General of the kingdom of France ("per universum regnum Franciae") brother Robert de Bourgogne. Thenceforth, with the permission of the Dominican General, he himself had been a member of a body of Cathari known by the name of Bulgari, Bougres). Robert was required to act in concert with the prelates and religious Orders (Fredericus, Robert de Bourgogne, premier inquisiteur général de France, p. 13).

It is well known how these pontifical measures were welcomed by the king of France. The Statute-book known as "Statutes of Saint Louis" and the "Consulat de Beaune" in Beaune set out the penal code for both orders. In the south, the ecclesiastical dioceses had their seat on the two slopes of the Pyrenees; hence the frequent communications between the orthodox, as also between the heretics, of Spain and France. The King of Aragon, Jaume I., was always interested in questions of faith. On the advice of his confessor, the Dominican Raymond of Pennafort, he requested Gregory IX. to send him some inquisitors; and in a bull of 9th May 1222 the pope invited the archbishop of Tarragona and his suffragans to institute a general inquisition in their dioceses, either personally or with the help of the Dominicans or some other religious Order. A little later (30th April 1233), in reply to several questions, Gregory IX. handed over to the king of Aragon a whole code of inquisitorial procedure which had been prepared by the dominicans in Aquitaine, on the initiative of Raymond of Pennafort. From this time the Inquisition operated regularly throughout Aragon, with the co-operation of Dominicans and Franciscans, and extended its sway into Navarre (Leg. Hist. Ord. x. 113, xii. 162 ff.). Castile could not escape its influence. The "Futuro real", a code promulgated by Alphonso the Wise in 1255, and the "Seite Partidas of 1256" reproduce the prescriptions against heretics given in the "Decretum" of Gregory IX., and also those of his successors, which figured later in the "Seite of..."
Boniface VIII. (cf. El Fuerro real, iv. 1; Siete Partidas, i. 6, 58, viii. 24, 7, vii. 25). The Cathari heretics in the south of France had come over from the north of Italy; but Italy still cherished a goodly number in her breast. Even before Gregory IX. adopted the laws of Frederick II., the Inquisition was doing active work in these regions. As early as 1254, Honorius III. had ordered the Bishop of Brescia, Modena, and Rimini to expel the heretics from their dioceses. In 1229 the papal legate, Geoffrey, commanded the unconverted and lapsed heretics of Milan to be handed over to the secular authorities. We have already noticed the inquisitorial work of Guibert in Brescia in 1230. Seeing the trend of the movement, Gregory IX., nominated the Dominican Albertus inquisitor in Lombardia (1229), the Dominican Peter of Verona (St. Peter Martyr) inquisitor at Milan (1233), and the Dominicans Aldobrandini Cavalcanti and Rugieri Calcagni inquisitors at Florence—the former in 1230, the latter about 1241 (cf. Lea, ii. 201 ff.).

In Germany, it was given to the Dominican Conrad of Marburg to apply the imperial ordinances and pontifical bulls relating to the Inquisition. He died 11th Oct. 1231, gave him minute directions as to the procedure to be followed (J. P. Kuchenbecker, _Analecta Hispalica_, Marburg, 1730, iii. 73). From Germany the Inquisition spread into Bohemia and Hungary, and even into the Slavonic and Scandinavian countries. In short, with the exception of England, it soon covered the whole of Latin Christendom.

2. Procedure.—The working of the Inquisition is explained in a letter addressed by Gregory IX. to Conrad of Marburg on 11th Oct. 1231 as follows: 'An inquisition in a town, expose the pestilential, defame, and people, and deliver a solemn address; then, with the help of some discreet persons make a diligent search for heretics and suspect; who will have been denounced to you. These men, after examination, are considered guilty or suspected of heresy, must promise absolute obedience to the orders of the Church; otherwise you will have to proceed against them in accordance with the statutes recently promulgated by us' (Kuchenbecker, loc. cit.).

Here we have the whole inquisitorial process: the 'time of grace'; the summoning and deposition of witnesses; the examination of the accused; the sentence of recantation; the banishment; and the sentence of condemnation of the unrepentant. The several acts of this drama call for separate explanation.

The first duty of the inquisitor was to invite those who acknowledged heresy to present themselves voluntarily before him, within a fixed time varying from fifteen days to a month. The time thus set apart for voluntary confession was called the 'time of grace' ('tempus gratiae sive indulgentiae'; cf. _Proces sus inquisitionis_, composed between 1241 and 1254, in Vancard, App. A, p. 315). Those who took advantage of this and whose offence had not been previously discovered were exempt from all penalty, or were prescribed a secret and only nominal penance; those whose heresy was already known before confession were exonerated from the penalties of death and life-imprisonment, and suffered no worse punishment than a short pilgrimage or some other of the usual canonical penalties (Constitutiones of Cardinal Pierre of Colmius, bishop of Albano, formerly prior of the Holy Sepulchre of Rolen, in fons Doat, xxxi. vol. 5; cf. Tanon, _Histoire des tribunaux de l'Inquisition en France_, p. 142).

With the edict of grace was connected an 'edict of faith,' which made it incumbent upon any one who knew a notorious heretic or any person suspected of heresy to point him out to the inquisitor (Foncettes, pt. iii. nos. 22, 53-56). Thus, if they failed to give themselves up voluntarily, the heretics were rooted out by the denounced of the orthodox catholics. The number of witnesses required to make an accusation valid was not fixed at first, but was finally settled as two. Gui Fomenci (afterwards Pope Clement IV.) thought that more than two witnesses would be advisable in certain circumstances (Consultation in Doat, vol. xxxvi. qu. xv.; cf. Eymero, pt. iii. 10, 'testium multiplicatione,' p. 445). In theory the inquirer was not supposed to accept the evidence of any but discreet persons, and it had long been acknowledged by the Church that the evidence of a heretic, an uncommunicated person, a heretic, a thief, a sorcerer, a poisoner, a false witness was not valid in a criminal prosecution (Gratian, _Decretum_, pt. ii. causa v. qu. iii. cap. 5). But the great fear of heresy made room for an exception in matters relating to the faith. In the 12th cent. Gratian decreed that the evidence of a heretic or a person under civil disability (infamis) should be received on the question of heresy (Decretum, pt. ii. causa ii. qu. vii. cap. 22, causa vi. qu. l. cap. 19). The edicts of Frederick II. softened the right of appealing in a court of justice to members of a sect, but this disability was removed in the Constitution of Ravenna of 22nd Feb. 1232; 'sile quidem quodammodum in omnem usum possit' (cf. Huillard-Bréholles, _Histoire diplomatique de Frederic II_. iv. 299 f.). At first the inquirers sometimes hesitated to consider evidence so obtained. The Council of Vienne (1216) and Alexander IV. soothed their consciences (bull _Constatibus omnium_. Jan. 1226, in Eymero, App. p. 40). From this time onwards it was agreed that the evidence of a heretic should be valid at the discretion of the inquirer. This principle was accepted generally, incorporated in canon law (cap. vi. 'In fidei favorere,' _Sedes_, v. ii; Eymero, p. 105), and confirmed by constant practice. Of all the legal pleas of common law that an accused person (Gratian, _Decretum_, pt. ii. causa v. qu. iii. cap. 5) could put forward against the witnesses to a charge, only one held good—mortal or very serious enmity (Eymero, pt. iii. qu. lxvii. p. 606 f.; cf. Penna's remarks, loc. cit. 607-609). It was quite useless to count on witnesses for the defence; in fact, we very seldom hear of their presence (cf. Lea, i. 446 ff.). And this is natural, for they would be in all cases certain to be suspected of complicity as abettors of the heretics.

For the same reason, the accused could not put his case in the hands of advocates except under special conditions. The bull _Si adversus nos_, signed by Innocent III. in 1250 and inserted again in the _Decretals_ (cap. xlvi. 'De haereticis', lib. v. tit. xvii), expressly forbade advocates and notaries to defend heretics; and this rule, though meant by the pontiff to concern only the acknowledged heretics, was sensibly extended to the accused who were striving to establish their innocence (Eymero, pt. iii. qu. xxxix. p. 565; cf. p. 446; Vancard, p. 151, n. 3). The heretics and suspects, therefore, usually found themselves quite alone in the presence of their judges. They had to reply to the various charges (capitula) collected against them. It was not important that the sources of these denunciations should be known. But the fear—a fear, moreover, that was justified (cf. Vancard, lxxii, n. 1)—that the accused or their relatives might be received in the trial on their denunciators made the judges keep a prudent silence as to the names of the witnesses (see _Proces sus inquisitionis_, in Vancard, App. A, p. 317; cf. bull of Alexander IV. in _Constatibus omnium_, vol. iii. [1875] no. 4291). When Boniface VIII. incorporated this rule in the canon law ( _Sedes_, v. ii. cap. 20), he made express reservations, and required the inquisitors to communicate the names of the witnesses to the accused when there
was no danger involved in doing so (cf. Eymeric, p. 438, n. 72: *Ad nominem et demini- tumur sint delatis publicandis*). But as a rule, the accused had no other means of invalidating the evidence against him than the privilege of having the witnesses whom he knew to be bent on his destruction; if his denunciators were of his number, their evidence was dropped (Eymeric, p. 446 II.).

But the real aim of the inquisitor was to induce the suspect to confess. For this purpose various means were employed, an account of which is given by David of Augsburg (analyzed in Donains, L'Inquisition, p. 170): (1) the fear of death; the supreme penalty and the stake were held before the prisoner's eyes if he should refuse to confess; on the other hand, he was promised that he would be spared these punishments if he would consent to speak; (2) more or less strict imprisonment, made more trying by very scanty fare and the total absence of friends; (3) the visit of two capable judges who could force a confession from the prisoner by clever insinuations and tricky questions; (4) finally, from the time of Innocent IV., torture (Tractatus de inquisitione hereticorum, ed. Preger, Mainz, 1876, p. 43). No one was permitted to until the judge had exhausted all the gentle methods on the prisoner, and unless the latter was under very serious suspicion. Even in the torture-chamber, while the prisoner was being stripped and bound, the inquisitor continued his exertions to extort confession. The *vezatio* then began with the mildest ordeal; if these were ineffectual, others were tried, and from the very beginning care was taken that the prisoner should suffer the whole series of punishments, so that he might be inspired with a salutary fear by the thought of the pains in store for him (Eymeric, pt. iii., p. 481, col. 1). But, of course, the prisoner's limbs and limbs were not meant to be endangered: *egeere citrum membris deminitumem et mortis periculum,* says the bull *Ad extirpanda* of Innocent IV. (in Eymeric, App., p. 8). Originally it was not even allowable to repeat the torture; but later it became the rule that, if necessary, torture might be applied several times and even at intervals of a few days, not by way of *repetition,* but by way of *continuation* ('*continuationem,*' as Eymeric says in Directorium, pt. iii., p. 481, col. 2).

If on leaving the torture-chamber the accused repeated his confession, his case was easily disposed of; but, if he withdrew the confession made under the pressure of torture, he necessitated recourse to witnesses. The rule of the *Processus inquisitionis* was that the accused must not be condemned without confession or certain and clear proofs (cf. Vacandard, p. 321). But, whether he confessed or not, if two witnesses deemed competent by the inquisitor agreed in charging him, he was declared a heretic.

Helpless in the face of such witness, the accused could only choose between two courses: either he had to make a confession and show his penitence by submitting to whatever sentence the Church, in the person of the judge, decided to impose on him, or he might stand firm in his denial of crime or in his profession of heresy, and bravely take the consequences.

If converted, the heretic bowed before the inquisitor as a penitent before his confessors. He had no cause to fear his judge, for the latter did not inflict real punishments, but rather penances. These penances consisted, firstly, of pious observances—recitation of prayers, frequenting of churches, the discipline, fasting, and abstinence of days and fasts nominally for pious uses, such as a confessors might impose on his ordinary penitents. These were for offences of trifling import. Next in grade are the...

*perfusio sanabildis*—the humiliating and degrading penances, of which the most important was the wearing of yellow crosses sewed upon the garments; and, finally, the severest punishment among those strictly within the confines of the Holy Office, the *'aura,* or prison (Las, i., 462; cf. G. Molliner, L'Inquisition dans le monde de la Princesse aux aliers de chévaux, pp. 358–359).

Imprisonment might be temporary or for life.

*"There were two kinds of imprisonment, the milder, or *'aura larvus,* and the harsher, known as *'aura aurus* or *aura aurata.* . . . Is the milder form, or *muraus aurus,* the prisoners apparently were, if they were ordered to take exercise in the corridors, where sometimes they had opportunities of converse with each other, with the advice and comfort of the holy word. This privilege was ordered to be given to the aged and infirm by the cardinals who investigated the prison of Carcasses and took measures to alleviate its rigors. In the harsher confinement, or *aurus strictus,* the prisoner was thrust into the smallest, darkest, and most noisome of cells, with chains on his feet—I am sure cases claimed to the walls. . . . When the culprits were members of a religious Order, to avoid scandal the proceedings were usually held in private, and the imprisonment would be ordered to take place in a convent of their own Order. As these buildings however, usually were provided with cells for the punishment of offenders, this was probably of no great advantage to the victim. In the case of Jeanne, widow of L. de la Tre, in a nuns of *La Comtesse,* the prisoner committed acts of both Chadars and Waldenstarian heresy, and had previcirand in her confession, the sentence was confinement in a separate cell in her own convent, where none was to enter or see her, her food being pushed in through an opening left for the purpose—which, the bringing in of her food. . . . While the penance prescribed was a diet of bread and water, the Inquisition, with unpardonable cruelty, did not object to its prisoners receiving from their friends contributions of bread, wine, money, and garments, and among its documents are such frequent allusions to this that it may be regarded as an established custom* (Las, i., 486, 487, 491).

The greatest penalty was that of death. The inquisitor, however, never condemned to death, but merely withdrew the protection of the Church from the hardened and implacable sinner who affected no hope of conversion, or from the heretic by relapse that there was no trust to be placed in his pretended repentance (Ges, p. 159).

It was then that the civil authority intervened. The ecclesiastical judge handed the prisoner over to the secular arm (cf. Liber sententiarum, in Limborch, Historia Inquisitionis, p. 91), and it applied the legal punishment (amansuellce deo deberet), death by fire. The prisoner had one last resource, however: to save his life he could, even at the stake, renounce his error, and his sentence was immediately commuted to imprisonment for life (Constitution of FrederickII. of 1292; cf. Eymeric, pt. iii., p. 515).

Death did not protect heretics from the condemnation of *'a heretico literato.* Death was not unknown to the Romans: it was applied to criminals who had committed treason, and, in case of conviction, entailed confiscation of property and spoliation of heirs. The analogy established by Innocent IV. (bull of 26th March, 1250, contained in the Decretals, v. vii. 19) between heresy and the crime of treason led the tribunals of the Inquisition to punish deceased heretics just as if they were still alive. They were regarded as condemned in default, and treated accordingly; their goods were seized and their remains exhumed. The exhumation was carried out with great solemnity; bones and even semi-decomposed bodies were carried through the streets to the sound of trumpets, and then burned at the stake. The names of the dead were proclaimed, and the living were threatened with a similar fate if they followed their example (qui per al pera, says the Chronique de Guillaume Perisson, first inquisitor of Albi (published in Donains, p. 110)).

These various penalties could be applied only after sentence pronounced in a public assembly convened for the purpose and known by the name of Sermo generalis (see Tauss, pp. 425–431). This assembly was what is commonly known as *auo facere, or avo de feu (act of faith).* To the masses and to many others the name *auo de feu* suggests the very worst horrors of the Inquisition; they
section 'Sciences historiques,' Freiburg, Switzerland, 1896, pp. 318-367). We see in these councilors a foreshadowing of the modern jury; and it has been rightly observed that the inquisitors generally followed their advice and even tempered it with mercy (Donais, pp. 324-326, with examples). They were, furthermore, forbidden, from the time of Clement V (bull Aditorum querelae) to make any serious decision without first hearing the advice of the bishops, the natural judges of the faith. In a word, although they do not present 'a sublime spectacle of social perfection' (Civiltà cattolica, Rome, 1835, i. 295), the tribunal of the Inquisition conformed to a very high ideal of justice; an ideal as lofty as that conceived by the best spirits of the Middle Ages.

We could not adopt this ideal for our own; for among the methods employed by the Inquisition there was one, namely, torture, which could never find favour in the eyes of criminals with a love of justice. If they had even restricted themselves to flagellation, such as was administered, to quote St. Augustine, at home, in school, and even in the episcopal tribunals of the early ages, or as was recommended by the Council of Agde in A.D. 596, and approved by the Holy Fathers (Augustine, Ep. xxxii. 3; cf. clxxx, 23; Concil. Agath., can. xxviii; Benedict Regula, xxvii; cf. Vancasdard, p. 38, n. 3), their conduct would not have appeared so scandalous. Perhaps it might have looked upon it as a sort of domestic or paternal practice, somewhat rigorous, of course, but harmonizing with the ideals of goodness prevalent at the time. But the rack, strappado, and lighted torches were particularly inhuman inventions (cf. St. Augustine, Ep. cxxxiii. 1). When they were employed in the first centuries against Christians, every one agreed regarding them as relics of barbarism and inventions of the devil. Their character did not change when they were employed by the Inquisition against heretics; and it is a sad fact that, contrary to Innocent IV's appeal for moderation ('citra membrum damnationem et mortis periculum'), it was possible to draw a comparison between the pagan and the ecclesiastical tribunals. Pope Nicholas I, delivered a judgment on torture as a means of getting judicial information which is worthy of remembrance.

'Such processes,' he said, 'are contrary to both divine and human law, for confusion should be spontaneous and not forced; it should abound voluntarily, not by compulsion. The prisoner can endure all the torments you inflict without confusion, and then what shame there is in a man who has had what an exhibition of his Iniquity? If, on the other hand, the prisoner is overcome by pain and confesses a crime of which he is innocent, on whom does this external, more necessary not upon him who forced the poor wretch to tell the lie? (Beverwijk en omnaalde Burger, ixxxvi, i. 547).'

Innocent IV. was, of course, ignorant of this text when he recommended the use of torture. His excuse, if he had any, was that he was only following the example of the civil courts and conforming to the customs of his time.

The penalties imposed by the tribunals of the Inquisition are more difficult to judge. The death-penalty is of the first importance. Let us notice, to begin with, as a point of history, that the punishment of death for the crime of heresy owed its origin to the people, and was inserted in the council code only at the wish of the princes, without any intervention of ecclesiastical power; the Church never admitted the penalty of death into her code. This being so, it remains for us to consider whether heretics could be justly condemned to death, and whether the Church could have, or actually had, any share in their condemnation. The early Fathers, Greek, Latin, and Augustine, did not approve of the death-penalty for heresy (see texts...
in Vanciardi, pp. 3, 5, 29, 34; and their doctrine seems to conflict with our Lord's parable of the wheat and tares: 'Is it not possible,' said Wazan, bishop of Liège, in the 12th cent., 'that those who are tares to-day may be converted to wheat to-morrow?' [Pap. Vat. lat. 1023, fol. 274b]. To put them to death, then, was to deprive them at a stroke of any possibility of conversion.

Those who advocated the death-penalty, Frederick of Aquitaine (Simons, ii. qu. xi. art. 3), tried to support their doctrine by arguments from reason. The supreme penalty, they said, was the recognized punishment for persons guilty of treason or forgery, and accordingly ... and so on. Their argument is, of course, a case of mistaking comparisons for reasons. The State criminals in question were a serious menace to the social order, which could not be truly said of all and every heresy as such. There is nothing in common between a crime against society and a crime against God; and, if these were to be assimilated, it would be quite an easy matter to prove that every sin is Divine treason, and consequently punishable with death.

'To tell the truth, the heresies of the Middle Ages were nearly always interwoven with anti-society. Such a sort as the Cathari, for instance, which wrapped itself round in mystery and corroded the heart of the people, inevitably called down the vengeance of society and the sword of the State for no other crime than existing and acting: 'and, however much we may deprecate the means used for its suppression and comonnize those who suffered for conscience sake, we cannot but admit that the cause of orthodoxy was in this case the cause of progress and civilization. Had Catharism become dominant, or even had it been allowed to exist, on equal terms, its influence could not have failed to prove fatal to the State. Its association with regard to commerce between the sexes, if strictly enforced, could only have led to the extinction of the race; and as this involves a contradiction of nature, it would have probably resulted in revolution, communal disorganization and the destruction of the Institution of the family, rather than in the disappearance of the human race and the return of exiled souls to their Creator, which was the supreme lesson of the true Catharism. Its condemnation of the visible universe and of material things as such, the work of Satan rendered sinfully all thing after material improvement, and the consequences which in such a creed could only lead man back, in time, to its original abode of corruption. It was not of a revolt against the Church, but a renunciation of man's domination over nature' [Leo, i. 120].

Its development had to be stopped at any cost. In fighting it to the death, society was only acting in self-defence against the inroads of an essentially destructive force. It was the struggle for existence. It is not surprising that Church and State should combine to oppose their common enemy. If all disturbers of public order and ordinary law-breakers were to be struck from the list of sect-members sent to the stake or the dungeon, we should find the remaining number of condemned heretics to be very small indeed. They were, according to common received doctrine, equally amenable to the jurisdiction of Church and of State. It was inconceivable that God and His revelation should lack defenders in a Christian kingdom: the magistrates were held responsible to a certain extent for offences committed against the Deity. Hence heresy being indirectly to their tribunal. It was their privilege and duty to combat errors of faith as they did anti-socialţe crimes.

As regards the Church's attitude, in principle no heretic was condemned to death. The sacred formula ran: 'Dannati per ecclesiam seculari judicio relinquantur, animadversione debita puniendi' (cf. EcononimoGrammatikos, 15, lib. 5, tit. 7 [ed. E. Friedberg, Leipzig, 1882, pp. 65-6]). Bernard Gui presided over 18 auto da fé held by the tribunal of Paniers, and one in 22 or 23 for that of Toulouse (cf. Vascanard, 1898, p. 248 b, with notes). Taking everything into consideration, we may hold that the institution and working of the tribunal of Inquisition were the means of real social progress: not only did they close the era of summary judgment (cf. Vascanard, pp. 38-66), but they also considerably lessened the severity of the sentences involving the death-penalty. Leo, who could not be charged with any bias in favour of the Church, has found it possible to say in all truth: 'The stake
a large degree, heredity or predisposition, which plays so large a part in the causation of mental diseases. But there is another aspect of heredity which is not necessarily connected with the question of immunity, namely, the germinal transmission of inborn variations in the structure and functions of the nervous system, and which are produced by the repeated appearance of idiocy, imbecility, eccentricity, and similar insanities in certain families. We see, therefore, that the main divisions of mental unsoundness are: (1) congenital defects in the structure of the brain, which prevent the proper manifestation of its function, and produce idiocy and the various grades of imbecility and mental weakness or imperfection; (2) the acquired insanities which occur as a rule between the ages of 20 and 50 years, and which chiefly depend upon, or are invariably accompanied by, definite physical changes of a subtle nature, indicating in the majority of forms a general toxemia of the system; (3) the toxic insanities caused by the effects of poisons such as metallic toxins, phials, alcohol, lead, etc., acting directly or indirectly upon the cellular cells in the convolutions of the brain; (4) the insanities which accompany nervous affections as epilepsy, hysteria, etc.; (5) the mental unsoundness caused by gross lesions of the brain, including injuries, tumours, apoplexies, and other vascular diseases which destroy the brain substance; and (6) the mental symptoms which accompany the decline of physical and mental vigour in old age.

1. Causes of insanity. As scientific investigation proceeds to throw light upon certain limited fields of this broad question, two facts begin to assume prominence: the great influence of hereditary predisposition over the complex of the changes in the human system which occur in all cases of mental disease. As we contemplate these facts we are compelled to admit the importance of this theory in the prevention, and to relegate to a more distant sphere of influence the host of popular influences which our forefathers regarded as the proximate, intimate, and essential causes of insanity.

The question of heredity itself is beset with great difficulties, and it has to be admitted that we are very far from a true comprehension of its intricacies (cf. art. Heredity, vol. vi. p. 507 ff.). It is clear, however, that the inheritance of insanity from his ancestors both his mental and his physical characteristics. In most ordinary families it is impossible to obtain the accurate information upon which to found an undoubted history of transmitted disease. On the other hand, in the case of certain races, sects, and castes, e.g. Jews, Quakers, and the aristocracy, fuller information on these points can be obtained, and the result shows indubitably that insanity in the ancestors tends to reproduce itself either in the same form or as a mental anomaly of some kind in the descendants. But, according to the law of regression to the normal which has been expounded by Galton, and according to the law of stason, the incidence of this heredity varies greatly in different members of the same family, so that the majority of the members may escape the taint altogether. Even though it may be shown that actual mental disease has not occurred in the family history of an insane person, it is often possible to ascertain the presence of nervous degeneration as evidenced by epilepsy, neuralgia, sexual and alcoholic excesses, or paralysis of various kinds, in the past and present members of his family. Perhaps the most common proofs of the connexion of the insanity in a family is what is known as mental degeneracy, which includes feeble-mindedness, great impres-
sionability, suspiciousness, violent temper, impulsiveness, or excessive timidity. Certain families show a marked tendency to produce at intervals individuals afflicted with certain physical deformities of various types. This is, of course, the result of an innate germinal variation. When this variation affects the structure of the nervous system, especially that of the brain, it is apt to be accompanied by idiocy or imbecility. In estimating the influence of mental defect and aberration in ancestors upon the production of insanity in their descendants, it must be kept in view that the strain of circumstances may determine the appearance of insanity in a predisposed person who might, under different conditions, have escaped the incidence of the malady. Nor must it be forgotten that a person predisposed to insanity by heredity may, in favourable circumstances, manifest no symptoms of insanity during his life, and yet transmit the tendency to his children. Here we must face to face one of the problems of hereditary predisposition. What is, in the latter instance, transmitted? There can only be speculation on such a problem, but, so far as we can perceive, there are probably two elements, among others, transmitted, namely, a structural, functional delicacy of the nervous system, and a defective immunity of the body tissues against the action of toxins of various kinds.

Races and families become acclimatized to special environments and modes of life, and their removal from them is attended by degeneration. It is a well-established fact that the type of town dweller differs in many respects physically and mentally, from the rural inhabitant. A little consideration will show that the change from the one type to the other is effected, chiefly, by the elimination of those individuals who are not fitted for the life of the new environment. The process of this elimination of the unfit must necessarily be attended by disease both of the body and of the mind. It has also to be remembered that the conditions of all localities, whether urban or rural, are constantly varying, in consonance with the universal surrounding change. Populations fluctuate; new inventions disturb old social relations; food, dress, and customs vary. To one and all of these changes the human organism has to adapt itself, and always the less fit types—not necessarily the least desirable—are the least favoured. With respect to these variations in the environment, man has to suffer. But those who become first, and most readily, the victims of mental alienation as the result of changes in their environment are the hereditarily predisposed.

Closely allied with the influence of the environment in producing insanity is the question of the influence of certain habits and excesses. Chief among these is the alcohol habit. There can be no question that over-indulgence in alcohol exercises a baneful effect upon the nervous system, and that a considerable number of people now insane might have remained sane had they abstained from its use. Sexual excesses are, though to a less degree, accredited causes of insanity. There is also to be mentioned indulgence in narcotic drugs, such as opium, hashish, and cocaine. With regard to all these causes of insanity, it must be pointed out that their causative relation to insanity is complicated by the following facts: (1) in some cases they constitute symptoms of an incipient or already established insanity; (2) in regard to certain of them (alcohol in particular) there undoubtedly exists a special inherited tendency towards their excessive use, and this in itself gives additional right to be regarded as a separate psychosis; (3) unfortunately, the tendency to both alcoholism and insanity may be inherited by the same individual. This double heredity and the independence of alcoholism and insanity are established by the existence in the same family at the same time of alcoholic members who do not become insane, and of insane members who never become alcoholic.

With regard to the hosts of moral causes which are popularly regarded as producing insanity, their influence has been accepted with great reluctance. That a sudden moral shock may cause insanity in a highly nervous individual is probably true, but such shocks when they do occur must be regarded more as of the nature of trunsits, or direct injuries affecting the nerve cells and fibres, than as subtle influences of a spiritual nature. That prolonged anxiety and worry may cause insanity in predisposed individuals is probably also true, but here the effect is indirect, and due to the lowering of the general health and nutrition of the body as a result of insomnia, decreased appetite, and disorder of function.

The wide field of toxemia and its role in the causation of mental troubles can only be touched upon. It is usual to divide such toxic agents into two great classes: (a) those introduced into the system from without, e.g., alkaloids, poisons, etc., and (b) those formed within the system, e.g., uric acid, oxalic acid, gastro-intestinal toxins, and toxins due to defective gland function, especially that of the thyroid gland. The effects of these toxins will be referred to under the headings of the diseases which they are supposed either to cause or to influence.

2. TERMINAL SYMPTOMS OF MENTAL ABBERRATION.—(a) Mental excitement or mania is a condition in which the subject, under the influence of a corresponding emotion, exhibits intellectual excitement with defective self-control, impaired judgment, and consequent anomalies of conduct. This condition is known as simple mania. When the excitement becomes acute, the flow of ideas more rapid, the conduct of the patient less and less restrained, the speech incoherent, and the bodily restlessness incessant, the condition is known as acute mania.

(b) Mental depression or melancholia is the antithesis of the preceding condition. It is characterized by mental pain and gloom, slow reaction to stimuli of all kinds, slow muscular action, and diminished general sensibility. The ideational centres are always in the same state as when melancholic, and the thoughts of the patient are constantly engaged in formulating explanations of his misery, and in the invention of self-accusatory and self-deprecatory ideas. When the condition becomes acute, there may be motor restlessness, and, under the influence of gloomy delusions, strenuous resistance to any offers of assistance on the part of others. Suicide is probably contemplated seriously by all sufferers from this affection.

(c) Mental confusion or delirium.—In this condition, in contrast to both mania and melancholia, where the intellectual functions and memory remain clear, there is obscurcation of thought, greater or less unconsciousness of surroundings and, in an imperfect memory, or total loss of memory, of what has taken place during illness. The condition is met with typically in the delirium of fevers, in acute alcoholism, and in many forms of mental affections which owe their origin to toxic infection.

Stupor is a symptom which may occur in the course of any mental affections. It is a characteristic of the katatonic form of dementia praecox described below. Patients suffering from stupor manifest little or no volition, and do not respond to any of the ordinary suggestions. They usually retain the power of walking and
Thus a man who believes himself the victim of persecution generally develops hallucinations corresponding to his delusions, and a man who is the subject of delusions of pride and grandeur is liable to hallucinations corresponding to these ideas (see, further, art. HALLUCINATION, WANDERING). (g) Obsessions and impulses.—An obsession is a dissociated idea, or group of ideas, which suddenly enters consciousness, disturbing the ordinary course of ideation, and not involving the mind of the individual—that is to say, the subject of obsession regards it as an unreality, and as apart from his ordinary ideation. Obsessions are most common in the morbidly neurotic, hysterical, or hereditarily degenerate person. The number of obsessions is endless, there being almost as many forms as there are of thought. Some are harmless and meaningless, as, e.g., the desire to repeat words or phrases, to count objects of no interest, or to touch certain articles. Others are fatal, as the desire to kill, to commit suicide, or to steal.

As though in a trance or daydream, so does obsession lead up to impulses. Some impulses are harmless; others are serious. Among the latter are suicidal and homicidal impulses, the impulse to drink (diplophobia), or the impulse to steal (kleptomania). True impulse is generally great in thought, leads to much distress, due to the strength of the obsession against which the purpose will of the individual contends. The recognition of this conflict between impulsion and will is important in the diagnosis of obsession and impulse.

(b) Dementia or mental enfeeblement.—Mental enfeeblement is of two kinds—primary and secondary.

1. Primary. Dementia precoce, and 'paralytic dementia.' Dementia precoce varies from a condition in which the mental faculties are rudimentary, if, indeed, they can be said to exist, up to a state of mind characterized by such limited capacity that the subject is unable to take proper care of himself, or to perform any ordinary social or civil functions. All idiots are incapable of acquiring literary education. The higher grades of them, however, are trained to habits of decency and cleanliness. There are various types of idiocy, e.g., the geniuses or congenital type, which are malformed mental variations; the paralytic type, in which the ear is brain is affected; the paralytic type, in which the ear is brain is affected; and the inane form, in which the will or imagination is affected.

2. Secondary. Idiocy, as a result of disease, has been produced by disease, such as cerebral disease, or by disease of the brain, or by a disease of the skull, or by a disease of the skull. Idiocy, as a result of disease, has been produced by disease, such as cerebral disease, or by disease of the brain, or by a disease of the skull, or by a disease of the skull. Idiocy, as a result of disease, has been produced by disease, such as cerebral disease, or by disease of the brain, or by a disease of the skull, or by a disease of the skull.
often difficult to classify borderline cases. The absence of mental power in imbeciles may be so slight that it becomes apparent only in the continuing infantilism which the subject manifests as puberty approaches. On the other hand, it may manifest itself by inability to acquire ordinary education at an early period of life. Not only so, but imbecile young children generally manifest peculiarities of conduct, unusual attitudes of mind, and abnormal ways of thought, all of which are characterized by a feeble and undeveloped mind. Physical deformity is rare, as compared with idiocy, and many imbeciles, though not well developed physically, are of robust bodily constitution.

The mental reaction of imbeciles towards their environment is, generally speaking, defective; they are incapable of learning by experience the conventional social relationships of everyday life, or of understanding anything beyond the merely animal and the simpler human necessities of existence. At the same time, these defects are, in a few exceptional individuals, associated with some musical or arithmetical faculty, with an extraordinary memory for dates, or even an aptitude for certain limited mechanical skill. The power to protect themselves is greatly reduced, from helplessness in the midst of ordinary dangers up to a capacity for partially or even wholly earning their own means of livelihood by the performance of, as a rule, unskilled labour. The majority of imbeciles are deficient in self-control and in the moral sense; and, though many are good-natured, not a few are impulsive, passionate, and vicious.

A grade imbecility or degeneracy.

This class of imbeciles, though often apparently normal, physically and mentally, are only a degree removed from imbeciles. As a rule, such individuals, though of average intelligence—occasionally even exhibiting signs of various kinds, and anomalies of emotion either in the direction of hyper-emotionalism or in the absence of certain emotional qualities, such as sympathy, tend to be more or less malignant. Certain types of criminals undoubtedly belong to this class. The intellectual development of such persons is always defective, and presents well-marked irregularities, and often shows signs of physical degeneration. They do not possess the normal capacity to learn, and are subject to various forms of psychopathic affection, such as paranoia or hysteria, and to such nervous diseases as epilepsy.

III. THE ACQUIRED INSANITIES.

The acquired insanities include those mental affections which manifest themselves between puberty and the end of the fourth decade in life. Undoubtedly they may appear, though rarely, both before and after these periods.

1. Mania-melancholia.

(a) The circular form of mania-melancholia.

The attacks of mental exaltation and of mental depression succeed each other usually without intermission, and are followed by a lucid intermission of longer or shorter duration (cycle a double form). When the alternate attacks follow one another without a lucid interval, or are continuous, the form is known as 'circular insanity' (cycle circulaire). The term 'circular insanity' is, however, used to embrace both forms. It is unimportant whether the mental depression succeeds or precedes the mental exaltation.

Although the form of mania which occurs in circular insanity may assume an acute type, it is usually of the form known as 'slight.' There is a general exaltation of the mental functions, without any apparent incoherence of ideas, without hallucinations of the senses, and without the presence of marked delusions. The memory becomes extraordinarily acute, and the patients talk or write incessantly. At the same time, although they appear capable of reasoning correctly, they lose their sense of proportion and the fitness of things, and their judgment loses its normal balance. Thus they become less reticent regarding themselves and their affairs, and less cautious in speculation, and may say or do things, to the disgust of others, and thus become faulty and untrustworthy. They lose their natural affection for their relatives and friends, and the company of people of inferior type. In short, they become extraordinarily given to idle, vain, vindictive, quarrelsome, and lose their moral status. When this condition has lasted for months, it may be years, the subject gradually loses his abnormal energy, though occasionally it may flicker up, and lapse into a state of mental depression. The contrast between the same patient labouring under melancholia and in his previous maniacal condition is profound. He becomes silent, pale-faced, seeks solitude, and shows a disinclination to converse. His former energy is replaced by extreme listlessness and a most paralyzing inability to perform mental or physical work. The duration of the two periods of mania and melancholia are not always the same, the period of depression being generally longer than the excitement. Great irregularity also exists in the duration of the lucid interval, although there are some cases in which it bears a stated relation to the length of the mental affections which precede it. Circular insanity is, on the point of view of recovery, a very hopeless condition; for, though the individual attacks are almost always recovered from, the condition tends to recur with an almost fatal certainty. It is a condition that is more common among the educated classes of society, and which occurs not infrequently in persons with an inherent tendency to insanity.

(b) The recurrent forms of mania-melancholia.

1. Mania.

The form in which mania appears may be either simple or acute. The description of simple mania given above in connexion with circular insanity must suffice for the present purpose. Acute mania differs from it in that it is of short duration, and is followed by a lucid interval of intensity, and simple mania may in any patient suddenly pass into the acute form. In acute mania there is great mental exaltation combined with intellectual disturbance, sensory delusions, and uncontrollable motor restlessness. The first appearance of the affection is usually ushered in by malaise and mental depression generally of short duration. Gradually mental exaltation supervenes, sometimes suddenly, at other times after lapses into depression. The patient's ideas soon become confused, for the ideation becomes so rapid that there is difficulty in consecutively
expressing them, until finally speech becomes incoherent. The exaggerated excitability of the senses of sight and hearing becomes so intense that a stray word or an object startles the patient unconsciously, with the train of ideas unconnected with the train of thought. Thus the patient's attention becomes unfixed, and he tends to associate his ideas more by their external than by any internal relational character. The motor excitement manifests itself by increased movement and lassitude. The will-power at this stage can hardly be said to exist, and actions are determined, not by any formulated principle, but by the idea predominant for the time. Further, there is complete loss of the moral sense and of natural affection, and the emotions are equally disturbed: grief, joy, fear, and hatred may be manifested by the patient within a few minutes of each other. Notwithstanding this extraordinary mental disturbance, the memory in many cases remains intact. Not only do many of the patients remember afterwards what had been said and done to them, but they are able to describe their sensations and repeat their own sayings. The physical symptoms comprise a marked change in the facial expression, which betrays the instinctive and varied passions which dominate the soul. The disorder of movement to which reference has been made expresses itself in an agitation of all the voluntary muscles, which during intense mental excitement results in violent contortions. Insomnia is always a morbid or less marked symptom of acute mania; it often resists all treatment, and, when long continued, has a deleterious effect upon the patient. The function of speech and nutrition are always disturbed during the attack; the appetite, whether diminished or increased, is capricious, and the patients invariably lose weight during the acute stages. The basal temperature is often slightly, if at all, increased. Finally, there is high blood pressure and a marked increase in the relative number of the white corpuscles of the blood. This last change is regarded as indicating a toxic condition of the blood. Mania may be associated with various nervous and cerebral affections, such as hysteria, epilepsy, and general paralysis. After one attack the disease tends to recur at regular or irregular intervals. Although it is not a usual occurrence, it is right to remark that at any time in the course of recurrent mania an attack of melancholia may take the place of one of the maniacal attacks. The termination of the attacks is by recovery in from 70 to 80 per cent, a small percentage die of some complication, and a certain number pass over to chronic mania.

Chronic mania is simply the indefinite persistence, in a milder form, of the symptoms of acute mania. The excitement is continuous but less intense, and the patients are more manageable. Many of the subjects are able to perform some simple work. The illusions and morbid ideas of the acute stage become more fixed and crystallized, so that many patients exhibit the symptoms of delusional insanity (paranoid). A certain degree of mental enfeeblement is always present, and many such patients are unable to express themselves coherently. The patient may be liable, from time to time, to acute attacks of excitement which resemble those of the primary condition.

2. Melancholia. — The characteristic feature of melancholia is a morbid depression of feeling which expresses itself in every degree from silent resignation up to the most violent despair. At the same time, there is intellectual disturbance in which painful impressions predominate. In contrast with mania, the intellectual contents are more or less depressed and inactive, so that instead of the pleasurable feelings which accompany their activity there is produced a feeling of pain and misery. The treatment of the attacks of manic-depressive insanity is symptomatic, and as a rule the patients make satisfactory recoveries from the individual attacks. From the point of view of prognosis, however, the matter is more serious, for the danger of a relapse at some future period can never be ignored. In the circular form of the disease, the recurrence of the attacks is almost certain.

ii. The Dementia Praecox Group. — Dementia praecox is essentially a disease of adolescence; by far the greater number of cases develop between the ages of 20 and 25 years. The disease cases develop before the age of 20 and a few after 40 do not affect the validity of the above statement. The onset of the disease is so slow and insidious as almost to escape observation. The early symptoms extend over a period of years. Patients, the majority of whom have given promise of a normal development, may gradually exhibit, in early adolescence, unmisshakable signs of progressive mental deterioration. This intellectual decadence is almost always accompanied by emotional disturbances, such as outbreaks of temper, undue conduct, or violent language. These irritable manifestations are at first transient, but they become fixed, and the patient may fully realize, and be truly repentant for, his behaviour. As the disease progresses, these unaccountable and unprovoked emotional outbursts may become more alarming, and even dangerous, and the patient becomes apathetic, careless in his habits, tends to lie in bed too long, and often gives up work altogether without any adequate reason. His natural affection abates until it may disappear or become diverted into an antipathy towards his nearest relatives. Finally, he may develop loose ideas of persecution, or ideas in the paraesthetic form of the disease. These delusions of persecution are accompanied by hallucinations and illusions of the senses. The disease ends, in the great majority of instances, in dementia or permanent mental decay.

Dementia praecox presents three forms: hebephrenia, katatonia, and paranoia, or the delusional form.

1. Hebephrenia occurs, as a rule, in young subjects who, although fairly normal up to a certain point in the intellectual sphere, yet have always presented some symptoms of emotional instability or eccentricity. The mental deterioration, which sets in very gradually, is characterized by a desire for solitude, reliance, shyness, and suspicion of others. Suddenly a period of slight mental excitation may appear, during which the behaviour of the patient attracts attention; or, on the other hand, an attack of depression may supervene, in many respects similar to a mild attack of melancholia. These mental disturbances quickly pass off, but sooner or later they recur. The patient may suffer from indefinite delusions, or even hallucinations, but these, as a rule, are rare in hebephrenia; meanwhile the mental deterioration progresses. The patient comes to lose all initiative, all interest in his work or surroundings; become indifferent towards relatives; careless of appearance and negligent of duties. His speech becomes jery and hesitating, and the power to carry on a conversation is gradually lost. Throughout the course of the disease, and up to the time when actual delusions set in, there is a surprising degree of accurate knowledge of his surround circumstances and of what is being said or done in his presence. The inability of the patient to respond or react is the characteristic feature of the disease. Sooner or later, however, the patient is cast into a state of irresponsiveness due to permanent loss of mental
power. Before this final stage is reached, it is not infrequent to observe violent and impulsive conduct, as a result, probably, of hallucinations, of delusions, or of both.

2. Kataonia differs from hebephrenia chiefly in the presence of peculiar attacks of muscular tension or cataleptic rigidity of the muscles; in mutism—phases of the disease, during which the patients refuse to speak; and in the peculiar apraxia and grasping movements in which the patient resists all attempts on the part of others to do anything for them. Impulsive actions are perhaps more marked in the kataontic form than in the other varieties of dementia precox. In other respects, such as the presence of acute temporary attacks of mental excitement and depression, and in the gradual mental deterioration of the subject, katanais bears a general resemblance to hebephrenia.

3. Paranoia. This variety of dementia precox may commence exactly like hebephrenia, or kataonia, or with an acute attack of manic-depressive insanity followed by or not by kataontic symptoms. Its chief and distinguishing feature, however, is the presence of delusions of a more or less systematized nature, and of hallucinations of the senses. The clearness and consistency of true paranoia (see below) and, moreover, the patients almost always exhibit peculiarities and mannerisms indicative of mental degeneration. Some of these or other of the symptoms which have been described as characteristic of dementia precox supervene and are followed by a tendency towards dementia.

The immediate of a prognosis, dementia precox is a particularly grave form of mental disease, and only a small minority of the subjects make a satisfactory recovery. It has been estimated that of the cases about 90 per cent fall into permanent dementia, that about 15 per cent recover partially, though more or less mentally crippled, and that only 5 per cent recover absolutely. So little is as yet known of the pathology of the disease that no scientifically formulated line of treatment can be laid down. As regards causation, the hereditary factor would appear to be of great importance, no less than 75 per cent of the cases showing an hereditary tendency to mental affections. The environment of the subject is also, apparently, important, and it has been pointed out by some observers that dementia precox is particularly liable to affect families which have been subjected to sudden and extreme social changes, such as from poverty to wealth, or from a country to an urban life.

III. THE PARANOIA GROUP. Paranoia is a chronic mental disease of which systematized delusions, with or without hallucinations of the senses, are the prominent characteristic. The delusions may take the form of ideas of persecution or of grandeur and ambition; these may exist separately or run concurrently in the same individual, or they may become transformed in the course of the patient's life from a persecutory to an ambivalent character. The disease may begin during adolescence, but the great majority of the subjects manifest no symptoms of the affection until full adult life. The prominent and distinguishing symptom of paranoia is the delusion, which is gradually organized out of a mass of original but erroneous beliefs or convictions, until it forms an integral part of the ordinary mental process of the subject and becomes fused with his personality. This slow process of the growth of a false idea is technically known as "systematization," and the delusion is then said to be "systematized." As such delusions are coherently formed, there is no manifest mental confusion in their expression. Notwithstanding the fixity of the delusion, it is subject in some cases to transformation which permits of the gradual substitution of delusions of grandeur for delusions of persecution. It happens also that periods of remission from the influence of the delusion may occur from time to time in individual cases, and it may even happen, though very rarely, that the delusion may permanently disappear.

Paranoia is classified for purposes according to the form of delusion which the patients exhibit. Thus there are the persecutory, the ambitious, the amatory, and the delusional types, these divisions depending upon the prevalence of the primary emotions of fear or suspicion, pride or vanity, and love.

1. Persecutory Paranoia. This form is characterized by delusions of persecution, with hallucinations of a painful and distressing character. In predisposed persons there is often observed an anomaly of character dating from early life. Towards the commencement of the insanity the patient becomes gloomy, preoccupied, and irritable. Suspicions respecting the attitude of others take possession of their minds, and they ultimately come to suspect the conduct of their nearest relatives. Certain of the symptoms caused by sleeplessness and anxiety gradually supervene, and the patients become pale and worried in appearance, and their appetite is affected. The mental symptoms slowly become more pronounced, until the patient believes that people are conspiring against him. The conversations of his friends are supposed to be interlarded with phrases which, on examination, he believes to contain hidden meanings, and the newspapers appear to abound in veiled references to him. A stray word, a look, a gesture, a smile, a cough, a shrug of the shoulders, or the look of a stranger, are apt to be misinterpreted. The extraordinary prevalence of this imagined conspiracy may lead the patient to regard himself as a person of great importance, and may result in the formation of delusions of ambition which imagine themselves with the general conceptions of persecution, or which may wholly supplant the persecutory insanity.

At this juncture, however, it generally happens that hallucinations begin to appear. These, in the great majority of instances, are auditory, and usually commence with definite noises in the ears, such as ringing sounds, hissing, or whispering. Gradually they assume a more definite form, until isolated words and, ultimately, formed sentences are distinctly heard. There is great diversity in the completeness of the verbal hallucinations in different patients. Some patients never experience more than the subjective annoyance of isolated words, generally of an insulting character, while others are compelled to listen to regular dialogues carried on by unknown voices concerning themselves. A not uncommon form of verbal hallucination is formulated in the complaint of the patients that 'all their thoughts are read and proclaimed aloud.' Even more than the enforced listening to verbal hallucinations this "right reading" distresses the patient, and often leads him to acts of violence, for the privacy of his inward thoughts is, he believes, desecrated, and he often feels helpless and desperate at the condition from which there is no possible escape.

Though some of the subjects do not develop any other form of hallucination, it is the unfortunate lot of others to suffer, in addition, from hallucinations of taste, smell, or touch. The characteristic sensation of the subjective sensations in these sense organs leads to the formulation of delusions of poisoning, of being subjected to the influence of
noxious gases or powders, or of being acted on by such agencies as electricity. Such are the persons who take their food to chemists for analysis; who complain to the police that people are acting upon them injuriously; who hermetically seal every crevice that admits air to their bedrooms to prevent the entrance of poisonous fumes; or who place glass castors between the feet of their beds and the ceiling, the object of insulating electric currents. Such patients obtain little sleep; some of them, indeed, remain awake all night—for the symptoms are usually worse at night—and have to be content with such snatches of sleep as they are able to obtain at odd times during the day. It is obvious that a person tormented and distracted in this way may at any moment lose self-control and become a danger to the community.

This type of the disease may persist for an indefinite period—even for 20 or 30 years—without any change, except for the important fact that remissions in the intensity of the symptoms occur from time to time. These remissions may be marked as to give rise to the belief that the patient has recovered; but in true paranoia this is never the case, and sooner or later the persecution begins again in all its former intensity.

2. Ambitious paranoia.—After a long period of persecution, a change in the symptoms may set in, in some cases, and the intensity of the hallucinations becomes modified. Delusions of grandeur begin to appear, at first faintly, and occasionally the increase in force until they ultimately supplant the delusions of persecution. At the same time, the hallucinations of a disagreeable nature fade away, and are replaced by audible hallucinations conforming to the new delusions of grandeur. Undoubtedly, however, paranoia may commence, so far as can be observed, with delusions of grandeur, in which case there is seldom or never a transformation of the delusion. If the personality, or of the delusions from grandeur to persecution, although delusions of persecution may engrave themselves upon or run side by side with the predominant hallucinations. The emotional basis of ambitious paranoia is pride, and every phase of human vanity and aspiration is represented in the delusions of the patients. There is a considerably less logical manner displayed in the explanations of their beliefs by such patients than in the case of the subjects of persecution. Many of them, without any regard for the psychological or ideological detail, affect to be the descendants of historical figures, and have no compunction in disowning their natural parents or explaining that they have been “changed in their cradles.” In order to account for the fact that they are of exalted or even of royal birth. Dominated by such beliefs, paranones have been known to travel all over the world in search of confirmation of their delusions. It is people of this kind who drop into the ears of confiding strangers vague hints as to their exalted origin and kindred, and who make desperate and occasionally alarming attempts to force their way into the presence of princes and rulers. The sphere of religion affords an endless field for the ambitious paranones, and some of them may even aspire to divine authority; but, as a rule, the true paranoia does not lose touch with the more extravagant delusions of persons who call themselves by divine names and assume omnipotent attributes are usually found in patients who have passed through acute attacks of mania or “dementia praecox,” and who are mentally enfeebled.

A not uncommon form of paranoia, combining both ambition and persecution, is where the subject believes that he is a man of unbounded wealth or power, and assumes the airs of a potentate. He has, however, deprived by the machinations of his enemies. These patients frequently obtain through auditory hallucinations the knowledge on which they base their delusions. They are often so troublesome, threatening, and persistent in their determination to obtain redress for their imagined wrongs that in the public interest they have to be forcibly detained in asylums. On the whole, however, the ambitions paranoid is not troublesome, but calm, dignified, self-possessed, and reserved on the subject of his delusions. He is usually capable of reasoning as correctly and of performing work as efficiently as ordinary people. Many of them, however, while living in society, are liable to give expression to their delusions under the influence of excitement, or to behave so strangely and unconventionally on unsuitable occasions as to render their seclusion either necessary or highly desirable.

3. Amatory paranoia.—A distinguishing feature of this form of paranoia is that the subjects are chivalrous and idealistic in their love. Some of them believe that they have been “mysteriously” married to a person of the opposite sex, usually in a prominent social position. The fact that they may have never spoken to or perhaps never seen the person in question is immaterial. The conviction that their love is reciprocated and the relationship understood by the person they believe them to be married to is unshakable, and is usually based upon suppositions that to a normal mind would appear either trivial or wholly unreal. The object of affection, if not mythical or of an esoteric character, is usually one who has been approached, is not infrequently persecuted by the admirer, who takes every opportunity of obstructing personally or by letter the evidences of an ardent adoration. This assumption can easily become complicated and embarrassing before it is realized that the persecutor is insane.

The subjects of this form of paranoia are in the majority married women well advanced in years who have led irreproachable lives, or men of a romantic disposition who have lived their mental lives more in the realm of chimeras than in the regions of real facts.

4. Litigious paranoia (paranodia quaerulous).—The clinical form of litigious paranoia presents uniform characteristic features which are recognized in every civilized community. The basic emotion is vanity, but it is modified by the element both of acquisitiveness and avarice. Moreover, the subjects are, as regards character, persistent, opinionative, and stubborn. When these qualities are exaggerated, as they are in this type, which, as has been pointed out, is more influenced by the passions or emotions than by ordinary rational considerations, it can readily be appreciated that the subjects are capable of creating difficulties and anxieties which sooner or later may lead to their forcible seclusion in the interests of social order.

It is important to observe that the rights to which such people lay claim, or the wrongs of which they complain, may not necessarily be imaginary. But, whether imaginary or real, the statement of their case is always made to rest upon some foundation of fact, and there is, moreover, presented, if not with ability, at any rate with forensic skill and plausibility. As the litigants are one-sided and capable of seeing only one side of the case—their own—and they are swayed by convictions which preclude feelings of delicacy or diffidence, they ultimately succeed in obtaining a hearing in a court of law under circumstances which would have discouraged any normal and intelligent person. Once in the law-courts, their doom is sealed. Neither the loss of the case nor the payment of heavy expenses has any effect in disheartening the litigant, who carries his suit from court to court until the methods of legal
appeal are exhausted. The suit may be raised again and again on some side issue, or some different legal action may be initiated. In spite of the alienation of the sympathy of his relatives, and the invalid character of the claims, the paranoid continues his futile litigation in the firm belief that he is only defending himself from fraud, or seeking to regain his just rights. After exhausting his means and perhaps those of his family, and finding himself deserted by all those to whom he was accustomed to look for advantage as formerly, delusions of persecution begin to establish themselves. He accuses the judges of corruption and the lawyers of being in the pay of his enemies and imagines a conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining justice. One of two things usually happens at this stage. Though well versed in legal procedure, he may one day lose self-control, and in open court resort to threats of violence. He is then probably arrested, and may on examination be found insane and committed to an asylum. Another not uncommon result is that, finding himself non-suited in a court of law, he commits a technical assault upon, it may be, some high legal functionary, or on some person in a prominent social position, with the object of seeking an opportunity of directing public attention to his grievances.

Paranoia is generally a hopeless affection from the point of view of recovery. From what has been stated regarding its genesis and slow development, it may be inferred that no form of ordinary medical treatment can be of the least avail in modifying its symptoms. The best that can be done in the interests of the patient is to place those in surroundings where they can be shielded from influences which aggravate their delusions, and in other respects to make their unfortunate lot as pleasant and easy to endure as possible.

In this division are included those forms of mental affection which we know to be associated with the presence of toxic substances within the body. Among these substances are the poison of infective fevers and of syphilis, the auto-intoxication of the body by waste products, as in fatigue, the disturbance of metabolism by shocks, either physical or mental, or by caloric changes; at length, finally, the poisoning of the system by the habitual abuse of such drugs as alcohol. Such a number of causes necessarily produce different clinical symptoms, which, for convenience and clearness have been divided as distinct varieties of disease. It is manifest that only the typical forms can be dealt with here.

There are certain general symptomaties features common to all these affections. On the mental side there is more or less marked confusion of ideas, in striking contrast to the mental clearness found in patients labouring under the so-called acquired insanities, especially in the manic-depressive and paranoid groups. The mental state is dreamy, thought is dissociated, speech is incoherent, and memory is blurred. There is great restlessness of an aimless character, accompanied often by mental and physical uneasiness, or pain, or an anxious emotional state. False senses-perceptions amounting to hallucinations, accompanied by delusions of a passing kind, are not unusual. All these manifestations are further coloured by the bodily weakness which is present. On the physical side there are grave bodily symptoms, characterized either by fever and prostration or by anaemic changes and wasting of the tissues. There is always a tendency to destruction of the finer nerve elements and cortical cells of the brain. In the acute forms the prognosis is always serious, but the course is more rapid, and recovery often takes place in the more chronic forms, such as chronic alcoholism and general paralysis, the prospect of recovery is almost hopeless.

1. The delirium of fevers.—This delirium is typical of the whole of the toxic insanities. The delirium varies greatly in different fevers, being, as a rule, more severe in typhus and certain types of smallpox, and less severe in the milder exanthemata, such as measles or scarlet fever. Much, however, depends on the general state of health, the condition of the nervous system to the influence of the toxin. Some persons, children in particular, tend to become confused and delirious when subjected to the action of any disease poison, e.g., smallpox or influenza, which raises the temperature of the body. The delirium generally subsides after the crisis of the fever.

2. Septic delirium.—Delirium is also apt to occur when the system is invaded by certain poisonous micro-organisms. This condition is frequently observed in the blood-poisoning arising from wounds, in puerperal conditions and, in purulent affections of the pleural and abdominal cavities, and in some conditions unaccompanied by purulent inflammation. The puerperal insanities, because of their frequency, are important; but here there are various forms of this disease. In predisposed individuals, insanity may occur during pregnancy, especially in the later months; at the time of parturition the ordinary forms of manic-depressive insanity may assume an aggravation or delirium. It is with the last variety that we are at present concerned, because it is in all respects similar to the other septic deliria associated with blood-poisoning as septic delirium reach their climax of intensity very rapidly after infection, though in some cases there is a preliminary period of mental depression, with apathy and listlessness. The speech is incoherent; there is great motor restlessness, and a subdued but intense excitement. Vivid hallucinations of sight and hearing are present, so that the patients live in their environment and lives in a world of phantasy. Sleep is invariably suspended, and the expression is anxious and morbidly mobile. The bodily symptoms point to prostration with fever, and the temperature ranges at first high, and then low. The pulse is weak and rapid, the tongue furled, and there is marked loss of appetite. The great majority of the patients (70 per cent) recover, the recovery being often preceded by a period of stupor. In those cases which do not recover, the patients, as the disease advances, become more and more prostrate, their movements become more feebie, and they lapse into coma from which they do not emerge.

3. Delirium of collapse (the exhaustion insanities).—These mental affections are most apt to occur in persons who have been exhausted by long continued fatigue, insufficient food, or wasting diseases; but they are found most frequently after the crisis of fevers or during convalescence from fevers, after surgical operations, injuries of a severe kind, or during the acute insanity by which they are preceded. The mental condition is one of confusion, with excitement, incoherence of speech, and weakened ideation. The patients suffer from vague hallucinations, and not infrequently express delusions of persecution or of self-importance. Such delusions are, however, fleeting and ill-defined. On the physical side the patients are weak, and manifest profound disorder of nutrition; the pulse is feeble and slow,
the papilla are dilated, and the skin is clammy; the tongue is furrowed, and the appetite so perverted that the patients are averse to taking food. The great majority of the patients recover, but the prognosis is by no means always favourable. When the preexisting cause has been comparatively slight, as, e.g., influenza or pneumonia, the patients rapidly recover; but, when it has been prolonged and grave, as, e.g., some forms of typhoid fever, long-continued wasting illnesses, or severe injuries, the prognosis, depending always upon the patient's strength, is more grave.

4. Alcoholism.—Many other diseases besides alcohol, when habitually taken into the system, may produce chronic poisoning, accompanied by mental disturbances; but, in view of their greater frequency, the effects of alcohol only will be referred to here.

(a) Ordinary intoxication.—Alcoholic intoxication is itself an insanity, and a person who drinks himself from sobriety into unconsciousness passes through many phases of mental alienation. In certain predisposed or irritable persons, ordinary alcoholic intoxication may produce a great excitement, with a tendency to violence. In this condition, of which the patients retain but a confused recollection, serious crimes against others, or suicide, may be committed.

(b) Acute alcoholism (delirium tremens) is the result of excessive drinking, but it is a secondary and not a direct consequence of alcoholic poisoning. For a person who has drunk to excess, but who has abstained from alcohol for several days, or even for several weeks, may, after some physical shock, such as a surgical operation, an illness, or a fit of convulsions, or a bodily injury, develop the symptoms of acute alcoholism. Such an entity points to a secondary toxemia from the intestinal canal, for alcohol is very rapidly eliminated from the system. The chief mental symptoms are vague terror, mental distress, and confusion of ideas. These symptoms are further complicated by vivid hallucinations of the senses, especially of sight and hearing. The dangers attending the mental symptoms of acute alcoholism are the violent impulses to which the patients are liable—impulses to homicide and suicide. These impulses are partly obsession, but they are undoubtedly often the result of the impression produced by the hallucinations. The chief bodily symptoms are insomniac, want of appetite, great thirst, and trembling or twitching of the muscles. The danger accompanied by physical symptoms is death from heart failure, from pneumonia, or from nervous exhaustion. Under suitable medical treatment the great majority of the patients recover.

(c) Dipsomania.—Dipsomania is really more an obsession than an alcoholic disease, but it is more convenient to consider it here. Probably all the subjects have a hereditary predisposition to alcohol, but the chief inherited quality is an instability of the nervous system which renders them liable to intoxication, and consequently to impulse. The impulse to drink probably would not appear in a person who had never experienced the pleasurable effects of alcohol, but an attack may occur suddenly in a predisposed person of perfectly irreproachable character. There are, however, exciting causes, such as mental shocks or strain or physical illness, and the attack is usually preceded by malaise or mental depression. The attacks usually last several weeks, often with short intermissions, during which the patient carries on with his usual duties and even appears to overcome his obsession. According to circumstances and the environment, the attacks tend to become more numerous or less frequent. If the former, then rapid physical and mental deterioration takes place, and the case becomes hopeless; if the latter, (unfortunately the minority), the patient may experience only one or two attacks and afterwards be immune.

(d) Chronic alcoholism is a somewhat vague term including numerous conditions. It may be defined as a condition of mental deterioration, emotional depression, and enfeeblement of the will, with a progressing tendency towards dementia, met with in persons who have habitually used alcohol to excess. The enfeeblement of the will-power, which is the cardinal mental symptom, is not confined to the inability to resist the craving for alcohol, but extends into all the social and business relations of the individual. So much is this the case that the subjects are more likely to use the tools of dupe of other people. In more advanced types of the disease there is loss of memory, especially for recent events, with confusion of ideas. The bodily symptoms are also characteristic, and include tremor of muscles, weakness of certain muscle groups, various sensory disturbances, and, not infrequently, epileptic seizures. Certain internal organs, especially the liver, kidneys, and heart, are liable to organic disease. The condition is incurable.

5. General paralysis.—While modern authorities have long been agreed that syphilis is the antecedent cause of this disease, the discovery by Noguchi of the spirochete of syphilis (Treponema pallidum) in the cerebral tissues of persons suffering from general paralysis has placed beyond doubt the fact that the disease has a syphilitic origin. General paralysis is a disease chiefly of middle life, occurring most often between the ages of 35 and 45. It is a disease of modern civilization, and affects the middle classes of direct syphilitic origin. Certain internal organs, especially the liver, kidneys, and heart, are liable to organic disease. The condition is incurable.

For clinical purposes the disease is divided into three stages, although a prodromal stage is also recognized. The symptoms of the first stage, characterized by mental symptoms, are usually of fits of memory, revealing themselves in odd and uncouth lapses in writing, in spelling, or in the performance of their ordinary routine duties. The chief change, however, is in the moral character; the patient is irritable, and occasionally violent; among strangers he is facile, versatile, and easily led astray. Gradually there develops in typical cases a condition resembling simple mania, with, however, a certain mental confusion depending upon the underlying condition of progressive dementia. Delusions of grandeur are common in this stage; these delusions, which result from the predominant state of mental
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exaltation, do not always exceed the bounds of possibility and credibility. It is important to bear in mind that the insanity of the first stage may be a simple mental confusion without any conspicuous feature, or may be of the melancholic type. The latter forms are more common in females. Towards the end of the first stage, the affection of the innervation of the muscular mechanism becomes more pronounced. The muscles of the face and neck become accomodatious and the speech becomes incoherent. Difficulty is experienced by the patient in pronouncing certain words, such as ‘artillery,’ ‘British Constitution,’ ‘incompatibility,’ etc. The staccato manner of pronouncing such words is characteristic of the disease.

In the second stage, the mental weakness and confusion are more marked, the delusions become extravagant and absurd, and the conduct of the patient uncertain and foolish. He is apt to steal useless objects, to stuff his pockets with rubbish, and to lose all sense of propriety, especially with regard to instinctive human habits. The embarrassment of speech becomes painfully apparent, and the muscular incoincidence becomes so great that the patient loses the power of performing accurately such habitual movements as buttoning clothes or nutting knowl and handwriting becomes shaky and unrecognizable, the gait ataxic, and all muscular movements feeble; towards the end of this stage there appear convulsive seizures which are sometimes as expressive as attacks, and which appear to accelerate greatly the downward course of the patient’s strength.

The state of mental weakness and confusion reaches its term in the third stage. The third stage of the patient appears to be devoid of emotion, sentiment, or memory, and the only animal instinct which seems to remain is that for food. The physical symptoms of the third stage are characterized by a progressive weakness and paralysis which necessitate ultimately the patient’s continued confinement to bed. The third stage terminates his life. He usually dies in a convulsive seizure, or from exhaustion of the disease to some vital centre in the brain, or from blood-poisoning or pneumonia.

General paralysis is the most fatal of all diseases, for no antiscetic instance of recovery is known. The average duration of this disease is from 2 to 3 years in the male, and from 3 to 4 years in the female.

V. INSANITY CONNECTED WITH THE NERVES.

There are many forms of insanity, but the types with which insanity may be associated are in order of importance, epilepsy, hysteria (q.v.), neurasthenia, and chorea. It must be remembered that the majority of persons who are the subjects of the neuroses do not become insane. As epilepsy is the most important of all the neuroses, and the one most commonly associated with insanity, it alone will be described here.

Epilepsy is a disease which is characterized by convulsions of a definite type, or by sudden and temporary loss of consciousness without convulsions. The former is known as the ‘grand mal,’ the latter as the ‘petit mal.’ In the severer form of the disease the patient, while and is violently convulsed; in the milder form he does not usually fall; he is suddenly overwhelmed with mental darkness, but after a few seconds he is able to continue his work in which he may have been engaged at the time of the seizure. The two forms of fit are often combined in the same individual. As a rule, beyond the congenital degeneracy or mental deterioration, to which reference will be made, the subjects of epilepsy who manifest insanity are free from mental symptoms in the interval between the seizures. Mental disturbances are most commonly observed either immediately preceding the fit, immediately succeeding it, or replacing it. The last form is designated ‘laved’ or ‘masked’ epilepsy. Of all the forms of insanity accompanying the fit, either before or after it, mania is the most common. The kind of mania varies, not only in different cases, but very markedly in the same case at different times. From mere irritability with capricious conduct it may vary to the most violent excitement, incoherence, and fury. But insanity does not always accompany the fits in the same person, and an epileptic mania may be free from it for long periods notwithstanding the regular recurrence of the fits. The insanity may then occur quite suddenly and be attended by acts of violence of which the patient retains no recollection. In the pre-epileptic mania the mental symptoms usually come on gradually, and may last a few days preceding the fit; the post-epileptic mania, on the other hand, is sudden in its onset, and usually of very short duration.

Another, but less common, post-epileptic form of insanity is stupor. When stupor occurs it is more persistent in its duration than mania, and may be accompanied by hallucinations and a tendency to automatic impulsive action.

The least common form of insanity connected with epilepsy is melancholy, which is not a passing insanity accompanying the fits, but a progressive, chronic, and usually incurable condition. Many epileptics exhibit mental degeneracy of a congenital kind which manifests itself by certain oddities and eccentricities of attack, want of self-control, and instability of the emotions. An extreme form of degeneracy is observed in epileptic idiots where epilepsy is superimposed upon a markedly degenerate mental condition which has been inherited from self-control and instability of the emotions. An extreme form of degeneracy is observed in epileptic idiots where epilepsy is superimposed upon a markedly degenerate mental condition which has been inherited from self-control and instability of the emotions. An extreme form of degeneracy is observed in epileptic idiots where epilepsy is superimposed upon a markedly degenerate mental condition which has been inherited from self-control and instability of the emotions. An extreme form of degeneracy is observed in epileptic idiots where epilepsy is superimposed upon a markedly degenerate mental condition which has been inherited from self-control and instability of the emotions. An extreme form of degeneracy is observed in epileptic idiots where epilepsy is superimposed upon a markedly degenerate mental condition which has been inherited from self-control and instability of the emotions. An extreme form of degeneracy is observed in epileptic idiots where epilepsy is superimposed upon a markedly degenerate mental condition which has been inherited from self-control and instability of the emotions.
recovery does not take place so readily, if at all. In a typical case of apoplexy occurring after middle life, there ensues as an almost invariable result a certain amount of dementia accompanied by emotional disturbances. Depending upon the nature of the case, the patient may become/addiction in a state of confusion and the symptom of the lesion there may also occur loss of memory, mental confusion, and an impairment of judgment. Again, in most of the cases, the mental and emotional condition is slowly progressive, but in the majority of the younger cases and sometimes, though exceptionally, in the older cases, the condition is not progressive.

Apoplexy may be followed by any of the chief forms of insanity. Perhaps the most common form is that which is greatly modified by the underlying condition of dementia. The mania is characterized by a noisy excitement accompanied by restlessness, and illusions or hallucinations of the senses. The symptoms are usually more accentuated during the night, so it is not uncommon to find a patient either quiet or slightly excited during the day become noisy and sleepless during the night. This form of mania is also often intermitting, the attack lasting for two or three weeks, followed by a period of calm which, however, cannot be guaranteed as the episode cannot be precisely predicted. Mania-melancholia is less frequently an accompaniment of cerebral lesions of this kind. It is usually acute in appearance, but there is probably less mental distress than the restlessness and noisy emotionalism of the patient would lead one to suppose. Delusions with visual and auditory hallucinations may also be met with as a result of such lesions. The delusions are of the persecutory form, but are irregular and badly systematized.

2. With regard to the insanity arising from tumours and injuries to the head, it may be said in a word that it is very irregular and difficult to describe. In cerebral tumour, by far the most common form is a progressive encephalomalacia ending in complete dementia. Traumatic injuries may undoubtedly cause a confusional insanity in predisposed persons, immediately following the injury. Where a portion of the skull has been depressed and affects the brain, serious cerebral affections may be caused, which are relieved by operation. In the class of cases in which insanity is said to occur long after the receipt of the injury, some excusable doubt has been cast upon the relation of the injury to the mental trouble. It is believed by many authorities, however, that profound moral deterioration accompanied by impulsive tendencies may supervene as a result of injuries to the head received years previously.

VII. SEMBLE INSANITY.—The insanity of old age has been divided into: (a) cases in which there is no dementia present, and (b) cases in which dementia is the most prominent mental symptom.

(a) In the first class any form of insanity may be observed, but by far the most common are mania and melancholia. The mania usually presents itself in an acute form, the patients being restlessly excited, confused, and often troublesome and destructive in their habits. The subjects are generally hereditarily predisposed, or have suffered from mania at previous periods of their lives. The melancholia is also acute. The patients present a debilitated appearance, and suffer from delusions of persecution and from hallucinations of hearing. Melancholia in senile persons is not so favourable as mania so far as recovery is concerned, and either lasts a long time or becomes chronic.

(b) The second class, who present dementia, owe their condition to advancing age, which varies in its onset according to the cerebral integrity of the individual. In some cases it occurs as early as 50, in others as late as 90. Superimposed to this dementia there may be mania-melancholia, or a form of systematized delusional insanity. The mania and melancholia correspond closely to the types already described as accompanying gross lesions of the brain. Systematized delusions may take the form of either persecution or ambition. In the former type the patients are in constant dread of being robbed. They may hide their more valuable possessions in out-of-the-way places which on account of their faulty memory they are afterwards unable to find; or they barricade their house or room doors to prevent the ingress of imaginary thieves or robbers. The delusions of ambition usually exist side by side with depression and are generally accompanied by hallucinations both of a pleasant and of a disagreeable character. The progress of senile insanity combined with dementia is always fatal.

For primitive views concerning the insane, cf. the various sections of art. POSSESSION.


INSPIRATION.

Primitive.—See POSSESSION (Primitive).


INSPIRATION (Protestant doctrine).—Protestant scholars of the present day, imbued with the scientific spirit, have no a priori theory of the inspiration of the Bible. They do not attempt to define the term by abstract reflection. Their method of inquiry is critical and inductive, not metaphysical and deductive. They do not, of course, attempt to make the Bible a completely infallible book, and weigh evidence a mere tabula rasa—that is neither possible nor desirable—but they do their best to free it from prepossessions and presuppositions. They are thus brought to an inescapable conclusion as to the source and shape in which God must reveal His ways to men. They do not open any book of

Greek and Roman.—See POSSESSION (Greek and Roman).


Japanese.—See POSSESSION (Japanese).

Muslim (E. Sell), p. 331.

the OT or NT with the feeling that they are bound to regard its teaching as sacred and authoritative. They yield to nothing but what they regard as the irresistible logic of a principle which they hold that they are not convinced of the inspiration of the Bible by its intrinsic merits, they cannot be legitimately convinced in any other way. And, if in the and they formulate which receives the same name in the different forms. It is a principle of Scripture authority under which the Scriptures were written, this is an inference from the characteristics which, after a free and fair investigation, are constrained to recognize.

The time of privilege and prestige among books is past for them. The attitude of all liberal thinkers
towards the Scriptures was admirably indicated half a century ago by Richard Rothe:

'Let the Bible go forth into Christendom as it is in itself, as a book which neither requires, without allowing any dogmatic theory to assign a reserved position in the ranks of books: let it accommodate itself to the temper of the age through which each man can find in it for himself: and it will accomplish great things' (quoted by W. N. Clarke, The Use of the Bible, p. 112).

Some believers in inspiration prefer to avoid 'the ancient, ambiguous, confusing word.' They think that this word

has lost its meaning without losing its claim; it bears the urgency of sacred tradition and definiteness has forsaken it; it is now an enemy to clear thought, and a misleading guide to reverence for the Scripture and it will be a good day for theology, and for religion, when we fearlessly take the Bible for exactly what it is, with an abiding value resident in itself' (ib. 156).

The term ‘inspired of God’ (διακοσμειωτος) is, however, used in the Bible itself (2 Ti 3:16); and if, after the application of the most rigid tests, inspiration is proved to be a fact, it is better not to abandon the accepted word, but, if possible, to re-mint it as to free it from all misleading associations.

Inspiration and experience.—It is through an experience of the spiritual power of the Bible that the term first comes to have a real meaning. Something more than the ‘efficacities of pure reason’ is required for the correct and just valuation of the Scriptures. They make their appeal not only to the intellect but to the imagination, the heart, and the conscience. Their light is for the seeing eye, their message for the spirit which hungered and thirsted after righteousness and truth; and it is the testimony of one generation after another that through the Scriptures God finds the soul and the soul finds God.

Their utterances may be regarded as typical. In his Letters on the Inspiration of the Scriptures (Letter I), Coleridge tells how he re-read the books of the Old and New Testaments, each book as a whole, and then as a part, and then he concludes: 'Nay, I know that I have met everywhere more or less obvious sources of truth, and power, and purifying impulses; that I have found words for my highest thoughts, songs for my joy, utterances for my hidden griefs, and pleadings for my name and my falsehoods; and in short, whatever finds me, bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a holy Spirit, even the Spirit of the Scriptures, which remaining in us yet regenerateth all other powers, and in all ages entering into holy souls, shall there be the voice of the Lord' (Isa. 55:7). 'If I am asked,' says W. B. Smith, 'why I receive Scripture as the Word of God, and as the only perfect rule of faith and life, I answer it because my fathers of the Protestant Church, because the Bible is the only record of the redeeming love of God, because in it is the only true way to the knowledge of Jesus Christ, and to arriving to us in His full will for our salvation. And this record I accept in belief by the witness of Holy Spirit in my heart, where I am assured that none other than God Himself is able to speak such words to my soul' (Reg. iv. x. [1865]).

2. Inspiration and ecstasy.—The theory that inspiration is an ecstasy, or possession, has probably few advocates to-day. It was the view professed by Plato, from whom it was borrowed by Philo, Josephus, and some early Christian writers.

'God has given the art of divination not to the wise, but to the foolishness of man. No man, when in his wise, attains prophetic truth and inspiration; but when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is enthralled in sleep, or he is demented by some diabolical possession' (Plato, Timaeus, 73). 'For a prophet gives forth nothing at all of his own, but acts as interpreter at the prompting of another in all his words; for so long as he is under inspiration he is in ignorance, his reason departing from its place and yielding up the command of the Father and of the Son, and entering into it and dwells in it and striketh at the mechanism of his voice, sounding through it to the clear declaration of that which He prophesied' (Josephus, Antiq. IV. 1, xiv, § 8). Josephus takes Balaam as a typical prophet, who spoke 'not as matter of himself, but as under the influence of the Divine Spirit, and makes him express himself thus to Balak: 'The Lord is stronger than my resolve to serve thee. For those who fancy that of themselves their works are all too weak to help saving what God suggests to them or to resist His will; for it is not received into us nothing that is in us any longer our own' (Ant. iv. vi. 5). Athenagoras, the Christian apostle (c. A.D. 177), and, in reference to the prophets, that, 'who upon the conviction of and derived from their natural powers of reason by the influence of the Divine Spirit, they uttered which that was wrought in them, the Spirit using them as its instruments as a flute-player might blow a flute.' Another favourite figure was that of a spectrum striking a lyre (Epiphanius, Her. xlviii. 4).

This theory commended itself to the Montanists (q.v.), whose excesses were castigated by Miltiades in a treatise bearing the title, That The Prophet ought not to speak in Ecstasy, which recalls the words of St. Paul, 'The spirit of man should be subject to the prophets' (1 Co 14:35). Few people now cling to the idea that the Divine influence was communicated to the Bible by dictation to its writers. It is seen that the prophets are inspired, but their doctrine and the apostle are degraded if they are regarded as the mere mouthpieces or penmen of Deity. Inspiration does not suspend the powers and faculties of the soul, but raise them to their highest activity, the supernatural intensifying the natural. A cognate word to inspiration (διακοσμειωτος) is enthusiasm (ευκοσμειωτος, from ευ and κοσμειωτος), and the Divine energy is comparable to a breath which quickens, a seed which fertilizes, a flame which kindles the human spirit to the finest issues.

3. Inspiration and revelation.—Inspiration is the correlate of revelation. Whenever God revealed Himself, He inspired men to receive and communicate the revelation. It is a truism that no lesson, human or Divine, is taught until it is learned; and it is inconceivable that the facts of the Kingdom of Heaven should have been imparted to appreciative minds. There were seekers ready to be initiated into the mysteries. Spiritual truths made their due impression upon the finest minds in the Hebrew nation and the Christian Church, in order that they might ultimately make a similar impression upon all mankind. Amos was disciplined to become the stern prophet of Divine righteousness. Hosea had an experience which sensitized his mind to receive a new image of Divine love. Isaiah's regal spirit apprelihed the Divine majesty. Paul knew himself to be separated and called that God's Son might reveal Himself in him (Gal. 1:16). Rare indeed were the minds which at first were possessed by any new truth, and impelled to utter it with a power greater than their own. Yet the Divine influence felt by the few was not essentially different from that which affected a much wider circle. Without a general inspiration there could have been no special one. Behind the inspired prophets and psalmists of the OT there was the inspired Hebrew nation and the inspired apostles there was the inspired Christian community. The organ of revelation was never a solitary visionary. It was in the religious consciousness of the many, purifying itself in the life and the teaching of their noblest representatives, expanding itself from age to age, and ultimately concentrating and summating itself in the Gospel of Jesus Christ, that the voice of God was heard.

4. Inspiration and literature.—It is self-evident that the true medium of revelation is not a book, but a man. Inspiration is a condition of the soul in relation to God, and can be ascribed to a roll or book only in so far as this is the record of a personal experience. It was not into prophecies and histories, laws and psalms, gospels and epistles, that the Spirit of God was directly breathed, but into their authors. If the truth always shaped itself first in some living mind, and whether it was published vide esse or by writing was immaterial. As a means of preserving the truth the art of writing was of prime necessity, but it could make no difference to the inspiration.

'The authority of the word written was precisely the same as that of the word spoken, and that the man who wrote was in the same sense in the person who wrote or spoke, and was derived from the special action upon that person of the Spirit of God' (W. Sunday, Inspiration, 2nd Edit. 1887).

5. In OT.—(a) The prophets are by pre-eminence the inspired men of the OT. Their inspiration is
the type of all inspiration. The 'madness' of the earlier prophets, such as those among whom Saul found himself (1 Sam. 10:6-10), had certain well-marked affinities with what is known as manic and with the emotions of the Muslim dervish, but the inspiration of the later Hebrew prophets purified itself from that taint; and if the claims which they made can be established by Divine influence upon the minds of men is an indisputable fact. Judged by their gospels, their credibility is the highest. The establishment of ethical monotheism as the religion of Israel, their achievements and the affirmations regarding the righteousness and love, the faithfulness and holiness of God, are to-day the kernel of the world's faith. It was their characteristic that, in complimenting and conjuring, they announced and commanded, and of them spoke as he was commissioned to publish the laws of heaven in the language of earth, as if his mind was a medium for the transmission of the white light of eternity. The ideas of which they were the bearers were not proclaimed as their own pious opinions or shrewd guesses. They drew a firm and unwavering distinction between the thoughts of their own mind and the sacred authorities which came to them by God's own prompting. They thus separated themselves from the false prophets, who uttered the deceits of their own heart. To the whole fellowship of the prophets, whose activities extended over several centuries, made the same claim to inspiration. 'Thus saith the Lord,' or some equivalent expression, was the formula by which they indicated the way in which they habitually introduced their utterances. And on the fact of their own consciousness, the belief of their contemporaries, the unanimity of their testimony, the ethical quality of their teaching, and the beneficial results of their labours a strong foundation is laid for the truth of their assumption that they were the organs or instruments of the Most High.

This, instead of dividing between accepting this belief as true and regarding it as a product of mental disease or delusion, led to being such a man as not against a few individuals but against the whole line of prophets from Moses or Shammai to Malachi, is a step from which most of us would shrink' (Sunday, op. cit. p. 39).

(b) In what sense and to what extent were the historians of Israel inspired? It is a remarkable fact that the books of the OT from Joshua to the end of Kings (Ruth excepted) are called 'The Former Prophets.' Historical criticism justifies this title, finding, as it does, that all the older historical writings were the work of men imbued with the prophetic spirit. That imbibition was their sole condition of receiving inspiration. They had the double function of relating and interpreting events, and as narrators they were dependent upon the channels of information—folk-ballads, oral traditions, the law, and the like. In their researches they were as liable as ordinary historians to fall into errors. Their inspiration did not fill up lacunae in their knowledge of events. If their sources of information were good, their narratives were full and accurate, but not otherwise. It is evident that they sometimes glorified the institutions of which, as patriots, they were justly proud, and that they frequently idealized the past, by reflecting upon it the beliefs and practices of a later time. The monuments of Assyria have shown how unreliable is their chronology. In the execution of the work in its several and with the technical part of their work—the collecting, sorting, arranging and combining of materials—the scientific historian of to-day finds many grounds for criticism. Yet their value remains, for they often have insight into the true meaning of events, their interpretation of history, and the lessons which they educe from the past for the guidance of men in the present, that they demonstrate their prophetic inspiration. History as well as Nature was for them a book written by the hand of God, and their community of spirit with Him made it possible for them to read His secrets. The stories which they tell—often with astonishing dramatic power—might, if otherwise related, have done infinite mischief. In the light of inspiration the annals of Israel's fortunes and misfortunes are so transfigured as to become the vehicles of spiritual and eternal truth for all men of all ages.

(c) If a measure of inspiration is also conceded to the Pentateuch, this cannot mean—except for the orthodox Jew—that the Torah is still authoritative in matters of conduct and in Genesis. The ancient Rabbis considered that the highest degree of inspiration was necessary for the Law, a lower degree for the prophets, and only a small degree for the other Scripture books. In other words, inspiration was limited to the Protestant

The 'Reform Judaism' of to-day, on the contrary, recognizes that the inspiration of the prophets extends to the Law itself. But this will not be the case if the books of the OT can be regarded as a sacred form without the volatile spirit of true religion which perhaps have perished in Israel's days of tribulation and distress.

The common origin of certain Chaldean and Biblical legends—notably those of the Creation, the Fall, and the Flood—cannot be disputed; but, with all the apparent affinities, which are too close to be mere coincidences, the stories play a remarkable difference, and the difference is the measure of their inspiration. The spirit of true religion penetrated the primitive traditions of the human race, purified them of their grossness and polytheism, and brought them into harmony with the ethical monotheism of the prophets of Israel.

If one of the marks of a book's inspiration is its spiritual power over its readers, no part of the OT is more fully inspired than the Psalter, which was originally the hymn-book of the second Temple, and is now the chief classic of praise and prayer, giving lyric expression to the mood of religious feeling, every phase of spiritual life. Its authors were the successors of the prophets. It need not be denied that some of them had a primary inspiration, a direct and original insight into the things of God; but as a class they were poets and singers who assimilated the characteristic ideas of the prophets and applied them to all the varied relations of human life. The products of their secondary inspiration are certainly not inferior in practical value to those of prophecy. Expressing for every type of experience—the grief of repentance and the joy of forgiveness, the agony of doubt and the serenity of faith, the agony of spiritual suffering and the rapture of communion, the Psalter bears on the face of it the unimpeachable stamp and sign of the Spirit of God. No part of the Bible is so equally inspired, or that every sentiment can be endorsed by a Christian. We cannot and we do not mean that the speeches which show an ignorance about the immortality of the soul, or the passages which breathe out curings and threatenings against personal enemies, are in any sense what the Psalter was meant to be. 'And the utterances of God' (E. P. Norton, Inspiration and the Bible, p. 311).

(f) The inspiration of the Wisdom literature—Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes—is for the most part secondary. Impregnated with the ideas of
RELIGION whose first principle is the fear of the Lord, the writers apply their minds now to the ordinary questions of conduct in the household and in society, now to the world’s ultimate enigmas of sin and suffering, of life and death, and nearly always as sage observing, reflecting, and ever speculating, rather than as diviners, forth from God’s immediate presence with authority to publish new truths in His name. Yet in some of the noblest passages of Job, where a great mind wields a difficult and difficult problem is rewarded, if not with a satisfying solution, at least with glimpses of Divine greatness and goodness which make life’s mystery bearable, and in such passages as the eighth chapter of Proverbs, where Wisdom is personified as God’s Master-workman in creation, the inspiration may be regarded as primary.

(g) In the Book of Esther, whose canonicity was long disputed by the Rabbis, and which Protestant Christian theologians accepted only in deference to Jewish tradition, inspiration is at a minimum. A certain vague doctrine of providence is presupposed, but God’s name is never mentioned in the story, and no spiritual interpretation is attempted, while the massacre over which the reader is invited to gloat sends him, by reaction, either to his own heart, his history, his personal romance and not history, or to the higher criticism of Marjory Fleming. ‘But then Jesus was not then come to teach us to be merciful!’ (John Brown, Suborne, Edinburgh, 1882, iii. 214). The Song of Songs is instinct with that which is the highest poetic inspiration, and, though the allegorical interpretation which secured it a place in the canon is regarded by Protestants as a mistake, it cannot but be welcomed on other grounds, such as its passionate delight in nature, its enthusiastic praise of a pure idyllic love strong as death and mightier than the grave.

To the inspired character of the whole, the equal and infallible inspiration of every part of the OT, with its correlated doctrine of the absence of inspiration from every book outside the Hebrew canon, is now rapidly disappearing among Protestants. There is, in reality, no clear dividing line between what is and what is not worthy of a place in the Scriptures. If some of the books of the Apocrypha could be included into the canon, few would be found to object.

‘It is out of the question to say that the Book of Esther is inspired by the Spirit of God and the Book of Wisdom wholly devoid of it. Just as there is a descending scale within the Canon, so there is an ascending scale outside it. Some of the books of our Apocrypha might well lay claim to a measure of inspiration’ (Sanday, op. cit. 228 ff.).

Further, our leading authority upon the Apocalyptic books finds in their contribution to the doctrine of immortality ‘a genuine product of Jewish inspiration,’ and in the ethics of some of them an advance upon the highest morality of the OT and a preparation for the Sermon on the Mount (R. H. Charles, Ecclesiastes, London, 1913, pp. 178, 226 ff.).

6. In NT.—The writers of the NT were as conscious of their own inspiration as those of the OT. The motive, like the Lord, spake with authority. They were not sent anticlerics, whether they used tongue or pen, they somehow knew that their minds were under the control of the Spirit of God. (a) St. Paul’s claim to teach is based on what he calls a special endowment. The gospel which he preaches was not received from man, but came to him through the revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal 1:11). He had no need to confer with man, for God was with him in an immediate, and personal. Having drunk at the fountain-head, he affirms that he and others who share his inspiration speak ‘not in the words which man’s wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Spirit teacheth; comparing spiritual things with spiritual’ (1 Co 2:13). Like the OT prophets, he can in general distinguish clearly between the revelations of God and his own opinions. After expressing his preference for the celibate life, he adds, ‘and I think that I am not unjust to God; that as I speak, so the Spirit of God’ (1 Co 7:9).

(b) Evidently there is a borderland between inspiration and uninspiration, a region in which he has to tolerate, if he cannot welcome, difference of opinion, because the oracle is silent. On some important points—‘concerning the resurrection of the dead [he] was commanded no law of the Lord, but can only offer his own judgment for what it is worth’ (v. 12). When he is about to give advice to the brother who has an unbelieving wife, or the woman who has an unbelieving husband, he is careful to premise that his counsel is based merely on his own sense of the fitness of things: ‘But to the rest speak I, not the Lord’ (v. 15). When, however, he admits that he speaks ‘after the manner of men’ (δι’ ἀνθρώπων λόγου, καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπων λόγοι, Ro 14:5, 1 Co 8:1, Gal 2:2), he implies that, unless he chooses to descend from a privileged position, he speaks and writes under a Divine influence to which most men are strangers.

(b) If the writers of the other Epistles do not directly refer to their inspiration, this is apparently because their authorship is of course not open to doubt. St. Paul’s been questioned and resisted. When St. Peter, St. James, and St. Jude teach and command, warn and exhort, they expect to be believed and obeyed. St. John’s claim to first-hand knowledge of Christ and His Gospel is peculiarly important, and he is quite right in saying that the OT prophets speak ‘not with us, as though we had looked upon, and our hands had handled, the Word of life, but unto you’ (1 John 1:3).

(c) The author of the Apocalypse makes a strong explicit claim to inspiration. He is a prophet, and his book a prophecy (1710). St. Paul’s theologically based upon the seven Churches is ‘what the Spirit saith’.

(d) Like the OT historians, the Evangelists did not depend upon inspiration for any of the facts which they wished to record. The Prologue to the gospel of St. Luke is in this relation singularly instructive. It indicates that a narrator required to be in touch with “eye-witnesses,” and ministerial assistants, and thus be able to trace the course of all things accurately from the first, before he could write in order. Papias of Hierapolis indicates the source of St. Mark’s information by saying that this evangelist, ‘having become interpreter of St. Peter, wrote down, as far as he remembered, the things said or done by Christ’ (Eusebius, HE ix. xxxix. 15).

Inspiration cannot, and there is no reason why it should, do the work of memory and research. It rather makes its presence felt in the spirit which was breathed into the evangelical narratives, and which is exhaled from them by the receptive reader. Two of the evangelists, according to tradition, were themselves apostles, and the other two belonged to the apostolic circles, St. Luke being the companion of St. Paul as St. Mark was of St. Peter. But behind all the narrators was the Spirit-filled Church, and many parts of the Gospels are doubtless not the composition of the evangelists themselves, but their transcripts from vivid traditions, first oral and then written, which had taken definite shape within the Church as the result of the apostles’ own preaching and teaching. It may be assumed that the Logia of the Synoptic Gospels came, as a whole, directly from Christ Himself, whose words form the standard of the highest inspiration. While the Divine power which seized the OT prophets was intermittent, and even that which worked in the apostles was given, not without brevity, yet the divine of Jesus was continuous and perfect. His words are revelations which touch the common heart of mankind as no other utterances of human lips. He is
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the inanimate Word, and no part of the Bible can be profitably used as a rule of faith and life until it is presented to itself in harmony with His Mind and Will.

7. Non-inspired Bible passages.—Tried by this standard, there are not a few passages in the Bible which cannot be regarded by Protestants as in any true sense inspired. Its simple statement (books certainly have not all the same measure of the Divine fire. Yet the old phrase ‘the inspiration of the Bible’ continues to have a real significance, which is thus expressed by Sambach: ‘It may be hard to sum up our definition in a single formula, but we mean to include all those concrete points in which as a matter of fact the Bible does differ from and does excel all other Sacred Books. ... And if we are asked to define the measure of this special influence, we can see it reflected in that wide margin which remains when the common elements of the Biblical religion and other religions have been subtracted and that which is peculiar to the Bible is left’ (op. cit. 155).

8. Inspiration in the Church and Individual.—The last matter is the bearing of the doctrine of inspiration upon the individual believer. Every Christian is inspired in so far as he is enlightened and renewed by the Divine Spirit. It is sometimes maintained that there is a certain kind of inspiration in the Church and that of the Church’s official pronouncements. This is probably a mistake. The real distinction is one of degree rather than of kind. The argument of an apostle should be conceived as that of a common Christian, reduced to a higher power in proportion to his clearer vision of Christ, his closer fellowship with Christ, and his deeper devotion to Christ.

'This must be understood, that the inspiration of the NT writings is not due to the mysterious endowment of a few chosen souls, but must be traced to the inspired life of Christian believers of greater or less intensity according to the moral and religious condition. In the Church of Christ to-day (as a whole) a new life has been imparted and the members have become a spiritual organism, and the Church is not a mere human institution, but a living body. Its life is a new and higher power in proportion to its clearer vision of Christ, its closer fellowship with Christ, and its deeper devotion to Christ.'


J. STRAHAN.

INSPIRATION (Roman Catholic doctrine).—I. In ascertaining what is meant and must be understood by inspiration in Roman Catholic doctrine, we are helped by several dogmatic definitions issued at various times. For this purpose these documents are the most important of the great pronouncements of the Church concerning the authenticity of the Scriptures, a further source of inspiration in certain respects, and the second hypothesis that was excluded by the above definition. It is the theory held, at a later date, by another theologian, J. Emmerich, of the School of Salamanca. In the following terms: ‘Hoc modo potest Spiritus Sanctus scriptorum dirigere, ut in nullo sumatur, nullumque se negligere; hic et atque ut nihil videat sum erratum, inspirationum sui esse aditum.’ This way of conceiving inspiration makes it practically identical with the ‘assistance’ of the Church to the interpretation of the Bible, which the Church understands to accompany the Supreme Pontiff in the ex cathedra pronouncement, lest guiding and pre-
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serving him from error; but inspiration implies more than this. The meaning of the Council requires something of a higher order, something positive, not negative; something not contingent, a motion

ation aut generis by which man acts as an instrument, conscious and free, while God remains the primary and responsible agent, or, in other words, he superintends the work of

by J. N. Franzen (De Div. trud. et erg., p. 3544.), "Deus est

inator Scripturae Sacrae per conscientias humanae." If the formula of the Vatican Council implies this much and no more, inspiration is not necessarily

mechanical, automatic performance, in which the Holy Spirit is the exclusive agent, and the human writer the mere material writing machine or 'penholder,' so to speak; nor is it

necessarily a process of dicta the, in which the writer acts simply as a scriber or registrar of effusa,
or oracles, in relation to which heis a mere conscious

but passive recipient. On the contrary, the definition of the Council does not even require that the things thus inspired by the Holy Spirit should always have been new and revealed to the sacred

writer. It may have been so, and in some cases at least the Council does not exclude the possibilitethey might very well not have been, and the Council says nothing about it.

3. If we seek now to form a theory in harmony with the definition contained in the Council, we can, by applying to the dogma of inspiration the old

scholastic doctrine of the instrument, give a notion of it which will appear both very luminous and very coherent, a thing to be a matter of faith, but merely a theological explanation. An instrument may be defined as a cause which receives its impulse and activity from a superior and principal agent, in virtue of which it produces the effect of the instrument, but produces it according to its own peculiar mode of action. An instrument is bound to show the traces of its own particular, specific, or individual characteristics in the effect which it produces. In the impulse of the instrument of the principal cause. Assuming now that, in the case of inspiration, God is the principal cause, and man the instrument, an instrument of a conscious and free nature, then it is clear that man will act through the impulse of God, who supernaturally inclines his will and illumines his mind to enable it to grasp, conceive, and view such things as God desires and in the way in which God means the agent to do. Sometimes God might reveal to the mind of the writer new and hitherto unknown facts or doctrines; sometimes He might content Himself with revealing to the writer, in very much the same way as inspiration the work of another equally inspired writer. The conscious and free 'instrument,' of which God makes use, retains his own individual characteristics, either congenital or acquired, his own temperament, culture, style, idiosyncrasies, etc., which will necessarily be reflected in his work. Hence the inspired writings of Isaiah must needs be unlike those of Jeremiah, the Gospel of Matthew unlike that of John, etc.

4. Such being the most accurate conception of the Catholic doctrine of inspiration—viz., that God is the moving agent and responsible author, and that the definition of the Vatican Council is correct, we are naturally led to inquire about the consequences that are likely to follow from such premises. We have already seen, by referring to the definition of the Vatican Council, that all the books and the parts of each book enumerated as canonical by the Council of Trent and contained in the Roman edition of the Vulgate are Divinely inspired. Hence, if a Catholic should convince himself, through critical researches, that the history of the adulteress, for instance, in the Gospel of

John, or that the final chapter of the Gospel of Mark, cannot possibly have been written by the same authors as those Gospels themselves, he must nevertheless maintain that they are in some other equal manner inspired. But, if we grant, as we must in the Catholic Church, that inspiration extends to all the books and to all the parts of the books, it does not necessarily follow that we are bound to accept every doctrine which we find referred to in them as, by that very fact, to be declared sacred, Divine, and God-appointed in themselves, so that God should be made answerable for every one of them; the definition of the Council, at least, does not say so. Accordingly, Catholic theologians are in the habit of distinguishing several classes of things, such as the teachings of faith and morals, the historical or scientific facts that may be known to the writer by natural means, the minor details or obiter dicta, the quotations, etc., and, finally, the words of the text themselves, and to inquire of each class separately whether they too are inspired.

The obvious cause for establishing such distinctions and separate inquiries is the difficulty often experienced, apparently at least, of reconciling some statements contained in the Scripture with what seem to be the well authenticated and reasonably certain conclusions of modern science. The natural tendency of some theologians is to limit inspiration to the things which are contained in the inspired writings (called 'moral teachings') as belonging exclusively to the domain of revealed religion, getting rid of scientific or historical objections by asserting that inspiration does not extend to the effect of the natural sciences, even when they are touched upon in the Scriptures.

5. Previously, therefore, to entering upon the question whether inspiration extends to the various classes of things or facts that can be distinguished among the contents of the Scripture, it is advisable, first of all, to answer the often mooted and vexed question, Can there be any errors in the Scripture? It is granted on all sides, and the concession has been officially recognized in the Encyclical Providentissimus Deus of Pope Leo XIII, that, once committed to writing, the sacred text became subject to alterations and vicissitudes, analogous to those which all other works undergo when repeated transcription are exposed; that, as a consequence, some errors foreign to the original slipped into the copies through the mistakes of the transcribers, or facts or things of another kind might even contain such expressions or modes of speech as a fastidious and scientifically trained mind might consider not strictly and rigorously accurate from a scientific point of view, since the authors themselves saw no reason for departing from the modes of speech that were prevalent at the time, lest they might uselessly arouse controversies foreign to their main object by ostensibly discarding the received notions in the minds of their hearers in non-religious matters. Every one nowadays will grant this. The question, however, remains, and must be solved. Can any inspired writer ever utter a false statement or perpetuate a false error?

The older theologians for whom the problem did not exist, and those modern theologians who apparently do not see the difficulty as present, have, perhaps, used to decide the question by simply answering in the words of Thomas Aquinas ('Sum. Theol.,

prima pars, qu. 1, art. 10, ad 3): 'Patet quod sensus literalis Sacri Scripturae quinquaginta potes subesse falsum.' The sacred text, giving expression to an utterance of the first truth, can contain no error, since God can neither deceive nor be mistaken. Other theologians, however, for whom the problem does exist, have often endeavored to modify in a more or less subtle way the rigorous
of the Thomistic axiom, while, of course, claiming to render both at heart and in word, perfectly orthodox.

As it would be tedious to enter upon a detailed historical analysis of the text, let it suffice to say that we shall content ourselves with recalling a simple, but pertinent observation, in which is the main aim of the text. The idea of a sacred author authoritatively to teach us a fact, necessarily alludes to a department in which the principal of Thomas Aquinas must have been placed full and entirely, in order to use a comparison of Thomas Aquinas himself: it is never definitively the intention of the Scripture to teach us authoritatively that Samuel was really the son of Elkanah. It is impossible that the statement should be erroneous, and that Samuel should have been in reality the son of another. Hence, however, obviously many cases where such an intention is absent, and can be introduced only by arbitrarily forcing one's private view on the text; the author is referring to received historical or scientific views, which are evidently immaterial to his purpose. Who can, in fact, without it be false that the role of a public interpreter of the mind of the sacred writer, to whom the latter certainly meant to teach us that, at the time of Gilbee, the son itself stood still in the heaven, is the literal sense of the words, and that any other interpretation of the text is therefore a complete failure.

Briefly, to assert in an absolute manner that the error is compatible with inspiration in the mind of the sacred writer is to adopt a position which many Catholic theologians would characterize as 'errorist', in so far as it is being indirectly opposed to the Catholic dogmas of inspiration. To maintain, on the other hand, that every statement in the Scripture must be taken as strictly accurate in the literal sense in which it appeared in the original text seems unnecessary, considering that the result of harmonizing the two is to maintain that the literal sense of the words, we ought to conceive of a supernatural influence full and one, pervading the sacred writing throughout, and casting its Divine splendour on everything contained in the most minute particles of the sacred text. There is no necessity to assume that inspiration enlightens the mind of the sacred writer in regard to his thoughts only, but abandons him to a natural industry when endeavouring to give literary utterance to his Divinely inspired conceptions.

LUTHERANISM. — J. B. Franzén, 'Protustas divinae tradi- tionis et scripturae', Rome, 1879; E. Schrader, Kritische Schriften über die judische Bibel mit u. t. (Leipzig, 1886); D. Zanet, Die Inspiration der Schriften des Alten Testaments, Rome, 1892; L. BILLI, De Ins- pirazione Sacrae Scripturae, Assisi, 1905; C. Pasch, De Ins- pirazione Sacrae Scripturae, Freiburg, 1910; P. Dauth, Die Schrifteninspiration, 1911; C. Hering, Die Bibelinspiration, 1912. [In England, the last writer's 'Scripture Inspiration' was published in 1893.]

E. L. VAN DEERLAERE.

INSPIRATION (Hindu). — Indian authorities and scholars in their references to the Hindu writings draw a clearly marked distinction between the Scripture, revealed and inspired, and other compositions which, however great their antiquity and worth, have, in their judgment and in accordance with the verdict of tradition, failed to receive Divine inspiration, or to direct derivation from a superhuman source. The former are 'sacred', that is, inspired, and its message divine; the latter are not, so far as their antiquity and character is concerned. In practice the line was not seldom overstepped, especially in regard to the non-priestly classes, which came to the general taste and inclination, and enjoyed consequently a wide popularity. In many instances these gained and retained a hold upon the allegiance and affection of the people, and especially of the non-priestly classes, which lay entirely outside of any theory or dogma of inspiration limited in its application to certain books and to those alone. The volume of Scripture is absolutely closed, and was incapable of either addition or diminution.

The language also that is employed with regard
to the Vedas is sufficiently definite to remove all doubt as to the religious estimate which the writers themselves placed upon them. For, although in certain passages a degree of inspiration appears to be claimed for other and later works, yet in more formal doctrine and practice the distinction was always observed between the Vedic writings which possessed authority as bruti and other compositions, in the production of which the mind and spirit of the writer did not rest. Hence in 7.7.4 it is said that the Rigveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda, Atharva-vedicrasa, Ilihasa, Purusa, and other works have been breathed forth from Brahman alone. The same theory is explained elsewhere in the same Upanisad, not always with an identical enumeration of texts. A definite doctrine of inspiration is assumed and stated, e.g., by Ramanuja on Vedanta-sutras, 1.43: "the Veda ... on account of its non-human character, is raised above all suspicion of error and other imperfections;" and the Veda, therefore, is the final authority and court of appeal on all questions of teaching and interpretation. The epithets applied to the Veda appear to be intended to convey the same idea, e.g., "imperishable," "eternal," etc. And the most comprehensive of all the names used to designate the Veda, or the syllable Om, which is the beginning and the end of the Veda, is identified with Brahman. The same thought also is postulated in regard to the Vedas, it is claimed, because it is said that the deity is resident in the sacred text. A further indication of the sacred character attached to the Vedic writings was the elaborate process on the part of the student for the exact preservation of the letter of the text. Apparently each of the schools had its own traditional recension, of which the members of the school were jointly and severally in charge, and which was their office and duty faithfully to bear in mind, and to communicate orally to their disciples. The Vedic texts, therefore, were committed to memory by all; and the precise and perpetual recitation of the texts, in which the Vedas were closely checked, was the safeguard against alteration even in the least detail of the accepted order and form of words. Moreover, as an additional precaution against accidental variation in the text, the written word was repeated twice in progressive order in the Vedic formula, or proceeding word. An extension of the same method, which further illustrates the anxious care with which it was sought to secure the saptasimha verb of the sacred text, was the jatiyapatha, 'twisted' or 'inverted reading,' in which each successive pair of words was repeated three times, in one instance in inverted order. Moreover, the verses and words of the hymns were laboriously counted, and the records preserved in the works of the Sanskrit grammarians; these numbers are found to be in agreement with the extant texts. It was in harmony also with this conception of the peculiar sanctity of the Veda recitation that the communication of them to Sutras, or out-estates, was strictly forbidden. They were the heritage and

1 Brhad. Up. iv. 11; cf. Sahasra on Vedanta-sutras, 1.13, a tradition which is generally shared by the other authorities; the latter being defined as consisting of the Rigveda and other works with the texts on the basis of the Samaveda; on Sahasra on Vedanta-sutras, 1.13 quotes the authority of earlier writers that the ten books of the Rigveda were "seen" by the ancient scribe; and elsewhere the same text is said to have been the bramhaca portion of the Veda (ibid. 1.34). Ramanuja seems to make an attempt to combine the theory of inspiration with a natural belief in the effective authorship of the poets: "the eternity of the Veda admits of being reconciled with what science says about the manuscript and copies of the sacred texts," etc. (SBE xxvi. 52), and the authors and editors were not regarded by the people as a whole hardly equalled the strict and anxious care with which the Jewish Rabbis erected a 'heige' about their Law. In fact, this was due to the success of the method. The writings were so jealously guarded by the Brahmanas, and screened from profane knowledge, that to the great majority of the Hindus they were and always have been invested with attributes of distance and mystery rather than accepted and known as a guiding presence and authority in the life. The theory of the inspiration and sanctity of the scriptures was universally taught and received, being denied only by the nisthikas, the atheists Sridhara (Vishnu, xviii. 12): 'let him not recite (the texts) indiscriminately nor in the presence of Sutras' (Manu, iv. 99).

2 Vedanta-sutras, 1.39. cf. Sankara's comment and citation of passages (SBE xxviii. 24). 3 Manu, 2.244: 'the sayings ... obtained the regulation of the Vedas through their ancestors'; and 3.244. Sankara (on Vedanta-sutras, 1.30) quotes the authority of earlier writers that the ten books of the Rigveda were 'seen' by the ancient scribe; and elsewhere is the same text is said to have been the bramhaca portion of the Veda (ibid. 1.34). Ramanuja seems to make an attempt to combine the theory of inspiration with a natural belief in the effective authorship of the poets: 'the eternity of the Veda admits of being reconciled with what science says about the manuscript and copies of the sacred texts,' etc. (SBE xxvi. 52), and the authors and editors were not regarded by the people as a whole hardly equalled the strict and anxious care with which the Jewish Rabbis erected a 'heige' about their Law. In fact, this was due to the success of the method. The writings were so jealously guarded by the Brahmanas, and screened from profane knowledge, that to the great majority of the Hindus they were and always have been invested with attributes of distance and mystery rather than accepted and known as a guiding presence and authority in the life. The theory of the inspiration and sanctity of the scriptures was universally taught and received, being denied only by the nisthikas, the atheists Sridhara (Vishnu, xviii. 12): 'let him not recite (the texts) indiscriminately nor in the presence of Sutras' (Manu, iv. 99).

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or infidels, whose influence appears at no time to have been widespread, or their numbers considerable. But its practical effect upon the everyday thought and experience of the Hindu was slight. Like the books themselves, it was the

doctrine and possession of a learned class. And, although theoretically acknowledged and accepted by all, it was in reality little in touch with the needs and movements of everyday life.

It was entirely otherwise with the belief in the inspiration and authority of the teacher, the man upon whom the spirit of the god had descended, and whose utterances, like his actions and person, were invested with the sanction and force of the divine. It would be difficult to indicate any one doctrine or belief which has had a more profound influence on the history and character of the Indian peoples. Beginning with the Brahmans, and passing down through a long series of deified men, among whom the guru, the teacher, has in India assumed a place, as one of the most important tenets of the direct inspiration of the individual has never ceased to be an effective and influential article of faith. The repeated incursions of the gospels came in the same terms of doctrine and belief. And, although modern changes in the forms under which modern education is being conveyed, are gradually and perhaps inexorably removing the ancient reverence of thought and life, it will be long before the Hindu affection deserts its ancient ideals, or regards as other than unwelcome a new teaching. It gives to the heart the spiritual element in the life and characteristic of the individual.

These numerous incarnations of the god, and the readiness with which men or women endowed with supernatural qualities or an attractive and dominating personality are deified, are evident of similar characteristics of thought. The highpriests of the different sects, in their formal visitations of the districts under their charge for purposes of pastoral care and confirmation of the young men, journey in state and are greeted by all with a reverence which implies the assumption of divine or semi-divine rank. Their persons and utterances are inspired; their touch confers happiness and deliverance from the bondage of evil.

In a similar manner the recognition of authority concentrated in the hands of an individual, whether European or Indian, is separated by a very narrow line in the thought of the Hindu from a belief in definite inspiration by the deity, who in greater or less fullness has taken up his abode within, and thus manifests his presence and power. The experience of any Englishman who has come into real touch with the mind and heart of the Indian would furnish many instances of the facility with which exceptional or unfamiliar gifts and powers are set down to the credit of a supernatural affiliate which for the time being, or permanently, confers upon the man the rights and dignity of god.

To the Hindu, therefore, the conception of an inspired personality or an inspired book is perfectly natural. In neither case would the affirmation of inspiration arrest doubt, or the necessity of an inquiry into the validity of the claim advanced or the possibility of the fact asserted. The disposition would rather be in favour of its acceptance as part of the natural order of things. It is regarded as not improbable, that it is even looked upon as highly probable, that the god will thus communicate his will and make known his ways.

The burden of proof lies with those who deny. And this disposition or tone of mind is part of the larger bias and tendency of the Eastern nature, which, for whatever reason, seems to live in closer touch with the real than in the unseen and the spiritual than the more practical and unemotional mind of the West.

LITERATURE.—See arts, God (Hindu), Hinduism.

A. S. GEDDES.

INSPIRATION (Muslim).—Inspiration may come to a prophet in an external form, and consist of the very words which God wishes him to give forth as the divine message. This is called wiṣāḥ ṣāḥib, 'external inspiration.' It is the highest form of inspiration, in the opinion of Muhammadans, and was used for the production of the Qurʾān. The mind of Muhammad was passive, and the message, an external one, was brought to him by Gabriel. A somewhat lower form of this is called isḥārat al-malak, 'the sign of the angel.' Muhammad refers to this when he says: 'The Holy Ghost has entered into my heart,' that is, the inspiration came through Gabriel, but not exactly. The other term is ilāham, which means the saint or prophet ushur his mental powers and, under divine guidance, gives forth the message of God, though not in the very words of God.

The recipient knows the medium, i.e. the angel, by which he receives the information and the form of inspiration of prophets, the inspiration of the Qurʾān. The recipient receives information from an unknown source and in an unknown way. This is the inspiration of saints and mystics. It is the ilāham of the mystic. The difference between wiṣāḥ and ilāham is that in the former the angel is the medium of communication, and in the latter he is not. It comes direct to the mind of the Prophet (see al-malak in the Mushaf of the Qurʾān, as an Urdu tr. of the ǐyāl ilāham al-Din, Lucknow, 1874, ii. 30).

Some theologians hold that, whilst the Qurʾān was revealed by the ʿīyāl method, the teaching of the Prophet was by the ilāham mode; that is, the traditions are a real revelation and convey divine injunctions, only the mode is different. Others hold that even the traditions were of wiṣāḥ authority, and that ilāham is not done under the constant influence of a divine inspiration.

The revelation given to Moses is thus described in the Qurʾān:

"We wrote for him upon the tablets a monition concerning every matter, and said, 'Receive them thyself with steadfastness, and command thy people to receive them for the observance of their most godly precepts.'" (Qurʾān lii. 1).

The latter part seems to refer to the Qurʾān, but the former distinctly asserts that Moses was rightly guided either by the wiṣāḥ or by the ilāham method of inspiration, and so all his words and actions form a rule of faith called the Sunna, which all Muslims must accept, for they were said or done under the constant influence of a divine inspiration.

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This equally describes the inspiration of the Qurʾān. The Muhammadan cannot conceive that there can be a human as well as a divine one to inspiration. This is clearly stated in the verse which Muhammad is directed to disclaim any knowledge apart from the words revealed:

"Say: I say not to you, "In my possession are the treasures of God"; neither say I, "I know things secret"; neither do I say to you, "Verily, I am an angel"; only what is revealed to me do I follow." (Qurʾān viii. 20).

The Qurʾān, then, comes direct from God. The word 'say' is either expressed or implied before each sentence. This to the Muslim mind is its highest perfection and also its most extreme form. The Christian view of inspiration—the divine mind working through the human consciousness—is considered to be very
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inferior, and any book so revealed to be altogether on a lower plane.

The Khali‘dan says: "Of all the divine books, the Qur‘an is the one only of those words, and phrases have been communicated to the Prophet through the mediation of the Archangel Gabriel: "Say, "whoso is the enemy of Gabriel?" For he is he who God's leave hath caused the Qur‘an to descend on thy heart" (96:61).

Other passages, though they do not mention Gabriel by name, are generally believed to refer to him.

The faithful spirit hath come down with it" (xxvi. 109); "one terrible in power taught it to him" (III. 5); "the Holy Spirit hath brought it down with truth from thy Lord" (xxvi. 109).

Tradition, however, is very clear on the point that Gabriel was the medium. Sometimes a bright
effect of inspiration is shown in the verse of which Gabriel delivered his message; sometimes the angel appeared in the form of a man called Dhu‘biyya, one of the Companions of the Prophet, renowned for his beauty. This statement is supported by the verse:

"And if we had appointed an angel, we should certainly have appeared in the form of a man" (v. 9).

When the revelation was one of denunciation or a prediction of woe, the angelic nature of Gabriel overcame the nature of Muhammad, who was then transported to the angelic world; when the message was one of comfort and consolation, the angel, in the form of a man, delivered his message. Gabriel sometimes made his message known through the tinkling of a bell, a mode of operation which had a most disquieting effect on the Prophet. His body became agitated, and even on a cold day the perspiration rolled off him. His countenance bore witness to the agitation of his mind. If riding, the camel on which he sat would fall to the ground.

Zaid said: "One day when God sent wrath on the Prophet, his thigh was on mine, but it became so heavy that I feared mine would be broken." (Qur‘an: Dhu‘biyya, XIX. 35; Kita‘b as-Salah, Leyden, 1852-56, ii. 106).

Gabriel, sometimes, without appearing in person, so influenced the mind of the Prophet that what he spoke was a divine message. This is ilham, the inspiration of the traditions.

On the occasion of Gabriel’s night journey to heaven, "great mysteries and numerous conversations took place" (Mirkhond’s Baudat as-Safa, Eas, 1803, ii. 211). God is said to have spoken to the Prophet directly, though whether with face veiled or not is a matter of doubt. God sometimes appeared to the Prophet in a dream and made known His will. On two occasions angels, each having six hundred wings, appeared and brought the message (for other accounts see Baudat as-Safa, ii. 133-148).

The seasons when it came were usually periods of anxiety and care. His countenance changed; his fear seemed uncontrollable. This terrifying effect of Gabriel’s visit is shown in the verse: "The best of recitals hath God sent down, a book in union with itself and teaching by repetition. The very skins of those who fear their Lord do chafe in it." (Tafsir, Lucknow, A.H. 1311 [A.D. 1893], iv. 75).

The fear caused to men is not to be wondered at when it is believed that in heaven the effect of it is that angels become senseless and that Gabriel is the bear of their Lord. This is shown in the chapter of Tafsir, Lucknow, A.H. 1311 [A.D. 1893], iv. 75.

The revelation of sūras xl., lxi., and ci., known as the sūras of terror, turned the hair of the Prophet white.

Ibn Khālidn thus describes inspiration.

After stating that some souls cannot attain to a perception of spiritual truth, and that others can enter into a state of contemplation and ecstasy, which is the intuition of the saints, he goes on to speak of those whose souls ascend from the human body to the angelic state and there hear the divine voice. Both are the souls of the prophets. God has given them the power of leaving the human body and, when separated from it, they receive His revelations, which, when they return from the spiritual world, they make known to men. This explains the origin of the sūras of terror and the journey from the angelic world and the comprehension of the message received occupied less time than the twinkling of an eye. This is why inspiration is described to Ibn Khālidn, means "make haste" (Prologomena, i. 296-298, quoted in full in Neils, Faiths of India, ii. 149).

The orthodox view is that a prophet knows all things without having received previous instruction, that he gives information regarding the past and the future, otherwise than by analogous reasoning, and that he is superior to other human beings, as he has communion with the angelic world.

The sacred month of Ramadan has been specially selected as the Triduum for divine ecstasy: on the first day the book of Abraham, on the sixth the book of Moses, on the thirteenth the Gospel, and on the twenty-seventh the Law of God; or the Night of Power: the Qur‘an becomes complete to the "House of Glory," situated in the lowest of the seven heavens, from which, as occasion required, portions were brought by Gabriel and revealed to Muhammad: "We caused it [the Qur‘an] to descend on the Night of Power" (xxvii. 1 ff.). This is the blessed night, the night better than a thousand months, the night which bringeth peace and blessings to therosy dawn (ib.).

Some suppose that the first revelation was "Warn thy relatives of nearer kin" (xxvi. 214), but the objection to this opinion is that the words of the context, "kindly lower thy wing over the faithful who follow thee" (ib. 212), and "who seek thee when thou standest as prayer and thyrossy dawn" (238 L.), presuppose the existence of a small Muslim community. There are other objections also connected with the style and use of words in this chapter which show that it must be a later one.

The general view, then, may be accepted as correct, which is that, when in the cave of Hira, a little distance from Mecca, the Prophet heard a voice calling on him to recite the opening words of the sūras XIX. (v. 9).

Tradition has sur: of diviné ecstasy with many marvels. The following is a condensed account of the narrative concerning the inspiration of the Prophet given in Mirkhond’s Baudat as-Safa (II. 140).

The Prophet was sleeping in the cave of Hira when Gabriel made his appearance in the form of a man. But his Lordship answered, "I am not a reader." Then Gabriel squeezed him so hard that he thought his end was near; but the angel again said: "Read, and recite the words of thy Lord, even if he be the most benighted of mankind, i.e., Recite thou in the name of thy Lord, who created mankind; in the name of Allah, Gabriel comforted him by saying that he was the messenger of God to prophets. When Muhammad said that he could not read, Gabriel took from his breast a golden book, "The Book of Paradise," and gave it to him. This book was as full of munificence and beauty as the silver boards and pearls and gems, and threw it on his blessed face. All this very much alarmed the Prophet. He hastened home, and Khadija, his wife, said: "I perceive a light in thy countenance, the like of which I have never seen, and when I separated from it, I lay down in a paroxysm of fear. When I recovered, he said, "O Khadija, I have become a soothsayer of grace and mercy." God will not surely let such a thing happen to thee, for thou speakest the truth, dost not return evil for evil, art of a good life, kind to thy relatives and friends. Hast thou seen such things?" He then told her what had happened, whereupon she said: "Repulse, dear husband, the evil people." He whose hands stand Khadija’s life is my witness that thou wilt be the Prophet of his people (Lytton Itabrit).
The doctrine of waqā', the inspiration of the Qurān, is closely connected with the attribute of God, called kalām, 'word,' or 'speech,' and concepts which there is a long and bitter conflict between the Mu'tazilites and the orthodox section of the Muslims. It ranged round the great dispute as to whether the attributes of God were eternal or not. The orthodox belief is that the Qurān was written from all eternity on the Preserved Table. The unbound reverence of the Muslims for the Qurān runs parallel in the Islamic faith (which appeared at an early date through the influence of the doctrine of the eternal Word of God) that the Book, as the divine word, is regarded as eternal in God, and consequently eternal and uncreated (T. Jäckh, Sketches from Eastern History, p. 5). This view has been well stated by D. B. MacDonald:

There has grown up very early in the Muslim community an unbounded reverence and awe in the presence of the Qurān. In it God speaks, addressing His servants, the Prophet; hence all His words, with few exceptions, are direct words of God. It is, therefore, the best witness one can have as to His existence and attributes. But the Muslim piety went further and had even exalted from all eternity with God. Whatever proofs of this doctrine may have been brought forward later in the Qurān itself, we can have no difficulty in recognizing that it is plainly derived from the Christian Logos and that the Greek Church, perhaps through John of Damascus, has again played a formative part. So, in correspondence with the heavenly and uncreated Logos in the bosom of the Father, there stands this uncreated and eternal Word of God to the earthly manifestation in Jesus corresponds the Qurān, the Word of God which we read and recite. The one word is, of course, the idea to be gained from the expressions of the one is equivalent to the idea which would be gained in the other, if the veil of the flesh was removed from us and the spiritual world revealed (Development of Muslim Theology, p. 160).

It is interesting to notice how, right in the heart of the Islamic system, there is such a nearapproach to a great truth, and how, in rejecting the Incarnate Word, the eternal Son of God, Muslims have arrived at a conclusion that Christianity is a bogy.

The history of the development of the Qurān and of its exegesis lies outside the scope of this article; and so it only remains to state the various views on kalām, 'the word,' so far as they are connected with the question of inspiration (see, further, art. KA'LAM). The orthodox view of kalām, one of the attributes of God, is that God 'speaks' with a tongue as he does not. He speaks to some of His servants without the intervention of another, even as He spoke to Moses, and to Muhammad on the night of the ascension to heaven. He speaks to others by the instrumentality of Gabriel, and this is the usual way in which He speaks to the prophets. It follows from this that the Qurān is the word of God, and is eternal and uncreated (Muhammad al-Būkhārī, quoted in Sei, Faith of Islam, p. 187).

The speech (kalām), then, that is necessary to God is that which the glorious expressions revealed to the Prophet, brought to the lowest heaven, and thence were revealed to the Prophet. These are the views held by the Sunnī Musalmas. They were earnestly opposed by the Mu'tazilites, who deny the existence of eternal speech, and this on the following grounds. It is written in Arabic, it descended to earth, and is written and read. Events are described in the past tense, whereas, if the Qurān existed, it would only have been used; it contains commands and prohibitions; therefore, if anything existed, and would be prohibited? If it existed from eternity past, it will exist till eternity future, and so on. In the next world its laws will be incumbent on men, no man must perform the same religious ceremonies as they do now; if it is eternal, then there are two eternal, eternal and the Word, which would destroy the Unity of the Divine Being. If it is said that it is speech only which is eternal, and not the word and sounds, then how can there be speech without sound? To the latter objection the Sunnī reply that a man's thoughts are a kind of speech without sound. It is true that, as man's thought is originated, it cannot be compared to God's speech, which is eternal; yet the illustration is good as far as it goes to show that speech does not necessarily need sound.

The Mu'tazilites produced such texts as 'Verily we have made it an Arabic Qurān' (xxii. 2, xxii. 37, xx. 129, 133) and 'We have created speech and what God made He created, as it is said: 'Who hath created the heavens and the earth' (vi. 1). To which the reply is made: 'Are not the creation and the commanded Him?' (xxii. 52). The difference between the creation and the command, and, inasmuch as the command 'bo' creates, it cannot have been created, and is, therefore, eternal. Some of the 'Abābid sect and the dā'ī were supporters of the Mu'tazilites, and the Khalīf Ma'mūn in the year 212 A.H. issued a decree declaring that all who asserted that the Qurān was eternal were heretics. A little later on the Khalīf ordered an account to the Prefect of Bagdad denouncing as a mere babble and mbash, as men of no insight or knowledge, those who held the orthodox views. He was told to assemble the Qarīs, the Qurān readers, to question them as to their opinion, and to inform them that the Khalīf neither wished for nor would retain in his service any one who he considered to be in error in the faith. The inquiry was unsatisfactory, and so this order was issued:

What the pretenders to orthodoxy and the seekers after the authority for which they are united have not dared to speak to me. Now, who does not admit that the Qurān is created, despised his exalted and powerful and his authority in the traditions' (Jālod-dīn as-Sūgūt, History of the Khalīfs, Caliphs, 1801, Ch. on Ma'mūn).

The next Khalīf, al-Mu'tasim, severely punished and imprisoned the Imām Ibn Hanbal (q.v.), a theologian of great repute, because he would not admit that the Qurān was created. Al-Būqātī, a theologian, was brought from Cairo to Bagdad, and there imprisoned till the day of his death for the same reason. Whilst they led him on fettered and chained, he kept repeating to himself, 'Almighty God created the world by means of the word.' Now, if that word was created, one created thing would have created another, which he held to be impossible.

The reference here is to the verse, 'Verily our speech unto a thing, when We will the same, is that we say to it only "Be," and it is' (xxii. 87). This was a standing argument against the Mu'tazilites. So also is the argument, 'The word is a warning... written on honoured pages, exculis, paraded,' (xxii. 111), said to refer to the eternal and the Hidden Table, an argument repudiated by the Mu'tazilites.

When times changed and the orthodox returned to power, Imām ash-Shāfi'ī called before him a theologian named Hāfiz, and, quoting the verse,
'God said "Be" and it is,' said, 'Did not God create this thing by the word "Be"?' Hafs answered. 'Then, if the Qur'an was created, must not the word "Be" also have been created?' To this Hafs agreed. 'Then all things were created by a created thing, which is a contradiction and manifestly impossible.' Such was the effect of Shâfi'i's reasoning that Hafs was put to death as a pestilent heretic (Sell, Faith of Islam, p. 217).

The Mu'tazilites opposed the orthodox view, for they did not believe that man's free will was limited by an eternal law, and thus they deplored the great doctrine of the Unity of God. However, the reaction came, and the orthodox school gained the day. The Mu'tazilite movement was a great one, and, when it failed, Isâlam again resumed the rigid form which has characterized it till this day. In India, under the influence of Western thought and a liberal government, there has been some attempt to revive Mu'tazilite teaching. The leaders of the movement see that the mechanical view of instinct, which is characteristic of enlightened progress, and they have selected this very subject as one to be discussed, and as one on which sounder views should be propagated. One of them says:

"The prophet does not believe that even the simple act of blinking feels that his mind is illuminated by God, that the things which are expressed by him and spoken or written under the influence of this illumination are also to be regarded as the words of God. This illumination of the mind, or effect of the divine influence, differs in the present world, as the present life is the creation of the circumstances—physical, moral, and religious—in which he is placed" (M. Cheragh 'All, Critical Exposition of Islam, p. 133).

Another well-known writer, an avowed Mu'tazilite, speaks of the realistic description of man's existence and hell as borrowed from Zoroastrian and Tantric sources (see Syed Amir All, Spirit of Islam, London, 1891, p. 294). It may be said that, as his followers grew in the apprehension of spiritual conceptions, the mind of the Prophet developed; but the objection to this is that the later chapters of the Qur'an are, as a rule, less spiritual than the earlier ones; and so the development, if such there was, was in a downward direction. But it is clear that in the Prophet's life, there were few Muslims who see wherein the weakness of their system lies, who boldly repudiate all the teaching of the past, and adopt what is practically a Christian view of inspiration. These men, however, are repudiated by the great mass of the Muslim world, as men having forsaken a revealed religion, and are to be shunned as innovators, a class most distasteful to the orthodox Muslim. But herein the only hope of Islam lies; for, until more reasonable views of inspiration become general, until the dead weight of traditionalism is lifted off, and until intelligence and reason are allowed some force, there can be no enlightened progress in the community.


E. SELL.

INSTINCT.—With regard to the exact meaning which we should attach to the words 'instinct' and 'propensity to experience,' the individual and independent of instruction (Natural Theology, London, 1852, ch. xviii.) But the word 'propensity' is somewhat vague. Then it must be asked to what end the propensity leads. Is it a propensity to behave in some more or less specific manner, or to experience certain emotional states, or to believe certain things, or to transgress certain usages? And is it one of these, or all of these? Furthermore, what are we to understand by an instinct? Is it a propensity to a specific mode of behaviour, a particular belief, or a definite type of emotion? And can such a propensity be clearly marked off and isolated in analytic treatment? There are difficulties in doing so; and it is probably better to use the noun as a generic term—"intelligence"—to cover all those processes to which the adjectives 'instinctive' is properly applicable. But this still leaves us on one hand the question: What is the distinguishing nature of these processes?

Those who approach this question from the biological side tend to limit the term 'instinctive' to certain more or less specific modes of behaviour which are characterized by the fact that they came, without any intervening and guiding mental process, when the organism is appropriately stimulated by the presentation of a more or less complex signal situation, or to the automatic responses arising within the organism. And on this view they come because the organism, and, especially in higher forms of life, its nervous system, have been prepared by an evolutionary process to respond to such stimulation in more or less specific ways. The chick pecks, the duckling swims, the moorhen dives, the infant sucks, because the inherited organic constitution is such that these modes of behaviour are the automatic outcome when the requisite situation is presented, without any mental realization of the meaning of the situation or of the effect of the word 'instinctive' is thus, for those who accept this view of the matter, primarily a biological term.

But the presented situation, and the process of behaving in such a manner in its midst, are accompanied by a coherent mode of experience—the instinctive experience—and this is assimilated to or incorporated with such prior experience revived through association as the organism may have already gained in other ways by previous occasions. Thus, although the word 'instinctive' is primarily a biological term, it is secondarily a psychological term which labels a somewhat complex factor in the development of the mental life of the individual.

Now, such a definition of the term 'instinctive' as has been briefly indicated, tenable as it may be in the appropriate universe of discourse, seems hardly acceptable in connexion with the topics of ethics and religion. It seems desirable, therefore, so to extend the connotation of the word 'instinctive' as to bring our treatment into line with current usage in the familiar speech of educated persons, who are often impatient of subtle psychological distinctions. In this broader sense of the word, the traditional distinction between that which is instinctive and that which is based on carefully reasoned foundations is preserved and emphasized; stress is laid on the spontaneous as contrasted with the deliberate nature of the mental processes involved; and, though it may be difficult to distinguish between that which is the outcome of the net results of previous training and education and that which is due to congenital and hereditary disposition, it is generally implied that what is instinctive in this larger sense is in the main unlearned and, at least predominantly, the expression of the innate constitution of the mind.

William James has given a graphic description of the manner in which he was affected by the
California earthquake of 1906, which lasted some forty-eight seconds. It may be quoted in illustration of the spontaneous as contrasted with the varied and cultivated attitude of mind.

In my case," he says, "sensation and emotion were so strong that little thought, and no reflection or volition, were possible in their grip. They were not caused by the phenomena. . . . As such I could think, I discerned retrospectively certain peculiar ways in which my consciousness had taken in the phenomena. This included the power to speak, to write, to work, and to reason. . . . It came, moreover, directly to me. It stole in behind my back, and once inside the room, had me at its will, and could manifest itself convincingly. Animals and inanimate objects were never more present in any human action, nor did any human activity ever more definitely point back to a living agent as its source and origin. . . . For "science," when the tensions in the earth's crust reach the breaking-point, and strains take into an altered equilibrium, the Earthquake is simply the collective sense of all the cracks and fissures, and disturbances that happen. They are the Earthquake. But for me the Earthquake was the cause of the disturbances, and the perception of it as a living agent was irresistible. It had an overpowering dramatic conviction. I realize now better than ever how inevitable was man's earlier mythological version of such catastrophes, and how artificial and against the grain of our spontaneous percepting are the later habits into which science educes us" (Memories and Studies, London, 1911, pp. 210-216).

In this graphic account of his mental attitude at a moment of crisis given us by a leading psychologist and a master of description, although the term 'instinctive' does not occur, what is commonly meant by the term, or by the older and currently popular sense is admirably exemplified. The outlook of the moment was not that which calls into play the rational faculties developed by scientific thought; it was far more primitive and unsophisticated. What James wished to emphasize, that, in face of a new and thrilling experience, deep-seated natural tendencies, spontaneous and now more explicitly volitional, emerged unsuited in the light of consciousness—especially a tendency to personify the cause of the disaster, and to attribute to that cause malign intent. The natural man in William James was, during those forty-eight seconds, laid bare: his science, his psychology, his philosophy had not, just then, a word of protest to utter. The sudden onslaught of the earthquake shook the guardians of the citizenry of reason asleep at their post. Whether the verdict of reason or that of instinct was the truer verdict is not here the point. The point is that the verdict of instinct was that James's attitude was spontaneous rather than deliberate, and that his swift interpretation of the meaning of the calamitous situation was charged with a sense of being immediate and irresistible—so much beyond his control as the earthquake itself—is clear from the description he gave just after the event. But whether this direct and immediate pronouncement of the natural man within him was due to something innate in his mental constitution, or was the unbidden outcome of acquired habits of mind—habits perhaps acquired in quite early stages of his development—he does not attempt to determine. And, if it was partly due to the one and partly to the other, he does not pause to assign something like approximate values to the innate and to the acquired determinants of the attitude spontaneously assumed. No doubt, since his aim was to describe faithfully what passed through his mind at the moment when the earthquake caught him in its grip, he was wise not to enter upon a discussion of an exceedingly difficult problem. But difficult, indeed, is this problem that it is questionable whether it is possible to solve it on the basis of the broader definition of the term 'instinctive.' Instinctive tendencies and emotions are unalterably profoundly modified in the light of the experience which is personally acquired through education, through commerce with the world of nature, and through a thousand social influences in childhood and in later life. Can we eliminate these if the question arises whether the moral and religious attitude of the adult is instinctive in the sense of being, strictly speaking, innate and not acquired, or even predominantly inborn, no matter how much they have been directed in early education? To differentiate the strictly congenital factors of the tendencies and prepossessions of nature from those which have been insensibly developed through individual training and habit seems, at present, to be a task beyond the powers of psychological analysis.

Still, analysis may help us on our way towards the solution of such problems. A resolute and suggestive attempt to lay bare the innate foundations of the mental life of man is made in W. McDougall's Introduction to Social Psychology (London, 1908). He holds that the problem for solution has been mis-stated—nay more, completely inverted.

The doctrine has been accepted, he says, that 'men normally and in the vast majority of cases act reasonably and as they ought to act, so that the question of whether the circumstances act otherwise; whereas the truth is that men are moved by a variety of impulses whose nature has been determined by long ages of the evolutionary process without reference to the interests of men in civilized societies; and the psychological problem we have to solve is—how can we account for the fact that men so moved ever come to act as they ought or morally and reasonably? For, 'mankind is only a little less reasonable and to a great extent very unreasoningly moved in quite unreasonable ways' (pp. 10-11).

This is McDougall's way of asking the question how moral and rational conduct have been evolved. But he renders the question more concrete by asking from what primitive impulses, common to men and the higher animals, this progress has proceeded. And his answer is: From a relatively small number of primitive instincts.

These instincts are directed or indirectly the prime movers of all human activity. By the conative and impulsive force of some instinct, or of some habit derived from an instinct, every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. There is on the one side the presentation of some situation or of some problem; there is on the other side an appropriate response in bodily behaviour or in mental activity; and at the meeting of the two there is the conative impulse emotionally toned in some more or less specific manner. Analysis discloses in any such emotional impulse, no matter how complex, a subtle combination of the conative and the instinctive; and any higher secondary or tertiary product of evolution may, therefore, be regarded as a synthesis of a few primary constitutents. What, then, are these primitive and elemental factors in the conative life of social mankind? The principal instincts of man, each of which is also a primary emotion, are, according to McDougall's analysis, seven in number: (1) the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear; (2) the instinct of repulsion and the emotion of disgust; (3) the instinct of curiosity and the emotion of wonder; (4) the instinct of aggression and the emotion of anger; (5) and (6) the instincts of self-abasement (or subjection) and of self-assertion (or self-display), and the emotions of subjection or of elation (positive or negative self-assertion); and (7) the parental instinct and tender emotion. These seven instincts are those whose excitement yields the most definite of the primary emotions, and from these nervous excitations rise all the feelings of pleasure and pain (and perhaps also feelings of excitement and of depression) are composed. But if all these, the affective states that are popularly recognized as emotions, and for which common speech has definite names (p. 83).

To these are added, in a supplementary list, the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct,
the instinct of acquisition, and that of construction. Among the more general innate tendencies, whose behaviour-outlet is less definite and circumstanced, are the hearty, suggestibility, imitation, display, habit, and certain ingrained temperamental factors.

It must be remembered that the presented situation, although a focus of such emotional impulses as self-abasement, or self-assertion, or the parental instinct with its tender emotion are very varied, and may be much modified in the course of the developing, and the individual experience as life runs its course. It must be remembered also that the resulting behaviour is no less varied and no less subject to modification through acquired habit.

The principal instincts of man, says he, are liable to modifications of their afferent and motor parts, while their central parts remain unchanged and determine the emotional tone and the visceral changes characteristic of the excitement of the instinct. "No doubt this must be taken in a relative sense; but even on these terms it is open to question whether there are not as many different shades and varieties of, say, tender emotion as there are situations which call it into being, and modes of behavior that further qualify its experiential nature. We must, however, attempt to classify modes of instinctive experience which are bewildering in their rich variety and multiplicity, and that perhaps no two are in all respects quite alike. McDougall's treatment is a helpful step towards such a classification of experiences which are differentiated, with much residual overlap, and where, according to H. G. H. Borrower terms of interpenetration, the presentation of diverse situations and by means of that instinctive behaviour in their midst which is a legacy of ages of evolutionary preparation.

We have thus a list of seven or more elementary ‘propensities’ or impulses which may be precipitated in man as the innate and hereditary constitution. Each concrete case of predication is, of course, conditioned upon the presentation of a situation of somewhat varied nature, and upon the performance of sundry appropriate activities linked therewith. But, as experience develops and becomes more complex, the life of emotions and conduct becomes richer, more subtly differentiated, and more harmoniously integrated. Still, according to McDougall, whom we are taking as our accredited guide, no new elementary factors are introduced. The higher and richer emotions are compounds of the primary emotions subtly combined or blended. We may take as examples adoration, awe, and reverence, since these are salient features in the religious attitude. With regard to admiration, McDougall says, there seem to be two primary emotions essentially involved in the state provoked by the contemplation of the admired object, namely, wonder and negative self-feeling or the emotion of submission. Thus admiration is a binary compound. But awe is a tertiary compound, since an element of fear is also present. Fear, indeed, of many shades, ranging from that in which admiration is but slightly tinged with fear to that in which fear is only slightly tinged with admiration. But, unless fear is in some measure incorporated with wonder and submission, the emotion which we name awe is not fully constituted. And, when to awe, as a tertiary compound, gratitude is also added, we experience the compounded emotion of reverence.

Gratitude itself is a binary compound of tender emotion and submission or negative self-feeling. Submission is doubly emphasized, for it is a constituent both of the emotion of and of gratitude. Thus we have a highly complex and predominantly submissive emotional state, but still one which is compounded of the primary instinctive and emotional constituents. Now, reverence is the religious emotion par excellence; few merely human powers are capable of exciting reverence. It involves wonder, fear, gratitude, and negative self-feeling. Those human beings who inspire reverence, or who are by custom and convention considered as entitled to inspire it, out their reverence character to their being regarded as the ministers and dispensers of Divine power. Religion seems to show us the gradual genesis of this highly complex emotion. Pruritive religion, to keep separate the superhuman objects of its component emotions, the terrible or awe-inspiring powers on the one hand, the kindly beneficent powers that inspired gratitude on the other, and which was not until religious doctrine had undergone a long evolution that, by a process of syncretism or fusion, it achieved the conception of a Deity whose attributes were capable of evolving all the elements of the complex emotions of reverence.

McDougall has an interesting suggestion with regard to the difference in attitude which characterizes religion on the one hand and magic on the other. He suggests that the fundamental distinction between religions and magical practices is not, as is sometimes said, that religion conceives the powers it envisages as personal powers, while magic conceives them as impersonal, but rather that the religious attitude is always a submission, the magical attitude that of self-assertion, and that the forces which both magical and religious practices are concerned to influence may be conceived in either case as personal or impersonal powers. Hence the savage, who at one time bows down before his fetish in supplication, and at another seeks to compel its assistance by threats or spells, adopts towards the one attitude of submission, and the other of assertion. In this connexion we may ask whether William James's attitude in the presence of the personified earthquake, as an attitude of submission, was religious in its nature. The point of view which McDougall has developed in his discussion of reverence in its relation to religion is interesting and suggestive. But questions of no little difficulty arise. Granted that reverence may be regarded as such a compound of elementary factors as McDougall has indicated, how far may we regard the process of compounding as an innate propensity, and thus lose reverence in its developed form as instinctive in the broader acceptance of the term—an acceptance somewhat broader than that which he advocates?

Is the process of blending as an instinct a related to the elementary factors which are blended? And, if so, instinctive in what sense? Is it instinctive in its unreasoned and involuntary spontaneity? Is it instinctive as wholly unlearnt? Can we say that it is entirely congenital and nowise acquired? And, if in some measure acquired, are we to regard the acquisition as a relatively negligible modification of an attitude that is fundamentally innate? The answers to these questions in some degree turn upon the previous answer to that most vexed of vexed questions with regard to the inheritance of that which is acquired in the course of a life. But apart from this question, which cannot here be discussed, it is exceedingly difficult to determine how far attitudes which are seemingly racial in character are due to inborn propensities or tendencies, and how far these attitudes are due to the influence of the environment on each succeeding generation and to the traditional outlook imparted through early education. C. D. Wedderburn, in his paper, "Concerning the Non-existence of a Man" (London, 1912, p. 251), has drawn attention to the fact that, whereas

*Chadsey and, more markedly, in Assyria, the gods were usually conceived as hostile to man, pursuing him in life and death with implacable hatred; in Egypt, as in Greece, the
divine powers were represented in mythology as friendly, ready to come to man’s aid in time of material danger and in the after-world. It would be interesting to enquire what should have been the effect of this special attitude towards nature and the mythology by which it was endeavoured to interpret the phenomena of the world and of concord and discord. In Egypt, the Nile, with its irregular and unfailing rise and fall, was the source of all fertility—steady, tranquil change, a symbol of the dispensations of the gods, the tempestuous and inconstant flooding of the Euphrates and the Tigris made life on those banks dangerous and uncertain. Nature was hostile, ready to swamp and deluge man and his works, and the work of one unforeseen flood was in one year undone. But, in the one case, any attempt to understand or to control the elemental forces was an impious and useless action. Doctrines and theories by magic and sorcery, or, at the best, prophetic knowledge, by which the hostile powers by sacrificial rites, represent the logical outcome of this view of nature. But in the other case, where the deities are friendly, any increase of man’s mastery over his surroundings propounded by the tutelary powers, and is probably directed by them, since it is their good pleasure to help him on his way. One of other of these alternative attitudes of mind predominates in every religious system, according to the race and circumstances of those who hold to it.

Here we have different attitudes as the result of differences of environment. We speak of the net as illustrating racial characteristics. But it is hard to say how far the ‘instinctive attitude’ assumed is congenital and innate, and how far it has been handed on by tradition in the social mind of the race.

Although McDougall deals with admiration, awe, and reverence under the heading of ‘complex emotions that do not necessarily imply the existence of sentiments,’ his treatment of their component parts is too simple. Religion leads us to infer that, at the stage of mental development when religious conceptions are in being, they are incorporated in that higher idealistic synthesis in which the sentiment plays so conspicuous a part. By sentiments, we are to understand, following A. F. Shand (‘Character and the Emotions,’ in Mind, new ser., v. [1896]), an organized system of emotional tendencies centred around the idea of an object. The object here is not merely a presentation to perceptive experience evoking such naive behaviour, adapted to the immediate situation, as is found in animal life. It is a centre, not only of a system of emotional dispositions, but of a system of knowledge in some degree organized, and of a system of conduct which is significantly related to the idea of the object or class of objects. It is always in some measure a centre of thought, of emotional tendency, and of conscious endeavour. Otherwise it does not attain to the level of sentiment, which is always in alliance with concepts and with conscious emotions, to the terms the sentiment cannot be wholly instinctive in the sense that it is on the same plane as the innate ideas of early writers. As McDougall says, the organization of the sentiments in the developing mind is determined by the course of experience; that is to say, the sentiment is a growth in the architecture of the mind that is not natively given in the inherited constitution (p. 109).

None the less, it may be founded on an inherited basis.

If, then, the question is raised whether the moral sentiments (centred around the ideas of self and of alter) and the religious sentiments (centred around the idea of a super-alter as source and cause of mundane happenings) are instinctive, our answer must again depend on the connotation to be attached to this perplexing elusive term. That in the course of life they may become instinctive, in the sense that they may be imbibed and spontaneously within the mind without explicit rational backing, when the circumstances are of the appropriate kind, can scarcely be questioned. That they are the outcome of a hereditary bias or proclivity in the native constitution of man, is more open to question, and is as readily asserted by some people as denied by others.

The fact is that, when once we accept the broad and general usage of popular speech, anything like a precise and clear definition of instincts becomes very difficult, if not impossible. And perhaps some measure of vagueness and elasticity is commonly regarded as only right; and sitting where strict accuracy of scientific interpretation is at present unattainable. If the instinctive in man is to be taken as synonymous with anything that belongs to his constitution as human, do we mean the constitution of the infant at birth, or the constitution of the adult after a long period of education and development? Or do we mean, as in one of those, but rather some indwelling principle of synthesis—or, if it be preferred, a synthetic tendency the existence of which is inferred from certain observed facts that arise from nature and are or may be throughout the life what he is or may become? By this nothing more mysterious is implied than that which is commonly accepted as the ground of the constitution, or even, in inorganic nature, as the ground of crystalline synthesis or of the formation of complex chemical compounds. The acceptance of a specific constitutional fact is only carrying up into the realm of mind what is by many regarded as a scientifically legitimate in the interpretation of other natural phenomena. Assume, e.g., that tender emotion (to select one item from McDougall’s list) is what, to borrow a term from interpretation, may be regarded as a ‘unit character.’ Even thus regarded, it is a synthesis of no little complexity. Its components are more elementary factors which are additive in a certain sense, and are probably more than additive in that in their combination they possess a constitutive quality which gives to the algebraical sum of the factors what we may perhaps term its peculiar and specific emotional timbre. Just as a note played on the violin gives a complex periodic wave according to our consciousness a simultaneous combination of the fundamental tones and its peculiar timbre, so a series of fainter overtones, and yet there is something about the timbre of the note which is not merely additive but constitutive of that peculiar auditory experience, so, in tender emotion there is a constitutive supplement to the additive factors—a supplement which gives to these factors in combination the characteristic property of the unit character as a synthetic whole. To pursue the analogy a stage further, just as in music the additive sum is not merely the additive sum of the constituent tones and overtones simultaneously presented to hearing, but has its constitutive property as a chord, so, too, the blend of wonder, negative self-feeling, and fear, as generators of the complex emotion of awe, affords in consciousness what we may term an emotional chord, the specific quality of which is not exhausted by giving a list of its factors. When the emotional chord has its definite place in life’s harmony, and derives further and richer significance from its context, it is raised to the level of a sentiment, and, in relation to the context, has a higher constitutive value.

Not all psychologists would concur in such statements as these. But many are prepared to accept what W. Wundt (An Introduction to Psychology, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 184) has termed the principle of creative resultants—creative in the sense that the resultant compounds have new properties. This principle, he says, attempts to state the fact that

‘In all psychical combinations the product is not the mere sum of the separate elements; it is not a combination of combinations, but that it represents a new creation’ (p. 184).

This is extended to the whole realm of life in Bergson’s doctrine of creative evolution, which many biologists can accept without subscribing to his radical dualism. Even in the inorganic world
the same principle holds. W. Nernst teaches (quoted in The New Realism, New York, 1912, p. 238) that, while a large number of physical properties are clearly additive, there are other properties which are not merely additive. Now non-native properties, he says, are termed constitutive.

Granted, then, that in the course of mental development new constitutive properties may arise, psychological treatises and religions and sentiments are characteristic evolutionary factors that supervene at critical periods of synthesis, our immediate question is whether they should be regarded as constitutive in that broader sense of the term which is here provisionally accepted. They appear to be distinctive of man in virtue of his inherent constitution as human; they appear to be in large measure beyond volitional control; from the ethical point of view they appear to be the outcome of character (which is the constitutive factor) rather than the sum of the conditions which, of course, must supply the requisite additive data; and on such grounds they may well be claimed to be constitutive in the widest sense of the term. On such grounds, therefore, it can scarcely be denied that a child receives, so to speak, its varnas as so many exogenous traits, nearly as prevalent in mankind, though they assume varied forms under varied circumstances, have an instinctive basis in the human constitution.


Psychological treatment: Text-books of Psychology, e.g.: W. James, Principles of Psychology, do. 1891; G. F. Stout, Mental Hygiene, do. 1913.


C. LLOYD MORGAN.

INSTITUTIONS (Indian).—A native of India, as observed by H. C. Bose in his attractive little work, The Hindus as they are, is a religious character. He is born religiously, lives religiously, eats religiously, walks religiously, writes religiously, sleeps religiously, and dies religiously. All the more important ancient institutions of the Aryan Indians may be said to have a religious tinge. Even the rules of Government, as framed by the Brahman, are essentially theocratic. It is true they could never have been fully enforced, but, whenever Brâhmanism was in the ascendant in a Hindu State, the orthodox union of Church and State was carried into practice as much as was found practicable. Thus one of the eight ministers appointed by the great Siâvi, the founder of Mahârta power, was entrusted with the exercise of all the sovereign's ecclesiastical powers, and was to order punishment to be inflicted after investigating into what is and what is not in accordance with the religious law (A.D. 1674). The main inspiring principle of the whole movement initiated by Siâvi, and carried on by his successors, was the preservation of the Hindu religion against foreign aggression. The administration of justice, which was considered one of the principal duties of a king, is similarly characterized. The trial by ordeal being a regular feature of judicial proceedings (see LAW).

Caste, whatever its origin, is another important institution of an essentially religious or historic character. As observed in the Report on the Census of 1901 (p. 360), the most obvious characteristic of the ordinary Hindu is his acceptance of the Brâhmanical supremacy and of the caste system. Although the political power of the Brâhman caste is gone, their influence with Hindu society continues to have a vitality that has been called the Brâhmanization of non-Hinduized castes—the endeavour to rise in the social scale by adopting the characteristic social customs of the Brâhmanas, such as sitting on the ground, and the prohibition of widow remarriage.

Passing to religious institutions in the proper sense of the term, we may perhaps mention the following as specially characteristic: a CRYSTAL with external and internal, is a great object with Hindus of every sect and persuasion, and manifold are the rules regarding the avoidance of pollution or defilement, and the removal of its consequences where it has been contracted (see PURIFICATION, FOOD). There is not only a fully developed system of penances (see EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT), but an endless row of devotional acts tending to the expiation of guilt and to the acquisition of spiritual merit. The śivākāras or sacrifices, to be performed during pregnancy (puṣâvatana, sivaṇtanaṇaṇaṇa), at childbirth (ādīḥaṇa), when the first gets rice to eat (uṇṇaṇākāra), on the first hair-clipping (cūhāa), when the boy is girt with the sacred thread (āpanaṇaṇa), on marriage (vivāda), and after death, etc., are established to wholesome ends, and form a regular source of income for the Brâhmanas officiating at these ceremonies. Thus among the Patane Prabhus of Poonia, a highly respectable caste, a birth was said to cost a gold basin, a thread-girding £20 to £50, the marriage of a son £150 to £400, of a daughter £100 to £500, a girl's coming of age £10 to £20, a pregnancy £10 to £15, the death of an adult £20 to £25 (BG xviii. 194). Marriage is a particularly expensive and solemn celebration, at which many of the old rites described in Sanskrit literature are still observed, together with many new ceremonies. The special importance and sanctity attributed to the institution of marriage in the Hindu religion become conspicuous equally in the before-mentioned customs of infant marriage and of prohibition of widow remarriage. By betrothing their children at an early age, parents could best provide for their not remaining unmarried, a spinster, especially of the Brâhman caste, being considered a disgrace to her family. This early betrothal was in reality the decisive act, though married life could not begin till some years later; and thus arose the peculiarly Indian institution of virgin widows, remarriage of a woman, like divorce, being unknown to the Brâhmanical law of India (see CHILD-MARRIAGE). The former practice of sati, or self-immolation of widows, has been abolished by the British Government. The two ceremonies of tenure (g.n.) and of thread-girding (see INITIATION) are considered important events in the life of a Hindu boy. The ordinary mode of disposing of the dead is by cremation (DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD). Every death is followed by a certain period of impurity, and by the offering, at regular intervals, of sacrificial oblations called śrīdās in the names. Adopting a boy, though not a sacrament, is a religious act of considerable importance for Indian family life (see ADOPTION). According to the religious duties prevailing in each successive stage of life, there are four dīnārassas, or orders, in the life of a Brâhman, of pupil (brahmacārin), married householder (gṛhastha), hermit (sānātana), and ascetic (brahmadāra); but, however, the order of hermits has died out, and the pupil and ascetic are chiefly represented by the ekās and gurus of the monastic orders of the
INSTITUTIONAL CHURCH

The modern type of the Hindu Brahman is the ordinary householder, engaged in commerce or industry, and the priest or the sacerdote of the Hindu temples. The Brahman is a member of the religious class, and the priest is a member of the religious caste. The Brahman is a member of the religious order, and the priest is a member of the religious community. The Brahman is a member of the religious society, and the priest is a member of the religious institution. The Brahman is a member of the religious community, and the priest is a member of the religious institution. The Brahman is a member of the religious society, and the priest is a member of the religious community.

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confirmed by the new sense which was being developed among the members of all Churches as to their duty to the young. The English Sunday Schools have seldom succeeded in retaining their older scholars. Even in schools where large Bible classes exist, the need for more and more help for keeping in touch with these young men and women was increasingly felt. The statistics were alarming as to the small number of young people who were attached to the Church. R. W. Dale, on a memorable occasion, pressed home the question, 'How have we lost them?' Certain religious associations sprang into existence to meet this felt need. The Christian Endeavour Societies (see art. CHRISTIAN ENDEAVOUR) were probably the most successful in making appeal to the religious nature of the young. But the Church was even then hardly prepared to recognize that the physical and intellectual needs of men and women are equally urgent, and that it may form part of her duty to make provision for these. In some communions this ideal was advocated; and what was then known as 'Guilds' were founded upon the explicit basis of the organic unity of our nature, and that just because we are human beings we must be treated as such. Hence the Guild had its social and moral, and at the same time intellectual and religious one. The Guild movement had a partial success. Where the home-life is normal and strong, it is evident that the need for men of the Church is more insistent. But modern Britain and modern America have tended increasingly to produce overcrowded areas, where little or nothing deserves the name of home-life, and where all social and recreational satisfactions must be sought for elsewhere. Earnest people in all Churches began to see that the problem before them was to adapt the Church's institutions to the needs of areas such as these.

One movement had brought home this problem to the conscience of Christian people. This was what was known as the 'F.S.A.' movement, by means of which large congregations of men and women were brought together on Sunday afternoons for purposes which, it would be fair to say, were at once religious and social. These people, from what was often spoken of as the 'hospitals of the poor', formed themselves into societies with branches designed to promote thrift, to encourage reading, and to secure effective house-to-house visitation. But, in the majority of cases, the Churches had no hostility to offer them apart from the Sunday meeting. It was borne in upon the minds of those who were especially concerned that the Church should prosper in the industrial districts that something must be designed more satisfactory than the orthodox place of worship, with rigid pews, which is usually closed from Sunday night to Sunday morning. The Institutional Church, therefore, was a practical attempt to bridge the gulf between the Sunday School and the Church; it aimed at ministering to the development of a man's all-round nature; it aimed at making such provision as was necessary under social conditions which make true home-life impossible. In many instances old places of worship were modernized into halls, with seats instead of pews, platforms instead of pulpits, and equally serviceable for public worship, lectures, concerts, and other meetings. This becomes the central meeting-place of the Church, where its members receive their vows of dedication to the social service which Christ calls His people. There, too, the obligations of the Christian life are pressed upon those who have not as yet become members. There the Gospel of Brotherhood, with its innumerable applications, is preached to gatherings of men and women. Then, round about the central building and from the halls of various kinds, some of them for conferences and discussions, some of them for recreation and games, some of them for reading and writing, and some for social conversation. Clubs are formed for working lads or girls; and gymnastics, singing, elicution, cooking, wood-carving, dressmaking, signalling, and many other wholesome activities are organized. The settlement idea is conserved by means of sisterhoods, whose members conduct such classes, and do much of the visitation and administration of relief inseparable from a many-sided work like this; and who commonly live together in rooms on the Church premises in a house in the immediate neighborhood. Lectures, scientific, literary, historical, and economic, bring the public together on these. By all these means an attempt is made, and realized, to strengthen the social bond, and demonstrate that everything that makes for human happiness and efficiency is the result of the Christian life; that all these are parts of the same thing, and that the Christian Church is a living and growing community.

It will be seen from this that the Institutional Church is best able to carry out what is known as the policy of 'counter-attractions. W. S. Rainsford, formerly a missionary and now a Church administrator, has described (Preacher's Story of his Work, New York, 1904) how this policy was gradually forced upon him by the necessities of the situation. The evil associations of the saloon, the beer-shop, the place of public amusement, the dance-hall, were gradually being replaced by a central church and a central hall. The open air was gradually becoming an important factor in the scheme of the Church. The first step was to provide a central centre with wholesome food and drink; the undesirable dancing saloons drove him to permit dancing in his church hall; the delightful dramatic exhibitions of all kinds led him to organize a dramatic society for the production of good, wholesome plays. Probably few, if any, of the similar experiments in England have been so comprehensive a scheme as this one; but the need to provide counter-attractions to the public-houses, and to supply refreshments, good and lively music, billiards and other games, and abundant social opportunities, apart from the unwholesome atmosphere of licentiousness with its frequent inroads upon the pure life of the land as in New York. Instances might be quoted in which social enterprises of an even more ambitious character have been successfully carried out, such as labour-yards, night-shelters, and even hospitals and orphanages; but there is an increasing disposition not to burden the Church with work which the State should properly undertake. Nevertheless, the Church has led the way in many new forms of work among the young. The cirele, or day nursery, where infants are well nursed and fed while their mothers are away at work, and the play-centre, where, outside school hours, children who have no privileges but the street are taught organized games, form part of the operations of nearly all Institutional Churches.

The ideal aimed at is that of a Mother Church which thus offers hospitality to all men, women, and children, and applies herself to discover and to satisfy their needs. The centre of the whole organization is the society of avowed disciples of Christ, who are inspired by His example and teaching, and who, in His spirit, are dedicated to the ends of His kingdom. The members of the Institutional Church would always feel that they had failed in their mission to any one who had come within their influence, and joined one or other of their
insitutions, unless they had converted him into a Christian citizen, and inspired a disinterested zeal for human betterment. This could be brought about only, as they would confess, by contact with a living Church. Thus the Institutional Church is not under any temptation to magnify its institutions and depreciate the Church. On the other hand, the necessity for keeping the institutions of Christian leads to the emphasis of the Church and its conscious that the highest success of the Institutional Church has been realized where the worship and teaching of the Church have been effectually central to all the manifold operations of the Church.

The decay of the gild system after the Reformation left many blanks in the national life. Not prominent among them was the absence of the compensation against some of the great risks of life which it might provide. It is true that marine insurance was unaffected, and this was gradually extended. Before the end of the 16th century, the loan on bottomry had been supplemented by a type of insurance carried out by a broker and known as a "Bottomry Assurance." It was not until the middle of the 16th century that marine insurance was introduced. It was called the "vouchers for money," and was issued to the shipowner as a certificate of insurance. The shipowner could then sell the voucher to a third party, who would be reimbursed if the ship were lost. This system was gradually extended, and by the middle of the 17th century, the practice of marine insurance was well established.

The period bounded on the one side by the Great Fire and on the other by the feverish promotion of companies in 1720 was one in which marine insurance made great strides, both in the insuring against new risks, or to provide new benefits, and in the prosecution of new methods. In the reign of Charles II, marine insurance was well understood, and, with the growth of coffee houses, those interested in shipping began to use certain of those resort as meeting-places and offices. By 1688, Lloyd's Coffee House had been started, and Lloyd's News—a newspaper dealing with the movements of ships—was founded in 1686. Then, between 1717 and 1719, two companies were organized, both of which received incorporation in 1720 as the Royal Exchange Assurance and the London Assurance. These bodies, at their foundation, were endowed with a monopoly against any other companies, but not against individuals. Thus marine insurance has been effected, partly by individual underwriters, partly by joint-stock companies. The Great Fire naturally turned attention to fire insurance. In Germany, mutual fire insurance societies had been founded at least as early as the 16th century, and Sir William Petty mentioned associations of this type as being worthy of imitation in England. After the disaster of the Great Fire three or perhaps four distinct kinds of fire insurance were attempted. The Corporation of London opened an office in 1679 or 1680, that is, insurance by a municipality. Then there was the Grand Assurance Society, known as the Friendly Society, which had issued proposals in 1683. The remaining methods were practised by individuals underwriting fire risks, or by several individuals in partnership. Nicholas Barbon had opened an office in 1657 which was transformed into a joint-stock company in 1689. Of these four types of fire insurance only two survived. Insurance by individuals never became prominent as regards fire risks, and mutual insurance was soon abandoned. There remained the mutual fire insurance societies and the joint-stock companies, both on an equal side by side in competition. The Hand in Hand Society was a mutual one. It was founded in 1696, and was absorbed by the Commercial Union.
Assurance Company in 1695. On the other hand, the Sun Fire Office, which was founded by Charles Povey between 1706 and 1708, was a joint-stock company. In the first twenty years of the 18th cent. many fire offices were established in London, and as slowly spread over the provinces.

Besides the provision made against losses by shipwreck or by fire, other risks to property were gradually insured against. Thus by 1694 goods were insured against thefts (Merchant's Daily Companion, London, 1694). By 1720 schemes had been projected for insurances against losses by highwaymen, by the dishonesty of servants, for the payment of men's wages, and for making good losses sustained by owners of horses through disease, disablement, or theft. Such schemes had been propounded resembling burglary, fidelity, guarantee, and life insurance, though, owing to the excessive number of promotions, long periods elapsed before all of these were established.

Meanwhile, the provision for life contingencies lagged behind marine and fire insurances. In the middle of the 17th cent. a species of life insurance could be effected whereby any one who borrowed money to purchase a place or office could arrange by payment of small payments from the income that, in the event of his death, the part of the loan outstanding would be repaid to the lender. It is after the Revolution that something of the nature of life insurance can be traced. One of the methods by which the Government raised funds for the carrying on of the war against France was by the guaranteeing of annuities in return for loans. For the Company this gave the Government also to issue annuities. These schemes were very imperfect, owing to the want of anything approaching mortality tables. Even the population of the country was unknown, for the payment of men's wages, and for making good losses sustained by owners of horses through disease, disablement, or theft. Such schemes had been propounded resembling burglary, fidelity, guarantee, and life insurance, though, owing to the excessive number of promotions, long periods elapsed before all of these were established.

Accordingly, insurance relating to life contingencies was developed in a different direction from modern life insurance, being concerned chiefly with such risks or eventualities as terminated at a comparatively early date as compared with that of the payment of the premium. Before the Revolution, schemes of the type of the Endowment Insurances of children on their attaining the age of 20 years (Add. MS. 28,073, f. 462). Early in the 18th cent. there were many offices which transacted professedly private benevolent insurances, which were all dividend societies—that is, the premiums collected in a quarter or in a year, as the case might be, were divided among those claimants who, in the same period, ranked for the specified benefit. Thus, in a marriage society, all insured persons who had been married since the last division participated pro rata in the distribution. Similarly in other societies the parents of all children born in wedlock, who had paid premiums regularly, ranked for the benefit. Then again, in the same way, a sum could be secured to enable a young man to start in business for himself when his apprenticeship was finished. These were known as marriage, christening, and apprenticeship insurances respectively. In 1709 and 1710 there was quite a rage for participation in these offices, but it arose from the idea that benefit varied greatly, the idea appealed to the gambling spirit of the times. There were many scandals, and insurance of this type was prohibited by Act of Parliament. It was based on the dividend principle. Just as in marriage insurance, the premiums were divided periodically among those who were entitled to claim. There was no distinction at first as to the age or sex of the life insured. One of the earliest life offices was the Society of Assurance of Widows (1699), which was followed by the Amicable Society in 1706. The latter existed independently till 1866, when it was absorbed by the Norwich Union Life Insurance Society.

During the reign of the 18th cent. the chief progress in marine and fire insurance was in the extension of the system. As the various offices acquired reputation, the number of persons insured increased. In fire insurance, on the other hand, great progress was made. The researches of de Moivre, Kersseboom, Hodgson, Corlyn Morris, Simpson, and Price gradually provided the expectation of life, and these were used by the Equitable Society (which was founded in 1762) in the establishing of graduated premiums. In 1825 insurance began to attract the attention of the company promoter, and a great number of new offices were started, the majority of which were soon forced to discontinue business. The remainder of the century is marked by the more exact classification of risks, by the variation of the forms of policies, by the issue of policies against risks which were not previously insured, and, finally, by a great increase in the total sums insured.

In the early forms of insurance the benefits were confined to persons who were comparatively well-to-do. The working-class population was altogether outside of most of the schemes which had been started. The amount and the times of payment of premiums were unsuitable to the wage-earner, nor were the benefits offered of the kind which he needed. As early as 1775 a bill was introduced into Parliament which was designed to extend some of the advantages of insurance to the poor, but it failed to become law. The gradual development of Friendly Societies tended to provide some of the benefits of which the wage-earning classes stood in need (see Friendly Societies).

Though the first Friendly Societies Act was passed in 1773, it was some time before the advantages of these societies became general. While many of these bodies have proved insolvent, others have attained a high degree of financial stability, and the growth of the State insurance has also aided in extending the benefits of insurance. The general method of the organization of a Friendly Society or of a Trade Union, in relation to the part the State insurance has been derived. Unlike all the other kinds of insurance already described, it is not permissive but compulsory. In Germany and France the idea of insurance by the Government may be traced back to the beginning of the 19th cent., since it arises from the conceptions of Fichte, Lessing, and Sismondi. As early as 1854 Prussian miners were compelled to belong to one of the
Knapen'schaf exemptions, or associations for sick funds; and in 1883 the same rule was applied to other labourers. The next year accidental insurance was established, while in 1889 old age and invalidity insurance were provided. The old age pensions in Germany are to be distinguished from those in Great Britain, in that the former are contributory, the latter are non-contributory. State insurance applies compulsion not only to the worker but also to the employer. The usual method is to provide that the worker, his employer, and the State contribute.

State insurance on a large scale was established in the United Kingdom by the National Insurance Act, 1911, p. 2 (section 3, cap. 55). This scheme has two main divisions, the one for sickness and the other for unemployment. Thus an attempt is made to provide for two of the great risks of wage-earners, namely, sickness and unemployment. As regards the first of these risks, it is understood that while the payment of contributions is compulsory for all employed persons as defined by the Act, whose ages are between 16 and 65, and whose remuneration does not exceed £120 a year, the administration is committed to Friendly Societies under the supervision of a Government department. While insurance may be described as the normal rate of contribution in Great Britain is 7d. per week for men and 6d. for women. The man pays 4d. per week, and the woman 3d. per week; while, in most cases, the employer adds 6d. per week. The State adds 10d., which amount adds 2d. per week for both sexes. Where the total earnings in Great Britain are less than 2s. 6d. per day these rates are modified, and there is a reduced scale for Ireland.

The scheme consists of a medical benefit (including medicines and medical and surgical appliances as are prescribed by the Insurance Commissioners), indemnity benefit (including sickness benefit, maternity benefit (being a payment of 30s. on the confinement of the woman of an insured person or of any other woman by whom it is insured, additional benefits, which are dependent upon sickness in the financial year), the Friendly Societies working the Act, and which may include additions to the amounts of the foregoing benefits, or further benefits, such as dental treatment, in the case of poor contribution rates, payments to insured persons who are out of work through infection, etc. Though the intention of the Act is that it should be administered by Friendly Societies or similar bodies, account has had to be taken of those persons who, while compelled to pay contributions, are not members of a Friendly Society. These become deposit contributors. The sums paid by and for them are lodged at the Ministerial Office, and they are entitled to benefits only till the end of the year in which the amount standing to their credit may be exhausted. Though this system is sanctions in its rate. It is clear that the element of insurance is relatively small.

The second part of the Act—that relating to unemployment—deals with those trades in which irregularity of work is common, e.g., building, construction of works, shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, iron founding, construction of vehicles, saw-milling. Contributions are provided by the workers in these trades, their employers, and the State. Subject to certain exceptions, the worker and the employer both pay 2½d. per week. The normal rate of unemployment benefit is 7s. per week; there are numerous rules to prevent malingerers; and provision is made for a court of reference to which the insured person may apply in case his unemployment benefit is stopped by the insurance officer.


2. Modern insurance. — I. Risk of marine, etc. (a) Marine insurance. — Allusion has already been made to the resort of underwriters of marine risks to Lloyd's Coffee House, and from this grew the body now known as 'Lloyd's.' While losses on ships are effected both by the members of Lloyd's and by marine insurance companies, Lloyd's is the centre of this class of business, since the society is not only an association of underwriters, but its function also includes the distribution of intelligence. By means of its agents, it is in touch with all parts of the world, and all ships can be reported, and thus materials arrive in London which determine the positions of ships, as well as any accidents they may sustain. Since 1834, Lloyd's Register has been published annually; it provides for an elaborate classification of ships according to their condition. Lloyd's is a voluntary society resembling in its constitution the Stock Exchange. The affairs of the body are managed by a committee, and each 'underwriting member' is entitled to access risks subject to the rules of the committee. In addition to the shipowner who is insured and the underwriter who insures, there are sometimes women underwriting members and a special class of agent, the general broker who acts as an intermediary between the two interests, both in the initiation of the insurance and in the settlement of any claim that may arise through it. Besides the members of Lloyd's and marine insurance companies, there is another type of this class of insurance, namely, where a merchant or shipowner, owning a large fleet of vessels, insures them himself by paying a liberal premium, which is divided among the vessels which would otherwise be handed over to an underwriter; or a company may itself insure a part of the vessels of its ships and place the remainder with an insurance company or with members of Lloyd's. The methods by which marine insurance companies maintain their financial solvency is similar to that adopted by fire and life companies, but the way in which the individual underwriter meets his losses is not so clear. This is effected by a minute subdivision and diffusion of any 'line' he may underwrite; that is, the member of Lloyd's who insures a ship for a large premium will at once re-insure the greater part of his risk with other underwriters. In this way the stability of a Lloyd's policy is maintained.

(b) Fire insurance. — Fire insurance has long been standardized. The chief offices have formed a tariff association, according to which they charge identical rates of premium for risks classed as the same. To some extent this body serves a similar purpose to that of Lloyd's Register, though, in the case of fire risks, the property is not capable of the same exact graduation as is possible with
regard to shipping. Originally insurance began upon a basis of specialization—that is, the early offices were established in order to effect a particular class of insurance. It was not long before a tendency manifested itself to combine the underwriting of different classes of risks. Thus in 1729 the Royal Exchange Assurance added to its marine business that of fire insurance by the purchase of an undertaking which had been formed for the latter type of risk. While labour tends more and more to minute division, industry works on a larger and larger scale. In insurance the movement towards large scale operation finds expression in the combining of different classes of risks by the same office, either by amalgamation with other companies or by the adding of new branches to its colonies. Of recent years in both foreign and British offices there has been a tendency towards an increase in the size of the business handled by each office. In 1860 the total net direct liabilities of British offices were £2,206,878; in 1870 the total net direct liabilities of all British offices were £2,929,157,789. Some of these companies now have branches in America, other foreign countries, and the colonies. The business is now of such magnitude that the operation of underwriting and other branches cannot be pursued by one office. Where a company has many branches a reduction in the rates of insurance is made possible, and the profit made is apportioned among all the branches of the company. In addition to the fire and marine insurance and reinsurance, insurance companies have also underwritten contracts of life and accident insurance. The former type is known as life insurance, and the latter as accident insurance.

ii. Risks of Persons.—(a) Life Insurance. The insurance of a fixed sum on the life of a person is known as life insurance. The risk in this case is the death of the life assured. The risk is increased by the age and the health of the person insured. Life assurance tables are calculated to show the probability of death at each age. The premium is calculated on the basis of the tables and the amount of the sum assured.

(b) Annuities. An annuity is a contract by which a person agrees to pay a certain sum of money at regular intervals in exchange for an absolute or conditional payment of a specified sum. The annuity may be payable for life or for a fixed period of years. The life of the annuitant is the risk in this case. Annuities are usually paid to pensioners or to persons who have retired from business. The annuity is a series of payments made by the insurance company to the annuitant, and the insurance company is insured against the death of the annuitant, as well as against the failure of the annuitant to pay the premiums.
panies, the ordinary life companies had a premium income (after deducting re-insurance) in 1892 of £11,659,319—a figure which increased in 1910 to £25,994,404. At the earlier date the income from interest and dividends (loss income-tax) was £5,551,000, and hence the balance was £13,168,317. In 1910–11 the life policies numbered 2,883,851, and the amount assured was £800,215,596.

e) **Personal accident insurance.**—The number of policies issued in 1910 was 84, and their premium income for the year was £2,588,710. Many ingenious methods have been adopted to extend this type of insurance as, e.g., the printing of coupons in libraries and certain periodicals, which entitle the holder to compensation should he sustain an accident of a specified character and under certain conditions within a fixed period.

f) **Other contingencies relating to persons.**—Sickness insurance is the chief of these, whereby provision is made for the expenses incurred by an illness and, if desired, for the loss of earnings through disease. Transactions of this character are of minor importance in the business of insurance offices, whereas these are most important in the work of Friendly Societies and of State Insurance in relation to the wage-earning classes (see above, § 1).


**2. The principles of insurance.**—The general principles of insurance are fairly obvious, but they have many ramifications which require to be traced with much care. Some of the uncertainties of life and business at times involve most serious consequences to the individual, unless some method has been devised by which he can provide against them or against their pecuniary results. When Shakespeare makes all the ventures of Antonio miscarry and "not one vessel 'scape the dreadful touch of merchant-marring rocks" (Merchant of Venice, iii, 1, 25–26), the owner is confronted with ruin. But, while ships are wrecked, many complice peril their voyages in safety; while some houses are destroyed by fire, the great majority escape this catastrophic; indeed, there are certain risks to which property is liable which, on the one hand, involve the total destruction of the things, but, on the other, are comparatively rare. Similarly, in the case of death, life or illness involves the total or the temporary cessation of earning power. It is clear that these risks can be divided into classes, and all those which fall within a certain class are subject to that risk, though it may result in a far smaller amount. Further, the damage sustained by those who suffer is relatively great. Hence it is to the advantage of the members of such a class to sacrifice a small part of their income, upon a condition that the estimated amount of the loss shall be made good. In the special case of life insurance the sum assured may be regarded in most instances as a compensation for the loss of income, accruing to the person who insures, either by his labour or in any other way, which may be of a terminable nature. Thus, in fact, the risk of loss by a calamity which may occur to any one of a certain group is distributed over the members of that class. The method by which what may be termed "loss-sharing" is distributed depends on the law of averages, and requires a collection of statistics. Taking the period of adult life, every one is subject to the risk of illness which would interrupt the earnings derived from occupation; but, as between individuals such illnesses fall unequally, some may have none, others may have a few, and others may have many. Where statistics of uncertainties are available, and where the period of life has been suitably extended, it is generally found that an average will be established for a special kind of risk; and, therefore, the average liability to that risk can be made the subject of ascertainable calculation. Accordingly, it is on this basis that the premium to insure against it is arrived at. In the absence of statistical data, any calculation of a premium is impossible. So, insurance was affected against damage to seroplasses which occurred through their flying. Therefore, firms undertook this risk, any mistake in the rate of the premiums may be serious, in view of the relatively small part of such insurance as compared with the total transactions of the insurance companies. In the event of a number of new offices being formed for this class of insurance, it is probable that at first, owing to the imperfectness of the data, there would be considerable variations in the rates; and, as shown by the outcome, some would prove to have been too high and some too low.

The application of the theory of insurance in practice is modified by the conditions under which the event insured against takes place. In some cases there is the danger that this event may be simulated. Life insurance is least subject to this disadvantage. In fire insurance, fraud may take the form of an attempt to create the conditions insured against in order to obtain the proceeds of his policy, should the crime be detected. In marine insurance there is the possibility of "bar-tary" in order to defraud the underwriters. Sickness insurance is subject to a greater degree of difficulty, in so far as illness may be feigned. As a general rule, those risks who are usually insured against are such as admit of easy proof of loss, while the claimant, and verification of his claim by the insurer. Outside the risks which are usually insured against, or insurance offices there are other uncertainties which are similar to those of the event of life insurance. Again, there are usually insured against in this way. A business may not suffer from fire, accidents, or losses of ships, and yet may experience most serious losses. The reason why the latter risk is not undertaken by insurance companies is that such business risks are inseparably connected with the general management of the business, and the underwriter responsible for the management of the business (A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, London, 1888, p. 470). At the same time fluctuations in profits, due to variations in trade, enter into and form part of the expenses of the business, and these must be added to the prime cost of its products. The amount which it is necessary to charge under this head represents a species of premium against this risk. Losses are limited and attempts are made to reduce it by the rating of, or the dealing in, a number of commodities the demands for which are subject to varying conditions; or, again, by securing access to different markets for the same commodity, the purchase price of which is subject to the market price of the same commodity, at the same time the effect of the price of the same commodity is subject to the market price of the same commodity at the same time. Other risks which have been mentioned are those of instruments of production, against which he provides by a depreciation fund and at a sum is contributed each year that with compound interest
will replace the value of the machines by the time they are worn out. But machines suffer not only from wear and tear, but from the risk of being superseded. In so far as this contingency differs from that due to variations in trade, a further protection should be provided against a depreciation and a contribution towards obsolescence together constitute a species of insurance resembling life insurance as applied to inanimate things. In fact, this analogy has been so fully recognized that it is insurance, instead of a depreciation and a process just described is often termed 'amortization.' —i.e., the formation of a fund which will make good the capital outlay when the source of income will no longer be available. In this manner appear at a glance the insurance against risk; and, if all success continues, a loss of capital will result. The converse would apply where the history of a company was more favourable than had been expected at the time when the investment was made; and there might well be an appreciation of capital altogether independent of the provision available in insurance against risk.

Insurance, both in its common forms and in its wider signification, has important advantages, both for the individual and for the country as a whole. It lessens the dislocation of industry which would otherwise arise through the cessation of production by some firm that has sustained a sudden calamity through a fire which destroys all its works, or any other similar disaster. In fact, in so far as insurance tends to make production more uniform, it tends to augment its efficiency. Similarly it makes labour more efficient also, since it relieves all those workers who have persons depending on their earnings from the harrowing anxiety to see the pecuniary position of those persons in the event of the early death of the earner of the income. Further, the system undoubtedly prevents cases of actual poverty which would otherwise have arisen. It is thus beneficial not only to the families of persons insured, but to the whole community. It has important psychological effects. The necessity of the punctual payment of premiums tends to form habits of saving, which are valuable towards the accumulation of wealth of a company. For these reasons Governments are disposed to encourage life insurance as well as certain other forms of insurance. The encouragement takes various forms, such as the provision of statistical material and departmental supervision. In Canada, income tax is related on that part of an income, otherwise subject to it, which is employed in the payment of life insurance premiums. These aids are of the nature of insurance and operate not only on the Continent but on the Continent cases occur where direct bounties are paid by the State. In the National Insurance Act, the principle of a double direct bounty to the insured (the State and the employer) is adopted, reinforced by compulsion. The latter element conflicts with some of the necessary advantages of insurance, e.g., in the formation of habits of thrift. At the same time, even in the case of ordinary life insurance, while the person who insures himself is free in law to discontinue the payment of his premiums and to obtain the surrendered assets as a consideration of an event that once a policy has been begun, in the great majority of cases there is a feeling almost amounting to compulsion towards the maintaining of the insurance. The problem in relation to the insurance of the working classes is in reality a choice of the line of least disadvantage. Bounties would maintain the voluntary principle, and would extend its applications under a certain artificial stimulus. Compulsion secures at once that, in a properly devised scheme, a greater number of persons obtain the benefits. Every effort has been made to conserve as much individual action as is possible, within a scheme of general compulsion, by associating Friendly Societies with the actual working of the Act.

Finally, the tendency to the more exact gradation and valuation of general business risk has important social effects. Here, too, there is a development in averaging, and thus the hazard of uncertainty lessens, on the whole, to be reduced. The element of 'increasing' in insurance against risk, since its rate is determined, once for all, by the price paid for the stock, the dividend then paid, and the rate of economic interest in the case. The decline in prosperity will contract the estimated sum available for
saving. Outside the risks insured by underwriters, there remain many uncertainties, which are gradually being reduced by improvements in organization, by increase in commercial knowledge and experience, by development of communication. The last two always afford increased opportunities of averaging, while the first lessens the amount of uncertainty, and in favourable circumstances may remove large classes of transactions from this category altogether.


INTELLECT.—A. Bain says:

'Thought, Intellect, Intelligence, or Cognition includes the power known as Perception, Memory, Conception, Abstraction, Reasons, Judgment, and Imagination. It is analyzed, as will be seen, into three, called Discrimination or Consciousness of Difference, Similarity or Consciousness of Agreement, and Retentiveness or Memory (Mental and Scientific Method, London, 1862, p. 2).

Sully (Human Mind, i. 64) objects to the inclusion of retentiveness among the functions of intellect, on the ground that it is not confined to the phenomena of intellect, but underlies the processes of feeling and willing as well; that the representation, like the sense-impression, is nothing but material for the process of intellect; and that the revival of past impressions takes place according to laws of association which are closely connected with the processes of assimilation and integration. Sully substitutes for retentiveness, as the third function of intellect, what he calls association or the connecting of a given material with its concomitants in time and place. If we exclude the presentations of sense and the retentiveness, imagination, 'intellect' is the name given to the higher cognitio powers of the mind. It may be considered as identical with what Sir W. Hamilton called the Intuitive Power, the faculty of the sensitive phantasm, and also to include what he called the Regulative Faculty— the Faculty of Principles. So understood, it includes the 5es and 5idous of the Greeks, and stands opposed to merely sensitive knowledge, although always regarded as standing in close interconnexion with the latter.

While the above may be taken as roughly descriptive of the reasonings on the subject of any system of philosophy or psychology, yet the whole significance of the description depends on the way in which intellect is conceived to stand to sensation, feeling, will, and the psychic principle itself.

In the Platonic philosophy, the soul is, so to speak, externally related to the body. It exists in the body as a detached principle, which directs and gives the soul as the chariot of the charioteer. Although Plato distinguishes various parts of the soul, or even various kinds of soul, still it is only through the soul considered as intellect, as pure thought, that the passions of the irrational part are known (R. D. Archer-Hind, Philetos, London, 1883, Intro. p. 30). The same holds true of sensuous perception (Archer-Hind, Timaeus, London and New York, 1888, p. 256, note). As Reavey says (Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition, p. 27), 'It may help us to understand Plato's distribution better if, distinguishing sôcras as we have done into two elements, the element of feeling or the element of cognition, we refer the latter element of daimones union in the intellectual soul, which has its seat in the cranium.'

Sensation, therefore, as known, is an affection of the pure psychic principle, and is not to be regarded as something sui generis, distinct from intellect. It is rather to be regarded as a phase of Intellective activity itself—in the philosophy of Aristotle the psychic principle occupies a different position. It is not related to the body as agent to instrument, but as form to matter, as resulutum to correlate, as antecedently to consequence. The elaboration of a general principle, the active intellect, is not, in itself, purely intellectual. Not only do the merely vital activities proceed from the same principle which exerts the cognitive activities, but the latter also, so far as they belong to sense and imagination, stand in the same condition and conditioned relation to the organism in which the vital activities stand. If Aristotle had remained at this standpoint, he would have held a position substantially identical with the doctrine of the De anima, in which relations of similarity and difference between sensations are conceived to become the conscious apprehension of resemblance and difference as such.

Aristotle, however, did not remain at this position. He postulated the presence of a Divine element in the human soul—the 5eis, emanating from the Divine 5eis, and constituting the really immortal part of man. It emerges from without. Aristotle's doctrine of 5eis has been a problem from his day until now. What is its relation to sensitive knowledge? The answer to this question is contained in the older demonstrations. The active intellect may be thought to create the form, as one creates images in a transparent medium, as one colour it, in other words, to generate it on the occasion of the sensuous phantasm, so that the active intellect in creation is both from the phantasms or sensible species, but rather an entirely new creation produced from itself by the active intellect. In the Middle Ages it was maintained that no material agency could act on this immaterial intellect, nor could the latter fabricate intellectual species from the material phantasm (cf. Maher, Psychology, p. 348; and Hamilton, Boyd's Writings, London, 1853, p. 653, f., and the references there given). The species intelligibilis impressus is thus elaborated by the active intellect, and received by the passive intellect, where, together with the act of intellect, it constitutes the species intelligibilis expressus. It is consequently with this view that the active intellect and the passive intellect should be regarded as two powers or faculties, as was held by the majority of the scholastic philosophers. On the other hand, the intellect may be regarded as playing a far less important rôle, as not producing the intelligible species, but simply supplying the illumination, as it were, through which the intellect exercises its power, the intelligible form abstracted from the sensible phantasm. From this point of view the passive
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intellect is not a distinct principle, but simply the receptive ideal ectype. The parallelism of the distinction of the active and passive reason to the pure Ego and the transcendental self of Fichte, and the consequent absence of consciousness in God, are both contained in Fichte's system and in Hegel's, as interpreted by the Hegelian Left, have been pointed out by Triangles - Pattison (Hegelianism and Personality, London, 1887, pp. 46, 229). The problem has maintained (Objectivity of Truth, London, 1884, p. 196.) that, alike in the human and the Divine thinking, the two aspects coincide and are to be conceived as one. Intellect in its very receptiveness is determinative, and receptive in its determinativeness. If this determinativeness is regarded as a continuously acting timelessness activity, the passive intellect is not only active, but also the active intellect as distinct from the faculty of sensuous cognition.

Aquinus and Duns Scotus regarded not only the active but also the passive intellect as distinct from the faculty of sensuous cognition.

The following modern interpretations of the passive intellect are cited by Hicks (de Anima, Introd. Iviii. P. A. Trendelenburg). It is an intellect in contradistinction to the active intellect, F. Zeller with "the sum of those faculties of representation which go beyond imagination and sensation, and yet less far than that higher Thought which has found peace in perfect unity with its object." F. Ravaisson with "the universal potentiality in abstract ideas," F. Brentano with "imagination," O. Herrling with "this sensus communis," and W. A. Hammond with "the passive intellect as a potentially rational mass," the sum of the deliverances of sense-perceptions and their re-abstracted representations, and as a faculty of the individual soul. This view was held by Alexander the Aphrodiasian, and by Avicenna, who, however, substitutes for the Deity a lower intelligence that has proceeded by a series of emanations from Him (Stöckh,Philos. des Mittelalters, ii. l. 42). (2) Avroco separates both the active and passive or material intellect from the individual soul, and regards it as one and the same person. In identifying it, however, not with the Deity Himself, but, like Avicenna, with an emanation from the Deity (ib. 113). (3) Aquinas and the medieval scholastics regard the intellect as a faculty of the individual human soul. The first of these interpretations is exposed to the difficulty that it separates the active and passive intellects so that they cannot act together (cf. Aquinas, contra Gent. ii. clxxvli.). The second interpretation makes both the active intellect and the apprehension of the rational concept the act not of a faculty of the individual soul, but of an intellect that is an entity in the individual human being, and one and the same in all men. Such a conception divorces intellect so completely from the individual soul that it is hard to conceive how any tie remains between them. The third interpretation is exposed to great difficulties. Unless conceived as a distinct faculty apart from the passive intellect, it becomes more than a phase of the latter. It can only be regarded as illuminative of the Divine creative thought, already implicitly present in the phantasms. If the active intellect is conceived as something distinct from the passive intellect, and Aquinas did so regard it—it is difficult to understand how a merely human faculty, acting instinctively or blindly, can be creative of an intelligible species which, nevertheless, has an ideal community or identity with the independently existing phantasms. Lastly, it seems impossible to understand how a human intellectus agens should be in perpetual activity, still more a speculative intellect that is.

In medieval philosophy the intellectus agens is not rectified with a productive ideal archetype of the world, but with a
combines both active and passive intellect (see Hiskis' de Anima, note 439, a. 29).

A solution of these difficulties in Aristotle's doctrine may possibly be found if we view him as relating only in its relation to the human soul as a Divine-human faculty, or power—on the human side active and passive at once, on the Divine ever active, for the activity of intellect is life. This agrees with the language of the Nic. Ethic. 10, where soul is 'something Divine'—"the true self."

Nor is it necessary, as the villeneues have it, to think like a man because one is a man, or to think like a mortal because one is a mortal, but one ought to play the immortal, as far as one lies, and leave nothing undone to live up to the highest part in one; for even if he be small in bulk, yet in power and preciousness it far surpasses all things" (Stoic. tr. Oxford and London, 1866, p. 97).

The relation of the Aristotelian doctrine of intellect to the question of the immortality of the soul depends on the relation in which intellect and sense are conceived to stand to consciousness and memory (Work, p. 878) cites a passage from Aristotle (Pred. xii. 33) which he translates: 'To divorce Sensation from Understanding, is to reduce Sensation to an insensible process—therefore it follows that...Intellect sees and Intellect hears.'

This would lead to a Platonic view, essentially identifying consciousness with the immaterial intellect. On the other hand, if the latter were not unlike machines, their sense life implies some kind of consciousness. Balanus was consequently led to attribute to them an immaterial self and some sort of possible immortality (Fundamental Philosophy, bk. ii. ch. 5). The body must be a mediating substance, originating and persifying with the body, was held by S. Tongiorgi, and opposed by Stockl, who held that matter was the substrate of the organic life of brutes (Lehrbuch der Philos. II, 109). Unless, therefore, intellect and sensibility can be regarded as still united in some common root, to use Kant's expression, the separability of intellect from the body seems to involve the division of consciousness itself.

The doctrine of Aquinas regarding memory seems to involve a similar division of that faculty, the cognition of the past object being in the intellect, and the preserving only the intelligible species, yet having, nevertheless, in relation to the act of intellect, though not to the object, a cognition of the past act. The real significance of Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect in its bearing on the immortality of the human soul has been disputed in every age. W. Archer Brown

"It is not sufficient to satisfy the demands of human anxiety on this subject, that an eternity should be pronounced essential to an active intellectual principle, which itself seems described as unable to exercise any conscious energies apart from the bodily structure; a quickening essence whose very existence reclines into nothingness when it is left nothing to quicken."

(Lectures, p. 559).

The changed point of view from which intellect is regarded by H. Nies in his "Prolegomena in Summa." The intellect, whether finite or infinite, is regarded by him not as in actuality, not in potentiality; but then this intellect belongs, not to active, but to passive nature, not to nature naturata, but to nature naturans (Ethics, i. prop. xxii). Hence it does not represent a power standing over against nature, but one which is identical with nature. The same changed relation is also to be seen in Leibniz's metaphysics. The scholastic formula, 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse.'

Intellect or reason is conceived in Leibniz and Kant as a sort of content essentially related to the objects of nature. We have already had occasion to mention the conception of intellect which we find in the Association school. This school makes feeling, sensation, the fundamental phenomenon of psychical and of rational life. Intellect, intelligence, is only the development of the most fundamental features of sensory life. Similarity, discrimination, retention, beget by means of the continued action of association the cognitive apprehension of objects distinct, or apparently distinct, from sensations themselves. It is unnecessary to call attention to the well-known criticisms to this doctrine which is exposed.

The unity of consciousness, through which similarity and difference are recognized, and which imparts significance to retention, is explained. In general, Associationists put the cart before the horse. In the most important activities of mind, phenomena are associated because they are cog-nized as related, not cognized as related, certain psychic events are associated. The same applies to the Herbartian school. As Höfling says, 'Consciousness is not merely a platform on which ideas work; it acts itself in and through the individual ideas' (Outlines of Psychology, Eng. tr., London, 1896, p. 144).

Owing perhaps to the influence of A. Schopenhauer and F. Nietzsche, a tendency has shown itself in recent philosophy, especially in Pragmatism, to regard intellect no longer as the refined product of Association, but as the creature and instrument of the will. According to Schopenhauer, 'nature has produced the intellect for the service of an individual will; therefore it is destined only to know things so far as they concern the creature with a will but not to fathom them or apprehend their essence in itself.' (Worke, ed. J. Frumenczi, Leipzig, 1897, II. 150). To Nietzsche 'reason is just a tool!' (Jenseits von Gut und Böse, do. 1906, p. 123).

The possibility of conceiving the force in nature as will, impulse, does not directly concern us here, but the possibility of so conceiving the fundamental principle in mind does. When it was thought that we had in the sense of effort an immediate consciousness of energy expended, it was not unreasonable to regard the consciousness of effort not only as determinative of much of our most intellectual perceptions, but even as affording a glimpse into the will, and intellect considered as the will.

But, now that the existence of such a feeling is generally rejected, it is difficult to conceive the stream of consciousness merely as such as presenting a conative process. According to Stout, the process of consciousness is in part self-determining. There is in it a current, a current which it feels, a tendency toward an end (Manual of Psychology, London, 1907). In this conative tendency the presentations of consciousness acquire objective meaning, and in general through conative continuity the processes of consciousness acquire meaning and significance. This theory seems exposed to the same objections as the Association theory. Such consciousness of an end, however vague, implies the presence of an intellectual power, which already sets out from such end from the current tending toward it. Only so can the current feel itself to be tending toward an end.

A much more decidedly voluntaristic explanation of intellect is involved in H. Münsterberg's Action Theory (Grundzüge der Psychologie, Leipzig, 1900, i. 525). According to that theory, the liveliness of a sensation depends on the strength of the centrifugal excitation in Leibniz's autointerpretation. Sensory excitation is not in itself accompanied by psychical processes, whether the excitation proceeds from the periphery or from associated centres. The afferent process is this whole which is only in its passage into motor discharge does it give rise to consciousness. The cerebral cortex,
which is the seat of the psycho-physical processes, must, in order to produce movements, act on subcortical centres. Every subcortical centre stands always in connexion with an opposite centre, viz. the centre which carries out the diametrically opposite movement. This fact, according to Münsterberg, is the basis not only of all motor antagonistic functions, but also of all psychical oppositions, even such as are purely intellectual and logical. On the contrary, Aristotle holds that the attitude in regard to our activity in the world. Upon the spatial variations in the discharge depend the varying intellectual values of the sensations. This theory is exposed to serious psychological and physiological objections, and its application in detail has not yet been given by the author. It is necessary only to mention that, at the point of transition to motor discharge, the author seems to postulate the action of a spiritual principle which determines the path of discharge and the consequent attitude of the agent to the world. It is here that the author's relation to Fichte comes in, whose ethical idealism he claims to unite with the physiological psychology of our time. The voluntaristic theory must not be confused with the practical Reason of the Scholastics. This concerns us purely to the application of reason to the harmony of action with nature and its final end. The voluntaristic conception of intellect appears in an interesting form in the writings of H. R. Bergson. To Bergson intellect is but a special instrument created by that divine vital which lies behind the whole process of evolution. This instrument is formed by the intellect, it acts not by unveiling the nature of things, but rather by falsifying the larger intuition of reality which flows through the vital impulse out of our consciousness. The falsification, however, works; it is useful for directing our activities, and is justified by its results. In fact, it is these activities which give us the forms of things. It is with inert matter, the solid, that our intelligence deals: the fluid in the real escapes it in part. Of the discontinuous and immobile alone can it form a clear idea. 'Intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life' (Bergson, "Creative Evolution," Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 174). Intellect and matter have progressively adapted themselves one to the other 'because it is the same in both' (ib. 217). It does not appear how such a movement, even if it existed, could catapult the intellect on to the object. Thought may in determining its object be determined by it (Stokes, "Objectivity of Truth," p. 58 f.), but, except in the individual, this reciprocal determination does not take place as a mere process in the intellect. We have it as a psychological hypothesis that the origin of intellect implies intellect itself as already existing. It postulates a consciousness or supra-consciousness lying behind intellect. The sympathetic insight by which we penetrate the mobility of things, the supra- and ultra-intellectual intuition by which there is a taking possession of the spirit by itself—these conceptions are but intellect itself, misconstrued and misunderstood. It is the problem of the intellectus agens once atrophied by a natural inability to comprehend life, which the followers of Aristotle have trod, and meets the same difficulties. Grant, however, that intellect is somehow evolved on the earth, is grappling more or less successfully if not with the mystery, at any rate with the practical working of things. What does this amount to? It means at least that the key fits the lock, and that the lock is fitted to the key. It means that nature in its working is relative, in large measure, to the concepts which intellect has framed; therefore, in still larger measure to the intellectual work that has framed the concepts and will still frame others, by which nature itself will be better understood—a process which can be justified only on the preassumption, which is common alike to scholarly philosophy and Absolute Idealism, that nature is relative to intelligence, that we governs all.


GEORGE J. STOKES.

INTELLECTUALISM.—In its popular and most general sense, 'intellectualism' means the belief in the supremacy in human life of the intellect. More precise, technical meanings of the term appear in the theory of knowledge, in ethics, and in theology.

1. In the theory of knowledge, intellectualism is the doctrine which derives knowledge chiefly, or mainly, from the intellect, i.e. from pure reason. Intellectualism is here practically synonymous with rationalism (q.v.), and stands opposed to sensationalism (q.v.). Whereas intellectualism affirms that reason is the unique or the principal source of knowledge, and that knowledge so derived is independent of, and superior to, the impressions received from the outside world through the senses, sensationalism affirms that general ideas arise from sensations. In its extreme form, sensationalism maintains that independently of sensation the mind is a tabula rasa, that there is nothing in the mind that was not first in the sense. One may also oppose to intellectualism the systems of thought represented by Schopenhauer's philosophy, in which the 'will' is the same in both. This is the determination of action and the discovery of knowledge. German philosophy has been dominantly of the intellectualistic type, while sensationalism has found its most notable exponent in Condorcet, d'Alembert and in England (Locke, Hume).

The method pursued in the search for knowledge will differ according to the conception formed of its source or sources. The pure intellectualist will rely altogether upon the a priori, deductive method, the pure sensationalist upon an empirical, inductive method, since knowledge comes, according to him, through sensory experience (Condorcet, d'Alembert) and in England (Locke, Hume).

2. In ethics, the intellectualistic doctrine affirms that knowledge is in itself sufficient to determine action. Socrates is the first and the chief representative of this doctrine, and ascribed to him, no one does wrong knowingly. Sin is error, i.e. ignorance; for no man purposely injures himself. This doctrine is opposed by the Stoics, on the ground that the same must be done by knowledge, but is, at least in some degree, self-determined. Aristotle differed from Socrates in that he held it possible for desire arising from insufficient knowledge to determine action, hence proceeding from full knowledge. He thought, therefore, that the practice of virtue required not
only right insight, but a training of the will, by which it became able to resist the stronger allure-
ment of unenlightened desire and to follow the dictates of ethical intellect. Ethical intellectualism as it
appeared in the modern period, particularly in the English moralist, S. Clarke.

3. In theology and in the philosophy of religion, the logical intellectualism tends to lead to a more or less complete neglect of feeling and of will, impulses, and desires, in favour of thought—this both in the problems of the origin and in those of the nature of religion. A consequence of this tendency is that certain ideas, or systems of ideas, necessary to religion are identified with religion, and are treated as if they constituted the whole of religion. Thus, religion is defined as 'a department of thought having for its object a self-conscious and intelligent Being' (G. J. Romanes, Thoughts on Religion, London, 1886, p. 41), or as 'an attempt to explain human experience by relating it to invisible existence' (G. T. T. I, e.g., by Schelling. Asch, and Scientific Methods, i. [1904] 9). Martinsen's definition also puts the emphasis upon a belief: 'belief in an ever-living God, that is, in a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding up moral relations with mankind' (A Study of Religion, Oxford, 1888, i. 1).

In the solution of the problems of origin, interest is led to an exclusive concern for the genesis of the ideas upon which the existence of religion depends, to the neglect of the other aspects of religious life, in particular of the emotions and of the ceremonial. Intellectualism is here opposed to affectivism and to voluntarism. The first emphasizes the feeling and the emotion; it looks upon some particular feeling as being the essential or vital part of religion. Schelling's maker's standpoint is an affectivism mitigated by an explicit recognition that feeling and activity are inseparable, though distinct. For him the essence of religion consists in the feeling of an absolute dependence upon God. In voluntarism a more comprehensive point of view disposes both intellectualism and affectivism. It recognizes that religion is a mode of life, and that it involves necessarily—as does every mode of life—ideas and feeling; and, in accordance with contemporary psychology, it insists that these exist only as a part of a conative act. There can be no thinking and no feeling without an intention. Religion, therefore, comes, thus, to be looked upon as a particular type of activity, or mode of behaviour (J. H. Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion, London, 1912, pp. 35–45).

LEUKA — In addition to the works mentioned in this article, see the articles to which reference has been made, and the literature appealed to them.

J. H. LEUKA.

INTELLECTUALISM (Philosophical).—I. Historical survey. The term 'intellectualism' had originally nearly the same meaning as 'idealism,' and it is so used, e.g., in the work of the Scholastic philosophers. It was regarded as the proper representative of the human mind in its entirety, the word 'intellectualism' seemed to be the most fitting designation of the philosophical view that stands opposed to materialism. It is only within recent times that the word has acquired a derogatory sense, and has come to signify a theory which exalts the intellectual at the expense of other elements of the mind, such as emotion and will.

Ever and again, in the course of historical development, there emerge periods in which the intellectual thought—up to the place of command, and these periods are always coincident with an advance in culture and a more conscious mode of life—conditions in which principles hitherto assumed to be self-evident begin to show them- selves insecure. As a matter of fact, the intellect is originally by no means the decisive factor in all aspects of civilized life. The truth is, rather, that all primitive culture contains a non-rational and positive element. In, for example, the history of religion, all have been believed to have been given by divine revelation, and anything like fundamental criticism of them is therefore barred. Or ancestral custom and communal tradition control to a rule with an authority that seems self-evident. Then all at once the hitherto unchallenged is assailed by doubt. External conditions and the inner life have alike undergone a transformation. The question arises why any particular institution should be precisely as it is and not otherwise, and there springs up a de-
sire for a rational vindication of things. The time now comes when the intellect asserts its independent power. In what had indeed, in a previous age, been received as simper, it now discovers defects, impossibilities, contradictions. Nothing shall count as authoritative that has not stood the scrutiny of the intellect. We have come to the stage exemplified in the Sophistic movement of Greek philosophy. The beginning of the modern period shows a number of powerful advances in the study of nature. The unity of medieval culture was broken up by the Renaissance and the Reforma- tion. It is true that, although the Renaissance and the Reforma-
tion did not originate new considerations, they availed to liberate the intellect by setting up, alongside of the institutions of the Middle Ages, other institutions having equal claims. For, when rival forms of religious thought stand side by side, the questions arise which of them can give the best reasons for its existence, and whether some other form is not possible; and, when such questions arise, it is in reality the intellect that is called upon to give a decisive answer.

This is clearly shown with reference to the question regarding truth. To the medieval mind truth was really tradition. The Church, for example, was not one of rigid repose. It had its own spiritual movements and its own problems; witness the controversy between the Thomists and the Scotists. While Thomas Aquinas and natural knowledge and the supernatural type of revelation as combining to form the one vast and regularly graded kingdom of reason, Duns Scotus considers the truth of the Church's doctrine to be something totally irrational. But these antagonistic views are both at one in assuming that the truth is actually there; that it requires, not to be discovered, but simply to be handed on from one generation to another. The Church is in possession of the truth, and she is its guardian. The Renaissance and the Reformation brought about a change—though not, indeed, as much as the intellect as such was not yet invested with the function of discovering and safeguarding the truth. The Renaissance itself was partly in-
volved in a tradition, though not so much in that of the Church as in that of classical antiquity, while for the Reformers the Bible, as the Word of God, came to rank as the foundation of all knowledge of the truth. But, when materially diverse truths, resting on different grounds, come into conflict with one another, the eventual result must be that the intellect acquires a larger measure of independence. The truth must necessarily operate and dispute with the same principles of reason, and hence the conviction gradually grows that the credentials of truth are to be
found in the reason—in the intellect—and nowhere else.

But these movements give rise to great incertitude. All real, as opposed to mere facts, truth is reduced to an unstable condition. In all things a new foundation must be laid, a new structure raised. The intellect finds itself face to face with a stupendous task. But it does not lack the right in this case to assume the solution of the difficulties is within its powers. For there is one kind of knowledge, viz. mathematics, upon which doubt has never been able to lay its hand. Now, mathematics is with the question an affair of the reason; it does not rest upon divine revelation, or upon venerable tradition, but is entirely a product of the intellect. If, therefore, the intellect has succeeded so well in this sphere, why should it fail in that one? This question is perfectly just, but it does not take into account the rise of opposition elsewhere. Mathematics thus comes to be regarded as the pattern of knowledge, and a close alliance between it and philosophy is the result. The powerful influence mathematics has clearly discernible in the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. In alliance with mathematics the intellect gains a secure foundation and a robust intellectual confidence. It now undertakes the task of framing clear and distinct conceptions, and of exposing to view the ultimate grounds of existence. It claims that the essential nature of the world is determined by a unifying principle of all things, and also the decisive laws that regulate the life, action, and conduct of human beings, must all yield their secrets to thought and its methodical procedure. Now the intellect comest to assert its supremacy only in the sphere of scientific knowledge; it extends its claim of authority also to morality, law, religion, politics, economics, and art. Men are forced to recognize that the human life obvious principles of truth can actually be drawn from a state of affairs which has proved unsatisfactory and is incapable of justification. By means of a natural jurisprudence, a natural morality, a natural religion; political constitutions are drafted, rules are drawn up for economic life, laws are formulated for art. In addition to the philosophers specially noted above, this movement is associated with the names of Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Montesquieu, Lessing, Adam Smith, and many others.

Intellectualist tendency was enormously reinforced by the rise of modern physical science and technical craftsmanship. As in mathematics, so also here, we find an indisputable contribution of the intellect. By means of observation, calculation, and skillfully devised experiments, the most amazing results have been achieved. Intellectualism continued to make steady advances from the 17th century, and, not having overcome the opposing tendencies, it reached its culminating point in the 19th century—in the philosophy of Hegel.

Great as was the reliance placed upon the intellect, however, it has been noted that its special function was exercised in discovering and elucidating, not in creating. In all that it had achieved it had proceeded upon something which it had not itself produced, which confronted it as something given and already existing. Even mathematics and kinematics were seen to depend ultimately on space and time—on entities, that is to say, which the intellect could not evolve from itself, but must in some sense recognize as given to it. The fact was still more obvious in the sphere of physical science, where the intellect could not advance a single step except in contact with the objective fact. But in other spheres as well—in ethics, law, religion, politics, economics, art—intellectual activity encountered ultimate elements, such as God, freedom, immortality, en-lightened self-interest, the struggle of each against all, etc., which the intellect could not create from its own resources, but could only expound as it was. In the light of this the intellect was able to be comprehensible to the real all at. In point of fact the Kantian philosophy had restricted the function of the intellect to the logical articulation of phenomena. It was the Kantian philosophy that the intellect could without doubt apprehend the veritably real only if what had hitherto been regarded as given, as prior to experience, was itself the prior created thing. To show that this was actually the case was the task undertaken by Hegel. On the Hegelian theory all reality whatever is an absolute process of thought, a self-unfolding of opposition, a self-creation of the essential nature of which is logical; thought and existence are identical. Hegel describes how the absolute idea externalizes itself and so becomes reality—the world of space and time, the finite spirit issues from the world, and in the process of historical development it realizes itself in its essential identity with the absolute spirit. The entire development of thought with logical necessity. In this system, accordingly, the intellect assumed the position of absolute sovereignty, and, although it did not hold that position long—the Hegelian philosophy having been soon superseded—yet Hegel's mode of thought has in our own time experienced a revival both in Britain and in Germany. On the other hand, intellectualism has always encountered a good deal of opposition. In the very definite theory of empiricism, as represented, e.g., by Locke and Hume—in every system, that is to say, according to which the function of the intellect is one of mere passive receptivity, there exists also an anti-intellectualistic spirit. Reference has already been made to Kant. When Fichte and Schelling exalt moral vocation or artistic intuition above the intellect, their thought really moves on anti-intellectualistic lines. Schopenhauer finds the ultimate cosmic force in a mysterious will, and in this connection mention should be made also of Hartmann, in whose system, however, there is a Hegelian strain. But the authority of intellectualism has been challenged above all by modern psychology. Wundt has endeavoured in his great work on the recognition for the volitional element in all life, so that his philosophical theory may be appropriately described as voluntarian. Heinrich Maier, in a notable work entitled Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens, has drawn attention to the fact that besides 'cognitive' thought there is also an 'emotional' thought, which, while it contains logical elements, is nevertheless guided by feeling and will. An extremely anti-intellectualistic position is taken also by pragmatism—a product of British and American thought—of which the leading representa-tives are W. James, J. Dewey, and F. C. Schiller. According to the latter, the intellect is per se incapable of deciding what truth is. Only that which justifies itself to living experience is to be accounted true, so that the intellect is here subordinated to life. Reference should also be
made in this connexion to Vaihinger and his significant work, Die Philosophie des Als Ob. On Vaihinger's theory the function of the intellect is not the discovery of truth, but the pre-calculation of occurrences which are to be designated as sensations (Empfindungen). The most delicate creations of the intellect—those which it produces for that purpose—are not reproductions of the real, but fictions. To these psychological and philosophical movements a fresh anti-intellectual tendency has been added by the recent emergence of a new aesthetic culture. The inadequacy of purely intellectual attainments is increasingly being felt on all sides. The over-estimation of the intellect, with its tendency to require a further level, its indifference to individual qualities, and its elimination of the subjective factor, is blamed for the impoverishment of the inner life and the repression of all true individuality of character, while, on the other hand, it is felt that art, with its special interest in the concrete, its sympathetic understanding of individual characteristics, and its creative force, should be the guide to a richer, deeper, and fuller life. These considerations have brought about a complete revolution, as, e.g., in the educational sphere. Thus, while the views disseminated by Herbart—views designed above all things to secure intellectual lucidity in education—hold until quite recently a position of almost unchallenged authority, they are now to a very great extent discarded. 'Art in child life' has become a widely recognized maxim in contemporary pedagogy.

Yet the intellect, in spite of all these counter-movements, and in spite of the active depreciation which it is forced to encounter, still continues to assert its power and its indispensability. It is obvious that mere negation will not answer here, and that the question regarding the significance of the intellect requires further investigation. Of contemporary thinkers, Eucken, in particular, has submitted the problem to searching treatment. He, too, strives earnestly to transcend anything like intellectualism. It is a fundamental doctrine of his philosophy of the spiritual life that the spirit of man involves more than intellectual activity, that the spirit in its entirety is richer than the intellect, but also that the intellect belongs to the spirit, and that the proper development of the spirit is impossible without intellectual action. He certainly admits that the intellect cannot of itself alone evolve any complete reality. It can do only when it has something else—something that does not originate in itself—to act upon, as can be clearly seen in the sphere of natural science. Here the intellect, however far-reaching and comprehensive its activity, is forced to keep in touch from first to last with given facts, with the world of experience. And the like holds good in every other department of human life. Ethical laws and ideals, religious convictions, and aesthetic intuitions are not products of the purely intellectual function, but have their rise in deeper regions of the spirit. If the intellect relies upon itself alone, it moves in a realm of merely formal concepts; and if, nevertheless, it aspires to create a reality, yet this reality has, in point of fact, come to it from elsewhere—only the intellect does not itself realize this or else the fact is shrouded from view. In such cases the sources from which the intellect has surreptitiously drawn are empirical and spiritual experience. This, however, does not exclude the recognition of the fact that, conversely, knowledge and life, whatever their nature may be, can make no proper progress without the co-operation of the intellect. The intellect sifts and combines; it clarifies and moulds. It is present in all experience, and its presence is unconditionally necessary if a completely articulated and ordered reality is to be attained at all. What could we make of sensations, which to-day are often held to be the truly real, if the intellect did not interpret them? They would be something inert, orderless, chaotic, and, in the last resort, absolutely null. Similarly, morality, religion, and art can never attain lucidity apart from the action of the intellect, whose action is, indeed, essential to the very possibility of their progressive development and refinement. In what a rudimentary condition would not art have been doomed to remain if the intellect had not taught it how to look at human life and the surrounding world? By such considerations does Eucken seek to maintain the rights of the intellect, without making it the sole authority in human life.

We arrive at results similar to those of Eucken by a consideration of the fundamental character of reality. That fundamental character stands in a peculiar relation to the tendency toward a more complete rationalization of the universe. The intellect strives to rationalize all reality, to bring it under calculation, to view it as necessary; and its ultimate aim is to construct a formula which will embrace all that occurs in the world, and which is capable of determining the actual condition of things at any particular moment. To a large extent, moreover, reality submits to this procedure of the intellect. But there is a point at which all the efforts of the intellect must necessarily fail. The great instrument of the intellect is law—the formula. Law and formula, however, are necessarily generated, and may be made to comprehend as many particular instances as desired. But they cannot determine what particular instance will actually emerge. Thus the formula and the intellect may hold good precisely as they do even if there were more or fewer planets in the solar system. It does not follow from the law of gravity that its formula shall apply to that particular system, and no other. In a word, laws and formulae are in their nature merely general, while the real is in all cases special and concrete, and accordingly reality refuses to be completely rationalized. The real might be described, indeed, as an intermixture of the rational and the irrational, or positive—an intermixture in which, however, the latter factor predominates over the former, since the rational can operate only in contact with a positively given object, from which it moves in a mere vacuum, and with all its efforts produces nothing.

This is true not merely of the reality which meets us in our external experience, but also of that which we call spiritual. In the moral sphere, for instance, we are confronted by various alternatives: there may be a morality of enlightened self-interest and one of self-denial; a morality which affirms and one which negates the world; a morality of rigid justice and one of benevolence; a morality of natural selection and one of religious ends. The intellect cannot claim to have produced any of these, nor can it demonstrate that any one of them is exclusively authoritative. It may certainly be employed in combating or defending any of them, but the intellect's acceptance of a particular ethical tendency rests ultimately upon a personal decision which is incapable of logical explanation. Once the decision is taken, however, the intellect may render valuable service in illuminating, elucidating, and developing the theory chosen.

Every genuine work of art, again, is an absolutely individual act of creation. To interpret a work of art as due to an application of unvarying universal rules is utterly to misunderstand it; thus Richard Wagner was undoubtedly
right in protesting against the notion of an absolute work of art, i.e. a work which would be simply the result of universal laws valid for all time and under all conditions. To desist such a work would involve the establishment of an absolute intellecutalism in the sphere of art. As a matter of fact, the general laws of art are mere abstract deductions from existing works of art or from the achievements of a particular creative mind, and a new creative period will give rise to new laws. Such laws may serve as a means of comprehending and interpreting what already exists, but they have no creative power of their own. Thus in ethics and art, precisely as in science, mere intellecutalism always works to the prejudice of reality, while, on the other hand, the action of the intellect is not only valuable, but indispensable.

Intellectualism in religion, which is not necessary here to refer to the various forms of religion; it will suffice to elucidate the relevant facts as they appear in Christianity. Christianity in its original form made not the slightest claim to serve as a rational interpretation of the world; the love of God, the expiatory death and the resurrection of Christ; immortal life, and eternal salvation—all through a being incomprehensible, something which no human reason can attain to, and no human understanding exegogate, which eyes has not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man perceived. That these rational proofs are of no avail here was an emphatic conviction in the mind of St. Paul. Nevertheless, intellectualism very soon found its way into Christianity, and, long stood in the way of a better understanding of what religion really signifies. In orthodoxy, in the Iamination, in rationalism and supra-rationalism, intellectualism held unbroken sway. The subject of religious truth was certainly of a very heterogeneous character, but the essential interest was in all cases a kind of knowledge which was accessible to the intellect and intuited by the heart. True, it was of a religious truth was certainly of a very heterogeneous character, but the essential interest was in all cases a kind of knowledge which was accessible to the intellect and intuited by the heart, of a manner to arbitrate. The views of Bayle, who emphasized the non-rational character of religion, and those of Spinoza, as set forth in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, were of the time of the early apostles, Christianity had come to be regarded as the true philosophy. In Alexandria the endeavor of Clement and Origen to reconcile their religion with Greek philosophy served to further intellectualization. The fact that these theologians regard λόγος as the highest attainment possible to man, and that λόγος, as pertaining to the perfect, is considered to be unequivocally superior to the human, is all that the ordinary member of the community can aspire to; simply implies that the Christian religion had opened the door to intellectualism. The conception of the Logos also played an important part in the rationalizing process. This conception, on the one hand, was in every respect a product of scientific thought; it signified the cosmic idea, and by means of this idea the world was to be linked to and interpreted, and interpreted, while, on the other hand, it is used in the Fourth Gospel to enunciate the eternal deity of Jesus Christ, and, although, at times, it is certainly brought into relation with the world, yet the conception is in no sense a scientific one, but purely religious, since the point in question is not the possibility of a rational interpretation of the world, but the dignity to be ascribed to Christ. Nevertheless, the conception served in part to bring various types of thought into contact with one another, and even to fuse them together. This process of dissonant intermingling of ideas, bringing great perplexities in its train. For one thing, correct knowledge was now considered to be the most important element in religion, and, on similar grounds, heresy was accounted the gravest of sins. At last, again, this position was constantly disputed by the natural conviction that religion is concerned with something else—something more essential than mere knowledge. Religious knowledge, moreover, was not only brought into contact with regard to itself. On the one hand, it was regarded as being of the same nature as rational truth, i.e. the type of cogitation found in logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences; on the other, the feeling that religion has essentially to do with an entirely different kind of truth, with a positive and non-rational truth, could never be wholly suppressed. A wavering between the two sides runs through the entire medieval theology; and, while Christianity sought to defend itself against intellectualism, it was never able actually to free itself from its grasp.

The work of Luther, in virtue of which faith was once more invested with its proper prerogative, offset the anathematization of reason from intellectualism. Faith is now interpreted as trust in the grace of God manifested in Jesus Christ, and thus alike in its character and in its object is no more matter of knowledge. Trust is never the outcome of purely intellectual reflection, but the grace of God in Christ is something that transcends all rational credentials and intellectual demonstration. Nevertheless, intellectualism soon reasserted itself in religion, even in the Churches of the Reformation. Faith came to be identified with the recognition of true doctrine, and this intellectualistic interpretation proved most detrimental to religion, and long stood in the way of a better understanding of what religion really signifies. In orthodoxy, in the Illumination, in rationalism and supra-rationalism, intellectualism held unbroken sway. The subject of religious truth was certainly of a very heterogeneous character, but the essential interest was in all cases a kind of knowledge which was accessible to the intellect and intuited by the heart. True, it was of a manner to arbitrate. The views of Bayle, who emphasized the non-rational character of religion, and those of Spinoza, as set forth in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, were of the time of the early apostles, Christianity had come to be regarded as the true philosophy. In Alexandria the endeavor of Clement and Origen to reconcile their religion with Greek philosophy served to further intellectualization. The fact that these theologians regard λόγος as the highest attainment possible to man, and that λόγος, as pertaining to the perfect, is considered to be unequivocally superior to the human, is all that the ordinary member of the community can aspire to; simply implies that the Christian religion had opened the door to intellectualism. The conception of the Logos also played an important part in the rationalizing process. This conception, on the one hand, was in every respect a product of scientific thought; it signified the cosmic idea, and by means of this idea the world was to be linked to and interpreted, and interpreted, while, on the other hand, it is used in the Fourth Gospel to enunciate the eternal deity of Jesus Christ, and, although, at times, it is certainly brought into relation with the world, yet the conception is in no sense a scientific one, but purely religious, since the point in question is not the possibility of a rational interpretation of the world, but the dignity to be ascribed to Christ. Nevertheless, the conception served in part to bring various types of thought into contact with one another, and even to fuse them together. This process of dissonant intermingling of ideas, bringing great perplexities in its train. For one thing, correct knowledge was now considered to be the most important element in religion, and, on similar grounds, heresy was accounted the gravest of sins. At last, again, this position was constantly disputed by the natural conviction that religion is concerned with something else—something more essential than mere knowledge. Religious knowledge, moreover, was not only brought into contact with regard to itself. On the one hand, it was regarded as being of the same nature as rational truth, i.e. the type of cogitation found in logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences; on the other, the feeling that religion has essentially to do with an entirely different kind of truth, with a positive and
proof. This new endeavour to rationalize religion was challenged by the Erlangen theologians and by the school of Ritschl, of whom in particular W. Herrmann has fought against the harmful influence of the unconscious in religious studies. He appeals to the Gospel as the criterion of all Christian belief and doctrine, to the historical investigation of religion, with its discovery of a vast mass of material which delineates all rational explanation, and, finally, to religious psychology, which serves to bring the unique character of religion into fuller relief. It is not thereby implied, of course, that the history and psychology of religion may not be used in the interests of intellectualism, as, e.g., when religion is repudiated altogether. In that case religious history may simply be drawn upon for materials to illustrate the story of human error, while the writer departs from religion only as far as his own study of the disorders of the human soul. Quite recently an endeavour to preclude this application of religious psychology has been made by Wöbbelin (see p. 276), who insists that the problem of religion proper is the psychology of religion proper and the psychology which is concerned with religious phenomena. The former, according to Wöbbelin, presupposes the existence of a religious people; the latter does not. It is only the former, however, that can arrive at a true understanding of religion, while the other, dealing with religious phenomena, is only a fiction with the external, empirical, sensation of religion. Religious psychology in this special sense is antipathetic to mere intellectualism. We are therefore justified in asserting that in the intellectualistic and materialistic scheme, forces are in opposition at the present day.

3. The significance of the intellect in the religious sphere. It is quite obvious that the intellect is not the most important factor in religious views of things. A fundamental element in every religious conception of the world is the conviction that God infinitely transcends all human existence. This involves the inscrutability of God, and thus also the importance of the intellect to be supreme. The intellect finds itself confronted here by an absolute limit, since the inscrutability cannot be brought within its capacities. The inscrutability of God is not merely a pre-condition of the possibility of religion; it is not something that might be surrendered without detriment to religion; on the contrary, religion stands or falls with it. God would not be God if He were not inscrutable. Nor is the inscrutableness of God merely one postulate of religion among others; it permeates everything embraced by religion. Thus, the fact that the central element of Christianity is the redeeming love of God is a blessed, but at the same time an incomprehensible, mystery. Of every genuine religious utterance it will be found to hold good that it grasps the conviction that God is incomprehensible. In religion there is something before which the intellect must abase itself, and its every claim to autocratic authority is utterly silenced.

On the other hand, discrepancy of the intellect finds no justification in religion. It would be an error to regard the intellect as alone, of all the functions of the human mind, hostile to religion, and to assume that the others are merely intimately allied with it. Even morality, for instance, is itself no more akin to the divine than is intellect. It is possible to have a morality which positively surpasses the intellect, and yet commits an act of God. Religion, moreover, must insist upon the fact that the intellect too belongs to God; that it is a gift of God which may be used in His service, and indeed ought to be so used. Hence religion itself requires that a high value shall be set upon the intellect, which, nevertheless, must be satisfied with a position below the highest. According to H. Pahor, long and the history of the idea of God and religion, the intellect, at least, may be satisfied with a position at least one particular reference the last word does not lie with the intellect. When we come to deal with the unavoidable problem regarding the truth of religion, is it to be decided by the intellect? To what other competent tribunal can we appeal for judgment? Self-evident as the answers to these questions may appear, it is nevertheless to be observed that the intellect would be able to maintain its sovereignty only on one of two conditions, viz. that it creates religion, or else abolishes it. Hegel undertook the task of evolving religion from the intellect, but any such deduction must inevitably founder upon the fact that religion has to do with the inscrutable. Were it on any possibility to succeed, it would bring religion itself to naught. To derive religion from the intellect would certainly be to go away with the inscrutable, and therefore with religion too. We should in that case have only the second alternative to consider, i.e., the abolition of religion by the intellect. And, indeed, that interaction between the intellect and religion may be a counteraction, i.e., of the intellect's power in this way seems actually to be concealed by religion itself—in the admission, namely, that all its affirmations resolve themselves into antinomies: God is an investigator himself; the latter does not. It is only the former, however, that can arrive at a true understanding of religion, while the other, dealing with religious phenomena, is only a fiction with the external, empirical, sensation of religion. Religious psychology in this special sense is antipathetic to mere intellectualism. We are therefore justified in asserting that in the intellectualistic and materialistic scheme, forces are in opposition at the present day.

Of prey, the recognition and avoidance of enemies, etc. If failure occurs, it is absolute, except that there are occasionally alternative reactions provided for special forms of situations. On the other hand, reason is said, may achieve the same efficiency as instinct, with the same immediacy, and without experience of similar situations, by the direct perception of the causal relations involved, by a general power, adapted to any kind of situation, and not tied down, as an instinct is, to a single class. In most cases, however, when a new contingency arises, the actions of an animal are not immediately effective; it appears to act blindly, with many fruitless efforts, until, by accident, as it appears, the right action may be hit upon, after a longer or shorter time or with fewer trials; ultimately, all unnecessary and inappropriate acts are omitted, and the one effective action is immediately adopted. This has been termed the method of trial and error, and under its formula all individual learning, in man as well as in animals, may be brought. Animal species, and individuals in the same species, differ in the time or amount of experience required to learn the same action, in the number of different actions they may learn, in the complexity of situations they can meet, in the extent to which previous experience is applied in new contingencies, and the like. Man's reason is itself an extension of the same process, and there are close approximations to it in the ape and other higher animals. But, while there is no ground for distinguishing between reason and intelligence, instinct and intelligence must be regarded as different in kind. They are not alternatives to each other, or different ways of achieving the same end, or 'lower' and 'higher' forms of action, or the like. Instincts provide the material on which intelligence builds; the intelligence of an animal is always limited and conditioned by its structure and habits, i.e. its instincts; intelligence develops progressively as the instincts become more numerous and more complicated. On the other hand, there is probably no species of animal which has instinct only, without intelligence, or a degree of complexity. The method of trial and error has been found, by Jennings and others, as low as the protozoa. In the development of the individual also, instincts and intelligence are concurrent from the beginning, but intelligence is progressive, while instinct is stationary: hence in the adult of the higher animal species, and especially in man, the primitive instincts are so buried beneath the accretions of intelligence that the dependence of the latter upon them is apt to be ignored.

3. Analysis of intelligence.—What are the mental qualities involved in learning by experience? If we take the classical instance of the burnt child dreading the fire, we have to distinguish between the first and the later experiences of the situation. In the first an object, the perceived object, which the child instinctively feels to be pleasing, and the instinctive reaction of grasping results; this is immediately followed in the supposed case by a strong sensation of pain, the instinctive withdrawal of the hand is provided. If there were no intelligence, the same series of impressions and acts would be repeated as often as the situation arose, with the same effect. How does any change take place through intelligence? The simplest assumption, that the child sees the fire to be the cause of the pain, avoids it in
consequence, is ruled out for numberless instances of such learning, although it may occasionally hold for a given child or animal in a given case. Let us suppose, then, that on the second experience the sight of the fire leads as before to the stretching out of the hand, that this associatively calls up in memory the painful sensation of the burn and this in turn the actual drawing back of hand and arm, the net result being that, if the association is rapid, the hand is drawn back almost before it begins to move. For this to be possible we need the presence of consciousness and mobility, of retentiveness of the impression, and associative recall, but above all intensity and unity of attention: the experience must have been appreciated as a single whole, otherwise the associative current would not run from 'fire' to 'palm,' from the conception of 'fire' to 'pain,' etc., but might be turned at 'grasp' to any other of the hundreds of grasping experiences. This comprehensiveness of attention is the essential thing in physical evolution, and it depends on the number of trials required in the trial and error method before success is achieved; on it depends also the transition from concrete to abstract imagery and thought. Abstraction is the power of neglecting the irrelevant and concentrating on the important features of a situation, whether in perception, in memory, or in thought, i.e. it is a process of attention. In its turn, attention depends on the degree of sensitiveness of the individual, his quickness of reaction, and, at higher levels, his retentiveness and the strength of his innate or instinctive or acquired interests. It may be said, in short, that the intelligence of an individual is the degree of his ability to learn, and to apply what he has learned, and that this depends on his willingness to engage in formal or trial and error methods. If, therefore, there is no wish to ask whether animals have 'intelligence,' if they have any form of mental experience-sensation, e.g., and no one denies this even of the lowest animals, then they have also intelligence. The task of comparative psychology is to determine the combinations of intelligence and adaptation in different animals and in the child, to reconstruct the scheme of mental evolution and development, parallel to the scheme of physical adaptation, and try to determine the combinations of intellectual adaptation in different animals and in the child, to reconstruct the scheme of mental evolution and development, which biology already has within its grasp.

4. Special problems.—How complex the nature of 'intelligence' may be seen by a perusal of the literature of the subject, and on two very modern problems—that of 'formal discipline,' and that of 'tests of intelligence.' The former is the question whether intelligence is a general power, which can be turned at will from one subject to another; whether, then, capacity in one sphere is or tends to be accompanied by high ability in other spheres; whether improvement in any kind of mental ability extends to improvement in different mental abilities, etc.; the probability being that intelligence is almost as specialized as memory, that ability in one subject gives no ground for inferring ability in closely similar subject, and that improvement in one subject carries with it improved ability in others so far as these others involve the same forms of perception, attention, and memory. The second problem is that of finding a scientific and tractable definition for the teacher's or doctor's rough classification (and rougher tests of children in regard to their intelligence)—'bright,' 'average,' 'poor,' 'dull,' 'backward,' 'defective,' 'failing,' etc. What is the second condition upon is that the most objective classification of children is by a comparison of the 'mental' with the 'physical' age; that for this an average mental ability for each physical age must be determinable, that the tests used in fixing the average, and in proving each child, must be of several kinds for each age, and must be graded for different ages, more difficult as the age is higher. But sex, social rank of family, school training, race, country, etc., as many other factors are found to interfere with the projected average or standard, and experimenters are still far from united in agreement upon the tests suitable for each age.


J. L. McINTYRE.

INTEMPERANCE.—See DRUNKENNESS.

INTENTION (Theological).—A sacrament involves some action of a minister, having a special significance; and, since the significance of a human action may depend in part upon the intention with which it was performed, it was inevitable that the progress of theology a question should be raised whether a proper intention in the minister is requisite for the validity of a sacrament; if so, the nature of that intention would have to be considered.

In the Eastern Church this question has been generally avoided; a sacrament is regarded as an act of the Church at large; the scholastic of which theologians speak is the purpose or spiritual meaning of the appointed rite, and the minister's only function is to exhibit that rite integrally. This applies even to the sacrament of marriage, in which, since it consists materially in the consent of the contracting parties, there is special room, because of the nature of a contract, for inquiry into their intention and specific consent. Some systems of law will annul a marriage on the ground of defective consent, even when all formalities have been ostensibly fulfilled; but the Canon Law of the Eastern Church allows no such objection to be raised against a marriage publicly contracted with the blessing of the Church.

In the Western Church, however, a different theory and practice followed. The final rejection of St. Cyprian's teaching about the baptism of heretics. When it was admitted that baptism administered by persons separated from the Church was valid, the sacrament could no longer be regarded exclusively as a public act of the Church. It was then necessary to inquire whether a particular baptism was valid. The Eastern Church evaded the difficulty by denying that baptism was sacramentae, in which case the consent of the Church is supposed to supply whatever may have been lacking; but the trend of Western theology and practice has generally agreed to treat such baptism as absolutely valid if the necessary conditions are fulfilled, or otherwise as absolutely invalid. Inquiry into the conditions of validity was, therefore, necessary, and the nature of such inquiry spread from baptism to other sacraments.

In his De Baptismo (vii. 53), Augustine considers several questions about the animus with
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which baptism is received as affecting the validity of the sacrament; and more incidentally, as though of less importance, he considers the animus of the minister: "Quid enim proit animus veraciter da tis faciendi actum non video." Taking the case where the minister alike 'faciendi actum' in ipsa unitas catholicam,' he asks: "An plus valent ad confirmandum sacramentum illi veraces inter quos agitur, quam ad frustrandum illi faciendas a quibus agitur, et in quo quis agitur?" In reply, he appeals to the practice of the Church: 'Si postea predatur, nemo repetit, sed aut excommunicando punitur illa simulatio aut poenitendi sanatur.' His own opinion he was unwilling to give where there was no express conciliar decision; but in counsel he would be disposed to support the proposition: "Habere eos baptismum qui ubiqueque et qui quibuscumque illud verbi evangeli consensu sine simulacris et cum aliqua fide accepissent." This seems to exclude the notion that the animus dantis can affect the integrity of the sacrament; only the stantio of the actum or his complectens with faith can it if administered in due form verbi evangeli.

The general acceptance of this judgment is proved by the present day usage of the solemn form of the minister's absolution, baptized in moonyrs on the stage. Augustine (loc. cit.) glances at the current practice of the menses, and shows a curious reluctance to give any explanation on the case "u isti tenuem indicem et minime et loquenter absolutionem." The story told by Gersen (s. ii.) about the boys of inyrs in play is less to the point, since it is implied that the children, though in play, had a more or less serious intention of doing what they had seen done in the Church.

The judgment of Augustine long prevailed. Nicholas (L. 557-561) ruled that persons representing to have been baptized by a Jew, "si in nomine sanctae Trinitatis vel tontum in Christi nomine... baptizati simus," are validly baptized, no question being raised about the intention of the minister. It should be observed that he proceeds (cap. 3) the necessity of consensus for a valid baptism, but without any indication that he would allow the intention underlying a publicly expressed consent to be called in question. In the early scholastics of the 12th century a contrary opinion appears. Hugh of St. Victor (Summ. Sent. v. 9) requires ut formas sacramentum servetur et intendat illud celebrandi lunaebus. Peter Lombard (iv. 6) follows him, and the great vogue of the Libri Sententiarum made the doctrine dominant. The nature of the requisite intention, however, was not yet settled. William of Auxerre (In iv. Sent. iv. 7) seems to have been the first to adopt the phrase 'intento faciendi quod facit ecclesia.' Albertus Magnus (In iv. Sent. iv. 6. ii.) limits the same by saying even if the minister does not believe the rite to have any spiritual effect; and he seems to meet the objection that the minister might maliciously withhold his intention, and so invalidate the sacrament. Sinibaldo Fieschi, afterwards Innocent iv., in his commentary on the Decretals (f. 42. 2), went further:

"... Non est necesse quod baptizans... siv est mentis facio quod facit... non est neces- sario quod facit ecclesia, sed fames tacta fodi formam servat, nihilominus baptizatu est, dummodo baptismum intendit..." He denied that specialis intention was necessary, and this was the intention to produce the effect of the sacrament, as the Compend. theol. veritas, however, does not want to be implied in insensitive, n. c. "ut iste baptizandus mundeatur." Thomas Aquinas, however, stiffened the requirement, saying (Opusc. iv. de Sacram.): 'Si minister sacramenti non intendit perium consensum conferre, non peremortum sacramentum,' and strengthening the current formula into 'intento conferendi et faciendi quod fact ecclesia.' Elsewhere he further defines the purport of the intention: Christ in the 'principal agent' in the sacramental action, and the minister must act as the representative of Christ; therefore requiring his intention to substantiate his principal act. But to the objection that all certainty about the sacrament is thus destroyed, since no man's intention can be known, he replies:

'Minister sacramenti agit in persona tutoris ecclesiae, cuius est minister; in verbo autem, quia verba sunt divinae, quae sufidic ad perfectionem sacramentum, nisi conversum exerit non recipiatur. (Summa Thol. iv. 64.)

This seems to deprive of all importance what he calls mentalis intention; and we are back at the position of Augustine, except that a concrescence to the Scholastic doctrine by the minister would invalidate the sacrament. A merely defective intention would do no harm; it must be positive and avowed. A soccoa intention, however, "cum aliqua non intendit soccoa sacramentum conferre, sed diversis aliquid agere," makes no sacrament; he adds, 'praecipue quando examinat intentionem exterius manifestat' (ib. 10). The case in view is clearly a mimetic representation of the sacrament, supported by the similar teaching of Bonaventura, become dominant in the schools until the 16th century.

In the meantime the Scholastic doctrine was finding its way into dogmatic decrees. In the profession of faith imposed by Innocent iii. on converted Waldensians, it is said that for a valid Eucharist is required fidem intentionem praebere (Deusdinger, Enchiridion, Freiburg, 1011, no. 424). In the dogmatic definition of the 4th Lateran, cap. 1, where something of the kind might be expected, there is nothing. According to Florencio, Eugenius IV., in his Decr. pro Armenis, adopted the language of the Opus. in. of Thomas Aquinas almost intact, for this as for other matters.

Luther made a brief reference to the Scholastic doctrine in the treatise de Bab. Capt. (ch. de Sacr. Baptismi), citing the ex demus quo quodam mino per locum baptizato. Maintaining the position that the sacraments operate as visible signs of the grace of God resting in the recipient, so that 'non in concentibus tantum quantum in suscipiendi fide vel usum sese est virtutis baptismi,' he brush aside completely the question about the intention of the minister. His bold treatment of soccoa intention had a large place in subsequent controversy, but as used by adversaries rather than as developed by his followers. One of the propositions extended that a solemn affirmation by condemnation by Leo x. was: "Si per impossibile confessus non esset corruptus, aut saecloribus non serio, sed falso assurdurat; si tamen esset in ambitu, verissime est absolutionis." The silence on this head of the Augustana, and of the Synod Confession presented to the Council of Trent, is significant. The Conf. Heliocitea (ch. xix. sect. 11), however, expressly excludes from the conditions requisite for a valid sacrament administration 'a concresce, et qui habeat intentionem concrescrandi.' Calvin's austere conception of the operation of the sacrament is certainly truly divine, and resting on the external decrees, left no room for any effect to flow from the intention of the minister.

Ambrosius Catharistan, in a treatise de ius Minist: Sacr: re-stated in the Scholastic doctrine with an important difference. Maintaining with Thomas Aquinas that the requisite intention is secured positively by the serious use of the external forms appointed in the Church, he denied that the minister could by any individual intention of his own, however contradictory, destroy the effect of those forms. Thus he excluded from validity only a mimic or derisory representation.
of a sacrament; the only intention required of the minister is the intention sincerely to use the appointed rite. Pallavice (ix. 6) asserts that the Church of Trent did not repudiate this teaching, though the language of secs. xiv. 6, denies the effect of absolution, *si... sacerdoti serio agendi est vere absolvendo desit,* seems to look that way. In secs. vili. c. 11, the Council condemned the opinion, *ex quorum intentionem sacramentum consuetudine.* Controversy turned chiefly on this point, it being said that the sacraments were thus robbed of all sanctity. Jewel, in his book on Harding (Tucker Soc., 1, (Cambridge, 1845) 139), used a phrase which became classic:

"This is the very dungeon of uncertainty. The heart of man is unspeakable. If we are in the possession of a mortal man, we may stand in doubt of our own baptism."

Horne (p. 59) fell back upon the position of Thomas, quoting, however, by preference the canons:

Lancelot:

"The known institution of the Church generally doth suffice, and, where the contrary is not manifest, I may presume that he which outwardly doth the work, hath inwardly the purpose of the Church thereof."

The peril indicated by Jewel compelled defenders of the doctrine to diminish their demands; and Bellarmine (de Sacramentis, ed. Gen. L. 27) said almost the last word on this side:

"Non est opus intendere quod facti ecclesia Romana, sed quod facti est ecclesia, quidem necesse habeat, sic est, vel quod Christus instituisset, vel quod facturum Christi voluisse."

Towards the end of the 17th cent. the teaching of Catherinus was once more brought up. There were stories current of a priest who declared that he had habitually perverted his interior intention when baptising, and of a bishop who had done the same when ordaining, and relief was sought from the implied consequences. This relief was denied by a decree of Alexander VIII. in 1690, condemning among others the proposition:

"Intercessum constituit a ministero, qui omno ritum externum formasse non tenuisset, si non observaret, he were in no case apud se resolvit: Non intendere quod facti ecclesia.

The main and looking of the 'dungeon of uncertainty' was resisted by some Thomist theologians, notably by J. H. Serrv, *Apostolicae Vindiciae, Patavium, (1727);* but the more exigent teaching prevailed, partly through the influence of Benedict XIV. and the Jesuit schools, until recent times. Thomism revived under the encouragement of Leo XIII., and in his bull *Apostolicae Curae* that pontificate laid down a principle which in practical effect differs little from that of Catherinus:

"Secundum que intentionem, utique quae se quidquid est intercus, ecclesia non intendit: at quosdam extra praelium, indicato de eo debeat. sed bono manito ad sacramentum confessandum et confessandum materia formansque debitam ac site reddat, eaque consensu ad alicub facere intendende quod facti ecclesia.

This seems to bring the authentic teaching of the Roman Church into line with that of Hooker (see above), and the conclusion may be held judicious.

**Literaturx.**—This has been sufficiently indicated in the article by T. A. LACKEY.

**INTERCESSION.**—I. Connotation of the Term.

The word is now usually restricted in its application to (a) pleading for others, as when a favour is asked for another from a fellowman; (b) praying for others, as when blessings are sought for another from God. When it is used of the intercession of Christ, it has a wider significance, and expresses the more general idea of (c) acting for others.

On the varying connotation of 'intercession' light is cast by its derivation and by the history of the Greek and Hebrew words of which it is the translation.

(1) *Intercesion* (inter, 'between,' and cedere, 'to pass' or 'to go') denotes (a) a passing between, as, e.g., an intervening period of time. Hence, in 16th and 17th cent. writers 'intercession' is equivalent to 'intercessionation'—a meaning now obsolete. Tyndale could write: 'We must call upon God without intercessionation' (Ged. v. 589); (b) a going between, as, e.g., the intervention of a mediator who strives to reconcile those who are at variance. The functions of a go-between may, however, differ greatly. Ordinarily required by the Roman tribunes of the people was known as *intercessio.* These tribunes could forbid the carrying out both of the resolutions of the *senatus,* or deliberative assembly, and the duties of the *comitia,* or legislative assembly. Referring to a statute which the senators could not oppose by argument, C. Merivale says: They gained one of the tribunes to interfere at a meeting of the *comitia.* (Foot of the Roman Republic. London, 1853, viii. 216.) The conception of thought must, therefore, determine whether the intervention is for or against. But it is in accord with the tendency to limit the meaning of 'intercession' to an appeal for a favour that in Ro 11 the AV reads 'how he (Elijah) pleaded with God against Israel,' instead of 'how he maketh intercession,' etc. (AV.)

(2) In the NT 'intercession' is once (1 Th 3:2) the translation of *προσευχή,* which is also once (1 Th 4:2) rendered 'prayer.' The corresponding verb *προσεύχομαι* (to fall in with, 'to have an interview with') is four times translated 'to make intercession' (Ro 2:27, 27, 27, Ro 7:27). In Ro 11 the rendering is 'to plead with,' and in Ac 25:24 to make suit to.' In his note on the last cited passage, P. Field (Noes on the Translation of the AV, Cambridge, 1899, p. 140 f.) gives quotations from Greek writers which show that frequently the idea of a personal interview seems to be required. In 2 Mac 4 the 'EV 'of the audience' is an improvement upon the AV 'by a verbal apology,' for the reference is to 'a confidential interview, face to face, between Jason and Antiochus' (cf. R. C. Trench, *Synonyms of the NT,* London, 1890, p. 190). The root idea of *προσεύχομαι* is, moreover, not prayer for others, but familiar intercourse such as obtains when confidential relationships are established, as between parents and children. Thus '4th prayer is the only possible translation, but it should be also noted that in EV 'intercession' is found (Jer 27:26) when the petition has no reference to another's benefit. It is by a natural and suggestive transition of thought that *προσεύχομαι,* which means prayer regarded as personal communication, familiar heart converse, should come to signify prayer regarded as application for others. The expression of this aspect of prayer is not, however, limited to this word; it is often represented by adding qualifying clauses to one or other of the synonyms for prayer.

(3) In the OT the subject of 'intercession' has great prominence, though the English word is of rare occurrence in EV. (a) The Hebrew verb *pأ�* is translated 'to make intercession' in Jer 7:27 36, Is 33:2, and the corresponding noun is rendered 'intercessor' in Is 59:1. This verb is closely related in meaning to *τρικάπτω* and signifies 'to encounter;' hence it is encountered with a request.' In two passages the context makes it plain that the meaning is 'to pray for others' (on Jer 27:26 36, cf. (2) above). In Jer 7:26 'pray not for this
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people' is parallel to, and synonymous with, 'neither make intercession with,' in Is 53:2, a definition clause is added: 'he made intercession for the transgressors.' (6) The Hebrew verb most frequently employed to express the idea of prayer for others is יָנָא, 'to intercede,' which sometimes expresses the same idea is פ. By most modern lexicographers it is connected with an Arabic root signifying 'to sacrifice,' and its earliest associations are with sacred rituals. The usual root meaning is 'to treat for others.' In Ex 34:27, 28; 10:3 this verb is six times used of the prayers of Moses and Aaron for Pharaoh; in Gn 23:3 it refers to Isaac's prayer for his wife, and in 2 Sam 24:12 to David's prayer for Israel.

2. Intercessory prayer. — When 'intercession' is defined as prayer for others, it is obvious that the object of prayer against prayer in general applies to intercessory prayer. Indeed, the mystery which attaches to prayer of all kinds reaches its climax in prayer for another's blessing (cf. Prayers, p. xxiv). Hence it is that intercession prayer has been generally admitted by theists. Such controversy as existed in pre-Christian times was rather as to the nature of the gods than as to the propriety of invoking their aid.

We may not say that the efficacy of prayer was admitted by all ancient Theists, but it does seem that this doctrine was not denied by any whose theology rendered its admission possible. (J. H. Kellett, The Efficacy of Prayer [Donnellan Lectures], Dublin, 1883, p. 23.)

It is held to be a redactio ad absurdum of Epicureanism that it rendered prayer nugatory (cf. Cicero, de Nat. Deor., i. 44). In Origens treatise on Prayer (I. 186 ff., Benedictine ed.) the doctrine of later scribes is represented as a necessary result of their fundamental principles. In all ages men who have had knowledge of God have regarded it as a reasonable inference that 'to Him they might lift hands of prayer both for themselves and those who call them friend' (Tennysen, Morte d'Arthur). In this respect systems of religion agree, notwithstanding different interpretations of important particulars.

The conception of intercessory prayer, like the idea of prayer in general, presupposes not only a doctrine of God, but also a doctrine of man and of his relation to his fellows. That relation is best described by the word 'solidarity.' An intercessor is one with those for whom he prays, and yet he differs from them in that he is nearer to God. The qualification for the work of intercession is twofold.

The more eminent the great heroes of the Bible are for holiness of life, the more intensely do they realize their enemies with the people whose pastors and priests they are, and take upon themselves the burdens of their nation's transgressions and sins (Burck, Solidarity of Humanity, quoted by D. W. Simon, The Redemption of Man, London, 1908, p. 384).

To make intercession for the nation was alike the duty and the privilege of the priests of Israel. Only once during a priest's lifetime could it fail to be his lot to enwrap the Temple with intercession for the people. The incense he offered there was the symbol of Israel's prayers presented with his own, 'thrice a day, before the Lord, for Israel.' (Lev 16:22.)

In the history of Israel it is the prophets who most frequently act as intercessors. Moses, Aaron, and Samuel are singled out as pre-eminent in this regard (Ps 99, Jer 15). So intense was Samuel's sense of obligation that he described neglect of the duty of praying for others as 'sin against the Lord' (I Sam 12:23). Prayer for us was not made to Jeremiah by Zebediah (Jer 37), and again by 'all the people' (Jer 42).

Practically all the intercessory prayers of the OT are offered either by prophets or by men—such as Abraham and Job—of whom later ages idealized as prophets. As a rule their intercessions were for the nation they loved, but occasionally the petitions have a wider range. 'Jeremiah, for example, urges the exile (Jer 29) to pray for Jerusalem, (29); and, Daniel, in his dream (Dan 9), desires the prayers of the Jews for himself and his dynasty (E. J. McFadyen, The Prayers of the Bible, London, 1908, p. 26). Intercessory prayer has the sanction of our Lord's example during His earthly ministry. He 'continued all night in prayer to God' before selecting the twelve Apostles (Lk 6:13). That His prayer included intercessions is a reasonable inference, as well from His petitions for His disciples on the eve of His departure from the world as from His supplication before the Father on the day of the ascension (Lk 22:42). At the grave of Lazarus His words of thanksgiving for prayer heard and answered, according to the Father's wont, point to the habit of intercession (Jn 11:41), such as makes it natural for Him to use almost His latest breath in praying for His enemies (Lk 22:42). The command, 'Pray for them that despitefully used you' (Lk 23:34), falls from His lips with the authority of the teacher and Lord who could say of this grace, as of all others, 'I have given you an example that ye should do as I have done' (Jn 13:15). The true spirit of intercession broaches in the pattern prayer (Mt 6:9). Our Lord teaches His disciples that they 'should not pray as atomistic individuals, but as members of human society, of the believing Church, of the kingdom' (H. Martensen, Christian Ethics, i. (Individual), Edinburgh, 1881, p. 120).

T. von Hasings rightly finds a sufficient warrant for intercession in the 'Our Father' of the Lord's Prayer: 'Our' and 'us' instead of the natural and 'my' and 'me' is for the Christian a really natural utterance. This faith in the Father cannot exist without love to others, both to those who really are so and to those who may presently become so. "The religious sentiments of the Jews were broader, more general, than those of the Greeks, and of Mahomet less than of the religion of Christ. The spirit of prayer that passes through the hymns of Isaiah and Ezekiel is really more than through the Psalms of David" (Jellett, p. 57)."
But, if laborare est orare, then the entire life of this strenuous missionary was a continual prayer that all men might 'know the grace of God in truth' (Col. 1).

As to the value of intercessory prayer there is little difference in theory amongst those who believe in the efficacy of prayer at all. But in practice many Christians fail to imitate the example of Christ and of the Apostolic Church. Nevertheless, the test of the purity of our petitionary prayers is whether they concern intercession. This shows if the individual is concerned about the whole Kingdom of God. Without intercession, prayer becomes egotistic, the view and the heart narrow. When papyrak expansion is the rule, it lacks the heart, and energy. To many is praying, the right hand of the Father when He says: 'I glorified thee on the earth,' etc.

The words of the prayer belong at least to that upper sanctuary: 'They are the concentration of all the heavenly Intercessor, as He bore on earth, as He bears now, and will bear for ever, the sins of His people before the Father, who is both able and willing to supply them' (W. Milligan, The Ascension and Heavenly Priesthood of our Lord, London, 1901, p. 169).

Milligan also gives expression to a needed caution when he reminds us that the intercession of Christ is not to be interpreted as if He were asking aid from an external source (p. 153). If this be borne in mind, the idea of the intercession of Christ may be extended so as to include every way in which He acts for others (cf. Matt. 20:26).

4. The intercession of the Holy Spirit. — 'Advocate' is a title of the Holy Spirit as well as of Christ, and to the Holy Spirit the work of intercession is ascribed. "Advocate," within, and like Him who is our 'Advocate with the Father,' He is 'touched with the feeling of our infirmities. St. Paul assures us that the Spirit also helps our infirmity: to know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered; and He that searcheth the hearts knoweth what the mind of the Spirit is, because He maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God" (Rom. 8).

The spirit of true prayer is identified with the voice of the Divine Spirit in man. There are times when we cannot express in words, or pray as we ought; but our inarticulate longings for a better life are the Spirit's intercessions on our behalf, unable to God who searches all hearts, and intelligible and acceptable to Him since they are the voice of His Spirit, and it is according to His will that the Spirit should intercede for the members of His Son" (H. R. Swete, The Holy Spirit in the NT, London, 1909, p. 321).

In the verses just quoted (Rom 8:26), the Spirit of God is distinguished from the spirit of man, even when in the mystery of prayer His relations with the human consciousness are most intimate. When the Christian is oppressed with the weight of 'this unintelligible world' (cf. v. 26), when he longs for light to shine on his surroundings man's prayers to God (He 13:19); (3) He secures access for man to God (He 4:13). It is a modern conception of Christ pleading in heaven His Passion, "offering His blood," as an offering for sins or to repeat His sacrifices made once for all, when He offered up Himself. R. F. Westcott shows that the fulfilment of the Levitical type by Christ takes three forms: (1) He intercedes for men as their present representative before God (He 7:25); (2) For those who made Christ's presence on the Father's throne. Meanwhile man on earth in quins with Him enjoy continually through His blood what was before the privilege of one man on one day is the year" (R. F. Westcott, The Epistle to the Hebrews, London, 1905, p. 239).

A. J. Tait discusses the subject fully in The Heavenly Session of our Lord (London, 1912), rightly insisting (p. 15) that "it is as Christ that Christ is also Priest, it is as seated on the Throne that He intercedes." The Session of our Lord signifies the cessation of prayer, our heavenly Father. The use of the intercession of Christ is not to be conceived as a continual process of propitiation. Propitiatory sacrifice and offering are alike over: the intercession of Christ of the presence of Christ on the throne, it is eternal (Tait, p. 151).

Discussion has arisen as to whether or not the intercession of Christ and of the Holy Spirit is understood as mere through words. A. B. Davidson (Handbooks for Bible Classes, 'Hebrews,' Edinburgh, n.d., p. 142, note on He 7:28) takes the negative view; but he makes a suggestion which approximates to the positive view when he refers to the example of Christ (Jn 17): 'The interceded in human speech to God in the days of His flesh, and translated this into the unarticulated word of communion, so far as we can imagine them, we may form some conception of it.' In our Lord's intercesory prayer it is important to note the significance of the simple past tenses which the AV substitutes for the perfect tenses of the AV. Our Lord is already thought of as the right hand of the Father when He says: 'I glorified thee on the earth,' etc.

INTERCESSION (Liturgical).—The custom of offering intercessions at the Eucharist seems to have been universal, at any rate from the middle of the 2nd cent. onwards. It would doubtless be conceivable that the earliest way of carrying out St. Paul's injunction to Timothy `that supplications, prayers, intercessions, thanksgivings (δεικνύω, παρακλητούμενος, ἐπιθυμεῖται, εὐχόμενος) be made for all men' (1 Ti 2:1), whereby the εὐχαίρετα were interpreted as having any reference to the Eucharist or not. We accordingly find that intercessions formed part of the Eucharistic service at least from the time of Justin (c. a.D. 150), and that in the 4th and 5th centuries they were developed into three different forms, of which two still remain in all liturgies.

1. Second and third centuries.—We do not get much information in the subject from the Didache. If the prayers there given are those used for the Eucharist proper, the only approach to an intercession is in the prayer over the 'broken bread' (διακονόν), and in the thanksgiving which follows being prepared in gathering and protection of the Church (§ 91 f.). If, as is suggested in art. Agape, they are the Agape prayers, while those for the Eucharist proper are intercessions, we cannot tell how far the feature of intercession was introduced. Justin Martyr, however, is explicit. In describing the baptismal Eucharist (Apol. i. 65) he says that after the newly-baptized is brought 'to the place where those who are called brethren are assembled,' they offer 'hearty prayers in common (κοινῶς εὐθύς) for themselves and the newly-baptized (illuminated) person and all others in every place.' Then follow the Kiss of Peace and the Offertory, bread and the mixed cup being brought to the president, who 'gives praise and glory . . . and offers thanks at considerable length.' Justin adds that, 'when [the president] has concluded the prayers and thanksgiving, all reply Amen;' and the administration by the deacons follows. So in the description of the Sunday Eucharist (Apol. i. 67) after the lections, at which the 'reader' officiates, the president preaches, and all 'rise together and pray;' then, 'when their prayer is ended,' bread and cup are taken and the president 'in like manner offers prayers and thanksgivings according to his ability,' the people answering 'Amen.' We are not here concerned with the rest of the description.

In view would probably that the 'prayers and thanksgivings' of the president did not include intercessions and this is borne out by the earliest 4th cent. evidence (see below, c. 69). The intercessions would be confined to the 'prayers in common,' at which all the people stood up. What this pruning means is not quite clear, but we may perhaps suppose it signifies that the minister (the deacon!) bids the prayers and that the people answered each petition separately, somewhat after the manner of an extempore or litany, though that, in the written form which afterwards attained, was not yet invented (see below, c. 69). The Brightman remonstrance (JTh 36 xii. 1893-11 332) that Justin's κοινῶς εὐθύς must have been some unconscious form of a litany in order to be σαρκί in all. See also JTh x. (1893-09) 600.

It is noteworthy, as J. Wardenworth points out (Holy Com., Oxford, 1891, p. 64 ff.), that neither in Justin nor in the Didache is there a trace of intercession at the Eucharist for any one outside the Church. For Justin's words 'all others in every place' are shown by the context to mean 'all Christians,' and this custom of confining the liturgical 'offering' to those of the household of faith is found long after in Augustine's rule that it is wrong to offer 'for any unbaptized.'

Thus we gather that both in the 2nd and in the 5th cent. there was some clear limit to the liturgical intercession. On the other hand, St. Paul emphatically orders prayers 'for all men,' including 'kings and all that are in high place'; indeed, he emphasizes prayer for those who are 'in the church,' and that they may 'come to the knowledge of the truth' (1 Ti 2:2). And Clement of Rome in the long prayer at the end of his epistle has somewhat elaborate intercession, which includes 'our rulers and governors upon the earth' (Cor. 60 f.). There is, however, no evidence that this was offered at the Eucharist (for a discussion of the prayer see J. B. Lightfoot, Clement, London, 1890, i. 352 ff.). Tertullian says (Apol. 39) that 'we pray for Emperors, for their ministers, and for those in authority (potestatibus), etc.; and (ad Scip. 2) that 'we sacrifice for the health (salute) of the Emperor, but to Him who is our God and his, but, as God commanded, in pure prayer'—probably an allusion to the Eucharist as opposed to the animal sacrifices of the heathen.

Cyprian speaks of penitents when restored to communion having the privilege of being prayed for by name at the Eucharist (Ep. ix. [xvi.], 2. 'To the clergy'; the true reading seems to be offertor nomine [not nonen] coram]; but this does not greatly alter the sense; if the Eucharist was offered in their name, they must have been named as the object of prayer). In Ep. ix. [xiii.], writing to the Numidian bishops, Cyprian says (§ 2) 'to present their captive brethren in their sacrifices and prayers, and subjoin the names of each of these and of others for whom he asks their intercessions.'

The Eucharistic intercessions in the 3rd cent. included prayers for the faithful departed. These appear first in Africa. Tertullian (de Cor. 3) says: 'We make obligations for the departed.' Cyprian, writing to the Church at Farni (Ep. lv. [i.], 2) says, that in the case of a certain offender, 'no offering is to be made for him, nor any sacrifice be celebrated for his rescue (dissolution). For he does not pray to be named at the altar of God in the prayer of the priest . . . no offering may be made by you for his repentance.' In Africa, the liturgy has been in the church in his name (for the recital of names in Cyprian's time see W. C. Bishop in JTh xiii. 1911-13 353).

We may here anticipate a little, and give testimony of a somewhat later form of the intercession (which must not be on a Sunday) the people's first partake of the mysteries and after the obligation receive the bread of exorcism and sit at an Agape (can. xxxiii.; ed. H. Achelis, TO vi. 4 [Leipzig, 1891], § 369 f.). In pseudo-Pionius's Life of Polycarp (probably of the 4th cent.), we read that the people took Boculus's body to the cemetery at Smyrna, and 'when all was ever they offered bread for Boculus and the rest' (§ 20 [Lightfoot, Ignatius]; London, 1889, ii. 462 f.). Of the other Church Orders, the Testament of our Lord (c. A.D. 350, i. 23, 35), the Arabic Didascalia (c. A.D. 400, § 38), and the Apostolic Constitutions (c. A.D. 375, viii. 15) may be mentioned as including prayers for the departed in their Eucharistic liturgies. For Sarapion and Cyril of Jerusalem see below, 2.

2. Fourth century and later.—From the middle of the 4th cent., at least, the liturgical intercessions began to take written and fixed forms, and were developed in three lines: (a) the diptychs; (b) the Litany, or Ecce, or Synaphe, or [Leonine] Proclamation, and other forms of the 'people's prayers' before the Offertory; (c) the Great Intercession in the middle of the Anaphora. Technical names did
not at first arise, but all three classes of intercession are found in the 4th century.

(a) The diptychs and their predecessors.—In the Testament of our Lord the priest, chief deacon, and readers, at some time not stated, sit in a special place to write down the names of the offerers of the oblations and of those for whom they have offered them, so that, when the holy things are offered by the priest, deacon, and reader, the names of the offerers may name them by way of commemoration, which the reader adds with supploration (c. 19).

In other words, the names of the offerers were recorded, and those for whom the prayers of the congregation were asked, were commemorated at the Eucharist, though the point of the service at which this was done is uncertain (in this manual to commemorate also means 'to say the Litany' (P. 35)). In the Pilgrimage of Silex or Etheria (c. A.D. 380f., though some have suggested a later date) the bishop on certain occasions commemorates the names of persons to be prayed for; but this is not at the Eucharist. In the middle of this century we find a recital of the names of the departed in the Liturgy of Sancip (see below). At the end of the century Jerome says that the names of those who offered for the Church were publicly read by the deacon (in Jerem. ii. 11, in Ezek. vi. 18).

Thus in the second half of the 4th cent. there is a recitation of the names of the departed at the beginning of the century there is an allusion to the custom, at the Council of Elvira, in Spain (can. 28f.); the bishop may not accept the oblation of a sinner, and a denial of the sinner's name is not to be recited at the altar 'cum oblatione,' i.e. as an offerer at the Eucharist. On the other hand, there is no clear evidence of a recital of names in the 4th cent. (p. 348) nor in A.D. 348 nor in the Apostolic Constitutions; and it has been denied that there is any, except in the case of martyrs and deceased bishops, in Augustine (E. Bishop, in Concilia, p. 113 n.; Swatton, Early Hist. of Liturgy, pp. 147, 215; on the other side see W. C. Bishop, in JTSSt xii. 235f.). In view of these facts we cannot affirm that the practice was universal in the 4th cent.

In the 5th cent. the name 'diptychs' came into common use. It is derived from the fact that the names of the living and of the departed respectively were inscribed on two-leaved tablets, 'normally' mentioned in the general inventory of the church, with the consul's portrait and name, distributed on his accession; many of these were transferred to ecclesiastical use (Brightman, Liturgies Eastern and Western, p. 80f.). The reading of the names of the dead became at this time a test of orthodoxy. The letters that passed between Cyril of Alexandria and Athanasius, bishop of Constantinople, early in the 5th cent. describe the controversy as to the insertion of St. Chrysostom's name, some enthusiastically demanding its recital, others as enthusiastically demanding its omission. The letters show that the living and the dead were at that time commemorated in two separate tables, the latter arranged in categories; and that the diptychs contained a list of the bishops of Constantinople from the first. The public recitation was an important and popular part of the service, and the inclusion or omission of a name might lead to a riot or at least to very serious disturbance among the congregation (Bede, De Est., p. 485, n. 7; E. Bishop, p. 102 f.; DODS i. 298).

The diptychs now become universal. We find them inserted in the Arabic translation (date uncertain) of the Testament of our Lord; they were used c. A.D. 500 by the East Syrians, for the Lit. Hom. of Narsai (ed. Comoll, p. 10, 112) attest the recital of the names of both the living and the dead, though the contemporary pseudo-Dionysian Ancyrense mentions only the names of the dead.

Edmund Bishop points out (op. cit. p. 101) that the form tends to be struck into the liturgy of the East and West; and that the recital of the names of the offerers was early abolished in the East, those of the departed being retained, while in the West the former were read and the latter not until a later period. In Gaul also the bishop does not read the names of the dead being recited till the 6th cent.; Innocent I mentions (Ep. to Deincesius, early 6th cent.) the reading of the names of the offerers, but not those who made offerings, and the recitation of names is explicitly mentioned in the oldest Gallican book, the Missale Rickenviaense, thus: 'Post nomina. Auditis nominibus offerentum.' (C. E. Hammond, Lit. Estabd. and Wckt., Oxford, 1878, p. xixii.) A similar phrase is found in many later Gallican books.

The place of the diptychs in the Eastern liturgies varies. In the Byzantine rites (Greek and Armenian), they come during or in connexion with the Great Intercession; and in so the Egyptian (Melita, etc.), the bishop may insert the names of the departed (Apostolike Apanagia of our Lord derived from the Testament), in the West Syrian (Jacobite) rite they came during or before the Kiss of Peace, in connexion with the Offertory, and similarly in the Gallican rite as given by Hammond (p. xxviii); and it is probable that this is the original position. The names were connected with the Offertory, as including those of the church. In the Western and Greek (Nestorian) rite there is, just after the Kiss of Peace and the Creed, a prayer for those who offer. In Narsai and in the Mesopotamian rites the recital is made before or after the Offertory and the Creed. Thus there seems to be good reason for thinking that in the Byzantine and Egyptian rites the diptychs have been moved from the neighbourhood of the Offertory to that of the Great Intercession. On the other hand, in the Syrian and Jacobite rite (A. H. Sayce, an explanation (recitation of names) of the departed comes in the middle of the Great Intercession.


(b) The Litany.—The intercessions before the Offertory took, at least in some places, the form of a written litany not later than the 4th cent., but probably that they were tending in this direction.

The technical name of this form of devotion seem to have been invented later. In Greek-speaking countries it was (and is) usually called the Edeke, which has been interpreted as 'the extended prayer' (Brightman, p. 500), or perhaps simply, as 'the forest prayer' (Lightfoot, Clement, i. 385, note how Clement lays stress on the prayer and supplication being fervent, cieren (Cor. 69), and pr. in Const. vii. 6-10, where the catechumen, the penitent, and the faithful after the dismissal of the others are repeatedly hidden to pray (see also Brightman, loc. cit.). Other names are the Synaxaria, or suffragia 'linked together,' and the Edeke, or 'the liturgy of the dead' (Sabal., 560, 829). In Syriac-speaking countries the litany is called the Kirabite, or 'Proclamation.'

We have two written litanies of the 4th cent., extant, as said before the Offertory in the liturgy, one in the Testament of our Lord and one in the Apost. Const., both being of the same form; and this form has survived in the East with scarcely any alteration to the present day. The deacon asks the prayers of the people for various persons and objects, e.g. 'For the emperor, the emperor's family, the army and the people, for the emperor and for them prudence and the fear of Him.' No response is given in either of these manuals; but probably, as in Silex (above, (a)) and in the later forms, the people answered 'Kyrie eleison' or some such formula. But in Augustine (if, indeed, he refers to a litany; see below) the answer is simply 'Amen'; and in the latter part of the daily litany of the East Syrians the people answer 'Kyrie, Christe, Kyrie eleison, not, as in the former part, 'Kyrie eleison.' (Brightman, p. 265.)

1 See some curious facts bearing on this in E. G. C. F. Alphonsus's Ordinum Romanorum Prinomis, p. 100.
2 In the West Syrian (Jacobite) rite the names are read both before the Kiss of Peace and at the Great Intercession (Brightman, pp. 83, 93).
3 When a memorial is made of persons departed, their names are read at the Great Intercession (Brightman, p. 246 n.).
INTERCESSION (Liturical)

In the Appendix to the Arabic Didascalia, which contains a Church Order based on the Testament of Tertullian and which formed the liturgy, but does not give it in full (c. A.D. 400), the lections read by the deacon follow the Offertory (t), and the deacons then pray for the sick and travellers, for the peace of God and the peace of the Church, for the rich and the poor, for the assembly and the congregation. Then the bishop "makes the liturgy" within the veil (F. X. Funk, Didascalia et Const. Ap., Paderborn, 1905, ii. 132; Brightman, p. 510). The place of the Offertory before the lections was very curious; but this may not be the exact meaning of the writer. He probably intends a litany by his description.

In the Testament and Apost. Const. the suffrages said by the deacon are concluded by an intercessory prayer said by the bishop, the text of the prayer being given in the latter but not in the former, and there was probably an extemporaneous utterance. In the Apost. Const. there are two other diaconal litanies (ii. 57, viii. 33), much shorter than that described above, but both concluded by the bishop. At first, as it would seem, they stood only in the epistle devotions, as in Justin, the older Didascalia (Funk, i. 160), and probably in Apost. Const. ii. 57 (i. p. 160); but in v. 8., as in the Testament, the people read for the suffrages and stood for the concluding prayer.

The further development of the intercession on these lines, by which, and by its conjunction with the Divine Procession, the modern Western litany arose, does not belong to this article; but it is noteworthy that the ancient place of the litany, just before the Offertory and after the lections, is preserved in the English Book of Common Prayer on one occasion only—at the consecration of a bishop. In the Roman Church it was said at the ordination of deacons just after the Epistle and Gradual (Atchley, Ordo Rom. Pr. i. p. 67). It has been doubted if there is other evidence for formal litanies in the 4th century. It seems probable, however, if Silvester was written at the end of that century that at Jerusalem they were then in use, though perhaps not at the Enchant.

The description in Silvester might appeal to a mere recital of names; but the authors can hardly mean that the boys cried "Kyrie eleison" after each name. If we refer to Hesychius, it follows that they were used, as at the present day among all Eastern Christians, at the daily morning and evening services; also at Jerusalem, while the deacon said the evening Litany, the bishop said the morning one.

In some other countries the Eucharistic Intercessions before the Offertory perhaps did not take a litany-form so soon as the 4th century. No litany is given in any Egyptian document of that period; nor, indeed, are any fixed intercessory forms found. Cyril of Jerusalem mentions no intercessions before the Offertory (see below, 3, for his detailed intercession at a later stage). The Council of Laodicea in Phrygia (c. A.D. 268) says that after the dismissal of the catechumens and priests' three prayers for the faithful were said, one in silence and the others aloud, and that at the kiss of Peace was given and the oblation offered (can. 19). This seems to exclude the litany, at any rate at this point in the service. It has been thought that in Augustinian liturgy there was no trace of a litany. His calls, however, the intercession 'common prayer' ('communes orationes'), and the deacon's as 'prayer (or 'voice of the deacon') (Ep. vi. 8. Hen. (ed.) ad episc. Jerusalem). The prayer for the brethren: 'May the Lord have mercy on the elect, and of his mercy...grant...and...May the Lord have mercy on all...' was probably a litany. The prayer 'for the people of God to pray for the unbaptized' ('pro ... baptizandis') (Ep. cxxvii. 2. Hen. (ed.) ad Fisulanus) the people's response 'Alas! ...yes, alas!' (Augustine), and about not offering 'except for the faithful (above, 1) must be interpreted as meaning only that private individuals could not be prayed for by name at the Eucharist unless they were Christians. Augustinus also mentions the prayer after the Eucharistic litanies, but does not give it in full (c. A.D. 400), the lections read by the deacons follow the Offertory (t), and the deacons then pray for the sick and travellers, for the peace of God and the peace of the Church, for the rich and the poor, for the assembly and the congregation.

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however, it comes between the Commemoration of Redemption and the Epistle, and this is the case
also in the Egyptian rite (Greek, Coptic, Ethiopic) it precedes the Com-
memoration of Redemption; and so in the Abyssinian Anaphora of our Lord (see art. INVOCATION,
Liturgical). In Egypt, for a translation see J. Cooper and A. J. Maclean, Test. of our
Lord, Edinburgh, 1902, p. 245 ff., where there is also a shorter intercession after the Invocation, as
in the Tzetantam from which it is derived also.

In the Roman rite the Great Intercession is divided into two parts, that for the living, with
a commemoration of saints, being said immediately after the Sanctus, and that for the departed, with
an intercession for the faithful dead, following the prayer for Divine intervention Supra quaes
supplices etc. (see art. INVOCATION [Liturgical], § 6).

The Ambrosian liturgy has the same feature. In
the old Coptic rite of the Copts, the Great Interces-
sion comes, with the names of the living and the
dead, before the Kiss of Peace (Duchesne, p. 211).
This custom was re-established by Innocent I. in
A.D. 407 (see Duchesne, loc. cit. 553 ff.; also Ascensio, Ordo Rom. Prim., p. 99).

The main difference between the Great Inter-
cession and the people's prayers at the earlier part of the liturgy, however, is that the former was a prayer
by the priest, the people answering 'Amen' at the
end, while the latter were at least usually re-
sponsorial, the deacon addressing the people and
the people responding at that time, and the people responding to each clause, usually with an
acclamation addressed to God. In the modern
Coptic rite (Brightman, p. 165) the people respond to
Kyrie eleison in the Great Intercession also, and the
deacon interjects some short exhortations.

3. Conclusion.—To sum up the evidence; it
appears that the liturgical intercessions have de-
veloped in three directions, into the diphythics, the
liturgical form of a dialogue, and being said as (in Justin) before the central act; the Great Intercessions growing into a long
prayer of the celebrant; while the diphythics, which
are more in the form of a dialogue, they became in time a mere list of somewhat meaning-
less names, and in most countries have fallen into complete de
complete.

INTEREST.—See Usury.

INTERIM.—See Usury.

INTEREST.—See Usury.

INTEREST.—See Usury.
be militant; but Melancthon, who furnished them with an appendix on the papacy, did not hesitate to qualify his subscription to them with the clause:—

"... that we might admit the sacraments, that we might admit the Gospel advertising the people of the common council of Christendom to exercise by human right his present jurisdiction over the bishops who are now or may hereafter be under his authority."

Agreement was reached on the first four subjects of which concerned man's original state, free will, and sin, and even on the doctrine of justification by faith, an inquiring as well as imputed righteousness being affirmed on the strength of Christ's merit. But, when the subjects of the Church, the sacraments, and the papal authority were dealt with, it became clear that the two sides were irreconcilable. To concede the cup to the German Emperor was to concede the rite to Germany, but to touch the fringe of the problem, and to concede primacy to Rome without diminution of its prerogative was merely to postpone a settlement. Moreover, when the results of the discussion were submitted to the pope and to Luther, it was ascertained that each was profoundly dissatisfied. The Emperor made the most he could of the disappointing result; but although the Roman Catholics would not allow themselves to be bound by the later agreements, he imposed these upon the Protestants as the substance of the 'Ratisbon Interim.'

The Interim was, therefore, the recognition of the fact that the Ratisbon Colloquy thus virtually came to nothing, and the antagonistic interests were destined never again to come so near to a settlement of their differences; that, from the day it was sent to the Emperor, for the time being, master of the political situation and gave a new opportunity to his great design. Disrepairing of successful action by the Council, he set himself, as Linday writes (History of the Reformation, i. 389f.),

"to bring about what he conceived to be a reasonable compromise, which might enable Germany to remain within one National Church. He tried at first to induce the separate province of Saxony to unite among themselves; and, when this was found to be hopeless, he, like a second Justinian, resolved to construct a creed and to impose it by force upon all; especially upon the Empire, in their interest and, slight the General Council for which he had been mainly responsible. Not infrequently had he before demanded that the Council should return to German soil (it had been transferred to Bologna), and, when this was refused, he protested against its existence and, like the German Protestants he was coercing, declared that he would not submit to its decrees. He selected three theologians, Michael Hedio, Julius von Pflug, and Agricola—a mediævalist, an Erasmian, and a very conservative Lutheran—

"to construct what was called the Augsburg Interim."

The Interim was enacted on May 15, 1548, and was put in force by the Emperor throughout the Empire, many Lutheran preachers and teachers, e.g., Brenz, Osiander, and Bucer, being sent into exile for refusing to submit. But it was vain to force it on Protestants while Roman Catholics declined it and had to be furnished with a Formula Reformatiae for themselves. Where the preachers were established the churches stood empty. In a short time the Interim was a spent force.

The document is an example of what Thomas Carlyle calls 'concoctive science.'

"Nothing that Charles ever undertook proved such a dismal failure as the Interim, which divided external from annulments from two Confessions. ... It is a hopeless task to construct creeds as a temporary expedient."

(Knight's notes, 'Linday,' i. 308 f.)

Its propositions are cast in terms of studied ambiguity. To reconcile the party of reform it affirmed a doctrine of justification by faith, con-

ceded the marriage of priests and the use of the sacramental cup by the laity, and revised the doctrine of the Mass. But the number of the common council of ceremonies, the worship and invocation of Mary and the saints, the doctrine of transubstantiation, and the sovereign authority of the pope were regularly maintained in favour of Rome.

3 Leipzig Interim. In Saxony the Elector Maurice, assisted by Melancthon, whose heart was set upon the restoration of his beloved University of Wittenberg after the war, and upon the speedy return of peace to his distracted country, imposed upon his subjects the Leipzig Interim, the counterpart of the Augsburg settlement. The policy of Melancthon, for which he was never wholly forgiven by ardent Lutherans, was to yield to Rome and the Emperor well-nigh all that concerned ritual and usage so long as the essentials of the Reformed doctrine, in particular justification by faith, were conserved. Luther had remonstrated again and again with his scholar-colleague on this very point, but Melancthon was content at this time of his life to form a compromise, and he was not to go back on the compromise. He had done his utmost to save the Lutheran Church from falling into the perils of Melanphylsophism, and deplored his attitude. Not till the Formula of Concord took shape in 1577 did the controversy thus originated reach a termination. But the Interim which gave rise to it was blamed by the sudden change of front of the Elector Maurice, and the dramatic success of his bold stroke on behalf of the cause which he had betrayed, and by the establishment of the Peace of Augsburg, which authorized finally the repetition of the Confession of Augsburg.

Cf. art. CONFESSIONS, vol. iii. p. 848.


WILLIAM A. CUETIS.

INTERMEDIATE STATE.—See STATE OF THE DEAD.

INTERNATIONALITY.—The term 'internationality' may be used with reference to both law and morality. This word is of English origin.

In its legal bearing, it can apply only to the relations existing between those States which are within the sphere of international law. This circle of States includes the Christian nations of Europe and their offshoots in America, the Ottoman Empire, and Japan—which had been admitted even before the Russo-Japanese War. China and Persia, too, have now a recognized international status of some kind. How the circle comes to be so restricted may be explained as follows: International law, according to a well-known authority (W. E. Hall, International Law, pt. i. ch. 1.), primarily governs the relations of those States called independent States which voluntarily submit themselves to it, although to a limited extent it may also govern the relations of certain analogous communities. The marks of an independent State are: that the community constituting it is permanently established for a political end; that it possesses a definite territory; and that it is independent of external control. But, as international law is a product of the special civilization of modern Europe, and forms a more or less artificial system, such States only can be presumed to be subject to it who are in a state of that
civilization. States which are outside European civilization must enter in a formal way into the circle of those governed by the law, although an express act of accession is not to be regarded as necessary. When a new State comes into existence, its position is determined by the same considerations; and its origin decides whether it is to belong to the circle or not. Recently, however, the tendency has been for admitted States to conduct their relations with States which are outside the circle, so far as the case permits, in such a manner that, although they do not have themselves set up. And so the spirit of international law is making itself felt all over the world.

There are some principles of State action which are, as it were, over the borders of the law. For example, the State's duty to extradite criminals is said on good authority to be a moral and not a legal one. And such bordering rights and duties are supplemented by the more clearly moral, and by many duties in which the State's relationship is not so clearly extended to other States, but rather to masses of foreigners or to the world in general. Thus the duty of a State to permit intercourse with it to be maintained by foreign nations is said to be a moral duty, as opposed to a legal one. But, whether it is a moral or a legal one, it is only a limitation that the State may take what measures of precaution it considers needful to prevent the right of access and intercourse from being used to its own injury. And in so far as they are in force preventing the access of alien vagabonds, destitute persons, and so forth, the interest and importance of the subject lie primarily in its ethical and practical aspects, and not in its strictly international bearing.

Mention must also be made, more specifically, of uncivilized peoples. Obviously the principles by which a civilized State is to regulate its conduct towards the people of less highly developed races give rise to many burning questions, though in a legal sense such problems might be ruled out of discussion. A civilized country possesses in its army and navy a dangerous power, and the more power a State has actually in force preventing the access of alien vagabonds, destitute persons, and so forth, the interest and importance of the subject lie primarily in its ethical and practical aspects, and not in its strictly international bearing.

This feature appears in its most definite form in later Judaism: the Halakha and Haggadah (see art. Rabbinism). The one practical, the other theoretical, were the laws actually in force preventing the access of alien vagabonds, destitute persons, and so forth, the interest and importance of the subject lie primarily in its ethical and practical aspects, and not in its strictly international bearing.

2. Development of exegetical theory. — The human mind endeavours to reduce such exegetical practice to rules, to a theory. Rabbi Hillel formulated seven rules of exegesis which, according to Rabbi Judah further extended to thirteen, and Rabbi Eliezer to thirty-two, most of them simply showing how to foist an extrinsic sense into the text by arbitrary and artificial devices. They include the principle of the context, the rule of the analogy, the combination of two passages, the parallelism (ab-
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, etc., include in epi
tiques was a subdivision of rhetoric, dealing with
the formation of thought or judgment in word and
sentiment, and the mode of expression in the choice
and combination of words, diction in the gram-
matical sense, and, finally, style in the rhetorical
sense (elocutio; Arist. ἐλ.οκ.).

This was called the analysis of this process of
thought in a single writer; and, just as the terms
epiveias and interpretari were used to denote
translation into another language (transferrre), so
the latter was also applied to the explanation of a
sentence in itself obscure (expositio). The latter
sense was also expressed by διεσφραγιζω, a word
originally connected with the sacred mysteries.

But, besides the Holy Scripture, however, it
was not merely the thoughts of the human writers
that had to be taken into consideration; the idea
of inspiration, along with the notion of an incom-
prehensible and mysterious divine wisdom, was
sought after for a more profound hidden meaning
behind the natural sense. Hence Philo of Alexandria,
the Jewish philosophical theologian, adopted the
allegorical method of the Stoics, and the Christian
theologians followed his example. As he assumed
that the Biblical history was not the real sense
history at all, but was rather eternal, unchanging
truth under a spiritual and intellectual veil, so
they maintained that what was told in the OT about
Joseph, David, or Solomon was in reality the story
of Jesus. The tabernacle and its sacrificial worship
stood for the Christian Church and its liturgies. If the
true meaning of the text was to be discovered, every
detail must be read as implying something else, as
in a pictorial enigma; or, to put it more precisely,
the allegorical interpretation was something of
the sort of a pre-established harmony between
the OT and the NT history. Thus, e.g.,
it is a historical fact that Abraham was ready
to sacrifice Isaac, but the true significance of the
incident is its identification with the sacrifice
of God’s sacrifice in Christ. Typology, no less than
allegory, puts an extrinsic meaning into the text;
but it looks at the relation between the literal and the added
sense in a somewhat different way.

The allegory, after its excessive cultivation by
the Gnostics, found a footing chiefly among the
Platonizing theologians of Alexandria, while
typology, to which Jewish Christians had
responded from the outset, was brought to its highest
development in the so-called School of Antioch (cf. art.
ANTIOCHEN THEOLOGY). There is no good reason
for connecting the difference between the two with
the antagonism between the Alexandrian and the
Pergamene schools of Hellenistic philology. It
was believed by the ancient scholars that the two
methods worked quite well side by side.

Of the Christian theologians, the first to formulate
a theory of interpretation was Origen (Iepi ἐφηγε
κατηρ. iv.); by the hypothesis of the manifold sense
of Scripture (semiotic, psychic, and pneumatic, i.e.
veiled, interpreted, and mystical) he showed that
the several modes of exegesis were all valid in their
own place. This was expanded by the Greek
theologians of the 4th cent. into the theory of the
‘fourfold’ sense of Scripture, which was in turn
adopted in the West by Augustine, and then
fired and brought to maturity by the Scholastics.

Like the ἁγίας of Malato of Sardis, the treatise
Diodorus ‘on the difference between theory and
allegory’ and that of Theodorus ‘on allegory and
history’ are unfortunately lost, and the only extant
Isidore of Pelusium (Ep. iv. 117, 203; FG lxxvii.
1192f., 1230-92) and Niltas (Ep. i. 118-127, ii. 223,
et al. FG lxxvii. 133-137, 320), as also the Instit.
uta regia in secvum legio of Joaq. the Pelasgioticus
(a.d. 351 FG lxxvii. 15-42; also ed. H. Kuhn,
Freiburg, 1880), which enounced from the school
of Paul of Nisibis, makes but a poor substitute for
them. The most valuable contribution, here as
elsewhere, was made by Augustine, who, in his
de Doctima Christiana, with the distinction
between re and signum as his starting-point, arrived
at an almost modern theory of interpretation.

The interpretation of the ancient Church, he confined himself to the task of explain-
ing difficult passages of Scripture.

The other extant manuals of hermeneutics—the
Liber regulamentorum et elucubrationum (ed.
F. C. Birkill, T. 111. 1 (1894); its seven rules were
adopted by Augustine, Isidore, Thomas Aquinas,
et al.), the Formulae spiritualis 4ntellegantiae and the
Instructiones of Eucharius of Lyons (ed. Joseph
CSEL xxxi. (1894), as well as the Burugw eis tην
θεαν τηνος of the monk Adrianos (c. A.D. 500;
FG xvii. 1273-1312)—are simply practical direc-
tions for the allegorical interpretation of the
material and treat of the OT and the NT in exactly
the same way.

Scarcely any further advance was made by the
medieval writers Caesarius (who mentions the triad
with Augustine and Januarius, Isidore, Bede (de Schematia et tropa sacra
scriptura), Notker Balbulus (Notatia de inter-
pretationibus divinarum scripturarum), Hugh of
Victor (Praedicationem cuad Scripturis sanctis
scripsit), or the Scholastics. The allegorical
method dominated all of them, and was systematized as the
fourfold sense of Scripture. In the later period,
however, a new feature, due to the in-
dependent thought of men like Roger Bacon, and
to a revived knowledge of Rabbincal intepretation,
was introduced into the ecclesiastical
exegesis, as seen in Nicolaus of Lyra (1270-1340)
(Prologia in hebraeis bibliae). J. Gerson (1363-
1429) (Proportionis de sensu literalis sanctae
scripturae), and others. Santes Pagninus of Liene (1470-
1541) reinstated the mystical sense in his
Interpretationes (Lyons, 1580), and Sixtus of Siena (1529-90), in his
Biblia sacra (Venice, 1569), collected with
vast erudition all the learning of the past that was
necessary for Biblical exegesis. The new
and decisive impulse, however, came from a
different quarter. Humanism revived the study of
the ancient languages, and the Reformation made that
study subservient to an exegesis that centred in
the plain historical sense. But the real turning-
point was that, whereas the entire ancient and
medieval theology had regarded Scripture as
abstruse, as something that could not be
interpreted only by learned men, with the help of
allegory and under the control of the Church, it
was now asserted, in virtue of the new evangelical
ideas of a revealed God and the assurance of salu-
tion, that Scripture could be understood (its
eratiles) : the devout reader of the Bible, once
he was furnished with the necessary linguistic
aids, would discover the meaning without difficulty.
Hence, in addition to the philologie, the critics
of G. Scioptius (1669), J. Clericus (1736), and
H. Valensiis (Amsterdam, 1740), we have the Claus
scriptura sacra of Matthias Plenius (1751)
and the Philologia sacra of Salomo Glasisna (1625-
30), which are chiefly concerned with the lexical
and grammatical material required to bring out the verbal sense of the text.

It was Biblical exegesis, and not classical philology, as W. Dilthey (see Lit.) also holds, that gave rise to modern hermeneutics. The term 'hermeneutics' (a reminiscence of Plato, Epomnis, 195C 7) first occurs in a work of J. C. Dammhuber (1854), while others still spoke of the art of interpreting (Rudorff, 1747; 'Analekastum,' G. F. Moer, Halle, 1768). Through the renewed study of the ancient treatises ἐρμηνευτικά a great many topics were introduced, which belonged properly to rhetoric, but not, and do not, strictly speaking, fall under hermeneutics in the modern sense. In the 18th cent., hermeneutics was a favourite study; scarcely a single year passed without the issue of a handbook on the subject. The outstanding theologians of all confessions added their quota, and of these J. A. Turretini of Geneva (1728), his friend S. Werenfels of Basel, and the semi-Fiscatist, semi-Wolffian S. J. van der Aa, have been mentioned; the most influential of them all was J. A. Ernesti of Leipzig, whose Institution Interpreti (1762) is distinguished by its philological acuteness and lucidity.

The necessity of a purely historical mode of understanding the text, however, was not yet fully realized. In place of the ecclesiastical authority of the Church, with the dogmatic exegesis, the orthodox theologians of the Reformed Churches, notwithstanding their maxim 'scriptura scriptura interpreter,' substituted the authority of their respective creeds. Thus, for instance, among the standard authorities of Biblical interpretation in philosophy (L. Meyer, Philosophia s. Scriptura interpresa, Amsterdam, 1666; J. Amor, Cartesius Mosaiicorum, Leovardis, 1669), and in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, in their desire to keep their exposition of Scripture within the bounds of reason, did the same thing in their own fashion. Perl the Fiscata, on the other hand, like the medieval mystics, wished to use the Scriptures only for edification, and were not concerned to understand them historically (A. H. Francke, Manuductio ad lectionem Scripturae Sacrae, Halle, 1695, 1790, Prakticon Hermeneuticae, Halle, 1717), while Kant, as the founder of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, in their desire to keep their exposition of Scripture within the bounds of reason, did the same thing in their own fashion.

Apart from all the theologians of this period stands Baruch Spinoza, the Jewish philosopher, who, in his Tractatus theorematis (1670), first ventured to question the fundamental axioms of all previous theology and Biblical exegesis. What Luther had intuitively felt, but had not consistently carried out, viz., that the value of a book was in its being a religious work, was made explicit by Spinoza, who thus prepared the way for a distinctively religious estimate of the content of Scripture, and for a historical interpretation that should do justice to the different world-views of various lines of thought.

The pioneer of a fresh movement was F. D. E. Schleiermacher, in whose hands hermeneutics (cf. 'Hermes' and W. Kritik, mit besonderer Beziehung auf das NT,' Werke, vi. v., ed. F. Lücke, Berlin, 1838), which had hitherto been an aggregation of knowledge and devices needed for exposition, became a philosophy of 'comprehension' ('Philosophie des Versteheums'). While Augustine had analyzed the materials to be understood, Schleiermacher deals with the process of understanding itself, and the relations between difficult and simple passages, and nothing is self-evident. The interpreter's task is to understand the religious personality of the writer as manifested in every single word, to look from the details to the whole, and from the standpoint of the whole to set the details in their true light. Accordingly, hermeneutics is one and the same for all literature, sacred or profane, and yet is a personal character for each individual writer, even within the Bible itself. Schleiermacher's views were maintained by his pupil F. Lücke (Grundrisse der NT Hermeneutik, Göttingen, 1861), and then in Germany for each and every writer, i.e. a doctrinally correct, exegesis (E. W. Hengstenberg); on these, again, J. C. C. Hofmann's biblic-historical hermeneutics (Biblische Hermeneutik, ed. W. Voelck, Nördlingen, 1866) certainly marks a distinct advance. Exegetical theology, however, refusing to be led astray by these ventures, partly, indeed, incidentally, but certainly, for the most part, with them, and moving on various lines—from the dogmatic attitude of H. A. W. Meyer and his continuator B. Weiss of Berlin, through the so-called mediating theology of C. B. Reuss, P. Bloek, and others, to the Tubingen School of F. C. Baur—has, with constantly increasing emphasis on the historical element (H. J. Holzmann, C. Weltsicker, A. Ulich) striven to return to a grammatical and historical comprehension of Scripture. Nevertheless, it has failed to provide its ever-expanding industry with a proportionate increase in the theorectical discourse with which to join the discovery we cannot associate with any human name, and are, as the ancients believed, gifts of the deity.

To these three productive capacities correspond three reproductive, viz., to give them in the reverse order—silent reading, reading aloud, and interpreting. Knowledge of the script, whether the script be ideographic or phonetic, makes reading possible, and reading attains its full realization in reading aloud. Even silent reading involves an inward phonetic element, as, e.g., in accentuation, grouping of words, etc., and the special difference in reading aloud is that the cadence of the spoken language is not indicated in the script; certain marks of punctuation are but a mark-shift. Thus, vespere in the phrase ‘Laudate Domino’ may mean either 'you search,' or 'do you search?' or 'search,' and, moreover, the tone of the indicative form may imply approval or reproach. It is only when the separate signs in writing or speaking, and also the thought as a whole, are fully understood—by interpretation—that reading to oneself or to others is brought to perfection. It is a long step from spelling out a text to reading it, and interpretation is usually treated as something that comes of itself until experience has shown with how many possibilities of misconception it is attended.
When these operations are applied to an entire literary document, they become a process of comprehension and interpretation; i.e., the thought expressed in word and script is, in virtue of the gracelessness of thinking and writing, apprehended and reproduced by another mind (and may then be given once more in speech and writing). Modern psycho-physics has shown by other places in which the problems of the difficulties have to be overcome in the process, even under normal conditions, when the individual possesses the ability to hear, to see, to read, to think, etc.; the process demands an effort of the will, i.e., attention. Where there is congruency of spirit, no doubt, this process often takes place spontaneously, like the sympathetic vibration of strings tuned alike. The task of skillfully understanding the text is a different matter; this process by rules, and is conscious of both its method and its aim, though here also affinity of spirit and sympathetic intuition are necessary. The work of comprehending culmens, i.e., in making a thing comprehensible to others, in 'discovery and transmission of the sense' (G. Heinrich in F.R.G. vii. 7b). The decisive proof of one's having understood is reduced to a point showing, though we must here guard against the intrusion of the practical and hortatory element. The psychological laws of association show—what was already noted in some branches of the knowledge of history and what is required, the exposition of the sense for the expositor, who, in order to grasp the peculiar significance of details, must assign them to their proper place in the whole, and impair them with as many similar facts as possible.

The final test of exposition is in the free reproduction of the thought expressed in the text—in translation, as it were. How verbally what one has heard, but difficult to reproduce it in its true sense; and unless every detail is brought out by an abrupt paraphrase, something will usually be lost. The task of the translator in another language presents special difficulties; a careful translation must not be slavishly literal, nor yet merely a free rendering of the sense, but must be in keeping with as much of the genius of the original as with that of the foreign language.

Exposition, however, is more than a mere reproduction of the thought. It is rightly required of the expositor that he shall be above his text, i.e., that he shall in a sense understand its thought better than the original writer, so that he is in a position to criticize the thought itself as well as its formulation. Just as in the interpretation of a law it is an acknowledged duty of the expositor to elucidate and make good the intention of the lawgiver, so something in certain circumstances actually opposed to the letter of the law, so also in literature: what the author intended to say; how he ought to have said it; whether a particular thought is relevant to his general argument, and whether it is in itself a right thought; whether the form is artistic and the reasoning sound—all these questions must be considered by the expositor, so that the exposition really resolves itself into a criticism. Here again, no doubt, a strong subjective element enters—certainly a source of danger for the expositor, yet an involuntary operation of his personal interest in the work he has to expound. From this point a path leads directly to the homily, which does not, however, belong to the proper function of the expositor, but for which the critical exposition is a preparation. But the homily is not supposed to aim at the exegesis of the true text. There is often a difficulty even in reading an autograph, but it is specially difficult to reconstruct a lost autograph from copies of various grades (so-called Textual Criticism), as due consideration must be given not only to the logical relations of the derivative documents, but also to the psychological possibilities of error. Words and sentences as the vehicles of formulated thought, and as such must be specially careful of in passages where his author has not himself framed the expression of his thought, but has borrowed it, as, e.g., where there is imitation, use of sources, or quotation; here it will often be necessary to note three distinct things—the author's own thought, the original sense of the passage quoted, and the sense in which the author uses it. (c) The materials of thought—terms and ideas. As a means of understanding the matter of the work before him, the expositor must be acquainted with the relevant archaology, history, geography, etc., while, in order to grasp the ideas and judgments, he must make himself master of the period and the age from which the document dates; here he must carefully guard against making unwarranted additions to, and putting false constructions upon, the original. (d) The personality of the writer—it is of the utmost importance that the expositor should by painstaking psychological analysis gain an insight into the personality of his author. A literary work, like a work of art, is, in the highest degree, outward, but the outward manifestation of a creative mind, and even the exegesis of details is conditioned by a knowledge of the personality behind them; it is a difficult, indeed, not a common, task. The fact that the proper understanding of details rests necessarily upon information which the original readers could supply for themselves, but which
could subsequently be provided by exegesis only, justifies the time-honoured practice of prefixing a literary work with an introduction.

(3) Special hermeneutics.—General hermeneutics, when applied to a special field, assumes special hermeneutics, i.e., in the present case, Biblical hermeneutics. It is not thereby implied, however, that the Bible, as a book, is distinct from other books, and, in virtue of such finality, have the ordinary hermeneutical rules; but the particular conditions in which it took shape, its peculiar contents, and our special interest in them naturally require a specific application of the rules in question. To leave the Heb. text of the OT entirely out of account, it is not every classical philologist who can deal critically with the original text of the NT, who can rightly estimate the character of its Greek, or, the exegesis of the Synoptic is what is enacted by a popular literature; while the explanation of the material calls for special knowledge, and the principle of congeniality demands a receptivity for religious thinking, though this, again, must not be used to support the claim for a peculiar theological or 'believing' exegesis.

(4) Individual hermeneutics.—The conception of synoptic harmony, and the unifying role of the Bible is not a literary unity, but an aggregation; and, just as the OT and the NT must, in the present position of exegesis, be dealt with separately, so for every single passage it is necessary to institute an individual hermeneutic, i.e., to determine the modifications undergone by the general rules of hermeneutics in consequence of the peculiar points of the text, which the literary and historical books. We cannot interpret the writings of the Synoptists, Paul, and John all in one and the same way, and it would be a crude error to transfer thoughts from Paul to the sayings of Jesus, or from the Heb. to those of Paul or John; the word γραφή as used by Jesus, Paul, and John has in each case a different meaning. The Apocalypse has a hermeneutic of its own. General hermeneutics must always be additive to the individual hermeneutics, for every single book, or, at least, the exegetical development of the last hundred years.

4. The history of exegesis.—The exegesis of each writer is not without practical importance. As compared with the work of recent years, it proceeded upon entirely different principles and worked with very differing means. It is nevertheless necessary, in the interest of science, to study the earlier work; we must know upon whose shoulders we stand, and what our predecessors had already attained. We distinguish here between (1) the history of exeges or (2) the history of exegesis.

(1) The biography of exeges, part of the general history of Christian literature. It deals with many outstanding figures in the life of the Church, who were engaged in practical work as well as in other kinds of literary work, and only one of whose works is to be considered here. It is also concerned with the work whose names are not forgotten, and whose writings have been lost, but who were of some importance in their own day, and had an influence upon later writers; such names appear in great numbers in Eusebius, Athanasius, and Vegetius, etc., and the most eminent of them all—Christian Duthier—his works are associated. Walther Strabo with his Gnosis Ortiordinae laid a foundation for the succeeding period, in which Peter Lombard, Hugh of St. Caro, Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, and Bonaventura composed their great scholastic commentaries; among these have we the mystics, Rupert of Deutz, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Richard of St. Victor, Hervaeus, etc. The 14th cent. saw the production of the comprehensive Moralitates (Speculum morale, etc.) of Vitalis a
Thus, while J. G. B. Winzer (Paulus ad Galatas Epistola, 1828, p. 125) speaks of some two hundred and fifty interpretations of Gal 2, the later history of exegesis shows us that the variations fall under two main types, and that the older and the newer must lie between these. It would not be right, however, to take account of modern exegesis only; in many cases the various possible theories are found from the very outset, and were related to one another throughout the entire history of exegesis. The Greek exegetes, slight as they may be the value of their theoretical principles for us, had the immense advantage of a living knowledge of Greek (though we must certainly bear in mind the linguistic development that took place between the 1st and the 4th century, and the difference between the popular idiom of the Bible and the literary language of the Fathers), and the advantage also of an accurate knowledge of details. With reference to the fourth point of the Lord's Prayer, we learn more from Origen's statement that certain dogmas did not exist; from all the attempts to explain it; the comparison of the ancient versions gives a synopsis of all possible renderings of the word; Augustine's classification in De Doctr. Christii (I. xxiv. 129) shows the three lines on which all subsequent exegesis of the passage proceeded—the natural, the spiritual, and the sacramental; while the history of exegesis shows that the last two have gradually been given up, so that the first alone is possible to-day. As regards the Lord's Supper, again, a truly historical exegetical study of the narrative shows that it is true that here and there in the older exegesis, as in Chrysostom, Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, we find glimpses into the historical aspect of the institution, and these the modern exegesis must also take into account. (I. Zickert.)

Exegesis is an art; and of exegesis, as of all art, it is true that its highest merit consists, not in originality, but in the sureness with which the right thing is seized upon. It is the subject of the Rigauger, on which Browne had been thought and said before, it still remains both true and new.

INTERPRETATION (Vedie and Avesta).—The history of the exegesis of the Rigveda is not without value in its implications for the interpretation of other sacred texts. This Veda possesses an elaborate commentary by Sāyana, a South-Indian scholar (latter half of 14th cent. A.D.), and in the earliest stage of European study of the Veda it was believed that it would be sufficient to translate the text according to this commentary—a process which is actually exhibited in the version by H. H. Wilson (London, 1856-88). Theories, however, an earlier source in the Nirukta of Yaska, who was a, and not merely diverges from him, but declares that his own predecessors, who worked in this, were in error, both from himself and from each other. In other words, the meaning of a large number of Vedic words and passages was lost in
INTROSPICION—"Introspection," briefly defined, is turning the mind inward upon itself, and is thus practically synonymous with self-consciousness to that extent. It is distinguished from both external and internal events considered as a mere stream of experiences that are not held in the field of self, or as phenomena of self. External events may occur in a series; a stream of facts in a sequential or a causal order, but they are not aware of this fact, nor of themselves as individuals in the problems of Vedic religion. The ideal translation of the Rigveda, which shall take into consideration native tradition and the sciences of comparative philology and comparative religion, the Vedic and classical Indian thought, is still to be done.

The process of development in the exegesis of the Avesta has not been dissimilar. The major portion of the Avesta possesses an elaborate gloss in Pahlavi, with a Sanskrit version by Nerosangh (I. e. A.D. 1900). The first to attempt a translation of the Avesta, Anquetil du Perron (Paris, 1711), was naturally partial to the native Parsi tradition, which was itself based, in his day, on an inadequate knowledge not merely of Avesta, but even of Pahlavi. But Roth on the Vedic side had a counterpart on the Avesta in E. Burnouf (Commentaire sur le Yaga, Paris, 1833-35), and a savage controversy now broke out between the ‘traditionalists’ and the ‘linguists.’ The ‘traditional’ school was represented chiefly by F. Spiegel (Avesta übersetzt, Leipzig, 1832-63, Commentator über das Avesta, do. 1864-68) and F. Justi (Handbuch der Zend sprachen, do. 1854), followed, with considerable support by C. de Harlez (Avesta traduit, Paris, 1851), as well as by L. H. Mills (Gathas, Leipzig, 1854-1913), while the translation of the Avesta by J. Darmesteter (SEE iv. [1895], xxiii. [1883], and especially Le Zend-Avesta, Paris, 1892-63) is little more than a reprint of the Pahlavi version. The ‘linguistic’ school, inspired largely by Roth, found defenders in such scholars as H. Hübschmann, also J. and T. Baumack (Studien auf dem Gebiete des Ghréch, 1, Leipzig, 1868-88). As in Vedic exegesis, however, the best method has been found to be one of combination of ‘traditional’ and ‘linguistic’ methods. The ‘linguist,’ who began as a pronounced antagonist of traditionism (F. Gathas, Leipzig, 1853-60), became almost a traditionalist himself after residence in Bombay (Essays on the Parsees, London, 1867); and C. Bartholomae, who in his Arsische Forschungen (Halle, 1862-67) was pronounced a ‘linguist,’ now gives full credit to the tradition, weighing both sides impartially, and deciding strictly according to the merits in each case (Altertum, Wértler, Strassburg, 1904, from which he has compiled his Gatha's des Avesta, do. 1905, and his paper, F. Wolf, his Avesta... übererset, do. 1916). In the interpretation of the religion of the Avesta it is not impossible that a new stage has been inaugurated by the researches of J. H. Moulton (Early Zoroastrianism, London, 1813), who holds that much that has hitherto been believed to be magian is Magian, and that the Magi were neither Indo-Germanic nor Semitic (see art. MAGI). The ‘higher criticism’ of both Veda and Avesta is as yet only in its initial stages, though a beginning has been made by H. Oldenberg (Die Hymnen des Rigveda, 1, Berlin, 1888) and F. W. Arnold (Ved. Metre, Cambridge, 1895) for the one, and by K. Geldner (Über die Metrik des Avestahavas, 1877) for the other. For an account of the interpretation of the Qur'an, see art. Qu'rân.
INTUITIONALISM.

The term 'intuition' (inters, 'to look upon') symbolizes the conception that one among the sources of knowledge is the direct and immediate apprehension of truth. It opposes the notion that all wisdom is based, whether directly or indirectly, upon intellectual processes and reasoned judgments.

In the 18th and early 19th cent., the adherents of intuitionalism were engaged in combating the view of utilitarianism, which believed that the groundwork of moral judgments consists, in the last analysis, in the estimation of the greatest good to the greatest number. Locke, in his Scepticism, claimed that there is that within us which will, independently of any calculation of facts or expediencies, furnish an inviolable criterion of right and wrong, and good and bad, true and false.

In the present state of the theory of knowledge, the chief contention of intuitionalism is against empiricism, which reduces all rational verities and moral and religious certainties back, not directly to individual and tribal experiences, but to those also of the race which have been harvested throughout a long stretch of biological evolution in the form of instincts and the predisposition of the organism towards right behaviour.

Intuitionalism still tries to make the distinction, as Kant did in The Critique of Pure Reason (1783), that the necessary truths of morals are not caused and produced by experience, but conditioned and called out by it. Apriorism has also antagonized the point of view of empiricism.

Intuitionalism differs from apriorism in emphasizing usually the importance of affection rather than, or in preference to, cognition as being itself a direct source of knowledge. The uniqueness of the two is represented, e.g., in the fondness of apriorism for the doctrine of innate ideas—a point of view with which intuitionalism has but little sympathy. The relationship between apriorism and intuitionalism is, however, sometimes often a friendly one, as, e.g., in the intellectual intuitionalism of Plato and Fichte and in the claim of other students that, while affection is fundamental as a source of knowledge, it is essential that the content of the affective life be cognized and thus organized before it can constitute knowledge of an effective sort or consciousness of a high order.

2. Classification of intuitionalists. It is customary to classify intuitionalists according to the doctrine of innate ideas. One who affirms that conscience and the love of righteousness are the voice of a Supreme Ruler who hovers about and dominates the personal life; the juristic intuitionalist, who proceeds as does the Legislator, who speaks to the heart through Church, creed, or revealed word; (3) the mystical intuitionalists, who have a sense of the rapport between the personal life and the highest personality of the race, as invidiously and the rationalistic, or intellectual, intuitionalists (Chrysostom, Augustine, Cudworth, Clark, Calderwood), who believe that it is in the very nature of reason or the understanding to apprehend truths of moral life and who sometimes appeal by way of analogy to the axioms of mathematics, which they
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claim to be finished truths that could not have come through experience; (6) the emotional or aesthetic intuitionists (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Rousseau, Herbart, Kant in his later years, and Schleiermacher), who discover finality in the feeling of the beauty or the restituere of certain kinds of thought and conduct as opposed to other kinds of thought, e.g., has used the analogy of our appreciation of consonant and dissonant notes which are unheard and unexperienced which is not the necessity of training and without the equipment of description or analysis; the Hebrew religionists were pre-dominantly of this type and were fond of appealing to the heart as the source of wisdom; (6) the perceptual intuitionists (Butler, Martineau, W. E. H. Lecky, and Kant during his middle years), who claim that the perception of right and wrong, which is never mistaken by a normal mind, can be compared to the perception of colour by the eye, extension by the hand, or the relationship among discrete objects by the mind.

Such a classification, while convenient, is unsatisfactory. There are those like Locke and Paley, who, while claiming to be consistent empiricists, naively accept as ultimate the intuitions of the law of causality, of God, and of the axioms. Others, of whom Descartes is typical, make a show of expanded intellect and at the same time accept the non-rational intuition as a starting-point and constant criterion of truth (Meditations II., et al.). In like manner, Spinoza, a strict moral logician, adopts a 'third kind of knowledge'—'scientific intuition'—which transcends the knowledge of the qualities and attributes of things given by reason and arrives at the apprehension of the absolute essence of things (Ethics, Edward tr., London, 1894, pt. ii. prop. 49, scholium 2; pt. v. prop. 29, et al.).

We find, too, an unassailable type of intuitionism in Plato, in the Mystics, which might be termed negative intuitionism. The reason is constantly defining truth in order to be able to transcend its formulations. The classifications usually suggested do violence to the facts, since so many of the writers cultivate a sort of eclecticism which would recognize the value of essentially all the sources of wisdom. Martineau, in letter and spirit, is as much an aesthetic as he is a perceptual intuitionist. Price, Reid, Butler, and others of the common man's group, ultimate the 'essential origin of the moral consciousness and at the same time find within it a rational principle of action along the lines of the natural impulses, instincts, and appetites, which, when normal, are useful.

A valuable instance of the refusal to accept a single faculty or function as the source of wisdom is that of Fichte (The Science of Ethics, tr. A. E. Kroker. London and New York, 1857, p. 182): 'Conscience is the immediate consciousness of our determined duty... The consciousness of a determined duty is a determination of a particular action: it is the immediate consciousness of the fact that its realization is the duty of the individual, and the consciousness that this determined action is one's duty is an immediate consciousness as soon as it is determined as such. The consciousness in question has a form. The consciousness of duty is formalized immediately, and this form of consciousness is a mere feeling.'

3. History of theory. — The 19th cent., particularly the first half, has witnessed the falling of intuitionism into disrepute. 'Pure' intuitionism, which assumes a final, though latent, form of ethical and religious consciousness, wanting to be called out by experience, has had almost no advocate. The general trend of thought has been inimical to such a view. Comparative ethics has shown that the moral standards among peoples in different parts of the earth are as diverse as are the social customs by which they are governed (e.g., L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, London, 1906; E. Westermarck, MI., do. 1906). Developmental ethics has been able to trace out the laws of the evolution of morality from animal and tribal life to its higher types (H. R. Marshall, Instinct and Reason, New York, 1898; A. Sutherland, The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, London, 1898). The study of instincts and their evolution has seemed to account for the consensual moral and religious life in terms of the content of instinct (T. A. Ribot, The Psychology of the Emotions, London, 1887; W. McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology, do. 1908). It has been easy to show how the individual, through his mental processes, is able to account for the 'sanctions' which are supremely authoritative (G. Tarde, Les Lois de l'imitation, Paris, 1895; J. M. Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpretations, London and New York, 1906). The laws of suggestion have been so well described that one can understand how social judgments can penetrate themselves from generation to generation through 'social heredity,' and how they can become so authoritative that they assume the majesty of a transcendental authority; hence also the sifting of standards in the same tribe or people and the unity, time-wise and space-wise, of the united group that the social judgments (i.e., moral precepts as felt within the individual) seem absolutely universal, necessary, and changeless.

It has been understood, too, how in the lives of growing children and the commanding influence of the group, authority, the precepts, and all the emotional appeals leave their traces or franchises until the mind is clothed finally with a moral 'atmosphere' that is irresistibly impelling. The effect of suggestion on the child who is constantly submerged within the complex is not unlike that of hypnotic suggestion, which can alone and of itself produce effects indistinguishable from the natural impulses. Indeed, the person undergoing the suggestion will not believe his impulses other than of subjective origin, personal and original (cf. M. J. Guyan, Education and Heredity, London, 1891). If one combines in his thought the effect of all these influences upon the personal consciousness, and keeps well in mind the accumulated predispositions towards certain types of thought and sentiment which are passed on from generation to generation, it does not seem unreasonable to share the conviction of those who look upon conscience as a refined hereditary memory. It is not to be wondered at, however, that there should be some indication that the developmental explanation of all things, intuitionism, should have been well nigh swept away.

This irresistible evolutionary habit of thinking has recently found expression in the two widely accepted doctrines of radical empiricism and pragmatism. It would seem to the devotees of these schools that all the old landmarks of thought—a time, space, causality, freedom, God, conscience, the axioms—had been swept from their base and swallowed up in the current of a changing order. To be sure, they re-establish themselves as postulates, perhaps necessary postulates, of thought. But, even so, the doctrine of intuitionism has seemed to suffer a deluge of destruction, for it has been its genius to claim the most shaky thought and wavering faith of mankind upon foundations that are changeless and eternal.

What is there left, then, of intuitionism? Very little, indeed, in its older form, except to those who still cling to a conviction of static as against the plastic and changing universe. It is a remarkable fact, however, that during the last two or three decades the tide has been turning in exactly the opposite direction. However, even modified intuitionism as lively as was the English ethical intuitionism in the days of Hume. It is particularly noticeable among the recent students
of the origin, development, and meaning of religion. It has arisen not in spite of, but by reason of, the evolutionary conception of the world and of morals and religion. The point of departure of the newer intuitionism is the study of instinct and feeling; its method of procedure is the observation of coincidences in their genetic relations, and the analysis of the nature of thinking; and its culmination is the notion that intelligence and reason are not primary and controlling facts of consciousness, but secondary functions of a consciousness which is fundamentally of a pulsing, energetic kind, for the sake of aiding it in making finer and fuller adjustments. It looks as if the life of lower animals and plants is essentially pragmatic or voluntaristic. The first fact of organic life seems to be an impulse towards action, a want, a need. Probably in its early stages it does not cognize, much less rationalize, its behaviour; still it leads a relatively happy and successful career of deliberately intuiting the situations it meets. If the lower and higher kinds, including the mind of man, belong to a single order, if nature makes no leaps, but each "new" thing is but the variation upon and refinement of some old fact or function, then there is no difference in kind between the "native reactions" of simpler organisms and the conscious, and between the instinctive adjustments of animals and the logical judgments of a scientist. Genetic logic is approximating to a satisfactory description of the relationship between the two. The conscious is not uncommon for the students of the mental life to speak of the "intellectual instinct." Genetic psychology is making many advances towards discovering the kinship between the instinctive and the conscious, for the refined intuitions of cultivated minds. They differ essentially in two respects: the ability of higher creatures to "fix" more definitely, through cognition, ideation, and judgment, the old and the new, and the refinement, from within, of the "values" that accompany conduct, which have flowered into the inner life of art, morality, and religion. If the direct source of the wisdom on which these higher aspects of life is the "wisdom" that is bound up in instinct, and if there has been an evolution, not simply of intelligence, but of the mechanism for the immediate, affective interpretation of experience, as well, then we should seem to have a basis for a confidence in the worth of the higher intuitions. And such is the case—so that many students now believe that intuitionism has gained a more substantial foundation in philosophy than it has ever enjoyed. The history of intuitionism has been, indeed, a record of the knocking out, one after another, of false bottoms in the theory of knowledge, each time accompanied, on the one hand, by the fear that this doctrine had permanently collapsed, and, on the other, by the hope that it had established itself more securely upon a permanent basis. When science, during the 15th and 16th centuries, was destroying the conception of an "absence" God who spoke and operated upon the heart, the only alternative seemed to be atheism. Ratiocinative intuitionism has promised to establish intuitionism upon the surer foundation of truth, a copy of which is somehow reflected in the eternal verities of the understanding. Empirical assent to the axioms and conscience is built up out of experience. The impeding consequence seemed to be that the "natural sense" philosophers found in the experiences themselves the saving grace of truth, and thought that they had found a more substantial ground for morals and religion in the common experience of common men. Since latterly the dominant way of thinking about the mental life is in terms of evolutionary psychology, it seemed at first flush as if nothing were left but "pure" experience, or even, in the last analysis, the facts and laws of physics and chemistry and all there set in the reaction already mentioned.

4. Criticism.—At every stage in the ebbs and flows of the doctrine, important considerations have been overlooked. It is as if the mind could entertain but one impelling conception at a time. Atheism was failing to entertain a possibility of the divine immanence; associationism, a sort of "mental chemistry," was uses to the simple truth that the blending or fusion of "pure" experiences would be the summation of nothing which could give anything but one result so a result. This careless thinking has persisted through two centuries, and has begun to yield at last, as the outcome of more highly disciplined judgment and a more careful analysis of the facts of pathology and of physiological and experimental psychology, (e.g., two articles by J. Ward on 'Association and Association' in Mind, new ser., ii. [1893] 997-998, and iii. [1894] 590-592). Association is wholly confined to ideas that, to begin with, are distinct and in the end of the age, is in the mind, what it is true, as Ladd, Baldwin, and other psychologists contend, that perception is found in every sensation. The notion of pure sensation is an artificial abstraction. No less false is the "pure experience" of evolution and the supposition of radical naturalism that consciousness cannot be built up out of "organic memories," the fusion of original elements of "behaviour" that is the end of any ability to evaluate the quality or fitness of its reactions. Perhaps it is always impossible rightly to assume that something can come out of nothing. It may be true that an organism may do something to the environment at the same time that environment is forming consciousness. If so, it is wholly consistent to say that, while consciousness is constructed out of experiences, its relation to experiences is such that they are experiences at all is that they are, at every step in the process, parts of a personal consciousness. Then there would be the elements of moral and religious insight resident somehow within all experiences. The only absurdity of such a belief would arise in the thought of one who holds still to a static and finished, as against a plastic and developing, truth. With this amendment the old question assumes new significance.

5. Modern statement of theory.—The central problem of the newer modified intuitionism, however, is this: are the hereditary moral predispositions harvested up solely out of cognized experiences, or are there other of the higher affirmations of morality and religion than cognition, intellect, and judgment? There are several lines of evidence that the cognitive life is only one of the sources of such wisdom; that intuition is, in a certain sense, sui generis, our present intuitions having arisen not out of cognitions, but out of other intuitions in the past. Intuition is always more or less successful in guiding life into making 'wise' adjustments.

(I) It is clear from embryology, comparative anatomy, and genetic psychology that the intellectual processes have not been conceived in intellectual evolution, but are a later "afterthought" or "by-product," a specialized mode of carrying out that which is fundamental—behaviour. Reason has arisen out of conduct, and exists for the sake of improving it. The original means of interpreting the fitness of conduct and of distinguishing right behaviour from wrong was through the affective life—immediate intuitions, we may say, of its fitness.
(2) There has been a progressive redefinition of the mechanism of attention, which has kept pace with that of cognition. The latter has been refined through the agency of the cerebrum and the logical functions. The former has developed through the instrumentality of the nervous system and its connexions with the special senses, the glands, intestines, and the circulatory system, as the mechanism for the immediate evaluation of higher experiences as wholesome or unwholesome, good or bad, right or wrong. As indicated by the generally accepted James-Lange theory of the emotions, the organic responses often, if not generally, precede the cognitive reactions, and do much towards determining their character. The higher instincts and sentiments are the direct outcome of the redefinition of the coarser, simpler instincts.

(3) There is 'wisdom' in instinct. Judging by the behaviour of animals, this wisdom is more like intuition than cognition. Low organisms will 'learn' how to meet a novel situation successfully: a sea-anemone, e.g., will trigger a few times in the vain attempt of assimilating filter paper saturated with beef-juice, will soon refuse the tempting morsel. Every reaction of every animal seems to carry with it a tang or tone or flavour of its worth or value to the organism, and the ability to direct the discharge of the attention to the direction of the valuation reactions and away from those which bore ill. This evaluating quality of consciousness is itself probably a primary instinct. Should one care to give it a name, it might be designated 'cosmesthesia,' a feeling of relation, a sense of fitness. There is also in instinct the peculiar, unanalysed, of feeling after the consequence has completed itself, a dim awareness of ends about to be attained. It might be useful to give this quality a name, as, for example, 'telesesthesia.' This prophetic quality of instinct has been observed by several recent writers.

G. B. Mayer, e.g., says: 'Instinct and Intelligence.' British Journal of Psychology, vol. iv. (1919) 213: 'But there is even more than this 'feeling of activity' at the very first performance of an instinct. There is another element which, so far as I am aware, has hitherto been completely ignored. To my mind it is certain, that on the occasion of the chick's first peck or of the rabbit's first flight, something, of course very dimly, conscious of the way it is about to act.' G. F. Stout agrees with this view, and adds: 'But the instinctive equipment as a whole is not to be analyzed in any way, to account for the animal's actual behaviour. The animal will be on the alert to respond to a new situation before the developing situation brings it. This will be so because it feels interested in the situation, and especially in the situation as having a future. It will, successively, initiate or watch, or search for coming experiences. It will, so to speak, go to meet them.' (Op. cit. p. 240.)

The developed quality of these two endows experiences of consciousness, cosmesthesia and telesesthesia, which designate the essential nature of the wisdom of instinct, is the highest wisdom of the heart, much of which cannot be cognized.

(4) There is always operative the act of subconscious inaction, which presents to the field of clear consciousness new and unexpected results. These often arise from lines of conveyance among the instincts, impulses, and imperfect ideas, whose combined effect is a 'revelation' to the mind of the object which had been at most but dimly felt. The study of the subconscious, indeed, has robbed intelligences of the credit it had claimed for its control of life, and for our scientific, philosophic, and artistic heritage.

(5) The analysis of the processes involved in invention and discovery shows that something like intuition has played a most important role in this sphere, where formerly the highest efficiency and in complete control (consult Em. Mach, 'The Part Played by Accident in Discovery and Invention,' Popular Scientific Address, Chicago, 1897).

(6) Clear concise judgments are often derived from the summation of experience in experience. There is a vast array of evidence from psychological experimentation pointing in this direction, and much that proves the law conclusively.

A case in point is the work of A. Brückner upon touch sensations (Geschicht für Physikal. und Psychol. der Sinnesorgane, etc. 1901) [532]. Two simultaneous touches, one of which is below the threshold of consciousness, will produce a definite perception if the sum of the two is well over it (see also G. M. Stratton, Experimental Psychology and its Bearing upon Science, London, 1903, ch. iv. i.).

It amounts to a turning-point in the history of thought that the proof is forthcoming that even our clear conscious judgments are based upon evidences that must be felt rather than cognized.

It is not strange that with the many construing lines of evidence, of which the above are only typical, of the fact of an intuitive source of knowledge, there should recently have arisen a pre-audience for believing the values of intuitional as compared with that of intuition (see W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience, London, 1903, ch. on 'Philosophy'; H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, do. 1911). The genetic view of consciousness hinted above would tend to bring the two aspects of life into a satisfactory harmony. It would suggest the validity of the progressively enriching content of the moral, aesthetic, religious life, drawn from the content of all the instincts, independently of conscious description, and mayhap often transcending it. It would assume, too, that reason and judgment are the artificiated organized aspects of the entire stream of processes, not different in kind from the life of instinct and intuition. The intellect, being but a specialized expression of the rest of life in certain of its phases, preserves as its inner life the inner life of the instincts. It does not furnish 'values' to life because of its formulations; on the contrary, its formulations are for the sake of describing, so far as possible, the values that consciousness already apprehends.

It is likely that most of life will remain below and above the reach of accurate description and formulation, and that we will derive much of its truth or values from the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, which are the only places in the world in which we catch reality and directly perceive how events happen and how work is actually done' (James, op. cit. p. 301ff.).


Criticism of Intemalism: James Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1896, p. 11; F. Tait, Introduction to Ethics, New York, 1896, pp. xxvii, 37-51; H. K. G. Royce, Sources of Intemalism, in J. Ethics. 1915...

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investiture were symbolic of the new relation into which vassal and suzerain entered. The vassal did homage and tended the oath of fealty to his liege-lord; therupon the suzerain invested him by delivering over some object which was the symbol of his new rights. The object might be a cloak of earth to symbolize his possession of the land, or a sword at once symbolized his power over those beneath him and the nature of the service he must render to his superior. Investiture, therefore, marked how, whenever a man entered into possession of a fief, he took his place in the feudal system, and enjoyed certain rights on condition of rendering certain service.

1. In the Empire.—The controversy which sprang up on the question between Church and Empire, and which bulk so largely in the medieval period, was the natural result of the increased wealth and social importance of the clergy. So long as the Church was the communion of the faithful and was supported by their gifts, its clergy were elected by those who valued their services, and owned no allegiance save to the flock whom they served. They were chosen in view of their capacity to fulfill spiritual functions, and were invested with spiritual authority over all who owned themselves their subjects. The ring and crozier, which became the symbols of investiture of the clergy, were symbols of spiritual authority. The ring symbolized the marriage between the Churchman and his bishopric or monastery; the crozier stood for the sure of souls which was the assurance that the Churchman had laid his office and from the Church to serve the ends of the Church; he was the Church's 'man.'

But the Church came into possession of great domains of its own land, and, since the Church never died, it rarely surrendered any of this property. As holders of land, Churchmen became at once involved in the responsibilities which, according to the feudal tenure of all land, were attached to such possessions. They became incorporated in the feudal system. Bishops and abbots became secular lords in virtue of their lands. As such, they held their property of secular lords on condition that they fulfilled their duty to their suzerain. They became responsible also for courts of justice among their own vassals, and required the secular service of their vassals. The king of France was vassal to one hundred bishops for his possessions in the Vexin. The bishop-counts held their temporal possessions as the king's men, even as their own vassals in turn held property as their men. The system which gave Churchmen rights and privileges in connection with their temporal possessions, could be safe only if the Churchmen fulfilled in turn the responsibilities to their suzerain which the possessions implied. But, because the Churchmen needed the services of the holder of an ecclesiastical property, he needed also some guarantee that a new holder was competent to fulfill that side of his duty. He interfered, therefore, in the election of bishops, not out of wantonness, but from the natural desire to have a loyal and capable vassal. Hence there was a tendency to construe the ecclesiastical benefice, not as a spiritual office, but as a feudal fief, like every other feudal fief, involved allegiance to a secular lord and conferred on him the right of investiture. The suzerain received homage and oath of fealty from the Churchman, and thereupon invested him with ring and crozier. While the claim was naturally most eagerly pressed in the case of the bishops, the situation was the same, though in an inferior degree, in connexion with the abbots and priors of other monasteries. The vassal became a man, and the Churchman was made a lord. The Churchman became conscious of its spiritual functions, and at once began to claim the power to govern itself with the view of fulfilling its special functions. Laying weight on the title of the Church, as every other feudal fief, insisted that a spiritual function could be conferred only by spiritual men. Churchmen must be chosen by the Church with a view to their religious qualifications, and must be free to act as they thought best. Naturally, the Church failed to recognize that such a change in the status of the clergy within medieval society must bring with it their renunciation of functions which they had hitherto enjoyed. No kingdom dared allow the establishment in its midst of a body of men who enjoyed all the privileges, but

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were not to be relied on to fulfill the duties of their temporal possessions.

The rising claim for autonomy on the part of the Church found expression in the Lateran synod of 1059, which, in its sixth decree, forbade clerics to accept any spiritual office from lay hands; and the claim thus made in Italy was echoed by the synods of Vienne and Touloles the following year. But this was not, however, until Hildebrand became Pope Gregory VII that the battle was joined with increasing consciousness of all that was involved in this issue.

This was partly due to the uncompromising temper of the new pope, but still more was it due to the fact that he knew his own mind, and had no hesitation about uttering it. He saw, with the instinct of a born ruler, that the only justification for a government is that it should take the responsibility and the risks of governing. All Christendom recognized a certain privilege resting in Rome, but practically Christendom was going on in its several provinces as though Rome did not exist. Gregory grasped the reins and actually drove. He saw that the first aim to be sought was the Church's life, and its servants were to be reconstituted in the College of Cardinals, with the sole right to elect a pope; the Church, not the Emperor, must choose its head. That carried with it the free choice of the bishops by their clergy and people, who were to have more in the Church than a bishop's name and title. Any bishop who assumed authority till he had received his pallium, the symbol of his authority, from Rome. He extended the practice of sending legates from Rome to all parts of Christendom to unite with the head that it itself had chosen. His attack on simony and clerical marriage was meant to free the clergy from secular control.

The key to the situation lay in investiture. Who invested a Churchman with his authority? If the secular power, then he was chosen for his fitness to fulfill the duties of that power, and, as its 'man,' must take the duties of his office. If the Church, then his qualification was a religious one, and he must serve religious ends. Accordingly, in the famous Lenten synod of 1075, Gregory denounced the married clergy, excommunicated five of Henry IV's counselors because they had obtained their ecclesiastical offices by simony, and forbade every layman to grant investiture to an ecclesiastical dignity.

It was impossible for the Emperor to submit to this decision simpliciter. So long as Churches held high office in the Empire and large fiefs in every kingdom in Europe, they must hold these under pledge to fulfill the duties to the secular authorities involved in their dignitaries; and the secular authorities must have some guarantees at their election that the beneficiaries were loyal subjects. The revived power of Rome only made more intolerable the position which Gregory claimed. So long as the practical government of the Church was lodged in each provincial Church, the secular ruler could acknowledge beneficiaries who were loyal to a Church over which the provincial government held some control. But, when Rome not only claimed but exercised power over every section of the Church, the claim meant the institution in every kingdom of a body of men, holding large secular authority, who were liable to remain free to follow the dictates of a foreign power. The only terms on which the demands of the Church were admissible in their full scope were that the Churchmen should surrender their territorial power and secular dignities, and, since they claimed to be free to exercise spiritual authority, undertake to fulfill their spiritual duties. In the course of the struggle, many of the high dignitaries of the Church saw that this was involved in Gregory's demand, and were distinctly lukewarm in their support of the pope.

It is unnecessary to follow the course of the struggle between Gregory and the Emperor. It is enough to note that Henry's humiliation at Canossa in 1077 was followed in 1085 by Gregory's death in exile; that the sudden political changes in the situation proved that the question in debate was not ripe for settlement. Church and Empire could alternately win, but no lasting settlement had been arrived at. But the two popes who followed Gregory were content to reiterate the claims of the Church, Victor III at the synod of Benevento in 1087, Urban II at the synod of Molfi in 1089. Paschal II, however, made a significant admission. At Nutri his legates in 1111 met Henry V and offered, if the Emperor would grant freedom of election and the abolition of lay investiture, that Paschal was prepared to surrender all the temporalities which the clergy had received since the time of Charlemagne. But, when Henry arrived at Rome to be crowned on those terms, the bishops present entered a strong protest against what they asserted a surrender. The Church, apart from the pope, was not willing to pay the price of its liberty.

There followed more than ten years of confused debate and struggle. When, in 1124, Henry had taken prisoner after his abhorrent visit to Rome, was cowed or persuaded into a renunciation of the right of investiture. But a Lateran Council (1129) rejected the pope's submission on the grounds that Paschal was not at liberty; and the synod of Vienne, with the consent of the pope, renewed the uncompromising claim of the Church. Many other factors entered to complicate the situation between the Church and the Empire, but the main principle which divided the two powers, in that period of antipopes and rival Emperors, was still the question of investiture.

A compromise between the conflicting principles was reached by Henry V. and Calixtus II. in the Worms Concordat (1122), to which the Church set its seal in the 8th and 9th canons of the Lateran Council (1129). The excommunication of Henry IV's counselors because they had obtained their ecclesiastical offices by simony, and forbad every layman to grant investiture to an ecclesiastical dignity. The Church, however, retained the right of consecrating bishops, the Emperor the right of theinvestiture, though the elected must be accepted by the Emperor, and the Church alone to confer ring and crosier, the emblems of spiritual authority. The worst abuse connected with lay investiture thus fell away at once, for the Emperor was unable to keep a benefice vacant, since he could not prevent the elections from meeting. Otherwise the Concordat is a compromise, and, as such, theoretically open to criticism. The Church safeguarded the claims of the electors to whom belonged the right of declaring who was a fitting person to fill an ecclesiastical office; it preserved the recognition of every church dignitary as the holder of a spiritual office, since he was invested with ring and crosier by the Church. The State retained the power to make its influence felt by the promotion of its nominees, and the Emperor was acknowledged as feudal suzerain over Church fiefs as over all fiefs. Both parties, in fact, owned that the situation needed delicate handling, and could not be determined by either side pressing its claims to their logical issue. The practical utility of the Concordat was proved by the fact that, though it did not and could not prevent encroachments on one side or the other, its principles regulated the tenure of church dignities in the Empire till its dissolution in 1806. Then the situation was wholly changed, since Christendom no longer owned only one Church;
the investigue question passed into the issues of Church and State.

2. In France.—The controversy arose in France, but there its course was different, because the Church was not dealing, as in the Empire, with one central authority. The settlement, for the same reasons, was different. There could not be a Concordat, since any decision at which the king arrived did not bind the great nobles. Hence, for a full statement of the struggle and its settlement, it is necessary to consider all the greater diets. It need only be noted that by the Pragmatic Sanction under Paschal II., the king abandoned all claim to homage from Churchmen and the right of investiture. He demanded, however, an oath of fealty before any beneficiary was allowed to enter on his temporalities, and thus retained suzerainty over church dignities, so far as they were fees. The agreement, though different in its terms, was practically the same as the Worms Concordat. The arrangements made by the feudal lords, varied according to their power and the condition of the Church in their territories. In the South of France, where the clergy were less amenable to the influence of Rome, homage was long exacted from bishops.

In England.—In England the controversy was clearly raised by Archbishop Anselm under Henry I. Anselm's conduct in the matter illustrates vividly the service which the monastic order was destined to render to the long debate. Monks, who held high dignity, were indifferent, to a degree that the more secularized Churchmen were not, to the emoluments and dignities of office and to the assiduous obedience to the Church. Anselm, appealing to the decrees of Gregory and Urban, refused to do homage for his own see on Henry's accession (1100), or to consecrate bishops who had done such homage. The controversy which followed was sharp and decisive, as was to be expected from two men who were intelligent for each other's position. The compromise at which they arrived and which Personal Concordat (1101) was practically the Worms Concordat. It came to be embodied in Magna Charta.

CI. further, art. CONCORDAT.


INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE.—The question as to how far ignorance in its various degrees affects the ministerial character of action calls for consideration in any ethical system which aims at completeness. Only in so far as it is voluntary is an action imputable. In the moral theology of the Roman Catholic Church a broad distinction is drawn between 'invincible' ignorance and 'vincible' ignorance. A man is said to be in a state of invincible ignorance if, when he acts, he is altogether unaware of the law or of the facts of the case, and hence is unamissuous of the obligation of further inquiry on the point. Only, if after reasonable effort he is unable to arrive at certain knowledge. Ignorance is invincible when a man is conscious of his lack of knowledge and of the duty of making some further inquiry, and nevertheless neglects to use his opportunities of so doing. Invincible ignorance presents several varieties. A man may actually foster his own ignorance for fear lest the obligation should become known to him (ignoravit et sibi erecta supina); he may make some efforts, but such as are incommensurate with the gravity of the matter (ignorantia pure vincible). It will be noted that the terms 'invincible' and 'vincible' ignorance have reference to the state of mind in which a particular action (or series of actions) is performed. Invincible ignorance in no way signifies that the mind is incapable of further enlightenment on the subject. New information may transform it into clear knowledge. As regards the degree of certain moral obligations, he may be justified in pleading as an explanation of errors due to want of such knowledge, unless considerable efforts have been made to attain it. All are bound to make every good effort to acquire ignorance in matters affecting the salvation of their own souls or those of others. Yet even here much will depend on the circumstances and capacity of the person concerned. What would be invincible ignorance in the case of the uneducated or of one much occupied with duties from which there was no escape would be vincible ignorance in those less unfavourably situated.

Invincible ignorance excuses from all culpability. An action committed in ignorance of the law prohibiting it, or of the facts of the case, is not a voluntary act. The true character of what he is doing is unknown to the agent by the unanimous teaching of Roman Catholic moralists. This position was, however, traversed by the Reformers. According to Luther, invincible ignorance renders no breaches of human law alone inexcusable; it is otherwise as regards the law of God. For here our ignorance is due to original sin, and is itself sinful. It cannot, therefore, inexcusable, though it be, pleaded in excuse.

'In politics segetis petes case locus invincible ignorantiae ... sed hoc ad aenormes et conscientiae segetis transferendos non est. Summa enim null in secula seculorum originalis: si malum ignorantcum est, sed non adeo excusable est, ait scholasticorum invincibilibus ignorantiam diximus ex causis.' (Comment in LXXV. 15).

Calvin goes so far as to deny the possibility of invincible ignorance as regards the divine law. Our ignorance, he says, is never such as to be invincible ignorance of the law of the super'.

'Certum est ignorantiam zizinnam supinae crassaque negligratitam saccatae comitissim.' (In Lactan., xlii. 47).

Jansenius on this point followed the teaching of Luther (de Stat., not. I., vii. 6); and, even after the condemnation of the five propositions, his doctrine on this subject continued to be upheld by some of his adherents. In 1690, Pope Alexander VIII. authoritatively condemned the proposition: 'Even if there be such a thing as invincible ignorance as to the divine law, and if ignorance of that kind is such as to make the person ignorant of the commandment, it is not thereby excused from formal sin.' (Jansenist doctrine of invincible ignorance is 'commodissima in statu naturalis hominis ex ordine non insensum non occulta.' De Mari, no. 1992).
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This thesis had been maintained by the Jansenist theologian Jean Baptiste de la Mothe (A. Vacant, Dict. de théologie, Paris, 1903, i. 759). The doctrine that invincible ignorance from sin is, indeed, of great importance in Roman Catholic theology. It renders the dispensation of grace by the Church, that communion with the See of Peter is by God’s ordinance necessary to salvation, compatible with the confident hope that many who are outside all communion with the Roman Catholic Church will enter heaven. This point was clearly expressed by Pius IX. in his Encyclical to the Bishops of Italy (10th Aug. 1863).

It is known both to ourselves and to you (venerable brethren) that they who are in the state of invincible ignorance regarding our holy religion, and who correctly observe the natural law and its precepts written by God Himself on the hearts of all...can, through the action of God’s light and grace, attain eternal life, since God...will by no means suffer any to perish who has not incurred the guilt of wilful sin (Borromeo, no. 1677).

On the other hand, invincible ignorance regarding those matters which a man is under obligation to know is culpable. Here the want of knowledge is voluntary, either directly, as in ignorantia affectata, or indirectly, as in ignorantia crassa or pure invisibilia. And no man is justified in remaining voluntarily ignorant as to the duties of his state of life or as to the truths essential to his salvation.

On this point Roman Catholic moralists find themselves at issue with the very prevalent opinion that invincible ignorance error can never be a breach of the Moral Law. Where the speculative error relates to vital matters of religion, and is due to negligence, such error, they hold, is gravely culpable. Possibly, invincible ignorance is voluntary, the responsibility for the acts resulting from it remains with the agent. The guilt, however, of sin due to this cause is proportioned, not to the object of the thing done, but to the degree of culpable negligence to which it is due. Moreover, an act done through ignorance, even that ignorance be crassa or supina, is less culpable than an act done with clear knowledge; for it is less fully voluntary, and, therefore, less imputable. As regards the ignorance which is deliberatively fostered, there is a divergence of opinion among moralists.

How far can invincible ignorance extend?

It would seem that there are limits beyond which it is impossible. There are certain broad principles of the natural law which can never be altogether overlooked. No man, e.g., can be invincibly ignorant that he should not do to another what he would be unwilling to have done to himself. As soon, however, as we pass to derivative principles, invincible ignorance appears. To the Christian moralist it is evident that polygamy is contrary to the law of nature. Yet many a pagan and Muhammadan is certainly in invincible ignorance on this matter. Dwelling provides a case in which invincible ignorance prevails in certain more civilized countries. A question of special interest in view of opinions now often maintained is whether it is possible for a man to be invincibly ignorant regarding the existence of God. The general reply of Roman Catholic theologians is that, even if such ignorance be possible, it is altogether abnormal and can last at most but a short time: the evidence of God’s existence both in the created world and in the human conscience are so manifest and clear that it is impossible for ignorance on this point to remain long invincible (J. de Lugo, de Incarn., 1836, i. 331). It is plain that this view is incompatible with the admission that any one can continue long to be a conscientious agnostic. Agnosticism appears as invincible ignorance on a question as to which a man is under the gravest obligation to acquire certain knowledge and thus to which such knowledge is easy of attainment.

In the Annals of the Roman Catholic Church, ad 1559–1630, vii. 364; G. Balderston, Theologica Moralia, Prato, 1598, i. c.; C. J. Bolland, Institutions Theologiae Moralis Prima, Bruxelles, 1877, pp. 60–77; V. Pagi, De Actibus Humanitatis, Parii, 1837, ii. 1557f.; W. J. Walsh, De Actibus Humanitatis, Dublin, 1838.

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INVISIBILITY. The attribute of invisibility is one which is shared by gods, spirits, demons, the dead and the region of the dead, or the world of the gods, while the power of becoming invisible belongs to those beings as well as to certain mortals. Where invisibility was ascribed to gods or spirits, one simple reason probably was that in the case of most of them, apart from animal-gods or worshipful parts of nature, they were in fact unseen. When man begins to people his world with spirits, which, as many savages believe, swarm everywhere, so that one cannot move without striking against them, their quality of invisibility is obvious. In the case of the dead it was more a power which could be exercised by them or a property hiding them from bodily eyes, since they could be seen in dreams, and it was then considered that the soul of the dreamer had been with the dead. Gods or spirits are not always all-powerful; they have the power of becoming visible or invisible at will, assuming in some instances a bodily form for the former purpose. In the case of favoured mortals, the supposed power of invisibility was ascribed to or claimed by them because it was a desirable thing. What men wish for is often what they think they or others possess. Such a supposed power might easily then be ascribed upon supernatural beings, otherwise material and visible. It should be observed that medicine-men often claim the power of seeing invisible beings whom ordinary mortals cannot see. In some instances it is thought that, formerly, when gods and men dwelt together, the gods were visible; but, now that separation has taken place, they are no longer seen, except on occasion. Hence, among the wise, the reason of the wide-spread belief that it is possible to see a god or spirit, when he takes a visible form.

I. Spirits and gods. The Andamanese believe that their high god Pulaha is now invisible, even when he descends to earth. Ju-ru-win, the evil spirit of the sea, is also invisible, and so, too, are the soul and spirit of the dead. In general the high gods of Australian blacks—Ba-income, Daramutan, etc.—are invisible and unknown, though they may be heard. Coddington writes of the Melanesian nobts that they come invisibly and possess men. Should such spirits chance to be seen, they disappear at once. Someuwa are visible; others are not, being incorporeal. There is a belief that, if the latter could be seen, it would be as a grey indistinct something. In Polynesia, gods generally were invisible, or visible only in so far as they became incarnate (though not always then) or embodied themselves in a visible shape. Such a god as Tauroa (Leeward islands) was invisible to mortals, and he sustained the world by his invisible power. Men lived in an invisible world of spirits and ghosts, which often, however, manifests itself and seems to men. Among the savage races of the Malay peninsula many of the gods (e.g., the creator Pirmam of the
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The gods of Babylon constituted a countless multitude of visible and invisible beings, whose bodies were of a more rarefied substance than that of mortals. The hosts of demons were invisible and impalpable, though possessed of some form, and could creep into houses through the narrowest possible openings. In Greece the gods had powers of invisibility or could surround themselves with a mist, but they could also make themselves visible to mortals in various forms. They would often assume their mortal forms, and their orders of beings are darkness or a mist to save them in time of danger. Early Hindu literature shows that the gods were invisible, yet could assume any visible form at will to favour or harm mortals, for they may possess a purely spiritual form. Such deities as Vâtas, the wind, are naturally regarded as invisible; 'his sound is heard, but his form is not seen.' Here also we find the belief in an earlier visible incarnation of the gods, which was broken off because of men's solicitations which wearied the gods. Formerly they drank with men visibly; now they do so unseen. Holy men formerly beheld the gods and the moral belief common to mortals and surrounded men invisibly. In modern Hinduism, while invisibility is an attribute of gods, as well as of most spirits and demons which surround men, the decided anthropomorphic forms attached to them make the belief in their visible appearance possible, as does also the conception of visible incarnations. Thus Radha 'by herself or by the numberless spirits where her ain vision may take shape, but he manifests himself to neatherdants and water-carriers.' The numerous gods of Northern Buddhism are invisible; e.g., they are invited to attend the ceremonies of the Buddhist creed. The earthly Buddhhas have ethereal and invisible counterparts in the formless worlds of meditation. In Shintoism the invisibility of gods is explained by the theory that since the Ance of the Gods they have removed farther from the earth, so that they are now beyond the scope of human vision.

In Celtic belief similar views have been entertained. The divine sid-folk appeared or disappeared at will, often from or into a supernatural mist, and one of them is represented as saying, 'We behold and are not beheld.' They may be seen by favoured persons, but not by others present at the same time, and some of the gods possess objects which cause invisibility—e.g., Manannan's magic cloak. Of him it is said that he makes the gods invisible and immortal.

The narrative of the 'Penz' shows that in early Hebrew belief the idea of a time when God visibly had intercourse with man was prevalent. In later times God is thought to be more withdrawn; and, though certain persons see Him or some part of Him or His glory, or theophanies of the Angel of Jehovah are granted to certain persons, or God is seen in visions, or He appears in symbolic form, e.g., as fire, yet no one can see even in some of these instances that it is dangerous to see Him. Thus 'no man shall see me and live.' The finest expression of God's invisibility is to be found in the words of Job. That God is invisible is also a doctrine of the NT and is finnally stated by St. John. God in Christ—the Incarnation—is the full manifestation of the invisible God. The idea of the danger of seeing God is found in the NT. Angelic orders of beings are darkness or a mist, yet they appear occasionally to men.

The Christian doctrine of God's invisibility is a natural corollary of the doctrine that God is spirit, but it does not mean that God does not manifest Himself as in the Incarnation and already in other ways: 'the invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.' The vision of God in the Beatitudes, in the Mysteries, Neoplatonist and Christian, is entirely a spiritual experience, 'not with the eyes of the body, but of the soul.' But the vision of God is enjoyed by angels, and is the reward of the pure in heart. The invisibility of God is also a doctrine of Islam, and here, too, it is held that such supernatural beings as the jinn can become invisible by a rapid extension or rarefaction of the particles which compose them, and even suddenly appear in the earth or air or through a solid wall. They can manifest themselves in any form which they please.

In folk-belief fairies, elves, dwarfs, etc., are supposed to have the power of invisibility when wishing to be heard of by men, or by means, e.g., of fansocred. They also confer their power on mortals. By a magical salve with which the eyes are anointed it is possible to see invisible elves.

2. Invisibility of the dead.—That the spirits of the dead are invisible is a general belief among most peoples. This is obvious when we consider how, in so many instances, where they are supposed to haunt the grave, or their former abode, or some particular locality, they are not usually seen, but their presence is known or felt, or they make manifest themselves to friends or relations there.

4 E. O. Thurn, Among the Ind, of Guinea, London, 1883, passim.
6 Q. Homer, II. 24, 510, xx, 658, etc.
7 Salopedia Brahmaka, III, 4, 5, 6, III, 2, 56.
8 D. J. Moodie, Del Vedu, Berlin, 1836, p. 39.
themselves heard, or, as in Manakihiki, where certain plants were protected by ghosts, those spots were known by their repulsive odour. On the other hand, they can be seen by the living—e.g., in dreams or trances—or they manifest themselves as apparitions, more or less visible, or they can be seen or communicated with by wizards. In many instances to see a ghost is dangerous to the percipient, causing death, disease, or madness. A few instances will illustrate the general belief in the invisibility of ghosts.

According to the Arusansans, they are invisible, but may be seen by the pali, i.e., the other souls of dreaming³. The Arusansans believe that the souls of the dead are invisible to human eyes, yet may be seen by dreamers with supernatural power (paka-mata), who can also see the invisible powers of good and evil.² Ghosts among the Melanesians do not appear in visible form, but if anything is seen of them it is as fire or flames.⁴ The Semang think that souls of the dead are visible to each other, but invisible to mortal eyes.⁵ At the Lapak feast of the dead the spirits are present invisibly—an idea which is constantly found in connection with all such feasts among savages and in folk-supernatural.⁶ In Sense, where the soul is thought to have the same form as the body, it is dreaded by those who profess to see it after death.⁷ Ben lived in a world of invisible spirits of the dead surrounding them, but they might be seen at night.⁸

In most cases, as Cooke has said, the dead have joined an indwelling ³¹ h genius. This is illustrated by the story told by Procopius²⁰ of the fishermen on the coast opposite Britania who were scattered by a ghost.²¹ They were taken to ferry across the shades of the dead, who were unseen by them.

3. Invisible of the Other-world.—The Other-world or the world of the gods, being a spiritual or quasi-spatial region, is generally held to be an atmosphere or ordinary circumstances. But like the dead, it may be seen in dreams and visions, the soul being supposed to go thither, or actual visits are paid to it by mortals in visible as well as invisible forms.²² Examples of this belief are found in the Polynesian conception of Ruhutia, the serial paradise, invisible save to spirits;²³ in the idea of the Dale of York Island natives regarding the place of the dead, matona nien, that, if our eyes were turned so that what is inside the head were now outside, we would see that matona nien was very near to us and not far away at all;²⁴ in one of the Celtic conceptions of Erym as a mysterious region on the same plane as this world or entered through a mist—a conception also entertained in later times regarding fairy-land;²⁵ and in the Jewish idea that the righteous dead (Psalm 17:14) will behold the world which is now invisible to them.²⁶ The unseen nature of the Other-world is a fact of ordinary experience, but in all ages and all religions it has been visible to select persons on occasion.

4. Invisibility as a power.—Invisibility, like shape-shifting, is a power frequently claimed by medicine-men, wizards, and witches, or various recipes or charms exist by which other persons can become invisible, or invisibility is produced by some magical means. A native told Count de Cardi that the Ju-Ju priests in W. Africa could make themselves invisible so quickly that one could not tell when they had done so.²⁷ Usually the means employed was a spell or potion. The Sinhalese think that a number of medicines mixed and charmed in a grave less than seven days old and rubbed on the face near the eyes makes the invisible at night.²⁸ The Ju-Ju priests make charms which give the wearer the power of invisibility.²⁹ In Dakhoney the potion used was made from the body of a male infant pounded in a mortar.³⁰ In a Kasaari tale collyrum rubbed on the eyes causes invisibility.³¹ In modern folk-survivals similar powers are ascribed to magic potions. According to a belief current in the S. Spondes, a snake should be killed on 1st May, and its head buried with a bean in its mouth. When the beans are grown, all should be gathered and placed one by one in the mouth of the dead, and invisibility as soon as a bean is found which makes the face invisible, this particular bean should be kept, and, when put in the mouth, will make one invisible.³² Witches in Lepsiu Island take the ear of a black cat, boil it in the milk of a black cow, and wear it on the thumb to produce invisibility.³³ Fern-seed, gathered between 12 and 1 on Midsummer Eve, censsed one to walk invisibly.³⁴ The ancient Druids were believed to possess the power of invisibility, either by means of a spell or by producing a magic mist. This spell, the fauth faethus, was also used by Christian saints, and survives in one form as St. Patrick’s Lorcan, by which he and his companions were made invisible to their enemies, or changed into deer—probably a late corruption of the earlier story through a confusion of the name with faethus, ‘deer’. The charm of invisibility is still remembered in the W. Highlands.³⁵ The gods of Greece frequently made their favourites invisible by means of a magic mist when they were in danger (see above).

A cap of invisibility is often mentioned in Middle時代—German, Greek, Italian, Balorn, etc. This corresponds to the helmet of Grecian which made Achilles invisible, the death mask of Macbeth and Siegfried—a hat or cloak, which is also a common property of demons and devils, especially in connection with the Devilishness of Norse tales, and the cap of Perseus.³⁶ Similar invisibility-producing articles are the ring of Ogden, Petason’s cloak, and many others mentioned in myths and legends. The cap or cloak of invisibility may have taken its origin from the disguise to which clothes lend themselves so easily, or it may have been from the natural desire of becoming invisible as a protection against danger.

In some myths of the Mundane religion, Hibil Izwa descends to the seven lower worlds, and remains invisible in them for long periods, acquiring their mysteries.³⁷ Gnostic descriptions of the descent and return of the heavenly son Christ through the spheres of the archons sometimes tell how he was accomplished invisibly to them, as in the basilidium system, where he probably descended through his mystic name ‘Caelau’. Gnostic souls, ascending through these spheres, were invisible to their rulers, who ordained their baptism or initiation, or because they had mastered the Gnosis and knew the names and nature of the archons.³⁸

The power of becoming invisible is still believed in sporadically, even by educated people, the process suggested being perhaps a kind of dematerialization of the body.³⁹

5. Invisible weapons.—As sickness or death is usually ascribed by savages to invisible demons, so they are often supposed to effect the evil by invisible weapons.⁴⁰

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnotes.

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3 J. W. E. ELLIS, Legends of the Ring, in Folklore, 1898, p. 66.
4 E. A. BORON, FZ, 1899, 171.
5 See HOPKINS, 166.
6 J. BURTON, 1210; 1 Henry IV., I I, 90; JENSON, New Inn, 6.
7 A. J. MACCULLOCH, 810, 222; FZ, 1910, 142.
8 F. E. W. ELLIS, 216, 218, 222.
10 N. M. ELLIS, 216, 218, 222.
11 B. THORPE, 122.
12 B. THORPE, 122.
13 See E. A. BORON, some curious accounts in Arch. and Lit., 1891, pp. 54-56.
14 For the invisible astral body of thesew, see C. W. LEANDER, Man and His Universe, 1905, 7.
15 B. THORPE, 122; S. B. SMITH, The Riddle of Life, ed. 1912.
16 See cases referred to in art. FIZ, J, 6, and cf. J. A. MACCULLOCH, 1900, 365.
INVOCATION (Liturgical).—Invocation or Epiclesis is the technical term for the prayer for the Holy Spirit in the consecration of the Eucharist, but also, more rarely, at Confirmation.

1. The Eucharistic consecration conceived as an epiclesis.—The universal practice of the Church in early times was to use a prayer for the consecration of the Eucharist, just as it was the practice to use a prayer rather than any declaratory formula for consecrating the Eucharist, or in ordaining, the Church would think it right to do the same. In instituting the Eucharist, our Lord ‘blessed’ or ‘gave thanks’—with what words we do not know—and then gave the sacrament to the disciples with a declaratory formula, ‘This is my body.’ Etc. We remark that the ‘blessing’ (Mt 26:26, Mk 14:22) and ‘giving thanks’ (Mt 26:26, Mk 14:22, Lk 22:19) over the bread and wine are identical. St. Paul, who used the latter phrase in 1 Co 11:24, speaks in 1 Co 10:16 of the cup of blessing which we bless; and this explains why the form used in consecrating the Eucharist in after ages is called the Thanksgiving, although it consisted of prayer as well as giving of thanks (cf. 1 Ti 4:4). ‘Every creature of God is good if it be received with thanksgiving’ (I Tim. 4:4). It must be remembered that the words of God and prayer; here prayer is part of thanksgiving). At a later time the question arose whether Jesus consecrated the Eucharist by this ‘blessing’ (‘giving thanks’). Some, being only by declaring it to be His body and blood. The medieval theologians seem generally to have taken the latter view (and perhaps Tertullian; see below); yet the Council of Trent apparently inclined the other way, for it says (sess. 13, cap. 1):

‘Our Redeemer instituted this wonderful sacrament at the Last Supper, when, after the blessing of the bread and wine, He instituted in express and clear words that He was giving them His own body and His blood.’

We have, however, to consider what the early Christians thought to be the essence of the consecration as celebrated by the Church, whether the invocation of Divine assistance, or the declaratory words, ‘This is my body,’ etc., it will appear from what we have already said that there was probably no difference of opinion in the early Church as to how our Lord consecrated the Eucharist at the Last Supper, yet all agreed that the Church could consecrate only by praying God that what was done then by Jesus might be done at each Christian Eucharist. To use a mere declaratory formula, whether in Holy Communion or at Ordination, would have appeared to the early Church as presumptuous and irreverent.

2. Early period. — No clear deduction can be made from the Didache, as it is uncertain whether the prayers there given were used for consecrating the Eucharist or not (see art. AGAPE). But Justin Martyr uses language which, however interpreted, shows that he conceived the consecration to be effected by a prayer. He says (Apol. i. 69):

‘As Jesus Christ often being incircumcised by the Word of God (for the possible confusion here of the Word and the Spirit, see Eph 4:23) blessed both flesh and blood for our salvation, so we have been taught that οὐκ εἴρημεν ἀλλὰ τὸν πίστεις τῶν εὐαγγελισμένων προφητών... are both the flesh and blood of the true Jesus;’

For our purpose the words left untranslated are the important ones; but they are very obscure. They might be rendered: ‘The flesh which has been given thanks over (unincircumcised, consecrated) by the formula of prayer which comes from Him’ (so Batifol, Études, 2nd ser., p. 140). Similarly the English word of prayer (Acts of the Apostles, London, 1837, p. 334) is ‘by a word of prayer’ (Ibid. vi. 23).

In the Church Orders of the 4th (or possibly 3rd) cent., bishops, priests, and deacons are ordained simply by a single prayer, with laying on of hands.

3. Second period. — When we come to Ireneus, the matter is clear. This Father tells us (Hær. i. xiii. 2) that the Gnostics used an Epiclesis. Mark the Valentinian, who came from Asia to Gaul, used (apparently at his Eucharist) a cup full of wine and water which was at first clear, and continued ‘the word of invocation’ till (by some conjuring trick) it became dark. It was pretended that the son Grace mixed its blood with the wine in answer to the invocation. Here we see a parody of the Christian Eucharist. The Orthodox also used an Epiclesis. In Hær. iv. xviii. 5, Ireneus says:

‘Bread from the earth receiving the Epiastés (the essence of the printed editions seems to be a mistake) literally not in 170 v. 3, 1571 b. 1890, p. 363 of God is no longer common bread, but Eucharist.’ The bread and wine ‘receive the word of God, and the Eucharist becomes the Body of Christ’ (Hær. v. ii. 5).

Here the ‘word of God’ may be personal, as perhaps in Sarapion (see 8, below), but more probably it is impersonal; it may mean the prayer of consecration (see Batifol, Études, 2nd ser., p. 159), or may have exactly the same force as Justin’s phrase ὑπὲρ εὐαγγελισμοῦ. So cautio warns us not to assume that any form of invocation existed in the time of Ireneus; the εὐαγγελισμοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ (JTST 117 n.)

In the Gnostic Acts of Thomas (2nd or 3rd cent.) there is an invocation at the Eucharistic. To Jesus, did we wish to use us partakers of the Eucharist of the holy body and precious blood, let us make bold to approach the Eucharist and to invoke the holy name of our Lord.‘ Rossites, . . . come, perfect companions; come thus that you may know the mysteries of the ancients, discover the secrets, and manifest things not to be spoken, the sacred dove which hath brought forth twin young; open thus secret mother,’ etc. (II. 46, ed. M. Rost, Leipzig, 1868, p. 36 f.; Acta Suec. Ed. vi., Edinburgh, 1879, p. 161; for the Ethiopic Acts, of which the text differs somewhat from the above, see E. A. Budge, Continuations of the Apocryphal Acts, London, 1901, ii. 653.) This invocation is noteworthy as being addressed to our Lord; it shows also some approach to a prayer for the Spirit. The Syriac Acts (given in W. Wright, Apocr. Acts of the Apostles, London, 1857, p. 128) name the Holy Spirit in the invocation explicitly; but they may have been revised by an orthodox hand. The Gnostic Acts of John (ibid. 11, 1938) has no Epiclesis; the work is earlier than the Acts of Thomas.

Tertullian approaches the matter from a somewhat different point of view. He says that the Eucharist is the body and blood of Christ, because our Lord distinctly called it so: ‘Acceptum paschæ et distributionis discipulorum corporis summis, hoc est corpus nosi divinum, id est, corpus corporis’ (cfr. Hær. iv. 49).

This passage does not, indeed, deny that Jesus used words of blessing or thanksgiving to consecrate the Eucharist at the Last Supper, and it need not mean more than that the words ‘This is my body,’ etc., were those by which our Lord made the change in the elements known to the disciples;
but it undoubtedly gives us a fresh point of view. Yet it tells us nothing of the usage of the African Church at that period of time.

The usage of the Cappadocian Church in the 3rd cent. may indirectly be gathered from the words of Firmilian in a letter to Cyprian (Cypr. Ep. lxiiv. (=Ep. lxx in P. P. iv. 428) 10). He says that a prayer, described as apodeixis, had arisen 22 years before, when he had administered the sacraments, and in consecrating the Eucharist had used 'no contemptible invocation.' Firmilian, though a Cappadocian bishop, shows no knowledge of Cyprian's usage being other than the Asiatic in this respect.

The Alexandrian usage of that time was, doubtless, the same, for Origen (c. Cel. viii. 38) speaks of the bread becoming a sacred body through the prayer, and (in Mt 15) of the Eucharist as 'sanctified by means of the Word of God, and prayer.' In his comment on 1 Co 7 he speaks of the Eucharistic Lord 'over which the name of God and Christ and the Holy Ghost has been invoked' (τοις λαλησθαι).

The Pistoia Sophia, an Ophite work of Egyptian origin (early 3rd cent., perhaps based on an earlier work), describes a sort of Eucharist with bread and wine; when the invocation is pronounced, the wine on the right of the oblation (bosis) is changed into water (Srawley, Early Hist. of Liturgy, p. 43).

The Eucharist of Alexandria, a work of the 3rd cent., perhaps testifies to an invocation of the Holy Spirit; but the text is not quite certain (Srawley, p. 88 f.)

These quotations show that an invocation of some sort was in general use in the 2nd and 3rd centuries, but give us, except in the case of the Gnostics, very little idea as to its nature. The Eucharistic worship of that time was probably in the main extemporaneous; the invocatory prayer had no fixed form, and all that we learn is that a calling down of Divine power was, to all appearance, universal.

4. Period of development.—When we come to the 4th and 5th centuries, a great era of liturgical making, we have quite clear evidence as to the Epistles. The Hippolytian Canons, which perhaps represent Egyptian usage in the 3rd cent., though in their present form (allowing for some slight additions of a later period) they are probably of the 4th cent. (Maclean, Aen. Ch. Orders, p. 150 ff.), when describing the Eucharistic service, says, after the communicants have drunk and sung Confessio, 'receives the prayer and finishes the Offering' (προφορὸς, ed. H. Achelis, TU vi. 4, Leipzig, 1891, §§ 21-27). The Egyptian Church Order (early 4th cent.? [Maclean, p. 106 f.]) has almost exactly the same words. But, in addition to descriptions of the service, we now possess five 4th cent. liturgies, of which at least the central part is extant in full; those, namely, of the Ethiopic Church Order, the Latin Verona Fragments of the Didascalics, etc. (these two are almost the same, so far as they run parallel); the Testament of our Lord, and the Apostolic Constitutions, and that of St. Ignatius of Antioch, bishop of Timis in the Nile Delta. In all these, after the Sursam Confession, there is (in some cases with the Sancius added) a Eucharistic Thanksgiving, giving thanks for our redemption, among other blessings, and, in doing so, introducing the narrative of the Last Supper, mentioning more or less fully (see below) our Lord's words and actions at it. Then come the Offering of the elements to God and the fatiguing formula for the Divine intervention (see 3, below). These three elements—narrative with thanksgiving, offering of the elements, and prayer—will be found to be the essence of all later liturgical form, which may have been added.

Before dealing with the comments on the Eucharistic liturgy of this period, it will be convenient to consider the omission of our Lord's words in some authorities. Cyril of Jerusalem (A.D. 348) describes the service at Jerusalem (Cat. Lact. xxiii. 6 f.); he deals fully with the 'prayer' with the grace of the heaven, earth, sea, the angels and archangels, and the sanctus, and yet he says nothing of the commemoration of redemption, or of our Lord's words, 'This is my body,' etc. Immediately after mentioning the Sanctus he says:

'...and we call upon God to send forth His Holy Spirit upon the gifts lying before Him, that He may make the bread the body of Christ and the wine the blood of Christ. For whosoever the Holy Ghost has touched is sanctified and changed.'

This is what strikes him as the essential feature of the service. So in xxxi. 3 he says that the bread of the Eucharist, after the invocation of the Holy Ghost, is no longer mere bread, but the body of Christ. There is no evidence of the existence of the Words of our Lord in the Jerusalem liturgy of the 4th cent., and Cyril's silence is significant as showing at least that they did not appear to him to be the principal act in the service. He comments on them elsewhere (xxii.) as used at the Last Supper, but not in connexion with the liturgy. Brightman, indeed, thinks that there is a liturgical reminiscence about this chapter, just as the phrase 'His undeceived hands and feet' in xx. 3 (On Baptism) has a parallel in the Liturgy of St. James, Greek and Syriac (Lit. East. and West, p. 469, n. 11). However this may be, half of the Words of our Lord—those over the cup—are omitted in the liturgy of the Testament of our Lord, which only alludes to them; and so in the Abyssinian Anaphora of our Lord (below, § 7), which is derived from the Testament, and which, though it has inserted several later features, leaves the narrative of the Last Supper in the same mutilated state. The East Syrian Lit. of the Apostles Adai and Mari, which in its essential features is probably to be dated before A.D. 431 (though it has received additions in course of time,§ 7), omits the words entirely. That this was not regarded, even at the beginning of the 7th cent., as an essential omission, however unusual, appears from the curious opinion of Gregory the Great, that it was the custom of the Apostles to consecrate the sacrificial oblation solely with [the Lord's] prayer' (Ep. ix. 12 [18]).

He contradicts the prayer in use in his day, 'composed by some scholar,' with our Lord's own words:

'Inconvener vetusto esse quasi sacerdotes sanctissimae communionis super oblationem non redderentur. Nam sanctissimae communionis super oblationem non redderunt corpus et sanguinem nostrum dicentes non dicerunt.'

He appointed the Lord's Prayer to be said directly after the Canon for this reason. There is no question whether Gregory's opinion was right or wrong; but the fact that he held it shows that he did not consider the essence of the service to lie in the declaratory formula, but thought of the consecration as being effected by a prayer.

5. Patristic comment in this period.—Turning to the comments of the Fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries, we find the same conception of the consecration by a prayer. Basil (de Spir. Sanct. xxvii. 69) says:

'Wish of the saints has led us in writing the words of invocation at the making (συνέβαλε) of the bread of the Eucharist and the cup of blessing.'

This shows the absence of any fixed form. Athanasius (or pseudo-Athanasius?), in a sermon to the newly-baptized quoted by Eutychius of Constantinople in the 6th cent. (de Pneumate et de sancte Liturgia, 8 [Brightman, p. 633, n. 17; PG lxxvi. 2401, fr. 7]), says:

' '-'...in the synaxis the Holy Spirit is invoked, and the words of the Apostles or of the Church are said, and the prayer is said for the saving of the soul.'

1 Condoni (liturgical Hymns of Narsai, p. 94) more cautiously says that the extra-anaphoral part, in so far as it is represented by Narsai's description of Christ's liturgy, contains before A.D. 400. But we may probably go further than this.
INVOCATION (Liturgal.)

"When the great prayers and holy supplications are pronounced (as above), the Word descends on the bread and the wine (as above) and becomes His Body" (see verses above). (c. Origen, loc. cit., vi.)

Other Alexandrian writers speak of prayer for the Spirit. Thus, Origen, "... when the altar 'we invoke the descent of the Holy Ghost' (Theodore, HE iv. 19)." Optatus, a Nubian bishop (c. A.D. 389) speaks (c. Pervamentum, vi. 1). Augustine (as above) and the Holy Ghost being praying for (postulatur) and descending (cf. c. Donat. vi. 1). Jerome (Ep. cl. i. xxii. or clxvi.) "ad Evangelium" says: "The body and blood of Christ is made ('conficulatus') at the prayer of the priest." Ambrose (de Pide, iv. 10 [125]) speaks of the sacrament which by the mystery of the sacred transfiguration is transfigured into the flesh and blood. Elsewhere, if (as is probable) the de Mysteriis of his authentic work, Ambrose uses words which recall Tertullian: (in the consecration the very words of the Lord, the same words, he says, that were recited by Jesus while he was made by the word of Christ... The Lord Jesus Himself proclaims... This is my body... Before the blessing of the heavenly words another nature is spoken of, after the consecration this word is signified, etc. (de Myst. iv. 32, 34).

In fact, the Eucharistic prayers are both by Ambrose, as we must interpret the letter, in the light of the former, to mean that our Lord's command operates through the prayer of the priest (cf. Justin, above, 2). The de Sacerdotiis, which is almost certainly later than the de Myst. (though written 6), has a similar passage, but in more explicit terms (iv. 5).

Chrysostom's evidence goes both ways. He says that

'the priest stands, not bringing down fire [like Elijah; cf. i. 178], but the Holy Spirit, and prays at length... that the gracing on the same may pass through its ineffable power of all' (de Sacerd. ii. [179]) and that 'the priest stands before the table stretching forth his hands to heaven, calling on the Holy Ghost to come and touch the gifts set forth.' (Hem. de Com. 3).

Yet elsewhere he says:

'nor man who makes the gifts set forth to become the body and blood of Christ... the priest stands filling a part (gnysia,ologie), uttering these words; but the power and grace are of God.' (This is my body) etc. He says (cf. Justin, above, 2).

'The priest... the prayer of the priest, that is to say, the prayer of the priest in the narrative form found in all liturgies are those which consecrate the Eucharist, he does not say: indeed, he would seem rather by implication to deny it. He thinks of our Lord as consecrating the bread and wine at the last Supper by this declaration, or at least as consummating the consecration thereby; but he says that this declaration, once made by Jesus at the Last Supper, consecrates the Eucharist for all time. Putting with this passage those quoted immediately before it, we may take Chrysostom as teaching that every Eucharist is consecrated by the priest praying that our Lord's declaration at the Last Supper may make effectual the particular act on which he and the people are then engaged. There is not in Chrysostom, or in any other ancient writer, any approach to the idea that, if a priest were merely to put the bread and wine the words 'This is my body' and 'This is my blood' with a proper intention, a valid Eucharist would result.

The English text is, in some respects, (c. 1 Pet. iv. 11). PL xvi. 855f., speaks of the 'Word' (Verbum) being added to the bread and wine and of their becoming thereby the body and blood of the Word: 'The translation,' (On the增设), "Spera Corda," and "Thanksgiving mentioned... et inde jam [successit] quae agnatur in prebess sancta... ut consecratio de corpus et sanguis Christi... addo verbum et faciatur sacramentum.' In Semn. 227, Ben. in de Paschae, iv.); he says that the bread and cup are sanctioned 'per verbum Dei' (see p. 227, 17). - Aug. in Trin. iii. 4 [10]. Ben. (A.D. 396), Augustine speaks of the elements being consecrated by the 'mythic prayer,' and only by the invisible operation of the Spirit of God. "This instant the Body being taken in with the teaching of his countrymen Optatus (see above) and Fulgentius (see below), to show that Augustine used an invocation of the Holy Ghost at the Eucharch, and that this was the first passage about 'adding the word: the 'verbum Dei' in the second passage would suit better the Divine command at the Last Supper, and, if so, we have a conception very like that of Chrysostom. It should be added that Swithin thinks that at Hippo there was no invocation of the Holy Ghost in Augustine's time (op. cit. p. 150).

The Cappadocian Fathers of the 4th cent. attest an invocation without stating its exact form. For Basil, see above. His brother Gregory of Nyssa speaks of the Eucharistic bread as sanctified by the Word of God and prays (he interprets this as the 'mythic prayer,' and of the virtue of the consecration by which the change is accomplished (Cat. 37). So Gregory of Nazianzus begs Amphelinus to pray for him in his illness at Constantinople 'to draw down the Word by your word' (Ep. 171). On the usage of the Cappadocian Church in the 4th cent. see below, § 8.

That the Eucharist is consecrated by a prayer is an idea not confined to orthodox circles. Nestorius believed the same thing. In a fragment of his (P. A. Loro, Nestorianus, S. B. 255, p. 241) we read: 'Christ is typified in the Eucharist, being slain with the sword of the priest's prayer.' And we may add the comment of a distinguished writer also the first passage about 'adding the word.' The newly published Liturgische Hymnologie of Nasari gives us the nearest approach that we have in Eastern books so far likely a date (c. A.D. 500) to the doctrine of what has and this by some writers has been called 'the moment of consecration.' After saying that the chosen apostles have not made known to us what our Lord said, when He 'gave thanks and blessed' at the Last Supper, and after describing what is recorded in the Gospels, with a traditional comment of Theodore, Nasari adds that to this effect 'the priest gives thanks before God,' i.e. commemorates the Last Supper; then, after mentioning the Great Intercession which here, in East Syrian fashion, follows, he describes the Epiclesis: 'The priest... summoned the Spirit to come down and dwell in the bread and wine and make them the Body and Blood of King Messiah.' To the spirit be called, that He will also light down upon the assembled congregation, that by His gift it may be worthy to receive the Body and Blood. The Spirit descends upon the bread and wine. The changes of place, and causes the power of His Godhead to dwell in the bread and wine, and completes the mystery of our Lord's communication from the dead. 'The Spirit sends down from the height of the holy place, and at the request of the priest, he be never so great a sinner, and celebrates the Mysteries by the mediation of the priest when he has consecrated... Then the herald of the Church of the diascon in that hour: 'In silence and fear be ye standing: peace be with you. Let all the people be in fear at this moment, in which the adorable Mysteries be accomplished by the descent of the Spirit,' etc. Connolly, p. 16-17. It will be noticed that even here there is no cut-and-dried theory of a 'moment of consecration,' but only a statement that at the Epiclesis the consecration of the Eucharist by the power of the Spirit is completed. A similar proclamation by the diacon is still on some occasions used in this place by the East Syrian.

We may close this review of Pastoral evidence by two quotations from Fathers of the 6th cent., which tend in somewhat different directions. Fulgentius, bishop of Ruspe in North Africa, says (c. A.D. 507):

"The Holy Ghost is asked of the Father for the consecration of the sacrifice, (of Mass.) ii. 7; cf. 10, 12) so the fragment of the same writer c. Pascham, 25, 25.

Cassarius of Aries in A.D. 582 writes:

"When the ceremonies are to be blessed with the heavenly words are placed on the sacred altar, there being consecrated by the invocation of the holy name, the bread and wine is there, but after the words of Christ, the body and blood of Christ." (Herm. de Pide, vi.) Cassarius's thought is, that the ritual run on the same lines as Chrysos- tomos, as described above.

"When the great prayers and holy supplications are pronounced (as above), the Word descends on the bread and the wine (as above) and becomes His body" (see verses above). (c. Origen, loc. cit., vi.)
6. Place of the Invocation.—Taking first the 4th cent. liturgies of the Church Orders and of Sarapion, and the Great Liturgies of the four families, developed by Brightman as Syrian, Egyptian, Persian (i.e. East Syrian or Nestorian), and Byzantine (this includes the Armenian), and omitting the Great Intercession, which varies in province, the Liturgy of ST. IGNATIUS (Liturigical), 2 (g) is, the order of the central part of the service in all (except the Egyptian in one detail) is as follows. After the Sursum Corda (which is prefaced by a benediction, salutation) comes the Eucharistic Thanksgiving, with a reference, in most cases, to the work of creation (cf. Ireneus, Hær. iv. xviii. 4, 6, where emphasis is laid on the oblations being God's creatures), and in all to that of redemption, introducing (except in some 4th cent. forms) the Sanctus in reference to the angelic creation (which seems to be the reason of its occurrence here), and ending, except in the cases mentioned above (§ 4), with the recitation of our Lord's deeds and words at the Last Supper. Then comes the oblation of the elements, which usually takes up the words, 'Thus in remembrance of me,' and gives them and the recital of the act (hence this is often called the Anamnesis); and after it, in close conjunction, comes the Invocation. In this scheme the words of Jesus are introduced in the recital of what happened at the Last Supper as part of the Commemoration of Redemption.

Next let us take the Roman rite. It is not known for certain how the Eucharist was celebrated at Rome before the 9th century. Extemporaneous liturgy may have lingered there much longer than elsewhere, for in early ages it was Jerusalem that ordinarily led the way with regard to liturgical matters, and Rome showed the most conservative spirit. When we first meet with the Roman rite, there are two differences in detail from the scheme given above. (a) A prayer is found in the Eucharistic Thanksgiving before the Commemoration of Redemption, which in its earliest known form (in the De sacramentis, iv. 51. [PL xvi. 463], a North Italian work, probably written at a place where the Roman and Milanesian use were combined, c. A.D. 400; see Duchesne, Uhr, Worship, p. 177) runs as follows:

Make this oblation for us (nothia) established (sacramentum), valid, respectable, acceptable, for it is the pure of the host and blood of Jesus Christ, who, in the day before he suffered, took bread, etc.

This is slightly altered in the present Roman eucharist, where probably goes back, at least in its main features, as far as Gregory the Great (6th cent.), to the following:

Which oblation do thou vouchsafe to make blessed, established, valid, reasonable, acceptable, that it may become for us (nothia) for the body and blood of thy beloved Son our Lord Jesus Christ, who is in the day before he suffered, took bread, etc.

This prayer, the Quae obliviscens, was developed by Cranmer in the First English Prayer-Book (1549), and afterwards in the Scottish Liturgy of 1559, into a more detailed Epiclesis, with an invocation of the Holy Ghost.

(b) After the Commemoration of Redemption and the oblation of the elements comes a prayer for the Divine intervention, as in the other liturgies described above. It is made up of two parts, the Sic et Nunc and the Supplices te. But, instead of asking that the Holy Ghost may come down to the earthy altar, it asks that the elements may be taken up by God's holy angel to the heavenly altar. The two conceptions, though differing in form, are really one, and are both justified by NT usage.

A writer in CQR (xxix. [1890] 370) remarks that 'the same thought is expressed in two forms: we are said to be raised up with Christ and made to sit with him and to be in the heavenly places (Eph. 2:6, 6:5), and on the other hand the Holy Ghost is sent forth into our hearts, for he is in us, and we are strengthened by the Spirit so that Christ does dwell in our hearts (Gal 4:6, 16; Eph. 3:16)."

The earliest form of the prayers Supplices te and Supplices tibi in the De sacramentis (loc. cit.) is, after the narrative of the Last Supper in the liturgy described in that work comes the oblation of the elements, followed by the words:

We ask and pray thee to take up this element and put the same on the hands of thy angels, as thou didst deign to take up the gifts of thy servants, just Abel and the father Abraham and that which Melchizedek the high priest offered to thee.'

The present Roman canon has inverted these clauses, has changed 'angels' into 'angel,' and has made some additions; notably it expresses the purposes of the prayer:

'that all who receive the holy body and blood of thy son may be filled with every heavenly benediction and grace.' For the meaning these passages which in the heavenly altar is first found in Ireneus (Hær. vi. xviii. 6)."

We may next take the Gallican rite. The peculiarity of this rite is that the central parts of the Eucharistic service are the same as in the 'post praeda', as in Roman others it does not; but apparently it is always or almost always asks for the Divine intervention in the mystery (see examples in Scaudamore, Not. Encycl. 398, 394; Duchesne, p. 517 f.; Gurney, Cons. of the Euch., 334 f.) On some days, also the 'Post Sanctus' (a prayer said after the Sanctus and before the Preparation of the Last Supper) contained an invocation, or an anticipation of the invocation (see the 'Post Sanctus' for Easter Even in the Missale Gothicum [Gurney, p. 387]). So in the Mosaetric Missal we find anticipatory invocations, sometimes mentioning the Holy Ghost and sometimes using as well as invocations in the 'Post praeda' (Gurney, pp. 339, 350 ff., 333, 353).

The Egyptian rite is noteworthy in this connexion as having an anticipatory Epiclesis before the Narrative of the Last Supper in addition to the normal one afterwards, though the anticipatory one is not usually very explicit. The words of Sarapion, 'Full is the heaven, full also is the earth of thy excellent glory: Lord of hosts, this sacrifice with thy power and thy participation, are taken up and amplified in the Greek Liturgy of St. Mark (Brightman, p. 152) in the Coptic St. Mark and St. Cyril (p. 170). The latter amplifies the last sentence thus:

'Fill this also thy sacrifice, O Lord, with thy blessing that is from thee, through the descent upon it of thy Holy Ghost, and in blessing bless and in purifying purge these thy precious gifts which have been set before thy face, this bread and this cup.'

The most marked development of this invocation before the Narrative is in a newly- discovered fragment of an Egyptian Anaphora, perhaps of the 6th or 7th century, which has:

'Fill us also with the glory that is from thee, and vouchsafe to send down thy holy ould on these creatures, and make the bread the body of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and the cup the blood of the New Testament, which is the body of Christ himself, in the right in which He was betrayed (the narrative of the Institution follows ... ye announce my death and confess my resurrection. We also, after thy death, we confess thy resurrection, and pray ...' here the fragment abruptly ends, and all the rest is wanting (p. 353 of the Sixteenth Euch. Congress [1906], London, 1906, p. 582; Cadoux, D.M.C. II. 1924 f.).

There is no reason to suppose that an Anamnesis and Epiclesis did not follow, as in the other Egyptian Anaphoras which have an anticipatory invocation before the Narrative. There is no trace of

1 In some Abyhobinian Anaphoras the Sanctus is thrust in without any connection with the context by Brightman, J.J.40 p. 283. This may show that even later liturgists have found this section.

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any such anticipatory Epileisis in the liturgies of the Church Orders, and from the evidence given above it is clear that the invocation in this fragment is a development (for which we can see it in the passage above) and not the survival of an antique feature. The development may have been due to an imitation of the Roman rite. A still more striking instance of an anticipatory Epileisis may be found in the prayer to the Son in the Coptic St. Mark and St. Cyril and in the present Ethiopic Liturgy (Brightman, pp. 148, 204; E. Renandot, Lit. Orient. Coll., Frankfort, 1947, i. 2); this is said when the elements have just been put on the altar, before the lections are read, and is called in the Coptic the 'prayer of (or over) the Prothesis' (see Renandot’s note, p. 135). It runs thus:

'O Master, Lord Jesus Christ, come to this thy body and this thy blood on this amphorion, which we have set on this thy holy table: bless, sanctify, and hallow them, and change them that this bread may become indeed thy holy body, and that which is mixed in this cup indeed thy precious blood; and may they become to us all for participation and healing and salvation of our souls and bodies and spirits.'

On these anticipatory invocations it may be observed that, however puzzling they may be to the more logical Western mind, if the more subtile Eastern mind they would be natural enough. In Divine mysteries there is no such thing as time, just as there is no such thing as space.

7. The Person or Persons addressed in the Invocation. As the most ancient authorities sometimes the Holy Trinity is addressed, sometimes the Son or the Holy Ghost, but more often the Father. Doubtless occasions arise where the Invocation of a Person may mean a prayer for him, or a prayer addressed to him; but an invocation of the Holy Trinity can only mean prayer addressed to the Holy Trinity. In the 2nd Ecumenical Council, for example, the invocation of the Holy Ghost is used in two senses here, the first time as the Divine command ("thy holy word"), and the second time, by a sort of paronomasia, as the Eternal Word. But probably there is merely a confusion of thought, of which we find some instances elsewhere in Early times (e.g., Tertullian, de Adu. Prax. 28, 'hic Spiritus Dei, idem erit Sermo'; cf. also Justin, Apol. i. 33, 66; Hermas, Sim. v. vi. 5 f.; Euseb., Hist. Eccl. ii. 5, iv. 3, 5, and perhaps Aristides, Apol. 15). It may be permissible to conjecture that the reason of this confusion of language, as it is, comes from the fact that all that the Eternal Word does for us is done through the Spirit. He is with us, always even unto the end of the world' (Mt 28:20), but it is through the Comforter that He comes to us (John 16:14). Perhaps, therefore, before the Macedonian controversy in Cyril’s time, it was perhaps the custom sometimes to address the Father, sometimes the Holy Trinity. In the liturgies of the Ethiopic Church Order, the Verona Fragments, the Apostolical Constitutions, and Sarapion, the Father is addressed. But the Oblation and Invocation (such as it is) in the Testament of our Lord are addressed to the Holy Trinity (i. 39):

'We offer this the thanksgiving, the peace of the Eternal Trinity, O Lord Jesus Christ, O Lord the Father . . . O Lord the Holy Ghost; we have brought (this is the best reading) this drink and this food to the blessed, holy of the blessed; cause that they may be to you not for condemnation, etc.'

Just before this our Lord had been addressed:

"Remembering therefore the death and resurrection, we offer thee the bread and the cup, etc., etc.

It was perhaps in view of such a formulation that the Council of Hippo in 399 (can. 21: C. J. Hele, Councils, trans. tr., 1885, i. 383) forbade Encharistic invocations to be addressed to any but the Father:

'In prayer no one shall address the Son instead of the Father, or likewise the Holy Ghost instead of the Son, except at the altar during the prayer shall always be addressed to the Father. No one shall make use of any other invocation of prayer without having first consulted well-instructed brethren.'

If this is aimed at books like the Testament, the language is not unsuitable, for the Prayers in that manuscript are somewhat(Page 2: Continued)

features (as to the Olation and Epileisis) of its prototype; but before the address to the Holy Trinity (which it slightly modifies) it includes an invocation of the universal type, asking for the Holy Ghost, and addressed, as we see from its wording, to the Father, though from what had immediately preceded we should have thought that it was addressed to the Father. It is, in fact, a very clumsy insertion (this Anaphora is given in Cooper-Maclean, Test. of our Lord, p. 245 ff.). In the Great Liturgies the Invocation is addressed to the Father.

4. The object of the Invocation. We may group Invocations in three classes: (a) those which do not explicitly pray for the Holy Ghost; (b) those in which the invocation of the Holy Ghost is asked for, without any explicit mention of a change in the elements; and (c) those (the great majority) in which the mention of the Holy Spirit is asked for, that He may change the elements and make them to be our Lord’s body and blood.

(a) The invocation in Sarapion’s sacramentary (C. A.D. 350) exhibits some confusion between the Word and the Spirit, and prays that the Word may descend, as it were, 'o Lord, who art mine', etc. (see JThKs i. 88 ff., 247 ff.; for an Eng. tr. see J. Wordsworth’s ed., London, 1899). It runs thus:

'O God of truth, let thy holy Word come upon this bread, that the bread may become body of the Word, and upon this cup that the cup may become blood of the Truth, and make all who communicants to receive a medicine of life . . . For we have invoked thee, the Uncreated, in the [the] Holy Spirit.

(b) That it is possible to use it in two senses here, the first time as the Divine command ("thy holy word"), and the second time, by a sort of paronomasia, as the Eternal Word. But probably there is merely a confusion of thought, of which we find some instances elsewhere in Early times (e.g., Tertullian, de Adu. Prax. 28, 'hic Spiritus Dei, idem erit Sermo'; cf. also Justin, Apol. i. 33, 66; Hermas, Sim. v. vi. 5 f.; Euseb., Hist. Eccl. ii. 5, iv. 3, 5, and perhaps Aristides, Apol. 15). It may be permissible to conjecture that the reason of this confusion of language, as it is, comes from the fact that all that the Eternal Word does for us is done through the Spirit. He is with us, always even unto the end of the world’ (Mt 28:20), but it is through the Comforter that He comes to us (John 16:14). Perhaps, therefore, before the Macedonian controversy in Cyril’s time, it was perhaps the custom sometimes to address the Father, sometimes the Holy Trinity. In the liturgies of the Ethiopic Church Order, the Verona Fragments, the Apostolical Constitutions, and Sarapion, the Father is addressed. But the Oblation and Invocation (such as it is) in the Testament of our Lord are addressed to the Holy Trinity (i. 39):

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elements may be taken up by the heavenly altar, as has already been described (above, 6).

(b) The implicit form is that found in the Ethiopic Church Order (Briand, § 83, 89) and the Verona Fragments (ed. E. Hauler, Leipzig, 1900, p. 197):

"... sent thy holy spirit on the oblation of this Church; give it together with all them that partake [for] sanctification and (from Fray, before all saints that partake) for fulfilling with the Holy Ghost, etc."

The liturgy used by St. Chrysostom at Antioch was not entirely similar in this respect (see the first two quotations from his writings given above, 5). The Testament of Our Lord is even less explicit in its invocation; the Holy Ghost is not directly asked for, though He is named in the address to the Holy Trinity, and only the blessing to the communicants is explicitly mentioned (above, 7).

The Nestorian or East Syrian Lit. of Adai and Mari (above, 4) has an invocation of this implicit form, though it has in addition a prayer for the blessing and hallowing of the oblation:

"May the Holy Spirit, O my Lord, come and rest upon this sacrifice, and may it bless and hallow it, and may it be to us, O my Lord, for pardon, etc."

(c) The explicit form is found already in the 4th cent.; Cyril of Jerusalem has it (above, 4), as also has the Patriarchal Constitutions (vii. 129).

"We implore thee... send down upon this sacrifice the Holy Spirit... that He may show (λύσσεται) this bread as the body of the Lord, and this cup as the blood of the Christ, that they who partake thereof may be strengthened in godliness, etc."

Similar explicit invocations are found in the Abyssinian Anaphora of Our Lord (above, 7), in the Egyptian Anaphora described in the Sacrae Eiae. Com., § 69 (Brillinger, p. 493), and in all the Great Liturgies (except Adai and Mari) if they have an express invocation of the Holy Ghost at all. Sarapion also has an explicit invocation, though it does not invoke the Holy Ghost.

It seems clear from the evidence here detailed that the implicit type of invocation is somewhat older than the explicit; and, indeed, it would be almost impossible for the former to be evolved out of the latter.

9. Interpretation of the evidence. - If we approach the evidence without any theory as to what are the words or the moment of the Eucharistic consecration—and to deal with all the details in their Eucharistic worship, the general scheme of the service was one and the same throughout Christian antiquity. The Eucharist, at least from the 2nd cent., was consecrated by a prayer, whether the prayer asked for the Holy Ghost, or for the Word, or for neither explicitly. But how are we to regard the invocation of the Holy Ghost? It would appear that before the rise of the Macedonian controversy about the Holy Spirit, the Third Person was not even in the East always mentioned in the Eucharistic Epiclesis. Indeed (now that the Pfaffian fragments of Lorenz have been dismissed as modern forgeries [Harnack, Z. v. 2]), there is no certain evidence; the Holy Spirit being mentioned in the invocations before the 4th cent.; the evidence is only consequent, and E. Bishop (App. to Connolly's Lit. Holy Euchar., p. 365) treats the kind of Epiclesis which became universal in the East and common in the West (see the Gallican and African evidence, above, 5, 6) as an invention of the 4th cent. In the case of the consecration, that is, in the fact that, in combating the Pneumatomachia, the Ortho-

1 An attractive theory identifies the angel with the Holy Spirit (see de Puniect, op. cit. p. 399); but the de Sacramentis of Credula (ed. V. Ant. 3, p. 307) is inconsistent with the Pauline invocations of the Holy Spirit, which are still more common.

2 Cf. Basil's use of ἁρπάζω, above, 5. For other parallels see Siews, p. 35 s.

did not appeal to the work of the Holy Ghost in consecrating the Eucharist, while they did appeal to His work in baptism. But the argument from silence here, as so often, is precarious; for at the very time when the controversy arose, and when it is said that this silence shows that they were not in the habit of using an Epiclesis of the Holy Ghost at the Eucharist, we find Cyril of Jerusalem (A.D. 348) and the liturgies of the Ethiopic Church Order and of the Verona Fragments (which, or some common origin, must almost certainly be dated about them) attesting its use, and (what is important) betraying absolutely no idea that it was a novelty. It will be remembered that Cyril and Sarapion were contemporaneous. Is it possible to explain the extraordinarily widespread—almost universal—use of the custom from that time forward, without a protest from any one, in most diverse countries, if it were an invention of that period? Is it not much more probable that the prayer for the Holy Ghost goes back to a much more remote time, although it was not the only form in use? It would seem that in this matter, as in others, the rise of heresy had indirectly a beneficial result; it forced the Church to think more clearly about the work of the Third Person.

In the invocation of the Holy Ghost the Church is transplanting into Christian experience the experience of the ancient Christians, after various trials, showing what were the forms most suitable for liturgical use.

Again, if we start with some pre-conceived theory, there seems to be no reason why the invocation should always be in the same place, or why there should not be more than one invocation in the same service. The Egyptian rite has a sort of invocation before the Narrative of the Last Supper in the preliminary service, and a fuller one after the Narrative (see above, 6). The Roman rite has the same feature. But there is no reason for denying that both prayers are, in their own way, invocations. No doubt, if we start with a theory that the consecration takes place at a particular moment, as when it is said that at the word 'mem,' in the phrase 'Hoc est corpus meum,' the bread is transubstantiated,1 then we shall be obliged by the theory to hold that the Supra quae and the Superius et in the Roman rite are merely periphrasis after we have made our theories a fatal mistake—we shall be impressed by the fact that, however much different ages and different countries may have used different details in their Eucharistic worship, the general scheme of the service was one and the same throughout Christian antiquity. The Eucharist, at least from the 2nd cent., was consecrated by a prayer, whether the prayer asked for the Holy Ghost, or for the Word, or for neither explicitly. But how are we to regard the invocation of the Holy Ghost? It would appear that before the rise of the Macedonian controversy about the Holy Spirit, the Third Person was not even in the East always mentioned in the Eucharistic Epiclesis. Indeed (now that the Pfaffian fragments of Lorenz have been dismissed as modern forgeries [Harnack, Z. v. 2]), there is no certain evidence; the Holy Spirit being mentioned in the invocations before the 4th cent.; the evidence is only consequent, and E. Bishop (App. to Connolly's Lit. Holy Euchar., p. 365) treats the kind of Epiclesis which became universal in the East and common in the West (see the Gallican and African evidence, above, 5, 6) as an invention of the 4th cent. In the case of the consecration, that is, in the fact that, in combating the Pneumatomachia, the Ortho-

1 The theory that, in the Roman rite, by the time the Words of Our Lord have been uttered the consecration is complete is not quite the same thing as this, inasmuch as it is the former which is the element of the offering to be offered to the faithful as such. The consecration in the Roman rite is a completed offering, and the consecration is effluxion, not consecration.
the Spondeis to it is always called the body and blood of our Lord—e.g., at the commixture (cf. Duchesne, p. 182). It appears, therefore, that the interpretation of writers of the school of Duchesne takes a view of the case which is more in accordance with the facts, namely, that the Spondeis and Sulpice beauty exactly correspond to the Epiclesis after the Narrative of the Last Supper which is found in the Eastern and usually in the Gallican liturgies, and are intended to be at least a part of the words of consecration.

The devout Christian need not ask too particularly, nor can he expect to know, at what moment God consecrates the elements; it is enough for him to be assured that, when all has been said, the consecration has been completed.

10. Invocation at baptism and confirmation.
The prayer for the gifts of the Holy Ghost is also in some early authorities called an Epiclesis. The bishop, in normal cases, was present at the administration of baptism, though he did not usually himself baptize; and directly after the immersion of the newly-baptized, the bishop spoke to him, and prayed for them (either before or at the laying on of hands) that the Holy Ghost might be given to them (cf. Ac. 8:17). Tertullian, who mentions the laying on of hands as an act distinct from the anointing, says:

"Having come out of the laver, we are anointed with the blessed unction... After this... invocating (advocavit) and invoking the Holy Spirit by a benediction (de Bapt. 7:1).

In the Verona Fragments (ed. Hauser, p. 111) the bishop after the layings on of hands have been anointed by a presbyter and clothed and brought into the church, lays hands (on a hand or on them) and invites (later) the prayer is given. In the Testament of Our Lord the same thing is found, the prayer is expressly called the invocation of the Holy Ghost which the bishop says and invokes over them (ii. 9). In other Church Orders a similar prayer is given, but it is not expressly called an invocation. It may perhaps be added that in the Gnostic Acts of Thomas there is an invocation of Christ and of the Holy Spirit before the baptism, at the anointing (ed. Bonnet, p. 68; Ante-Nic. Chr. Lit. ii. 43). The invocation after the immersion has no connexion with the invoking of the Divine name at the immersion, of which we receive no trace in Acts, I. 6:1; the name of God, the Father of all, the Lord, is named upon him) and in the Apost. Const. (ii. 10: "the name of God, the Father of all, the Lord, and His name only which shall baptize us in water"); for those refer only to the words used in baptizing. The same may be said of the allusion in Acts 2:38 and 31:20 (which is the same name which was invoked (ἐναποφήσει) upon you; cf. Acts 6:6).


A. J. MACLEAN.

INVOCATION (Roman)—It was believed by the Romans that, if a prayer was to be truly effective, it must be directed specially to the deity within whose sphere of power its fulfillment lay, and that this deity must be invoked by his right name; so Arnobius, iii. 43:

"Sueque ad deum legantur omnes able vacile nec ambigere nec dubitare de uniis cuiusque vi nominis, ne si alienis ritu et suppletionibus ferox invocaret, atque ille earum structur et piaculat nos tenet inexplicabilibus obligationi."

To know the right name of the competent deity was to possess a real power of compulsion over him (cf. A. Diez, Eine Mitkreuzigungsliturgie, Neuwied, 1910, p. 110f.; hence the names of the specific tutelary deities of Rome were kept secret, in order that they might not be used for evil ends by the enemies of the State (Serv. Hä, ii. 351; "hodie pontificum centum est se alia nominibus dei Romani appellautem, ne exagurari possent"); cf. Georg. i. 498; Plin. xxviii. 13; Macr. Sat. iii. 9). This explains also why it was regarded as of the utmost importance to invoke the gods in the proper form, and why every precaution was taken to avoid mistakes. If a supplicant was in doubt as to the right name of the deity he desired to address, he either uttered a variety of names to address the deity from (so Hor. Sat. ii. 2. 20; "Matrimine pater secus lancea libertus audias") or added some such formula as "sive quo alio nomine faci cas omni nani" (Maur. Sat. iii. 9. 10; cf. Serv. Aen. ii. 351; Apoll. Metan. xi. 2; CIL ii. 1823) or "quisquis es" (e.g., Verg. Aen. iv. 577, and the note of Servius: ""quisquis es" secundum pontificem morum, quid proponent, sed ut etiam deus in alio non nomine appetitur vello"); cf. E. Norden, Agnostos Theos, Berlin and Leipzig, 1913, p. 144 f.

If, however, the supplicant did not know which deity was concerned with the matter of his expediency this prayer was offered. He might omit the divine name altogether, and substitute for it a phrase like "Genio urbis Romae sive mae sive femina" (Serv. Aen. ii. 351; cf. Macr. Sat. iii. 9; Plin. Nat. Hist. 61) or "sive des secus des incul tudia tutice hic locuse est" (so among the Arval Brothers (CIL vi. 2099, ii. 3; cf. G. Henzen, Acta fratrum Arcatium, Berlin, 1874, pp. 147-149; a substantia quoniam (Arnab. iii. 3; cf. Gall. ii. 28. 21, 21), of which we have numerous instances in extant formulæ of prayer alike in literature (Cato, de Agric. 139; Macr. Sat. iii. 9. 7) and in inscriptions on altars (CIL vi. 70/1; cf. Epigraphica Epigraphica, v. 1043, ix. 608; on these cf. C. Pascal, in Bull. archéol. comm. xxi. [1894] 188 ff. - Studi di antichità e mitologia, Milan, 1896, p. 55, p. 55, edd. 7). It is thus simply a new name to the deity. It is certain that many of the recognized Roman deities derived their origin from the practice of invoking as divine things lying close at hand (e.g., genio, the door; vesti, the heart), or of using the names of the evils which the prayer was designed to avert (e.g., febris, fever, robigus, nil dum on grum); or of the virtues and conditions prayed for (e.g., fides, fidelity, concordia, agreement) as the names of divine beings. In such cases it was of importance to define clearly the conception of the higher power thus invoked, and to express its connotation fully. Hence the deities frequently received double names, meant to indicate their character from two contrasted points of view, as, e.g., Anna Perenna, who could grant a man a prosperous end (permanere); Genita Manna, who presided over birth and death; Fatuclus Chastivus, the god of the opening and shutting of doors and gates, etc. Again, the supplicant might use the qv (CIL vi. 70/1) testamentum, for which he sought divine aid into its several component elements, and frame for each of these an appropriate divine name. Thus, while in the aera Sericlea the flames offered the sacrifice (Pass. 71, Ceres) he gave definite expression to what he asked of them by invoking
twelve names which covered the husbandman's work from the first ploughing to the delivery of the grain from the granary, viz. Verwader, Resi- 
Hente, Obrantor, Obiotor, Ocator, Sarr-
Sari generator, Messor, Convector, Conditor, 
Dosan, Profesor, Serv. Georg. i. 21, and, similarly, the Arval 
and Verwader, etc. used to bring down, cutting, and burning a fig tree that had grown on the roof of their temple, offered sacri-
thesis to three newly created deities, i.e. Dafexura, Coen and another occasioning the same kind of sacrifice to Coenique and Aidelle (Henzen, op. cit. 147 f.1. In the case of gods whose range of power was very wide, it was necessary to specify the particular matter in which they were needed to be helped, and from this arose the practice of dividing the personality of certain deities and investing the component elements with distinct 
epithets, which, quite a number might appear to 
together in a single prayer. Thus, e.g., the Arval 
Brothers, in the vow which they made for the trium-
phant return of Tuscus from the Dacian cam-
paign in A.D. 101 (CIL vi. 2674, i. 25 ff.), invoked the 
Gazlabi, Mars and Mares and Mars, also Jupitier Victor and Mars Victor. In the case of so multiflora a deity as Fortuna, the supplicant was above all concerned to direct his plea to the right divinity; if, e.g., he prayed for the favourable issue of a battle, he 
pealed to Fortuna guisse diei i.e. the particular 
Fortuna in whose hands lay the destiny of the day of 
day of battle [Wissean, Rel. und Kult. der Eromen, 
Muir, 1918, p. 129; J. 192, p. 120, Great spirits are always but a transference of that which, at one 
no divine power who had a right to be invoked 
should be passed over. Hence, after all the deities 
specially concerned had been duly invoked in a prayer, it was customary to add a "general invoca-
tion" which should include all the others: 
'Post speciem invocavit templum ad generalitatem, ne 
missum praestaret, maxima pontifex, per quot sita veteri 
eminentes mortis post specialis dies, quos ad ipsum surremis quod futuro accessit oraculi, generalis omnium 
invocatores' (Soz. Georg. s. 31. et Rom. vii. 105, Cato, i. 10). 
This practice finds parallels in Greek prayers (cf. 
O. Cursius, Untersuchungen zu den Miniamen des 
Rheinicker, Leipzig, 1895, p. 89 f.**; R. Wünsch, in 
In forms of prayer that have come down to us, 
acordingly, the group of deities addressed is very 
frequently rounded off with some such formula as 
"Hail all, divine deities, etc. so that the divine deities 
confess of the earth and the gods infernal!" (Livy, i. 12. 10), or "ci novilaves, ci ingises, ci quibus et 
sub urbem extis se est universum hostium" (cf. Livy, ii. 6. 6). 
With this custom is connected the requirement that 
in every prayer, no matter to what god it 
was addressed, Janus and Jupitier should be in-
voked first of all (Mars. Sat. i. 16. 25; cf. Cat. 
de Agric. 141 [see also 134]: 'Janum iovem vino praefinam'), 
and that the series of gods invoked should always begin with Janus and end with 
Yesta (Cic. de Nat. Dii, ii. 67, and other passages, 
cited by Wissean, op. cit. 108). 
LITERATURE—G. Appel, De Romanorum precationibus (Re-
ligiongeschichte. Vorschlähe und Verarbeiten, viii. 2). Gießen, 
1906. H. R. Wissean, Gnaemische Abhandlungen zur 
Romischen- und Staatsgesch., Munich, 1904, p. 327 f. 
INWARD LIGHT.—See EXPERIENCE (Religious); FRIENDS, 
SOCIETY OF.

IONIC PHILOSOPHY.—The schools of philos-
ophy that arose in Ionia, on the coast of Asia 
Minor, and among the adjacent islands, during the 
6th cent. B.C., are above all remarkable for their 
originality and vigour. With them begins the great 
epoch in Greek philosophy, and even their fragments 
are stimulating to this day. It is hard to 
fix precisely the limits of the term 'Ionic'. In 
so active a period of thought, systems gave birth 
to other systems with astonishing rapidity, and 
Xenophanes, Heroditus, Pythagoras, and Anax-
agoras, all of them bred in Ionia, were deeply in-
fluenced by the speculations around them. All 
historians would agree, however, that Thales, 
Anaximander, and Anaximenes, the earliest in 
time, form to some extent the class apart, and most 
would confuse the distinctive name to these three 
and their immediate disciples. But Xenophanes 
seems to come nearer to them than to their great 
successors, and we may include him here, especially 
as he gives particular expression to the opposite 
side of their views. Dominant in the four is the 
recognition of matter, motion, and physical causa-
tion,—i.e. of objects extended in space, and orderly 
movements and changes in space,—as being them-
selves manifestations of the Absolute Reality. 
There is a marked aversion to earlier anthropo-
morphic ideas, and to all such mythology as that 
in which a storm at sea would be explained simply 
as due to the incausable wrath of a Fossession. 
At the same time this 'matter' with which our 
philosophers are concerned does not appear to be 
considered as anything apart from spirit; they 
shrink from imagining it in terms of mere mechan-
ism, but do not ask themselves the precise distinc-
tion between mechanism and spirit, or the precise 
connection between the two. This is, however, 
that no one has answered yet. But, with the 
possible exception of Xenophanes, these early 
thinkers do not even raise such questions, at least 
not expressly; in Hegelian language, they do not 
ask how far spaces also take the "physical, 'painless'
manifestation of the Absolute; they are absorbed 
rather in the simple feeling that it is a manifesta-
tion. They feel that things do happen in the way of 
mechanical and physical causes, but the spirit is 
in space and time being followed by another as its 
necessary 'effect'; that a cloud, e.g., is formed 
and will be formed by an exhalation from the sea, 
not by the god choosing to send his messenger 
wrapped in a magic veil. At the same time, they 
insist that these physical processes are, in some 
profound sense which they do not determine, 
bound up with life, mind, and divinity. Thus 
they have been called 'hylolatry', 'seelentheorie', 
'life spirit', since they assert a union, though 
an undefined union, between the two; or, rather, 
they do not assert it, they assume it, for they 
have hardly reached the height of thinking 
as two. Aristotle sees the danger of this indef-
initeness, one result of which was to make ex-
tended things and movements in space as such 
appear to be the sole causes of all that existed, 
including the movements themselves and the glory 
and beauty of the universe (Met. A 3. 883&84-20). 
But no criticism can do justice to these pioneers 
that does not recognize the immense service done 
to thought by initiating research into the prop-
erties of space and the physical qualities of things, 
and connecting with this, rather than with the 
more mythical fancies, the search for the ab-
solute truth about the universe and God. Science 
and mathematics are not in themselves metaphysics 
and theology, but there will never be a great meta-
physical, that does not at least account for them, 
and never a great theology that does not take account 
of metaphysics.

1. Thales.—It is significant that Thales, the 
first of these thinkers, is said to have brought 
the elements of geometry to Greece, havingstude 
the science in Egypt and made discoveries of his 
own (Ritter-Pfleider, Hist. Phil. Greece, p E 
and reft. there). But how far it was a true deductive 
science and not a mere inductive, especially empirically, it is difficult to say. Our direct 
information for Egypt is derived from a document 
written, probably about 1500 B.C., by the priest
How exactly Thales conceived the ordered universe to be evolved from this fundamental water is quite unknown to us. Diog. Laer. states (i. 22) that, according to some authorities, he left nothing written, and certainly no writings of his have come down to us. Diog. Laer. therefore refers to his doctrines, speaks of them in a tone of conjecture. From a passage in the *Physics*, however (i. 4 init. 157° 12), where Aristotle is dealing with the early thinkers and the infinite substance underlying all the forms that we see, it may be inferred that Thales believed in a process of rarefaction and condensation. Still, this is only an inference, and Aristotle's seems to have held that Thales first, as the pupil of Anaximenes, considered the first to state a theory (Ritter-Pfleger, 288; Diels, p. 164). Perhaps Anaximenes was the first to state it fully.

Of greater interest is Aristotle's remark that Thales is reputed to have said that the magnet had a soul, because it could make iron move (in *Anaxim*, i. 2, 405° B) (Ritter-Pfleger, 283). As Aristotle saw, this suggests that Thales was not satisfied with mechanisms as providing an ultimate explanation for the cause of movement, and held that in some fashion (cf. Plut. *Laws*, x. 589 Β: δέ γάρ τοις ὁμαλοίς) soul must be the cause, and we are present through writing c. A.D. 456, but he quotes Eudemos (c. 325 Β. C.), who undoubtedly thought that Thales must have grasped the general principle that a triangle is determined when the base and two angles at the base are given; otherwise, Eudemos held, he could not have measured the distances of ships at sea, as he is said to have done (his base, apparently, being a tower, and the base angles being obtained by observation; Proclus, i. 32, 14). Thus we may see in Thales the first beginnings of that insight into the real importance of mathematics both for science and for metaphysics which so deeply influenced Greek thought, from the time when the Pythagoreans believed that the very essence of all things was to be found in number down to the days of Archimedes.

Herodotus tells (i. 93) that Thales foretold the eclipse of the sun which took place in the sixth year of the war between the Lydians and the Medes. Incidentally this gives us a date for Thales' life, since astronomy was well known in Asia Minor on May 28, 658 B.C. (Ritter-Pfleger, 88). We cannot suppose, without authority, that Thales had discovered the true cause of eclipses, but we know from Assyrian records that the Babylonians watched for eclipses at fixed dates (Burnet, *Early Greek Phil.* p. 42). Thales may have had access to this knowledge in his travels, possibly at the court of Croesus, king of Lydia (Herod. i. 90). In any case we can understand how such knowledge, coupled with his mathematical studies, would stimulate his search after one universal physical cause for all the changes in the world. This, he held, was water. Aristotelian authority, suggests that he was led to this view by observing that the seed of all living things is moist, and also the nutriment of all things, and that host itself is generated from the mud and kept alive by it (Met. A 3, 983° 18). It is not clear whether the last passage refers to animal heat alone, as the context certainly suggests, or, as later writers thought, to Thales' belief that the stars were fed by exhalation (Ritter-Pfleger, 12; Plut. *Plac.* i. 3; Diels, *Diog. Oxograp.* p. 276). It is quite possible that Thales had both in mind. Aristotle also states (DE *Cael.* ii. 1, 190a 16) that he believed the earth to float on water, as a piece of wood might float. This recalls the Semitic belief in the waters under the firmament.

2. Anaximander. — Anaximander, also a Milesian, and probably a pupil of Thales (Ritter-Pfleger, 15), assembles us by the boldness and subtility of his speculations. According to Aristotle and also, apparently, to a tradition preserved in Simplicius (Asc. *Met.* A 2, 989° 18; Simp. *Phys.* 24, 20 [Ritter-Pfleger, 16, 26]), he struck out the idea of one primitive substance, infinite in extent, but otherwise undefined in character, something that was thus none of the things we know, but something that was capable of becoming all things and manifesting all qualities. That the primitive substance was thus conceived as undefined has been disputed (see Burnet, p. 37), chiefly on the ground that Aristotle may have read into his predecessor an approximation to his own theory of matter as something that is essentially potentiality, i.e. something with the power of receiving form and change though not of generating it by its own force alone. But there is no real reason why Aristotle should have misrepresented his forerunner, whose book was in existence at the time. However, we must account for the tradition in Simplicius. If we accept Aristotle's account, we have a significant connexion between Anaximander and Heracleit.
The generation of the various elements, as we know them, is followed by their dissolution into the primitive substance, and this re-absorption is felt to be right and seemly (οἰκονομικός).

At the appointed time they make reparative action to one another for their injurings (Barret’s tr., slightly altered).

Thus Anaximander seems to hold that the diversity and multiplicity of the world depend on a struggle of opposites (e.g., of warmth against cold, of wet against dry); and that the presence of one element is a wrong done to the other. Heraclitus carries on this idea of struggle, but rejects in it and justifies it. Anaximander held also, it would appear, that this double process of generation and destruction was repeated incessantly; 'generation could never fail,' for the infinite fountain was always there ( Arist. Phys. i. 8, 208 B 8 (Ritter-Pfleger, 164)). Thus Anaxi-
mander may really have reached the idea, which later writers say he held, of immeasurable univer-
se, rising and passing away for ever (Ritter-Pfleger, 21). It is not clear whether they think he imagined many universes in existence at the same time, or meant that they followed singly, one after the other. But the latter is suggested by the coherent system which he conceived for the present universe, of which the earth and sun and stars, in one complete whole. He came very near to realizing that the earth was a globe; he conceived it, apparently, as shaped like a stampy cylinder, with a convex lid, and three times as broad as it was deep, swinging free in the centre of the universe, and surrounded by hollow rings of compressed air (or vapour) which contained the fire of the different elements. These, the rings with apertures in them through which the fire showed (Ritter-Pfleger, 19, 20; Barret, pp. 70, 71). His biological speculations were equally bold, and in many ways anticipated the modern theory of hereditary con-
nection between all animals by his suggestions that the earliest living creatures were of the nature of fishes, and that man was developed from these, supporting his view by the sound observation that man now requires a longer period of nurture than any other creature, and considering that it was hard to imagine how he could have survived from the first if this had been always so (Ritter-Pfleger, 22).

3. Anaximenes. — Anaximenes, his successor, also a Milesian (ib. 23, 26), was a man of much
tamer intellect. He fell back to the old idea of the earth as a flat disk, and to the old idea of fire, but less profound and fruitful, conception of the primitive substance as one of the recognizable elements. This was air, infinite in extent, but definite in quality. Rarefied, air became fire; condensed, it appeared successively as wind, cloud, water, earth, and stones. Motion existed from all eternity and was the cause of change, but no
explanation of motion itself was given (ib. 24, 25, 28). Soul, he said in so many words, was air:

'Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world' (ib. Barret, p. 77; Ritter-Pfleger, 24).

We cannot say, however, whether he meant that the air encompassing the universe was the air vitalis, or that the air encompassing the universe was a sort of divine (Ritter-Pfleger, 28a), nor need we doubt that he did; but he is unlikely to have formulated the conception of divinity any more precisely than his predecessors. There is little now in his thought, but he too has a claim to what Hegel regards as the great merit of these thinkers—that they were the first to announce that the bewildering variety of the world could be explained as the manifestation of one principle, a principle that was in-
destructible (Gesch. der Phil., i. *' Grieche. Phil.' A i (Thylas), p. 233).

The theory of Anaximenes was revived a century later by Diogenes of Apol-
Ionia, whose system, however, shows the mark of other influences (Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Phil.,* i. 280 ff.).

4. Xenophanes.—In Xenophanes the mental enthusiasm of the time seems to blaze out into a careless irreligion of the first water. The best introduction to him is still the brief sentence of Aristotle (Met. 4, 980* b* 21), that Xenophanes was the first to believe in the unity of all things (cf. *Arist. Eth. 222 D 1*). 'All that we call many is really one,' an Elysian tenet derived 'from Xenophanes.'

Not that Xenophanes made any clear statement, or distinguished what was one in matter from what was one in principle.

He simply looked up to the whole heaven and said the One existed, and was God (''καὶ τὸν οὐκ εἶναι αἰσθητότα τὰ τούτα θεωρεῖν ποιεῖ' οὐκ εἶναι θεός.' For Xenophanes, *Hipp. Lfc. I, 1, αἰσθητήριον τὸν οὐκ εἶναι: Diels, *Deut.,* p. 555).}

We may compare the famous passage in Sext. Emp. (ado, *Phys.,* i. 98 1), which, no doubt, reflects Aristotle's opinion, telling how some have thought that the first conception of the providence of God came to man from the sight of the starry heavens:

'By the men who first looked up at the sky (οἵ τινες τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αἰσθήτηριον) and gazed at the sun running his course from his rising until his setting, and watched the ordered dances of the stars, these men not themselves to discover the creator of so glorious a harmony, believing that it could not have arisen by chance, but through a mightier and immortal power, and that this power was God.'

Xenophanes made no clear statement (οὐδὲ λέγει τὸ μὲν, ἔχει τὸ δὲ τοῦ οὐκ καταλέγει), cutting to the root of the matter in his trenchant way; as with Xenophanes' predecessors, so with himself, we are unable to discover any articulated theory of the relation between space and spirit, either in the unity of the One, or in the relations of the many to the One. His minds are instinct with the sense that these two conceptions are of ultimate importance, and must somehow be brought together. How to bring them together he does not tell; to one he tempted to say that he simply claps them together, but he has got hold of what neither philosophy nor religion must ever let go again. He will have nothing of the old anthropomorphic fancies by which the real grandeur and mystery of the physical universe are jiggled out of sight:

'What men call Isis is a cloud, coloured purple and scarlet and of all colours:

But that does not make him write the rainbow

'in the dull catalogue of common things.'
skeptical despair; the possibility of advance towards knowledge still remains:

'The gods do not reveal all the truth at once; men must seek them and they find the better.' (ib. 190).

The greater part of what we hear about his physical speculation is neither well attested nor of much interest. It was his revolt against a low mythology and his conception that all things must somehow form a unity, that had the profound and far-reaching results. There is much in both Plato and Empedocles that recalls his attacks on the Olympian creed, and there can be little doubt that Parmenides, whose philosophical centres in the conception of the One, is in the direct line of succession from Xenophanes, who thus forms the link between the Ionian and Eleatic schools. Aristotle says in so many words that Parmenides was reported to have been his pupil (ib. 101), and it is quite possible that Xenophanes, in his long years of wandering, came to Elea in Italy, his wife died there (ib. 97).

His own native city was Colophon in Lydia, but it is natural to suppose that he left it when the Mede appeared (ib. 85). The date given by Diog. Laert. ix. 62, 580 B.C. (ib. 97). Besides his religious writings he possesses a number of fragments, half-lyric, half-
diacritic. A very lovely nature appears in them, typically Greek in its union of sunny enjoyment with self-control, and high above all luxury, tyranny, and superstition. His picture of a drinking-feast is characteristic: the clean floor and the clean cups and the clean hands of the guests, the flowers and the flower-scented wine and the fresh cool water, the dance and the song and the drinking, but such drinking that a man needs no servant to help him home after it, the feast, and the beginning with prayer to the gods 'for strength to do right,' and ending with songs that have no lies in them, no worn-out fancies about gods and Titans and giants, and no bitterness, no reproaches, memories of past strife (Bergk and Hiller, Anthologia Lyrica, 'Xenophanes, 1 and 2).


IRANIANS.—I. Iran, the modern name of Persia, comes from the proper name of a city in the Avestan Airysena, used generally as an epithet of wadjah (of uncertain meaning) to describe the land from which the ariyah folk came; its identification has not been achieved. Airya, Old Pers. Aria, (cf. Gr. Aryan), is cognate with Skr. Ayra, and it seems to have been the name by which the undivided Aryan people called themselves, a race of invaders from Europe, who, perhaps about the middle of the 2nd millennium B.C., occupied Bactria and the neighbouring country, and imposed their form of Indo-European speech upon the inhabitants. This admixture of speculative reading of the facts of a dim pre-historic seems to suit best the evidence at present at our disposal. Whether the term 'Aryan' may be accurately used of a wider unity, as in British popular phrase (of cf. O. Schrader's art. AYRYAN [Lit. Indo-European] RELIGION, vol. I, p. 1).

It should be noted, however, that the S.Past (Kultur, Ausbrie-
sungen, 1911, p. 117) is strongly inclined in part on the evidence of the recently discovered Tocharian language, to revert the earlier view and see in the original home of the race in Asia, more specifically in Rus-
sian Turkistan. This is chronicled without suggesting that the writer finds himself shaken by this novel and bold argument.

II ff. need not be discussed here: for the purposes of the present article the term will be restricted to the Indo-Iranian branch of the family. The divi-
sion of the branch took place relatively late, the ancestors of the Aryan Indians migrating into the Punjab, where we find them in the 1st millennium B.C., and leaving the Iranians in possession of the wide belt of territory from Bactria to Media, down to the borders of India. The linguistic tests of Iranian as against the Indo-Aryan and Dravidian are not, it is true, the two groups lying closer together than any other distinct languages in the Indo-European family; it is as close a connexion as that between French and Italian. In Avestan and Old Persian, for instance, Hindu is the name for India, answer-
ing to the Skr. Sindu. This illustrates two characteristic Iranian developments—the provocative change of s to h, and the loss of the original aspirates. The application of a few principles enables us to transform the oldest extant Sanskrit into the corresponding Iranian of our early texts, and vice versa, with quite a small residue of new developments to be allowed for. A fact from some linguistic complications, involving certain specula-
tions on pre-historic movements described in the present writer's Notes on Iranian Ethnography, our material enables us to reconstruct a considerable fullness the cultural conditions of the Aryan people before the Indian trek. We restrict ourselves here to matters affecting religion.

Our evidence is collected partly from the comparative treatment of words, names, and ideas occurring in the older Indian and Iranian literature, and partly from historical notices of Iranian tribes found in ancient writers, of whom Herodotus is the most important. It will be remembered that the term 'Iranian' properly connotes a language only; the main reason to presuppose racial affinity among the wild nomad tribes who spoke, or may have spoken, an Iranian dialect is, accordingly, that such tribes as the Mazung or Sogdian in framing our picture of proto-Iranian religion, it is at least as probable that such tribes may be purely aboriginal.

2. Naturally the most certain elements in this reconstruction are those which we can prove to have been Aryan. The combination of Veide evidence with that of Herodotus, in the description of the popular religion of Persia, presents us with a system which agrees closely with that of the later Avesta (excluding the later prose and the ritual arts). Now these forms of thought, in a certain sense, are a counter-reformation, a refuge from the too drastic reform of Zarathushtra into the old Iranian nature-worship, conformed to Zarathush-
tra's most emphatic teaching, but not alone, and compounding for its abandonment of Zarathushtra's essential teaching by an apotheosis of the prophet himself. In language and thought alike we find the Rigveda closely paralleled by the 

Yatsa, and even more closely by the 'Gathā of Seven Chapters' (prose), which is actually com-
pound in the archaic dialect of Zarathushtra's own versus Gāthā. So great is the difference in religious standpoint, that, if we omitted one line (Ys. xii. 2, which offers adoration to Zarathushtra and Ahura in a breath), we might plausibly argue total ignor-
ance of the reform. The religious teachings would be practically identical with that of the Rigveda, allowance being made for the small compass of the Gāthā. We should have to provide only for some innovations like the cult of Indra on the Vedic side, and that of Mazda and the Holy Immortals (AAMA Spenta, now first collectively named; see art. AMESA SPENTAS) on the Iranian.

3. Leaving the reform of Zarathushtra and the dualism of the Magi, we may describe that religion as it was in special art.,
we may delineate here the religion professed by the Iranian people when Zarathushtra arose. According to Herodotus (l. 131), the Persians sacrificed on mountain-tops to Zeus, calling him 'the white-footed son of the sky Zeus.' It is highly probable that the Greek
traveller records the native name, "Diyana", identical with Vedic Dyuas, Zoroasian Ahriman, and "Sun, Moon, Earth, Fire, Water, and Winds." All six divinities belong to the circle of the 'heavenly ones,' Indo-European "deos", whose name declares them of the company of *Deos* (Deus). The evidence of the sacrifice also, he proceeds, "is in the name of the chief is not certainly found outside the South Indo-European tribes, the general term is universal in our speech area from India to the British Isles; they are all "sky-spirits in residence of the ancestors." So far, accordingly, we have set down only what the Iranians still observed of a cultus common to the Aryans alone, but to the whole of our family. We may add that they kept plentiful traces of the primitive ancestor-worship as well (see art. Fravashis). In Iran the names were wholly beneficent, and the darker side of the tenance of the dead separated itself entirely from association with them. "\[\text{Plutarch (Life of Theseus).}\]

"Av. abura," in which Veda and Avesta, as A. A. Macfadyen notes (Vedic Mythology, Strasbourg, 1887, p. 7), is applied to the highest gods, who in both are conceived as mighty kings, drawn through the air in their war charriots by swift steeds, and in character benevolent, entirely almost free from guile and mortal traits. The similarity of these attributes to those given in the Avesta to the Fravashis, who are largely names, suggests the otherwise probable inference that, if Aranya "avas" mean an astronomical deity, "ahura" analogically meant a 'here' in the Greek sense. This fits very well the etymological connexion traced by Schrader (ERS ii. 15) between *avara* and the Germanic anagorin (W. Gr. *anagogia*), whose ultimate rivalry was assured. The rivalry started largely, we may conjecture, in conditions different from social status. The elemental powers were likely to be popular deities, adored by uncultured nomads who could not understand gods of shadowy and abstract character. The latter, especially if connected closely with the names, would appeal to the nobles, prone everywhere to reverence ancestors from the very fact that they knew who they were, and therein showed their superiority to the common people. In some aristocracy of Eastern Iran, it would seem, one *ahura*—or rather *ahura", for the weakening of the *s* had not yet set in—was elevated above other such powers by the epithet "masda", 'wise, or 'wisdom." Closely linked with him were the *ahrmeta*, or the *ahuras* of the sky, in the sense that they are the "sky-spirits" in residence of the ancestors. In the Avesta the former name proves that the date of its annexation by the Semites was centuries earlier than that of the Zend. This discovery (for which see E. Hommel in PSBA xxi. [1899] 133) makes it necessary to date the name *Ahura Mazda" long before the days of Zarathushtra. The Beinmer, in the writer's opinion, was at the head of the race which worshipped this deity as 'god of the Aryans,' by which title he is known in one of the Behistun Inscriptions (Elamite version, iii. 77, 78). 'Aryans' there will mean here peoples of whom its ancestral home is already sketched will account excellently for the first hints which Zarathushtra improved so as to make the system underlying the Gathas.

Meanwhile the names were worshiping the "deos", like their cousins who had migrated into India. Chief among them was the Light-god *Varuna*, Mitthra. His later history, in Zoroastrianism and in Mythology, involves us in some complex problems which may be left to the articles concerned. According to A. Meillet (JA x. [1907] 133 ff), this Aryan deity originated in an ethical conception, that of the 'compacts' or "mitans," which occurs as a common name in the Gathas. Mitthra's Vedic companion, Varuna, is plausibly traced to a similar origin, his name being compared with Skr. "varnata," "ordain," Av. "varnata," "vastun," "contract," Pahl. "varnata," "bago arvata," or "BAGO ARVATA." From the pre-Aryan period also may have come other elements of Iranian religion, as is suggested especially by comparisons with Roman divinities and cultus.

4. Aranya religion has by the side of the 'heavenly ones' (Skr. deva, Av. daiva) another term, *ahura* (Av. abura), which in Veda and Avesta, as A. A. Macfadyen notes (Vedic Mythology, Strasbourg, 1887, p. 7), is applied to the highest gods, who in both are conceived as mighty kings, drawn through the air in their war charriots by swift steeds, and in character benevolent, entirely almost free from guile and mortal traits. The similarity of these attributes to those given in the Avesta to the Fravashis, who are largely names, suggests the otherwise probable inference that, if Aranya "avas" mean an astronomical deity, "ahura" analogically meant a 'here' in the Greek sense. This fits very well the etymological connexion traced by Schrader (ERS ii. 15) between *avara* and the Germanic anagorin (W. Gr. *anagogia*), whose ultimate rivalry was assured. The rivalry started largely, we may conjecture, in conditions different from social status. The elemental powers were likely to be popular deities, adored by uncultured nomads who could not understand gods of shadowy and abstract character. The latter, especially if connected closely with the names, would appeal to the nobles, prone everywhere to reverence ancestors from the very fact that they knew who they were, and therein showed their superiority to the common people. In some aristocracy of Eastern Iran, it would seem, one *ahura*—or rather *ahura*, for the weakening of the *s* had not yet set in—was elevated above other such powers by the epithet *masda*, 'wise, or 'wisdom.' Closely linked with him were the *ahrmeta*, or the *ahuras* of the sky, in the sense that they are the "sky-spirits" in residence of the ancestors. In the Avesta the former name proves that the date of its annexation by the Semites was centuries earlier than that of the Zend. This discovery (for which see E. Hommel in PSBA xxi. [1899] 133) makes it necessary to date the name *Ahura Mazda" long before the days of Zarathushtra. The Beinmer, in the writer's opinion, was at the head of the race which worshipped this deity as 'god of the Aryans,' by which title he is known in one of the Behistun Inscriptions (Elamite version, iii. 77, 78). 'Aryans' there will mean here peoples of whom its ancestral home is already sketched will account excellently for the first hints which Zarathushtra improved so as to make the system underlying the Gathas.

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6. The cult of the nature-powers in the list of Herodotus (above, § 3) calls for little further comment. Sun and Moon are objects of worship in the Vedas and (to a limited extent) in the later Avesta. For the popular cultus in Iran, Herodotus's notices of what he saw in Persia are much better evidence than the Avesta. (We might cite one striking proof that the historian got his information among the people and not only in Court circles—his note [iii. 67] that the Magian usurper, pseudo-Smerdis, "was lamented by all in Asia except the Persians as being the great benefactor, the Smerdis, as spouse of the Sky, is seen in the Indian coupling of Dynas and Prthivi, and on Iranian soil among the Scythians (Herod. iv. 59). The Aranyus *Aravati* (Vedic; Av. *Arnavi*), scanned as a "quadrantisable" in the 15th c.m. was a member of the Avesta from the first; and on the evidence of the commentator Sâyana (on Rigveda vii. xxxvi. 8, viii. xiii. 3) it is generally allowed that this was an Indian (and that shows that the conceptions were thoroughly assimilated, and with the very primitive form of the name proves that
IROQUOIS.

The sacred formula, which lies behind the important equation of Skr. orvahum and Lat. flamma (origin, heater), is thus included with the invocation of this site. There is no direct evidence on Iranian soil that such priests held hereditary office; but we may recall the combinations of Schrader to prove that traditional lore was handed down in Indiana. Magi succeeded to these ascendant functions in Persia, largely because of their influence over the non-Aryan population, which had more or less decorously adopted the forms of Iranian worship and a few features of Zarathushtra's reform (on this subject see art. MAGI).


IRISH.—See CELTS.

IROQUOIS.—The name 'Iroquois' was given by the French settlers in Canada to the great confederation of the Five Nations—Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca, to which, after 1726, the Tuscarora, also the famous Six Nations. The most advanced of all American Indians in statecraft and political organization, they were the leading members of a linguistic family which ranges from the Ottawa River (the Sagunay on the north bank, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the south) through South Quebec and Ontario, the greater part of New York and Pennsylvania, and the north-western half of Ohio, with an exclave running south-west through portions of Virginia, Tennessee, the Carolinas, Georgia, and Alabama. Excepting the exclave, they were entirely surrounded by Indians of Algonquian stock. The name 'Iroquois' is itself Algonquian, 'real adders' (with the French termination -ois).

The chief Iroquoian tribes were the Huron (q.v.), the Tiennomati, or Tobacco People (the 'Nation du Poton' of the Jesuit Relations), who lived in Grey and Simcoe counties, Ont., and who combined with the Huron to form the modern Wyandot; the Atiwendakon, or Neutral (who, unlike the Huron, took no part in the wars between the Huron and the Iroquois), living north of Lake Erie; the Coasata, along the Susquehanna River; the Erie, or Catt Nation (in allusion to the panther or wild-cat), south of the Neutrals; the Tuscarora in North Carolina; the Notaway in South-East Virginia; the Meherrin, along the river of that name, on the border between Virginia and North Carolina; and the Cherokee (q.v.).

1. Government. —Iroquoian government was essentially a confederacy of clans, each composed of a number of gentes or families, which, in turn, consisted of several fraternities. The family (Mohawk, or Human) was matriarchal, its members being the male and female offspring of a woman and her female relatives. Male warfare was confined to women's line, together with such persons as had been adopted into the Human. The head of an Human was usually its eldest woman, and each of its members possessed the right of inheritance from deceased fellow-members, and the vote in its councils. In the process of development, Human, either actually or theoretically, then became coalesced, in which case certain

This equation is not made by A. Walle, Lat. etymolog. Worterbüch, Heidelberg, 1910, p. 295.)
The Iroquois gained the custody of the titles of chief and sachem, and the married women could, accordingly, take the initial steps not only in choosing, but also in deposing, a chief or sub-chief—in both cases subject to confirmation and installation (or deposition) by the tribe. In consequence, the matrilineages of the ohwachiras also appears in the fact that all the land of a family was exclusively owned by women. Each ohwachira possessed its own tutelary deities (oyaron or oching speaking), and the clans were organized into a matrilineal principle. The clans were to the ohwachiras what the latter were to the firesides (families in our sense of the term, except that they were matrilineal instead of patrilineal); and the clans, combined in a matrilineal fashion, into phratries, two of which normally constituted a tribe. The clans composing a phratry were brothers and sisters to each other, and cousins (or progenitors) to the other phratry. Consequently, marriage within a phratry was a crime, and, though long after the clans were exogamous, 2.

2. Family life and culture. As would be evident in a matrilineal society, the power of women is paramount in many respects in Iroquois society. Women's rights to land and her privilege of choosing the chiefs have already been noted. Being the source of life, she alone could independently adopt an alien (a man could do this only with the consent of his wife); she had the right to determine whether a captive should be put to death or adopted, and she might even forbid her sons to go on the warpath. Children were raised by the women, provided the food for festivals, etc., watched over the treasury, and, when of extraordinary ability, might even, in case of need, act as substitute during the vacancy of a male chieftainship. The penalty for killing a woman was double that for the murder of a man (see art. BLOOD-FRUD [Primitive], vol. ii. p. 725). Yet, although a son belonged to his mother's clan, a husband retained his own clan, as the wife retained hers. Their offspring had, therefore, a relationship to both clans; and the father's clan gave the son his tutelary (oyaron), supplied a prisoner or a scalp. If the fell in battle, his wife performed the sepulchral rites in case of death in his wife's clan.

The principle of adoption (g.v.) was one of prime importance in Iroquoian organization. As among the Huron (see ERE, vol. vi. p. 885 f.), a captive might be adopted to replace a fallen warrior, and, as Hewitt points out (HAL II. 15), to restore the ohvenda (as which see below) lost by the clan through the death of its member. Not only individuals, but entire tribes, might be adopted. This was notably the case when, about 1720, the Tuscarora were adopted by the Five Nations, through the successive stages of infant, boy, youth, man, assistant to the official women, warrior, and peer. The Tuscarora were Iroquoian; but Algonquins (Leni-lenape and Nanticoke) and Siouans (Saponi and Tatelio) were also adopted.

The character of the Iroquoians has been described in art. Huron; but that their reputed savagery was not inherent in the race is shown by the gentleness of the Tuscarora, who suffered from the whites the cruellest wrongs, perhaps the least of which was the constant kidnapping of both men and women into slavery (Hewitt, HAL II. 845 f.).

The Iroquoian dwellings were the famous 'long houses,' often over 100 ft. in length, and corresponding width. The stone walls were made of poles, which were covered with bark (as was also the roof), usually of the elm. Within, each house had its own apartment, curtained off, while through the centre ran a passage (ocoyaron). Among the Tuscarora, however, the round bark lodge was in use (ib. ii. 851). In war, body-armour of twined wooden rods or slats was used (W. Hough, in Rep. U.S. Nat. Mus. 1893, p. 848 f.)., and, besides the ordinary Indian weapons, blow-guns were frequently employed, while, at least among the Erie, poisoned arrows were not unknown.

3. Religion. The underlying concept of Iroquoian religion is orenda, a term which has passed into the vocabulary of comparative religion. Orenda is closely connected to the Polynesian concept of mana (g.v.), and denotes the active force, principle, or magic power which was assumed by the iroquois reasoning of primitive man to be inherent in every body and being of nature and in every object, whether animate or inanimate. It was a principle of life and death, property, or activity, belonging to each of these and connected in the active sense or force, or as it were, involved in every operation or phenomenon of nature, in any manner affecting or controlling the welfare of man. This hypothesis was conceived to be immediate, personal, mysterious in mode of action, limited in function and efficiency, and not at all connected, local and not comprehensive, or extraneous, or embodied or immanent in some object, although it was believed that it could be transferred, attracted, acquired, increased, superseded, or estranged or ritualistic formulas endowed with more power' (Hewitt, HAL II. 147).

The object of sacrifice is to secure the exercise, in behalf of the sacrificer, of the orenda possessed by worshipful beings; and the phenomena of nature are simply contents between different orenda. Orenda may be beneficent or malignant; the beings who use orenda for injurious ends are called oton. The chief defense of the individual against the oton is the oyaron, or tutelaries, which were also possessed by tribes, clans, and families. The normal mode of acquiring one's oyanon is detailed in art. COMMUNICATION WITH DEITY (American). Like the orenda, the oyaron differed in potency and in character. Those possessed of powerful and beneficent orenda, were the wise men and beneficent magicians, whose oyaron-revealed knowledge enabled them to foretell the future, divine remedies for disease, interpret dreams, and, if sufficiently potent, cure evil orenda, oton, and oyaron. Those whose oyaron were malignant were the evil wizards, who bore the significant name agaton or hokaton ('he is an olyon'), whereas the benignant type was orenda ('his oyaron is powerful'), and orenda ('Huron, 'one who examines another by seeing'), etc.

The good will of the oyaron must be retained by feats and sacrifices to keep it in health and strength, or it would turn against its possessor; neither could its dictates, as revealed in dreams, be denied without most serious consequences (for details see ERE, vol. vi. p. 885 f.). If the object manifested as the oyanon was an animal, the possessor's life was conditioned by that of the living creature in question; but in any case the material creature or object was not the oyaron itself, but merely

As in so many other cosmologies, the earth was female to the Iroquois.

1. Hewitt's notes (HAL II. 841 f.) that the number of the phratries was based on the duumviral of natural sex.

2. A 'council-house' of the Iroquois is preserved at Portage, N.Y., but, if genuine, is a very recent development, being simply a log-cabin. A similar didactic women's meeting place, the slating house of N.Y., is claimed to have been the home of an Indian family at the time of Sullivan's destructive invasion in 1779.
The personal oyaron was carefully carried by \textit{joya} (marriage or war) to the House of the Sun. A symbol or representation of it was made by the father's clan at the New Year ceremony after the death of the youth who was to bear it. It was traditionally interpreted as the head of the new world. In the oyaron concept lies at least one of the first expressions of a totemism of power.

The chief deities of the Iroquois were Taharonhawagon and Tawiskaron. They were twins, and antagonistic to each other, being the creator and enforcer of law and order respectively. The Taharonhawagon is the creator of the world, and the Tawiskaron is the bringer of winter. They were not, however, gods in the usual sense of the term, but man-beings (\textit{onques}), and their origin is inseparably connected with the cosmological myth of the Iroquois.

According to this cosmology, there were three cosmic periods. In the first race of man-beings—\textit{si-pueri} to man in every way, and uncared for by the old—life was both long and comfortable. In the second race of man-beings, which followed, life became more difficult. In the third and present race, life was hard and filled with suffering.

The Iroquois undertook various rituals and ceremonies throughout the year, driven by the rhythms of nature and the agricultural cycle. These included the five major ceremonies: the Strawberry Dance, the Bean Dance, the Greenland Hunt, the Deer Dance, and the Bear Dance. Each ceremony was associated with a particular phase of the moon, and the rituals performed were believed to have a direct impact on the natural world.

Belief in immortality was strong among the Iroquois peoples. The souls of the dead were thought to join the ancestors and participate in a form of collective memory and tradition. The rituals and ceremonies were designed to ensure the well-being of the souls of the deceased, and to maintain the balance of the natural world.

The Iroquois believed in a rich pantheon of gods and spirits, each with specific roles and duties. These included the creator god, the god of war, the god of the moon, and the god of the sun. The Iroquois also believed in the spirits of the natural world, such as the spirits of the forest, the spirits of the water, and the spirits of the animals.

The Iroquois were skilled at agriculture, hunting, and foraging. They lived in large communities, governed by a council of elders, and were known for their cooperation and teamwork. The Iroquois language was complex and difficult to learn, and it played a crucial role in maintaining the community's culture and traditions.
rate substance and local influence; his mother, Mary Leith, came of a family of "bonnet lairds" in the adjacent parish of Dornock. He was bap-
tized in the Established Church, which in the west of Scotland was much influenced by traditions of the Reformed Church. His education was received at the Academy of his native town under Adam Hope, who also became schoolmaster to Thomas Carlyle, and at Edinburgh University, where he matriculated at the age of thirteen. He gave no evident sign of his subsequent career; at school his only distinction was that of an athlete. At the University he graduated M.A. in 1809, and, still undistinguished, entered the Divinity Hall. Thereafter he followed the usual course prepara-
tory to the ministry of the Church of Scotland, supporting himself meanwhile by teaching in the Mathematical School recently established in Had-
ingston. With this work he combined the func-
tion of private tutor to the daughter of a medical practitioner in the town, Jane Welsh, the future wife of his friend Carlyle. Two years later, while his University studies still incomplete, he was appointed to the mastership of another new Academy at Kirkcaldy, Fifeshire. In 1815 he became a Probationer of the Church of Scotland, being licensed to preach by the Presbytery of Kinross. He remained at Kirkcaldy for the next three years, combining this new office with the work of his school. In 1818 he resigned his mastership and returned to Edinburgh, where he remained until, in the follow-
ing year, he was appointed assistant to Thomas Chalmers (q.v.) at St. John’s, Glasgow. The fame of the latter was too great, and Irving's genius was too strongly contrasted with that of his chief, to allow much scope for his own work. The next two years, though dis-
charged with uninterrupted loyalty and sufficient credit, was not such as to command the enthusi-
astic appreciation either of the minister or of the congregation of St. John’s, or to attract the notice of those who could further his interests. But his position as assistant to Chalmers was prominent enough to bring him under the notice of the Caledonian Church in Hayton Garden, London, a struggling outpost of the Church of Scotland, the pastorate of which had little to commend it to an amb-
tious man. In 1822, Irving was appointed to this charge, at least of the Atonal class. During his reception ordination from his native Presbytery at Annan.

In less than twelve months his popularity was assured. The incident usually associated with the sudden outburst of the new preacher upon the big world of London was the visit of Canning to the National Scots Church at the instance of his colleague, Sir James Mackintosh, and a subse-
quent speech in the House of Commons, in the course of which the statesman alluded to the eloquence of the sermon then heard. From this moment Irving was provided with the opportunity of his genius, and his permanent congregation, as it was swelled by the numbers drawn from every religious communion, not least from the Church of England, gradually lost its peculiarly Scottish complexion and took on the characteristics of the Old Testament Church. As affording examples of a new type of religious address (the title itself was ambitious, though justified by the contents), and exhibit the claim and recognition of the author to the public mind in a form alike more compre-
hensive and more vital than the conventional echoes of a narrow and moribund evangelicalism to which the ear of the church-goer had become accustomed. The Argument for Judgment to come foreshadows that prophetic teaching which, to-
gether with the exercise of spiritual gifts, constitutes the popular conception of Irvingism. This was followed in two years by Babylon and Infidelity Foredoomed of God, a survey of con-
temporary history in the light of that millennial principle of interpreting Daniel and the Revelation which had been such a powerful appeal to American Christians in the early decades of the 19th cent., and of which Irving’s mind proved readily recep-
tive. Another influence, which approached him from a different quarter, was that of S. T. Cule-
ridge, to whom he had been personally introduced in 1833.

The year 1826 is important as that of the first of the Conferences held at Albury Park, Surrey, by invitation of Henry Drummond, M.P., under the presidency of Hugh MacNeil, rector of the parish and subsequently dean of Ripon. Drummond had already been brought into contact with Irving, and, knowing his town, the state of the prophets, offered him a seat at the Conference, in which his eminence soon gave him a leading place. As will be apparent, the Albury Conferences were not the product of Irving's own brain; his London congregation directly concerned in them, though Drummond, by whom they were organized, afterwards became a prominent mem-
ber of the body associated with his name. The movement represented by them is still active in evangelical circles, and in Irvingism it became a formative principle. The Morning Watch, a periodical inaugurated by the Conference, virtu-
ally became, before its annexation in 1838, the organ of the new community.

In 1827 the church in Regent Square was opened to accommodate the crowds for which the small chapel in Hayton Garden was totally inade-
quate. The building still stands, but no longer as the National Scots Church. The congregation, which continued to use it after Irving's expulsion, became identified in 1843 with the party of the Scottish Disruption, and is now in communion with the English Presbyterians. It was about this time that Irving became acquainted with John McLeod Campbell of Row, who was beginning to re-state the doctrine of the Incarnation. This was developed in three volumes of sermons and a book on the Lost Days, published in 1828. It would be difficult to say that the alleged heresies for which the two men were severally deposed from the ministry had a single source in the mind of either. They are to be regarded as parallel developments of a com-
mon tendency. It is significant that the General Assembly (1831) which condemned Campbell di-
rected that any attempt on the part of Irving to exercise his ministry in Scotland should be met by the Presbytery concerned with an inquiry into his writings on the Incarnation. It was the sermons published in 1828 that contained the statements which first brought him under the suspicion of having asserted the sinfulness of Christ's Ation. Action had actually been taken the previous year (1830) by the Presbytery of London, from the con-
sequences of which Irving escaped only by the doubtful expedient of claiming exemption from their jurisdiction, and by there his ordination. The members of the National Scots Church required their minister to be ordained by a Presbytery in Scotland. His position, though anarchical, was practically ten-
able, because he was no longer under the control of his own Kirk Session, who in a few months were them-
selves to invoke the authority of the same Presby-
tery, when on a grave matter of Church discipline
they found themselves irreconcilably opposed to the pastor whose orthodoxy they had stoutly maintained.

Meanwhile events had taken place in Scotland, destined to precipitate the crisis which in a few years severed Irving from the communion of his native Church. An old friendship existed between himself and Robert Story, minister of Roseneath, which on more than one occasion had brought him to that place to consult with the venerable Alexander Scott, who, coming to London in the first instance as Irving’s assistant, received a call to the Scots congregation at Woolwich, and was in consequence involved before the London Presbytery in a charge of heretical teaching concerning our Lord’s human nature. Sharing Irving’s view of the Incarnation, he insisted that the exceptional gifts of the Spirit, manifested in the Apostolic Church, were a permanent endowment of the Body of Christ, restrained only by the faithlessness of later Christians. This teaching he disseminated, among other places, in his old home in the West of Scotland. At Ferniegare Farm, near Kirkcudbright, Row, lived Mary Campbell, a young woman of extraordinary piety and unusual personality, who, in 1830, while apparently a hopeless invalid, became the subject of spiritual manifestations which her friends clasped as a veritable reappearance of the tongues spoken at Pentecost in the NT. Shortly afterwards the ‘power,’ as it came to be called, visited a shipbuilding family at Port Glasgow. James and Margaret MacDonald, brother and sister, spoke in an unknown tongue, and the latter was raised from sickness at the word of the former. James then proceeded to inform Mary Campbell by letter of what had occurred, and the sister’s act of faith, whereupon she too rose from her bed, apparently fully restored to health. From that time she continued, like Margaret MacDonald, to speak with tongues, with which was associated what was claimed as the gift of prophecy. She married, and became a familiar figure among the friends of the new movement as Mrs. Caird. A sympathetic but not unquestioning account of these proceedings has been preserved in the Memoir of Robert Story, published (Cambridge, 1862) by his son Herbert, sometime Principal of Glasgow University. Wide-spread interest in the phenomena arose throughout Scotland. They were investigated by Thomas Erskine’s Lincluden, who acknowledged their genuineness. No money was made out of them, and there is no evidence of imposture. They may, perhaps, be classed as mediumistic or spiritualistic in nature, and in other parts of Christendom, Irving, predisposed alike by character and antecedents, at once accepted them as a baptism of the Holy Spirit and Fire.

In 1831 the gifts of tongues and prophecy appeared, it was believed, in answer to fervent prayer, among the members of Irving’s congregation. The gift of healing was also claimed, and an attitude towards disease, strikingly allied to that which in later times has become characteristic of Christian Science, began to be assumed by ‘the spiritual.’ But, if disease was spoken of among them as sin, it was because the Spirit was supposed to hold and consume, not negate and annihilate, the flesh. It was, however, the two former gifts that exercised a determining influence on the fortunes of Irving and his people, by being ‘called into the church.’ Irving and some of his ‘prophets’ of the ‘true spirits’ of the prophets, in right of his ministerial commission as angel or pastor, and, finding them to be true spirits, made provision for the exercise of their function in London. Soon afterwards another prophetic utterance sent him on a mission to Scotland, and, reaching Glasgow after a circuitous journey through England and Wales, he died in that city on 7th December 1834, and was buried in the crypt of his adopted cathedral.

The religious society thus brought into being still exists, but it has had little or no public
history. Popularly called Irvingite, a name only recently adopted by the Church, the Catholic Apostolic Church is a faithful successor of the Church of England. It is a congregational church, meeting in Newman Street. Its organization was practically completed when the college of apostles was increased from two to twelve in obedience to a prophetic message. Prophets and evangelists being already in existence, the fourfold ministry was completed by the ordination of pastors and teachers—a local priesthood consisting, in the case of each congregation, of the bishop or angel (cf. the ‘angels of the churches’ in the Apocalypse), or chief pastor, with the elders and deacons. The meeting-place in Newman Street has been replaced by a fine Gothic Church in Gordon Square, and there are churches in Edinburgh and other large cities, as well as at Albury, outside Britain and Germany. Its extension has been limited. Its terms of worship have been assimilated to those of ancient Christendom, and its ritual is elaborate. It possesses a liturgy constructed for the most part on Eastern models. These changes, which were spontaneous and independent, may be traced partly to the study of the Apocalypse, partly to the example of its members. Its ministry has never been professional, being composed for the most part of persons engaged in ordinary occupations. Many of its members are married, and some are actively engaged in public affairs, and as individuals take a prominent part in works of general utility and philanthropy. But in its corporate capacity the community has lived apart, and there has been no sensation caused by the outbreak of the ‘gifts,’ has neither courted nor received a place in popular consideration. This is the natural consequence of the theory of its origin, which also accounts for its apathy in respect to missionary work. It is due, not to the cooling of its early zeal, but to its expectation of a returning Lord. The appearance of the gifts was regarded as the sign of the approach of the Son of Man. The apostolic Church was constituted for the ingathering of the nations. Evangelists were at first sent out into the highways; apostolic journeys were undertaken in Europe and elsewhere; but their object was not to preach, but to feed the people in the spirit and on the method of the great missionary societies, and to bear final testimony before nations and kings to the coming of the Day of the Lord. The witnesses had no zeal for the extension of the Church, but for its preparation as a bride adorned for her husband. They had no special tenets to proclaim as contrasted with the received teaching of Christianity. Their exclusiveness was due not to what they conceived as the false teaching, but to the apathy, of the churches. If they were in a peculiar sense God’s people, it was only because they were aroused, expectant, waiting for the final baptism. Their Church was constituted for the ‘witness’ of the last times. Their testimony given, they were content to wait in spiritual readiness for the rending of the heavens. They became a church within the Church, instituted a rite of ‘sealing,’ or laying on of hands, by which those who received the witness of the last times were set apart against the final Day of Redemption. But the sealed were not necessarily required to withdraw from the communion of other churches. ‘Irvingites’ have always been found communicating and, it is said, even ministering in other religious bodies. A special affinity with those Churches which retained the order of bishops, successors of the ‘angels’ who presided over the apostolic Church, has always been recognized, in spite of the fact that Irving himself had been a Presbyterian minister, and that the connexion of his people with the Church of England was dissolved through the agency of individuals who had abandoned its ministry. The last of the apostles is now dead, and the church is in process of readjustment to the new conditions created by the increase of the college.

Differences of opinion regarding this Church have led to a division of the Irvingites, and to the formation of the ‘New Apostolic Church.’ The latter body holds that the number of the apostles may be five more than twelve, and traces its origin to Germany. Where Irvingism had been introduced by William Caird in 1841, centres were formed at Augsburg, Berlin, Königsberg, and Hamburg. The New Apostolic Church arose from the few members of the congregation in Hanover, by Heinrich Geyer, who formed new apostles chosen. Excommunicated in 1868, he joined Schwartz, the bishop at Hamburg, and formed the new organization under the direction of Schwartz, so that in Germany the new body has discarded much of its elaborate ritual, and lays less stress on the expectation of the speedy Second Coming. Its main centre is Brunswick, where one of their number, F. Krebs, gradually rose to be the ‘father of the apostles’). His successor, H. Niehaus, terms himself the ‘Stammapostel’ as well as the ‘leader of the apostles.’ Since the beginning of the new century the New Apostolic Church has suffered the ‘excommunication’ of the ‘Sceptre of Judah,’ which differs little except that it lays still less emphasis on eschatological hopes.

Except for the United States, no exact statistics are available for the Irvingites. They are supposed to number about 5,000 in Great Britain and about 20,000 in Germany and Switzerland; the New Apostolic branch estimated their adherents at 20,000 in Europe at the end of 1608. According to the last religious census of the United States (1900), the Catholic Apostolic Church reported 11 organizations, with a membership of 2,907 and 14 ministers; the New Apostolic Church, 13 organizations, with a membership of 2,650 and 19 ministers. Since the last previous religious census of 1890 the Catholic Apostolic Church had increased by 1 organization and 1,513 members; the New Apostolic Church was not reported in America in 1890. The main strength of both bodies is in the N. Atlantic States, especially in New York, which has 7 out of the total number of 24 organizations.

2. Criticism.—Our estimate of Irvingism as a religious phenomenon will vary according as we regard it in the particular community in which its principles are embodied or to the spiritual movements of the 19th cent., to which it is vitally related. The main strength of both bodies is in the N. Atlantic States, especially in New York, which has 7 out of the total number of 24 organizations.

The limitations of Irving’s personality and the isolation of his position will to a large extent explain the absurdities and inconsistencies which bear his name. It cannot be said that its failure to command popular sympathy and to carry
with it the reason and judgment of his contemporaries is self-evidence of error, for this would be a mistake of Christianity itself in its initial stages. But we are justified in pointing out the presumptions against a stable and progressive work which are to be found in the character of Irving's genius. His opponents held that he developed his gifts and his influence in inverse proportion to his intellectual equipment. Unlike the Tractarians, he had no solid basis of learning upon which to ground his theology. He had a vision of great religious ideas rather than a comprehensive knowledge of theology. This is the true criticism of his doctrine of the Incarnation. An adequate inheritance of theological thinking would have kept him from those clumsy statements of our Lord's human nature which exposed him to the assaults of a criticism equally ill-equipped. His philosophy was also at fault. While, therefore, he always maintained Christ's immortality from actual sin, he invariably insisted that the humanity which the Son of God assumed was sinful. By this he meant to assert that God became flesh under the conditions which sin had imposed, in order that He might redeem what He took. It is, therefore, the Spirit indwelling 'the creature' which lifts the Body of Christ and all its members above sin. The second proposition, which was the practical conclusion that Irving wished to reach, is genuine Nicene and over against it no better theological tribunal ought to have recognized. The imperfection of the first proposition, which really marked a return to a fuller doctrine of the Person of Christ than the formal evangelism of his contemporaries, lies in the false psychology, misled by the phrase 'sinful flesh,' which does not predicate sin solely of the will. But in so far as Irving's teaching was strong enough for his identification of Christ with human nature as sin has made it, not excluding its guilt, his doctrine cut deeper than that of his successors. The further criticism, which attempts to find in Irving's error concerning the peculiarity of Christ's manhood the secret of his attitude towards the spiritual 'gifts,' and to discredit in consequence his whole system, is not consistent with facts. In so far as the expectation which led him to acknowledge claims disallowed by others sprung out of his theology, rather than out of his reading of the NT, it must be attributed to his strong identification of believers with Him who is the Last Adam. He was more than involved in the statement of Athanasius, that ' God became Man in order that we might be made divine' (de Incarn. Verbi, liv. 3 [PG xxv. 192]). This language is admittedly hyperbolical, but it is intended to cover no more than the 'grace of union,' a phrase by which Hooker, a writer with whom Irving acknowledged his own sympathy, expressed the supernatural powers which human nature received by union with the Lordhead in Christ.

Again, the prophetic element in Irving's personality was allowed to dull his intellectual appreciation. John's experience rather than the Pauline temper, but in the form which appears in the Apocalypse rather than in the Fourth Gospel. He was the mystic in fervent action, not in calm contemplation, and not in the passion of events, and not in the natural silence, fascinated him. God was always coming forth out of His place rather than inhabiting eternity. His own impatience of spirit was manifested in his eager desire for speech, and his presence witnessed divine events from day to day. This injured his sense of proportion, and led him to give values to occurrences within his own circle which at once endowed them with significance in the history of the Church of Christ and of the ancient prophets with a difference. They saw in their immediate social experience types of God's judgments; Irving saw in the activities of Regent Square forces intimately connected with the shaking of worlds. This want of proportion in the Irvingite movement is one of the features that most readily offer themselves to the critic. If we may not deny that the Spirit manifests Himself in most of and pursues methods that are 'foolishness with men,' we are yet bound to judge a phenomenon in relation to its environment, and to estimate its value in some proportion to its effectiveness. Closest connected with the foregoing must be noted Irving's lack of humour, which belongs also to the whole movement. He always takes himself very seriously. Every occasion is great, every speech an appearance. His style is stilted, often turgid, never delicate. The world is identified too readily with Babylon. There is none of that shrewd observation of the facts of society which makes the prophet canonic and the seer sympathetic. He does not really know life as he knows his Bible. It follows that he did not know men, still less women. He took every one at his own valuation, mistook cranks for persons of insight, and became the tool of minds smaller than his own. It is a mistake to charge him with conceit. The movement which revolved round him never made him its centre or took the impress of his personality. It claimed an inspiration of the Spirit, but never through the medium of himself. No one, e.g., has ever ventured to claim for him the position assigned to Montaups in the primitive schism with which Irving sympathised, or to make the Irvingites resent being so named, not merely as unchristian, but as wrong in fact. The secondary position which their leader assumed without complaint after his identification of Christ with human nature as sin has made it, not excluding its guilt, his doctrine cut deeper than that of his successors. The further criticism, which attempts to find in Irving's error concerning the peculiarity of Christ's manhood the secret of his attitude towards the spiritual 'gifts,' and to discredit in consequence his whole system, is not consistent with facts. In so far as the expectation which led him to acknowledge claims disallowed by others sprung out of his theology, rather than out of his reading of the NT, it must be attributed to his strong identification of believers with Him who is the Last Adam. He was more than involved in the statement of Athanasius, that ' God became Man in order that we might be made divine' (de Incarn. Verbi, liv. 3 [PG xxv. 192]). This language is admittedly hyperbolical, but it is intended to cover no more than the 'grace of union,' a phrase by which Hooker, a writer with whom Irving acknowledged his own sympathy, expressed the supernatural powers which human nature received by union with the Lordhead in Christ.

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Irving exulted his hearers to prepare themselves for the imminent judgment which awaited the world, and the coming glory which was to descend upon the Church. The great event had appeared, because past and future had alike lost their importance in view of the approaching end of the age. The ecclesiastical Church order, worked out by the miscellaneous group of ministers constituted his "ecclesiastical Church" after the rupture with the Church of Scotland, made no pretence of continuity with the past, and did not, in one sense, claim to supersede existing ministries. They were not fashioning an instrument for the conversion of mankind; they were simply settling their house in order to wait for the coming King.

There is, however, one criticism often levelled at Irvingism which has no foundation in fact. It is accused of adding to the Christian faith, by supplementing it with a revelation of its own. This is not the case. It does not claim to add anything to the Catholic interpretation of the Person and Work of Christ. Believing themselves to be a part of the universal Church, its adherents claim that, as the Spirit spoke by prophecy in the churches of Antioch and Corinth, so He spoke in their church in London. They claimed that the work for the evangelization of the world was the ministry of the prophets, so (they hold) a ministry was set apart for the sealing of believers in the latter day. Our attitude towards such a claim may involve rejection, but not on the ground that it adds to the deposit of faith.

Perhaps the greatest flaw in the movement was its unorthodox attitude towards the progressive developments of the early 19th century. Its adherents had not the power of discrimination to distinguish between the true and the false elements in the liberalism of the day. They saw in it nothing but the final apostasy, a destructive effort of Satan. In the weaver of change they failed to detect the operation of forces directed by the Spirit and prophecies of the Kingdom. In Glasgow, Irving had shown no sympathy with the social schemes of Chalmerians, whose experiment was in full operation when he was assistant at St. John's. So far as he was a politician, it was an unprofitable one for him. Toryism had committed itself to his mind and expressed itself in his personality. His leading followers in London were mainly of the same mould. There was not so much in the asceticism of the Oxford movement, with its antiquarian tendency and its rigidity of form, as was absent from Irving's teaching. He was always evangelical, even if his general vital and less legal than that of his immediate predecessors. And, amid much that was fantastic in the methods of interpretation current among those millenarian Christians to whose speculations Irving lent the authority of his name, he emphasized that expectation of the Second Coming which the study of apocalyptic literature among the scientific theologians and Biblical students of the 19th cent. shows to have been an integral element of apocalyptic and primitive Christianity, and the recognition of which as the ultimate hope of the Church is necessary to a true estimate of the task which confronts it, as the witness among all nations to a crucified, exalted, and returning Lord.

ISHTAR.—Ishtar was the Babylonian and Assyrian form of the divinity who was worshipped in Canaan as Ashtar (Ashoreth, Ashtoreth), in Mesopotamia as 'Attar, in Moab as 'Ashtar, in South Arabia as Athtar, and in Abyssinia as Athshat, Asphalt, Atargatis, Sareians.

I. THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.—The cult of Ishtar is now known from a multitude of original Bab. and Assy. records: (1) historical inscriptions of the kings, (2) mythological texts, (3) hymns and prayers, (4) magical texts, (5) omen, (6) boundary stones, and (7) artistic representations in statues, reliefs, seals, etc. (see literature at end of art.).

II. THE ORIGIN OF ISHTAR.—In the art. Ashtar the reasons are given for thinking that this goddess was not a creation of the Semurrians, or of the Semitic Babylonians, but a primitive Semitic divinity. She was a personification of the force in nature that showed itself in the giving and the taking of life. As a glossator of Plautus has aptly expressed it (Mercator, iv. vi. 283 f.), she was ‘Diva Ashtar, hominem deorumque vis, vita, salus; rationem humanitatis intellegit.’ The conception of her character, which is common to all the Semites, was brought into Babylonia by the first Semitic settlers, and formed the basis of the development of the goddess in the third.

III. THE IDENTIFICATION OF ISHTAR WITH OTHER DIVINITIES.—The Semites who entered Babylonia found on the ground a number of local goddesses of the original Semanian population whom they proceeded to identify with their mother goddess. These old goddesses eventually disappeared in Ishtar, leaving only their names as titles, and some of their functions as attributes. Some of these absorbed Semanian goddesses are as follows.

1. Innanna, or Ishtar of Ereh.—In Semitic inscriptions of the Old Bab. period the most conspicuous goddess is the one whose name is written with an ideograph which the Assyrians sometimes reproduced as EI (R. Brunnnow, A Classified List of Ideographs, Leyden, 1889, no. 2561), which, according to the syllabaries, is to be read Innanna, Inanna, Anu, or Ninlil (V. Jenson, KIB iii. 1882) 1, 20). The temple of this goddess was the temple called E-an-na at Ereh (Vorderasiatisches Bibliothek, v. 1907) 1, 192 n.). For her cult in early times see FAB i. 1, 283, s.v. ‘Ninlil.’ In binalgal, texts, syllabaries, and historical inscriptions, Innanna is repeatedly equated with Ishtar (e.g. Owa. Texts, xxiv. [1908] p. 41, line 75; PSBA xxxi. 1889) 29, pl. ii. line 5; Code of Hammurabi, iv. 40-45). A large number of hymns originally addressed to Innanna are supposed to be Ishtar (e.g. PSBA xxxi. 60). For this reason, Ishtar bears the titles ‘Queen of Eanna,’ ‘Queen of the land of Ereh’ (loc. cit.).

2. Nin, or Ishtar of Lagash and Nineveh.—In the Old Bab. inscriptions the goddess mentioned most frequently after Innanna is the one whose name is often written with the ideograph generally read Nin (Brunnnow, 4890). This goddess was used also for a district of Lagash and for the city of Nin, or Nineveh. Hence it is inferred that the sign for the goddess and the district of Lagash should also be read Nin. It is possible that Nin was originally a title that Nineveh was prefixed by colonists from Lagash (cf. Gn. 10), and that the patron-goddess of Nineveh was originally the same as the patron-goddess of the old city of Nin (see also § 1). Also Nin should be written in the Old Bab. period see FAB i. 1, 283, s.v. ‘Nin’.

Eannatum (c. 3200 B.C.) carefully distinguishes Ninharak, Innanna, and Ninlil (18, 50°); so also Uli-Bab (c. 2700 B.C. [FAB i. 1, 90, 52]); but Hammurabi (c. 1800 B.C.) calls the goddess of Kish Innanna (Code, ii. 59-65), and Kurigalzu i. 500 B.C.) gave to Nin of Ishtar of Babylon a tablet that had originally been dedicated to Innanna, which shows that he identified the goddesses (H. V. Hfilprecht, Old Bab. Inscr., Philadelphia, 1898, 1, 11, nos. 15, 43). The Assy. kings frequently identify Ninlil = Belit-Ishtar (Brunnow, 11046; KIB [1889] 28); Winckler, Jastrow, Bab. and Ass. 1899, 105; and in one copy of a prayer of Assurbanipal the goddess is called ‘Nin’ in the inscription of Osiris of Babylon (Jastrow, Bab. and Ass. 418, n. 6).

Zarpanit, or Ishtar of Babylon. —The consort of Marduk, the chief god of Babylon, was Zarpanit, whose name means ‘bride of Nineveh,’ ‘shining,’ but was popularly interpreted by the Semites as Zer-banit, ‘seed-producing,’ with allusion to the reproductive function of the goddess.

Inanna and Ninlil (FAB i. 1, 18, 50°); so also Gudea (c. 2500 B.C. [FAB ii. 104, 142]). Hammurabi, on the contrary, calls the goddess of Nineveh Ninlil (Code, iv. 83), and the Assyrians always call her Ishtar. This shows that Ninlil was early identified with both Innanna and Ishtar (cf. Brunnow, 1060). The earliest Assyrian creation of Ninlil is in a prayer of Ashurbanipal ii. (c. 1100 B.C.; see literature). From that time onward she is frequently named in the royal inscriptions (see Barton, Hebrews, ix. [1892-93] 60), and her temple in Nineveh bore the name of E-sarratu. Hence she is described as ‘dwelling in E-sarratu,’ and Ninlil is called ‘beloved of Ishtar.’

3. Anunn, or Ishtar of Akkad.—The chief goddess of the N. Bab. city called Agade, or Akkad, was Anunnit. The name of her temple was E-uluma.

For her worship in early times see FAB i. 1, 282, s.v. ‘Anunnit’; Code of Hammurabi, iii. 54, iv. 471. There is no record that the Assyrian kings paid her any special attention, but she was a great favourite with the Neo-Bab. king Nabonidus, who honoured her above all goddesses, and rebuilt and repaved the temple of Akkad (FAB iv. [1912] 300, s.v. ‘Anunnit’). For her identification with Ishtar see KIB iii. 1, 1026; Jastrow, Bab. and Ass. 111; PSBA xxxi. 67; H. Zimmer, Beitrag, Leipzig, 1889, 105-111; Barton, Hebrews, x. 29; FAB iv. 170, 240; 246;

4. Nin-nil, or Ishtar of Nippur.—The chief goddess of the earliest Bab. pantheon was ‘En-nil, ‘master of the wind,’ the patron-deity of Nippur. His consort was Nin-nil, ‘mistress of the wind’ (see II. 236). Under this name she was worshipped in the temple of E-me-te-ur-nil at Kish, and in Girzu, a district of Sippar (FAB i. 1, 284, s.v. ‘Nin-nil’; Code of Hammurabi, iii. 54). Still another title of Nin-nil was Nin-mah, ‘exalted mistress,’ or ‘Mah, ‘exalted’ (FAB i. 1, 138, 196, 257); Brunnow, 1060, 1106). Under this name she had a temple at Babylon called E-mah (KIB iii. 1, 199); the seat of the Nin-mah was Nippur (KIB ii. 1, 1001, 113). For the Semitic settlers in Babylonia Nin-nil was the Ninn, or ‘Mistress, ‘par excellence; hence she called her husband Bel, ‘Mistress, just as they called her husband Bel (see KIB ii. 238; Brunnow, 11064 ff).

Eannatum (c. 3200 B.C.) carefully distinguishes Ninharak, Innanna, and Ninlil (18, 50°); so also Uli-Bab (c. 2700 B.C. [FAB i. 1, 90, 52]); but Hammurabi (c. 1800 B.C.) calls the goddess of Kish Innanna (Code, ii. 59-65), and Kurigalzu i. 500 B.C.) gave to Nin of Ishtar of Babylon a tablet that had originally been dedicated to Innanna, which shows that he identified the goddesses (H. V. Hfilprecht, Old Bab. Inscr., Philadelphia, 1898, 1, 11, nos. 15, 43). The Assy. kings frequently identify Ninlil = Belit-Ishtar (Brunnow, 11046; KIB [1889] 28); Winckler, Jastrow, Bab. and Ass. 1899, 105; and in one copy of a prayer of Assurbanipal the goddess is called ‘Nin’ in the inscription of Osiris of Babylon (Jastrow, Bab. and Ass. 418, n. 6).
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One of her titles was Erat, 'pregnant.' (C. F. Lehmann, Shanashnezemsuk, Leipzig, 1892, ii. 36.) She had a chapel called Kudshuq in Assuriga, the great temple of Marduk (V.A.B. iv. 726-4). For references to her cult, see 1 Hammratu, London, 1888-1900, no. 10, i. 41, ii. 12; Code of Hammurabi, xlii. 43, 56; KIB ii. 138 f.; Winckler, Sargun, i. 180; KIB iv. (1896) 307, et v. Zarpant.i. When, through the rise of the city of Babylon, Marduk became the supreme god to the Babylonians, she was identified with Emili = Bel, the ancient chief god (E.R.E. ii. 296 f.). The logical procedure was then to identify Zarpant, the wife of Marduk, with Ninlil = Belit, the wife of Emili = Bel (V.A.B. iv. 288 f.); KIB ii. 233 f.; J. A. Craig, Rel. Texts, Leipzig, 1895, i. pl. 12, obv. 25-26; Jastrow, Rel. Texts, i. 536.) Accordingly, when in later texts we read of 'Ishtar of Babylon,' we are to understand this of Zarpant. Herodotus (i. 199) calls Zarpant Aphrodite.

6. Ishtar of Ashur.—At Ashur, the capital of the early Assyrian monarchy, an Ishtar was worshipped, who was distinguished by the name Ishtar Ashurilatu, or 'Ishtar of Ashur' (KIB i. 43, 38°, 39°; L. W. King and E. A. W. Budge, Annals of the Kings of Assyria, London, 1902, i. 198 f.; Tiele, V.A.B. iv. 288, 316, 337). The primitive name of Ishtar of Ashur and the peculiarities of her cult are unknown.

7. Ishtar of Arbel.—At Arbel another Ishtar was worshipped in a temple called Egeshshana-kalamma, 'house of the lady of the world' (PSBA xxxi. 68). In the inscriptions of the Assyrian kings, from Sennacherib onwards, Ishtar of Nineveh and Ishtar of Arbel are mentioned as though they were separate goddesses (KIB ii. 1053, 124°, 154°). An oracle to Ešaraddon (WA.II iv. 68, coll. iii. 15) begins: 'I am Ishtar of Ashur.' Asurbanipal distinguished sharply between Ishtar of Nineveh and Ishtar of Arbel, and paid more honour to the latter (KIB ii. 178°, 200°, 203°, 248°, 255, 290°). Several astrological reports from her temple are known (WA.II iii. (1570) 61, no. 54 f.). Although she is not mentioned before Sennacherib, it is probable that she was an ancient local divinity of Arbel. The name of the city Arba-isu suggests either that four divinities were united there or else that the original name was Arba (cf. Kirjath-Arba in Palestine). The Sumerian name of her temple Egeshshana-kalamma suggests the high antiquity of her cult. The same conclusion is demanded by the fact that Ashur appears in connexion with the re-building of her temple. Whose 'wall from old (ula-sepu) was not built' (KIB ii. 290°).

8. Other goddesses identified with Ishtar.—The minor goddesses of the Old Bab. pantheon came also sooner or later to be identified with Ishtar. Antu, the consort of Anu, is called Ishtar by Sargon (Winckler, Sargun, i. 464), and is mentioned withNineveh and Ishtar by the lists (O. R. Texta, iv. 21 and 29; texts i. 22°, 23°; PSBA xxi. 51). Dinkina, the consort of Ea, is identified with Belit—Ishtar by Sargon (ou. cit., ins. 34). Nin-anap-luna, the consort of Sin, has the attributes of Ishtar in a hymn published by Craig (Rel. Texts, ii. pl. 1-2) and translated by Jastrow (Rel. Texts, ii. 547), and he has had to do with a similar fate, inasmuch as she early ceased to have any independent importance in Sumerian literature. The ancient name addresses Innana-erin, or Ishtar of the cedar forest—Inanna (see above, 8), by the title of 'king' (O. A. Barton, A Sketch of Semitic Origins, New York, 1899, p. 153, ii. 1824; see also H. A. Sayce, Rel. Egypt and Bab., Edinburgh, 1898, p. 357). Whatever tendencies of the Semitic hero-goddesses we existed among the Semarians, they exerted no influence upon the Semitic conception of Ishtar. For the Babylonians and Assyrians she remained exclusively feminine. The few passages in which she receives male attributes do not imply that she had changed her sex or was bisexual, but show only a sort of henotheism, in which for the moment she was regarded as the supreme divinity. Thus in the hymn published by Haupt (Cl. Ant. et Syn., Keilinschriften, 113-115; Prince, J.A.O.S. xcvii. (1906) 153 f.) Ishtar says (obv. 23-24): 'I am En-lil and I am En-erin.' The astrological tablet (WA.II iii. (1510) 327) contains the statement that 'Dilbat (the star of Ishtar) is a female at sunrise and becomes a male at sunset.' A hymn to Ishtar of Nihirm (Craig, Rel. Texts, ii. pl. 79) reads: 'Like Ashur she is bearded with a heart.' This probably refers merely to the halo, or radiance, that surrounds her star (see Jastrow, Rel. Texts xxi. (1913) 371-398).

IV. THE CHARACTER OF ISHTAR.—As a result of the syncretism which has just been described, Ishtar inherited the characteristics of several goddesses; nevertheless, at the end of the process she retained all the traits of the primitive Semitic Asherah.

1. Water-goddess.—In E.R.E. ii. 119 it is shown that the primitive 'Asherah was closely connected with springs as the source of life in the Arabian desert. This character she retained in Babylonian.
The sign for Nita, 'fish-house,' shows that she was originally a water-goddess; and her name Nita probably means 'mistress.' 8

8. H. Langdon, Pastuns, Paris, 1909, p. 247. In another hymn she is called 'the glad-eyed, goddess of desire, goddess of signing' (PSBA xxxi. 190). Offerings of fish were made to her, as also to INMANA (PSBA xxxii. 385). She is called 'amorous mother-goddess at whose side no god or bird dwells' (S. H. Langdon, Pastuns, Paris, 1909, p. 247). In another hymn she has been called 'queen of the sea.' (PSBA xxxi. 190.)

INMANA, the goddess of the sea, is often called 'fishara of the sea.' Archaic representations of her show her with some form of fish. Others show her with a fish on her head. In the middle ages she was called 'the mother of the fish.' The word 'fishara' is derived from 'fish' and 'arar,' 'the sea.'

In a hymn to SIMILIN (JASXL xxxii. 190), she is called 'the mother of the gods,' 'the child of the gods,' 'the bringer of spring,' 'the source of all,' 'the mother of all.' She is also called 'the mother of the gods' (JASXL xxxii. 190). In another hymn she is called 'the mother of all' (JASXL xxxii. 190). The word 'fishara' is derived from 'fish' and 'arar,' 'the sea.'

2. Giver of vegetation. - As the goddess of springtime, INMANA was naturally connected with the vegetation that prevailed.

In a hymn (Reiter, Hymnen, no. 56, rev. 140.) she says: 'In the heavens, I watch my rain and send it to the earth. In the rain I take my place and cause the green to spring forth.' In another hymn (Crit. Rel. Texts, i. pl. 15-17) she is called 'Gunos, who gives the growth of plants.' In a lament (HAP, xiv. 15, and i. 195, KELKELÎ, xvi. 115.) she is called 'the one who causes verdur to spring forth.' In the Gilgamesh Epic she says to her father Antu: 'I have kept up my gardens, and I have produced fodder for the cattle.' If there should be seeds, if there should be a garden, if there should be a cattle flock, I have gathered the seeds and I have made the fodder great for the cattle.' In this capacity she is the wife, or mother, of Tammus, the personification of vegetation. In another hymn (JASXL xxxii. 190) she appears as the personification of Ishtar in the earliest Babylonian inscriptions (see VAM, i. 157). In another hymn (Hap., 157, KELKELÎ, xvi. 115.) she says: 'In the verdure I hear the voice of the tree, which is probably derived from 'ezas,' 'green,' rather than from 'uruz,' 'Ezech' (JASTROW, i. 443, n. 6). She is also called 'queen of the garden,' 'queen of the verdure.' If the tree has gone to the bosom of the earth, and the dead are numerous in the field, how long shall the springing of verdure be restrained? How long will the leaves be green in the field?'

'To bring him home to life Ishtar descends to Sheol (JASXL xxxii. 190) and, as Ishtar, appears as the luminous image of Ishtar in the earliest Babylonian inscriptions (see VAM, i. 157). In another hymn (Hap., 157, KELKELÎ, xvi. 115.) she says: 'In the verdure I hear the voice of the tree, which is probably derived from 'ezas,' 'green,' rather than from 'uruz,' 'Ezech' (JASTROW, i. 443, n. 6). She is also called 'queen of the garden,' 'queen of the verdure.' If the tree has gone to the bosom of the earth, and the dead are numerous in the field, how long shall the springing of verdure be restrained? How long will the leaves be green in the field?'

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In a hymn to the goddess INMANA (JASXL xxxii. 190) she says: 'At the beginning of spring I fill the vessel, the mountain spring of Dumuzi I warm my head.' Ishtar is brought to the goddess by Shamash by sprinkling her with the water of life (KIB vi. 187.)

3. Creatress of animals. - In an amulet published in Mitt. der deut. Orient-Gesell., no. 9 (1901), p. 13, and translated by Jastrow (i. 335 fl.), Ishtar is called 'creator of the creatures.' In a hymn (HAP, xiv. 15, and i. 195, KELKELÎ, xvi. 115.) she says: 'In the verdure I hear the voice of the tree, which is probably derived from 'ezas,' 'green,' rather than from 'uruz,' 'Ezech' (JASTROW, i. 443, n. 6). She is also called 'queen of the garden,' 'queen of the verdure.' If the tree has gone to the bosom of the earth, and the dead are numerous in the field, how long shall the springing of verdure be restrained? How long will the leaves be green in the field?'

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As a mother Ishtar was believed to love man-kind and to grieve over their sorrows. At the deluge she cried like a woman in travail over the death of the children that she had borne (KIB vi. 187.)

Several laws have been passed which she bewails the destruction of her city Ereh by the Elamites (see literature). In a hymn she is described as 'she who loves all men' (PSBA xxxi. 60). Another hymn says: 'Thou lookest most kindly upon the Children of Ereh and the wrong-doer daily' (JASTROW, ii. 67).

As another hymn calls her the 'mistress of heaven.
and earth, who hears prayers, who listens to complaints, who receives petitions, the compassionate goddess, who loves righteousness" (ib. ii. 112).

7. Giver of earthly blessings.—On account of her mother-love for men she bestowed life, health, prosperity, and all other blessings upon them.

Gudea speaks of her life-giving glance (V.A.B. I, 73). Kudurrus describe their goddess as "his life, prosperity, and all other blessings" (ib. 230). And-Sin declares that she gave him long life (ib. 214). Sargons says of her: "He endowed the Inshushinak, the land to prosper" (Winkler, Sargons, I, 845); and Nebuchadrezzar affirms that she gives him length of days (V.A.B. IV, 176). An old hymn to Kish says: "She gives prosperity to the man with whom she is pleased (=all), she guards his path, etc.

The physiognomy of Mashpiil with whom she is pleased is now often seen in the mirror. Her hand is with the masnawis and the scribes. Who can do anything without her?" (Jastrow, c. 533). Another hymn calls her "Ishtar, without whom none possesses peace and joy" (ib. 347).

She was regarded as the mistress of magical acts with which she counteracted the wills of the demons (Zimmern, Beiträge, p. 33; A.J.S.E. xxiii. 151). Accordingly, she is constantly invoked as a helper in the magical exorcisms (Jastrow, i. 283, 290, 292, 300, 315, 321).

On account of her good-will and her power, prayers were addressed to her more frequently than to any other deity. Ashurbanipal prayed for her long life for himself and his brother (Lahmann, Shamashshumukin, pl. xxiii.-xxiv.). Nebuchadrezzar prayed Ishtar, or Nimush, for long life, posterity, victory, and success. A large number of prayers and penitential psalms to Ishtar were found in the library of Ashurbanipal (see list in Jastrow, ch. xxv. II). These breathe a noble ethical and religious spirit, and are among the finest products of the Bab. religion. In one of them the poet expresses the joy of serving her goddess in the words: 'Her song is sweeter than honey and wine; sweeter than sprets and herbs, superior indeed to pure cream' (cf. Ps 19th). In many of the prayers Ishtar is asked to intercede with her father Sin, or with some other god, on behalf of the supplicant.

8. Moral counselor of men.—As the mother of men, who loved and cared for their well-being, she was naturally concerned with the enactment of laws and ordinances.

She was 'queen of all dwelling-places,' 'imparting all laws, wearing the ruler's crown,' 'executing judgments and despond to the king;' 'enjoining righteous judgments;' 'giving her name to the sovereignty of the land, and placed in his hand the sceptre over all peoples (V.A.B. i. 2459).

9. Giver of revelations.—In her care for men, it became necessary for Ishtar at times to make special communications of her will. Gudea calls her 'the child of Eridu, who counsels what is best, keenest interpreter of the gods' (V.A.B. I. 1, 90, 29). He says also that 'she directed her attention to the welfare of man' (ib. 1). ‘Lilum-Sin calls her 'reveler of all decisions, who causes the oracles of the land to remain' (ib. 218c).

Through an association of ideas with verdure, green colour in liquid abundance, flood, and birds were regarded as omens sent by her (Jastrow, ii. 722, 823). Many omens derived from the observation of nature were attributed to her (ib. 326, 327, 430 f.). She also inspired prophets to deliver her message. In a prayer of the king, Nebuchadrezzar (ib. 113) the king prays: 'Grant me a trustworthy oracle.'

Through prayer and through dreams, Ishtar, to Nineveh and Ishtar of Arbela for direction (K.I.B. ii. 107). A severe storm, or flooding, or a political calamity (ib. 113) the king prays: 'Grant me a trustworthy oracle.'

The king, Nebuchadrezzar, (ib. 120) the king prays: 'Grant me a trustworthy oracle.' She also inspired prophets to deliver her message. Ishtar was also addressed as 'the pleasant earth' (ib. 113) the kingly prays: 'Grant me a trustworthy oracle.'

Because of her influence over nature, she was also the patron of a great number of occupations and professions, from the farmer to the doctor. She was also the patron of the arts and sciences.

10. Destroyer of life.—In striking contrast to the life-giving beneficent character of the goddess that has been seen before, we now see her in another aspect as a destroyer of life. From the earliest times it must have been observed that life and death were only two aspects of the same force, and that love was the frequent cause of jealousy, hatred, and strife.

For Tammuz, the lover of her youth, she appointed yearly death (K.I.B. vi. 189). With him died the vegetation that she had called into life. On his account she herself had to descend into Sheol, and be afflicted there with all the diseases (ib. 30-41). Hammurapi (Code, ii. 245 f.) says that he 'decked with green the sepulchre of Maktu (the queen) of Sippar.' The sufferings that she endured she also inflicted upon man. Elamites she smote with disease and death (K.I.B. vi. 190). She sent the heavenly body to destroy Gilgashesh (ib. 172). Men prayed to her as the cause of sickness and sufferings. One lament says: 'The descent to the house of a man, thou art as the jackal which hath been caused to come to thee. She is a helper against the demon Tiu (ib. 347), and against the wicked seven' (ib. 361 f.).

On account of her good-will and her power, prayers were addressed to her more frequently than to any other deity. Ashurbanipal prayed for her long life for himself and his brother (Lahmann, Shamashshumukin, pl. xxiii.-xxiv.). Nebuchadrezzar prayed Ishtar, or Nimush, for long life, posterity, victory, and success. A large number of prayers and penitential psalms to Ishtar were found in the library of Ashurbanipal (see list in Jastrow, ch. xxv. II). These breathe a noble ethical and religious spirit, and are among the finest products of the Bab. religion. In one of them the poet expresses the joy of serving her goddess in the words: 'Her song is sweeter than honey and wine; sweeter than sprets and herbs, superior indeed to pure cream' (cf. Ps 19th). In many of the prayers Ishtar is asked to intercede with her father Sin, or with some other god, on behalf of the supplicant.

11. Storm-goddess.—Either as a destroyer or as a sender of rain, Ishtar was occasionally regarded as a storm-goddess. She was 'the lofty one who causes the heavens to tremble, the earth to quake, the flaming fire, who causes the bird-like Zu (the storm cloud) to fly forth as a devourer and destroy the mountains like dead bodies' (A.J.S.E. xxviii. 1907 f., 164 f.). In her character as storm-goddess she waged war with the gods of the mountains (A.J.O. iv. 144). In art she was often represented holding a caduceus of two serpents (Ward, pp. 155, 405, 408). This is apparently a symbol of the lightning.

12. War-goddess.—The primitive Semitic mother was the leader of her clan in war, and therefore from the earliest times Ishtar was a war-goddess (E.R.E. ii. 116). She promised Gilgamesh victory over all lands (K.I.B. i. 1698). She brought the Elamites upon her city of Erech (ib. 272). Hammurapi speaks of casting the net of Ninippar over the heads of the people of Gishas (ib. 216). Hammurapi (ib. 228) says: "She is the mistress of mankind" (Jastrow, ii. 76). Hammurapi says of her (ib. 110): "mistress of justice" (ib. 203). In a hymn she says: 'In the dispute when I take part, the woman who understands plaiting am I in the dispute, she who understands the law am I' (A.J.S.E. xxiii. 149). Like Shamash, she is the judge of the world. She is also the goddess of warfare, and the one who has the power to inflict the death of man. She is often called 'mighty hero of Ishtar, the warrior-goddess' (ib. 135). Nebuchadrezzar says: 'the command of Ishtar and Adad, the gods of war,' he defeated the Elamites (ib. 1694). In the inscriptions of the Assyrian kings, Ishtar appears chiefly as a war-goddess. Taduhili calls her 'the lord who supports the gods, mistress of warfare, the armorer of battle' (ib. 1059). Ashurbanipal says: 'set her heart upon the making of battle and war' (ib. 1609). He first applies to her the title 'Queen of Kittimurru,' i.e. 'Queen of Conflict' (Jastrow, i. 215, 245). Hammurapi (ib. 215) calls her the 'first born of heaven and earth, who is perfect in bravery, who establishes the fates, who enlarges my soul' (ib. 129). Ishtar is called 'she who controls heaven and earth' (ib. 1259). Sommerrich says: '1 prayed with Ishtar of Nineveh, Ishtar of Arbela, the great goddess, my mistress, I rushed to the source of water, and found no rival to her' (ib. 12479). For Ishtar's part in Ashurbanipal's campaign see a passage in which he makes her the savior who was sent to assist him in his wars. When she appeared to his hear, she appeared full of flames (ib. 2650 f.). Nabonidus calls her 'Ishtar, mistress of battle, who reigns on the mountain peaks; who overcomes the enemy, destroys the wicked' (V.A.B. vi. 2595). The war-goddess is personified in the hymns. One meets such titles as 'warlike daughter of Sin,' 'leader in battle,' 'Ishtar is known in courage,' 'goddess of heroes,' 'sharp dagger,' 'destroyer of the land,' 'mistress of countries.' In one hymn she says: 'Beside my father in battle I take my place; beside Bel in combat and...
13. The planet Venus.—Utterly unrelated to the other Semites, except in late times and under evident Babylonian influence, is the planet Venus. Even in Babylonian astrology this character cannot be traced back to the Old Babylonic period. It is impossible, therefore, that it was primitive Semitic (against D. Nielsen, ZDMG ixvi. 400-475). No certain evidence of Ishtar with the planet Venus is found before the time of Hammurabi.

Venus (A. B. c. 2500 a.c.) says that he dedicated a disk to Inanna (P. A. B. c. 2300 a.c.) speaks of Venus, the mistress, who is like the sky in gleaming splendor (Bo. 2205, but this also is not a certain astral on boundary stones of the Cassite dynasty, as early as the middle of the 12th cent. B.C., the four- to eight-pointed star is the established emblem of Ishtar (Hittite, Boundary stone of Iblei, top). In the ancient Babylonian, the period later is accompanied with a star (Ward, ch. xxv). In one case (Ward, fig. 412) she is represented with wings, rising above the sun, like a goddess of the morning star, which resembles her astral character (Jastrow, L 133). The fact that Markub, the chief god of Babylonia, is identified with the planet Jupiter, and Selos, lord of the sea, with Venus, appears very curious, indicating the identification of the great gods with planets did not arise before the unification of Babylonia by Hammurabi. It was part of the system of religious syncretism by which this monarch sought to consolidate his empire. The arithmetical sign XV for Ishtar, which is connected with her astral character (the sign for Sin is XXX), makes its first appearance in the list of Hammurabi. As to the reason why Ishtar was identified with Venus, one can only conjecture that it may have been the beauty of the planet, or its alternation as morning and evening star, which approximates to the life-giving and destroying functions of the goddess. Possibly the goddess Ishtar was the daughter of Sin, moon, as early as Astarte, her identification with the planet Venus.

The identity of Venus as a morning star with Venus as evening star was known in the Assyr. period, and probably much earlier. There are numerous official reports of the astrologers that speak of Ishtar as a morning and evening star (Jastrow, ii. 612). In a hymn she says: ‘Ishtar, the goddess of the morning, and Ishtar, the goddess of the evening, am I’ (Is. 531). Nalopotidas calls her ‘Anunnini, the sun-rise and sun-set gives me favourable signs’ (P. A. B. iv. 2208, 2209). The morning star was called Dilbat, and as the evening star Zib (P. C. A. Jensen, Kosmologie, 1890, p. 417). The difference of names in new periods in the two aspects of the planet were supposed to be different stars, but the list WAT ii. 45, line 51a b, asserts ‘Zib = Dilbat.’

The aspects of the planet gave rise to a variety of titles and identifications. Thus the list WAT iii. 53, col. ii. line 68 mentions ‘Dilbat at evening is Ishtar of Ereh, Dilbat at sun-set is Mistress of the Gods’ (as Ninhursag). See also the list of titles of the planet by Barnabas (P. E. ‘A. Br. 22). This list of titles is very similar to the list of the planet by Nipparad (P. E. ‘A. Br. 23). There seems to be evidence also that the mythological period of Ishtar and Venus is connected with the god of the sky, Enlil (P. E. Momon, iv. [1910] 83-186; E. Windisch, o. v. [1911] 28-39; P. H. H. 18, v. 81-109).

The claim has often been made that the planet Venus is a manifestation of a goddess, and that it bears the epithet ‘horror’ (PSBA xxxii. 22-94). This is very doubtful.

14. The star Sirius.—Less frequently Ishtar is identified with the Bow-star, or Sirius (Jensen, Kosmologie, pp. 62 ff., 149-161), and with Venus. The bow-star is a symbol of the rising and setting of the sun, which resembles her astral character (Jastrow, L 133). The fact that Markub, the chief god of Babylonia, is identified with the planet Jupiter, and Selos, lord of the sea, with Venus, appears very curious, indicating the identification of the great gods with planets did not arise before the unification of Babylonia by Hammurabi. It was part of the system of religious syncretism by which this monarch sought to consolidate his empire. The arithmetical sign XV for Ishtar, which is connected with her astral character (the sign for Sin is XXX), makes its first appearance in the list of Hammurabi. As to the reason why Ishtar was identified with Venus, one can only conjecture that it may have been the beauty of the planet, or its alternation as morning and evening star, which approximates to the life-giving and destroying functions of the goddess. Possibly the goddess Ishtar was the daughter of Sin, moon, as early as Astarte, her identification with the planet Venus.

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15. The constellation Virgo.—It is probable that Ishtar is occasionally identified with the zodiacal constellation Virgo (Zimmern, K implies 427). These different identifications show that her astral character is secondary, and rests upon late priestly speculation. From the foregoing survey it appears that Ishtar was the most important divinity of the Assyrian Bab. pantheon. She absorbed so many other goddesses, and exercised such a variety of functions, that she came near to being the supreme divinity. Many hymns addressed to her disclose a henotheism that approximates to monotheism.
the robes of Marduk and Zarratim (KIB iii 149a, 267a) and a horned and a beaked (ib. 250c) axe. Her priests are often mentioned, and the hierodouloi have been referred to above (IV. 4).

Slaves were dedicated to her temples (OLZ xii 116). The most important was in the chief city of Atargatis (ERE ii. 116), and instead titles derived from the astral form of Ishtar were employed, such as Kokakha, 'star' (=Bab. kubnu), Kokab-nuha, 'star of splendour,' or Nuna, 'splendour.' In the Old Babylonian period the name Nanai was used in Syria for the planet Venus (ZDMG xv. [1890] 459) and in use by the term; name Dilbat (Jensen, Karmologie, p. 118). Astara and Bélit were names for Venus among the Mandaeans (ib. p. 135). For survivals of Bab. myths concerning Ishtar in Mesopotamia see Baedissin, 'Tammuz bei den Harrânern,' ZDMG lxvii. 172 ff.

3. In Arabia.—In the South Arabian inscriptions Athtar, who is masculine, is represented by a star with eight points, and forms a triad with the sun and moon. It can hardly be doubted that this is due to direct Bab. influence. In North Arabia the original name of the goddess is displaced by titles such as al-Lät, 'the goddess,' or al-Uzza, 'the strong' (J. Wellhausen, Beiträge zur Heiden

4. In Syria and Palestine.—In the Amarna letters the Canaanite Ashatir is equated with Ishtar, and Canaanite artistic representations often conform to the Bab. type (see ERE iii. 182, 183). There is no clear evidence of Ishtar in the early writings of the OT. The efforts of P. C. A. Jensen (Gilgamesch) to show that the goddess of Jeremias (AT im Lichte des alt. Orientes) to show that Sarah, Rebekah, Tamar, Pharoah's daughter, Jephthah's daughter, and most of the other female characters of the OT are transformed Ishtar-myths cannot be pronounced successful. The first certain trace of Ishtar in the OT is in the neo-Bab. period in Jer 7th 44:1-22, where she is called 'queen of heaven.' This is a specifically Bab. name for Ishtar in her astral aspect, and the kowma, or 'cage,' that the Hebrew women bade her for her is the same as the kowma that was presented to Ishtar (KAP. 441f.). The waiting for Tammuz mentioned in Ezek 64 is closely connected with Ishtar and is specifically Babylonian. At the time of the Bab. supremacy the cult of Ishtar must have been established in Jerusalem, or even earlier under Assyri. rule (2 K 21). The name Esther is an Aramaic form of Ishtar, and the Book of Esther shows clear knowledge of Bab. Ishtar myths (see Paton, 'Esther' in ICC, Edinburgh, 1908, pp. 67-94). In Palestine the Bab. Ishtar was worshipped under the name of Athirat. In the later period, when the rites of the Phoenician 'Ashatir at Gebal, as described by Lucian (de Dea Syr. 6, 8), were evidently coloured by the Bab. mourning for Tammuz. For the whole subject, see on the West see Baedissin, 'Adonis und Eunomus,' Leipzig, 1911.
5. Among the Greeks and Romans.—During the period of Selucid Greek rule the religions of the East and of the West were fused with extraordinary rapidity in Syria and in Egypt, and under the auspice of the emperors Bab, astrology became the dominant religion of the day. The gods of Greece and of Rome were identified with the nearest Bab counterparts, and thus came to take on astral characteristics. The equations that resulted were: Jupiter = Bel-Marduk = the planet Jupiter; Hermes = Mercury = Nabu = the planet Mercury; Ares = Mars = Nergal = the planet Mars; Chronos = Saturn = Nibiru = the planet Saturn. Apollo = Ares = Venus = Ishtar = the planet Venus. To these identifications are due the names of the planets in all modern European languages.

Ishtar thus took the place of Aphrodite, and the mythology of the Bab, mother-goddess was grafted on to the myths of the ancient local Aphrodites and Astartes. Even the Sumerian name Dilbat for the planet Venus became known to the Greeks: Ἀθηναιόος ηήριναι Ἰσθαῖρα Ἐσθαηρία Ἐσθαηρία (see F. Cumont, Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain, Paris, [1900] [Eng. tr., Chicago, 1911] ch. v., Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and the Romans, New York, 1912).

LITERATURE.—I. On the Assyr.-Bab. religion in general and its literature see BARTHELEMY and ARMAND; also references in Ezech., 25:5, 10; 26:14-16; 30:24. See also ARTIFAC, ATAR-ATAT, BAB. CANAANITE.


II. On Ishtar.—See also A. Boaz, "Zum Namen der Göttin der Stadt Niniveh“ (see F. Cumont, Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain, Paris, [1900] (Eng. tr., Chicago, 1911) ch. v., Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and the Romans, New York, 1912).
The Isis-Osiris myth in its main lines is as follows: Osiris (Sarapis), known and loved for his benevolence to all mankind, is treacherously slain by his brother Set, who encloses him in a chest and casts it into the Nile, which bears him towards the sea. Isis, after much wandering, perseverance, and sorrow, discovers the mourners over the body of her husband, accompanied by Nephtys, her sister, who is also the wife of Set, but Set again gets possession of the body, and disperses it about Egypt. Meanwhile Isis gives birth to Horus, whom she secretly rears in the marshes of the Delta. After learning of what has been done, Isis, with the assistance of Nephtys and the members of Osiris, who, resisting the magic formulas of Set, Thoth, becomes a judge and god of the dead, and even visits the earth in the form of a child, the son Horus. The latter takes vengeance upon Set for the slaying of his father, spares his life, however, on account of the magic formulas of Set. Thoth restores Horus as a cow's head helmed (or cow's head), Horus and Set then appear before the court of the great gods of Egypt, where Horus, through the support of Thoth, is victorious, receives the crown and throne of his father, and unites both parts of the land under him (Plinarch, de Is. et Osir. Ekkia, Egyptian Religion, ch. 14).

Whether the Isis-Osiris myth is founded on a primitive attempt to explain the daily vicissitudes of the sun, or is the outgrowth of a local historical or religious legend which was grafted on to popular speculation, there is no doubt as to its having possessed a sort of significance in the minds of those who reflected upon religion. Osiris was the Sun, born of the Nuit, Earth and Heaven; Set was Night; Isis, whose names signify 'sister' or 'throne,' was the daughter of the heavens, and especially of the earth, who restored Osiris, the Son, after his death at the hands of Night, and also gave birth to Horus, the Sun, who took vengeance on Set, the Night, and became the son of the father's throne; Nephtys, the Western Horizon, or Evening, sister of Isis, the Eastern Horizon, or Dawn, mourns with the latter, by her, of Anubis, god of the realm of darkness and the dead. Transferred to the realm of morals, the myth symbolized the warfare between good and evil. It also symbolized human destiny, the rebirth of man in his children; but its greatest significance in the minds of the ancients was spiritual—the immortality of the soul, the resurrection, universal motherhood of Isis, and her etherial influence. The resurrection of Osiris through the efforts of Isis symbolized the rebirth of the soul, and it was this that made the Isis cult the greatest of all Egyptian religions, though there is no evidence that it had attained to any importance, or even to existence, before the New Empire. Through her mysteries the worshipper received the gift of immortality, which her magical powers enabled her to bestow. Her connexion with magic so doubtless made her cult still more popular. In a papyrus of as early as 1563 b.c., a physician invokes her aid, beseeching her to employ in his interests the same arts by which she had healed the wounds of Set and Horus. She was called "The Mighty in Magic." By the time of the Saite and Greek periods (from 663 on) she had gradually developed into a universal nature-goddess, a beneficent, maternal deity whose hand was full of all manner of blessings, temporal and spiritual. She was the "Great," the "Great Mother." "The Mother of the Gods!" Local goddesses were invested with her characteristics, and she in turn took on theirs, until the distinction between them and she was little more than one of name. She became the great prototype of all goddesses. Her importance in the cult far overshadowed that of Osiris; she even ousted independent shrines, as, for example, the temple of Osiris at Gizeh, called "the temple of the Mistress of the Pyramid." Her most important temples were in Egypt at Memphis and, on the Island of Philae, at the mouth of the Nile, she having a temple, first completed in the reign of Nectanebo II. (291-253 B.C.), remained open until A.D. 569, when it was closed by order of Justinian (Meyer, loc. cit.).

Outside of Egypt, the Isis-Osiris cult rose to importance nowhere until the Hellenistic period (from 333 B.C.), though it was known in Phoenicia in the 7th and 6th centuries B.C., and was communicated thence to other parts of the world. Evidence of it are abundant, however, in every part of the Hellenistic and Roman world. The Greeks saw in these mysteries an analogue to Demeter and the Eleusinian mysteries, identified Osiris with Dionysus, Horus with Apollo, Sob and Nut with Kronos and Rhea. As each of these three parts of Greek prejudice against foreign cults, the cult of a temple at Pergamus was permitted, and under the Ptolemies the cult was received at Athens itself, and a temple erected at the foot of the Acropolis. The use of the word 'Isis' in the composition of citizens' names—Isodoto, Isodoro, etc.—and the numerous relics representing Greek ladies in the character of Isis afford evidence of the popularity of the cult. There were two temples in Corinth (Daremberg-Saglio, Dictionnaire des antiquites grecques et romaines, s.v. 'Isis, Histoire'; Drexler, in Koschier, s. v. 'Isis', 373-391).

The success of the cult in the West was even more pronounced. Sardinia had received it before the Hellenistic period, probably through the Phoenicians; Malta, Sicily, and Southern Italy admitted it later. Puteoli was an important centre in Campania, while the cult was also strong at Pompeii, Herculanum, and Stabiae. The Pompeian temple of Isis, of which the remains are still to be seen, was founded between 200 and 30 B.C., was ruined by the earthquake of A.D. 79, and was the only temple in the city which had been restored when the final catastrophe occurred in 79 A.D. to the entire city, Pompejan. Stud., Leipzig, 1877, pp. 371, 170 f.). First introduced into the city of Rome in the time of Sulla, though probably it found a place in Ostia and the suburbs before this, it was the object of much distrust on the part of the conservative citizenship of Rome that in 58 B.C. its altars on the Capitol, and its chapels (to the number of fifty-three), were destroyed by order of the Senate. In 54, 50, and 48 similar events occurred; in 43 the Saite and Greek decreed a temple to Isis and Sarapis, and the cult seemed about to gain the permanent support of the State; but in 38 Augustus exiled the worship from inside the Pomerium, beyond this sacred line of the city, his policy of opposition to foreign cults having been inaugurated by the war with Antony and Cleopatra; in 21 Agrippa forbade the erection of chapels within a radius of seven and a half stades from the limit; and Tibullus, in A.D. 19, as a result of certain scandals in connection with the cult, destroyed its places of worship and banished its priests. Under Caligula, however, the cult seemed to have been recognized by the State, though it was not yet in possession of the right to erect temples within the Pomerium, nor supported by the public funds. It grew, nevertheless, and abundant evidence of its strength is to be seen in the art and literature of the Empire. Under Caracalla, the Sibylline law was made null which had kept its temples outside the Pomerium, and henceforth it enjoyed perfect equality of rights with other cults. Its altars and shrines of minor importance, of which there were only one or two in the city, and it had been strong in the support of the lower classes. Besides its lesser shrines and chapels, its greatest temples were those that in the sixth region erected by Caracalla, then on the Caelian Hill, and the Colosseum, from which the third region took its name (Isis et Sarapis), and the great temple in the Campus Martius, east of the Pantheum, which was voted in 43 B.C., but probably not erected until about A.D. 39, burned in 86, and restored by
times may be assumed to represent with more or less accuracy those of all lands in which the religion found favour. Its main festival occurred on the last day of October and the first three days of November (for the date see Wisowa, 'Religion und Kultus der Romer,' p. 354), as follows: October 31: Hierosol; November 1–3: the celebration of the resurrection, of Osrus, with unstrained expressions of joy, November 2 being called Ter Novaen, perhaps from a chorus consisting of three times nine participants, and November 8, Hilaria, from its character, which was like that of the corresponding festival of the Great Mother. Another annual festival was that called Isis Navigium, which occurred on March 6, at the opening of navigation. A ship, richly equipped and laden with spices, was sent to sea as an offering to the goddess. Apuleius (Metam. xi. 7–17) describes this festival as it took place at Cenehus near Corinth. It may have had a parallel at Rome in a ceremony at the mouth of the Tiber. Two other festivals, Sacrum Pharia and Saroparia, mentioned in the Menologio Rustico, the first on April 20 and the second on Christmas, were of less importance. The Pelasia, on March 20, was a festival whose motive was in the flooding of the Nile, and was introduced at Rome at a late date. Festi Philoecos, said Lydos, de Isibis, 446, and the first evidences of it (Wisowa, 'Religion und Kultus der Romer,' p. 354 f.)

The conduct of the cult was in the hands of priests and priestesses, chosen by the cultus for various terms. The priests to have been a high priest, summis sacerdos, sacerdos maximus, primarius, praeceptor (Apul. xi. 20, 17, 21, 22), who was perhaps the same as the prophetae primarii (ii. 28). The priestesses were another priest. Each association was officered by a pater, a questor, or treasurer, and decision, if the membership was large. Numerous names mentioned in inscriptions indicate that different associations performed special duties in the procession. There were the pastophoroi, who carried little urns upon litters; pousarii, so named from their pauses at certain places along the route. Anabei and Bubastiaci, who may have been impersonated Anubis and Babusiai; etc. Those who fulfilled a priestly office were obliged to keep head and face clean, shave, wear linen garments, and to abstain from certain things (Wisowa, 357 f.; Daremberg-Saglio, s.v. 'Isis, Les associations, Le sacré').

According to Apuleius, there were three degrees—one of Isis, another of Isis and Osrus, and a third of actual priestly functions. Accurate knowledge of the observances through which the mystic passed in his rise from one degree to another is impossible because of the comparative strictness with which ancient writers keep the rule of secrecy.

The account of Apuleius, however (Metam. xi.), throws general light upon both the public and the private character of the cult, in spite of the authorities' reticence. His experience, Lex, the hero of the tale, in whose character Apuleius is narrating his own experience, determines to devote himself to Isis. The goddess herself has so directed him in a vision (xi. 5). The procession of the following day was that of Isis Navigium. First, the tetrathemata, soldiers and musicians, dressed in robe to the accompaniment of music in their hands. Then the chief priest on a covered platform, with women on either side, with other musicians, in the course of singing, would light a wax taper, and then musicians with pipes and flutes, in
whose train advanced a chorus of chosen youths clad in mourning, and bearing a hymn. Horses followed, and heralds, after whom marched the train of mystics, men and women, all in mourning. In the middle there was a house in pure white, on which the women, with long hair, covered transparent veils, and the men with smooth-шин white heads; and all were bearing censers of fragrant incense, filling with balsam, silver, and evergreen sycamor. Then came the chief ministers in shining linen, bearing the images of their gods. The first carried a gilded lamp; the second, a golden bowl with golden leaves and a golden candelabrum; the third, a four-leafed palm tree, and a golden vessel in the form of the female breast, from which he poured libations of milk on the ground. Other vessels of golden wine, garnished with thick golden branches; and another, an amphora. The next feature of the procession was a number of men who represented various deities: Amun, the messenger-deity, bearing in his left hand the caduceus and with his right shaking a golden palm; a cow, erect, the symbol of the universal parent in her; etc. These were followed by one who bore a chest containing secret pharaonic charms; another who bore the effigy of a great divinity which resembled neither beast nor bird, nor even man; and, finally, by a priest with stigmata and crown of roses. After the solemn rites were over, the sacred ship returned to the temple, deposited the holy symbols, were formally dismissed, and all the priests and the servants of the gods, in their festive attire, left the temple gates and in a procession of ten days from wine, the flesh of animals, and all abundance of food and drink, and in this period the evening of his consecration arrived. Having been favoured, at sunset, with many presents brought by the sacred ship of the worshipers of the gods, he was led by the thrones, and in the night conducted to the inner recess of the temple, where he was the recipient of religious rites. For the wives of this god, as he was now permitted to divulge to a greater extent than in the following suggestive description: I approached the confines of death, the threshold of Persephone, and returned bearers through all the elements; at midnight I saw the sun gleaming with brightness, under whose保护 I approached face to face, and adored near by’ (CB. 23). The next morning he appeared before the people dressed in twelve stoles, a beautifully coloured garment of linen, and a precious scarf which covered his back from neck to ankles, all of these articles being red in colour, and with various colours. With a burning taper in his hand and a chaplet of palm leaves on his head, he was suddenly revealed to the multitude by the drawing of the sanctuary curtains (CB. 24). Then, as the adoration of the godess, spent a year in Rome, and at the end of this time the sacred ship was dispatched in her . A short time afterwards, he was for the third time directed in a vision to be further initiated. This he did, becoming also a member of the college of Paneplophoi, in which he held the office of Quinquennial Decurion (CB. 26, 27).

The sacred ceremonies in a temple of Isis comprised two ceremonies each day. The first occurred at sunrise, when the priest opened the doors, ‘waked the deity’; and after several moments of prayer, made the confession of the altar, performing the sacred service and pouring libations at each, after which rites the worshippers loudly announced the first hour of the day (April. op. cit. 20). At the second ceremony, which took place in the afternoo, the priest held up before the worshippers a vase of consecrated water, which they venerated as the first principle of all things (Martial, x. 48.1).

ISLAM. — Islâm is the term peculiar to the religion founded by Muhammad, and embraces all the different sects which are now found among his followers. Thus, a Shîite and a Sunnite are both members of the same sect, since the Shîites are the followers of the infallible form of Isââm, and means ‘to receive oneself’ or ‘to profess Islam. It is sometimes looked upon by European writers as expressing complete resignation to the will of God, that is, in all matters of faith and duty; but this seems to be a too wide extension of the term, as it is not the practice of all who profess Islam to obey the dictates of their conscience. The word does not imply, as is commonly supposed, absolute submission to a moral law, but means, on the contrary, stringing after righteousness’ (Spirit of Islam, ed. 1831, p. 289).

But what is the idea of righteousness which the term ‘Islâm’ expresses? It is given in the verse, ‘Whoso is a House in pure white’ (Qur. lxiii. 14). Here, again, we need a definition of the words ‘Islam’ and ‘right way.’

Muhammadan commentators explain them thus: ‘the former means’ one who places his neck under the yoke of God,’ ‘one who yields up his right order,’ ‘one who sincerely accepts the dogma of the Unity of God’; ‘the other, the rashâd, or ‘right way,’ is the ‘finding of the reward of good works,’ the ‘desire of goodness.’

The term ‘Islam’ occurs twice in late Meccan sûras, but not in the earlier ones. That man’s breast will be open to Islam (v. 125). Whose breast God has opened to Islam’ (v. 76). The entrance of Islam into the Jewish community was the signal for the conversion of a large number of Jews, and the early stages of the Prophet’s career were characterized by the conversion of many Jews to Islam. It is very important to bear this fact in mind. In a few places a more general idea of resignation seems to be referred to, as: ‘They who set aside their religion with resignation God (v. 126) and do that which is righteous, their reward is with their Lord’ (v. 127). ‘The Prophet gave the news of the coming of the Last Day, that a man becomes a true believer. Shahrâshâf, the Milâd-una-Nihâl (ed. London, 1848, p. 27), draws a distinction between Islam, isâm (‘faith’), and ihsân (‘devotion, ‘benevolence’) in the following tradition: Gabriel one day came in the form of an Arab and sat near the Prophet and said: ‘O Messenger of God, announce the good tidings of the near approach of the Last Day. The Prophet replied: ‘Isââm is to believe in God and His Prophet, to say the prescribed prayers, to give alms, to observe the fast of Ramâdân, and to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.’ Gabriel replied that he had spoken truth, and then asked the Prophet what was sin. He replied that it was to believe in God, angels, books, prophets, the Last Day, and resurrection. Again, Gabriel admitted the correctness of the definition, and inquired what else meant. The Prophet replied: ‘To worship God as if thou seest Him, for if thou seest Him not He sees thee.’

This is borne out by the meaning assigned in Persian commentaries to the term ‘Muslim,’ which is said to designate a man who is a mumph and a hukmââdir, words which mean ‘submissive’ or ‘obedient to orders.’ A Muslim, then, is one who carefully keeps the outward works of the law, but, when he adds to it ihsân, or devotion, he is a musalin, a man who does good works as well as pays attention to ceremonial observances; when to these he adds sincerity of heart and exercises faith (isâm), he becomes a mûmin, or ‘believer.’

The true believers are divided into two classes: those who believe in Allah and His Apostle, and afterwards God’s not?’ (xliii. 10).

The term ‘Islam’ emphasizes the Rabbinical precept that it is not the ‘study of the law which is most important, but the practice of it which notes the formal performance of certain outward duties. It is doubtful whether it ever had an
ethic meaning attached to it. The commentators seem to be unanimous in using it in a mechanical sense. That is, its literal meaning is the division of the terms of the earlier sūras; for it was not till Muhammad formulated his religion at Medina that the Arkān-ad-dīn ('pillars of religion'), the five obligatory duties, were first clearly defined in the Code of the Koran. Earlier, the word Islām does not appear to have been in common use. Thus, Islām, when looked at from the Muhammadan standpoint, loses much of the beauty which has gathered round the ethical ideas of his successors. It is essentially a political unity, it really emphasizes the external and legal side of religion.

For the religions of Islām see MUHAMMADANISM.

Incarnation, see God: Incarnation.

SOCRATES.—The place of Isocrates in the history of Greek oratory and the evolution of prose style is definitely described in John’s Attic Orators, and his art in Ebr. xiv. 877. In ethics, Isocrates interests the student of to-day chiefly as a measure of the altitude by which Plato towers above the flat and undistinguished tenor of refined and educated Greeks of the 4th cent. B.C. But to Ascham, Milton, and the educators of the Renaissance generally, he was a still edifying expositor of the great commonplace of morality and the conduct of life. Thomas Elyot says of him:

'Isocrates, concerning the lesion of corruptions, is everywhere most edifying, instructive, and takes up many error sentences as he bath words: and with that is so wise and delectable to read, that, after him, almost all other sense unnaturally and tediously; and in persuasions, as well a prince, as a private person, to virtue, in two very like and compendious traits, wherein he made the one to signify Nicocles, the other to his friends Democles, who be perfectly known, and had in continuall memoris. (The book named The Governor, London, 1396."

The (probably genuine) 'protean' or parrentic discourse to Democritus here mentioned is the ancient extant specimen of a long literary succession which in modern English literature ends with Sir Henry Sidney’s Letter to his ‘little Philip at school at Shrubsbury’. Polonius’s advice to Laertes, and Sir Thomas Browne’s Christian Morals, throve Checkers’ advice to a Schoolboy, Thackeray’s Mr. Brown’s Letters to his Nephew, and their numerous recent imitators. The Democles anticipates many fragments of the author of the Oedipus Tyrannus in Classic style.

The term 'a priori' or 'principle' or 'fundamentum' or 'condition' or 'premise' or 'proposition' is defined in Aristotle’s Astis (Athens’s Treaty, ii. ii. to ‘How do the little busy bee’. In its pages the appeal to the secret tribunal of conscience (i. 16) and the Golden Rule (i. 14), on which Isocrates twice stumble elsewhere (ili. 62 and IV. 81) as a happy turn of Gorgian rhetoric, stand in a prodigious constellation with the Chesterfieldian recommendation to win the favour of men by speaking 'advantageously' or 'advantages' or 'behind their backs in companies where is reason to believe that· they will tell them again'.

The two discourses in this kind that bear the names of Socrates are connected together with a large number of considerations concerning the duties of good kings and loyal subjects—the theme of the 11th and 22nd of post-Classical and Byzantine art and literature is the study of the kind of writing, which, Isocrates tells us, is appropriately disjointed and aphoristic, and its manner, which, it thinks, demands not so much originality as industry in the choice of the best and the oneIon of the best. He says, by Herodotus, Phocylides, Theognis, and other moral poets. Isocrates here (ili. 44) and elsewhere deplores the perversion of mankind, who prefer the pleasant to the useful and the fables of mythology to the profitable admonishments of the ancients.

The Areopagitica, which has only its title in common with Milton’s famous tract, was also a favourite with Renaissance moralists because of its impressive deal with the topics of the degeneracy of the age, the licence of democracy, and the need for a restoration of the salutary discipline of the good old times.

The main ethical interest of the other orations lies in their recognition of the orator’s task in Plato. Isocrates’ ethics is utilitarian, not in any speculative sense, but in its prevailing tone and temper. His preaching is exactly that of the excellent fathers of families whose prenalian philosophy fails to satisfy Glaucon and Adams in the second book of Plato’s Republic. He celebrates not the beauty, not the absolute worth and intrinsic sanctions, but the profitableness of virtues. Honesty is and ought to be spoken of as the best policy (x. 253). Isocrates repeatedly enforces this lesson with illustrations drawn from Greek history, and more particularly from the famous effects of a selfish policy of intrigue on the welfare and prosperity of Athens and Sparta (vi. 34, viii. 14, 23 ff., xiv. 40). But even this empirical coincidence of happiness and righteousness he will not affirm absolutely (x. 54 ff.,xiv. 185 f., but cf. xiv. 25). It is true, ‘for the most part,’ he says in a phrase made technical by Aristotle, and the wise man will govern his country by probabilities and the general rule. To this he adds the interesting remark that the laws are most certain of verification in the longer life of cities and States (xii. 180, vi. 34-38), and he maintains that we may fairly attribute the apparent violation to the neglect of the gods (xii. 187), an expression against which Plato would have protested. As Dryden more piously puts it:

'Thou hast heard, indeed, of some virtuous persons who have perished unhappily, but never of any virtuous nation. Providence is engaged too deeply, when the cause becomes so general’ (Prelude to Annus Mirabilis).

But, though Isocrates deprecates (xii. 118) or sneers at (x. 1), they are the sublitudes and the paradoxes of absolute Platonic ethics, he seems to have been increasingly moved to emulate by the success and the moral fervour of the Gorgias and the Statesman (iii. 17, xvi. 218) of the Areopagitica (iii. 47). This feeling appear in the passages already mentioned on the verification of moral law in history. It is still more apparent in certain edifying digressions on the true meaning of those ambiguous words, ‘advantage’ and ‘gain’ (ενεφαλίζῃ, ili. 9, viii. 7, 17, xv. 275, xii. 241; σφιχας, ili. 56). All men desire their own advantage, he repeatedly tells us, but they mistakenly seek it in taking wrongful advantage of others. All men desire gain, but they know not in what true gain consists.

In addition to this, Isocrates has many ethical or psychological observations that recall Plato or anticipate Aristotle. Though teaching alone will not make a good man of a bad one (xii. 21), he is confident that ‘virtue’ can be taught (i. 12 f.), as even the training of animals (II. 99). His list of virtues includes the Platonian four (iv. 22 f.) and incidentally others, as self-control and magnificence (ili. 19). ‘Great-souled’ is one of his terms of praise. He emphasizes the idea of magnification and the mean, and anticipates Aristotle in the remark that the virtuous man is more akin to deficiency than to excess (ili. 33 f.), as also in the affirmation that virtue when won is the most stable of possessions (i. 5 f.). The three notions of human action, he says, are gain, honour, and pleasure.

His conjectural influence upon Greek politics,
and the elements of political theory and terminology scattered through his writings, lie outside of our topic.

His religion is conventional and perfunctory, though he sometimes develops the Euripidean or anticipates the Platonic canons of the anthropomorphic polytheism, which attributes human failings to the gods (xi. 41). References to the subject are sometimes introduced by the phrase: 'if I may properly speak of such ancient or old-fashioned things' (vi. 12). In the same way, he tells us, the governs mank grip and appoortion good and evil, not by direct intervention, but by the thoughts which they inspire in men (v. 10o). In one passage he comes very near to the Ovidian 'expedit case deos at expedite case putumens' (xii. 24 f.). He alludes to the better hope of the righteous and of the initiated (il. 20, iv. 23; cf. viii. 35), and he makes use of the conventional formula: 'if any perception remains to the dead' (xiv. 61). But the only immortality which he really expects is the subjective immortality of fame (xii. 250).

In ethics and religion, as in philosophy and eloquence, he cannot bear confrontation with his two supreme contemporaries; but, removed from the shadow of that comparison, he appears as a worthy citizen, an excellent teacher, and an estimable writer. In this respect, which is the most lasting for himself, he is indispensable to the understanding of the life and thought of the age of Plato and Democles.

LITERATURE.—There is very little literature on the ethics of Israel; but in the collection of the Annals of the Berlin, 1882, may be mentioned. The philological literature is given in Bibl. xiv. 881; R. C. Jebb, Attic Inscriptions, London, 1882; P. Flood, Dicht. des alten Griechen, Berlin, 1882; and W. Christ, Gesch. der griech. Lit., ed. O. Stublin and W. Schmid, Munich, 1892.

PAUL SHOREY.

ISRAEL.—I. Introduction.—An adequate treatment of the questions suggested by the name 'Israel' would require an encyclopedia to itself. All that is attempted is to trace the religious development which has given pre-emience to Israel among the spiritual teachers of mankind. The religion of Israel cannot be satisfactorily studied apart from the external history of the race, but account will here be taken of the latter only in so far as it serves to elucidate the former. An inquiry into the historical value of the narrative of the Pentateuch is beyond the scope of the present article. Suffice it to say that by the name 'Israel' we understand that people which, though not originally homogeneous, may have been formed into a single nation in Palestine about a millennium before the Christian era.

Of this nation the strictly Israelite element was of comparatively recent introduction, the Israelites before the conquest of the Canaanites and subsequent mingling with them having occupied the oases in the wilderness to the south of Palestine, where they had entered into close relation with the Kanites and other tribes of kindred stock as well as with the Midianites farther east, from whom, perhaps, they learned to reverence Horeb, the high mountain. They regarded themselves as closely akin to the Edomites, who seem to have preceded the Israelites in coming to this district south of the Dead Sea at a somewhat earlier date; and somewhat less closely to the Moabites and Ammonites on the east. The belief that the Israelites had been a Canaanite race and that Arameans and Israelites had once lived in N.W. Mesopotamia may not, perhaps, be of very ancient origin, and may be due to the fusion with Aramean settlers which took place during the domination of Assur, which had once lived in N.W. Mesopotamia. It may be that the Israelites had been compelled to do taskwork, from which they had been freed by Moses. It is only necessary to be convinced whether all the tribes of Israel were ever in Egypt. The early legends which have come down to us had taken form at a time when stress was being laid on the national character of Israel, and in this unity in Egypt there has in many cases been wrongly ascribed to the past.

2. Tribal division and conquest of Palestine.—The twelve tribes of which, in later times, Israel was considered to be composed, were the children of Jacob, each group, severally connected by descent from four women to whom they traced their ancestry. The Leah group included Reuben, Simeon, Levi, Judah, Issachar, and Zebulun; the Rachel group, Joseph (subdivided into Ephraim and Manasseh) and Benjamin. To Zilpah, said to be Leah's handmaid (whereby some dependence upon the Leah tribes seems to be indicated), were assigned Gad and Asher; to Bilhah, Rachel's handmaid, Dan and Naphtali. We need not suppose that all the tribes finally incorporated in Israel had become confederated before the Exodus or even before the conquest of Palestine. It is probable that the tribes of the Rachel tribes at least we have the witness of Amos 2:1-3; for that of the Leah tribes we have no direct evidence apart from the Pentateuch; but when Moses, Levite, in the traditions of the Exodus, if only the Rachel tribes had come out of Egypt. The tribes which are represented as descended from the Leahs were probably of mixed origin, being Canaanite and incorporated in Israel only after the conquest of Palestine. In addition to these, in Judah, at least, were other tribes, such as the Calebites, which, however, remained more or less distinct for a long time after their inclusion in Judah. It is probable that these clans entered upon their inheritance from the south; but, since Reuben, not Judah, is reckoned as the first-born son of Leah, by which priority of settlement is probably to be understood, and since Moses the Levite was buried in Reubenite territory east of the Jordan, the Pentateuchal tradition, according to which the land between the Arnon and the Jabbok was first won by Israel, and W. Palestine was invaded from this region, may be accepted as correct for both the Leah and the Rachel tribes, though it is unlikely that these noted topographical details of the Pentateuchal tradition of the Joseph showing that Simeon is associated with Judah, but the writer to the contrary. We owe this section in its present form has probably modified an early tradition of Simeon's first invasion of Palestine to suit the fact that in later times Simeon was incorporated with Judah. Bezek, which is reasonably identified with the modern Bezik, 14 miles N.E. of Shechem, seems to be beyond the sphere of Judah's operations; but a Simeonite war in this neighbourhood is perfectly consistent with the fact that in Gn 34 (cf. 49) Simeon is found with Levi in central Palestine. We do not know

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1 We must guard against the supposition that every statement in the Pentateuch and the historical books of the O.T. embodies a 'tradition.' Hebrew writers were as capable of drawing inferences as modern commentators, and in some cases they cannot have intended their statements to be taken literally. In the case of Gen 20-21 we have what appears to be a deliberate device to show in genealogical fashion the connexion of Israel with Midian and other sections. In the case of Gen 16:16-18 the position is now misplaced, and that it once followed the account of the birth of Ishmael; but it does not harmonize well with the tone of this story, and in any case the editor who made the change to its present position can scarcely have failed to notice its incongruity, if taken literally, with the narrative of the exodus. The writers were, in any case, writing mainly from a point of view to which the reader was not necessary to the text. The writer to the contrary. We owe this section in its present form has probably modified an early tradition of Simeon's first invasion of Palestine to suit the fact that in later times Simeon was incorporated with Judah. Bezek, which is reasonably identified with the modern Bezik, 14 miles N.E. of Shechem, seems to be beyond the sphere of Judah's operations; but a Simeonite war in this neighbourhood is perfectly consistent with the fact that in Gn 34 (cf. 49) Simeon is found with Levi in central Palestine. We do not know

2 It is a significant fact that Gn 29:36 evidently implies that the tomb of Israel was east of the Jordan, and that Jacob's death and burial at Shechem belongs to the later and exclusively Judaean modification of tradition.
the extent of the area occupied by these tribes, but it is probable that, allowance being made for the many strongholds which remained in the hands of the Canaanites, the five Leah tribes west of the Jordan and the originally contiguous, Judges being settled in the south, where the tribe came into contact with the friendly Calebites, and Issachar and Zebulun in the plain of Megiddo and the district to the north.

The permanent effect of this invasion of W. Palestine was not very great. Issachar and Zebulun were entirely dominated by the Canaanites; Simeon, which next to Reuben, must have been originally the least of the five Leah tribes, was before long expelled from its first settlements, the survivors finding a refuge in the south; 1 at the same time Levi as a territorial tribe ceased to exist. Simeon, however, he being the axis of the tribes, was by degrees to consolidate their position and to exercise some sort of hegemony over tribes of mixed origin—the sons of the handmaids. The assignment of Gad to Leah's handmaid may be explained by the position of the Leah tribes immediately to the north of Reuben—Asher, similarly assigned, being contiguous to Zebulun. Dan, assigned to Rachel's handmaid, lay immediately to the west of the Leah tribes, and the similar assignment of Naphtali may perhaps be accounted for by its proximity to the northern Dan. Benjamin, which would appear to have been originally a subdivision of the Joseph tribes, 4 gained in importance sufficiently to be reckoned as a separate tribe, and colonists from Manasseh re-crossed the Jordan and settled in Bashan.

3. Union of the tribes.—It is impossible here to do justice to the complex by which the tribes of Israel were welded together. The cause of unity was the common danger which for several generations threatened the tribes, either from the original inhabitants of Canaan, whom they had sought to dispossess, or from other invaders, such as the Philistines, who, like Israel, were seeking to gain possession of the country. Thus the struggle against the king of Hazor (Jos 1, Jg 4) probably involved not only Naphat, but also the neighbouring tribes; the power of Sisera and the fortified town of Hazor, Magiddo and Jerzeel threatened both the Leah tribes, Issachar and Zebulun, and the Rachel tribes to the south of them. From time to time a military leader who had been successful in struggles of this kind would exercise authority as a king in the region which he had delivered. Thus Gideon was elected king 2 over some portion of Manasseh and Ephraim. Somewhat later, apparently towards the end of the 11th cent. B.C., the opposition of Philistine Ammmonites and Amalekites demonstrated the need of concerted action, and for a time united the Rachel tribes with the Leah tribes farther south. The union was short-lived, and was broken in the reign of Rehoboam; but it gave to later ages an ideal of what Israel should be.

An exact history of the reigns of Saul and David is impossible. The longer accounts of these reigns—though they doubtless embody some true traditions—are inconsistent with the short summaries given in 1 S 14, and in 2 S 8. These sections, which are certainly quite independent, show that in the circles in which they originated the names of Saul and David were definitely known of the reigns of Saul and David was that certain wars had been waged during this period, the exploits of the two kings not being clearly distinguished.

4. Early religion of Israel.—Of the religion of the tribes of Israel proper at the time of the conquest of Palestine we have no direct information; all the stories relating authority are kings for the edification of later ages and are coloured by their circumstances. The most noteworthy passages which throw any light on the subject are Am 5, and Jer 51. 17. In the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. it could be asserted that Israel had not offered sacrifices and burnt-offerings during the Sojourn in the wilderness, we cannot doubt that throughout the Monarchy there still existed in some circles traditions of a religious life which have been very different from what is presented to us, not only in the books of Judges, Samuel, and Kings, but even in the earlier documents of the Pentateuch. We need not go so far as to suppose that in the early days sacrifice was altogether unknown, but we shall scarcely do justice to the plain words of the prophets if we do not conclude that it was a comparatively infrequent rite, perhaps confined to the feast of the Passover. The statements of Amos and Jeremiah are also in harmony with the fact that the great feasts of Israel were mainly agricultural, and could not, therefore, have been celebrated by such people as the Rechabites (g.v.), who were loyal worshippers of the national God of Israel. It is not improbable that the Rechabites may have been a representative of the true Israelite, as distinct from the Canaanite, elements in Israel. Presumably before the conquest of Canaan the Israelites lived mainly on milk, as do the Bedouins and other nomads.

1 That Gideon, or Jerubbaal (g.v), the two are identical, was king is evident from Jg 9. According to the account of Gideon's refusal of the kingship (Jg 8) evidently proceeds from the same covenant as the other accounts of the school of s. 1 S 10:27, and cannot be regarded as a tradition.

2 Jg 2:10, 16, Am 6:19.

3 Sci 2:10; Am 6:19.

4 Sci 14:27; 2 S 8:5.
times, though the eating of game may also have been permitted. Accordingly picture the primitive Israelites as a race of men cruel, fierce, and barbarous indeed, but preserved by their abstinence from agriculture that crude nature-worship with which agriculture was connected. It should be noted that the prophetic reformers of the 8th and 7th centuries B.C. were not so much innovators as champions of an ancient Israelite tradition which the most genuine Israelite families had never wholly abandoned.

The provenance of the name of the national Israelite God, Jahweh (Jehovah), 1 is as yet uncertain. Ex 3:16 (E) represents it as revealed to Moses at Horeb, whereas according to J the name was known to the antediluvian ancestors of Israel (Gen 4:26). Ex 3, as is shown below, reflects the circumstances of a later age, but it is noteworthy that Joshua bears a name compounded with the Tetragrammaton, and it is possible that the tribes of Israel were united in the worship of Jahweh before the conquest of Palestine.

Yet, if they gave to the God whom they worshipped the same name, they at all events represented Him by different symbols. The tribe of Levi, and probably all the Leah tribes, venerated a serpent, or winged serpent; the Rachel tribes, a bull as the symbol of their circumcision, though the story in Ex 4:25-26 might suggest that the rite had not been adopted by the primitive ancestors of Israel—but it was performed, at all events normally, not in infancy but in adolescence or manhood. 2 This fact and the use of flint knives (Josh 6:19, Ex 4:23) show that the rite was of a barbarous character, as among the modern Zulus and other peoples. In the earliest times Jahweh would seem to have been regarded as a God of war, and we may conclude that the tabus to which we find warriors subject (cf. 1 S 21:11, etc.) date from primitive times.

We cannot say whether other features of Israelite religion were brought by Israel into Palestine or were there acquired. We do not even know whether the observance of the new moon and the Sabbath goes back to the earliest time of the period. Similarly, we have no exact information regarding the ethical ideas current in Israel in pre-Palestinian days. It is probable that then, as in later times, political institutions prevailed, and that, though adultery was condemned, concubinage was freely allowed. Ideas of blood vengeance may also be ascribed to the earliest period.

5. BLEEDING OF ISRAELITE AND CANAANITE RELIGIOUS IDEAS AND TRADITIONS.—It was not long before the Israelite conquerors, with the exception, perhaps, of some families, such as the Rechabites, became thoroughly merged with the conquered Canaanites, adopting the customs and consequently, to a great extent, the religion of the latter. Canaanite sanctuaries continued to exist as sanctuaries of the mixed race resulting from the fusion of conquerors and conquered. At these sanctuaries, according to the traditions, the tribal sacrifices were made. The Israelites would acquire the traditions of the patriarchal heroes associated with them. They may suppose that at Bethel Israel learned the traditions of Jacob, at Ramah of Rachel, at Shechem of Joseph, and so forth; and these, being now regarded as prophecies by the united people, would have deeds assigned to them which in pre-Israelite times had not been told of them. The transparency of the characters of some features in the genealogies has already been noticed, and we have only to suppose that this loose treatment of the genealogical style was possible in early times to account for much in the patriarchal stories, which is otherwise inexplicable. Probably Joseph was at first revered as the ancestor of the population in the district of Shechem, where was his reputed tomb; Jacob and Rachel would be similarly honoured in the districts of Ramah and Bethel, Abraham at Hebron, and so forth. With the growing sense of the unity of the nation, traditions originally local would obtain a wider currency, and thus, in course of time, the reputed ancestors of clans would be regarded as ancestors of great tribes, or even of the whole nation. 1

Perhaps the only sanctuary during the period of the Judges which might be regarded as genuinely Israelite was that at Shiloh; it is noteworthy that no temple was established in connexion with it, and that the patriarch was buried there; its foundation is associated with no great name; while, on the other hand, a tradition which, though perhaps considerably modified, cannot be very late ascribed to it, the possession of the Ark, and Jeremiah states that Jahweh put His name there at the first. If Shiloh was Israelite rather than Canaanite, we can understand why, as the absence of prophetic references shows, it was not popular among the mixed population. Jeremiah (7:11 f.) certainly implies that Shiloh existed as a sanctuary long after the period of the Judges, and Jg 18:30, which is not at all early in its present form, is in harmony with the supposition. Jeremiah may have regarded Shiloh as the sanctuary which most nearly resembled Jerusalem.

That the religion of Israel should be very greatly affected by that of Canaan was inevitable. Since in primitive times agriculture was bound up with religion, so that agricultural operations might almost be reckoned as ritual acts, and people in adopting agriculture would, almost of necessity, adopt the religion of the agriculturists. Hence Canaanite festivals became Israelite (see, further, art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS [Hebrew], vol. v. pp. 663-667), and the name Bethel (q.v.), by which the Canaanites denoted their god, was applied to Jahweh.

Household gods appear to have been common (1 S 19:19, Gen 31:29, etc.); here and there a chief priest or wealthy man, such as Gideon or Micah, would build a sanctuary for an idol which would be revered by the family or tribe.

The appearance of these deities we have no information.

The implication that David's teraphim was in human form only proves that this form was common when the story took shape. We would suppose that the idol at Shiloh was a bronze serpent, 2 and

1 We need not suppose that all the stories of the patriarchs can be explained from incidents of which we have precise knowledge. The traditions of the nation generally have been finally shaped in the south, and the names of places in the north have been changed. No one could have accepted such an excuse, if the circumcision of infants had been a conscious act of the whole people. We may perhaps infer from the story of the circumcision of Moses that the rite was occasionally practised in the north, and that it was not held to be valid in the case of adults. We may also infer from the story of the circumcision of Moses that the rite was occasionally practised in the north, and that it was not held to be valid in the case of adults. 3 We need not suppose that the account of the abuse of the Canaanites was a genuine tradition, for it is to exalt the priesthood of Zadok, and the abuses described are probably those against which the Zadokites protested.

1 There is no doubt that the pronunciation 'Jehovah' results from an erroneous interpretation of the name of the same age as Sinai, and that the form Jahweh, having been used throughout this Encyclopaedia, is adopted in this article also.

2 On such points it is impossible to speak definitely. It cannot be maintained that polyandry is found in the OT, though some scholars on the weight of custom may be supposed to have originated in such a state of things.

3 We need not suppose that the account of the abuse of the Canaanites was a genuine tradition, for it is to exalt the priesthood of Zadok, and the abuses described are probably those against which the Zadokites protested.
that the image made by Miah and stoles by the Dinites was in the form of a bull (see, further, art, IMAGES AND IDOLS [Hebrew and Arabic], vol. II., p. 158).

Doubtless some cults were always merely local. In the Moloch worship which carried forth the de
monization of the 7th cent. prophets we may recognize
the name of the Canaanite god Moloch, perhaps.

In the first-born children were sacrificed to the
king as the embodiment of the god. High places with altars (see ar.t. HECHEM [Hebrew], vol. II. pp. 679-
81) were set up all over Canaan (see, further, art. ALTAR [Hebrew]), vol. I. pp. 350-354), appear to have been numerous, and there were not a few larger sanctuaries with temples and idols. Whether a priest was always necessary for a sacrifice it is difficult to say (see art. SACRIFICE [Hebrew]). The victim could, apparently, be slain by the offerer; but it is difficult to decide whether it was competent for the layman to burn the fat and to pour out the blood on the altar. All the more important sanctuaries had organized priesthoods in which the priestly office, though not necessarily hereditary, would tend to become so. The priest was the repository of religious traditions, and where there was no idol to be kóph, he, or a subordinate, was the custodian (see, further, art. PRIEST [Hebrew]). Most important of all, he was acquainted with the proper way of obtaining and preserving the sacred lot, and possessed the necessary paraphernalia. A decision thus reached would, in matters of dispute, become a precedent for the future, and the priests would gradually become the exponents of much of the common law. How far their functions ever coincided with those of the 'sacred men' (k'deshan) cannot be determined. Underlying the story in 1 S. 2:25-28 may perhaps be discerned a state of things in which the priests acted as k'deshan, but in many cases, at any rate, the office was distinct. These 'sacred men,' one of the greatest threats on the ancient religion of Israel, the existence of whom was the chief cause of the prophetic antagonism to the high places, appear to have been Canaanite in origin. They acted as the surrogates of the god in stimulating the reproductive powers of nature. It is double to the ideas associated with them that we may ascribe that other great blot, the sacrifice of the first-born. Since the 'opening of the womb,' the fruitfulness of marriage, was ascribed to the union with the god shekh, the person of the k'deshan, the first-born would naturally be regarded as the property of the god (cf. also art. FIRST-BORN [Hebrew], vol. IV. p. 101). The office of 'sacred women' (k'deshāh) may have been simply an extension of the principle implied in the k'deshan, or may have been directly derived from Ashthoreth worship.

In addition to the priests, who were definitely attached to certain sanctuaries, and who ascertained the divine will by casting lots in the presence of the idol with sacrifice and divine formalities, there were also diviners (k'dorant), who appeared like the priests, to have made use of some method of casting lots. They were not, however, attached to any sanctuary, and their divination required neither sanctuary nor sacrifice. The references in J. 2. 4 and in 3. 2 show that the

The diviner during the Monarchy was a prominent figure in Israelite society.

Besides the priests and diviners who ascertained the divine will by mechanical means, there was another kind of knowledge concerned with the knowledge of the future, the knowledge of omens. This was obtained by means of the

1. C. J. G. Fraser, Adonis, Attis, Osiris', London, 1907, ch. II.

2. For the whole subject see Fraser op. cit. iv. 6, and of. art. DIVINATION [Hebrew], vol. ii. pp. 146-154.

3. It is impossible here to take account of classes of seers of which we are indebted for the preservation of their teaching. The collections of prophetic sayings have been made in many cases, as the collections of the sayings of our Lord which we have in the Gospel.

4. That this method of divining the Ark was not due to clerical

5. Although there is no reason for believing that any of the

6. Introduction of Baal-worship. Israelite religious history may be said to begin about the middle of the 9th cent. B.C., when a new danger for the religion of Jahweh began to arise from the Near East about by Omri's alliance with the kingdom of Tyre and the marriage of his son Ahab with Jezebel. Hitherto Jahweh, at least in name, had been ac-

Through intuition or inspiration. These fall into two main classes, represented respectively by the seer and the prophet (see, further, art. PROPHET AND PROPHETS [Hebrew]). These were in their origin quite distinct, although they were finally regarded as identical. The fusion of the two is best illustrated by the story of Saul's application to Samuel concerning his father's lost asses. The prophets, on the other hand, were originally enthusiastic bands together, whose function appears to have been directed in early times chiefly towards the stirring up of the martial spirit in Israel. Certainly such men as Isaiah or Jeremiah would not in earlier days have been included among the prophets. But—perhaps with the coming of peace—the prophets, whose efforts had been directed originally to the setting forth of Jahweh's will in war, tended to become exponents of His will in other matters, and thus, to some extent, approximated to the seers. It would seem that the prophets proper lived in communities, and were supported largely by the gifts of those to whom they prophesied. The Nazarites (p. 141), of whom we have a full account only in the later legislation, were merely persons who for a greater or less period were bound by certain tabus. The term seems originally to have included the consecrated warrior (cf. Am. 2:11-12).

Of the religious history of Israel under the Monarchy down to the middle of the 9th cent. B.C. we have little information. We have only the construction of altars (1 S. 14:3), of David's bringing of the Ark to Jerusalem and institution of a sanctuary on Mt. Zion, of Solomon's building of the Temple, and of the adoption of Bethel by the national sanctuaries of N. Israel as a set-off against Jerusalem. But the motive of all these stories belongs to a much later period; even the extremely extrabiblical narratives of 2 Samuel can be shown by both literary and historical criticism to have no claim to be considered contemporary history. It is only here and there, in some cases perhaps through the inaudience of later editors, that we have glimpses of the primitive type of early Israelite religion. The coming to pieces of Agag 'before Jahweh' (1 S. 15:30), the conception of the Ark (evidently regarded as Jahweh's actual dwelling-place), the method of the giving of a new cart-drawn by horned cattle (2 S. 6:2); David's dance before it (2 S. 6:14), and the mention of k'deshan in the reigns of Rehoboam, Ass, and Ahab are all evidence that parallel to the religion of the average Israelite during this period, we must look to modern Uganda or India rather than to modern Judaism. Doubtless there were exceptions to the rule; and some families, such as the Rechabites, though they remained barbarous and uncivilized, were uncontaminated by the grosser pollutions of Canaanite religion—the true salt of Israel, which never wholly lost its savour.
cepted as the sole God of the nation. But now an attempt was made to introduce the worship of the Tyrian Baal—an innovation dangerous since many elements of the Canaanite religion had already passed over into that of Israel. The new movement, which set forth with Tyrian gourgeousness the ideas which the people had inherited, the Arameans, was not entirely unpopular. In some circles, however, it was fiercely resisted. The protagonist in the struggle was a Gileadite prophet, Elijah, who left to posterity the name of maintaining the cause of Jehovah against Baal. It seemed for some time a forlorn hope, for Omri and Ahab were great kings; but the party of Elisha, taking advantage of the indignation against the royal family caused by the judicial murder of Naboth, at last succeeded, with the aid of the unscrupulous adventurer Jezabel, in overthrowing the dynasty of Omri, and in forcing on the nation the acceptance of the principle—'No God but Jehovah in Jehovah's land.'

It was in N. Israel that the cult of the Tyrian Baal had been most prominent; but Judah was not untroubled. We know that Jeroboam I, the first king of the N. Kingdom during this period; but it is almost certain that under Omri, and probably from the time of Busba, Judah had been tributary to N. Israel. The absence of mention of the Asherah here to this effect, is, doubtless, due to the pride of the Judean editors to whom we owe the OT in its present form, for the facts can scarcely be interpreted in any other way. That Judah remained a separate kingdom may be explained from the common practice of ancient Asiatic conquerors, whose sole object was to obtain tribute, and who were content to leave the collection of it to native rulers.

Whether the school of Elijah attempted any reforms in the worship ostensibly paid to Jehovah we cannot say. Certainly the times were not very propitious, for Israel was engaged in a death-struggle with the Arameans of Damascus, which lasted for more than half a century; but it is probable that the requirements of the religion of Jehovah were now formally set forth in the ancient Decalogue (Ex. 20:1-17), which can be distinguished in both of the earliest documents of the Pentateuch, and which was probably drawn up in N. Israel, and subsequently adopted in Judah during the reign of Josiah. The original draft of this Decalogue was probably written on two tablets of stone, which were preserved at Bethel, and the Judean copy on two similar tablets which, since they vindicated Jehovah's rights against any other god, might well be deposited in the Ark, which had probably been originally the portable shrine of Jehovah's image (the bronze serekh), and which perhaps still contained it. In this way we may explain how it was that the Ark came to be called 'the Ark of the Covenant.'

This early Decalogue was apparently as follows:

(I) I am Jehovah thy God, and shalt worship no other god. (II) Thy flesh of unleavened cakes thou shalt eat seven days, but on the seventh day thou shalt shave hair. (III) Thou shalt not commit sexual immorality. (IV) A sabbath shalt thou keep; seven days thou shalt eat unleavened cakes. (V) All that openeth the womb is mine; and all thy cattle that go to male, the first fruit of thy work. (VI) When thou bringest in the first-fruits of wheat harvest. (VII) Thou shalt not take the name of Jehovah thy God in vain. (VIII) Thou shalt not murder. (IX) Thou shalt not commit adultery. (X) Thou shalt not steal. (XI) Thou shalt not covet. (XII) The image which was set forth by this present, doubtless greatly modified, form of the very primitive story therein contained probably explains the extent of the feeling of the Rechabites and the prophet of the 8th cent.; but there is no reason for supposing that it was already current in N. Israel at this time. A very good discussion of the subject will be found in "The Decalogue in the Law of Good and Evil," by F. C. Lightfoot, in BJ xxxvi. [1910] 10-f.

It speaks volumes for the thoroughness with which the reformation was carried out in the time of Jehu that, with the Arameans into Israel during the 9th cent., the labors of the 8th cent. prophets, Amos and Hosea, appear to be directed not so much against Aramean cults as against superstitions which went back to pre-Aramean days. The three were not entirely unpopular. In some circles, however, it was fiercely resisted. The protagonist in the struggle was a Gileadite prophet, Elijah, who left to posterity the name of maintaining the cause of Jehovah against Baal. It seemed for some time a forlorn hope, for Omri and Ahab were great kings; but the party of Elisha, taking advantage of the indignation against the royal family caused by the judicial murder of Naboth, at last succeeded, with the aid of the unscrupulous adventurer Jezabel, in overthrowing the dynasty of Omri, and in forcing on the nation the acceptance of the principle—'No God but Jehovah in Jehovah's land.'

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type that Amos, the first of those prophets whose teaching is collected in separate books, addressed himself. There is no need to question the statement that he was not brought up as a prophet, and that he did not attach himself to any school or gild of prophets. It was a common belief in the schools and in the ancient Israelites, that prophetic teaching, that of the whole nation, was the most significant and divinely inspired. The book of Amos, which forms part of the prophetic literature and was written by Amos, is divided into two parts: the first part, Amos 1-2; the second part, Amos 3-9. The first part contains prophecies against the northern kingdom of Israel, while the second part contains prophecies against the southern kingdom of Judah and against the general situation of the time.

Amos was a herdsman and a wool gatherer, who lived in the town of Tekoa, which was a city in the hill country of Judah, about six miles from Jerusalem. He was a simple, hardworking man, who was not interested in politics or religion, but who was moved by the suffering of the people and the corruption of society to speak out against the injustices he saw.

Amos's message was that Israel was a nation that had forgotten its covenant with God. They had become arrogant and proud, and had forsaken the ways of righteousness and justice. Amos called on the people to repent and turn back to God, lest they be destroyed.

Amos's prophecies were delivered in the days of King Jeroboam II, during the latter part of the 8th century BCE. The book of Amos is one of the most stern and uncompromising of the prophetic books, and it has been interpreted as a call to moral and social reform.

8. Continuance of the worship of Jahweh in Samaria after 722 B.C.—It has been too common mistake to treat the land of Israel north of the kingdom of Judah as virtually a vacuum after 722; but it is to the exigencies of this district that we must look for an explanation of the subsequent development of Israelite religion. Thousands of captives were deported by Tiglath-Pileser and Sargon, and probably by Esar-haddon; and Esar-
haddon and his successor (Ezr 4:24) introduced in their stead a number of colonists from N.W. Mesopotamia and other parts of the Assyrian Empire. But the glory of Jehoh was not being altogether extinguished. Indeed, it is not improbable that, on the one hand, the vindication of Hosea's teaching against idolatry by the destruction of the N. Israelite sanctuaries in 722 B.C. served to carry off all of their appeal and strength and resulted in the enlargement of the existence of the existing Decalogue by a law forbidding the worship of images (cf. Ex 20:24); and, on the other, the efforts of the leaders of Judah to tie over the heathen settlers brought about a new and important development in religion.

9. Reforming movement in Judah during the latter half of the 8th cent. B.C.—Of the religious history of Judah we know practically nothing from the reformation under Josiah till the reign of Ahaz. It must not be forgotten that the compiler of the book of Kings makes two assumptions which are of first importance for the criticism of the history which he relates. Writing from the standpoint of Deuteronomy, he concludes that those who have been especially used by God in the history of Judah are thereby to be classified among those who "have done evil in the sight of Jehovah;" and, believing that disaster is the chief proof of wickedness, he is apt to infer that those who have suffered disaster have been especially evil. Having regard, then, to the fact that, so far as we are able to form an opinion from the scanty materials available, Judah down to the middle of the 8th cent. was neglectful of the sacred word and worship of N. Israel, and may perhaps have been inferior, it is precarious to argue that, because a particular superstition is not mentioned before a certain date, it was not observed before. On the other hand, the attempt not justified in affirming that Ahaz introduced into Judah the sacrifice of the first-born simply because he is the first king of whom such a sacrifice is recorded. It may well be that an action which in the days of the earlier kings would have attracted no attention, because it was the universal practice, is specially mentioned in the case of Ahaz, because in his time it was done in defiance of the prophetic teaching. If more of Isaiah's discourses had come down to us, we should probably be in a position to understand the verdict passed on Ahaz by the writer of the book of Kings.

The most important contributions to the religious thought of his people are to be found in his insistence on the incompatibility of Jahweh's majesty and holiness with the images by which he represented his majesty, and in his declaration that the Assyrian has been the scourge in the land of Judah to chastise Israel, and that, this being effected, Assyrian ambition and cruelty must be punished. Isaiah's attack on idolatry, which may perhaps have been inspired to some extent by the teaching of his elder contemporary Hosea, dates from the very beginning of his ministry. In the allegory of extraordinary force and majesty in which he narrates his call (Is 6) Isaiah gave expression alike to a higher conception of Jahweh and to his conviction of the coming ruin of the national life of his people. He pictured Jahweh emerging from a cloud, his hand upon a serpent, but in human form, clad in a gorgeous robe of which the train covered the whole of the temple floor, so as to leave room for no other god. As though to years after 720 speaking happened to N. Israel which deprived it of any claim to be still considered a nation. It is quite likely that Egypt, for selfish ends, had induced Samaria to rebel, with the result that Samaria was taken and its inhabitants were carried away as captives. In the absence of any proof that the disaster to the Assyrian army happened during a later campaign, and having regard to the obscurity of certain details in Sennacherib's statement, the year 701 B.C. may still stand as the date of the great deliverance. In the absence of any proof that the disaster to the Assyrian army happened during a later campaign, and having regard to the obscurity of certain details in Sennacherib's statement, the year 701 B.C. may still stand as the date of the great deliverance.

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2 In 2 K. 19 there is, as J. Wellhausen has pointed out (art. "Israel," E. F. Hultzsch, ii. 413), a combination of the general and the particular which is in no wise for all. It must not be forgotten that the image of Jahweh at Jerusalem was a flying serpent, as Ezekiel (Eze 17) taught. In both Nahu. and Ezek., the serpent is a symbol of the power of God, of his surpassing majesty. This is impossible to argue from 2 K. 12, that the reforms had preceded the Assyrian invasion. L. i. e. a flying serpent (see 2 K. 18:7, 8. Nu 21:9, 2 K. 19:35); cf. De 32:34, 1 K. 18:29, and Jer. 2:5, 13.

The serpent form may already have been modified by the introduction of some human form. show Jahweh's superiority to the popular conception of Him which found expression in the bronze serpent. Isaiah represented Him as ministered to by seraphim, who were described as angels whose work was clearly to bring out their inferiority, thereby implying that Jahweh was as far above the popular views of Him as the great king is above the ministers who dare not lift their eyes to his face.

The course of events which led to Isaiah's prediction of Jahweh's judgment on the Assyrian oppressors is somewhat obscure. The prediction itself and the prophet's unwavering assurance in his protection of His people in the face of Sennacherib's menace gave him a temporary influence in Judah which enabled him to induce the king, Hezekiah, to carry out a drastic reform. We have, indeed, no information as to the year of Hezekiah's reign when this was done, but there are indications that Isaiah met with not a little opposition during the greater part of his ministry, and it is, therefore, probable that a reform which must have been intensely distasteful to many people was not carried out till the prophet's influence had reached its climax. At the beginning of his activity as a minister in Jerusalem, the crudity of thought which could accept the bronze serpent as the representation of Jahweh. His teaching was now carried into effect, and the venerable idol was destroyed (2 K 18). Probably at the same time many other similar ceremonies had been accepted in Judah since the time of Josiah, was enlarged by the insertion of a prohibition of "molten gods" (Ex 34:13).

The precise extent of Hezekiah's reform is uncertain. We are told that the asherah (on which see art. POLES [Hebrew]), in the Temple court— perhaps association specially with the kedeshahin and kedashahin (2 Chr 29:3). We are certain, however, that the attempt may have been made to reform the high places. We may wonder that a king who so dared to wound the religious feelings of many of his subjects should have kept his throne. Yet in the last years of Hezekiah's reign the political situation was such that there was little likelihood of revolt; for, since Sennacherib had taken from Judah and had annexed to the neighbouring States no fewer than forty-six fortified cities, the population of the remaining districts, cowed by the horrors of the Assyrian wars, may have felt compelled to accept the king's action.

10. Reaction against the reformers.—There can be no doubt that the reformers had gone beyond that which commended itself to the popular conscience. There were many to whom Hezekiah's iconoclasm would appear to be a sin crying aloud for vengeance, and it is not surprising that, when his death occurred a few years later, there was a violent reaction. Not only was there a recrudescence of the ancient superstitions, but new cults were introduced by Assyrian officials and settlers; so that the cause of a pure monothelism appeared, for the time, to be lost in Judah.

It must not, however, be supposed that Israelite religion gained nothing from foreign influences during this period. Worship even at Jerusalem had been very barbarous, and contact with more highly civilized and cultured peoples could not fail to introduce something new. We find in the
this direction. It is noteworthy that the first meeting between the king of Judah and a king of Assyria resulted in an important innovation in the ritual at Jerusalem; for Ahaz, when he had been besieged at Damascus in 732, saw there a great stone altar more suitable for sacrifice on a large scale than the brazen altar which had hitherto been in use in the Temple, and had a copy of it erected (2 K 18:26), thereby inaugurating that increase in the volume of sacrifice which made it possible for a rite so savage to continue for centuries longer the rallying-point of Israel.

II. Religion of Jahweh in Samaria during the 7th cent. B.C.—Though in Judah, with the accession of Manasseh, reform was crushed and the religion of Jahweh itself appeared to be in jeopardy, in the north the religious outlook was soon to become somewhat brighter. Since the fall of the city of Samaria, the old kingdom of N. Israel had been governed by Assyrian officials, and the name Samaria was now applied to that portion of it which lay south of the plain of Megiddo. In consequence of the deportation of Israelites and importation of colonists from other portions of the Assyrian Empire, there existed in the province of Samaria at the end of Asar-haddur’s reign—perhaps earlier—already an admixture of Aramean and other settlers that the religion of Jahweh which still survived was but one of many cults. The great sanctity of Bethel had been deprived of its priests, and for a time there seemed a possibility that not only the worship of Israel had ended at Hosen, but even that of Elijah and Elisha, might be undone. But there were still prophets in the land, and a plague of lions, doubtless occasioned by the long war and the depopulation of the country, gave them their opportunity. They declared the cause of the trouble to be the neglect of the cult of the God of the land, and so far convinced the new masters that an appeal was made to the king of Assyria to allow the return of one of the Israelite priests, in order that he might teach the cult of Jahweh. The appeal was successful, and Bethel was reopened, by the express permission of a king of Assyria, as a sanctuary of Jahweh (2 K 17:31). It is probable that, if other sanctuaries had been closed, they were reopened at the same time; but Bethel was of particular importance, not only for its traditions, but also for its proximity to the boundary between Samaria and Judah. We may well believe that some at least of the Judean reformers who were persecuted by Manasseh would find a refuge at Bethel, and would add strength to the reforming ideas there existing. For the present, indeed, there was no thought of giving effect to the teaching of Amos and Hosea concerning sacrifices. The influx of heathen Arameans and others had put the clock back. It would have been impossible to persuade them at the same time not only to forsake their gods, but also to worship their new God Jahweh in a way entirely strange to them, without sacrifice. The first thing to be done was to win them over to the necessity of the religion of Jahweh, and, in order to do this, it was necessary, not to take the highest places and altars, but rather to encourage the building of as many as circumstances would allow, indeed, Hosea’s teaching had been vindicated. The golden bull of Bethel no longer existed, and worship without idols was accepted by the Bethelite priesthood, 1 who would presumably teach on the basis of the primitive Decalogue, now amplified by the insertion of a law forbidding the worship of images.

12. Codification of law for Samaria.—The newcomers in Samaria would require instruction not only in the Israelite law of worship, but in what it might be described as the common law of Israel, which may perhaps in some measure have already been modified by Assyrian influence. The old Decalogue was, therefore, now combined with a collection of laws relating to slavery, property, and the like, in order that the population of Samaria might be united by identity of law. If the Ten Commandments, which, with some later modifications, is now found in Ex 20:1-17, was probably issued originally as a separate document.

No mere code of laws could make those whose traditions were entirely heathenish whole-hearted worshipers of the God of Israel. They required to be taught the traditions of Israel, and to learn what great things Jahweh had done for the ancestors of the nation in which they were now incorporated. Hence the traditions which had been current at the great sanctuaries were collected, and worked into an authoritative narrative, which embraced legends of the patriarchs, the story of the deliverance from Egypt, the sojourn in the wilderness, and the giving of the Law by Moses, which was identified with the code described above. That this document, which we know as the work of the Elohist (E), was originally designed for people who had quite recently been heathen is evident not only from such a statement as that in Gn 35:4, but also from the fact that the principal name of the God of Israel is represented as not originally known to the nation as a whole, and as specially revealed to Moses. It may also be inferred that the story in Ex 24:14 was invented for people of Aramean stock, since the Tetragrammaton is explained as being identical with the Aramaic word meaning ‘He will be.’ 2 How long

1 The account of Moses’ destruction of the ‘golden calf’ (Ex 32:20) might be thought to be suggested by what has actually taken place in the desecration of Bethel. Holes of various sorts, however, must have riddled at some sanctuaries for a considerable time, and the method of destruction ascribed to Moses may be based on what was actually done in some places.

2 The phrase ‘to come near unto God’ (W) will naturally mean ‘to come to the nearest sanctuary.’ It doubtless arose when there were images, but presuppose them. There is no necessity to understand the term in 21:1 to mean ‘house of God’; the idea is probably that there is rise is, according to primitive thought, there can be no exemption from the common law (which in Israel forbade perpetual servitude) except for the gods. By being attached to the temple, the slave was brought into perpetual servitude, theoretically, to Jahweh, but, since Jahweh did not claim his service, in reality to the master from whom he did not desire to be separated. An apparently contrary procedure, but based on precisely the same conception of the gods as exempted from common law, is found at Delphi and elsewhere, where a slave, in order to receive his freedom—the assumption of slavery being prohibited by the common law—was made over to the god, to whom theoretically he belonged, though he was attached directly to the temple service (see Darmestert-Saglio, 302 ff. C. Locriam in Durbneb-Saglio, ill. 111; J. E. Mayer on Gen. 1, 101 ff.). This parallel is sufficiently strong for the assumption based on Ex 21 that we must ascribe the origin of these laws to a period when heathen gods were entertained in the temples, and in fact, indeed, Hosea’s teaching had been vindicated. The phrase ‘I will be’ (translation ‘I am’), in the sense of ‘epi, is impossible’ is given in the first person, because Jahweh is represented as speaking to those who had been depending on their gods from N. Israel. For the ‘adversaries of Reum’ we should probably read his adversaries.

3 It is probable that the priests of other N. Israelite sanctuaries were deported at the same time. There was, however, a special reason for the deportation of the Bethelite priests, since Bethel was the king’s sanctuary (Am 7:9), and the priests would consequently be more closely connected with the royal family.

4 That the explanation of Assyrians at this period will explain the presence of a law enjoining the making of altars ‘in every place’ (Ez 35:3) is the more probable, since the original writer evidently supposed that (Jahweh) Jehovah to be ‘yiqy (eined), ‘I will be,’ as the third person to the first. It must be remembered that, owing to the weakening which took place in the pronunciation of the vowels, some imperfect of the verb הָיְרֵ (the word, according to the Masoretes, pronunciation, would, if it occurred, be pronounced הָיְרֵ (‘gathering’), must in earlier times have been הָיְרֵ (‘yiqy (eined), ‘I will be’), and must, therefore, have been nearly, if not quite, identical with the proper name of the God of Israel.

5 The phrase ‘I will be’ (translation ‘I am’), in the sense of ‘epi, is impossible’ is given in the first person, because Jahweh is represented as speaking to those who had been depending on their gods from N. Israel. For the ‘adversaries of Reum’ we should probably read his adversaries.
the process of the collection and redaction of traditions lasted we do not know, but it was probably completed in the 7th cent. B.C. It may have gone on at more than one centre, but we shall not be wrong in assuming that Bethel, the chief sanctuary of Samaria, was responsible for its final shape.

It would itself be unlikely that the school of men who produced E would have ceased from their activity at its publication. We may suppose that, shortly afterwards, a beginning was made with the writing of other books, traditions as to the conquest of Palestine by the tribes, and the exploits of the judges, kings, and prophets. This does not mean that E itself was continued down into the Monarchy, for it is very doubtful whether any parts of the existing books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, or Kings ever formed one document with it, but merely that the writing of E provided the stimulus for the collection of other N. Israelite traditions. It must be remembered that the collectors had a practical purpose, and were not actuated by antiquarian interests. Thus, in the story of Elijah, Jahweh's protagonist against foreign cults, we have precisely the teaching which was necessary in Samaria in the 7th cent. B.C. As Ex 20:19 encourages the building of altars in places consecrated to Jahweh, so Elijah is represented as repudiating the altar of Jezebel that is broken down, while at the same time he has friendly relations with heathen outside Jahweh's land (1 K 19:17). Similarly in E itself it is natural that Balaam comes from 'Aram, from the mountains of the East' (Nu 22:6). The story of an Aramean prophet who was constrained to declare the superiority of Jahweh and Israel would have special force in Samaria in the 7th cent. B.C.

13. Prophetic activity under Josiah. Meanwhile in Judah the violent reaction against reform which the accession of Manasseh had brought about was spending its force. Manasseh died about 641 B.C., and was succeeded by his son Amon, who died after a short reign of two years and was succeeded by his son Josiah, then only eight years old. We have no information about the early years of Josiah's reign, but it is evident from the subsequent course of events that the antagonism to the teaching of the school of Isaiah must have greatly increased, for some time nothing occurred to give the necessary impetus to a popular reformation; but about the year 629 B.C. news of the havoc which the Assyrians were working in the districts north of Palestine, and which menaced Judah itself, caused the prophets to preach repentance, in order that the threatened blow might be averted. Among these the most prominent, as he was undoubtedly the greatest, was Jeremiah, who for the next forty years or more exercised a profound influence on the religious development of his countrymen, though comparatively few were prepared to accept his teaching in its entirety. It is remarkable that Jeremiah shows few signs of direct dependence upon his great predecessor Isaiah, while he is evidently deeply imbued with the teaching of Hosea—a fact which may perhaps be explained on the ground that, when Jeremiah, during the persecution under Manasseh, Judæan reformers found an asylum in Samaria, especially at Bethel. The evils which Jeremiah believed to be calling forth upon Judah are to a great extent those which the earlier prophets had denounced, but in addition to those there were some foreign cults of Aramean and Assyrian origin, of which there had been an influx during the reign of Manasseh. About five years after the beginning of Jeremiah's mission, during some building operations at the Temple1 a book was found which, when read before the king, convinced him of the need of reform. There can be little doubt that the historian of 2 K 22:4, whose account, however, cannot be held to be contemporaneous with the events recorded,2 identified this book with Deuteronomy. But this identification is beset with difficulties, even if the book read to Josiah should have included only chs. 12-26. If Deuteronomy be anterior to 621, it is hard to understand how, at a time when the province of Samaria was governed by an Assyrian envoy sent by a native king,3 any man or school of men could have drawn up an entirely new code of law for all Israel. Men of average common sense do not legislate in the air for a situation which may conceivably arise nobody knows when, but for one which is actually present or imminent. Moreover, the ritual law of Deuteronomy with respect to the fat and the blood appears to be in substance later than that which is found in the Law of Holiness (Le 17), and which may reasonably be supposed to represent the custom in Jerusalem at the time of the Exile (cf. Ezk 44:19).

Further, Jeremiah's emphatic repudiation of the sacrificial law as a teaching which the king has accepted, he reiterated as late as the fourth year of Jehoiakim is incompatible with the supposition that Deuteronomy became virtually canonical Scripture in 621.4 Here indeed, an need to call in question the main incidents in the finding of the book. It is true that, although in the Deuteronomistic period the phrase, 'the book of the law' (אֱלֹהִי הַתּוֹרָה), would naturally suggest Deuteronomy, the mere omission of the definitive article would make a wider application possible. A 'book of the law' might be used of any collection of prophetic teaching (cf. Is 8:11), and the book read before Josiah may have been a roll containing sayings of Mish (cf. Jer 29:10), or of Isaiah, or, more probably, it may have been a collection of Hosea's prophecies which had been brought to Jerusalem from Bethel when the persecution under Manasseh had come to an end.

14. Reformation under Josiah. It is evident that the king and his advisers felt the necessity of putting a stop to the superstitious rites practised at Judian sanctuaries; but the enforcement of this that of this was by no means an easy matter, for the national welfare was popularly supposed to depend upon them. More legislation on the subject would have been futile, for there was no one in authority to enforce such legislation. A solution of the difficulty was provided by what had hitherto appeared to be an unmitigated calamity, viz. Sennacherib's curtailment of Judian territory eighty years before. No king, however absolute he may be in theory, can with safety shock the sensibilities of the overwhelming majority of his subjects, but...
thanks to Sennacherib, the kingdom of Judah had lost most of its important towns, and Josiah reigned over a little kingdom comprising country districts with small towns and vil- lages, Jerusalem being the only city of first-rate importance. 1 We cannot help thinking that the king and his advisors shrank from causing mortal offense to Jerusalem, they probably considered, however, that, if a measure of reform could be introduced which could be accepted by Jerusalem, the opposition of the remaining parties in the country would be a negligible quantity. Moreover, the Temple at Jerusalem was an annex of the royal palace, and Josiah doubtless supposed that he would be able to exercise over it a supervision which would be impossible in the case of the country sanctuaries. With these principles in view, the king and his advisors carried out a sweeping reform. The country sanctuaries were destroyed utterly, 2 the 48thnahm, who had quarters even in the Temple, were put to death; the foreign cults recently introduced were abolished. No change was made in regard to sacrifice, except that it could now be celebrated only at Jerusalem. Needless to say, a change so tremendous as the abolition of sanctuaries numerous enough to be described in the terms 'upon every high mountain and under every green tree' (cf. Je 19:3) for a time caused many difficulties. In the first place, it was necessary to make provision for the country priests, the Levites as they were called, who were now thrown out of employment, for the reformers would scarcely have dared, had they wished to do so, to treat them as they had treated the 48thnahm. Josiah doubtless supposed, since his nursery of worship at Jerusalem would now be increased, the Temple revenue alone would be able to support a more numerous priesthood, and he seems to have intended that the priests who had ministered at the country sanctuaries should now be allowed to become members of the gild of Zadok at Jerusalem. But he had not taken into account the opposition of the Zadokites to such a scheme, and in effect these country priests who managed to gain a footing in the Temple all were placed by the Zadokites in an inferior position, so that henceforward the Jerusalem priests were of two ranks (cf. 2 K 23:4, Ezk 44:20-21).

It is evident that the discontent caused by the king's reformers was not the less intense. Even in Jerusalem the forbidden practices went on, if not in the Temple, at all events more or less openly. The country people had good cause for discontent, for, since no change had been made in the sacrificial law, and the domestic animals could be slain only at an altar, it had become illegal to hold a feast except at Jerusalem. 3 It would seem that some inhabitants of the more distant districts, having no altar near, dispersed with one altogether, so that it now became necessary to urge upon them the requirements of the sacrificial law. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that, although the original impetus to reform had been given by prophets who repudiated sacrificial altogether, a school of prophets arose who laid stress on

1 The suppression that it was Josiah's teaching that gave to Jerusalem the unique position afterwards assigned to it is one of the many interesting facts which are the fragments of Josiah's teaching which have been preserved to us in their original form, it is clear that Josiah took the same view of sacrifice as Amos, Hosea, and Ahaziah, and although Micah, even had declared that Zion should be 'plowed as a field,' that is, a field of plowed land, it is better to say that Micah was not at this time subject to the king of Judah, and thus formally recognized by him.

2 The words put into the mouth of Rabshakeh (2 K 19:20) probably reflect the discontent caused by Josiah's reforms.

3 The necessity of performing sacrificial ordinances.

Against those who, because of their distance from Jerusalem, were inclined to drop sacrificial worship altogether, or to slaughter domestic animals without due rite, the obligation of keeping the great feasts, which were, indeed, specially mentioned in the ancient Decalogue, was insisted on (Ex 34:21), and old stories of the building of altars and of solemn sacrifice by the patriarchs were again told. 4 The result may be seen in the Jahvistic book of the Pentateuch (Deut 4-18), the idea of which may have been suggested by the similar document E, which was, perhaps, still taking shape in the province of Samaria. The population of Judah was homogeneous to a much greater extent than that of Samaria, and it was, accordingly, unnecessary to introduce any social legislation into this document; but the ancient Decalogue, which had probably been somewhat amplified in the closing years of Hezekiah's reign, and was perhaps already popularly ascribed to Moses, was enlarged by horitory additions to suit the exigencies of the present situation. The school which we owe this document, and which may be considered as representative among the prophets of the State religion of the period, found no favour in the eyes of Jeremiah. It is highly significant that he, the author of the account of Josiah's reforms given in 2 K 22:1, he remained unshaken in his conviction that sacrifice was unnecessary and displeasing to Jehovah. He gives an unequalled depth of insight into the assertion that Moses had commanded it (Jer 7:34-35); he may have introduced, perhaps of the Jahvistic document itself, that 'the king's head had wrought falsely' (89).

It is stated (2 K 23:9) that Josiah's reformation was inaugurated by a solemn covenant ceremony in which the king pronounced the law on the part of the king and the people. That there was some solemn publication of what was henceforth to be the law at some stage of the reformation is likely enough; it is by no means probable that this did not take place at the beginning of the movement, but when it had made sufficient progress to ensure the absence of any very violent opposition. The present narrative has a strongly Deuteronomic colouring, and seems to have been modified since it was first written. 2 The code now contained in Ex 34 may well represent the basis of the 'covenant' determined upon by Josiah (note particularly v.24), but though the horitory introduction is probably of somewhat later date.

Notwithstanding the deep cleavage between Jeremiah and those prophets who approved of Josiah's compromise, the influence of Jeremiah must have been great. He attacked unsparingly the superstitions which all Josiah's zeal had been unable to stamp out, as well as the moral evils from which even the reformed Temple was by no means free. It was doubtless in small measure owing to him that, at the disaffection caused by the troubles which followed the death of Josiah, there was not a far greater recrudescence of the superstitions which that king had put down.

The false hopes raised in Judah by the defeat of Pharaoh at the battle of Carchemish again
called forth Jeremiah’s activity. His earlier anticipations of Judah’s ruin at the hands of a foe from the north had not been realized; for, though the invader was soon near, there is no evidence that they ever invaded Judah. But now there was a prospect of the domination of a far more powerful nation, viz. the Chaldaeans, who in Judah would not naturally be regarded as coming from the north. Accordingly, in the fourth year of Jehoiakim (c. 604-603 B.C.), Jeremiah directed his disciple Baruch to write down a number of prophecies which he had composed since the beginning of his ministry in 623, with the object of showing that the judgment then threatened had been merely postponed and not averted.

15. End of the kingdom of Judah. - The ill-advised revolt of Jehoiakim, three years after he had taken an oath of allegiance to Nebuchadnezzar, brought against Jerusalem an army of Chaldaeans which, after some time, was joined by Nebuchadnezzar in person. Jehoiakim appears to have died during the siege. He was succeeded by his son Jehoiachin, who, three months later, surrendered to Nebuchadnezzar. Jehoiachin and many of the royal family with the aristocracy of Judah, including both the people and the priests, were carried captive to Babylon; Nebuchadnezzar appointing as king of Judah Mattaniah, the brother of Jehoiakim and uncle of Jehoiachin, who now assumed the name of Zedekiah.

But the new government proved no better than the old. The Palestinian States had not yet realized the full power of the Chaldaeans, while Egypt continued its policy, which she had followed for more than a century, of fomenting revolts in Palestine, in order to avert the danger which threatened herself from the great W. Asiatic empires. In spite of Jeremiah’s earnest warning, Zedekiah was induced to revolt, with the inevitable result. After a long siege, Jerusalem was taken in the year 596 B.C. King Zedekiah was made prisoner, blinded, and carried to Babylon; the Temple was first rifled and then, together with the king’s palace and the better houses in Jerusalem, burned; the city walls were broken down. For the second time a great number of the inhabitants, including those priests who had been left on the former occasion, were transported to Babylon.

The OT, as is but natural from the place and period of composition, is for the most part written from an aristocratic point of view; and accordingly, since the upper classes were taken into exile, it is not surprising that some passages give the impression that the whole population of Judah except the very poorest were transported. But, although the whole land had suffered greatly, it was Jerusalem only that had borne the brunt of Nebuchadnezzar’s wrath, and a not inconsiderable population remained in the land, whose numbers were augmented, as soon as the Chaldaean army had gone, by the return of numerous refugees, many of whom were doubtless of good family, who had sought an asylum in the neighbouring countries. Nebuchadnezzar, although even his patience was exhausted as far as the house of David was concerned, adhered to his former policy of leaving the government of the country in the hands of a puppet, and appointed Gedaliah the son of Ahikam governor of Judah.

How long Gedaliah’s governorship lasted cannot be determined with certainty. The year is not given in Jer 39:1, 2 K 25, and an interval of less than three months seems scarcely sufficient for the events recorded in 2 K 25. Since Jer 29:29 mentions a third transplantation of Jews to Babylon five years after the second, which, although it is stated in the eighteenth year of Nebuchadnezzar, must be the same as that which is described in 2 K 25, we may perhaps suppose that Gedaliah was governor for about five years, the last transplantation being the result of his murder (2 K 25, Jer 41), which the Chaldaeans regarded as a pretext for rebellion. Thenceforward Judah, like Samaria, appears to have been governed by a Babylonian official.

In the certainty that the Chaldaeans, after the murder of Gedaliah, would send a punitive expedition to Judah, a number of the inhabitants fled to Egypt, which had probably been for a considerable period a place of refuge for the distressed inhabitants not only of Judah, but also of Samaria. There thus arose a number of Israelite communities in Egypt, which were destined in after times to have an important influence on Israel. The refugees would naturally be representative of the mediocrity of cattle which existed in Palestine in the 7th cent. B.C., but the religion of Judah flourished among them, and in the times of Canaanites—apparently there had previously been oppressed by the captors; perhaps on the grounds of the choice of sacrificial animals—a temple for sacrifice was built to Jehoveh at Elephanthis.

Of the last years and death of Jeremiah, who, after the murder of Gedaliah, wascompelled by the refugees to accompany them to Egypt, we have no information. There is no evidence that his presence exercised any permanent influence upon the community in Egypt. He may have returned to Jerusalem and died there.

It had been Jeremiah’s sad office ‘to pluck up and to break down, and to overthrow and to destroy,’ and apparently it was not till the close of his ministry that it was perceived that he had also a mission ‘to build and to plant’ (Jer 31:14). Although he never wavered in his conviction of the futurity of opposition to the Exile, there can be little doubt that to those who believed his preaching he turned comforter. Perhaps the individualism which was beginning to make itself heard (cf. Jer 31:14) may partly spring from this phase, but it was probably due in the main to the conviction that Jehovah, who all through Israel’s sin had remembered the love of her espousal (23), could not wholly cast her off. The prophecy in 35:6, which appears worked up again in 36:23, although it was in its original setting, and perhaps not quite in its original form, may be dated with considerable likelihood in the period of the reign of the king after the capture of Zedekiah. The tree of David’s dynasty had been cut down, but from the root there would yet spring up a shoot (wrongly rendered ‘branch’ in EV) which would grow again into as goodly a tree. This restored monarchy, unlike Zedekiah, who had belied his name of ‘Jehovah is righteousness,’ would seek its ‘righteousness,’ i.e. wellbeing, only in Jehovah, and the restored community would enjoy a ‘covenant’ with Jehovah which would be permanent, in the conviction that Jehovah would be written on His people’s hearts (31:31,32). The prophecy of the ‘Shoot’ is the ear.

1 The term ‘David’ in 35:6 need not necessarily be understood to mean originally the actual family of David, but the royal line of Judah, which had so long belonged to the dynasty of David. In 2 K 25, although strictly speaking the king’s actual descendants are excluded from reigning, Jeremiah seems to mean the royal family generally.

Since the word rendered ‘shoot’ has a much wider range of meaning in Hebrew than the English rendering would imply, it is not quite certain what is here represented in the form ‘branch.’ The word may denote merely a state of peace such as that which exists between two parties who have entered into an agreement for mutual protection, and is so used, e.g. in Hos 2:24, Job 20:21. If this sense be adopted here, the earlier covenant will be the living relation between Jehovah and Israel described in Jer 31.
liest prediction of future happiness to which we may see subsequent definite reference in the OT (of Zech. 2:4, 6), and may be regarded as the starting-point of 'Messianic' prophecy.

15. Religion in Judah after the destruction of the Temple.—The deportation of the priests from Jerusalem and their acceptance. It is possible to see the reason why the Temple had not made sacrifices impossible, for the great stone altar originally erected by Ahaz probably remained, and in any case some sort of altar could have been continued on its site. But the absence of a priesthood might have occasioned many difficulties; for sacred and secular life were hardly distinguishable. In this respect Samaria was now better off than Judah, for Bethel had been reopened by special permission of the king of Assyria, and probably Shechem and other sanctuaries were to some extent flourishing. The removal of the dynasty of David had taken away the old cause of jealousy between Samaria and Judah; and, since the similarity in their political situations would doubtless have drawn the two provinces together, there was no reason why they should not combine for their mutual advantage. The position of Bethel, which may reasonably be regarded as Aaronite,2 represented in the main the ideas, not indeed of Jeremiah, but of the prophetic school which had drawn up the Jahvistic document (J); and it is probable that the proximity of Bethel to Jericho suggested the possibility of an arrangement by which the latter sanctuary should serve the needs of those who had hitherto worshipped at the former, Bethel for its part supplying the priestly body. That by some means, at some time, the province of Samaria was for religious purposes united with Judah is evident. The writer of Ezr. 4-6 believed that such a union had been effected before the Exile, and that the Samaritan and priestly Hebraism and subsequent worship at Gerizim is inexplicable unless the Samaritans had previously accepted the principle of one sanctuary only. The combination of the N. Israelite and Judahite documents E and J also presupposes some such union, which may most easily be explained on the supposition of a voluntary agreement. We need not dismiss the account given in 2 K. 23-25 as altogether fictitious, but it is probable that by some means, at some time, those who had worshipped at Bethel would be unanimously in favour of closing that sanctuary, and the majority may have perpetrated the horrors here narrated but may have been compelled to consent in assenting to Josiah. Probably this beginning of reunion affected at first only Judah, and the district hitherto served by Bethel. There were, indeed, many problems to be solved before it could have a wider scope. In particular, there was the question of the law-books, or, in Hebrew phraseology, the 'covenant'-books, recognized respectively at Jerusalem and Samaria. The Biblical document E was probably accepted not only at Bethel, but also at other sanctuaries in Samaria; while in Judah the Jahvistic document J, in spite of the opposition of Jeremiah, had probably acquired, except perhaps in Zadokite circles, a quasi-canonical recognition. If both communities should abandon its Scriptures, and the difficulty was solved by the combination of J and E into JE, the code of J (Ex. 34) being represented as given to replace the code of E, which had been broken up by Moses.

It must have been evident to those who cherished any nationalist aspirations that anything which tended towards centralization and union was of the greatest value, and it is not surprising that, when the compact between Bethel and Jerusalem had had time to prove its advantages, a further extension of the law of the One Sanctuary began to be mooted. But there were many difficulties in the way. The impossibility of slaughtering domestic animals except at Jerusalem had already been found a great burden in the more distant districts of Judah. It was, therefore, that still more distant districts in N. Samaria or Galilee would tolerate such an inconvenience. Besides, even on the supposition that the rest of the country would be willing to accept Jerusalem as the supreme sanctuary in lieu of others, there was the problem of the maintenance of the priests who had ministered at these, while a state of society in which the venal priest was recognized would simply shrink from abolishing local sanctuaries where an innocent homicide might find asylum. A further difficulty would be found in the fact that reforming ideas had in some respects made greater way in Judah. Thus, e.g., the Samaritan schism and subsequent worship at Gerizim is inexplicable unless the Samaritans had previously accepted the principle of one sanctuary only. The combination of the N. Israelite and Judahite documents E and J also presupposes some such union, which may most easily be explained on the supposition of a voluntary agreement. We need not dismiss the account given in 2 K. 23-25 as altogether fictitious, but it is probable that by some means, at some time, those who had worshipped at Bethel would be unanimously in favour of closing that sanctuary, and the majority may have perpetrated the horrors here narrated but may have been compelled to consent in assenting to Josiah. Probably this beginning of reunion affected at first only Judah, and the district hitherto served by Bethel. There were, indeed, many problems to be solved before it could have a wider scope. In particular, there was the question of the law-books, or, in Hebrew phraseology, the 'covenant'-books, recognized respectively at the time of the Exilarch.

We hear, however, of a solemn ratification of a covenant in the reign of Zedekiah (Jer. 34:12-16), though we are not told the circumstances under which it took place. While in Jer. 15 this covenant is assumed to be on the basis of an ordinance dating from the Exile. But ch. 34, though it may embody some of Jeremiah's phrases, is not from the prophet's own hand, and cannot be held to prove that there existed in Judah at this time a council of elders with regard to the eating of slavés which was ascribed to the period of the Exodus. It is therefore probable that the writer to whom we owe the account of Josiah's reforms in 2 K. 23-24, if he had heard of the destruction and desolation brought about by Josiah, would have given the limits of the reform as from 'Gibeah of Benjamin' (v. 6). Bethel lay outside Josiah's kingdom. 2 K. 23:8 is from the same hand as 2 K. 19:15, and is a command which is peculiar to the Deuteronomistic school, and was written at least as late as the third generation from Josiah. The reason why 2 K. 23:16, and also 2 K. 24:4, ignores the alleged destruction of Bethel and of the high places of Samaria.

4 For a fuller discussion of this point see KENITT, 'The Origin of the Deuteronomistic Priesthood,' in JPRhSt, 1906, 151-158.

5 The exact limits of Judah at this period are not known. It is possible to think that, when Judah ceased to be a kingdom and was made a province governed by a Babylonian official, its old limits were restored; but some districts which, as far as their political history was concerned, were Jewish may even yet have remained distinct with their old sanctuaries.

The outcome of these and other reforms and concessions was the book of Deuteronomy, of which the legal code (ch. 12-26) is evidently the.

1 The text that may be maintained of the teaching of Gn 22 is that the sacrifice of the first-born is not insisted on (cf. Jer. 7:24, 25). Ezekiel (34:25) recognizes that the sacrifice of the first-born has been legal in the past.
nucleus. In the forefront of this code is placed the law relating to sacrifice at the one altar,1 specially framed in view of the extension of the law to all Israel. The code also contains rules relating to the celebration of the great feasts, the maintenance of the priests, and the like, as well as a number of enactments designed to put a stop to superstitious and heathenish practices, and ordinances dealing with matters of common life. These last, which are to some extent based upon the code of the Samaritan, book E, appear to be intended more especially, though not exclusively, for the instruction of the non-Jewish districts of the land. This code of law, although it is directly at variance with Jeremiah (722) in definitely requiring sacrifice—which represents as commanded by Moses himself—indirectly did much to further Jeremiah's conception of religion. In time past, the motive of sacrifice had frequently been "to eat flesh"—a fact which had called forth the scathing sarcasm of Jeremiah (723)—but now those who desired to feast could do so at home, and thus sacrifice was at least lifted above such sordid considerations.

There was, indeed, the danger that the infrequency of ritual worship might bring about a forgetfulness of religion, but this was not to a great extent guarded against by the Deuteronomistic reform. The great sacrifice based on obedience to the common law of Israel on Israel's relation to Jahveh, and subsequently prefaced to the code of laws several phrases cast into the form ofhortatory addresses by Moses, yet the difficulty must have been felt that the old Deuteronomic covenant as was regarded as the basis of Jahveh's covenant with Israel, being chiefly concerned with ritual ordinances, had been repudiated by the school of Jeremiah, and that this school, which, indeed, had greatly learned religious thought, would never accept as the basis of a divine covenant a code which required sacrifice but did not insist on justice, mercy, and truth. Accordingly, since the tradition of the laws divinely given and gravely upon two tables of stone had gained firm hold of the popular mind, the bold step was taken of providing a new Decalogue (De 5), laying down the first commandment and that relating to the observance of the Sabbath, as well as the more recently introduced prohibition of images, but otherwise based on the ethical teaching of the great prophets, especially Jeremiah (see, e.g., Jer 7 9-11, etc.).

One of the last of the great Samaritan sanctuaries to fall into line in the matter of the Deuteronomistic law was that of Shechem, which claimed to be the burial-place of Joseph (Jos 24,7), and which possessed near it a temple and a standing-stone supposed to have been placed there by Joshua (Dt 27-8; Jos 8). It would have been strange if the inhabitants of Shechem had not been willing to destroy that which had made their city so famous, while without Shechem the unity of Israel could not have been attained. A solemn compact, legalized by an appendix to the earlier law of Deuteronomy (cf. 97), was therefore made with the Shechemites, whereby the latter agreed to accept the law of the One Sanctuary. This compact was ratified with sacrifice upon the old altar of Shechem, which was allowed to remain on condition that it should not again be used for its original purpose, while the standing-stones were purged of any heathenish or schismatic associations by being plastered over and described, with the provisions of the new law, 1 This fact alone is sufficient to dispose of the assertion that
Shechem was acquainted with the book of Deuteronomy, and, indeed, deeply indebted by it. The passage of laws not least prominent in Deuteronomy as sacramental prayers and rubrics in the Book of Common Prayer; but who will maintain that the latter is not concerned with sacraments?

1 Probably the story contained in Jos 9 had its origin in a similar conception with regard to some altar in the vicinity of the Jordan.

Advantage was taken of the gathering at Shechem to stimulate the national sentiment. Representatives of the twelve tribes were stationed, six on Erhel, on which stood the ancient sanctuary, and six on Gerizim, who responded respectively when the Levites pronounced curses on those who should transgress, and blessings on those who should obey, the new law. No doubt there still remained some heathen communities in Samaria, and, still more in Galilee and Gilead; but there was little cohesion between them, and much national sentiment as existed was Israelite. So greatly had the sense of Israelite unity been developed by the centralization of worship, that the reformers had considered it desirable to incorporate in their new law-book legislation for a future king (Dt 1717-20). The provision that such a king must be of Israelite blood might possibly be aimed at the ambitious schemes of some governor appointed by the Chaldeans as king of Palestine, or may be intended merely to ensure that a king of Israel should not be a man who had only recently accepted the religion of Jahveh, who was thoroughly imbued with Israelite tradition, while in the warning against Egypt and against horses we may see the fruits of the teaching of the great prophets. It is impossible to give a terminus ad quem for the adoption of the Deuteronomistic laws, but it may probably be dated before the appointment of Zerubbabel.

17. Development of religion among the Babylonian exiles.—Meanwhile a religious development of the utmost importance was going on among the Jewish community settled in Babylonia. It might have been supposed that these exiles, like their brethren who had taken refuge in Egypt, would have erected one or more temples to Jahweh, and would have continued the exercise of their own religion. But, whereas the refugees in Egypt had left their native land of their free will, the exiles in Babylonia were for the most part victims of rebellion, and less inclined to settle down in a foreign country; indeed, for some time it was difficult to persuade them that their exile would be of long duration (cf. Jer 38 f.).

The most important factor in shaping the religion of the exiles in Babylonia was the presence among them of the Exilarch priests, of whom the majority had been carried off with Johoiachin in 597 B.C. An unforeseen result of Josiah's reforms was that these priests had been placed in a unique position; for, since they had refused to accept an equality with the priests who had ministered at the country sanctuaries (Ezk 4424), they were compelled to maintain not only that there must be but one sanctuary, but also that that one sanctuary must be at Jerusalem. These men, therefore, could not have acceded to a demand for a temple in Babylonia—had such a demand been made—without nullifying their previous action.

Prominent among these priests was a certain Ezekiel, son of Buzi, a man thoroughly imbued with the traditions of the Exilarch priesthood as they had taken shape after 621. Ezekiel felt himself called to be a prophet in the fifth year of Johoiachin's captivity. Shipped on the Ararat, he performed for twenty-two years he exercised a powerful influence on his fellow-captives. It is vain to speculate why for four years Ezekiel was silent; but it is possible that for some time he, like his fellow-captives, did

1 Notice especially De 27.
not realize that the exile was likely to be of long duration.

Like the other great prophets, Ezekiel was conscious that the disasters which had come upon his people were due to sins, but his priestly training largely modified his conception of what those sins had been. He was alive to the social evils, but, in his opinion, Israel's chief sin in the past had consisted in idolatry and idolatrous practices in the religion of Jehovah. Unlike Jeremiah, he considered sacrifice a divine institution, and his standpoint is throughout sacrificial rather than prophetic. Himself a man of intensely strong convictions, he makes no allowance for the fact that his code of right is of very recent origin. Thus he condemns as some of the sins which have caused Israel's ruin the taking of a father's wives by his son (Ezk 22:12), as well as the marriage of a half-sister on the father's side (v. 11), though such practices had been, and perhaps in Palestine still were, the common custom in Israel (2 S 11:18; 19; cf. Gn 30:4).

That Ezekiel, under the circumstances in which he found himself, should have developed an individualism was but natural. It was inevitable that some of the evils should be merged in the heathenism of Babylonia; and the desire to keep the rest faithful to Jehovah must have called forth a care for individuals which had not been required of earlier prophets, so that Ezekiel became the prototype of the Christian minister. It is true that individualism of a sort was already in the air, even before the disester of 597, men had asked why, if the fathers had stood faithful, the children's teeth should be set on edge (Jer 2:19). To a prophet who felt himself bound to care for individual souls such a question must of necessity present a problem which could not be left unheeded and Ezekiel (ch. 18) attempted to grapple with it. The thought of the age was insufficiently advanced to render a full discussion of the problem possible, and Ezekiel was hampered by the supposed necessity of considering together sin and suffering as cause and effect; but in his efforts to vindicate Jehovah's justice he insisted on Jehovah's relation with the individual soul, and thus prepared the way for later and fuller teaching.

Ezekiel's great achievement was the forging of the weapon by which the religion of Israel was finally enabled to withstand the attacks of heathenism. He opened the eyes of the leaders of the right of the Zadokites to the priesthood, as well as of a return to Jerusalem, Ezekiel set himself to commit to writing the priestly traditions of the Temple ritual, freely introducing, however, in characteristic fashion, modifications and innovations which he considered would be an improvement on the old state of things, and insuring on the permanent degradation of inferior offices in the Temple of those Levites who had been at Josiah's reformation ministered at the country sanctuaries. He claimed no ancient authority for this new 'ecclesiastical polity'; but the school which he founded was naturally concluded, in accordance with his teaching, that what he laid down ought to have been practised all along, and this in itself would tend to produce the impression that what the priestly traditions of Babylonia agreed reed to be right must have been enjoined at the Exodus. It is possible that the Zadokite priests, before they left Jerusalem, knew the Jahvistic document J in its original form, though it is hardly likely that they would have accepted it as such; we should call canonical; or perhaps, after the combination of J and E into JE, the latter document, or an account of it, may have reached them in Babylonia, and may thus have preserved the prototype of a frame of reference to which they could add their traditions. The codification of priestly traditions was evidently spread over a considerable time. The nucleus of the collection, which bears a strong resemblance to Ezekiel's writings, is contained in the so-called Law of Holiness (Lv 17-26), and presents the remarkable feature that, in connexion with the slaughter of domestic animals, it requires the offering of the blood and fat at the centre of the altar, and must be in substance anterior to Deuteronomy.

The victories of Cyrus and the threatened conquest of Babylonia caused grave disquiet not only to the exiles themselves but also to the Jewish communities abroad, to their brethren in Palestine. The situation in Babylonia called forth the eloquence of one of the most attractive of the canonical prophets, whose compositions, however, have come down to us only in a very fragmentary form, and modified and interwoven with prophecies of a later date. In the coming overthrow of Chaldean rule he foresaw the release of his people from captivity, and hailed Cyrus as a deliverer. Whether his anticipations were justified by the event is very doubtful. The belief that Cyrus gave free permission to the Jews to return rests only on the statement of the Chronicler, whose trustworthiness in this connexion may be gauged by the fact that he represents (Ezr 1:3) Cyrus as restoring the vessels of the Temple, which, according to the more probable statement in 2 K 25:17 (cf. Jer 52:20), Nebuchadnezzar had carried away 70 years before. The Cylinder Inscription of Cyrus does not prove that all the captive population of the Babylonian Empire were allowed to return to their homes, but no other confirmation of the Chronicler's statement.

Neither Haggai nor Zechariah refers to any such return from captivity, and neither shows the least gratitude towards Persia. Probably the reign of Cyrus the province of Judah continued to be governed by the Babylonian official whose name appears in Ezr 1 as Sheshbazzar.

18. Zerubbabel appointed governor of Judah;
rebuilt the Temple. Though there is good reason for doubting the Chronicler's statement as regards Cyrus, there is no doubt that in the second year of Darius (539-538 B.C.) a member of the old royal family of Judah, Zerubbabel the son of Shecani- tiel, had been appointed governor of Judah. We know nothing of the fortunes of the house of David in Babylonia beyond the fact that Jehoiachin had been treated with contempt by Nebuchadnezzar. Zerubbabel may have commended himself to Darius in some such way as is described in 1 Es 3:8, or he may have been selected for the governorship of Judah because Darius, in the troubles which beset him at the beginning of his reign, wished to conciliate the inhabitants of that province. That there was any return of exiles on a large scale at the time of Zerubbabel's appointment is unlikely; but there is little doubt that he would be accompanied by a retinue of his own people, among whom there would be, in all probability, some Zadokite priests.

Hitherto little had been done at Jerusalem in the way of restoration. Sacrifices were offered at the altar (Hag 2:4); but the Temple had not been rebuilt, and, apparently, its ruins had not, call of Jerusalem was still broken down, and the community generally was poverty-stricken. The poverty, however, was not universal, and a certain number of people had built themselves houses which, in the opinion of the prophet Haggai, were unnecessarily luxuriously. This prophet, of whose antecedents we know nothing, took advantage of the enthusiasm evoked by Zerubbabel's appointment. We are not in a position to decide whether Zerubbabel and Zechariah had returned with Zerubbabel, or whether they had always lived in Judah. Zechariah's interest centres in Judah, from which he might be inferred that he was the exclusive Jews of Babylonia. On the other hand, the province
by Zerubbabel's appointment to urge the rebuilding of the Temple. On the new-moon festival (c. 1st Sept. 529 B.C.) he addressed the people on the subject, and so much success attended that, three weeks later (c. 29th Sept.), work, probably in the clearing of the site, was actually begun. A month later (c. 21st Oct.), the work was so far advanced that it was possible to lay the foundation-stone with stones taken from the Temple. Haggai had encouraged those who were dependents because of the inferior character of the building just begun, by declaring that the outcome of the shaking of the world—referring probably to Ezechiel's vision which had broken out against Darius in various parts of the Persian Empire—would be that the wealth of all nations would flow into the Temple. Two months later (c. 24th Dec.), Haggai gave expression to what was doubtless a general hope—that in Zerubbabel would be seen the reversal of Jeremiah's judgment on Jeboiachin (Hag 2:2, Jer 25:5).

Haggai's hope of the dissolution of the Persian Empire proved illusory, however, and it soon became evident that Darius would hold his own. The disappointment thus caused in Judah was combated by Zechariah, who endeavoured to keep alive the enthusiasm which had been awakened by the project of rebuilding the Temple. Zechariah's prophecies, of which those that have come down to us are, for the most part, in alphabetical form, are of unique interest, but only two features of his work can here be mentioned. As the work at the Temple proceeded successfully, the idea was mooted, perhaps by Zerubbabel himself, of rebuilding the wall of Jerusalem. Zechariah, although he hoped and believed that Zerubbabel would one day actually be king of Judah, was fully alive to the danger of such an enterprise, and earnestly deprecated it (2:8). The prophet seems in this instance to have been unsuccessful, and the proposed fortification of Jerusalem naturally aroosed the suspicion of the Samaritans, who imagined that Zerubbabel was aiming at making himself a second Solomon, and of exacting from them forced labour (Ezr 4:1-2).

It was inevitable that there should be collision between those who had always been settled in Jerusalem and their brethren who had returned from the wilderness. The chief priest at this time was a certain Joshua, son of Jehohanan, whose genealogy is connected with the Chronicles (1 Ch 6:31-44) with the Zacoiotes probably by the mere combination of Jer 35:8 with Hag 1:2, but who may have been chosen from the Amaronites or priests who had formerly ministered at Bethel. The Zacoiotes who accompanied Zerubbabel would naturally regard this man as disqualified, and at best not superior to the country Levites who had been permanently degraded to an inferior position. Joshua, however, found a staunch champion in Zechariah, who declared that so long as he should be loyal to Jehovah's law he should have the government of the Temple. Zerubbabel, Zechariah maintained, should be king upon his throne, and Joshua priest at his right hand; and of Samaria was probably in a more flourishing condition, as it had had longer time to recover from the effects of the Assyrian invasions.

3. Josephus in Ant. xiii. 6. 1. 1. 3 mentions a mistake in the foundation-stone.

The exact nature of the appeal to Darius is not stated, but it may be inferred from the subsequent appeal to have been addressed at the council of Babylon (1 Ch 36:19).

2 That Joshua's misfortune—which Zechariah allegedly deplored—was an accusation by Satan (Zee 3:2) was attempted deposition from office, and this evidently Zechariah's judgment is represented as clad in filthy garments, i.e., garments in which it was evident that he lavished his blood. In Zeo 9:3 for 'on his throne' (the second time of the occurrence of the phrase) the LXX has 'at his right hand'; and, since there is a reference to the Eschatological claims, it is evident that the name of Joshua has been omitted in this verse, which has been wrongly written for that of Zerubbabel in 1:8.

3 The prominence given in the existing books of Samuel to the rejection of Saul in favour of David was occasioned by the fact that he was claimed by some in Samaria that a king who should reign over all Israel should not be from the family of David. There is no difficulty in the supposition that some members of Saul's family still remained at Gath.

4 A good illustration of this is found in the words put into the mouth of Joshua (Jos 23:8). In mentioning the people who died beyond the Jordan the memorials of those have in view the immediate ancestors of many of those whom he is addressing.
tions of the sayings of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Zephaniah, Nahum, and Habakkuk.¹

The ideals of those whom Zerahiah had endeavored to dissuade from attempting to fortify Jerusalem, were to be cherished by many in that city. The work of rebuilding the wall was probably begun in 515 B.C., and Tattenai and Shethar-bozzeni appeared against it successfully to the Persian government. According to Ezra 4,² an appeal was made to Xerxes (Ahasuerus) against the Jews about the year 485 B.C., from which it may be inferred that there was then another attempt to fortify Jerusalem. The work was yet again taken in hand in the reign of Artaxerxes Longimanus, probably between 460 and 455.³ On this occasion the wall appears to have been almost completed when Artaxerxes, in response to an earnest appeal from Reheman and Shimshai, who appear to have been respectively governors of Samaria and some other Palestinian province, allowed these men to raise troops in the country and to stop the work. A force composed of Samaritans, Ammonites, Moabites, and others thereupon attacked Jerusalem, demolished a considerable portion of the newly built wall, burned the gates, and carried off many captives.⁴ The Edomites, after a long siege of more than a century being press ing northwards and had become incorporated in Judah, may have been induced by the Samaritans to take part in this attack—an act of treachery which the Jerusalem party never forgave.

20. Appointment of Nehemiah; rebuilding of the wall of Jerusalem. — It was not long before the tables were turned on those who had attacked Jerusalem. Nehemiah (Neh 2:8), the son of Hacaliah, was in the ranks seen by Xerxes as well as by Artaxerxes, and his appointment as governor of Judah, the son of the Exiles, was not a matter of indifference. The Persian king, therefore, appointed him to the post of governor, and Nehemiah, as soon as he had been confirmed in his office, set out for Jerusalem, which he entered in a state of great excitement. The walls were in a ruinous state, and the gates were not only destroyed but entirely abandoned. The cities and villages were inhabited by Gentiles, and the inhabitants were left to themselves and to their fate. The situation was indeed a critical one, and Nehemiah was called to face it with courage and determination.

Upon his arrival, Nehemiah immediately set about repairing the wall, and in a short time the work was completed. The Jews were enabled to resume their former way of life, and the city was once again a flourishing and populous place. The restoration of the walls was a great step forward in the building up of the national life of the Jews, and it was a fitting precursor of the more important work that was to come.

21. Mission of Ezra; publication of the Law. — Upon their arrival, another attempt was made to separate Jews from non-Jews, and to put a stop to mixed marriages. The attempt aroused intense opposition and little was effected. Ezra must indeed have felt himself powerless, inasmuch as among a people who possessed and revered the Scriptures they had none to which he could appeal as authority for the work which he proposed to do. He determined, therefore, to publish in Jerusalem the law of the Zadokite lawyers in Babylonia; and, since it was impossible to expect that Jerusalem would give up its Scriptures, he decided to follow the precedent set when the Scriptures of Samaria and Judah had been combined into JE. Probably in order to carry out this work, Ezra returned to the east, but on this point we are not informed. When he returned, Nehemiah got Artaxerxes to appoint him governor of Jerusalem, and returned thither, perhaps accompanied by Ezra. As yet little had been accomplished in the matter of reform. It was necessary, therefore, to take steps to ensure the success of the law, and Ezra accordingly set about the work of publication. The law was read in the temple, and the people were instructed in its provisions.

22. Final breach with the Samaritans. — From the first Nehemiah had shown himself uncompromising in his Judaeo-Zadokite prejudices. Having grown up as a member of a race which had for long been separate from other races for several generations, he could not bring himself to look upon people of mixed nationality as truly Israelites. Although those who accompanied Ezra seem to have been chosen as representative of the twelve tribes, Nehemiah soon showed that, in his opinion, the existing conditions, to indoctrinate their fellow-countrymen. Nehemiah came to the conclusion that the reforms which he desired could not be carried into practice unless the small minority who sympathised with him were to form a distinct community from Babylonia. Upon his return to the east he obtained permission from Artaxerxes for the return to Jerusalem under the leadership of Ezra¹ of a number of Jews (probably carefully selected)² then living in the exilic community.²

¹ For this view of the relation of Nehemiah and Ezra see Cambridge Biblical Atlas, p. 153 B.
² At first there were no Levites among the returning exiles, and Ezra made a special point of providing for them. It is probable that from the deportations of the Zadokites till the return of Ezra the clergy who ministered at Jerusalem had been all of one race.
³ This must not be taken to mean that any of these collections have descended from Nehemiah himself, as Helck, Theit, and others have all been more or less modified to suit the exigencies of later ages.
⁵ The rendering of the English version in Neh 2, 'the remnant that are left of the captivity,' naturally suggests to English readers the idea of a dual community, but the Hebrew is more naturally understood of the carrying off of those who had been recently captured in war.
Judah alone was genuinely Israelite. The Samaritans ho scorned and hated. This was, after the circumstances a breach sooner or later was inevitable, and we can scarcely wonder that, when Nehemiah dismissed the grandson of the high priest from office at the Temple on the ground that he had rejected the worship of Samshah, the governor of Samaria (Neh. 13:29), the last straw was laid on the burden of Samaritan patience. Shechem still retained memories of its once famous sanctuary, and the dispersed priest, whose name, according to Josephus (Ant. xiii. vii. 2, viii. 2, 4), was Manasseh, was soon installed there as priest in a new temple. 1

The cleavage seems to have followéd political lines, 2 the boundary between the two provinces being also the boundary between the areas of the rival sanctuaries. By this schism, which was, indeed, the culmination of Nehemiah's whole policy, the Jews of Jerusalem and its vicinity became as completely separated from their neighbours in Palestine as their brethren in the east had been from the heathen population of Babylonia. The Jew became a man apart, and a century of isolation gave to the new Judaism sufficient strength to enable it to stand against the flood of new ideas which came in with Alexander the Great.

We do not know what effect the Samaritan schism had on Galilee. The mention of Kedesh 3 as a city of refuge (Jos 20:33) implies that Galilee had, at least to some extent, accepted the law of the Ose Sanctuary, and in Maccabean times there were not a few loyal Jews (2 Macc. 5:1-2). It is impossible to say whether these had settled in the north since 352, or whether the Israelites of Galilee remained loyal throughout the Samaritan schism. The latter supposition is by no means impossible, for Galilea and Samaria formed different provinces, and the jealousy between Samaria and Judah was almost wholly political.

Since the deportation of Jews by Nebuchadnezzar, there had been a real fear that religions might develop on such different lines in the east and in the west as to cause a permanent cleavage in the religion of Israel. By the combination of the law of the east with that of the west, Nehemiah had avoided this danger. In Egypt, however, the Israelite settlers appear to have known nothing of the development of the Law at home. It is very doubtful whether they possessed any portion of the Pentateuch, and it is practically certain that they were unacquainted with Deuteronomy and the Priestly Code.

The drastic measures adopted by Nehemiah to get rid of those who would not accept the new Law, based as this was entirely on religious principles, inevitably transformed the population which did accept it into a church rather than a nation, and in such a state of things the priests were naturally all-important, and the high priest was regarded as the head of the State. It would seem, however, that the national spirit was not wholly dead, and that there were even proposals to elect a king—proposals which were vigorously opposed by the clerical aristocracy.3

1. Josephus puts this schism a century later, but that Samshah was governor in the 4th cent. B.C. is proved by the Elephantine papyri.

2. The idea that the kingdom of N. Israel was composed of ten tribes probably arose very late. Since Simon was absolved in Judah, and Levi was not a territorial tribe, the number ten can be accounted for by counting Benjamin. In some passages Judah seems to denote the kingdom of Judah, e.g. Jg 19:15; 1 K. 12:29, and is described as "one tribe," e.g. in 1 K. 12:17. Later on, probably in consequence of the presence of powerful Benjamite families in the province of Judah, Judea was reckoned as containing ten tribes. The number ten was obtained simply by subtracting two from fourteen.

2. No one can fail to be struck by the extraordinary statements put into the mouth of Samuel when the people demand a king, and the way in which the prophet is represented as giving his orders to the king.

23. Institution of synagogues and rise of the scribes. —Nehemiah's efforts to enforce the Law produced one result of inestimable advantage for the development of the religious spirit—the institution of synagogues with the consequent rise of the scribes. Since a Law so complex that even the people in the Pentateuch could not have been learnt at one hearing, it must have been necessary to provide for regular instruction in it; and the informal meetings which in the past had taken place in the prophets' houses (2 K. 4:38) probably suggested a way in which this could be effected. Henceforth those who wished to know the will of Jahweh before they took themselves, not to the prophets who had taught according to their own intuition, but to those who were duly instructed in the written Law. Professional prophets, indeed, long continued to exist, but they were men with whom prophecy was merely a livelihood. The nobler exponents of Jahweh's will found their inspiration for the most part in the Scriptures, though prophecy was by no means dead, if the word be understood not of the form, but of the substance of the message delivered. 1 It was impossible that the Jews should be among so highly civilized a people as the Babylonians without acquiring a considerable amount of culture, and the connexion between Palestine and the east in time of trouble must have brought much of this culture to Jerusalem. Doubtless a number of practices of which Ezra and Nehemiah would have disapproved lingered on or even found their way into Jewish religious life, and in some cases, such as the celebration of the Day of Atonement, were found to have taken such firm hold upon the people that it became necessary to enjoin them in the Law. There can be little doubt, however, that the spirit of Judaism in religion from the time of Nehemiah was in the direction of a higher spirituality. It is true that the princes whom Makkachi had bequeathed the middle of the 5th cent., and who were then far from being spiritual leaders, do not appear to have been any better after Nehemiah's reforms, but happily the spirituality of Israel did not depend on the Temple.

From the Samaritan schism till the coming of Alexander the history of Judah is almost blank. Josephus tells us (Ant. xiii. vii. 1) of a quarrel between the high priest Jannai and the high priest John. We have also the account of the revolt of a Jewess, and of the murder of the latter, which was punished by Bagoas, who may reasonably be identified with the Bagothus, who, according to the Elephantine papyri, was governor of Judah in 408. Perhaps the prophecy of Joel in its original form dates from the period between Nehemiah and Alexander, and doubtless the redaction of the historical books still continued.

24. Condition of Judaism, 332-198 B.C.—With the coming of Alexander the Great a new era dawned for Palestine and for Judaism. The Persians had been most unpopular rulers, and Alexander promised a large measure of freedom. But long isolation had produced, at least in the rank and file of Judaism, a shrinking from contact with heathenism, and it was perhaps for some time doubtful whether the little community of Jews in Jerusalem and the neighbouring districts of Judah would gain any advantage from the opening up of the world which had resulted from Alexander's conquests. It is probable that in the book of Nehemiah we have a re-echo of that spirit which was directed towards the Gentiles which was endangering the
very existence of the nation. The writer, who, like St. Paul, evidently contrasted 'Jews by nature' with 'sinners of the Gentiles,' maintains that Israel has a message for the world, and it was done with piety and sincerity, that they were like-minded, that Jews loyal to their religion now left the narrow district to which they had been restricted and settled not only further afield in Palestine, but also in more remote parts of Alexander's dominions.

It is not unlikely that the Jews had at first anticipated from the coming of Alexander greater freedom than was actually given them. They must have felt keenly their submission to the Ptolemaic rule, although that rule was mild compared with Persian methods of government. A new trouble was, however, arising. With the advent of Hellenism the religion of Jehovah had to grapple with a more dangerous foe than it had as yet encountered. At first the danger was scarcely realized, but, as milder government made it increasingly possible for Jews to become wealthy, the attractions of Hellenism became more serious.

In the book of Proverbs we have a picture of a fainly well-to-do community, and the warnings against foreign vices here given show the temptations to which the younger Jews especially were exposed.

25. Struggle between Judaism and Hellenism.—When Antiochus the Great became master of Palestine (198 B.C.), the condition of Judaism was outwardly more flourishing than it had been for centuries. The work which Simon the son of Onias had been able to carry out at the Temple (32 B.C.) (see above the end of the 3rd cent. is sufficient proof that there was probably at this time a considerable amount of wealth among loyal Jews. Moreover, there had been a great expansion of Judaism, and Jewish communities were to be found not only in Jerusalem and the almost exclusively Jewish districts of Judea, but also in Galilee and Gilead, as well as among the Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, and Philistines. The poorer Jews, especially in the country districts, were loyal to the Law, but among the wealthier classes, particularly in Jerusalem, the social disadvantages of customs radically opposed to Hellenism were being keenly felt, and there were not a few people who were disposed to live in a way which the Law did not actually imply the abandonment of the Law, at least showed a dangerous inclination to coquet with Hellenism.

It is unnecessary to trace here in detail the whole history of the battle between the two, which was long and arduous. The attempt of Antiochus Epiphanes to make an end of Judaism that attempt marks the greatest and most glorious development in the religion of Israel. Never before had the religion of Jehovah been subjected to so severe a trial; yet it not only stood the test, but emerged from it spiritualized and glorified. At first the resistance of the Hellenizers was passive; martyrdom followed martyrology. Ralhito it had been the received teaching that compassion for sufferers would be given to the righteous before death, but now old theories of retribution, which had, perhaps, been quite recently attacked in the poems of the Psalms, were invoked utterly. The Hellenizers asked, 'Why standest thou so far off, O Jehovah?' and from many a synagogue there went up the cry, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' Those were the days when they found no answer, they were yet loyal. Hunted as they were from place to place, and treated as sheep for the slaughter, they nevertheless continued to meet, and to comfort one another. Lessons for the present distress were found in the words of the prophets whose utterances were now sometimes modified or amplified to suit the situation, sometimes imitated. Several passages in the prophetic books, especially Isaiah, as these have come down to us, show signs of having been composed or adapted during this period of storm and stress.

It is impossible here to tell the story of the Maccabean struggle and of the successes achieved by the Jews, beginning with the celebrated burning of the altar in the Temple on 25th Dec. 165 B.C. and culminating in the granting of autonomy to the Jews under Simon, who was accepted as high priest in 141. The tremendous importance of the religious development during this period has been overlooked, partly owing to preconceived ideas about the history of the Canon and the date of the Septuagint version, but largely owing to the quite correct feeling that the religion of the Psalms and the books of the Prophets is on a far higher plane than that which is found in the books of Maccabees.

Yet, if it be remembered that the Hellenists and the Maccabees were not identical, and that, whereas some of the latter (e.g. Jonathan and Simon) were, despite their personal bravery, stained with vice, of the former the Apostle writes, 'of whom the world was not worthy' (Heb 11), objections to a Maccabean date on this score will have little force.

Happily, the Maccabees were dependent for a time on the help of the Hellenists, and to this cause we may attribute the fact that, in the work of restoration under Simon, the Hellenists appear to have had considerable influence. In Jerusalem and in many synagogues the Scriptures had been burnt, defaced, or defiled, and after the struggle it would probably be necessary to revert to them from tattered and mutilated fragments, the original Scriptures and later compositions based upon them being in many cases indistinguishable. At the same time the synagouge collections of Psalms, which had now become an integral part of the religious life of the people, would be combined for the use of the Temple, and a beginning would thus be made of the last section of the Hebrew Canon.

In the Psalms and in the books of the Prophets, as they finally appear after the Maccabean struggle, we see how great an evolution has taken place in Israel. The crude religion of Israel, as it had existed several hundred years before, has been enriched and purified 'by divers portions and in divers manners.' The crudities often remain, but to a great extent they fail to obtrude themselves, because they too have been made to serve the purpose of a spiritual religion, and only the student of comparative religion recognizes their original nature.

The climax of OT revelation was achieved through the sufferings of the Hellenists. Those sufferings, which had once tried the faith of the best men in Israel almost to breaking, were seen in the final issue not only to have preserved the national life of Israel, but to have established a Church which attracted the best elements of other nations. At last the meaning of martyrdom was made clear, and those who in their suffering for the right had proved themselves to be the true Israel were vindicated. To this Israel, his steadfast servant who had faith to discern His utterance, Jehovah had spoken in no uncertain voice:

'It is too long a thing that thou shouldest be patient unto me, and that I should bear; for the children of Jacob have sinned against me, even my people Israel. They are very wicked; therefore I will speak against them, and multiply them that hate them. A prophet is despised in his own country, and among his own tribe; and whosoever speaketh against him shall be destroyed.'


R. H. KENNETT.
ITALY (ANCIENT).—1. Introductory. The design of this article is limited to recording briefly such features in the religious belief and usage of Ancient Italy during the last six centuries B.C. as are independent, so far as can be ascertained, both of Etruscan and of Roman religion. The materials for such an account are, of course, scanty. They consist mainly of ancient inscriptions or archeological remains from the areas inhabited by tribes not speaking either Etruscan or Greek. Etruscan, combined with what meagre records survive, in Roman and Greek authors, of the customs of those tribes. This record is often still difficult to interpret; and there is always the danger that a particular cult in a particular district (say in the 6th or later centuries B.C.), though wearing all the appearance of native usage, may really have been planted there by either Etruscan or Greek influence. Under these circumstances, the only useful method is to avoid general statements relating to the whole of the peninsula, and to present instead a brief outline of the salient features of each separate tribal area; so that, however limited our progress may be, there will be at least firm ground beneath our feet. By comparison of the details given here with the art, Roman Religion and Etruscan Religion, the reader will easily reach its general conclusions as may at present safely be drawn.  

2. Chronology. The period which is mostly represented by the statements that follow, when no more precise dates are given, is from 400–50 B.C. (or the beginning of the 3rd century from 300–150). After the latter year there were not many parts of Italy in which Latia was not commonly understood and spoken; and after 89 B.C., at the conclusion of the Social War, what remained of the local dialects rapidly died out. So soon as the conquering idiom has established itself in a locality, it becomes difficult to distinguish with certainty the surviving elements of local usage from the predominant influence of Roman custom. The beginning of the record is for most districts safely reckoned at 400 B.C., since (with the possible exception of a few Venetic inscriptions from Padua, and some interesting, but as yet mainly undeciphered, and almost wholly untranslated, inscriptions from the Eastern coast, such as the inscriptions of Catargium and Groselio) there are no dialectal inscriptions referred to any earlier date than 400 B.C., when the knowledge of the Greek–Etruscan alphabet first penetrated the mountain tribes of the centre, through their contact with Greek colonies of the Western coast and with the Etruscans. Nevertheless, it will be found that some of the records come themselves provided with a considerable history, from the analysis of which we can glean not uninteresting particulars of the beliefs of the tribes at a period antecedent to the first Gallic invasion, though in no case earlier than the arrival of the Etruscans. 

3. Tribal areas. For a description of the geographical distribution of the different tribes of Ancient Italy, the reader must be referred to other sources—e.g., the art. 'Italy' in Encycl. of Universal Language and Peoples. It will suffice to enumerate here the following different tribes of whose religious beliefs we have some limited knowledge: (1) the Messapians in the South Eastern peninsula; (2) the Samnites occupying roughly the southern half of the centre of the peninsula; (3) their kinsmen who settled in the Campanian plain between 440 and 400 B.C., overrunning a partlyItalic and partly Etruscan population, and creating the great city of Capua, which they held until it was destroyed in 311 B.C.; (4) their kinsmen to the North—a group of barby mountain-dwelling of whom the Marsians and Pelignians were the most conspicuous; (5) the Sabines, the brothers of the Roman Patricians and the predecessors of the Samnites; (6) the ancient inhabitants of Latium, probably identical with the Plebeians at Rome; (7) the Volsinians, a primitive tribe who occupied the mountains between the Tiber hills behind them, between the Latins and the Campanians; (8) the Umbrian inhabitants of Iugurium, the authors of the famous ignoves Tables; (9) the Veneti in the plains of the North East. This leaves out of account the Bruttii in the extreme South Western peninsula, the Ligurians in the North West (see art. Ligurian Religion), and the Finnic tribes in the East; no very substantial record of the religion of any of these at this period has been as yet discovered. For the usages of the Celtic invaders of Trans-Alpine Gaul, see art. Celts. 

1. Messapians. The scanty and difficult inscriptions that survive from this people (the tribe from which the Latin poet Ennius sprang) no deities have been recognized except such as are familiar on Greek soil; and the only divine name that occurs frequently without hesitation is that of the goddess Aphrodite in a genuine Messapian form (Aprodita), which is fairly good evidence that her worship was established in the locality, though it is not altogether certain that the goddess Damara (Attic Demeter) was also not unknown. According to Festus (p. 181 [ed. C. O. Muller, Leipzig, 1830]), the Jupiter to whom the Messapian Sabini dedicated a horse had the epithet Menaza—a name for which there is more than one possible but no certain etymology. Even Mommsen's careful collection (Unterital. Diath. pp. 35–36) of the evidence from ancient writers contains hardly anything that is of service to students of religion. 

2. The Samnite tribes. The Samnite tribes were in origin identical with the Sabines, and there is little doubt that, like them, they shared many of the beliefs and usages of the Roman official religion. There is no doubt, e.g., that they practised the curious institution of the yx sacrum, by which, under pressure of some public calamity, all the creatures, human and others, born in a particular spring were devoted to the gods, and compelled at a certain age to leave the territory of the rest of the tribe and seek a home elsewhere. Such, according to a well-authenticated report, was the origin of the distinction between the Samnites proper and the Sabines (see, e.g., Festus, p. 326 f., 106 [Müll]). In the intercourse between Romans and Samnites in the Samnite Wars they appear to have well understood the feitual ceremonies practised by the Romans (see Liy, ix, 1–12), and they certainly shared the body of early Italian custom which the Romans originally denoted by the term tim gestum. More definite information about their beliefs is afforded by a well-preserved monument, which has hardly attracted as much notice as it deserves. It is a bronze tablet, now in the British Museum, inscribed on both sides, known as the Tabula Apomnensia, from the name of the modern village (Agnume) near which it was found, and which is near the site of the ancient Boeumum. This tablet enumerates the deities worshipped in a sacred grove or garden, and presents some details of their cult. The text of it is typical of the religion of the most powerful tribe of Italy, and was doubtless written in full. A query in the translation indicates the points at which the meaning of the Oscan is still subject to doubt. It should be explained that the whole grove was sacred to a (presumably feminine) deity called Kore, who certainly stands in some association to the Latin Ceres; and most of the various deities 1 See (5) below.
have an epithet showing their subordination or connexion with a deity.

The following deities are placed in the Garden of Kerres. A statue to the goddess of Gestation (7); to the Good-Humoured god; to the Kerres Nurse; to the Kerres mother; to the goddess Midwife; to the Kerres Wet-Nurse; to the Kerres Korina; to the basket-borne (8) goddess; to the Kerres Nurse; to the Kerres Daeva; to the Kerres Ida; to the Kerres Dardel; to the Kerres Broom; to the Kerres Keeper (9); to the Kerres Ruler; to the Kerres Hercules; to the Kerres Hesperus; to the Kerres Hesperus; to the Kerres Greatness.

On the altar for fire-sacrifice a sacred offering is decreed at every lunar festival.

All the garden the statues are dedicated to the following attendants of Flora. To the Kerres Presentress (i.e. a goddess of sleep); to the Kerres Wet-Nurse; to the Kerres Nurse; to the Kerres Flora; to Father Good-Humour (Mercury).

The remaining altars belong to the garden.

Then follows an enumeration of the deities whose statues have been already mentioned in which Jupiter the Ruler is also called Fias; "outfit" (as son of father); (1) a repetition of the rule for the fire-sacrifice; and, finally, the statement that the garden is dedicated to the Demons (10) (deities of the sacred sites).

It would be out of place to discuss the details of this interesting list; but it will be seen at once that there could hardly be a better illustration of the primitive stage which Wace Fowler has traced in his Religious Experience of the Roman People (London, 1911), p. 117. Side by side with fairly complete persons, such as Jupiter, Hercules, and Ceres, we have a number of shadowy figures representing the different natural operations of importance to the worshippers in an agricultural community, and their connexion with the supreme creative force represented by Kerres is expressed with various faithfulness by the continual repetition of the epithet Kerren.

This town, Boianum, was the chief centre of the Samnites; but no Samnite inscriptions have survived connected with any buildings. An interesting characteristic, however, of a large temple which has been laid bare upon the site (modern Caceltalo, near Pietrabonanto) is that the hill on which it stood slopes towards the E.; and, in order that the worshipper might not have to turn his back upon the E. in addressing the statue of the god, this was placed on the N. side wall of the Cella, similar arrangements being made with the altars outside. The temple presumably belonged to Apollo. One other deity who should be mentioned was called in Samnite form Anagita, better known under her Marso-Latin title of Angitia (see below, § 4).

3. The Campanians. — The inscriptions of the prosperous towns of Pompeii and Herculanenum, which were overwhelmed in A.D. 79, include many which go back to the Osco period, and vouch for the veneration of Apollo, Flora, Venus, and Hercules under their Osco titles of Apollu, Fluna, Herntas, and Herculet. To Hercules, for instance, was dedicated a spacious temple on the confines of Nola and Abella, whose administration formed the subject of a solemn treaty between the two communities (R. S. Conway, Italic Dialects, no. 95).

On the leads of curiae, of which several have been preserved, having been originally put into tombs in order to be conducted by the dead man (who had no connexion with the curse) to another world, we find the deity Kerres with an epithet arentica (supposed to mean "avenging"); and also a euphemistic description of some punitive deities as "the best of maidens" (velatina puellam), who with Kerres are besought to punish the victim of the curse by depriving him of all capacity to undertake any operation of life, as well as by various species of torture (see the curse of Vibia [Conway, no. 130]). Kerres apparently has a "legion" of other spirits under her command; and the object of the curse is to secure some connexion, which, if necessary, will visit the victim from it.

The most interesting phenomenon, however, in

1 The epithet hpaanhedóti would be in Latin form "Hypanthes", and may conceivably mean "that indicates the proper trees to be hewn."
withnesses in classical times, and is still counted the home of witchcraft in Modern Italy (A. de Nino, Ue e costumi abruzzesi, Florence, 1891, passim, esp. vol. vi.).

To discuss the religion of the Sabines would be to examine the most lofty and austere elements of the religion of the primitive Latins at Rome, a system whose foundation truths are derived from the Sabine king Nummi. The Roman writers like Horace, Odes, iii. vii. 38, habitually associate with the Sabine element in the Roman stock the ideals of a simple if somewhat, i.e. in a more fact of joint life. It must suffice here to indicate this important distinction, and the sources in which further account of the evidence can be found.

"As the Spizzano (esp. on 'Ancient History'), 'Sabini,' and 'Volsci' in Etrusco give the considerable linguistic evidence. W. Edgcumbe's 'Who were the Romans?' (Proc. of the Coll. of Antiquaries, 1901, 1908, esp. p. 115), collects the anthropological data, which should be supplemented by the important criticism of Ward-Perkins in the Early History of the Kingship (in the Early History of the Kingship, London, 1906, vol. ii. 140), though his general standpoint (see p. 243) is not very far removed from Edgcumbe's. The traces of descent through the female line in the Roman legends of the kings are collected by J. G. Frazer, in Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship, London, 1898, vol. vii. Julius Caesar (De Bello Gallico, 1898) also maintains Schlegel's view of a racial distinction between the Sabines and the Romans.

Beyond this there is little to say of Sabine religious cults, for the reason that they were practically amalgamated with the Romans at so early a period; the legends ascribe the fusion to the 8th cent. B.C. There have been preserved to us, however, a certain number of divine names and religious terms from the Sabine district, mainly by the Augustan scholar, Varro, who was himself a Sabine. These will be found enumerated in Conway, pp. 353-354.

To the Sabines are specifically assigned by Latin authorities the deities Juno, Quirinus, Mamers (Mars), Minerva, Venus, and more shadowy figures, among which may be mentioned the picturesque name of Frisone, the goddess of wild creatures, who had also a great temple in Etruscan territory, descended by Hannibal in 216 B.C. The Etruscans, who were a half-Etruscanized Sabine community, especially worshipped the goddesses Juno and Minerva, and to the Etruscans is attributed also the curious institution of fire-keeping priests (Hirpi). Mention should be made here of the sacredness of the oak-tree and its connexion in many places with the worship of Jupiter. The evidence for this is collected by A. de Nino (GIE, xvi. (1904) 360 ff.) and of this wide use has been made by J. G. Frazer in his Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship (esp. in sect. viii.). But the criticism of W. Fowler (Religious Experience, p. 23) is not gratuitous.

There is no doubt that the oak had many religious associations in central ancient Italy: but it is not clear whether this belief belonged to the Sabines (Patriarchs) or the Etruscans (the Latin or Plebeian stock), or to both. This question is ignored by Fratres, who attributes it equally to the Latin centre of Areia and to the Sabine Patriarchs. In one interesting passage (in the Books of Ezechures, p. 227) it is not clear from the story, was regarded, with more reverence by the Roman than by the Sabine commander. The Diras, Sabine, is described as the Etruscan champion of the Sabines (p. 230) and of the Sabine side of the tribal division. But there is no evidence in the passage that the oak was connected with any particular god, and it is not to be observed in the light of anything that has accumulated since Cook's paper (see Windy, 'Who were the Romans?').

If, then, that tree is represented with the word meaning 'oak,' it is probably the Sabine rather than that in origin. On Quirinus see, further, Vines, in Nioche.

(6) Ancient Latium. - To attempt to separate the religion of the Plebeian or Latin part or parts of the Roman stock is impossible within the limits of this article. The evidence for their distinction from the Sabines and its already cited; but mention should be made here of the famous cult of the Lake of Nemi near Areia, which was an ancient cult of worship in Latium, and which in historical times was connected with Diane and the Vestal Virgins by whom the worship was properly conducted. There was a curious and very ancient person called Rex Namorissus, who is described by Strabo (V. ii. 12), and also by Ovid, Fasti, who makes him a predecessor of the VestalVirgin.

There seems no reason to doubt that this is a survival of a very primitive religious belonging to, or at least at home in, the Latin stock, and that Frazer's collection of the evidence of the Romans, and the collection which came in the end to be attached to the cult is of fascinating interest, although the political deductions which he would attach to his collection still need confirmation.

(7) The Roman district. - In an inscription (Conway, no. 252) from the Etruscan town of Velu- nium (the birthplace of Augustus), dating from about 300 B.C., whose language shows remarkable affinities to the Umbrian of Ignavium, we read directions as to what is to be done in the case of any profanation of the temple of a deity called Declunia or Decluna; among them it is notable that, in order to repair any injury to the temple, it is specifically permitted, showing that in the ordinary course that metal would be taboo, as to the Flamen of Jupiter at Rome.

(9) The Umbrians. - The most famous monument of ancient Italian religious outside Rome is the Ignavian Tables (sometimes erroneously called Etruscan), which were found in the town of Gubbio in the 19th cent., and are still preserved in its Town Hall. They are seven tables of bronze of varying sizes; all but two are engraved on both sides. They are all written in what is generally called the Umbrian dialect, though in different periods of the language. In the earlier Tables, i.e., the Umbrian alphabet, which is a variety of the Etruscan, is used. The two later Tables, vi and vii, with the last paragraph of Table v, are written in the Latin alphabet of about 100 B.C. All but Tables i and ii can now be interpreted with approximate completeness, and even of iv and v the general sense is tolerably clear. The Tables contain the liturgy of a sacred brooch, the Exfrater ad JEIAID, who in Latin style would be called the Frates Atiedj, together with some administrative resolutions of the same body. Tables vi and vii contain a later and greatly expanded version of the liturgical directions contained in Table i, both alike regulating the solemn curation of the town
of Igviunium and an assembly of the people closely connected with the lustrum. The curse which the pronouncing of the enemies of Igviunium denounced the Etruscans but not the Gauls, and must, therefore, have been first composed well before 400 B.C., when the Gaals appear in both Italy south of the Apennines in great numbers.

The chief item in the expansion is that the prayers which are to be recited by the priests, although the existing copies seem later than II, contain on the whole, the oldest mould of all the seven, give directions for sacrificial to be offered in a particular month to a number of deities: (1) Jupiter, (2) Pomona, with a doleful epitaph (Papilki, a, Ille dedit, us creator, aeternam 15), and (3) Venus, who is associated with Pomona probably as consors, since offerings of a peculiarly feminine character are made to her. Three other deities also receive honour: Terras, who seems to be a goddess of terror; and Portunus and Hula (or Partopitus and Hulus), who are dismissed somewhat briefly. Tursa occurs in one of the supplications as an associate, or originally perhaps merely as a potency, of the masculine deity known as Ceres Marcus. Part of the ritual prescribed in Table III seems to have been the carrying round of the victim in some sort of a cage, though the meaning of this has clauses (10-30) is by no means certain. If this view of the meaning of the ritual is correct, it gives a welcome ground for assuming some historical connexion between the ritual of the Tables and the remarkable ceremony still practised in Gubbio every year on 15th May, the date of the Roman Ambavalia. A full description of this modern and ancient rite with admirable photographs and a discussion of its connexion with the Tables will be found in H. M. Low, The Edition and Procession of the Car at Gubbio (= Publication xxxix, of Folk-Lore Society, London, 1897).

The following paragraph (Tab. Igvi. v. b. 19-38), taken from a manuscript, which may be observed at the Vejan Gate, will illustrate the style of the ritual. The two deities invoked are (1) Grabovis, who is probably the same as the Roman Gradovis, with an epitaph Volo, which probably means 'Eheer of Vovis'; and (2) Terer Jovins, the first title being presumably connected with Gr. τέρας, 'ashes', and Ocean ωτατημι, 'burnt-sacrifice'. For the sake of conciseness, the rendering that follows is given in the 2nd person; but the original is in the 3rd.

*Before the Vejan Gate sacrifice three bulls with white foreheads to Grabovis, the Hearer of Vows, on behalf of the Flaminian hill and the city of Igviunium. Offer the inward parts (2) with the sacrificial knife (3) the sacrificial dish; make offering either with wine or vinegar; offer the corn (4) pray silently. Sacrifice the right foot, libation, and the image of a pig. Make a hollow for the sacred basin; hold it in the left hand (5). The sacred basin is placed at the temple, and at the left foot offer the blood (6) the final offering. Then pray thus over the libation: "Thus I invoke thee, Terer Jovins, the Hearer of Vows, on behalf of the Flaminian hill and the city of Igviunium for the folk (7) to be kind and the hill to the city, to the folk of each. I beseech thee, holy Zeus, trusting in thy assistance, to make the Flaminian hill and the city of Igviunium to be kind to the folk of each. O Terer Son of Jovins, by the might of this offering, whatever fire has broken out (8) in the Flaminian hill, whatever solemn rites have been neglected in the city of Igviunium, or lost, whatever defect there be in thy sacrifice, seen or unseen, O Terer Son of Jovins, in as far as it be lawful, let it be made pure by this sacred purifying image of a pig. Therefore, Son of Jovins, make pure the Flaminian hill and the city of Igviunium. O Terer, Son of Jovins, make pure the folk of each. O Terer, Son of Jovins, keep safe the folk, the nobles, the sacred rites, the persons of men and cattle, and the fruits of the Flaminian hill and the city of Igviunium; make them pure, foster and be kind with thy peace towards the Flaminian hill and the city of Igviunium, and to the folk of each. O Terer, Son of Jovins, keep safe the folk and the city of Igviunium. O Terer, Son of Jovins, keep safe the folk, the nobles, the sacred rites, the persons of men and cattle, and the fruits of the Flaminian hill and the city of Igviunium; make them pure, foster and be kind with thy peace towards them. O Terer, Son of Jovins, thee with this thine own sacred purifying image of a pig on behalf of the Flaminian hill and the city of Igviunium, the folk of each, O Son of Jovins, I beseech thee: in the middle of the prayer, henceforth." It should perhaps be mentioned here that Frazer (op. cit. p. 275) accepts without criticism a tradition recorded in a fragment of Nicomachus Damascenus (Stoichaios, Frag. 343 [1884 ii. 167] to the effect that among the Umbrians, whoever may be meant by that description, the original national combat was regular. In view of (1) the losses with which these peoples were left, (2) the description is used by many Greek writers (see Conway, op. cit. p. 128), (3) the nearness of the Umbrians to the Celts, (4) the absence of any other evidence of such a practice among the Umbrians of Italy proper, the statement cannot be accepted without reservation."

(9) The Veneti.—Of the religion of the Veneti, a people speaking an Indo-European tongue which may be described as midway between Illyrian and Latin, and inhabiting the lower Plain of the Po before and after the invasion of the Gauls, we learn most from the inscriptions, both Venetic and Latin, of the district. From the Latin inscriptions contained in CIL, vol. x., we find a god named Bolconus, occasionally identified with Apollo (e.g., 741). Under the Empire he is often called Augustus (e.g., 2143 and 2144). He was extensively worshipped in the district, and, according to Tertullian (L. i. 2), he was of Norican origin (cf. G. Wissowa, Rel. und Cultus der Romer, p. 297). Another deity who should be mentioned is Bergium, whose name must be connected with the modern town of Berigo (e.g., CIL 4290).

We find here also the same instinct as far south, of worshipping geographical entities: an altar to Loua Hevecus (Ligus deus fortis) and to the Nymphae Augusti and Genius popi (919). These remarks, of course, apply mainly to the Latin period, i.e., after the foundation of the Roman Colony in Aquileia in 184 B.C. The most picturesque figure among the Venetic deities of whom we have knowledge is the goddess known as Rehtis, to whom belonged what must have been a popular cult in the ancient city of Ateste, the modern Este, where an admirable Museum contains the recently excavated traces of her cult (some account of these was given by the present writer to the British Academy, and reported in the Times of 28th July 1908). The name means 'goddess of straightforwardness or rectitude'; but there can be little doubt that she enjoyed the attributes of a goddess of fortune, like the Tuscan Nortia. Among the most popular of the Venetic deities, a temple is a number of long bronze nails of square shape, with inscriptions minutely incised along the sides. Attached to the head of some of the nails are small objects which may be compared with the amulets as representing the wedges of necessity (olim truncationes) which Horace described as borne by the goddess of Fortune (Od. i. xxxvi. 11). The inscriptions are all of the common votive type, and all in the Venetic language, save that the last line, which may be translated, the workmanship of the nail is degraded show also
a mere make-believe inscription—a string of zig-zag lines and crosses, with an occasional letter taking the place of the old formula.

Among the various types of vein-hunting are common: (1) bronze images of race-horses, of which little is left except the heels of their hind feet embedded in the pedestal that bears the inscription, and (2) bronze alphabetic tablets, often confused in the same magical purposes as similar inscriptions found elsewhere in Greece and Italy (see ET RUSCAN RELIGION, § 250).

There is at present no complete edition of the records of the Veuster (see Veuster), and the Veuster, as a rule, has filled with precepts of duty and profit (or the acts (thryta) of princes of men and great-souled men) possesses considerable historical value, as it refers to the "thāsās" the best among the thāsās, i.e. the Mahābhārata (cf., e.g., I. 1, 19, 259, II. 36 [208], III. 35 [244], IV. 9 [259], V. 38 [460], VII. 28 [380]), which, in point of fact, contains all the component elements of the "thāsās" ascribed to Kautiya, Bhamar- and arabhānas included. 1 To the category of the purāṇa may be assigned in this connexion—here the present writer agrees with Jacob—the legendary (cf. the definition Mahābh. i. 1, 2 [864]); to that of the thryta, the historical (cf. the passage cited above, Mahābh. i. 1, 10): to that of the ṛgveda, the prose narratives corresponding to the later ṛgveda and ṛgveda, 1 and to that of the udāravas, the moral inscriptions (cf. the udāravas kathā Mahābh. i. 1, 16), often introduced in the Mahābhārata with the verse already quoted, 'right here they begin,' etc. 2 This collective sense of thāsās probably also explains the variety of designations by which the same work is known, as ṛgvyāna, upapāṭyas, etc. 2

From what has been said it is clear that the "thāsās" were at first but one of the various possible and actually occurring forms of literary composition. The Mahābhārata itself is described as the most excellent of the thāsās (i. 268 [259], etc.). Moreover, there are positive grounds for believing that in ancient India there existed a collection of thāsās under the title of Ithāsā, or Ithāvasāsā.

In the pūrnikās ṛgvedas, a ten-days' cycle of ritual belonging to the udāravas (p. 2, 2), and repeated throughout the entire year in which the sacrificial horse was permitted to roam at large, every day a particular class of thāsās was performed, and to this class of thāsās the thāsās of the Mahābhārata (cf. i. 1, 17) are often referred; 2 and a hymn from the Rgveda was recited; and on the 2nd day there were given, in the respective parts, Yama Vaiṣṇava, the pātrīs, and a chapter of the Vajrasātra; on the 3rd day, Vāruṇa Aditya, the Gandharvas, and a purāṇa of the Atriya; 3 on the 4th day, Soma Vaiṣṇava, the Apsaras, and a purāṇa of the Agni; 4 on the 5th day, Ardhā- or Rādha-rāṣṭī, the serpent-serpents, and a purāṇa of the Pūrṇamadī; 5 on the 6th day, Kumāra Yājñavalkya, the Rākṣas, and a purāṇa of the Dāsanavamī; 6 on the 7th day, Aśva Dhāvanī, the Asuras, and a purāṇa of the Pūrṇa; 7 on the 8th day, Mahā-Hanumā, the Asuras, and a purāṇa of the Mahā-Bhārata; 8 and on the 9th day, Daiva, a purāṇa of the Mahā-Nāyika; 9 and a purāṇa of the Pūrṇa, and a samyutā of the Atriya; on the 10th day, Daiva Indra, and a purāṇa of the Dāsanavamī; 10 on the 11th day, Daiva Indra, and a purāṇa of the Mahā-Bhārata; and, finally, on the 12th day, Śaivismā, and a purāṇa of the Apsara.

Here, accordingly, we have the following series: Pañca, Yajñīṣṭha, Atriya, Apsaraṇa, Śrīvāsa, Pūrṇa, Parivraja, and Pārvatī. 11

In these ancient lists thāsās is always found side by side with purāṇa; sometimes, indeed, the two are joined together to form a dāśpurva (dual compound), and it is impossible, in view of the above remarks, to doubt their close relationship and affinity. The present writer has, in fact, noted in Vedic texts only a single occurrence of each

1 Of Jacob, op. cit., p. 909.
2 Stories about women, perhaps; cf. Sieg, l.c., p. 32.
3 Of Sieg, l.c., p. 32. Many of these terms may, of course, mean no more than "story," and, in particular, with ṛgveda; but with reference to the Mahābhārata it should be indicated that they work spoken of as stories (e.g., i. 1, 10 [245] also as stories or "rules"); much more especially in i. 1, 18 (208) it is called upamānas purāṇa ("last or eldest purāṇa").
5 So at least the present writer interprets the description given in S. R. xiv. 3. 2 ff., Śāhāk. Sr. S. xv. 11 ff.
unaccompanied by the other, viz. itihāsa in Śātaṃkara, xi. i. 6, 9, and purāṇa in Ahattaravada, xi. vii. 24. It is also of importance to note the position which the two terms occupy in the lists. It will be seen that in most cases they come immediately after the four Vedas, and it is, therefore, by no means surprising that in Chāndog. U. (vii. i. 2 and iv. 1, vii. 1) the Itihāsapuruṣa is actually spoken of as the fifth Veda (iḥtiḥsapuruṣaḥ pūrṇaḥ ca veṇuṇāḥ vedah).

To these indisputable evidences from Vedic texts, conclusively attesting the existence of a collection of itihāsas, or purāṇas, entitled Iktihāsa or Purāṇa and reckoned among the Vedas, there has been recently added a most significant datum in the discovery of Kautiya's Artihāśaka, which shows that this Itihāsapuruṣa was still extant about the beginning of the 3rd century B.C.

The relevant passage is i. 7 (2 R.): "The triad Śāna, Rg and Yajur Vedas, the Ahattaravada, and the Itihāsapuruṣa (or Vedas, V) in this connection we may call attention also to a passage in the introduction of the Mahābhārata, vi. 12. 2 (cf. Kielhorn, Bombay, 1889): 'The four Vedas with their ancillary literature and esoteric portions (śāstra) are divided in many ways...' the dialogue, the itihāsas, "the purāṇas," the ṛṣi, the mythological story of the ādityas," as also to the terms itihāsa and purāṇa applied respectively to those who knew or studied the Itihāsas or the Purāṇas.

Curiously enough, we find that in the Itihāsapuruṣa por excellence, i.e. the Mahābhārata, the title of the fifth Veda is given to Ākhyāna, while the Mahābhārata itself became the representative of this fifth Veda; cf., e.g., III. vii. 9 (1227): 'all four Vedas, and Ākhyāna as the fifth,' and X. vii. 21 (1257): 'the Vedas...the Mahābhārata is the fifth Veda.' Nevertheless, we also find in the Mahābhārata numerous references to Itihāsas and Purāṇas as ancient works that were studied together with the Vedas.

The number of such passages, which, of course, are far from having all the same historical value, the Mahābhārata in its present shape having been a growth of centuries—might easily be increased; but they are quite sufficient to show that the ancient Itihāsa or Itihāsapuruṣa has left distinct traces of its existence in the great epic. The Mahābhārata, in fact, must very gradually have come to the place of that fifth Veda, and the process may quite readily be explained by the assumption that the Itihāsapuruṣa literature was to a large extent incorporated by degrees in the epic. The source of these stories is often shown by the terms itihāsa, purāṇa, itihāsapuruṣa, and the like.

We must now ask what connexion exists between the extensive Purāṇa literature still extant and the ancient Purāṇa science. We must obviously assume that the ancient Purāṇa was the precursor of the later literary group bearing the same name, and that much of its subject-matter has been preserved in the Purāṇas known to us. The latter assumption will be especially valid in the case of those passages in which the Purāṇas agree more or less verbally with one another, or with the Mahābhārata, and will probably also of those in which the lokasarga (charioteers) belonging, according to ancient tradition, to the Purāṇas find expression in the extant Purāṇas. This occurs very sel-

dom, however, for the chief characteristic of these Purāṇas is their sectarian spirit, and they were certainly absent from the ancient Purāṇa.

The present writer is of opinion that remains of the ancient Itihāsapuruṣa can be traced elsewhere in Śrīkānatas literature. Materials derived from that collection must be recognized above all in the myths and legends of the Brahmānas, especially in such as occur in the Arthavada (explanatory) parts and are distinguished by form and matter alike from the general context; but the group is also recognized also in the shorter mythological-historical additions of the Brahmānas designed to explain them.

From Yāska's Nārikaś we learn that there was a Vedic school known as the Athithāśikas—so named because its members made use of 'the Itihāsas' in expounding the mantras; and to certain mantras (or sūtra) Yāska attaches short narrative supplements which he designates itihāsas or ākhyānas. Alike in their subject-matter and in the formulae with which they are introduced, these remind us of all the additions to the Brahmānas just mentioned. Such Itihāsas are found, further, in the Bhadda-devata, in the Amsāramānas to the Rigveda, and in the medieval commentaries—e.g., those of Dārāmāya, Durgā, Śāgadharṣikā, and especially Śāyana. Even these relatively modern texts contain several Itihāsas, and, as the present writer believes, do really preserve, ancient traditions, for it was an established principle in the exegesis of the mantras that the itihāsas (primal cause, basis) of this kind of itihāsas must be taught first in order to bring out the meaning, and that the verbal explanation could be entered upon only after that had been done.

It is, however, quite another question whether the writers of the Brahmānas and the exegeses of the Veda made a right use of the itihāsas, and whether, above all, they applied them at the proper places, in the exposition of mantras. The present writer is of opinion that the question can be answered only with reference to each individual case. He now holds the view that the ancient Itihāsapuruṣa was an independent collection of legends and stories not especially connected with any particular Veda. Even on the hypothesis that there was a general correspondence between Itihāsas and Veda with respect to mythological views and to mythical and legendary ideas; the Itihāsapuruṣa might still differ very essentially in form from the same sagas in Vedic mantras, and in particular, therefore, from those in the Rigveda. In such cases the employment of an itihāsa in the exposition of the mantras could easily prove a dangerous procedure.

We may here refer, by way of illustration, to the two specially prominent cases. The story of Suṣumna, which the text had to relate to the king at the Bālāyāna, is quite appropriately introduced into the Brahmānas of the Rigveda, since it formed the arthavada for the śākhās. The legend of Śoma was also used in the Bālāyāna, but the Brahmānas writer certainly erred in interweaving this saga with all the songs of the Rigveda which are ascribed to Suṣumna.

1 Itihāsikā, p. 445ff.; Sieg. I. 54.
2 Itihāsikā, I. 18ff.
3 Itihāsikā, I. 18ff.
4 The well-known verse in Vīdūṣa, Dharm. xxvii. 6, Mahābh., x. 107 (260), Vīpak Puras, I. 107 (260), is that is to say, for the Isa-āśramas should supplement the Veda; the Veda teaches a man with scanty [learned] heart, lest "this may injure me"; cf. Sieg. I. 13ff.
5 Sieg. I. 18ff.
6 Itihāsikā, p. 59ff.
7 Itihāsikā, p. 16ff.; and "Aber die Echteit des Kautiyas" in Kautiṃyakośa, x. 18ff.
8 Itihāsikā, p. 16ff.
9 Itihāsikā, p. 16ff.
10 Itihāsikā, p. 16ff.
11 Itihāsikā, p. 16ff.
12 Itihāsikā, p. 16ff.
13 Itihāsikā, p. 16ff.
14 Itihāsikā, p. 16ff.
since the story of Súrya's being bound to and delivered from the sacrificial stake is only very briefly alluded to in the Rigveda (x, xxiv, 12-13, v. 7).

the story of Prárrúvasa and Urvasi \(^{1}\) is quite appropriately given in the Samhitás (cf. Satap. x. v. 1; Kāthās. x. vii. 10. Māntra, v. iii. 10) as the artharándha for the use of special fire-sticks in the Agnásatár, but the legend fits here only if the speaker--who represents the lovers--has a consolatory ending. According to the version of the story in the Rigveda (x. xxiv.), the dialogue ended tragically, and here the Sáhásra-príti writer took the proper course of utilizing the Rigveda strophes only so far as they fitted in with his śrīkāta, and discarding the rest.\(^{2}\)

It may be observed, finally, that the connexion between the Vedic sūkta and the itikātra is still a subject of dispute in Vedic philology. E. Windisch (Vorhandl. der dtsd. akad. d. Wiss. Phil. v. Ges. rij. W. 1880, p. 11) has advanced the conjecture that the song of Prárrúvasa and Urvasi (Rig. x. xxiv.) has a poetical origin from its original narrative context. This idea was further developed by H. Oldenberg,\(^{3}\) who advocated the theory that a number of Rigveda hymns actually postulated a prose narrative as the connecting medium of the metrical parts, and that such must be recognized as a popular type of story in ancient India—the type in which verses were set in a prose framework in favourite passages of a work, and especially in passages of adoring speeches, and the rejoinders to them. For the systematic transmission of such a narrative—Oldenberg calls it abhikṣandh—on the example of the Samhāprākāsa abhikṣandh, he holds, to teach and learn the verse parts only, while the prose matrix, the language of which had never been fixed, suffered numerous changes at the hands of successive generations of narrators, or else was lost altogether.\(^{4}\) In particular, the prose context which later tradition supplies for the abhikṣandh hymns of the Rigveda is, according to Oldenberg, mere drivel—not genuine tradition at all, but at most worthless gauś-tradition. Oldenberg believes that the Laksanabhaṣya has long enjoyed an all but universal acceptance. Pischel, Geldner, and the present writer have all expressed their agreement with it, except that, in contrast to Oldenberg, they have strenuously insisted upon the value of the Indian itikātra tradition for the Rigveda.

On the other hand, S. Lévi\(^{5}\) asserts that the majority of the dialogue hymns in the Rigveda are so lucid in their verse that they cannot have required a story to link the single strophes together; the mere reading of them calls up some sort of dramatic scene. As a matter of fact, Max Müller had thought of a dramatic connection in connexion with Rig. i. 16.\(^{1}\)

Independently of both, J. Hertel\(^{6}\) has rejected the abhikṣandh theory; he regards all the samhāprākāsa hymns of the Rigveda as dramatic responsive songs, which were performed occasionally at sacrificial festivals, and he conjectures that we have in these the garris of the Indian drama. L. von Schroeder\(^{7}\) takes the further step of explaining all these hymns as ritual dramas.

Winternitz\(^{8}\) adopts a middle course between the two views, advocating the theory that the dialogue songs of the Rigveda are not all to be explained in the same way. Some of them, he holds, are ballads, in which everything is told in versified speeches, and for which a prose introduction was necessary only in certain cases; some are poetical fragments of narrative composed partly of verse and partly of a prose element that has not survived; while others are to be regarded as strophes belonging to ritual dramas.\(^{9}\)

A. B. Keith argues that it is impossible to obtain really cogent evidence for either of the theories.\(^{10}\) He says that in the ancient Vedic literature there is no trace whatever of the knowledge of such a prose-poetic abhikṣandh as Oldenberg's theory requires,\(^{11}\) but there is likewise no trace of a knowledge of dramatic responsive songs at sacrificial feasts, or of the ritual drama. He further observes that the hypotheses of Hertel and von Schroeder sound, both types would certainly occur in the ritual texts of the Vedas. Keith's conclusion, accordingly, is that no explanation yields a solution in all respects satisfactory has as yet been discovered.

The last word on the subject, so far, has been spoken by K. F. Geldner,\(^{12}\) who, thus coming near to Hertel's views, has tried to solve the problem by regarding the hymns in question as ballads in the wider sense in which Goethe has defined the ballad. These ballads require no connecting prose, but explain themselves, as the subject used by the poet is not a free invention, but is taken from some well-known myth. Geldner's hypothesis is most attractive, as it allows the explanation of the hymns without calling for connecting prose that, in fact, does not exist. Little, however, is changed by it as regards the chief interesting point in this connexion. For these ballads, like a great number of the Rigvedic māntras, are to be understood only by one who knows the old myths, i.e. the old itikātras, from which their theme is taken.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the course of the article. E. Sidg.

I-TSING.—See under YUAN CHWANG.

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JACOBITES.—See NESTORIANS.

**JAGANNÁTH**, v.i. JUGGERNAUT (H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, **Boson—Jujwab**, 496 ff.); Skr. Jagāntā, 'lord of the world,' an epithet of **Visnú** and **Krṣṇa**; the name is 'really nothing but a misapplied ancient epithet, the Pāli Lokanātha of the great thinker and reformer of India.'

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2. J. Hertel's proposal (WZKM xxvii. [1909] 340) to delete the strophe Rig. x. xxiv. 16 in Satap. x. v. 1, 10 as an interpolation seems to the present writer a happy one.
8. But see also pp. 407 ff. for the edition of the 'Abhikṣandh' by Keith, for whom the present with Oldenberg in regarding as 'strange rubbish,' as 'bugger,' and of no traditional value (J.R.A.S. 1911, p. 407 ff.; 1912, p. 407 ff.);

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The present temple was built about A.D. 1100 by Ananta Chodagangā (1076-1147), the most notable king of the E. Ganga dynasty of Kalinga (V. A. Smith, Early Hindu, London, 1906, p. 423). It stands in a square enclosure about 120 feet on each side; the stone is grey and white, and broad, the interior being carefully guarded from profane intrusion by a massive stone wall, 20 ft. high. Within the enclosure stand about 120 temples, including, besides those dedicated to Vaiṣṇava cult, some 13 dedicated to Siva, and several to his consort, thus illustrating the eclecticism of modern Hinduism. The central tower of Jagannath's temple rises to a height of 192 ft., and is surmounted by the mystical wheel (chakra) and flag (dhwaja) of Vaiṣṇava. It contains four chambers: a hall of offerings, where the harka and oblations are made; a storehouse, where the daily offerings are kept; an audience hall, where the image of the god is carried in procession; and a temple shrine, where the image of the god is kept. The temple is in a triple form, representing Jagannath, Balabhadra, and Subhadra. The theory that this triple image is a representation of the three forms of the Buddha, Triratna—Buddha, the Law (Dharma), and the Congregation (Sangha)—is due to A. Cunningham (The Temples of Bharat, London, 1879, p. 112; cf. P. Ray, Jātaka, and Sripaṭa, no. 190, p. 24 n. 6.). It has been connected with other authorities by the tritāla, or trident symbol (G. d’Alberti, The Migration of Symbols, Westminster, 1891). Padhod, however, remarks: "The Three Holy Ones" are action, if ever, concretely presented in Tōtō by Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha; nor have I found such a triad figured in Indian Buddhism, although many writers have alleged the existence of them, without however bringing forward any proof (Buddhism of Tōtō, London, 1890, p. 107; cf. A. Oldfield, Sketches from Nepal, 1820, p. 145 n., with a drawing of the Triratna).

The legends indicate that, under Buddhist and Hindu rule, the rule of the gods has been adapted to the Vaiṣṇava cult. In the East, a lower priesthood of a minor cast has been adopted to Vaiṣṇava. On one occasion, a young priest was sent, as a slave, to the king, and, when the priest arrived, the king, who was a Vaiṣṇava, was pleased to see the image of the god, the image of the god was put in the temple, and the priest was appointed as a priest. The priest was pleased with the image of the god, and the king was pleased with the priest. The priest was pleased with the king, and the king was pleased with the priest. The priest was pleased with the priest, and the king was pleased with the priest. The priest was pleased with the priest, and the king was pleased with the priest. The priest was pleased with the priest, and the king was pleased with the priest. The priest was pleased with the priest, and the king was pleased with the priest. The priest was pleased with the priest, and the king was pleased with the priest.

In a closely-packed eagerness of a hundred thousand men and women, many of these uncombecd to expense or hard labour, and all of them tugging and straining to the utmost under the blazing tropical sun, deaths must occasionally occur. There have, indeed, been instances of pilgrims throwing themselves under the wheels of a frenzy of religious excitement. But such instances have always been rare, and are now unknown. At one time several unhappy people were killed or injured every year, but they were almost invariably cases of accidental trampling. The few suicides that did occur were for the most part cases of diseased and miserable objects who took this means to put themselves out of pain. The official returns now place this beyond doubt. Indeed, nothing could be more opposed to the spirit of Viṣṇu-worship than self-destruction.

The sanctified death within the temple renders the whole place unclean. The ritual suddenly stops, and the poluted offerings are hurried, which is a sight of the sacred spot (Hunting, 1. 13.3.).

The last and most impure castes are never excluded from the sanctified death within the temple, and the customs regarding the consecrated food (maha-prasāda) are remarkable. This is properly the food cooked for deity or dedicated to the images. The local belief as the god Kahetra (Khetra mahāśraya) is that it is prepared by the goddess, Mahā Lākṣmi, who gives prosperity. She who eats it is absolved from the four cardinal sins of the Hindu faith: killing a living being, taking what is not given, adultery, and committing adultery with a female of a Guru or spiritual
JAINISM — See Israel.

JAINISM. — I. Introductory. — Jainism is a monastic religion which, like Buddhism, denies the authority of the Veda, and is therefore regarded by the Brahmanas as heretical. The Jain church consists of the monastic order and the lay community. It is divided into two rival sections, the Svetambaras, or ‘White-robbed,’ and the Digambaras, or ‘Sky-clad;’ they are so called because the monks of the Svetambaras wear white clothes, and those of the Digambaras originally went about stark naked, until the Muhammadans forced them to cover their virilities. The dogmatic differences between the two sections are rather trivial (see art. DIGAMBARA); they differ more in conduct, as will be noticed in the course of the article.

The interest of Jainism to the student of religion consists in the fact that it goes back to a very early period, and to primitive currents of religions and metaphysical speculation, which gave rise also to the oldest Indian philosophies—Sankhya and Yoga (q.v.). — Jainism, like Buddhism, marks an early stage in the theoretical pessimism of these systems, as also in their practical ideal—liberation. Life in the world, permeated by the transmigration of the soul, is necessarily in this world painful; therefore it must be our aim to put an end to the Cycle of Births and this end will be accomplished when we come into possession of right knowledge. In this general agreement with Buddhism, Sankhya, Yoga, and Buddhism; but they differ in their methods of realizing it. In metaphysics there is some general likeness between Sankhya and Yoga on the one hand, and Jainism on the other. For in these systems a dualism is acknowledged and the main premiss, without a proper feeling of reverence' (A. Sterling, Buddhism, p. 193).

Hence there is at Puri a temporary suspension of the rigid tabu which controls the use of food which is not cooked in the regular way, and all cannot thus taste of the food with impunity. Nowadays the priests impress upon the pilgrims the impropriety of dressing food within the holy limits, and provide them from the temple kitchen. The food, sacred that none can be thrown away, and it is only consumed in a state of purity, with the natural result that it causes danger to the public health. It has been suggested that the licence in the use of food at Puri, Pandharupur, and other holy places is due to the spirit-sense power of the god and his holy place; but the fact of its dedication sufficiently explains the feeling regarding it (BG xx. (1884) 474). Even among a tribe like the Kamlus (q.v.), friendship is sworn on the holy rice from Puri (Thurston, ill. 409).

In 1890 a remarkable attempt was made by a party of fanatics from Sambalpur, known as the Adavutis, who cut off the heads, they wear only ropes made of the leaves (pati) of the Kamalk tree (Gmelinoloma gossypium), to destroy the images. In the affray one of the fanatics was killed (L. L. S. O’Neill, Sambalpur Gaz., Nagpur, 1899, l. 60 ff.).


W. Crooke.

JAHWEH. — See Israel.

1 The Sankhyas endeavoured to explain, from their dualistic principles, purus and purusha, the development of the material world as well as that of living beings; the Jains, however, are almost exclusively concerned with the latter, and declare that the cause of the material world and of the structure of the universe is ahambhut, 'primordial disposition' (Tattvottarika-prakriti). Sankhya, probably based on cosmogonic theories contained in the Brahmanas and some of the Upanishads. But Jainism was, in the first place, a religion, and developed a philosophy of its own in order to make this religion a self-consistent system.

2 The Sankhya principle mahatmā, the primary substance, is divided into three parts: a. are admitted that, with the exception of Yoga, all these systems are essentially atheistic, i.e., they do not admit of an absolute Supreme God; even in Yoga the divinity is not the first and only object of everything existent. Their fundamental theological observances, in accord with cosmic law, their division of living beings, especially the elementary lives, are not found in Buddhism.

preserved in the canonical books of the Jains about Mahāvīra. His becoming a monk, and, some 12 years later, his attainment of omniscience (kevala), are, of course, celebrated events. But tradition is silent about his motives for renouncing the world, and about the particular truths whose discovery led to his exalted position. At any rate, Mahāvīra is not described by tradition as having first become a disciple of teachers whose doctrines afterwards failed to satisfy him, as we are told of Buddha; he seems to have had no misgivings, and to have known where truth was to be had,1 and thus he became a Jain monk. And again, when, after many years of austeries such as are practised by other ascetics of the Jains, he reached omniscience, we are not given to understand that he found any new truth, or a new revelation, as Buddha is said to have received; nor is any particular doctrine or philosophical principle mentioned the knowledge and insight of which then occurred to him for the first time. But he is represented as gaining, at his kevala, perfect knowledge of what he knew before in part and imperfectly. Thus Mahāvīra appears in the tradition of his own sect as one who, from the beginning, had followed a religion established long ago; had been more, had he been a monarch, no other prophet, ever engage to exalt a prophet, would not have totally repressed his claims to reverence as such. Nor do Buddhist traditions indicate that the Niganthas owed their origin to Nātapatta; they simply speak of the Mahāvīra of the time, and of the religion at the time of Buddha. We cannot, therefore, without doing violence to tradition, declare Mahāvīra to be the founder of Jainism. But he is without doubt the last prophet of the three great prophets of the last Tirthankaras. His predecessor, Pārvā, the last Tirthankara but one, seems to have better claims to the title of founder of Jainism. His death is placed at the reasonable interval of 200 years before that of Mahāvīra, while Pārvā’s predecessor Atriṣānami is stated to have died 84,000 years before Mahāvīra’s Nirvāṇa. Followers of Pārvā are mentioned in the canonical books; and a legend in the Uttarāmārgaṇa stotra xxvii. relates a meeting between a disciple of Pārvā and a disciple of Mahāvīra which brought about the union of the old branch of the Jain church and the new one.2 This seems to indicate that Pārvā was a real prophet of a sort; but in the absence of historic documents we cannot venture to go beyond a conjecture.

2. Jain view of their origin, etc. According to the Jains themselves, Jain religion is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again, in every one of the endless succeeding periods of the world, by innumerable Tirthankaras. In the present antarṣaṃśa period (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Indian], vol. i. p. 200 f.), the first Tirthankara was Rājaba, and the last, the 24th, was Vardhanamāna. The names, sīgas, and colours of the 24 Tirthankaras were as follows:

1. Rājaba (or Vṛṣṇa), bull, golden; 2. Aja, elephant, golden; 3. Sambhava, horse, golden; 4. Abhivama, ape, green; 5. Sunyavatana, monkey, yellow; 6. Umapati, parrot, red; 7. Suvajra, the scorpion, golden; 8. Chadrameru, monkey, white; 9. Svarāj (or Pajavanāra), dolphin, white; 10. Kṛttivaśa (or Jhūmā), lion, yellow; 11. Sreyēśa (or Arjuna), rhinoceros, golden; 12. Vasiṣtha, buffalo, red; 13. Vinoba, hog, golden; 14. Amaśaka (or Aḍapati), baboon, golden; 15. Dharma, thunderbolt, golden; 16. Śūbhata, mother-jaguar, golden; 17. Kusuma, goat, golden; 18. Arti, the māyāyaka, golden; 19. Malli, jar, blue; 20. Suvratā (or Muniśvaratā), tortoise, black; 21. Nami, blue lines; 22. Mahāmuni, conch shell; black; 23. Pārvā, snake, blue; 24. Vardhanamāna, lion, golden. All these names, sīgas, and colours of the Tirthankaras are recorded in the Śvetāmbara system; in the Digambara system, all are gold, except Nami and Nami who became the Haritvarṇa, the remaining 22 to the ākyuvara race. Malli was a woman, according to the Śvetāmbaras; but this the Digambaras do not believe; also, they cannot be expressed in definite numbers of years, but are given in jyotis-panchas and jyotis-prakūpo, the last being the time of one kosa of ālayagrāma. The length of the life and the height of the Tirthankaras is in proportion to the length of the interval (see art. Āyu or the Vara [Indian]). These particulars are here given according to the Śvetāmbara.

In connection with these times of the mythological history of the Jains, it may be added that they relate the legends of 11 universal monarchs (Chakravartīs), of 18 Vaisvēnas, 9 Baladevas, and 9 Pārvatīs (or Pragjñās) who lived within the period from the first to the 22nd Tirthankara. Together with the 24 Tirthankaras they are the 53 great personages of Jain history; the legends of their lives form the subject of a great epic work by Hemachandra—the Pravṛttigrūpaṇākhyāna (P. 7th cent.)—probably the Vāmadevañi (edited in Bāvanagar, 1906-09, by the Jainināraṣaṇasakhaṇḍa.)

All Tirthankaras have reached Nirvāṇa at their death. Though, however, released from the world, they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, they have nevertheless become the object of worship and are regarded as the gods.' (devo) by the Jains (see art. ATIJNISME [Jain], vol. ii. p. 180 f.); temples are erected to them where their idols are worshipped.3 The favourite Tirthankaras are the first and the three last ones, but temples of the remainder are also met with. The worship of the idols of the Tirthankaras is already mentioned in some canonical books, but no rules for their worship are given; it was, however, already in full vigour in the centuries of our era, as evidenced by the Paśu- mahārjinni, the oldest Prakrit āgacija of the Jains, and by the statues of Tirthankaras found in ancient sites —e.g., in the Kankāli mound at Mathura which belongs to this period.4 Some sects, especially a rather recent section of the Śvetāmbaras, the Dhumārā or Śāhānātavāsā, reject this kind of worship altogether.

It goes without saying that the Tirthankaras, except the two last, belong to mythology rather than to history; the 22nd, Atriṣānami, is connected with the legend of Kṛṣṇa as his relative. But the details of Mahāvīra’s life as related in the several Jaina canonical books may be regarded on the whole as historic facts.

He was a Kṣatriya of the Pāṇḍa line and a native of Kūrama, a suburb of the town Vaiśali (the modern Bārāthi, some 57 miles north of Patna). He was the second son of the Keśapīya Sātradhāra and Trilāka, a highly connected lady. The Śvetāmbaras maintain, and thus it is stated in the Ādharānyā vīrā, the Kulpārṣiṇi, etc., that the soul of the Tirthankara first descended into the womb of the Brahmāni Devānandā, and, by the will of Indra, removed thence to the womb of Trilāka. But the Digambaras reject this story. His parents, 3 For images and idols of the Jains see J. Burgess, ‘Digambara Jain Iconography,’ JA xxxiii (1903) 493 ff.; G. Bühler, ‘Spectra of Jaina Bhūtajñaputra, Mathura: A Reproduction from I. l. [1904] 311 ff.; J. Ferguson and J. Burgess, Cave Temples, London, 1880, p. 497 ff.
4 Some kind of worship, however, seems to be implied by the usual times of the monthing of the various cheṣas (diptas), or shrines, in the sacred books. These shrines were originally in gardens in which Mahāvīra resided during his visits to the towns to which they belonged. Cf. Horne, Ucchāsāṅgadā, tr. p. 2, E. 4, p. 4.
5 R. and R. E. 511 f.
6 See ‘Notes on the Non-Adulterous Svetambar Jains,’ by ‘Skeers.’ 1911; and Margaret Stevenson, Notes on Modern Jainism, p. 111.
7 Kuppyaganva and Pipiyaganva, both suburbs of Vesālī, have been identified by Horne from the ancient texts, p. 8 with the modern villages Bāliya and Jāmān, etc. on the Swatambaru R. 8 Of the transfer of the embols of Baladeva from the womb of Rohini to that of Derakvi, whence he got the name Sankarpāla, still retaining the monastic laylaya.
even afterwards, they have undergone many alterations—transposition of parts, additions, etc.—traces of which can still be pointed out. Along with these alterations there seems to have grown a gradual change of the language in which the texts were composed. The original language, according to the Jains, was Ardhamagadhi, and they give that name, or Mağadhi, to the language in which the texts. But it has, most probably, been modernised during the process of oral transmission. The older parts of the canon contain many archaic forms for which in later texts distinct Mahâbhârata idioms are substituted. It will be best to call the language of the sacred texts simply Jain Prâkrit, and that of later works Jain Mâhârâṣṭri.

As the works belonging to the canon are of different origin and age, some are in prose, some in mixed prose and verse. Frequently a work consists of disparate parts put together when the redaction of the canon took place. The later prose works are generally very diffuse and contain endless repetitions; some, however, contain succinct rules, some, besides lengthy descriptories, systematic expositions of various dogmatic questions; in others, again, the systematic order generally prevails throughout. A large literature of glosses and commentaries has grown up round the more important parts of the canon. A body of literary and the commentaries belonging to it, the Jainas possess several separate works, in close material agreement with the former, which contain systematic expositions of their faith, or parts of it, in Prâkrit and Sanskrit. These works were generally possess the advantage of accuracy and clearness, have in their turn become the object of learned labours of commentators. One of the oldest is Umasâvâti's Tattvarâddhakâtyâgama, a Śvetâmbara canon, which, however, is also claimed by the Digambaras. A sort of encyclopedia of Jainism is the Antakâsalamās-paṭākā, a Digambara work, which, however, is also claimed by the Digambaras.

The redaction of the canon took place under Devardhârâ in 880 after the Nirvâna (A.D. 454), according to the common redaction, actually perhaps 60 years later; before that the sacred texts were handed down without embodying them in written books. In the interval between the composition and the final redaction of the texts, even afterwards, they have undergone many alterations—transposition of parts, additions, etc.—traces of which can still be pointed out. Along with these alterations there seems to have grown a gradual change of the language in which the texts were composed. The original language, according to the Jains, was Ardhamagadhi, and they give that name, or Mağadhi, to the language in which the texts. But it has, most probably, been modernised during the process of oral transmission. The older parts of the canon contain many archaic forms for which in later texts distinct Mahâbhârata idioms are substituted. It will be best to call the language of the sacred texts simply Jain Prâkrit, and that of later works Jain Mâhârâṣṭri.

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production, continuation, and destruction. This theory they call the theory of the Indefiniteness of Being. It comes to this: existing things are permanent only as regards their substance, but their accidents or qualities originate and perish. To explain: any material thing contains three elements or qualities; if we add to this; this matter, however, may assume any shape and quality. Thus, clay as substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay, or its colour, may come into existence and pass out of the existence. Buddhist Brahmical speculations are concerned with transcendental Being, while the Jain view deals with Being as given in common experience. The doctrine of the Indefiniteness of Being is upheld by a very strange dialectical method called Syādvedāda, to which the Jains attach so much importance that this name frequently is used as a synonym for the Jain system itself. According to this doctrine of Syādvedāda, there are 7 forms of metaphysical propositions, and all contain the word syāt, e.g. syād asti sarvān, syād nāsti sarvān. Syāt means 'may be,' and is explained by kathāchārī, which is in this connexion may be translated 'somehow.' The word syāt here signifies the word asti, and indicates the Indefiniteness of Being (or astistvam). For example, we say a jar is somehow, i.e. it exists, if we mean thereby that it may exist or not; we do not say it not exist somehow, if we mean that it exists as a cloth or the like. The purpose of these seeming truisms is to guard against the assumption of the Vedantists that Being is one with the same in all things. Thus we have the correlative predicates 'is' (asti) and 'is not' (nāsti). A third predicate is 'inexpressible' (anuvakayya); for existent and non-existent (asti and nāsti) belong to the same thing at the same time, and such a co-existence of mutually contradictory attributes cannot be expressed by any word in the language. The three predicates variously combined make up the 7 propositions, or asaptā dhānaṅga, of the Syādvedāda.

Supplementary to the doctrine of the Syādvedāda, and, in a way, the logical complement to it, is the doctrine of the nayās. The nayás are ways of expressing the nature of things; all these ways of judgment according to the Jains, are one-sided, and they contain but a part of the truth. There are 7 nayás, 4 referring to concepts, and 3 to words. The reason for the statement is that Being is not simple, as the Vedantists contend, but is of a complicated nature; therefore every statement and every denotation of a thing is necessarily incomplete and one-sided; and, if we follow one way only of expressing or of viewing things, we are bound to go astray. Hence it is usual in explaining notions to state what the thing under discussion is with reference to substance, place, time, and state of being.

(b) Metaphysics. — All things, i.e. substances (dvāraya), are divided into lifeless things (saṅkhyā-s) and lives or souls (jīva-s). The former are again divided into: (1) space (ākāśa); (2) and (3) two subtle substances called dhāraṇa and adharma, and (4) matter (jīvaka). Space, dhāraṇa, and adharma are the necessary conditions for the substances; the other things, viz.: souls and matter; space affords them room to subsist; dhāraṇa makes it possible for them to move or to be moved; and adharma, to rest. It will be seen that the function of space, as we conceive it, is by the Jains designated under these three different substances; this seems highly speculative, and rather hyperlogical. But the conception of the two essential substances dhāraṇa and adharma, which occur already, in the technical meaning just given, in canonical books, seems to be derived from a more primitive notion. For, as their names dhāraṇa and adharma indicate, they seem to have been denoted, in primitive speculation, those invisible 'folds' by which contact is occupied by the world of things (loka-bhāsā), and the space beyond it (alo-ka-bhāsā), which is absolutely void and empty, an abyss of nothing. Dhāraṇa and adharma are co-extensive with the world; accordingly no soul nor any particle of matter can get beyond this world for want of the substrates of motion and rest. Time is recognized by some as a quasi-substance besides those enumerated.

Matter (jīvaka) is eternal and consists of atoms; otherwise it is not determined in its nature, but, as is already implied by the doctrine of the Indefiniteness of Being, it is something that may become anything, as earth, water, fire, wind, etc. Two states of matter are distinguished: gross matter, of which the things which we perceive consist, and subtle matter, which is beyond the reach of our senses. Subtle matter is that matter which is transformed into the different kinds of karma (see below). All material things are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. Two atoms form a compound when the one is viscous and the other dry, or both are of different degrees either of viscosity or dryness. Such compounds combine with others, and so on. They are, however, not constant in their properties, but are subject to change or development (pargānās), which consists in the assumption of qualities (guna-s). In this way originate also the bodies and senses of living beings. Thus earth, water, fire, and wind—bodies of souls in the lowest stage of development, and are, therefore, spoken of as 'earth-bodies,' 'water-bodies,' etc. Here we meet with animistic ideas which, in this form, are peculiar to Jainism. They probably go back to a remote period, and must have prevailed in classes of Indian society, which were not influenced by the more advanced ideas of the Brahmins.

Different from matter and matter and matter are souls (sattva, lit. 'lives'). There is an infinite number of souls; the whole world is literally filled with them. The souls are substances, and as such eternal; but they are not of a definite size, since they contract or expand according to the dimensions of the body in which they are incorporated for the time being. Their characteristic mark is intelligence, which may be obscured by extraneous causes, but never destroyed.

Souls are of two kinds: mundane (saknātā-s), and liberated (muktā-s). Mundane souls are the embodied souls of living beings in the world and still subject to the Cycle of Birth; liberated souls will be embodied no more; they have accomplished absolute purity; they dwell in the state of perfection at the top of the universe, and to do with worldly affairs; they have reached nirvāna (nirvānti, or muktā). Metaphysically the difference between the mundane and the liberated soul consists in this, that the former is entirely filled by subtle matter, thus filled with sand, while the latter is absolutely pure and free from any material alloy.

The delimitation of the soul takes place in the following way. Subtle matter ready to be transformed into karma pours into the soul; this is called 'influx' (ākāra). In the usual state of things a soul harbours passions (kṣaya-s) which act like a viscous substance and retain the subtle
matter coming into contact with the soul; the
subtle matter thus caught by the soul enters, as it
were, into a chemical combination with it; this
is called the binding (bindus) of (karma-matter).
The subtle matter ‘sound’ or annalagamst by
the soul is transformed into the 5 kinds of karmas, and
forms the material organ of the 5 senses (karanasandhāra),
which clings to the soul in all its migrations and
future births, and determines the individual state
and lot of that particular soul. For, as each
particular karmas has been caused by some action,
goed, or habit of the individual in question, so this
dharma, in its turn, produces certain painful, or pleasant,
or indifferent conditions and events which the individual in
question must undergo. Now, when a particular
karma has produced its effect in the way described, it
(i.e. the particular karma-matter) is discharged or
purged from the soul. This process of ‘purgating
off’ karma, (i.e. the effect of karma-matter) will, in
the end, be discharged from the soul; and the latter,
now freed from the weight which had kept it down
before the time of its liberation (for matter is
heavy, and karma is material), goes up in a
straight line to the top of the universe where the
liberated souls dwells. But in the usual course of
thing, the presence in it being simultaneous, and thereby the soul is forced to
continue its mundane existence. After the death
of an individual, his soul, together with its karmas,
goes, in a few moments, to the place of its next birth and there assumes a new body,
expanding or contracting in accordance with the
dimensions of the latter.

Embodied souls are living beings, the classification
of which is a subject only of theoretic unrealism,
but also of great practical interest to the Jain.
As their highest duty (parina dharma) is not to
kill any living beings (akīmāna), it becomes
incumbent upon him to know the various forms
which their life may assume. The Jains divide living beings
according to the number of sense organs which they possess:
the highest (paricchātakirniva) possess all five
groups of sense organs; taste, smell, sight,
hearing, and the lower, the only one optic
organ, and the remaining classes
each organ more than the preceding one
in the order of organs given above; e.g. worms, etc., possess
only the optic organ; and then possess, in addition, smell, taste, etc., seeing.
The vertebrates possess all five organs of sense; the
higher animals, men, denizens of hell, and gods possess
an internal organ or mind (manas), and are therefore
called rational (svasamjñā), while the lower animals
have no mind (asamjñā). The notions of the
Jains about beings with only one organ are,
part, peculiar to themselves and call for a more
detailed notice.

It has already been stated that the four elements are ani-
mated by souls; e.g. part of earth, etc., are the body
of soul, called earth-souls, etc. These may we call common
beings; they live and die and are born again, in the same or
another elementary body. These elementary lives are either
great or small; in the latter case they are invisible. The last

1 The Jains recognize 6 bodies which an individual may possess (although simultaneously), one gross and 4 subtle kinds. Besides the karanasandhāra, which is the recollection of karmas and has no bodily functions, there are (1) the transmutation body (kshanakirniva); producing the wonderful appearance of the gods, magicians, etc., may assume; (2) the translocation body (vinyāsa); in which the body may assume for short time in order to consult a Tirthankara at some distance; (3) the igneous body (shantrikā), which in common beings causes the digestion of food, but in persons of great insight gives effect to their curses (that they burn their objects) and to their beneficent words; (4) the body of the moon, etc. The
document of the subtle bodies, in which, however, many details are
omitted, may not be of primary importance, and to controversy, seems to be the outcome of very
primitive ideas. The number of the six karanas and of the manas, etc., is reduced to a rational theory. With the term sakti-rija, and
the popular name of the 6s, are connected the senses and the jātaka dreams of the Śālikas.

2 The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge: (1) ordinary (karmasandhāra), which is an agglomeration of embodied souls which have all functions of life, reproduction and nutrition, in common. That plants possess souls is an opinion shared by other Indians; it is not clear whether the Jains have developed this theory in a remarkable way. Plants in which only one soul is embodied are rare, and they are found only in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants of which each is a fakir (karanasandhāra) may have a number of very small, i.e.
invisible, and in that case they are distinct species. These little<br>plants are called sakti-rija; they are composed of an infinite number of souls because they do not cluster, have reproduction and nutrition in common, and experience the most exquisite pains. Immense sakti-rija form a globular, and with them the whole universe. The common pack of</br>the little things, which is packed, like a box filled with powder. The sakti-rija form the supply of souls in place of those who have reached nirvana. But an infinitesimally small fraction of one sakti-rija has sufficed to replace the vast number caused in the world by the development of all the souls that have been liberated from the beginningless past down to the present. Thus it is evident that the sakti-rija will be empty of living beings (see Lokapaksha, VI, II ini.

From another point of view mundane beings are divided into four groups (the four kinds of the four groups), which are the four walks of life (jivati), in which beings are born according to their merits or demerits. For details, see art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (JAINA); also the total of bundle and COGNOSCOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY (Indian), § 4, iv, p. 160 f., and AGES OF THE WORLD (Indian), vol. i, p. 200.

We have seen that the cause of the soul's embodiment is the karma-matter. The theory of karma is the key-stone of the whole system; it is necessary, therefore, to explain this theory in more detail. The natural qualities of soul are perfect knowledge (jñāna), intuition or faith (dūkṣa), high and there are several perfections; but these inborn qualities of the soul are weakened or obscured, in mundane souls, by the presence of karma. From this point of view the division of soul's matter is understood. The karma-matter has penetrated the soul, it is transformed into 8 kinds (prakṛiti) of karma singly or severally, which form the karanasandhāras, just as food is, by digestion, transformed into the various fluids necessary for the support and growth of the body. The 8 kinds of karanas are as follows.

(1) Ājñānakāraṇa, which that obliterates the inherent right
knower (i.e. conscience) of the soul. These are further
into different degrees of knowledge and of ignorance; (2) fasind-
ākaraṇa, which that obliterates right understanding, i.e., sleep;
(3) vedanākaraṇa, which that obliterates the bliss-nature of the soul and thereby produces pleasure and pain; (4) mokṣa, which that disturbs the right notice of the soul with respect to the soul's
research, passions and other emotions, and produces desire, error,
right or wrong and taste; (5) manas, which that destroys the
truth of life of an individual is one birth as false-being, animal
or god; (6) manas, which that produces the various circumstances or elements; the meaning is another; (7) manas, which that destroys the peculiarity with its general and special qualities, faculties, etc.; (8) manas, which that destroys the bigness, caste, family, social standing, etc., of an individual; (9) manas, which that obstructs the inner energy of the soul and thereby prevents the doing of a good action when there is a desire to do it.

Each kind of karma has its predetermined limits in time within which it must take effect and thereby be purged off. Before we deal with the operation of karma, however, we must mention another doctrine which is connected with the karma-theory, viz. that of the six ṛṣis. The six ṛṣis, as it were, are agminated by a soul indites on it a transcendental colour, a kind of complex, which cannot be perceived by our eyes; and this is called ṛṣiśī. There are six ṛṣis: black, blue, grey; yellow, red, and white. They are talismans which can be worn externally, a moral bearing; for the ṛṣiśī indicates the character of the individual who wears it. The first three belong to bad characters, the last three to good characters.

1 The Jains recognize five kinds of knowledge: (1) ordinary cognition (mājñāna), (1) testimony (vṛṣṭa), (2) supernatural cognition (sukṣma), (3) the Jains acknowledge the knowledge of the thoughts of others (manasātāra), (4) conscience (śīla).
The individual state of the soul is produced by its incantatory nature and the law with which it is invitated; this is the developmental or परिवर्तित्ता state. But there are 4 other states which have reference only to the behaviour of the karma. In these four states of things karma takes effect and produces its proper result; then the soul is in the अद्यायिता state. By proper efforts karma may be prevented, for some time, from taking effect; it is neutralized (वाशोमता), but it is still present, just like fire covered by a cloth, then the soul is in the अपाकंतिका state. When karma is not only prevented from operating, but is annihilated altogether (कम्पत्ता), then the soul is in the कतक्षिका state, which is necessary for reaching निर्विक्रम. There is a fourth state of the soul, शत्याग्यकम्तिका, which partakes of the nature of the preceding ones; in this state some karma is annihilated, some is neutralized, and some is active. This is the state of ordinary good men, but the कतक्षिका and अपाकंतिका states belong to holy men, especially the former. It will be easily understood that these distinctions have an important moral bearing; they are frequently referred to in the practical ethics of the Jains.

We shall now consider the application of the कर्म्म-theory to ethics. The highest goal is to get rid of these gifts, to refrain from all acts, to sequent no new karma—technically speaking, to stop the influx (आवृत्त) of karma, which is called स्वाभव, or the covering of the channels through which karma finds entrance into the soul. All actions produce karma, and these actions are divided into (1) sāmānyās, which ensure the continuance of worldly existence (सामान्यास); but, when a man is free from passions and acts in strict compliance with the rules of right conduct, his actions produce karma, which lasts but for a moment, and is then annihilated (प्रायाप्ता). Therefore the whole apparatus of monastic conduct is required to prevent the creation of new karma; the same purpose is served by austerities (तपस्स), which, moreover, annihilate the old karma more speedily than would happen in the common course of things.

It is evident from the preceding remarks that the ethics and ascetics of the Jains are to be regarded as the logical consequences of the theory of karma. But from a historical point of view many of their ethical principles, monastic institutions, and ascetic practises were taken over from older and common religious classes of Indian society, since Brahmanical ascesis and Buddhists resemble them in many of their precepts and institutions (see SBE xxi. (1884) Introd. p. 228 ff.).

ii. Jain ethics has for its end the realization of निर्विक्रम, or मोक्षa. The necessary condition for reaching this end is the possession of right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct. These three excellences are metaphysically named the ‘three jewels’ (त्रिनंत), an expression used also by the Buddhist but in a different sense; they are not produced, but they are manifested on the removal of obstructing or obscuring species of karma. To effect this, the rules of conduct must be observed and corresponding virtues must be acquired. Of first importance are the five vows, the rules for which, are also acknowledged by Brahmans and Buddhists. The five vows (व्रताः) of the Jains are: (1) not to kill; (2) not to lie; (3) not to steal; (4) to abstain from sexual intercourse; (5) to renounce all interest in worldly things, especially to keep no property. These vows are to be strictly observed by monks, who take them on entering the Order, or, as it is commonly expressed, on taking दिल्लग. In their case the vows are called लीलबट्टा, or व्रती. Lay people, however, should observe them so far as their conditions admit; the five vows of the lay people are called the small vows (सन्नायन). To explain: not to kill any living beings requires the greatest caution in all actions, considering that nearly every living is believed to be soulful; hence a rule which is, therefore, obliged to refrain only from intentionally killing living beings, be it for food, pleasure, gain, or any such purpose. And so it also with the remaining vows; their rigour is somewhat abated in the case of laymen. A layman, however, may, for a limited time, follow some more rigorous practice by taking one of the following particular vows or regulations of conduct (सन्नायन): (1) दिल्लग; he may limit the distance up to which he will go in this or that direction; (2) अनार्थकालवान्न; he may abstain from engaging in anything that does not strictly concern him; (3) सार्थकालपार्ष्पार्ष्पात्म, he may set a limit to his food, drink, and the things he enjoys, avoiding besides gross enjoyments. It may be mentioned in passing that certain articles of food, etc., are strictly forbidden to all, such as roots, honey, and spirits; and likewise no food may be eaten at night.) The preceding three vows are called गुणान्वत्ता; the next four are the disciplinary vows (सन्नायन): (1) जम्बुन्न; reducing the area in which one will stay; (2) जम्बूत्ति, for the layman undertakes to give up, at stated times, all sinful actions by sitting down motionless and meditating on holy things; (3) जम्बूत्ति, to live as a monk, or fasting, for the 8th, and 16th day of the lunar fortnight, at least once a month; (4) जम्बूत्ति, to give a share to guests, but it is understood in a less literal sense, viz. to provide the monks with what they take.

Most of these regulations of conduct for laymen are intended apparently to make them participate, in a measure and for some time, in the merits and benefits of monastic life without obliging them to renounce the world altogether. The rules for a voluntary death have a similar end in view (see art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Jain]; vol. iv. p. 484 ff.). It is evident that the lay part of the community were non-religious and laymen only as friends and patrons of the Order, as seems to have been the ease in early Buddhism; their position was, from the beginning, well defined by religious duties and privileges; the bond which united them to the Order of monks was an effective one. The state of a layman was one preliminary and, in many cases, preparatory to the state of a monk; in the latter respect, however, a change seems to have come about, in so far as now and for some time past the Order of monks is recruited chiefly from novices entering it at an early age, not from laymen in general. It cannot be doubted that this close union between laymen and monks brought about by the similarity of their religious duties, differing not in kind, but in degree, has enabled Jainism to avoid fundamental changes within, and to resist dangers from without for more than two thousand years, while Buddhism, being less exacting as regards the laymen, underwent the most extraordinary changes, and essentially finally disappeared altogether in the country of its origin.

A monk on entering the Order takes the five great vows stated above; if they are kept, the spirit of the five times five clauses, तिथिविद्या (SBE xxi. 202 ff.), no new karma can form. But, to practically them effectually, more explicit regulations are required, and these constitute the discipline
of the monks. This discipline is described under seven heads.

(1) Since through the activity of body, speech, and mind, which is technically called yagna, the Jains, karma-matter pours into the soul (atman) and forms new karma, as explained above, it is necessary, in order to prevent the karmas (or effects, external), to regulate those activities by keeping body, speech, and mind in strict control: these are the three gyastis (e.g., the gyasti or guarding of the mind consists in not thinking or desiring anything bad; having only good thoughts, etc.).

(2) Even those actions which are inspired from the duties of a monk, he may become guilty of sin by inadvertently transgressing the great vows (e.g., killing living beings). To avoid such sins he must observe the five samāca, i.e., he must be cautious in walking, speaking, collecting alms, taking up or putting down things, and avoiding the body; e.g., a monk should in walking look before him for about six feet of ground to avoid killing or hurting any living being; he should, for the same reason, inspect and sweep the ground before he puts anything on it; he should be careful not to eat anything out of the goodness of his life, etc. (3) Passion being the cause of the amalgamation of karma-matter with the soul, the monk should acquire virtues. The four cardinal vices (kāyagāra) are anger, pride, illusion, and greed; their opposite virtues are forbearance, patience, truthfulness, and purity. Adding to them the following six virtues, veracity, restraint, austerities, freedom from attachment to anything, poverty, and contentment, these have been placed in the tenfold law of the monks (sattamahākarma). (4) Helpful for the realization of the sanctity of which an earnest searcher of the highest good stands in need are the twelve ‘advises’ (amantritah or bhāmāntah) on the transitoriness of all things, on the helplessness of men, on the misery of the world, and similar topics, which form the subject of endless homilies inserted in their works by Jain authors. (5) Furthermore, it is necessary for a monk, in order to keep in the right path to perfection and to annihilate his karma, to bear cheerfully with all that may cause him annoyance. There are 22 such troubles (parīpatas) which a monk must endure without flinching, as hunger and thirst, cold and heat, all sorts of trying occurrences, illness, ill treatment, temptations, etc. If we consider that the conduct of the monk is ascertained with the purpose of denying him every form of comfort and merely keeping him alive, without, however, the risk of hurting any living being, it may be imagined to what practical consequences the endurance of the parīpatas must lead. (6) Conduct (chārita) consists in control and is of 5 degrees or phases. In the lowest phase all sinful activities are avoided, and the highest leads to the annihilation of all karma, preliminary to final liberation. (7) The last item is asceticism or austerities (tapas), which not only prevents the forming of new karma (saharasa), but also purges off the old (mintaro), provided that it be undertaken in the right way and with the right intention; for there are also the ‘austerities of fools’ (bholatapas) practised by other religious sects, through which temporary merits, such as supernatural powers, birth in a god, etc., can be accomplished but the highest good will never be attained. Tapas is therefore, one of the most important institutions of Jainism. It is divided into (a) tapas internal and (b) tapas external; the former comprises the austerities practised by the Jains, the latter their spiritual exercises. (a) Among austerities fasting is the most conspicuous; the

1 The second part of the Jātakāgāra aśraṇa will give an idea of the next stage that is taken in this regard.
2 Cf. Manu, vi. 92.
self-mortification of the flesh,¹ which should be birth of a monkey's career, though it no longer leads to liberation, for Jainaharma, the disciple of Mahavira's disciple Sudharman, was the last man who reached karvaka, or nonexistence, and was liberated on his death.² (44 after Mahavira's 24th samay). As a result of the present Avatarsini period nobody will be born who reaches nirvāna in the same existence. Nevertheless these speculations possess a great theoretical interest, because they afford us a deeper insight into the Jain system.

In this connexion we must notice a doctrine to which the Jains attach much importance, viz. the doctrine of the 14 paññākānas, i.e. the 14 steps which, by a gradual increase of good qualities and decrease of karma, lead from total ignorance and wrong belief to absolute purity of the soul and final liberation.

In the first stage (sādhanyadvijn) are all beings from the nīcāgasa upwards to those men who do not know or do not believe in the truths revealed by the Tirthankaras: they are swayed by the two cardinal passions, love and hate (rīga and dṛṣṭa), and are completely tied down by karmas. In the following stages, as one advances, degrees in true knowledge, in firmness of belief, and in the control and repression of passions, different kinds of good karma are the result of these māyās; and as the being in question becomes purer and purer in each following stage, in all stages up to the 11th (that of a vikāpāya nirvāna), the same kind of māyās may take place and a man may fall even down to the first stage. But as soon as he has reached the 12th stage (that of a kārmikāya nirvāna of the kind of karvaka), he cannot pass through the last two stages, in which Comm. science is reached, in the 13th stage (that of a sūryaparāya nirvāna), the man still belongs to the world, and may continue in it for a long period; but relative activities of body, speech, and mind; but, when all his activities cease, he enters on the last stage (that of a sūrya, that of the nirvāna, that of the nirvāna). When the last remnant of karma has been annihilated, a question must now be answered which will present itself to every critical reader, viz. Is the karma-theory as explained above an original and integral part of the Jain system? It seems so abstract and highly artificial that one would readily believe it a later developed metaphysical doctrine which was grafted on an originally religious system based on animistic notions and intent on sparing all living beings. But such a hypothesis would be in conflict with the fact that this karvaka-theory, if not in all details, certainly in the main outline, is acknowledged in the oldest parts of the canon and presupposed by many expository and technical terms occurring in it. Nor can we assume that in this regard the canonical books represent a later dogmatic development for the following reason: the terms dārava, sāravara, nirjāra, etc., can be understood only in the supposition that karvaka is a kind of subtle matter, flowing or pouring into the soul (dārava), that this influx can be stopped or its inlets covered (sāravara), and that the karvaka-matter received into the soul is consumed or digested, as it were, by it (nirjāra). The Jains understand these terms in their literal meaning, and use them in explaining the way of salvation (the sāravara of the dārava and the nirjāra lead to niṣpada). Now these terms are as old as Jainism. For the Buddhists we have borrowed from it the most significant term dārava; they use it in very much the same sense as the Jains do, and in its literal meaning, since they do not regard the karvaka as subtle matter, and deny the existence of a soul into which the karva could have an 'influx.' Instead of sāravara they say asavikkayya (asavikkayya), 'destruction of the dārava', with certainty, with māyāga (māyga, 'path'). It is obvious that with them dārava has lost its literal meaning, and that, therefore, they must have borrowed this term from a sect where it had its original significance, or, in other words, from the Jains. The Buddhists also use the term samava, e.g. attanānava, 'restraint under the moral law,' and the participle kanavā, 'controlled,' which words are not used in this sense by Brahmanical writers, and therefore are most probably adopted from Jainism, where in their literal sense they may express the idea that they denote. Thus the same argument serves to prove at the same time that the karvaka-theory of the Jains is an original and integral part of their system, and that Jainism is considerably older than the origin of Buddhism.

5. Present state of Jainism.—The Jains, both Svetāmbaras and Digambaras, number, according to the census of 1901, 1,334,146 members, i.e. even less than 1 per cent of the whole population of India.¹ On account of their wealth and education the Jains are of greater importance, however, than might be expected from their number. There are communities of Jains in most towns all over India. The Digambaras are found chiefly in Southern India, in Māsīr and Kannada, but also in the North, in the North-Western provinces, Eastern part of India, etc. The head-quarters of the Svetāmbaras are in Gujārt (where Gujarati has become the common language of the Svetāmbaras, rather than Hindi) and Western Rājputāna, but they are to be found also all over Northern and Central India. The common distribution of the Jains as at present seems, from the evidence of the inscriptions, to have prevailed even since the 4th century.² Splendid temples bear testimony to the development the sect, some of which rank among the architectural wonders of India, as those on the hills of Girnār and Sātrupājaya, on Mount Abū, in Ellora, and elsewhere.

The jutā of a monk is restricted to bare necessities, and these he must leg: clothes, a blanket, an alms-bowl, a stīka, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it. The monks' outfit is the same except that they have additional clothes. The Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes and use peacocks' feathers instead of the broad raiment of the Jain, or remove the hair by plucking it out (locha). The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred and is necessary at particular times; it is peculiar to the Jains and is regarded by them as an essential rite.

Originally the monks had to lead a wandering life except during the monsoon, when they stayed in one place; compare the wānas of the Buddhist monks. Thus Mahavira in his wandering stayed for one day only in a village and five days in a town. But this habit has been somewhat changed by the introduction of convents (upārāja), corresponding to the vihāras of the Buddhists.

The upārājas are separate buildings erected by each sect for their monks or nuns. An Upārāja is a large barn hall without lathe-rooms and cooking places, furnished only with wooden beds.³ (M. Stevenm., Mod. Jainism, p. 39).

The Svetāmbaras, as a rule, go only to those places where there are such upārājas; and now they stay as long as a week in a village, in a town as long as a month. It is in the upārājas that the monks preach or explain sacred texts to laymen who come to visit them. The daily duties of a monk are rather arduous if conscientiously performed; e.g., he should sleep only three hours of the night. His duties consist in repelling of and expiating sins, meditating, studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), careful inspection of the utensils and other things for the removal of insects, for

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¹ See Deka and Dinsmore, of the Dead Jain, vol. IV, p. 28. ² See Girnirn, Repertoire d'epygraphie jainas, p. 24.
cleaning them, etc. (for details see loc. xxvi. of the Uttara-dhārayana sūtra [SBE xlv. 142 ff.]. There are various monastic degrees. First there is the acariya, who is ordained. When he or any other man takes the vows (sāmghikā), he renounces the world (pravrajya) and is initiated or takes dīkṣā. The most important ceremony at that time is the shaving or pulling out of the hair up to the tika. After this a newly ordained monk may rise to the rank of a teacher and superior called upādhyāya, dāhārya, vṣaṭāka, gacchita, etc., according to degrees and occupations.

The religious duties of the laity have, to some extent, been treated above. The ideal of conduct is that of the monk, which a layman, of course, cannot realize, but which he tries to approach by taking upon himself particular vows. But in practical life also, apart from asceticism, the Jains possess a body of rules composed by monks which lay out a rational course of life for laymen and tend to improve their welfare and moral standard. The monks have also to provide for the religious wants of the laity by explaining sacred texts or religious treatises and delivering sermons; this is done by the upādhyāya, when the laymen visit them; similarly the nun is visited by or visits the lay women. But the most conspicuous habit of the laity is attendance in temples, and worship of the Tirthankaras and the deities associated with them.

We must now advert to a peculiarity of the Jains which has struck all observers more than any other, viz. their extreme carefulness not to destroy any living being, a principle which is carried out to its very last consequences in monastic life, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, not even an insect, however troublesome; he will remove it carefully without hurting it. It goes without saying that the Jains are strict vegetarians. This principle of not hurting any living being bars them from some professions, e.g. agriculture, and 'has thrust them into commerce, and especially into its least elevating branch of money-lending. Most of the money-lending in Western India is in the hands of the Jains, and this accounts in a great measure both for their unpopularity and for their wealth. A remarkable institution of the Jains, due to their tender regard for animal life, is their asyumin for old and diseased animals, which, whenever they are kept and fed till they die a natural death.

6. History of Jainism.—The history of the Jain Church, in both the Svetāmbara and the Digambara sections, is chiefly contained in their lists of patriarchs and teachers and legends concerning them. The oldest list of patriarchs of the Svetāmbara is the Svakāvdaśī in the Kalpasūtra, which begins with Mahāvīra's disciple Sūdharman and ends with the 33rd patriarch Sāndilya or Skandila. Of most patriarchs only the names and the gotra are given; but there is also an expanded list from the 6th, Bhadradhān, down to the 14th, Vajrascena, which adds more details, viz. the names of the disciples of each patriarch and of the schools and branches (gopa, kula, and śāhā) founded by, or originating with, them. As some of these details are also mentioned in old Jain inscriptions of the 2nd cent. A.D. found at Mathura, this part at least of the Jain tradition is proved to be based on historical facts. Furthermore, a detailed list of patriarchs shows that after the 6th patriarch a great exten- sion of Jainism took place in the N. and W. of India. Beyond the details mentioned, we have no historical records about the patriarchs; but such legends as are known in the Mahāvīra, or Pārśvanātha, are a kind of continuous narrative. For later times there are lists of teachers (pravādryā, politically) of separate schools, called gachchha, which give a summary account from Mahāvīra down to the founder of the gachchha in question, and then a more detailed one of the line of descent from the latter downward, with some particulars of subsequent heads of the gachchha called śriptīya. The number of gachchhas, which usually (though not always in minute details of conduct, is allotted to some, of which only 8 are represented in Gujarāt, the most important of them being the Kharata Gachchha, which has split into many minor gachchhas, the Tapā, Acharla, and others. Separate mention is due to the Upanīsas Gachchha, the oldest known as the Ośval Jains; they are remarkable for beginning their descent, not from Mahāvīra, but from his predecessor Pārśva. These lists of teachers seem, as a rule, to be reliable only in that part which comes after the founder of the school to which they belong; the preceding period down to about the 6th cent. A.D. is one of great uncertainty; there seem to be a chronological blank of three centuries somewhere.

Records which allude to contemporaneous secular history are scant; such as we have in inscriptions and legends refer to kings who had favoured the Jains or were believed to have embraced Jainism. The first patron king of the Jains is said to have been Samprati, grandson of the great emperor Asoka; but this is a doubtful history. A historical fact of the greatest importance for the history of Jainism was the conversion of Kumārāṭa, king of Gujarāt, by Hemachandra (see art. HEMACHANDRA).

Finally, we must mention the schismas (niśāmaṇa) that have occurred in the Jain church. According to the Svetāmbara, there were eight schismas, of which the first was originated by Mahāvīra's son Vīmañjuka, and the eighth, occurring in 609 A.D., or A.D. 53, gave rise to the Digambara sect. But the Digambaras seem to be ignorant of the earlier schismas; they say that under Bhadradhān rose the sect of Archāpāparakas, which in A.D. 80 developed into the Svetāmbara sect. It is probable that the separation of the sections of the Jain church took place gradually, an individual development going on in both groups living at a great distance from one another, and that they became aware of their mutual difference about the end of the 1st cent. A.D. But the difference is small in articles of faith (see art. DIGAMBARA).

The sources for the history of the Digambaras are

1 Source: Bihārī, Bijāpī. J. [1905], 171 ff., 309 ff.
2 It is here, however, curious that another inscription states: "In India after the time of the Nanda kings the law of the Jains will become secure" (Panamachayya, lxxvii. 83). Perhaps this refers more specially to Magadhā and the adjoining countries, where, under the reign of the Mauryas, Buddhism soon attained the position of a state religion, and moral forces began to be a formidable rival of Jainism.
3 From the contents of the work given in the introduction to the text in the Bibl. Ind. edition.
4 The oldest gurukula known is that of Mundumbo, A.D. 30, followed by Ekanātha, A.D. 70, and Ekanātha, A.D. 106.
5 A full bibliography of this subject is contained in Gandhāra, ante, pp. 37 ff., and Repertorio degli Studi, p. 59 ff.
6 See E. de Léon, in Ind. Stud., xvi., [1896], 1 ff.
7 See E. de Léon, in Ind. Stud., xxvii., [1897], 1 ff.
of a similar kind to those of the Svētāmbaras, but later in date. The Digambara line of patriarchs is quite distinct from that of their rivals, except that they agree in the names of the first patriarch, Jamālī, and the 9th, Bhadrabahu, who, according to the Digambaras, emigrated at the head of the true monks towards the South. From Bhadrabahu dates the gradual loss of their sacred literature, as stated above. The inscriptions furnish ample materials for a necessarily incomplete history of their ancient school, but they do not quite agree in all details with the mere modern tradition of the Jainaists. According to the latter, the main church (nīla-sahāya) divided into four gopas, Nandi, Sana, Sihā, and Deva, about the end of the 1st cent. A.D.

LITERATURE.—Some of the more important works and treatments have been cited in the text; a full bibliography has been given by G. Greifenhagen, Bibliotheque Jacobia, Paris, 1907, to which the reader is referred for all questions of detail. Of new monographs on the subject besides the one by G. Bieder, Über die indische Seite der Jaina, Vienna, 1907, J. Burgess, London, 1909, the following will be found useful: Margaret Stevenson's Notes on Modern Jainism, Oxford, 1910; Herbert Warren's Jainaism, in Western Cults, as a Solution of Life, London, 1920; J. Beverley's The First Principles of the Jain Philosophy, London, 1920. For translations of the Jaina texts see W. H. Jones, Indian Religion, SBE xxii., xlv. (1884, 1889).

Hermann Jacobi.

JALAL AL-DIN RUMI.—Muhammad Jalal al-dīn, commonly known as Maḥmūd (or Maseehr), Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, was born at Bahk in eastern Persia in A.D. 1207 and died in 1273 at Qonīya (Leonina) in Rām (Asia Minor) ; whence the epithet 'Rūmī,' which he sometimes employs as a takhllih, or pen-name, in his lyrical poems. When Jalāl was only a few years old, his father, Muhammad ibn Ḥusayn al-Khatībi al-Bakri, governor of Ṣan'ā and ʿAla Wālid, was obliged to leave Bahk in consequence of a court intrigue which aroused against him the anger of the reigning sovereign, ʿAla al-Dīn Muhammad Khwārezmshāh. The exiled family, after long wanderings, in the course of which they visited Nināpār, Bagdād, and Mecca, arrived at Malāyya (Meitene) on the upper Euphrates, and, having stayed there four years, moved farther westward to Lārānā (Laranda), where Jalāl died in A.D. 1292. His brothers, Ṣamān and ʿAbd al-Qādir, were also poets. Finally, several years later, Bahā al-dīn was invited by the Sultan prince, ʿAla al-Dīn Kāmābud, to Qonīya. He died here in A.D. 1231. Jalāl had already married Mir-emīr ʿAṣma, a daughter of Lāl Sharaf al-dīn of Samarkand, who bore him two sons. One of these, Sulṭān Wālid, is the author of a mystical poem, the Bahābānuma, which, though written in Persian, contains 158 couplets in the Saljūq dialect of Turkish—the earliest important specimen of West Turkish poetry that we possess (see E. J. W. Gibb, History of Ottoman Poetry, i. 167). After several years of study at Aleppo and Damascus, Jalāl returned to Qonīya, where he was appointed professor and gained a great reputation for learning. About this time he seems to have devoted himself to theology under the guidance of Burhān al-dīn of Tirmiz, one of his father's pupils; but the crisis of his spiritual life was his meeting with Shams al-dīn of Tabriz, a warlike but pious man whom he met in Persia in A.D. 1444 and vanished mysteriously—according to one legend, he was killed in a riot—in 1346. This Ilhdarated God-intoxicated man exerted upon Jalāl an extraordinary influence almost amounting to possession, which was bitterly resented by his numerous disciples at Qonīya. To escape from their persecution Shams al-dīn left the city and returned only at his death. During his absence Jalāl composed part of the enormous collection of mystical odes entitled Divān-i Shams-i Tabriz; the rest belongs to a later period, but nearly the whole work is written in the name of his beloved teacher and friend. Jalāl founded—in it is said, of Cinnà al-dīn—the Mahalvi order of dervishes with their peculiar dress and whirling dance; and some of these hymns, first uttered in moments of ecstatic rapture, are still chanted by the Mahalvis, whose headquarters remain at Qonīya to this present day. In the Divān Jalāl's poetic genius is not hampered by didactic motives, and he sings out of the fulness of his heart; here he very often soars on the wings of pantheistic exaltation to such heights that few Sufi poets have been able to approach.

Probably about A.D. 1290, at the instigation of his favourite pupil Ḥasan Ḥusayn al-dīn, he began to compose the most celebrated of his works and perhaps the greatest mystical poem of any age, the Mathanwi-i Masnavi, or 'Spiritual Couplets,' in six books containing altogether some 27,000 verses. The Mathanwi may be described as a medley of anecdotes, dialogues, allegories, and discursive theological speculations. Each book, however, forms an independent whole and has an inward, though not always obvious, unity of its own. Such difficulties as occur are generally due to the abstruse nature of the subject; the narrative portions are written in a plain style, singularity free from rhetorical conclusions, self-contradictory, and sometimes tedious though it be, the Mathanwi stands unrivalled as a comprehensive and thoroughly characteristic exposition of the religious philosophy of the Persian Sufism which is inspired by intense moral feeling and illuminated by many beautiful and profound thoughts.

While no attempt can be made to describe the author's doctrines in detail, a few salient points may be noticed. Jalāl al-dīn is a pantheist in the sense that he identifies all real being with God and regards the world of phenomena as a mere image of the divine ideas reflected from the darkness of not-being: the universe in itself is nothing, and God alone really exists. Every atom of the universe reflects some attribute of God, but man is the microcosm. Finally, the poet (who claims Qur'an xxiii. 72), is responsible for his actions and can choose good or evil. Admitting for practical purposes the existence of evil, the poet is careful to guard himself against dualism: he holds that evil is a negation of real being, or that, in so far as it has a positive character, it tends to good. He insists repeatedly on the supreme value of love as the unifying and purifying element in religion. Those who love God will discern the soul of goodness everywhere and will realize the unity underlying all differences of creed and ritual; not only will a moral transformation be wrought in them by grace of God, but they will pass utterly away from selfhood and individuality, which are the great obstacles to absorption in the divine life. Another noteworthy doctrine is that of the evolution of the soul through stages and trials, of purifying —mineral, vegetable, animal, human, angelic—before its final return to the source whence it sprang. Besides the Divān and the Mathanwi, Jalāl al-dīn is the author of a prose treatise bearing the title Pīli ma fah, several copies of which are preserved at Constantinople.

LITERATURE.—1. Life and doctrine.—The most authoritative Persian biography of Jalāl, see his life of Jalāl by Aflākī, a pupil of the poet's grandson Chahār Aflākī, of which J. Redhouse has translated copies (see below). Further information will be found in the life of the Mathanwi and Divān and also in the following works:

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JALANDHARA-JAMBUKESWARAM

JALANDHARA.—Jalandhara (Jullunder) is the name of a town (lat. 31° 59' N., long. 75° 26' E.), district, and division in the Panjab. The 'division' includes the 'districts' of Jalandhara (Jullunder), Hoshiyarpur, and Kangra. The ancient kingdom, called Trigarta by the Hindus and Jalandhara by the Chinese pilgrim Hui-sen Tan-t'ung, was at the time of the 7th century, included, like the modern 'division,' both the hill country of Kangra and the plain of Jalandhara. The latter is associated in Hindu mythology with an eponymous demon, on whose back the town is supposed to be built, and the neighbourhood is regarded as holy ground, pilgrimages to which are meritorious. The fort of Kangra (Naggar) formerly considered one of the strongest places in India, possesses the famous Brahmanical temple of Mata Devi, or Vaisnava Devi, thrice desecrated by the Muhammadans, and mostly destroyed by the earthquake of 1905, as well as some Jain shrines and images, but no Jains now reside there. At Jaldamukhi ('flaming mouth'), about 20 miles S.E. of Kangra, a discharge of inflammable gas from a fissure at the base of a high range of hills is honoured with great veneration and much visited by pilgrims. The Chinese pilgrim, Huen Tsang, twice visited Jalandhara in A.D. 634 and 645. The capital was then described as being 'the royal city of Northern India,' and the Rajā was specially selected by king Harṣa (Siladitya), the paramount sovereign, to escort the 'Master of the Law' when on his return journey from China. An earlier uncertain Rajā, who had become a convert to Buddhism, is said to have been given by the paramount power 'sole control of matters relating to Buddhism in all India,' and to have been vested, in his capacity of Protector of the Faith, with jurisdiction to reward and punish monks impartially without distinction of persons. The same prince was believed to have travelled all through India and to have erected stūpas (tomes) and monasteries at the sacred sites; but no record confirming these statements of the pilgrimage has been discovered. Although Buddhism was decadent in most parts of N. India during the 7th century, it was still the dominant religion at Jalandhara, where the Buddhist monasteries, served by more than 2000 brethren, students of both 'vehicles,' exceeded fifty in number. In the Brahmanical temples of the Siva sect of Pāsūpati were only three, with about 500 votaries. Probably the Buddhist worship survived until the Muhammadan conquest early in the 11th century, for it would not endure the multitude of images displayed in Buddhist establishments, and made an end of monks and monasteries wherever they found them. The Brahmanical temple at Jullunder made a special study of the Abhidharmā, or metaphysical, sections of the canon, and Huen Tsang studied an Abhidharmā commentyary for four months in 634 under the guidance of a teacher named Chandravara. The compilation of such commentaries is recorded to have been the business of the Council assembled by the Kṣṇa monarch Kaniṣka (q.v.), probably in about A.D. 100. But in the opinion of the Japanese scholar, Takakusu,'all arguments about the Council and its works will be valueless until the Mantravardhana— an encyclopaedia of Buddhist philosophy—is translated into one of the European languages.' He holds that the Council was almost entirely composed of the heretics of the Hinayāna school of the Sarvāstivādins (J.R.A.S., 1895, p. 415).

Huen Tsang had no doubt that the Council held at Rajagriha, the ancient capital of Magadha (Bihar) was also rejected, and ultimately it was decided to hold the Council at Jalandhara. The commentaries authorized by the assembly are said to have been engraved on copper-plates and deposited in a stūpa. It is possible that they may still exist among the ruins of Pandrothān, Asoka's capital, which lie to the south-east of Srinagar, or Pravarasenaapura, founded by a Rajā of Saiva faith, perhaps during the 6th century. A rival tradition alleged that the Council was held at the Kavana or Tamasvaya monastery of Jalandhara, and the Tibetan historian of Buddhism, Tamāntha, writing in A.D. 1608, was of opinion that this tradition was supported by the weight of learned authority (Schiefner, Tamāntha, p. 60). But the precise testimony of Huen Tsang, nearly a thousand years earlier in date, obviously is entitled to more credence, and the fact may be accepted that most of the sittings of the Council were held in Kashmir. It is possible that the assembly may have met first in a monastery at or near Jalandhara, and may have adjourned to Kashmir for the hot season. Paramānā, author of the Life of Vasubandha, fully confirms the tradition that Kashmir was the place of the Council (J.R.A.S., 1906, pp. 38, 52).

JAMBUKESWARAM (Skṛ. Jambukadvīpa), a title of Śiva, 'Lord of the jambulu, or rose-apple tree,' under an old specimen of which, much venerated, the symbol of the god is placed.—A famous Saiva temple in Srīrangam (Island) (a portion of the Trichinopoly District of the Madras Presidency. It rivals the more famous Vālsana temple at Srīrangam in architectural beauty, interest, and possibly in antiquity. The object of worship is one of the five known as 'elemental,' the 'element' being in this case water, by which it is surrounded (for the other 'elementals' Hīgus see Madras Manual of Administration, iii. [1893] 420 f.). According to the legend the first gateway of the outer enclosure is not large, but it leads direct to the centre of a hall containing some 400 yllars. On the right there is open to a tank fed by a spring which is one of the wonders of the place. The corresponding space on the left was intended to be occupied by a 400 yllar, requisites to make up the 1000, but was never completed. There are, in reality, 700 columns, or, in all 900, if the 142 round the little tank which adjoins the hall are added. Between the two pinnacal (entrance gates) of the second enclosure is a very beautiful portico of cruciform shape, leading to a large sanctuary, which, however, makes no show externally, and access to its interior is not conjectured to the profane (Hist. of Ind. and East. Arch., p. 396).
He fixes the date of the building about A.D. (1605); but this inscription, however, is said to be dated A.D. 1483. Formerly, when sectarian jealousy was less intense, the image of Vishnu used to be brought for one day in the year into a coco-nut grove within the enclosure of the rival temple, but owing to sectarian disputes this practice has now been abandoned.


W. CROOKE.

JAMNOTRI (Skr. Yamuna-avatara-puri, 'city of the appearance of the Jumna').—A sacred place of the Hindus near the source of the river Jumna; lat. 31° 1' N., long. 78° 25' E.; in the State of Gahrwal, United Provinces, India. The river rises from the group of mountains known as Badarpahar, 'monkey's tail,' the height of which is 20,731 ft.; at Jamnotari, at an elevation of 10,540 ft. above sea level. Close to the source of the river from a glacier there is a hot spring.

'From a rock which projects from the snow a small rill descends during the day, about 8 feet wide and very shallow, being only the remnant of a shower of spray produced by the snow melting under the sun's rays. Below this the snow-bed is dotted with lumps of ice, caused by the chilling effect of the snow as it is melted by the steam of the boiling spring beneath. The stream wind and twist, and will find its way through crevices formed in the snow-bed to the ground beneath, out of which gush numerous springs of water of nearly boiling heat [1847° Fahr.]; and the stream, which when we arrived was about 5 feet deep, as to form numerous excavations resembling vaulted roots of nutmeg. Perhaps further causes a copious shower, which affects the principal supply to the Jumna' (Atkinson, Himalayan Jour. iii. 376).

Jamnotari is a place of a resort of pilgrims, but is not so popular as Gangotri (q.v.), the source of the Ganges.


W. CROOKE.

JANSENISM.—Jansenism, a religious revival within the Church of Rome, originated in the 17th century, and is hardly yet extinct. Although its history is connected chiefly with France, its first home was the Flemish University of Louvain; and it bears the name of its chief Flemish apostle, Cornelius Jansen, bishop of Ypres. Jansen (1638-1688) was born of humble parents at Arcy in the province of Utrecht, and educated at Louvain, where he formed a momentous friendship with a French student, Jean du Vercier de Hallain, who introduced his ideas to France. Jansen rose to be tutor and professor at Louvain; in 1636 he was appointed bishop of Ypres, but died within two years of his elevation. In 1640 his executors published the work of his lifetime: Augustinus, seu doctrina S. Augustini de humanis naturae agricultura, sanatibus et medicina aduersus Pelagianos et Mansuenses. This bulky treatise is the chief monument of a controversy that had raged at Louvain ever since its great professor Bainis, otherwise Michael de Bay (1513-59), had revolted against the traditional Scholasticism of the college lecture-rooms. Medialval theology抱住 was held to be mere intellectual, making it clear to reason the dogmas that faith already accepted; and reason, to the medieval mind, meant the categories of Aristotle. With their help, it was believed that all the mysteries of religion could be translated into clear, coherent language; and, in pursuance of this end, the Schoolmen raised a gigantic monument of subtle dialectic, wherein they sought to envelop in its precise metaphysical equivalent. As time went on, however, the world grew increasingly dissatisfied with their performance. Simple souls were bewildered. They felt that faith and grace and love and eternity, and all the pomp of logical abstraction, were woefully unlike all that they meant to the unsophisticated human heart. Accordingly they accused the Church of over-intellectualized religion; the Flemish Huguenots told King Philip that man's happiness would be a saience humaine parmy la saience divine.' Their protest was in some degree supported by de Bay and other moderate Catholics, who were in favour of making all reasonable concessions to the Reformation.

They felt that scholasticism, in its doctrine and logic, had let theology drift out of touch with Christian feeling and experience. 'Divines talk of sin,' wrote de Bay (Linsenmann, Michaelis Basiu, p. 78), 'as though it were a creature dictated by some visionary dreamer, which must be pondered over and believed, although nobody could feel it or grasp it.' Under his leadership an Anti-Scholastic tradition grew up at Louvain, of which Jansen became the great exponent. In the preface to his Augustinus he declares that the first great enemy of God is Aristotle, the arch-logician. His pura, guta philosophiae may be well enough suited to the investigation of physical phenomena; it is utterly out of place in a discussion of spiritual things. It engenders a blind trust in argument; and argument transforms theology into a kind of dialectical titling-match, where everything is open to question, and nothing is held sacred or assured. 'What is held probable to-day will be considered false to-morrow, and the certainty of yesterday becomes the paradox of to-day.' Thus the scholastics, he concluded, brought Babel for confusion, and a Cimmerian region for obscurity.

Where had a remedy for this state of things? Jansen appealed to Augustine—rightly or wrongly to God's Providence to be the eternal and victorious foe of Aristotle. To follow him was to escape from the frosty intellectualism of the Schoolmen; for Augustine, although no more than a match in logic for the dogmatic Aristotelian who ever lectured in the Schools, had never hesitated to appeal to the imagination and the feelings; his works owed even more to his charity than to his brain. Again, to follow Augustine was to escape for ever from the instability of the theologians. He had always taught that faith and reason have nothing to do with each other. Divine truth in no way depends on the vagaries of the human mind. The truths are not solely by prescriptions and traditions flowing straight from the Fountainhead. In other words, it is given by God—not made by the hand of man. And what is true of faith is also true of works. Left to ourselves, we can neither make nor get right. All that is good in us is the fruit of grace implanted in the individual heart by the hand of God Himself. Jansen's three volumes are an inextricable elaboration of this central thesis. The changes are incessantly rung on the absolute necessity of grace, on the blindness of the human intellect and the weakness of the human will, until commonplace Catholics began to rub their eyes, and ask whether the bishop of Ypres was anything better than a Calvinist in disguise. They were wrong. Strongly as Jansen held to the Augustinian doctrine of individual sanctification by the direct personal agency of God, he held quite as strongly to the other side of the Augustinian system—to the Civitas Dei, or Visible Church, wherein the Redeemer became the Holy Spirit in its organization generation after generation. Thus communion with the Visible Church—acceptance of its dogmas, participation in its sacraments—was absolutely necessary for salvation. The Church found in the dry bones of righteousness; the inward witnesses of the Spirit clothed the skeleton with flesh. Hence, during their long struggle with the Roman authorities, none of Jansen's followers dreamed of casting loose from Rome.

Moreover, all their surroundings indisposed them from any sympathy with the Reformation. Jansen
spent most of his life at Louvain, the frontier-citadel of Rome over against Presbyterian Holland; there he had become, as it were, a swordsman with the great Calvinist, controversialist, Vouicius, still remembered for his attacks on Descartes. And he probably owed his life to the favour with which the Spanish Viceroy regarded him when he received his best Gallicians (1638), a fiery political pamphlet attacking Louis XIII. of France for having allied himself with the heretical powers of Northern Europe during his long fight with Spain and Anjou, traditional champions of the papacy. On the other hand, Jansen, like de Bay before him, may well have dreamed of gaining the Protostats with their own weapons, and proving that—a given strong infusion of Augustinian doctrine—Rome could be as truly evangelical as Wittenberg or Geneva. Certainly this idea appealed much to his friend and fellow-labourer, du Vergier de Hauranne. He came of a wealthy family near Bayonne, and was educated at Louvain, where he made Jansen’s acquaintance. After his ordination he spent some years as confidential secretary to the bishop of Poitiers; in 1629, the bishop made over to him the commendatory (or sinecure) abbacy of Saint Cyran, a Benedictine monastery in central France. Thenceforward he was generally known as Monseigneur de Saint Cyran. At Poitiers he was so well received that the abbots of Tours thought the centre of French Protestantism. And experience soon convinced him that their reconciliation with the Roman Church was impossible, until the Church had laid the foundations of a new order. Accordingly he settled in Paris, and there started on a vigorous campaign to bring the Church’s disorders to an end.

The disorders in question were fruits of the Wars of Religion. The French prelates, wearying of thirty years’ fighting about theology, most Frenchmen were sick of the very name of dogma. As the long struggle had ended with the conversion of Henry IV. to Rome, most of them were willing enough to call themselves Catholics, and perform the most solemn ceremonies of their country with a decent moderation, as one of their great writers enjoins. But independent spirits were drift ing away from Christianity altogether to a purely natural religion untainted by sectarian bickerings—a religion of noble self-respect and disinterested love of duty, learned from Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus. Such men seemed to need grace or redemption: was not the wise man sufficient unto himself? As for the frivolous many, they were frankly weary of religion altogether, and the Church’s only chance of gaining them back within its fold was to pitch its standard of decent moderation as low as possible. This view soon dawned on the Jesuits and the more worldly-wise among the clergy. They argued that severity in pulpit and confessional only scared sinners away altogether; thereby their money and influence were lost to the Church, and their souls robbed of the priceless benefit of priestly absolution. Accordingly, through their casuists—writers of official textbooks on the management of the confessional—they entered on a vigorous campaign to force priests to be lax. The kind of argument that a confessor might ask was rigorously defined. He must always lean towards the most ‘benign’ interpretation of the law; and for his guidance the casuists ran many an ingenious counsel and four through inconceivable enactments. Not that they went as far as some of their Protestant critics imagined. They did not legitimate grave sins; their object was to show that the Church’s minimum standard was no higher than that which the majority of mankind seem to require of human nature, or to expect. The Jesuits certainly did not ignore the necessity of sacramental grace. But they said that, if a man wished for it, he must take the first step himself, and merit grace by coming to confession. For grace, on their principles, never took the lead; its business was to complement and complete what human nature had begun. That being so, they argued that it was unjust to ask men for more than they were fully capable of performing; God must perform his part of the bargain. And, in fact, the Jesuits thought it fair and reasonable of Him to expect.

Saint Cyran brought all the batteries of Jansen’s theology to bear on this position. He refused to ask what a man could do simply by himself: the question was how contact with the Resurrection of Christ and the Church could be thus borne upon the wings of grace. And whether he was so upborne depended in no way on himself; God did not ask His creatures to choose whether they would accept grace or refuse it. The case of man was like that of a man who left to perish in its sins. On the few whom He elected to save grace descended like a whirlwind—irresistibly, unerring, victoriously. There were ‘thunder-claps and visible upheavals’—a sudden, violent, awakening. In every true conversion,’ wrote Saint Cyran in his Spiritual Letters, ‘God speaks at least once to the soul as distinctly as on the road to Damascus. He spoke to St. Paul, model of all penitents.’ There followed a long course of internal repentance and external penitential discipline, carried out under expert guidance: was not St. Paul himself ‘directed’ by Ananias immediately after his conversion? At last the sinner emerged a new creature, living only for religion. To all other interests he was dead. Even the most innocent—art and literature, family ties, civic and professional duties—might prove dangerous to the love of God, and were therefore better away. But for such a man the cloister is the only place, and of this Saint Cyran was well aware. As his first biographer says, he strove hard to make his amanuensis of himself, and give new citizens to Heaven,’ by driving most of his hearers into convents.

Hence it is scarcely surprising that his first celebrated disciple should have been a nun. This was Angélique Arnauld (1621–1691), abbess of Port Royal des Champs, a Cistercian convent near Versailles. She had early revolted against the spiritual deadness around her, and embarked on various schemes of reform. But all her efforts had been tentative and uncertain, until Saint Cyran appeared to give her the precise kind of guidance that she needed. In return, she furnished his doctrine with a local habitation and a name; within a few years Port Royal became the headquarters of the Jansenist party. Angélique enlisted in its service her large and influential family— notably her brother, Antoine (1622–94), one of the most promising young men of the time. Her convent opened in the capital a daughter-house, known as Port Royal de Paris. At the abbey gates a little group of masculine adherents formed the ‘hermits of Port Royal,’ who lived the semi-monastic life, although bound together by no vow. Under the guidance of Antoine Arnauld, they poured forth an ever-increasing flood of devotional
Jansenism

literature remarkable for its literary style. Both
runs and hermits opened ‘little schools’ for the
creation of clergy of the movement; Pascal’s
cister, Jacques, was a teacher in the one, and
Racine a pupil in the other. So successful was
the party that it soon excited the suspicions of
Richelieu’s police; in 1638 Saint Cyran was arrested
and forced to leave his country on pain of ecclesiastical
penalty, and kept in prison till the Cardinal’s death (December 1642).
Then he was at once released; but his health had
been broken by his confinement, and he died in
October 1643.

The leadership of the Jansenist party at once
devoiced on Antoine Arnauld, who had just pub-
lished (August 1643) a Traité de la fréquente con-
version, which for the first time set the Jansenist
case before the general reader. The Augustinian,
written in Latin, had been too learned; Saint
Cyran’s devotional works were at once too
monastic and too inspirational—too full of ‘thunder-
claps and visible spices.’ Arnauld, son of a
family of lawyers, used the language of the country,
and imported into theology all the hard-headed
calculations of his race. He dealt with the manage-
ment of the confessional, a subject of interest to
every one. And he dealt with it in a manner in-
telligible to every one. The casuistical party
maintained that Catholics were the Chosen People
—members of the One True Church—and that
God showed His particular favor to them by
blessing those sacraments, which ‘met their efforts
half-way,’ that is, made them holy with very
little trouble. Arnauld on their part, in his Traité
defended this position. He held that the fact
of being a Catholic was any recommendation
in God’s sight. Religion did not consist in believ-
ing a particular opinion, or conforming to a par-
ticular mode of life; it meant conversion, becoming
a new creature. But conversion was no affair of
a moment; it was a slow and gradual process,
involving a long course of discipline, internal and
external. How absurd, it said, to give absolution easily—‘like footmen, rather
than judges’—to all who chose to ask for it. How could a madder
absolution make a sinner a new man?

The casuistical party must needs take up soopen
a challenge. They could not dispute with the Traité
directly, for it had been very favourably received.
So they concentrated their attacks on the weakest
point in Arnauld’s position, and accused the Augustinian
of reviving the Calvinist doctrine, and the
Book of Calvin. The book had appeared in 1640, and was
promptly censured by the Inquisition, on the ground
that it was illegal to write controversial works on
the subject of grace without special leave from
Rome. This censure was confirmed by Urban VIII.
in 1642. But various technical objections were
raised to the legality of this condemnation, and a
lively war of pamphlets ensued. In July 1649
seven propositions were denounced to the Sorbonne,
or Divinity Faculty of Paris University. Two of
these, taken from the Fréquente conversion, were
soon dropped; the other five made up what Bossuet
called the soul of the Augustinianus, though only the
first proposition of the five was textually extracted
from it. They run as follows:

1. They are condemned which good men cannot obey, however hard they try. (2) In the state of fallen nature, internal grace is never needed. (3) To be active in the story of the fallen nature meritorious or otherwise, it is not requisite that they should be free from internal necessity, but only from external. (4) The Augustinian error consists in teaching that men can choose whether they will accept grace or reject it. (5) It is a Semi-Pelagian error to say that Christ died for all men.

These five Propositions gave rise to heated debates in
the summer until Arnauld’s supporters, finding
themselves in a minority, appealed to the law
courts on a question of privilege, and the whole
question was referred to the Assembly of the
Clergy meeting in the following year. But the
Assembly also was divided in opinion. In April
1651, eighty-five bishops wrote to Pope Innocent X,
begging him to examine the Propositions; eleven
other bishops wrote deprecating the action of their
colleagues. Innocent appointed a commission forth-
with to examine into the whole question, with the
help of advocates on both sides. Early in 1653 the
commission reported; and on the strength of its
findings Innocent declared all five Propositions
heretical.

At first the Jansenists made light of his judg-
ment. In the 17th cent. few Framboys believed in
papal infallibility. Rome was looked on as a
country where diplomatic intrigue went for more
than theological scholarship, and one pontificate
might easily undo the work of another. The
Jesuits might manage to hoodwink Innocent X;
Port Royal could afford to wait till he gave place
to a pope less amenable to their influence. Accord-
ingly Arnauld temporized. He began by denying
that Jansen was touched by the censure. Only one of the five Propositions was a literal
extract from the Augustinianus; and that one,
thought liable to Calvinistic misconstruction, was
also capable of being read in the semi-Pelagian
sense given it by Augustine, Jansen’s master.
Hence, to condemn the disciple was to condemn
the Doctor of Grace. The bishops replied that
Innocent had committed error in the precise sense intended by Jansen; and their asser-
tion was confirmed by Innocent’s successor, Alex-
ander VII., in October 1656. Arnauld had already
been expelled from the collegium of the spiritual’s
Provincial Letters (Jan. 1656—March 1657), begun
in an attempt to save him. Early in 1657 the
Assembly of the Clergy imposed on every priest,
analyst, and nun in Paris, or declaration,
that the Propositions really were in Jansen’s
book. For a while, however, the Formulary hung
fire. Although in a small minority, the Jansenists
had powerful backers among both bishops and
judges. Public opinion was impressed by the
Provincial Letters, and still more by the so-called
‘miracle of the Holy Thorn’ (March 24, 1656),
when Pascal’s little niece, Marguerite Férié, was
suddenly cured of an incurable disease, and the
relic from the Crown of Thorns in the convent
chapel at Port Royal. But the respite was short;
for in 1660 a new and most powerful enemy entered
the lists. Louis XIV. had become the government
into his own hands; and this great fanatic for uni-
formity was the last man in the world to tolerate
a handful of eccentric rednecks who believed them-
selves to be in special touch with Heaven, and
therefore might at any moment set their conscience
up against the law. In 1661 he stirred up the
bishops to enforce signature of the Formulary; and,
when the Jansenists objected that mere bishops had
no right to impose it, he got a new Formulary
drafted by the pope (1664).

At last the Jansenists found themselves between
two fires. Were they to sign, or were they not to
sign? A few of the most consistent were for a
blank refusal. Just before his death (1662) Pascal
had declared that the Augustinian was absolutely
in the right, and the pope absolutely in the wrong.
Hence to sign the Formulary, without expressly
accepting Jansen’s name from censure of every
kind, was to act in a way ‘abominable before God,’
evens in the sight of man, and of no use whatever
ever to those already marked out for destruction.
But the mass of the party followed Arnauld in his
temporizing tactics. He said that the Formulary
might be signed by any one who bore in mind the
common distinction of law and fact. In essential
matters of dogma the Church was certainly infal-
lible. But this infallibility ceased so soon as it
approached concrete cases of fact; and it knew no more than any one else what was in a particular author's mind when he wrote a certain passage in his book. Properly speaking, it had no right to pronounce on such questions at all; if it insisted on doing so, the conclusion might easily be that the 'respectful silence' that involves external conformity, but no inward acquiescence. Tacitly convinced at by many bishops, this position was openly accepted by others—though both of the leading bishops of Paris, Arnauld and Quensel, were very severe on the 'respectful silence' that involves external conformity, but no inward acquiescence. Tacitly convi...
in the services of a committee of moderate bishops, among them being Massillon of Clermont, the famous pulpitor. The committee produced two documents. One—the Corpus de doctrine—was a commentary on the bull, explaining away everything in its provisions that might stick in the gorge of an "apellant." The second document was a letter addressed in the same sense as the pope—which, as the indignant Clement pointed out, was often very different from the sense laid down in the Corpus de doctrine—and at the same time through some of the most extravagant utterances of the bull's extreme supporters. The two documents made up what was known as an accomodement, or compromise; and the Government decreed that any one who signed the compromise should be deemed to have accepted the bull, and be free from further molestation. After some wavering, Noailles and most of the appellant bishops accepted the Government's terms (1720); and Jansenism came to an end as an organized political force.

Not that it was by any means dead. The four original appellants refused the compromise, and were "re-appealed" to a general Council. The tolerant Regent let them alone; but after his death power passed into the hands of Fleury, former tutor to the young king, and an ardent aspirant to a cardinal's hat. He determined to make an example of the most representative appellant, Bishop Soanen of Senez. This old man of over eighty was deposed from his bishopric, and exiled to a remote monastery in Auvergne. Noailles protested against his treatment, and afterwards he died (1729), just after having made a humble submission to Rome. He was hardly in his grave before Jansenism burst out again in a new form. Persecution generally begets hysteria in its victims, more especially when they already accept a strong doctrine of conversion. Belief in material miracles goes hand in hand with belief in moral; and even in its great days Port Royal could furnish a long list of special providences and portents, like the miracle of the Holy Thorn. Now that the fortunes of the party were at their lowest ebb, these were multiplied a hundredfold. About 1728 the "miracles of St. Médard" began to make the talk of Paris. These were a series of astonishing cures—mostly of nervous diseases—effected at the tomb of François de Paris (1600-1727), a young Jansenist cleric of singularly humble birth. He was the founder of the Unigenitus. In 1722 the Government closed the cemetery, and gave rise to the famous epigram:

"De peur de la loi, défense à Paris
De faire miracle en ce lieu."

From mere miracles it was but a step to apocalyptic prophecy and speaking with tongues. The so-called Commissaires worked themselves up, by means of frightful self-torture, into a state of ecstasy, in which they prophesied and cared diseases. They were speedily disowned by the serious Jansenists, but they dragged on a disreputable existence for many years. In 1722 they were still important enough for Diderot to take the field against them. A curious law-suit revealed that they had a regular organization, with elective officers and a common treasury, known as the botte à Perrette ("Perrette's boot") from the name of the old lady who was its original custodian.

Meanwhile Cardinal Fleury was having much ado to enforce the Unigenitus on the clergy generally. The French judges were enthusiastically Gallican; and they hated the bull, because it was a triumph of their hereditary enemies, the Jesuits and Jansenists. But they knew the papists they put every possible difficulty in the way of its execution. Under their fostering care, a belief sprang up that to call oneself a 'Jansenist,' and abuse the Unigenitus, was to show oneself a lover of civil and religious liberty.

And, as the Jesuits grew more and more unpopular, the word 'Jansenist' came to mean everything that they were not; it stood for a sterling, upright character, and a manly hatred of double-dealing and shams. Thus the historian Sismondi, who was born in 1773, remembered an old gentleman who used to boast that he was an atheist. He was an adherent of the Jansenist sect. Men of this type had much to do with the eventual suppression of the Jesuits (1773), and not a little with the French Revolution. Here political Jansenism joined hands with religious in the remarkable figure of the Abbé Henri Grégoire (1750-1831), sometime constitutional bishop of Blois.

For religious Jansenism was not dead. The old Spirit of Port Royal still survived in many a country parsonage and convent, and led throughout the 18th cent. to chronic conflicts with authority. Often the causes of quarrel were trumpery enough; and Jansen's latter-day descendants did not always show themselves reasonable or broad-minded. Still, in their dim fashion they upheld the great principle of their school—that religion begins and ends as an inward 'touch of the Spirit,' and over the movements of that Spirit death. Outside France also during the 18th cent. much was heard of Jansenism, though the word was loosely used to cover a great number of different meanings. Any one of them might be absorbed—more especially abuses profitable to the Court of Rome—was at once set down as a Jansenist. So was any priest in any country who tried to keep a strict hand over his flock. In Ireland, down to quite modern times, Jansenism meant more than a conscientious objection to dancing on Sunday. Much the same is true of Italy, though here something of the true spirit of Port Royal inspired the efforts of Bishop Segismonde de Ricci (1741-1816), the leading spirit in the ill-fated synod of Pistoia (1786). But the most direct heir of Port Royal was Jansen's native country of Holland. Here, ever since Jansen's own day, Catholic ecclesiastical affairs had been in a great tangle. The Dutch priests clung to their ancient right of electing their own archbishop of Utrecht—or, rather, since the archbishopric had lapsed at the Reformation, they wished to choose their acting bishop, or vicar-general. Rome, on the other hand, wanted to assimilate Holland to other Protestant countries, where the chief ecclesiastical office was a vicar apostolic, chosen by the pope and directly under his orders. Thus was all the more burning, since in Holland, as in the England of Elizabeth, there were bitter quarrels between the Jesuits and the secular parochial clergy. The Jesuits wanted a papal nominee, the seculars held tightly to their local independence. Jansen had entered the lists on behalf of the seculars, while he was still a professor at Louvain; Saint Cyra and Antoine Arnauld had followed him, and ever since Port Royal had been on the friendliest terms with Utrecht. The fact was not forgotten at Rome. In 1762 the Vicar-General Codde was deposed by the pope on a charge of Jansenism. A section of the Dutch parish priests refused to recognize his deposition, and were supported by a number of French 'apellant' refugees, who streamed into Holland on the degeneration of the Unigenitus. Codde himself succeeded, under protest, in his deposition; but his supporters were not so meek as he, and eventually organized themselves into a separate community. In 1729 Cornelius Steenoven was consecrated bishop of Utrecht by Dominique Varlet, a French missianary bishop, who had been deposed by Rome as a suspected Jansenist; and suffragan sees were afterwards founded at Haarlem, which never entered the Counter. Popularity the community has always been known.
JAPAN

as the Jansenist Church of Utrecht; officially it rejects the name of Jansenist, and calls itself the Old Roman Catholic Church—"De Oud-roombeschouwende Religie van Kerspel"—nevertheless, its theology bears a strongly Jansenist complexion. It regards Arnauld's interpretation of Jansen as perfectly orthodox; and it rejects the Unigenitus and the inoffensibility of infants, and resists it adheres strictly to Catholic beliefs and practices—the practices of two hundred years ago; for it is rigidly conservative, and boasts that it does not move with the times. Of late years, however, it has given up something of its immobility. Since 1752 it has been in communion with the Old Catholics of Germany, although it by no means approves all their departures from established Catholic usage. More recently it has established a mission in Paris—the "Église gallicane"—and has consecrated a bishop to supervise the Old Catholics of England. And, if there is any future for free Catholic Churches in Western Europe, Utrecht will undoubtedly be their natural starting-point and centre.


JAPAN.—The country of Japan (exclusive of Korea [p. v.]) consists of more than 40 islands and a great number of islets, lying between 60° 30' and 48° 15' N. lat. and 134° and 142° E. long. having an area of more than 173,786 sq. miles. Of these islands Honshū is the largest, containing nearly two-thirds of the total area; and it has been, and is likely to remain, the chief seat of national life. But Kyūshū, to the south-west of Honshū, is historically of far greater importance, having been for centuries one of the main channels through which Asiatic and European influences reached Japan.

A remarkable feature of Japan is the high ratio of coast-line to land area, this being estimated at 1 : 35, whereas in Greece and Norway, which have the longest coast-lines in Europe, the ratio is 1 : 5. The coast-line of Honshū and Kyūshū is so long that narrow, oval faces of the sea, and the fact that the sea and the sea currents which flow into Japan are most violent, have no special projection of cheek bones, a straight or aquiline nose, more or less slanting eyes, and small hands and feet, long, delicate fingers. People of this type were called by the name of Idzumo. Mongol characteristics are a broad face, prominent cheek bones, oblique eyes, and a flat nose. The Malayans are said to have contributed the most important elements to the Japanese race. Their physical characteristics are the square-built, well-developed body, generally short in stature, and the round face with a prominent nose. They are found in S. China, in the south-western parts of Korea, and in all the islands along the eastern coasts of the Asiatic continent; and it is probable that at the dawn of Japanese history they landed in Kyūshū and thence pushed their way north until they finally conquered the Manchu-Korean settlers in Idzumo. These three types are now so blended as to make it impossible to trace any single one distinctly and exclusively in the features of particular individuals. Every Japanese is a composite, each differing from the rest only in the measure of proportion.

There is, however, a group of people in Japan who have preserved their racial distinctness until this day. They are the Ainu, the people who now inhabit the islands north of the Tsugaru Strait. It still remains an unsolved question whether they were the aborigines of Japan. Some assert that a primitive people known as the "Koropokkyu" inhabited the Japanese islands previous to the intrusion of the Ainu. In any case, it is certain that the Ainu are the only aboriginal inhabitants of the whole land, but were gradually driven out of Kyūshū and the main island by later intruders from the Asiatic continent or the South Sea Islands. Historical records show that the Ainu were not fierce, brave fighters, making strong opposition to the central government, and not infrequently becoming a menace to its security. There was, however, a distinct feeling in the Ainu, called the nio-yeo, the 'naturalized' Ainu, in contrast to the aro-yeo, the 'wild' Ainu. This tends to show that Ainu blood is flowing in the veins of the Japanese. The Ainu people, unlike the Manchu-Koreans or the Mongols, have a very close resemblance to some Europeans in physical characteristics. They are rather short and thickly built; they have prominent foreheads with deep-set eyes, bushy eyebrows, thick overhanging eyelashes, and, unlike their Manchu-Korean neighbours, with heavy heads, and, remarkably enough, long divergent eyelashes. There is, accordingly, good reason to believe that the Ainu are the best authority upon the Ainu, to hold that they belong to the Canadian race. He maintains also that the 'Ainu language is Aryan, with the marks common to the languages of the six great Aryan peoples' (cf. W. E. Griffis, The Jap. Nation in Evolution, p. 5; see, further, art. AINA, vol. i. p. 239 ff.), B. H. Chamberlain is opposed to this view, principally on the ground that the flattening of the shin bone differentiates the Ainu from the Arians (The Language, Mythology, and Geographical Nomenclature of Japan, in the Light of Aino Studies, London, 1905, p. 107). This involves the question whether there is an Aryan element in the physical and mental constitution of the Japanese race.

J. J. Rein declares that 'Japanese society exhibits a surprisely large variety and suitability to the four seas.' The latter, though, generally speaking, much darker than among Caucasians, is characterized in occasional instances by even the fair, clear complexion of the Germanic peoples. Not unfrequently the symmetry and the regularity of features are so great and so discreet from the general types that we imagine we are in the presence of a well-formed European (Jap. Japan, London, 1904, p. 37). If so, the 'evidences,' including physical features and mental character-
itself, of the Japanese being descended from
Iranian, Caucasian, or Aryan ancestry. It is a
fact that in certain sections of the country, e.g., in
considerable portions of Kyushu, Chagoku, and
Hokuriku—the inhabitants have at least physical
evergethecultures and the constant adjustment
of them to Japanese temperament and needs.

1. Early period.—The religion of ancient Japan
presents no definitely systematized forms of worship
or belief. It was ministric or spiritistic. The
term karai, which signifies 'deity,' was applied
indiscriminately to any object or natural phe-
nomenon that might arouse the feelings of wonder,
awe, fear, or love. Hence, mountains, rivers, plants,
sea, mountains, rivers, and winds, in which the
people believed some supernatural spirit dwelt,
were worshipped (see, further, art. God [Japanese],
volumes vi. p. 294 ff.). Belief in divine animism was
prevalent. Divination was practiced by various kinds of
mystical and magical charms employed to aver evil.
The introduction of Confucianism (see art. Confucianism,
vol. iv. p. 123 ff.) in A.D. 588, and Buddhism in A.D.
588, produced no change in these primitive practices,
which only refined outwardly.

The mythological accounts contained in the
Kojiki (Record of Ancient Events, compiled A.D.
712) and the Nihongi (Chronicle, compiled A.D.
720); however, seem to represent those ancient
beliefs and practices in the light of an age in which a
more formalized form of ancestor-worship had been
developed (see, however, art. Ancestor-
Worship [Japanese], vol. i. p. 455 ff.). The racial
blending and cultural unification of the tribes
inhabiting the islands, which took place at a very early
stage of development is not precisely determined, but may
have brought about a type of religion which, in subse-
quently ages, took the name of Shinto (g.w.).
The imperial thanksgiving festivals, such as the Dajiki
(Great Rite of the First Rice), the Shinji (Annual
Rite of the First Rice), and the Kamamarioi
(Thanksgiving Offering to the Ancestor-God), are
generally regarded as having been handed down
from time immemorial. All the mythological
narratives contained in the ancient annals show the
fundamental importance attached to the common
ancestry of all the Japanese people; and this is also evident from the fact that the religious
rites in which the ancestor-gods were invoked were
regarded as a function of government, both rites
and government having the same name, mitsukyrejito.
In primitive Japan, a man was bound to maintain
those religious rites. A system of ancestor-worship
implies a conviction of the immortalitv of the soul,
and this belief held by the ancient Japanese.
Death was called 'disappearing,' 'going away,'
and a 'departure of the soul.' Distinction was made
between the two kinds of soul existing in each
distinguished person. The one was the mitiguma,
gentle, peaceful, and benevolent; the other the
arutame, rough, fierce, and savage. An emergency
called kaikyo ('child of the god') was on an
emergency called to discover the will of a departed
ancestor. The idea of transmigration seems also to
have been present. Closely connected with ancestor-worship are the rites of purification, which
were of pre-eminent importance in Shinto ritual.
There were two principal forms, one of which was
harai, wind-purification (which often consisted in
paying a penalty or fine) and the other misojo, water-
purification. To the mind of the ancient Japanese,
cleanness was next to godliness. Any defilement,
sanitary, moral, or ritual, received the utmost care
and attention. Prayers, called norito, are more of
the nature of prayers than of religious ceremonies.

2. 559-1220.—Borne on the current of the
continental civilization which brought various forms of
art and culture to Japan, Buddhism came through
China to Korea to the island-nation in the second quarter
of the 6th century. This was the century of great
Buddhist propaganda in China (cf. art. China
[Buddhism in], vol. iii. p. 555 ff.). Many of her
inhabitants, who were coming in great numbers, seem to
have been devoted missionaries. In A.D.
538, through the agency of the king of Kadara in
Korea, a royal gift, consisting of a statue of
Buddha, sittaras, and banners, was presented to the
Japanese Court, accompanied with the message that
the Buddha Dharma, the most excellent of all
Laws, which would bring immeasurable benefit to
its believers, had been accepted in all the
kingdoms between India and the Sea of Japan.
Determination whether the new faith should be accepted was taken up by
two hostile Court parties struggling for political
supremacy. The new religion was in the mean-
time being continued to be studied by
missionaries, magicians, artists, sittaras, and
objects of ritual. It first received Court-sanction
when Prince Unayaro 0 Shohtoku des-
teated the army of the anti-Buddhist
Emperor, then, in A.D. 593, he became
regent to Empress Suikô in
A.D. 593. He drew up Japan's first constitution,
proclaiming the 'Three Treasures,' i.e., the Buddha,
the Law, and the Sutra, to be the cornerstones of faith,
and single-hearted devotion to it the
foundational factor of an upright life. At
the public expense he built Buddhist temples, pagodas,
seminaries, hospitals, dispensaries for the aged and
sick students, directly to China to study Buddhist doctrines.
The new faith made headway among both the
higher and the lower classes. In the year 624,
less than 70 years after the introduction of the
sittaras, the temples numbered 46, the priests
816, and the monks 569. From this time the influ-
ence of Buddhism continued almost without inter-
ruption to the close of the Tokugawa regime (1868).
During the Nara period (710-794), successive
Emperors fostered the faith. It became the
religion of the Court, and the security of the crown
and the peace of the land were thought to be depen-
dent upon the continuous favour of Buddha and his
saints. The cebonies, as his followers, were re-
elieved from the public service required from all
others. Under the Emperor Shômoin, a Buddhist
temple was built in each province, and the Todaiji
temple in Nara, the metropolis of that time, was
the central shrine (741), dedicated to Vairochana
(the universe personified as Buddha), whose
colossal bronze image, 53 ft. in height, was cast a
few years later. The beautiful consort of Shômoin,
Empress Komô, who had great influence with
him, was a zealous Buddhist. She called herself the 'servant of the Triune Treasure,'
and on one occasion prostrated themselves before
Buddha's image. Under such circumstances it was
but natural that the religion should become an
instrument in the hands of ambitious emperors.
In the time of Emperor Kôken (749-790), the
eclesiastical body had grown into a political power which
almost overshadowed the imperial authority.
Yugé-no-Dokýa, a notorious bonze, became Imperial abbot and prime minister, and would have usurped the imperial throne but for the heroic opposition of Waki-no-Kiyomaro, a devoted royalist. This同一时 a sympathetic movement was going on. Natural calamities and plagues, which frequently afflicted the people, disturbed their belief in Buddha’s protection, and tended to lower the moral tone of court and country. The Emperors themselves had a dread that the forsaken deities might be avenging themselves. A religious compromise was arranged by the priest Gyokki, when the colossal image of Buddha, already mentioned, was cast after he had secured an oracle at the Shintó temple of Ise to the effect that Amaterasu, the ancestor-goddess, was a manifestation of Vairochana. This example of combining the worship of native deities with that of Buddha and his saints was followed in other parts of the country, to the advantage of Buddhism. This syncretistic movement was brought to completion by Kukai, who appeared about fifty years later.

Whatever may be said of the Buddhism of the Nara period, it made an unparalleled contribution to the advancement of religious arts.

The period immediately following (894) is marked by the introduction of different divisions of Buddhism. The sect called Tendai-shi in Japan was inaugurated by Saicho (posthumously Dengyô, 767–822), a preacher and Buddhist statesman. He traveled to China and studied the doctrine of Tendai, which he rearranged and remodelled into something almost new. Saicho’s doctrine is based upon the teaching known as Tatsunomi, or the True Buddha, the historical revealer of truth, is here viewed as the full enlightenment. Realization of such Buddhahood in one’s consciousness is the supreme object of practice, and wisdom. Saicho’s system combined different aspects of the Buddhist doctrine which received emphasis in different proportion at the hands of later Buddhists, and thus became the fountain-head of different branches of Japanese Buddhism. Wealth of learning and purity of character made Saicho influential with the Court, and he built a monastery on Mount Hiei (788), which was for several centuries one of the greatest centres of Buddhist learning as well as of ecclesiastical power.

Another division called Shingon-shi (‘Sect of True Word’) was introduced in the Nara period, and for the greater part of the Heian, or Kôbô, 774–835). He began his teaching by classifying various forms of religious life in ten grades of development, the last and highest being that of Shingon. It is the state in which full blessedness of Buddhahood is realized. According to Kukai, the entire universe, including all spiritual existence, is made up of the six elements which again may be grouped as two, mental and material. The two are, however, inseparably blended. Matter contains mind, and mind incorporates itself in matter. The two are one, and the one is two. Every particle of matter is, therefore, pervaded by the divine presence of Buddhahood. The universe is but Buddhahood externalized. The Buddha within us may be called forth by practice of the ‘mystery’ in conduct, speech, and heart. This doctrine of Kukai led, especially on the theological side, to the syncretistic movement of Buddhism that had been inaugurated by Gyôki. The propagator of the Shingon sect thus became also the originator of Kyôba, namely, Buddhist Sahito, proclaiming that the Imperial custom of kuni-worship is, in reality, but disguised adoration of Buddha. Kukai had far greater influence than any of his predecessors. His versatile genius and his practical resourcefulness combined to make him a great power both in the Court circle and among the common people. He built a monastery on Mount Kôya, which became the headquarters of his denomination, and eventually overshadowed the influence of the hill-monastery on Hie. We may here note a remarkable change that took place in the religious atmosphere. During the earlier part of this same period, worldly blessings, as health, good harvest, prosperity, and peace, were the reward sought in the worship of the kuni, or Buddhist deities; and gorgeous rituals and the mystery practices pertaining to the Shingon sect made it attractive, especially in Court circles. Later, however, as the Fujiwara family declined and one civil war occurred after another, both the nobles and the common people felt the evanescence of this world; the yearning after supramundane bliss became imperative, while pessimism prevailed.

3. 700–900.—For half a century or more previous to Yoritomo’s founding of the Bakufu (military government) at Kamakura (1192), class struggles involved the country in constant warfare. Bloody combat, exhaustion, death, and the treachery of friends, all of which were daily occurrences, could not fail to produce a pessimistic temperament. Elaborate rituals and theological distinctions offered no attraction. The religion which could point to a place of refuge, no longer dis- turbed by the storms of life, was in urgent demand. To meet such a need Hôen (1133–1212) and Shinran (1173–1263) appeared.

(a) Jodo and Law sects.—Hôen, formerly a student of the Tendai doctrine at the monastery-school on Hie, renounced all its philosophy as effete, and denounced the mystery practices and the discipline of conduct as useless. He preached the doctrine of Sukhavati, the Japanese ‘Jodo,’ or the ‘Western Pure Land,’ according to which any man, ignorant or wise, high or low, could be saved by faith in the boundless grace of Amitábha. He作风 character, profound piety, and sincere conviction, with his doctrine of the future redemption, made Hôen the greatest religious influence with the Court and common people, until the jealousy of his religious rivals caused him to be exiled. Some of his disciples to be put to death. The faith which he once preached, however, did not cease to be a powerful influence. Hôen had many capable followers, the most famous of which is Kôbô Daishi, who carried his master’s teaching to its logical consequence. He unhesitatingly abandoned the repeated invocation of Amitábha’s name which constituted an important part in Hôen’s doctrine, proclaiming a simple, undoubting trust in the Deliverer as the sole condition of salvation. With a bold stroke of genius, he abolished the prohibition of the marriage of bonzes, practically removing the distinction between the secular and the sacred. He was married himself, and he called himself the gottou, the ‘tensored ignoramus,’ putting himself on the same level as common people. Thus the Shin sect was founded by Shinran, whose doctrine and influence have survived all vicissitudes of time, and are perpetuated to this day in the Hongwanji, the two greatest shrines in Japan. This especially on the external means. All doctrinal learning and rituals, therefore, are useless, and meditation or a con-
centrated reflection upon one’s essential nature is the
only way to realize Buddhahood in one’s self. A
complete disregard of the letter and of ritual
pageantry made Buddhism among the most popular
among military men, who prized them for its
extra extreme simplicity of life. The Dhyāna
doctrine also helped them to cultivate the spirit of
stoical indifference to hardship and the habit of
resoluteness in conflict. Many Shōguns because
adherents of this doctrine.

(c) Nichiren sect.—In the meantime there arose
an extreme form of bibilology. Nichiren (1222–
82) after the teaching of Saichō, based his teaching
upon the Suddhādharma-pārvitikā (‘Lotus of the
True Law’). His principal tenet consisted in
accepting the doctrine of Buddha’s Truth by repeatedly uttering
the title of that scripture in which alone, he held, the genuine and, indeed, the only true
doctrines of Gautama are set forth. Persecuted,
exiled, almost put to death, he ever grew bolder in his
denunciation of the faithless age, holding to
the firm conviction that he was the heaven-sent
Bodhisattva (g.v.), whose coming in the ‘latter age
had been predicted by Gautama.

The religious leaders whom we have just men-
tioned, we may call the precursors, the next disciples who
perpetuated and developed the movements which
their teachers had begun. Roughly speaking, the
Tendai and Shingon sects held influence among the
noble, the Zen among the warrior class, and
Shinshū and Shinshū among the mass of the people. In
the 16th and 17th centuries, an age again involved
in wars and political disorder, these religious bodies
often became political factors, or interfered with politics.
The Zen sect, being that of the military aristocracy,
became influential through its monasteries in edu-
cational work and literary culture. It was an
age of religious fermentation, and a great number
of minor sects arose, finding more or less of a
following.

(d) Shinshū.—Shinshū also awoke from the
dogmatic slumber which it had enjoyed under the
name of Ryōbu Shinshū, and sought an attempt to
systematize itself. Kitabatake Chikafusa (1539)
tried to show that the divine descent of the Imperial
sovereigns, and vindicate kumite-worship as essential
to the preservation of national order. In this
preaching he became a forerunner of the royal
Shintōists of the 18th century. In the 15th century,
Yoshida Kanetomo, borrowing his method largely
from the Buddhist Shingon, developed a new
Christian Shinshū (Yūritsu Shinshū), which stood in contrast
with Ryōbu (syácretist Shinshū). Shinshū did not
become a great social factor, however, until the
earlier 17th century.

(e) Roman Catholics.—In the 16th century,
the Jesuit missionaries began operations in Kyūshū
and extended them to Kyōto, where their message
was welcomed by Nobunaga, the ruling Shōgun,
who, at their instance, opened a theological semi-
nary at Azuchi, Omi, and also built a cathedral in
the Imperial capital. Their propaganda, often
accompanied with gifts of musical instruments,
cloaks, glasses, and even distribution of rice among
the poor, found great success among both the popu-
lace and the feudal nobles, especially in Kyūshū
and Nagato. Thirty years after the commences;
mentary (1588), and under Hidetsuki and the Tokugawa
Shōguns, patrons of Buddhism, the Roman Catholic
faith was annihilated. The suppression of the
insurgents at Shimabara, Kyūshū, in 1638 marks the
dowfall of the ‘Kirishitan’ as a political factor.

4. 1600–1688.—The Tokugawa government
adopted a Shintō-Confucian philosophy, designed
for the suppression of any political or social factor
to unmanageable magnitude. Religions of any
potency were, therefore, either paralyzed by gener-
ous patronage or put under prescription. The
aggressive movement of the Roman Catholic Chris-
tians was completely checked in 1638; and the
government tried to exterminate individual Chris-
tians by charging the Buddhist priests with the
office of taking a religious census. The nation as a
whole was compelled to be Buddhist, outwardly
in outward form. At the same time, Buddhism under
the Shōgun’s patronage fell into spiritual decay,
although to its credit is the fact that most of the
Buddhist scriptures and literary productions were
put into print. The doctrines and ecclesiastical
policy of each of the Buddhist sects were systemat-
ized. Takuan († 1645), Hakuun († 1789), and Jien
(† 1804) were among the most conspicuous priests
of this age. The oppressive policy of the Shogunate
government caused, as we have seen, religious and
spiritual lassitude on the one hand, but, on the
other hand, it produced a strong reaction on the
part of the adherents of those religions which the
government had neglected and overlooked. Such
was the case with the Shintōists. Since the time
of Dennyū and Kūkai, Shinshū had lost its pristine
purity and present movement was under the shadow of Buddhism. Now Hayashi
Rasen († 1657), officially a Confucianist, made an
attempt to free Shinshū from the ‘element’ of
Buddhism, but he had not the power to resist
strongly with Confucian philosophies.

It was Hirotaru Asatuné (1443) who claimed Shinshū
as the only true religion, asserting that Japan and her
Imperial house are the descendants of the Original
Creativity of the universe, the special objects of divine favor. All other
religions he denounces as false or deteriorated.

He had a large following, especially among the
samurai, and contributed greatly to the Restora-
tion of the Imperial government.

In the 19th century, religious beliefs arose which
claimed the name of Shinshū, but which really had
little connection with the ancient system of that
name. Probably the best known and most worthy
leader was Kurozumi, who preached on the four
elements of divine revelation, prayer, providence,
and honesty. He preached also the Goddess
Amaterasu was the fountain-head of all life, and
that man must be in constant communion with her.
Many other systems, such as Konkō, Tenri, and
Yomonomo, are but old-fashioned practices under
the guise of Shinshū worship.

5. After 1868.—The Restoration of 1868 brought
Shinshū into prominence, at least temporarily, since
it was regarded as representing the ‘way’ of
the national gods or ancestors. The first act of
the Emperor and government was to call the
Buddha’s Appearance, establish the Holy and
Monk, and establish a new form of government
under the guidance of the Imperial court.

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centres of influence through the agency of mission workers and teachers, of whom G. H. F. Verbeek, D. S. Thompson, W. S. Clark, S. R. Brown, W. K. Griffin, George Cochran, James Ballagh, Captain Janes, and D. C. Greene are the best known. Of the Japanese Christian leaders, Nakishima († 1890) and Honda (Bishop of the Japan Mission, 1897–1905), were particularly important. The mighty current of 'Europeanization' which swept the country at the end of the eighties gave an opportunity for Christian propaganda to make rapid headway. Its friendly reception, culminating in what was to become the Diet, was lamented, and confirmed the right of the Christians to maintain their faith. Indeed, the placards prohibiting the Christian faith had been removed in 1875, but it had continued to be a proscribed religion. Early in the nineties an extreme counter-current of Nationalism set in. The problem of Treaty Revision had aroused anti-foreign feeling, and Christianity, being regarded as an alien faith, suffered. The faith was attacked as detrimental to educational interests; the doors of the Government schools were closed against it, and Christian education became an impossibility. Moreover, the European culture which had flooded the nation brought with it some ideas that apparently were hostile to Christian doctrine as it was presented at that time. Not only Bentham and Mill were denounced generally as atheist. All this, however, presented no serious difficulty to progressive Christians.

The Buddhists now started a movement which they called the Romashika Buddhist Union, and stirred up all Japanese to join their anti-Christian campaign. The Shintoists combined with them once more. The Imperial Rescript on Education was issued in 1876 with the purpose of setting up a national standard of morality, and this document was employed by conservatives as a basis of argument against Christianity.

The war with Russia in 1894–95 had two opposite effects. On the one hand, it awoke the whole nation to a consciousness of her own resources, both material and spiritual, which led some to believe that Japan required no other religion than the one which she had had from old times. On the other hand, the very gratifying of a long-cherished political aspiration led the people to feel the spirit of a higher and deeper piety which more material or political glory could not satisfy. Here and there, amidst the blaze of the national exultation, a dark, cold stream of pessimism flowed.

From kawashiki ('spiritual distress') not a few young men took refuge in suicide. Christianity, now more 'naturalized' or 'Japanese' and stronger after many years of struggle, renewed her activity. At the beginning of the new century, all Protestant denominations (22 in number), except a few extremely conservative ones, joined in an evangelizing campaign which was carried on at strategic points in the Empire. Buddhism also, perceiving the spiritual crisis of the century upon the nation, made an attempt to promote religious interests instead of wasting its energy in attacking Christianity; and a body of Buddhist scholars, mostly of the new sect, started a philanthropic movement called 'New Buddhism.' Christianity and other forms of religion passed.

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Yet the younger generation seems to crave something deeper and more fundamental. Enkeik and Bergson are now claiming their attention, and Christianity and Buddhism are expected to develop new and more excited aspects of power than they have hitherto revealed.

III. ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT.—1. Earliest period to the 6th century,—The history of Japanese ethics reveals a composite character in the temperament of the people. In both ancient times, a combination of what may be called Hellenic and Hebraic tendencies, varying only in proportion in different ages. Clear sky, crystal waters, and a transparent sea surrounding the whole land all tended to develop a moral conception in which ideas fundamentally ethical blended with aesthetic ideas. In ancient times, good and bad desires were expressed in terms designating optical sensations, such as akai ('red, clear,' kuro (dark, black), kyon (clean, clear), and kitani (turbid, impure, unclear). Even to-day these terms, used in proper context, may convey a purely spiritual signification. To the Japanese karashi, 'red heart' (i.e. single-heartedness), and karamagiro, 'black-abdomen' (i.e. black-heartedness), do not sound strange. The conception of teim, 'offence, therefore, was not purely ethical. The idea is better expressed by the term 'evil,' or more strictly, 'soulfulness.' Among amatsu-teimu (offences against the heavenly gods), the 'sin' of which was so very much like modern ideas. All this, however, present no serious difficulty to progressive Christians.

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and officials. He included many injunctions which were Buddhist and Confucian in spirit, and therefore, theoretically speaking, opposed to certain moral principles which arose under the patriarchal form of society. Loyal obedience to the sovereign, for instance, is enjoined, not because he is the family head of the house of the ruling people, but because he is so appointed by heaven, it being presupposed that the ruler's position may be occupied by any one best fitted for it. The general welfare of the nation is considered as the most important, while loyalty to the clan receives no attention whatever. Further, the emphasis placed upon the importance of adhering to the "Yumi Tōme" may be interpreted as involving Bud-
dhist universalism, which is essentially subversive of patriarchal morality. All this, however, may be due to the effort of the Prince to check those evils which the ever growing clannism of that period had developed. In fact, the Taikō Reformation (A.D. 648) followed the downfall of the Soga family. The ethical history of Japan may in one sense be regarded as a struggle between the patriarchal morality (family or clan morality) indigenous to the country and the universal morality introduced from abroad, a combination of which may be found in the late development of Buddhism (342) (2). Similarly, universalism as expressed in the Confucian system of moral rules was weakened by the introduction of Confucianism from the Chinese civilization (the 14th cent.). The introduction of Buddhism awakened the humanitarian sentiment, particularly among the Court nobles and members of the Imperial Household. A new law of behavior has been established, with a strong emphasis on the protection of the weak, the sick, and the aged. In the establishment of asylums for the poor, in the building of dispensaries, and in the laws prohibiting the destruction of animal life. It also encouraged an appreciation of nature and a struggle against the customary barbaric treatment of the less fortunate members of society. The introduction of Buddhism also had a profound influence on the Confucian system of values, which was weakened by the introduction of Confucianism from the Chinese civilization (the 14th cent.). The introduction of Buddhism awakened the humanitarian sentiment, particularly among the Court nobles and members of the Imperial Household. A new law of behavior has been established, with a strong emphasis on the protection of the weak, the sick, and the aged. In the establishment of asylums for the poor, in the building of dispensaries, and in the laws prohibiting the destruction of animal life. It also encouraged an appreciation of nature and a struggle against the customary barbaric treatment of the less fortunate members of society.

The practice of Confucian obedience to the sovereign, the names of men and women were placarded, after the Chinese fashion, for their filial obedience to their parents, and those who committed the "sin" of filial disobedience were exiled to distant provinces. Believing the practice of filial obedience to be the foundation of all virtues, the Empress Kōken (749–758), earnest Buddhist, offered substantial contributions to the promotion of Buddhism in the early part of the Heian period (794–1185) and the Kamakura period (1185–1333). The study of the classics became a part of education in the upper classes, and the Confucian system of values was strengthened. However, the introduction of Buddhism also had a profound influence on the Confucian system of values, which was weakened by the introduction of Confucianism from the Chinese civilization (the 14th cent.). The introduction of Buddhism awakened the humanitarian sentiment, particularly among the Court nobles and members of the Imperial Household. A new law of behavior has been established, with a strong emphasis on the protection of the weak, the sick, and the aged. In the establishment of asylums for the poor, in the building of dispensaries, and in the laws prohibiting the destruction of animal life. It also encouraged an appreciation of nature and a struggle against the customary barbaric treatment of the less fortunate members of society.

Yet all these seem to have contributed nothing to the ethical culture of the nation; nor did Buddhism bring any perceptibly wholsome results. The deeper and more exalted aspects of the spiritual life were left untouched. The tendency was to en-
counter superstitions and practices such as magic and incantation, rather than to elevate the moral tone. Unrestricted admission into monasteries often turned them into institutions which menaced the peace of the community. Confucianism also seems to have had little influence. The Tenno's efforts to deliver the populace from ignorance and superstition. Teachings of the 1-King ("Book of Change") tended to encourage a fatalistic belief, which had, no doubt, a morally paralyzing effect. Buddhist moralists, particularly Zen, flattered the more luxurious, effeminate, and corrupt persons in striking contrast to splendid achievements in literature.

3. 1200–1600.—The rise of the military class at the close of the 12th cent. had a paralyzing effect somewhat similar to the occupation of Europe by the Northern barbarians in the 5th. century. The splendor and corruption of the Heian period were swept away with the fall of the Fujiwara family, and the establishment by Yoritomo of the military government became an occasion for the rise of a new type of military people, the samurai. It was a moral spirit of temperance, prevalent among the samurai, characterized by austere simplicity of life, duty endurance of hardship, love of peace, and unyielding devotion to one's lord. It was a product peculiar to an age in which fighters were the preservers of social order. It included, therefore, physical, mental, and emotional endurance, quickness of perception, and mental alertness were essential parts of samurai education. Intellectual culture received little attention until the latter part of the Ashikaga period (the middle of the 15th cent.). Among moral virtues, valor naturally occupied the central position. It had value by itself irrespective of the results which it brought, and the verdict of cowardice was more hated than loss of life. Courage, however, had to be accompanied by a sense of propriety (regī), even in the midst of fighting. Apart from the latter, valor itself was true to a promise, was emphasized equally with honor. The Bushi has no double tongue' and 'A gentleman never trifles with words' were sayings which became proverbial. The Bushi was the ideal of a samurai. The use of any base or cowardly means in war was despised and often involved destruction for its perpetrator. Chūshin, or the principle of loyalty, however, was as much a part of the samurai as of all military virtues. It was the organizing principle by which the samurai belonged to the same clan and were united into one solid body which lived and died for the cause of their master. And already been observed (p. 484). Bushido found a good ally in the Zen school of Buddhism which arose at the beginning of the period, and other branches of Buddhism also had some influence. Exposed to sudden and often extreme change, the samurai felt the need of some superhuman power upon which to rely. It became more or less a fashion among them, when they went to the front, to put a tiny Buddha image in their tuck of hair, or a prayer-leaflet in the pocket of their armour. Their religious faith, however, sometimes differed from that of other classes in that they believed that the deities whom they worshipped favoured only the cause of the good and the righteous: 'If thy heart be upright, the gods will protect thee, though thou mayest not invoke them.' Compared with that of the Heian period, the religious faith of the samurai was more free from superstition. Towards the latter part of this period, Bushido became more comprehensive, and took a form that might well serve as a moral code for the people in general. Some injunctions relative to economic and other practical lines of conduct, based upon Confucian teachings, were introduced in the written codes of certain feudal families. Popular education, so far as it existed, was in the hands of Buddhist priests. Text-books were compiled by them in which were expounded theories of filial duty and family propriety, based on Confucian as well as Buddhist doctrines.

4. 1600–1868.—The Tokugawa policy of diverting the attention of the daimyō from political to literary pursuits introduced a period of marvellous culture. Classical scholars were elevated to the
rank of official instructors, and numerous schools and libraries were established, some of which remain to this day. In accordance with the general movement, the lord of the province of Bizen devoted one-third of his total revenue to the cause of education. Under these circumstances, Confucianism blossomed in full splendour, though Buddhism withered under the blighting shadow of the Shōgun's patronage. Philological and logical historical interests caused a revival of Shintō. Buddhism, which during the period, burst forth after some vicissitudes into a political movement which brought about the Restoration of 1868. Side by side with all this, the Shingakuta ('spiritual culture') movement arose for the moral instruction of the uneducated (see below, (d)).

(a) Confucianism.—Of the different divisions of Confucianism, that of the Shushi School (named after its Chinese founder, Chu-Hi) was the earliest to appear, and became the pioneer of learning in this period. Its most prominent representatives were Fūjirara Issei (1561–1619), Hayaishi Rasan (1583–1657), Murō Kyōhe (1685–1748), Kaibara Ekiken (1630–1714), and, later, Satō Tsai (1723–1755) and Rai Sanyō (1750–1832). Sanyō's historical work, which had inspired the samurai to the political movement which resulted in the Restoration, was the first in the list which became personal teachers of Isyūya; and of these, Rasan, erudite, versatile, and scarcely equalled by his contemporaries, took the chief part in framing the legislative and administrative systems of the Shōgun's government. His office of instructor and counsellor was made hereditary, and it is to him that the majority of the Shogunate. The doctrine of the school became the orthodox and only authorized teaching. Indeed, towards the close of the 18th cent., an edict was issued prohibiting all contrary doctrines. Accordingly to this school, the teseōke, infinite, eternal, and absolute Essence, is the ri (reason, or logos), and the source from which emanate the in and yo (positive and, active, or so-called and positive principles, which together may be called the ki (spirit, temperment, or inclination). The manner in which the ri and the ki interact and thereby generate all things is the 'way,' which should be practically applied and observed. The ri, or reason, is the controlling and directing principle of the universe, and veritably dwells in man's original nature, from which springs all goodness and virtue, justice, propriety, wisdom, and truth. He who applies these virtues to his family and social relations is in accord with the 'way,' the Will of Heaven. The 'way' is not far from one, but is in the heart. This doctrine often led scholars to adopt a speculative method, yet the Mito School, which was founded by the lord of Mito for the purpose of compiling a political history of Japan, consisted of scholars of the Shushi School, and its influence became one of the most potent factors for the overthrow of the Shōgunate government.

In the middle of the 17th cent., there arose the Yomei School (named after Wang Yang-Ming, a Chinese scholar of the Ming dynasty) which, in opposition to the dualistic system of Chu-Hi, taught a distinctively monistic, idealistic doctrine. Among the Japanese exponents of this system, Sen Naka (1606–78), who declared the alleged difference between the ri and the ki to be only nominal, both being different phases of the same Being. All is One (Is). This led to the accomplishment of the political transformation of 1868. 

Saints.—This cult, which heretofore had never been an ethical factor of much influence, now appeared against a Confucian background. An exponent of the type of Shintō which was called Sutō-Ryū was Yamagaki Ansei (1818–82), who took the doctrine of Chu-Hi almost bodily and interpreted it in Shintō terms. He held it man's supreme duty to cultivate the original purity of his nature, and to regulate his conduct in accordance with the principle of righteousness. Bodily purification, prayer, and meditation received strong emphasis in his system. Rigid as it was, it was narrow and exclusive; but his intense zeal and sincerity awakened amongst his contemporaries a patriotic, nationalistic sentiment which contributed not a little to the accomplishment of the political transformation of 1868.

Shintō as a religious system, however, like its politically disinterested Imperial representative, absorbed and forgotten in prosperous Buddhism,
would never have regained its ascendancy but for the tidal wave of royalism which began to swell early in the 18th century. Kada Annamaro (1660-1736), Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), and Hirata Atsutane (1715-1843) appeared one after another, and proclaimed Shinto as the only system original and indigenous to Japan, and, therefore, naturally adapted to her people. Shinto in its purity they held to be the kumamaga-no-michi, that is, the way of Kimmakunai, the supreme Deity, the 'way' developed among the ancestor-gods of Japan, the only way to be reverently and unrestrainedly followed. According to them, Confucian teaching is exotic, mechanical, and artificial; the Empress Jingu, descended directly from the goddess Amaterasu, is alone worthy of absolute respect; and the laws of the Japanese State, being the embodiment of the divine will, are to be observed with the utmost devotion. Of those Shintoists Hirata Atsutane, though of broad learning, held extremely nationalistic views, which he based upon his cosmology. He held to be the first created of all nations, guided by the constant presence of the spirit of the goddess Amaterasu, to be cherished and strengthened by all Japanese endowed with the divine spirit. His royalism during was contagious and greatly advanced the cause of the Restoration.

(c) Bushido.—During the centuries of peace under the Shogunate, the samurai gradually lost the spirit of Bushido which had formerly characterized them, although, as we have seen, the spirit of loyalty was contagious and greatly advanced the cause of the Restoration.

(d) Confucianism.—During the centuries of peace under the Shogunate, the Confucian code gradually relaxed the spirit of the samurai which had formerly characterized them, although, as we have seen, the spirit of loyalty was contagious and greatly advanced the cause of the Restoration.

(e) Shingon.—In the direction of extending moral culture to the masses of the people which had hitherto been excluded from that privilege, a movement called Shingonkushu or heart culture arose in the first half of the 18th century. The leaders of the movement were Ishida Beigen and his followers. Their method was characterized by the free use of everyday language and humorous illustration, and, with a practical purpose in view, they derived their teaching from any source whatsoever, Confucian, Buddhist, or Shinto, which seemed adapted to their use.

(f) The Restoration.—The Restoration of 1868, viewed from an ethical standpoint, was a reaffirmation in politics of the samurai spirit of loyalty, moved by an inomitable aspiration for a new order of things. The new era was marked by the interplay of two opposing tendencies which were forced into united action by the pressure of political need, but which had to undergo radical transformation before they could be organized, the nationalistic, conservative, Bushido spirit on the one hand, the progressive, Europeanizing tendency on the other. It was but natural, then, that the leading engineer of these two in whom had clamorously condemned the Shogun's policy of opening the ports, eagerly sought, after the Restoration, to adopt European methods. The Restoration meant a perversion of the spiritual life of Japan. Under the new government Buddhism was deprived of its political prestige, and the bonzes became objects of unparagoned taunt. Confucianism was consigned to the hands of classical exegetes. Shinto itself, now that it had lost what it had long sought, was left to sink back into its old inertness. All moral doctrinists disappeared. Finally, Bushido itself, the moving spirit of the Restoration, was remodeled and incorporated into a new system of ethics and of state and society, with the progressive Westernizing tendency. The tendency of the time was represented by two personages entirely different in temperament and purpose. Uesugi Yukichi, founder of Keio-gijun, a pioneer importers of occidental learning. Standing upon a utilitarian ground, which he adopted after serious investigation, he daily converted, by his burning sarcasm upon the principle of royal fidelity. He held the establishment of one's self and the general welfare of the community to be the supreme objects to be pursued. Akitsu, the new Rousseau, he declared that State sovereignty is simply a power delegated by the people, implicitly denying the doctrine of its divine origin. He rigidly ascribed the spiritless and socially inefficient attitude of the commons to the evil political dependence to which they had long been reduced. Thus he became a champion of democratic and individualistic principles of morality, which, he held, ought to take the place of the old ascetic and militaristic tendency of the time. Salutary as his influence was in that respect, his teaching tended to encourage the pursuit of material success at the expense of spiritual dignity.

The other was Nishimura Jo. Born and bred a samurai, and, while in New England, thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Puritanism, he combined the essence of Bushido and Christianity. He was not a theologian; but he was an embodiment of the moral power which makes a man glad to sacrifice himself for whatsoever means spiritual progress and the enhancement of personal worth. In this he represented the general disposition of leading Christians who, while held to no particular system-bound ethical doctrines, aimed at the moral and spiritual transformation of society. Having embraced the religion that had been tempered by Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon individualism, the Japanese Christians were fundamentally no less revolutionary than the disciples of Rousseau or Bentham. Their persecution by the nationalistic, especially among government educators, was not altogether unreasonable, at least from the nationalist standpoint. Indirectly, but none the less effectively, the Christians brought home a truth that was bound to undermine the traditional forms of politics and society. Significantly enough, a considerable number of the leading politicians who advocated the cause of representative govern-
ments were Christians. Equally interesting is the fact that, in the minds of many Christians and Socialists, or men of 'dangerous ideas,' were associated. But profounder and more subtle in its effect than any other ethical system that ever impressed the faithful the teaching of Jesus was, and is felt in the secret recesses of the heart. Its social effectiveness is being shown in all virtues resulting from faith in the value and dignity of the individual, such as sexual purity, regularity in matrimonial relations, the elevation of the character, the desire for honor, cleanliness of habit, temperance, etc.

A conservative, nationalistic reaction set in at the close of the nineteenth century. The cry of 'Nipponism,' with its emphasis upon the supremacy of the nation's coming to a consciousness of its inborn privilege and power, was raised in a somewhat extravagant fashion. The movement was not altogether new in the Orient, and it gave expression to a legitimate and noble aspiration. The Imperial Rescript on education, which was issued in 1889, expressed the broadest and most ideal aspect of this movement. It was clearly the nationalistic, patriotic energy embodied in the Rescript that conducted the nation safely through the critical movements of war in 1894-95 and 1904-05. The consequent chauvinistic sentiment was embedded in the conclusion of the later war. The beginning of the new century brought the younger generation into contact with a spiritual atmosphere which was hitherto unknown in Japan. Neitzsche and Tolstoi have each found their ardent exponents among the young. Ibsen, Shaw, and Strindberg have gained a considerable number of admirers. Even a skeptical, rebellious, materialistic temper has not altogether been wanting. Yet this is simply an indication of the great spiritual struggle which new Japan is undergoing. From an ethical standpoint, Buddhism is intellectual; but it still has immeasurable resources, which is as yet insignificant in numerical and material respects, but it is ever growing and achieving. Which will be the commanding authority in the ethical and religious realm may be an open question; but that there will be one some assured.


The JAT (fem. Jâti; fem. Jâttî) is a caste found over all N.W. India, in the Panjâb, Sind, United Provinces, and the northern parts of the Rajputâna, especially Bhartpur, but hardly in Kashmir or the Himalayas to the east of that State. West of the Indus they are found in the N.W. territory, probably as such in the southern districts, but not in Afghanistan or in Balochistán, though they appear to have once occupied the latter territory. The Bâlochî term for Jâti is Jagjâl or Jagjâl, and one of the Bâlochî tribes traces its descent from 'a Jâti, a Jagjâl, a nobdy,' who on account of a woman, i.e. marrying a Bâloch bride, became a Bâloch. The Jâto tribe of the Balochi may also be of Jâti origin.

The term castes, to which any certain race, be it as ethnic, or is it easy to draw any hard and fast line between the Jâto and Râjputs in the N.W. Panjâb. The traditions of many Jâti tribes declare that they are by origin socially degraded Râjputs, whose fathers, by marrying a Jâti wives or espousing widows, lost their Râjput rank and sank to the status of Jâti, or yeomen. Other Jâti tribes are of undoubted Brahman origin. But, while many thus claim to be of gentle (Râjî) extraction or priestly (Brâhman) origin, few will admit that they have risen in the social scale. Nevertheless it is possible that the Sânsi tribe of the Jâti is akin to the criminal tribe of that name, though it produced the greatest of the Jâti in the person of Mahârâja Ranjit Singh, the famous Sikh ruler of the Panjâb.

The earliest mention of the Jâti in history occurs in Ibn Khurdadba, before A.D. 912, who mentions the Zâti (Jâti) as keeping watch over the country between Kirmâ and Manstra. The Majmû 'Ut-Tastorîk observs that by the Arabs the Hindus are called Jâti and the Moslems a Sind tribe, are descendants of Haim. The Arabs appear to have found Jâti at Châlma as well as in Sind, but the Muslims who later invaded the Panjâb cannot be said with certainty to have found them in that Province, and it is not until the 17th century, in 1398, that we have any insubstantial reference to Jâti as settled to the north of Delhi. While, then, it is credible that there is a Sûfiic element in the Jâti, it is impossible to regard them as identifiable with the 'wintry Getae,' the Marathaot, or the Goths.

That the Jâti are not a pure caste, or race is, indeed apparent from the rules which they observe in marriage. While marriage within castes is, to use a convenient, but not a scientifically accurate or definable, term, is the rule, marriage with a woman of inferior castes is not invalid, though mixed unions are rare in a caste society. The Jâti are, in that Jâti, as that which centre round Rohitak near Delhi, and public opinion reproves them.

The popular derivation of the term Jâti is closely associated with the various religious traditions. It is said to be derived from the hair (Jâti) of the god Siva, and the Mân, Her, and Bhollar, which are reputed to be the oldest Jâti tribes and to form a kind of nucleus of the caste, in particular claim this ancestry. In the S.E. Panjâb the Jâti are divided into two bagomous groups—one, the Sîvagotri, who say that their forefather was created from the mixed hair of Siva and so named Jâti Budh, and the other, the Kâsalagotri, who claim connexion with the Râjputs and are so named after Brahman's son Râsâh. It may be permissible to regard the Sîvagoti as autocratic, Siva being the earth-god, and the Kâsalagotri as later accretions to the caste.

The Jâti cannot, however, be said to have any distinctive religion or code of ethics. In the Central Panjâb they are mainly Sikhs, but to the south-east they have touched on their other Hindu caste traditions, and to the west the vast majority have embraced Islam.
Islam, whose tribes not only professing that falsehood but seek to make them Arab or Saryays by descent. Indeed, the Muhammadan Tahims are not invariably a Saari Qurashi by origin and descended from Tamim, but it is much more likely to be through the Tahims, some of whom became Brahman, and worshippers of the goddess Sri Dadi Matta. Tod mentions the Dahims an extinct Rajput race.

Another tribe, the Arbi, certainly appears to be A. There are many genealogies can be almost proved to have been invented on conversion that no reliance can be placed on etymologies corrolorated by pedigrees.

The tribes of the Jats probably number more than a thousand, and among the Hindus and Sikhs they are spoken of as gota, a corruption of the Skr. gata.

Some of these tribes bear names which suggest a totemistic origin. Such are the Jat, Jum (Jungs), Gorka (Moseqow), Banda, Bajaj (meaning), Balai (Balai), the Popali from sing, Pisnis religiosus, Nand (from Jan, Prasos nipson), Mar (from peacock), Khand (from gandhis, etc.). But no reverence is paid to any of these things. The Panthial tribe is so called because Jaiga girl married to a Rajput son and he was reverence and his membes save those who had placed 'peacock's feathers' on his head. The Jats are protected by a peacock from the snake. The Jars (from Jora, twins') is said to have five branches, or apparently subgroups, all named after parts of the joro, the jora's hind (Paras successiva), vach (from ruga, barn), Jars (from jora, jackal), Binia (from the plum or fruit), Jhara (jewelling), and Khan (horn). It is also very common to find a tribe named from some event at an ancestor's birth. Thus the Basrakh is so called because his ancestor committed suicide near a banyan tree, and the Sibo or Sibi tribe derives its name from sibs, a funeral pile, because its ancestors gave birth to a son when about to commit self. But such tales are told of countless tribes which are not Jats, and folk-etymology is probably responsible.

The Jats, religiously, are generally adherents of the great orthodox religions, the Jats are often devotees of some sect, or devotees of a tribal or personal cult, as well. Thus in Hissar, a District near Delhi, large numbers are Sindhis, a Valiquetta sect, while in Karnal, a District on the Jumna, many of them are Saistics, or 'Pure' saints, belonging to a sect, founded about 200 years ago, which affects great personal cleanliness, forbids smoking, adorns only the one God under the title of Sat, or the True One. Other Jats do not eat or marry with them. Another cult very popular among the Jats is that of the 'generous' Sikh Sarwar, the Dallam, the Dallam boy is considered to be of Nigihai (Nigeria), the earth-god—probably Siva—taken over by Islam and transformed into the cult of a Muhammadan saint and the chief of the Panthial elements. The fertility which is the object of the worship naturally appeals to a landed peasantry.

Thus a Jat may be by birth and education a Hindu or Musalim, by choice or conviction a Sikh, a Saistani, or a sectary who has thrown in his lot with one of the countless sects old and new to be found in India. He can even become a Christian. But under or alongside of his religion and his sect is a mass of usage partly social, partly religious, and wholly based on custom, not on belief, to which he clings with a tenacity all the greater because it is irrational. In the northern and central Districts of the Panjais these usages centre round the worship of forefathers (jathes), but in the S.W. of that Province they cluster round the godling of the village (khera) rather than the tribe.

This change is the religious system is in congruence with the evolution from the tribal system of the tracts towards the N.W. frontier to the 'village community' organisation of the long-established Delhi. The jathera is usually styled Bawia (master) or Siddit (perfect) and bears some conventional name which shows that his real name has been forgotten. His tomb is sometimes called bathshahin (p.,), and consists of three or four pits with pillars formed of earth dug out of them. He is usually worshipped at marriage.

A typical Jat wedding according to the rites in vogue in the sub-montane districts which lie under the Himalayas in the Central Provinces and Berar, is carried out in a heap of wheat weighing about 50 lbs (23 kg.), and by it are put Harry of coarse sugar. A lump is lit and put on the embers to melt, and it is thrown to all the females of the family and the bridegroom do obeisance. The bridegroom cuts the twig with a knife or sword; and the grain and sugar are divided, half going to the Brahaman and half to the vere (mangel). The last turns them a ram (dehra, whose name is the rite itself), cuts its ear, and with his thumb impresses a mark (tikka) of its blood on the youth's forehead, and on those of all present.® He gets the ram and a rupee as his bride. The youth then washes, and boiled what is distributed. He is old, and a red tape is tied round his forehead. Thereafter he must keep a knife or sword in his hand till the wedding day. On that day he bathes again, breaks earthen vessels and does new clothes. His kinsmen offer their presents, and the mesthans get their dues. The bride is then brought home, and the newly-wedded pair, with all the females of the family, go to the temple of Har Mandir the progenitor of the tribe, offer him a double cloth and a cake (the priest's perquisite), and how their heads in the temple. The wedding ceremony among the Bajewa Jats, an im...
ever, does not appear to be thus chosen or regarded. He is often a martyr, or shahid, who fall fighting with daalis or in an affray with a neighbouring village. A disciple of the Buddha may be, it would seem, a Jogi, a Bairagi, a Gosain, or a Naga, though in such a case the priest regarded as the jaktha was expected to be an embodiment of the god Siva or Vishnu, and among the Jats, for the obvious reason that they allow widow remarriage, but the hindu mata called the khanghan, or monastery, of Sataoo.

LITERATURE.—D. C. J. Robertson, Punjabi Bibliography, Calcutta, 1885, is the classical authority. See also Madhava, Punjabi Census Report, 1897, H. A. Rose, Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjabi and W. Frontier Provinces, Lahore, 1912, etc., *Jat*, and W. Crooke, ToB 13, 23, *Jat*. For the possible connection of the Jat or Sati, an Archana form of Jat, with the Gypsies see Wohler, The Indian Origin of the Gypsies in Europe, in *Journ. of Punjabi Hist. Soc., ii. 3* (1914).

JATIKA. 1. Meaning of the word. A jatika (in Buddhist dogmatics and literature) is a story in which the Bodhisattva (g.v.), i.e., the Buddha, appears in the form of his former birth, plays some part, either that of the hero or of some other character, or sometimes only that of a looker-on. Hence the word might be translated ‘Bodhisattva story,’ or ‘a Bodhisattva tale.’ But the current rendering of jatika is ‘Buddhist’ birth story.’

‘Jatika, birth, nativity, a birth or existence in the Bud dha’s life, the jatika, or story of one of the former births of a Buddha,’ (L. G. Childers, Dictionary of the Pali Language, London, 1878, 2nd ed.). This is the generally accepted explanation, the word being derived from Skt. jata, in the sense of ‘birth.’ Another explanation of the word has been proposed by H. Kern, in the ‘Zeitschrift für Indische Sprache,’ Leipzig, 1899, 44, (1.23), and adopted by J. S. Speyer (Jatikastudien, London, 1909, [S 111], p. xxiii), who derive the word from jita in the sense of ‘what has become, what has happened,’ and would translate it by जन्ितिक, tale, story.’

Jatikas originally means only a single ‘birth story,’ but it is also used as the title of the Collection of Jatikas, in the Tripitaka, and in the Jatika Commentary (see below).

2. Origin and purpose of the Jatikas. We read in the SuttaNipanasavatika, (SE XI. 1884, 190), that the Buddhists, knowing the differences in faculties and energy of his numerous hearers, preach in many different ways, ‘tells many tales, amusing, agreeable, both instructive and pleasant, tales by means of which all beings not only become pleased with the law in this present life, but also after death will reach happy states.’ And the reason book is stated (ib. 44 [SE XI. 44a]), that the Buddha teaches both by suttas and jatikas and by legends and jatikas. It is, indeed, likely enough that Gautama Buddha himself made use of parables and tales in preaching to the people. It is certain that the Buddhist monks and preachers did so. In fact, we know that the preachers of all religious sects in India always took advantage of the Hindu passion for story-hearing and storytelling, and made extensive use of stories in preaching to the people, much in the same way as Christian preachers in the Middle Ages introduced ‘experiences’ into their sermons to attract the attention of their hearers. They sometimes invented pious legends, but more frequently they told fables, fairy tales, and amusing anecdotes from the rich storehouse of popular tales or from sacred literature, altering and adapting them for the purposes of religious propaganda. The Bodhisattva dogma (see art. Bodhisattva), in connexion with the doctrines of rebirth and Karma (g.v.), was an excellent expedient for turning any popular or literary tale into a Buddhist legend.

3. In his numerous existences, before he came to be born as Sakayamuni who was to be the Buddha, the Bodhisattva had been born, as a horse, a karna, sometimes as a god, sometimes as a king, or a merchant, or a nobleman, or an out-caste, or an elephant, or some other man or animal (see SBE II. 745, note §). It was thus only to identify the hero or any character of a story with the Bodhisattva, in order to turn any tale, however secular or even frivolous, into a jatika.

Hence the jatikas regularly begin with some such as: ‘Once upon a time, when Brhatadhatu was reigning in Benares, the Bodhisattva (Skr. Bodhisattva) was born in the womb of his chief queen;’ or ‘Once upon a time, when Brhatadhata was reigning in Benares, the Bodhisattva was born into the family of a forester;’ or ‘Once upon a time...’ the Bodhisattva an ox called Mahakala (the Big Red One);’ or ‘Once upon a time... the Bodhisattva was born in the womb of a crow;’ or ‘Once upon a time... the Bodhisattva was born in the womb of the god Siva;’ or ‘Once upon a time... the Bodhisattva was Saka, king of the gods,’ etc. In many of his existences the Bodhisattva, according to the jatikas, was a god, a king, a Brahman, a minister, an ascetic, a merchant, but he also was a gardener, a musician, a physician, a barber, a robber, a gambler, an elephant, a lion, an ape, a dog, a frog, some bird, etc. (see the list in A. Grünwedel, Mythologie des Buddhismus, Leipzig, 1902, p. 197.)

3. The Jatikas in the Pali Tripitaka. Some of the stories which were afterwards turned into jatikas are told in the Suttas as simple tales, without any reference to the Bodhisattva. On the other hand, there are a group of stories which, while told in the Suttas—e.g., the *Kācitāyanta and Mahākācitāyanta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya* and the *Mahāvamsa* in the *Majjhima Nikāya*. That the jatikas form an essential part of this canon is shown by the fact that they are included in the list of nine angas (twelve Dharmapravachanas in the Sanskrit canon) into which the sacred books of the Buddhists were divided according to the ancients, as the 7th anga (the 9th Dharmapravacana).

The *Book of Jatikas*, however, is one of the fifteen collections of texts forming the Khaddaka Nikāya (Collection of Small Texts) of the Pali Tripitaka. This *Book of Jatikas* consists of gāthās or stanzas only, and is divided into 22 sections (nipātas), which are arranged according to the number of stanzas belonging to or forming a jatika.

The first section is supposed to contain 150 jatikas, each verse belonging to a separate story; the second, 100 jatikas, with two verses each; the third, 50 jatikas, with three verses each, and so on, each successive nipāta having a larger number of stanzas and a smaller number of jatikas. This *Book of Jatikas* has not yet been published, and MSS of it are rare. In many of these jatikas are poetic tales, ballads, or epic poems, but very often, more especially in the first sections, they are quite unintelligible by themselves, and must be understood as belonging to some other tale. Why these prose stories did not attain to canonical dignity we do not know. Probably they were supposed to be well known, and, therefore, left to the improvisation of the preachers. It is only in a more or less contaminated form that the prose parts of the jatikas have been preserved in the Commentary (see below) that was composed or compiled at some later period, after the final redaction of the canon.

1. Of Chalasangwa, vi. vi. 3, with the *Tittitijakasas (no. 27);* or Mahasangha, vi. vii. 0, with the *Dīghā-Kaṇḍakasasas (no. 271).* 2. It is worth mentioning that, according to the Pali Mahavamsa, the chronicle Dipancharasasv (v. 79), there was a school of monks, the Mahavasthigitas, who rejected some portions (we are uncertain not told which) of the jatikas as non-canonical. The Dharmagosas had also a *Jātaka Book in their canon* (see M. Asen, The Four Jatakas Agamas in Chinese, Ser. XV., xxviii. [1906] pl. III, p. 8. 3. It is not found in the King of Siam’s edition of the Tripitaka.
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relation between prose and verse in works like the Paśchātana and the Jatakas. The Jatakas, like the Sūtras, are not a single work but consist of many books, each of which is further divided into chapters. The Jatakas, like the Sūtras, are not a single work but consist of many books, each of which is further divided into chapters.

5. Place of the Jatakas in Indian literature.

Though the Jatakas are not a single work but consist of many books, each of which is further divided into chapters, they are not a single work but consist of many books, each of which is further divided into chapters. The Jatakas, like the Sūtras, are not a single work but consist of many books, each of which is further divided into chapters.

As regards the 'stories of the present,' they are of little value, being either inventions of the commentator or borrowings from other texts, such as the Vinaya-piṭaka, Suttanāṇīta, or Apanā, or from other commentaries. But in the 'stories of the present,' they are of little value, being either inventions of the commentator or borrowings from other texts, such as the Vinaya-piṭaka, Suttanāṇīta, or Apanā, or from other commentaries.

The Jatakas vary also in length. We find short stories of hardly a page by the side of long romances or epic poems covering more than a hundred pages in our Jatakas.

Many of the stories found in our Jatakas Book occur also in the Paśchātana, Kathāśāstra, and other Indian story books, and are important for the history of Sanskrit literature. Some of the tales have parallels in the Mahābhārata and in the Rāmāyaṇa, and many others in Jain literature.

A great many Jatakas have also parallels in the literatures of the West. Thus, the tale of the peasant that lost his brute through his shameless dance (Jatakas, no. 35, represented on the slings of Bhārata) was known to the Hebrews (p. 139), who tell us the story of the Huns in Spain.

The Jatakas have innumerable uses. They are a storehouse of moral teaching, and have been used as a source of information about the life and customs of ancient India. They have also been used as a source of information about the life and customs of ancient India. They have also been used as a source of information about the life and customs of ancient India.

1 These narrative verses are called Ahāmamuddhikapātika, or stanzas told by a Buddha (see, for instance, B. H. and S. W. E. xliii. 329, and ii. 439). The Ahāmamuddhikapātika may be said to be a form of the word "praise," and is the same as the word "praise." 1. Only the Fāvajjukapātika seems to be a work of a later date; see O. O. Franke in Skandavaita, ed. V. F. Pembury, xliii.

2. Only the Fāvajjukapātika seems to be a work of a later date; see O. O. Franke in Skandavaita, ed. V. F. Pembury, xliii.

3. Only the Fāvajjukapātika seems to be a work of a later date; see O. O. Franke in Skandavaita, ed. V. F. Pembury, xliii.


It is probable that these stories were first told by the Buddha himself, the redaction of the Jatakas being the work of many individual Buddhist masters, who added their own versions and variations to the original text. These stories are still popular in modern times and are considered to be important for understanding the teachings of the Buddha.

The Jatakas are a collection of Buddhist stories, each of which is associated with a particular Buddha. These stories are believed to have been compiled in the 3rd century BCE and were later added to the Buddhist scriptures. The Jatakas are considered to be especially important for their moral teachings and their ability to make abstract concepts accessible to a lay audience.

The Jatakas are divided into two main sections: the Early Jatakas and the Later Jatakas. The Early Jatakas are believed to have been compiled by the Buddha himself, while the Later Jatakas were compiled by his disciples. The stories in the Early Jatakas are generally considered to be more traditional and conservative, while the stories in the Later Jatakas are more innovative and experimental.

The Jatakas are also significant because they provide insight into the historical and cultural context of the Buddha's time. The stories often reflect the social, political, and religious issues of the time, and they are considered to be an important source of information about the historical Buddha and his teachings.
high poetical merit, composed by the poet Aryanā or Sura. There have been several āstakāmalas, or 'garlands of āstakas,' i.e. poetical selections of āstakas, but Aryanā's work is best known. It is a florilegium of 34 āstakas, mostly known from the Sanskrit, and a lowly style of Sanskrit court poetry, elaborate prose alternating with verse. As in the Āryāvīrakā (see above), so also in the Jātakāmalā the āstakas serve as illustrative episodes in the lives of the ārāṇys, especially those of generosity and kindness towards all creatures.

Thus the first story (not occurring in the Pali collection) is that of the Bodhisatta throwing himself before a starving tiger that is about to devour her offspring. Most stories occur also in the Āstakāmalā and in the Āstakāmalā, as the Pali literature of the Indian period, especially in the Pali literature of the 4th century. The Āstakāmalā is a work of high merit, composed by the poet Aryanā, who flourished in the 4th century. A.D. Sianas of the Āstakāmalā are inscribed on frescoes found in the caves of Ajanta, and the Chinese pilgrim I-tsing mentions the Āstakāmalā among the works that in his time were very popular in India.

10. Āstakas and Āvadānas are also found in Śrīvijaya's Śrīvaṃśa (called Almahāra in art, Āṣyoga or, in Śrīvijaya's Āvasāra, as Ávadāna). Āstakas are also mentioned in the Jātaka, a work of the same period, by the Bodhisatta Bharadāvāja.


11. In the introduction to the tr. of the Āvadānas of Āstakāmalā, in Magna Indica, Paris, 1901, and J. S. Speyer in his ed. of the same text (Bibliothèque de l'École, Paris, 1900), vol. I, pref. p. iv; also Winteritz, Gesch. der Ind. Lit., II, 215 f.

The Āstakāmalā has been edited by H. Kern (Harvard Oriental Series, I, Cambridge, Mass., 1909) and translated by J. D. B. Anderson, London, 1925. Aryanā's work on the same (or a similar) collection of āstakas as we have in the Śrīvaṃśa, Speyer's. In his ed. of the same text (Bibliothèque de l'École, Paris, 1900), vol. II, p. iv; also Winteritz, Gesch. der Ind. Lit., II, 215 f.

11. Āstakas and popular Buddhism. The Āstakas are highly important for the history of Buddhism, especially as it grew up to popular Buddhism. The whole system of relating āstakas is based on the most popular dogma of karma, and the ethical ideal of this religion is not the Arhat (q.v.), who has attained to nirvāṇa,1 but the Bodhisatta who, in all his former existences, has shown one or more of the great virtues by which he prepared himself for becoming the future Buddha. However high or low he may have been born, in every āstaka he is either helpful, kind, and self-sacrificing, or brave, clever, and even possessing supernatural wisdom. Āstakas like those of King Sivi (no. 499), who gave away his eyes as a gift, or of Queen Vessantara (no. 547), who gave away his own children as a gift to the wicked Brāhmaṇa, are standard texts for this ideal of ethics. It may easily be understood how the theory of the āstakas which sharpen the ethical ideals in the Mahāyāna Buddhism, though not mentioned in the Āstakas Gāthās, but only in the Buddhavoras, Āryāvīrakā, and the Āstakas Commentary, was already in the Mahāyāna Buddhism, and so it is not wonder that the āstakas belong as much to the Mahāyāna as to the Hinayāna Buddhism. They are indeed the chief vehicle of Buddhist propaganda, and the chief witnesses of popular Buddhism.

As to the popular Buddhism, it is sufficient to quote the words of B. Spence Hardy, Manual of Buddhism, London, 1899, p. 103. 'The Buddhist has been taught that he should do good to his fellow creatures, and that he should do good to his fellow creatures, and that he should do good to his fellow creatures. In them the doctrine of the Buddha specks of light in the darkness of the mind of the people. They are the chief vehicle of Buddhist propaganda, and the chief witnesses of popular Buddhism.


12. Āstakas in Buddhist art. The enormous popularity of the āstakas is also proved by the fact that representations from these stories are among the earliest productions of Indian art, and they have remained the favourite topic of Indian artists and paintings through all the centuries in all Buddhist countries. In the 3rd or 2nd B.C. we find them in India in Bharat and Sanchi (see above), in the 3rd CENT. A.D. in Amaravati, and later on in the caves of Ajanta. The Chinese pilgrim Fa-hian, when visiting Ceylon in A.D. 412, saw at Abhayagiri 4 representations of the 200 bodily forms in which the Buddha was assumed during his successive births; and Huen Tsang mentions atūpas erected in honour of the Bodhisattvas whose deeds were related in āstakas. The famous temples of Boru-Budrī in Pālā (late 7th cent.), Abhur in Burma (13th cent. A.D.) and of Sukhodaya in Siam (14th cent. A.D.) are decorated with hundreds of bas-reliefs representing scenes from āstakas.
The foundation of the present city was laid by Frūz Tughāq on his return from an expedition into Bengal in A.D. 1360. Subsequently under Khwāja Jahan, who was viceroy of the Emperor Mahmūd Tughluq (1326-54), even those of Timur, became independent; and for nearly a century the Shaqhrī, or eastern dynasty, continued powerful rivals of the Delhi kings, and formed one of the rival kingdoms of India. Their ascendency, however, gave way to that of the Deccan, which was not finally overthrown by the Emperor Bahādur Lodī in A.D. 1487. The religious buildings still in existence consist of mosques and tombs, the work of these Shaqhrī princes. They are the finest example of what has erroneously been called the 'Pathan' style, which is really Persian, but executed and modified by the native architects whom the conquerors were forced to employ. So beautiful was the city at this period that the Emperor Akbar of the Deccan, on his visit to the Shahīr of Delhi, found so many mosques that the emperor took a fancy to them. The present three mosques, with others in the fort, date from A.D. 1377. The three great mosques are in the city. The Aṭālā mosque, so called because it stands on the site of the palace of that name, which was donated to the Sūfī Shaikhs of the Aṭālā order, is the most famous of the three. It was completed in 1378. The greatest mosque is that of the 4th century, and found in 1406. The most famous of the three mosques is the Aṭālā mosque, which was completed in 1378. It is distinguished by a majestic gateway pyramid or propylon, and three massive columns. The gateway, which was completed in 1378, is the most notable feature of the building, as little known at the time in Jaunpur as it was in Delhi. It was completed in 1478. The third great mosque, known as that of Bihī Raj and Tarā, is commonly called Lāl Darwāzah, and was completed in 1478. It is distinguished by a magnificent gateway pyramid or propylon, and three massive columns. The gateway, which was completed in 1478, is the most notable feature of the building, as little known at the time in Jaunpur as it was in Delhi. It was completed in 1478.

With the fall of the local rulers the religious history of Jaunpur came to an end.

LITERATURE.—A. Forbiger, The Shaqhrī Architecture of Jaunpur, Calcutta, 1846, and Monumental Architekture and Inscriptions of the North India, Calcutta, 1846. A. Cunningham, Archaeological Survey Reports, xi. (1856) 108. J. Fergusson, Rise of Indian Architecture, London, 1876, p. 352. W. Crooke, JAVA, BALI, AND SUMATRA (Buddhism in), 1. The Indian name of Java, known to the geographer Ptolemy (vii. 29) as Isabadi (50, χαδάδί) is a correct one. It is derived from the Sanskrit word Jaya, which means 'he who conquers.' The island, which is one of the largest in the world, is divided into two main parts: the northern part, which is called Java, and the southern part, which is called Bali. The southern part is the more mountainous, and is divided into several smaller islands. The capital of Java is Jakarta, which is the largest city in the country. The island is divided into two main parts: the northern part, which is called Java, and the southern part, which is called Bali. The southern part is the more mountainous, and is divided into several smaller islands. The capital of Java is Jakarta, which is the largest city in the country.

2 For the religious history see ART. INDONESIAM.

3 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 113.

4 For the religious history see ART. INDONESIAM.


7 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

8 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

9 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

10 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.


12 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

13 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

14 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

15 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

16 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

17 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

18 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

19 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.


21 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.

22 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.


26 See J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, Oxford, 1886, p. 405.


The most renowned and best explored monuments and groups of religious buildings, besides the sanctuary at Kalasan, are the so-called Chandi Sari, Chandr Sowu, and Chandi Ploosa; the magnificent sannyāsa of Boro-Budur; the beautiful shrine at Mendut; and the great statue of the five vāndhaas, which are brought into connexion with the five (Dhyāni) Tathāgatas. We also find an enumeration of the saktis of those Tathāgatas, and, finally, prose, on the treatment of coition.1

The worship of the five Dhyānibuddhas and their female counterparts, or saktas, as taught in the Kanakāyājñikam, must have been very popular in Java, as it is attested by the numerous images of those supernatural beings discovered in or near sacred buildings.

During the whole period in which Buddhism was flourishing in Java, it found favour with kings and royal families. The earliest document bearing witness to marked favour is the inscription of Kalasan mentioned above. We know also from a copper grant, dated 861 Saka (A.D. 949-50), that the King Mpu Kertanagar, otherwise called by his title Śri Isāna Vijaya Dharmottungga Deva, confes Buddha.1 His daughter, who reigned after him under the title of Śri Isāna Tungga Vijaya, was likewise a convert to Buddhism. The King Kṛtaraṅga, who reigned from 1194 to 1214 Saka (A.D. 1272-92), is glorified by the court poet Prapāneha as being a most devout Saktist, though his posthumous image at the Mahāyana temple was so pointed to his being a latitudinarian.2 He calls himself, however, in a Saksitott inscription an upāsaka of the Mahāyāna. The inscription, in more than one copy, has been taken from the text of Kṛtaraṅga's granddaughter, Tribhu-vanattungadive, who ruled as sovereign over the whole of Java during the minority of her son, the famous Hayam Wuruk, in the 14th cent. of our era, was of the same persuasion as her grandfather; likewise her consort, the Prince Kṛtavardhana of Singhasari, her sister, and the consort of the latter.3 The Queen Dowager of the King Kṛtaraṅga, the founder of Majapahit, is described as an energetic woman, and so earnestly devoted to the religion of Buddha that in her old age she became a nun.4

Apart from all documentary evidence in writings, the remains of splendid buildings destined for the worship or use of Buddhists cannot fail to leave the impression that those architectural monuments must have been the expression of a definite system of society. The majority of the mere gorgeous Chandi on Javanese soil are undoubtedly Budhdhistic, whereas out of the whole mass of literature and inscriptions upon stems come few or any connexion with Buddhism. To explain this fact it may be assumed that the great bulk of the population were Saktists. It is quite certain that in the Middle Ages, before the irruption of Mahāmādhanism, Javanese society was based upon the caste system, just as in India, and that in civil and criminal law the Code of Manu was the chief authority. The present state of things in Java, where such Javanese as remained faithful to their religion have found a refuge after the fall of Majapahit in the beginning of the 16th cent., tends to confirm the conclusion that the Saktists, or, more generally, the Brahmins, had the superiority. For the great majority of the Ballinese confess Sāivism, with an admixture of practices deriving from an ancient animistic religion. It appears from a notice in the Nāgārāyājñikam that in the 14th cent. there were established two communities or sects of Buddhists

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1 Kawi Gorboden, xxii. (1875).
2 Inscrip. in Bijdragen e. Ges. Histor. en Ges. Pad. 1902, p. 177, 186.
3 The chief work on it is by C. L. Meiningen, 'Boro-Budur, a stele found at Boro-Budur, in Java.'
4 For the literature see Verheuk.
5 H. J. A. de Vries, xxii. (1882); J. Ferguson, History of the Arabs in the Eastern Archives, London, 1903, p. 77. For the literature see Verheuk.
6 As the name㉮ at the end of the inscription is in particular.
7 For the literature see Verheuk.
8 H. J. A. de Vries, xxii. (1891).
9 P. Forkel, 'Ein Textbuchisches Inscrive,' Verheuk, 1904, p. 146 no. 365.
10 'Verhalen en Mededelingen,' Ak. v. Wetenschappen, iii. 11. in. (1867) (see also for the literature B. D. M. Verheue, X. H. J. A. de Vries, p. 127, 138.
11 For the literature see Verheuk.
in Bali, one of followers of the Vinaya, i.e., the regular clergy, the other of the so-called Vajrayana, evidently identical with the Vajrayära in Nepal and Tibet, and consequently Tantrists. There are sufficient proofs of Tantrism having had its votaries also in Java. Nowadays the number of Buddhists of any description in Bali is insignificant.

As to Sumatra, there is a blank in our knowledge of the conditions of Buddhism from the days of I-tsing down to the middle of the 14th cent., the time when King Adityavarman was ruler of Middle Sumatra. It is known from sundry inscriptions, ranging from 935 to 1278 Sakas (A.D. 1342-56), that Adityavarman was a staunch Mahayana, identified with Pandang Chandah in Sumatra, informs us that he was dedicated by order of the same king. As Amoghapāsa is a Tantric form of Avalokiteśvara, the inscription is an indication of Tantrism having its votaries in Sumatra. In an inscription on the tomestone of Adityavarman he is glorified as an acárya of Lokesvara. It may be remarked that the Sanskrit of the Sumatran inscriptions is entirely idiomatized and at least non-Buddhist ideas and practices.

LITERATURE.—This is fully given in the footnotes.

H. KERN.

JEALOUSY.—See ETVY.

JEROME.—I. Life. —Jerome was born at Stridon, a town on the confines of Dalmatia and Pannonia (de Vit. Illust. 135). He was the son of a Moesian officer, according to F. Bulté, the ancient Stridon, which was demolished by the Goths in A.D. 375, may now be identified with the modern Gmhofo Polje. The birth of Jerome is said to have been sudden, and, as is frequently stated from his own pen himself to point to a later date—somewhere between 340 and 340. He was born of Christian parents; his father was named Eusebius, and was evidently well-to-do. He received his elementary education in his own home at Stridon, and then, together with his friend Bonosus, went to Rome in order to study grammar and the rhetorical philosophy. He became a pupil of the renowned grammarian Donatus, and gained a thorough knowledge of the Latin classics, especially of Cicero and Vergil.

1 Bifurca. Rer. Initiat. viii. 1811 (1825) 299, xiv. (1872) 19, ii. (1877) 36.
2 Arch. Oud. Onderzoek op Java en Madura, ii. (1876) 101. 1907 (1897) 159-170.
4 Ibid. (1877) 159-170.
5 In Fasti. für Otto Bauernfeind, Vienna, 1896; the older literature is given very fully in this work.
6 et alii. (1891) 136.
7 E. A. Groner, Hieronymus, i. 45-48.
8 E. Launae, De Hieronymo, Denatu discipulo, Leipzig, 1812.
9 A. Lüsebrink, Hasse, and R. L. Heuler, De Hieronymo, observazioni e notizie storiche su quanti genti in differenti lingue, 1890; idem, Hieronymi observazioni su nomini verborum olim permissis jure in quattuor canonum quattuor leges. Zum hieronymianischen Schrifttum, der Gusnianer, xxxi. (1885). (De parte rei publicae quidam in Latinitate Hieronymi usw.)

His teacher in rhetoric was not, as was formerly supposed, the veteran rhetorician C. Maurius Victorinus. He did not study Greek during his early residence in Rome, but presumably learned it later in Antioch.

He was baptized in his early manhood by Bishop Liberius (+ 366) in Rome (Ep. xv. 1). Notwithstanding this, he fell for a time into serious moral errors (Ep. iv. 2), but thereafter manifested once more an enthusiastic piety, visiting the graves of the apostles and martyrs at Cæsarea and Cæsarea in Cappadocia (Comm. in Petr. xii. 40). From Rome he travelled, in the company of Bonosus, to Gaul, and stayed for a while in the still semi-barbaric district of the Rhine (Ep. vi. 5). While in Transylvania he began to busy himself with theological work, copying, on behalf of his friend Rufinus, the Commentary on the Pentateuch and the de Synode of Hilary of Poitiers (Ep. vi.). He then went to Aquileia, where he connected himself with an earnest-minded group of men, including Chromatius, subsequently bishop of Aquileia, and his friend Rufinus, a native of the town. It was in Aquileia that he took a decisive step towards carrying out a resolution that he had already formed in Trèves, viz. to devote himself to the ascetic life. All at once, from reasons that we do not know, he set out with a few companions and journey to the East (A.D. 378). Having reached Antioch, he lingered there for some time, and attended the proceedings of the celebrated Anti-ecumenical Council of 378, which met under the presidency of the theologian Apollinaris. It was during this period of indecision as to whether he should become a hermit or not that he had the experience, known as his 'anti-Ciceronian vision' (Ep. xxii. 30), in which Christ appeared to him, asked him regarding his religious profession, and, in answer to Jerome's claim to be a Christian, said: 'Thou speakest falsely; thou art a Ciceronian, not a Christian; for why should I heart thee.' For a considerable time afterwards Jerome renounced the study of the classics (Comm. in Gal. iii. pref.); but at a later date, in the monastery at Bethlehem, we find him engaged in instructing youths in Vergil and Cicero (contra Hieron. i. 28). Very soon after his vision he went to live in the wilderness of Chalcis as an eremite, and there, amid severe self-castigations, he began the study of Hebrew under the guidance of a certain Greek Jew (Ep. xxv. 12), while he was also involved in the dogmatic controversies that divided the Christians of Antioch into various parties. Being, as a native of the West, quite unknown to the older Nicean and the younger Orthodox groups who were here at feud with each other, he appealed to Pope Damasus for advice as to which party he should join. Subsequently he attached himself to the anti-Melitian bishop, Paulinus of Antioch, whom he was ordained a presbyter, though on the understanding that he might still remain a monk, i.e. that he should not be compelled to undertake the cure of souls (contra Joh. Hieronymi, 41).

Jerome then went to Constantinople, where he came into close touch with the great Cappadocian, Gregory of Nazianzen, at that time bishop of the Eastern capital. Gregory drew near to him the theology of Origen. On the invitation of Damasus, Jerome returned in 382 to Rome, where a synod, called that year, was to meet for the purpose of settling the Anti-ecumenical schism (Rufinus, contra Hieron. i. 28). Without any clearly defined function or any distinct charge, but rather in a confidential position to which no responsibility attached, he was observant, in Eith. Hist. xxvii. (1863); H. Cullin, De Hieronymo, de Hieronymi observationes in nominum verborum usum pertinentes, ib. (1883), and Gruter, Hieronymi observationes (ed. 1888). It was on this ground that later tradition made Jerome a cardinal; cf. Gruter, i. 224.
assisted the Roman bishop in the composition of official papers (Ep. cxxix. 10). Moreover, during his residence at Rome (382–383) he was commissioned by Damasus to revise the Latin NT on the basis of the Greek text; and this, again, proved to be the initiative to his greatest literary achievement—his translation of the OT from the Hebrew. In Rome he gathered around him a band of women of high rank, to whom he expounded the Scriptures, and whom he inspired with enthusiasm for the ascetic ideal. The more eminent personalities in this group were Marcella and Paula, both widows, and the two daughters of the latter, Basillia and Eustochium. By his mendacious criticisms of the Roman secular clergy he alienated the sympathies which at the outset he had won, and which, he ambitiously hoped, would secure him for the death of Damasus, his successor to see (Ep. xlv. 3). In August 385 he left the ungrateful city in the company of his brother Paulinian and his friend Vincentius, in order that his house at Bethlehem might be the scene for many of the last years of his life. With Paula and her daughter Eustochium they followed him shortly afterwards. In order to give no occasion for scandal, the two parties had arranged to make the journey separately, but they met again in Antioch. From this point, they started on a pilgrimage through the Holy Land, visiting, first of all, Jerusalem and Bethlehem, then the South of Palestine, and, finally, the sacred sites of Galilee, Nazareth, Cana, Capernaum, and the Sea of Tiberias (Ep. civii.). Some- what later they proceeded to Egypt, and stayed a month in the houses of St. Antony and St. Pachomius, where Jerome attended the lectures of Didymus the Blind, the head of the long-renowned catechetical school (Ritumus, contra Hieron. ii. 12). Thence they visited also the Nitria, the most holy colony—the city of the Lord, as Jerome calls it—and then, in the late summer of 386, returned to Bethlehem, where they settled permanently. Here they had to be content with somewhat cramped quarters for three years—until, in fact, the monastic buildings for the lodging of monks and nuns were quite complete. The monastic houses built at Paula’s expense were four in number—one for monks, and three for nuns—who were attached to these hospices was erected for the entertainment of pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem.

The period of Jerome’s stay in the monastery at Bethlehem, in the last thirty-four years of his life was by far the most fertile in literary work. His manner of life at this time is described by Sulpicius Severus (Dial. i. 9) from information supplied by a monk named Postumius, who had spent six months in Bethlehem:

‘He is ever occupied with reading, with books; he takes no rest by day or night; he is always either reading or writing.’

Yet Jerome did not find in his solitude the peace he had come to seek. His passionate nature led him to take part in all the conflicts that were agitating the Church. In 392 his controversy with the Roman ascetic Jovinian brought him once more into touch with the capital. He was subsequently drawn into the Origenistic controversies—in conflict, first, with John, Bishop of Jerusalem, and then with his former friend, but now embittered enemy, Rufinus. Towards the close of his life we find him issuing biting pamphlets against the Spanish priest Vigilantius and the Pelagians. Among the events of the world-politics of the day, the sack of Rome at the hands of Alaric in 410 affected him profoundly (Comm. in Jer. vii. 2. Ep. cxxvii. 5). Paula had died in 404; and in 410 Marcella also passed away (Ep. cxxvii.). In 416 the religious mission at Bethlehem was assaulted by a band of Pelagians, and Jerome was able to save his life only by a hurried flight to a stronghold, his monastery being demolished (Ep. cxxviii.). Then came the death of Eustochium, his most devoted adherent, and shortly afterwards, on the 30th of September 420, Jerome himself, now old, lonely, and weary of life, passed away at Bethlehem (Prosper, Chronicon, ed. Mommsen, Chron. min. i. 499).

2. Writings.—Jerome left behind him a large and varied mass of literary work, which may be classified as follows:

(a) Letters.—These form the most valuable source of information regarding his life. They are unquestionably the most brilliant productions of his fertile brain, and furnish a richly detailed picture of the contemporary life and society. They reflect his personality in the most vivid way. They date variously from the interval between 373 (Ep. i.) and 420 (Ep. cxxviii), and their contents show a great variety of topics, from scholarship, and, in particular, of exegesis, appearing among purely personal communications. Jerome corresponded with most of the outstanding people of his time—e.g., Pope Damasus, Theophylactus of Alexandria (Ep. liii., lviii., lxxvi., lxxviii., lxxix., lxxxv.), Augoustus (Ep. cli., clii., cv., cvii., cxxv., cxxvi.), and the whole series, exhibiting, as they do, the diverse characters of the two greatest Fathers of the Western Church, Paulinus of Nola (Ep. liii., lixiv.), and Paustianus, the Roman senator who became a monk (Ep. lxxviii., lxxxvii., lxxviii., lxxxv.), as well as to Laeta, on the training of her daughter; Ep. clii. to Paris, and cxxvi., to Agatha, on maintaining the continence of widows; and Ep. lxxvi., to Paula, on the life of clergy and monks.

(b) Engaging portraits of his associates are given in his obituary notices of Nepotianus (Ep. lxi.), Fabiola (Ep. lxxviii.), and Paula (Ep. cxxvi.), and Marcella (Ep. cxxvii.), on the life of clergy and monks. The following is an extract from his obituary notices of Nepotianus (Ep. lxi.), Fabiola (Ep. lxxviii.), and Paula (Ep. cxxvi.), on the life of clergy and monks. The following is an extract from his obituary notices of Nepotianus (Ep. lxi.), Fabiola (Ep. lxxviii.), and Paula (Ep. cxxvi.), on the life of clergy and monks.
been written in Antioch in 376, but, as the present writer thinks,1 falls rather within the years of Jerome's stay in Rome (382-385). In this work, which is in the form of a dialogue, he assails the opinion of those who followed Lucifer of Calaris, and especially their non-recognition of heretical baptism. To 382-384 must likewise be assigned the treatise adv. Helvidium de perpetua virginitate B. Mariae, in which, in opposition to Helvidius, a resident in Rome—Jerome supports the doctrine of Mary's perpetual virginity, asserting that the Lord's brethren were in fact his cousins. The ad Helvidium letter II. was composed in Bethlehem (392-393). Jovianus, the Roman ascetic, had asserted that the state of celibacy was in no way superior to that of widowhood or marriage, that the regenerate were essentially without sin, that fasting was of no real merit, and that all the regenerate would attain the heavenly reward in equal degree. Jerome assailed the position of Jovianus with great acerbity, awaking a resentment that for some time he endeavored to mitigate in Ep. cxlvii., the Apologetica ad Pacamuthion pro libris contra Jovianum, in which he somewhat modified the severity of his strictures upon marriage in the ad Helvidium. In 390, amid the controversy regarding the orthodoxy of Origen, he wrote the unfinished work contra Johannes Hierosolymitanum (Jehan, bishop of Jerusalem). In 420 he composed the Apologetica ad Rufinus in two books, to which he added a third in the following year. These, together with the Apology (two books) of Rufinus against Jerome, form our most valuable and authentic source for the Origenistic controversy, in the course of which Jerome renounced the heresies of Origen. The short but extremely bitter pamphlet against the Spanish presbyter Vigilantius, in which Jerome denounces the worship of martyrs and relics, the keeping of vigils, and the monastic life, dates from 406. Finally, in 415, he wrote the Dialogus ad Poligianum in three books—a work in masterly form, in which he seeks to controvert the views of Poligius from the stand point of the Catholic doctrine current in his day.

(2) Historical works.—The most extensive historical work from Jerome's pen is the Chronicon Chronicon (ed. I. H. Herz, 1852), a translation of the second part, i.e., the chronological tables, of the Chronicler of Eusebius of Caesarea.2 He followed the original as far as it went (A.D. 325), making additions, and he wrote a supplement covering the period between 325 and 378. In spite of many errors and oversights, the work is a mine of information for that period.

We have from Jerome's hand also three biographies of monks. The Vita Pauli Eremitae was written between 374 and 379, and its matter was in all likelihood drawn from the monastic traditions of Egypt,2 though fancy plays a large part in its composition. The Vita Malchi monachi capitis, based upon information given to him by the aged Malchius himself in the wilderness of Chalcis,3 and the Vita Hilarius (the founder of monasticism in the eastern and southern provinces of Palestine) date from the early years of his residence in Bethlehelm (c. 386-391). All three are characteristic examples of the monastic literary genre.

The most important of Jerome's historical writings, however, is his de Viris Illustribus. This a-eone highly extolled work has been called by many a gross instance of his literary methods;5 it is virtually taken piecemeal from Eusebius, HE.6 Nevertheleen, we cannot deny Jerome the distinction of having in this work made the first attempt to compose a history of Christian literature—a task in which he had many successors. The little book was translated into Greek by his friend Sophronius.7

4 (4) Ecclesiastical works.—(a) Under this head come, first of all, three works dating from 386-391, viz. de Situ et nominibus locorum Hebraeorum—in reality a translation of the Onomasticon of Eusebius of Cesaras,8 and for modern scholars a valuable contribution to the topography of Palestine; Interpretationes hebraeorum nominum,9 a work based, according to the preface, upon a new lost treatise of Philo, which Origen extended by adding the TETE proper names; and Questiones hebraicas in libro Genesis,10 an aphoristic commentary on Genesis, the value of which is enhanced by the interpretations derived from the Jewish Haggadah and communicated to Jerome by the Rabbis—interpretations such as he uses also in his other OT commentaries.11

(b) The OT commentaries.—In 388-390 Jerome composed his commentary on Ecclesiastes, in 392 on the Minor Prophets Nahum, Micah, Zephaniah, Haggai, and Habakkuk; in 395-396, on Isaiah and Obadiah; and in 398 on the ten visions of Isaiah 18-28. In 402 and 404 he wrote his Commentarius in Psalms.12 In 406 came his exposition of Hosea, Joel, Amos, Zechariah, and Malachi; between 406 and 408, that of Daniel; 408-410, Isaiah; 410-412, Ezekiel; between 415 and his death in 420, Jeremiah. Jerome's work on the last-named book was interrupted by his death, no more than the first thirty-two chapters having been dealt with. These commentaries show a certain vaesilation between the historical and allegorical methods, and are specially valuable because of the Jewish exegesis which they have brought down to us. The exposition of Daniel, Jerome makes concessions to Ptolemy.

(c) The NT commentaries.—In 388-378 Jerome wrote expositions of Philum, Galatians, Ephesians, and Titus, all of which he was specially indebted to the now lost commentaries of Origen. In 398 he composed his commentary on Matthew—valuable by reason of its extracts from the Gospel to the Hebrews. His translations of that Gospel into Greek and Latin are lost. We are unable to date the date of his exposition of Revelation, which is in no sense an independent work, but an adaptation of the commentary of Victorinus of Peteanus (4th cent.), in which the chiliasmte interpretation of Victorinus is superseded by a spiritualistic one.9

1 Critical ed. C. A. Bernocchi, Hieronymii und Cononii, de vitis illustribus, Freiburg, 1866.
3 Die Bedeutung der Vita Pauli in Juxta eiu Geneseos in Juxta quae i. [1.87]; Berlin, 1878; further, the same writer's Die Weltchronik des Eusebius in ihrer Fortsetzung durch Hieronymus, Berlin, 1903.
5 Paul van d. V. J. Jérôme et la vie de son maître Malchus le capitif, Louvain, 1861, in opposition to J. Kunz, Marcus Rambini und Hieronymus in der geschichtlicher Literatur, xti. [1865] 191-196.
6 O. Zeiller, die Vater der Gnosis, eine Recherchen der Geschicht- lehre in Neum Jahr für deutsche Theologie, II. (1883). In opposition to W. Israel, Die Vita S. Hieronimi in die Chronik der Studien und Forschungen, x. (1885).
9 J. Hauffeiter, Die Kommerz der Hieronymus, Tichonius und Hieronymus zur Apocalypse, in M.K. T. (1867); also Die chiliasmische Schauspielen im echten Apokalypes-
texts from the Psalms, Mark, and other books of Scripture have come down to us. They were preached between 392 and 401 to the inmates of his monastery, and were afterwards committed to writing by them.

3. Significance. — Jerome was no great creative spirit, as was Augustine, but he was certainly the most learned of the Latin Fathers. Not only was he equipped with an extensive knowledge of the one sacred tongue; and in his day the most important works of the Church were written in the vernacular tongues of all the Fathers in his mastery of Hebrew. His significance lies in the fact that he stands supreme among those who mediatised the religious heritage of Hebrew and Greek antiquity to the Latin world. His personality was not of the most attractive kind, although the strictures passed upon him in this respect—e.g., by Luther—are often unduly severe. He had the natural temperamen of the scholar, but his work is frequently impaired by lack of thoroughness. He was passionate and sensuous, yet he was the champion of the most rigid asceticism. Pull of petty vanity and learned rivalry, he was self-assertive and unjust towards his opponents; and, though desitute of the constructive theologian's gift, he liked to pose as a pillar of orthodoxy. By his translation the Bible exercised an immense influence upon the development of the Church and its theology in succeeding centuries, and in that work he produced what must be numbered among the supreme achievements of the Church in the Middle Ages.

LITERATURE. — Books dealing with special parts or aspects of Jerome's work have been fully referred to in the course of the article. Here we note further:


O. GRÜTZMACHER.

JESUITS.—1. Origin. — The Jesuits, or members of the Society of Jesus, are the name of an institute of 'Clercs Regular,' men devoted especially to the care of souls and to the works of mercy spiritual and corporal, like the Theatines, e.g., or the Barnabites (q. v.), both of which are slightly older in date. The Society is not a sect nor even a theological school, but simply a religious Order (that is to say, a body of men living under vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, which, though differing in many respects from the old monastic ideal, has its recognized place in the organization of the Roman Catholic Church. In accordance with this, it is obvious that the term 'Jesuit,' which, almost as much as the word 'Jesuitism,' originated with critics who attributed to the Order a certain distinctive spirit independent of, and distinct from, the Church to which it belongs, would be deprecated by all who bear the name of Jesuits, in so far as it implies the existence of a doctrine, system, policy, or line of thought, as if it were said at the outset that it was certainly not the object of the founder to create such a spirit. Nothing would have been more abhorrent to St. Ignatius Loyola than the erection of an imperium

1 These names were well known and recognized by him in the Acta Secundae generalis, iii, 2 (1907), 2 (1908).
in imperio either in the domain of external discipline or in the domain of ideas. At a crisis when mutaul confidence was lacking, it was to the clergy and to the sovereign pontiff. The spirit of his Society was to be exceptional only in this, that its members, as the result of a religious training unusually proracted and severe, were to be instructed with regard to the model of Jesus Christ Himself, full of zeal, detachment, and self-sacrifice, and of a virtue so highly temperd that they might safely be exposed to an extraordinary strain. This was the founder's conception, and it was realized by many of his followers, especially in his own lifetime and in the first century or two after his death. To admit that with the lapse of years some relaxation of these high ideals may have taken place in the Order is only to admit that the work of Ignatius was a human work and was carried out by human means.

Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556) converted from a careless, if not a sinful, life during the long convalescence which followed a wound received in battle (1521), determined to fit himself for an apostolic vocation by the study of theology. Passing from Alcalá to Saragossa, then to Toulouse and from Salamanca to Paris, he there (1534-35) gathered a handful of companions around him, who in 1534 took vows of poverty and chastity together, and, placing themselves shortly afterwards on the papal vacation of the Holy See, were formally approved as a religious Order by Pope Paul III, 27 Sept. 1540. Although it may be said that Loyola felt his way only by degrees to the complete organization of the Society which he founded, one dominant idea is discernible in all his projects. From the first, as might be expected of an old soldier, his conception was a military one. The Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius de Loyola, though it may be correctly translated 'Society of Jesus,' is at least patient of a military interpretation. It probably first conveyed the idea of a company, i.e., a band commanded by a captain. The term Jesuit (Jesuita), let us note parenthetically, was not chosen by the founder. It appears first in 1544, and was then used by opponents as a nickname (see Astin, Hist. i. 183), but eventually was tacitly acquii red in even by members of the Order. The military conception is especially emphasized in the fundamental meditations of the 'Exercises.' The Jesuit, as he was named, was he, training devised by Loyola and communicated to his fellows, to be used first of all in securing their own progress in virtue, and afterwards for the salvation of their neighbours. The characteristic meditations known as the 'Kingdom of Christ' and the 'Two Standards' are parables of human warfare. In the first Jesus Christ is set before us as a leader appealing for volunteers in a crusade against the infidel. In view of His promise that in all hardships He will share alike with His men and that they shall share with Him the fruits of victory, the conclusion is pressed home that no right-minded Christian who possesses a spark of knightly courage can remain deaf to such a call. In the 'Two Standards' the character of the spiritual campaign is more closely studied. It is pointed out that the tactics of the enemy Satan are to enchain mankind and drag them down by love of money, worldliness and pride. From this the conclusion is drawn that the only effective combat on the side of Christ is that has been has bound itself to a life of mental poverty and humiliation after the example of the leader Himself. It is plain that all this makes appeal to two of the strongest instincts of human nature, instincts deeply rooted in the Spaniards of Loyola's day, viz. loyalty to the feudal chieftain, and the spirit of generous fortitude.

Now, it is easy to see what a marked ideal which above all supplies justification for the 'blind' obedience which Ignatius desired to be the distinctive characteristic of his followers.

'More easily,' he says in his famous letter on obedience, 'may we suffer ourselves to be surprised by other religious Orders in fasting, watching, and other austerities, and by their clothes, which they practice according to their rule, but true and perfect obedience and the absence of our will and judgment, I greatly desire that those who serve God in this Society should be conscious.'

Insubordination is the soldier's most unforgivable crime, discipline a virtue which, so far as great bodies of men are concerned, comes even before courage. Consequently, in the military organization of his Company, Ignatius insisted on obedience most of all. 'Theirs not to make reply, theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do or die,' must be the soldierly ideal as long as the world lasts. And this was especially true of such a force as the Spanish knight had conceived, a lightly equipped force ready to take the field at a moment's notice in any forlorn hope, whatever the nature of the service required of them. The blind obedience of the Jesuits has often been made a matter of reproach, but in point of fact it was imposed by the founder to be an entirely blind obedience. It was 'casea guadarn obedientin' even to him, and in almost every context when speaking of obedience he limited its scope to things which were not sinful. For example, he says (Summarium, cap. 31) that his disciples must 'endeavour to be resigned inferiorly . . . conferring their will and judgment wholly to the superiors,' and in all things in which no sin is perceptible 'in omnibus obsequia non sine decretali recto.'

The charge that St. Ignatius in the very text of his Constitutions (lib. vi. cap. 5) empowers a superior to bind his subjects to obedience even though compliance with the order involves the commission of a grievous sin—the famous obligatio ad pecossum—is based on a ridiculous misinterpre tation of a formula well known to the earlier canonists (see De Laudibus et Pauella, p. 517 ff, and Monkar's preface to Bochmar, Les Jesuites). Many writers, like F. von Ranke, John Addington Symonds, J. N. Figgis, and others, who have at first made this misapplication upon inadequate evidence, have afterwards withdrawn it when they have given themselves time to consider the texts at leisure. Always regarding the priests of his Order as a corporal of special training, and as a special service, Loyola saw the necessity of, besides perfect obedience, equipment by an extremely severe training. Instead of a single year of novice ship, as in the older Orders, two years, abounding in tests of the most varied kind, were imposed upon every candidate before he was permitted to take vows. Even then the vows were 'simple,' not solemn. The recruit was bound to the Society, but not the Society to the recruit, and the Father General might still at any time dismiss him if he proved unsuitable. Practically speaking, a state of things soon resulted in which ordination to the priesthood could not be conferred much before the age of thirty, and the public vows, which finally marked a recruit's acceptance as a 'founded' member of the body, were even then permitted only after a sort of the enemy Satan is thus defeated under strict control, a large part of the time having been spent in study, three years in purely spiritual discipline, and, ordinarily speaking, another long period in the teaching or moral supervision of youth. Such a system seems
This idea, as well as that of an organization of crypto-Jesuits and secret emissaries, has been largely fostered by royalty. British in 1588, and French since 1625, of Dumas per and still more seriously by the dissemination of the notorious Monstra Secreta, a supposed Jesuit code of secret instructions, the apocryphal casuistry of which has been recognized (on this see Duhm, Jesuiten-Fabrik, ch. 5; Brou, Les Jésuites de la légende, i. 275-301; and Monod's Introduction to Boehmer, Les Jésuites, pp. 151-152), were in early life for a period of a month continually, each Jesuit, leaving all other occupations, devotes himself to making the Exercises, thus to renew the memory of the principles upon which his choice of a vocation is founded. It was an extension of this practice in a modified form to select bodies of the clergy, students, sodalities, and whole parishes which first brought into vogue the system of retreats and missions. The Jesuits found universal favour in the Church of Rome, and has of late years become prevalent among the more advanced type of Anglicans.

2. Organization.—As regards the organization of the Society of Jesus not much need be said. The Constitutions, by which the Order is still governed, were drawn up by Loyola himself, but the rule was incorporated into the Roman Missal of 1570, and the Society has ever since been subject to the authority of the Holy See. The form and spirit of the Constitutions are the same as they were when Loyola dictated them, to their translation into French by Saint Ignatius. The Constitutions of the Order, as adopted by the General Congregation at Seville in 1562, have never been amended or altered. The General Congregation, which meets every six years, is the supreme authority of the Society. It is composed of the Superior General and the heads of the various provinces. The Constitutions of the Order are divided into two parts: the General and the Provincial. The General Constitutions contain the rules for the government of the Society as a whole, including the Constitutions of the Provinces. The Provincial Constitutions are the rules for the government of each individual province.

3. Criticisms.—Perhaps the charge which has most seriously weighed upon the Order, and which has at any rate entailed the most serious consequences in rendering them obnoxious to anti-clerical governments, is the accusation of teaching the fallibility of the Church. That this charge is not founded on the older canons, and that the younger Jesuits, not being well understood by the ordinary reader, is probably due the wide-spread fiction that there exist among the Jesuits various degrees of initiation like those of the Freemasons.
published anonymously, was primarily a "jeu d’esprit." But, as time went on, thanks partly to the bitterness of the Jesenian controversy, and partly to the pardonable indignation and retributions in deadly earnest of the 'victims themselves, the attack was understood much more seriously, and it is now quite commonly treated as if it were a protest of outraged virtue against a corruption which threatened all the men of William, the author of Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey, etc., or, again, the Gunpowder Plot, with the teaching and influence of the Jesuits. The weakness of the evidence on which such charges are based cannot be adequately illustrated here, but it may be pointed out that refutations have been published on the Jesuit side in such books as the "Jesuiten-Relief" of Duhr and the similar French work of Brun. Nor are there wanting independent writers (see, e.g., A. Marks, "Who Killed Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey?", London, 1900) who range themselves on the Jesuit side.

The much-abused casuistry of the Jesuits stands upon precisely the same footing as their alleged advocacy of tyrannicide. To begin with, they did not create this branch of theological study. The cardinal errors of the Jesuit casuistry were first laid down by the Cappuccinos and the Jesuit casuistry's real opponents have always been the austere Jesuits, and not Loyola himself. The casuistry of their contemporaries who were not Jesuits, and indeed against the moral teaching of the whole Catholic Church. The Jesuits have drawn the fire of opposing critics simply because their textbooks were the most widely appealed to and most commonly accepted. The Jesuits now or in the past have merely echoed the warnings given by the Istituuti casuistry of the whole Catholic Church, by its discrediting laxity. The famous "Problematis" of the Society is based upon a very simple maxim, "le plus bête n'est obligé," which in ordinary life is acted upon as the dictate of simple common sense (see the book "Quo ego", by "Pilatus" [Viktor Naumann], a non-Catholic writer, published in 1603 in answer to the attacks of von Hoovenbroek). So, again, with the Jesuits. A similar principle can be put aside, which, while in certain texts it may obviously bear a quite innocent meaning, has always been repudiated by the Society in its absolute and immoral significance. The Jesuits have also been copiously dealt with by Duhr, Brun, and many other writers. No doubt much of the disfavour which attaches to the casuistry of the Jesuits is due to the "Itineris provinciales" of Pascal. The Jesuit synods in these brilliant contrivances dealt a heavier blow than he foresaw or probably intended. He himself knew enough of the Jesuits to be aware that a sort of cynical indifference to right and wrong could not be laid to their charge. He also knew that the cultured audience whom he first addressed were equally far from believing that the religious brethren of St. François Régis, and such men as M. de Brébeuf, C. Lalemant, J. Jogues, J. Marquette, etc., between 1633 and 1655 among the Great Lakes Indians. For all this the impartial testimony of F. Parkman in his "Jesuits in North America," London, 1885, is even more remarkable for the "reductions" established among the Indians of the coureurs de bois. But does the splendour which once characterized this noble race fall to make itself felt even in such lively pages as those of R. B. Cunninghame Graham's "A Vanished Arcadia," London, 1901. But there is hardly any part of the earth's surface for which the Jesuit missionaries have not laboured. Five Fathers went to the Congo at the instance of the king of Portugal as
early as 1547. Five sailed for Brazil in 1549, where the labors of Father Joseph Anchieta in particular were soon to make him known as the apostle of all the New World. In 1552, ten Jesuits started for Abyssinia, founding a mission where some wonderful story is told in a long series of volumes now being published at the expense of the Italian government, by Motto. In the same year, 1558, three other priests began to labor among the Káfers of South Africa, and a couple of years later two others reached Memphis in Upper Egypt. In 1566 a great missionary work was inaugurated by the arrival of Peruvian Jesuits in Pera. Before fifty years had expired, the Peruvian Jesuits were divided into two separate provinces; while a hardly less thriving centre had been established in Mexico, whence thirteen Jesuits sailed for the first time in 1572. In 1615, St. Peter Claver began his extraordinary apostolate among the Negro slaves of Carthagena (see M. D. Petre, Aethiopum Seruus, London, 1895). A mission was sent to the Tartars of the Black Sea region in 1663. In 1684 A. de Rhodes opened up a new field of labour in Tonking, and in the same year Antonio de Andrade reached the heart of Tibet. But the record is endless. Of course, many regions remained a Church where, before long numbered over 300,000 converts had been founded by Xavier in Japan, but between 1600 and 1840 every missionary was killed or deported, and China was reduced to a confraternity by fire and sword (see M. Steichen, The Christian Diaspora, Tokyo, 1908). In most other countries, despite contradictions, and in particular the domestic troubles originated by the controversy over the lawfulness of the 'Chinese rites,' there has been a remarkably vigorous growth until the suppression of the Society in 1773.

The third special work of the Order was the education of youth; and here also, as soon as the Jesuits began to set up colleges of their own, their success was remarkable. A more or less uniform method and arrangement of studies was contemplated from the start. But the rough draught de Studiis Societatis Jesu, outlined by Jerome Nadal between 1548 and 1552, reached its full development only after much discussion and experiment in the Instituto et Universitatis S. J. of 1561. (Important collections of documents relating to the Society's educational methods and aims may be found in the four volumes contributed by G. M. Fischer to the Monumenta Germaniae Pede-
gagogica, 1887 ff., and in the two volumes of Monumenta Pædagogica published by the Madrid Fathers, Madrid, 1901.) Perhaps no more convincing tribute can be founded to the educational success of the Jesuits than the fact that in 1606 Bacon in England could write of them as follows:

"Education: which excellent part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort revived of late times by the colleges of the Jesuits: of whom, although in regard of their superstition I may say Quo melius, so inferior, yet in regard of this, and some other points concerning human learning and moral manners, I may say, as Aguinaldo said to his enemy Pharnabazus, Tuies quos sis, ultimum munere ostendis." (Advancement of Learning, bk. 1.)

In 1694 the Collegio Romano had 2108 students. At Rouen the attendance averaged 2000. For a great part of the 17th cent., the scholars at the college of Louis le Grand, Paris, varied from 1800 to 2900. In 1616 the Sacred Congregation of cards seminaries under its direction. In 1700 the number of collegiate and university establishments had risen to 789. Schwiererath computes that, when the French Revolution came in 1791, there was, at the height of its educational fame, the number of students attending its classes at any one time must have amounted to a total of 300,000. As regards the growth of the Jesuit body itself we may note that, while at the death of St. Ignatius in 1556 there were 12 provinces and 1000 members of the Order all told, these numbers at the death of Laynez, the second General, nine years later, had increased to 18 provinces and 3500 Jesuits. In 1615, at the death of Acquaviva, the fifth General, there were 32 provinces and 18,112 members, and in 1770 just before the suppression 42 provinces and 23,000 members. No Jesuit has ever been elected a cardinal, and comparatively few have been created cardinals or raised to higher dignities in the Church, but it must be remembered that all professed Fathers take a vow to accept no ecclesiastical dignity, and from this vow they can be released only by the express command of the Holy See.

The Jesuit Order, in virtue of its monarchical government, its centralization, and its special vow of obedience to the pope, has always inclined to an extreme ultramontanism. This has constantly brought it into conflict with nationalistic movements, while, on the other hand, its independence of episcopal control and its claims, whether justified or not, to figure as a corps d'élite, have made the secular clergy somewhat lukewarm in its defence. Add to this the bitter attacks and calumnies with its avowed enemies, the free-thinkers, Evangelicals, Jansenists, etc., and you have probably sufficient explanation, even apart from the prayer of the founder that persecution should be their lot, for the numerous deces of banishment of which they have been the subject. In the latter half of the 18th cent. the spread of infidelity and corruption of morals, especially in France, together with the political intrigues of the ministers of the Bourbon kings, led to a combination of attack upon the very existence of the Society. Pretenses were naturally found in the inducements or alleged misconduct of some individual members of the Order—the bankruptcy of Father A. Lavalette in certain commercial transactions connected with the missions being the most serious of these. As a result the Jesuits were banished and their property was confiscated in Portugal (1759), France (1765), Spain and its dependencies (1775), and, finally, Naples (1787). A few years later the pressure brought to bear upon Pope Clement XIV was so great that he yielded to the storm, and in 1773 published abriefsuppression which had been under discussion for some years. Strangely enough, in White Russia the autocratic Empress Catherine would not allow the decrees of suppression to be promulgated, and a few Jesuits still held together. After the French Revolution, Pope Pius VII, approved their constitution in France and eventually, in 1814, restored the Society by the bull Sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum. Since then the Order, though with many vicissitudes, has again established itself in all European countries, in N. and S. America, and in many of the old mission fields; it has resumed the work of education; and at present it numbers in all some 17,000 members.

LITURGICAL.—The literature relating to the Jesuits is vast, and for a relatively complete bibliography the reader must be referred to some such work as that of Father Max Heinrich, Die Orden und Kongregationen der katol. Kirche, Paderborn, 1898, 3 vols., and similar works on the Society of Jesus, in CE xiv. 81. The ten volumes of C. Sommervogel and A. de Backer, Bibliographie de la Compagnie de Jésus de Paris, 1800-1890, not only contain an enumeration of all the books and editions published by the Jesuits, but also, in vol. x, an elaborate classification of the colleges and other works; in the same series are the volumes of J. P. H. Merks, Der Jansenismus in den holländischen Missionsgesellschaften, 1901, which, besides a list of apologetic works written by Jesuits in defence of the Society in the Netherlands, contains a useful bibliography. Bibliographies compiled from mere or less authentic point of view may be found in Pp. VIII v. 729, and in C. Moxod and H. Bosch, J. Jesuiten, 1906, 2 vols., and similar works. The Jesuits published a number of important works, the most important of which is the series of Monuments Historiques Societatis Jesu, containing a very complete edition of the letters of St. Ignatius as also of documents emanating from nearly all the countries of the founder, notably St. Francis Xavier, Laynez, Blessed Peter Faber, St. Francis Borgia, etc. Another remarkable collection
is that of O. Brunnberg, "Petrus Convati et sola, Freiburg, 1566," of which six volumes have now appeared.

Many documents connected with the history of the Jesuits in France have been published by A. Carayon, Documents inédits concernant la Compagnie de Jésus, 23 vols., Poitiers, 1885-90, and by J. F. S. Prat, Les Histoires de nos Catholiques Forsfathers, 3 vols., 1874-77, as also The History of the Catholiques sans Frontières, 1875, and other works. Much original material concerning Scottish Jesuits may be found in W. J. T. Curran, The History of the Society of Jesus, 2 vols., London, 1888-90, and in Reminiscences of Scottish Catholic Jesuits, 4 vols., 1888, and of Scottish Catholic Jesuits, 3 vols., 1889. With regard to the foreign missions, collections of letters from Japan, China, and other countries are too numerous to mention in detail, but profusely may be given to the great American undertaking under the auspices of the Jesuits, The Jesuit Relations and Ancient Documents, 73 vols., Cleveland, 1886-1901, and to the Lettres et documents inédits, of which the first edition, prepared by C. Le Goben, was published in Paris, 1865.

Of general histories of the Jesuits the best known is that of G. Chanut, Histoire des missions, de l'ordre de Jésus, 8 vols., 1851, but it has been translated into various languages, and an abridgment has been published in English by C. C. Gall, The Jesuit Missionary, 2 vols., London, 1860, and in the Geistliche Bibliothek, 20 vols., Vienna, 1870.

is important to notice, what must be more fully considered later in this article in relation to the founder of Christianity, that the moral and spiritual history of each of the three personal founders threw peculiar light upon the field of thought, so that his followers derived, as it were, their needs through that history.

(2) The special function or office of the founder.

Here three ideas must be recognized as essential. The founder is imperial, exemplar, or prophet, or redeemer, or as a combination of two or three of these. Yet, when the central idea of each of these functions is thoroughly conceived, it will be found to involve the others. Buddhism in its first stages knew its founder primarily as exemplar of the process of enlightenment. His teaching function arose from and was based upon his personal experiences of salvation. But later Buddhism showed powerful tendencies to enlarge his authority into that of a prophet and his experience into that of a redeemer. The founder of Islam was conceived of primarily as a prophet, inspired with definite and direct messages from God. As in Buddhism the prophetic, so here the exemplary, function of the founder was obscured. And yet, of course, the personal character and condition of the man his society and the ethical of his religion. The 'imitation' of Muhammad is confined to the 'copying of external acts' (D. R. Macdonald, Aspects of Islam, New York, 1911, p. 20), but the influence of his spirit and personal life has gone deeper. Christianity views Jesus Christ as the perfect exemplar of the character of God the Father, as the full revealer of religious truth, and also as the redeemer, whose personal experience, interpreted as His 'work', changed the moral relations of God and men.

(3) The person of the founder.

Though the Buddha himself, according to legend, assumed an amnestic position as to the Absolute Being, and was wholly concerned with a system of ethical culture for the attainment of deliverance, his followers in later generations came to think of him as an incarnation of the Supreme Spirit. So also some of the followers of Muhammad gradually worked out a doctrine of his person resembling the Arian doctrine of Christ, though this has no basis in Muhammad's own literature. Christianity from the first viewed its founder as a superhuman being, as one who had become incarnate, who as such an incarnate, divine personality exercised the whole historical function, as the redeemer, distinctly and with ideal completeness, and who met the fundamental needs of man for moral harmony with God, for victory over all evil, and for eternal life.

3. The field of practical decision.

It is obvious from this brief comparison that in certain matters a modified parallelism exists between the three great 'founded' religions. Hence their founders are often compared with one another or named together in current literature. And one result of this modern spirit is the energetic challenge as to why one should be accepted as final in preference to the others; e.g., J. Estlin Carpenter, after comparing the 'exaltation' of Gautama with that of Jesus, addresses Christendom thus: 'In each case the belief is justified by an appeal to experience. The one to be rejected, the other to be accepted?* (in Jesus or Christ? London, 1909, p. 247). There can be no doubt that each of these great personalities has proved to be a most powerful theme in the history of man; each has contributed rich material to man's religious experience; each has exercised profound influence upon the ethical conceptions and the civilization of great masses of humanity; each personality has become more or less directly bound up with that interpretation of God and the world which on the whole is the distinguishing property of the religion and the form of civilization associated with his name. It is not the aim of this article to carry out the comparison any further. That comparison is being carried out in another way by the scientific theories of religion and ethics, and indeed by every scientific contribution to the history and science of religion. For every serious and extensive study of any religion raises the question of its historical and final religion is necessary or possible, and, if so, what that final religion may be. But the comparison is being carried out in another and still more potent way, to which indeed each scientific piece of work is subordinate, on every mission field where the heralds of the personal founders confront one another. There each system faces what is after all the final test of the result; a movement of adequacy to meet the deepest needs of the human soul.

II. THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF JESUS CHRIST.

1. The rise of the problem.

The investigation of the life of Christ in the 19th cent. and the whole trend of modern thought have combined to set in a new light the problem of His Person. One of the most vital elements in that problem is stated in the phrase 'the epoch-making Leben Jesu' of Strauss. Even as the epoch-making Leben Jesu of Strauss began to be considered, the subject came to view. The change appeared at once on the orthodox side in Neander's Leben Jesu (1837). It was signalized in the successive editions of Ullmann's Die Sündenkindheit Jesu (Eng. tr., The Sinlessness of Jesus). Strauss's method of attack compelled men to think more seriously than he did himself of that which lay behind all the separate utterances of Jesus, namely that consciousness of Himself from which His whole attitude, action, purpose, and speech arose, on which, as on the absolutism of His Person, we have the first earnest dealing with His consciousness and its historical development. Parallel with the development of the sense of history and contributing to the same result was the growth of thought which sprang mainly from Schleiermacher. His very definition of religion as 'the feeling of dependence' and his penetrating analysis of the religious consciousness compelled men to apply to the founders of faith the same criteria of reality which they were learning to apply to the whole range of religions inquiry. From the days of Strauss and Neander the volume of inquiry grew steadily. Modern, as it ever did, on the insights of GUSS (Christi Person und Werk, vol. 1) found this to be the central question: 'What was the form and content and history of the self-consciousness of Jesus? In English the first use of the phrase is to be found, perhaps, in John Young's The Christ of History (1857), in which he says 'His Own Idea of His Pable Life' (bk. ii. pt. 1) and 'The Forms of His Consciousness' (bk. iii. pt. ii.). In H. P. Liidon's Hampton Lectures, The Divinity of our Lord, we find the Fourth Lecture entitled 'Our Lord's Divinity as witnessed by His Consciousness.' But it was only gradually that the subject won a large place in the theology of the English-speaking world, and that mainly through the writings of three men, A. R. Bruce, the translator of the Vulgate, The Humiliation of Christ (Lect. vi.), The Kingdom of God, A. M. Fairbam (Studies in the Life of Christ, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology), and C. Gore (Essay in Luzi nuclei, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and Dissertations). It is important to remember that for a brief period strong objections were felt to the investigation in question by the church at large. For example, W. Sanday in his article on Jesus Christ' (Hastings' DB II. 603) said: 'On
the Christian hypothesis, frankly held, any such grasp [i.e., the consciousness to be investigated] would seem to be excluded, and the attempt to reach it could hardly be made without irreverence.

The difference between that position and the bold speculations on this very topic by the same author in the articles, "Ages Annihilated: Moderns mark the increasing range, confidence, and reverent courage with which this absolutely unique historical problem has been explored by English and American theologians during the last quarter of a century.

I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM. — There is still much uncertainty among those who discuss this subject as to the exact nature of the question before them. And the uncertainty leads to such haste in reaching a hasty or determining its dogmatic conclusions in advance.

1. The Christian Hypothesis. — If Jesus is conceived of primarily and definitely as a prophet or as an abnormal religious enthusiast, or even as the sanest and deepest religious spirit in human history, the question of His consciousness will be classed wholly with the study of religious geniuses, or, at most, of inspired messengers of God. And then the phenomena of O.T. prophecy, of religious devotion and insight among religious leaders of various races and ages, will be relevant to the issue. But Jesus had a purpose worth while, and what with what inheritance the normal human mind and will did attain such moral and spiritual prominence as His will be the main matter of investigation. On this point there is here concerned with something more, something quite unique and raised beyond the level even of the highest religious experience known to history. The NT and the vast mass of Christian believers, as well as the whole of theology, present us with a new idea, namely that of a superhuman consciousness which has entered for definite moral ends into the conditions of human experience. It asserts that Jesus has a unique type of personality. It is at once human because it is conscious will, and yet more than human because it has invaded the course of human life from a realm of consciousness being and human mind, and clung. The neglect to take this matter seriously has led to such amazing confusions of thought and fact as infest, for example, so brilliant a work as that of Wene (Die Geschichte Christi, etc.) and that of Ritschl (Christ’s consciousness and Reconciliation, Eng. tr., p. 386).

2. The word "consciousness". — It is in the interests of sound thinking about this unique history consciousness that modern science and philosophy have combined to clear and also vastly to extend the use of that word "consciousness.

We recognize now everywhere that there are various grades of consciousness in all evolution, and, between all of which there are definite units as well as diversities. Thus so calm and careful a thinker as C. A. Strong (Why the Mind has a Body, New York, 1898) says that "the origin of consciousness can be explained, if at all, only out of antecedent realities of the same order" (p. 386), and, again, "consciousness has arisen out of simpler spiritual facts." No one except a materialist believes that this world contains all the forms of conscious beings that exist. There may be many kinds and grades of consciousness, but all of them are out of consciousness having a natural cause, being out of existence, many below the human. Nor would it be quite "modern" to hold dogmatically that the human consciousness is shut off from contact with all forms of consciousness. But we will remove to any one time upon this earth. Now the Christian hypothesis hitherto been that, in Jesus Christ, a superhuman consciousness will have taken its place in history, manifesting throughout all its range of expression at once its alliance with and its difference from the ordinary type of human consciousness. Upon that difference in unity the whole peculiar religious value of the history of Jesus Christ has been made to rest from the Apostolic days down to the world-wide promulgation of the Christian message in our own day.

3. Elements involved in the investigation. — The investigation of the Christian consciousness of the historic Christ must contain difficulties which are peculiar to that subject. As to its modes of action, its development, its content, its relation to the divine purpose of redemption, the inner meaning of human life and the destiny of the race, such a consciousness must present unique features to the student of history and religion. These peculiarities must be examined in the study of the relations with the men about Him, their estimate of Him, their appreciation and their memory of His words and deeds. If the natural and inevitable confusion of mind is reflected in their records, if these records show that their estimate of Him varied and grew, and that their memory of His earlier words and deeds became coloured by the fuller knowledge of later days—all this will add to the perplexity even of that historian who believes most profoundly that in Jesus Christ a more than human self manifested its consciousness, and who at the same time seeks accuracy of historical statement, and order in the psychological analysis of experience. And here we are facing the supreme problem. If Christ was divine and His history on earth was and is essential to the perfecting of mankind, then His consciousness in its self-manifestations was and is one of the basic facts of human existence. And consciousness has this wonderful property, that in it knowledge and being are not distinct and separate. It is not dependent on my thought, nor may thought on my existence. The self-conscious thing exists only in being conscious and is conscious only in existing. Hence we do not merely argue from the words and acts of a human consciousness to a human being being or above them. In those words and acts the self is revealed. The conscious will is the ultimate fact, the real and immortal nature of it.

II. FACTORS IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. — A. The Religion of Jesus. — Any study of the consciousness of Jesus must begin with the qualities of His own religious life. Jesus must take note both (1) of what He inherited and retained in mature life from His Jewish ancestry and from the religious life of His environment, and (2) of what His modern science and philosophy have combined to clear and also vastly to extend the use of that word "consciousness.

We recognize now everywhere that there are various grades of consciousness in all evolution, and, between all of which there are definite units as well as diversities. Thus so calm and careful a thinker as C. A. Strong (Why the Mind has a Body, New York, 1898) says that "the origin of consciousness can be explained, if at all, only out of antecedent realities of the same order" (p. 386), and, again, "consciousness has arisen out of simpler spiritual facts." No one except a materialist believes that this world contains all the forms of conscious beings that exist. There may be many kinds and grades of consciousness, but all of them are out of existence, many below the human. Nor would it be quite "modern" to hold dogmatically that the human consciousness is shut off from contact with all forms of consciousness. But we will remove to any one time upon this earth. Now the Christian hypothesis hitherto been that, in Jesus Christ, a superhuman consciousness will have taken its place in history, manifesting throughout all its range of expression at once its alliance with and its difference from the ordinary type of human consciousness. Upon that difference in unity the whole peculiar religious value of the history of Jesus Christ has been made to rest from the Apostolic days down to the world-wide promulgation of the Christian message in our own day.

3. Elements involved in the investigation. — The investigation of the Christian consciousness of the historic Christ must contain difficulties which are peculiar to that subject. As to its modes of action, its development, its content, its relation to the divine purpose of redemption, the inner meaning of human life and the destiny of the race, such a consciousness must present unique features to the student of history and religion. These peculiarities must be examined in the study of the relations with the men about Him, their estimate of Him, their appreciation and their memory of His words and deeds. If the natural and inevitable confusion of mind is reflected in their records, if these records show that their estimate of Him varied and grew, and that their memory of His earlier words and deeds became coloured by the fuller knowledge of later days—all this will add to the perplexity even of that historian who believes most profoundly that in Jesus Christ a more than human self manifested its consciousness, and who at the same time seeks accuracy of historical statement, and order in the psychological analysis of experience. And here we are facing the supreme problem. If Christ was divine and His history on earth was and is essential to the perfecting of mankind, then His consciousness in its self-manifestations was and is one of the basic facts of human existence. And consciousness has this wonderful property, that in it knowledge and being are not distinct and separate. It is not dependent on my thought, nor may thought on my existence. The self-conscious thing exists only in being conscious and is conscious only in existing. Hence we do not merely argue from the words and acts of a human consciousness to a human being being or above them. In those words and acts the self is revealed. The conscious will is the ultimate fact, the real and immortal nature of it.
the great mass of the people. The relation of Israel to God and the purpose of God with Israel remained as the supreme subjects of thought and discussion in the synagogue. Jesus heard the Law read and expounded from tender years. To the Temple He was taken in due course for the performance of His inherited duties there. His own reading of the Scriptures must have been deep, since His teaching is supported by quotations and illuminated by fresh interpretations of nearly all parts of the OT, and especially of the Psalms, Isaiah, and Daniel. Important references to the Pentateuch occur, which He used and cited without quotation as to authorship or historicity. For Him the OT remained the true revelation of God Himself. God is the creator and sustainer of nature and of man, the ruler of history. God is the Father of the people (Mt 7:10, Mt 16:27) and they are 'sons of the kingdom' (Mt 8:1). He has promulgated His law of righteousness through Moses (Mt 7:10, 12:34), and has announced through the prophets the day of the Messiah when His kingdom shall be established in the earth (Mt 5:17, Lk 4:16-21). These things He had been taught, and He held them true. And He takes for granted that His hearers know and believe them. But, as Baedeker has pointed out (Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu, p. 72 ff., 2nd ed., p. 54 ff.), there was felt at that time a deep pathetic unness in regard to the Temple worship, and at the same time a strained and passionate concentration upon the application of the law to the desolate and dried-up conditions of the day. God in His transcendental holiness seemed to have vanished from the sin-sainted land. The voice of prophecy had long ceased, the Temple had been repeatedly defiled by Gentile conquerors, and the kingdom was under foreign rule. The sense of fellowship with Jahweh was broken. Yet His Law and promise were there in written form. In three directions relief was sought: first, by setting up the internese between God and man with heavenly hierarchies; second, by the formation of quietist circles like the Essenes, who sought, away from the clash of the world's turmoil, in the spirit of the ancient fellowship with Jahweh; and third, by the cherishing of apocalyptic dreams, in which the Day of the Lord was seen as the near and sudden act of God breaking in upon the course of history. Not with earthly armies but by the power of the word of God, many now look for the appearing of that hour when the ancient promises would be fulfilled, and Israel once more vindicated, justified, as the chosen and supreme people of a mixed atmosphere at once of stubborn faith and of spiritual bitterness, of national humiliation and legalistic pride, of religious fervour and moral blindness, of political defeat and apocalyptic hope, Jesus grew up. In some measure all these elements can be found in the men of His day, and in Him. But in Him appear now and distinctive characteristics.  

2. Elements in the religious consciousness of Jesus. Through what processes of experience and thought His youth and early manhood passed, we do not know. When He stands before us in the Gospels, He has already attained fullness. His self-consciousness is fully developed. All attempts to prove that, after His baptism He obviously changed His mind, or received entirely new revelations in the first years of His ministry, as yet failed to win general consent. The utmost that has been done is to mark out more clearly the manner in which His central self-consciousness adapted itself to the conditions when He was unfolded in the lives of those with whom He came in contact. His wit was indeed conditioned by the wiles of others in its progressive operation, and His method of dealing with them developed itself appropriately from stage to stage. His capacity to do as of old did appear as these stages were passed through. But from first to last His own religious consciousness remained consistent and unchanged, and it implies from the beginning the fundamental elements of His work. Of His religious consciousness we shall here name four principal elements.  

(a) Secret of Divine favour. He found the secret of fellowship with God in the condition of the heart. At one stroke He lays aside the burdens of the external law and their elaboration by tradition. Even the most righteous, as an act and gift of grace at the advent of the Kingdom, is deeply modified. Righteousness before God, the 'blessedness' of the divine fellowship, rests on what a man 'thinks', the 'inmost sources of thought and volition.' Out of the heart proceed all evil things (Mk 7:21). In His 'heart' a man may commit the vilest sin, and, there, before God, it is a completed deed (Mt 5:22). It is the pure in 'heart' that shall receive the vision of God at that day. This does not mean that the outer life has no significance. No one can insist more relentlessly upon full and literal obedience to the known will of God (Mt 15:9 and Lk 10:27). But, when applied in the parables of judgment against unfaithful lives are unmitigated. For Jesus, the supreme law is love to God and love to man (Lk 10:27). But, as love to man the circumstances of men, so love to God is conditioned by its object. It manifests itself in faith, which should know no bounds, in obedience at all costs, and in prayer, which should be holy and passionate, persistent, and unostentatious. These and other important features are not new when taken singly. Parallels can be found in many quarters. But in the teaching of Jesus they acquire unique significance from three facts: first, from their being unified in the thought of one mind, as they are nowhere else; second, from the exclusion of any alloy of formalism, worldliness, superstition, or mere ceremonialism; third, from the fact that they are expressed and find their unity and power in, His own religious experience and moral character. He is not dealing with the results of abstract speculation or with the current morals of His time. He is not attempting to justify a certain doctrine about God before men. He is describing what life is to Him, as He confronts man and walks with God. The Beatitudes, even though interpreted eschatologically, describe the life and character of His own work as a result, His own actual blessedness. Men feel as they read, they must have felt as they heard, these utterances that what He commanded and promised He Himself realized in His own soul.  

(6) Conception of God.—This applies in the fullest manner to that which is at the centre of the religious consciousness, its conception of God. And here it is not possible to exaggerate the change which Jesus wrought in human history. He assumed that God is holy and supreme. All man's awe of God, his sense of the majesty, wisdom, and purity of Jahweh of Israel is for Him not only justified but increased. But Jesus with one word transmuted the whole. He taught men to think of God as the Father. Not one attribute of reverence was cancelled, but a new meaning was, as it were, shot through the whole true picture of God, and has attributed a new relation to the others and all stood in a new light for man. It is true that, founding on Ex 4, Dt 32, 33, 34; Hos 11, the Jews spoke of God as the Father of Israel, and references to Him as Father among the individual Israelites are not unknown (see G. Dalmann, Die Welters Jesu, Leipzig, 1888, p. 150 ff.); yet Jesus did make the same central and supreme in an entirely new way, while avoiding, except on rare occasions, other Jewish titles for God. He nowhere
speaks of God as the Father of mankind: rather do men need to become His sons (Mt 5:6, Lk 6:20, cf. Mt. 23). The persons which He uses are 'my Father,' 'your Father,' 'thy Father,' and once 'our Father' (in the Lord's Prayer), and occasionally He speaks of 'the Father.' His use of the word is thus the profound bond up with it always presuppose faith and obedience in those addressed. But, for them, 'the Father' who is 'in heaven' is the God of nature (Mt 5:25, 6:25, 10:10), who cares for them with love (Mt 6:25, 32), who demands righteousness (Mt 5:26-30), hears prayer (Mt 6), forgives sin (Mt 6:12), and at last receives them to glory (Mt 18:19). There is then no lessening of awe or reverence before God. In the use of this name, He corresponds to that demand for 'inwardness' in the religious life of men. It is a searching, penetrating demand which He makes, that men shall treat God as their Father. His correlatives as His Father are: man, son, and child—Da'atHa'—the Kingdom of God. The very power as well as love, the righteousness as well as mercy, of the Father combine to set up a moral standard the most searching and the most severe of which the world has heard. 'Your righteousness shall exceed'—the most exacting system of law known to history. This teaching also came out of the inner conscience of God. As we shall see later, He knew Himself as Son of God in a unique Sonship. But its uniqueness neither removed it from analogy with that of believing men nor made the moral demand any lighter, but intensified it, made it more penetrating. His own Sonship raised questions of self-adaptation, of self-denial, demanded wisdom and grace, sympathetic insight and brooding patience, which caused it always to be faintly disagreeable as we see Him training the twelve, dealing with His foes, moving to the Cross. It was out of the disciples well as the joy, the surrender as well as the confidence, in His experience of being, that He made of the Sonship of God, which changed the face of God for the hearts of men. (c) The sinless conscience. We come to a point at which the religious consciousness of Jesus is paralleled, in that of man, always and everywhere in an incomparable manner. Whereas the whole religious history of the races assumes and proceeds from the sense of moral failure, that of Jesus is a characteristic and continuous sense of moral harmony with the will of the Father. Put in the negative form, this means 'the sinlessness of Jesus.' (d) The witness of His disciples ought not to be unheeded. These are evidences for the fact does not rest upon their inability to find and record definite moral or religious failures in His character. Their belief in the unseen of fact could arise only from two sources, viz. the impression made by His whole personal bearing, and the definite tasks which he undertook and accomplished. Hence we find that His sinlessness is not a deduction from, but a fundamental presupposition of, the essential Christian doctrine. It is as such referred to explicitly in a few passages (e.g., 2 Co 5:10, Ro 1:4, He 4:17-23, 1 P 2:2, 1 Jn 2:29). But they are not needed. The whole apostolic conception of Jesus and the Sonship and Lord was utterly inconsistent with any thought of His own guilt and need of pardon or redemption. The Fourth Gospel is more definite on this, as on other elements of His life. But even the words 'I have glorified thee,' 'I have manifested thy name' (Jn 17:4), do not surpass in their inner meaning the saying of Mt 11:28 (even when abbreviated by Harnack in his search for the original form (Mt 3:17), which is not paralleled in the New Testament). The pronouncements of Jn 13, in which the Son's sinlessness and sin is recognized, are paralleled in the pronouncements of Mt 16:13 in which the Son is sinless and sin is recognized, or in the pronouncements of Lk 15, in which He openly represents Himself as setting for and revealing God in that very conduct which severe and superficial moralists condemn. That chapter practically says, 'He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.' (5) It has been the custom to discover the quality of His moral consciousness from the way in which Jesus dealt with sin. He not only exposed and rebuked it, but He even went the length of pronouncing the forgiveness of sin upon individuals (Mt 9:3-5; Lk 7:36-37), and that in a manner so authoritative that He was accused of blasphemy. For He demands of all who would enter the Kingdom of God that they should pass through a great moral renewal (Mt 11:2-5, 18:10, Jn 3:12). But, on the other hand, He departs from the method of all other moral leaders in that He nowhere manifests the consciousness that He Himself had passed or needed to pass through such a change of mind and heart and faith. He seems never to have repented or become as a little child or pleaded for pardon. As Harnack in a powerful passage has asserted: 'There lie behind the period of the public ministry of Jesus no powerful crises and tumults, no break with his past.' He carried no 'scares of a frightful struggle' (Das Wesen des Christentums, p. 21). These facts, if we are to estimate their meaning aright, must be kept in close relation with what was said above about His doctrine of sin and the searching quality of His doctrine of God as Father. His penetrating and sensitive view of inward sin must have made some conscious flaw in His own moral character an infallible rule. But His recorded agonies have a very different source. (2) But arguments like these are subordinate to those central facts which recent discussions of the eschatological character of the Christian religion emphasize with fresh power. There can be no doubt now that Jesus, in calling Himself the Son of Man or the Man (see below), asserted that He was a superhuman being, and that as such He had appeared to act as King in the Kingdom of God, as the Suffering Servant (cf. Is 53) working redemption, and that He would Himself appear as Judge of the human world; these assertions were the result either of moral blindness or of a sinless consciousness. They were evidences either of a self-seeking spirit which His whole teaching ruthlessly represses or of a self-montisicacity compatible only with frankness, humility, and utter purity of soul. It seems impossible to picture any combination of ideas under which He should be admitted to be the foretold personal Revealer of the Father, of a sacrificial Redeemer of men, of the real Head (Principi) of the new moral order, and yet to have carried in His bosom the sense of personal guilt. The sense of a personally needed redemption and the claim to be an atoning Redeemer or the supreme Judge of mankind are not to be conceived of as nurtured sincerely, intelligently, and piously in the same heart. The kind of vocation on which Jesus entered at His baptism presupposes the consciousness that He had 'fulfilled all righteousness,' even including that rite prescribed by fresh prophetic authority (Mt 3:2). That He represented in His ministry was mirrored always in the placid, teeming depths of His own soul. (6) Objections to the doctrine of the perfect moral harmony of Jesus with the Father and His open will of the Father have been founded on certain incidents recorded in the Gospels: (e) On his relations with human beings, alleged disobedience in boyhood (Lk 2:46-47), alleged undisclosed intercourse, even a relationship with woman (Mt 15:20, John 8:44), alleged insouciance with disciples (Mt 21:15), alleged dissipation as to the destruction of sin (Mt 16:23-25), alleged passionlessness in the Temple (Mt 21:11, Lk 19:41), towards scribes and Pharisees, etc. (Mt 23); (f) On His relations with God, alleged insouciance with His own sin (Jn 8:44), alleged lack of harmony in Gethsemane (Mt 26:36-42), on the Cross (Mt 27:40), and in His famous treatment of the title 'good' (Mt 15:17).
natural culmination of a long history, whose deepest elements were to be found in the opening of His mind, by prayer, obedience, and faith, to the meaning of this immeasurable difference between a moral consciousness which could not doubt the inner presence of the Father, and His performance of the obligations of the Father, and His forgiveness of any sin, and the religious experience of all other souls. His very great love for man was born out of an active, sacrificial passion out of those crowded hours of unworldly communion with God, before His baptism.

This, then, is the religion of Jesus. He surpasses all others in His insistence upon man's dependence on the Father for all things, temporal and spiritual, raiment for the body and goodness for the will.

This penetrating insight and faith applied to Himself discovered His perfect Sonship, His qualification for the throne of all worlds, and the fitness of His which, though in such unity with ours, yet created and discovered those transcendental differences which have made the Christian consciousness possible.

JESUS AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD.—Even though the phrase "Kingdom of God" seldom occurs in the NT Epistles, and its use has been exaggerated in modern times, yet no true description of the consciousness of Jesus can fail to give it a place of fundamental importance. No less constant was the word "kingdom" than the word "law". The kingdom was the central idea of Jesus, and the consciousness of its unfoldings, its institutions, and its spiritual nature.

1. Jahweh as King.—The phrase was not unknown in Jewish circles. The OT is pervaded by the idea that Jahweh is to Israel what kings are to other peoples. When Saul was rejected, there was a sense, preserved in one tradition, of a new departure in religion as well as in political consciousness through that event. The successive dynasties of Saul, David, and Solomon, and the successive kings accepted or rejected by Yahweh. The prophets were His spokesmen, exercising at times more than kingly power, just because they represented, and interpreted the will of Israel's true King. In Daniel (see ch. 2), the conception of this Kingship comes to fullest expression, and that in close connexion with the perception that God, who is Creator and Lord of all, must control the history of all kingship and the day when He shall reign directly, alone and for ever. And the apocalypticists, to whom it seemed as if God's power were in abeyance, and the powers of evil in possession of the earth, pictured the day when suddenly the might of God would reveal its shattering power, when the present evil order would collapse and a new heaven and a new earth would vindicate the doubted righteousness of God. But Jesus lifted the phrase into new and rich significance.

2. Jesus and the imminence of the Kingdom.—(a) The exhortational problem. With the extraordinary conviction and energy, from the beginning of His public career, He affirmed the imminence of that Kingdom (Mk 10:33). Certain of His words, uttered at great crises of His work and experience, imply, and many think that He believed, that the literal and concrete fulfilment of apocalyptic hopes and pictures would take place immediately (Mt 10:34, Mk 8:38. The disciples of this subject in recent days bears upon the two subjects of form and time: What did Jesus really expect the Kingdom to be? How far was His language deliberately pictorial? In what sense did he think and measure did He expect to see it established in that generation? According to the extremists in one direction, Jesus thought of the Kingdom of God as an inward spiritual and spiritual consciousness of man's mind and heart in which, by communion with the Father, and the development of a holy character, he shall
fulfi the divine will, and carry out the divine spirit in all his social relations. This ideal is being progressively approached as the spiritual and teaching of Jesus win wider and deeper influence over the life of man. According to the extreme eschatologists, Jesus held the strict apocalyptic view that the end of the world would be overwhelmed by outward miraculous and portentous physical events as the instruments of the vindication of God. The Son of Man would appear in the clouds, the order of nature would be convulsed, and the whole world would be overwhelmed.

J. Weiss [Die Predigt Jesu vom Reich Gottes], Göttingen, 1906, p. 123 f. even attributes to Jesus a regard for the political side in the overthrow of kingship. History can also happen in another generation, might happen any day or hour, though on that point He would not commit Himself to definite prophecy. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of these hostile views. We must try in a brief statement to do justice to both elements in His sayings that we may grasp more fully His marvelously self-consciousness.

(b) The phrase ‘Kingdom of God’ (κράτος θεοῦ).—This phrase does not primarily refer to the organized community over which God reigns, but to an active, personal, effective reign of God over human life, displacing the present, active power of Satan, that is announced when the Kingdom of God has come upon us. Here Jesus announces the establishment of this Kingdom as an act of God. It is the Kingdom of heaven, probably called by Him (for whatever else the prophets and other evangelists may have had for avoiding it). Matthew can hardly have used the phrase so consistently unless it had fallen from the lips of Jesus because in heaven that Kingdom is not yet realized and remains until the forces come which are to establish it on earth (Mt 6:34). In acts of overwhelming power and glory it shall appear and be seen of all men, for then shall be fulfilled what was written in the prophets. Here Jesus uses language which echoes that of apocalyptic from Daniel to Enoch, though Daniel is the only one actually quoted by Him (Mt 14:10—Es 7:18). The historical Jesus has the Kingdom established on earth before heaven.

(c) Transformation of current conceptions.—The Jews of that day held certain eschatological ideas which Jesus did not openly attack, though the effective kingdom He preached was not in the light of history, not in the sense of the Jews. Here Jesus uses language which echoes that of apocalyptic from Daniel to Enoch, though Daniel is the only one actually quoted by Him. The historical Jesus has the Kingdom established on earth before heaven.

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but they were both present with apparently equal force and value to the consciousness of Jesus.

(b) Further, it is clear indeed that Jesus views the fulfillment of the Kingdom as an act of grace, a natural development of the universal reign of God's power and glory, most certain and most real. Yet He also sees that God's act is not arbitrary, undetermined as to form and date by an external agent; He was not a mere agent through whom the预定 event which is unrelated to man's conduct. On the contrary, Jesus views the coming of the Kingdom as conditioned by human historical events and acts.

(c) It is a central idea in the parables of growth that the "consummation of the age" (cf. W. C. Allen on Mt 13:28) presupposes the conditions of attainment. When the fruit is ripe, the hour of the sickle has come. The meaning of the "mustard seed" and the "bitter" parables cannot be reasonably confined to the contrast between the small beginning and the great result with J. Weiss, or to the "miraculous character of such occurrences" with W. H. Goetz. These must be understood to be directed to those in whom a predicted event which is unrelated to man's conduct.

(1) Jesus taught that the coming of the Kingdom must be preceded and conditioned by various events. Among these must be named the conquest of the powers of evil, on which He even speaks: "With power will I go forth with vengeance, - to consume them that rejoice in unrighteousness" (Isa. 11:4). The opposition of the Kingdom indicates the presence and activity of the forces of evil, which, however, are ultimately to be overcome and destroyed.

(2) It appears from the preceding parables that the coming of the Kingdom will be preceded and conditioned by various events. The coming of the Kingdom is not separate from the present world, but is manifested in the present world. The coming of the Kingdom is a process, a development, a progressive activity, not a sudden and complete change.

3. Conclusion.—For Jesus the Kingdom of God, which means His active, direct rule of human life, on earth as in heaven, is to be established by acts of God which Jesus does not mean to do with the physical universe, nor to effect it by the exercise of mere spiritual or supernatural power. The Kingdom of God is not a spiritual upon the literal interpretation of the text, but it is a reality that will be established in the world through the agency of Jesus' disciples. The Kingdom of God is not a spiritual upon the literal interpretation of the text, but it is a reality that will be established in the world through the agency of Jesus' disciples.
declare and even to enforce the ultimate laws of human existence, is an ineradicable element of the gospel story. It is no less evident in the Synoptics than in Mark's Gospel that the discussion of the Messiah's kingdom is to be found from being brought to an end. He exercises power or authority (διακονία) in His teaching (12), over unclean spirits (13), to forgive sins (14), and to send out His disciples (15). All great religious leaders have followed a nameless spell over their followers, and their allegiance even unto death. But the range and quality of His authority as represented in the Synoptics has peculiar elements.

2. Messiah-King.—He is dealing with the final fact—the King of God—through which human nature is to reach its consummation. Yet it is He who has received 'kingship' and the power of the kingdom (Lk 22:29; cf. Mt 15:29, Mk 9); or accept the tribute from others (Mt 22:28, where for 'kingdom' Mk 10:36, 'glory' the substance is the same). In His mind, it is that of His followers the sovereignty of Jahweh over Israel was directed towards a great consummation, with which the prophets were much concerned. The end to which they were looking forward is fulfilled in the fact of the presence of the Messiah in Himself (Mt 13:34). But the end must surpass the stages which lead to it; hence He does not hesitate to set His mission above all the glory of the OT, and He claimed as His predecessor. It would be enough to refer to the passages found in the document now known as Q which is emblazoned in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. Is it not clear that the teachings of Jesus deeply impressed the minds of His disciples; e.g., 'more than' Jonah, or Solomon (Mt 12:40, Lk 11:33). The same idea is even more pronounced in the parables attributed to Him in Matthew 12:39: 'Something greater than the temple is here.' It is now almost universally admitted that Jesus knew Himself as the Messiah, that personal representative of Jahweh for whom Israel waited and for the signs of whose appearance were searched heaven and earth. But opinions still differ widely as to the conditions under which Jesus discovered His Messiahship, or interpreted the details of its task, and made it known to His disciples. The term does not occur in the OT as a personal name, but came to be used in Jewish thought of that One through whom they hoped for deliverance from the foreign yoke, and as the claim for supreme sovereignty for the Israel of Jahweh. That He could be an invincible king and 'laid up in Himself the ideal qualities of royalty' (cf. 2 S 7:13, Ps 72, etc.), that He was the Son of David, that He would usher in the Day of Jahweh, that He would be the Christ or Anointed One of Jahweh (Lk 23), the Holy One of God (Mk 1:1; cf. Mk 1:2, Lk 4)—all these ideas were found among the people who came in contact with Jesus. That the 'political' aspect was prominent is plain from the fact that, when He confessed Himself to be the 'Christ' as His trial, His enemies at once made that the basis of the accusation before Pilate that He claimed to be king, and that this title 'King of the Jews' was set upon His cross (see below). It is this fact that makes sufficient content for His avoidance of the title, His open acceptance of it from the disciples only after they had learned something of its transformation of His meaning. To have used that title premonitory earlier would have been, in the attitude of His day, to demeant completely His interpretation of prophecy and His own consciousness of His functions. To have dispensed with by itself would have also been to misrepresent Himself and His mission. For He knew Himself to be the One in whom prophecy terminated, who had come to fulfill the best hopes of Israel, to establish over all mankind, beginning at Jerusalem, the Kingdom of God. It was His supremely delicate task to claim the substance and disown the popular form of Messiahship. Hence what we find Him doing is to fulfill the sublime functions of that office without formal acknowledgment of His relation to it. The difficulty of His position is made plain by the misunderstandings of His disciples which are recorded with power to His disciples (30). All great religious leaders have followed a nameless spell over their followers, and their allegiance even unto death. But the range and quality of His authority as represented in the Synoptics has peculiar elements.

3. Elements in His will as Messiah.—When we come to His own concrete interpretation and application of the idea of Messiah by Jesus, we find ourselves in the presence of a will greater than that which any prophet or saint of the OT had desired or foreseen. Their partial glimpses into human need and divine fullness are united and then surpassed in that which He essays to accomplish. His functions at once surpass and elevate, gather and reorganize, the scattered spiritual principles of OT religion.

(a) Receiver of God.—He acts as the Receiver of God. The OT treasures of God's full knowledge of Jahweh in the day of His appearing to judge the nations. But the nature and medium of that knowledge had been left vague. Jesus in His great passage, Mt 11:25, asserts this as His function, to reveal the Father. There is undoubtedly a mystical element involved in this work of revelation, but no less clearly is there a natural and concrete element which is the security for the historical development of the doctrine. Thus His words about God throw welcome light upon His will and spirit, and He uses the definite and vivid name of Father to describe Him. Further, He does not shrink, as we have seen, from assuming that His own conduct is a revelation of the character and will of God (Lk 10). This is carried to the extreme in those passages in which, while interpreting the OT proclamations, He sets Himself in the place of Jahweh—e.g., Mt 11:23 = Is 52:3, Lk 4:14 = Is 61:1; Lk 7:22 = Mal 3. This whole matter is fully expounded in the Fourth Gospel, but we must begin with the teaching of Thomas and Philip (Jn 14-16).

(b) Power over demons.—The attitude of Jesus towards the world of evil spirits must be taken just as it is set forth, if we would understand the significance of His conquest of these powers. He has met and conquered the prince of demons (Mt 4:31-32), and has power over all lesser spirits of evil. He therefore accepts as true to fact the testimony of the evil spirits themselves (Mk 3:11), as well as the recognition of this superhuman power by the people who saw His works.

(c) Miracles.—The earlier rationalism strove to extrude from the story of Jesus all the miracles. They were regarded as inventions or legendarygrowths arising from the desire to illustrate His teaching or to add to the superhuman claims. The later rationalism draws a distinction between the miracles of healing for which analogies can be found elsewhere, and the 'natural miracles' such as multiplying the loaves, raising the dead, walking on the sea, etc. The former, or some of them, are retained par excellence, while the latter are rejected. The dilemma is a peculiar one. For, on the one hand, the same records preserve both classes of
works with the same simplicity, directness, and relevance; on the other hand, the supposed distinction is not grounded on objective science, but has been created for the express purpose of dealing with the gospel story.

Science has not yet drawn any such line as this imaginary one, and the theological writers who advocate it use only vague and conventional terms, but of the Gospel (cf. E. A. Abbott, The Kernel and the Husk, London, 1888; P. Gardner, Explorations Evangelica, d., 1899).

In that central passage of Q (Mt 11:27, Lk 7:28) Jesus appears as the King of glory, and the raising of the dead as work which He performed. His consciousness held Him in a relation to natural processes above that of other men. And this is necessary to the unity of that consciousness; it concerns us with the general trend of the operations in the whole round of its life presents a consistent unity.

For Jesus the distinction above referred to did not exist. He was conscious of power to direct the forces of nature. He was to reveal God, to announce the eternal conditions of bliss or woe, and to conquer Satan, to forgive sins, to judge the race, and to rise from the dead. (d) Lawyer.—While He did not have the power to fulfill the Law and the prophets (Mt 5:17), He yet appears as Himself the lawyer of the Kingdom. The Sermon on the Mount reflects this consciousness of supreme authority in the moral and religious life. Here He speaks in criticism of the holiest ethical code of antiquity, much of which He would have to be denounced by God through Moses. But, in passing behind those prescriptions to reveal the inner principles of human character, He deliberately and repeatedly uses the form 'I say unto you,' as if He spoke, as no prophet spoke, in His own name and authority. What appears formally in that phrase, is, in substance, the expression of His teaching.

He is everywhere laying down the laws of eternal righteousness for the citizens of the Kingdom of God. (e) Administrator of law.—He not only brought law to those who might not know its existence by its operation in their lives. It is significant that Judaism had not attained to the view that the Messiah would act as Judge (though that office is assigned to 'the Son of man' in the Shema') and teacher of the Law, and the more so, as the matter of forgiveness of sins was inevitably reserved for God Himself. Even if they could have conceived of such a judge-ship, the scrutiny of conduct and the award of appropriate rewards and punishments would have been the prerogative of God. To a representative, the question would still remain, 'Who can forgive sins but one, even God?' (Mk 2:7). But Jesus not only asserted that He would act as Judge of mankind, but by the operation of His life the whole world saw that the prerogative of forgiving sin (cf. C. W. Votaw, art. 'Sermon on the Mount' in HDB, vol. i, p. 30).

This is Messianism of a type which men had not dared to ascribe to any personal being, save in the special instance of the idea was transferred, and even then the Messiah's death was looked on as a dark and mysterious fate which He shared with His people. But with Jesus a new view has taken hold of history, viz., that His death is to be regarded as the means whereby salvation, a weapon of the divine Kingship. Whether He contemplated His death from the beginning of His ministry is much in dispute. Certain passages would seem to show that the idea of the death was in His mind from the time of the baptism. The words which He heard at the baptism, 'Thou art my Son, the beloved, in whom I am well pleased' (Mk 1:11; cf. Lk 3:22), contain phrases from Ps 2:7 and 4:4, from which it is clear that He had in His mind the Isaiahic picture of the Servant of Jehovah, and that He interpreted His life and the events of His ministry as fulfilling this prophecy. It is significant that the story of the Temptation shows that renunciation was from the first an essential feature of that mission. The sayings about persecution (Mt 5:10-11, Lk 6:22-23, and the like (cf. Mk 6:10, Lk 4:4, Mt 13:39). Indicating He expected relentless opposition which He could not avoid and others would not abate. Hence the saying about the Brdigeom was not of keeping with His general outlook at that early period (Mt 3:9). Moreover, when He does speak more definitely of His death, He does not treat it as a new factor or as a surprise. It is the complete fulfillment of that which was clearly to be the means of His victory over the world (Mk 10:22-23).

From these passages we learn: (d) That His death was to be inflicted, and consummated His rejection by Israel; (f) that it was also the will of His Father (Mk 14:36); (g) that He looked on it in the light of Is 53, and therefore could call it a 'ransom for many'; (Mk 10:45; Ps 22:22, Ecclus. 53:29), and as the price for saving a Man who is supreme in authority over the Kingdom; He would suffer as Messiah not merely with, but, for Himself; (h) that He deliberately and solemnly set forth as the last supper as a means of redemption, as the ratifying of new relations between God and man ('blood of the covenant') (Mt 26:26-30, 28:6), as a means of creating a new order and as a means of bringing death with peculiar agony of soul, but ensured its accomplishment, its outer shame and inner horror, with steadfast will as the sacrifice without which He could not establish the Kingdom of God of the many.

(f) The expectation of death.—This is not the place to discuss either the theory of the Attonement or the detailed and successive steps through which His consciousness passed. Suffice it on the latter point to say that the phenomena of the Gospels are based on those facts. (1) A great mind can hold a great concept in view and see its general outlines without allowing itself to be prematurely concerned with the particular details of the planned work of the Redeemer, and yet hold off the agony of a coming sorrow. The solemnity which some people see in the earlier days of His ministry is a witness not to His ignorance that only death can bring salvation for the world, but to the greatness and soundness, amounting in His case to majesty, of self-direction, self-estimate, and self-control. To say that He could not have preserved a calm composure in view of that event is to belittle Him absurdly, below the standard of many brave men and women. 'For the joy that was set before him he endured' is not a psychological blank, but the expression of a great idea. (2) Much must be allowed for His 'patience' method. Not only did His task unfold itself to His own mind in successive steps, from great principles in the beginning to very practical details, but the mind of the world was already formed and firmly held when He entered on His Messianic functions, but He had also to communicate these principles and their practical issues in like (but not always parallel) steps to His disciples. The agreement of salvation, a weapon of the divine Kingship. Whether He contemplated His death from the beginning of His ministry is much in dispute. Certain passages would seem to show that the idea of the death was in His mind from the time of the baptism. The words which He heard at the baptism, 'Thou art my Son, the beloved, in whom I am well pleased' (Mk 1:11; cf. Lk 3:22), contain phrases from Ps 2:7 and 4:4, from which it is clear that He had in His mind the Isaiahic picture of the Servant of Jehovah, and that He interpreted His life and the events of His ministry as fulfilling this prophecy. It is significant that the story of the Temptation shows that renunciation was from the first an essential feature of that mission. The sayings about persecution (Mt 5:10-11, Lk 6:22-23, and the like (cf. Mk 6:10, Lk 4:4, Mt 13:39). Indicating He expected relentless opposition which He could not avoid and others would not abate. Hence the saying about the Bridegroom was not of keeping with His general outlook at that early period (Mt 3:9). Moreover, when He does speak more definitely of His death, He does not treat it as a new factor or as a surprise. It is the complete fulfillment of that which was clearly to be the means of His victory over the world (Mk 10:22-23).

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justified His method. (a) Resurrection.—That Jesus spoke not only of His death, but also, though with significant reserve, of His resurrection, was at one time much questioned. But the frank acceptance of philological evidence and the facts of tradition sets that dispute at an end. He who announced both His death and His coming in the clouds of heaven as "Son of man" did foresee a resurrection of His people when His followers shall arise (with only verbal variation (Mk 8:31; [after three days!]) that He prophesied His resurrection as they afterwards record it, implying the idea of a physical resurrection. It may be taken as certain that Jesus carried in His consciousness something more than the human hope of a future life. It entered into His will, it modified the scope and method of His work, it qualified His whole conception both of the kingdom as a future event and of His relation to it as its Ruler. No doubt, as Strauss saw with characteristic clearness, this (continuous) certainty must have been as supernatural as the event itself (New Life of Jesus, Eng. tr., iv. 40). But that need not trouble us nowadays. We are manifestly in the presence of a consciousness which contains elements that must be frankly conceded to be superhuman. One of these is the idea of a bodily resurrection which includes the life after death. It is not at all inappropriate to find in the Fourth Gospel this aspect of eternal life radiating from its wonderful picture of "the life which is life indeed." Jesus had, it seems, told Martha, "I am the resurrection and the life, He utters in mystical phrase what is implied in the assertion that after death He will come in glory and receive the faithful to the rewards of the Kingdom.

4. His demands on the disciples.—It is a natural and constant of all these forces in His consciousness that they should issue in demands on His subjects. (a) He imposes on them the law of faith, a faith in Himself which He nowhere discriminates from faith in God. It is this attitude of trust that produces His miracles of healing and His words of forgiveness. (b) He imposes the law of complete surrender even to death. "For my sake." The varied Greek equivalents for "for my sake" may be taken back to a primitive form, but the freedom of translation and allusion means no loss to the frequency and the penetrating quality of the words of Jesus in this regard. This phrase, uttered in respect of separation and of death, throws light upon such an attitude as is now enjoined by the young ruler to sell his possessions and follow Jesus, and upon the completeness of that devotion which He demanded of the twelve. (c) He imposes a still more searching test—a test of character—when He speaks of those who are "worthy" of Him. To be worthy of Him (cf. Mt 10:43, and Harnack's searching analysis [Sayings of Jesus, pp. 86-90]) is tacitly assumed to prove that a man belongs to the kingdom of righteousness. The idea must not be treated superficially, as if any distinguished leader might determine who are worthy followers. It must be connected with the other ideas in which Jesus seems to be constantly reconceiving Himself to His disciples as an object of religious regard. The worthiness here referred to, must, therefore, be compared with the whole standard of personal worth which is presented in the Gospels. That standard has various phases and elements. It demands unlimited inward purity, unlimited outward consecration to the known will of God, love for God which absorbs the whole personality, and love for one's neighbour which is equivalent to the love of one's own life; it sets up the character of God as the object known, in His righteousness and His love, and it makes this supreme test of character; it lifts the whole problem from local, national, external tests to those which are universal, supreme, eternal, inevitable. It is in the heart of this system of ideas, even in the course of its unfolding, that the character, will, teaching, and very Person of Jesus emerge as an unexpected and not essential part of His teaching, though the question how the historical could thus be realized with the eternal, how one person in time could determine the moral standing of all others through their deliberate vacation of Him; that is a later question. The matter before us is one of fact. It would seem that, according to the earliest tradition, Jesus did without formality of claim, but certainly, on all sides of His self-expression, in word and act, draw to Himself the faith and affection of His disciples and present Himself to them as the standard of moral worth—in fact, became to them the object of a religious regard. The effort to prove that this worship of Christ arose only after His death and is reflected into the story of His ministry has been prolonged, painful, and futile. The fact is too deeply and subtly involved in the whole presentation of His personality, even in the Synoptic Gospels, to have been added and merely reflected from later and baseless enthusiasm. The vast majority of modern scholars—even including many life-long and historicist—have, in the so-called 'liberal' position—admit that there are here in the Gospels indubitable proofs that the consciousness of Jesus contained elements not invented by the apostles, though they are native to the human mind as known everywhere else in history. These elements, as we have surveyed them thus far, appeared in the kind of things He undertook to do among men, in the manner of His self-expression. They do not hint at personal workings of His mind, into the foundations of His character, into the substance of His purpose. Conceived by them as possessed by a man—a son of the race—and not by the apocryphal, the life native to the human mind as known everywhere else in history. These elements, as we have surveyed them thus far, appeared in the kind of things He undertook to do among men, in the manner of His self-expression. They do not hint at personal workings of His mind, into the foundations of His character, into the substance of His purpose. Conceived by them as possessed by a man—a son of the race—(c) D. The special titles.—I. The Son of God.—The NT contains material for tracing in part the remarkable development of the meaning of this great title. In tracing this critical method, we shall assume that N. Schmidt (ESB iv. 4690 ff., and The Prophet of Nazareth) occupies an impossible position when he maintains that Jesus never used the term "Son of God" and was never addressed by that title (ESB iv. 4761, where the last clause, strictly taken, may be true, but is irrelevant).

(a) Two terms.—The termiitas a quo in NT usage is reflected not only in the Synoptic Gospels, but even in the Fourth, where we find in certain passages what appears to have been the current Jewish usage of the phrase. Its history goes back to Ps 2:7, where the twin ideas of Messiahship and Sonship are brought together. The well-known Hebrew way of conceiving of Israel as God's Son by making the deliverance from Egypt the birthday of the people (Ex 4:22, Hos 11 etc.) was followed by an equally careful avoidance of the idea that any King of Israel was His offspring. The idea of Sonship expressed in Nathan's words (2 S 7:14) is quite evidently religious, but the language in which it is fashioned may have given rise to the language of Ps 2. In the Jewish period, outside the Gospels, no certain cases are found in which the Messiah is spoken of as 'Son of God'. But in the Gospels, though the evidence is confused, signs are not wanting that occasionally the phrase was employed as a honorable title for the anointed one; cf. Mk 3:35 (Mt 8:16), Mt 16:16 (wanting in Lk), Mt 27:54 (wanting in Mk 8:9, Lk 9:4), Mt 26:66 (different in Mk 14:63, Lk 22:63), Mt 27:54 (different in Lk 22:63, wanting in
of the Spirit of God by His works in Mt 12:28. Did He exclude that kind of revelation when He thought of the 'all things'? And further, if it is 'teaching' that is done by the 'yoke' (Mt 11:29), wherein does that differ from the 'burdens' which He deplores? If the paragraph is not to be interpreted in this setting, the best place to put it was mode of birth the Messiah. The terminus ad quem in the NT literature is seen in the Epistle to the Hebrews quite as clearly as in the Fourth Gospel. There the words only of a divine being (He 1:1) are put in the mouth of a son of God, a son of man who partook of human life by a sublime act of His own gracious will (2:14).

(6) The source of the later use.—That which came historically between these extremes and made possible the distinction between the Messiah and the Messiah as a son of God was the consciousness and self-manifestation of Jesus. As we have seen, He spoke of God as His Father with a note which differentiated His relationship from that of all other men. He avoided the most unavoidable phrase 'Our Father' except when He taught His disciples how they should pray. According to the Synoptics He rather took this Sonship as a fundamental fact, not to be discussed, while the Fourth Gospel represents it as an open claim which caused much controversy between Him and the Jewish theologians and nearly brought Him to death (Jn 5:17-28). And it is of the utmost significance that John in these two passages represents this claim to a unique and divine Sonship to have been made by His enemies simply in His person, emphasis upon the words 'My Father.' If it is true to fact, then certain passages in the Synoptics must have conveyed the same idea to His disciples. In the Synoptics reference must be made to Mt 11:27 (Mt 16:16-17 where He implies describes Himself as 'Son' as compared with the prophets and others, who are 'servants,' to Mt 17:5 (see Dalman, Worte Jesu, p. 231), and to Mt 18:20 (see Dalman, Worte Jesu, p. 231), where He implies.

(c) of a central passage.—One of the central passages is Mt 11:25-27, Lk 10:16 (from Q), concerning which it is clear: (i) that He reveals a consciousness and place in Sonship which is the basis of mutual knowledge between Himself and the 'Father'; (ii) that He recognizes that 'all things' have been 'delivered' unto Him in fullness. (iii) that all doctrine and knowledge is among the Jews wpa&IoG. But the father&JoG of Jesus springs immediately from God, not from men. It is very common to restrict this phrase to the matter and teaching (sonship) (so Harnack, Wellhausen, Denney). And yet, if we read the passage in its Matthean context, it would seem that 'all things' must include at least the Messianic functions to which He refers in His answer to John's messenger (Mt 11:23), and which ought to have brought to repentance the cities where His mighty works were done (Mt 11:20). To some it still seems jeane and which of His consciousness and the type of His Messiahship to restrict the 'all things' to His 'doctrine' (see Harnack's argument in Sayings of Jesus, p. 207 ff.). The revelation to which He refers at the beginning of these verses (He does mention the 38:17; but when they rejected His revelation of the Son of Man, etc.), that is, the consciousness that everything necessary for establishing the Kingdom of God was now committed to His will, and that, as we know, included far more than teachings.

(d) The answer of this Sonship.—The idea that the term 'Son of God' was only equivalent to the term 'Messiah' having been discarded, some scholars tried to prove that Jesus first conceived of His Messianic functions and that He was aware of His unique Sonship. That theory in turn seems to be doomed. It is clear that His Messiahship arose out of a religious background, but that religious background had no reality as such for Him, the Son, as the consciousness of 'the Father' in His relation to 'the Son.' But, if this filial relationship with God is the basis of His consciousness, and if it is unique and incomparable and in a secondary sense in a sense, where Jesus speaks of 'all things' had come fully into view. Then the true meaning of 'all things have been delivered unto me' would appear clearly as a reference to the functions of the Messiahship. It was only as their consciousness that everything necessary for establishing the Kingdom of God was now committed to His will, and that, as we know, included far more than teachings.

2. The Son of Man.—(a) Origin of the term.—Controversy has gathered around the use of the term 'Son of Man.' Until about twenty years ago, it was generally accepted as a historical fact that Jesus used the phrase, and infamy was spent upon discovering what He meant by it and why He seems to have preferred it to any other. (For full accounts of the variety of opinion see the summaries sub voce of S. R. Driver in HDB, and of N. Schmidt in EBL.) A sadden of some German scholars, especially Lietzmann, Wellhausen, and Fiebig, raised the question, on purely philological grounds, whether Jesus could have used the phrase at all. Assuming that He spoke Aramaic, it was pointed out that the Aramaic equivalent of 'a id&JoG tow 36&JoG ou&G could only be Barnab in Barnabiah, and that this was the ordinary Aramaic word for 'a man' in the indefinite sense, and had come to be used as an indefinite personal pronoun for 'one.' The conclusion was reached by some (Wellhausen, Schmidt, etc.) that a sheer misunderstanding of certain (authentic) sayings (especially Mt 10:42), where Jesus speaks of 'man,' had led early Greek translators from the Aramaic to use the unnatural Greek phrase, and that by a natural process this was extended to other
authentic passages, and also to some new ones which theological conceptions of His Person led them to attribute to Jesus. The discussion of this problem must therefore be left to the apologetic specialists. But a survey of the controversy yields the following conclusions:

(3) Much depends on the date ascribed to the first documents in which it occurs. Now the authors of Matthew and Luke found the maturation of this document in Q. In all probability Q gave them as many as 20 passages of the words of Jesus. If they independently got hold of Q in its final form, it was compiled before the Fall of Jerusalem, but it must be dated in the lifetime of many of the first disciples of Jesus. This fact will go far to prove that the language of the New Testament is much more akin to that of the Apocrypha in its independent material, which also must have existed before a.d. 70. The double process of misunderstanding the Aramaic phrase and using it for theological purposes, by which N. Schmitt accounts for its place in the Gospels, is then thrown back to the lifetime of the primary apostles. This seems incredible among people who speak both Aramaic and Greek. (3) Those who believe that Jesus used some word to mean an idea agree that He therein directed them to Da 7, and did so most distinctly at His trial (Mr 1439). It seems difficult to believe that He could not have made this reference to a form on the ground that, as He imparted, the title Son of Man 'did not, and for linguistic reasons could not, mean anything Aramaic'—an extreme which Dalmann refuses to accept (Worter Juden, p. 161). As a matter of fact, when the Greek Gospel writers combined in the Synoptic canon the Aramaic phrase which 'may, perhaps, bear a close resemblance to that in which Jesus applied the title Son of Man' (J. Nestle, Nov. Testament Exegesis of the Greek NT, Eng. tr., London, 1929, p. 163), two forms were used, certainly not to mean the same. Moreover, the phrase 'Son of Man' (N. Schmitt, EB, 847) is an Aramaic phrase, as is also the phrase 'the Son of Man,' which in the Syriac is translated as 'the Son of Man' (J. Nestle, Nov. Testament Exegesis of the Greek NT, Eng. tr., London, 1929, p. 163). The phrase is indeed, and admittable, unclad in the Aramaic language. But its very strangeness makes it the more of the value for the purposes of Jesus. Those who believe with R. H. Charles that Jesus adopted the phrase from origin, others assert that He said 'Son of Man' to his disciples on a number of occasions, and that He was using such a phrase in His early preaching. To this it may be objected that the phrase is not found in any of the Gospels before the trial scene. When Jesus is asked what He 'is the Christ,' He 'is not the Christ, but immediately, as if still avoiding a misunderstanding, makes the statement that the Son of Man is on the right hand of power and in the form of man.' Now, it was no blasphemy, as has often been pointed out, for a man to claim to be Messiah; the only claim for which He was put to death was to say that He was the Son of God. What is remarkable is the occurrence of the phrase 'Son of Man' in the presence of so many witnesses, and the fact that this phrase is known to the Syriac form of the Gospels. The difference between the Gospels and the Synoptics, the Jewish judges did not lay before the political (Son of Man) but the political (Messiah) claim. He objected to the Son of Man being called the Son of God. (b) The use of the term by Jesus.—It must help us to understand His consciousness if we try to discover how and why He used this strange term. The use of the term 'Messiah' did not occur as a personal noun until Jewish times, and that the indiscriminate use of it by us is as an equivalent for other terms may and does tend to show this. The word must, indeed, be found to cover all the phenomena of this word, and there is no hope which held the eyes of that race directed upon God and the future with passionate confidence; and 'Messiah' has become fixed for us in that usage. But we must not forget that many descriptions of their hope even in the OT contain no allusion to a personal Messiah. The word 'Messiah' in late Jewish literature was used by people of the 'the')—anointed one'—is used most frequently where the mind of the seer is fixed upon the clash of nations, where he thinks of dynasties succeeding dynasty and empire, overrunning empire. This is precisely the conception of the Anointed One, generally as the 'Son of David,' as appearing to overcome all foes. From this it becomes plain that in the days of Jesus—whether false Messias had already appeared or not—the word Messiah would inevitably suggest a powerful historical king, a warrior, an army, a sedentary and relentless revolution. But, if we take Enoch 77 to be pre-Christian, another conception of the great deliverer had arisen. Developing the central idea in Da 7, the eye of faith saw one appear, who comes down upon the scene of history from above, wholly 'supernatural,' for whom a new name must be found. (c) He is very rarely called 'the Anointed.' He, the Son of Man, shall execute judgment on men and angels alike. His sphere is evidently other than that usually associated with the picture of the anointed king, David's lineage. The difference between the Gospels and the Synoptics, the Jewish judges did not lay before the political (Son of Man) but the political (Messiah) claim. He objected to the Son of Man being called the Son of God. (b) The use of the term by Jesus.—It must help us to understand His consciousness if we try to discover how and why He used this strange term. The use of the term 'Messiah' did not occur as a personal noun until Jewish times, and that the indiscriminate use of it by us is as an equivalent for other terms may and does tend to show this. 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founder of the Kingdom of God on earth. Some of these correspond with the functions assigned to the Son of Man in the Book of Enoch, but many are profoundly different.

(i.) Before the critical passage describing His appearance to His disciples near Cæsarea Phillippi, He had already used it, according to the three Synoptics (of which Mk 8th 29th and 9th); according to Q, four times in Matthew’s arrangement, and twice in Luke’s arrangement (Mt 16th 13th 9th 28th and 38th); according to Luke alone, once more (6th, where Q), and once more (24th). Of these, the most significant are that the Son of Man has power on earth to forgive sins and is Lord of the Sabbath. The latter is not a strange claim, as Wallhauser and others maintain, when we remember that the Sabbath was a Jewish institution, and that the saying is parallel, therefore, to His assumption of authority over other institutions, such as ‘the Law’ in the Sermon on the Mount, the Temple (Mt 12th, cf. Mk 11th 5th-18th), and even the Covenant itself (Mk 14th).

(ii.) He uses the title ‘Son of Man’ when He begins to teach His disciples about His death (Mk 8th 9th 9th). And the religious and moral nature of these appearances of the Son of Man are expressed in words which have a dreadful and distressing meaning in the light of events. The Son of Man appears as the one who will be present at the end of the age, and who will cause His enemies to be subjugated to Him; who will judge men and women; who will come with power and authority; who will be present in glory on His throne as King of kings and Lord of lords. These appearances of the Son of Man are the expressions of the divinity and the infinity of His nature, and they are also the expressions of the power and authority which He holds as the Son of God. The Son of Man is the One who has power and authority, and He will rule over His enemies.

(iii.) The title ‘Son of Man’ is used also and most frequently in the eschatological, or eschatological, parts of the New Testament, and it is to be understood as referring to the coming of the Son of Man. This title is used in the context of the coming of the Messiah and the establishment of the Kingdom of God. The Son of Man is the One who will establish the Kingdom of God on earth. He is the One who will bring about the end of the world and the judgment of all mankind. He is the One who will come with power and authority, and He will judge men and women. He is the One who will come in glory, and He will be present in the midst of His people.

And these appearances of the Son of Man are the expressions of the divinity and the infinity of His nature, and they are also the expressions of the power and authority which He holds as the Son of God. The Son of Man is the One who has power and authority, and He will rule over His enemies. He is the One who will establish the Kingdom of God on earth. He is the One who will bring about the end of the world and the judgment of all mankind. He is the One who will come with power and authority, and He will judge men and women. He is the One who will come in glory, and He will be present in the midst of His people.
add to the conviction that we must not attribute to Him the crude 'miracleism' that His disciples saw in the form of His sayings. On the other hand, we must not take refuge, with the timidity of the modern mind before the word 'miracle,' in the notion that He possessed and claimed no superhuman power. This is a difficult nature. There is a 'paramount spiritual' view of His relation to history, whatever that may mean, was His as little as it was His disciples' view. It is the higher conception of evolution (not the natural), mechanism that gives it to our day better than to His own or any other generation the means of interpreting His consciousness at these points. That view is that the history of our world has been carried upward and enriched by the appearance and operation of new factors. For it is a crude evolutionism which holds that the simple produced the complex or the lower caused the higher to exist. To say that the higher was in the lower, when there was no sign of its presence, does not enlighten us. It is best to say that, when the conditions were ready, life or thought appeared, whence we know not, and became a self-multiplying power in history. The new factors are 'from above,' they have 'come,' and they have laid hold of the material prepared for them, with a strange power and for ends that we ourselves cannot suggest. The Son of Man was conscious of being such a new factor in history, and hence of a relation to nature which was both human and more than human. He came as such to lay His head, He had to face the conditions of human history even in temptation of the devil, in hostility and betrayal by those whom He loved, in death, because He was a son of Man. But as the Son of Man, He could do those mighty works among the forces of nature and even raise the dead. And He would come, soon or late (His words leave room for both), with power and glory for a supernatural reign over the human race in the name of God.

(3) In the Fourth Gospel.—The use of the title 'Son of Man' in the Fourth Gospel, where it occurs 12 times, is characterized fundamentally different from, and yet fundamentally the same as, its use in the Synoptics. (a) The peculiar use of the 3rd pers. in connexion with this title is emphasized by the fact that in this Gospel He uses the superordinate term 'Son of God,' not 'Son of Man,' just as Peter was, according to the Synoptists. The Jews and the multitude likewise are perplexed (6:62), and ask, 'Who is this Son of Man?' (12:34).

(c) It is in answer to a perplexed mind that in two cases Jesus gives His own interpretation of that apocalyptic and less familiar title 'Son of Man' (if familiar at all to any but the doctri with death and with eating His flesh and drinking His blood (6:51-57). His disciples are discouraged (6:69) just as Peter was, according to the Synoptists. The Jews and the multitude likewise are perplexed (6:62), and ask, 'Who is this Son of Man?' (12:34).

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This fact as fully and clearly as they do His words of an eschatological character. And their understanding of His self-estimation was rooted in the fact that, not merely in His words of prophecy. The Gospels prove on every page that Jesus deliberately set Himself to establish the Church as the manifestation of the Kingdom of God. Whether He purposely used the word 'Church' (Mt 16:13) or not is a minor matter; and it may be even irrelevant. The fact is, that as He found individuals responsive to His call, repenting and following Him (Lk 9:2) ready to rise up and follow Him at all costs, waiting upon His will as upon that of a king, He saw in them the members of the new community of God. He speaks of it as 'salt of the earth,' 'light of the world' (Mt 5:13), and distills their kind of righteousness from that of the Pharisees (40). He sees publicans and harlots, who repent and follow Him (as many of them had believed John the Baptist) in His day, as a part of the Kingdom of God (Mt 21:31). He takes the faith of the centurion in Himself as the harbinger of that multitude of Gentiles who shall come from the east and the west while the Kingdom are cast out (Mt 10:18). The idea that Jesus was primarily a teacher, and a personal revelation only so far as He went about doing good, just as He expected John the Baptist to do (cf. Mt 11:11), is more pictured to Himself, and to others, certain transcendent acts of God lying yet for Him wholly in the future, through which the Kingdom would be established out of time. Thus, it is not surprising that we find certain facts and events in the Gospels. The central fact is that He created, consciously, deliberately, patiently, the new nation, the community in which God's Kingdom is formed. (Neue Untersuchungen, etc., p. 97) names it as one of the 'developments' in which is pictured as addressing a definite community ('eine geschlossene Gemeinde'). This abstracts a slight element of exaggeration in the phrase, the fact is not less true of Mark. In the latter His movements are affected by consideration of three groups—the masses and the leaders, the officials and their representatives, and the disciples. The last, even when limited to the twelve (though not always so limited), form a definite community, which even in Mark is looked upon as the nucleus of the Kingdom of God (11:28, 25. 22:40. 13:28, 36. 20:26, 27 [al. d. o.]).

What is the evidence in the Gospels that His disciples experienced the force of that creative will during His earthly ministry? On the outward side the answer is easy. For it is clear that Jesus, as we have seen, gathered His followers around Him, as individuals who became a more or less definite body, through their willingness to accept His teaching, obey His behests, and put their hope in His power. We do not know how large this body was, it appears indistinguishably as varying in number, intelligence, and enthusiasm. That crowd which followed Him so much as to endanger His work is made very clear in Mark's Gospel, where He is represented as repeatedly eluding them and their superficial and earthly desires. Then we find the Gospels describe Him as selecting twelve men on whom He concentrated His attention (Mk 1:19 = Mt 10:20; cf. Lk 6:13, 14. Mk 3:13-19. Lk 6:12-19. 10:1-4), and finally (Mk 3:15-16) shaking the very foundation of Judaism in His own attitude and action towards them.

2. The new Israel. —The whole Jewish thought may be summed up in this, that as surely as there is one Jewish community, there is the community of God. The people of God are the representatives of the new community of God. The disciples preserve this fact as fully and clearly as they do His words of an eschatological character. And their understanding of His self-estimation was rooted in the fact that, not merely in His words of prophecy. The Gospels prove on every page that Jesus deliberately set Himself to establish the Church as the manifestation of the Kingdom of God. Whether He purposely used the word 'Church' (Mt 16:13) or not is a minor matter; and it may be even irrelevant. The fact is, that as He found individuals responsive to His call, repenting and following Him (Lk 9:2) ready to rise up and follow Him at all costs, waiting upon His will as upon that of a king, He saw in them the members of the new community of God. He speaks of it as 'salt of the earth,' 'light of the world' (Mt 5:13), and distills their kind of righteousness from that of the Pharisees (40). He sees publicans and harlots, who repent and follow Him (as many of them had believed John the Baptist) in His day, as a part of the Kingdom of God (Mt 21:31). He takes the faith of the centurion in Himself as the harbinger of that multitude of Gentiles who shall come from the east and the west while the Kingdom are cast out (Mt 10:18). The idea that Jesus was primarily a teacher, and a personal revelation only so far as He went about doing good, just as He expected John the Baptist to do (cf. Mt 11:1), is more pictured to Himself, and to others, certain transcendent acts of God lying yet for Him wholly in the future, through which the Kingdom would be established out of time. Thus, it is not surprising that we find certain facts and events in the Gospels. The central fact is that He created, consciously, deliberately, patiently, the new nation, the community in which God's Kingdom is formed. (Neue Untersuchungen, etc., p. 97) names it as one of the 'developments' in which is pictured as addressing a definite community ('eine geschlossene Gemeinde'). This abstracts a slight element of exaggeration in the phrase, the fact is not less true of Mark. In the latter His movements are affected by consideration of three groups—the masses and the leaders, the officials and their representatives, and the disciples. The last, even when limited to the twelve (though not always so limited), form a definite community, which even in Mark is looked upon as the nucleus of the Kingdom of God (11:28, 25. 22:40. 13:28, 36. 20:26, 27 [al. d. o.]).

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not the question of whether Harnack is right in extending from consideration the great passages (cited earlier in this article) in which the conscious will of Jesus is represented as determining the destiny of men. But it is not a question to be decided merely by quoting utterances which explicitly and formally put Him into the gospel as He preached it, or by refusing to accept them as authentic. The real question is whether we have proof that Jesus became to His disciples a religious object during His earthly life, and whether their experience in that manner was in their minds the nucleus of that community in which He intended the Kingdom of God to be realized. Have we any right to limit His gospel to His disciples in terms of formal teaching, addressed to the multitudes, if we find that the whole effect of His training of the twelve was to replace their Jewish religion with a religious attitude of life by teaching, miracle, example, and direct moulding of their life formed them into the nucleus of that community in which He intended the Kingdom of God to be realized. Have we any right to limit His gospel to His disciples in terms of formal teaching, addressed to the multitudes, if we find that the whole effect of His training of the twelve was to replace their Jewish religion with a religious attitude of life by teaching, miracle, example, and direct moulding of their life formed them into the nucleus of that community in which He intended the Kingdom of God to be realized. Have we any right to limit His gospel to His disciples in terms of formal teaching, addressed to the multitudes, if we find that the whole effect of His training of the twelve was to replace their Jewish religion with a religious attitude of life by teaching, miracle, example, and direct moulding of their life formed them into the nucleus of that community in which He intended the Kingdom of God to be realized.

4. The method of Jesus. This, which is purely historical as well as a vital religious inquiry, we must now deal with. It will be best to deal with considering the matter in relation to the three functions of personal founders described in the opening section of this article. The appearance of repetition, when compared with the discussion of the consciousness of Jesus, will be lessened if it be remembered, as already explained, that we are here considering the other half of the central fact (the founding of the Christian religion), viz. the religious consciousness of the disciples of Jesus. We must see the experience through which the first disciples passed as the conscious realization of the function of Messiah, and another who, like John, was absorbed wholly in the thought of that supreme crisis, and He too announced the Kingdom. But they found many great differences between their experiences. These differences are not exhausted by speaking of His geniality, breadth, sympathy, social interest, and so forth. For He was also stern, definite, authoritative. His disciples found themselves involved by their discipleship in
new personal relations with the living, present, and insistent will of God. Jesus did not, like the Baptist, postulate that Kingship to an outer cataclysmic event. He makes them feel that they have to do with God now, as He is dealing with them now. This lies at the bottom of all the Lord’s Prayer, every clause of which involves the idea of God’s present action in our human life, even though it may have an eschatological background. It is precisely this that He says about prayer, against anxiety, concerning the Father’s love, in the call to repentance, to faith, to self-sacrifice. In spite of the eschatological element in His sayings, through which He taught them to cherish the expectation of the future acts of God, we must see in these records their memory of the awe, the humility, the confidence towards God, the sense of His actual Kingship which Jesus awoke in their souls.

(5) Jesus also took up the Baptist’s call to repentance. But His disciples found that with Him this meant a change more profound than any prophet had ever sought to effect, for no prophet had ever learned it as they did from the Messiah Himself (cf. Mt 13:17). This repentance was something which He wrought in them by His whole conduct, and which He had worked in them as well as by any explicit preliminary call. They learned from Him the depth and subtlety of their sin. Apart altogether from lessons about outward sin, which He does not altogether leave His listeners to understand from the Law (Mt 10:16), they were taught to see deadliness of self-righteousness and self-seeking and unbelief. On these matters they received, and have preserved these principles, as the most penetrating and heart-breaking experiences.

For His words created the Christian world by first making history in their own souls. The teachings gathered together in the Sermon on the Mount were addressed to them as disciples, and cannot be understood if viewed as spoken to all and sundry—a thrilling, excited crowd (Mt 5). Not only was Peter first encouraged to become a permanent follower in an hour of moral agony (Lk 6:14), but he was repeatedly compelled to deeper knowledge of the distance of his heart from the ideal of his Master (Mt 14:2617; 18:2; 19:35-36; 20:28; 21:31-32). The years of constant training revealed in that series of passages expressed only in part the effect which Jesus produced upon the disciples when He thus proved to them how much there was still to learn as to what He summoned them. In the conversations of Levi the publican, of Zacchaeus, of the woman that was a sinner, there must have been powerful emotional crises. And the disciples were witnesses of these, and learners from them. They saw and felt the extending effect of the personality of Jesus upon the moral consciousness of susceptible souls. On the positive side, we may note that He taught them to repent, and got them to repent, by demanding the attitude of a little child (Mt 18:3), by measuring their sin with the most terrible of all standards, the principle of a single sin (Mt 12:31-32), by insisting that the essential spirit of the Kingdom in which they now began to live was that of service, unselfishness, and complete (Mt 20:28), which cannot be rendered unless one unselfishly committed them with the call to love as God loves the unworthy and ungenerous (Mt 5:40). He even taught them that this inner moral revolution must be carried in upon the deepest apparently most natural and prevalent desires of human nature (Mt 19:11-12; 24-38). It is impossible to measure the work of Jesus in founding the new and final religion unless we see in these mere excerpts from the wealth of material in all four Gospels, not the quiet, placid teaching of a Rabbi, but the active penetrating spirit, the conscious will, of their Lord bearing the idea of repentance persistently and insistently, deeper and deeper, into the heart, conscience, and will of the disciples. And they were thus actualized even in the modern human heart, that which is not merely moral relation with the holy will of the actual and living God. And Jesus made them feel that need while He was there in the flesh, or they could not have seen or felt what He was in His power when He came to them in the Spirit.

(2) How the need was satisfied.—The second matter of inquiry as to a personal founder is this—What function did He exercise in meeting the need which He revealed in man’s heart? Did He actually give them the new relation with God for which penitence is at once the preparation and the passionate outcry? It is plain from the Synoptics alone that they knew what their world was about (Ps 93:1; Jer 26:11; Zeph 3:19); they spoke on things human and divine with authority unmistakable, and announced the laws of the Kingdom of God. The religious results were not what they came to teach or understand, but which they were in kind the same. They found Him to be a fountain of the grace of God. No doubt the idea of saving the lost (Lk 19:10; Mt 18:13; [un certain text]; Mark 2:1-12) in its most radical implications, as the word ‘salvation’ continues to have even in Paul’s Epistles. But we cannot get rid of the fact that in the parables of the lost sheep, the lost coin, and the prodigal son Jesus described His own present conduct as He pursued and received those who became His disciples. The fact that the recorded words of explicit forgiveness were addressed to strangers (Mt 5:24 and 6, Lk 7:49-50) must not obscure the underlying fact that they became associated with Him entered into that state of forgiveness. It is true that He glancingly describes the willingness of the Father to receive, and the supreme joy in the heart of the Father that His own disciples had that grace of heaven manifested to them in the will of Jesus towards them. He treated those as penitent who followed Him, and His followers were children of God, enjoying the love of the Father because they were under His own will and objects of His own love. This comes out more clearly if we recall, in its significance for their religious experience, the kind and extent of submission which He exacted and they yielded to Him. The very symbols and metaphors employed to describe their relations to Him and His functions towards them are significant. Thus He is the Shepherd and they His flock (Mt 10:12; 23:7; Lk 10:12; 12:50; Jn 10:14-18), and therein encourages them to remember the OT conception of Jehovah as Shepherd (Ps 100:3; 90; Is 40:11; Ezk 34:13-15). He is the builder of the new temple, i.e. the community which shall take Israel’s place (Mt 21:33; Jn 2:21), for He is ‘more than the temple’ (Mt 12:24). He is the sower, and the souls whom He gathers to Himself are the harvest of God (Mt 13:24; cf. 9:39). In all these metaphors we must note the gulf between shepherd and sheep, builder and house, sower and ground, as if they must be made to feel that this difference lies between Him and them, and yet that it is His love, His wisdom, His powerful care and control, that is their supreme hope. He does for them what the moral insight of a true penitent would ask from God. Even more strikingly, He is the
Lord who appoints to every man his task, as a slave-owner deals with the slaves who are his property (Mt 19:18-23), who returns to judge them. The metaphor is that of the consumption of human destiny: the disciples of Jesus must wait in eagerness, faithfulness, and faith. These metaphors are added to the positive fundamental assurance that the Servant of the Lord is the Man, final Judge, mysterious Servant of Jehovah doomed to death, whose tremendous force is felt with increasing awe as they watch Him move along His strange and awe-inspiring path to death and resurrection. But without the detailed enumeration of the latter group of ideas are present to their minds, now as startling sayings and anon as more startling explanations of Jesus, the former group are those which describe his actual will as it takes effect upon their present experience. Therefore, they have given up all for His sake (Mt 19:28), are ready, as He assumed, to meet persecution and even death for His sake (Mt 20:28, cf. Gess, Christ, Person and Work, i. 15 f., Mt 20:28). They learn to believe in Him as the Messiah-King (Mt 16:16-19), and, when they reach this measure of insight, Jesus rejoices because He sees now the new community established through which the Kingdom of God is made actual on the earth. He sees in that confession of Him the work of God's grace ("my Father") in their hearts. The death He then referring not only about His death, but about their relation to Him, begins to find expression (Mc 8:38-39). (Much of the material in Mt 10 probably belongs to this later period.) Now it becomes, not only about their relation to Him, but about their relation to Him, begins to find expression (Mc 8:38-39). (Much of the material in Mt 10 probably belongs to this later period.) Now it becomes necessary to tell them of the weighty matters of the new life, which every disciple may be tempted to be ashamed of (Mc 8:38, Mt 10:32, 11:29, Ro 12:2). There is a gospel which they may begin to preach foreign to them, a picture of the world which no longer has the power to influence their lives, and the spirit which is to influence their lives. For Jesus begins to speak of a cross (Mc 8:38, Mt 10:31, Lk 9:26) which they may be called on to carry to their own execution. (It is obvious that this is not just a reflection from a later date, for then the minds of Christians were absorbed in another view of the cross and spoke of being crucified with Christ (Gal 2:20), and of dying with Him, not of hearing each one an independent cross.) And He is said to have spoken of His drawing the world to Himself by being "lifted up" (Jn 12:24).  

3. Their inchoate thought of His Person.—We now find the first explicit statement regarding the personal religious experience of the disciples. All that fullness of the inner life which created the rest of the NT writings (and in a sense the Synoptic Gospels too) is absent from the story of their intercourse with Him in the days of His flesh. They have preserved the records of their unbelief, their quarrelling, their selfish ambition, their blindness to His meaning, their readiness to forsake or deny Him when the supreme stress came. But they do not speak of their joy or peace or hope. It is evident that these were transition days from the acute, enduring life of the Jewish world of that time to the exaltant hearts that were later filled with the Spirit and presence of the Risen Christ and of God in Him. They do not make clear how they thought of the Father as Jesus taught them, nor how the peace and satisfaction as they walked with eyes of trust and awe fastened upon this incomparable yet tender Master of their souls. But certainly they had begun to feel a religious joy in His fellowship, a religious reverence in His presence, a religious confidence in Him as their Master as He showed Himself and as they learned the deeper meaning, even the deeper significance, in the nature of the penitent, consecrated, and faithful life did seize their wills and change their hearts. The story of Peter's contrition at the beginning and end of the record (Lk 5:8, Mk 14:70) presents one side. The words of Jesus (Mt 16:27) indicate that in His view the recognition of His Messiahship was a religious experience of the highest character, in which Peter had been brought into relation with the Father. It is quite certain that they entered into the new life of prayer in which we could never have received their record of His many teachings on that central matter. No less certain is it that, as they thus sought communion with the Father, the constant presence of the spiritual spirit, the authoritative word, and the personal atmosphere of the Messiah and Son of God conditioned in the deepest way their thought of God and their endeavours after a realized fellowship with Him. The vagueness of the matter at this point is obviously natural on the orthodox view. For, if the gospel must, in Christ's own view, contain Himself as essential to it, it was inevitable that this should not become clear to His disciples, nor the form of religious experience which He alone could make possible become realized, until His relations with them had passed through all stages and reached that climax at which alone the full situation could come into view. It is those who hold that the personal religion of Jesus Himself was meant by Him to become realized that is that He did not think of entering into their religious consciousness except as an inspiring teacher and example, who cannot explain the absence from the Gospels of any proof that the disciples felt, that He and them, the God in the new world, the Son of God, and the Gospels all would give the idea of the new life and its joy. For this His martyr death was not necessary. That event could only add a glow of pathos—but why not of despair—to a picture of perfect relations with God which life alone could reveal and death could only blot out.  

II. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE DISCIPLES AFTER THE RESURRECTION.—This is the place to attempt a history of the apocalyptic Church. Our task is to set forth as briefly as possible some of those elements, described in the apocalyptic literature, which constituted the Church as a community, whose existence is founded on conscious reconciliation with God, conscious possession of His Spirit, and that through faith in Jesus as the Messiah, Son of God.  

1. The Resurrection faith.—It is universally admitted that the inchoate community left by Jesus at His crucifixion had no basis in their brief intercourse with Jesus for continuation as a community. They were not organized for political action. Nor was their religious experience definite and strong enough to give them a distinct consciousness or place within the system of the Jewish Church. Their later conduct towards a universal gospel proves this. As an experience it was, as we have seen, real, but bound up with and dependent upon the presence of Jesus with them, and unreleased from Jewish bonds. When He lay dead, their faith was ready to die. They allowed outsiders to bury Him (Joseph of Arimathaea [Mc 15:45]; Jn 19:38 adds Nicodemus). The story of two of them, according to the poet, gives the most vivid and realistic picture of their attitude of mind, as persons who retained a gracious memory of Jesus without hope. The grief which all the Gospels depict, the story of Thomas, the story of the women, the testimony of Peter, the evidence for the preparation for a permanent burial, combine to illustrate a situation which the white history of human experience would compel us to expect as the only natural conclusion. There was a sporadic glimpse of the situation which must have stained even the inevitable despair with shame and dismay. For an ancient law which was perfectly familiar to them, and which, indeed,
made all crucifixion a matter of peculiar horror to the Jewish imagination, asserted that a man who was executed, or exposed in death, on a cross was proved by that very event to have been accursed of God (De 21:22, Ac 5:30, Gal 3:1; cf. 1 Co 1:2; "a Mark on the man", 1:24). These facts are named here not for an apologetic purpose, but to account for the fact that practically all scholars, from Strauss onward, have held that the Christian Church could have come into being only when the disciples came to have the Resurrection faith. What produced that faith is the matter in dispute, a discussion of which would involve critical details and a philosophy of miracle too involved for this article. But it was this sudden conviction that God had raised Jesus from the dead that thrilled the despairing disciples with new life.

2. The Holy Spirit.—Another event occurred in the experience of the community which is known as the Descent of the Holy Spirit. What the matter is accurately described in Ac 2 or not (cf. Jn 20:22), something happened early in the history of the disciples which made the language of Paul about the Spirit intelligible, and the Book of Acts is pervaded by the atmosphere and psychological effects of it. The coming of the Spirit meant that the power of God had come upon them. This power was manifested in various ways, some of them now obscure. Miracles and other forms of endowment (ἐνδοξία) were the result of His presence (see H. Gunkel, Die Wurzeln des heil. Gottesdienstes, 1899; J. E. Wood, The Spirit of God in Bib. Lit., London, 1904). It was natural and the records show it, that at first there should be much confusion of mind among the disciples on a subject so new and so startling as the consciousness of the indwelling of God in the hearts of a human community. But it rapidly became clear that this experience meant that Jesus Christ Himself was still in living contact with them. They were—to use William James’s striking word—"co-conscious" with Him in this overwhelming suffusion of their hearts with a superhuman divine power.

3. Christ of history and of experience.—The disciples had no intellectual difficulty about the transition from “the Christ of history to the Christ of experience,” with which modern thought has concerned itself so deeply. On the one hand, they believed in the same Jesus whom they had known in the flesh had appeared to them after His death, and that the experience of the Spirit’s power was the fulfillment of His promise (Ac 1:8; 2:38; 10:42), and that the proof in their own life that they were under control of the same conscious will that dominated them in His earthly days. Even Paul, when he defends his authority as an apostle, claims to have “seen Jesus” (1 Co 9:1; cf. 15). For him this conscious will (Οἶδα, the spirit of God, Christ, the spirit of Christ, Ro 8:11) that rules him is the will of the historical personality whom they all knew as Jesus. But, on the other hand, they seem to have assumed that there was a continuity in the course and nature of their religious experience itself. It is a strange feature of the early addresses of Peter, and trace to this view of the experience of the early Christians, and he does not represent the primary disciples, all of whom had been with Jesus (Ac 1:1-13; 2:4), as having now for the first time received the forgiveness of sins; and there is no record of their having been baptized at this time. Repentance, baptism, forgiveness, are proclaimed to others (Ac 2:32, 38, 39), but are presupposed as already characteristic of the disciples. This can only mean that they cannot deny or ignore the past blessings which they had enjoyed in His outward presence. What was obscure has been made clear, what was inchoate is fulfilled.

The Messiahship of Jesus is now openly established by transcendent acts of God on Him and in them.

It has been made a difficulty that the Kingdom of God of which Jesus spoke so much seems to disappear from their vocabulary. But the fact remains and is now reflected in their use of the term ‘Kingdom’ as applied to Jesus. His Lordship over them, so real and potent and glad, is the Kingship of God! In Paul’s language the ‘salvation’ ‘takes the place of ‘kingdom’ (Ac 28:28; Ro 14:9), or ‘life’, ‘eternal life’ (Ro 5:19). The prevailing Johannine term is ‘eternal life’, They are all used now in a presental and now in an eschatological sense.

4. The experience of union with God.—William James said:

“We have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self in which more experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes. (The Varieties of Religious Experience, London, 1902, p. 162.)

This may be set beside the still more penetrating statement of another American thinker:

‘That which can happen only with the consciousness of God is an act of God’ (W. E. Hocking, The Meaning of God to Human Experience, London, 1912, p. 140).

These assertions may be held true of religion at every grade of its development. But they do not give their full illustration, and, indeed, have been made possible, only by the complete fulfilment in the experience of the community founded by Christ. It is, of course, impossible to distinguish, the light from the lower types of religious experiences by the mere intensity of subjective emotional experience. It is the historical setting and moral qualities of that experience that make religion greater than another, and the religion of Christ the supreme fact which it is. The immeasurable force of the apostles’ witness in the history of the world arises from the following among other facts.

(a) The greatness of it.—The ‘wider Self’ with whom the believers were in contact was conceived in terms which had not been attained before and have not been surpassed. The living God, Creator, Sustainer, Father, is described in a series of magnificent statements of Paul (Ac 17:22, Ro 1:5, 11; 11:36; Col 1:15, 19), and no less clearly though less elaborately by other writers (Jn 1:1-3, 4:14).

Throughout the apostolic literature it is assumed that He is personal, holy, and righteous, whose hand of sin is righteous (Ro 1:15), and whose purpose with man is glorious. Those concepts were not scientific or theological in form or origin. They were derived from the past life and thought of the Jewish people. They had been confirmed by the teaching of Jesus. But they were now driven deep into the human consciousness by the immeasurable power of the new range of experience. Every word and phrase in which they describe the new life is a witness to some new form of the divine action upon human nature, which transformed everything. Hence we hear of it as a new birth (Jn 3:1-19), as a new creation (2 Co 5:17), Gal 6:15, as dying to the past life of sin, weakness (Ro 6:6, Col 2:12), Gal 2:20), and entering into light after darkness (1 Jn 1:5, Eph 5:8), liberty after bondage (Gal 4:31), and so on. Thus the change is often described in terms which have been used for the vital and fundamental conditions of human existence. Men who are convicted of sin are yet living in the conscious fellowship and peace of the living and personal God.

(b) The divine power as conditioned.—This new form of religious consciousness can be fully understood only in and through its ethical qualities. The mystical experience is that which men cannot deny or ignore the past blessings which they had enjoyed, the present, and the people have living with them. It is a divine power, it is divine life, it is the divine spirit, which has come upon them and swept them into
ecstatics of joy and rapture. There are signs that
many of them (even Paul (2 Co 12:2) were carried
into abnormal psychic conditions. The scene
said to have occurred at Pentecost (Ac 2), many
of the incidents connected with demons (e.g., Ac
19:11), as well as Paul’s discoursing of tongues
and other phenomena (1 Co 14:26), prove this abun-
dant. For though these many parallels can be
found elsewhere in the history of religious
experience. The new thing, or the excellent thing,
in the NT religion is that the experience of the
unknown power which permeated the spirit of
Christ, the spirit of God, Ro 8:11, Jn 14:16) is
conditioned rationally, ethically, and historically.
This was no mere inflow of inexplicable energy
from an unknown source, no afflux which breathes
upon the soul from mystic ‘eaves of the winds.’
Yet nothing is taken from its mystery, its serious-
ness, its intensity, its solemn awe. These qualities
are simply relieved of their ‘brutishness,’ their mere
infantile nature, by the conditions under which
the mystic union with God is realized. Mysticism
is delivered from its sheer darkness and filled with
real meaning. For the word of God in the soul is
laid up by the word of the gospel which is ad-
ressed at once to the understanding, the conscience,
and the heart. There is no demand for asceticism
or for prolonged technical self-denial. Meditation,
such as the early ascetics practiced, was dis-
approved as an avocation by the Church. The
attitude and experience of the Church, especially in the
following century, demanded. It is assumed that all
men must think, indeed, to become Christian; but the
simplest man may think well enough to understand the
simplest truths, even when a sacred idea is calling him.
And then he will find, as Paul showed the untaught Galatians as well as the
philosophers of the University of Athens, that the
language of the soul, the language of the Heart, after all, the
reason and faith, are those under which the divine
will deals with the human, and the human must
deal with the divine. Hence we are not surprised to
find that Galatians (4:18), of the righteousness of God as an effective fact, a living
force, in human experience; just as the same
apostle no less than John (1 Jn 4:18) speaks of love
— for God, who is working in us and begetting
His children among us, has commended His love towards
us and has proved that He is love.
(c) The historic Christ as related to these condi-
tions. —The whole effect of that word of the gospel
is to teach men that it is God who is now invading
the individual life, that the divine is pressing in a
new way and under purely moral conditions upon the
human. The gospel is an appeal to men not to
scale the heights of God, but to submit to the
influence of God’s grace which is His very spirit and
presence, an experienced force, in the inner depths of
the soul. But this new religious attitude and
experience, constituting the substance of the new
religion, has been intelligible, and therefore is
possible as a programme of spiritual history, be-
cause it is organically connected with the fact that
in Christ the divine has invaded man’s history
personally, definitely. Every phase of the
divine grace is linked with His name. It is the
deeds of God in Him, in His historic consciousness
and person, that are the revelation of the quality
of God’s will and the moral ground of
His new and supreme appeal to man’s reason,
science, and heart. For the primary disciples this
sense of union with God could be only by
the continuance of the power of Jesus, now exalted
as Christ, to exert His supreme influence upon
human nature. And the Church has never been
content with any other explanation.
(3) Universalism and Parousia. —The religion of
Jesus Christ, being of this nature, was inherently
a universal religion. It required a great struggle in
the primitive Church before the full meaning of
this fact was grasped and its consequences were
accepted. Into that story we need not enter here.
But is it necessary to do more than point out in a
few words that the eschatological view, which ex-
pected the speedy manifestation (Parousia) of Christ,
did not prevent the development of the universal-
istic view of the gospel. The former and the later
in the future, the latter was made an experience in the
present. The old antinomy, which was, as we have
seen, in the consciousness of Jesus Himself, was
now present to the faith of His Church. It is the
ethical and historical effect of the eager waiting for the return of Christ, the coming
of the Man from heaven. Potent as that hope was,
it did not destroy the diligence of a man like Paul
or hinder (rather it greatly helped) the rapid spread
of the new religion. Yet we see in Paul’s letters
epistles (when his own death drew near) how a
world programme seemed to open before him, whose
outlines could not be filled in within a brief space of
time (Christ the Head of the Church, I Co 15, Eph, Col).
And the Fourth Gospel, as well as
1 John, represents an effort not to forsake that
hope, but to see it through the medium of an experi-
ce which means that Christ is here and His people
already live in Him. Just as, in the Gospels, He
is confessed as Messiah, and accepts the confession as
sprung from God, so, also, in Ephesians (see note 199),
in fullness of power; just as He spoke also of the Son
of Man as there where He forgave sins and sought
the lost, yet announced that the Son of Man would
be seen coming on the clouds of heaven (2 Th. 1:7)
but in the righteousness of God as an effective fact, a living
force, in human experience; just as the same
apostle no less than John (1 Jn 4:18) speaks of love
— for God, who is working in us and begetting
His children among us, has commended His love towards
us and has proved that He is love.
trition, and reformation. This means that Jesus Christ remains in the life of the Church not as a fossil memory growing dim and less effective upon the conscience of the Church and mankind, as time flows, but as a living judge and unexhausted source of moral power. Let us consider Him as the supreme personal force in the moral history of man.

2. The ethical teaching of Jesus.—The first appeal is naturally made to the teachings of Jesus which have been explored with extraordinary minuteness to discover their personal and social application. Two things have gradually become clear which modify the nature of that appeal. (1) The first is that He abdicated all dependence on outward ceremony as a means of salvation. Jesus revealed the ethical nature of man's religious relation. The same principles of faith and love unite men with one another and with God. Even worship of God is a moral act, and God's readiness to answer is compared with the attitude of good parents to their children (Mt 7:10, 20; 18:1-4; Jn 4:14). (2) The second is that Jesus did not, except for illustration, deal with the concrete details of life, and that He did not announce an organized system of laws. The only matter in which He approached the method of statutory legislation was that of marriage (Mt 19:5, 6; Mk 10:1-12) — a fact which is of the utmost significance for the fundamental nature of that institution in His community. His teaching on moral issues was more occasional, fragmentary. They penetrate to the fundamental principles of conduct, rather to the inner spirit, the secret self-determinations of man. For example, take His words on divorce (Mt 5:32; Mk 10:12; Lk 16:18; Jn 8:40-44). Jesus provides parables, parables, or mere simple illustrations, as well as direct commands, to state these principles, to make them distinct and impressive, to startle His hearers from the moral somnolence induced by their traditional habits of thought and evasions of serious moral issues, to show His principles at work in concrete social relations. In all this we note a certain finality which makes His principles inevitable for the highest and most critical circumstances and certain urgency which makes them impressive, solemn; and He binds them as ethical statements to religion as their final explanation, justification, and sanction. He makes the great principle of reward and punishment to the heart of all His teaching. But He makes it appear that these are not accidental, external, and confusing to the conscience. The reward and penalty come from God and are part of the history of the Kingdom and of the individual soul. The moral order of the universe is at once established and revealed through them.

3. His personal character.—In addition to the teaching of Jesus we must take account of His personal character as a moral force. It is true that the direct appeal to that character in the ordinary relations of life in apostolic literature are few (cf. Ac 10:9, 3 Co 10, 1 L 2:11). But on every page we see its searching and inexpressible influence. The picture of that holy and merciful life is ever before the Church, cherished in their hearts. In the Gospels it is preserved for us simply and directly, with such unity of spirit in its apparently divergent or even contradictory elements that it has won for itself a position of majesty, a strange and irresistible authority over the imagination, if not yet over the will, of the human race. He stands before the world as harmonizing in His own will with the perfection of self-mastery—for He was tempted to the utmost, yet sinless—such contrasts as these: (1) the consciousness of high and even superhuman station united with the will to obey unto death, unresisting and unafraid; (2) the nobility and dignity of a great mind and powerful soul united with simplicity and lowliness of life; (3) severity of the utmost in His purity, frankness of the least compromising in His truth, united with tenderness, pity, and comprehensive sympathy with the clear, relentless perception, exposure, and hatred of man's sin united with the unflattering resolution to be Himself the Saviour of man. Such a character was itself a revelation of the ideal of human life, and has since these Gospels were written ruled the hearts of men with royal supremacy.

4. His character measured by His divinity.—If there was more than man's teaching and more than His character as a perfect man, it might have seemed impossible that a character formed from such a consciousness as His should be of any avail for him, selfish, earthly-minded, impulsive men. For His superhuman consciousness of the fact of man's native sinlessness would open up a gulf between the achievement of moral glory and man's continuous and dismal failure which no man could cross, the very sighs of which would crush all faith and hope with the weight of personal despair. But the picture of Christ's moral quality sets before us in the light of His Incarnation and His redeeming purposes in life and in death. Passages of the Epistles (1 Pt 2:22 and 3:18) show that the pre-existence of Christ was not for the apostles what certain Ritschelians have too often represented it to be—an empty and uninspired ideal. On the contrary, it was the will of the Son of God, His 'grace,' His 'mind,' that are revealed in His self-emptying and self-purification. It is not the limited though noble sacrifice of a man that is seen in the Christian Church. It can only be measured by the movement of His will from the throne to the cross. When the Word became flesh, His glory was beheld, the glory of His truth (Jn 1:14), and, when He was seen and handled, it was the Word of life that stood revealed (1 Jn 1:1). When the author of Hebrews refers to the Incarnation (He 1:3-10), we cannot miss the effect of contemplating the Son of God as He chose to partake of the flesh of the blood in which all the children share, and to become in all things like unto His brethren. When in 1 Peter we read of the lamb without blemish (He 10:9), of His patient endurance of shame and suffering (He 12:2-3), of the purpose of His suffering once for all (He 9:28), we cannot but realize that the writer is thinking of a man, but of the divine being who entered into human life in His own full and holy will of love. When in Paul's writings we read of Him 'who loved me and gave himself up for me' (Gal 2:20), of His own desire to know the fellowship of His suffering (He 2:10), of Christ's love which constrained him (2 Co 5:4), from which no pang or shame can separate him (Ro 8:39), we realize all the time that this is the love of a divine being. The whole subsequent history of the Church shows that the inner secret of that spell which the name of Jesus Christ has cast upon man's heart lies in this view of His character as that of one whose eternal holiness and love became active and powerful for man. Many good men have suffered for their fellow-men. Patriotism and friendship, stern devotion to duty and a certain royal self-respect, have produced their myriads of martyrs of varied degrees of worth. But they are men entangled without their will in human relations, and rising worthy to their task. Here is the picture of one whose sinless life, whose love, whose will is more than man, and who is, of His own will, set into the entanglements of man's moral situation for man's deliverance. His very difference from us gives moral stimuli to His deliberate and merciful self-union with us.
5. The will of God revealed as the ultimate ground of moral ideals. — The ethical values and force of the story of Christ is not yet fully stated. Another element in the greatest and most potent of all, is involved in it.

(a) A permanent problem in the history of morality. — That we may estimate aright its true significance, let us recall the central problem of the higher ethical systems of different ages, which have often penetrated far into the heart of virtue and have tried to picture the perfect man. Aristotle did so, and discovered that the virtuous man is alone capable of true happiness. But he was apparently baffled by the fact that he cannot be pictured as attaining the ideal in our world because the environment proves hostile. There ought to be a relation of ‘perfect virtue’ and ‘perfect life.’ But the latter fails even the best of men, either through misfortune in life or through the close of life itself in death. The States faced the same situation, and their very name means for us in English what it does because they girded themselves to meet it not merely in speculation but in practical life, by the discipline not merely of the mind but of the will. They sought their sure guide to virtue and peace in an appeal to the Reason which informs the universe as a whole. Yet, just because their vision of this Reason was won only by the severe labour of the statesman, in its objective ground, but only an inner and therefore indemonstrable conviction, their virtue lacked joy. It could not and did not become a social good, a wide and permanent force in history. In Kant, again, in the same opposition between a very high conception of the will and of duty and the actual situation of man appears. For he too saw — and more clearly, as the heir of Christian culture — that in the end virtue must find its justification in the universe. God must have conceived of a scheme, some sort of perfect environment for the good will, that the need of happiness may be enjoyed. Hoppé, from a narrower vision and in the language of our thought, puts the same problem when he says, ‘the conservation of value is the characteristic axiom of religion,’ and adds that, therefore, ‘the religious problem also is concerned with the problem of the universe.’ In the special point of view (Philosophy of Religion, Eng. tr., London, 1906, pp. 10, 13). The same principle or problem appears in the Hebrew Scriptures in the terms of the God and religion. It created the drama of Job. It even produced the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. The Psalms ring with its passion and wail. For Israel was confronted with the fact that the man who was righteous, who was conscious of integrity before the will of Jahveh, was yet left to the mischiefs of life and the doom of the grave, just like the virtuous man of Aristotle. Man needs for his clear and sure grasp of the idea of goodness, and for its social fulfilment on a large scale, the assurance not only that the universe is ultimately in accord with it, but more definitely that the Will which rules history confirms and secures it finally and absolutely.

(b) Its solution in God’s will concerning Christ. — According to the NT and the continuous faith of the Church since then, this supreme problem was solved by the story of Jesus Christ. For the whole ‘fact of Christ’ is viewed steadily as an act of God (Jn 3:16, Gal 4:4, He 1:3). Outwardly this is depicted for us in the stories of His birth and His crucifixion. Inwardly it is made certain in His resurrection, and it is said of Jesus Christ with the will of God. That is not viewed either in the NT or in the faith of the Church, it was not viewed by Jesus Himself, as the product of a pure human will (Mt 16:21, Mk 10:25). It was the product in Him of the spirit of holiness, which became God in Him (Ro 1:3), of the Logos incarnate in Him (Jn 1:14), of the Son of God incarnate in Him (Ro 8:32) by the will of God. (6) In His sacrifice on the Cross. For that event is distinctly and repeatedly described as the will and central problem of the higher ethical systems of different ages, which have often penetrated far into the heart of virtue and have tried to picture the perfect man. Aristotle did so, and discovered that the virtuous man is alone capable of true happiness. But he was apparently baffled by the fact that he cannot be pictured as attaining the ideal in our world because the environment proves hostile. There ought to be a relation of ‘perfect virtue’ and ‘perfect life.’ But the latter fails even the best of men, either through misfortune in life or through the close of life itself in death. The States faced the same situation, and their very name means for us in English what it does because they girded themselves to meet it not merely in speculation but in practical life, by the discipline not merely of the mind but of the will. They sought their sure guide to virtue and peace in an appeal to the Reason which informs the universe as a whole. Yet, just because their vision of this Reason was won only by the severe labour of the statesman, in its objective ground, but only an inner and therefore indemonstrable conviction, their virtue lacked joy. It could not and did not become a social good, a wide and permanent force in history. In Kant, again, in the same opposition between a very high conception of the will and of duty and the actual situation of man appears. For he too saw — and more clearly, as the heir of Christian culture — that in the end virtue must find its justification in the universe. God must have conceived of a scheme, some sort of perfect environment for the good will, that the need of happiness may be enjoyed. Hoppé, from a narrower vision and in the language of our thought, puts the same problem when he says, ‘the conservation of value is the characteristic axiom of religion,’ and adds that, therefore, ‘the religious problem also is concerned with the problem of the universe.’ In the special point of view (Philosophy of Religion, Eng. tr., London, 1906, pp. 10, 13). The same principle or problem appears in the Hebrew Scriptures in the terms of the God and religion. It created the drama of Job. It even produced the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. The Psalms ring with its passion and wail. For Israel was confronted with the fact that the man who was righteous, who was conscious of integrity before the will of Jahveh, was yet left to the mischiefs of life and the doom of the grave, just like the virtuous man of Aristotle. Man needs for his clear and sure grasp of the idea of goodness, and for its social fulfilment on a large scale, the assurance not only that the universe is ultimately in accord with it, but more definitely that the Will which rules history confirms and secures it finally and absolutely.

6. The moral foundations of the Church. We have already seen that, in gathering His disciples into the nucleus of the new community of God upon earth, Jesus united them with Himself by the ethical bonds of patience, trust, obedience, and hope. The apostolic communities grew up in various parts of the Roman Empire on the same foundation (Mt 16:18, Co 3:1). These new social groups are filled with the consciousness of a divine indwelling (1 Co 3:16, Ro 8:17, Col 1:9, Jn 14:16) which they describe under the three names of God, Christ, and Spirit. They live in new ethical relations with God, and the human relationships appear in a new light. A new form of moral consciousness has taken its place in human history. It was destined to pass through many outward forms, but it was destined to pass through many periods of clearness and confusion, of effective energy and feebleness. But, having the secret of renewal within its own nature and in its connection with the history of its creator and redeemer, in Christ, it has preserved itself as inextinguishable source of light and power for all periods of culture and all races of man. In proportion as the religious life...
feeds itself directly upon the deeds of God in Christ, and upon Christ's character, word, and work, as the embodiment and manifestation of those deeds, it becomes aware again of its moral ideals and becomes charged afresh with faith and passion for their fulfillment. A few words only can be used here upon the social influence of the Church as a moral organism. As a social group its outward moral influence on the State and on all other social groups and institutions is dependent on the principles of its own organization. These principles are faith, love, obedience towards God, and mutual love and service towards one another. The Church as a distinct institution is created by these. The measure of the intensity with which they are practised by the Church has always been the measure of the Church's moral influence on society. Not its mere teachings, but its actual rules of combination and cooperation have proved to be the most potent revolutionary forces. The meaning of these rules, their inner logic, has not yet been read off into the continual flux and change even of its own life. But the humanizing of man's heart, the democratizing of his governments, the socialization of his possessions and all 'values' are the laboured, slow, and not yet completed effort to translate the ideals or principles of Christ into its own being into the organization of the whole world. And that process is slow and laboured, because the Church, being composed of only partially enlightened human beings, and as such, is incompletely able to understand itself, as well as because the 'kingdoms of this world' fight for the holistic principles on which they are so widely and firmly established (Mt 23:23, Ro 13:1). From this we can see the ethical meaning of the fight of Paul for the universality of the gospel against the Jews and on. It was a movement of the Spirit by which the will of Jesus in relation to the human family was to be fulfilled, and the moral value of God's deeds in Him, were translated into human action, and into the very organization of the Church. That all races, both sexes, every grade of social life, every quality of mind, should be baptized into Christ and become one body in Him, on the same ethical terms, was necessary to make the practice of righteousness and love, as He taught them (and, in His own work, fulfilled them), possible to the whole human family. And the conscious human community of man could arise, so as to become a historical force, only in communities which had begun to practise it across all these gulls which cut the human family. It is that the new society, the community of man, is the basic principle of the speedy return of Christ mercifully hid from the imagination of the first Christians the length and breadth and heath and depth of the task of the Church as the embodiment and promulgator of the will of God in Christ for the re-organization of society. But they did their work no less effectively. It is not the possession of any theory as to the ideal form of general society, whether politically or economically considered, that has given the Church its power. Where it has attempted to dictate such a form it has always incurred disaster. Its supreme function and power have come from the possession of those of the life of control by which the ambitions, passions, appetites, and convictions of men—out of these the forms of government and social order are themselves regulated and directed within its own life. The Church’s control lies in its continuous sense of responsibility to the living Christ and its continuous dependence upon the manifestation of His will in all the transactions of its earthly life.

7. Eschatology and morals.—The attempt of some recent eschatologists to prove that the teaching of Jesus contains an *Interimanthiké*—a view of conduct dictated by the expectation of the speedy establishment of the Kingdom of God in which the whole condition of life would undergo a catastrophic change—deserves a few words. There is no teaching of Jesus which relieves men from the regular duties of life. No reasonable man so interprets the words about hating one's family (Lk 14:26), et. Mt 10:29, or applies to all men the demand made on the rich ruler (Mk 10:29), or understands that the forbidding of anxiety about clothing and food (Mt 6:25) is the bidding of idleness, even for a season. Jesus could not have seen less clearly than Paul did that a definite life lies in the refusal to work (2 Th 3:3). The deep moral and religious principles underlying the commands about the laying up of treasure (Mt 6:19), the docility of the little ones (Mt 18:1), are not annihilated away by the idea that they were based upon an excited view of the imminence of the last day. The teaching about eschats (Mt 19:28) is likewise misunderstood, if it is taken to mean that men should not marry because the day of heaven is near, or shall be no marrying or giving in marriage. On the contrary, our Lord assumes that men will have money to use for their almsgiving (Mt 5:3, 6:4, 23:11, Lk 16:12), while such a passage as Lk 14:26. (with every mark of authentically) assumes a condition of society in which the love of men is not yet annihilated away by the love of creatures, the world, the flesh, and the devil. The fact (πάντα ἔρχονται) are always present to its consciousness. Death and judgment, the transitoriness of this world and the hope of consummation and blessedness for the race in the unseen universe, the brief life of the individual and his eternal destiny—these facts make all the possessions and the values of society, all the human enterprises, limited in their positive value, dangerous in their misuse, good only in their subjection to the ends of the soul and the meaning of the Kingdom of God. The antithesis of the present human society and the society of the Kingdom of God is thus not an eschatological doctrine of evolution, as Schweitzer and others suppose, but actually essential to its application in the moral history of man. For the evolution of moral and political life in humanity is not the present, but the future. And when the reality and imminence of the eternal fills him with a sense of solemn urgency and makes the joys of earth seem by comparison meagre and incomplete, and when, on the other hand, the reality and definiteness of the holy will and the
loving mercy of God, apprehended now and here, make the earthly task seem noble. Christ's own character, and even His work of redemption, was evolved from the appeal to His will of these two aspects of the human situation. And His disciples were taught by word and example, and His Church by His spirit, to cherish both the urgency and the magnificence. But the latter aspect, the eager waiting for a Saviour and the determined devotion to the present opportunity, out of which the loftiest morality has arisen, and the spiritual which alone the perfect civilization can be evolved.

V. APOSTOLIC CHRISTOLOGY.—I. THE CHRISTOLOGY OF PAUL THE APOSTLE.—I. His religious experience.—All attempts to explain Paul's fundamental doctrine of the Person of Christ except through his contact with the primitive Christian community, and through his faith in the risen Christ, have utterly failed. A profound experience was the beginning of his Christology. Not merely in the Acts of the Apostles but in his own letters the evidence on this matter is as direct and conclusive as possible. Many writers from Bauckham onwards have treated him as primarily a speculative theologian whose opinions about Jesus have the value only of deductions from Jewish Messianism, and of attempts to reconcile these with Alexandrian philosophy. Many such views fail to do justice to the central things in the self-revelation of his own letters.

(a) As a Jew.—It is abundantly proved, first, that he was an original, and in his practical religion he was exceedingly zealous for the traditional faith of his race (Gal 1:14). It would seem that he had given years to the earnest study of Jewish and non-Jewish books, and that he had given himself with great energy to the practical side (Ph 3:6). The intensity of his love for his race never abated, and proves that, while it was fired by a deep contemplative bent of mind, it was no less active and practical in the demands which it made upon his will (2 Co 11:16, Ro 9:9–11). His ardour for the fulfilment of the Law carried him apparently to all lengths. His contemporaries saw him 'advanced' beyond them all and 'excessive' in his zeal (Gal 1:14; cf. Ac 22:20); they found him 'blasphemous' (Ph 3:13; and Lk 20:26), in the details of legal observance. According to Ac 30:25 he could appeal before Agrippa to the reputation which he had won as a Jew for strictness in practical religion.

(b) As a foil of Christianity.—His intensely practical nature made him the bitter and most powerful enemy of the gospel. He refers to this period with shame (1 Co 15; cf. Eph 3:1, 1 Ti 11), in proof of his Jewish orthodoxy (Gal 1:19, Ph 3:5), and as proof also of the power of the free grace of God in Christ. The grounds of that fierce hatred of 'the Way;' and of Jesus, may be surmised to have included the usual prejudices of others, his fellow-perservers. He led in the attack on Stephen, who was condemned for teaching the abolition of Temple-worship and the Law (Ac 6), and for blasphemy in ascribing a divine exaltation to Jesus that was crucified as 'Son of Man' (Ac 7:56). It would seem that Paul had a particular horror at the idea that the crucified and accused Jesus should have been the Messiah and Saviour of the world (Gal 3:13); and he ever after realized that this must involve a particular evil befallen to Jesus (1 Co 15). It is accepted, therefore, by most scholars who are not exploiting some private method of approval that Paul before his conversion knew Jesus and the gospel. This is to be, and that this was the original of his hatred of them. To make them curse Jesus was for him a religious act, a service of Jehovah which he must render with his whole soul; and that implies at least a general knowledge of their claims concerning Jesus.

(c) The grace of God.—If Paul became a believer in this gospel, he attributed the change not to the processes of his own mind, but to the gracious act of God (Gal 1:15, Eph 3:7). The revealing act was so direct, vivid, personal, objective, that he never entertained the slightest doubt that he had seen Jesus even as the other apostles (1 Co 9:1, Gal 1:12). His heart was changed, and all his letters predicate with the light and joy and love and power from the very work of God, which henceforth filled his consciousness. It is at this point that some writers, like Percy Gardner (The Religious Experience of St. Paul, London, 1911), pass too hastily to a supposed preparation of the Apostle's mind in his pre-Christian days for his distinctive Christology. Gardner not only attributes to him a reasoned Jewish conception of the Messiah, and knows its outlines, but credits him with a conception already illumined and expanded by Alexandrian philosophy (pp. 26, 56). Against this must be set two facts. First, the 'hints' of Paul's familiarity with Greek speculation before his conversion are too meagre and precarious. The elements in his Christology which ally themselves with the Greek world are found in his later Epistles, after he had spent years in direct contact with such views as those in Asia Minor and Achaia. Scores of modern missionaries can parallel this experience, even as late in life as he. Secondly, it is clear that the effect of his conversion was to make him receive Jesus as the primary apostles declared Him. The differences which developed later between some of that first group and himself were never concerned with the Person of Christ, but with the contrast between the act of faith on which the Church was founded and the act of circumcision on which the Jewish system was based, or with the work of divine grace in mind as against the principle of legalism. There is no sign that he had any controversy with the original group in the field of Christology.

2. Three stages in his Christology.—It was natural and inevitable that a mind so keen and powerful should seek to interpret the Person and Work of Jesus, and on these three distinct strata of thought are discernible in his letters.

(a) Data from early Christianity. He received from the primitive Church, as confirmed in his own experience, the fact that Jesus must be called Messiah (Christ), Son of God, and Lord (Koios). Of course these are not mere titles of honor. They are so closely descriptive of His very being and of His functions in the salvation of men that they are used by Paul as proper names. Moreover, as proper names they are applied to that one historical Person who is known to him as Jesus, of whom Peter, standing up with the eleven, spoke in Jerusalem, and who is described in every paragraph of the Synoptic Gospels. Hence Paul is free to use these terms, whatever status he is thinking of. It was 'Christ' who existed eternally in the nature of God (Ph 2); it was 'Christ' who was crucified (1 Co 15, Gal 2); who died for our sins (1 Co 15), who was raised from the dead (Ro 8), who is exalted and ever liveth (Ph 2, Ro 8), who is the final judge (2 Co 5). It was the 'Son of God' who was sent forth (Gal 4, Ro 8), who gave Himself unto death for all (Php 2:7), who is definitely marked out in the Resurrection (Ro 1), in whom the universe has its origin, its order, and its meaning (Col 1). It was 'the Lord' whom men must see and believe (Io 1), who was betrayed (1 Co 11), who is received as the Spirit (2 Co 3), who controls human experience (2 Co 3). To confess Him as Lord absolutely is
not, like the worship of heathen gods, to detract from, but, on the contrary, it is to manifest and magnify the very glory of God (Ph 2:1). And this Lordship extends over the created universe (Ro 14:9, Ph 2:11). All three original titles are brought together by Paul into one full-hearted and glorious description of this Person when he says: 'Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ' (2 Co 1, Eph 1:3).

(6) Relation to the Spirit of God.—In the mind of Paul the supreme term for Christ is 'Son of God,' and the great peculiarity of the Christian faith is that which he can give to God is 'the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.' But the relation of Christ to God is also stated in a very different way, through the use of the word 'Spirit.' Paul considers this Spirit as an elemental part of the very being or life of God Himself (1 Co 2:9-12), and as the form under which God enters and operates in the heart of man. And the Spirit's work is performed in a distinctive way, as the Spirit of Christ. It is going too far perhaps to say with some that the Spirit is the essence or basis of His personality; even Ro 8:1 (cf. 1 Co 15:19) will hardly carry us so far. The famous passage in Ro 8:10 does indeed seem to carry the identification through to the end —'The Lord is the Spirit,' 'even as from the Lord the Spirit.' But this must be compared with the elaborated interchange of names in Ro 8:2, where this identification is deliberately avoided. And yet a form of unity is even there implied which is supra-temporal. The Spirit of God is the Spirit of Christ, and the experienced presence of the Spirit in the believing man is at once the presence of God and of Christ.

The two main practical aspects of this conception for Paul are these:

(a) The Holy Spirit reproduces in men the divine relations and qualities of God. He is included in the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, and victory over death. The love of God for His Son, which is presupposed as the fountainhead of all grace (Col 1:9), is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, which is given in us as the sense of divine sonship which He sets forth in divine majesty (Ro 5:5). His work is referred to as a 'partaking of the divine nature' (1 Pt 1:21), and as 'giving us the indwelling Spirit which gives men freedom (Ro 8:2), and becomes the principle or source of their life (v. 2).' Even the Holy Spirit lives and abides in the Resurrection of Christ (Ro 8:11; cf. Ph 3:12). The Holy Spirit is thus for the mind of Paul the production in men of the moral qualities of Christ. All spiritual 'gifts' must be tested by the attitude of those who possess them towards Jesus (1 Co 12:3-11) and the subject of life to His Lordship. Christ's Spirit which is after the likeness of God and of Christ, the Spirit is yet a communication name with these, and must be specially named in a full statement of the God in whom Christians believe and whom they worship (2 Co 13:14).

(b) Anticipations of this doctrine.—Once more we must be careful, while allowing for the originality and power of the Apostle's mind, to recognize that in this magnificent doctrine he bases himself upon the common say, more correctly painted it into 'the man from heaven' (cf. Jn 3:16). It is less likely both to the idea of the Son of Man' or 'the man' as Jesus used it at His trial and to the Hebrew translation of the former, which is 'Son of God' (Jn 3:18) than the latter idea, as given to him in the disciples' accounts of Jesus and His words, led him to carry the parallel back to the former. J. Weiss in his Commentary states that the influence of Ps 8, Dn 7, and the 'Similitudes' of Enoch without the mediation of the words of Jesus.
ness of Jesus (In 12th. 14-19), who promised this word of his Church (cf. 28). Even in the Synoptics we find that: (a) the Holy Spirit is described in the account of the Virgin Birth as the energy which causesthe appearance of His mother (Mc. 1: 20, Lk. 1: 35); (b) John the Baptist named the gift of the Spirit as one of the marks of the Messiahs (Mk. 1: 7, Mt. 3: 11, Lk. 3: 16); (c) the four gospels also name the baptism of Jesus as the hour of the coming upon Him of the Holy Spirit, for His anointing to the work of Messiahship (Mt. 3: 26, 29, 30, Lk. 3: 21, 22), In Lk. 3: 16, cf. Mt. 3: 11, Lk. 4: 1). It is asserted in that Gospel that He went to the desert to face His trial in the power of the Spirit; (d) Jesus claims that He does His works of wonder by the Spirit of God (Mt. 15: 30-31, 17: 22). These passages show that in the first place the word 'Holy Spirit' in the Gospels has the same meaning as it has in the Book of Acts; in the second place, the phrase in Acts 1: 4-9 shows that the Holy Spirit for their service of Him (Mt. 3: 11, Mt. 17: 5; cf. Lk. 11: 11).

The extraordinary fullness of reference to the presence and workings of the Spirit in the book of Acts can only be accounted for ultimately through some communal experience which was, in their minds, at once a manifestation of God's presence and power and also connected directly with Jesus and their past experience of Him. That whole situation is needed to explain the significant fact that Paul everywhere assumes that his readers must understand his references to the Spirit in relation to Christ and the Church life. Here as throughout his Central teachings, even as to what he calls 'my gospel', he appeals steadily and even passionately, not to his speculative prepositions as a theologian, but to the real and Christian experience of every Christian community.

(c) The influence of Greek thought. — There is another range of Pauline thought concerning Christology, especially, which comes to expression in Colossians and Ephesians. There are evidences nearly all his Epistles that Paul in his mission work strove to make sympathetic contact with the moral and religious peculiarities of the people whom he taught (cf. Ac 17: 28, and W. Ramsey, Galatians, London, 1889). Much controversy has been waged in recent years as to the extent and content of his浸信会 as a theologian to the mystery religions, the Gnostic philosophy, and even the Stoic philosophy, which were popular at the great centres where his work lay. It has not been proved that anything essentially new was added to his Christology from any of these sources. But it has become very clear that he did set himself to make Christ intelligible to minds saturated with Gnostic interpretations of life and attractive to souls absorbed in an irreligious, thought pecu-lia to the people. It is to be held that he learned to think of 'the cosmic Christ' from the Philo doctrine of the Logos or some Asiatic reflection of it. That he was compelled, as a missionary is often compelled nowadays, to relate the doctrine of Christ to the intellectual concepts of his field of labour, and that this led to the use of new terminologies, is obvious. But it is significant that, while the term 'Logos' occurs in the Pauline Epistles about eighty times and occasionally in meanings verging on the technical philosophical use of it, there is not one occasion when he does use it in the Philocanic sense. In the critical passage of Col. 1: 15 he undoubtedly addresses men who have cherished some phase of what is generally known as the logos doctrine. And the result is a setting forth of the eternal being of the Son of God by the manner of Christ which is more elaborate philosophically than we find in any other place, except In 12th and He 1: 14. But the exposition is intended deliberately to exclude all comparison of Christ with other angelic beings, or heavenly powers (v. 18), which Gnostics seem to have intended. They are described as emanations from the absolute and controllers of the world. He does not borrow their categories to add some new and unthought of quality or dignity to the glory of Christ, but to reveal to them in their own language that which He is essentially for the Christian consciousness.

The result is that Christology in Paul begins to take on the language of the Greek world, as it is of characteristic of all creation'. In Him the attributes of God are concentrated, and He has His being before all creation' (v. 9), 'before all things' (v. 16). In spite of J. Weiss's argument at the inspiration of the Holy Spirit for their service of Him (Mc. 3: 16, Mt. 17: 5; cf. Lk. 11: 11).

The words ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου mean more than ἐκ σώματος, implying that He is not a mere instrument but a continuous, abiding, conditioning cause. This is made explicit in the further statement that all things 'stand together' receive their organic unity, through their continuous dependence upon Him. (b) In addition to origin and continuity, we have in Christ the third great metaphysical conception of end or final cause. 'All things have been created unto Him'.

1. Characteristics common to both. — In the two great systems of the ancient philosopher there are commonplaces of thought which are drawn from the same atmosphere and charged with the Logos doctrine. It must, however, be carefully noted that these writers move...
2. The Fourth Gospel.—The entire meaning of the Fourth Gospel lies here. It is an effort to show the Logos, who is thoroughly conceived of in Paul very specifically as an eternal, living, purposive, rational being, as He appeared in flesh, as He moved a man among men. It is a profound study of the consciousness of Jesus as the consciousness of a God living under the conditions of human experience. Incidents and discourses are recalled, interpreted, re-stated, and recorded, as they reveal that ‘glory’ which shone through the veil of flesh into His disciples’ hearts, full of grace and truth (Jn 14).

There can be no doubt, whether the author be John the Apostle or some other mind working upon material which must be traced back to Jerusalem and the Lord’s immediate disciples, that he is describing the actual consciousness of the historic Jesus. He is not inventing; nor is he using what he knows to be the inventions of a Pauline group, but what he has learned from the lips of whom Jesus said and did. If, as seems certain, he had at least Mark and Luke before him, then it is impossible, without impugning his honesty in the most sacred manner, to account for us of whom Jesus knew Himself to be the Son of God. This it is that accounts most reasonably for the well-known and fundamental features which distinguish his few but penetrating words about the Logos from the doctrine of Philo. He has not as an independent metaphysician discovered the defects of Philo, and then clothed the name of Jesus with the eternal attributes, but rather has he begun with a magnificent grasp of the idea of divine Sonship and read that back into the philosopher’s idea of the Logos. His work is therefore as truly a criticism of the inadequacy of the Logos doctrine as Paul’s, of the same idea of Sonship in the same philosophic atmosphere (Col 1 above), which was intended to be at once a condemnation and transcendence of the wisdom of the Greeks.

3. The Second Epistle.—The same facts appear in the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is true that in the great opening sentence the metaphysical terminology is more closely involved with the idea of a doctrine and normal being, than appears to be the case in John in verses 14. In literary manner it is more akin to Paul’s passage in Col 1:9-2. But we must remember that John in later verses (16-18) deliberately re-states in relation to Jesus the whole of the ideas which are set forth in v.14 in relation to the Logos. It is this later verses that are the true parallel to the passages in Colossians and Hebrews. In like manner, then, for the author of the Hebrews, the Son of God is a supreme Being, who as a Son possesses the essential and fundamental feature common to all—that the one common term in all their descriptions is ‘Son of God.’

Their real unity is not to be found either in their philosophical terminology, which is very different in each case, or in a common metaphysical theory, supposed to be in the background but which we have no real means of discovering. Their unity is found in this, that they are describing the eternal and cosmic relations of a concrete personality, who is identical at once with Jesus of Nazareth and with this divine Spirit which fills the Church. But the significance of the matter is not seen until we emphasize against the one point which is most generally ignored in our day—that as a mere matter of fact these writers all feel that their whole view is based originally upon the consciousness of the historic Jesus, the Son of God.

III. CONCLUSION.—It is in the interest not of apologetics but of actual history that we may in presence of these facts agree with J. Moffatt:

‘We cannot explain primitive Christiasity either as the transformation of the Jesus of History into that of the historical Jesus, or as the evolution of a Jesus-cult out of a current series of christological doctrines (Theogony of the Gospels, London, 1912, p. 174m).

But the same historical interest must prevent us from using, as wholly true to these facts, a certain form of expression which is quite popular in our day of psychological approach to every problem of history. For example, we may take the following from J. Weiss:

The total impression is that early Christianity has used current ready-made forms and concepts in order to express in generally understood language, and yet it is an absolute and supreme manner, the overwhelming impression made by the Personality of Christ. Men sought out predicates whereby to announce that the Ideal and the highest religious values are in Him (Ohrdnung, p. 67).

The perfection of such a summary appears in the succeeding paragraphs, where it appears that these ancient predicates, even that of Deyt (‘Gottheit’), are an account of whom Jesus was and what He said and did. If, as seems certain, He had at least Mark and Luke before him, then it is impossible, without impugning his honesty in the most sacred manner, to account for us of whom Jesus knew Himself to be the Son of God. This it is that accounts most reasonably for the well-known and fundamental features which distinguish his few but penetrating words about the Logos from the doctrine of Philo. He has not as an independent metaphysician discovered the defects of Philo, and then clothed the name of Jesus with the eternal attributes, but rather has he begun with a magnificent grasp of the idea of divine Sonship and read that back into the philosopher’s idea of the Logos. His work is therefore as truly a criticism of the inadequacy of the Logos doctrine as Paul’s, of the same idea of Sonship in the same philosophic atmosphere (Col 1 above), which was intended to be at once a condemnation and transcendence of the wisdom of the Greeks.

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apologist and the denier of the deity of Christ to war over the issue as to whether the will to wear these titles was madness or miracle, delusion or divinity. But the effect of the pre-condition, the facts which constitute the field of battle.

VI. CHRISTOLOGY IN THE EARLY CHURCH.——

I. INTRODUCTORY.—1. Logic and community life.——Christology for Christology's sake is the nature of all human social organizations. All groups that are formed for definite ends are compelled to work out, not only those ends, but the principles of efficiency toward those ends. Of course this must be done actually, whether it is done formally or informally. The history of every social group in the world, from a private club to a national government, includes the working out of the logic of its inherent principles. Moreover, the group history is always more logical than the development of the individual members of it, for in the individual the emotions play upon the core of the will, confuse the logical powers, and make the individual's life an imperfect reflexion of the inner logic of the principles which he professes to have adopted. But, for the group life, private emotions are cancelled in the clash of wills and in the course of controversy as to the meaning of the ends, the principles, and the methods which inhere in the constitution of the group. For this reason it is the heart and very life of every institution, of a government, of a political party, of a church, is often severely logical. It is the reading off into active life of the rational implications of those principles on which it is founded. This process of unfolding the logic of its adopted rules is aided by every institution by the challenge of the environment. For each organized group lives in a world of its own, and its own principles come into collision or co-operation with theirs. Controversy arises, and that is, in all important and continuing cases, pushed further and further, until the full inner meaning of each interpretation is revealed. Acceptance and rejection of the institution and its ends, the loosening or confining of conviction, the desertion of an ineffective or untrue principle, the deepening of the power of the true principles, even the gradual death of an institution when its once logical bases of thought lay in non-Christian speculations about the nature of God and His remoteness from all contact with the evil inherent in the material universe, is a natural and inevitable result of the attempts of the church to rise to a new plane of intellectual and moral development.

Christ inherent in the new community.—The theology of the Christian church, as its orthodox form and including all its departments and phases of history is the natural and inevitable result of this process. As far as Christology is concerned, it is the gradual unfolding of the central fact that Jesus Christ is from the first accepted by the Church as the incarnate Son of God, the redeemer of man by the Cross, the ruler of our experience by His Spirit. The institution that was organized on that basis must work out to the very end all the implications, the inner logic, of the conviction which gave it being and power. It would be impossible to relate here the particular stages and various adventures of the human spirit in this great undertaking. We must be content to give a mere outline of the logical process by which the Church, through all natural causes of controversy, sought to define and develop its faith and was as refiner of Christ. That faith and worship of Christ created the Church. It separated, not without pain and surprise and alarm, the primary disciples from the Jewish Church. It was the explanation and power of individuals from all classes and races as the message of redemption through Him and of control by Him was carried from place to place. The Perfection of God and redeemer of man was the foundation of the new community. This principle brought it at once into conflict with the monotheism of the Jews and the polytheism of the Gentiles. Among cultured classes it was confronted by the Gnostics with their confident speculations about the deity and His invisible hierarchies of creative agencies, and by the practical Agnosticism of vast numbers for whom neither idolatry, nor Gnosticism, nor mystery-religions contained any solution of life's enigma. Collisions of this order were felt from the beginning, as the NT proves. But, as time went on, the warfare became more definite and more keen, especially as the number of Christian adherents increased and varieties of culture, of intellectual equipment, of moral and spiritual insight and intensity, took their place within the growing host of the baptized.

II. THE FIRST STAGE IN CHRISTOLOGY.—During the sub-Apostolic period, and through that of the apologists down to nearly the close of the 2nd cent., Christological inquiry had hardly begun on the Christian basis. Such cruder phases as are known by the names of Ebionism and Docetism started from conceptions of God and the world which themselves were anti-Christian. Thus Ebionism, obscure in its history and teaching, while it affirmed for Jesus as Messiah, shrank from seeing in Him the actual presence of God. Jewish prejudice against believing that God could come into such close relations with the material world as are implied in the divinity and crucifixion of the Son of God held that view in abhorrence. If it came upon Him at baptism and made Him the supreme teacher; the death was an ineradicable horror, but He would come again in power and glory to make all things new. Docetism, on the other hand, rose from or was adopted by various phases of Gnosticism. Even Justin Martyr bears witness that many Gnostics were in the Church and must be specifically eulogised on the basis of their thought lay in non-Christian speculations about the nature of God and His remoteness from all contact with the evil inherent in the material universe. This is to be found in such a mixture of dogmatic speculations on the origins of God and the universe with reverence for Jesus, as a member of the supernatural forms of the divine nature which are the agencies of our universe has arisen, as was attributed to Basilides towards the middle of the 2nd cent.; and in such a union of Christian faith with purely chthonological conceptions of the divine generation as proceeded from the poetic mind of Valentinus a little later. From such sources, in the main, arose the Docetic view of the Incarnation, according to which the divine element in Christ was the only real and permanent element, and it assumed, in this way or that, the appearance of a man, but did not partake of actual life and blood. (Logically it was inevitable that the Ebionite and Docetic positions should appear as barely possible, as at least conceivable, explanations of Christ, the one denying the reality of the divine, the other denying the reality of the human nature in Him. Actually these views made in their original and crude forms less disturbance among the general mass of Christians and in the minds of the greatest Christian teachers than other interpretations of His person which appeared later.) Thus Clement of Rome, the Apostolic Fathers, and the Apologists, the apostolic positions were maintained, often in their own language of concrete and positive affirmation, used by means of carefully chosen equivalents for their words and phrases. Thus Clement speaks of 'Our Lord Jesus Christ, the sceptre of the majesty of God' (Cor. 16). In another passage (ch. 2, whatever or not with Lightfoot and Harnack we read 'God' instead of 'Christ'), the clause 'His sufferings were before your eyes', the dependence upon Christ as at once revealer of
truth, redeemer from sin, and living Lord is vividly and passionately expressed. In the Epistle
of Barnabas He is spoken of figuratively as the Son
of God and Lord of the World. As Maker of the
Sun before which our eyes quail, how much more
glorious must He be; His incarnation was the
veiling of His dazzling radiance. For Polycarp,
in his martyrdom and death He is the fascinat-
ing centre of thought. He is Lord and Saviour
(ch. 1, 6), Son of God (ch. 12), and His name is
associated with that of God as supreme object of
fear, He is the object of mercy (ch. 11). Ignatius is
more full and varied in his forms of
expression. He uses the so-called Trinitarian
formula but naming Christ first, 'in the Son and
in the Father and in the Spirit,' or 'to Christ and
to the Father and to the Spirit' (ad Magn. xiii. 1).
He speaks of Christ as right as 'our God' and 'my
God,' asserts His pre-existence (ib. viii., ad Phry.
), and uses the striking mystical expression 'Who
is His word (VERUM) proceeding forth from Silence'
(Var. 5) (ib. viii.). Echoes of controversy with Doc-
teism appear in his repeated use of the adverb
ἀναφέρεται (ad Eph. xvii. 2) when referring to the
incarnation and death. But the double being of
Christ is stated in terms which were possible only
before the rise of the great discussions of His
Person: e.g., he says in one place:

'He is at once flesh and spirit, begotten and unbegotten, God

in the flesh, the real life, both from Mary and from God at
first possible and then impossible' (ad Eph. vii. 2; cf. xvii.
4, ad Sminth. 1. 1, 1).

By these and other such writers (e.g., Epistle to
Diognetus) we are kept in the atmosphere of specu-
losic language. The Church is still in the glow of
its first enthusiasm, eager in its missionary labours,
absorbed above all in the task of teaching God through
the risen Christ, that conqueror of death and giver of
the Spirit, and concerned with the continuous
fight against heathen vices and the inoculation of the
new life of inward holiness and of the new loyal
soul. They were building on the foundation
without inquiry as to its material and mode of
construction.

II. THE SECOND STAGE IN CHRISTILOGY. - 1.
The Gnostics and Grecian Christology. A new
wave of heresy entered into the life of the Church with
Justin Martyr, the race of men who before or after
their conversion were saturated with Greek culture and
spoke the language of the Hellenic world. They were
Gnostics, men like Origen, Clement of Alexandria,
Gregory of Nyssa, and many others. But whether or
not they took Justin's motto, 'Whatever is
rightly said among all men belongs to us Christi-
ans,' they began the long and delicate task of
determining what was 'rightly said' by tests found
within the Christian system itself. Thus opened
the next stage in the unfolding of the nature of
Christ. Given the reality of the pre-existent Son
or Logos and the reality of the man Jesus, the
doubly being of Christ, the question arose as to
what was meant by and how much was contained
in those respective realities. At this point it is
a modern powerful school of thought has
found the chief disaster of Christianity (see A.
Ritschl, Die Entwicklung der christlichen Kirche,
tr., Hist. of Dogma, London, 1894-99; E. Huch, In-
fluence of Gr. Ideas and Usage upon the Chr. Church
[II. 1885], London, 1889). For such writers it
appears that literalism not only to the divine
nature of Christ and especially the use of the
Logos idea, with the resulting minute discussions about the
modus of the Incarnation, diverted faith from
Christology; A. Harnack, for example, characterized
from its true and only source of inspiration. For
them the gospel lies simply and directly in the
experience of God's Fatherhood by the soul of Jesus
and the practical teaching which flows from that
(cf. W. Herrmann, Der Verkehr des Christen mit
Gott, Stuttgart, 1903; Eng. tr., Communion of the
Christian with God, London, 1906; A. Harnack, Das
Wesen des Christentums, Leipzig, 1909, Eng. tr.,
What is Christianity?, London, 1904). The effort
to treat His Person as a metaphysical and philo-
sophic problem is inevitably to the idea that
salvation depends on the right solution of that
problem, and so to the substitution of an orthodox
creed for a historical and personal revelation of
God as the true object of faith. Such an all-
discussion of this subject is out of place here, but, as
the centre of the controversy has been the Person
of the founder of Christianity, a few facts on the
other side must be briefly stated. (1) From the
beginning the Christian consciousness, as we have
seen, has been determined in its form and content
by a definite conception of Christ as superhuman
Messiah and incarnate Son of God. This concep-
tion was not invented for Him, but given forth
from His own consciousness and involved in His
actual power and in the new consciousness of His
Church in relation to God. (2) The results of
through inquiry into the nature of His Person
could have avoided being only by a universal con-
cept not to investigate intellectually the ultimate
facts of the religious life. (3) Given the right to
think, the alleged divisor, attribution of any intel-
lectual definition of orthodoxy, must be compared with
the effects which would have been produced upon
the religious consciousness in that age by the
general acceptance of the opposite conception that
these were treated as essential to the existence of the
Christian community, or if treated as of equal
value to its life with any others, or even if treated
as matters of indifference. It is true that any intellec-
tual definition of the Person of Christ, and of His
Messianic function, if sincerely used, produces characteristic effects in the further
spiritual and social life of the community which
adopts it. There can be no doubt that the preva-
ience of the 'Liberal' picture of Jesus in our time
has put its own colour upon wide circles of religious
life. (4) The real and vital problem of the Church,
in preserving its true relation to its divine founder,
is as to the right use of its conclusions in any con-
troversy about His Person. The ancient Church,
especially under the power of the Emperors, turned
its conclusions (mediations of the Church) into
weapon by a centralized authority. This the
modern Church cannot do. It was at this point,
and in this way, that disaster entered.

2. The First Phase: the divine nature of Christ.

Assuming that in Christ the Son of God has
appeared as a man, the problem arose as to what
is meant by the Son of God or Logos. How is He
related to God? This question was not forced by
the metaphysical, but by a very practical, interest.
For the worship of Christ was the life of the Church
from the beginning, and it inevitably raised the
rebut from heathenism that Christians themselves
had two, or, counting the Spirit, three Gods. It
was the effort to meet this condemnation that drove
men to define how Christ, a man, could become an
object of worship for answered and sincere mono-
theteists.

(a) Monarchianism.—The first answer came from
those who are called Monarchians. They were
of various kinds. Some evolved an East
Unitarianism, not unlike Ebionism. But those
who made history took a higher road. Their chief
representative was one Sabellius, who lived in the
first half of the 3rd century. God in Himself was
said to be without temporal succession and
impossible, unknowable. As He acts outwards upon
the universe, He assumes aspects (πρόσωπα) for
which various names are needed. The three names
Father, Son, Spirit, are appropriate to describe Him as Creator of the universe, Redeemer (in Christ, from Birth to Ascension), and Life of the Church. But these names should be used only in relation to that phase of the divine action to which they exclusively refer. Much ingenuity was apparently borrowed to allegorically and illustratively translate this ineffable unity of God. Thus He may be called ἐσώτερος, to abolish the idea that in Him any distinction exists, though we rightly name Him Μέσος. For the worship of that perfect action, which is from the divine condescension summoned to divine honours. The solution of the problem was too easy. The Christian view of Christ had always implied a closer and more mystical relation of God Himself to the cradle and the cross. The ape and the joy of faith in Christ arose from the presence of God in Him and in His deeds of redemption. The Arian Christ, mighty as He could be depicted, was less than the Christ who was the personal manifestation of God, and in whose death the righteousness and love of God Himself were directly realized, and made effective in the actual history of man.

(c) The Nicene Christology.—The third possibility regarding the relation of the Son of God to the Father was that which won the day at Nicea (A.D. 325). Constantine took the portentous step of summoning the Councils, and for a time, as for a while, the baneful step of using the fleshly arm to enforce its conclusions. It must be remembered that these acts of Constantine introduced a new principle into the organized life of the Church, that of putting a character that it took long centuries to unfold its finer logic. Trust in the State and trust in the ruling Spirit of Christ are principles whose reconciliation is not yet achieved either at Rome or at Berlin. More than half a century of Arian strife and shameful confusions of statecraft scattered out before the unforeseeing Church after Nicea. But in the conclusive itself there were men of profound Christian conviction and powerful intellect who saw that in this controversy the apostolic faith was itself at stake, and the defensive creed which they formulated became a living force in the Church from that day to this.

(e) The Nicene theology, as such, really began with Origen (*A.D. 254). Against Monarchianism he affirmed the Personality of God, teaching that He is the indivisible, and for Him is the first of all creatures, and with Him time begins. But ὅτι is the root of all. Hence we may say that God is the Father, and that the Son does not directly know God. He is known under many conceptions (πρότερον), indicating His great glory. And yet 'God is ineffable to His Son,' for it is plain that it is impossible for that which has no contact to make any impression or to grasp the idea. The Son became incarnate in Jesus Christ in the simple and obvious sense of entering into a human body. There was no need for another human soul in that body, save the Son of God was God, to be the instrument of that condescension both as the medium of Creation and as the glorified Christ. On the surface this view makes a fair show. It seems to avoid some dangers of Monarchianism. But on the one hand and Pantheism on the other, and yet in its deepest principle Arianism is Monarchian. Over against the dominant Origenistic theology it escapes the difficult idea of 'eternal generation' and the tendency to make the earlier phase of Jesus an unreal thing for imagination and faith. But Arianism as a religion was too close to heathenism and too far from the centre of Christian faith to live. In reducing mysteries it lost its hold over the realities of revelation and redemption, for its God is too remote and abstract to be known or to appear in time. And, worse still, it made a distinct approximation to idolatry in its arguments for the worship of the Logos. From the divine condescension summoned to divine honours, the solution of the problem was too easy. The Christian view of Christ had always implied a closer and more mystical relation of God Himself to the cradle and the cross. The ape and the joy of faith in Christ arose from the presence of God in Him and in His deeds of redemption. The Arian Christ, mighty as He could be depicted, was less than the Christ who was the personal manifestation of God, and in whose death the righteousness and love of God Himself were directly realized, and made effective in the actual history of man.
with the pure, personal Spirit, of which it is the self-expression, better than the unity of a Son with a Father, while we can apprehend the distinct hypostasis of each more easily through the latter terms than through the more abstract. Each set of terms is used to describe the same unity and new the difference, but always the eternal reality of God the Father and the Son, on the danger of deriving the Son from the Will, and not from the essence, of the Father, see Athan. de Syn. 35 f.).

(b) In this substance of man is subordinate to a higher view of spiritual nature. And we have already seen that for Origen the supreme facts in the being of God are will, intelligence, and love. The resistance with which Athanasius and others encountered in the discussions which involved the use of σῶμα, ἐπίπτωσις, etc., is a witness to the fact that they were fully aware of the limitations of the human mind when applied to the mystery of God's nature. These terms were used in the Nicene Creed (in the Athan.) only that the dogmas of Ariyanism and Monarchianism might be denied, and that the substance of the Christian faith, which rests in the fact that God was in Christ and that Christ is 'eternally one with God,' might not perish from the earth.

3. Second phase: the humanity of Christ. — The official victory of Trinitarianism, the affirmation of the proper deity of Christ, led naturally to the raising of the next problem, viz., the question of His humanity. The supreme emphasis of orthodoxy on the deity of Christ seemed to endanger the unity of His appearance in the flesh. Even in NT times this tendency was felt (cf. Jn 1: 18-34, 20-33), and the reproach of Docetism has been uttered against many writers in the 2nd and 3rd centuries who were yet counted orthodox. Indeed, Harnack goes so far as to say that down to the beginning of the 2nd century "no single outstanding church teacher really accepted the humanity in the unqualified way" (Hist. of Dogma, iv. 129). Origen used his daring genius on the problem. Believing that all souls of men have pre-existence, and become incarnate because of the mystery of God's nature, he held that the one unassiled soul became united with the divine Logos and then by an act of will, and love, became incarnate as the soul of Jesus. This theory did not deeply influence the history of the subject, though Arius owes something to it. It was Apollinaris who first dealt with it in a more sober and suggestive manner. That he was true to the doctrine of redemption is evident from such words as: "He is both God and man: in Christ only two natures are preserved, and if only God, he did not save through suffering. If Christ was only man, or if only God, he was not a mediator between man and God." But Apollinaris was equally clear that, if a perfect God were united with a perfect man, there would be two, one by nature. Son of God, and the other by adoption. (Athan. c. Apoll. 1: 3.)

He solved the problem partly by falling back on the Aristotelian view of man's nature as tripartite and buttressing that with 1 Th 5th ('May you, spirit, soul, and body be preserved entire,' etc.). He finds the essential features of human nature in distinction from God to be body and soul, while in mind or spirit (σώμα, ψυχή, πνεῦμα) man is of one type with the divine Logos. Hence in Jesus Christ the union of the two natures must be found in this, that the Logos became the ψυχή (or πνεῦμα) of the man Jesus by becoming united with the body and soul in the womb of His mother. Thus we have a mind in Jesus 'unaffected by psychical and fleshly experiences, and one by nature, as the commonwealth of the Son and God. When Gregory of Nyssa deals with human nature he can be seen struggling to say that the essence of man, though distributed throughout his body, is not something 'spatial,' as we would so naturally put it. And, when he would state the difference between the divine and the human nature, he finds it is reside ultimately not in a difference of substance, but in this, that God is the Creator and man wholly dependent on Him (On the Making of Man, xvi. 12). There we are in the region of volition and ethics, and religious insight. The cross view of substance is subordinate to a higher view of spiritual nature. And we have already seen that for Origen the supreme facts in the being of God are will, intelligence and love. The resistance with which Athanasius and others encountered in the discussions which involved the use of σῶμα, ἐπίπτωσις, etc., is a witness to the fact that they were fully aware of the limitations of the human mind when applied to the mystery of God's nature. These terms were used in the Nicene Creed (in the Athan.) only that the dogmas of Ariyanism and Monarchianism might be denied, and that the substance of the Christian faith, which rests in the fact that God was in Christ and that Christ is 'eternally one with God,' might not perish from the earth. —
ner man; and his opponents have ever since made the most of that concession. The hostile arguments were based on the idea that this affirmed a mutilated humanity, and thus left it unredeemed at its highest point. For, while Apollinaris (Greg. Nyss. ad "Apol. It.) insisted that "the death of man does not abolish death," others answered that the death of the divine Logos (if that were possible) would not redeem the soul of man. What was required for redemption was a redeeming manhood in the person of the Incarnation, that body might redeem body, soul redeem soul, and mind redeem mind. What was not assumed was not redeemed. It was in vain that Apollinaris urged his two strongest positions, that only the divine can redeem the human, and that, since the soul is the seat of personality, to conceive of Christ as possessed of all these human elements is to conceive of Him as a true human individual, and to make the Incarnation inconceivable. He was not himself released from the realistic (some would say, magical) view of redemption, and could not rebut the strong argument made against him on that basis. The very conception of personality which his own speculations were helping to clarify was still so confused with that of substance that his vision of the Incarnation was held in alien bonds. That in God there is a human element; that the divine Logos and the human mind are of a type so that the former can act for or as the latter; that the seat of personality is here; that it is fatal to faith and reason alike to see in the Incarnation Christ two distinct, immanent, and imitative forms of unity—these are positions of great power, which account for the fact that 'Appollinarism' reappears persistently in later ages, and in our day is more widespread than it has ever been imagined. But he was himself hindered, by a meagre psychology and by the remainder in his mind of the tendency to define human nature in mutually exclusive 'parts,' from doing justice to his presupposed fact. Hence Appollinarism was explicitly condemned in the first Council of the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381), at which the Nicene Creed was revised, decreed, and maintained. The Decree of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) elaborate care was taken to rule it out completely. Christ is 'at once God truly and man truly of a reasonable soul and body' (τὸν ἄνθρωπον τόν ἄνθρωπον); He is 'of the same substance (ὁμοούσιος) with us according to his manhood.' The conclusion of the Church was therefore officially announced in the doctrine of the perfect manhood, in the sense of the parts of an individual man, must be ascribed to Jesus Christ.

T. THE THIRD STAGE IN CHRISTOLOGY—The third stage in the development of Christology was now reached. With its insistence upon the full deity of the Logos (Son of God) and the full humanity of Jesus, the Church was driven to consider more deeply the mode of the union of the divine and human in one life. The matter had not been ignored indeed. Origin, as we have seen, confronted the problem from the speculativte side; Athanasius had dealt with it in close adherence to Scripture. The latter held that the Logos in assuming human nature did not merely unite Himself with an individual man, but become the true subject of the human life of Jesus. At the same time He retained His functions as Lord of the universe. He did, indeed, as man experience growth (Lk 2), and as a moral being, He increased in wisdom and stature (Mk 13), but in such aspects of His incarnate life the Logos restrained His powers. This double consciousness is the very mystery of the Incarnation. For our salvation, we are encouraged of all our divine glory and now veils it, in the limitations of a man's mind and body. But the chief difficulty with this position is the uncertainty, the apparent discontinuity, of the subject in the self-expressions of the incarnate state. The doctrine of a continuous self-limitation was not yet admitted by some Christian theologians likewise, with their intense hostility to Apollinarism, while holding the unity of the Person, yet insisted very strongly also that each 'nature' was perfect; the union was effected by an indescribable 'commingling.' Apollinaris, however, raised the question to new distinctness and importance, and these uncertain views were subjected to fresh and closer scrutiny.

(a) First phase: Nestorianism—On the one hand arose the so-called Nestorians, who were prepared for by the famous school of Antioch among whom the name of Theodore of Mopsuestia stood out as a brilliant expounder of the Scriptures. With a keen sense of the historical, he approached the problem as one who was filled with the reality and power of the life of Jesus. But he was also a vigorous defender of the Nicene Creed and as vigorous an opponent of the Apollinarian Christology, and therefore faced the problem of the nexus between a complete divine nature and a complete human nature. This he found in the Will of God the Word, who, Himself begotten from the Father, unites the man Jesus Christ with Himself. Hence Christ is rightly called 'Son,' because beyond all else. He possessed the adoption of a Son through that union (Rom. on Gal 4). But it is a union that was expressed by his own voice, who carried this doctrine to its full issues in the controversy which led up to the third ecumenical Council at Ephesus (A.D. 431) to the fourth Council at Chalcedon (A.D. 451). Rejecting the use of the term "ἐμπράξωσις" (Mother of God) as applied to Mary the Virgin (which was defended with great energy by Cyril of Alexandria), he also, like Theodore, set the union of the human nature of Jesus Christ with the Logos in the region of will. It was the grace of God that bound this sinless man in an inseparable oneness with Himself as Logos. The general term λειτουργία (eternal union) was used as over against the "ἐναρμοσμένος" (real union) with which Cyril of Alexandria sought to express the higher view. In a series of mutual "analithemata" these two protagonists defined their hostile positions, which lay in a region that philosophy was only beginning to explore. Nestorius insisted that, as Jesus possessed a 'rational soul,' He was a complete human individual, while Cyril maintained that He was a complete and a rational soul but insisted that 'the Word having personally united to Himself flesh animated by a rational soul,' the result was a true union in 'one Christ and one Son.' Cyril, that is to say, insisted that the Word did not unite Himself with a human individual, but united the two natures in one (οὐδηδήν). For the result, for the basis of their oneness, he could find no technical term. "Φύσις (natural) and συνώσις (substantia, substance) were still applied as a rule to the total content of the human and divine elements in their respective and distinct reality, and Cyril's use of συνώσις in the so-called Creed of Union (A.D. 451) is not as yet distinct enough to define their basis of unity. But this school came near Docetism in maintaining that the Logos appeared, for our sakes, to be ignorant, weary, etc., but that such sufferings could be ascribed to real experiences to the Logos incarnate. Nevertheless, Cyril and his party, in spite of their own difficulties of construction, made it clear that the Nicene Creed was perfect; the union was perfect; the union was perfected by an indescribable 'commingling.' Apollinaris, however, raised the question to new distinctness and importance, and these uncertain views were subjected to fresh and closer scrutiny.
his carefully drawn anathemas, failed, is because in his fear of Apollinarism (of which, however, he was accused) he shrank from taking the full consequences of making the Logos the personal instrument of the Incarnate One. Striving to maintain the completeness of the humanity for soteriological reasons—and this with great earnestness and insight—he yet failed to define, so as to satisfy the Nestorians, how the human can remain human if it has not its basis, and indeed the divine 'nature,' but the divine Logos. Nestorius had a curious trick in his anathemas of describing his opponents' language about the incarnate Christ, in His unity, as if they applied it to the one 'nature' or the other as Nestorius conceived of these; e.g., in the eleventh he accuses them of maintaining 'that the flesh which is united with God the Word is by the power of its own nature life-giving'—an incredible misrepresentation, and possible only because Nestorius was so possessed of his own vision of the facts that he could not read the words of others as they meant them. He could not see their vision.

(b) Second phase: Eutychianism.—From this strong insistence by the orthodox party upon the Logos as the true basis of the one Christ logical exegesis had to some extent permeated Christian literature. If Eutychianism failed when starting from the integrity of the human, as though that were primary in their interest, how would it be if the start were made from the integrity of the divine in the incarnate One? Eutyches cared little for the soul over the ever-narrowing edge of definitions into another 'heresy.' For him it was clear that the incarnate One had but one nature, as indeed Cyril insisted. But the students, urged on by their own views, the whole system must have been changed in its very substance by union with deity. The humanity is absorbed into the divinity (cf. Origen's approach to this view, c. Cate, iii. 4). This was condemned, of course, as docteric in its ultimate effect, and as 'confusing' (Σωχυρωμεν) the natures.

(c) The Decree of Chalcedon.—At Chalcedon the matters thus brought to a climax. Subsequent councils dealing with further developments of the matter (Monophysitism and Monothelitism) could only insist on right maintenance of the Decree of Chalcedon. Theological speculation had passed beyond the limitations of analyses and psychologies in that age, and could only be restrained by repeating the formula which marked the utmost boundary of knowledge and safe reasoning. This formula, nearly word for word, was to be kept. But the high-water mark of ancient Christology, has in recent times become the object of serious criticism. Theologians pour contempt upon it as a mere assertion of logical contradictions. Historians (Harnack especially, who does less than justice to Cyril) strive to prove that its terms were a miserable compromise which, to satisfy the ambitions of the West (led by Pope Leo, author of the famous letter to Flavian known as 'Leo's Tome,' on which the Decree was founded), obscured the real issues by asserting the two natures in one person, and muffling in the nonsense of the Athanasian Christology, which sought to assert that the result of the Incarnation was the 'One incarnate nature of the Logos.' In spite of Harnack's vehement pages, the view will probably continue to have its adherents, and justly. It actually saves the fundamental Athanasian position. Moreover, a protest should be entered against the frequent yet absurd suggestion that the 'two-nature hypothesis' was just before Chalcedon. The very idea of an incamation involves that of two natures somehow made into one life. The idea dates back to the NT, to the combination of 'Son of God' and 'Son of Man,' of 'existing in the form of God' and 'found in fashion as a man.' And the entire course of Christological speculation presupposed this hypothesis from the beginning.

There is, however, much difference of opinion as to the real effect of the Decree at the critical point. The following are its main points for our purpose: (1) each nature, the humanity and the Godhead of 'our Lord Jesus Christ,' is 'perfect'; (2) He is consubstantial (ιοινωνια) with the Father and consubstantial with us'; (3) the property [δυνατος = property] of each nature is retained even in one person (παραουρος = person) and one substance (ινερατος = substance); (4) the famous four adverbs (without confusion, change, division, separation) condemn Eutychianism, Apollinarism, and Nestorianism. The main difficulty about the interpretation arises from the fact that the crucial clause starts with the different natures, defining each in its distinctness and completeness, and then speaks indifferently of 'the property of each nature' as 'being preserved and continuing in one person and substance.' This is not the way of Scripture or of the Apologists or of Greek theology as a whole, which was to view the Incarnation steadily downwards, as it were, from the side of the Glory of God as a living and personal act of consecration. Hence it has led some (Dormer especially) to maintain that, according to the Decree, 'the substance' is the resultant of the union of the two natures, and not that the Person or substance of the Son of God, having already a divine nature as the instrument of the union of the human nature as a parallel and distinct means of action. Harnack seems to agree with this:

"In Leo's view the 'Person' is no longer entirely the one subject with two natures, but one union of two hypostatic natures" (Hist. of Dogma, ii. 395).

But this interpretation is not borne out by Leo's Tome itself. In the very sentence of that famous letter from which the Decree is taken, the pope says: 'Lowliness was assumed by majesty,' etc. Leo even uses the Apollinarian phrase 'which (the flesh) he (Logos) animated with the Spirit of rational life.' And again he speaks of the unity of the Person in the two natures, and of the one Person of God and man.

If that clause, which has curiously absorbed attention to its method, as over against the method of earlier clauses, is accepted as the view which tends to proceed, as it were, from differences to their unity, Dormer's interpretation may result; but, if read from another point of view which moves from unity to diversity, to be held to be the high-water mark of ancient Christology, has in recent times become the object of serious criticism. Theologians pour contempt upon it as a mere assertion of logical contradictions. Historians (Harnack especially, who does less than justice to Cyril) strive to prove that its terms were a miserable compromise which, to satisfy the ambitions of the West (led by Pope Leo, author of the famous letter to Flavian known as 'Leo's Tome,' on which the Decree was founded), obscured the real issues by asserting the two natures in one person, and muffling in the nonsense of the Athanasian Christology, which sought to assert that the result of the Incarnation was the 'One incarnate nature of the Logos.' In spite of Harnack's vehement pages, the view will probably continue to have its adherents, and justly. It actually saves the fundamental Athanasian position. Moreover, a protest should be entered against the frequent yet absurd suggestion that the 'two-nature hypothesis' was just before Chalcedon. The very idea of an incamation involves that of two natures somehow made into one life. The idea dates back to the NT, to the combination of 'Son of God' and 'Son of Man,' of 'existing in the form of God' and 'found in fashion as a man.' And the entire course of Christological speculation presupposed this hypothesis from the beginning.

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victory to orthodoxy against the persistent teachers of Monophysitism and Monothelitism; but its inner and real meaning, that the Logos became the Ego of the human nature, encouraged persistent speculation as to how much is included in a conception Ego (now ἴδιος), and in what sense human nature retains all its ‘parts,’ when it is said to be absorbed. It was thus that the problem of the human nature, as formulated by the Holy Council of Chalcedon, stood forth for them all as the supreme Christological utterance of the Church. But this loyalty to the Councils was conditioned by the idea that the Councils of the Church were authoritative only in so far as Scripture supported them. The reformers completely disowned the notion that the official Church had power to develop and enforce an authoritative theology. The central fact for the reformers is that the Christian faith is a living experience, made possible by the full revelation of God in the historic Christ. Apart from Him there is no saving knowledge of God. Through varying phases this characteristic evangelical view of Christianity has persisted in the reformed Churches. In periods when emphasis was placed upon doctrinal definition rather than upon personal experience, and a new intellectual formalism arose instead of the appeal to conscience, the Protestant communions have felt an arrest upon their spiritual life and their world influence. The Puritan movement in England, or the Moravian and Wesleyan movements both in Europe and in America—have all arisen from a fresh insight into the fundamental nature of Christian faith and apostolic Christianity. In the 17th century, the extraordinary expansion of Christianity, through the foreign missionary movement has borne an ample and more impressive witness to the reality and power of the Christian faith as thus re-apprehended and proclaimed. It must be observed that in Christianity, thus defined and thus operative the Person of Christ always stands forth as unique, supreme, divine, redemptive, and directive. ‘ubi Christus, ibi Ecclesia.’ And no less true it is that where Christ is, the presence of the living, eternal, and immediate God is immediately and directly sensed. He is believed, and His followers insist that He is irresistibly proved, to be the invisible, spiritual, divine power or will which is directing man to his true good.

1. INTRODUCTORY: THE MODERN MIND.

1. The reformation of religion.—The history of Christology in modern times is bound up exclusively with this question. The spirit of Protestantism, and here more ecclesiasticism has played but a minor part. The broken condition of the Protestant communions has prevented anything like the careful critical study of the Councils, the action of individual denominations having authority only for themselves. Hence such terms as ‘history’ are applied only by a certain limited class of historians to certain thinkers of the ancient Church. It is universally thought to be inappropriate under modern circumstances to use such a term of any modern theologian. Modern Christology is more intimately connected with the modern religious and intellectual life as a whole than with that of the ancient world, for in the civilization which we call Graeco-Roman it is involved as in many respects an exotic. But modern civilization is deeply moulded by Christian principles, and its defects are to be corrected only by a fuller measure of the Christian spirit. Indeed, some of the ideas which have seemed most hostile to the Church have been nourished and ultimately sustained by her own supreme teachings. With the Reformation came a new conception of the Christian life. Martin Luther was not so much the discoverer as the chief exponent of this sense of religious experience. His power, and indeed that of the entire modern movement, is due not only to the nature of his experience, but to the fact that it can prove itself identical in its fundamental elements with that of the primitive Church. Modern Christology is the conviction that the grace of God is a living force which has entered history in Christ and which lays hold of

the individual directly without any essential human mediation save that of the preached word, the gospel. On the human side it is penitence and faith that apprehend the grace of God and are the means through which that grace apprehends the human soul. Luther and the other great reformers maintained that they were loyal to the Councils of the Church, but the loyalty was not that of a strict adherence to the decisions of the Holy Council of Chalcedon. They were authoritative only in so far as Scripture supported them. The reformed Churches disowned the notion that the official Church had power to develop and enforce an authoritative theology. The central fact for the reformers is that the Christian faith is a living experience, made possible by the full revelation of God in the historic Christ. Apart from Him there is no saving knowledge of God. Through varying phases this characteristic evangelical view of Christianity has persisted in the reformed Churches. In periods when emphasis was placed upon doctrinal definition rather than upon personal experience, and a new intellectual formalism arose instead of the appeal to conscience, the Protestant communions have felt an arrest upon their spiritual life and their world influence. The Puritan movement in England, or the Moravian and Wesleyan movements both in Europe and in America—have all arisen from a fresh insight into the fundamental nature of Christian faith and apostolic Christianity. In the 17th century, the extraordinary expansion of Christianity, through the foreign missionary movement has borne an ample and more impressive witness to the reality and power of the Christian faith as thus re-apprehended and proclaimed. It must be observed that in Christianity, thus defined and thus operative the Person of Christ always stands forth as unique, supreme, divine, redemptive, and directive. ‘ubi Christus, ibi Ecclesia.’ And no less true it is that where Christ is, the presence of the living, eternal, and immediate God is immediately and directly sensed. He is believed, and His followers insist that He is irresistibly proved, to be the invisible, spiritual, divine power or will which is directing man to his true good.


Europe experienced an amazing revival of intellectual life in the same general period in which the renaissance of Christianity took place. In part this renaissance of the mind was due to fresh contact with the literature of the ancients, but it had its roots also in the long labours and deep intellectual interests of the Christian Church. For example, even in its darkest days that Church bore in upon the mind of Europe the conception that there is but one living God, who has created the entire universe for ends worthy of His own character. This great conception conserved nature and abolished the crude ancient dualism. Modern science has arisen from, and still depends upon, certain principles which Christianity first enforced upon the human mind especially those of the unity and order and sameness of the natural universe. Hence the investigation of nature must now be considered as a religious act, though the officials of the Church learned this with difficulty and dismay. Modern Christology is the conviction that the grace of God is a living force which has entered history in Christ and which lays hold of
the basis of all reality. Only gradually has this conception been transmuted. But now for all heirs of Christian civilization the universe of consciousness and conscious beings has come into view as the true source and seat of reality. Through this mighty process of change certain facts have emerged which we must briefly state. And in stating them we may assume that for Christian thought the purely mechanistic view of the universe must be held as false. First we must note the emergence of the universe as the ideal centre of consciousness. In personality the conscious universe must be recognized as the supreme fact. As yet the human mind can conceive of nothing higher which can be named as the ultimate form of reality. If it is ultimate, it must be also final, and every other form of the actual must proceed from and depend upon it. Next, there is the emergence of the idea of reality as the most general term which can be applied to all that exists for personality. The material universe seems to be undergoing, not merely through philosophical reasoning, but through scientific investigation, a complete transformation, in virtue of which all its elements are seen to be symbols and instruments of a spiritual universe. Hence ancient words like 'nature,' 'substance,' 'body,' 'essence,' even 'humanity' and 'parte of humanity,' require to be thought through afresh. Many of these ideas are contained in the Christological controversies of the early Church has simply fallen away from them for the modern mind.

The spirit of science. Further, we must note the deep influence of the modern scientific spirit. It has learned through long and painful processes of discipline that truth concerning the natural universe and the history of man can be discovered only by patience, method, and the critical faculty of reason. A new conscience has arisen in reference to the requirement of knowledge and the interpretation of life. For, if nature and history be taken as a divine process, this nature and history must be there and to find it there he must wait upon nature and history with a spirit of utter sincerity and patience, and with the calmness of trust in his methods of investigation and their sure result. Through the labours of the scientist the universe has undergone a great transition and has emerged the great conception of evolution. The very idea is itself undergoing a process of development. We have seen it in two generations pass from the idea of the universe as taught in the name of science by such men as Spencer and Darwin to the more spiritual conceptions which begin to guide the thought of our day. But common to them all is the idea that there is a unity in the history of nature and of man, and that this vast unified process must be read in terms of reason and of will.

Certain assumptions of Christian thought. In the main, it may be said without much risk that the following constitute some of the fundamental elements of prevalent modern thought. (c) What reason can explain is rational; what is rational must be derived from reason. (d) What exists in relation to consciousness exists for a conscious being or beings; and what exists for conscious beings, having its raison d'être (subject), must be derived from a conscious source. (e) If there is a universe of life and of conscious beings, they may or must exist in various grades as to structure, power, and meaning. (f) If there is a universe of rational, conscious beings, they must be capable of mutual intercourse, and such intercourse may depend upon the existence of media through which they become aware of and act upon each other. (g) The universe constitutes the world or universe of nature, which must be conceived of as an ultimately unified system of facts. The trend of philosophy in all its chief forms to-day is controlled by the varying influences allowed by different classes of thinkers to these and such-like fundamental conceptions. With the gradual extinction of mere materialism these have emerged as in some way the common property of the main groups of thinkers. Even natural science, through its physics, biology, and psychology, is gradually approaching a statement of its actual discoveries and provisional inferences regarding material substance, life, and mind, which is bringing it into close correspondence with these general assumptions. When the field of knowledge and its processes, of philosophy and its assumptions, one can see the irresistible pressure of the fundamental and characteristic Christian doctrines concerning God as Creator and Lord of All, concerning man as primarily a moral and spiritual being, concerning the spiritual universe as at once the source, explanation, and end of human history. For the Christian Church the conviction remains that for these ideas, however reason may strive to support and illuminate and systematize them, the one indefeasible guarantee of their truth, in the field of objective reality, is to be found in the inwoven processes and the permanent spiritual presence and power of Jesus Christ.

As Trollope has put the matter: '... the image of Jesus will always remain the center of the religious faith of the Christian believer in God.' A Christian mysticism: will always remain the central point of true and genuine Christianity as long as it exists. Without this, the personalistic belief in God would sink into a shroud and the Report of the International Congress of Free Christianity, London, 1864, p. 284.

Modern Christology, with a longer history of the Church behind it and a wider if not a deeper religious experience to correct or confirm it, is the inevitable effort of the Church of Christ to verify afresh for itself the conception of the founder of Christianity as the personal self-revelation of God, the personal interpreter of human nature, the personal director of history, the creator.

II. The first phase: Absolute Idealism. Christology received its greatest modern developments in the 19th cent., and most of these arose in the midst of the unparalleled intellectual life of the German universities. This philosophical and historical research combined to produce a complete re-casting of the Christian system of doctrine by concentrating attention upon two supreme subjects—the idea of God and the subject of the history of Christ in history. The giants of philosophy from Kant to Hegel endeavoured to do justice to both features of the Christian religion. Out of that period, whether by direct derivation or by reaction against the prevalent philosophies, arose three main views of Christianity, and hence three main forms of Christology.

1. Hegel's Christology. In the first place Absolute Idealism must be reckoned with. It has made the modern mind familiar with the theory that God is an immanent principle, generating the history of the entire universe. But, as Hegel works the subject out on his vast canvas, God must not be conceived of as above or before the process. He is the idea realizing itself in the two successive forms of nature (subject and object) and man (subject, spirit), and coming to consciousness only in the latter. God became personal in humanity. At some point in human history the Spirit which has struggled to free itself from the bonds of the world of nature as the world in itself, but not in itself, must come to the full realization of that climax. That full incarnation of the idea in the form of conscious Spirit was achieved in the Person of Christ, who is the supreme self-communicated, self-conscious, self-conscious form appropriate to history of the unity of man with God. But in Christ the Spirit appeared in fullness, that from Him the whole of humanity might be set free
and made conscious of itself as the dwelling-place of the divine. In spite of its vivid insight into some deeper meanings of Christianity, Hegelianism remains abstract, elusive. Its conception of God, as it has been said, appears as an ingenious apotheosis of Hegel's own dialectic. Again, in spite of its emphasis on the idea of the absolute, it failed to enter into the spirit of the Church. In its denial of the grace of God, its denial of the illumination of the Church, and in its failure to grapple with the facts of the Church's history, it is not true to the picture in the Gospel nor to the faith of the Church. Its early promise, that of the Light of the Church, Lehre von der Person Christi, p. 97 (Et), had not brought Hegel close to the fact that Jesus knew Himself distinctively as Son of God, and that God is a Being with whom men must deal in the lofty regions of personal relationship. Sin is for him a stage in the process of man's movement towards the divine self-consciousness; and grace therefore is not the mercy that forgives, but the sense of unity with the immanent God, achieved by Christ.

2. Its influence.—Nevertheless the marvellous energy of Hegel's expositions and the vast sweep of his system, its sublime confidence in the power of reason to unlock the ultimate secrets of being, and its complete subordination of the physical to the meanings of the spiritual universe, have had a permanent and deep effect on the whole course of modern theology. The exaggerated emphasis upon the doctrine of the divine immanence in more recent popular Christology in England and America is due to him. That theological phase sometimes called 'modern spiritualism' has appealed to natural science as teaching the unity of all things in its doctrine of evolution, and to idealism as teaching the immanence of God in the entire process of time. From Hegel, it has drawn its doctrine that in all men the divine is in some measure inherent, while in Christ manhood has been filled with the divine to its utmost capacity. These are, somewhat, the main inheritances, inheritances from Hegel. In Germany the Hegelian influence showed itself in many ways. It gave Baur his method of conceiving the development of Christian dogma amidst the conflicts of the early Church. For a time it seemed to give Strauss a resting-place for his faith after the destructive work done upon the story of the Gospels. It gave the clue by which men like Biedermann, for whose life work, the natural (in the old sense) had fallen from Christianity, sought to secure the permanent essence of that faith while its historical setting was discarded, as the husk of mere circumstance is removed from the kernel of truth. But everywhere it failed to satisfy the Christian consciousness. That consciousness cannot deduce history from ideas, but rather derives its ideas from history. It cannot persuade itself of man's power to see God through reason, and then prove that what it has seen independently was also discovered in the Christ of history. Hence, as Fairbairn (The Place of Christ in Mod. Theol., London, 1889, p. 215 f.) insisted with such force, Hegel's view of Christ endeavoured to translate into his own terminology what the Church has held; but the whole reality and value of the Church's faith consists in the fact that men have met with God in a way that is not to be reduced to its object, real and effective, and of ground of fact is not present to his mind. This element in the Hegelian method, which is not personal or the subjective, but the pervaded modern thought very deeply, as we shall see.

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**JESUS CHRIST**

great movement was that which sprang from the remarkable personal gifts, the spiritual life, and the distinctive theological method of Schleiermacher. Many elements which seem to his critics, and even to his admirers, utterly inconsistent with one another had their unity for him through his deep mystical type of religious life, his poetic and during imagination, and his great gift of analytic thought. This remarkable combination carried him in distaste away from the abstract and unreal dogmatism of Abbei. It carried him through the strong and powerful temptations of the period of surrender to the Romantics, dominant in Berlin society, without delivering him from the intellectual independence of his spirit. His vast reading and reading made him sensitive to the realities of history and to the supreme significance of a fellowship like that of the Christian Church. He therefore set forth with convincing and almost revolutionary power the absoluteness of religion. It has its seat in experience, i.e. in the living, feeling consciousness of man. In that consciousness man finds himself dependent on the Infinite, on God, for his very being and for all the true meanings of his existence. Religion, which rises out of the fundamental fact of dependence, and also nourishes it as a feeling which has infinite worth, is for that reason independent of the organized church system, and, on the other hand, must be restrained as a mere department of social ethics. The poor straining which Kant knew as religion, an adjutorium lepida, is repulsive to the richer soul of Schleiermacher.

2. His idea of God.—In his conception of God, Schleiermacher, while defining Christianity as a 'theological monism,' yet fails to realize the pantheistic trend inherent in the 'romantic' view of the universe. The sense of its unity, its vast life, its mystery, its moral beauty, made it unnatural for him to insist upon the personality of the God of the Christian Church, and to define that conception. God is immediately given in the universal, persistent, and supreme feeling of our absolute dependence on the Infinite. It can be accounted for by the only thing which is also its very essence, viz. that it is a feeling produced by God. He and not the self is its 'Weltgeist' ('das Woher'). Similarly the fact of sin is not to be distinguished from the consciousness of sin, and that apparent self-sufficiency, the feeling of failure, of incompleteness, and self-reproach. We are guilty because we feel guilty. As God is not to be proved by reasons which lie outside the God-consciousness, so sin must not be traced to any source outside the universal human feeling that there is something wrong.

3. His view of Christ.—It will always seem an intellectual inconsistency that Schleiermacher, in spite of this view of God and man, affirmed with unconquerable conviction that in one historic consciousness, that of Jesus Christ, we find a new departure in human history. Christ was and is the redeemer of mankind. This fact is found by us in the continuous existence of the Church, as that body of human fellowship which, in spite of all imperfection, possesses the sense of the grace of God, the feeling of the fact that God extends even to the moral issues and the destiny of man. The Church sprang from Christ and depends on Christ, and holds in its own spirit and life the future of man's religious history. Schleiermacher, though he worked directly on the Gospels, did not go into an examination of the consciousness of Christ in the construction of his theological system. It was enough for him that in Christ, through the faith of His original community in Him, we have an
assurance of God's perfect union with a human life. In Him that union was a new, original act of God, incorruptible but intangible. He is the archetype of the new life of which He is the fountainhead. But He is not to be interpreted through any doctrine of rebirth, or re-existence, or resurrection, or even of the Resurrection. These are reflections of this divine impression of unique and perfect union with God which He made upon His disciples, and through which He filled them with a communion animated by His own life and light, controlled by His Spirit, which is the Spirit of God. The conclusions of the ancient Connels he lays on one side. Their whole aim was irrelevant. The idea of two natures in one Person is illogical. God has no 'nature', and the insistence of a divine Person in human nature must inevitably annul the essential characteristics of the latter. Yet God was uniquely in Christ, constituting Him the object of universal faith and the permanent life of His Church. In sanctification others may go far towards the heights of peace and holiness, but only and always in their confessed dependence upon Him and the nourishing qualities of the Church which He created. To lose faith in Him would mean the collapse of the Church and the return of man to the unredeemed consciousness of guilt.

4. Criticism.—In this brief sketch of some of the main positions of Schleiermacher, certain facts are clear in reference to the subject of this article. (a) Schleiermacher, by his bold appeal to experience of the innermost, the real, the vital, and to the sense of dependence on either metaphysical or theological dogmas as the sources and sources of faith. His passionate appeal to the human consciousness of the reality of consciousness, of its feeling of dependence, sin, and reconciliation revealed the depth, the fact, and the reality of that consciousness in its religious, and above all in its Christian, manifestation. Yet he failed even in his acute analysis of the process of consciousness to find the personality which is conscious. His account of experience on both the objective (Godward) and the subjective (manward) side is left as a stream with no containing banks, a system of real and beautiful clouds with no sense of solidity or guarantee of continuance. (b) His welcome emphasis on the uniqueness of Christ and on the fact that His image and spirit are preserved for us in the living faith and life of the Church, gave rise to the whole speculation of the Rischkianism in its various phases. It is Christ-in-His-value-for-faith, in his total impact on His followers, that constitutes Christianity. Again the problem of personality is avoided. His consciousness as a reflection in the hearts of others, not as the seat and definite manifestation of His own will and thought about Himself, is the object of faith. (c) By this subtle and persuasive method of winning man to a sense of the divine power of Christ, attention was diverted from all questions about His origin and His miracles. The miracles may have helped the first disciples, but they are remote from our experience. The mystery of His being is lost where the mystery of our own disappears, not to be discovered by metaphysics. As E. Kahler argues, "his formula is ambiguous (\textit{misverstandend}) since it does not clearly enough assert that it is concerned with a school or a 'movement' in theology whose members have been identified with much of the best work done in Germany during the last thirty years. Ritschel owes what is most valuable in his thought to the earlier thinker, but he set it forth in a more definite manner, and in a generation prepared by prolonged discussion of the history of early Christianity to welcome a system which made it seem controlled by the theological and the Spinozistic, the Spinozistic and the modern, the modern and the rationalistic. So Ritschel on the one hand, and despair as to the historical on the other. He justified the scepticism by accepting the Kantian theory of knowledge, as it was reinterpreted by his colleague at Göttingen, Hermann Lotze. Of that which is above the experience of knowledge we can have no real knowledge. Hence it is vain to investigate the problem of the Trinity, or to attempt a Christology in the sense of the early Church. Our experience is built up of judgments of fact and judgments of value. The former deal with the material of the sense, and form the field of natural science. The latter deal with the moral and spiritual elements of experience. All religious conceptions are in their essence value judgments. They arise out of our view of the world in relation to our human, moral, spiritual interests. The conception of God as a God who is known form the mind of man through his felt need of superhuman spiritual powers to supplement his own in his unequal struggle with the natural world. The existence of God and the activity of God becomes to us a matter of conviction through the attitude we take up to the world as religious men. (Rechtsverwaltung und Versehrung, Bonn, 1870-74. Education and Reconciliation, Edinburgh, 1900, p. 218).

(b) His view of Christ.—For the Christian Church, God, thus assumed to exist, has been actually revealed in Jesus Christ. His Christ founded the community in which this revelation was first realized, and through which it is perceived as the perfect form of religious conviction and life. Jesus Christ became aware of His world as the bearer of this revelation through His own perfect religious knowledge of the Father, which included the assurance of God's purpose to found the Kingdom of God through Him. This task He undertook with unfailing devotion. It is in God's word and deed and by the majesty of His unanswerable faith in face of sin, hostility, and death. So completely did He absorb the divine and end of God's governance of the world in the interest of His Kingdom, that in Him, His faith, His obedience, His love, we see the love, the grace, of God towards us. Thus Christ, in the famous phrase, has for us 'the very nature of God.' In the mind of God and in our faith, Christ, as the Son of God, is the founder or source of the organization of men according to God's idea of their destiny. His end with there is made known in the Person of Christ, and Christ is the type after which they are to be conformed. The doctrine of His actual Godhead is translated into this eternal purpose of God concerning man which was ever bound up with the fact as object of the divine Mind and Will,' and 'shaper of God's attribute as end of creation.' Concerning His actual pre-existence we can say nothing. It lies as completely beyond the range of knowledge as His post-existence, and is unnecessary to our faith in Him. Nor can we conceive of His exaltation otherwise than as the experience of the abiding influence of His historical manifestation. Of His origin we can say nothing. All we need and all we are given is the assurance that in His holy will, in His limitless love, and in His invincible faith we see the

- 1. Ritschel's Christology.

IV. Third Phase: AGNOSTIC PHILOSOPHY AND POSITIVIST THEOLOGY.
purpose of God and His love for the community which Jesus took to His heart and in whose service He died. However, the right appreciation of the completeness of the revelation of God through Christ is assured by the predicate of His Godhead.

(c) His influence.—This Christology has held sway over many portions of the church and its virtues are negative and positive. On the negative side it has seemed to give the Christian faith a position where the forces of natural science could not assail it. Miracle is not an inherent part of Christology. The supernatural is limited to the sphere of moral influences and spiritual cognitions which the categories of the scientific understanding cannot penetrate. Also, as especially with Herrmann, it has seemed to make faith independent of the results of historical criticism of the Gospels. Enough is given when we have insight into the invincible assurane of Jesus Himself concerning the love of God His Father, and His complete surrender to the divine will and the divine ends. But some have gone further even than that. They are so sure that the ideas of God's Fatherhood and His gracious promise of life eternal are confirmed in the long and deep experience of the Church that they surmise, Christianity will survive even though Jesus fade from among the facts of history. And with them the reduction of the Christian notion of God, of sacred history, and of the historical reality of reality is attained. On the positive side the Ritschelian position has gained through its valuable insistence upon the 'fact of Christ' as the essential object of any living and communal faith in the Church. This position, which led all Agnosticism in essence sceptical, leaves us in the dark as to the foundations of the phenomena of all history, yet within that history and among itself, a new faith is engaged with all characteristic of the Christian consciousness. This view drove Ritschel's followers into the deeper study of the consciousness of Christ, some of whose results we have already considered above.

(b) Christian consciousness.—(a) Content of the Christian consciousness.—Like all great movements, the Ritschelian has broken into several directions. One is represented more completely by W. Herrmann than by any other. He declares the more transcendentally than Ritschel between metaphysics and religion, and holds that in religious experience we move in a sphere where no use of the logical understanding can construct into an objective framework for the universe which science investigates, and which metaphysics tries to interpret as 'one,' with the moral and spiritual contents of the Christian consciousness. The following points may be taken as summarizing Herrmann's view of these contents.

(a) We are, as human beings, conscious of our dependence on an infinite power. (b) We are as Christians conscious of moral reconciliation with God when we understand the 'personal life of Jesus.' For it is in the historical Christ Himself that we see God revealed as Father. This positive vision of God in Christ awakens in us the moral impulse to deny self, and in that we find ourselves released from the tyranny of the world. We must not so define Christ as a mediator that we may seem to get past Him to God, or find a greater good in God than in Him. With a right appreciation of Christianity to a merely relative and perhaps vanishing form of religion. 'It is true to say that we find in God Himself nothing but Christ.' On the other hand, we know nothing of the God except as He becomes revealed in Christ. (c) Hence we must not make true faith depend on a theory of His Person, or a system of doctrines about Him. We must find a moral record or an individual heart faces Jesus for itself and yields itself to the vision of God in Him. Hence Herrmann has the daring to say, 'We must get past the old dogma of the Deity of Christ to a higher conception of Christ' (Der Verbrennende Christus, p. 84). The higher conception of which he speaks is not a higher metaphysical, but a higher working conception, one which consists in realizing that Its virtues are real and that it is not a power of God apart from, or beyond, or above the historical Christ. How Christ knew God and lived in Him is His secret. All that we can know is the redemption of Christ, or His redemptive relation with God. We cannot deal with God except in Jesus. (d) Herrmann insists further that we must not seek to image for ourselves a living Christ of to-day with whom we can get into personal contact. That image will again abolish the historical Jesus and seem to us independent of Him. The supreme secret of Christianity is this linking of the past with the present, this perennial flow of living water from the heart of the historical Jesus. When we turn our eyes away from Him to a theory of His Person, or to a picture of His present exaltation, we depart from the real faith of Christianity. It is only as we gaze upon Him in His, however far off, historical reality and see God disclosed in Him that we enter into a sense that God is here with us. Yet even in that instant view of His present power in us we dare not separate Him from the vision of Him in that historic Jesus. (e) It is true that we must have many and great conceptions of Christ. But they do not precede faith or produce faith. They are, therefore, preposterous (Glaubengedanken'). The resurrection, exaltation, and mediation of Christ are conclusions drawn from faith, and in which it delights, but they are not the faith's presuppositions, nor the saving attitude of trust. Herrmann discusses with unwavered care the difference, which seems to him immense, between the view that the deity of Christ must be taught to men and the view that men may come to put their trust in Him, and so find God in Him, and the view that men must come straight to Him in history and receive from Him the overwhelming presentations of the redeeming grace of God which compels them to see the very presence of God in His personality and so to confess His deity.

(b) Estimate.—There is no better witness to the intellectual peculiarities of the Christian theologian to-day than the appearance of such a view as Herrmann's. His writings have from the first revealed a most earnest and most Christian spirit. There can be no doubt that in his own heart he has had an experience, intense and vital, which he has spent his life in making as real as possible to others. But our minds stubbornly demand that a man shall be placed in our intellectual map. And Herrmann seems to elude us. He seems a mystic, but denies mysticism. He seems a subjective idealist, and argues for an objective ground of faith. He is not a romanticist, closely as he adheres to part of Schleiermacher's position, nor a pantheist, for he will utter no word that does not speak of God as a personal Father. His Christology, with its mingling of deep loyalty to the deity of Christ as given in expository form, his respect for or even his claim to define His Person or even His work, except in passionate repetitions of the redeeming power of His historical personality, is possible only in an age when the war of God except as He becomes revealed in Christ. (c) Hence we must not make true faith depend on a theory of His Person, or a system of doctrines about Him. We must find a moral record or an individual heart faces Jesus for itself and yields itself to the vision of God in Him. Hence Herrmann has the daring to say, 'We must get past
tuous and universal human experience which has its own rights and its unquestionable reality (see H. Schultz, Christliche Apologetik, Göttingen, 1884). There faith, the soul's organ for sight into the spiritual and moral universe, reigns beyond the assails of science or metaphysics. And human faith, in the historic Jesus, reached such heights of such intensity and spiritual illumination for other souls, that it has ever since produced faith in Him and in that grace of God which, concentrated with infinite force in Him, breaks out from Him as the very glory of God's own face upon all susceptible souls. This has proved itself to be a refuge and fortress for many individual minds. But it has not been fruitful, either practically or theologically. Its psychology is faulty when it deals with the relation of dogmas to individual experience, and again when it attempts to picture the Church, living and growing, conquering and thinking, over wider horizons of human experience, without making its explanation of the objects of its faith credible, verifiable, and authoritative for its own life and in its appeals to the world.

3. Kaftan. The Ritschlian movement, while carried to this extreme in so noble a way by Herrmann, has in another direction tended towards a closer affiliation with historic theology. In Kaftan (Doyimatisi, 1901) we find a less strict use of the spiritual faculty in question which carries the latter semet, at any rate, to say that the religious view of the world consisted only in value-judgments, Kaftan holds that it consists much rather in a fund of mystical, or 'metaphysical,' which are reached through judgments of value. It is real knowledge (e.g., that God is and God's will), although it does not arise from our scientific knowledge. Kaftan, no less than Ritschl and Herrmann, carries on the magnificent emphasis of the whole movement upon the nature and royal significance of faith. He holds that the 'relation theory' which underlies the whole Christology of the early Church, was due to the conception of salvation which was then held. The reformed Church, and that in the life of the whole modern world, has undergone a revolution which consists neither in the magical communication of life (as in the early Church) nor in the transactional soteriology which arose with Anselm. We have in Jesus Christ one who is truly the image of the invisible God, a person whose character and work, His triumph and exaltation as the Risen Lord of the Church's faith, an act of God through which His forgiveness is assured to us, and we are made partakers of His Spirit and life. The Church thinks of Him first and directly as the exalted Lord, and as such the Head of the Church. But that exalted Lord cannot be conceived except by reference to the historical Jesus. It is the spiritual content of His Person on which we depend, and that is known to us only in the story of His life in the flesh, for there the central fact is that the development of His self-consciousness as a man proceeds from His consciousness of oneness with God. That unique and supreme historical self-shape in the divine attribute of omnipotence in its ethical aspect. This perspective is logical dependent on abstract speculative premises. It appears in His actual life, His independence of the world, His complete control of all things and relations ('alle Dinge und Verhältnisse') for the fulfillment of His task. But this fact of moral omnipotence proves that the human life in which it was manifest had a unique origion, arose from a special, unparalleled, and irreplaceable subject. It is this which shows that God prepared human nature for the great event of His own manifestation in and through it, but refuses to consider this event only in terms of an immanent process. There is in it a definite impartation from God. Christ therefore, while wholly and truly man, is also the manifestation under human conditions of God's very being. The Church therefore will and must always consider Jesus Christ as eternal. He is more than a divine ideal (as Harnack and others before him have maintained). He is both "Ja" and "Nein" to the pre-existence hypothesis. The definition of that pre-existence through such a conception as the Logos meant and means the introduction of a speculative and really unknown factor, which disturbs the concrete object of Christian faith. All that we can properly assert is that 'the coming of Jesus into the world ('das Werden Jesi in der Welt') absolutely surpasses the conditions of ordinary human development. God sent and God gave Him.'

4. Other representatives. Among those who are reckoned as of the Ritschian school, Harnack must be mentioned, not as having a remarkable contribution to Christology, but as one whose historical investigations have done so much to refresh interest in the long history of its controversies. We have seen above (p. 201) he seems to utter inconsistent ideas concerning the place of Christ in the gospel. Perhaps the real cause of this is that within the vigour of the scientific historian he carries the heart of a mystic, who makes 'feeling and inner vivacity the measure of truth' (see a keen estimate of Harnack's position by J. Baumna, Grundzüge der Religionsgeschichte, Stuttgart, 1885) and he carried out a spirit of negative criticism, which he sought to interpret in the Ritschlian doctrine, modifies it even further than Kaftan. He warns us that we must not confuse metaphysical realities with historic realities before us as discoveries of the rational understanding and objects of a priori speculation. Our knowledge of them is limited to and by the very means and conditions through which we have become certain of their existence and of some aspect of their nature (cf. G. Webberdin, Theologie und Metaphysik, Berlin, 1901, pp. 26–40, and Der christliche Gottbild, Seebach, 1903). Ritschel's includes a large number of the leading theologians of the past and present generation in Germany. A full account would have to include the names of Herrmann Schultz, H. H. Wendt, J. Häring, W. Bornemann, and M. Reischle. None of these has made any distinctive contribution to the problem. They differ mainly in their emphasis upon the essential reality of the historical Jesus to the gospel, upon the form of the presence of God in Him, upon the distinctness with which He is to be conceived of as the exalted Lord in living relation with the Church. They are all characterized by the effort to disown any adhesion to the doctrine of His two natures, with its Trinitarian background and its permanent puzzle regarding the presence of the Divine subject in the consubstantial life of the man Jesus. They all insist on the faith of the first disciples ('die Gemeinde') in Jesus as the Christ, as forming the original source and type of the conception which must permanently rule the mind of the Church.

v. Fourth phase: the keniotic christology. — 1. Its origins. — Parallel with the movement which arose with Schleiermacher and continued through Schleiermacher, one in the 19th cent., another known as the Kenotic Christology (from the phrase ενοικειμένος, Ph 2)).
theory avoids the pantheistic tendencies of Absolute Idealism or of such a man as Schleiermacher. On the other hand, it rejects the philosophical Agnosticism which rules the movements derived from Kant. However closely it may approach any other standpoint, it can never be, like that of Fichte, an agnosticism of the state of mind of God, and as a rule develops a definite doctrine of the Trinity. It had various roots in the thought world of Germany, connecting it with the Lutheran doctrine of the Holy Ghost, and with the influence of the majesty of the pre-existent Christ, and with the Reformed doctrine of the excommunication with its emphasis on the reality of the human nature and experience of the Incarnate Son of God. Its formulation was hastened in the ecclesiastical sphere by the efforts to bring about the union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. On the other hand, it was not least intense where the personal participation of God in human experience, for revelation and redemption, has been most vividly realized.

Parallels were the direct fruit of the modern emphasis upon consciousness and will as the seat of reality, which has undermined the ancient concepts of matter, substance, and nature as objective and independent realities. Accepting the two principles of community of the philosophical writers of the ancient Christology, which was founded, the Kenotists have set themselves to translate its terms, and also to analyze as a living process that act by which a human person is united with Himself the human nature and therein lived as the Gospe depict Him. Günther (op. cit., §§ 25-28) has traced the various stages by which the full statement of the idea of Thomasius was prepared for.

2. Its full statement.—(a) G. Thomasius.—In this theologian the theory received its first complete and systematic exposition (Christi Person und Werk, Erlangen, 1835 ff.). According to Thomasius, the Incarnation is an act by which the Logos, Son of God, laid aside the so-called "relative" attributes of omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience, while retaining the identity of his consciousness, with the limits of human nature. The essential ethical attributes of love and holiness He retained in His assumption of that nature. Thus the Son of God in the Incarnation is only the only and single personal life of Jesus Christ, in whom we see human nature assumed by the Son of God, and the Son of God limiting Himself to human conditions through that very act. To say that such an act is impossible is to limit the power of God's will. Given the possibility of this act of infinite love, we see its fruits in the story of Jesus Christ. Thoroughly human in the forms of His consciousness, He yet manifests the essential qualities of God in His perfect love and sinless life. Though we must call Him "the man who is God," we must recognize the reality of His human consciousness. Hence He is the image of the perfect ideal of human nature. Other theologians, like Luther and Ebrard, adopted the Kenotic theory with variations of their own.

(b) Goss.—F. Goss (Christi Person und Werk, Basel, 1870) who made the most important stage in its development. The first volume of his work deals directly with the consciousness ("Selbstziehende") of Jesus, as it is set forth in the NT. In his constructive theory he shrieks from any implication of the idea of a "self-emptying" of the Son of God. By a supreme act of will He deprived Himself of the self-consciousness as Logos. He entered into that night of unconsciousness in which our life begins. Adopting the "Creationist hypothesis that each human soul is a fresh creation of God, Gess found in that an obvious way of accounting for the union of the Logos with the human body of Jesus. In the earthly life the Logos gradually attained knowledge of His being through the ordinary principles of human development. But we may well suppose that in His unique case there would be operative a deep inexcusable (the "instinctus" and its emphasis on the majesty of the pre-existent Christ, and with the Reformed doctrine of the excommunication with its emphasis on the reality of the human nature and experience of the Incarnate Son of God. Its formulation was hastened in the ecclesiastical sphere by the efforts to bring about the union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. On the other hand, it was not least intense where the personal participation of God in human experience, for revelation and redemption, has been most vividly realized.

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from other men, as He read in the OT the Messianic prophecies and faced the question of His own life-work. He could not but be forced to ask, 'Who am I?' The persistent enigmas of His consciousness are answered at His baptism, 'Thou art my Son.' Another interesting statement of the kenotic view was given by J. B. Hearde in *Old and New Theology* (London, 1884), ch. vi. 'The Person of Christ.'

But the leading champion was A. M. Fairbairn (*Phases of Christ in Mod. Theol.*, London, 1883), who boldly went back to the Thessalonian distinction between the external or physical attributes of God—omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.—and the internal or ethical—truth and love. The former are 'under the command of the internal.' The Son surrendered the physical attributes which are 'the less' in order to realize in human conditions 'the more Godlike qualities.' Fairbairn made the suggestive statement that the problem of the union of God with human nature is only a part or phase of the question, 'Who was this Man.' We may answer, 'He is the Logos,' only when we accept a modified form of the kenotic theory. He, like Fairbairn, deals directly with the historical material. It is in the Gospel records that we find both the divine and the human in one consciousness, and that manifested consciousness is characterized by such holiness and love as can only be the working of a divine Will. He finds in a direct recognition of God's self-limitation in the act of creating in the form of a law. The Incarnation is a further step in this process of self-humiliation, and it was prompted wholly by grace. Therein both the Father and the Son made a 'real surrender.' We do not know how, and the divine attributes could be retained in exercise or abandoned; but the record seems to assure us that our Lord in His mortal life was not habitually living in the exercise of omnipotence. Nor can we decide anything as to how this self-emptying affected the 'cosmic functions of the Son.'

Among all the British Kenoticists (D. W. Forrest, W. L. Whitney, etc.) Fairbairn was the only one to give a full answer to the question of the kenosis. He places the kenotic section in a higher plane, and he sees it as a process of self-call to the periphrastic formula. The kenosis is found in the 'kenosis' which some suppose to presuppose it. 'If the infinite God was so constituted that He could not live also as a finite man, then He was not infinite' (p. 316). The fact of the Incarnation sprang from the holy love which is of the very essence of God, in Him and in all of God's omnipotence exists. The limitation of His power was 'His intense concentration on His fixed purpose with the world' (p. 316). Implicit in the kenosis is a pre-existence of personality, of Christ. The process of the means to the end; and the second, as the fulfilment of God's ideal of self-relation with human nature, involves His being in the person of the humanity He has redeemed into ideal union with Him in the Spirit.

Strident opposition to the kenotic theology has come mainly from Anglican theologians. The exegetical basis has been examined by E. H. Gifford. Criticism from a strictly philosophical standpoint is seen in the volume of the older creed and the work of J. C. Garrow, *The Principles of the Incarnation* (London, 1890). The critical examination of the kenotic theology as a whole is given by F. J. H. Henry, *The Kenotic Theory* (New York, 1899).

Mackintosh rejects both the division of the attributes of Thomasius and the complete self-renunciation propounded by Gess. He suggests, agreeing with Ponsot, what he calls the 'transposition of attributes,' which must result from the change of consciousness in the sphere of its action. The intelligence that the external state is 'intuitive and complete' must, if it submits to the conditions of time, become 'discursive and progressive.' So omniscience becomes in the temporal state a mere exercise of 'phrenological faculty.' Mackintosh stoutly rejects the scorn of Ritschl for the kenotic theory, and insists that, on this theory, Jesus did not become God, nor was the significance of the—i.e., the assumption of the flesh. There is all through the earthly life of Jesus a 'potentiality,' which does not mean that the divine was not in action, but that it was in sublimed action. In His consciousness of the Father, and 'Spiritual omniscience' in relation to Him, we have the proof of the divine self-active in Him.

Mackintosh confesses warm sympathy with the very powerful setting which this point of view has received in P. T. Forsyth's work (*The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, London, 1899). The preexistence of Christ is not necessary postulate of Christology, because it is a necessary implication of the Church's faith in its Lord, who is not only Reconciler and Redeemer, but also Sanctifier. For sanctification is creative work and possible only to a person who is a divine being. Our faith implies a divine reality of both Father and Son—'both being equally personal and divine.' The possibility of the kenosis is found in the 'infinite' which some suppose to presuppose it. 'If the infinite God was so constituted that He could not live also as a finite man, then He was not infinite' (p. 316). The fact of the Incarnation sprang from the holy love which is of the very essence of God, in Him and in all of God's omnipotence exists. The limitation of His power was 'His intense concentration on His fixed purpose with the world' (p. 316). Implicit in the kenosis is a pre-existence of personality, of Christ. The process of the means to the end; and the second, as the fulfilment of God's ideal of self-relation with human nature, involves His being in the person of the humanity He has redeemed into ideal union with Him in the Spirit.

A singularly wise review of the movement is given by H. R. Mackintosh (*The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, Edinburgh, 1912), who is in sympathy with it. He admits that the difficulties are 'very grave,' but adds that 'they are as no bold construction can avoid.' There are four positions which he says are 'impossible in the completely Christian view of Jesus' (p. 469f.). There are: (1) 'Christ is now Divine, as being the object of faith and worship,' (2) 'In some person sense He Divinity is identical with truth and God,' (3) 'His person presumes being is real, not ideal merely,' (4) 'His life on earth was genuine human life.' (2) We cannot predicate of Him two conscious-nesses or two wills. The unity of His personal life is such that there are continuous experiences of consciousness in the person of Jesus.

The effect of all this is that we must throw the ethical back more vividly into the life of God than the Agnostic position makes possible. In God's holy love the pre-conditions lie for His cosmic relations, and these find their consummation in His consciousness of His relation with personal human experience in a human being. Mackintosh rejects both

See also art. KENOIS.

vi. THE PRESENT SITUATION. It is possible only to say a few things, in concluding this article, regarding the principal features of the Christological problem at the present hour. The situation is full of perplexity and difficulty for all minds which lay themselves open to the forces of their own day. And no one can write without prejudice on a question which at every point is connected with the nature of the spiritual life and with the ever passionate, ever active, ever varied and complex life of the Church.

JESUS CHRIST

"It is impossible to over-estimate the value of what German research upon the life of Jesus has accomplished. It is a supreme and unique expression of sincerity, one of the most significant events in the whole mental and spiritual life of humanity."—George Buttrick.

(a) The logic of a circle.—We have more than once referred to the logic that characterizes the course of an intelligent community life. Such a course of events, typical and universal in character, has existed in the theologians of the German universities. They are, for good or ill, a class by themselves. Within that class more or less clearly defined, and have long been the object of intense scrutiny and criticism. The members are extremely sensitive to each other's influence, whose eyes are mainly directed upon the work of those who are like-minded with themselves. Through the means of intercommunication which they have created, they lead a life of unsurpassed intellectual intensity (see on this J. T. Mers, History of European Thought in the 19th Century, Edinburgh, 1890-1912, vol. 1, ch. II.), and are conscious of spending it, though separated geographically, as in each other's presence. Any principles which are adopted, as points of mutual understanding and common interest, in one of these circles (in science or history, philosophy or theology) must have their inner logic worked out to the end in the process of time.

(b) Schweitzer's history of it.—In relation to the life of Christ, Schweitzer's book is a brilliant exposition of this process. A powerful circle has existed within the theological faculties for a hundred years, whose unifying and minute and ambitious and critical efforts have led to the result that the problems have been attacked from two negative principles, viz.: that the proper deity of Jesus Christ and the occurrence of miracles are impossible. With the exclusion of these two of the NT picture of the Lord, the problem before this quasi-critical circle of ardent intellectual life has been, on the one hand, to recover an exact picture of the actual historical Jesus, and, on the other, to measure His religious value. Schweitzer gives scant notice of the men, sometimes of equally great erudition, who have written Lives of Jesus from which the two elements named above are no more. And there is no attempt to reach out to younger scholars, who are, on the contrary, the object of their study.

(c) The 'liberal' Jesus.—Through the process of exhaustive intellectual experimentation there gradually emerged before the circle of 'liberal' theologians the figure of Jesus as a prophet and reformer, who made to divine claims, whose words were confusedly preserved in tradition and recorded in successive documents out of which at last the present Gospels were fashioned. Jesus used the current Jewish religious conceptions, but shaped them to be instruments of His own clear insight into the Fatherhood of God and His strong grasp on the true moral principles which must guide men in religious and social conduct. This has come to be known as the 'liberal conception of Jesus.' It varies from one scholar to another in many features. Some would assign more of religious supremacy to His teachings. Some, like Wernle, would confess that He was a superhuman person, but decline to define it further, and hold that its presence was not inconsistent with grave errors. But others, like N. Schmitz (The Prophet of Nazareth, and Son of Man in E.B.) would know Him only as a prophet whose character of pure self-sacrifice and faith in God has made Him the highest source of inspiration down to the present day. He is the Son of God and the Son of Man (Christ in the Christian Religion, London, 1896, who writes as if J. Weiss, Wernle, Boussen, and others had said the last word on NT criticism, on whose scientific certainty all further thought must rest.) It has become quite clear, however, that the Jesus whom the 'liberals' depict never existed. Few, says F. C. Burkitt, in his Preface to Schweitzer's Quest, except professors, know what a protean and kaleidoscopic figure this 'Jesus of History' is. The stubborn facts remain that Jesus knew Himself and what He had heard and the Kingd of God, and that the Christian Church sprang from the disciples who by His self-manifestation in these superhuman relations passed to the understanding that we may experience in a new consciousness of the power of God.

But another conclusion has been drawn from the fact that the 'liberal picture' of Jesus is untrue to history. With the help of the religiousgeschichtliche Methode men have sought to prove that Christianity arose as a syncretistic religion (Gunkel). This again has been pushed to the extreme of maintaining that Jesus never existed as a historical person, that the gospel stories arose to illustrate and justify the faith in an ideal Christ as the revelation of God (cf. Drews and W. B. Smith). (In addition to Schweitzer's exposition of the failure of the 'liberal' Lives of Jesus [see cit. cit. iv.], see the hostile and severe but not unjust pamphlet by R. H. Grützmacher, Ist das libera Jeusbild modern? [Grosslitzendorf, 1907].)

(d) The eschatological Jesus.—The point of view from the radical and destructive view has been powerfully aided by the rise of the eschatological movement. It has been held inconsistent with the two primary assumptions of the learned 'circle' that the historical Jesus should have taught a strictly supernatural view of the Kingdom of God. What He held must have been the view that the Kingship of God the Father over human souls is to be conceived and realized wholly within the conditions of this life. If He spoke any words about a future life, He must have spoken as all human beings speak of that matter, in terms of faith and hope, without any peculiar authority arising from a superhuman consciousness. But the eschatologists (led by J. Weiss in the work often cited above) proved beyond a doubt that the eschatological sayings of Jesus are of assured authenticity. Moreover, these sayings are not occasional utterances peculiar to ecstatic moments and really foreign to His main principles. Rather can it be proved that they underlie the whole course of His consciousness. When He conceived of Himself as Messiah and Son of Man, of the Kingdom of God as near at hand, He is thinking of a catastrophic, supernatural act of God, in which He will share as its supreme organ and controller, by which the natural life of man will be submerged and a new universe be established. The eschatologists to whom we refer do not even yet break away from their 'circle.' Their primary negative presuppositions hold them still eagerly experimenting with new ways of accounting for this as an illusionary element in the consciousness of Jesus, and yet as one through which a divine spiritual conception of human history and given men the assurance of God's love. The noblest proof of the reality and sincerity with which men may give themselves to this as a compulsive religious fact is found in the fact that Schweitzer (at the behest of his Master, as he believes and says) has diverted his own career from that of a distinguished and brilliant German, the Father of a white medical missionary in West Africa. The radical school has put forth no higher proof that the grace of God is within reach of its view of Jesus.
2. The special influence of the sciences. — There are signs that the two great sciences which deal with the highest forms of phenomenal history, viz. biology and psychology, will yet exert powerful influence on Christology as well as on other sides of theology.

(a) Biology. — At present biology is itself embarrassed by two phases of discussion — that concerning the nature of life (energism — vitalism) and that concerning the process of evolution (mechanical, teleological, structural). It is the latter of these discussions that is at present the more controversial. The issue of the two was already decided by British theologians to use these biological discussions in Christology (e.g., D. W. Simon, Reconci1ication by Incarnation, London, 1898; W. L. Walker, The Spirit and the Incarnation, Edinburgh, 1901, and others; W. D. McLaren, Our Growing Creed, do. 1912; A. Morris Stewart, The Crown of Science, London, 1915). Such writers usually adopt some phase of Kenoticism.

(b) Psychology. — Psychology has proved more fruitful of suggestion already. That science is in the full flush of early and enthusiastic enthusiasm, and its results to date appear to be of great importance, especially in relation to religious experience. Its influence on our present subject is seen, partly in the more careful and thoughtful work of the Kenotics, partly in the work of those who have combined the two. The Schöneckel-Ritschlibns describe the conditions under which they view the consciousness of Christ, (cf. T. Häring, Der christliche Glaube, Calw and Stuttgart, 1906, Eng. trans., The Christian Faith, London, 1908; and A. Schlatter, Das christliche Dogma, Calw and Stuttgart, 1911. W. Temple in Foundations may also be named here. The position of Schöneckel (op. cit., p. 222 f.) is stated as follows: The God-will, as the history of mankind to salvation entered into history in Jesus, became man in Him, and worked after the method of human history in His words and deeds. By this personification of the will, we may, in the language of Schelling who has discussed the conclusions of modern theology, do not mean a mere active force such as proceeds from God actively elsewhere, but the divine Person Himself. For a person is not merely a potential being, who has its consciousness will (Hence-Fehl's divine person worked in the human life of Jesus so that He could not look upon His thoughts otherwise than as God's thoughts. He could not will, without the consciousness that God willed.') His divine personal will or His divine personality was for His own consciousness the eternal Son of the Father in heaven. Schöneckel (op. cit., § 87, Die Ewigkeit-Jesu.) goes further in his estimate of the eternal nature of Jesus. The words of Jesus and the Epistles do not set His deity and humanity beside each other as two static objects ('zahende Dinge'), but work of a volitional kind ('Wille verwandelt'). He approaches the biological point of view when he says further: 'In that the Word became flesh the humanity of Jesus was begotten (erezogen) through the Divine word and serves, therefore, but as an act of God which is the whole process of growth. This appeal to the idea of will is not, however, completely worked out by any Christologist. The fact is that neither for ethics nor for Christology have the psychological data of our day been thoroughly explored. The whole meaning of the word consciousness is undergoing a portentous change. The very question of the subconscious, a region shadowy and unexplored, to which Sanday (Christologies Ancient and Modern) has gone for help, is complicated by the almost terrifying phenomena of dissociated personalities (see Morton Prince, The Dissociation of a Personality, New York, 1906). There we have a demonstration of the most astounding kind as to the complex nature of the human consciousness something has power over them to reduce them to unity and harmony. But all this is cited here not as giving us any sure clue, but to prove that, when henceforth we speak of the consciousness of Jesus as carrying with it the divine and the human, and as manifesting a range and richness of power above that of our ordinary human life, modern investigation of our consciousness encourages us to believe that we are not speaking in mere contradictions. The ideas that consciousness means a stream or series of events is dead, and the other idea that a will can operate at one 'centre of control' is also dead. But chiefly its influence is seen in 'the Voluntarism' of men like R. Seeberg (Die Grundweserheiten der christlichen Religion, Leipzig, 1916, Eng. tr., The Groundwork of Christian Religion, London, 1908) and A. Schlatter, Das christliche Dogma, Calw and Stuttgart, 1911). W. 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Schöneckel (op. cit., § 87, Die Ewigkeit-Jesu.) goes further in his estimate of the eternal nature of Jesus. The words of Jesus and the Epistles do not set His deity and humanity beside each other as two static objects ('zahende Dinge'), but work of a volitional kind ('Wille verwandelt'). He approaches the biological point of view when he says further: 'In that the Word became flesh the humanity of Jesus was begotten (erezogen) through the Divine word and serves, therefore, but as an act of God which is the whole process of growth. This appeal to the idea of will is not, however, completely worked out by any Christologist. The fact is that neither for ethics nor for Christology have the psychological...
many genii, many saints, many prophets, and they are all dead. It is the infinite difference of Christ from us that has made an infinite difference of forms. It is what is more than man in Him, even in His sympathy, that has transformed the meaning of His sympathy in God with us, the 'more than man' is human. And this must be possible if God and man are spiritual, conscious beings.

(2) The superhuman 'aspect or 'element':—That which we see is a consciousness which is fundamentally of the same type as the human, and yet working in a range more than human. Human it is in that (1) He possesses direct superhuman knowledge of God, and that not by prophetic inspiration but in virtue of a Sonship relation, whatever that may be (Mt 1:23); (2) He is conscious of the flawless will—of perfect moral harmony with God; (3) He reveals Himself as in a unique, supreme, redemptive relation with the world and man. Hence His Self-consciousness, universal Lordship, was conscious of a future relationship to mankind, i.e., of the continuation of His control of history after His own death. His consciousness related to all; (5) He was open to all the physical experiences of mankind.

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(c) The problem of every human birth and this problem:—In solving the problem of this Person it is much more important that theologians realize that its solution is the ordinary human individual. How does the new human individual arise? By what process is, not only the physical, but the physio-spiritual, nature created distinct from the physical, as O. Lodge supposed? Is there a universe and an evolution of mental facts or natures distinct from temporal life as well as from the physical? Is there a unity of the universe of mental or spiritual facts such that there the facts which become fulfilled as human personalities are already of various grades within that unity? If, out of that universal universe of mental living facts, one of a unique kind, identical in type with the human, should enter into the stream of human life, evidently the history of the resulting individual must manifest at least some of the things which we have enumerated above. If, then, the question is asked how this self-conscious fact is related to that of the parents (or parent), we must answer that no discussion of that is possible till we know how the self-conscious fact in the ordinary human being is related to the self-conscious nature of the father and mother respectively. What is it, if anything, that enters from the mental structure of the parents into that of their child? What is evident in the case of Jesus is that through the processes of human birth an individual has arisen whose self-conscious nature manifests itself as of a new type. The basis of His being as a man was of two natures: the spiritual type. He became flesh. The Pauline conception likewise must have some difference in it, to account for the difference in His active consciousness.

(a) A new kind of historic self:—The question of the new Church, whether the new individual has all the 'parts' of human nature, such as body or soul or spirit, is entirely irrelevant here and for us. And we shall make no headway till we see that irreducible fact is that of the new combination of 'parts' peculiar to itself (in that ancient sense); e.g., it shares its physical history and nature with the lower animals. It shares its mental and spiritual nature, perhaps, with innumerable forms of being below or above itself.
the ordinary, healthy-minded, non-theological believer have always assumed that the mind and will of Jesus were more than human, just as they have always assumed that the mind and will of God are more than human, that there is one type with one type with mind and will in us. The self-conscious being, the pre-existent Christ, the Son of God, entered as an individual, vital, and mental organism into the history of the human and the blind impulse of the animal, which does not lie completely open to His mind. There is nothing there to experience. In these facts a finite content unfolds itself fully and all its beauty to the divine mind, which will it all.

But in man is it so? Here all the reality of creaturehood is gathered up with the infinitude of a subjective, rational, moral, conscious experience, dependence—of creaturehood is felt, thought, realized through all the range of human activity in a unique and supreme manner. There is something here that not even a divine observer possesses or realizes by observing. His sympathy is wondrous, but yet it is sympathy across the gulf. Its deep, infinitely deep, observation of man's experience can never be a substitute or full equivalent for that experience. To see and understand it, and to love it as it is, not the same as to live by its virtue; to create, trace, and watch growth is not the same as to grow; to measure the sorrow of that other creaturely heart even to the last, uppermost, deepest thrill of pain is yet not to know it as the subject of it. Even to taste God's pain is different from tasting man's. Now the Incarnation means that there is this one fact in His life which God would completely identify Himself, one fact not yet made His own which could become His own only in one way. Can He cross the gulf? Can He, the eternal divine Will, who has what it is to be a Creator, and to rule, and infer, and bear the conscious burden of all the universe of dependent beings, can He yet put our own peculiar cup to His lips and taste even that human dependence itself—on the human side—in its very essence? The Babe at Bethlehem, the tired Physician in Galilee, the praying Servant of Jahweh, the Man of the broken heart—what if all that means that He has tasted what it is to be a man? And, in love.

LITERATURE.—The immense range of literature on this subject makes any selection seem meagre and arbitrary. The following list includes some authors and their works that may be of interest:


JESUS CHRIST IN JUDAISM.

The relations between Judaism and Christianity have seldom been friendly. Two early Church fathers dismissed its Jewish element; and, in the centuries during which Christianity had the power to persecute, the Jewish people were thought of, not as the natural kindred of the Jews, but as those who had rejected and killed Him. There was seldom a good word for the Jews, except from those who were not Christians. Jews, on the other side, had no reason to love the Gentiles, or to say any good of them. The coming of Christianity into the world had perhaps brought blessing to the Gentiles; but to the Jews it was the herald of suffering, more severe and more prolonged than any which had been endured by them in earlier ages.

It would not be unreasonable to expect that the Jews, in their literature, should be most bitter against the founder of the Christian religion, as being the source of all their misery; yet that is not the case. The remarkable fact about the Jewish literature, whether of the Talmudic period, or of the Middle Ages, or of our own day, is the infrequency of any references to Christ Himself.

There is plenty of polemic against Christians mainly in regard to doctrine. The Jews were never at a loss to destroy their religion, in all its length and breadth, against Christ. But they said very little, I mean very little, about Him, except what would pass for a very slight and indirect allusion. They were not interested in the details of the spiritual history; and the main reason was that they had very little to say. No doubt, the knowledge that anything that they might say about Him would be unfavourably judged made them coincide in times when it was to be looked upon with fear. But, apart from that, they really knew very little about Him, and had no interest in knowing more. Only in recent times has there been, on the part of the Jewish writers, a real desire for fuller knowledge of the historical facts concerning Him, and a recognition that there was something to be learned which Israel would be the better for knowing.

The period covered by the Talmud includes the birth of Jesus and the rise of the Christian Church. In the Talmud, accordingly, and in the cognate literature will be found whatever the Jews of the first five centuries after Christ has to say about Him. Something is said; but the amount is extremely small, and the statements are seldom of any importance. There is enough to show that the person mentioned in it is Jesus, the Son of God, under the names of Ben Pandira, Ben Sada, and Mas'ah the Master, as is so often the case. When collected together, the references to Jesus in the Rabbinical literature may seem not incon siderable in quantity and contents; and the reader may get the impression of it being an important element in that literature than they do.

It is, however, a complete mistake to suppose that in that literature there is an undeniable hostility to Christianity or its founder. The Jews were thinking of their own religion, not of any other; and when, in a passing allusion, a chance remark here and there, they did refer to Jesus, it was only by way of a marginal note, so to speak, illustrating their argument; it was not for any intrinsic importance of the subject. There does not seem to have been, in the mind of any of the Talmudic Rabbis, a recognition of the greatness of Jesus. And even when they had a name for His, He was remembered as, after all, the man who had chiefly brought division to Israel, and the nearest approach to a defined opinion about Him in the Talmud is the statement (Bab. Sanhed. 90b) that the majority of the nation had practised magic and deceived and led astray Israel.

Round that statement there gradually gathered stray bits of gossip about Him, coarse allusions to His birth, reminiscences of His trial, and the like, having sufficient resemblance to the gospel narrative to show who is referred to, but not enough precision to be of any value as independent evidence. It is more likely that they were based on what was learned from intercourse with Christians than that the Rabbis themselves read the Gospels. But the point at present is that Jesus was of very small account in the range of ideas expressed in the Rabbinical literature of the first five centuries. He belonged to Christianity; and Judaism went its own way, caring nothing for Him or for the religion that He founded.

The Talmudic period was one of such hardship for Israel, not specially on account of Christian oppression. Indeed, the Talmud does not seem to mention Christian oppression of the Jews. It does refer to the adoption of Christianity as a title to the empire, but does not connect therewith any special display of hostility towards Israel. In the Middle Ages, on the other hand, the Christians sought to oppress the Jews, and the hatreds were kindled of the latter towards Christianity and its founder naturally underwent a change. They were not on their
defence when charged with holding false doctrine, and especially with speaking blasphemy against Jesus. Converted Jews were able to tell their Christian brethren of the unctuous passages in the Talmud which referred to Him, and the Christian contemporaries eagerly caught up the weapon. What use they made of it may be seen in the Pseudo-Bayemmus Martimns (18th cent., ed. Paris, 1631). The defenders of Judaism pressed the attack, so far as it related to Jesus, by asserting that the person referred to in the abusive passages of the Talmud was not the Jesus who founded Christianity, but another Jesus, who had lived nearly a century earlier; and a good deal of attention was given by medieval Jewish writers to the chronological argument by which this assertion was supported.  

But the attack was directed not against the Talmud alone. The book just mentioned, the Pseudo-Bidel, reproduced the whole (so far as known to the writer) of an anonymous lampoon upon Jesus, bearing the title of Toldoth Yehoshua (ed. E. Bischoff, Leipzig, 1895). Traces of this book can be found as early as the 9th cent., and it was probably of German origin. It is a connected story, based on the Talmudic references to Jesus, and amplified in a manner which was, no doubt, intended to be witty, but is now very dull. The coarse allusion in the Talmud are the most of; and the whole piece is entirely. Editio princeps of it are still published in our own day, but it would be unjust to say that it is representative of Jewish thought about Jesus. It represents the miserable revenge which the persecuted Jew of the then sort for the sufferings which he endured at the hand of Christians; but it has never been acknowledged by the leaders of Judaism as anything more than an unseemly satire. Judaism has borne its martyrdom in a nobler spirit than that which produced the Toldoth; and the attitude of medieval Jews is defined with far greater accuracy in the polemic which disclaimed any intention of disrespect towards Him than in the petty malice which made a burlesque of Him. In other words, the Jews of the Middle Ages would have left Him alone if they had not been compelled to speak of Him in self-defence.

Coming to modern times, we find a change in the attitude of Jews towards Jesus, not indeed shown by all Jews, but exemplified in some of them. It is no longer, as it used to be, true that the great mass of Jews, whose circumstances have kept away from them the influences of modern thought, that they have no idea about Jesus at all, except as of one who did harm to Israel long age; but, where increasing security and liberty allowed Jewish scholarship to profit by modern methods of research, there has been a breaking away from the old position of silent hostility to, or unwilling mention of, Jesus. The first to lead in this very new direction was L. M. Jost, who wrote with warm indignation of the way in which defect and martyr of Christianity was treated (Gesch. des Judentums, Leipzig, 1857-59, i. 396-409).

The line thus opened up by Jost was followed by his Gorgias. History of the Jews (Gesch. der Juden, ed. 1899, iii. 224-252) would be memorable for its treatment of Christianity, if for nothing else. Graetz boldly expressed his admiration for Jesus, whom he regarded as an Essenian, irrespective of the history of his followers than by the malice of his enemies. The sketch of

of Christianity was not spared, especially in Dātūtan-i-Dīnī, xxxvii. 90–92, and Sīkān-dīnīānī Vījār, xv., both documents dating from the latter half of the 9th century. The former passage, in which the expression is employed, is directed against the Christian Church, and is a repetition of a passage in the Avesta of the Zoroastrians, which contains a similar expression. The latter passage is directed against the Christian Church, and is a repetition of a passage in the Avesta of the Zoroastrians, which contains a similar expression.

The important passage is the second. This brings into play the terms 'his' and 'her', which are used in the Gospels to denote the third person, and which are also used in the Avesta of the Zoroastrians, to denote the third person. The expression is used in the Gospels to denote the third person, and which are also used in the Avesta of the Zoroastrians, to denote the third person.

The doctrine of the Trinity is also assailed. Assuming the truth of the Christian statement: that the Father and Son and Holy Ghost are three persons who are one in substance from the same source, and are the same substance from the other, nor is there one essence in them, and that the Father and Son are one substance, and that the Holy Ghost is one substance, it is clear that the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be maintained.

Again, the equality of the Persons in the Trinity is assailed, and it is alleged, on the basis of Mk 13:14, that the Son cannot be equal to the Father in every respect. It is further argued that the Jews showed Christ at the will of the Father, whence, with an allusion to Mt 20:14, a new argument is sought for an attack upon the tenet of the freedom of the will, and attention is called to the fact that, whereas Christ declared that He came not to destroy but to fulfill, the law and the prophets (Mt 5:17), 'all his sayings and commands were those that are distinct and adverbial for the law and the prophets', the NT plainly shows a belief in a separate power of God (cf. 2 Cor 11:14–23).

The precise source from which the polemists drew is yet to be discovered, but, as one of the proper names occurring elsewhere in the treatise betrays a Syriac origin (West, 3BE xxiv, p. xxviii), it was probably derived from faulty reading of a Syriac version—or a translation from a Syriac text—containing the same or similar statements, and which is more consistent with Christian doctrinal current in Persia.

JESUS, SOCIETY OF—See JESUS.

JEWEL (Buddhist).—The 'jewel' (Pāli ratana, Skr. ratna, also rotna) played a prominent part in the cult and terminology of Buddhism, throughout all sections of that religion. This conspicuousness of its symbolism in practical Buddhism is, we shall show, owing to the fact, not hitherto recognized, that this symbolism incorporates the deeply rooted archaic belief in the magical efficacy of the fabulous wish-granting gems as the means of procuring long life and immortality. Our inquiry into the source of this symbolism sheds much new interesting and important light upon the question of Buddhist origins.

The epithet of 'jewel' was applied to Buddha not only as the first member of the 'Buddhist Triad' or 'Three Jewels' (Tri-ratna) in whom every professing Buddhist must take his or her refuge (sīkān), but also to his teaching (dharma) and the sanctuary in which it was revealed. For that distinction is described in the earliest Pāli canon as the possessor of the 'seven jewels' (saptaratna), which are essentially the attributes of the highest pharisaical ritual, as monarch of the universe (Chakravarthi [q.v.; see also below]), and are, we find, traceable to remote pre-Vedic antiquity. The sacred texts express this jewel symbolism in universal use, through Buddhistdom, both 'north' and 'south,' as prayers and luck-compelling magical spells.

The origin of the symbolism.—In attempting to trace the origin of the 'jewel' symbolism of Buddhism, we find that originally the term ratana in the Vedico age (c. 1500–400 B.C.), including Buddha's day, denoted a 'treasure' rather than a 'jewel', such as came to mean in post-Vedic India, so that it embraced living and non-living entities (properly maṇi). In two early hymns of the Rigveda (v. 1.5.9, vi. xxi. 11) the deity who is homœothetically the supreme god of the universe, in the form respectively of Agni (fire) and Soma (wine), is described as the 'seven treasures' (saptaratna) of the world. He is invoked in both cases with the identical words (puttās in the seat of the mythical fire-prince Atri, in the first instance):

1. 'Breathe seven breaths on seven horns, bless three to our feet, and a blessing to our four-footed [creatures]!'

Upon the number 'seven' in this stanza Macdonell writes: 'The expression is probably without specific significance here; but is simply a vague expression equivalent to "all," so often it is in the Rigveda in connection with many other words besides ratana. However this may have been at the period when these hymns were composed (c. 1000 B.C.), it is certain that at the time of the Vedico commentary, the Bhāyāvat (c. 400 B.C.), the expression had become literally restricted to the number 'seven' and formed a symbol of the sacred seven.

For that commentary explains this particular verse referring to the "seven treasures of all Chakravartins," and it specifies them as the wheel, car (ratna), jewel, wife (bhāgavā = companion of her husband), horse, elephant, and chintamani. The evidence of this early commentator is against the view that terrestrical treasure, such as gold, silver, etc., was intended. It appears to be the first detailed list of the divine treasures; and it must take precedence over the list in the Buddhist Pāli canon, which, by its mythology, indicates for its compilation a date not earlier than the 1st century B.C.

The reference in the same extract to multiple symbols is:

1. Dīcchā-Kāliya: Mahāpārshuṭha Sīlātātra, slit, etc.
3. "Rudra," also called the great god, 'Mahādeva,' is in the Vedas a form of Agni (Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, Bâresburg, 1897, p. 312).
4. "Dāṇḍa-saṁjña atīta ratna daśāh, sa anu-ahāvapi dasyāh dvaśaṁ dace śreṣṭhaṁ" (Rigveda v. 1.5.9, vi. xxi. 11). The translation is kindly supplied by Macdonell.}

5. In a letter to the author.
7. "Text, p. 59; tr. p. 158.
8. There is a variety of seven precious minerals also called saptaratna, though post-Vedic in date, namely gold, silver, emerald, beryl (neatdāna), diamond or crystal, coral, and agate (cf. R. C. Childers, Dictionary of the Pāli Language, London, 1875, p. 462; E. J. Birt, Handbook of Chinese Buddhism, Hongkong, 1888, p. 145).
Chakravartins, or 'universal monarchs,' does not necessarily imply that those personages were yet considered to be human, as they become in later Buddhist and Brahmanical literature—for the references to human Chakravartins in the Mahabharata are also probably later interpolations, as they occur in the composite episodes exhibiting the characters of the Purushas and presumably of no earlier date than the latter (c. 1st cent. a.d.). These may be regarded as the forerunners of Buddha, who was ascetically pure and divinely inspired, but was not a god. He was born, and died, and is considered to have been the supreme creator, in the later Vedic period to resolve himself, the series of active creators, Prabhati, or Purusa.

3. Assyrian ('s) source of the 'seven treasures.'—The detailed list in the Bhagavata and Buddhist texts indicates the important fact, not hitherto recognized, that these seven treasures were the famous divine treasures of life and immortality won by the gods of light in their great struggle against the powers of darkness and the deep, in the contest termed by the Indians 'the churning of the ocean' (an appropriate metaphor for the creation of life, of which the power of whose food was largely obtained by churning). This conflict, forming a chief episode in the Mahabharata and Ramayana epics, whilst incorporating a rude version of the cosmogony of Newton, forces in evolving the universe from chaos, marks also, in the view of the present writer, the final breaking away of the Indo-Aryans from the Assyrian gods which their Aryan ancestors had borrowed from their western neighbours when in Iran. For it is the Asuras who seize the great serpent of the deep by the head and thus stir up from the ocean the treasures of immortality. Now, the great Asura of the Rigveda is the serpent-hooded god of the sky, Varuna, the Ouranes of the Greeks, who is now admitted to be identical with the supreme god Ahura (i.e. Asura) of the Zendavesta, and further traced by the present writer to the 'Asur' of the Assyrians.  

4. The epic relates that the Asuras, who had gained the ambrosia and other treasures of divinity were then deprived of them by stratagem and put to flight. Thus the pre-Vedic, non-Indian, and presumably Assyrian origin of these 'Indian' and 'Buddhist' treasures is now probable. 

The order in which the treasures emerged from the ocean varied, and according to the Mahabharata, i. 18 (c. 500-400 b.c.), 2 as follows (the corresponding number in the Bhagavata is added within curved brackets) in the Buddhist lists, given in this order: 

1. The wheel of a thousand rays or spokes 
2. Earth 
3. Horse 
4. Gem 
5. Wife 
6. Household chief 
7. General

The next and last object to issue from the waters at this 'churning' was the world-destroying poison 

The great significance of this discovery, that the 'wheel' of the seven treasures symbolizes the moon and not the sun, is that it postulates for those Hindu symbols an extremely remote and Western antiquity, long before the Indo-Iranian period. In giving this pre-eminence to the moon, they presumably belong to that early pre-historic period when the moon was regarded as the parent of the sun, as is found in the earliest Assyrian and Egyptian myths. In that pristine cosmic myth of the evolution of light from the darkness of chaos, the moon was conceived as the luminous moon most intimately associated with darkness, and as traversing not only the sky, but the waters of the deep under the earth; and the daily changes in its form led to its being regarded as taking a more active part in the workings of Nature than the unaltering sun. Vestiges of this primitive myth survive also in the early Vedas, and account for the fact that there are such Hindu symbols as Vritta, 'wheel,' and Vrata, 'round,' and Mantra, 'round.'

4. See S. N. Datta, Jt, i. 54-176; also V. F. Vickers, Theology, London, 1887, i. 90-81. The number is increased as the legend is expanded.

With this Brahmanical list may be compared the Buddhist, in the order in which the items are cited in the Pali canon, which is the usual sequence.
the great pronouncements given throughout the Vedas, which has the dual character of 'amulet' and the 'moon'; for in the Rigveda the 'moon' is called the 'treasure' (ravi); and in the Avesta, it is called the 'gem' (soma).

5. Original lord of the wheel and Chakra-varini: Varuna. — It is to be noted that it is Varuna, not the Sun, who is the original gem (soma). An amulet, which is worn on the neck, is called the 'jewel' (gumna) of Varuna. This is the amulet of the moon (soma) for it signifies the universal monarch (soma-raj; Macdonell, p. 24); and Soma is positively identified with Varuna in several of the aspects of the latter (Rigveda, ix. xix. v. 3), and is sometimes called the 'treasure' (ravi; ib. 110). It was, on the other hand, Varuna who not only placed the sun in the sky, but also placed Soma in the sky; and it is by Varuna's ordinances (that the moon shining brightly moves at night) (ib. 23). This expression associates the moon with Varuna does not necessarily imply, as Oldenberg thought, that the sun was placed by Varuna. It is probably the moon that he placed in the heavens, but the sun was put in its place by one of Varuna's messengers, who alone could traverse it. The sun is the Vedic god of the entire sky, including the luminaries, which traverse it, and lord of light both by day and by night, his eye is the solar disk (ib. 110-29). Varuna, the supreme god of Varuna. This god is brought into relation with the owners of the seven treasures, namely, Soma-Buddha, who are identified with the seven sacred treasures of the Vedic age of Varuna (ib. 129), thus implying that they were his agents, and that the seven treasures are primarily those of Varuna himself as the original Chakravarini of the universe. Varuna, indeed, in the Rigveda, personifies the wheel (chakra) of which the name is trita, the Soma-preserver, apparently personified lightning (ib. 68 f.); and the present writer has shown, firstly, that the entire Soma and Chakravarini cycle of the 3rd cent. B.C. Varuna is figured as the King of the Golden Swans (i.e. the winged sun conceived as a bird, as in the ancient Asyran and Egyptian sculptures of the sun-god) and actually bears the inscription of Chakravarini (i.e. Chakravarana, literally: wheel-crane, a title of the golden goose, or swan, as sun-bird); and, secondly, that Buddha was put by his chief in chief mode as a god (Puruṣa in the Pali canon and Amítábha in the Mahâyana) upon the model of the god Varuna-Chakravarana, the manifest prototype of the Chakravarini with whom Buddha was early identified.

3. The 'māṇi' gem symbolism. — Of the seven treasures other than the first, or wheel, whence the Chakravarini derives his title, the most popular is the jewel proper or 'wishing-gem,' the synonym of the moon (soma). This popular is doubtless owing to its being essentially of the nature of a primitive magical amulet of the animistic period. In the Atharvaveda (c. 800 B.C.) there is not only an amulet against all kinds of evil, and many sorts are mentioned. 1 In its special hymn to the māṇi (viii. 5) the amulet hanging from the neck is called the 'lucky repelling jewel' (ayyakṣatari, soma). Buddha himself refers in his Khevalukh Sattra 2 to the use in his day of the 'jewel-charm,' called maṇikjāli-vija, 3 which, he says, was used for 'making new promises, for satisfying feelings, the reasonings and thought of other beings,' enabling its possessor to say, 'So and so is in your mind; you are thinking of so and so; thus and thus are your emotions.' Besides its use as an amulet, the māṇi is identified with the thunderbolt in the Atharvaveda (viii. v. 3), which positively says that 'it was with the māṇi (jewel) that Indra struck Vṛtra, that he has vanished the Asuras, conquered the sky, the earth, the two worlds, and the four regions of the atmosphere.' In this sense of thunderbolt it is employed also in the Lalita Vitaras (c. 1st cent. A.D. pp. 417, 416), and it seems to us, in the Pali canon a descriptive of the birth of Buddha in the Airāvata-undersphere, the white umbrella which miraculously appeared over the infant, hīra, 'diamond,' being an ordinary title of Indra's thunderbolt.

On the other hand, the māṇi is interpreted by the commentator of the Atharvaveda as the 'sunstone' (dīlīyamaṇi), and the probability is that it represents the sun has something in common with the moon. It is described in the Pali canon 4 as the beryl (like)—jewel, bright, with eight facets, clear, transparent, . . . its radiance penetrates a day's march (yajjana) on every side . . . a turning night into day (ib. 311). The jewel is in the Jātaka, 331, which was given by Indra to Buddha in his former birth, was called 'the ever-shining' (vīrokkana), an ordinary epithet of the sun; and Vīrokhana is the title of Buddha in the Jātaka. 5 In the Jātaka 331, in which Buddha was habitually saluted with 'Shine forth as is thy might, Lord.' 6 it also occurs in the longer lotus-jewel formula: 'Oti! Amogha Varačchana mahāparama Māṇi padma nīlotapāravataya Hāṃ.' 7

7. 'Omi māṇi' formula. — The hitherto unknown origin of this famous Buddhist lotus-jewel formula (Omi māṇi padma namaha) has been here traced back to its Brāhmaṇical source. The māṇi is specially invoked in the Atharvaveda hymn cited above, and in the Brāhmaṇical invocation the sectarian Omi was extensively employed already in the earliest Rigveda, even in those hymns which are not of an obviously magical character. This syllable is stated in the early Brāhmaṇas (c. 800 B.C.) to be the divine counterpart of tāthā. 8 i.e. 'so be it,' implying an assuagement of certain threats or evil, in which Buddha was habitually saluted with 'Shine forth as is thy might, Lord.' 9 it also occurs in the longer lotus-jewel formula: 'Oti! Amogha Varačchana mahāparama Māṇi padma nīlotapāravataya Hāṃ.' 10

1. Dīpaka-Nikāya (SBE ii. 378).
2. For the details of Buddhism in the 4th century B.C., see the commentary Budhagoesa as the Chanda-piṇjāpi-vija (SBE ii. 378), which probably contained a written spell.
5. Macdonell and Keith, ii. 319.
6. Dīpaka-Nikāya, iv. 14 (SBE iii. 30, 14); and in almost identical words in Lalita Vitaras, r. Rajendrāla Mitra, Calcutta, 1900. 1. ib. iii. 33.
9. Waddesdon, Brāhmaṇas, i. 1. 3; and in almost identical words in Lalita Vitaras, r. Rajendrala Mitra, Calcutta, 1900. 1. ib. iii. 33.
10. Macdonell and Keith, ii. 319.
11. Śrīparb-Devata, ii. 125, r. Macdonell, p. 69.
evolved anthropomorphic Brahmā before he created the universe.¹ From the Ośha the Prajñāva-Upanid (c. 800 B.C.)² derives the entire creation.

This anthropomorphic figure of Brahmā, created or personified as Vāhana, Brahmā upon a lotus-lotus, then appears to Brahmā himself. The word Ośha is probably a term of address or greeting. In this context, it may be translated as 'O Śiva' or 'O Gājendra', the king of the elephants.

Now, let us continue with the description of the ritualistic practice. Ośha is the oldest son of Brahmā.³ In the ancient Indian tradition, the practice of meditation and the ritual of lotus-worship were highly revered.

Here we have revealed, in this Brāhmanical ritual prevalent in India about 800 B.C., the manifest origin of two of the three elements of the famous lotus-jewel formula, whilst the third element, maṇi, is invoked as Ośha maṇi still earlier with a similar connexion; also there is enforced therein the magical efficacy of repeated reiteration of the mystic syllable. The lotus element in this Brāhmanical symbolism of creation has probably a sexual significance, denoting the union of prakṛti, or productive female energy, with the masculine puruṣottam, or cherished Indra in the Śatapatāka Brahmanas (c. 800 B.C.)³ the lotus-lotus is the womb.⁴

The Buddhist monks of the Mahāyāna school in India manifestly borrowed this Brāhmanical symbolism of the lotus of Brahmā (c. about the 2nd cent. B.C.) for their counterpart of Brahmā, namely the 'Buddha of meditation.' Aimitabha, who, like Brahmā himself, was evolved, as we have seen, on the model of the ancient primordial god Varuṇa. This Amitābha-Buddha in the Buddhist teaching is impassively in abstract meditation, performed his benevolent and creative functions through the medium of his active sons, corresponding to the creator-sons (Prajāpati) of Brahmā; and the greatest of Aimitabha's sons was Avalokiteśvara, to whom this lotus-jewel formula is solely addressed. On this Brāhmanical analogy, therefore, the Ośha would represent Avalokiteśvara, the active proximate creator 'elder' son of Aimitabha-Buddha, seated as a herāna-praditte upon the fertile lotus of his father, the remote creator-named as Adibuddha (p. 226). The maṇi, maṇi, etc., as well as the lotus is an essential attribute of Avalokiteśvara, is frequently figured in ancient Indian images as holding both the jewel and the lotus, and bearing the epithet of the holder of the jewel (maṇiśumber). In this regard it is to be noted, that the Brāhmanical homologue of Avalokiteśvara, namely Vīṣṇu in his later Brahmanised and mūnī-Vedā form of Vīṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, several of whose attributes were borrowed by the Buddhist monks for Avalokiteśvara, is called the 'jewel-waist' (ratna-āhāra), and in his form as creator Vīṣṇu is figured with the lotus of creation springing from the jewel at his waist (or navel). Here we have all the three elements of the lotus-jewel formula unified in Vīṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa as creator, that is Ośha, the son of Brahmā as Vīṣṇu himself, while, issuing from the jewel at his navel, the lotus gives birth to the Brāhmanical triad. The Ośha maṇi formula of Avalokiteśvara, therefore, like the Vīṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa figure in Brāhmanism, presumably symbolizes the creative cosmic action by self-generated supernatural efficacy.

In the later Tantrik period, from about the 5th cent. A.D. onwards, when Indian Buddhism, following in the footsteps of the Gāthā tradition, the Śramaṇa, and the Yājñika, has been transformed into the Tantrik, the Vīra Śramaṇa, with the identification of the Buddha, (2) his Word or Law (Dharma), and (3) his Order of monks (Sāṅgha). As it is the stereotyped conventional formula found in the earliest Pali canon of Buddhism, the word maṇi has been translated into the Sanskrit maṇi, and for a layman's belief in Buddhism. It is doubtless coined by Buddha himself. In arriving at this nomenclature, the title of 'treasure' (ratna) was obviously, in view of the above facts, borrowed by Buddha from the Brāhmanical treasure concept. The Vīra Śramaṇa's identification of the divine Chakravartin, a form of the supreme Vedic god Varuṇa, with whose entire septet of treasures we find Brahmā already clothed in the Pali canon. The number three was thus a favourite in Vedic Brahmānism, as is the still earlier faiths. There are the three divisions of the universe, the three worlds, three classes of gods, etc.

¹ Cf. E. E. 129, footnote 2.
² Wackell, tr. in IA xiii. 1911, 218. The usual Sanskrit word for navel is tānḍava, translated by maṇi, 'beak,' evidently mirroring hands as tāndava.
³ By F. W. Thomas in J.R.S., 1900, p. 404.
⁴ Cf. E. E. 129, footnote 2. Footnote 2. Pusey considers that this is the formula referred to, though Cowell, who translated the text, expressly states in the preface that 'there is no mention of Avalokiteśvara or the other Nārāyaṇas in the Ośha maṇi.'
⁵ Waddell, Buddhism of Tibet, p. 39, 138-150, 286, where the mystical value of each syllable is described.
⁶ Bunjia Nanjio, Catalogue of the Chinese Trans. of the Buddhist Tripitika, Oxford, 1883, no. 349; other recensions of this text are nos. 383, 384, translated by E. E. 605 and 602-607 respectively. The following texts also contain the formula (see Sembo Fujii in Hinsui Zasshi, Tokyo, 1898, pp. 64-65; nos. 782, 1,177, and 1787 of Nanjio's Catalogue). The last is the Senso temple epithet of Nārāyaṇa Dārājī, translated 980-1001, 990-1127.
⁷ Sembo Fujii, op. cit., p. 64.
⁹ See art. INDIAN. (Buddhist), x.
the three Vedas, or revealed scriptures of Manu, and the tripitaka god Tra, who is the protector of some, the draught of immortality, and the nace in the wheel of Varuna. The latter god Varuna, indeed, is expressly related to several triads as well as to the law, the three heavens and the demons. If the deities are not within him... he is a great lord of the arts of nature. 2 Here the term for law is ri, or fixed law, which has the same value as dharma, the pre-Buddhist term in Manu and elsewhere for laws and ordinances, in the tripitaka, the law or code by which the early Buddhists used it for Buddha's word or dogma. 3 Buddha as the first member of this triad is termed the first of the treasures; but besides this he is independently referred to as a treasure-jewel (ratnamandam) or likened to one. In the Digha-Nikaya he is likened on his incarnation to this and to the beryl-jewel, and also in the Lelita Vistara, which further, refers to that event thus: 'the beautiful treasure (ratna) will shortly be manifested in the three regions', and the jewel-victor (jina-ratna) from the mine of religion will be manifested in the continent of Jambu (India). 4 Now, the latter epithet of Buddha is at the present day the ordinary formal title of him who professes to be Buddha's representative and successor, viz. the Dalai Lama of Tibet; his designation of Gyatso-ma-rin-po-che, the literal translation of jina-ratna into Tibetan, is thus seen to have its origin (atiberto unkowna) manifestly in this appellative of Buddha in the Lelita Vistara.

The central member of the triad personifying the fixed ordinances and speech of Sakayamunis was probably suggested to that saint by the personified Speech of Brahmanism, the goddess, Vach (or Vaka), who is one of the earliest of the Vedas goddesses, and was made the wife of Brahma about the time of Buddha, when the new eponymous god Brahma was being invested with the functions of the supreme god of Vedic religion, Purusa, Vakasana, the transition form of Varuna (Chakravaka). Vach in the Rigveda is called 'the queen of the gods,' and her original abode was the sea (suggestive of relation to Varuna and her original identity with Srti, the wife in the seven treasures); and, while she has a triad nature (terrestrial, middle, and celestial), she especially occupies the middle region of the atmosphere, and thus may have suggested the middle location for speech in the Buddhist triad. For the more closely we examine the mythology, idioms, and terminology of the Pali canon, the more manifest is the indebtedness of Buddhism to its parent religion, Brahmanism. The third member of the triad is the 'Order of Buddha's monks'—it is erroneously to translate this as the 'chureh' or 'congregation,' as is often done; for the latex, both men and women, are excluded from the Sangha. 9.

9. The treasure as a spell.—The fact that spells have been in universal use by all sections of Buddhism from the earliest times, and even by Buddha himself, has been established by the present writer. 11 Among the southern Buddhists, of Burma, Siam, and Ceylon, one of the canons of the protective spells, or paritta, is the 'Jewel or treasure' Sermon ('Dhatuvattada Sutta'). This discourse, ascribed to Buddha in the Pali canon, 1 is an invocation to demons to grant prosperity, and it is couched in the orthodox form of Buddhist spells, namely, as an 'act of appeasement' (sukkha-kiraja; Skr. satyakirija) 2 which is virtually an incantation. The Ratana Sutta begins: 'Of all ye demons who are assembled, terrestrial or celestial, may you all possess happiness! Be friendly to the man of the right understanding those who protect those who by day or night propitiate you by offerings! Whatever harm may he done to these, whether in this world or in another, or whether there be any disease or misfortune, this spell shall not be experienced by him. This gem-like Buddha is superlatively excellent. By this truth let there be prosperity!' and so on for the other two members of the triad, treasures, etc., in fifteen stanzas, the closing sentence of each being, 'By this truth let there be prosperity!' This is one of a large series of demonsitic and theistic texts ascribed to Buddha in the orthodox Pali canon, and belongs to a phase of Buddhism which, although usually overlooked by writers on southern Buddhism, yet forms a very conspicuous and important part of southern Buddhism as a practical religion. Its contents and form indicate that it must have been originally composed expressly for use as a luck-compelling charm, based upon the supposed magical efficacy of the pre-historic wishing-gea or amulet.

The 'jewels' and 'treasures' in Indian Buddhist symbolism and cults are thus seen to be of non-Indian, pre-Hindu, and pre-Iranian archaic origin, and possibly borrowed from Assyrian and pre-historic mythology.

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated in the footnotes.

J. A. WADDEN.

Jews in China.—See Jews in China.

Jews in Cochino (Malabar).—I. History.—The earliest known history of this community connects it with the now extinct city of Cranganore, the deserted site of which is situated some 20 miles north of the present port and town of Cochino. Spelt Kranangur, it is the more easily seen to be the Portuguese form of Kodungallur, the name of a village which still exists close by. It is almost certainly to be identified with the ancient port of Monemis (Moysa), known to Ptolomey, and the author of the Periplous Maris Erythraei, where, according to the Pentingarian Tables, the Romans, up to at least A.D. 220, kept a force of two cohorts to protect the trade between India and Egypt. Another name in frequent use for the same spot in the Middle Ages is Shinkali. 4

The origin of the settlement is shrouded in obscurity. We may pass over possible deductions to be drawn as to a Palestinian-Indian trade from well-known foreign words in the Biblical account of the merchandise of King Solomon, suggesting an Indian, to some a S. Indian or Dravidian, origin; these traditions of the Cochino Jews themselves, embodied in a supposed record-book (Dibre Huganaim), represent their ancestors as arriving in Malabar immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus (A.D. 70). 5

1 Chakeranen, 1st Sutra, tr. V. Fassull, SBE X (1886), ii. 36; Childers, JRAS, 1898, p. 314; and D. J. Gogorly, Ceylon Buddhism, Colombo, 1900, ii. 341-342.


3 See Gogorly, Ceylon Buddhism, ii. 227-232, for translations of several of them.

4 Monemis primum euripium Indicis ('IV. vi. xxii. 30).

5 See Yule and Burnell, Moslem-Indian, p. 130, and Burnell, Ancient India as described by Ptolomey, London, 1886, p. 41; R. Campbell, 'On the Inscriptions of Kranangur,' 4. in. 1876, quoted in McCarty, Moseus Marius Erythraei, p. 13; also Burnell in Jd. Ill. 1874, ii. 251 ff, on the origin of the confutated often met with in India, and various names for the same site.

6 K. R. 1913, 2 Ch 696 (cf. Hume Rae, Syrian Church of India, p. 285.5).

7 See Buchanan, Christian Researches, ii. 222.
however, be attached to this document, which bears signs of interpolation, and of which more than one version exists, and which may even have been wholly rewritten from memory after destruction from various causes. The first really reliable and explicit record in relation to the Jews of Cochin presents itself in the form of an ancient royal charter (sīyâṣa), engraved on plates of copper, whereby a piece of land, named Anjumavura, is conveyed by Bhāskara Rāva Varmā, the reigning monarch of Malabar, residing at his palace in Mu¬yirkodi,1 to one Joseph Rabban, headman of the Jewish community, and to his heirs in perpetuity, with the annexation to it of various privileges of nobility and rights of revenue. The charter is attested by the signatures of six subordinate princes, whose rank Joseph Rabban may be assumed to have been called to share. Buchanān in 1666 caused a facsimile of this charter to be executed in brass, and deposited it in the Library at Cambridge. A description of it by Burnet, entitled ‘The Original Settlement Deed of the Jewish Colony at Cochin,’ with reproductions of the plates, may be found in IA iii. [1874] 333 f. Burnet shows that this document, which is inscribed in arcaic Tamil, in the Vāgarānta font, must be ascribed to some time in the 8th cent., perhaps as early as A.D. 700. It reveals the Jews in an already affluent and organized condition in Malabar, bespeaking an antiquity considerably anterior to its date; and it was presumably preserved by the king in return for important State services rendered by the community. After the light afforded by this charter, all subsequent documents descend for upwards of a thousand years upon the history of the Jews in Malabar, covering perhaps a period generally prosperous. When it lifts, it is to disclose the setting in of a time of adversity and overthrow. About 1895 the sack of Cranganore by the Muhammadan Zamorins of Calicut, who previously had invaded the place in 1594 and massacred many, accompanied by the incoming of the Portuguese, involved the ruin of the small Jewish State, and resulted in the final desertion of Cranganore as a place of abode. Reduced in numbers, and with largely shattered fortunes, the main body of the dispersed Jews migrated to Cochin, and built their present Jewish Town in its immediate vicinity. Certain of their number, however, continued to linger in the neighbourhood of the old Cranganore, at places named Cherambur, North Parangam, and Māla, where their successors are still to be found; and several have settled at Ernakulam, the native capital of the Cochin State, situated a few miles eastwards from Cochin, across the Malabar Backwater.

2. ‘White’ and ‘Black’ Jews. A singular feature of the Cochin Jewish community in the eyes of foreign observers has always been its division into ‘White’ and ‘Black’ Jews. As early as 1655, Mannaṭṭa Ben Israël,3 addressing Cromwell, describes them as consisting one part of ‘a white colour and three of a tawny.’ Buchanan and a succession of later writers have not failed to call attention to the same distinction of colour. Yemenite writers have even seen their way to discriminate a third, or Brown, section. It is probably correct to regard the so-called Black Jews as comprising two classes, characterized by themselves as M’ukhasdam (those of lineage) and enam-M’ukhasdam (non-M’ukhasdam) (manumitted slaves). Regarded thus, the M’ukhasdam among the Black Jews constituted themselves to be the representatives of an original stock, older than the present White Jews, and look upon the

1 It is from the ‘Miyri’ in this name, elsewhere shown to be identical with Craganore, that the classical name Mazzucete is believed to have been formed.

2 See Life and Labours of Mannath Ben Israel, in A. Loisy’s Miscellanea of Hebrew Literature, ii. 2nd ser., London, 1877.

3 Mannath Ben Israel Jacob de Castro (1603-1684). The decision to be found in a Hebrew work of his entitled Ḥayyim (‘Life of Jacob’), published at Leghorn in 1728. Mannath gave decisions, or opinions, on questions of ritual and casuistry propounded to him. As Eng. tr. of the passage in relation to the Cochin Jews from the pen of ‘A. Cochin Jew,’ may be found in the Jewish Chronicle, 9th April, 1859.

4 The report of this Commission was published at Amsterdam in 1657, under the title of Noticias dos Judeus de Cochin, by Pereira da Silva (see J.E., art. ‘Cochin’ and ‘India’).
dants of the original settlers, and that the Black Jews are an entirely mixed class, resulting from unions between the former and their Indian slaves, have been the victims of too sweeping generalizations. A. Wolf, having given us a sketch in 1830, promptly met with an indignant reproof from the Black Jews, repudiating the theory. The fact, on the other hand, that the royal copper-plating charter is found at present in the keeping of the White Jews and not of the Black, Jews would seem to point to some position of consensual priority which the White Jews must have occupied in the bygone days of unbroken friendly intercourse between the two sections of the community. A White Jew, of the existing house of Halegus, held in old times a high position as Mudallar, or hereditary headman of the community, recognized by the Raja—an honor now abolished.

The present numbers of the Cochin Jewish community are small, and are slowly diminishing, as judged by the percentages of several past decades. By the census of 1911, the total number of Jews amounted to 1268. Of these, 73 are located in a patch of the Travancore State, which here curiously overlaps that of Cochin, and takes in the region of North Parur. Of the 1248 Jews mentioned, 1055 are Black Jews, and 192 White. Distributed according to residence in towns, there may be said to be 495 Jews at Jews Town, Cochin; 488 at Ernakulam; 147 at Chennanampalam; 110 at North Parur; 42 at Trichur; and 2 at Trichirappalli. The so-called Black Jews are to be found in all the above places, the White Jews almost exclusively in Jews Town, or in the neighboring European towns. Cochin, where the quarter north of the Jews Town itself consists of a single narrow street, running N. and S. Its northernmost end is occupied by the synagogue of the White Jews, paved with hard-burned bricks (jas) tiles, and flanked by a conspicuous clock-tower, furnished with a Dutch clock. About the middle of the street is situated the Thekumbagam synagogue, and near the southernmost end the Kada-vanbagam synagogue, both of the Black Jews. Eastwards, across the Backwater, at Ernakulam, the capital of the Cochin State, situated on ground granted them in 1711, the Black Jews possess two more synagogues, also known by the names of Thekumbagam and Kada-
vanbagam. These designations, meaning 'southside' and 'river-side' respectively, bear no relation to the synagogues of the same names in either place, but are derived from the positions originally occupied by the corresponding synagogues in Cranganore. Internally, the synagogues conform to the pattern of those in other parts of the world, except that peculiarities of native art enter into the structure of their fittings. Externally, after the manner of the country, the buildings are generally approached by a sort of prolonged porch or corridor. The Black Jews possess also a synagogue at each of the three places North Parur, Chennanampalam, and Mala. Disused sites and ruins of discarded synagogues are to be met with, as at Tirur and Vallacott, and an old synagogue known as the 'Cochin Angadi' is situated near Jews Town.

1 See the Oriental Christian Spectator, September, 1820.
2 While designated the 'White' and the 'Black,' it is by no means always possible to distinguish, even by the eyes of a native, or black, view on which side the sea, and hence, as is the case with the Black are the earlier conquerors.

3 Ritual.—In their synagogue ritual the Jews of Cochin do not differ appreciably from Jews in other parts of the world. They follow the Sephardic rite, like most of the Jews of the East. Immediately after the White and Black Jews are called to the reading of the Pentateuch, the former are assigned to the Book of Deuteronomy, and the latter to the Book of the Prophets.

4 Organization and occupations.—As to communal organization, the Black Jews formurally constitute a federation of seven synagogue communities, or yeganes, embracing the two in Ernakulam, the two in Jews Town, and one each at North Parur, and Chennanampalam. It is obvious that the symmetry of this arrangement has been broken in recent years by the secession of the Kadavanbagam synagogue at Jews Town to the jurisdiction of the White Jews, on account of a dispute. In respect of their occupations, the Cochin Jews are engaged mainly in trade and merchandise, though not to the extent prevailing in the days of their forefathers. The Black Jews deal fairly largely in rice, though some are handycraftsmen. Education is making way among both classes, although the recent census shows barely more than a quarter of their number to be as yet literate.


J. H. LORD.
JEWISH RACES—See BENI ISRAEL.

JEWISH IN INDIA.—See BENI ISRAEL.

JEWISH IN ISLAM.—The attitude of the Muhammadans towards the Jews and the consequent position occupied by the latter in the lands of Islam must be traced ultimately to the decisions regarding them promulgated by Muhammad, and especially to the ordinances of the khalif Omar. Muhammad was the first of sym pathetic tolerance, for he hoped to range behind him, in support of the faith which he was establishing, the whole of the forces of the powerful Jewish tribes of Arabia. But, however, before he discovered that the absorption of Judaism into the new faith was unsustainable; the Jews were thereupon denounced as enemies of the faith, and a bitter war of extermination was waged against them. The khalif Omar, who reigned from A.D. 634 to 644, was the first to regularize and legalize the attitude of Islam towards the Jews, and, as it was under his khalifate that Persia, Egypt, and Syria, all lands with considerable Jewish populations, first came under Arabian influence, his Ordinances had immediately a considerable influence on Jewish life. By these Ordinances Jews were not allowed to change Judaism or to restore those which were in ruins; they were to conduct their services in subdued tones, and to pay heavy and exceptional taxes; they were not to hinder their converts from accepting Islam; they were debarred from holding public office or from obtaining a verdict against a Muhammadan in a court of law; they were forbidden to ride on horses or to wear rings—both marks of distinction; and they were compelled to wear distinctive dress. A Muhammadan was free to enter a synagogue at any time, but no Jew was in any circumstances admitted to a mosque. Even in death Jews laboured under a disability, for they were allowed only flat tombs, not monuments. These Ordinances are still the law in all countries in which the Muhammadans hold sway, although they are not always enforced. They were not invariably acted upon even while Omar still reigned, and it is probable that, although the Ordinances all bear his name, the Code in its accepted form came into existence gradually during a period which extended beyond the date of his assassination. To Omar, however, it was undoubtedly due one definite piece of persecution. Determined that Arabia should henceforth try no innovator, he ruthlessly exiled the depressed remnant of Jews who survived in the peninsula in a state of semi-slavery. Outside of Arabia the rule of the Muhammadans did not at first come to the Jews as a scourge. Under the later Persian kings they had suffered persecution. The advent of the conquerors was consequently welcomed, and the Jews, settled in Mesopotamia, aided materially in the conquest of that region. The Muhammadans, on their part, treated their allies with tolerance, and an era of relative happiness dawned for the Jewish communities of Babylonia. To the Jews of Syria and of Egypt also the Muhammadans came as deliverers from the yoke of oppression. In Arabia, however, the first home of Muhammadanism, the Jews have always been subject to persecution. There, if anywhere, the Ordinances of Omar had their full effect. As late as last century, the Jews of Yemen or S. Arabia were forbidden to wear new or good clothes, to ride on an ass or a mule, or to engage in commerce. With hardly an exception they were until recent times in a state of servile trade. Of late an emigration from Yemen has set in, and many of the former Jewish inhabitants are now settled in Jerusalem and in the modern Jewish settlements in Palestine, where they ply the trades which they learned in their former homes. There are at present about 25,000 Jews in Arabia.

In Persia, Jewish communities have existed since the period of the Arab conquest. The disorders which filled the centuries immediately succeeded that event reacted unfavourably upon the fortunes of the Jewish population, whose condition from that day to this has almost always been a pitiable one. To 83,000 Jews who are to be found in Persia to-day are due the most part of the Jewish community in the more important towns of Hamadan, Isfahan, Kirmanshah, Shiraz, Teheran, and Mashhad. They, with few exceptions, confined to their own quarters of the town, marked off from their neighbours by occupation, dress, and customs. As a rule they are engaged in retail trade or follow callings for which little respect is felt. Another serious disability under which they labour is the law or custom whereby a Jew converted to Islam inherits all the property of his relatives to the exclusion of the next of kin. The Alliance Israelite Universelle, a society founded in 1860 for the protection and improvement of the Jews in general, and now concentrating its attention on educational works in Muhammadan lands, has schools for boys and girls at Teheran.

Egypt had a considerable and important Jewish population at the time of the Arab invasion, and throughout the period of Muhammadan domination, except for a few short periods, the Jews were both prosperous and contented. The khalif al-Hakim (906-1020), after a period of toleration, suddenly began to enforce the Ordinances of Omar. He even exceeded their rigor. He compelled the Jews to wear distinctive dress, and to keep a wooden image of a calf. On the pretext that they mocked him, al-Hakim burned the whole of the Jewish quarter. But his treatment was quite exceptional, and more marked off from his actions. Under other rules individual Jews held high office in the State. Some of them—notably Maimonides, the greatest Jewish philosopher of the Middle Ages—were physicians to the khalif. Until the middle of the 16th century the Jewish communities in Egypt were presided over by a rabbi, whose rule was co-extensive with the Egyptian dominions. He had full civil and criminal jurisdiction, and was as powerful as power to punish by fine and imprisonment. The appointment of Rabbis rested with him, as well as the responsibility for seeing that the civil law was observed within the limits of his authority. The rabbi was appointed by the khalif, and his installation was attended by much ceremonial. The Jewish population of Egypt is at present estimated at 50,000.

In the other districts of N. Africa the conditions were much the same. Although there were times of persecution, for the greater part of the period of Muhammadan domination the political condition of the Jews was a tolerably easy one. The pre-Muhammadan conditions of Arabia were reproduced to some extent, and Jewish semi-independent tribes roved about the interior of Africa. For centuries after the Dissolution, and some of them persisted to the present day. In Tunis, towards the end of the 8th cent., there was a persecution by the Imam Idris, but his reign did not last long. The accession of the Almohads led to a longer period of tribulation. The first of the Almohads, 'Abd-al-Mu'min, was responsible for forcible conversions of Jews and Christians on a wholesale scale. This policy was pursued by his successors. At length the number of converts had become so large, and, in view of the circumstances of the conversions, their sincerity was so doubful, that a distinctive dress was allotted to them. Under the Hafite dynasty, which commenced in
1236, the condition of the Jews improved greatly. But even in the relatively comfortable period following, the Jews suffered from many disabilities, notably special taxation and restriction of residence. They, however, furnished the government with a succession of high officials, in particular the re-challenged grand vizier of the Janissaries. By such a title they had secured the grant of a constitution by Muhammad Bey, by which their liberties were secured. Tunis has since 1881 been a dependency of France. Its Jewish population at present numbers about 60,000.

In Algeria the conditions were identical with those in Tunis until the fall of the Almohads. Subsequent to that event the viceroyalty of the Jewish population was similar to that in the neighbouring State. Under the Turks in both regions the Jews, so long as they accepted with resignation the disabilities inherent in the Turkish system of government which were imposed upon them, found their condition one of relative comfort, much envied by most of their co-religionists settled in Christian lands. They were granted self-government under a sultan. This policy was continued after the fall of the Almohads, and the Jews were permitted to live and move in the Turkish dominions with perfect freedom. In occupation and dress they were without restrictions. They were even admitted into the army.

In Morocco the rule of the Almohads lasted until our own day and still exists nominally. In this, the westernmost of the lands of N. Africa, the history of the Jews until the severance of the country from dependence on Baghdad in 788, is the same as in the lands farther east. Idris, the conqueror of that year, was successful, by means of persuasion aided by force, in inducing the Jewish tribes of the west to join his standard, and with their assistance he was able to consolidate his power. In the same year the conqueror and the Jews, in consequence of which the latter suffered many indignities. For the following two centuries and a half their condition remained one of tolerate subjection. However, on the fall of the Almohads in 1146 brought upon them, they were, as elsewhere, all the rigours of persecution. The rule of the Almohads meant forced conversions to Islam and the expulsion of those who objected. Even the few Jews who were permitted to remain were subjected to heavy taxation and were compelled to wear a distinguishing badge. When the rule of the Almohads passed, their position improved somewhat, but always remained precarious. Mulai Arshid and his brother Mulai Ismail, who reigned at the end of the 17th cent., were especially severe, and the latter plundered the Jews without mercy. During the subsequent reign the Jews very often suffered cruel persecution, and on the other hand, there were periods of quietude. Whenever civil war broke out, as so frequently happened, the Jews in the disturbed region were saved from the fury of the sword, not by any special intercessions, but, on the other hand, there were periods of quietude. Whenever civil war broke out, as so frequently happened, the Jews in the disturbed region were saved from the fury of the sword, not by any special intercessions, but, on the other hand, there were periods of quietude. Whenever civil war broke out, as so frequently happened, the Jews in the disturbed region were saved from the fury of the sword, not by any special intercessions, but, on the other hand, there were periods of quietude. Whenever civil war broke out, as so frequently happened, the Jews in the disturbed region were saved from the fury of the sword, not by any special intercessions, but, on the other hand, there were periods of quietude.

The Sultanate at Constantinople was accustomed to absolute freedom to their Jewish subjects, and utilized with advantage all their services; they also, on occasions, intervened on behalf of foreign Jews who were suffering at the hands of other governments. Numerous instances of such action were the representations made at Venice on behalf of Donna Gracia Mandes which led to her release, and the protests sent to the pope against the treatment of Jewish prisoners in Ancona. The office of hakham bashi, or chief Rabbi, was instituted in the reign of Muhammad the Conqueror (1451-81). He was, and still is, the official representative of the Jews in civil affairs. The hakham bashi was a member of the State council. He had considerable powers over the Jews of the empire. He arranged their taxation, appointed Rabbis, and was, in fact, under the Sultan, the ruler of the Jews of Turkey. The first hakham bashi, Moses Cazzial, was appointed by the Sultan, and was subsequently appointed subject to the Sultan's approval. The Golden Age of the Jews of Turkey lasted for about two centuries. But, as in all despotic States, the conditions under which they dwelt were those of permanence. Their rights and privileges depended on the whim of the rulers, and, when a Sultan such as Murad iii. arose, they found even their lives in danger. It was by the party in power at the time that they were the object of a movement against the government. To the Jew, however, whether he was murdered or plun-
JEWS IN ZORASTRIANISM.

The account of the Jewish Exile and the fortunes of the Jews under the Achaemenian dynasty are too familiar to require recapitulation here; suffice it to say that the history of Montreal and Esther presents the proof that the Hebrew Ethnol. of the time was written in the Persian dominion, while such cities as Nekardea were centres of Jewish culture. The only convert of real note was the pious king of Adiabene, Izates (1 Macc. 10:1; Jos. Ant. xx. ii. 3), whose name (Avesta Yazata, Greek Yazat, or Yadra) suggests a Semitic etymology (cf. Armenian Amanzer, or Amanazar), is Iranian.

When the last Parthian monarch, Artabanus IV., fell in battle in A.D. 226, the Jews lamented his descent, but were consoled with the accession of the founder of the Sassanian dynasty, Artashata Paspakan, in whom, as in Josephus, and Parvak inscription on the Parthian stele, the truth of the prophecy of the Jewish exilarch (ch. 4:4–5), probably found a more Exilarch, and who became by her father the famous Bahram Gār (420–453). This queen established colonies of her compatriots in Parnor and Moribonos (cf. Armenian Maraγas), in Iberia.

When the Jewish exilarch (ch. 4:4–5), probably Bahram I., and who became by her father the famous Bahram Gār (420–453). This queen established colonies of her compatriots in Parnor and Moribonos (cf. Armenian Maraγas), in Iberia.

The eighth and ninth of these precepts mention the Jews, and may be based on Lv 4:25 and on distorted reminiscences of condemnation of human sacrifice, as in 2 Chr. 29:28,Ps 106:6, Is 57:5, Jer 19:29, Ezek 22:29.

There is a possibility that the Talmud is mentioned in the Talmud, if the reading Used in 19th century, the Tifereth Yisrael, p. 359, is 359 as is in 19th century.

The quotation is paraphrases rather than translations. Thus, De 24:16 is rendered: "The Lord, who is the sacred being himself, commanded Adam thus: "Eat of every tree which is in the garden."

1 On the lettering, see P. Iscch. 119; M. Sellhein. "Innu n. B. Nathan," JEW. vi. 4948.
2 JEW. vi. 4948.
3 JEW. vi. 4948.
5 A. Contrasted in this art. to Spy.
in this garden, except that tree of knowledge; because when you eat thereof you die" (in one passage xlii. 28-29, and "the serpent said unto the woman, 'Did God say that ye should not eat of every tree of the garden?'"). The serpent, therefore, seems to have had some idea of the nature of forbidden knowledge before his temptation. The garden is a place of knowledge as well as of innocence. Thus it is that the Garden of Eden is a place of trial. The Garden of Eden is a place of temptation. The Garden of Eden is a place of knowledge as well as of innocence. The Garden of Eden is a place of temptation as well as of innocence.

In Gn 2:9 there is a curious variant, "darkness was upon the face of the world," and in Gn 2:10, "and the light shone upon the face of the world." With this 'black water' we may perhaps compare the 'black water' (melek) which, in Mandan, means, according to the bottom of the abyss and forms the home of all evil (A. H. W. Brandt, Mandanische Religion, Leipzig, 1888, pp. 45, 60, 65-66). This is also termed WON C'NE, 'black water, water' being developed by metathesis from WICON.

Jinnwar, Dhimar, Jinnwar (Skr. dhīnvar, 'fisherman').—The term applied in the Banjhaë to the carrier, waterman, fisherman, and basket-maker castes of the E. districts and Kâshmir. The caste numbered, according to the Census of 1911, 575,694, of whom 61 per cent were Hindus and the remainder Muhammadans, with a small Sikh minority. It has a low place in the Hindu caste system, and, as with the Jinnwar, in Kâshmir, the Hindu or Muhammadan beliefs are only a slight veneer over Animism. Its members worship chiefly the deities or spirits connected with their occupation, and the divinities of the great rivers, Ganges, Jumna, and Indus; and they make use of the boats, nets, and other implements of their craft.

One remarkable rite is almost peculiar to them. In the Banjhaë the 8th day after the Revat or feast of lights, which is celebrated at the new moon of K防火 (Oct.-Nov.), the Hoi or Hoi festival is held, at which the Jinnwar, or female water-carriers, are given the first place, and is petted by the ladies of the family, who act as their firewomen. After the house has been purified by being smeared with cow-dung, figures of a litter and its bearers are drawn on the wall in four or five colours, and to it offerings, accompanied by the usual worship (pajul) with incense, lights, and flowers, are made, consisting of reds, white, and yellow, and many sorts of the roots of the banyan.

The legend tells that at the beginning of the KâlÄgya or present age, the Hoi, as a result of the Jinnwar's rites, was to be extinguished.

The story of the Jinnwar probably belongs to the pseudo-Jonathan ad loc., and Yalgut (Gen. 115), the vine which Jacob brought back from Damascus and which was consumed by the Jinnwar near the huts of the Jinnwar.

According to the story told in tyi xiv. 62-70, the Jinnwar, who were attached to the Targum of the Hebrew Bible (compare from Jinnwar to Jonathan), were given the first place, and were petted by the ladies of the family, who acted as their firewomen. After the house had been purified by being smeared with cow-dung, figures of a litter and its bearers were drawn on the wall in four or five colours, and to it offerings, accompanied by the usual worship (pajul) with incense, lights, and flowers, were made, consisting of reds, white, and yellow, and many sorts of the roots of the banyan. This tale tells that at the beginning of the KâlÄgya or present age, the Hoi, as a result of the Jinnwar's rites, was to be extinguished. This is a theory of the Jinnwar tribe, and in their minds and encouraged them to further efforts, as the result of which the goddess Phalak or Chánumâ, who appeared as the avenue of the sun, was already given the first place, and was petted by the ladies of the family, who acted as her firewomen. After the house had been purified by being smeared with cow-dung, figures of a litter and its bearers were drawn on the wall in four or five colours, and to it offerings, accompanied by the usual worship (pajul) with incense, lights, and flowers, were made, consisting of reds, white, and yellow, and many sorts of the roots of the banyan.
ditions of deliverance and is living his last existence. Since he has exhausted desire and illusion, which are the fuel of individual existence (Brahmanism), the soul takes the body from the ‘mundane’ (lesukka) plane, where thoughts and actions move, to a higher plane, ‘supramundane’ (lokottara), from which thought and action are, practically speaking, transferred from the coarse body, because the physical forces which sustain life are not yet dead, just as the potter’s wheel continues to turn by the force which has acquired; because the potter, who is the payment, has not been entirely paid for. But such acts, recent or ancient, which ought to be paid for in a new rebirth, are either suppressed and ‘skipped over’ or ‘transferred’ to this life. No new act can be imputed to the jivanmukta, for an act can be imputed to a person only when it is ‘redolent of desire.’

The origin of this definition of sanctity is to be found, on the one hand, in the speculations concerning the ascetic, aloof from all human interest and clothed with and fed on air, in whom, as it would appear, there is no longer anything human; on the other hand, in the doctrines relating to the identity of the atman and the brahman, and to nirvana.

All the Indian sects have adopted the idea of the jivanmukta, and they have all had to study the various complicated problems which it raises. Can the jivanmukta get free from the world? Is he unless, May he do whatever he pleases, since sin no longer exists for him? Is he incapable of suffering? Is he exempt from mundane thoughts? We have a great deal of literature relating to these problems, especially in Buddhism (jivanmukta-arhat). It is one of the characteristics of Hindu theologies that they have always had, with much loyalty, sagacity, and subtlety, to ‘organize’ mystical ideas which cannot easily be reconciled with morality and experience. Within the limits of this article we cannot even touch upon the problem that is here presented.


JANA-MARGA. — The term, jana-marga, ‘the path of knowledge’ (to salvation, moksa, mokul, or jana-karya, department of knowledge, covers what are known as the ‘systems of Indian philosophy.’ The term is opposed to karma-marga (q.v.), karma-karya, salvation by works. The literature of the Vedic period is characterized by a joy of life which forms a striking contrast to the pessimistic attitude that dominates Indian thought throughout the later periods. The Vedas themselves are chiefly concerned with the attainment of happiness in this world and its continuance in the next by means of sacrifices and other good works (karma-karya) pleasing to the gods. At an early period we find objections raised to the purely selfish character of this attitude; some of the earlier Upanisads reject works altogether as being utterly inadequate. If not useless, for the attainment of salvation, and because they aim at worldly happiness only. This opposition to Vedic ritual gradually disappears in the Upanisads, and ultimately the philosophy of ignorance of the Upanisads becomes the Vedanta, and the saving knowledge that they teach is called the Vedanta (end of the Veda).

1. Upanisads.—The general attitude of the Upanisads to works is that sacrifice and good works may procure happiness to a limited extent, but are on the whole a hindrance rather than a help in the attainment of real salvation, which is to be sought through knowledge alone. To have any merit, works must not be performed with a view to a particular reward; if performed in a proper spirit, they contribute to originate a desire for knowledge. In order that knowledge may arise, the effects of past evil works must be removed, and this may be effected by performing acts of piety not aiming at any immediate reward; when the mind has been purified in this way, there arises a desire for knowledge, and this desire is to an end. Works, however, although useless by themselves, are sometimes even said to be essential: ‘Only he who knows both knowledge and not-knowledge (works) can be saved, because by good works he overcomes death and by knowledge he obtains the immortal.’

At a very early period we find two new ideas, which were destined to influence profoundly all future Indian thought, making their appearance with striking suddenness—the dogmas of metempsychosis (Hindu) and of the influence of actions in a previous existence (karma). No satisfactory explanation has yet been given of the origin of these beliefs, on which the latter depends (see, further, art. METEMPSYCHOSIS; Hindu). The second idea is based on the belief that no good or evil deed can go unrewarded or unpunished; happiness in this life is the reward of good deeds in a previous existence, and the observer, even apparently unmerited, is readily explained as the result of evil deeds in a previous existence (see further, art. KARMA). What is true of the previous existence is also true of the cycle of existence.

The cycle of existence has no beginning, and similarly has no end; for in each existence there must be a certain balance of unredressed good or unexpiated evil to carry the individual on to a new existence. Every action unfailingly brings its own reward or punishment; the cause of action is desire, and desire is due to ignorance, which mistakes the real nature of things (cf. art. Desire; Buddhist); it is this ignorance that is the cause of the cycle of rebirths (cf. art. MIVA). The result of this doctrine is a firm conviction of the misery of mundane existence, which contrasts with the passionate love of life of the earliest period, and the belief that real happiness is to be obtained only by release from the samsara. This release is to be obtained only by destroying the ignorance which is the cause of the cycle of existence; the object of the various philosophies is to teach that knowledge which brings salvation from mundane existence to the happy few.

Vedic and allied knowledge, and indeed all existing knowledge, was early recognized as insufficient for the attainment of salvation. True, for example, the Vedas taught that, though he has studied the Vedas, the epics, grammar, etc., and is learned in the scriptures, yet he is not learned in the atman; and believing to be taught the atman which overcomes sorrow, and to be led to the shore that lies beyond sorrow. Similarly, Svetakota, having completed his education under his father Arhat, and failing to answer questions put to him,Dubbed his father for declaring his education perfect. More learning and book-knowledge then are not sufficient. ‘The atman is not attained by learning... and much knowledge of books.’

True knowledge in the Upanisads is a knowledge of brahman or the atman (q.v.). This knowledge was recognized as being different in its nature from what is commonly understood by the term ‘knowledge’; for it is possible to know all branches of human knowledge and yet lack the philosophy of ignorance of the Upanisads, and the saving knowledge of the atman; this state of ignorance of true knowledge is called avidya (not-knowledge); this term gradually lost the meaning of simple ignorance, and came to be applied to the false knowledge which impedes a knowledge of brahman, by preventing us from seeing things as they really are, and is based on illusion (maya) due to the limitations of the human intellect.
Ignorance, then, is the knowledge derived from the experience of the senses, while true knowledge is of Brahman or the atman.

There are two fundamental ideas in the Upanisads—Brahman and the atman, which came to be used synonymously. Brahman is the first principle of the universe. Not the Eternal One, the all-pervading power; atman is first the vital principle, the Self, then the All-soul, the One, and thus comes to be identical with brahman. Saving knowledge of the unity of Brahma and the atman is the object of the atman. The doctrine of the identity of brahman and the atman is summed up in such phrases as 

Brahmānu nauc (from whom Brahma, Brahma, the self being Brahma) 

The veil of ignorance, through which we see a plurality of objects when in reality brahman alone exists, is lifted when the underlying brahman of the object is recognized in the atman of the knower. Mundane objects are no realities, and are of no value for their own sake, but exist only through the atman, which alone exists and is the entire universe. Yajñavalkya compares the phenomena of the world to the notes of a flute or conch shell: the notes cannot be seen. It is not the instrument, but the player who is seized; only when the atman is known is all else known. He who has comprehended the atman knows the whole universe. When it is recognized that there is only one being, the Self or atman, eternal and unchanging, the illusions resulting from the limitations of the intellect disappear, and release is obtained from this world of ignorance.

2. VEDANTA.—The Brahmic speculations of the Upanisads are developed in the philosophical system usually called Vedanta, properly the Uttara-mimamsa, or 'Second inquiry' (concerning brahman; it is also called brahma-mimamsa); the founder of the system, Badarayana, flourished about the beginning of the Christian era, and his great expounder Sankara eight centuries later. The fundamental notion in the system, which is still the most influential in India, is the identity of the atman, or self, with the brahman. Brahman is the One, the Unique, the Self-existent, everlasting and unchanging, and cannot therefore be subject to any illusion. The self of each individual must therefore be identical with the self of brahman, instead of being a part of it; the self in each individual is therefore the whole un divided brahman. Nothing exists but brahman (adwitiya-vidyā, doctrine of non-duality). The apparent objections to this, which arise out of mundane experience, are due to ignorance, which prevents the self from recognizing that all else is illusion; the phenomena of the senses and the material universe are illusions, just as the idea of separate souls is. The Vedanta does not inquire into the origin of this ignorance, whether due to desire, etc., or not, but teaches that it may be destroyed by the saving knowledge that all that is not soul is illusion, and that the soul is brahman.

When this truth is known, the fetters that bind the soul to the cycle of existence are broken, and release is obtained (see, further, art. VEDANTA). We may here mention the Visistadvaita (modified monism) school of the Vedanta founded by Badarayana, one of the most important commentators on the Brahma-sutras, who flourished in the 12th or 13th cent. A.D. and belonged to the Bhagavata sect. He expounds the Vedanta system according to the tenets of this monistic sect in a way which differs in important respects from that given; according to the Visistadvaitas, the individual souls are not identical with brahman or God, but are elements of him and not separate from him; the individual souls are subject to the miseries of mundane existence, not entirely by ignorance, but by unbelief. The true means of salvation is therefore found, not in some means of self-knowledge, but in devout love of God (bhakti) and belief.

3. SAIVA.—The Saiva school, which has been called the oldest real system of Indian philosophy, is as much impressed by the infinite variety of the universe as the Vedanta. The system, the traditional founder of which was Kapila, is essentially dualistic; two principles are admitted whose interworkings produce the universe—prasaktyam (matter) and purusa (soul or spirit); the latter is not one all-pervading spirit like the brahman of the Vedanta, but rather an infinite number of individual spirits each independent, and thus the variety of the universe is explained. These two are entirely distinct, and have existed side by side from all eternity. Mental processes are mechanical actions of physical organs, i.e. of praktyam; purusa, however, would remain unconscious if it were not acted upon by praktyam; purusa, or soul, has no volition of its own, but the subtle body (sukshma sharira), the inner organs and senses which surround it has. Through this body the soul becomes waylaid, and thus has to suffer the miseries of mundane existence. The aim of the Saiva is to teach that purusa is absolutely distinct from praktyam in the most subtle organs. A knowledge that these two are absolutely distinct, and have been so from the beginning, delivers the soul from the cycle of existence; it then realizes that the knowledge of itself and matter, on which the miseries of the whole depend, is only an apparent one, and, when this is realized, the sufferings of praktyam are no longer the sufferings of purusa, while the sufferings of the formers are no longer experienced, since they are no longer illuminated by purusa (see, further, art. SAIVA).

The philosophical basis of Buddhism is considerably influenced by the Saiva school (for a further view see above, p. 213). It assumes that mundane existence is nothing but suffering, and that the cause of this suffering is the desire to enjoy the apparent delights of the world. The cure of this attachment is ignorance; this ignorance and all that follows it will be dissipated when attachment to the world is renounced.

4. YOGA.—The Yoga system, founded by Patanjali, who, if not identical with the celebrated grammarian of that name, likewise flourished in the 2nd cent. B.C., is closely connected with the Saiva. The philosophical basis of the Yoga is that of the Saiva with the addition of the notions of a personal God (deva) and of the occult powers to be derived from Yoga practices. Its characteristic feature is the influence laid on asceticism and mental concentration (yoga = concentration, concentration, union).

Asceticism and contemplation have always been practised in India as means of acquiring merit. Patanjali developed a formal system the methodical practice of which, in addition to giving occult powers, is regarded by him as one of the surest ways of gaining saving knowledge. The aim of Yoga was at first, that of the Saiva, namely, the separation (kayagamana) of soul and matter; but, with the addition of the concept of the Divine (deva) or Universal Soul, the ultimate aim comes to be union of the individual soul with God. The mind is to be deliberately and artificially withdrawn from the external world and concentrated upon itself; it is then enabled to return effortlessly to the external world, and to realize one the material fetters that bind it to the saumadiva.
and to awaken to a knowledge of truth, and the individual gains freedom and absorption in the World-Soul (see, further, art. YOGA).

5. Minor systems. — Of the minor systems that teach the way of escape from the samsara the most important is the Vaiśeṣika founded by Kaṇāda. The name (Vaiśeṣika = 'atom-eater') at quite an early date. Deliverance, according to Kaṇāda, is to be obtained only by a knowledge of the real nature of soul and the universe. Deliverance depends upon this knowledge of the "six categories" (padārtha), under which everything that exists can be classified; these are substance, quality, action, generality, individuality, and inherence or inseparability. These are narrowly defined and subdivided; it is from the fifth that the system takes its name (vaiśēga = atomic individuality); all substances (defined in the first category as earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul (jīva)) consist of invisible atoms, from the combination of which all mental and physical phenomena arise. Freedom is obtained when the Vaiśeṣika doctrines have been comprehended (see, further, art. VAIŚEṢIKA).

The Nyāya system of Gantama is usually coupled with the Vaiśeṣika, from which it is developed. It is really the logical form of the Nyāya of means of knowledge. Truth is to be attained by the application of sixteen categories, or logical notions, and salvation depends on a correct knowledge of their nature. It is the only case in which the human soul has the role of ascertaining truth (see, further, art. NYĀYA).

The aim of the Īravatī-ṃūrti ("first inquiry"), which is usually coupled with the Vedānta, is, like the Nyāya, to ascertain the ultimate origin of liberation from the world, but, as the other name (Karma-ṃūrti) of the system shows, it is not its aim it is to discern the observance of orthodox rites and ceremonies, and not saving knowledge. It is particularly concerned with the study and interpretation of the Vedas (see, further, art. MIMĀṂSĀ).

Indra"

The Jaina. — P. D. Beissner, "Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie,

Joachites. — As a sect in the Christian Church the Joachites exercised an remarkable influence in the 13th cent. and, as we shall see, some of their tenets passed over into the motivod doctrines of the Reformation. The sect derived their name from Joachim of Floris, who seems to have been born about 1145 and to have died in 1202. He was, therefore, an older contemporary of Francis of Assisi (1189–1220), with whom followers the Joachinites were in vigorous sympathy. It is difficult to disentangle the personality or the work of Joachim from the mass of tradition which has gathered about his name, and it is equally difficult to discover what Joachim himself actually taught. He was certainly a creative personality, and works have been attributed to him which are really the fruit of the thought of later times. His teaching about the trinity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is in a way open to the year 1260. Of art. AGES OF THE WORLD (Christian), vol. i. p. 191.

3. His influence. — The Joachite views thus expressed by Joachim were eagerly caught up and developed by his followers, and the fullest expression of them is to be found in the comments on Isaiah and Jeremiah, which go under Joachin as a title. The stricter Franciscans also found them peculiarly congenial, and the idea of a spiritual Christianity and an imminent Age of the Spirit was at once
assimilated by them. Their criticism of the
secularized Roman Church had been exceptionally
vigorous. To them the Church of Rome was the
good and its greed of god,
should be, and in their methods for securing
be unfaithful to its true mission,
the saving of the world for Christ. The Church
could have trusted in the strength of God, not
in the sword. In the Age of the Reformation
it had been unfaithful in common
with the strict Franciscans, the Joachimites
looked forward to a purified Church and a spiritual
Christianity. In such a Church the monks would
remain as the organ of the National Gospel.
Outward authority must disappear in the Age of the
Spirit. The later Joachimite teaching was
peculiarly stringent in its anti-Romatism. One
of the fruits of this school of thought was the
famous Liber Introductories in Evangelium exter-
nunm, written probably in 1254 by the Franciscan,
Gerardus of Borgo San Domenico. In its teaching
the Introductories drew largely from the writings
of Joachim, whom it regarded as an inspired
prophet. The book was condemned by Alexander
iv. in 1255; but the apocalyptic ideas which it
bolstered up were accepted by the Franciscans and
the followers of Joachim. From the chronicle
of Salimbene of Parma, who belonged to a generation
after Joachim, we can gather how influential and
central was the place of Joachim in the
influence of the Franciscans and
in the teaching of the Joachimites. We can see how
the Joachimites were agitated by such questions as
the controversy between the papacy and the monarchy,
and the approaching last time.

Though much of the teaching of Joachim and his
followers was highly visionary and artificial, it
is apparent that there was behind it a genuine
religious experience. They made their protest against
the secularization of the Church and formed their
vision of the future out of the fullness of this
experience. So far as their distinctive teaching was
concerned, parts of it had been already before the
Church's mind. The doctrine of the Thirty
Years' War had been anticipated by Montanism, while
the teaching of the Eternal Gospel may be found in
Origen. But the religious experience of Joachim
and his followers was a real contribution to the
thought of the 16th century. Nor was it teaching
which passed away. In one form or another the
ideals of the Joachimites passed over into the
thought of the Reformation, influencing more especially
the later versions of Wycliffe and Huss.

formation, London, 1871; — ed. in PEPS. T. 1; and 751;
and 856; — Church History of Gieseler, Edinburgh, 1846-59
JOSEPHAT, BARTLAAM AND. — The history of
Joasaph, Bartlam, and Josaphat, which has become known
through numerous translations in the West, is
derived from the Buddhist collection of stories known as the
Jātaka, the 'Birth-Stories,' records of the
and the Buddhist
in the course of his
upon events. 1 Of the stories
these themselves the date and origin are various.
None, however, has attained so great popularity
or passed through so many transformations and
variations as that of Bartlam and Josephat.
All are of the nature of folk-lore, parable, or fable,
derived from Indian sources or collections of tales,
which in the first instance were for the most part
non-Buddhist, but were adapted to the purposes of
Buddhist propaganda and made to serve ethical
and didactic ends. Gautama himself, in these tales,
them all the protagonist, and expounds or
illuminates the moral which the story is intended to
enforce. In the regions of the West, however, in
which not a few of these narratives have found
a home and become popular, the Buddhist element
thus introduced is again excluded and is replaced
by Christian terminology and teaching. Interpretation
and adaptation have frequently so changed the
'story' of the story and the definite
point of the moral that it is only historically and
by tracing the course of development that its
Indian origin can be recognized.

Of the original form of the story, as it was
compiled in India or adapted from more ancient
existing materials, nothing is directly known.
Incidents or parables contained in it have been traced
in the Buddhist Agadās, the Mahabharata,
and elsewhere. From the Buddhist original, which,
it may be assumed, was composed in Magadhi, or
in an early form of some Prakrit dialect, a Pahlavi
rendering was made in or about the time of the
reign of Chosroes the Great of Persia (A.D. 531-
579). This version also is no longer extant.
There is, however, a curious and certainly not
accidental resemblance between the life and history
of this king and the character of Abnerus, the
Indian ruler and the father of Josephat, as
presented in the Buddhist story. To this Pahlavi
rendering, which would seem to have been already
deprecated of its distinctive Buddhist
learning, all the numerous versions of the West
owe their origin. The earliest Greek translation
is derived from a Syriac version of the Pahlavi,
and is attributed to the beginning of the 9th
century, partly on the ground that in an enumeration
of the great religions of the world no reference is
made to Mummudanianism. The Greek text is
printed among the works of John of Damascus,
who it was ascribed by a mistaken identification
with a 'John, Monk' of the Convent of St.
Saba, to whom the work was assigned in the
color of early Greek MSS. There are also three
early Arabic versions, the original of which bore
the title of Kitab Balahevan or Badaq; and a
medieval Jewish translation into Hebrew, attributed
to Abraham ibn Chisdai in the 13th
century. From these Oriental renderings, of the
later versions, numbering more than sixty, are
ultimately descended. The first Latin translation
was made from the Greek by Anastasius, the
papal librarian in the latter part of the 9th
century, and became the parent of most of the modern
European versions, including the English. The
Greek was again independently translated into
Latin a few centuries later by J. Billius, Abbot
of St. Michel in Brittany, and both renderings
are printed among the works of John of Damascus.
The earliest English version was produced by W.
Caxton in A.D. 1483. There are also extant four
later versions or paraphrases, none of which are
in verse. The verse renderings have been
reprinted more than once, but the prose
version is rare.

1 "JOSEPHAT, BARTLAAM AND." 2
2 The Arabic text has been reprinted recently at Cairo for the
benefit of the Coptic Christians, under the title of "Bartlam and
Josaphat, the Tale of the Copts." 3
3 Reprinted by J. Jacob, London, 1885; and also as an
appendix to the same author's Barltam and Josaphat.
4 "E.g., 2. Jacob, op. cit. 5. H. Macdonald, Story of Bar-
tlam and Josaphat," The History of the Renowned Balaam" (1806), from Caxton's, or Stories of the
Buddhist's Former Births, lr. from the Fall by various hands,
vols., Cambridge, 1896-1907; and the.
5 J. J. Jacobs, Bartlam and Josaphat, p. xi.
6 Reprinted by J. Jacob, London, 1885; and also as an
appendix to the same author's Barltam and Josaphat.
7 "E.g., 2. Jacob, op. cit. 5. H. Macdonald, Story of Bar-
tlam and Josaphat," The History of the Renowned Balaam" (1806), from Caxton's, or Stories of the
Buddhist's Former Births, lr. from the Fall by various hands,
vols., Cambridge, 1896-1907; and the.
Essentially the legend is as follows. Variations in detail, however, are numerous in the different versions.

Antecedently to the reign of a powerful Indian ruler named Abner, Christian teaching had found its way to the East; and many converts had been made within his dominions. The king, himself, however, was strongly opposed to the foreign religion, and issued an edict against it. Among others an inhabitant of the city of Jerusalem went to Abner and informed him that if he persisted in this opposition he would be excommunicated by the Holy Church if he could be persuaded to return. The king was prevailed upon to yield, but he had lost the confidence of his people, and the sense of his religion, and the renouncing the world, adopted the life of an anchorite in the desert. Being bezir, delivered a brief and fulsome apology, by which Abner was further incensed against the Christian, and he fled to the north and formed a monastery in anger, forbidding him ever to return to his presence.

The king, however, had been childless, of fawning form and beauty, to whom is given the name of Josaphat (in the Greek Ισαβαάλ). At a birthday feast he met a scholar who presented to his form the prophecy of his future greatness and wisdom. In some forms of the story the hero, who bears a high rank for wisdom and purity of life, comes to the court and in successive interviews with the prince convinces him of the truth, whereupon the latter expresses his desire that Josaphat become his disciple. The anchorite's name is Barlaam. To convey his teaching he employs a simile or a parable which set forth the true doctrine and illustrate the vanity and fruitlessness of worldly things. In the number and arrangement of these parables the versions again present considerable variations. The king is naturally moved to grief and wrath on hearing of his son's conversion, and endeavors to change his argument to change his purposes.

He also issues orders for the arrest of Barlaam. The hermit, however, has left the city, and the attempt fails. Arrangement soon takes place for the holding of a public discussion before the prince, in which a stranger, Nacher, is to play the part of the apostate, to present the Christian argument, and to be defeated in it. Thus it is hoped to discredit the faith in the eyes of Josaphat, and to induce him to return to the faith of his fathers. In a secret interview with Nacher, however, the prince threatens him with death if he does not visitiate the truth. He urges his case therefore with eloquence and success, and offers before the king a powerful and convincing apology for the faith, by which his arguments and pleas are lost in the wilderness. A further attempt is made to lead the King to confess the vanity of worldly and spiritual possessions, in which the agency of Theodas, a magician, is employed. This also meets with no success; and Theodas himself is converted by means of a parable of a ship and its passengers and friend, given himself over to the life of an anchorite in the wilderness.

Some forms of the legend are in their details more strikingly reminiscent of the life history of Gautama and in the above, which in substance represents the Greek. Thus in an Arabic version the Bo-tree appears, with miraculous fruit. Josaphat flees on horseback from the city by night in company with his vizier, whom he sends back, together with his horse and all his possessions, when he arrives in the wilderness. After his conversion he is carried up into heaven, and on his return devotes himself with much success to preaching. He dies, as in the Buddhist record, reclining with his head to the west, and with a final blessing on his disciple Ananda.

The distinctively Christian features of the narrative are interpolations introduced to further the story, when the text was utilized for Christian edification and adapted to the purposes of Christian apologetic. The older Oriental version, as the Arabic above, more evidently betray their Indian and Buddhist origin. Both Barlaam and Josaphat have a formal place on the roll of Christian saints, and special days on the church calendar are set apart to their memory. In the Macedonian Church the Greek Church, August 26 is the commemoration of St. Josaphat, and, in the sister Church of Rossolar Christiania, August 27 is dedicated to the joint service of the two saints. The Church is said to be relics of St. Josaphat, in the form of a bone and part of the spine, preserved in a church at Antiparos. A monastery in Thessaly bears the name of St. Barlaam; and elsewhere also churches have been consecrated in their honour.

Not the least remarkable of the many strange features of the story is that the names of the two principal characters are both ultimately derived from one and the same source, and denote the Buddha, the founder of the Buddhist faith. The characters, therefore, are really doublets of a common original. The Greek Ἰσαβαάλ is a transformed and corrupt form of the title Ἰδασίκη, which through the Pahlavi has found its way into Arabic as Dádšáh, and then by a confusion of g and ţ, and by the dialectical point, became Yudhásat or Yudhás, and finally Yoszaf. Rasavara, the original form of the name which through the Syriac has become Barlaam, is the well-known title of the Buddha, Ḥaŋgaacən, 'the Lord', the patronymics of letters g and ţ being similar and easily confused in the Pahlavi alphabet. Thus the great Indian religious teacher reappears in a double form in the West as a venerated Christian saint. Other names also in the story seem to be derived from the Indian texts. Thus Zardan, the nobleman entrusted with the guardianship of the young prince, has been identified with Chandana, Gautama's charioteer and the companion of his flight from his father's palace.

The Latin version of Barlaam and Josaphat was printed as early as 1530 at Basel; but the Greek text not until three centuries later, at Paris in the year 1832. In the latter the story is described as 'a profitable story brought ... from the further part of Ethiopia, called India, by John the Monk ... or the Monastery of St. Sabas or Sabas.' John the Monk is believed to be identical with a well-known John, a member of an early fraternity on Mt. Sinai, who lived about two centuries before John of Damascus (A.D. 750). It was not, however, connected with the account in the monastery of St. Catherines, of the Syriac text of the Apology of Aristides, which it became evident that the defence of the faith offered by Nacher in the story was not original, but borrowed from the Christian author. According to Eusebius (HE iv. 3), Aristides addressed his Apology to the Emperor Hadrian (A.D. 117-138), but in the judgment of Rendel Harris the work belongs more probably to the early years of his successor Antoninus Pius (138-161). It was long believed to have been lost. With the publication of the Greek text its practical identity with the Greek form part of the story of Barlaam and Josaphat was at once recognized. In its Syriac form the text of the Apology is expanded by a number of characteristic repetitions which add considerably to its length. The Greek is supposed to represent more faithfully the original. In the early Christian centuries the Apology of Aristides enjoyed much popularity, and was regarded as an effective and complete defence of the faith, which was adopted accordingly by the Greek translator of the 1

1 Published with an Eng. tr. by J. Rendel Harris in PS 1.1, Cambridge, 1857.
JOSEPHUS.—The correct forms of the name of Josephus (or, according to his adopted Roman name, Flavius Josephus), the Jewish historian, were Jo-sé-phus, Josephus, or Josephus. The forms Iosepbe, Joseph, Josephus, Josephus, or Josephus. The forms

1. The Hebrew text is remarkable for the number of parables that it records. It will be found printed in all complete editions of the works.
2. That of the Sonne follows so closely the lines of the narrative in the Synoptic Gospels that its source can hardly be in doubt. It is found, moreover, in the earliest versions, Arabic and Hebrew, as well as in the Greek, in the version known as the Rabbinical or the Palestinian, and in the Christian Gospels. The likeness between the two is not striking. Perhaps it justifies the suggestion that the Christian form of the parable has replaced a Buddhist original of similar import.

Stories similar to that of the three caskets in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice are distributed more widely. They are found in the Talmud as well as in Buddhist sources, and in medieval Europe seem to have been well known and popular. In the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat the king sets before his attendants four caskets, two of which are overlaid with gold and precious stones, and two covered with rough clay. The gold-encrusted caskets, however, contain only dry bones, the others are filled with pearls and jewels. The caskets are opened before the king, and required to estimate the value of the various caskets. Their judgment is, of course, at fault; and the king forces the moral that a fair outside view can conceal an evil heart, while the clay-covered vessels he likes are vastly more important in reality, but within full of noble and elevating thoughts. Whether the English poet was familiar with the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat it is impossible to determine; but the ultimate source of the story which he has adopted and immortalized is Buddhist and Indian. That it was contained in the original form of the Indian legend is proved by the fact that it finds a place in the earliest versions.

LITERATURE.—J. Jacobs, Barlaam and Josaphat, English Lives of Buddha, London, 1880 (the most complete discussion of the legend and its historical relations, where also numerous references will be found to earlier works); Max Müller, Migration of Peoples, in United States and Europe, 1881; K. S. Macmillan, Story of Barlaam and Josaphat, Calcutta, 1880; and The Great Unknown, London, 1886. See also The Romance of the World in the Bible of the Middle Ages, comps. and edd. by V. L. Hemming, 1881. The life of the Buddha is described in the K. S. Macmillan, Story of Barlaam and Josaphat, Calcutta, 1880; and The Great Unknown, London, 1886. See also The Romance of the World in the Bible of the Middle Ages, comps. and edd. by V. L. Hemming, 1881. The life of the Buddha is described in the

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1. In this article the works of Josephus will be cited under the following abbreviations: BJ = Bellum Judææum, AJ = Antiquitates Judæææum, V. — Vita, CA = a letter, and the accompanying numbers refer to the paragraphs of the present writers edition.
authority, and to thwart the designs of his enemy, mainly because of the loyal support accorded him by the people of Galilee.

The men of the charge preferred against Josephus. In Galilee, John denounced him as a traitor to the national cause (BJ ii. 364), while in Jerusalem the same accusers contended that he had betrayed the Temple to the Tyrians, and that he had been dismissed from office before he became too powerful, and that there was a danger of his coming to Armenia and setting up a despotic government (BJ ii. 366, VI. 340)—an entirely different accusation, and one which practically means nothing, since Josephus is far from impartial in his narrative. It is highly probable that other and more serious grievances were also launched against him. It seems clear that he was not very enterprising or successful general, and showed obtuseness in many things. He was especially at fault in allowing Sophronia, one of his commanding generals, to fall into the hands of the enemy (BJ ii. 374, 669), and probably in other ways laid himself open to criticism. Whatever the truth may have been in these matters, it is clear that the dissensions with John of Gischala and others were anything but favourable to the preparations and defences being made by the Galileans in view of the imminent attack of the Romans.

In the spring of A.D. 67, immediately after Sophronia had been occupied and the surrounding country devastated by an advance guard of the Roman army under Phæceus, Vespasian, the legate of Nero, pressed forwards from Ptolemais with a large force. Josephus fell back upon Tiberias, and from there sent couriers to Jerusalem, and did not think it either that effective reinforcements should be granted him or that peace should be concluded. He seems to have felt that his position in Tiberias was precarious. Vespasian's advance against Jotapata, he marched thither, and gained admission before the investment was complete (9th June, A.D. 67). But he had little hope, as we learn from Flavius Josephus, of standing there and accordingly made up his mind to escape from the besieged town together with some of his more eminent colleagues. The inhabitants, however, furnished him with the privilege of seeking mercy, and after some consideration, he consented.

His companions, however, would not bear of submitting to Rome, and gave Josephus the choice of conforming to their plans or of dying at their hands; but at his suggestion they determined to kill one another in a certain order determined by lot, and the cast of fortune left as the last survivors Josephus and another. They had little difficulty in persuading him to join him in accepting the Roman clemency. We may venture to assert that the transaction cannot have been quite as he describes it, for among those whom he claims to have outwitted were persons by no means so simple as his narrative implies (BJ iii. 342).

After this act of submission, Josephus was brought before Vespasian, who had him put in irons, with a view to his being sent to Nero at Rome. The prisoner now asked for a special interview with the commander, at which he announced to Vespasian that the imperial throne would shortly be his, since he was at hand. He intended to deprecate such language, but, having learned that Josephus had previously shown himself something of a prophet, he took a different attitude. The captive still remained, however, with the same spirit; and all at once he was well treated, and all events nothing more was said about his being sent to Rome.

Suetonius has a statement not unlike this, though differing in details. He speaks of the capture first as not intended, when put in chains, that Vespasian would soon liberate him again, but as the Emperor (Satius Flavius i. 5; Dio Cass. livi. i). The prediction of Josephus must, therefore, have been known to other historians of the period. In point of fact, premonitions and prophetic dreams were then at that time highly credited and seriously regarded among all classes, and it is likely that Josephus in his precarious situation should have ventured to make such a prediction—hazards though it was. He wants his prophetic gift, and seems to have believed that God had specially favoured him and revealed the future to him (BJ iii. 316, 605 f.; VI. 306). In any case, the special favours shown to him by Vespasian seems to prove that the Emperor felt in some sense indebted to Josephus.

Vespasian was proclaimed Emperor in Alexandria on the 1st, then at Caesarea on the 3rd, of July, A.D. 69, and Josephus was at once set free (BJ iv. 623 f.). He accompanied the Emperor to Egypt, and in the spring of A.D. 70 joined him in his march towards Jerusalem. He was present during the whole siege, acting at the headquarters of Titus as interpreter and commissioner, knowing both the language and the art of war, and thus taking service with the Romans against his own countrymen (CA i. 48 f.). More than once, as he tells us, he unsuccessfully advised his people to abandon their futile resistance (BJ iv. 114, 201, 391 f., VI. 94 f., 118 f., 305); on one occasion, indeed, a stone was hurled at him and he was severely injured (BJ iv. 541), for the insurgents regarded him as a renegade and a traitor (BJ iii. 438). When the city fell, he was able to save his two brothers, including his own brother, and to rescue some sacred writings (VI. 417 f.), and he then accompanied Titus to Rome and took part in the Jewish Triumph. Thereafter he settled in the capital. Vespasian allowed him to occupy his own previous dwelling, and granted him a pension and the right of citizenship. He now took the name Flavius Josephus. This gracious treatment was continued by Titus, as also by Domitian and the Empress Domitia. Josephus likewise enjoyed the friendship of Agrippa II. and his household (BJ vii. 364), and it is probable that he kept in touch with eminent Jews in Alexandria and other places, as well as with the Adiabenean chiefs who lived in Rome (BJ vi. 356, vii. 447).

His wealth must have been considerable, as well as the orders he had received from Nero or at Rome concerning the bestowal of lands near Jerusalem, that had been taken by Titus in order to better suit some of his companions and Vespasian supplemented his income by the gift of another estate in Judaea, which, again, was exempt from taxes by Domitian. He was several times married; his first wife had remained in Jerusalem, and was also the mother of his son, who had married a lady of rank (BJ iv. 419). Josephus's second wife gave him a girl-appearing, who, however, deserted him in Egypt; thereupon he married a third wife at Alexandria, and by her he had three children, one of whom, a son named Hyrcanus, was still living in A.D. 94. Josephus had this child committed to the care of a certain girl of good family belonging to Cretics, who bore him two children, Atticus and Simonides (BJ iv. 414 f., 490 f.). The health of the streets Agrippa, is believed by K. Zaringimeler to be the M. Flavius Agrippa mentioned in an inscription found in Cesarea (EDP III. 380/923).

The outward circumstances of Josephus were thus fairly propitious. True, his good fortune was not altogether unbroken. He was hated, and more than once legally indicted, by his countrymen, notably by a certain Jonathan, who had raised some disturbance in Cyrene, and who, having been brought to Rome, denounced Josephus and other leading Jews as the instigators and abettors of the rebellion. Similar things occurred under Titus and Domitian (BJ vii. 448 f.; VI. 423 f., 429). But Josephus had always been able to clear himself, and retained the favour of the three Flavian Emperors to the last. Among his patrons was also the Emperor's freedman, Epaphroditus, to whom he dedicated his later writings.

The identity of this Epaphroditus is a disputed point. Some scholars, among whom is E. Schürer, identify him with the Epaphroditus of the Acts (Acts xx. 4)—an opinion with which the present writer cannot agree. Josephus endorses his friends as those who administered affairs of the utmost importance, and with whom he was on terms of the closest intimacy. It is true that our evidence is fragmentary, and that several names are mentioned in connexion with him, but the chief are: (1) the Epaphroditus whom Josephus names as his friend, and to whom he dedicated his works. (2) A. E. R. E. (Add. I. 8)—statements which apply, not to the grammarian and scholar, but rather to the freedman, who had previously been
We cannot say when Josephus died. For us his life comes to an end with his writings, and these do not carry beyond the end of his reign. What then follows, if we care, with H. Dodwell (Disquisitiones in Ieronomum, Oxford, 1689, p. 468), that he did not survive Domitian, and that he was involved in the fall of his patron Epaphroditus, or fell a victim to the suspicion manifested before the Emperor in his last days.

2. Works.—We have seen that Josephus spent the latter part of his life, from A.D. 71, in Rome, and that he was there that part of it which formed part of his literary career. His object was to give the Greeks—a term which, probably, also covers the educated classes among the Romans—a more thorough knowledge of his own people, and especially of their history and their religion. He accordingly wrote in Greek, which he had doubtless learned while in his native country, and, as he tells us himself (Cai. 1, 228), he guarded against defects in style by consulting writers of experience. It is certain that he also had some knowledge of Latin, and in one passage he quotes Livy (A.C. liv. 68; cf. xix. 257).

His first work was the History of the Jewish War (Ἰσραήλ ὁ Ἰουδαίως ἀληθεύως, de Bello Judeico)—to give the title which he himself chose, though the MSS show a preference for Ἰσραήλ Ἰουδαίως (de Israele Judaeo), which only is found in Christian literature, and is, indeed, used by Origen (Selecta in Theronem, iv. 14 [PG xii. 660]). In this work Josephus tells the story of the Jewish insurrection in which he himself took part, first on the national, then on the imperial, side. The book was written after the dedication of the temple of Pax (A.D. 75), and a little before the death of Vespasian (A.D. 79) (BJ vii. 158 sq.; Vit. 301; Ed. xiv. 60). As Josephus says in his preface, however, he was not the first to write a history of the war.

As account of it had been given immediately after its termination. Its compilation, however, was different from the earlier narratives was composed by a certain Antonius Julianus, who likewise took part on the imperial side, and was one of the procurators of Judea (Maine, Felix, Gesneriis, xxxiv. 4; BJ vi. 232). Josephus himself had previously written an Aramaic account (now lost) of the war, in which he wrote of his own people in the Past, and it was only after the completion of this that he resolved to make his own narrative a companion to the history of the Greeks (Cai. 1. 12). No part of this Aramaic record has come down to us, and we are, therefore, not in a position to fix its relation to the extent Greek narrative. The latter was probably a complete, exact, recast, constructed on a more comprehensive plan. A Syrian version of it, the Basor, is preserved in the Peshitta, the Syriac OT (ed. A. M. Ceriani, Milan, 1876-80). This is, however, as some have supposed, a survival of the original Aramaic work, but rather a translation from our present Greek text, as is clearly proved by its erroneous renderings (F.A. 1, 228; ed. Strauss, p. xxii).

In his preface to the B.J., Josephus proposes, by means of a true and straightforward chronicle, to bring his readers to a better understanding of the Jewish people and of the insurrection.

He proceeds to give a brief sketch of the world, and of the Jewish people, and of the insurrection.

In the first place, the details he lays down the period between that event and the outbreak of the revolt against Rome (A.D. 66). Then comes the revolt itself; first, the beginning of the campaign of Vespasian in A.D. 67-69 (iii. and iv.); the investment and capture of Jerusalem in A.D. 70; the fall of the city down to the taking of Masada (A.D. 73); and the Jewish disturbances in Egypt and Cyrene. He then turns naturally to a description of the Jewish nation's sufferings, the various things that happened to them while the war was in progress, and concludes with a description of the services of the Romans and their victories over the Jews. Finally, he concludes his account with an account of the final destruction of Jerusalem and the end of the revolt (A.D. 73). His account of the siege of Jerusalem is particularly interesting, and he devotes a great deal of space to it. He mentions the capture of the city by Titus, and the destruction of the Temple. He describes the sack of Jerusalem, and the burning of the Temple, and the capture of the city. He also describes the death of the Roman general, and the capture of the city by the Romans. He describes the destruction of the city, and the capture of the Temple. He describes the sack of Jerusalem, and the burning of the Temple, and the capture of the city. He also describes the death of the Roman general, and the capture of the city by the Romans. He describes the destruction of the city, and the capture of the Temple. He describes the sack of Jerusalem, and the burning of the Temple, and the capture of the city. He also describes the death of the Roman general, and the capture of the city by the Romans. He describes the destruction of the city, and the capture of the Temple.

Josephus likewise knows how to mingle self-approbation with his laudations of the Emperor and his family. In particular, he seeks to place his own martial performances in the best light.

He gives a full description of the way in which he so cleverly brought to naught the schemes of his opponents in Galilee (ii. 599 ff., 623 ff., and of the various measures that were taken to suppress the rebellion of the Jews in the Galilean revolt (ii. 524 ff.). He describes the capture of the city, and the destruction of the Temple. He describes the sack of Jerusalem, and the burning of the Temple, and the capture of the city. He also describes the death of the Roman general, and the capture of the city by the Romans. He describes the destruction of the city, and the capture of the Temple. He describes the sack of Jerusalem, and the burning of the Temple, and the capture of the city. He also describes the death of the Roman general, and the capture of the city by the Romans. He describes the destruction of the city, and the capture of the Temple.

Further, the history is steeped in rhetoric, in accord-
and occasionally amazing, exploits of war, performed by individuals, both Romans and Jews; he tells of remarkable natural phenomena, such as the river Bosphorus (ii. 189), the Sabine river (iii. 261), that flows only every seventh day (vii. 90), and the rock Mount (ii. 192) and, finally, he specifies the various omens which heralded various events (vii. 256). Considerable space is devoted to description—e.g., of the land of Judea, the Dead Sea, the city of Jerusalem, the Temple (vii. 25, 226 f., vi. 156 f.). It is evident that he has not to practice ingenuity in selecting and expressing his thoughts. His expression is clear, concise and accurate, and he is often the only one who tells the truth. His sympathy with his饱学的 comrades is evident in the description, for instance, of the magnificent ornaments and furniture of the temple which Josephus had been shown by a friend.

As to the sources from which Josephus draws his materials, we are left to mere conjecture. As he gives us no information on the subject. For the most part his work is based on the history of the rebellion, which he drew upon his own experience and sometimes even upon what he had actually witnessed. He may have also been, and probably was, indebted to some of the earlier accounts noted above—an inference strengthened by the occasional similarity between his work and that of Tacitus (Tacitus, Hist. v. 61 f.), B.J. iv. 476, ii. 186; v. 12; BJ vi. 251, 321 f.). As, however, these earlier accounts have all disappeared, we can say no more on the matter. Josephus accordingly states (CA i. 49) that he kept a record of events during the siege of Jerusalem, but this does not extend beyond the close of the war, and his knowledge of events in Jerusalem and Judea does not go beyond what he had been taught among the Romans themselves.

It is of interest to note that the chronological references are given according to the Roman, but according to a S. Macedonian calendar, which had been adjusted to the Jewish reckoning and, accordingly, corresponds with the calendar of Zoroastrianism. Known to us from the Jewish War, the specimen given by Josephus is used from this that the dates given by Josephus were obtained from a Jewish source.

In the latter part of the B.C. and the early history of the Jews, the names of the months, hours, and days are given. This, as well as from the books of the Maccabees, which he appears not to have used, suggests that the religious and historical Jewish Chronicle can hardly have existed. Josephus probably excepted from works in general history such passages as related to his own nation. In this connexion the name of Nicocles or Damascus is the first to suggest itself—the writer whose chronicle extends till the death of Herod's reign, and to which Josephus occasionally draws. From this, he must have drawn upon other sources as well. The names of Herod and the Byzantine emperors, however, are not made by him, and he appears not to have made any additions to the chronicle of the lives of the kings of David and Solomon as well as of Haggai and Zachariah (ii. 475, viii. 44, ix. 206 f., 239, x. 52 f., 78 f., 244 f., xi. 96). He is silent regarding Job, though it does not follow that he did not know of that book. He may assume, in fact, that it was a part of the canon in its present form.

The second outstanding work of Josephus is the Antiquities ('Aqkavayia Tawbaybi, Antiquitates Judaicae), which comprises in its twenty books the whole history of his people from the creation of the world to the beginning of the Christian era (AD 66), and which was completed and published in the 12th year of Domitian, i.e. A.D. 93-94 (AJ xx. 257). It is a number of years after the B.C. He tells us that he was 21 years old when he began with the B.C., he had entertained the idea of writing a book, but that this statement is belied by the preface to the B.C., in which he explicitly says that a work of that kind is now a superfluity, as other writers had been in the field (AJ i. 6; B.J. i. 17). The project of writing the A.B. must, therefore, have been a later inspiration.

As in the B.C., so in the A.B., the object of Josephus is to furnish the Hebrews with an accurate delineation of Israelite and Jewish history, in place of the misrepresentations of unfriendly or malevolent chroniclers.

It must be admitted that the knowledge possessed by educated people of the day in regard to the remotest part of the Jews was as meagre as it was inaccurate. Josephus takes as his basis ('ilustrationes et rerum quas reales (..)) the history of the Jews, as he has it from the Laws of Moses, and the Temple, and at best their idea of the history of Israel in its earliest times. Current tales about the Jews, some of which, such as those given by Thucydis, etc. were altogether fabulous, had mostly passed through Egyptian hands. In Egypt, as in Syria, and the adjacent country of Cyprus, and is common throughout Asia, from Seleucian times at least, the two peoples were constantly at feud, and this mutual hostility diffused itself through almost every region where Jew and Greek dwelt together, their respective material interests often contributing largely to the strife. The Greek antagonism to the Jews found expression in a series of acts, leading to vehement attacks upon both their personal characteristics and their national history. In these circumstances Josephus thought it incumbent upon him to give a faithful account of his people's history, in order to distinguish the minds of men, and especially of the Greeks, for it is this spirit which is for the Greeks whom he writes (AD i. 5 f., xvi. 36, xx. 262).

Josephus was not the first Jew to undertake the task of systematizing OT history. To say nothing of the Septuagint, other works of the kind had already appeared in the field of Alexandrine scholarship. Some of these were known to Josephus, and others he names Demetrius, Eupolemus, and the elder Philo (CA i. 218; cf. BJ i. 17). It would appear that the Alexandrian works referred to had not met with much acceptance among the Greeks, their uniting form not being resented. Moreover, none of them had gone beyond the period covered by the canonical Scriptures, while Josephus carries his narrative down to his own times, to the beginning of the rebellion, in fact. It is not known, accordingly, what was the character of these two or twenty-two books, viz. the five books of Moses, their alterations, etc., from the following epoch terminating with the reign of Artaxerxes I, and four books of Songs and Proverbs (CA i. 307). Jos. used the books which he himself had compiled himself, mostly of the historical books, but he supplements these from the prophets Nahum, Jonah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel. He makes frequent mention of the chronicler of the reigns of David and Solomon as well as of Haggai and Zachariah (AJ vii. 305, viii. 44, ix. 206 f., 239, x. 52 f., 78 f., 244 f., xi. 96). He is silent regarding Job, though it does not follow that he did not know of that work. He may assume, in fact, that it was a part of the canon in its present form.

To judge from what is said in the introduction and from other passages, he used the original Hebrew texts of his sources, and made use of the Greek versions to help him. He also tells us that he was acquainted with the B.C., and that he had entertained the idea of writing a book, but that this statement is belied by the preface to the B.C., in which he explicitly says that a work of that kind is now a superfluity, as other writers had been in the field (AJ i. 6; B.J. i. 17). The project of writing the A.B. must, therefore, have been a later inspiration.
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resorts not only to its phraseology, but also to its explanations and definitions. In the first place, the terminology of the Greek, a term like his. In the second place, he states that he has not always been consistent in his statement of facts. When, again, he repeats the strange mistakes of his sources, concerning the proper name Kléodis with Kléodis, 'a dog,' it makes Nabal the Calebite (2 Sam. 21:19, 25) the son of Jethro, whereas, from the version known as I EEdra, and theether which he used contained the additions found only in the Greek. According to the best and oldest recension of the Hebrew text, as regard to Judges and Samuel, the text was used that is the so-called Lachmian recension, to which he is, therefore, in accordance with the earlier writers. Neither, however, as is implied in the question whether Josephus really knew Hebrew, as some believe, though it is also denied. The present writer is of opinion that we have not sufficient evidence finally to decide this question, though, as Josephus himself testifies, that he is one of the most learned men among the Jews (AJ. v. 58), we need hardly hesitate to credit him with some knowledge of the ancient tongue. At the same time it should be observed that he makes no distinction between Hebrew and the Aramaic version (v. 298), and he is at least conceivable that on occasion he reads the Scriptures through the medium of an Aramaic paraphrase, i.e., a Targum. Special mention is also due to the fact that he interprets. In the one case he often differs widely from the Septuagint, and sometimes approximates to the Targum, and in the other case; e. g., he writes 'not Nàgge; not Tódáha, but 'Oóka; not Móda, but 'Olepous; it is clear that Josephus represents a pronunciation which differs greatly from that generally in use.

Josephus's rendering of the Scripture narrative is, on his own showing, anything but a mere paraphrase, without supplement or abridgment. He threads his recital with the additions and explanations which had been given by the exegesi, and often with the help of his contemporaries of Alexandria, upon both the historical and the legislative portions. He has thus used the Haggadá as well as the Halañá. The latter appears mainly in his description of the Pocket system of Moses (1891), which Haggadá, elements, legends, etc., occur with special frequency in b. i., as the patriarchal tradition given there readily lend itself to such supplementary or explanatory material.

As an instance of this we may refer to the table of nations given in Gen. 10, which Josephus harmonized with the geographical tables of Babel, a legendary addition which is found in 1.0 of Herodotus, there, in conformity with Hellenic traditions, he tells us that the son of Noah created two memorial pillars just before the Flood, in order that the science and invention of the one may remain on record for future generation. This conception is not far from the well-known narrative which Moses, as an Egyptian prince, composed his own account of the events during the duration of the Tanach and of other institutions of the Jewish exiles (AJ. i. 189 ff.; cf. Philo. ed. T. Mangey, London, 1742, ii. 159; according to AJ. i. 14 Moses himself in each case; and it naturally leads to similar conclusions. The next step in the same direction is the appearance in the narrative of Balaam, as given in AJ. iv. 122 ff., and Philo, ii. 127 ff., respectively.

In many other matters, however, Josephus and Philo differ. The former, for instance, is reproduces Josephus in the form quite unlike that given by Philo. Some of the Jewish authors that are just mentioned to Artapanus, but that with this writer does tell (Ep. Eusebius, Frag. Rerum. 26 of a war waged by Moses against the Ethiopians, he has in mind a different event altogether, so that the theory of Josephus having borrowed from him is out of the question. In brief, the enlargement is not a mere matter of translation, but a matter of interpretation. Josephus cannot be definitely assigned to his respective sources. In all probability he has read, not that the great text was quoted, including oral traditions, and chose what suited his purpose. It would appear as if it is in many of his own text and tradition had already been fused together.

His chronology of the Old Testament period presents considerable difficulties. He expands the chronological references of the Scriptures into a system. Thus B' contains calculations running back from the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus to the days of Abraham (v. 40, 143 ff.), in the AJ. the whole system is divided into two parts (i. e. 83 ff., 141 ff., ii. 81, 82 ff., vii. 86, 95 ff., viii. 6, 91 ff., ix. 250, x. 41, 147, xxvii. 230 ff.). In this he is probably following the example of Hellenistic experts, two of whom, Demottius and Epipolam, had set some repute as chronologists.

The details of his system are often inconsistent with each other. Such discrepancies have been explained on the theory that Josephus, using a variety of documents and traditions, revised and corrected them, and now another, without calculating for himself. Objectives have been brought against this view by D'Alonzo, who shows that Josephus obtained them at least, of his sources by computations based upon his own narrative; but even so, his discrepancies are not all removed. We must, however, believe the mind that the MSS themselves manifest considerable variation in regard to chronology, and that many of the statements may be due to copyists' errors, and may be eliminated by conjecture, the expediency should be adopted only with the greatest care, and, as all is done, differences in all cases. On the whole it seems impossible to deduce from Josephus a consistent system of chronology, or even any consistent system, and in this respect his work is of a somewhat careless kind.

The personal standpoint of Josephus is fixed by his religion and his position in life; he is a Jew, a priest, and a Pharisee. History teaches, in his opinion, that prosperity attends those who fear God, while the godless and the disobedient are daily punished (AJ. i. 13 ff.) and carried out in his account of how he is convinced that the world is ordered by divine providence; in a noteworthy passage (AJ. x. 277 ff.) he denounces the Epicureans, whom he puts on a level with the Sadducees, while the Phariséans correspond to the Stoics (v. 129). His views regarding God, destiny, and the human soul are in line with Pharisaic teaching, as appears also from the AJ. (v. 375 ff.), though he occasionally dilutes his Judaism with the conceptions of Greek philosophy, even showing some inclination towards pantheism (AJ. vi. 259, vii. 107). Nor is this his work for the theologian or philosopher, but is concerned, above all, to make Jewish history and Jewish character intelligible to the Greeks, and at the same time to present these things in the most favourable light. He accordingly takes pains to remove or to palliate the more sinister or repulsive elements, to bring the marvellous within the bounds of credibility, and to overlay the OT history with a Hellenistic gloss.

Abraham appears as a reformer of religion and science, as the founder of monotheism, and as the founder of medicine and arithmetical science. Josephus speaks of the Ptolemy of Hellenism as if they were the productions of a Greek legendary poet (v. 379). The tenth century the Maccabees he describes as the Messianic period, and the Hellenistic Jew, the Ozrián of (i. 36), and, similarly, the altar which Moses set up after his victory over the Amalekites is said to have been dedicated to the God of Victory, the god...—an idea of which there is no trace in Ex. 17:14. When Josephus refers to Moses two works, viz., Jair and T. Memni (v. 194, 196, 262), it is manifest that he has in his mind the great works of Plato bearing these names—the law-giver being the precursor of the philosopher. He is likewise from Plato (Leg. i. 676 ff.) that Josephus borrows the tradition that the stand-off from the hills to the plains after the Flight (AJ. 109); and the patriarchal history in b. i. affords, on the whole, the most numerous and least inconsistent evidence for the use of and modernizing methods. He makes no mention of the worship of the golden calf; he transfers the events into the time of Moses, for the traditions of the people's idols (v. 10); cf. 81 ff. (v. 19) and 100 (v. 18), and the 100 prophets of the Philistines which David is required to bring to so much in 600 heads (v. 261: cf. 181 D (K))
JOSEPHUS, seeking in this way to modify or expunge the specifically Jewish character of his narrative, closely connected herewith is his attempt to meet the attacks and suspicions current among the Moses and his laws (I. 13, II. 177, iii. 178, 205, vii. 116 f., cf. xiv. 381).

In order to invest the Missional legislation with a character of extraordinary humanfulness and compatibility, Josephus does not scruple to supplement the traditional text with engravements of his own (iv. 207, 234); and to win the suffrages of Hellenisation, he interposes the confirmatory testimonies of several historians. Of these the most outstanding are Herodotus (vii. 107, 293, 597), the Annals of Tyre (viii. 144 f., xiv. 293 f.), Berossus (i. 93, 107, 108, x. 39, 34, 219), the Shilleh Oreses (i. 118), Alexander Polyhistor (i. 240), and Nicolaus of Damascus (i. 94, 103, 159 f., xii. 101 f.), all noted and distinguished names.

With the book of Esther and the period of Artaxerxes, Josephus reaches the end of the OT narrative (xii. 206), and this marks the beginning of the second section of the A.J. At the very outset a lacuna occurs in the tradition, which extends to the time of the Maccabean revolt. For this interval of three centuries, embracing the reigns of the Syrian satraps, Ptolemy, and the Seleucids, Josephus had only disconnected legends of later origin.

There is, first of all, the visit of Alexander to Jerusalem, with all the consequences following it (xv. 297 f.), for the account of which Josephus is indebted to an apocryphal work which was written during the reign of the Book of Daniel (xi. 287). For the narrative of the Seventy and their traditions of the Mesopotamian Jews (xii. 111-119) his authority was the still extant letter of Aristeas, while the sections which follow, embracing the semi-legendary narratives of Apocryphon and the Joseph, the book of the Antiochus and Hyrcanus (xii. 157 f., 159 f.), appear to have had a similar source.

The beginning of a new era for the Jews is really marked by the Maccabean rising: it was then that they took their place in universal history, and came within the range of Greek writers, so that we have firm historical ground beneath our feet. The basis of the Maccabean history as given by Josephus is I Macc. (A.J. xii. 242-xiii. 225), for the existence of which work he is our earliest authority; he is of no small importance also for its textual criticism; but his use of it extends only to the death of Jonathan, the later portion (136-102 B.C.) appearing as commentary on a source.

Various explanations of this fact may be given. Destined up to this point he was to be a source. He was then in a position where it was not yet added to the present work. The exordium more probable that Josephus dis- regarded I Macc. at the point where it fails to bear the death of Jonathan because he now wished to work upon the basis of his own materials (ii. 107). That he used the MS in its earlier form, while he did not use the concluding part of I Macc., he was certainly acquainted with it. Of II Macc. he seems to have had no knowledge; but it is, nevertheless, probable that he was indebted directly or indirectly to its source, viz. Jason of Cyrene, for some of his materials. II Macc. 113 f., e.g., has no corresponding passage in I Macc. 1 but has points of contact with it, e.g., 21, 22, and, probably, some emendations from Jason. Another such insertion is found in xii. 36—an account of the temple of Omnipresence in Egypt. Further, in the narrative of I Macc., Josephus has made some alterations of his own. A special instance, he asserts that Judas Maccabaeus was high priest by divine indication, and the train of events changes more or less in harmony with this new order. He has also transferred some materials from his own previous work, the A.J., so that, taken all in all, his divergences from I Macc. are by no means insignificant. Finally, he was afraid of another characteristic of the A.J., viz. hostility to the Samarians, which is not found in the earlier writings, and first brought into relief by Josephus. This attitude is not confined to his account of the Maccabean period, but manifests itself as far back as xc. 291 f., giving occasion for manifest enlargements of greater or less extent. The last passage of the chapter (xii. 247), which, however, is, in my opinion, unanswerable, marks the conflict between Jews and Samaritans in Egypt under Ptolemy Philopator. We may very well believe that this is a passage in Josephus the antagonism between the orthodox Jews and the Samaritans is more pronounced than usual.

The beginning with Simon the high priest (xii. 218), Josephus took the BJ in review and enlarged, as his groundwork in the A.J. The two narratives are often quite identical, though verbal reproduction in passages of any length (with the exception of A.J. xiv. 489 f. = BJ i. 302 f.) is avoided. This agreement was formerly explained on the hypothesis that both works were drawn from a common source; the present writer has shared this opinion, but now regards it as erroneous, believing that Josephus simply incorporated in his later work a revised transcript of his earlier. As a matter of fact, the BJ is a work of unique character, composed according to the writer's own special design, and it is scarcely conceivable that any work capable of serving as a common source was previously in existence. Corroboration of the theory that the BJ is an expansion provided also by the inconsistencies and dislocations found in the former, as these would naturally occur where new material was imperfectly grafted upon the pre-existing text; a point which is evident in the account of Pompey (A.J. xiv. 37-44; cf. BJ I. 131).

Upon the older substructure Josephus superimposed a great deal—so much, in fact, that his additions, especially in the later books, greatly exceed the original in point of quantity. They are of many kinds; first of all may be mentioned the testimonies of various historians, such as Strabo, Timagenes, Nicolas, Livy; and to these we may add Agatharchides and Polybius, whom he had already quoted (xii. 5 f., 156 f.). Then there are the more or less extensive enlargements upon the earlier work which appear in the last sections of the BJ. Josephus has not divulged his authorities for these enlargements, and we must, therefore, depend upon conjectures, which in the present state of our knowledge, are most uncertain.

It is very unlikely that he directly availed himself of the Commentaries of King Herod, which he mentions once (xv. 174), and the most natural suggestion is that he relied upon the historians whom he now and again quotes—e.g., Strabo and Niclaus of Damascus. There is no doubt that latter in particular was largely drawn upon by Josephus (as was suggested above in regard to the BJ), more especially, though not exclusively, for the time of Herod; for Nicolas, as is well known, was a friend of Herod, and was likewise acquainted with Jewish history from a Jewish point of view. As a matter of fact, he is not only quoted in the A.J., but also criticized and corrected (xiv. 5 f., xvi. 13, 130). Josephus must have had other sources of information as well; nor must we forget his own original, for he was anything but a verbal plagiarist. As regards the post-Maccabean period, he must have depended largely upon the later writers. In this section he inserts several fairly long supplements in the account of Agrippa I. (xvii. 139 f., xx. 241 f.), of the Babylonian Jews (xvii. 287 f.), that the final section of the book, the last three chapters, which are of no great account, was added by the historian himself. Moreover, he must have availed himself of works dealing with Jewish history (cf. xx. 54); and from these he sometimes takes facts and incidents having little or nothing in common with the Josephus. From the embroils with Parthia under Tiberius (xvii. 32 f., 36 f.). An account of the death of Emperor Claudius, the bitter enemy of the Jews, is given with great differences (xiv. 211) and is adapted. T. Mommsen conjectures (Herod, iv. 160, 329), from the historian Claudius Rufus, though it may quite well have come from some other source.

Besides his classical authorities, however, Josephus also made use of native Jewish traditions. From the latter come the history of the Temple, and the annals of the successive high priests from br. i. 11 onwards, while the whole work is brought to a conclusion by a second historical sketch of the high-priesthood (xx. 241 f.), quite independent of the earlier, as appears both from the fact that it omits—rightly—the name of Judas Maccabaeus from the list. To this must be added the numerous, and sometimes very extraordinary, Jewish legends, a number of which reappear in the Talmudic writings (e.g., a story of the death of Hyrcanus I. and his wife), and the parables of Jesus and the parables of Jesus and the story of the Great Council (xiv. 411 f.), but there are many more, and the historical value of this, as, for example, xiv. 396 f., xx. 319 f., sqq. is not always high.

Notice is due to the documents and letters here and there inserted by Josephus. Some of them are simply transferred from their sources, where they already form part of the narrative, and are still to be found in 1 Eza and Esther, in 1 Mac., and the Letter of Aristeas. To this class in all likelihood belong also the Edicts of Antiochus III.
188-189), the genuineness of which is not unreasonably doubted. A different judgment must be passed upon the fairly numerous Roman edicts or decrees of the senate: the plebeian edict of 188 B.C. on the claim of the Jews to religious immunities, notably to the freedom of Asia Minor; and certain official deeds dating from the reign of Claudius (XII. 259 ff., XIV. 144 ff., 186 ff., 304 ff., XIV. 165 ff., XIX. 324 ff.), which have come down to us. These have no bearing whatever upon the narrative, or practically none; thus, to give a salient instance, there is found in XIV. 186 ff. a quite prominent conclusion of records emanating from most of the various periods. But their genuineness is not disputed, and is admitted by all.

Moreover, in this period especially those cities and persons which the Jews had before Marcus Agrippa—King Herod being also in attendance—in 16 B.C. It was Nicolas who conducted this case for the Jews, and he seems to have insisted in his speech, together with the relevant documents, into his historiography, so that Josephus had but to transfer them to his own work (XII. 125 ff., XIX. 278 ff.). The deeds of later date had, of course, a different origin. The three edicts of xix. 380 ff. go hand in hand; the first two, as appears from xix. 310, were articulated with the third.

We note, finally, that from the earliest possible point, viz. the Persian period (Xi.), chronological references were inserted by Josephus at the appropriate places. For this purpose he availed himself of the chronological schemes then to hand, and took the Greek-Roman reckoning as his standard, the chronology itself being a part of the general history within the range of universal chronology. The task was not without its difficulties, and at one point, indeed, a violation of the text was necessary; the Artaxerxes who, according to 2 Kings 20, reigned between Cyrus and Darius I. had to give place to Cambyses (XII. 21 ff.).

In the AJ, as in the BJ, Josephus took great pains with the form of his narration. He introduced general introductory long speeches of the type of the Eusebian, e.g. X. 140 ff., XV. 157 ff., XVI. 31 ff., XIX. 167 ff.—and he exerts himself throughout to write with vigour and elegance. Good examples of his style will be found in IV. 11 ff., VI. 327 ff., XVIII. 310 ff., XIX. 14 ff. In this respect, however, he puts more restraint upon himself than in the BJ, the diction of the AJ showing a change in the direction of simplicity. The contrast in style is best seen in passages which are substantially the same in both works. Thus Herod's address to his soldiers as reported in AJ XV. 157 ff. is quite different from what appears in BJ I. 373 ff. In general, Josephus endeavours in the AJ to fill out his earlier delineation. An example of this is provided by the section dealing with the Jewish parties, which is inserted at the same point in both narratives (AJ xviii. 11 ff., BJ I. 375 ff.). It is of great interest to trace the connexion of his relation to Thucydides, whom he specially chose as his model for the AJ, more particularly in bks. xvi.-xix., where he even employs forms of the old Attic dialect, as he does nowhere else, and is manifestly at pains to emulate the great historian in his form of expression, his massive sentence-construction, and his fulness of thought. Nor can it be denied, finally, that in the AJ Josephus has changed his views with respect to many things and persons discussed in the BJ, and utters a different verdict regarding them. An instance of this is found in AJ xx. 138 ff. (cf. vii. 193 ff.), which treats of the attitude of the Jews toward the emperor, and from which we derive an entirely different impression of the man from that gained from the story, and especially the characterization, of the corresponding passage in the BJ (iv. 6 ff.).

The thànhos of Josephus (θὴν ἀποκράτεια) forms a sequel to the AJ. It is appended to the latter without break or introduction, and at the close is distinctly spoken of as belonging to the long series of those subsequent writings which are like or equal to the AJ in style and purpose. Like the AJ, the CA is dedicated to Epaphroditus, who died, as has already been noted, in A.D. 95, and it must, therefore, have been written some time anterior to that date, i.e. very shortly after the AJ. It is a defence of the Jews against the imputations made by Greek writers, which Josephus had, on occasion, tried to ward off in the AJ. But his arguments had not carried conviction; the voice of calumny was not silenced; and he felt that he must have recourse to his pen once more, in order to furnish a thoroughgoing and final refutation of the charges. The whole of its appearance, been massed together by the Apion, the well-known grammaticus of Alexandria. This Apion was the leader of an Alexandrian deputation to Rome in connection with the conflict between the Jews and his fellow-citizens which occurred in the
reign of Galus, and he took occasion at this juncture to draw up an indictment against the hated race—a theme upon which he had previously touched in his "Apology." 

Josephus first of all impresses the assertion that the Jews were a people of recent origin—an assertion made on the ground that none of the ancient writers mentioned them. Greek Hellenes, he maintained, were entirely without warrant in charging the Jews with possession of the most ancient historical learning, when, as a matter of fact, their records were quite modern, and their early history was unverifiable. The statement of his authority for this is, that in the time of the more remote era, while the Jews had for ages preserved their history, concerning the time of Moses, they had nothing beyond the time of the death of David. The earliest Greek historians was thus simply to the geographical position of the Jews. Josephus himself sets forth the testimonies of Egyptian, Babylonian, and Phoenician historians, in order to prove that the Hebrew people had a far more ancient history than the Greeks, and that in his time (73-39 B.C.) he proceeds to show that even Greek authors of considerable antiquity were acquainted with the Jews, and had spoken of them with respect (i. 216-218), and he comes at length to the tales of Mantine, Chaldrion, and others regarding the exodus from Egypt, submitting them to careful examination, and showing them to be unworthy of credit. In bk. ii. Josephus is less certain with Apion, and relates the structures passed by the latter upon the person of Moses, the claim of the Jews to the free citizens of Alexandria, and the Jewish religion (ii. 1-12). Finally, by way of rebutting the assertions of the Jewish historian, he gives a summary of the facts of the Jewish history, and makes himself the historian of the Judaeo-Greek bearing character of the Jews with the religious indifference and the immoral mythology of the Heathen (i. 140-200).

The criticism of the various stories about the exodus of the Jews from Egypt is altogether to the point, their inconsistencies and other defects being most ably exposed. Josephus himself is of opinion that the Jews were one with the Hylese, and uses this identificatory to fix the date of the exodus. His arguments are not seldom defective, as, e.g., in his statement how the date of Solomon's reign according to the Hebrew chronology (i. 116 f.) he supposes, or distorts many things, the clearest instances of which are connected with the Jewish right of citizenship in Alexandria. The assertion that the Hylese (Apion, ii. 288) he procured by Al. that for the Great or Tobiomos i. is unquestionably a fabrication. Among the authors cited by him, moreover, names are found which are open to suspicion or simply for which he has, in this connection, preserved some valuable origins from the ancient historical literature, and especially from the annals of Egypt, Babylonia, and Tyre. Some of these had already been given in the Ap. It is so easy matter to identify the traditions from which he drew all these. He may possibly have borrowed a good deal of it from Apion himself. In Rome, which was at that time a great emporium for Greek literature and science, he would find no difficulty in securing the learned equipment requisite for his polemics.

A question may be raised as to the specific occasion of the booklet. This can scarcely have been the indictment framed by Apion, for at the time when Josephus wrote, i.e., A.D. 94 or 96, the pamphlet of Apion and the whole controversy which it had evoked were fifty years old. It is conjectured by A. von Germer that the revolt of the Jews had been the occasion of producing a fresh crop of anti-Jewish writings, and that it was these that moved Josephus to take up the challenge once more. His words seems to imply that the cause of defamation had been quite recently renewed—just after the publication of the Ap. In the end, he perhaps wished to bring us up to the closing years of Domitian's reign. About this time several persons were by the Emperor's orders put to death on account of their Jewish Judaism—a procedure which tended to revive the old charge of atheism (Oio Cass. xliii. 14). In many respects the polemic of Josephus is essentially the same as the polemic of the Ap. It was written with the same object in view, it followed immediately upon the larger work, and its contents had for the most part been written down in the Ap. (cf. A. J. i. 15-43, ii. 171 f., 172-192, 203). Josephus, must, therefore, have taken it in hand immediately after the publication of the Apian book.

(c) In addition to his extant works, Josephus had other literary projects in view, which in all probability, however, were never carried out. Among these are to be mentioned a book which was to deal with Jerusalem, the Temple, the sacrifices, and the worship, but this must have remained as an intention only, as otherwise he would accordingly have mentioned it, or quoted from it, in his subsequent writings. At a later period, again, he meditated a theological work of a similar kind, for at the end of the Ap. (xxv. 206) he announces his intention of writing a book on God, His nature, and the ground of the mandates and prohibitions of the Mosaic law, and, as he returns several times to this projected work (e.g., A. J. i. 25, 31, ii. 25, iv. 189, 193), it seems as if he had even drafted some definite plan for it. It was to be a kind of apologia of the Mosaic law, in the style of the rationalizing allegories of Philo. Whether the work was ever written we do not know; certainly not a single trace of it survives. Further, he proceeded to write another historical volume which should deal more with the life of the Jews till the date of writing. He more than once alludes to this forthcoming volume (e.g., A. J. xviii. 25, xix. 390), but it must remain open to question whether it was ever given to the public.

Finally, in numerous passages of the A.J. we meet with references to the phrase καθώς εις Ελλάδα δειδαλοικός ου ήδαιμόνιος (or δειδαλοικος) to an earlier work, which have caused much perplexity among scholars, and given rise to various conjectures. These references bear upon events in general history, and they punctuate the narrative from Philip and Alexander the Great (xvi. 295) to the battle of Philippi (xv. 391), appearing again in the passage dealing with the reign of Tiberius (xvii. 94). They suggest the thought that Josephus had produced still another historical composition.

A. von Germer and H. Drusen suppose that this work was an unpublished draft, the first of the Ap. Josephus had been a commentary upon Daniel—according to Jerome in Antiq. ii. ed. Vallarsi, i. 461 (P. L. xlvii. 277). Josephus had in fact himself occupied himself with the interpretation of the Ap. (cf. A. J. x. 269 f.) or elsewhere, both conjectures are equally improbable. Further, Jerome cannot be speaking here from his own knowledge, but must have borrowed the annotation from Porphyry, and repeated it inaccurately. It is, therefore, conjectured by Delitzsch that Josephus, in more care of the quotation, omitted the quotation-phrase from the source which he was using; but this also is an unlikely theory. There are still other explanations of the facts. On the whole, therefore, the references form an unsolved riddle. They may mean nothing more than that Josephus had a filling for a scaffolding phrase; but it is to be borne in mind that similar unintroductory references are found also in the iii. A. J. xvi. 244 and i. 25, by which Josephus had produced still another historical composition.

3. Value and significance. Josephus was assuredly no historian of the first rank, no conscientious or unbiased inquirer, seeking truth alone, but a writer whose supreme object was to produce a certain impression. Like other historians, he is not unwilling to afford his readers as instruction (A. J. i. 13, xviii. 228 f.), but the leading motive of all that he writes is that of the apologist. Though he did not overlook the needs of his countrymen (A. J. iv. 167), he also found no difficulty in securing the learned equipment requisite for his polemics. In view he endeavored to present the history of his nation in the most favorable light. His apologetic purpose reveals itself also in the selection of his documents, for he quotes with the intention of showing the favor in which the Jews had been held by the great monarchs, as well as by the Romans themselves (A. J. xiv. 186, xvii. 174 f.). It is his ambition to dissipate the prejudices against the Jews, to repel the imputations cast upon them, and to mitigate the antagonism between Jew and Greek. With such objects in view he endeavors to present the history of his nation in the most favorable light. His apologetic purpose reveals itself also in the selection of his documents, for he quotes with the intention of showing the favor in which the Jews had been held by the great monarchs, as well as by the Romans themselves (A. J. xiv. 186, xvii. 174 f.). Truth is sacrificed to tendency; for, though he asserts that he will set down nothing but the truth, and the whole truth (A. J. x. 218, xiv. 1), he does not keep his promise. He omits and he frequently quotes from his authorities in very casual fashion; and, accordingly, the Biblical narratives sometimes receive from his hand an entirely new complexion. The author of himself in all the resources which the art of rhetoric had provided, in order that he might render his narrative forcible and attractive. In spite of these defects, however, we cannot fail to disapprove him. When we remember the purity of
made use of his works, as many believe, remains very doubtful, and certainly cannot be proved. Nor does Suetonius, who mentions his name (Vestas. 5), seem to have read him. One of the first to quote him stands the Neoclaudian, Eusebius. It was in Christian circles that his reputation was highest. An author like Josephus, who stood upon the ground of the OT and the Law, and who had, nevertheless, wrought himself free from the narrow limits of Judaism and who interpreted the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple as a penalty inflicted by God, had so much in common with Christian writers that they could speak up about him almost as one of themselves. We must regard the evangelist Luke as being the first to make use of his works, not a few well-attested indications of such dependence being found alike in the third Gospel and in the Acts of the Apostles.

4. Relation to Christ.—The problem of the attitude of Josephus to Christ and Christianity is of considerable importance. We find in AJ xviii. 63 f., appended to an account of the administration of Pontius Pilate, a short chapter about Christ, which has a place in all our MSS and which was quoted by Eusebius and many others after him. What is said here about Christ, however, does not take the form of a narrative, such as we should expect from a historian, but is, in the main, a eulogy, and of a kind that only a Christian could have written. But, as Josephus, alike in feeling and in utterance, is very near to a Jew, and as a Jewish priest, never manifesting the slightest hint of the Christian standpoint, the general consensus of investigators has long ago decided that the passage is spurious. Still, it is not improbable that it may have been interpolated in the old passage as an interpolation; others, such as A. von Gutschmid and T. Reinauch (RE J xxvi. [1897] 1-18), try to rescue a portion of it, supposing that it is a genuine passage that was afterwards re-cast from a Christian point of view, and seeking to restore it to its original form. This view appears to the present writer untenable; the whole chapter forms so obviously an indispensable unity that, if any part of it is a fabrication, the whole of it must be so, and ought to be removed from the text altogether. If objection be alleged to this conclusion on the ground that Josephus could not have completely ignored Jesus, it may be replied that he records only such events in Jewish history as attracted the attention of foreigners by disturbances or otherwise, and led to the intervention of the emperor, and that the silence of Josephus provides no difficulty. Further, if in reality he had written some account of Jesus, this would have been found in the BJ, for the Jewish history found in the AJ, so far as it relates to Jerusalem and Judea, is essentially a reproduction of the earlier narrative. Since, then, he makes no mention of Christ in the BJ, his silence regarding him in the AJ is precisely what we might expect. Finally, it should be noted that Origen (in Math. x. 17; c. Cels. i. 47 [PG xiii. 877, xi. 745, 743]) is not aware of the testimony of Josephus to Christ, his silence regarding Him in the AJ is precisely what we might expect. Finally, it should be noted that Origen (in Math. x. 17; c. Cels. i. 47 [PG xiii. 877, xi. 745, 743]) is not aware of the testimony of Josephus to Christ, his silence regarding Him in the AJ is precisely what we might expect.

The motive of the interpolation is no mystery: it was desirable that there should be some account of Jesus in the works of Josephus, some note in harmony with the Christian view, and, naturally enough, this was inserted in the section where the mention of Pilate and the governorship of Pilate. But the course of the narrative is thereby deranged, and even now we can see plainly that the passage did not originally exist in its present state. An incidental reference to Jesus is found in a later passage (AJ xx. 390), where the James who had been beheaded is spoken of as His brother (rev diδοθες Ἰωάννης τῷ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ, ἵνα ἀναλαμβάνῃ τὸν οἴκον τοῦ Ισραήλ). This passage is altogether beyond sus-

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picion, and we are unable to agree with the scholars who regard it likewise as an interpolation. The manner in which Jesus is here mentioned collates with what Jesus should have reacted from Josephus. Thus, while Josephus had doubtless heard of Jesus, he did not deal with Him in his history, and the passage in *AJ* xvi. which we have discussed must be pronounced spurious.

The documentatio mariae must have helped to make Josephus still more acceptable to the Christians. They pored over his works, and from them, more particularly the two books against Apion, they borrowed a goodly portion of their equipment for their controversial writings. The earliest apologist—Theophilus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, and Minucius Felix—refer to him by name and make use of him. The chronologists, in particular—Julius Africans, Hippolytus, Eusebius, and their successors—availed themselves of his help. In another sphere Eusebius also is indebted to him, especially in the *HS* and the *Prep. Eclog.* while in the later ecclesiastical writers are all acquainted with him. Throughout the entire medieval epoch he ranks as one of the great authors, alike in East and West.

The Josephus who has been controversial, since the death of Nieue, by F. C. Burritt (TAP civ. 1902) to the society for the study of Jesus in Antiquity, Dr. Nieue's argument for the

existence of Jesus (AJ xvii. 583-4; AA 1069-70, and W. E. Barnes (IL 1915), Dr. Nieue maintains that, in view of the evidence put forward by John the Baptist and James the Just by Josephus (AJ xvi. 119-19, xx. 200), we should naturally expect that the Son of God would have become a political figure, which was no more than a suspicion in the mind of Jesus in *Tactum* (Ant. xv. 44; cf. also S. C. O. A. Claudii, xvi. 60, N. 16. 6), a reference which, as Whitson had already suggested, was probably borrowed from Josephus. Thus it is in the passage of Josephus, as well as a "cool and pow'ring tone" which a Chrestian author has often repeated since (*Eus. HS* 44; cf. also S. C. O. A. Claudii, xvi. 60, N. 16. 6), a reference which, as Whitson had already suggested, was probably borrowed from Josephus. Thus the appearance of the Resurrection in the **passage of Josephus**, as well as a "cool and pow'ring tone" which a Chrestian author has often repeated since (*Eus. HS* 44; cf. also S. C. O. A. Claudii, xvi. 60, N. 16. 6), a reference which, as Whitson had already suggested, was probably borrowed from Josephus. Thus the appearance of the Resurrection in the...
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Jerome or Rufinus (Cassiodorius, de Inst. Div. Litt. 17 [P.L. xxi. 1133]).

About the middle of the 6th cent. the A.J. (not including the Vit., however) and the C.J. were at the disposal of Cassiodorus, reproduced in a very inferior copy of Latin (ib.). The 6th bk. of the B.J., which treats of the destruction of Jerusalem, had been previously translated into Syriac, and incorporated into the Syriac OT (Peshitta) as the 8th bk. of Maccaebes. Subsequently there appeared a Slavonic translation or paraphrase, which is extant in several recensions, and there exists also a rendering into modern Greek (in the Batak Library [cod. Gr. n. 226, 229]). Rome, besides fragments of an Armenian version (F. C. Conybeare, TTStSt ix. (1808) 577-583).

The many translations into European languages which appeared shortly after the invention of printing all go to show how assiduously Josephus was read.

In view of this almost colossal prestige enjoyed by the writings of Josephus, we need not be surprised to find that he was credited with other works of unknown or disputed authorship, such as the following: (1) the so-called Fourth Book of Maccabees, an entire apocryphal work, not Josephus, but a later work, under his name; (2) the 'lordship of divine reason over human desires,' and illustrious works that the Sibyl of Gaul, according to S. Mac, suffered martyrdom under Antiochus Epiphanes. The fact is, so far as we know, to attribute it to Josephus. Some fragments (ib. 52, 26; 53, 27) of a work ascribed to Josephus, such as books vii., viii., and ix. of the Vita, are followed with, or in some MSS, Joseph as the author. In the rise of the Jewish sects and the ascension to Josephus, as is rightly observed in the ancient scholion to the Christian text, Epitomae, P. Alex. (Paris, 1673, l. 45), is a quite unwarranted conjecture. He had no connection with the book; in the A.J. he knows nothing of the seven martyrdoms; and the whole address, alike in form and content, is alien to the manner of Josephus.

(4) A third work, still extant, bearing the name of Josephus, viz. the Joannis eor Doctoris et Scholiastae, is a treatise on the art of writing, and a model for the most important principles. The author himself, and his pupils, indeed, consider this work the most valuable of all Jewish literature; and, above all, is a work of the highest importance in the study of the ancient world. It is devoted to the study of the sacred language, and is a work of great value in the study of the history of the ancient world. It is devoted to the study of the sacred language, and is a work of great value in the study of the history of the ancient world. It is devoted to the study of the sacred language, and is a work of great value in the study of the history of the ancient world.

(5) The works of Josephus were first printed in their Latin form in 1619. The first edition was by Joannes Foss, in 1617, and the second by Ioannes Oxenius, in 1619. The third edition was by J. M. Strickland, in 1623. The fourth edition was by J. M. Strickland, in 1623. These impressions were subsequently often republished, and the last complete edition was by Josephus in 1619. The first complete edition was by J. M. Strickland, in 1623. The second complete edition was by J. M. Strickland, in 1623. The third complete edition was by J. M. Strickland, in 1623. The fourth complete edition was by J. M. Strickland, in 1623. The fifth complete edition was by J. M. Strickland, in 1623. The sixth complete edition was by J. M. Strickland, in 1623. The seventh complete edition was by J. M. Strickland, in 1623. The eighth complete edition was by J. M. Strickland, in 1623.

Manuscript transmission and editions.—The wide circulation and popularity of the works of Josephus are indicated in the history of their transmission. The MSS were, and still are, very numerous, and the textual tradition branches out in manifold ways. Each work, again, had its own peculiar fortunes. Thus, the most comprehensive, the A.J., was first of all divided into four parts, then into two, and each of these, again, took its own particular path. It was only at the close of the period that the A.J. was put together in a single volume, the B.J. also being included; and scholars endeavored toounded and elucidate the transmission of a few MSS still show traces of a thoroughgoing revision.

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god-dreaded man. . . Other inidels have said that Sulîhu Muhammad Shâh bin Tughlaq Shâh held an umbrella over the sun and called it 'a lie, and good Muhammadans should say no lie to such statements' (E. M. Elliot, Hist. of India, London, 1897-77, ii. 34, 441, iii. 316).

The goddess Akbari, by Benoist, Akbâr, a description of the Empress Akbar, describes the shrine under the name of Mahamayâ, 'great illusion'. 

...Pilgrims from distant parts visit it and obtain their desires. So great is it that in order that their prayers may be favourably heard, they cut out their tongues; with some it grows again on the spot, with others after one or two days. Although the medical faculty allow the possibility of growth in the tongue, yet in so short a space of time it is sufficiently amazing' (Al-Adhâr, tr. H. S. Jarrett, ii. [Calcutta, 1861] 218). On such mutilations of the tongue, which fanatics sometimes offer to Exile. 16, Class. Jour., 1872, p. 492.

Abûl Faîl also refers to the legend, traced by E. B. Cowell in the Gopakava Brahmava, which tells the belief in the sanctity of the place arose from the quarrel between Siva and his father-in-law Dakâša, when the latter was refused admission to a sacrifice. The spouse of Siva, goddess Pushâni, or Sati, offended at the insult offered, cut her body, and Visnâ cut up her body, of which the tongue is said to have fallen at this place (H. H. Wilson, Vishnû Purana, London, 1854-77, iv. 337). On the word Pushnâ, Classical Dict., 1879, p. 76 ff.

The account in the Vâyu Purâna, that about the mountains of Subakâsa and Sikkhisara is a level country about a hundred yojanas in extent, and that the ground emits flames, doublets refers to Jullâhmukhâ (E. T. Atkinson, Hinduayán Gaz., Allahabad, 1884, ii. 258). The place, again, is connected with the story of the Sikh Guru Angad, who, on arriving there, extricated the idolatrous character of the râtes (M. A. Macalisse, The Sikh Religion, Oxford, 1909, ii. 3).

The best modern account is that of C. Hügel (Travels in Kashmir and the Punjab, p. 42 ff.). No idol represented the goddess; but the centre of the forecourt of the temple there is a pit with seats at either end on which he found fagirs resting. A perpetual flame rose from this pit, and two places in the smooth rocks, two flames were seen bursting out to a height of about 8 inches. The worshippers, on entering the sanctuary, delivered their gifts, usually flowers, into the hands of one of the fagirs, who first held them over a light, and then cast them into the temple. Close by is a shrine of the saint Gorkhnâh. 

On descending a good many steps I saw flames issuing from two holes in the perpendicular wall; and, on examining not attentively, I perceived, where the fire was burning, little cavities in the smooth stones, with just the same appearance as when a burning-glass is made to consume wood; the flame issuing, not from any aperture, but from those minute cavities emits a scent like alcohol, burning with an acrid and most agreeable mixture, which I could by no means identify. Under each of these flames stood a pot of water, of the same temperature as the atmosphere; the condensed residue of the gas thus deposited takes in the application of a light, and burns for at least a minute. Additionally this is one of the most extraordinary phenomena I ever recollect to have witnessed; and no doubt in distant ages was one of the spots most frequented by fire-worshippers. The sight of this flame rising out of the sanctuary building was next it, worthy of notice. 

The same traveller suggests that the place was an asylum for Buddhists, and J. Wilson believes that this is the explanation of the low esteem in which the Brahmans officiants are regarded (Indian Cast, Bombay, 1871, ii. 133). The high-priest is known as the 'fagir', that is to say, 'the officiant who eats the offerings', the term bhoto being usually applied to those degraded Brahmans whose only function is that of being fed vicariously by pilgrims in the hope that the food thus consumed may be transmitted to the deceased ancestors of the worshipper. They are said not to be genuine Brahmans, but descendants of a servile class of agriculturists, who from their connexion with the temples have professed to be Brahmins. Ar. Rose, Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab, Lahore, 1911, i. 107 f.). The facts regarding fire-worship in N. India have been collected by Elliot, Hist. of India, v. (1877) 459. The cult of the goddess of Jullâhmukhâ is extended into Bengal, the Deccan, and the aboriginal Kâhrâns have a shrine dedicated to the holy fire which they call by the same name (Riley, T.C., 1891, ii. 294; Crooke, T.C., 1896, ii. 247; F. H. Skrine, 1880) 267 f.; MS notes received from H. A. Rose, Superintendent Ethnological Survey, Punjab.

W. CRooKE.

JUANG, PATTUA (the latter name meaning 'leaf-wearers' [Hindi, pathâ, Skt, patra, 'a leaf']).

A non-Aryan tribe found in the Kajak Tributary States of Dhubãnâ and Karmâ in Küntâl, and are the most numerous in the latter. At the Census of 1911 they numbered 12,945, of whom the vast majority recorded their religion as animistic. They are interesting as being the last tribe of the Kajak who retained the archaic custom of wearing leaves as clothing. According to the tribal tradition, they were formerly fond of dress and were accustomed to lay aside their costumes when doing 'foul suits of leaves. The goddess (Itsera) or, as some say, Sitâ) reprimanded them for their vanity, and demanded them to wear leaves in future, threatening them that if they wore them again, they would be eaten by tigers. Similar legends are told by other leaf-wearing tribes in S. India (E. Thurston,Castes and Tribes, 1908, vii. 20). The classical account of the tribe is that of E. T. Dalton (Misc. Ethnol. of Bengal, Calcutta, 1873, p. 152 ff.), who gives the following summary of their beliefs:

The Jungs appear to be free from the belief in witchcraft, which is the bane of the Kols, and probably influences nearly all other classes in the Jungle and Tributary Mahals. They have not, like the Kols, the reputation of being deeply skilled in sorcery. They have in their own language no terms for 'God,' for 'heaven,' or 'hell,' and, so far as I can learn, no idea of a future state. They are very partial to the earth to give them its fruits in due season. On these occasions an old man officiates as priest. The details of the rite are very obscure. The even tenor of their lives is unbroken by any obligatory religious ceremonies.

If this account, in itself improbable, be accepted, they stand in a much lower stage of religious belief than the neighbouring Dravidian tribes (see DRAVIDIANS [North India]). But Riley (T.C., 1891, i. 353) disputes Dalton's conclusions, asserting that the tribe in Kevâla worship a forest deity called Barân, who stands at the head of their system, and is regarded with great veneration. Next to him come Thâmâpati, the patron deity of the village site, Madâmâl, Kâlapât, Bêbbûli, and Benamât, or Mother Earth.

Joubles, goats, fowls, milk, and sugar are offered to all of them, and are afterwards par Takes of by the worshippers. No regular days seem to be set apart for sacrifice, but offerings are made at all seasons and seasons, and the forest god is care-fully propitiated when a plot of land is cleared from jungle and prepared for the plough. In addition to these elemental or ani-mistic deities, the Hindu gods are recognized, in a scanty and inconstant fashion, by the tribe. Brahmans are not admitted as priests, and the worshipper is discharged by the 'kâbir' or village priest. ... Judges burn their dead, laying the corpse on the pyre with the head to the south. The ashes are left at the place of cremation or are cast into a running stream. A few days after death a mock pro-cession or ceremonial is performed, at which the priest of the deceased officiates as priest. Offerings to departed an-cestors are also made in October, when the autumn rice crop is harvested.

LITERATURE.—Str. The authorities are quoted in the article.

W. CRooKE.

JUBILEE.—See FESTIVALS and Fasts (He-brew).
JUDAISM.—I. DEFINITION.—Judaism may be defined as the strictest form of monothetic belief. But it is something more than a bare mental belief. It is the effect which such a belief, with all its logical consequences, exerts on life, thought and conduct. It is the religion which was first preached by Abraham, and symbolized by the covenant of circumcision (cf. art. Circumcision [Semiitic]), and it is still practiced by the present-day Jews. It is, in all essential respects, the same religion of the two patriarchs, the parent of two mighty faiths that have spread over the major portion of the globe. They have diffused the principles of Judaism in a modified form, but the kernel of their teaching is Jewish, in spite of accretions and losses, and Judaism does not, in consequence, repudiate these religions or class them as idolatrous and false. A formal and precise definition of Judaism is a matter of some difficulty, because it raises the question, What is the absolute and irreducible minimum of conformity? (see art. Creed [Jewish]). On the other hand, it may be said, more widely, that the foundation of Judaism rests on two principles—the unity of God and the choice of Israel. Judaism denominates idolatry and polytheism. It believes in a universal God, but it is not monothestic. It believes that this world is good, and that man is capable of perfection. He possesses a free will and is responsible for his actions. Judaism rejects any Mediator and any cosmic force for evil. Man is free, not to choose evil, but to choose good; nor are the material gifts of life inherently bad; wealth may be a blessing as well as a curse. Man is made in the image of God; therefore he is noble, like the rest of the universe. From this reason all nations are equally brothers. Just as they were united in the beginning, so will they be drawn together again at the end of time. They will be brought near to the King by the hand of Israel. This is the function of Judaism—to spread peace and goodwill throughout the world.

1. Judaism by its idea of a divine kingdom of truth and righteousness to be built on earth gave rise to a hope and a history of goals for which to live and strive through the centuries. Other nations behold in the world's progress a continual decline from a golden age of happiness to an iron age of toil, until in a great catastrophe of confusions and ruin the end of all things, of men and gods, is to be looked for. Judaism points forward to a state of human perfection and bliss to be brought about by the conversion of the Gentiles, the instruction of the divine man or the revelation of God's full glory as the goal of history. And herein lies its great distinction also from Christianity. Judaism's scope lies not in the after-life but in the world of the spirit, of which man on earth can have no conception. Both the hope of resurrection and of the world to come are beyond the other religions and indispensable to all tribes and creeds, seem evidently to have come to the Jews from without—the one from Persia or Babylonian, the other from the Stuarts. Judaism itself rests on neither. Its sole aim and purpose is to render the world that now is a divine kingdom of truth and righteousness; and this gives it its eminently rational, ethical, and practical character (K. Kohler, in JBE, vol. 1, 1904, 567).

This aim is pursued by the insistence on the belief in the Unity and on the practice of the Commandments. Judaism lays more stress on work than on faith, though the former are of no avail without the latter. Judaism is not a creed or system of beliefs upon the acceptance of which redemption or future salvation depends. It is a system of human conduct, a law of righteousness which man should follow in order to live thereby (Kohler, note).

Yet Judaism does not lack a doctrine of faith; it is very doubtful whether an atheist who kept the Torah, or the Jewish ideals of righteousness, could exist on a Jewish ground. (B. Commandments [Jewish], vol. ii, 187 f.). There is no doubt that he would be saved, in the Christian sense, because Judaism teaches that every righteous man, irrespective of his beliefs, has a share in the world to come. But just because Judaism believes that every good man is saved, it follows that to be a good Jew must include something more, and must be ethically higher, than being a good man.

While Judaism, on the one hand, opens the door to proselytes, it is inevitable, from the fact of its demanding self-sacrifice, that it must long remain the religion of a minority. The function of Judaism is to keep the great ideals, unaltered and intact, before the eyes of the world. A Jew must be prepared to defend their standard at the cost of his lives, as in the past, and to sacrifice, not only their lives, but their material prosperity—often a harder task. Many a potential martyr becomes indifferent, through prosperity, to the ideals for which he would offer his life in time of persecution.

The world has need of a minority of idealists. For, although Judaism recognizes the truth taught by Christianity and Islam, it believes at the same time that there are other elements contained in these faiths which are not in complete harmony with the primitive source of truth. Judaism, then, has not to compete with the other religions; it is their religion; its raison d'être is not to rival the successful missionary activity of its daughters, the Church and the Mosque; it claims, not to be the only form of truth, but to be the living, ever-renewing tradition of truth. While Christianity and Islam are permeating the world with their teachings, Judaism awaits the day when it will, as originally, extend its influence over both of them, and so over all mankind. How this will take place is a problem. Under this universal worship of the One God will be, it does not seek to define. This 'despised faith,' which holds itself to be in reality the Remnant or essence of righteousness, is safeguarded from extinction or contamination by the fence of the mimkōt (Commandments). It has developed and grown, but ever in unbroken continuity, from the simple declaration of monotheism to a complete and comprehensive scheme of life. From Abraham to the present day the story has been written, and the pen has not yet been laid aside.

II. GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT.—1. To the end of the Restoration period.—The Exile marked a new stage in the religion of Israel. It was the beginning of internal consolidation and external expansion. The patriarchy, the lawgiver, and the prophet represented the three great epochs of Jewish history. The young religion monotheism, the Law, is laid waste. The faith of Abraham was moulded into the religion of a people, to become, ultimately, the source of ideals for a world; monotheism, purity, righteousness, and justice had developed under the impetus of lawgiver, prophet, and priest until the time of trial arrived. Exile and persecution were to test the reality of these lessons, to show that the work of the teachers was sound and the faith of the pupils unshaken. The touchstone of misfortune clearly demonstrated this: the seed had indeed been skilfully sown on fertile soil. The teachings of Isaiah had not been in vain: the exhortations of his contemporaries and predecessors succeeded in creating a compact remnant to carry on the truth and hand it over unimpaired to posterity. The Ten Tribes were lost, with the Remnant, the southern kingdom, endured.

1 Even Eliezer ben Abura is ultimately pardoned after the death of B. Merir (see B. Hag., 166).
2 The immutability of the Covenant Law in the coming time was a matter on which divergence of opinion prevailed; see, e.g., Nidah, 618, and Minorah Tanna, Ps. 146, 17:2171 Peel 11:1177. 217.
3 But, on the other hand, the 8th Crete of Mammonides (the Singer, Authorized Daily Prayer-Book, London, 1915, p. 50) (the pagination is identical in all editions).

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by the prophet. After the Return, no more is heard of temptations or lapes in this direction. The spark kindled and fostered by the prophets had spread into a mighty flame. From the day of the Return on, that as far as the Jews were concerned, "the Lord was one, and His name was one." 

The belief, then, of the returned exiles in a supreme God, supreme not only for Israel but for the whole world, was a sign of the changing times. The idea of God as the father of the Jewish nation was no longer adequate. Linked to this belief was the corollary that God was good and His service obligatory on mankind, to each one of whom he was accessible as a father to his children. The insistence on the compassionate character of God, that element which was later called the middath hārādhāmin—resulted in reflections on the nature and origin of evil, sin, and suffering. These speculations produced a repugnance to ascribe to the Deity the authorship of any actions which seemed incompatible with His attribute of a merciful Father. Hence the exiles of Babylonia were somewhat allured by the Persian dualistic theology, which seemed to offer a more satisfactory solution of the riddle of the universe. It was not a desire for idolatry, not a negation of the Unity, nor the attraction of a new religion whose doctrine of a dominant religion that led Jews to regard the contrast of Ahura Mazda and Ahriman with approval. Their attitude arose from mistaken motives of piety, and from earnest shrivings after the hidden truth. Again and again Judaism has witnessed a recrudescence of the desire for a dualistic explanation of the problem of evil. Answers were not wanted from the prophets and teachers, yet new generations repeatedly felt the old difficulty in a newer and keener form. The book of Job and the Lamentations of Jeremiah declared vehemently for the Unity, and did not shrink from attributing evil to the Creator. The change of the Exile states explicitly (Is 457): "I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil; I the Lord do all these things;" and this clear definition of God's activity left no escape from attributing to His omnipotence that which man considered evil. Yet a later age again felt repelled by this outspoken avowal and sought to mitigate its seeming harshness.

In the present time, the Jewish liturgy, in the daily morning service (see Singer, p. 35), contains this passage as an introduction to the service of the day. In the important section, the alinu (Ps 64), it is not apparently directed to the very principle to which it owes its insertion. For the passage now runs, "who formeth light and darkness, who saith peace, and我们也 get an idea of the change. This alteration is, of course, merely external, since "all things" is not translated as "evil"; yet the change is significant, and marks, no doubt, a revival of the hesitation to ascribe evil to God.

Closely allied to the problem of evil was the question of the prosperity of the wicked and the sufferings of the righteous, dealt with frequently in the later Psalms and in Job. In this, as in all the great problems, considerable fluctuation may be observed. The unity of God was a sheet anchor to which all held fast. His existence and divine providence presupposed a true solution to man's perplexities; if man could but succeed in finding the key, he would be able to unravel the mysteries. The certainty and dogmatism of later ages seem lacking during the Exile and in the two following centuries. From the Apocrypha it can be seen how much the minds of men were exercised and how little they were satisfied by the answers which they possessed. The Apocrypha, taken as a whole, is at least two centuries younger than the Return, and it is only since the earlier age evoked no solution of which the later was ignorant. While taking care, then, not to read into the former period the progress and development of the latter, we may at least infer that none of the philosophical ideas of the former escaped the notice of the later generations, and, therefore, of our own time. Our knowledge of the period immediately succeeding the Return is very scanty; but, as the centuries advanced, the period of Apocrypha, Maccabaeus (see TALMUD), and Midrash (q.e.), our material becomes more abundant, and it is practically certain that no great idea, no supreme solution of any of the problems which agitate the mind of man in all ages, would have disappeared from the intellectual heritage that our ancestors bequeathed to us.

From the 2nd cent. before the Christian era onward such a summary of the facts is unthinkable. The solutions of the problems of evil and suffering ran on two lines, in a way closely allied. Man was incapable of understanding the inscrutable ways of Providence. The prosperity of the wicked was unseemly or unreal even in this world; how much more in the world to come? It was only a superficial judgment that would convict the Almighty of injustice, by measuring His actions with an imperfect human norm. This line of argument, that of Job, Ps 73, etc., combines two thoughts—the insufficiency of human reason and the belief in the future world to relieve the inequities of this life. Ps 49 is difficult to interpret. On the one hand, vers. 12—vers. 14 EY) seems a clear indication of a future life, yet the last verse seems a pessimistic summary of the fate of humanity, couched in terms of a momentary almost recalling the language of Lucretius.

The corollary of the future world was not always employed. It was sometimes argued (e.g. Ps 129) that the fall of the wicked and the triumph of the righteous would be manifest even in this world; or that, as God had saved His people in the past, so would He deliver them from present troubles; the appeal to history is common in the post-Exilic prophetic. Coupled with this (e.g. Macc 9) is faith in the future. Some believe Moshe will save the Jews and frustrate their enemies, though the latter seem successful and the Jews doomed to failure. The different treatment of the problem afforded by Ecclesiastes will be discussed when dealing with the Apocrypha.

Closely allied to the problem of sin and suffering is the question of a future life (see, in general, art. ESCHATOLOGY, § 10, vol. v, pp. 376-381). At the early age of the Return, it is difficult to state precisely how this question was regarded. Judaism has usually refrained from defining with precision the details and circumstances of the future world, contenting itself with a belief in its reality. This belief is, however, firm and unshaken; the difficulty felt in later times was to deduce this belief from the Pentateuch. There can be little doubt, though direct evidence as to the antiquity of the idea is not plentiful, that the post-Exilic Jews believed in a world to come; whether they believed in a resurrection of the body or of the soul is a difficult point to determine (see art. RESURRECTION [Jewish]). With the future life was bound up a belief in future reward and punishment; it is hard, in the first instance at any rate, to conceive of a future state which will not differ from the present. If this world is to be one of trial and testing, the life beyond the grave must surely bear some relation to it, depending on the success or failure achieved during the preliminary stage. The latter must be correlated to the present. The sin of mankind, if not expiated, must surely be visited at a later time; and, if the sin, so also the merit.

The famous first chapter of Isaiah is formerly taken as the authority for a belief in vicarious atonement, and the idea of human Christology interpretation has always been repudiated by Judaism; the general principle has always been conceded (see H. D. Driver and A. D. Neubauer, The Fifth Third Chapter of Isaiah according to the Jewish Interpreters, Oxford, 1877). Thus the Kethuvim (q.e.) use the expression "my servant" to all those God-fearing Jews who were in exile; Kethuvim, p. 452-527), the exception of these commentators reflect traditional exegesis; their views do not merely represent contemporary opinion. The suffering of the Exile is regarded by them as an explanation
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for their sin; but this opinion, put into the mouths of the Gentile Kinsmen, was a form of amanu-ment at the persistence of the Servant under such unpunished persecution. The impossibility of a vicarious atonement is clearly stated in the refusal of God to become a substitute for the sins of Israel. "Whoever hath sinned against me will I blot out of my book." (Ex. 34:23.)

Similarly, although inherited punishment might be deduced from the Decalogues, the post-Exilic Jews relied on the teachings of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, which maintain emphatically the doctrine of individual responsibility (Jer. 25:19-2, Ezek. 18). The problem of free will (q.v.) developed more fully in later ages. In Derrnonacy the free will of man is distinctly stated, and it is not felt to be an encroachment on the divine prerogative of omniscience (De 13:22, 19:29). Man is free, and God is all-powerful. The dilemma does not seem to have troubled the post-Exilic Jews.

One of the most important elements in Jewish theology was the idea of cause and effect. The books of Kings, which were compiled after, or at least at the end of, the Exile, show very clearly that the writers were prone to link together events between which there was not, of necessity, any connexion, to find some religious motive in all affairs, and to account for history by the aid of theology. Thus the disaster to the village children who were eaten by the bears is narrated after the murder of Uzziah the prophet (2 K. 22:15). To the writer it was obvious that the former incident was directly caused by the latter; post hoc ergo propter hoc. The Exilic or post-Exilic Jews seem to have had no notion of secondary causes; the division of causes into material, formal, efficient, and final belongs to the later age of Aristotle. Consequently, their ideas as to divine agency were summative, primitive, and influenced their estimates of persons and events.

Thus the compiler of the books of Chronicles, who must have lived at least in the age of Alexander, cares little for political historical details to that of religion, and to a less extent this is true of the writer of Kings. If the early theory of causation be kept in mind, many difficulties, such as Hosea, can be satisfactorily solved. The influence of this theory on theology was great.

Both in Babylon and after the Return the Jews held tenaciously to the belief in their divine election (q.v.). Countless texts and teachings reminded them of the fact that God had chosen them to be His people, His witnesses, a kingdom of priests, and a people of light and truth to the nation of the earth. However much they might have fallen short of their duty, however much they might have neglected not only to teach others, but even themselves to remain faithful to their sacred task, God had not deposed them for ever from the office to which He had appointed them and their ancestors. Although the Jews had at times misinterpreted their position to mean a freedom to sin with impunity from punishment—a view strongly opposed by the prophets (e.g. Am 2:3)—yet they never felt themselves to have been superseded. Their mission was not taken from them. How deeply they realized their responsibility and at what personal cost they were willing to fulfil their obligation may be seen from the great domestic sacrifice which Ezra exacted from a willing people (Ezra 9:1-3).

It was no light matter to separate from beloved wives and children, yet it was obvious that, if the mission of Israel were not fulfilled, the Suffering Servant was not. The re-

The post-Exilic Jews, however, were wrongly attributed to the Jew, and as an act of remembrance and as evidence of callousness; it was in reality an instance of their devotion and their unswerving fidelity to the idea for which they had been called to be a light to the Gentiles. The words spread the Word of God to the uttermost ends of the earth.

At this point it becomes necessary to examine the relation in which the Jewish considered them-

selves to be placed with regard to Gentiles. Did they regard themselves as a separate nation among other nations? This question acquires fresh importance in later and in modern times, and seems to have been regarded differently in different epochs. It must be remembered that the Jews, being Semites (q.v.), must, in consequence, be regarded from the Semitic and not from the modern ethnological point of view. The idea of a unity of mankind is the idea of a unity of culture; the Semitic bond was community of worship. From the earliest times the principle of divine selection has been religious and not racial; otherwise there is no reason why distinctions should have been made between members of the same family; e.g., Abraham, not his father Terah nor his brother Haran; Isaac, not Ishmael; Jacob, not Esau. The twin brothers have the same parents and the same racial conditions, but even the primegeniture is ignored, and the spiritual heritage is given to the younger brother. A Moabite is one who worships Chemosh, an Ammonite one who worships Milcom, and an Israelite one who worships Adonai. It was not the possession of a territory, for nomads have no settled territory. It was not the ties of blood, for the descendants of Esau, though called the brethren of Israel, are yet not sharers of Israel's Abrahamic heritage. The strife of ideals is graphically portrayed as originating in the womb (cf. Gen. 25:24, and see Rashi's remark on the alliteration). The link between Semites is that of a common worship. At times this might acquire a racial sense, for inter-marriage with non-Jews, involving almost necessarily an abandonment of Judaism in the home and among the offspring, was prohibited. This prohibition, however, arose from a fear that religion would be affected, not from a sense of superiority of blood. The book of Ruth is a lesson in the misfortune of pushing this tendency too far; the people can be as worthy as the native, and from the Moabite woman David himself was descended. For the same reason a distinction was observed between the seven nations of Canaan, who were irremediably steeped in wickedness (a fact borne out by archaeology), and others, who, coming to sojourn under the wings of the Shekinah, would develop into true sons of the Covenant.

The effect of the Exile upon the Jewish community is summarized as follows by W. O. E. Oesterlicher and G. H. Box (Religion and Worship of the Synagogue, London, 1911, p. 31):

'For a large extent it denationalized religion by demonstrating that the religion of Israel could survive the destruction of the State, and was, therefore, independent of a national centre. It is true that the elements of a national organization and life still existed in the Jewish communities, long after the Babylonian exile, and even later asserted themselves in new national forms. The connection between race and religion, though modified, was not destroyed. Judaism, in fact, has never given up altogether the racial basis. In this, as in other respects, it has ever been inconsistent. When the idea of a community, organized for purely religious purposes and recognizing no distinctions of race, has attempted to translate itself into action from within organized Judaism, a reaction back to the national idea has invariably followed. And it was after every outward sign and vestige of separate nationality had been swept away by Judaism (a.b. 135) that national feeling and sense of solidarity became more intense. But all the same, it remains true that ever since, the widely separated and (in all other respects) distinct communities of Jews wandered over the world and find their one link of continuity and unity in a common religious idea. It has been pointed out, justly, that in principle, the separation between the State of the Church had already been effected in the Book of Deuteronomy. But in practice Deuteronomic principles met with the most serious obstacles in the way of their realization. The last of these disappeared with the destruction of the State. . . .

The first step to unite and enforce the lessons of the Exile was the
This universalistic consummation was regarded by all the prophets as the purpose for which the Deity was working. This must not be taken to imply that Israel was to lose its particularism. Zion is constantly exalted to a position of leadership, and this position is contrasted with the Oriental despotism, with which the kings and nobles were associated. At certain times, traces of a nationalistic spirit may be observed, especially in the Kings and in the Hasmoneans in persecution. By the waters of Babylon the Jews were, so to speak, driven into nationality because they felt themselves to stand apart from the empire wherein they dwelt. But it was not to a contrast between the two religions, not a cease of nationality, that sinned the Jews from their conquerors. The Northern Kingdom was essentially more nationalistic in proportion as it was less religious in spirit than Judah. Destruction and expatriation fell upon both kingdoms alike; but Judah survived. Samaria persisted. During the Maccabean persecutions the contrast between Jews and Greek acquired something of a national tinge. In Babylon, after the Return, the religion alone seems to have been the essential characteristic.

The dispersal of Israel began before the Exile; it continued after the Return. Exiles were scattered by trade and other motives, as well as exile, had removed many Jews from the land of their fathers. They were to be found in Assyria, in Egypt, in Hamath, in the eastlands of the Mediterranean, and even in remote and mysterious 'Sinim' (Is 11:11; 49:6). The presence of Jews in Gentile surroundings, differing from their neighbours in so many ways, must have stimulated, on both sides, introspection. The Jews were driven back on themselves, and they studied their own religion the more carefully. They would naturally look outside their own camp as well, and contrast the forms of worship and the beliefs that existed without. At a very early stage the influence of the Jewish Diaspora, as a missionary agency, began to be felt. Judaism became more and more universalistic. Cumulative inscriptions reveal an intense Jewish life in Mesopotamia; socially and religiously the Jews played a small part in the land of their conquerors. The other world power, Egypt, was also the home of a solid Jewish community. Doubtless many other colonies existed, for silence must not be construed as an argument. Until the appearance of the Assuan papyri, we had no evidence for Jewish life in Egypt at the time of the Return; we now, by one single papyrus, are largely to re-construct the history of the Jews of Yeb (Elephantine). The favour of the Persian governors protected them; they prospered commercially, engaging in various trades and holding property. They seem to have had a temple of their own, at least an altar with incense. They felt themselves in spiritual communion with Palestine, corresponding with political and religious officials. Their names are mostly Biblical, and they seem to have clung to their ancestral faith. It is unfortunate that most of the documents are of a business nature; more positive details as to religious life and thought would have been welcome. Doubtless the activity of the Jews prevailed in many other places, of which, at present, we have no knowledge. We can safely assume that, wherever they settled, a centre of established whences Judaism was diffused not only from Jerusalem, but also to Genile. Already Jeremiah, from the womb (Jer 1:5), had been designated as a prophet to the Gentiles, to preach a belief in God and the tenets of righteousness to the heathen world. The Temple and its sacrifices (see SACRIFICE) fulfilled a large part of Judaism after the Return as before the first destruction. It is often urged that the prophets deprecated the sacrificial
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system and were not over-seals for the Temple itself. This view is scarcely correct. The prophets frequently decry sacrifices, when brought in a wrong spirit or regarded as licences to sin. It is extremely doubtful whether they rejected sacrifices qua sacrifices. Similarly Jeremiah denounces those who make the existence of the Temple and the Ark of the Lord an excuse for sin. Jeremiah 3:12 is definitely clear: it cannot be regarded as otherwise than a denunciation of those who felt that the Temple was inviolate, and that its inviolability would safeguard them from the effect of their wrongdoing. The prophets of the Return favour the sacrifices. Malachi, speaking not merely of the present but even of the Messianic age, looks forward to a time when the minhag of Judah and Jerusalem shall again be pleasing to the Lord as in days of old (39). Haggai and Zechariah, so far from depreciating the Temple idea, reproach the people for being lukewarm in the work of rebuilding. There would have been no possibility for these admonitions had the idea of Temple and sacrifices been superseded. The rebukes are directed against those who are despondent or those who are apathetic. The first Return was followed by a certain amount of disorganization. Not until the advent of Ezra was the religious life firmly established. Ezra and Nehemiah were required to right wrongs among the tithe-payers and those who would defraud God of the sacrifices due to His Temple. There is no indication anywhere that the Temple and the sacrifices were to be relegated to the past. The Messianic idea seems, to some extent, dormant at the beginning of the Restoration. The term 'Messiah,' of course, occurs in early passages of Scripture, but in a purely literal sense of 'anointed,' i.e., king, or one appointed to fill a certain office (cf. art. MESSIAH, MESSIANISM). Temple and sacrifices are also never used in the Old Testament in the special sense to which it has been consecrated by Jewish and Christian usage. (J. Skinner, Book of the Prophet Isaiah, Chapters 40-66, Cambridge, 1886, p. ivii.) During the Exile the term is even applied to Cyrus, a Gentile ruler, because he had been chosen to be a divine instrument in Israel's release. What may be termed the Messianic idea is to be seen in two matters: (1) the redemption of Israel, from the first Exile; (2) eschatological prophecies of a Golden Age of universal peace and brotherhood. Under the influence of the Restoration, when the people and prophets alike were animated by optimistic hopes for the present and the more immediate future, the Messianic idea was not so strongly dominant. The settlement of the people and the restitution and spread of divine worship in its former home occupied general attention. The age of the Apocrypha saw a renewal of eschatological speculation and a development, and perhaps an extension of the Messianic idea. Prayer was naturally associated with the Temple ritual, and the phrase Mō adhê El (Ps. 74) has been taken to denote assemblies for worship, synagogues. Sermon prayers are recorded in Chronicles and Ezra, and Jewish tradition assigns to this period the institution of the Amidah prayer (Singer, p. 44 ff.; see, further, art. PRAYER (Jewish).) During the Exile the term is even applied to Cyrus, a Gentile ruler, because he had been chosen to be a divine instrument in Israel's release. What may be termed the Messianic idea is to be seen in two matters: (1) the redemption of Israel, from the first Exile; (2) eschatological prophecies of a Golden Age of universal peace and brotherhood. Under the influence of the Restoration, when the people and prophets alike were animated by optimistic hopes for the present and the more immediate future, the Messianic idea was not so strongly dominant. The settlement of the people and the restitution and spread of divine worship in its former home occupied general attention. The age of the Apocrypha saw a renewal of eschatological speculation and a development, and perhaps an extension of the Messianic idea. 3

3 For a detailed survey of this idea in its earlier forms see Skinner, p. lvii.

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3 3 See MÖ adhê El (Sifre, § 342, ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1894, l. 44th, l. 2; ed. Boncompagni, Venice, 1546, col. 238). See also Meg. 179, where in an attribution to the Great Synagogue a man named is probably old, but has been redacted. Ezra instituted the public reading of the Law on certain occasions.

1 The Maccabean period.—After the Return the thoughts of the restored exiles were primarily devoted to religion, to the rebuilding of the Temple, and to the exposition of the Law. Considerable time elapsed before the idea of nationality asserted itself. At the outset the Jews were governed by Persian officials whose authority power was in ratio to their distance from the Court. Such a policy of decentralization was ill-adapted to consolidate a vast and unwieldy empire. In the great political convulsions occasioned by the conquests of Alexander and the strife between the Diadochi, the evil consequences of such a system of administration became manifest. There was neither a national idea nor an imperial spirit to foster a sense of unity or attachment. Unity would, in any case, be well nigh unattainable in such a heterogeneous collection of subjects, although patriotism might perhaps have been aroused by a strong personality at the head of the State. The local governor, not the remote and unknown 'King of kings,' represented to the country folk their actual master; with his overlord they had no concern. The feuds of cities would often result in civil wars, and remote districts would not feel the weakness of the central government; these internal conflicts affected the provincials, not the great battles of the Empire. The Jews felt themselves at first neither citizens nor Palestinian nationalists. The Empire was too large and Jewish Palestine was too small.

4 The Jewish people had not the extension which is shown us in the days of Christ. The foundations of the national life were laid in the Persian period, through Alexander's conquest of Asia to the Parthian dynasty. The Jews were scattered through Galilee—through all those sacred places so familiar to us, Nazareth, Cana, Bethsaida, Capernaum—we should have been among heathens. The name Galilee is the short for Galilee of the Gentiles, that is, the region of the Gentiles; the name clinging to those upland districts after the destruction of Jerusalem and after they had become predominantly Jewish. We should have been not only among heathens, but among barbarians, a population in which the original race of Syrian peasants, tillers of the soil, had been crossed with the wilder Arab blood which came in by infiltration from the desert. The people of the Jews we should have found only in Jerusalem and in the fields and villages around Jerusalem in a radius of some ten to fifteen miles (cf. R. Doran, Jerusalem Under the High-Priests, London, 1934, p. 11).

5 Nationality was produced, amongst the Jews, by purely political causes. The overthrow of Darius and his Empire at the hands of Alexander did not at first react on them. For nearly a century they were under the dominion of the Ptolemies, and the change in the political aspect was slight. It was not until Palestine was transferred to the Seleucids that a new era really began. To the spread of Hellenism and to the fostering by the Seleucids of Hellenic institutions and customs the growth of Jewish nationality is due. Antiochus was a much more zealous disseminator of Greek culture than Alexandria, but the Hellenic spirit of Antioch, more intense and aggressive, was correspondingly debased in quality. The Jews of Alexandria were not offended by Egyptian Hellenism, but the Syrian Hellenism of Antioch stirred up strife through the whole land.

6 The attempt of Antiochus IV. to suppress Judaism and substitute the worship of Olympian Zeus roused intense opposition. The Maccabees were supported with devotion by the Hasideans (see art. HASEDEANS, HASSIDEANS) and their victory secured the permanence of Judaism. The beginning of the conflict was a fight for religious liberty; the end resolved itself into a struggle for nationality. When once the triumph of religion was assured, the Hasmonaean leaders, in continuing the struggle for the sake of national expansion, lost the support of the Hasidim, who became their undisputed opponents. No circumstance is more
instructive in the annals of Maccebean history than the succession of the 'Pious' party, as soon as the aims of the Hasmonaeans became material. It is not difficult to discover the cause of this divergence. The gulf between Judaism and the Church was great; for not only religious beliefs but social practices were involved. Judaism, like Islam and other Semitic faiths, included under 'religion' many elements which elsewhere would fall under a different classification. This point, so important to remember, will be dealt with again in considering Ḥāṭiḥāṭ. The Ḥāṣdim could not tolerate many things, harmless in themselves, which would have been allowed to pass unchecked had religion not been at stake. The Greek dress and ablutions would not have inspired traits to Judaism. In Palestine, under Antiochus Epiphanes, all contact with the heathen became impossible. Things innocent by nature became actively noxious. The gap was complete, and could not be bridged. With this utter loathing for all things Greek, there came an insistence on all things Jewish; the antagonism revealed itself in numerous forms. There was no national feeling before; it was this religious antagonism that created it, perhaps on purpose to oppose Greek nationalism. The aim of Alexander was Hellenisation, and the aim of the Ḥāṣdim was a strong national feeling; Antiochus and his party unholy peers of a great ideal, and boastful of their national superiority, produced by their ex- fanaticism a corresponding national feeling on the part of Judaeans.

It was not among the pious Ḥāṣdim that this spirit was strongest; it was chiefly evident in Judas and the leaders. The Ḥāṣdim were connected with one object and one object only—freedom of worship. Beyond this they cared for nothing. Judas believed that there could be no security from a repetition of the persecutions unless the Jews possessed a State as well as a religion. Hence he favoured all institutions that tended to arouse national feeling. Here he parted company with the Ḥāṣdim, for his staunchness and his passion for independence were not shared by the majority of the Hasmonaeans. As high priest, the Ḥāṣdim were ready to accept him, and this was the beginning of the breach. Hereafter Caspar was for national and dynastic ambitions (Beraq, p. 117). In exactly the same way Jonathan and John Hyrcanus lost the support of the Pharisees, the spiritual successors of the Ḥāṣdim, because they combined the offices of high priest and king (see Ps.-Sol. 17:9). The Ḥāṣdim and the Pharisees despised all worldly elements. They cared not who ruled them or to what nation they belonged if only they could have freedom to worship God. The tendency may be often paralleled in Semitic history. The Khnawarij in A.D. 657, deserted the cause of Ali, the fourth Khalif, and made their battle-cry, 'No judgment save that of God.' At another stage, the government was, in the main, theocratic—that is to say, the priests and the exponents of the Law enjoyed considerable power; the book of Ezra mentions four branches of secular rulers (10:9)—princes, elders, rulers, and nobles.

The functions of these classes are not clear, nor is it possible to state with certainty that these different names imply different offices. It was a system of religious democracy, and thus constituted for, as Benner remarks (op. cit., p. 4), 'the Community at Jerusalem was no democracy of men, but of priests were included the high priest gradually acquiring more and more power, until, in the time of Jonathan and John Hyrcanus, the high priest was the head of the State as well as of the religious community. He was the president of the Assembly later known as the Sanhedrin.1 The Sanhedrin, composed of both Rabbis and nobles, possessed, up to the Roman period, the power of life and death. Even Herod, after the course of his career, was summoned to appear before them; and from this it will be seen that the authority and influence of this body of men was exceedingly strong in the Jewish State. The priests, in accordance with the provisions of the Pentateuch, were maintained by the people. They received their produce as atonement sacrifices, and their salaries, and were regarded with reverence on account of their sacred calling. They were treated with considerably more respect than the secular officials by all classes of the population.

On the first day of the month Shavuṭ, 444 B.C., Ezra the scribe and Nehemiah brought out to the people the Law of Moses (Neh 8), and read its contents to the assembled multitude. From now onwards, under the influence of Ezra, priest as well as scribe, the study and observance of the Law were prosecuted with ardour. From his days the scribes, or interpreters of the Law, came into existence. The canon of the whole Bible was most probably formed later (see further, p. 594), in the time of Akiba (A.D. 135); on 'Aqiba himself see art. AKBIA BEN JOSEPH, vol. i. pp. 274-276). The Pentateuchal legislation pronounced the people, moulded their lives. At the Torah spread, the influence of the scribes increased in proportion. Not only in Palestine, but wherever the Jews had settled, the zeal for the Law accompanied them. In Syria they made Hellenistic Judaism (Stukenbrok, B.V. VII. iii. 3). In Egypt by about 260 B.C. the Septuagint translators began their work, and the Bible was made accessible to the Gentiles in their own tongue. The various Aramaic versions, known as Targumim (see art. TARGUM), are of later date and were made for Jewish use. The Septuagint seems to have been intended, according to the account of Aristobulus, for non-Jews. The Samaritan community accepted and received the Pentateuch about 430 B.C. Their reception differs in certain respects from the Jewish or Massoretic text (see, further, art. SAMARITANS).

All these facts show how the knowledge of the Torah was becoming diffused. It is safe to assume that many of the other Scriptural books circulated freely, as well as the Law. For the intense devotion to the Law and to Judaism the scribes and priests, the successors of the prophets, are largely responsible. The strength of the religious spirit appeared in various guises, not always uniform. Some began to see an Irit in the Law, and though Jews were brought face to face with the fascinations of Greek culture, a Hellenizing party grew up. Originally, no doubt, this party desired to adopt all that was good in foreign culture while remaining steadfast to the Jewish solid principles of their faith. In course of time partly by compulsion and partly by choice, the Hellenizers succumbed to the allurements of their Greek friends and made jettison of their religion to save their material prosperity (1 Mac. 10). There were not wanting, doubtless, among them those who did not prove utterly faithless, but the real resistance came from the uncompromising opponents of Hellenism. From these the party of the Ḥāṣdim developed, men zealous for religion and for religion only. These were the mainstay of the forces led by Judah; they were pioneers of martyrdom, ready to die not merely for the broad principles of their faith but for the absolute observance of the Law. They were, at first, prepared to suffer death rather than defend themselves if attacked on the Sabbath. After their breach with Judas, the Ḥāṣdim pass away. The term disappeared, but the spirit survived, to reappear under the guise of the Pharisees.

After the fixing of the text of the Law, the functions of the scribes centred on the exposition of the precepts and commandments, and the conservation and teaching of the traditions. These traditions, called the Oral Law (Torâh shel beit el peh), are believed by orthodox Jews to have accompanied

1 See J.S. V. [1894] 593.
the Written Law (Torah shelikhitah), and a tradition of Mosaic authority is called Halakhah (Masheh)
and Midrash (see, further, arts. LAW; Jewish). The Written Law (Torah shelikhitah) contains all of the bible, but the
details are not prescribed (cf. above, vol. p. 440). The object of the scribes (rav) was to
teach the people how to follow the requirements and laws that were revealed to them.
The absence of such scribal teaching had been a persistent and significant cause of their
teaching had been concentrated on the Written Law and of idolatry in earlier times; the work
of the scribes consolidated Judaism and gave it stability and endurance through the later ages.
The Torah was not a system of laws to be followed
was adopted by or applied to those who were careful to observe the Written and the Oral Law
(see, further, art. PHARISEES).

The letter of the scribes and Pharisees. The enormous moral and spiritual effect of the
was very intense, and attention is focused on
their so-called 'hair-splitting.'

(1) This mistaken attitude is due to ignorance of the true

(a) Judaism includes many civil elements under the head of
many of the actions and prescriptions referring to civil matters had to be decided by
the religious teachers. Similar legal arguments are found in every ancient legal code. Every system must
necessarily contain some elements of formal expediency, if it is
survived. It is not uncommon to find that
had been added to their logical conclusion.
Moreover, a legal fiction was often designed to
preserve the memory of a principle, while alleviating the
special hardship of a particular case. If the fiction had
become too difficult for the community (ghéshar), it
must be removed, in order to prevent it becoming a
law in itself, if not, it is considered, society and
personality; he was a civil judge as well as a religious
teacher. It is not fair to confuse the two functions and
ignore that the result of the deceptions of the
sometimes easy to draw a line of demarcation. Further,
the statement is a generalization. There was nothing
what was regarded by the people, to secure homogeneity of practice.
It is obvious
the vague prohibition of work on the Sabbath would lead to
public scandal and Sabbath-breaking, if the interpretation of
work were left to individuals. It was by specification and
precise rubric, 'Pirahah was achieved.

The Sabbath was not merely a day of work. It was a day of

A. At a matter of fact, the circumcising
of activities in the material sphere impelled a high
sense of rest and consecration. This statement is capable of
simple proof. On the whole, in the course of time, the
Sabbath laws have not been relaxed.
The tendency has been in the opposite direction (Pahadim). Consequently the observance
of the Sabbath must be more rigid today than in the days of
the early scribes. Hence the Sabbath is to
be anything but a day of true delight, awedness and
sacredness and consecration.

And this delight can be realized only
within. No non-Jew is competent to describe it, for
those who have not experienced it for a day or two can never have enjoyed it.

The Sabbath is to the Jew a day of beauty, a day of
peace, a day of good cheer, not a day of restraint;
It has a positive, not a negative, character. Only
who can work so long a day, exercise the
and the undercurrent spirit, tend to
by prohibition exactly specified by the codes, but which is
inevitably, obviously out of keeping with the Sabbath
to the Sabbath. Plans are circumvented and are observed in
the letter and not in the spirit, then the restrictions are felt to
be irksome. But the fuss with the Sabbath wavers, not
the scribes. The result is that the breach of the letter
soon follows that of the spirit, and the observance of the Sabbath is
abandoned. Those who keep the Sabbath do not suffer
a perturbation, but they are often falsely imagined: those who see only
the restrictions, and not the underlying spirit, tend to
process of time, to lose the Sabbath altogether. It is therefore
those who do not keep the Sabbath that find it a burden.

10 Many authorities T. Haran holds that the Letter of exercises in logic and dialectic in which every
hypothesis is examined. Benjamins and Simon often correspond to
John Doe and Richard Roe.

It must be observed that when the Sabbath contravene two ways of
serving God, 'from love' (nefesh tahara) and 'from necessity
(tripple), and exalt the former, they are practically in
unconscious agreement with this saying. Both involve
and implies disinterested service, performed for its own sake. According to Antigonus and the Pharisees in
life is beyond the grave. The Sadducean doctrine of doing for
its own sake is perhaps ethically higher than that of the Pharisees, but it is the Sadducees'
Sabbath is impractical as a popular creed; hence, if for no other reason,
the Pharisee's party and form of belief were more popular.

The two parties, according to Josephus, differed mainly on the
question of free will. The Pharisees held that man's freedom of action was limited. They
subscribe all to providence and to

1 Of the comprehensive verdicts on this important class,
the impartial and scientific may be found in an ordination
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subscribe all to providence and to
God, and yet allow that as is right, or the contrary, is practically in the power of men; although fate does cooperate in every action... But the Sadducees take away fate entirely and make God the only agent of what is evil; and that to act as if good or as evil is at man's own choice and not determined by anything ascribed to the one or the other will" (Josephus, BJ n. vii. 11).

It would be wrong to imagine that the whole code of life, especially the laws of ritual purity, prescribed by the Pharisees, was not intended by them to have an impact on all alike. "The 'am ha-āres (ב', or multitude, was free from most of these provisions, which were observed only by the 'hōherīm, or 'associates. This has been conclusively shown by A. Bickler (Der gallitische 'Am-ha Ares, Vienna, 1906). Nor was the antagonism of Pharisees and 'am ha-āres general, as is often thought. Had that been the case, the Sadducees would have been more influential and popular.

A third sect existed among the Jews, the Essenes (ג', or whose name is inapplicable as the sect itself. Josephus (BJ n. viii. 242) gives a long account of their manner of life and forms of belief.

They were extreme ascetics. They rejected pleasure as evil, owned property in common, and recruited their numbers mostly through adoption of orphaned and the reception of younger brothers than by marriage, which, however, they did not entirely avoid. Their piety was extraordinary, and they indulged in religious fasting. They were noted for their fidelity: whatever they say is finer than an oath.' They devoted themselves to the study of the Law and the sacred writings and to the study of nature and medicine. They believed in the corporeality of the body and the immortality of the soul.

Their sect was based on a desire to live in isolation and to maintain the purity of the body. Their asceticism was an incentive to right conduct. Many of their customs give evidence of some foreign connection, and it has been suggested that they derived some of their ideas from Gnostic, Pythagorean, and other sources. It is clear, however, that they formed but a small body of men, and that they could not have been a serious menace to the life of the people. Their influence and the Temple ritual was a sufficient cause for separation. They were a religious and ascetic people, which would not appeal to a multitude. Most important feature in connexion with the Essene is their mysticism. For their influence on the Rabbinic Sages see Rambam.

The oldest Jewish schismatics were, of course, the Samaritans (ג'.). After the fall of Samaria, the king of Assyria introduced the Inmigrants from Babylon, Cushan, Ov, Hamath, and Seepharvaim to replace the departed Israelites (2 K 17:24).

These settlers partially adopted Judaism, serving the God of Israel, but not entirely abandoning idolatry. In 538 B.C. they were joined by Jewish exiles from Jerusalem who had quarreled with Nehemiah (Bek 13th; Josephus, Ant. n. vii. 2, v. 7). The Essene sect was founded about the same time. Being excluded from worship at Jerusalem, they desired a temple of their own. The high priest, who represented the high priestly blood, had married a daughter of Sambaitat, the governor of Samaria. For this he was deposed from office by Zerubbabel and, and he therefore urged his father-in-law to cause an altar to be erected in Shechem. This was done, and the leaders and the people of Shechem confirmed the relations between the Jews and the Samaritans. The Sanhedrin of the Samaritans sided with Antipatros (Josephus, Ant. n. iii. v. 5). Later, John Hyrcanus destroyed their temple. They possessed the Pentateuch in a somewhat different recension, which they wrote in their own characters, resembling the ancient Semitic series, but none of the Prophets, whose inspiration they did not recognize.

In addition to the books of Daniel, Chronicles (in part), and Ecclesiastes, and the works of the historian Josephus, other sources are available for information about this period. The Apocryphal writings furnish contemporary, furnish abundant material, especially for a study of thought and religion.

In using evidence from the Apocrypha, it must be borne in mind that the Apocrypha is not a part of the Bible, and that the author of any such book is not an eyewitness of the events described. It is the work of some said from orthodoxy. It does not follow that orthodoxy changed between the composition of the Apocrypha and the formation of the canon. However, the Apocrypha, and the formation of the canon. In some cases, books, once orthodox, have become Apocryphal, and in others, the text of the Jewish, non-Christian, or secular interpretation.
Judaism has never adopted this idea, care must be exercised in studying those early allusions, and in accepting their testimony as typical (but see the theory of S. Levy, The Doctrine of Original Virtue, London, 1907).

The existence of an active power or powers for evil also comes into prominence, especially, though not exclusively, in the Apocryphal writings (cf. art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Jewish], vol. iv. p. 612ff.). Not only such books as Enoch, which are full of demonology and angelology, but even Wisdom (22:1), contains such allusions: ‘By the envy of the devil death entered into the world, and they that are of his portion make trial thereof.’ Perhaps this re-emergence of demonology is due to the old remembrance of the Deity. Thus, Jubilees, in describing the temptation of Abraham, makes the agent not the Deity, but an evil spirit, Mastemâ (17:3). The later Chronicles of Jerahmeel omit the incident entirely. Tobit also contains references to the devil (6:58) and to demons.

The pessimism of Ecclesiastes represents one trend of thought, probably Sadducean; Wisdom (12:12) another:

‘God alone is good; neither delighteth he in the living perish: for he created all things that they might have being; and the generative powers of the world are healthcare, and there is no portion of destruction is there; nor hath Hades royal dominion upon earth.’

The Pharisaic teaching was predominantly optimistic, and the Rabbinic writings are full of the sentiment that God is good: ‘the observance of the Law was a joy in itself.’ It was good because it was the handiwork of the Creator, who saw that it was good. Probably the pessimism of the Essenes, as much as anything else, contributed to their disappearance. The fatherhood of God was one of the keystones of Rabbinic teaching.

‘The latter end of the righteous he calleth happy; and he varrieth that God is his father’ (Wis 2:24).

The immanence was always upheld, and the transcendental nature of the Deity was held to correspond with, not to contradict, His nearness to man.

The divine fatherhood was one of the answers to the problem of suffering and a protection against the assaults of evil.

Two books of the Apocrypha, Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom, belong to the category of didactic literature, but the first, in the latter, is the counterpart of the OT Wisdom literature. With the Rabbis wisdom was often lauded, and its great powers are often enumerated, but it is symbolic with the Torah, the wisdom of the Apocrypha ‘wisdom’ implies knowledge in a wider sense. While ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,’ general secular learning is sometimes meant. Holiness and perhaps Gnostic influences may be held responsible to some extent, for the growth and spread of these ideas.

Wisdom, as in the OT, is personified. She save Adam after the Fall, Lot from Sodom, Jacob from Esau, Joseph and Israel from Egypt; in fact, she is God’s instrument (Wis 10:9). By the wisdom thou hast made man’ (69); Wisdom is ‘the aridutus of all things’ (77). Wisdom is associated (60:11) with the ‘Word of God,’ though the Logos theory is not developed very far.

Perhaps the personification of wisdom, of course, can be paralleled in Proverbs, as in 8:3, may be regarded as the first stage in the growth of angelology. Except in the definitely Apocryphal books, angels seem to have been used as poetical images, and regarded from a figurative point of view. In Jubilees, however, and in the Ascension of Isaiah, very advanced angelology — 9 — division into groups, and rules by grades; of this kind of books are later in date, and the references belong to Christian rather than to Jewish Apocrypha.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Psalms of Solomon is the central position occupied by eschatological and Messianic ideas. In no portion of the Apocrypha is a clearer view presented or a more spiritual hero portrayed. The title ἡματος [here, perhaps for the first time, rhymed epithet of Messiah] is used, not later known as the ‘birth-pangs of the Messiah’ (ḥabbaMaššiah). The deliverer was to be descended, but not supernaturally, from the house of David, the Davidic relation being a link with the Messiah of the prophets. He will be so described as an eternal, but under God; he will be king and prince; he will destroy ‘proud sinners’ and break up the rule of the Gentiles, i.e. the Romans. He will restore the kingdom and gather in the outcasts of Israel. He will rule the nations and peoples in holiness and wisdom, and he will be known for his justice.

The era of universal peace and brotherhood is not clearly indicated as by Isaiah; there are, however, distinct allusions to it: ‘There shall be no more uprightness in his days, nor will he reign by means of war (Psa. Sol. 17:26); ‘Blessed shall they be that shall be in his days, in that they shall see the goodness of the Lord’ (18:9). There shall be perfect performance for the generation that is to come’ (18:11). The blessings are not to be restricted to Israel; the converted Gentiles shall share them. There is no reference to judgment, resurrection, or immortality.

Kyle and James (p. iv) quote an earlier parallel from the Alexandreine Sibylline Oracles in the later 4th cent. B.C. Here (Orac. Sibyl. III. 923-960) the Messiah (called ‘King’) is sent by God to make war to cease from the whole world, punishing and rewarding, not in virtue of his own power, but by the authority of God.

The views as to the Messiah were various and by no means uniform. Most described him as expected by some, spiritual by others. In such a complex situation it is difficult to get a synoptic view. In 2 Maccabees the Messiah element is measurer; in 2 Esdras, on the other hand, the length of his dominion is specified as 400 years. Enoch associates the Messiah with the future life and reward and punishment (chs. 48-51, 90, Charles, ii. 216 ff., 259 ff.), and in the later Apocryphal books the idea is developed. Enoch’s Messiah, ‘the king (Heb. שטוח), in a future life (174-28), has no place for a Messianic personage. The absence of this idea is a distinctive mark of Sadducean origin.

The Sadducees accepted religiously only not lacking in devotion to the Torah; their observance was perhaps less extensive, but not less fervent. They rejected the sabbath, or fence, which the Pharisees erected. They did not insist so strongly and frequently as the Pharisees on the necessity for observing the Law, because this was taken for granted.

The Sadducees had their traditions as to the way the Law should be carried out in practice, but they refused to make the authority of the scribes absolute. It is sometimes said that the Sadducees were analogous to the modern rationalists. The comparison is not a happy one; it would rather be to those in the eighteenth century who adhered to the church of the fashionable classes, reassembling any religious claim upon them outside the routine of conventional observance. They were opposed the fantastic ‘reformers,” as they called it, of the followers of Wesley” (Bryan, p. 155).

A stern judgment is threatened, ‘awfully and swiftly,’ upon those in ‘high place’ who have not kept the Law (Wis 6:4). The aim of the book of Judith, the composition of which has been assigned either to the age of the Maccabees or to the period following it, is to exalt the Law. The Sabbath and festivals are mentioned (8:10), firstfruits and tithes (11:2), circumcision (14:2). Tobit is similar to Judith in enjoining strict adherence to the Law; the dietary laws, firstfruits, charity,
prayer, and repentance are specially emphasized. Baruch, Jubilees, and the Psalms of Solomon all 'magify the Law and make it honorable.' In Ecclesiasticus, on the other hand, the function of the scribe is that of a philosopher rather than a religious instructor (39); he is an exponent of ancient lore, of sententious doctrine, rather than of statutes and ordinances. The principle that is lighted on in the light is self-evidently a true one, that the Commandments were to be carried out; and the maxims and wisdom of Ecclesiasticus were intended, doublets, as a complement to the essentially practical teaching of the other books.

The attitude towards the Law may be paralleled by that adopted towards the Temple and sacrifices. No finer tribute to the ecclesiastical system can be found than the magnificent eulogy of Simon, the son of Onias, the great high priest, the type of the Kohén Gedéz, in Sir 50. Great as was his well-deserved popularity, one feels that some, at least of the praises are intended for the office rather than for the personality of the occupant. Significant: is his 8 motto, 'Upon three things the world is based: upon the Torah, charity, and the practice of charity' (Abdót, i. 2; Singer, p. 184; Charles, ii. 691). His disciple, Antigonus of Socho, the founder of the Saducees, is hardly likely to have inculcated a discipulenum spiritus, having been the pupil of so distinguished a high priest. Ecclesiasties, like Ecclesiastes, makes no great point of the sacrificial system; like the Law, it was taken as a matter of course (see also Jdt 19).

Finally, reference should be made to an appreciation of natural phenomena, just as in the Psalms and in Job the pietistical genius was impressed by the beauty of the heavens. It is reechoed in such stirring passages as Sir 42f.

Little has been said hitherto as to the domestic practices and personal religion of the Jews. These subjects can be dealt with more conveniently in the next epoch.

3. To the completion of the Gemara. — Isaiah had warned his countrymen against appeals to foreign powers for aid. The unbridled passion of such alliances scarcely concealed the sullen but effective fetter of vassalage. Judah, flattered at the idea of being an equal ally of a mighty monarch, was, in point of fact, reduced to a dependent state. The very name of the Exodous, the final political error was committed by the Hasmonaës, in seeking the aid of Rome. Wherever the eagles once set foot, the country ultimately fell under Roman rule and was deprived of every vestige of independence. It may be argued that, in any case, Judaea could not have remained unnoticed, but must inevitably be drawn into contact with the great world power. This is true; but, had Judah not broken with the Hasdám, it is possible that dissolution of the Jewish State might have been accomplished more peacefully. The pious party—whether Hasdám or Pharisees—were supremely indifferent to the personality of their civil rulers and the political system by which they were governed. So long as freedom of worship was secured, they were ready to 'render unto Caesar' his due. The Maccabean princes, on the other hand, although they coveted territorial and political independence, could not fail to pre-


2 See Montefiore, Judaism and St. Paul, p. 46.

3 See above art. Festivals and Fastes (Jewish), vol. v. pp. 879-881.

4 The influence of Roman government on Judaism was manifest in three ways: (1) the functions of the Rabbis became more exclusively religious than civil or political; (2) the unity of the Roman Empire stimulated the growth of the Didascalia; (3) the Roman persecutions had the most fruitful epoch of internal religious expansion and constructive development in Judaism. To begin with, the civil authority of the Rabbis was diminished by curtailing the jurisdiction and field of the Jewish courts. The right of giving decisions in questions involving finance was abrogated in the time of B. Simon ben Shetah, during the reign of Alexander Jannaeus; the power of inflicting the death penalty was suspended forty years before the fall of the Temple (Jer. Sanh. 18c, inner col., line 24 of first perek, ed. Krotoschin, 1865; Schwab's tr., Paris, 1888, p. 229; see Crimes and Puni-

5 On the functions of these officials see Jfb ix. (1905) 541 f.
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the Jewish formula of marriage, ‘Thou shalt be my wife,’ not the customary Egyptian declaration, ‘Thou shalt be my maid.’ Philo, de Vita Mosis, ii. 137 [Manzey]; ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland, Berlin, 1902, iv. 209f.; tr. Cohn, Breslau, 1909, i. 352) bears testimony to the strictness with which their descendants kept the Sabbath, abstaining from all manifold work, neither kindling fires nor carrying burdens, nor in any way violating the Pluriasic sabbath. In Syria, too, Judaism flourished and spread (see Josephus, BJ v. iii. 342). From the Babylonian business documents of the great commercial house of Marash and Sons, in which documents many Jewish names occur, Samuel Damesh has shown how great was the zeal for Judaism existing among the Jews in Mesopotamia (The Jews in Babylon in the Time of Ezra, London, 1910).

Judaism had also planted itself firmly and extensively within the Roman Empire. The allusions of the classical writers are instructive. Already before the time of Pompey’s conquests, Jews were to be found in the Italian cities (cf. Gnaecet, Hist. of the Jews, Eng. tr., London, 1891–92, ii. 67). Josephus, War, ii. 194, brought to Rome as slaves, were freed by their co-religionists and added strength to the Jewish community. The hostile, or at all events contemptuous, attitude of Horace, Tacitus, and Suetonius was due to the innate pride of Roman race rather than to Jewish blood; it reflects a superficial popular verdict, not a judgment of matured reflection. But such phrases as ‘in qua qua pars promotus, (Javanis, ii. 246) are illuminating for the purposes of our study. They show that Jews brought their worship with them in their wanderings, and that their synagogues were numerous and well known. Caesar, like Alexander and Seleucus, founded Jewish communities, which, in time, ramified through the Roman empire in its provinces, that Jews were worshiped in Rome, 4 Augustus decreed the inviolability of synagogues, and exempted Jews from appearing in the law-courts on the Sabbath and on Friday after the ninth hour. Judaism was indeed a missionary religion. The disgust at the hollowness of the old faith was causing many cultured Romans to waver in their allegiance to the gods of the Capitol, and a desire for the truth was making itself felt. The Jews were an open sect, and the public were permitted to hear the proselytes explaining their beliefs and teaching the truth of their religion. The Jews of the Roman Empire were divided into two classes, the devout and the proselytes. The devout were those who had left their own country and had settled in Rome. They were called the "Jewish Jews," and they formed the nucleus of the Jewish community in Rome. The proselytes were those who had adopted Judaism as a secondary religion, and they were known as the " converts." The proselytes were a large and influential group, and they played an important role in the development of Judaism in Rome.

Their position was sufficiently important to require a special treatise of the Gemara, containing laws, etc., affecting them. This treatise is Mase. Berinim and belongs to the Babylonian Masehshatoth. The proselytes of the gate, gire haška, haška, and gire haška, see Di 5° 14, 12. Ab. Zara, 645, who accepted part of the Torah, that is to say, the Seven Noahian commandments, for which see Di 6° 242, are distinguished from the gire haška, haška, proselytes, for whom a blessing was added to the Amidah (see Singer, p. 48). The translations of the Bible into Greek, by Aquila, and into Aramaic (the Targum Onakadu hag-go'), are ascribed to the proselytes. Queen Helena of Adiabene, her son Zechariah, and King Monobazus adopted Judaism before the time of Claudius (Josephus, Ant. xx. ii.); Flavius Clemens, the cousin of Domitian, died a martyr for his adopted Judaism in A.D. 95, his wife and fellow-convert, Flavia Domitilla, being exiled to Pandaia (see Dio Cassius, lvii. 14; and art. PROSELYTES).

As a rule, Rome did not persecute for religious motives, preferring to overlook nonconformity wherever possible; but with the spread of Judaism and of Christianity the refusal to sacrifice to the Emperor or to look on him as divine was regarded as treason, and punished with death. The private and public life of Rome was so closely associated with idolatry that intercourse between Jews and Romans was very rare. Every civic or social act or custom was allied to idolatry in the Jewish mind, and the pouring of libations to heathen deities. The refusal to participate caused the Jews, and the Christians too, to be regarded as atheists and as unseemly hosts of mankind. It is true, the private observance of Judaism did not become a matter of public regulation; but the public observance was a matter of public concern, and the refusal to participate was regarded as a day of black misfortune to Israel, no less disastrous than the day on which the Golden Calf was set up (see Misha Shabb., i. 4 f.; Bab. Shabb. 13a, 11b, etc.; Tos. Shabb. i. 16; M. S. Zuckermandel, Passowale, 1898–82, p. 111, i. 2). This is, doubtless, a verdict of poesy on the consequences of interfering with the practice of a religious custom in the Roman world. The Haggada for Passover, or order of domestic ceremonies, with which this festival is observed, is saturated with customs copied from Roman etiquette.

The menu, ab uno usque ad mala, is represented by the hard-boiled eggs, eaten just before the meal, the brenthites (apples soaked in wine and spiced); the piece of unlevanted bread, omodi, omodi, omodi, "after the bread," or perhaps abi omodi, "during the meal," takes the place of the usual dessert of apples for a special occasion on this festival. The meaning of "lending" at the meal is that of the triclinium; the prescription of four glasses, reminiscence of the proportion of the number of glasses and proportion of wine by the Aristotle on Ethics (see Her. Ol. 61 xii.; Hec. Furtw. v. 7, 20). The most instructive comments are corresponded to the number of letters in the name of the chief guest. You would obviously represent the Numerals on the day of the wedding of the sons of the Kings of the Haggada (Dio Cassius, vii. 4).
Another Sadducean sect was that of the Dositheans (see art. 'Dositheus' in JE iv. [1903] 643 f.). The Ophites and Nazorean serpent-worshippers, who were mystical sects that arose in the Roman Empire, were also called ‘heretics’ by orthodox Jews. The Christian Church, however, was a more fruitful soil and actually ‘lent’ learning to Palestine, so that Hillel ‘brought’ Babylonian wisdom to the land of Israel. Just as in the case of Christianity, the growth of the Church was less a source of strength than of weakness. When Judaism spread abroad, sects arose within.

A contrast has often been drawn between the Jews of Egypt and those of Mesopotamia. On the whole, the latter country was more favourable to the growth of the spirit of Judaism. Babylon was the birthplace of the larger Talmud, undying in its influence on Judaism; Egypt is the home of the Septuagint, which was superseded by Aquila’s version and became the heritage of the Greek Church, as well as of Philo Judeus (q.v.), whose philosophy, though important in its day, cannot for a moment be compared with the teachings of the Babylonian Rabbis in its importance for Judaism. The Jewish communities of Egypt seem to have fluctuated and disappeared periodically, at all events, when the Arab general, Amr ibn al-A’as, conquered the country (A.D. 640-642), no mention is made of the Jews among the religions enumerated in the treaty of peace with the Munkatsis. The Jews of Egypt and of Mesopotamia were mostly orthodox; but sects, more or less heretical, manifested themselves in Palestine at an early date. Justin Martyr enumerates (Dial. cum Trypho. 80 [PG vi. 660]), besides the Sadduceans and Pharisees, the Gnostics, Merismos, Galileei, Helleniani, and Baptists. A. Clement of Alexandria also mentions (Strom. vii. 15 [PG ix. 924]) the existence of Jewish sects. Against the exact dates of these sects—a term which at certain periods included Jewish Christians—a special combination, drawn up by Samuel the Younger (early part of 2nd cent.) at the request of Gamaliel, was added to the Eighteen Benedictions. The Jewish Christians, a Sadducean sect, were descended from Simon b. Boethus of Alexandria. The Cairo Genizah has recently furnished documents of an unknown group of sects. These have been edited by F. S.ра (Documents of Jewish Sects, i. Cambridge, 1910), which attributes them to a Zadokite sect at Damascus founded in Macabean times.

This hypothesis has been disputed, however, by many of the scholars who have devoted themselves to the book. See Israel Levi (REJ lii. [1911] 162-192); M. J. Lagnum (EB, new ser. ix. [1912] 213-240, 351-360); W. Barclay (Leiterster für hebr. Bibel, vol. xi. [1911], ii. 1, pp. 23-35); G. Margulies (Attestation, 30 Nov. 1911, Esp. viii. ii. [1912] 469-477, iii. [1913] 121-225), who believes that the Zadokites regarded John the Baptist as the Messiah and Jesus as the teacher of righteousness; R. W. Charles (ib. 735 ff.), who regards the book as the composition of a party (not a sect) originating among the Sadducees, but closely related to the Pharisees, and writing between 18 and 50; and A. Bieber (JQR, new ser., iii. [1912-13] 129-135), who regards the book as coming from the period preceding the Karaite schism. At all events, this sect agrees with the Zadokites of Kirjath, mentioned in the Tishbi, in rejecting Rabbinic ordinances in several particulars, notably divorce and the regulation of the calendar.

1 See last line of Saba, 446, and Rashi, loc. cit.
2 These sects were known to Eusebius (EB, vi. xx. 6) from the work of an older author, Hegesippus; and Epiphanius (HA, xvii. 27) was able to quote the Heron, to which the name of 'Herodes' (Jer. Jer. 3rd rev. iii. 4., 6) is not to be confused with the Essenes.
5 Inter alia, they were strict Sabatarians and did not believe that representing the messiah (Saba, 1650).

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die iben und höchsten Kultusbehörden vorstanden, ist es selbstverständlich, dass auch religiöse Anerkennungen durch diese Repräsentanten verleihen wurden. Die disziplinierte in der Schule gelehrt, wurde durch diese zum Gesetz erhoben. On the other hand, the law... (The Canon of the OT, London, 1911, p. 397, note 1). The evidence is quite insufficient to justify us in regarding the "Gentiles," a term which may indicate either secular books or prohibited heretical scriptures, and, probably, the Gospels, means had to be taken to protect the people from ascribing inspiration to documents that had no claim to such authority. "Apostolic books are called 'Genizai,' 'hidden away,' books preserved as ancient but not adapted for public reading... (Ib.). This word "Genizai," the Heb. root of "Genizah," meaning books and 'proven,'... in spite of the similarity in the derivation of the word, from Apostolic. The name denotes doubt rather than final rejection... (Ib., p. 187).

It is said that the fierce fight raged about the inclusion of Canticles and Ecclesiastes, the former because the allegorical interpretation was not universally adopted, the latter because of its Sadducean tendencies. The strength of Akiba was excited in their favour, and the books received the stamp of canonicity, i.e. they were said to "deify the hands." This expression is indicative of the care for books insculpted by the Rabbis. In order to ensure safety and to preserve the scrolls from careless handling, they were declared to be "unclean" (see the Mishna, treatise Tishkui).

The Jews, at the fall of the Temple, may be divided into three groups, each of which may be typified by a representative hero... (Ib.). There was the party of extreme nationalism, the party of the zealots, who repeatedly repudiated Rome. An example of this class was Akiba, who supported the revolt of Bar Kokhba against Hadrian. The zeal... of his work as a Halakhist was nearly lost through the terrible persecutions and wholesale exterminations that followed the suppression of the revolt which he had encouraged and aided. Akiba stood for nationalism, but he stood for the Halakhah as well, and in this respect he differs from the zealots and from Bar Kokhba, whose aims were almost wholly political... (Ib.). AKIRA BEN JOSEPH, vol. i, pp. 274-276. (2) At the other extreme stood Johanan ben Zakki, who represents the old Hasidic idea in its purest form. He and his followers concentrated on the Halakhah, and were indifferent to politics. Johanan, like Jeremiah, was denounced as a traitor, because, like Jeremiah, he realized the hopelessness of resistance, and saw that hope lay only in submission and in strict attention to the law. He was subjected to persecution as Jeremiah was, and had to escape from Jerusalem in a coffin. (3) The third party may be typified by Josephus (p. 62), who, though equally eager for the independence of Judaism, believed in friendship with Rome. In this, but in this alone, he is reminiscent of the Hellenizers under the Maccabees and the Sadducees.

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dees. As regards nationalism he stands at the opposite extreme to Akiba, Johanan being perhaps midway between the two, though nearer to Akiba. Administration was what was laudable in Roman institutions was not confined to the Sadducees. Paul boasts with pride of his Roman citizenship, and, almost in the same breath, of being a keen Pharisee. Even if Paul was less conscious of the pride of Roman citizenship, it was faithful to the Law.
The fall of the Temple made the Jews wanderers, with a book for their portable fatherland and a code for their nationality. But the yearning to return to Zion showed itself to be deep and real. The liturgy contains many allusions to and prayers for a restoration, but the restoration which is described as the Return to Zion and the rebuilding of Jerusalem meant something more than a merely physical return and rebuilding. It was associated with the reign of universal peace and the coming of the Messiah. Under the overpowering influence of the catastrophe, such aspirations could not have been expressed in other phraseology. In the course of time the ideas became separated. It is signifi-
cantly that the Return are not included in the Thirteen Creeds, based on Maimonides (see Abrahams, Annotated Prayer-Book, p. 561; EEKE iv. 246), although the coming of the Messiah is mentioned. The attitude of faith in the God of the universe, the dogmatic precision as to eschatology. The Return may be exclusively physical in form, but not necessarily so. So, too, the restoration of the sacrifices. The verse of Hosea (14:4) 'Let us make up for the sacrifices with good lips' (see Kimhi and also Abrahams, p. xxv), was taken to indicate the supersession of sacrifice by prayer. The allusions to sacrifices in the liturgy are, for the most part, unavailing. They were designed to preserve the memory of the Temple, as is the Aboda, or Temple service, of the high priest, in the Misaf of the Day of Atonement. The belief in the restoration of the sacrifices is not clear, and many citations could be adduced on both sides (cf. O. J. Simon, 'Authority and Dogma in Judaism,' JQR v. 231-243, and the counter-statement of M. Hyamson, ib. 438-442).

This spiritulation has its counterpart in the homilies of the Midrash and the allegorization of Philo. It was also one of the points of difference between Sadducees and Pharisees. As an instance it is noteworthy that it was held that the Sadducean sect of Boethus (Meg. Tama'ith, iv.) rejected the old traditional interpretation of the lex talionis, adopted by the Pharisees, in which 'the value of an eye' was to be given for 'an eye.' The Sadducees claimed that the apparently literal explanation was correct and upheld severity. The Pharisees, on the other hand, pointed out that the injured party did not, in fact, receive compensation by this means. In this, as in other matters, the tendency to spiritualize and allegorize had been long existent.

For the growth of angelology, see art. Demons and Spirits (Jewish). The effect of Greek learning and the continued influence of Greek philosophy made themselves felt even on Rabbinics. It is said (Too. Hagigah, ii., ed. Zunckerman, p. 224, l. 7) that four Rabbits entered Paradise, i.e. indulged in the use of tobacco in philosophy. Ben Zoma in his lost record: Ben Azzi died young; Elisha ben Abuya 'cut down the little plants' (corrupted young students) and became an apostate; Akiba 'waved his gauntlet' (a la Paracelsus) to the Spartees and said: 'I shall not be taught publicly; that is to say, they might be imparted to two

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Students but not to a greater number at one time; other portions, e.g. shevet, 'cosmology, genesis,' should not be taught Joseph in private. The most mystical of all chapters was not taught all, but was reserved for individual study in nature age.

The chapter thus prescribed was Mark 1, known as הָגִיגָה, 'the work of the, Joseph, on the nature of the Deity which was to be adorned. For this reason, cosmology was not much encouraged (see Jewish' 'art. Josephus) or was taught only in the presence of the teacher (see Abrahams, Annotated Prayer-Book, p. 607). The word qetub (sect of the dead) is also used in the sense of a fixed time for devotions (see Mishna Berihkah, iv. 5), but in the passage cited it has a bad sense. It was 'impossible to imagine a keter (a crown) or an attoned spirit; without this feeling of attention, the prayer was nugatory (see the formulation of the self-dedication, before performing a commandment, which begins יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה (Singer, pp. 14, 15, 216, 222, etc.). The early Hasidim used to wait as long (yiqb) before prayer, in order to induce thoughts of God. We do not rise for prayer unless imbued with deep seriousness. 'אָהָבָה (Ps. 28, 2, in 'beaviness of head,' opposed to יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה (Licht, iii. 17; Singer, 162). The ' revelation, if the king greet a man, he should not reply; even if a serpent be wound round his heel, he should not pause' (Mishna Berihkah, v. 1). It is to be noted, 'Whose soul is upon his fixed burden (qetub), his prayers are not appeals' (ib. 4). Similar citations could be freely added. Prayer was to be not merely heart-felt, but also fixed (יהוה יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה (ib. 4, v. 6).

Further, it is known that originally it was prohibited to write down a formula of blessing.

Those who write down יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה יְהֹוָה are like those who learn the Torah (Shab. 115a). It is doubtful whether this does not simply mean, as Rashbi suggests, that written blessings are not to be rescued from a fire on the Sabbath. In any case, however, וְיִשְׂרֵי הָעָדָה were not generally written down. The reader knew or received instructions as to the subjects of his prayer and the order in which they were to be arranged. Frequently certain phrases were specified, but the general framework was left to the taste and inspiration of the טֵבֶן יִשְׂרֵי הָעָדָה, or preacher. In the course of time, owing either to ignorance on the part of officials or to a desire to ensure uniformity, the prayers were written down, and the imposition and composition of original prayers survived in the pizgah, or poetical hymns, of later times.

The central portion of the morning and evening service was, of course, the recital of the ateret (see Singer, p. 40; Abrahams, p. 1; cf. also Taylor, Excursus iv., p. 110) with the blessings appropriate to it. This is fully discussed in the opening chapters of Berahkoh. The Amida, laked by R. Jamaliel, who 'introduced the usage of set prayers' (Graetz, ii. 360), the kernel of the prayer is much older, and very probably goes back to the early Soferim.

It is well known that tradition has sacrificed to Moses and Ezra many institutions, whose origin, dating back to ancient times, was thus forgotten. It was feared that many who.were uninitiated might be led to undertake metaphysical research, and the Rabbis accordingly ordained that certain portions (i.e. וְיִשְׂרֵי הָעָדָה, instruct, etc.) of the Scriptures and liturgy be taught publicly; that is to say, they might be imparted to two

1 See above, p. 685.

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Many Psalms and Scriptural extracts were included in the service, and many touching prayers

of the Tannaitic age have been preserved. The Lord's Prayer has been shown by Taylor to be composed of phrases taken from contemporary Rabbinic prayer. The great use of Holophite passionate and prophetic passages took place on Sabbath, festivals, and fasts; the Law alone was read on Saturday afternoons, Monday and Thursday mornings (market days), and on other occasions, such as the New Moon. In the first centuries of the Christian era, Hafṭārā (from the root pāṭār, 'to be free, or finished') was, additionally, to be free, or finished. This name, as also the alternative e’regē, seems to be due to the fact of its following the Siṭānā, or Pentateuchal lesson (see Abrahams, p. cvii). When, therefore, the Māṣīl, or additional service, was read after an interval, and not immediately following shakārāh (morning), the conclusion of the Hafṭārā would mark almost the end of the service. The Law was read, in Babylon, in an annual cycle of consecutive sections. In Palestine, a triennial cycle existed (see A. Büchner, JQR v, 429 ff.), but cf. M. Gaster, i. 77). It is possible that, notwithstanding the sobriety of the Hafṭārā was, to a considerable extent, in the hands of the reader (Lk 4:4), but it was intended to have some point of contact with the Pentateuchal portion of the day. Both Siṭānā and Hafṭārā were interpreted by the interpreter, verse by verse. In the case of the Hafṭārā, the version was more homiletical, and greater sections were rendered at a time. The Targum was greatly esteemed (see art. TARGUM). A man was to study the Targum twice in Hebrew and once in the Targum. To this day the Targum is universally studied among Jews, privately, all over the world. The Yemeinites also have an Arabic Targum; the Sefer ha-David, a Spanish Targum, which is read publicly verse by verse on the ninth of Ab; the Ashkenazie Yiddish versions are not generally used in service.

The Eighteen Benedictions contain paragraphs relating to the Messiah and to the resurrection. The former subject is introduced at the beginning, after the mention of the patriarchs; and it is often repeated, perhaps, to imply that the proof of immortality employed by Jesus (Gen 12:7; 18:18, 21:17, 22:18) was an unshaken. The tendency of Tannaitic religious thought, in the Haggadah especially, was optimistic, and these two ideas are the outcome of optimism. The range of Haggadah extended over the whole sphere of life and tinged everything with bright and pleasant hues. The Haggadah reflects the spirit of the Halakhah, and, consequently, the conceptions of the next world, as well as of this, were given an optimistic turn. The Messianic idea is based on the prophetic reign of peace. The troubles or 'birth pains' that were to precede the advent of the divine Saviour were naturally identified by many of the people with the hardships and persecutions connected with the Maccabean revolution. Hence, it is thought, was the Messianic idea of the Messianic age, and thus the temporal Messiah, of the type of Judas and Theudas (Acts 5:38) and of Bar Kokhba, gained popular support may be seen (see also M. Gaster, Book of Prayer ... acc. to the Custom of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews, i. 9).

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dispersion, in proportion as the personal history of the Jews becomes of interest, owing to their varied fortunes and their continuous influence upon human thought. Judaism was, in fact, recuperating after the creative energy of the preceding centuries. Evolution moves in stages, not in a path of gradual and imperceptible progress. The schools of Palestine, of Babylonia, of Galilee, had been fertile; so, too, had been the Babylonian academies in their time. But the ages of the later Amoraim and Saboraim collected and formulated. The chief centres of intellectual activity in Babylonia were Sura (also known as Mata Mahasaya), Nehardea, Mahnaza, and Pumbeditha. Abba-Arika, known as Rabbi (A.D. 175-247), was instrumental in raising the importance of the Babylonian schools. He was educated at Tiberias, under Judah I., and, after his return to Babylon, he founded his school about 220 and gathered a large number of pupils. Babylonia now began to attain a higher renown than Palestine and Galilee for scholarship and Rabbinic authority. Ammi and Assi, the leaders in Judaism, acknowledged the supremacy of Rabbi's successor, Babylon (e.g., Bab. Shothah, 247a). The growth of the school was followed by a rise in the morality of the inhabitants of Babylon, which had hitherto been of a low standard. The fine ethical sayings of Rabbi described a new conception of the old Jewish ideal of the sanctity of marriage, for decay had set in. He is said to be the author of Mahosh for the New Year (see Singer, p. 249), and of 273 117 167 (Singer, p. 250), for the Day of Atonement. He devoted much attention to the liturgy. The great opponent of Rabbi was Mar Samuel (also called Arokh (Shabb. 58c)), head of the academy of Nehardea (c. 185-257). The rivalry of these two teachers may, in some respects perhaps, be compared to the contests of Hiilei and Shammi. Yet Rabbi, though inclining to severity in his judgments, was not unlike Hiilei in disposition (see Pumbeditha, p. 5). The Persians, so far as the Persians to the Persians: Rabbi sternly opposed any non-Jewish influence and teaching. Dathan, who takes up with the affairs of his own nation, refused to allow the customs of the Persians to exert any influence on those of the Jews, and even forbad those latter to adopt them, however innocent, from the Magi: "If a man learns a single thing of the Magi ruin death." Samuel, on the other hand, learned many things of the Persian aces. None of his decrees, however, were possessed of such important results as the one by which he declared the law of the land to be just as binding on the Jews as their own law (Mak. 244a). ... Jeremiah had given to the families which were exiled to Babylonia, the following urgent exhortation as to their conduct in a foreign land: "Seek the peace of the city whither ye have been carried away captives." Samuel had transformed this exhortation into a religious precept: "The law of the land is a binding law." To Jeremiah and Mar-Samuel Judaism owned the possibility of existence in a foreign country (Gen. ii. 245, 259, 259). Another of Samuel's claims to fame is his regulation of the calendar, based on his knowledge of astronomy, which he had acquired from Magian instructors. He said of himself that he knew his way as accurately among the paths of the heavens as the streets of Nehardea, but that he could not explain the courses of the comets (Ber. 556). His other name, Jarshinah, was derived from the place near which he was born. Among the later principals of Pumbeditha was R. Joseph, regarded by Hai Gaon as the author of the Targum on the Prophets (cf. J.E. xi. (1866) 61). He is said to have translated those portions of the Prophets which had hitherto not existed in an Aramaic version. His object was purely to supply the Pentateuch, just as Aquila supplied the Song of Songs. Although the Pentateuch version of the Targum was not as much used as the versions of the Jewish translators, certain of the Prophets—e.g., Isaiah—were revised by Christians and amended from the Greek text. The NT was retranslated by Babylonian bishops of Edessa (411-480), and the unrevised text still exists in the Christian MS and the Syriac Peshitta, where it was seems to have been the receives of the MS of J. Parfoot, in PJotropa Syneno, t.l (Paris, 1842 p. 401), a contemporary of R. Joseph. It is, therefore, very likely that Joseph undertook a Targum in order to provide the Jews with a version of their own.

The great achievement of the schools in Mesopotamia was the Babylonian Gemara. When the creative power of the teachers of Halakhah began to diminish, the time arrived to seal up tradition. R. Ashi, the son of Simai (352-427), a teacher of the Sura school, who had become president of the great seminary, was one of the greatest exponents of his time, and he was known by the honorific title of Rabbâni, 'our master.' Ashi began the collection and arrangement of the Talmud, although this must not be taken to imply the production of a written text. He devoted his labours, which extended over fifty years, to the comparison of materials and placing in order of all the decisions, corollaries, and fancies of Haggadic and Halakhah which had accrued through the ages. The text was preserved orally for some considerable time to come. Ashi's work was continued and completed by Rabina and Sura and Jose of Pumbeditha. In 499, when Rabina died, the Talmud of Babyloyn was finished. The Jerusalem Talmud had been concluded, it is generally held, about a century and a half previously. (See W. F. Grätz, Judeen, p. 95.) The Talmud is so encyclopaedic for this period that nothing can be said with certainty, but it is generally assumed that the place of compilation was Babylonia. The Talmud was in no sense a popular work. It was taught and studied in the schools by the Gemara and successors of the Saboraim. As a code it was unwieldy and could not be easily consulted by private persons. Consequently, in course of time there grew up other arrangements which were shorter and more accessible. The Talmud has, however, always remained the ultimate source of learning. Its decisions have been modified and its contents arranged and rearranged repeatedly. But to book, after the Bible, has exerted such influence on Judaism.

Code succeeded code, commentary followed upon commentary, finally, the Talmud became a field of learning, more or less abstract, while for practical questions reference would be made in the first instance, to the code of the day (see, further, art. TALMUD). Between the Talmud and the Shalhan Arakh of R. Joseph Qaro (1604-1661), is the most universally accepted to-day as the exposition of orthodox Judaism, many other codes intervene. With these the development of Judaism is vitally concerned (see S. Dalcheh, Jewish Codes and Codifiers, J.E. Chroo., Jan. 1, 1900, p. 247, Jan. 8, p. 26 f., Jan. 15, p. 25 f., also reprinted in pamphlet form).

The three first codes emanated from Babylonia. The Gaon Jehovah b. Nahman, at Sura, is said to have written the Halakhoth Tamid, about 770. The Halakhoth Gedolah, or Bishnahoth of R. Simon Kayara, who was, according to Abraham ibn Daud, a Rabbi of Pumbeditha about 770, was thought, in reality, to be of later date, about the beginning of the 9th century. They could not have been the model for Judai. The Cairo Genizah has preserved part of the work, which probably existed in the form of loose letters. Gaon Abah wrote his Shemith, a book of responses, constituting a Halakhic exposition of the weekly Seder, or Pentateuchal lesson. The Talmud was the warp of the Jewish translators, certain of the Prophets—e.g., Isaiah—were revised by Christians and amended from the Greek text. The NT was retranslated by Babylonian code, commentary followed upon commentary, finally, the Talmud became a field of learning, more or less abstract, while for practical questions reference would be made in the first instance, to the code of the day (see, further, art. TALMUD). Between the Talmud and the Shalhan Arakh of R. Joseph Qaro (1604-1661), is the most universally accepted to-day as the exposition of orthodox Judaism, many other codes intervene. With these the development of Judaism is vitally concerned (see S. Dalcheh, Jewish Codes and Codifiers, J.E. Chroo., Jan. 1, 1900, p. 247, Jan. 8, p. 26 f., Jan. 15, p. 25 f., also reprinted in pamphlet form).

The three first codes emanated from Babylonia. The Gaon Jehovah b. Nahman, at Sura, is said to have written the Halakhoth Pesigoth, about 770. The Halakhoth Gedolah, or Bishnahoth of R. Simon Kayara, who was, according to Abraham ibn Daud, a Rabbi of Pumbeditha about 770, was thought, in reality, to be of later date, about the beginning of the 9th century. They could not have been the model for Judai. The Cairo Genizah has preserved part of the work, which possibly existed in the form of loose letters. Gaon Abah wrote his Shemith, a book of responses, constituting a Halakhic exposition of the weekly Seder, or Pentateuchal lesson. The Talmud was the warp of the Jewish translators, certain of the Prophets—e.g., Isaiah—were revised by Christians and amended from the Greek text. The NT was retranslated by Babylonian
The triumph of Christianity and its adoption by Constantine meant the humilation of the Jews. Numerous repressive acts of legislation were passed against them, and the boycotts were frequent. Jews were prohibited from entering Jerusalem, and their lives were burdened with hardships and oppressive restrictions. Prelates of the Church, notably Ambrose of Milan, and Cyril of Alexandria, were among their bitterest persecutors, and the Emperors, whom friendly, or at least not ill-disposed, to the Jews, were frequently persuaded by their priests to inflict on them these unbecoming punishments. Even Jerome, who, like Ambrose, owed his knowledge of Hebrew to Jewish teachers, publicly declared his hatred of them. Yet the popes themselves and the Roman bishops were often exceptions to this rule, and they did not infrequently stand forth as the champions and protectors of the Jews. The Arians, as a rule, were more tolerant than the Ostrogoths. The reign of Julian, who abandoned Christianity, was a brief interval of light for the Jews amid their sorrows. But on Judaism itself the domination of Christianity had little influence. In the same way, little effect was experienced from the rise of the Sassanian dynasty (224-651), founded by Ardashir I. Papakān, which brought into greater prominence the worship of fire. The Jews themselves suffered at first from the extreme sternness with which the profane use of fire was prevented, but by the time of the first Shakhād (243-271) the relations between the two religions were amicably readjusted.

Mention must be made of a false Messiah (see art. MESSIAH, PSEUDO-) who arose in Crete during this time—i.e., before 427. About this time the hopes of the millennium were spreading, and the long-awaited deliverer was expected. This was, to some extent, due to an ancient Sibylline oracle (see GAEBER, B 617), which placed the advent of the Messiah in the 8th jubile, between A.D. 440 and 470. In proportion as persecution became stronger, these hopes grew more vigorous. The Chronicles of Josephus, composed, according to Gaster, during the first centuries of the common era (M. Gaster, Chron. of Jer., London, 1899, p. xxix), contain such eschatological calculations. These Messianic ideas were strongly discouraged by Ashi, and this event had no permanent influence on Judaism. It has been mentioned that the successors to the Amoraim were called Sabborim. The name is connected with the Arian and Syriac words for giving, giving to, giving off, etc., and probably meant a teacher or expounder. The Sabboraim, however, made their appearance at a somewhat later period, during the time of the Gemara. The word Gaon (pl. Goim) literally signifies 'great, majesty' (Hebrew hiddol, in a bad sense: Am 8, 15, in a good sense), and is said to be derived from this 47 (Hebrew). The word Gaon (pl. Goim) literally signifies 'great, majesty' (Hebrew hiddol, in a bad sense: Am 8, 15, in a good sense), and is said to be derived from this 47 (Hebrew). The word Gaon (pl. Goim) literally signifies 'great, majesty' (Hebrew hiddol, in a bad sense: Am 8, 15, in a good sense), and is said to be derived from this 47 (Hebrew).

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JUDAISM (599)

(929-942), who met the Karaites attacks first of all by translating the Bible into Arabic, and secondly by replying directly to the enemy. Saadya's great work was the Kitab al-Anwamalal wa-l-Bid'at (Hebrew, "The Book of Words and Custom", and other titles), or "Faith and Philosophy," which was the first attempt to bring revealed religion into harmony with Greek philosophy. 

"... an ascetic, who discarded the Bible, and formed his opinions solely by his own reasoning. But he might safely8 only say that he repudiated indeplicity of revelation, the truths which revelation had given. Faith, said Saadiya again, is the soul's absorption of the essence of a truth, which thus becomes part of the individual who believes, and therefore contributes whatever the occasion arises. Thus Saadiya identified reason with faith. He excluded the fear that philosophy leads to scepticism. You might as well, he argued, identify astronomy with superstition, because some deluded people believe that an eclipse of the sun is caused by a dragon's mouth. The same occurred (R. Abdr. El, ed. Hist. of Jew. Lit., London, 1906, p. 56). Many lost portions of Saadiya's anti-Karatian writings have been published by H. Hirschfeld, from the Cairo Genizah, in JQR. Thus of his Kitab al-Rudi 'al-Mutanabbi ("Exegeta of the Unfair Aggressor") two leaves exist (JQR xvii. 118-119). In these Saadiya maintains the Jewish tradition of deqqaqah, or post-mortem speculations. The fragment is probably a reply to Ibn Saqqawai. There is also one leaf of a treatise on mary (m. 1191). In JQR xivi. (1901-02) 72-73 Hirschfeld has published four leaves of a manuscript recording the giving of marriage manuals, and two on transgression of laws. Saadiya saw that the way in which the Karaites developed their Judaism in their attacks could be counteracted only by adopting the Kalam itself for the defense of the orthodox position. He thus became a disciple of the Jewish Mithkala, the great logician, Mithkabbonah, who sought to reconcile a belief in the divine creation with the Aristotelian theories of the universe. The unity of matter (Hirschfeld, Kzaer, p. 4). 

Judaism was not modified by Karaism, except in so far as the study of philosophy was stimulated and the impetus to philosophy created. The Karaites never once officially followed contact with Islam. The Karaites were never very numerous, and probably do not number more than 12,000. In the eyes of the Muslims there was never much question that Karaites and the Jews were equally Jews. Interesting light is thrown on this point of the controversy by the decisions of the four Imams, recorded in B.M. S. Or. 2538, vol. 73-83, headed "Story of the Karaite Laws and the Decrees of the Karaites," published by Hirschfeld (see Jews' Coll. J. J. Ed., 1848, p. 88). Yet, on account of their dietary customs and law of incest, intermarriage with Jews is very rare. 

In spite of Muhammad's treatment of the Jews of Arabia, the relations between the two faiths were intimate and not unfriendly. Islam had far more influence on Judaism than Christianity, because it was more tolerating. Theological status of Jews and Christians was recognized. They were Ahd al-Kitab, people possessing a legitimate scripture, as opposed to idolaters and to the Magi and Magians, whose revelation was not regarded as authentic (man Isbn shufflea-Kitab). 

It is necessary to emphasize the correct use of the phrase Ahd al-Kitab, first, because it is so frequently misinterpreted and applied to the Jews only, who are said to have called the people of the book. 2 The Jews are, however, in the strict sense, the people of the book. Even writers like Gersht have made this mistake (see Gersht, lii. 50, but, on the other hand, see p. 82, and where the term is correctly used). Secondly, it is a clear indication of the attitude of Islam to the Jewish faith: it did not claim a monopoly of salvation. In consequence, Jews and Muslims were able to study and discuss theology and science in a way that was impossible between Jews and Christians. 

The love of learning prevalent in Muslim lands was carried over to the Muslims; it was shared by all classes of the population. Consequently, when, after and as a result of the growth of Greek philosophy, the Arabs began to turn their attention to their own language as less deeply affected, and impetus given to philosophical study created a Jewish religious philosophy. 3 Hitherto, Jewish theology had been essentially the science of the world. But after the light of the Karaite, was extinguished in Islam, and the Jewish family of the Ben-Tibbon were mainly instrumental in making Arabo-Iranian knowledge known in Europe (see G. W. Thatcher, in EHR, iii. 229). 

The term is used of Christians as opposed to Jews in the First Vatican Council (Act., 1870, p. 11, line 50 (70th Syll of the Kitab el-Iman)). 

The influence was not confined to Judaism. Jewish schools and colleges of the place is teaching Arabic. 

Occupied either with questions of practical Halakhah or, in refutation of Karashism, with a defence of the Talmudic system of legislation. Ishaq ibn Sulaiman, better known as Isaac ibn Abba, or Avichai (d. 932), was perhaps the greatest, who died about 932, was well known as a scientific and philosopher and physician (see W. Engelkes, Religious-philosophical Werke Salmei ohne von der Möhrer, Jued. Hist., 1903, p. 2, note 2). His title name remains purely on his scientific work, not on his theology. Jews took up these studies with avidity, and a series of famous writers arose who sought to harmonize Judaism with the thought of the age, and who thus developed its philosophy of religion. 

Babyya b. Joseph ibn Pakhuda, who lived at Saragossa at the beginning of the 11th cent., was one of the first of Jewish authors to expound a system of ethics in his Arabic Al-Hikayat el-Farid el-Qulub (1040) ('Guide to the Duties of the Heart'), which was translated into Hebrew by Judah ibn Tibbon under the title of Hikba al-Hikmat. 

Babyya attempts to show that 'Jewish faith is a great spiritual truth founded on Reason, Revelation, and Traditions, all stress being at the same time laid on the willingness and the joyful readiness of the God-loving heart to perform life's duties.' He was influenced by Aristotelian philosophy, and by Galvani, and leaned toward Neo-Platonic philosophy. Faith must be intellectual, not bilateral and unreasoning. He proves the necessity and unity of God, and of God's will. The divine attributes are twofold, negative and active. One, not the other, is within the knowledge. God's existence is knowable from the circumstance that non-existent beings cannot create existent beings. His Unity and Eternity are also comprehensible, since the Supreme Cause must of necessity be indivisible and permanent. The other divine attributes are in his power, since they are an indispensable medium for thought and speech, and in reality, symbols and not realities. From these postulates Babyya deduced his system of ethics. He maintained that immortality must be reserved for mature speculations; hence the comparative poverty of biblical allusions. Neither was he essentially a mystic, but at the same time practical in his system of the religious life. Asceticism, as a discipline of abstinence and self-purification, is advocated, but not for general adoption. 4 

Babyya was a Spaniard, and one of the many Jewish scholars who arose in his Hebraic period during the Muslim domination. The light of Jewish learning was first kindled by Moses ibn Enouch († 966), from Babylon, who founded an academy at Cordova which soon eclipsed Sura. Among the great Jews of Spain were Hassadai ibn Shaprut, poet, physician, and politician (915-990), Menahem ben Saruk, Dunash ibn Labun, Judah Hayyuj, Abn-ib-Waliha, and the great scientist and theosophical philosopher, Samuel the Nasi (993-1055), the vizier of Abbas, king of Granada, who wrote an introduction to the Talmud and many liturgical hymns. 

The religious philosophy of Judaism owes much to Solomon b. Judah ibn Gabirol, commonly known as Avicenna (see art. IBN GABIROL, above, p. 69). His greatness, both as poet and as philosopher, is mirrored in his Keter Mahloth, or "Royal Crown," the text and translation of which may be seen conveniently in Gast (ii. 47); and his Akbath al-Abiyad, or Improvement of the Moral Qualities (ed. and tr. S. S. Wise, New York, 1901), is a summary of ethics for popular use. 

In this the virtues and the vices are arranged, coherently, in the same manner as the four elements distinguished by the physical from the psychical perceptions. The senses are indications of the disposition of the soul itself, as, for example, the animal soul, not the divine soul within man. His quotations are in most cases drawn from the Bible, not from Rabbinic writings, though the latter have, of course, an influence and popularity among non-Jews. In his First View of the Virtues, the following statement to the schoolmen. It was amongst them, especially in Maimonides, that Aristotelianism was most assimilated the Jewish family of the Ben-Tibbon were mainly instrumental in making Araco-Iranian knowledge known in Europe (see G. W. Thatcher, in EHR, iii. 229). 

See, further, L. Broidy and L. Kohan, 'Babyya ibn Joseph,'
neither Bible nor Rabbinic authorities are cited at all. This work, written in the form of a dialogue, reduced everything the Sefardim to two categories: (1) God, the first substance of the world, matter and form; and (2) the will, as intermediary. His teaching is based on Neo-Platonism, and, owing to the great Zechariah, the great influence of Jewish thought. There is a difference between the pantheistic emanationism of Greek and the Jewish concept of creation. Moreover, the Neoplatonic doctrine that the Godhead is unknowable naturally appealed to a Jewish rationalist, who, while preserving the existence of God, secularly refrained from ascribing definite qualities or positive attributes to Him. On this basis, and in the spirit of his unique philosophy, he created a wondrous philosophy as the "handmaid of theology," pursued his philosophy regardless of the claims of religion. (Rev., "Ezra on the Most Valuable Gifts."

While Gabirol leaned toward Neo-Platonism, Judah Halevi, born in Toledo (c. 1085—c. 1148), whose poems are tender and sacred, furnishes some of the most inspired examples of the later Hebrew ase of the doctrine of emanation as well as the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of matter. As Hirschfeld says (Kalamari, p. 6), his doctrine, like that of the Muslim al-Ghazali, may be summed up in one sentence as a philosophical scepticism in favour of a priori belief. His most famous philosophical work was the Clement, properly Kuzir al-Kalamari.

In this book he sets forth Jewish belief in a popular form, under the guise of a dialogue between a Rabbi and a king of the kingdom of God, who, in turn, consults with a Muslim and a Christian in turn, and, finally, a Rabbi, whose talks are not quite so tiresome. The form of the Kalamari, and, in a more positive form, the beliefs and practices of Judaism are enumerated. The pivot of his argument, the fact that men understand and the cooling down of the revelation by uninterrupted tradition (Kalamari, 98, 123, 748), is well seen through the fact that he assumed the idea of Judaism as revealed from any reliable source at his disposal. He mediated on the beginning of the world, but found as much difficulty in the theory of a beginning as in that of eternity. Finally, the absolute nature of the world does not exist, and the world as a whole is created by God, his world cannot be destroyed, and he found no reason to inquire into the chronology or derivation of those who lived before him. Had he lived among a people with well established traditions he would have established the theory of creation, however difficult, instead of restricting himself to the great statements and the general difficulties such as Ga 139 (see A. T. Chapman, "Intro. to Pent.," Cambridge, 1911, p. 20). The solutions which he gives are similar to the solutions which are upheld under the phrase "Am-naz-Makri," the "intelligent will perceive."

From the great families of Ibn Ezra and Kimhi, Jewish philosophy enjoyed marked and valuable support. Their contributions to learning were incalculable. France and Germany were the home of Talmudic and Biblical exegesis, Spain being more strongly devoted to philosophy.

The outstanding figure among Jewish medieval scholars is Moses Maimonides, also known as Rambam (1135—1204), of whom it was said, "From Moses unto Moses there arose not one like Moses." His fame rests on several foundations, but for the present it must suffice to refer to the great influence which he exercised on Judaism, first as a philosopher, then as an exponent of Halakha. His famous Guide was written for "religious persons who, adhering to the Talmud, have studied philosophy and are embarrased by the contradictions between the teachings of philosophy and the dictates of the Jewish law. He devoted much more attention to explaining them one by one, and laid far greater emphasis on the incomparability of God. Further, he subjected the divine attributes to a searching analysis. He rejected the teaching of the Metzillamim, and based his philosophy entirely upon Aristotle, for whom he had a profound admiration.

He adds twenty-six propositions to prove the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God (Guide, pt. ii, ch. 1; tr. M. Fischel, London, 1908), in it, the theory of God is based on the theory of motion. Motion requires an agent to produce it, the number of intermediate causes being finite. Some hold that motion is possible but that it can receive but do not impart; consequently, such a theory is a scholastic idea, a convention, not a fact. The unity of God is demonstrated in two ways: (1) Two gods can not be assumed, for they would
necessarily have one element in common by virtue of which they would be gods, and another element by which they would be distinguished from each other; furthermore, neither of these could have independent existence, but both would themselves have to be created. (3) The whole existing world is "one" organic body, the part of which is man. The sub-
immary world is independent upon the forces proceeding from the sphere, so that the whole universe is macrocosm, and thus the immediate world is due to one cause" (p. 161 ch. ii, p. 128; cited from J.B. ix. (1951) 76).

The chief point in which Maimonides differed from Aristotle was the eternity of matter, although he maintained that the Greek philosopher was fully correct in suggesting his thesis. Maimonides believed in the creation ex nihilo, and he held that this was in harmony with the teaching of Aristotle. The spheres and intelligences were not, as Aristotle taught, co-existent with the Prime Cause, but created by it. Evil does not proceed from God, because, being negative, it has no actuality. It is a negation, the absence of a capacity for good. He asserts human free will, somewhat at the expense of divine omniscience. This omniscience is incomprehensible to man, with his limited knowledge, but it is none the less, supreme. The fact of God's foreknowledge which of several possibilities will occur does not abrogate the freedom of choice. God foresees the result of a choice, having conceded full liberty of action at the outset.

Maimonides was entirely optimistic in his outlook. The ultimate aim of existence is happiness, and the object of the Commandments is to secure this end. He was the exponent of pure reason, and maintained the absolute reality of the rite of the intellect. It is most typical of him that he did not believe in the creation ex nihilo because of the Bible. He declared that, had his reason prompted him to adopt a natural doctrine in this matter, he would have had no difficulty in reconciling it with the Scriptures. Maimonides has been styled the first pragmatist. His breadth of mind and his attitude towards other faiths are remarkable. He recognized the validity, to a certain extent, of Judaism and Christianity, and maintained that the adherents of these religions must not be regarded as idolaters. Salvation is not confined to Jews. The rightousness of all nations have a place in the Books of the Scriptures.

Maimonides, in his famous commentary on the Mishna Hilek, regards immortality as intellectual. The wise man — i.e., the truly virtuous — will pursue good for its own sake. The child had to be taught to study by the offer of prizes. As man grows, his desires become greater, and the prizes have to be increased. So too, in mental and spiritual development, the hope of reward is the inducement to the wise to live virtuous lives. The saint requires no inducement. His reward is in the raising of his soul to that level of the divine essence. His motive must be, like that of Antigonus of Socho, to serve the Master not for the sake of a reward. In the Thirteen Articles of Faith which are formulated in the 12th precept of Hilek (which is quoted, in part, in Singer, p. 184, before ch. i; see also A.R.T. 793, 590), Maimonides included: "If it is the Resurrection of the Just.

As a code, not less than as a philosopher, Maimonides exerted great influence on Judaism. Mention has already been made of the growth of codification, a necessary consequence to the nature and method of the Talmud. It was found desirable to assemble the prevalent hand-books or large digests, in which the laws could be more readily consulted; some of these were for the learned, others for the people. Laws had to be introduced to explain the Mishpah, and to meet the needs of the day and of local conditions, occasioned by the scattering of the Jews.

R. Isaac b. Jacob of Pes (1018-1100), called Alfasi, a pupil of R. Isaac Asher, wrote a Compendium, which is practically the Babylonian — sometimes the Jerusalem-Talmud described of Haggadah and of all opinions were warranted as authoritative. Where the Gemara had modified the Talmud, their modification was adopted by Alfred: Isaac ben Ghayyad (950-1019) and Isaac b. Reuben (1012-1105) compiled books of laws, the former concerning festivals and fasts, the latter about a code.

All these were eclipsed, however, by the brilliance of the Mishna Torah or second Torah, of Maimonides, which contains more than the Mishna, because it 'includes the fundamental doctrines of the Jewish religion... it represents a system of the whole of Judaism, ethical and philosophical' (A. D. da Silva, 'Jewish Cods and Codifiers,' Jea. Chron., Jan. 1909, pp. 1, 8, 15, 22). Maimonides did not, like the other codifiers, follow the order of the Talmud, but introduced new divisions and groupings of laws. His style is concise and he cites no authorities — a practice for which he was blamed by his foes.

The Mishna Torah, also called Yad ha-Hazakah ('Strong Hand'), was written in Hebrew, because it was for general use. The Guide, being intended for students of Arabic philosophy, was composed in that language. Maimonides, in his letter to his pupil Akins, states that he did not intend the hand to supersede the Talmud as a study, but to provide a convenient work of reference, and to present students from going astray in practical laws.

By reason of its originality, and, especially, of its free attitude towards faith and reason, Maimonides was very much attacked by Abraham Ibn Daud, the son of David of Posqueres being a keen though sincere opponent. His works were even committed to the flames, and the controversy was not softened by the passing of time. It was, however, a great benefit to his death. Maimonides omitted from his code anything of the nature of superstition or demonology which had crept into the Talmud. His description of the liturgy is very important for the study of the development of the Prayer Book.

The influence of Maimonides is too great to be estimated briefly. He saved Judaism from being controlled by Aristotelianism, and was the forerunner of the School of Averroes. He was the first to attack the magic of the Cabala, of which he was himself a follower, and to criticize the mystical teachings of the Kabbalists. He was the first to make a complete and thorough study of the science of mathematics, and to classify the different branches of it.

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JUDAISM

aptitude for learning needed no encouragement; as soon as hindrances were removed, they applied themselves zealously to liberal culture. Many of their co-religionists in other lands, however, being permitted to enjoy these advantages, did not entirely appreciate the work of the Spanish Rabbins. They were rather repelled by the cold reason of Maimonides, and they also disagreed with his Halakhah. Hence a mystic reaction had every chance of making itself felt. Several distinguished scholars were attracted by the cult of the mysterious and lent it support. This new teaching, which was called Kabbalah, or tradition, spread from Gerona all over Spain, and also northward. It was a revolt against logic, and sought to unite the divine element in man with the world spirit (shekhel hatov, by striving to attain perfection and self-purification. It instilled the recognition of a harmony in all things. The macrocosm is a counterpart of the macrocosm. The doctrine of the Sephiroth ('spheres'), the agencies of the En-Sefi ('Infinite'), and the emanations and revelations of the Tree of Life, the grades and functions of spirits and angels, and the relation between the material and the ideal were all worked out with mathematical precision (see, further, art. KABBALAH). Metempsychosis has already been taught by Isaac b. Abraham of Fonserannes, the Blinded (d. 1190-1210). Life was surrounded with countless customs and acts having a mystical origin. In every secular deed, in every word of prayer, in every mishnah, man was to be in the conscious state, to think of a new connection with the spiritual world, and thus to induce the desired communion with it. The divine name was a mystery which overshadowed and influenced everything, and the deaden was said to have had a mystical power (see, further, art. TETRAGRAMMATON).

All kinds of devices were invented or employed to interpret the sacred books and their relationship with Kabbalah. Examples of such incantations were: thea, vavath, and gersa, or permutations, the use of letters according to their numerical value and transposition. Various systems of substitution prevailed—e.g., avatkh (...), which, in the first letter of the alphabet was equated to the last, the second to the last but one, and so on (see, further, art. Neoplatonism).

The Abulafia, Isaac Ibn Latif, Joseph Jikhitall, and Moses de Leon, the pious of Kabbalah, wereSpaniards. The most distinguished adherent was Nacimahah (Nahmanides or Haman), 1195-1270, who was known at an early age for his saintliness and learning.

His influence on Judaism was very great, because he was really the first to establish methodical Rabbinal mysticism; as an absolute Kabbalist, for he believed in a creative ex nihilo, who selects the letters; who chose as the essence of reason, Nahmanides was the defender of authority. The former adopted a rationalistic attitude towards the Biblical miracles, ignoring those of the Talmud. To the latter the Biblical miracles were the object of veneration and implicit belief. Although his respect for authority was not limited to the Talmud, but extended to the Gemara and rendered sacred in his eyes even the utterances of his contemporaries, Nahmanides did not hesitate to declare, at the great disputations of 1263, that a belief in magic is not incumbent on the Jew. Nahmanides' chief activity lay in the Talmud. His philosophical theories, though based on logic, in reality rest on authority. He made miracles the foundation of his system, rejecting Maimonides and Aristotle. 1 For Nachman, on the other hand, the belief in miracles was the foundation of Judaism, on which the three pillars of his structure rested: the creation from nothing, the omniscience of God, and the divine providence. He was assumed, with the philosophers, that the sensory instincts are a disgrace to man, since he is destined to a spiritual life. Nachman was a strenuous opponent of this view. Sin, which is perfect, has created the earth world... nothing in it should be regarded as... hateful.

Judaism was for Nachman a cult of the intellect, for Nachmam it was a religion of the feelings (Graetz, iii. 591). Thus Maimonides insisted on the power of the intellect to solve the mysteries of religion, while Nahmanides regarded the divine secrets as a necessary not to be revealed at penetration. Demons and angels were rejected as heathenisms by Maimonides; they are part of the system of Nahmanides. The Kabbalah, laying great emphasis on nature and the ideal, was admiringly with his view of life, and the approval of so famous a Rabbi was of great value to Nahmanides.

The Kabbalistic scriptures achieved their fame very largely by the fact that they were pseudographica. The most famous book was the Zohar (zohar), composed by Moses b. Shem Tob de Leon (1220-1290) after 1255. This work has been attributed to Simon b. Jehuda; it was written in Aramaic, and its preservation was accounted for in a miraculous way. Its aim was to show that the Bible was never intended to be understood in a literal sense. In spite of its extravagances, the book exercised enormous influence for a long time. The Bakhai was composed by Azriel, one of the pupils of Isaac the Blind, and was attributed to Nissanka b. hak-Kanna. 2 Contemporary Rabbanus, however, refused to acknowledge it, and Meir b. Simon of Narbonne (second half of 13th cent.) ordered it to be burned. The Kabbalistic movement lasted for many years. Its failure to capture Judaism completely was largely due to the firm bulwark in defence of reason erected by Maimonides; yet it saved Judaism from being reduced to a mere system of logic. It produced many saints, and it created some fantastic enthusiasm. In the persecution it stimulated hope and encouraged pietjy, and by emphasizing the inner underlying ideas it prevented observance from losing its original meaning. The fault of Kabbalah lay in the fact that it was not fitted for the populace. In the case of a scholar or recire, mysticism produced devotion and ecstasy; in ignorant masses it generated superstition. Gradually the Kabbalists drifted to Palestine. Safed became a centre where its devotees gathered, and Joseph Qaro, Isaac ben Solomon Luria, and Alkates settled in the Holy Land. Their saintly lives are fine examples of the higher side of the movement. 2 So strong was the influence that the Zohar was studied by many Christian scholars, who attempted to find in it proofs for the Trinity and Christianity. The famous Pico della Mirandola, the disciple of Elia Delmeisio, translated several Kabbalistic works into Latin, and introduced the Zohar to the notice of the Medeces in the work Pope Sixtus IV. (pope from 1471 to 1484) procured translations, and ordered them to be disseminated as evidences of Christianity (Graetz, iv. 314).

The influence of the Kabbalah on Christianity was not wide or permanent, and, similarly, Judaism was to no great extent influenced by Christianity during the Middle Ages. It was as persecutors and as sufferers that Jews had knowledge of the Gentiles among whom they dwelt. 3 It is scarcely a source of wonder, therefore, that Judaism was so little affected by contact with Christianity. The followers of either religion knew and cared nothing for the thoughts and beliefs of the other. In the disputations between the two faiths—e.g., Paris (1240), Barcelona (1263), Burgos and Avila (1578), and Tortosa (1415)—the Christians endeavored to convert the Jews, and the Jews, who had no desire for controversy, were forced to argue. The attacks on the Talmud, the persecutions incidental to the Crusades, to the Black Death, and the increasing fear of poisoning wells, the blood accusation, the whole...
sale massacre of entire communities, the tortures of
the Inquisition, the *auto de fe*, and the ex-
pulsions and sequestrations all combined to stig-
mattize Christianity in the eyes of the Jews as a
religion of hate and blood. Consequently they
ceased not to use it as a weapon, and made no
attempt at a compromise. Marranos and others, to force
their career open, seized the earliest opportunity of
recanting their feigned conversion, even if their
inhabitants were men of death.
The Renaissance and the Reformation brought
some amelioration. Erasmus and Reuchlin were
champions of freedom in thought, far in advance
of their age. Luther, at first favourable to toler-
ance, ultimately changed his views. His pamphlet
*Concerning the Jews and their Lies* was full of
bitterness; he detested the Jews themselves as
much as he hated their religion, and his invective
against both was boundless. The study of Hebrew
by Christians was too strictly confined to a few
learned men to influence the masses or even the
classing classes. Only in the case of Reuchlin did
Hebrew learning among Christians prove of
advantage to Jews, and it is not certain that even
Reuchlin would have championed the cause of
the Talmud had his hand not been forced by his
Dominican superiors. Perhaps the most important
event in which the influence of Christianity on
Judaism may be observed is the expulsion from
Spain, in 1492, by which the Jews were dispersed.
Learning was spread abroad generally; in par-
ticular, a nucleus was formed in the East.

Towards the end of the 13th cent. a controversy
arose in Judaism as to the study of science. The
period when the *Zohar* began to circulate, was
intellectually poor. There were no outstanding
personalities who could have suppressed the
extravagant fancies of Kabalism and restored a
due sense of proportion. Men had lost the sense
of proportion and were involved in intrinsics.

Biblical exegesis and preaching became
tinged with obscurity, allegorization, and
pseudo-philosophy. Their activity was frequently
devoted to merely empty words and the twisting
and the twining of words. The chief of this
school, Levi b. Abraham of Vilnafrance, near
Perpignan (1340-1315), a follower of Maimonides,
became the intimate friend of Peter of Navarre.
Perpignan itself was the seat of this sort of false
learning; the allegorization, e.g., by Levi, of Biblical
characters (thus, Abraham and Sarah were regarded
by him as types of master and in-
tellect, who provoked the antagonism of the orthodox
and of those who favoured the literal exegesis.
A conflict arose in 1303 which resolved itself into
the question, Is the study of science opposed to Judaism?
and should it be suppressed? The
leader of the obscurantists was Abbah b.
Moses of Montpellier, who, from the outset,
posed Levi of Vilnafrance, who stood for freedom
of thought. The Rabbi of Perpignan, Don Vital
Menahem b. Solomon Meri (1249-1300), was
a very different type of scholar from his contempor-
aries. Of unimpeachable orthodoxy, he loved
science and philosophy, and refused to be coerced
by Abbah Maro, became a champion of science,
but declared that it ought to be studied only after
the Talmud was thoroughly mastered. Abbah
Moro, however, managed to involve the Rabbi of
Barcelona, Solomon Ben Abraham, in his quarrel,
and secured his support. The lovers of science
were led by Jacob b. Makhir Tibbon, a mathematician
and astronomer, and the famous Tibbon family
were naturally all the more adherents to science
by its cause to accusing their adversaries of being anti-Maimonists.

While the strife was raging, there came from the Rhenishland,
where he had been driven by persecution, the dis-
tinguished Asher b. Jehiel (1550-1597), a pupil of
the famous Meir of Rothenburg. Asher wandered
from his native country to escape the massacre of
Rindleisch, which were destroying communities. And, in 1595, he was made Rabbi of
Toledo. He was a great Talmudist and the com-
piler of a famous abstract of the Talmud, but he was a bitter enemy of secular scholarship. Naturally he joined the side of Abbah Maro and proposed to convoke a synod in which science was to be
condemned and utterly banished from the Jew-
ish curriculum. Finally, on 29th July 1593, a solemn ban, to remain valid for fifty years, was
pronounced against all secular study and also
against the works of Maimonides. Any person
under the age of twenty-five reading a scientific
work was to be excommunicated. The organiza-
tion of the Jewish communities was such that the
ban affected only the town under the jurisdiction
of the particular Rabbi who issued it—is this case
Barcelona. Attempts were made to have the
decree recognized elsewhere, but meanwhile the
other side were not idle, and issued a counter-ban
from Montpellier by which excommunication was
pronounced against all who should read the books
of others or other persons from studying science, in
whatever language the text-book was written,
against those who abused Maimonides, and against
those who attacked religious teachers because
of their scientific or philosophical beliefs. The
cause of the enlightened party prospered and gained
much from the famous circular letter (lqqaret hikhamaselet) which Jedediah Bedarei
(on whom see J.E. ii. 626-627) wrote in 1597 to
Adarit and his party in defence of science and
Maimonides. After the French expulsions, partis-
sans of the two parties settled in Perpignan, and
the controversy continued; but the liberal gains
were perhaps the simple assert itself in favour of
scarcity.

Perpignan had been the centre of the obscur-
antists, but scholarship was not killed there. From
this town came forth a worthy successor of Maim-
onides, who went even further than that scholar
himself in his daring attitude towards reason and
learning. This great man was Levi b. Gershom
(G. F.), called Gerondes, Rabha (from his birthplace),
Leon de Bagnols (from his birthplace), or Magister
Leo Hebraus (1288-1344). The ban against science
had no effect on his education. Before his thirtieth
year he began his famous philosophical work
*Mithnawth Adonmi* ("Wars of the Lord").

Of his numerous others works, his Talmudic knowledge,
and his scientific and medical attainments it is
impossible to write here; his influence on Judaism
may be measured by his philosophical attitude in the
work mentioned above.

He stood forth as a convinced Aristotelian, to a much greater
degree than Maimonides, so that he sometimes does not scruple
to follow Aristotle when he disagrees with Jewish doctrine,
even where Maimonides threw the Greek philosopher over. He
denied that the Torah requiredblind faith or belief in anything
opposed to truth and reason. The *Wars* deals with the six
questions on which Maimonides deserted Aristotle or on which
he gave no clear reply, these points being: (1) immortality;
(2) prophecy; (3) divine omniscience; (4) divine providence;
(5) the nature of the sphere; and (6) the eternity of matter.

Rabbi carries the intellect born in man as a faculty which is
operated by the universal intellect; man cannot grasp the
object of his thought. He derives mortality from the doctrine
of the realists. He maintains the freedom of the human
spirit in the spirit of the divine conicience. He differs from
Maimonides on the position assigned to the function of the
imagination in prophecy. Maimonides holds that it is a secondary
power, the other that it should be subordinated to reason. Further, for
Maimonides the special will of God is the same as the
prophecy; for Levi moral and intellectual perfections are quite
sufficient." (I. Brody, in J.E. v. 405.) Rabbi demonstrated
that this world had a beginning, and was not a mere copy of
a previous world, but that it has no end. The tikkun had
been from all times, but was formed by the

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1 On these scholars see J.E. vi. 22-24, 411, l. 314, 212 f., vi. 846, l. 152 f.
Creation. As regards miracles he was extremely rationalistic, and believed that they could only be justified as convertible conditions by which they were to be judged: (1) miracles are transitory; their effect does not endure; (2) the natural working of nature; (3) nothing can be traced and white simultaneously; and the crucifixion was not in one of the celestial spheres. Miracles are not supernatural, but are natural occurrences. And yet, he was himself convinced of the existence of miracles. In 1038, the miracle was not the sensation of the sun, but the reappearance of the sun with the Jewish covenant. He was also convinced of the existence of miracles. So also in the case of Harkh (2 K. 40-45), it was the shadow, not the sun, that went westwards. 

The theories of Rabbein did not pass unchallenged. His ideas were not popular with the masses, but retained their hold over learned minds for generations. Pepe Clement VI. ordered his astronomical works to be translated into Latin, and Simplicius adopted works on the treatment of miracles (see Graetz, iv. 101). A contemporary of Rabba, was Moses b. Joshua of Narbonne (Vidal Narboni), who was born at Perpignan. He died after 1332. In the history of the study of philosophy at the University of Toulouse.

He was a follower of Maimonides and Ibn Hazad (Averroes; Averroes, Azeyrox, vol. ii, pp. 295-296). In spite of a chequered life, he was a productive author, and his most considered influence. He conceived Judaism as a disinterested guide which led to the attainment of the highest degree of theoretical moral truths: the Torah had a double meaning, the one spiritual, made easy for the thoughtless and the other, a deeper content, made available to the spiritual. This was a common opinion in those times, from which he never departed. He endeavored to give expression to rational views, that is, such as were contrary to the accepted understanding of Judaism, but not with the freedom and collection of the Arab philosophers. He also rejected the belief in miracles, and attempted to explain them away altogether. He also wrote on the freedom of will by philosophical arguments (Graetz, iv. 102).

Rabba was a staunch Aristotelian, but the Jewish philosophers were not confined to this school of thought. Abraham Crescas (1400-1410), born in Barcelona, sought to free Judaism completely from Aristotelianism, and was thus at variance both with Rabba and with Maimonides. His was the greatest of all the Jewish philosophers. He was a master of reason and style.

Crescas declared that the teachings of Rabba and Ramban were contrary to orthodoxy, mainly because they were based on Aristotle, whereas differed from the other opponents of those teachers in that he came to his conclusion through argument, not with appeals to authority or threats of excommunication. Maimonides himself disapproved of the use of Aristotle. Crescas rejected them. He held that philosophy was insufficient to demonstrate the unity of God. Although philosophy might show that the First Cause was simple and compound, yet there might still be deities subservient to the same cause, which were reactualizations of God's essence, not knowledge, but love. Crescas also admitted the miracles. He rejected the thirteen articles of the creed of Maimonides as being either too few or too many, and laid down his own six essentials: God's omniscience, providence, and omnipotence; prophecy; free will; and the belief that the world was created for a purpose. Man's will is free because he feels it to be free; though in reality God's omnipotence pre-determines, yet man will in sufficiently free to admit reward and punishment. The world was created, and would pass away, while the heavens would endure. The good of the world was human happiness, to be brought about by love, both here and in the hereafter. Knowledge is apart from the soul.

It will thus be seen that the gulf between Crescas and his predecessor was very great. Crescas was not only attacked, was strangely ignored by his contemporaries. So was his teaching was diffused largely by the works of his pupil Joseph Albo, chiefly through the Igudah ('Roots'), in which there is little originality, but the matter being almost entirely derived from Crescas.

The appearance of David Reuben (c. 1450-1535) and Solomon Molko (c. 1500-32) kindled great hopes in the hearts of the Jews and Marranos. Their extraordinary nature gained them many followers, and the honour which they were received in Rome and Portugal deluded many into the belief that their Messianic claims were valid. Their failure caused bitter disappointment, though the heroism of Molko at his martyrdom (1332) encouraged many who were doomed to a similar fate. Their importance to Judaism lies in the fact that the failure of one pseudo-Messiah did not prevent his successor from receiving credence.

Only 150 years later, Judaism was rent by the schism produced by another claimant, Joel Zehi, whose followers were numbered by thousands (see below, p. 603). Kabbalah was largely responsible for these eschatological ideas. Already in 1284, Abraham Abulafia declared himself to be the Messiah, and fixed the millenium for 1999. Two of his disciples, Joseph Jiquatilla and Samuel, from Medina Celli, alleged themselves to be prophets and heralds of the Messiah, and Messianic hopes were largely predominant in the minds of the later Kabbalists at Safed.

It has already been pointed out that Christian persecution was driving the Jews into Muslim countries. Little by little, Turkey and Palestine were receiving a large Jewish population; Safed, in particular, became the home of many distinguished Rabbis. Among these Rabbis there grew up the desire for the classical Rabbis to maintain the Rabbi's supremacy of Palestine. They desired to maintain once more the "simkhat," or ordination, and thus ordain a Sanhedrin which would be recognized throughout the world. In 1338, Jacob Berab began to ordain in Safed; but his pupil's ministry, conducted by Levi b. Jacob Rabbi, the chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, and his colleague, Moses de Castro. Berab failed and was forced to emigrate, but before doing so he ordained his disciple, Joseph Karo. When Joseph Karo was Joseph Karo. Had Berab succeeded, a great step in the direction of Jewish ecclesiastical unity would have been accomplished. It is significant that he failed. Judaism has never liked the idea of an institution of authority, certainly not since the Diaspora, and it has flourished perhaps by reason of its local autonomy in religious spheres. Had a single authority been able to control Jewish thought and belief during such controversies as raged over Kabbalah, Maimonides, the study of science, and the Arab and Greek philosophy, the result would have been the death of sects, from which Judaism is so remarkably free. But the twenty-five years during which many of these conflicts, taken sides, Judaism would have been crippled. Freedom of thought, the result of local autonomy and independence, alone has preserved the rich tissue of Jewish life.

The convocation of synods, however, is not an unknown event in post-Talmudic Judaism, but the feature of these synods has usually been their temporary character and their convocation for a particular purpose. Thus, the 'Arba'ah, or assemblies, of R. Ta'an, in the middle of the 12th cent., met at Troyes and Rheim; to determine many cases, generally those arising out of the intercourse of Jews and Christians. Perhaps the most famous synod was that summoned about 1000 by R. Gerhard (960-1040), which (1) prohibited polygamy, (2) maintained the principle of mutual consent in divorce, (3) ordained leniency for forced conversions, and (4) prohibited the opening of other people's letters. Assemblies were also held at Mainz (1223), at York (1281), of the Spanish Jews (1314), and at Bologna (1416), Forli (1418), Jerusalem (1532), and others.

Labin (1589), while Napoleon (1806) and Alexander I. (1804) summoned synods. In 1903 a synod of 60 Rabbis was held at Cracow, under the presidency of R. Eliahu Hayzàn, chief Rabbi of Alexandria, who repudiated the blood accusation and schism which they were induced into.

2 Also the followers of David Alroy (c. 1100) formed a sect called the Manicheans (cf. M. Adler, in J.BQ, 451.)
3 See J. H. Ginser, 'Berab, Jacob,' in J.BQ, iii, 47-47.
denounced Nihilism. In America and Germany synagogues have been summoned in modern times, chiefly by the Reform party. The synods of Lublin, in 1650, was that of permanent character, the famous "Arba Arba" of the Council of the Polish Jews a year later, in 1653, the Lublin, Poland, Polish Russia, and Volhynia), regularly during two centuries. But all these synods were, in effect, local. They did not pretend to legislate beyond their own jurisdiction, much less a serious and vital question. The theory of the Rabbis has always been mutually exclusive; that there has been no official primate inter partes. At the present day in Europe, many of the Zaddikim and Ashkenazim communities exist side by side, in friendship and mutual recognition; their position may be compared to adjacent dioceses of the same Church, without a primate.

The great Halakhic work of Maimonides did not change the utilization of codes. Many teachers devoted themselves to the task, either for popular use or for the elucidation of the principles of Halakhah. Eliezer b. Nathan of Mainz (Rabbi) was the author of the "Evasa ha-Ivri". Menasseh b. Isroc wrote the "Shemah", or Sefer M Megosh Gedoloh, and Isaac of Corbeil composed the "Sena", or Sefer M Megosh Katan, a smaller work. Efraim of Worms (1176-1238), a prolific and vigorous writer, was the author of the "Kabbalistic" works. His fame rests chiefly on the "Kallah", an ethical-Halakhic work in 497 paragraphs. His Kabbalistic views, shallow and superficial, yet the "Kallah" is a valuable contribution to Judaism. Solomon b. Adar of Barcelona wrote a comprehensive scheme of laws, covering all the practical needs of Jewish life. In distinction to Maimonides, he gives in this work, "Tora ad-din ad-din", the sources and proofs of his rulings.

Perhaps the most famous of those post-Maimonides codes was the "Arba Arba" of Jacob b. Asher (1290-1340), a son of Asher b. Jehiel. Its influence on Jewish life is, perhaps, greater than that of any other code, and it became a household word. Joseph Caro, when he thought it necessary to compose the "Shulhan Arukh", practically revised and brought up to date the work of Jacob b. Asher. Caro was a mystic and devoted to Kabbalah. His life and those of the Sefed Kabbalists have been well portrayed by S. Schechter in his "Studies in Judaism" (London, 1896). Their influence pervaded Jewish life and ceremonial, and many a touch of spirituality, a high association, an ethical hint, is due to their teaching. They introduced a spirit of concentration, a sanctification of religious practice, devotion, and self-sacrifice. Every part of their teaching would have made Judaism unreal and superficial; in due proportion it gave life and light. Protected and fortified by his philosophers, Judaism was safe from the dangers of an exaggerated mysticism. On the other hand, the exactitude of the law and its enforcement would be reduced to the collection of intellectual dogmas, lacking man and vitality. Its stability is due to the heterogeneous nature of its component parts and to the proportions and moderation with which each one had to fulfill its appointed function.

Poland was pre-eminent in the home of Talmudic studies of Jewish education; given an impetus to this learning, and the practical jurisdiction of the Rabbinical tribunals forced judges as well as litigants to master the code by which judgment would be given in the printing presses worked, the output of copies of the Talmud was speedily sold out. In forty years, three large editions were exhausted (Cracow, 1602-05, 1616-20; Lublin, 1617-39). So great was the devotion and so numerous were the Rabbis and pupils that the supremacy of Poland was everywhere acknowledged. The dispersion of the Polish Jews, due to the terrible atrocities in 1648 of Chmielnicki (1555-1675), had scarcely any effect on their attachment to the Talmud. They carried their love with them into exile and claimed their rabbis and schools. This enthusiasm carried with it one great disadvantage, for every other study, Jewish and secular, was abandoned, and the Polish Jews immersed themselves in an intellectual ghetto, the confines of which were as narrow and crushing as those of the physical pale. There began a period of darkness and ignorance, which was ended only by the light of the Mendelssohnian movement. It is incorrect to attribute this misfortune to the nature of the Talmud. It was not concentration on the Talmud, but the exclusion of everything else, that was responsible for this retrograde tendency. The devotion of the Polish Jews to the Talmud is largely maintained to-day, but other influences are at work, and, while they no longer shut out general knowledge from their curriculum, their zeal for Halakhah is not abated.

In the 17th c. three different influences exerted themselves upon Judaism. The Talmudic influence, alluded to above, became more powerful with the diffusion of the Polish-Jewish chasidim. Secondly, a strong wave of Kabbalah infected Jewish communities in every land, East and West. This, too, was naturally followed, in reaction, by a strong spirit of opposition. This phase of Kabbalah had nothing in its favour. The earlier saliency of the mystic idea was gone; it degenerated into senseless tricks and jugglings. Isaac Luria and his pupils, in spite of their piety, were the teachers of an unworthy supposition. They claimed to work miracles, and belied the ignorant by their visions and alleged wonders. They preached metempsychosis, the union and redemption of souls, and practical magic, often by means of the inefable names. Hayyim Vital Caban, his brother Moses, and his son Samuel lived in Palestine (Jerusalem, Safed, and Damascus being strongholds of Kabbalism). Isaac Saruk, a pupil of Luria, and Azaria da Fano, in Italy. The teaching of these men and their numerous followers prepared the way for the pseudo-Messiah Shabbethai Zebi.

This wonderful impostor succeeded in deceiving thousands; not merely the ignorant multitude but learned and earnest Rabbis followed him. All over the world preparations were made for the Messiah's advent. He became the centre and leader of the Chasidim, or "Mirabils, 1665. London and Amsterdam were filled by Smyrna in anguish, and few kept their heads during this commotion. So strong was his personality that, in spite of his ludicrous fables, multitudes believed in him. A rumour afloat about Shabbethai similar to the Doctrinale theory of theGrundtvig, which maintained that a substitute had intervened and saved Jesus from the Cross, it was said that another had appeared, and that the real Shabbethai had withdrawn for a while and would reappear in glory. The belief in him has remained in the present day, and a separate sect of Turkish Jews call themselves "Dinnaah" (on whom see B. J. H. Goffe, "J. B. iv. 293), await his second coming. When the majority of his misguided followers recovered their senses, every reminiscence of the false prophet was banned. Thus it is said that an imposter, for the second day of Pentecost (July 27, 1704) by Rabbi) is emitted from the usual Ashkenazic Kabal, because of some supposed association with Shabbethai-Zebi. The Mendelssohnian movement, however, times itself self imposed in Holland. It was re-echoed by the English Puritans, and to no small extent facilitated the return of the Jews to England.

The excesses of Talmudism and Kabbalism produced an intellectual revolt, the last of the three tendencies to which allusion has been made. For the first time Judaism had to deal with rationalism and philosophical scepticism. This new trend of thought was first manifested in three contemporaries, Uriel de Costa (1590-1647); see art. ACOSTA, for these see J. E. viii. 210-212, xli. 421 ff., xxli. 64.
Far more important to Jewish development was Moses Mendelssohn (q.v.) (1729-56). No less brilliant than Spinoza, no less erudite, and similarly endowed with a capacity for philosophy, he was a tower of strength to Judaism. The crisis in Judaism is due to the great revival which aroused thought, stimulated culture, and once more brought Judaism into contact with external learning. Without Mendelssohn, it would have sunk more deeply into the clutches of ignorance and remained an easy prey to the attacks of atheism.

Mendelssohn had to contend with opposition on account of his translation of and commentary on the Bible, but his teaching was enormously diffused and gave vast numbers of young men as insight into modern thought, without destroying their faith. Like Maimonides, he was one of those intellectuals that give another turn to the wheel of Jewish ethics and intellect. His effect was all the more potent since it almost coincided with the break up of the ghetto. The Jews emerged into more intimate contact with their surroundings and, despite the element of light, found help in his guidance. His influence for German over Judaism was in itself epoch-making. He taught fidelity to Judaism and respect for the belief of others. His friendship with Lessing helped to make the cause of Judaism known outside and may be counted as a stage in the progress of Jewish emancipation.

Mendelssohn and Naphtali Hirz Wessely were the founders of a Jewish Renaissance, and their work was continued by Nahmann Krocchnal (1785-1840) and Samuel Hirsch (1778-1858). The large array of Jewish scholars of the 19th cent. all owed inspiration ultimately—in whatever branch they were engaged—to the Mendelssohn revival.

Wessely, in his Dibberi Shelahim ve-emeth (Germ. tr. by D. Friedlander, Worte der Wahrheit und der Fakten, Berlin, 1798), had outlined a scheme of Jewish education in which the Talmud should both find a place; nevertheless, he was not regarded with cordiality by many Polish Rabbis, some of whom were genuinely frightened at the combination, though not hostile to it, while others were merely obsequious.

The spirit of the 19th cent. was, it is true, that a certain number became estranged, but many were fortified in their belief. At the same time a curious development had arisen in Poland, a revival of Essenism and mysticism, the followers of which called themselves by the old name Hasidim. The founders of the new movement were Israel b. Eliezer, known as Biala Shem-Tob (Leipzig, 1750) and other Hasidic leaders. Biala Shem-Tob was the Breshei of Mezritz (1710-72). The extraordinary piety of the Hasidim was re-echoed in their followers. Prayer was a vital force and was the means of union and fusion with the Godhead. In spite of the attempts at miracles and predicting the future, Hasidism remained within the bounds of kosher practices. The sect was, and remains to the present day, a band of devotional enthusiasts, giving themselves entirely to introspection and prayer. The quasi-religious exercises of the Hasidim and their partial antagonism to the Talmud brought them into conflict with the Rabbis, and they were denounced by Eliezer Wima (1790-97), but in 1781 they were declared to be heretics, and the agitators, the Mithkademet ('opponents'), rightly perceived that Judaism has no liking for extremes. The excesses of the Hasidim were becoming intolerable, and, as their numbers grew, the Talmudic and Hasidic controversies developed. It is estimated that at one time they numbered 100,000, although this is perhaps too large a figure. With the political emancipation of the Jews, a new era in Jewish life began; this emancipation is still incomplete in many lands.

The effects can scarcely yet be estimated. Russia, the home of the greater number of the Jews, is still pursuing a policy of repression which affects not only the Russian Jews, but other Jews as well.
countries to which fugitives go. Emancipation brings many problems in its train; for, so soon as a community begins to solve some of the difficulties and readjust itself to new conditions, an influx of Russians renews the process. Education is in the main desirable, but it is a dangerous thing in which religious and secular knowledge shall each have a proper place, is being gradually and variously evolved. In Russia, the Haskalah movement has usually followed because the tendency of the Maskilim and their children is almost invariably towards assimilation. This is in reality due to economic conditions. The oppressive restrictions imposed by the Government on schools and learning prevent the rise of a carefully planned scheme of education. Thus modern knowledge must be acquired, almost entirely, either surreptitiously or from anti-religious sources. For the Zionist movement in modern Judaism, see art. ZIONISM.

III. JUDAISM AT THE PRESENT DAY.—The future of orthodox Judaism and its relations with Christianity, on the one hand, and Zionism and liberal Judaism on the other, may be briefly summarized. It is unnecessary to dwell on the origin of Christianity. Graetz (ii. ch. xiv.) has traced the steps by which the breach between the two in the first instance was made. Judaism does not admit that Jesus was the promised Messiah. It cannot accept such distinctively Christian doctrines as the miraculous birth of Jesus, His divinity and relation to the Father, the Triumphant Entry, the Resurrection, the idea of mediation, the conception of sin. Further, Judaism differs from Christianity with regard to the Law, neither admitting the possibility of its abrogation nor regarding it as burdensome. The Commandments are given to man 'that he may do them and live by them' (Lv 18:5). Judaism has a more optimistic view of life than Christianity; it does not hold that the pleasure of the mighty is that their wealth is a bad thing under all circumstances (Lk 6:24, 25; Ja 1:25; Mt 10:28) and that marriage is evil. No Rabbi may be a celibate. Marriage is the first commandment of the Bible (Ex 20:18).

The "Return to God" (from see F. C. Porter, Yehu Benayahu Bib. and Sem. Studies, London, 1901, p. 123; it is called see zc (Gen. Rab. 7:61, 70, of Theodor's ed., Berlin, 1903; see his note), and God instituted it 'for his glory.' See, e.g., God and Man (Singer, p. 299; cf. Book of Common Prayer, The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony: 'Matrimony, which is an honorable estate instituted of God.' In the case of the "Return to God," the remedy against sin and against the smallest of the sins is found there, and the marriage of the man of Nazareth and of the man of Ithmael... We cannot mention all the services of the service, for it is so vast a field... In Babylon only the ninth of Ab was observed. Finally, Judaism does not declare that relief in any dogma is necessary for salvation. It teaches that 'the righteous of all nations have a share in the world to come' (Maimonides, Hilchot Teshuva, iii. 2), that 'the teachings of the sages are Torah and the of Nazareth and of the man of Ithmael... serve to bring to perfection all mankind, so that they may serve God.' (Maimonides, ed. D. Yellin and I. Alexander, 'Halakhic I.,' 1903, p. 244 f.), that 'the good actions of any man, to whichever people he may belong, will be rewarded by God. But the priority belongs to people who are near God during their life, and we estimate the rank they occupy near God after death accordingly' (Kuzar, i. 111 = Hirschfeld, p. 78; see also Exodus Rabba, p. 49, and, for other references, D. Wassermann, The Messianic Idea, p. 229). The foundation of Judaism is the assumption "Remnant." Though it recognizes the general truths of Christianity and Islam, and the religious validity of these systems, it cannot concede that its own destiny is such as to make the differences outlined above remain in existence. While rejecting eschatologicalism, Judaism can fully appreciate the life of the founder of Christianity; and, in estimating the practical value of that spirit, it pays regard to the noble lives fostered by its ideals rather than to the persecutors that have proved false to its teaching.

Judaism is to be the religion of a Remnant; from the material conditions demanded of its adherents, resulting from an environment preponderantly non-Jewish, it is inevitable that Judaism, under present circumstances, must be limited to a minority. This circumstance constitutes its strength. It must never be forgotten that the minority influences the majority, not vice versa, for good. All great movements spring from the few; when they have perished, the movement fades; but when they have failed, and that there is need for a new growth, that is that they have accomplished their purpose. Nearly every ideal degenerates with popularity. When the masses are stronger than their leaders, chaos results.

In a great population animated by democratic notions, recognizing no external authority in matters of faith or state, with a growing passion for equality and a creed that can handle the good things of this world, as recommended by the modes and methods of life of the wealthy and luxurious, it would be irrational to expect to discover any general refinement or delicacy of thought or feeling. To expect too much of the human race is the ancient error of moralists and philosophers, The human nature is to fail. In his lecture on "Numbers," delivered in the United States, Mr. Matthew Arnold illustrated by quotations from Plato and Idealism that it is always the remnant that saves a nation or a race, and the advantage of a big country and a great population is that the remnant has at least a chance of being a good large one. (Augustine Birrell, "Modern Conditions of Literary Production," 1900, p. 12.)

The losses sustained by Judaism through persecution and by the oppression of the Jews in Russia and Kuma, together with the more sable but no less severe persecution prevalent in some other countries, have produced a strong movement, first among the Jews, for the Zionists regard a minority as doomed to failure. Originally this movement was partly economic and philanthropic in scope; Herzl's Zionism was under the Basel Congress in 1895. "The Jewish people is an every-" a new home in Syria and Palestine for persecuted Jews. The words 'legally assured' differentiated Zionism from the other colonizing enterprises. Since the death of Herzl, who said, 'Der Weg zum Judentum fuhrt durch das Judentum,' Zionism has developed into nationalism, which asserts a Jewish nationality independent of religion. The division of certain sentiments into 'national' and 'religious' is arbitrary: it is a Latin or European conception, as the language of the terms indicates. The antithesis is not Semitic; for, while religion to a Semite—Jew or Muslim—includes, as has been said of him in the Old Testament, more than is now ordinarily understood by the word, a kinship on the basis of blood or language or any other but a religious tie is conceivable neither to the prophet of old nor to the Semitic ethnologist or historian of to-day. Monotheism, not some physiological inheritance, is the raison d'être of Judaism (see C. G. Montefiore, 'The Jewish People, and their Prospects,' 1868). See also id. xxvii. [1904-05] 1-25, 397-425; Jewish Chronicle Correspondence, 1900, Jan. 1, 19, March 12, April 9, 16, 23, 30, May 21, June 25; on the
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question of a Jewish race see R. N. Salamon, in Journal of Genetics, i. [1910-11] 273 ff., where a complete bibliography is given.

Every reencouragement of nationalism has brought misfortune to the Jews and to Judaism. It was the cause of the catastrophes of 1870, of the fall of the Maccabees, of the decay of the Sadducees, of the destruction of Titus, and of the desolation of Judea in 136. In every case the disasters came about as a result of bitter disputes with their opponents. Johanan b. Zakai built up what the zealous overthrow, and the breaches resulting from Bar Kokhba's declaration of national unity were beset by the Rabbis. A Jewish centre is not an essential to enable the genius of Judaism to assert itself. There was neither a physical nor a spiritual ghetto in Spain, yet the Spanish period is perhaps the brightest in the history of Judaism. Nor is the circumstance that the Jewish liturgy prays for a return an argument for Zionism; the return to which Judaism looks forward is always associated with religion. 'And let our eyes behold thy return in mercy to Zion, and there we will worship Thee in awe as in the days of old' (Adler and Davis, Service of Syn. [Tabernacles], p. 140). The true character of Zionism, as an alternative to religion, may be seen from such passages as the following: 'We will not find a satisfactory sphere of activity in the life of Miztvah ... to-day we have no one centre of Jewish loyalty, and the life of Miztvah is losing its hold. Such Zionism would save the Jews at the cost of Judaism. Finally, liberal Judaism has arisen as a missionary movement in order to rescue those Jews who have become indifferent to their faith. Liberal Judaism stands much nearer to orthodox Judaism than Zionism does. The differences between the two forms are internal and small in comparison with their points of contact; to the outside world both are united, although there may be a great gulf between individuals on both sides.

For membership of a liberal synagogue does not necessarily imply the repudiation of something not definitely taught from its pulpit. Liberal Judaism is not a necessity for certain practices, but it does not require their abandonment. It is thus in nature not Karaitic, but it asserts the continuation of Rabbinic tradition as a living force. Becher and Arickch in the sealing up of Halakhah, liberal Judaism maintains that its religious teachers and individual members to-day have the power to bind and loose as of old. In this respect it is something positive, not a mere negation of orthodoxy. The latter, on the other hand, cannot accept any development unless sanctioned by a Rabbi with Hadarorhord (facultas docebit), and permits a synod to decree changes only if its authority is recognized as equal to that of its predecessors. Liberal Judaism seeks to win back the lapsed, even at the cost of modifications; orthodoxy, however, maintains that the preservation of the ideal is more important than the salvation of the individual, for Judaism must be handed down unimpaired, even though by a minority. In theory the two bodies are in agreement, but in practice there would seem to be a sacrificing of its ideals; it is on the definition of the essential principles that the controversy turns. Orthodox Judaism foresees a danger of liberal Judaism, by not laying down clear-cut principles, a drifting into a colourless belief of universalist monotheism.

Since 1842, when the controversy reached an acute stage in England, orthodox Judaism has changed its attitude to the Reformers. Already in 1854 the Sephardim removed the ban which had been imposed, and to-day, while acknowledging that there are differences between the two points of view, the orthodoxy has come to regard the Reformers in harmony and tolerance. Judaism has always striven to secure union and avoid sectarianism. To the credit of Zionism it must be urged that it has brought back to the Jews the ancient idea of the great home in Israel, even if nationalism, at best, is a mere modification of Judaism, the children of the nationalists may become orthodox Jews (לַּעֲשָׂה בֵּית נֶגֶר וּלְבוֹשֵׂת עֵדֶת). In the case of liberal Judaism, many Jews, previously lacking all feelings of spirituality and loyalty, have been taught to love God, to keep His commandments, to attend worship, and to observe the festivals. Israelites and Samaritans are not entirely those of orthodox Judaism, but of the sincerity of their purpose there can be no doubt. How much more then can there be applied to them the saying, 'Always let a manbusy himself with a Mişwa, even though it be not for the purpose of the Mişwa, for by practice he will come to do the Mişwa for the proper purpose' (Bab. Pes. 50b); since the purpose of liberal Judaism is to promote the sanctification of God's Name, its cause is related to a sense of duty, the choice of method, unpleasing though it be to the orthodox, must be left to the conscience and judgment of the liberals themselves. Hence if Judaism, orthodox and liberal, and Zionism can look forward with confidence to a future, one and indivisible.

LITERATURE.—The following is a selection of works, chiefly those that have appeared since the bibliography of the B 8 was compiled.


JUDAIZING

3. The Christianity they could not adopt.—The teaching of Jesus offended Pharisaic Judaism by its unanswerable criticism of the traditions of the elders (the Oral Law), by its want of deference to the hierarchy, and by exalting the end of religion (love to God and man) and consequently depreciating the current estimate of that of the Pharisees, dietary rules, and the 'hodge about the Law'—generally, however. He claimed an authority which shocked the scribes. Not by vision, or by dreams, or by prophetic inspiration, or by writing a Pseudepigraphon, but in his Own name he restated the Mosaic Law: He spoke as the Judge of the whole religious past of the nation, and prescribed for the future a mission of world-wide benevolence. He had kindled a new spirit in a few disciples; and this religion of the spirit would seek to save that which Judaism considered to be lost. He thus claimed the Messianic rank, and the hierarchy induced Pilate to consent to the Crucifixion.

The company of disciples, animated by the spirit of the Risen Christ, continued steadfastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers (Ac 2:47). They were conscious of being called to preach the gospel, and they chose Matthias in place of Judas. They showed no hatred for their enemies, and some men who had professed the death of Jesus; what had happened was part of a divine purpose foretold by the prophets. As yet the disciples were not cast out from Temple or synagogue, or considered as inscrutable to the incipient Church. The believers continued to frequent the Temple (Ac 2:38; 21:38), they increased rapidly in numbers and were joined by ‘a great company of the priests’, the new interpretation of Israel's history and mission was proclaimed by Stephen, which seemed to the authorities to be 'blasphemous words against Moses and against God' (Ac 6:12).

The stoning of Stephen and the active part of Saul mark the end of toleration for the followers of Christ—the Galileans, or Nazarenes, or Mums, as the Jewish authorities began to call them.

4. Appearance of 'Judaizers.'—Persecuted in Jerusalem, the Church made converts among the Samaritans, who did not profess the Oral Law. The Good Samaritan of the Temple, sacrifice, was bidden, like the priest and the Levite under the Oral Law, to help a wounded stranger. The apostles Peter and John had no hesitation in accepting Samaritan converts (Ac 8:12). Philip admits the Ethiopian, who could not have been more than a ἐθνικὸς ἔθνος (De 29:3). Other converts are admitted, in Damascus (Ac 9:33), Lydda (9:33), and Joppa (9:38); but the mission is directed to Jews only, or to proselytes attached to the synagogues (11:19), at Salamis (13:13), at Antioch in Pisidia (13:14), at Iconium (14:1), at Thessalonica (17:1), at Berea (17:12), at Ephesus (18:19; cf. 19:18), and at Rome (28:19). Thus for some fifteen years after the Crucifixion the Church included only the Jews or Gentiles who had become proselytes to Judaism. The admission of the Roman Cornelius was felt to be an innovation requiring the highest sanction; and Peter, on returning to Jerusalem, did not feel it necessary to criticize, the opposition to his act marking the first appearance of the 'Judaizers.'

At Antioch Greeks were admitted to the Church by the missionaries; and the name 'Christians' was first applied to the new brotherhood. The Church at Jerusalem at once sent Barnabas to inquire into this proceeding; and, after getting Paul to assist him for a year in Antioch, returned to Jerusalem with his new companion returned to Jerusalem, bringing gifts for the relief of the brethren in Judaea during a famine. From Antioch, Paul and
Barnabas set forth on their missionary journeys. With the help of Judas Antioch, they definitely announced their intention of appealing to the Gentiles, and on their return to Antioch they rehearsed their work and the reception of the Gentiles. Certain Jews from Jerusalem maintained that it was necessary to circumcise the Gentiles and to command them to keep the Law of Moses. This led to the Council of the apostles in Jerusalem, which gave the most important decision on the subject of circumcision.

5. The Council of Jerusalem.—The accuracy of the account in Acts 15 has been questioned; but, if we take A.D. 52 as the date of St. Luke's composition of the Acts and c. A.D. 50 for the Council, the time limit is against serious error. One MS (D. Codex Bezae) omits καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν, and is followed by Irenaeus, Cyril, Tertullian, and Jerome. The Decree thus prohibits the use of flesh offered to idols, murder, and fornication—being "a summary of Jewish ethical catechetics" (Harnack, Acts of the Apostles, p. 299). The Textus Receptus reads, 'That they abstain from pollutions of idols, and from fornication, and from things strangled, and from blood' (Acts 15:20). A careful analysis of Harnack, reinforced by E. H. Eckel and S. A. Devan (Expositor, 8th ser., vi., [1913] 60-82), may be held that the TR is preferable. Idolatry and fornication are specified because they were considered vileness among Gentiles. Lambs killed by a non-Jewish butcher could not be eaten by a Jew by birth; it is fairly certain that St. Paul, for all the freedom that he claimed, would not release the law's unblemished victims. Unless this regulation were observed, there would be no common social barriers between Jewish and Gentile Christians. Higher hygienic reasons may have been instinctively present; the motive for instituting abstinence from blood in Gen 9:4 was to diminish the ferocity that had filled the earth with violence. It would cause little trouble to teach the Gentile Christians the method of slaughter.

For Moses of old time hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the synagogues every sabbath day' (Acts 13:15). In every such place there was a shofar, and the use of his services might help the Christians to go forth 'as lambs among wolves.' It may seem strange that the universal religion should include the menu of a Palestinian party, yet the matter of eating and drinking was regarded as a matter of conscience. Paul master asks for 'daily bread'; Islam commands abstinence from wine. St. Paul felt the incongruity when he wrote: 'The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but righteousness and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost' (Rom 14:17). The Apostolic Decree assumed that Gentile Christians honoured the sacraments, and had received the Holy Spirit and the evangelical temperament; it would be insulting to ask them to abstain from murder, as this interpretation of Codex Bezae proposes to do. The intention of the Council was that Christians should use kasher meat; but St. Paul's theological abolition of law, Jewish and Gentile, resulted in the survival of custom, Jewish and Gentile, in the preparation of animal food.

It is worthy of note that the Decree does not require Gentiles to abstain from eating 'of the share which shrank, which is upon the hollow of the thigh' (Gen 32:14), although this regulation was observed as kindling in the Mishna (Hullin, 7). When strict requirements that the hind quarter of sheep and oxen were disallowed to Jews, and had to be sold at any price to neighbours. The practice is still continued among Oriental Jews, though it entails loss for no visible gain.

The hind quarter (like blood and fat) is avoided as food on account of its association with immolation, Jewish ceremonial institutions and customs, p. 135, speaking in general.

The long-lost Jews in China had forgotten the Hebrew language and the Law, but retained this strange abstinence, and were known among the Chinese as 'the people of the sinew.' The rōorāwa could hardly have been a special class of foods referred to as with aqwa, and would denote such things as chickens, geese, or game killed in the Gentile manner. The idea that bloodshed was forbidden, in the sense that a Christian could not become a soldier, is excluded by the case of Cornelius.

6. Judaizing opposition to St. Paul.—The Apostolic Decree thus established a rule of guidance for Jewish and Gentile Christians. Many matters required regulation. Were Jewish Christians to circumcise their boys on the eighth day? Were they to keep the Sabbath, or the first day of the week? Were Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles to be kept with the old associations? Was the pilgrimage to Jerusalem obligatory? Were they to intermarry with Gentiles, to maintain the dietary rules, to eat unleavened bread for a week in spring-time, to wear phylacteries, and to recite the prayers of the Jewish liturgy, and to read the Law and the Prophets with the same uncritical deference? Heathen converts such as Trophimus (Acts 21:21) or Epenetus (Col 1:15) could not interpret the Decree; proselytes—of the gate or of righteousness—would also welcome it; the liberal Hebrew Christians who carried the Decree might continue the old customs, but this was an unwholesome strain upon Gentiles; but the minority of Judaizers refused all laxity, and hampered the work of St. Paul in most of his mission field.

The activity of the Judaizers is indicated in the account of the work and correspondence of St. Paul, and has to be kept distinct from the open antagonism of unconverted Hebrews. The Judaizers had sought to persuade the Galatian Church to observe days and months and times and years, and to require circumcision. They questioned Paul's authority, and may have cited the example of Peter. Paul's defence is to point to the presence and the fruits of the Spirit. If observance of Law is sufficient to give life, then the advent of Christ is a negligible accident. Peter's desire to conform to Jewish scruples is condemned as dissimulation; and Paul's sternness on this point is mentioned as sanctioned by the Church at Jerusalem. Again, at Colossae the Christians seemed likely to be spoiled by a 'shew of wisdom in idol-worship, and humility, and severity to the body' (Col 2:23). Here the legalism was tinged with theosophy, which interfered with 'meat or drink, or a feast day, or a new moon, or a Sabbath day' (Col 2:16). The Epistle shows the danger of losing freedom and universality, and insists on the need of conscious communion with a living Spirit. The Christian is under a Spirit whose voice was the true law. At Corinth the Church consisted mainly of Gentiles who had not passed through the synagogue (1 Cor 12:29); but included Jews (1 Cor 7:17); and it may be inferred from 2 Cor 3 that teaching of a Judaistic type had been addressed to the Corinthians. To the Philippians, Paul has to write 'Beware of the concision. For we are the circumcision, which worship God in the Spirit.' (Phil 3:3). The Epistle to the Romans warns that Church against 'them which cause divisions and offences contrary to the doctrine which ye have learned' (16). These were probably Judaizers; the argument of the Epistle is St. Paul's greatest effort to answer them. All old laws and customs, Jewish and Gentile, have ceased to be important because 'the love of
God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us" (Ro. 5:5). Paul's ex-position of righteousness through faith, of freedom, and of universalism has served to overshadow his important reservation for Israel according to the flesh. This is what Paul yielded to the Judaeans in these particulars: 

"In allowing that Israel sar epiqes, because of the promises, have a privilege in the kingdom of God, not to be only a race etwais; that only Christians who were Jews by birth were the good olive tree; that the Gentiles are not only on the branches, but also by the wild olive tree; that thus the whole Hope is the Hope of Israel; that the Gentile Christians have material obligations towards the Jewish Christians; that the Jewish Christians should, and indeed must, still observe the Law of Moses, though it is now abolished" (Barneke, Iate of the Acts, p. 60, footnote).

If we except the imperative 'must' in the last sentence, this summary fairly describes the attitude of St. Paul, and this attitude explains his conduct as described by St. Luke. He has Timothy circumcised (Ac 16); he has his own head shorn in Cenchrea, for he had a vow (18); at his last visit to Jerusalem he is ready to show his conformity to the Law by purifying himself with the four men who had a vow on them (21). It explains his words (1 Co 9:14), "unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews." The contribution from the Gentile Church to the poor at Jerusalem may be considered a form of tribute. It thus appears that St. Paul as well as St. Peter found it difficult to transcend the limits of Judaism; and that the universal element in Christianity does not reach to Jesus, who knew the best that was in the past, and rose above it, and appointed the whole world as the field for the good seed.

The power of the Judaeans is seen at its greatest during St. Paul's last visit to Jerusalem. They numbered many thousands of Jews, who were believers and all reasons for the Law (Ac 21:27). They were indignant with St. Paul, maintaining that he taught all the Jews who were among the Gentiles to forsake Moses, saying that they ought not to concentrate their children, neither to walk after the customs (21:24). No doubt was the effect though not the intention of St. Paul's teaching and example, but the antagonism of the real Jews saved the Judaeans from further trouble in persecuting the Apostle.

Later references to Judaeans.—(a) In Christian records.—After the death of St. Paul, the Church moved away from Judaising tenets. The Epistle to the Hebrews demonstrates the right of the church to Christian sacrifice, and the destruction of the Temple confirmed the argument. In the Fourth Gospel, Judaism within the Church has ceased to be of any account; the antithesis is the Jews. Christians are to follow a Light, but they have a new law in Christ's commandments. The religion of the Spirit, as proclaimed by St. Paul, has permeated the evangelical tradition in the Synoptics. The convert has much to learn, and his teacher is the Church. Christ is his Lawgiver, and has entrusted a power of legislation to the Church.

The Judaeans, who kept themselves distinct from Christ's followers, appear later as Ebionites and Nazarenes. The Ebionites admitted only a Gospel according to St. Matthew, rejected St. Paul as an apostate, and denied the divinity of Christ. The Nazarenes acknowledged the obligation of the whole Mosaic law, except the Christians of Jewish descent, but allowed Gentile Christians, as presbyties of the gate, to emit these observances.

See art. Ebionism, Ebionites.

(b) In Jewish records.—Rabbinical literature has few and obscure references to the Judaeans; for Judaism was firmly resolved to ignore the Christianity which had come into being. It set itself after the fall of Jerusalem to define the canon of Holy Scripture, rejecting the Apocrypha and apocalyptic Pseudepigrapha, which seemed to give prophetic colour to the new religion, and expurgating the Greek Bible by the versions of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theolosion. Within its own fold discipline became more stern.

'A Nazile who has become a proselyte, and been circumcised and baptized, and afterwards wishes to return to the Lord, not to be only a race etwais; that only Christians who were Jews by birth were the good olive tree; that the whole Hope is the Hope of Israel; that the Gentile Christians have material obligations towards the Jewish Christians; that the Jewish Christians should, and indeed must, still observe the Law of Moses, though it is now abolished' (Barneke, Iate of the Acts, p. 60, footnote).

By the end of the first Christian century the standard Jewish prayer included a formula, 'May there be no hope for the sectaries' (Y'd, afterwards changed to Y'devi, 'the slanderers'). One of the signs of Messiah's coming will be that the Kingdom (the Roman Empire) will be turned to the heresy of the Minim (Mish. Sotah, ix. 15). The growth of Christianity in the Roman Empire and the indignation of Jews at the claim of Christians to inherit the promises of the OT are seen in Jesus. Nedar. 356: 'Esaau the wicked will put his filth and sit with the righteous in Paradise in time to come; and the Holy One will drag him and cast him forth from hence.'

By the 4th cent. Judaism regards the Minim with disdain rather than fear. Yosefa son. xiii. 4-5 imposes grave punishment on the 'Gentile Christians' (Mish. Sotah, ix. 15). Moseith (informer), and Apelros (tree-thriker), and a Jewish comment on Ex 19:16 says that circumcision will not avail to save the Minim from Gehinnom (Shemot Rabba, 35a). This implies that Jewish Christians in Palestine still practised circumcision in the 4th century. Talmud and Midrash confirm Jerome in considering the Minim (Minha, Jewish Christians) an insignificant body.

'They had no share in the viality either of Judaism or Christianity' (Herford, Christianity in Judaism and Mithraism, p. 354).

Jerome's words in a letter to Augustine (Ep. Lxxvi., xiv. 60 (PL xxi. 224)) are:

'To this day in all the synagogues of the East there is among the Jews a sect called Minim, which is condemned by the Church. They are commonly spoken of as Nazarenes, and believe in Christ the Son of God, born of the Virgin Mary; the same who, they say, suffered under Pontius Pilate again. In whom we, too, believe; but while this sect desires to be both Jews and Christians, they are neither the one nor the other.'

8. Recusants forms.—About 1720 John Glass, minister of Tealing, founded a small sect, which refrained from things strangled and from blood, and his son-in-law Sandeman gave great attention to adherents in England (see art. GLASITES). The Seventh Day Adventists and Seventh Day Baptists Judaise in their observance of Saturday.

A Judaising sect appears in Russia about the middle of the 16th cent., their chief centres being Novgorod and Pleskaw, whence they spread to Moscow and other cities. They denied the Trinity and the Sonship and Messiahship of Christ, and rejected the invocation of the Virgin and the saints, the veneration of icons, the doctrines of original sin and redemption, the Church, and the Sacraments, while they gave greater honour to the Old than to the New Testament. Their adherents are mentioned in the early 18th cent., and Uklein, the founder of the sect of Melkonian, adopted for himself certain Jewish dietary laws, while his pupil, Sundukov, regarded Christ as infinitely inferior to Moses, observed the Jewish Sabbath, and finally submitted to the Mosaic rite. Sundukov established the modern sect of Subbotniks (Sabatarians), who are exclusively restricted to real Jews. They are divided into a number of sub-sects, the most important being: (a) Gers (Heb. גֵּר), who worship in Hebrew under the leadership of regular Jewish Rabbis and are practically
Talmudic Jews; (d) Subbotniks proper, differing from the less numerous Gezis only in the use of Russian Bibles and Prayer Books and in the abrogation of some of the Talmudic rules for the Sabbath and food; (e) Karaites or Karinim ('Karaite nation'). Also, like the Karaites, the Pentateuch and reject the Talmud, but who do not observe all the Pentateuchal laws, e.g. that regarding circumcision; and (d) the waning Transcendentalism and the resurrection of the dead. Mention may likewise be made of the 'Jehovists', founded by Nikola Hyin in 1846, in an effort to establish an OT Christianity or NT Judaism, although the rather fantastic sect was only short-lived.

Two minor American sects may also be classed as Judaizing. The first of these is the Christian Israelites, founded by Joel Wroe at Ashton, England, in 1819, to gather the twelve tribes of Israel under the doctrinal basis being the re-establishment of the Mosaic Law, and the condition of membership subscription to 'the four books of Moses and the written constitution'. Members do not cut their hair or beard (cf. Lv 19:27), and object to all images and pictures (cf. Ex 20:4, Dt 25:8). Both the Jewish and the Christian Sabbaths are observed. The second of these sects is the negro Church of God, established by William Crowdy in 1860. Believing that the negroes are the descendants of the lost Ten Tribes, this sect observes the Jewish calendar and festivals, especially the Sabbath, but insists on baptism by immersing, confession of faith in Christ, the Lord's Supper, and feet-washing.

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JUDGMENT (Logical),—r. Introductory.—The only use which the understanding can make of the objects by them, while 'the understanding may be defined as the faculty of judging' (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Eng. tr., London, 1881, pt. ii. bk. i. ch. i. § 1). Concepts are judgments. Judgment is the derivation of new judgments out of old. Method is the disposition of concepts and judgments in a system. Thus judgment becomes a centre of reference for the defining of the other logical entities, and is the task of definition is to be undertaken philosophically, it involves all the considerations which contribute to mark out the logical consciousness in general; the labour of precising in the case of each concept as idea, belief, truth, reality, fact; and studied limits between the levels of abstraction proper to psychological, metaphysical, and logical science respectively. But the motives of logical doctrine if we followed exclusively either of the two objects- to analyse the state of mind called Belief, or to define what is called a (System of Logic). London, 1872, bk. i. ch. v. § 6); or, indeed, if we followed too precisely a combination of the two. He himself in his Examinations of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, 1878, relies heavily, on the reference to belief, while in his Logic he insists that 'intelligent assertion refers to external facts,' and that the import of propositions consists in connection between facts. In pursuing the latter analysis, after resolving facts, with metaphysical precision, into states of consciousness and relations between them, he allows himself in his substantie definition to use references by more popular conceptions such as 'things,' 'phenomena,' and 'attributes.' Similarly Ueberweg defines judgment as 'the consciousness of the object, the validity of a subjective union of conceptions,' without definitely undertaking to resolve the contrast or mediate the correspondence between the two worlds; a mere 'reference to existence' gives the judgment its character as a logical function ('System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines, Eng. tr., London, 1871, § 67).

A more scrupulous orientation of logical consciousnes with regard to the psychological and the objective is attempted in some doctrines now current. The judgment is defined as identifying the content of ideas with reality, and the nature and possibility of such an achievement are explained by resolving reality into a system of tendencies sustained by judgment itself. Each single act of identification enters constitutively into an ever-expanding structure which in its totality is self-sufficient and all-controlling.

Our knowledge of reality, knowledge, exists for us as a judgment, that is, as an affirmation in which our present perception is amplified by an ideal interpretation which is identified with it. This interpretation or enhancement claims necessity or universality, and is therefore objective as our world, i.e. what we are obliged to think, and we all are obliged to think. The whole system of perception, viz., our present perception as extended by interpretation, is what we mean by reality, only with a restriction of forms of experience which are not intellectual at all (H. Rosencrantz, The Essence of Logic, London, 1830, p. 53).

If we assume as already understood and approved a definite epistemology such as Kant's, we might escape both unceritical references to psychology and popular physics and the intricacies of a metaphysical analysis. Kant himself defines judgment as 'the conception of the unity of the consciousness of different representations, or of their relation so far as they make up one notion' ('Logic,' § 17), while in the background of this description lies his more definite epistemological characterization, 'the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of the apperception' (Ueberweg, Logic, Eng. tr., London, 1871, § 87). The conception of judgment as 'the faculty which they form one whole, our specifically logical consciousness may be aroused apart from either introspective or external observation; and a clue to the recognition of the act of judgment may then be supplied from the detailed examination of its conceptual ideas, over and above the ideas of the concept. In the plan of our spiritual nature there must be a faculty which commits the detailed activities of intelligence to a resultant imposed by external nature itself. The concept provides bounds for each commitment and the measureless possibilities. The faculty of judg-
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ment, consequently, follows special constitutive ideas, which may be enriched with some technical adaptation and departure from the common usage of the words, necessity, universality, and synthetic unity.

(c) Constitutive Ideas.—(a) Necessity.—Necessity is akin to the inevitability of fact and the absoluteness of natural law. It is described by Sigwart thus:

"Besides the necessity of psychological normality, there is another necessity entirely from the content and object of thought itself, which is therefore grounded, not upon the variable and contingent characteristics of the individual, but upon the nature of the object thought of, and which may be far called objective." (Logik, Eng. tr., London, 1886, § 1, 6.)

It is an ultimate constraint upon intellectual spontaneity, and finds incidental expression in such phrases as 'I am obliged to think,' 'I cannot but believe' (Bosanquet, Essentials, p. 24). It is recognized in current psychology as 'objective control of ideational processes' (G. F. Stout, Manual of Psychology, London, 1913, bk. iv, ch. viii. § 1). It is described with variations of logical suggestion, such as the 'inherence of truth or falsehood (Aristotle, truth and falsity of individuals, p. 3); its identification with the idea, the 'claim to be true' (Bosanquet). It may be contrasted with the freedom of the concept, which Mill considers a 'faculty of creation of forms' (Elements of Thought, p. 419), and which is certainly differently related to personality.

Following a general, though ill-defined, logical tradition, we may distinguish three modes in which necessity confronts our ideas. It may be conveyed by the contents of the concepts which we employ independently of their origin. If we choose to conceive a three-sided figure, we must believe it to have three angles and these equal to two right angles. If we think of an organism in growth and decay, we must expect it to die; if we think of a perfect nature, we must, according to Descartes, predicate existence. The necessity may, however, be conveyed through the activity of other faculties than the conceptual—perception, introspection, memory, feeling, even respect for authority sometimes sways us white! 'Napoleon died at St. Helena'; 'I am of all men most miserable.' And a necessity, though conveyed neither through concepts alone nor through the more direct representations of the subject, may be conveyed through the union and co-operation of these media. As a case in point, the need of obedience to authority is in a large degree the result of the joint work of three faculties: necessity, authority, and habit. The inventiveness of the faculty of memory is also the result of an intellectual effort. The memory is often outside our control, and the necessity is the result of the union of the two faculties. And the necessity is the result of the union of the two faculties. The necessity is the result of the union of the two faculties. The necessity is the result of the union of the two faculties.

(b) Universality.—Universal, in the sense of our personality is common to the world of persons; what we are obliged to think is what we are not obliged to think (Bosanquet, Essentials, p. 24), modality being essential. The idea of necessity is subject to the same medium of necessity. It has already been noted (see art. Concept [Logical]) that it is because of a logical solvability for universal values that the idea of necessity is possible. The idea of necessity is the freedom of the concept sought, by means of conventions in the use of language, to be deliberately harmonized with the intellectual outlook of mankind in general, and only by the joint work of mind and nature can the idea of necessity be reached. The necessity of the concept may be given in presentation, or by the conceptual faculty, or through reflection on determinations of complete judgment itself.

But the harmonization of concepts is ultimately dependent on a common identification of similar things. And a logical system which, like the Aristotelian, has specialized in view to promote cooperative thought, must give fundamental significance to differences in the extent to which judgments presume the common identification of things. Judgment may be defined as the identification of a denotation, along with discrimination as to connotations or conceptual intentions (cf. E. C. James, New Law of Thought, Cambridge, 1911, p. 1 ff.). And, for purposes of common discourse or debate, judgments must be classified according to quantity—"as singular or general, where one thing or a collection of things is identifiable by all thinkers; or as particular, where the identity is only so far open to all that for each person it lies within the limits of a common totality of identifiable things: 'Alexander died'; 'All men die'; 'Some men die willingly.'" (c) Synthetic unity.—All the authoritative descriptions of the act of judgment, while varying much in their suggestiveness as to the sources of the act of judgment and the nature of universality, agree in requiring that synthesis, combination, or construction shall be shown in the product. It is owing to this uniform achievement of judgment that in psychological terms (Mill), connects the subject and predicate in definite form (Lotze).

Obviously a function of our spiritual nature which adjusts its reactions to the complexities of the world must be connective. In each act of judgment the constraint from reality and the stress of intellectual responsibility fall where they can meet with two conditions: a definite interest has selected a domain within the inaccessible area of possible truth, and a definite concept is available for reaction on it. Although the ultimate subject (i.e., reality in general) extends beyond the content of judgments, yet in every judgment there is a starting-point or points of contact with the ultimate subject, and the starting-point or points of contact with reality is present in a rudimentary form in the immediate or subjective judgment, as it is explicitly in the later and more elaborate type (Bosanquet, Logic, Oxford, 1888, bk. ii, ch. 82).

Thus the synthesis special to each pulsation of the faculty links a predicate with a subject. And, although the whole construct becomes a unity and has a necessary and universality dominant throughout, and the attendant psychical complex may present to introspection either simultaneity or a variable sequence, yet functionally judgment, following its own principle, duality, 'divides no less than it binds together ideas that are mutually associated,' in order that it may 'connect subject and predicate in definite form' (Lotze, Microcosmus, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1885, ii, 4, § 4, and Outlines of Logic, Boston, 1882, § 21).

Our logical consciousness must and synthesis in denial as well as in affirmation, notwithstanding such an antithesis between them as is in the description of judgment quoted above from Wolff, and notwithstanding that the character, while negation introduces only contrast, into the expanding system of timeless truth.

3. Grades of synthetic relation.—The delimitation of interest, on concepts we reach common media of necessity in judgment, and can then share, and co-operate in creating, a common 'inherence of science and civilization.'
(a) Presentational. — There are 'impersonal' judgments, in which the selection of subject is as indefinite as possible in a view of a proposed predicate—e.g., 'It rains'; and 'demonstrative' judgments, where only the position in space or time is definite—'This is the forest primeval.' And a legal judgment can neither be predicated of a subject nor inhere in a subject; but can only be a subject (Categories, v. 10); and this implies that the synthetic relation is between thing and concept, and not subject and concept.

(b) Conceptual. — The presentational faculties may receive aid from the concept in various ways and degrees: 'The first man was a living soul,' a 'singular' judgment; 'Our fathers have told us,' an 'enumerative' judgment; 'Man is few as days, a 'concrete general' judgment; 'Love is the fulfilling of the law,' an 'abstract' judgment. There is now a synthetic relation between two concepts, superadded to that between thing and concept.

(c) Reflective. — The starting-point of a judgment may be given directly neither by presentation nor by conception, but by the faculty of reflecting on judgments, actual or possible, whose starting-point is 'If I had standing ground, I could move the world'; 'If we are sons, then heirs;' 'Either there is a resurrection or mankind is irrational.' Mill describes such a judgment as arising from the logical quality of propositions: 'That we are heirs is inferable from our being sons;' other writers, as the relating of 'condition' to 'consequent.' Sonship is the condition of which the members are entitled by a hypothetical, and the specially composite form in which 'condition' and 'consequent' are found by negating any one of the members is entitled disjunctive: 'Either there was a resurrection, or mankind is irrational,' while, 'If mankind is not irrational, there is a resurrection.'

LITERATURE. — See the various systems of Logic; and especially in addition to the authorities quoted above, the recent ones mentioned as representative under art. Cognitive Logiqs, or as important or frequently referred to on the nature of inference under art. Inference. There are numerous monographs, especially on the psychological and epistemological influences of judgment, and among the more recent and relevant to logic may be mentioned A. Wolff, Studies in Logic, Leipsic, 1886; F. Tappen and G. Schlick, Die neue philos. F., Jena, 1887; P. Hillebrand, Die neuen Theorien der Logik, Berlin, 1892; W. Jena, Die Logik, Breslau, 1892; A. Menaor, Oor Aanarchie, Leipzig, 1890; J. M. Baldwin, Thought and Things, ii., London, 1896; J. BROUGH.

JUGGERNUTH. — See JAGANNATH.

JUMNA (Skr. Yamuna personified as Yamni, twin sister of Yamni, the god of death). — One of the great rivers of N. India, rising in the Himalaya near Jamnori (q.v.), and finally joining the Ganges at Prayag, 'the place of sacrifice,' par excellence, now known as Allahabad (q.v.). In the Rigveda it occupies a position lower even than that of the Ganges, the Aryans having reached its banks only at a later period when they migrated eastward from their original settlements in the Panjab. When it is addressed it is only in connection with other rivers, Ganga, Sarasvati, Sutdru, Parni, and others, twenty-six in all (Rigveda, x. lx., 5; cf. V. 17, 7, 70, and J. Muir, Ori. Stkr. Texts, ii. [1875] 346 ff.; A. A. Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, Strassburg, 1887, p. 86). In the later literature the geographical outline widens, and it is called 'the great river Yamuna,' and is described as one of the three children of Sun by Sanjana, daughter of Viśvakarman, architect of the universe (Vishnu Purana, tr. H. H. Wilson, London, 1864-77, iii. 23, v. 82). Another legend describes the river as the wife of Yama, god of death; and the story of their incest curiously resembles a tale which Pinceare (de Fleur iv.), doubtless from Indian sources, attributes to the Ganges. Naturally, as the river flows past Mathura, the seat of the Kṛṣṇa cultus, it has been included in this complex series of myths. Balarāma, in a state of intoxication, order the river to approach him, as he desired to bathe.

'The river, disregarding the words of a drunken man, came not (by bhārīd). On which, Bāma, in a rage, took up his ploughshare, which he plunged into her bank, and said: 'You must be called:" Will you not come, you Jādi? Will you not come? Now go where you please (if you can." Thus saying, he compelled the deep river to quit the earth and follow him whithersoever he wandered through the wood. Assuming a mortal figure, the Yamuna, with her ploughshare in her hand, approached Bālabodha, and entreated him to pardon her, and let her go. But he replied: "I will drag you with my ploughshare, thousand directions, since you contempt my process and strength." At last, however, appeased by her reiterated prayers, he let her go, after she had watered all the country' (Viṣnupurāṇa, v. 67 ff.).

Wilson interprets this legend as referring to the excavation of ancient irrigation channels from the river; but F. S. Grove (Mathura, Allahabd, 1883, p. 184 f.) holds that there are no signs of ancient canals in the neighbourhood, and that the existing irrigation of the river sufficiently explains the myth. When the classical writers gained knowledge of the river, it was known as the Sarasvati (Bharatar, 29, 42) under the name Diamonna (J. W. McRindle, Ancient India as described by Ptolemy, London, 1885, p. 98 ff.), by Arrian (Indica, viii.) as Jobares, by Pison (INN 3), and many others. The legend of incest connected with the Jumna, the fact that it is supposed never to have been cleansed by the marriage ceremony, the only rite of purification in which he Hindu woman shews, and the supposed resultant indigestibility of the water is some of the causes which have contributed to render it a less sacred river than the Ganges. Its source at Jamnori is much more frequented by pilgrims than Gangothri (q.v.). Though it flows through a country sanctified in the upper part of its course by many legends of gods and heroes (E. T. Atkinson, Himalayan Gazetteer, Allahabad, 1882-84 ii. ch. iii. poomia), thence past Delhi (q.v.), the ancient Indraprastha, an early Indo-Aryan settlement, Mathura, the seat of the Kṛṣṇa cultus, and Agra (q.v.), the Mogul capital, still, except Mathura (q.v.) and in a very small degree Batesar (q.v.), there is no great place of pilgrimage on its banks, and it does not acquire full sanctity until it unites with the Ganges at the holy place known as Triveni, or 'the triple braid,' where the Ganges and Jumna are supposed to flow together, due to means of an underground channel the waters of the Sarasvati. Here the stream of the Jumna is clear and blue, in striking contrast to the muddy waters of the Ganges.

LITERATURE. — The authorities are quoted in the article. For the geography see IGI xiv. (1906) 323 ff.

W. CROOK.

JUNAR (said to be a corruption of Jumana-gara, 'old city,' and wrongly identified with the Tagara of Greek writers and Hindu tradition, which is really Ter in the Nizam's Dominions (J.R.A.S., 1901, p. 537 ff.)) — A town in the Purna District of the Bombay Presidency; lat. 19° 12' N.; long. 75° 58' E. Its importance depends on its command of the Nana pass, which leads to the W. coast. The town is small, the hillock containing Buddhist caves nearly equally distributed in five different localities, including fifty-seven separate excavations. These caves are devoid of figure ornament in many respects, in keeping with those of later date, such as Ellora (q.v.) and Ajanta (q.v.).

Although none of these caves can compare either in magnificence or interest with the Chaitya and vihara carvings of the Viharas of Nāikā, their forms are still full of instruction to the student of cave architecture. The group comprises monuments of almost every variety of composition, and several forms not found elsewhere, and though plainer than
JUSTIFICATION

Justice. — See Righteousness, Law.

JUSTIFICATION. — The term ἴσχωσις, which 'justifies' represents, means 'account righteous.' It is used both in the LXX and in the NT, and is juridical in idea, though forensic associations are not necessarily present to the mind of the writer, who is not concerned with a court of law. It implies an acquittal or declaration of righteousness, whether the facts of the case correspond with the pronouncement or not. The situation to which it refers is the result of past action, not the act of righteousness itself. It describes the requirement of a status, not the production of a state. It has reference to personal relations, not to psychological conditions. The only instance in the LXX that seems to conform with this statement is Ps. 72 (AV 33) — δοθήνα τοῖς ἵσχωσισι τῇ καρδίᾳ μου, not improbably implies an act of justification before God rather than a process of self-cleansing. In every case where the word occurs, it is proof of righteousness that is implied. In view of Ro 4 the words of Ex 23,‘ολως ἰσχωσισμόν τῇ καρδίᾳ'—should be noted (cf. Is 52'). Thus the verb becomes equivalent to 'absolve'—e.g., Sir 25:8 etc. In the NT the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican shows the word as involving the sense both of self-justification and of absolution (Lk 18:14; cf. 10:30-35). The Epistle of James, in the spirit of Christ's words in Mt 18:23, regards Abraham's obedience and Rahab's loyalty as 'justifying' them, because their actions are stamped by the OT as winning the Divine approval (Hebrews 11:31ff.). It shows no sign of acquiring an ethical sense which attaches to the word in the parable cited above. But it is from St. Paul's use of the verb in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians that the term 'justification' has its permanent place in Christian theology. The idea first appears in connexion with the controversy between Paul and Cephas at Antioch (Gal 2:13-21), when the latter, having lived 'as do the Gentiles,' separated himself together with other Hebrew Christians, fearing 'certain who came from James.' St. Paul represents himself as having contended that the recognition of Jesus as Messiah meant an acknowledgment that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but 'through faith in Jesus Christ' (v. 20). The old antithesis between those who were 'Jews by nature' and 'sinners of the Gentiles' (v. 12) had become little more than a convention. Justification was applied to any human being as such (v. 18; ὡσπερ), that henceforth living whether as do the Jews' 'as do the Gentiles' (v. 20) he might 'live unto God' (v. 20). This was the newly noted fact that Christians recover their relation to God is spoken of as 'justification in Christ' (v. 11). On its Godward side it depended upon the death of Christ, which was 'gratuitous' (v. 24; τευχήσθη), if righteousness were bestowed by grace. On its outward side it was by outward compliance with its ordinances, and not 'in faith of the Son of God' (v. 24). In the following chapter the idea is still further developed, so that we find St. Paul appealing to the bestowal of the Spirit (v. 39), which was an actual experience of the Galatian converts. As a result of 'hearing the gospel' (ib.) an effect had actually taken place which was in itself the relationship of the Galatians to God and the members of the Christian community. The delivery of the message had been met by, or, rather, had produced, 'faith' in those who heard (see Ro 10:9). They had been enabled to trust God and so become recipients of His grace. This leads the Apostle to introduce two pivot passages from the OT, one from the Law and the other from the Prophets, which express the principles that reach their consummation in Christ. Abraham believed God and it was reckoned unto him for righteousness' (Ga 15:6, cited v. 6). 'The righteous shall live as a result of faith' (Hab 2:4 cited v. 4). The book of Genesis presents as an initial act what Hahakuk represents as a continuing condition. The purpose of salvation begins with Abraham, though the promise reaches its fruition in Christ. His surrender to the promise was an act of faith which was rightly described as 'reckoned for righteousness' because it enabled God to establish those relations with him, which, viewed from the manward side, constitute 'righteousness.' And it can be extended forward to its consequent realization in the full 'vision' (Hab 2) or revelation only if the attitude of faith is permanently maintained. The real scope of St. Paul's argument cannot be understood unless it be observed how he undertakes the whole controversy in which he had been involved. 'Neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision' (Gal 5:6; cf. 1 Co 7:19). The self-condemned action of Peter in going from the Gentiles (22) and the subsequent defection of the Galatian Church under stress of the demand that they should submit to circumcision and its practical implications (4:7-8) had emphasized those precepts of the Mosaic system which were occupied with ceremonial rather than with conduct. It was, in fact, ceremonial observance, and not the keeping of the moral Law, that was endangering the freedom of the gospel. This fact, though even in Galatians the conception of law is not wholly confined to these provisions, enabled St. Paul to perceive that moral actions have only the value of ritual acts if regarded in formality with law. Law, therefore, is a system of regulations and has the value of discipline (3:3). That particular form of it which was immediately in question, viz., the Mosaic Code, could only be held to prepare those whose faith had already responded to the promise for the fuller response which its fulfilment in Christ would demand. The Law was until Christ (ib. 5:19). If they are justified at all, are justified, as Abraham was, by trusting in God. Their obedience would be a 'fruit of the Spirit' (5:6) so far as the life unto God was granted in anticipation of the fulfilment of the promise in Christ. All this is implied, if not implicitly stated, in the argument concerning the faith of Abraham (3:9). In principle, God's dealings with mankind have always been the same. His purpose has always been to bring men into those relations with Himself which confer the status of sonship, the gift of the Spirit, and the possession of life, in Christ. The historical work of Jesus is only the saving forth of the fulness of the time (4), i.e. at the appropriate moment in the education of the human race. The gospel was preached beforehand to Abraham, who received the promise (9), as afterwards to the disciples, who have received 'the promise of the Spirit through faith' (v. 18). The Cross of Christ
stands in living relation to both. All alike were loved by the Son of God, who gave Himself for them (2 Co 5:19). All alike must acknowledge, at least implicitly, that the life that they now live in the flesh they live through faith in Him (1 Th 1:9).

It has been observed that St. Paul uses the phrase ‘justified in Christ’ (Rom 4:25). Here he combines in one sentence two lines of teaching, which many modern interpreters have found it difficult to correlate. It has been asserted that the deepest and most significant of the Christian teachings is expressed in the phrase ‘in Christ,’ and that the whole argument concerning justification by faith is only a controversial device to account for the apparent paradox of abandoning the Jewish system while acknowledging Jesus as the fuller fulfillment of the Messianic expectation. The Epistle to the Galatians is too obviously a vehement attempt to express the personal experience manifested in its autobiographical passages to make such a conclusion probable, and the fuller elaboration of the soteriological doctrine in Romans, which has no immediate reference to controversy, renders it practically impossible. The personal history of St. Paul’s faith, the point of contact, the point of contact was wanting, would itself be sufficient to hold together justification by faith and the life in Christ as representing two equally important aspects of the one Christian experience. But at the very outset the Apostle has welded them together in this conception of justification of Christ, which may in turn be interpreted by the phrase used in Rom 5:1-2, ‘justification of life.’

Condemnation, not a formal sentence, but an attitude of God toward transgressors, rests upon all those who ‘in Adam’ (Rom 5:12). So justification, i.e., the act of God whereby He accepts mankind for the sake of whom Adam has become, of which the issue is life, rests upon all those who as a consequence live in Christ. What we have to recognize is that to the mind of the Apostle justification is a Divine act, and only figuratively a declaration. The metaphor is forensic, but the fact is such only so far as all forgiveness may be said to partake of this quality. Being the act of the living God, it is dynamic, and as such necessarily involves the infusion of the Spirit. Consequently it brings with it love, joy, peace, etc., which are the fruit of the Spirit, and the presence of which is part of the essential experience of the life in Christ. But (1) the act ‘justified in Christ’ (Gal 2:16) and it is manifest that active faith is involved in the complex result. It is, therefore, all one whether we say that we live the new life ‘in Christ’ or ‘through faith in Christ.’ St. Paul’s doctrine is not one of a mystical union ex opere operato. It is reached through a conscious act of appropriation. And (2) the sending forth into our hearts of the Holy Spirit of the Son (Gal 4:6), though it issues in the reproduction of Christ in us (v. 19), an ethical as well as spiritual transformation, is primarily the medium through which we are enabled to call upon God as Father (v. 19). This involves a dative case, which is not given the experience, but to which experience testifies, viz. that we are no longer bond servants but sons and heirs of God (1 Th 1:9). The fundamental fact, therefore, lies in the realm of absolute, theological truth. To recognize Jesus as Redeemer is to acknowledge Him as the Messiah, in whom the Kingdom is established, in which a new status is conferred on every disciple expressed under the figure of ‘adoption’ (v. 21). Compare the Epistle, which takes up the language of the earlier Epistles—by grace have ye been saved through faith (Eph 2:8)—and it means the translation of sinners, through forgiveness by the blood of the Cross, into the ‘body of Christ’ (Col 1:24).”

It is clear that St. Paul accepted in general outline the dogmatic belief of the primitive community concerning the Kingdom of the righteous, which had been brought in by the exaltation of Jesus, which was also the advent of faith in the life of the ecclesia, and whose final revelation was anticipated in the sacraments. ‘We through the Spirit by faith wait for the hope of righteousness’ (Gal 5:5), being delivered by Him who gave Himself for our sins out of this present evil world (1 Cor 1:27). There is, therefore, an eschatological element in the idea of justification. It is initial to the Christian life in the sense of inaugurating those relations with God which issue in the presence of the Spirit. It is final in so far as it is only ultimately reached with that judgment which at the end will establish the Kingdom. What St. Paul criticized in the Pharisaism of his contemporaries was not the passion for ethical righteousness, which he shared, but the spiritual blindness which did not perceive the need of a new creation, of the uplifting of human life, whether Jewish or Gentile, on to a new level, the ‘Jerusalem that is above’ (Col 3:1), into which men must be reborn by a Divine act. This act is forgiveness (3:8; cf. Ro 4:25), to which justification is therefore equivalent.

The Epistle to the Romans presents the teaching of justification in a less controversial and more philosophic spirit. First of all, it affirms the ethical proposition that ‘not the hearers of a law are just before God, but the doers of it’ (Rom 2:13). Condemnation, not a formal sentence, but an attitude of God toward transgressors, rests upon all those who ‘in Adam’ (Rom 5:12). So justification, i.e., the act of God whereby He accepts mankind for the sake of whom Adam has become, of which the issue is life, rests upon all those who as a consequence live in Christ. What we have to recognize is that to the mind of the Apostle justification is a Divine act, and only figuratively a declaration. The metaphor is forensic, but the fact is such only so far as all forgiveness may be said to partake of this quality. Being the act of the living God, it is dynamic, and as such necessarily involves the infusion of the Spirit. Consequently it brings with it love, joy, peace, etc., which are the fruit of the Spirit, and the presence of which is part of the essential experience of the life in Christ. But (1) the act ‘justified in Christ’ (Gal 2:16) and it is manifest that active faith is involved in the complex result. It is, therefore, all one whether we say that we live the new life ‘in Christ’ or ‘through faith in Christ.’ St. Paul’s doctrine is not one of a mystical union ex opere operato. It is reached through a conscious act of appropriation. And (2) the sending forth into our hearts of the Holy Spirit of the Son (Gal 4:6), though it issues in the reproduction of Christ in us (v. 19), an ethical as well as spiritual transformation, is primarily the medium through which we are enabled to call upon God as Father (v. 19). This involves a dative case, which is not given the experience, but to which experience testifies, viz. that we are no longer bond servants but sons and heirs of God (1 Th 1:9). The fundamental fact, therefore, lies in the realm of absolute, theological truth. To recognize Jesus as Redeemer is to acknowledge Him as the Messiah, in whom the Kingdom is established, in which a new status is conferred on every disciple expressed under the figure of ‘adoption’ (v. 21). Compare the Epistle, which takes up the language of the earlier Epistles—by grace have ye been saved through faith (Eph 2:8)—and it means the translation of sinners, through forgiveness by the blood of the Cross, into the ‘body of Christ’ (Col 1:24).’
lieveth’ (1 Thess. 5:3). To accept this message, to obey this gospel, to be ‘in Christ Jesus’ (see above, p. 11) is to walk in the Spirit (89) and to escape from sin in present experience, and so to have the assurance that there is ‘no condemnation’ (v.4) here or hereafter. The righteousness of God, a living, active force in Christ, is expressed with a mannerism of his own righteousness, which the revealed law shows to have no existence in fact. This Divine righteousness is by faith unto faith (103). Faith contemplate the manifest acting of God in the Person and Work of Christ (11-14, 20, 21), the trustful acceptance of which as the gift of God leads to that faith by which, abandoning self-sufficiency, we become obedient, surrender ourselves, to it. First of all there is the experience of ‘newness of life’ (6), an identification with Christ so complete that St. Paul can use the expressions ‘buried with Christ in baptism’ (7), crucified with Christ, risen with him’ (6). In proportion as this faith is active in us, we henceforth cease to serve sin (v.3), we are liberated from ‘the law of sin and death’ (8), and no longer find sin reigning in our mortal bodies (8). The fruits of the Spirit (8) become manifest in the mortifying of the deeds of the body. The love of Christ—the love of God in Christ—became, as the Apostle had himself proved, an intense moment of his soul. He could speak of Christ, or the Spirit of Christ (the two expressions are practically indistinguishable (8-10)), inhabiting his personality, the source of holiness and of good works. But, as in Galatians, this is clearly a new source, transforming the character ex opere operato, but a conscious fellowship based upon loyalty and trust. As it is expressed in Ephesians, he had yielded himself to Christ, to the Redeemer, that Christ might dwell in his heart by faith (Eph. 3:17).

But, if this were all, the Death and Resurrection of Christ would remain unexplained; the relation of these facts to the reproduction of the life of Christ in the believer would be undefined. Once again, therefore, the ethical result is taken as the pledge of that altered relationship to God which was dogmatically expressed in the theology of the primitive community as the covering effect of the work of Christ on our behalf. The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God’ (Ro 8:16). The actual, realized effectiveness is attested to the fellowship of disciples, the fulfilling of the ordinances of the law in those who were walking not after the flesh but after the spirit, are the immediate and subjective pledge of an ultimate and objective relationship between the members of the community reconciled in Christ on the one hand and Him who is God and Father on the other. Viewed from the side of God’s action, which is all along spontaneous, paramount, and free, this condition is brought about by grace or free favour. On man’s side it results from faith, which is not a meritorious and independent act, but is itself a Divine gift, the reflex in human experience of free grace.

That the Pauline doctrine is forensic in form rather than in fact should be clear from the following considerations. The Apostle necessarily comes to walk in the Spirit as a Christian, and the altered relationship to God, to which it testifies, with his former experience as a Pharisee. He had believed that as a circumcision he had been admitted to the community in which the stigmatizing observances of the Mosaic Law both on the ceremonial and on the moral side afforded a meritorious ground for the final sentence of the Divine Lawgiver and would procure his acceptance. What he found in Galatia, according to which St. Paul is by a process of legal compliance had now been reached by the establishment of relations which were not legal at all, viz. by the free exercise of God’s fatherly love towards him in Christ, which had awakened a responsive trust. This is the essential Christian experience, however it be expressed. Its note is the restoration through forgiveness of personal relations with a Father, not the not the claim of a Lawgiver. Thus the term ‘justification,’ as used to express what the NT elsewhere calls ‘salvation,’ is forensic in what it denotes rather than in what it signifies. But, insomuch as the Pharisaic arises out of that righteousness in which he learns to recognize the holy love of God through the disciplinary revelation of His character in the precepts of a formal law, the conception of salvation is not adequately expressed unless it is seen in relation to what ‘the law could not do in that it was weak.’ Nor must we fail to perceive that faith is not an antecedent condition, but is involved in the idea of justification, so that the method cannot be separated from the fact. What the gospel means by ‘they faith hath saved thee’ St. Paul expresses by saying that we are justified through faith. The corollaries which together are the keynotes of justification and faith, the former being the activity of God’s personality towards man as realized and expressed in the historical work of Christ, the latter being the activity of man’s personality directed to that end in Himself as Redeemer. They are indeed two sides of expressing the same relation viewed from opposite sides. It is logic, not experience, that separates them, and that requires a third term like justification to express the resultant of both. But it is faith that is the norm of the Pauline theology. And justification must always be interpreted in the light of the experience implicit in the Apostle’s obedience to the heavenly vision (Ac 9:25–27), summed up in the declaration: ‘The life that I now live in the flesh I live in faith, in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me (Gal 2:20).

The connexion between justification and baptism, though St. Paul does not himself explicitly adopt the terms, arises out of the fact that ‘we are justified in Christ’ (i.e. Christ is the sphere in which justification takes place. The Son of God is revealed not merely to, but in, the believer (Gal 1:4), and this because he is ‘created in Christ Jesus’ (Eph 2:5). The purpose of God was to group all things in Christ (1:10). The mystery of the Divine will was ‘the one body,’ in which all believers are reconciled to the Father through the Cross (2:20). Thus ‘we are members one of another,’ which for St. Paul is the reason and motive of the ethical life (Ro 12:1, 1 Co 12:25). St. Paul’s doctrine of the body of Christ, or the ecclesia, is the counterpart in his theology of the Kingdom to which in the Gospels the forgiveness of sins stands in a constant relation. Similarly, to be ‘justified in Christ’ is ipso facto to be placed in relation to the body in which he realized the fellowship of the one Spirit. And baptism is the act of initiation into the Christian fellowship (1 Co 12:13), wherein justifying faith perfects itself and thus becomes the starting-point of the new life in Christ. In this rite the believer washes away his sins (Ac 22:16), and puts on Christ (Gal 3:28), not because he cannot achieve these results by faith, but because he can ‘appropriate the forgiveness of sins by faith only when he unites in his faith at the same time in God and Christ, and the intention to connect himself with the community of believers’ (Ritschl, Rechtfertigung und Seelsorge, III. § 30, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1890, p. 111). In view of recent discussion of which St. Paul is by a process of legal compliance had now been reached by the establishment of relations which were not legal at
Interpreting justification by a false appeal to its etymology (= justum facere), he recovered the conception of salvation as a free gift of God (gratia is that which is gratuitous and gratuitous), but failed adequately to realize that it involved the re-establishment of personal relations with the Father through Christ. Grace was represented as a supernatural grace infused into the regenerated through sacramental channels and gradually built up into a righteousness which was not meritorious only because it was imparted rather than achieved. Thus his teaching was a more or less materialized form of the Pauline doctrine of sanctification, i.e., the teaching which God transforms into the image of Christ those whom He has already accepted for His children through faith in Jesus. The initial action, which alone is covered by the NT view of justification, was entirely omitted by Augustinianism, which became the accepted mould of the medieval theology, the standard expression of which is found in the Summae of St. Thomas Aquinas. Thus in Summ. Thol. ii, 1, qu. 100, he asserts that gratia justificans is quidam realis et positivum in se, a supernatural quality, infused like the virtues—faith, hope, and love—of which it is the cause. In conformity with this view, he regarded justification as a corrupt action. Though involving the observance of the will, at least when formed by love (dei voluntate per caritatem), it is primarily intellectual assent and has no reference to subjective action. There is no limitation of the redemptive personality of God, and it is then a preliminary condition of justification rather than its channel. In its imperfect stage (justitia informis) it is scarcely distinguishable from the nakedness to truth which is wrong even from devils, who 'believe and tremble' (Summ. Thol. ii, 2, qu. 1-10). These ideas were stereotyped by the Council of Trent, after being disputed by Humanists and Reformers, in the 'Dissertatio de Justificatione,' which published an anathema against those who declare that men are justified either by imputation of Christ's righteousness alone, or by remission of sins alone, excluding the grace which becomes inherent in them, or who say that the grace by which we are justified is only the favour of God (Conv. Trid., sess. vi, 'Dissertatio de Justitie,' can. xl.). The point of this position is not the objection offered to the phrase 'imputation of Christ's righteousness,' which is admitted not to be scriptural, but the identification of grace with an imparted gift and the consequent description of justification as a naturally realized psychological experience. This was the position of the Church at a time when St. Augustine's system parted company with Paulinism, and opened the way to the re-establishment of salvation by merit, which was characteristic of the formal teaching of the medieval Church. For a supernatural gift, if it be transmuted through use of the prescribed sacramental means into virtues inherent in human character, becomes the achievement of the possessor, precisely as the result of labour, though not obtained without the employment of material, are acquired by the worker. Thus Aquinas, in opposition to the spirit of St. Paul, allows that fides est meritorium. It is easy, therefore, to see how this effect of the party that had most keenly opposed the Augustinian view of grace to produce that combination of sacramental mysticism and ecclesiastical legality of remarking to be content with conformity to established and traditional institutions as a sufficient discharge of the Divine claims upon them, converted organized Church, which was the framework for salvation, which the Mosaic system had failed to allow, in the case of St. Paul, began to reassert itself in the Western Church, St. Augustine partially reaffirmed the Pauline position, but without rising to its characteristic and essential principle.
The 16th cent. saw the rediscovery of the NT doctrine of justification. This was rendered possible in the first instance by the Revival of Greek, which threw men back upon the original Greek, and prepared the way for Reformation as distinguished from scholastic theology. But the renewed knowledge of Greek was not the only key to a living interpretation of the NT. The awakening of personality, the new mening of nature had only imperfectly understood whether by the classical, the patristic, or the medieval mind, quickened those religious needs which only an experience akin to that which produced the Pauline theology could adequately satisfy. The story of Luther, laboriously climbing the Santa Scala at Rome, till the words of Habakkuk twicerepeated by St. Paul in his crucial arguments — *the just shall live by faith* — sent him incommingently down the steps with a revolution in his soul, is typical of the Reformation. For Luther, as for St. Paul, the vision of God in Christ brought home to his fatherly love as manifested in the Person and Work of the Redeemer, with the consequent assurance of free forgiveness and a personal share in the purpose of salvation. This is the essential Christian experience, and though, as Husserl affirms in his sermon on *justification*, there have doubtless been in all ages thousands who have been the subjects of it (Serm. ii. § 84.), it is difficult to find room for it in the official theology of medieval Catholicism. Confidence in God became the mark of men of Luther’s own teaching and of Reformation theology, and confidence is nothing else but faith aware of itself. It is the subjective aspect of the restored personal relations, or re-connection with God, by which it is inspired, and which constitute what Protestants have always meant by justification.

Neither the general outlines of the teaching of the Reformation nor the particular theories of individual writers correspond in every detail with the Pauline statement. These last do not, of course, agree one with another, either in terminology, in scope, or in adjustment to other balancing principles. Further, it must be borne in mind not only that the phraseology of St. Paul is to be interpreted in relation to the NT generally, but also that his Epistles do not present us with a system in itself. The upheaval of religious thought in the 16th cent. followed upon a long dogmatic history, in relation to which its theology was re-constructed. While, therefore, St. Paul speaks of faith as the basic truth of the gospel, the Protestant divine uses *the imputation of righteousness* as a technical term defined in respect to a general body of doctrine, and justification by faith becomes justification by faith only. The deviation in the latter case is due not to an exaggregation of St. Paul’s teaching, but to the conditions of the later controversy. The Reformers did not deny that hope and love no less than faith were necessarily present in those who are justified. What they saw was that to connect those virtues with justification itself was to shift the meaning of the term from the Biblical to the medieval sense. Whether *imputation of righteousness* is to be regarded as a Biblical idea depends upon whether such a phrase as *the righteousness which is of God* (Ps 33:19) has a positive content, and means, e.g., the merits of Christ, or whether it is simply equivalent to the status of those to whom faith is reckoned for righteousness. But what is really involved here is not so much the meaning of justification as the validity of certain theologies. And this is true also of Ritschl’s contention, that the community of believers is primarily the object of justification (op. cit. iii. § 26, etc.). For the question really is whether the Church is part of the revelation of God in Christ or not, and justification is still equivalent to the forgiveness of sins in either case. Whether the Cross is a satisfaction for sin, whether the work of Christ possesses a substantive, whether the sacramental Church is part of the Divine scheme of redemption, are questions affecting the revelation of God in Christ rather than the status of those who through faith become members of the Church. The parting of the ways in respect of justification depends on the relation which exists between forgiveness and the infusion of holiness. The latter is not denied by Protestants, but it is conceived as resulting from the communication of the Spirit, which necessarily springs from the Divine act of pardon and acceptance. Roman theology, on the other hand, regards forgiveness as consequent upon the transmission of holiness, which it calls righteousness, the normal channels of this process being the sacraments. The distinction is not merely a matter of terms, but has an important bearing upon the Christian character. The provision of aids, however powerful, for the attainment of justification must have an entirely different effect upon the daily life of the believer from the assurance of a reconciliation already fully won.

JUVENILE CRIMINALS.—By ‘criminals’ we mean those offenders whom the criminal law of the particular State takes cognizance by way of punishment, not those wrongdoers, against the wrongdoer’s family or others, whom the State refuses to prosecute and punish. By ‘juvenile’ in the expression ‘juvenile criminals,’ we primarily mean offenders who have reached the minimum age at which the State prosecutes for crime, but who are under the age at which full legal responsibility is held to begin. In a secondary sense, we include as juvenile criminals those young persons who, although they have not actually committed crime, are danger of becoming criminals. In many cases, an accident whether a boy or a girl is in the one class or the other. State or voluntary action to prevent the manufacture of criminals may be as necessary in the one case as in the other.

This delimitation of our subject is convenient; but it does not in all cases square with the facts. There are exceptional children, under the age of possible prosecution, who might be held responsible for their wrongful acts, because they are as conscious of the nature, probable results, wrongful character, and legal consequences of these acts as those who are above that age. On the other hand, there are many juvenile criminals—some authorities say twenty-five, others seventy-five, per cent—whose mental and moral development is so stunted that they are not fully conscious, when they commit crimes, of the conditions involving legal responsibility. Although the modern State will not prosecute and punish persons below the age at which it considers legal responsibility of the individual, it is entitled, in certain circumstances, to interfere with the liberty of these persons, and with the natural rights of their parents, and to take such steps as it thinks fit to prevent their becoming criminals.
This is the principle of 'prevention better than cure,' on which the Industrial School and, to a lesser extent, the Reformatory School of the United Kingdom, and similar institutions in other countries, are founded.

In theory, the law of all countries used to treat juveniles (above the age at which the particular state held legal responsibility to begin) and adults as equally liable to punishment, although, in practice, the obvious distinctions between the two cases were more or less acted upon, at least by the more humane administrators of the law. Children were sentenced to be transported or hanged; but these sentences were modified in their case more frequently than in the case of adults.

In modern times, by criminologists of all countries, increasing stress has been laid on the view suggested by the words: 'Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.' (Ro 12:9). Torture, mutilation, branding, starvation, and transportation had each their study advocates who honestly and believed that, on their abolition, discipline inside the prison and the safety of the inmates would improve. Yet these worse than useless horrors have all disappeared with the pileory and the stocks, the treadmill and the wheel, the whipping post, and the pillory, and all the rest. Flogging and other forms of discipline have been reduced to a minimum, and, with the silent system, will, for similar reasons, cease to be things of the past. It has been sharply questioned whether, except as an incident of the reformatory and reformatory treatment of the individual or in order to secure the safety of the community, the State, as such, has any right to punish offenders, whether by fine, imprisonment, or other punishment. It is generally agreed that, whether the idea of punishment pure and simple is, or is not admissible in the case of adults, it has no place (except in very exceptional circumstances, as an adjunct of reformation) in dealing with juveniles. It was only in 1808, by clauses 102 and 103 of The Children Act of that year, that it was made impossible in the United Kingdom to send to penal servitude, or to hang, a boy or girl under 16. The efficacy of rewards rather than punishments, the power of sympathy rather than coercion, in the interests both of discipline and of reformation, are not yet fully recognized in prisons, in schools, or in families.

Modern methods of dealing with juvenile criminals have proceeded on similar lines in Great Britain and its Colonies, the United States, and the Commonwealth, and are based on two considerations: (1) the conviction that the crimes of juveniles are not in fact (unlike those of adults) the result of wilful wrongdoing or deliberate choice, but of heredity polluted by want, drink, and disease, of physical hardships (due in large measure to the periodic unemployment and the insufficient wages of parents), of defective religious and secular education, of want of parental supervision and control, and of vicious associations; and (2) the general agreement, founded on experience, that juveniles, when withdrawn from their vicious surroundings (the nursery, the public house, or the streets) and provided with a firm, kindly, intelligent reformatory influences more readily and more permanently than adults.

The movement in Europe, the United States, and the British Colonies for a radical change in the treatment of potential and actual juvenile criminals was the result of a quickened sense in the State, and in the Church, of the supreme value of the interest (in the broadest sense) of the nation, and of national as well as parental responsibility, for all the children in the community, whether they are normal or defective physically, mentally, or morally. In Great Britain it was, like many other movements for the welfare of children, partly at least the consequence of the Ragged School movement, begun by John Pounds, the Portsmouth cobbler, early in the 19th century, and subsequently extended over Great Britain and Ireland, under the inspiration of such men as John Street, John Dean, and Mary Carpenter in England, and Thomas Guthrie and Sheriff Watson in Scotland. It was not till Ragged School methods had been proved in Britain and elsewhere that the State in Great Britain took any share in the work, which results in benefit to the whole community, and is, therefore, suitable for State recognition and support.

In later years, the State's action in Great Britain has been accelerated by the success of similar preserving and reformatory institutions in the United States and in the British Colonies, and by the splendid work done by such agencies, independent of State aid, as those of the Ragged School Union and Barnardo and Müller in England, Quarrier in Scotland, and the Salvation Army in different parts of the world.

Modern legislation dealing with juvenile crime has been mainly directed (1) to exclude juveniles from prison; (2) to provide institutions for the preservation of those who are in danger of falling into crime, and for the reform of those who have been convicted of crime; and (3) to secure for any who may be in prison such treatment, in confinement and on release, as will at least make it possible for them to redeem their past, and live honest and useful lives, keeping in view the sad and unfortunate statement, or, rather, understatement, made by the Departmental Committee of 1895: 'Few inmates leave prison better than when they came in.' It is not possible in a short space to exhaust the application of these views in different countries. The matter may be illustrated by stating the position in the United Kingdom, where the law relating to juvenile crime is to be found in parts iv. and v. of The Children Act, 1878 (Edward vii., ch. 67), entitled 'An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the protection of children and young persons, Reformatory and Industrial Schools, and Juvenile Offenders, and otherwise to amend the law with respect to children and young persons.' The First Offenders Act, 1887, The Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904, and The Probation of Offenders Act, 1907, should be read along with The Children Act, 1908.

By section 58, magistrates may send to Industrial Schools (1) children who are found begging, (2) children found wandering, and (3) children who have no adequate means of subsistence, (4) destitute children, and those whose parents (or surviving parent) are in prison, (4) children of criminal or drunken parents, unfit to have the care of them, (5) children living in grossly immoral surroundings, (6) children who are refractory and beyond the control of parents or guardians, or, if in a workhouse, of the managers, and (7), in exceptional circumstances, children not older than 13 charged with crime. All boys and girls sent to Reformatory (with the exception of refractory children sent from Industrial Schools) must have been convicted of crime.

The body of legislation which culminated in The Children Act, 1908, has, in conjunction with voluntary effort, resulted in the establishment, in different parts of the United Kingdom, of two institutions designed to prevent and deal with that brand which, once affixed, is rarely effaced, and to fit them, convicted or unconvicted, for a new career: (1) Certificated Industrial Schools for children not old enough to be convicted, but in imminent danger, from their destitute and neglected condition, from their immoral surroundings, or from their refractory habits, of falling into crime, or who have been convicted of minor
offences; they may be committed for any period, but cannot remain in an Industrial School beyond 16; (2) Reformatory Schools for children over 12 years and under 16 at entry, who have committed more serious offences, or who may be beyond the Industrial School age of 14; they are committed for not less than three, and not more than five, years, but cannot remain in a Reformatory School beyond the age of 19.

(1) Industrial Schools certified and subsidised by Government. The State has interfered in favour of Industrial Schools in four ways: (1) by certifying those of whose management and methods it approves as fit places for the detention of the boys and girls for whose benefit the Acts already mentioned were passed; (2) by conferring powers on magistrates to send boys and girls to these schools under detention orders for a fixed period; (3) by paying a proportion of the cost of the boys and girls so committed under magistrates' orders; and (4) by providing Government inspection of certified Industrial Schools.

Government recognition and subsidy were not obtained for Industrial Schools without opposition. It was said that these schools were merely doing the work which the parents ought to do; that to support them was to pauperise both parents and children. It required to set free the children’s money to feed the vicious indulgences of the parents. If there were parents, who, although able, were not willing to do their duty by their children, why did not the criminal law compel them? These arguments, although specious, were inapplicable to orphans, deserted children, and children of long sentence prisoners. Even where they had a basis in fact—e.g., the compulsory cases of parents spending their drink money on that alone—true in the case of the children, it was proved that it would be of advantage to the State to save the children from joining the criminal ranks, even at the cost in some cases of pauperising the parents and feeding their vices.

The opponents of Government interference relied on another great principle, viz., the inalienable rights of parents in their children. But, while this principle could have no application in the case of orphan children, it had only a technical application even in the case of those deserted or neglected children who, although one or both parents might be living, were worse than orphans.

(2) Reformatory Schools. As in the case of Industrial Schools, voluntary effort had proved the success of Reformatory Schools for youthful offenders before the system was adopted by Government. In the preamble of the first Reformatory Statute (passed in 1854, 7 and 8 Victoria, ch. 86) there is a recital of the establishment, by voluntary contributions, of Reformatory Schools in various parts of Great Britain.

Dealing with both Reformatory and Industrial Schools, the 1908 Act makes careful provision in the choice of a school, for respect being paid to the religion in which the child has been brought up. It also provides for the parents of the children, wherever possible, being compelled to contribute to the cost of their maintenance and education. In the case of Industrial Schools, the children may, when the managers of the school think the case a suitable one, be boarded out instead of being kept in the school; and they may be licensed out, from both Industrial and Reformatory Schools, before the normal period for which they were sent to the school.

The statute does not contain any provision for emigration; but it is the practice, especially when the home is an exceptionally bad one, to send the children to the Colonies. There is no difficulty in finding employment for the children, who go as domestic servants, and the boys in all kinds of skilled trades and in the army and navy. After leaving school, the children remain under the supervision of the managers—Industrial School children till 18, Reformatory School children till 18. The cost of these schools is not met entirely by the Treasury or by local authorities. Voluntary contributions cover a proportion of the cost; but, as in all cases when Government aid is available, the directors of these institutions find it increasingly difficult to maintain voluntary subscriptions. Government has wisely left the administration of the schools to voluntary committees of non-official men and women specially interested and specially skilled.

Naturally, looking to the age and careers of the inmates, the discipline in Reformatories is more severe than in Industrial Schools, and, for the same reason, the percentage who do well after their time is up may not be so high. But, whatever differences of opinion there may be as to the best methods of dealing with juvenile crime or as to the precise percentage of satisfactory cases, it is universally admitted that the State has got many times more than full value for all the public money spent on Reformatories and Industrial Schools.

(3) The Borstal system. In addition to Industrial Schools and Reformatories, there are State institutions in England and Scotland on what is known as the Borstal system, for offenders, from 16 to 21, too old for Reformatories, but whose habits have not yet matured beyond redemption, although they may have long enough been criminal times. The success already achieved in these institutions—the first was founded in 1902—makes it certain that the test of age will be abandoned, and that, sooner or later, all prisoner will be treated as capable of reformation, save only those professional criminals who have shown by a strengthened career in crime that, for the safety of the community, they must be confined for life.

See, further, art. CRIMINOLOGY.

(4) Truant Schools. The position of Day Industrial Schools in Scotland, established under the Day Industrial Schools (Scotland) Act, 1893, in relation to Certified Industrial Schools appears from clause 83 of The Children Act, 1908. In the United States remarkable results have been achieved in an establishment called ‘The George Junior Republic,’ founded in 1885, in which the inmates are put upon their honour and trusted with administration and discipline to an extent unknown until 1913 in any institution, public or private, for similar purposes in Great Britain. An institution on similar lines, called ‘The Little Commonwealth,’ was started in 1913 in Dorsetshire, the success or failure of which may have important results on the whole method of dealing with juvenile criminals. Mention must also be made of the work carried on by the Ragged School Union and other associations, which prefer to work without State aid that they may be independent of State control.

The tendency is increasing to eliminate both the appearance and the reality of prison life from the institutions mentioned above. This does not proceed from any pseudo-humanitarianism, but from experience that thereby the children are better braced for the battle of life when they leave school. The Reformatory Act of 1854 enacted that every young person sent to a Reformatory must first be imprisoned for not less than 14 days, and it was not till 1899, 45 years thereafter, that this most objectionable condition was abolished. Experience proved that even this short experience was sufficient in many cases to rob the prison of its terrors, and to affix an indelible prison-brand. The discipline is firm, and temporary causes and difficulties may make it, at times, severe. Few, if any, boys or girls go voluntarily into Reformatories,
or even Industrial Schools; and few, if any, remain of their own free choice. The food, although ample, is plain. The children, consistently with the preservation of robust health, work hard, both in the school-room and at industrial work. Yet every school has abundant testimony from former pupils, many of them occupying positions of trust at home and abroad, that they owe everything to these institutions.

There is another provision in the Children Act (first put into practice in the United States in 1869), which cannot be passed over, viz., that for the establishment of Children's Courts, separate from the ordinary Police Courts, and to which none but those directly interested, including the Press, are admitted. Reference may also be made to clause 62 (2), in which it is contemplated that Industrial Schools will provide a department for children suffering from mental or physical defect. It is a sad feature of almost all effort, State and voluntary, in connection with juvenile criminals, actual or anticipated, that the institutions for their benefit are open only to children mentally and physically normal, or nearly normal, and that no effort is made to segregate the defective, who are thus allowed, by the production of children, weak physically, morally, and mentally, to maintain the supply of the criminal class. The Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 is, however, evidence that this aspect of the question is at last to be seriously faced.

The 1908 Act recognizes by clause 60, dealing with probation of offenders (a system, like so many others, adopted from successful experience in the United States), how essential it is that the child, when he or she leaves the Industrial or Reformatory School, shall be provided with a suitable situation, and shall be supervised in his or her earlier years of freedom. In reference to juvenile criminals who have been sent to prison, we may merely mention the noble work done by them, during confinement and on release, by Prison Visitors, Discharged Prisoner Aid Societies, the Churches, and the Salvation Army, working in conjunction with the Prison Commissioners and the prison officials.

The advocates and managers of the great reformatory institutions and agencies above described have always been keenly alive to the drawbacks and deficiencies of all such establishments, however well managed, compared with home life as it ought to be. While doing what we can to safeguard the tempted and to reform the fallen in our own generation, we must look forward to the day when the conditions of life of the working classes—their religions, moral, and intellectual opportunities, the regularity of their employment, their wages, their housing, their means of innocent and health-giving recreation, and their resultant law-abiding character—will be such that there will be no need for any of these institutions, and when the subject of juvenile criminals will have only an historical and antiquarian interest.

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KA—See DOUBLES, EGYPTIAN RELIGION.

KA BA—See MECCA.

KABBALÁ. I. History. Kabbalá (Heb., 'he received') was a term usually reserved to denote the Prophets and Hagiographers as opposed to the Pentateuch, e.g., T. B. Bahr hash-shahna, 10s (see C. Taylor, The History of the Jewish Fathers, Cambridge, 1897, p. 114). The prophetic teaching was 'received' or 'traditional.' In the course of time, however, the meaning of Kabbalá underwent a change; it was applied to hidden and mysterious doctrines, dealing with the nature of the Deity and His relation to the world. This secret mysticism had no late growth. Difficult though it is to prove the date and origin of this system of philosophy and the influence and causes which produced it, we can fairly certain that its roots stretch back very far, and that the medieval and Geonic Kabbalá was the culmination and not the inception of Jewish esoteric mysticism. Already in the days of the Mishna, it was felt that speculations concerning the origin of the world (see art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Jewish)) should be restricted to those of nature, intellect, and the same tractate (Haggiga, ii. 1 and T. B. Hagiga, 13s; see A. W. Strane, Chagigih, Cambridge, 1891, p. 55) associates themselves (v. 11) with cosmology (v. 12) and philosophy (v. 13). In the same tractate, the same tractate (Haggiga, ii. 1 and T. B. Hagiga, 13s; see A. W. Strane, Chagigih, Cambridge, 1891, p. 55) associates themselves (v. 11) with cosmology (v. 12) and philosophy (v. 13). These two sciences are subject to the same restrictions and are regarded as interdependent. The famous admonition of Sirach, not to seek 'that which is too wonderful for thee'

(Sir 39.1; see Taylor, 'The Wisdom of Ben Sira,' JQR xxv. [1902-3], 442; repeated in Bereshit Rabbá, viii, ed. J. Theodor, Berlin, 1903, p. 58) and in Mazigita, 13s, shows not only that these speculations were rife in the 2nd cent. B.C., but that in pursuing them caution was deemed necessary. It is superfluous to cite further evidence, since this statement is now generally accepted.

One of the etymologies of the same essence (Kaprão; cf. Essere, v. p. 4000) is 'secret' (Hebr. 'mesi,' or 'mesi'). This is based on 'Meschurá (D.J. ish, 8), who says of the sect of Qe'der as wurbab r v-quarter to the kheret earahemars. This would seem to imply a tendency to esoteric doctrines on the part of the Essenes (see Taylor, Essays, p. 73, note). The name of the Elekabá, a Gnostic sect (s. v. 180), would furnish a parallel to this etymology, according to the derivation given by Espliánsi (cf. Bereshit Rabbá, v. p. 262, viz. 77'22, 'hidden strength."

The Apocryphal writings, especially Enoch and Jubilees, mark a considerable development in the history of Kabbalá. Gnosticism and dualism played a great part in influencing its growth, and contributed towards the body of ideas that found expression in the Sifre Yeira and the later Zohár. Kabbaláism denies the creatio ex nihilo and the possibility of knowing God. Hence it taught the doctrine of negative attributes, by which expedient the Godhead might be described. Kabbaláism, further, represents the insistence on the divine immanence; it is a reaction against excessive emphasis on the transcendence of God, an opinion which is often held that Judaism is a purely formal religion, in which the warmth of mysticism has no place. Such an opinion, in any case erroneous, is entirely untenable.
if attention be paid to the history of the Kabbalah. For centuries it has coursed through the veins of Judaism in a fiery flood, raising man to God and bringing God to man, cheering him with hopes of a speedy Messiahian advent, and comforting him in times of trouble, care and need. The Kabbalah is the universal religion, reaching a peak of mystery which draws the remote future, with its promise of peace, into the immediate present with its clouds and sorrows. It has filled the lives of the poor and the rich, the learned and the unlearned with the love of God, and with the assurance of His interest in their daily concerns, and has made them feel at every moment that they should and could 'imitate' Him. There is no lack in the Kabbalah of the fantastic, the childish, or the grotesque, or sometimes even the blasphemous, but the proportion of the dross to the gold is insignificant, though not infrequently misrepresented and exaggerated. Nor is it altogether correct to regard the Kabbalah as the antithesis of the ceremonial Law. There have been mystics, notably among the later Russian Hasidim, who laid more stress on study of the Talmud and Codes, but, on the other hand, many have striven to combine mysticism with the invariable observance of the Din. The very author of the Shabath Arakh was a Kabbalist. Every act and every thought of his life has been surrounded with a mystic halo, given a new vigour and meaning, and preceded by a formula of self-consecration. Thus the tendency of Kabbalism, in general, has been largely to strengthen the ceremonial Law, not to destroy it.

From the time of Graetz it has been the fashion to decry Kabbalism and to regard it as a later invention, as something of which Judaism had reason to be ashamed. To remedy this judgment goes back much further; it rests ultimately on the authority of Moses Maimonides, to whom reason was the foundation of Judaism, and the imaginative faculty abhorrent. The weight of his influence was sufficient to prejudice the majority of scholars against the Kabbalah. Further, the Kabbalists claimed extreme antiquity for their doctrines. The Zohar, e.g., was attributed to Simeon bar Jo‘aš, a Galilean Rabbi of the 2nd cent.; it is, in point of fact, a Spanish work, more than eleven hundred years later. In consequence of the critical analysis to which modern historians have subjected the history of Judaism, such traditions as the traditional date of the Zohar, have been exposed, reaction has pushed too far to the other extremes. The recent tendency requires adjustment. The Kabbalah, though later in form than is claimed by its adherents, is far older in material than is allowed by its detractors. It is not entirely a collection of fantasy; it is poetry, spirituality, and idealism as well. Nor has the excess of imagery and anthropomorphism been suffered to spread too far. Simeon bar Jo‘aš, a pillar of mysticism, declared a ban on those who expounded the Zohar as a personification of the Deity which is known among the Kabbalists as the Shekhinah. He preferred to use the word of mouth, so that it is not easy to say exactly what was taught and believed by those who first spread the Kabbalah through Italy into other countries. The doctrines which he taught found ready acceptance, and through him the seed soon bore fruit in Europe. But at this time little was written down. Mysticism was transmitted by word of mouth, so that it is not easy to say exactly what was taught and believed by those who first spread the Kabbalah through Italy into other countries. The alphabet are of frequent occurrence in the Geonic writings, which are probably responsible for the French, German, and Spanish Kabbalah. The German Kabbalah, brought from Italy by the Karolins of Bohemia, has lost much of its originality. In England, the Kabbalists are not easy to study. The greatest of them, Moses de Leon, who died in 1271, his pupil Eleazar of Worms, and Abraham Abulafia, who was a great mystic, have worked miracles by the use of the Divine Name. The doctrines which he taught found ready acceptance, and through him the seed soon bore fruit in Europe. But at this time little was written down. Mysticism was transmitted by word of mouth, so that it is not easy to say exactly what was taught and believed by those who first spread the Kabbalah through Italy into other countries.
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dignitaries. The authenticity of much of his written work is doubted because he wrote down but little, his disciples being the repositories of his teaching. If the Songs of Unity and Song of Glory are, in fact, his composition, his mystic teaching is still obscure. At any rate, whether composed by Judah, by his father Samuel, or by any of his contemporaries, they reflect the current mysticism. In these mystic songs, which may be found in the Sopher Yeira, many Kabbalistic and philosophical ideas occur: they deal, in general, with the divine nature, either from the transcendental or from the immanent side.

- Thou encompass all and fillst all; and since Thou art the All, Thou art in all...
- Colour and shape cannot be applied to Thy Oneness, nor body to the essence of Thy Unity.
- Neither is anything separate from Thee in the midst: nor is the smallest place void of Thee.
- Thou art not in them, nor time, nor space, nor discord, nor any imperfection.

("Hymn for the Third Day")

- We may not class Him with matter or substance, or ascribe to Him accident or attribute.

- Things that are seen or concealed or known are included in the ten categories; there are seven kinds of quantity and six kinds of motion, three kinds of predication, three times, and three places, all contained in the Creator, and we cannot name them exactly, for He created them all together. ("Fifth Day").

- I have not seen Thee, yet I tell Thy praise.
- Not known Thee, yet I image forth Thy ways.
- For by Thy scroll and servants' mystic speech
  Thou didst Thy servant splendidly teach us.
- And from the grasper of Thy work they drew
  Their piety and power, and Thy inner greatness too.
- They told of Thee, but not as Thou must be.
- From since Thy work they tried to body Thee.

("Hymn of Glory")

In addition to other liturgical works, Judah's mysticism was expounded in a commentary to the Pentateuch and in an ethical will, but chiefly in the Sopher Hadasah, a collection of mystical and ethical sentences. Probably Judah had no more than a share in the last-named work. His fame, however, rests not on his personal writings, but on the impetus which he gave to the German Kabbalah. This impetus will best be measured not by his books, but by the number of pupils and associates who carried his ideas and influence far and wide. Of his disciples Eleazar ben Judah ben Kallir, who is said to have written as much as twenty books, was the most distinguished both as a Kabbalistic and as a writer of ethics. Though his title to fame rests chiefly on the Kabbalah, which is devoted to ethics and halakhah, he was also an important Kabbalist. Eleazar was given to asceticism.

- In his cabalistic works he developed and gave a new impetus to the mysticism associated with the letters of the alphabet. The philosophical Cabala of the school of Isaac the Blind is replaced by arithmetical speculations. By the gematria and arithmetical systems of interpretation found in the Talmud, Eleazar invented new combinations by which miracles could be performed. The hebraic anthropomorphism which he had combated in his earlier works ("Iza-Boqar"), "Sea are made without-Tupi") occupied later the foremost place in his cabalistic writings. (T. B. Pesahim, 110b: רפואת פקיעת הים, 'even numbers are to be avoided in drinking').

The Kabbalah of the Arabic-speaking Jews was in the meantime undergoing modification. The Arabic Jews, who were more familiar with Greek philosophy, and their own was thereby affected. The influence of the "Brothers of Purity" in Basra, whose writings were directed to the renewal and survival, was felt in Jewry; notably Baiba ibn Pakuda wrote in a free manner of their movement. In the treatise Men and Animals their philosophy is expounded with special reference to cosmogony, angelology, the soul, the Godhead, and the interrelation of man to God. It was chiefly their theory of emanation (see F. Dietricher, Thier und Mensch vor dem König der Genien, Leipzig, 1851, p. 69, line 1, etc. =

Der Streit zwischen Mensch und Thier, Berlin, 1888, p. 97, foot, etc.; see also p. 169 for the discussion about angels) and of the nine numbers that found favour with and adaptation by the Jewish Kabbalists. Already in the 16th cent. signs begin to appear of an opposition between the rational and mystic. Prayer and the study of the Haikkah tended to become antitheses in Germany, while the German and Spanish Kabbalists differed in many important points. The Spanish school was more purely mystical and visionary, while Germany devoted more thought to speculative Kabbalah and to permutations. The details of the spread of the Kabbalah into Provence are obscure. Isaac the Blind cannot be the founder of the movement here, as was formerly held. In him Kabbalah is already so far developed as to make it certain that he must have had predecessors. The advent of philosophy to Provence produced a mystic reaction, and thus Kabbalah, which had hitherto remained obscure, came forward as a protest against the coldness of rationalism.

A new stage in the growth of the Kabbalah was marked by the appearance of the Zohar (see below), which became the mystical Bible. This pseudographical work probably dates from the 14th century. It paved the way for the last stage of mysticism, which has continued till the present day. This stage is associated with Isaac Luria (1535-72), known as Ari, and Hayyim Vital. They and their followers combined spirituality and permutations. Their piety was of extremely high order, but coupled with it was their use of charms and amulets. In the Orient, Galicia, and Poland their influence is strong; their precepts have sometimes been misunderstood, and in distant hands, have degenerated into superstition. In Russia the Hassidim have incorporated the Kabbalah, laying special emphasis on prayer and mysticism. But the lower elements have not been wanting; hence the Hassidic movement has met with strenuous opposition on the part of the Rabbis.

2. Chief theories and doctrines of Kabbalah.

The complete Kabbalistic system consists of two main subdivisions — theoretical, joyousness, and practical, Ma'asitl. It is impossible to deal exhaustively with the individual points in each branch, and it is difficult to make a rigid line of division between the two; but it is proper to consider briefly the chief ideas and principles.

(a) The use of numbers and letters. —The permutations and combinations of numbers and letters are not entirely mystical and pagan, for Hebrew has no numerical symbols, and the use of the alphabet for numerals goes back to Maccabean times. This practice is, no doubt, responsible for the later gematria or enumeratio, by which the numerical equivalents of letters and words were made a means of interpretation. An interesting example is cited in art. EXPiation and Atonement (Jewish), vol. v. p. 662 § 3. Unrelated numbers are known in the Talmud (T. B. Pesahim, 110b: רפואת פקיעת הים, 'even numbers are to be avoided in drinking'). Owing to the principle of the connection between letters, one letter, or a word, might be replaced by another, or by number. Many examples can be seen in the Ethics of the Fathers (e.g., ch. vi. Taylor, Sayings, p. 78ff. From this personal observation of seeing a connexion between gematria and anthroponymic, one felt that more active employment of numbers might be possible, and that he who held the secret of the mystical chain might force nature and attain fuller power. In earlier times seven, and in later times ten, was regarded as the permanent number. The permutation of letters and numbers is called יִנָּה. As perfected in the Sopher Yeira, which is arranged according to the letters of the alphabet, it is doubt-
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less Pythagorean, but the Jews cannot have borrowed it altogether; the knowledge of the science was ascribed to BezeAle (T. B. Berakhoth 55a).

(b) Classes of angels and demigods.—The belief in the existence of angels and demigods is still commonly held by the Jews, and angels play an important part in Jewish mysticism. The angels are divided into three classes: the Seraphim, the Cherubim, and the Thrones. The Seraphim are the highest order of angels, and are said to be the bearers of the Shekhinah. The Cherubim are the second order of angels, and are said to be the protectors of the Shekhinah. The Thrones are the lowest order of angels, and are said to be the messengers of the Shekhinah.

(c) The term 'Shekhinah.'—The Shekhinah is the feminine form of the word 'Shekhinah,' which means 'manifestation.' It is the personification of the divine presence, and is said to be the embodiment of the divine feminine principle. The Shekhinah is said to be the source of all life and creativity, and is the object of the Jewish mystic's love and devotion.

(d) The doctrine of emanation.—The doctrine of emanation is a central tenet of Jewish mysticism. It states that the universe was created by God through the process of emanation, in which the divine spark was successively subdivided into various forms and qualities. The doctrine of emanation is also known as the doctrine of the Worlds of Being, or the Worlds of Creation.

(e) The doctrine of the sefirot.—The sefirot are the ten Sephirot, which are the primary emanations of the divine essence. Each sefira represents a stage in the process of emanation, and is associated with a specific quality or characteristic. The sefirot are: the S'phirah, the S'phirah, the S'phirah, the S'phirah, the S'phirah, the S'phirah, the S'phirah, the S'phirah, the S'phirah, and the S'phirah.

(f) The doctrine of the Chariot of the Ark.—The Chariot of the Ark is a symbol used in Jewish mysticism to represent the process of emanation. It is said to be a vehicle in which the divine spark is transported from one sefira to another. The Chariot of the Ark is also known as the Ark of the Covenant, and is said to be the dwelling place of the Shekhinah.

(g) The doctrine of the Sefirot in the Kabbalah.—The Kabbalah is a system of Jewish mysticism that developed in the 13th century. It is based on the doctrine of the sefirot, and seeks to explain the nature of the universe and the role of the Shekhinah in its creation. The Kabbalah is a complex system, and its teachings have been the subject of much debate and controversy over the centuries.
duct is Reason (775), but this is not a separate emanation. These constitute the first group. The second consists of (1) Mercy (777), a father, and (2) Justice (777), a mother, which produce (3) Beauty (764); Mercy and Justice are both qualities of the Divine nature which check one another and produce a harmonious mean. The third group consists of (7) Victory (791); (8) Glory (787); and (9) Foundation (775). Victory, Glory, and Foundation are regarded as aspects that produce a direct connection with the Divine Foundation as their offspring. The last of the sférot, (10) Sovereignty (7757), has no direct connection with the rest.

The sférot are often known by different names—e.g., נְפֶס (nephēs) and נְפֶסִים (nephēsim), or נְפֶסִים. Abelson’s chapter on the sférot (Jewish Mysticism, p. 136) should be carefully studied. According to some Kabbalists, the sférot bear a direct relation to the corporeal members of Adam Kadmon.

(1) Adam Kadmon, or primal man.—This idea, originally held by the Gnostics, of an incorruptible primitive man, fashioned in the image of God, is also known to Philo and the Midrash. This being is sexless or bisexual (see Genesis Rabbi, 8976, Theodore, p. 55). St. Paul’s idea of a heavenly and an earthly Adam (1 Co 15a23a43) is, no doubt, based on the Midrash. The various portions of the body of Adam Kadmon are correlated to the sférot (see JE 161 and xi. 150). From the heavenly man the earthly Adam is derived. The Adam Kadmon is held by some to occupy a position between the Ein Sof and the sférot.

(2) Metempsychosis (767a) was rejected, without compromising severity by Jewish philosophers, but was adopted by the Kabbalists. It is taught in the Zohar (ii. 99a, tr. Jean de Pamiy, Paris, 1908, iii. 400), and was regarded as an answer of the prophets to the wicked. Luria believed that all souls were created at the same time as the different parts of Adam’s body; hence the quality of the souls varies according to the particular member of Adam’s body to which they are related. His successors taught that souls could wander on earth until fulfilled duties neglected by a man in his lifetime or to assist others to perform their duties. The term 727 was used to express the act of junction of a soul with a living man.

(3) Evil.—According to the Kabbalists, evil is essentially finite, as opposed to the divine good. It is the left side in the saxyx. Evil is an appearance, not a substance, and man’s sin consists of his separation from the Divine Being. The words ‘fall’ or ‘fall’, gave man the potentiality of sin, which he previously lacked. By penitence and asceticism man can join the ‘Riders of the Merkbabha’ and attain to life. The idea of the microcosm, or a comparison of man’s frame and members with the parts of the universe (macrocosm) and nature, came from the Greek philosophers to the Jews through Neo-Platonism. It was much favoured by the Kabbalists, and is mentioned in the Zohar. Of the many Kabbalistic devices and practices, notice must here be limited to three.

(a) Amulets (ניָפֶס, also נְפָה or נְפָה), private charms and prophylactic devices, were much in vogue. In spite of the fact that Maimonide and other teachers emphatically opposed the use of amulets and declared their ineffectiveness, the Kabbalists were not strong enough to resist the attractions of this superstition. Amulets were regarded as potent charms to ward off sickness and evil, to help women in labour, and generally to assist the wearer to attain his desire. The charms were usually written on parchment or engraved on a precious metal. The so-called shield of David, the opacic (הָלָעַם), is an example of this popular formula. The word 77 was usually figured, in addition to permutations of the Divine Name or the sférot. Very frequently the prayer attributed to Nebunya haq-Kâma (1st cent. A.D.) was used, or its initials (for the prayer cf. Singer, p. 273, last par.). The initials of the first line (לְאֵל) and of the second line (which form the words לְאֵל, ‘Rend Satan’) occur in most amulets. Reference should be made to M. Gaster, Sword of Moses, London, 1899, where many amulets are cited and explained; a Moorish charm against scorpions is reproduced in J.E. ix. 24; cf. also art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Jewish). It must be remembered that in many cases people who used amulets did so from a spiritual and not material motives. The constant recitation of Scriptural verses and prayers was intended to relieve the mind and calm the soul, not directly to act on the body; hence not all amulets were put to superstitious use.

(b) The casting of lots, an old Biblical and Talmudic custom, for which many motives may be traced, was also adopted by the Kabbalists and practiced in various forms, chad yace, as a means of divination. Methods similar to the sortes vergitanæ were in vogue.

(c) Change of name (767a) was a Kabbalistic device, no doubt based on the idea of penitence and regeneration, employed in case of serious illness as a life-saving expedient (see M. Gaster, Book of Prayer, i. 185). Frequently the new name chosen was בורים, ‘Life’, or some variant, such as Via.

The chief Kabbalists and their works.—The following list are by no means exhaustive, but contain the principal exponents of Kabbalistic doctrines and the most important books on which the Kabbalah is based, and are intended to serve the reader as a guide for further investigation.

(1) Kabbalists.—(1) Aaron b. Samuel († after 807) is important as having carried the Kabbalah from Europe to Babylon. He lived in Italy. Until modern times he was regarded as a mythical personage, but his historical identity has been proved by Neubauer (see above, p. 625).

(2) Solomon ibn Gabirol (1021–58), a Spanish philosopher, though scarcely to be included among the rabbins of the Kabbalists, must be noted in relation to the Kabbalah, because he introduced Neo-Platonism among the Jews. He is, therefore, responsible for the theory of emanations. See, further, art. IBN GABIROL.

(3) Judah b. Samuel of Regensburg (the Pious, 1277 + 1297) was the founder of a school of noted Kabbalists (see above, p. 623).

(4) Elazar b. Judah b. Kalonymus of Worms (1176–1228) was a pupil of Judah the Pious. He was not only a Kabbalist, but a famous Jewish scholar and a scientist. His most important work is the Boukab. In his Shalvi ha-Asan Sidah he opposed anthropomorphism.

(5) Moses b. Nahman (Nahmamides, Ramah), the famous Spanish Rabbi (1194–1270), though hardly a Kabbalist, since he repudiated several fundamental doctrines (e.g., he held a creatio ex nihilo), supported Kabbalistic teaching in many ways. In his Pentateuchal commentary the influence of the Kabbalah is marked.

(6) Abraham b. Samuel Abravanel (born 1240 at Saragossa, † after 1291) was one of the founders of Spanish Kabbalah. He was an ascetic and practised all kinds of permutations, but did not attempt to work miracles. He travelled in Palestine and made a special journey to Rome in order to convert the pope (1286). In Saragossa he gave himself out to be the Messiah, but was discredited by Solomon b. Adret. He was a voluminous writer, but was responsible for much unworthy juggling and mysticism. Perhaps the most important feature of his teaching was his desire to convert Islam and Christianity to his views. In this desire to unite the three faiths he was, in a way, the forerunner of Elie
Benamozegh, Rabbi of Leghorn, whose life work was directed to the same end (see E. Benamozegh, Israel et l’humanité).

(7) Joseph b. Abraham Jigáthála (1248-1300), a Spanish Kabbalist, was, unlike his teacher Abraham Abuná da Israel, a mystic who was not a rabbi. He tried to reconcile philosophy and Kabbalah. He belonged to the mystic school, but made a large use of gematria. His works were many, chief among them being *Gemilath Elohim* and *Sefer Shabbath*. His systematization on the Haggadá for Passover, *Mizne Génesis*, was very popular.

(8) Isaac ben Latif, a Spanish physician (†1290), attempted to combine philosophy and Kabbalah. Much Kabbalistic terminology is due to his efforts to secure precision in reasoning and the exact use of names and qualities.

(9) Azriel b. Menahém was also known as Ezra; in fact, the two names gave rise to the belief that Ezra and Azriel were brothers. Azriel, the author of several works (born in Gerona in 1160, † in 1235), was a pupil of Isaac the Blind. He taught the theory of negative attributes, emanations, and the sefráth, on which he wrote a commentary, and denied the creatio ex nihilo. He was greatly influenced by Gaon of Vilna.

(10) The *Sefer Hasidim* of Posquières was regarded as the link between the mysticism of the Geonim and the Kabbalists; but, as he is said to have lived in the 13th cent., this is unlikely. Yet the Kabbalists held him in high esteem. Parts of the *Bahir* may be his work.

(11) Buhíy b. Ascher of Saragossa (†1340) must be noted as one of the first Bible exegetes to employ Kabbalistic methods for Bible interpretation. He himself a literalist and rationalist, he used Kabbalá with care and judgment. Among his other works, his *Discourse* (*Kad ha-kDamah*) is the most important.

(12) Isaac b. Moses Arana (1420-94) was more of a philosopher than a Kabbalist. He belongs to the Spanish school, but can scarcely be said to have added much to Kabbalah.

(13) Abraham b. Benjamin Reconati was a prominent Italian Kabbalist of the late 13th century. He is noteworthy for his mystical commentaries on the Bible, one of which was translated into Latin by Pios di Mirandola.

(14) *Zohar* (Ari) (1534-72) was the most important of the later Kabbalists. He lived in Palestine, and to him the whole of the modern Kabbalah may be traced. He was active for many years, and had extensive visions. His chief disciples were Cordovero, el-Kabiz, Joseph b. Qara, Haggaz, and Vital. The system and practices which he founded are still operative in the East. Most of his teachings were written down by his disciples, chiefly by Háyjim Vital. His system is far too wide to be summarized, but he is most important for (1) his teaching of metempsychosis or ‘impregnation’, and (2) his introduction of the *Zohar* into daily life. Every Oriental Prayer Book bears traces of his ordinances and recommendations. He even promulgated a new code, *Shulhan Arukh Shel Ar*, which his followers adopted and diffused. So great was the esteem in which he was held that his followers almost ‘canonized’ him. His teaching called forth opposition from the anti-Kabbalists, but his piety and holiness were his most effective answer to attack.

(15) Háyjim Vital (1543-1609) was a pupil of *Zohar*, to whose position he succeeded. He was a visionary and an alchemist; he also believed himself to be the Messiah for some time. Vital is important because he edited most of *Zohar*’s works, which the latter rarely committed to writing; but he also wrote works of his own.

(16) Israel Sarug, a pupil of *Zohar*, is noteworthy for having spread in Italy and Germany the new Kabbalistic teaching of Luria. He had great influence with Menahem Azarya of Fano, who became an adherent of Luria’s school and spent large sums on buying his MSS.

(17) Leo of Modena (1711-1848; see art. JUDAISM, p. 606), whose curious anomalies make him one of the most perplexing characters in Jewish history, attacked the *Kabbalah* in his *Art Niháh*. He shows that, as a system it is unsound and that the *Zohar* is a late work. For this he is important in the history of Kabbalah.

(18) Háyjim Joseph David Azulai (1724-1807), author of the *Shass ha-yag* (*Chasháh*), a most prolific and versatile writer, carried the Kabbalah of Luria to extremes. His credulity and superstition are all the more remarkable when his scholarship is examined. His works are full of numerical permutations, etc.

(19) Israel b. Elizeir, Be’al Shem Tob (Besht) (1700-1760), was the founder of the Hasidim, a sect which marks the latest stage in the history of Kabbalah and which developed from the school of Luria, with which it was finally in opposition. Besht, though poor, exerted unbounded influence in Poland and Galicia. Little is known of his life, and his teaching is not recorded for he wrote no books. Besht was a pantheist and rejected emanation. Further, he preached joy and ecstasy as opposed to asceticism. He raised the position of the Sabæik to a very high level of authority. The breach between Talmudism and Hasidism did not take place till after his death.

(20) Baer (Dob) of Mesezít (1710-72) was one of the earliest and most important teachers of the Hasidic movement in Poland. He was an ascetic and an enthusiastic adherent of the school of Luria until he became acquainted with Besht, whom he succeeded as leader of the Hasidim. Baer fought their battle against the Talmudists until his death. Like his master, he left no written works.

(21) Works.—(1) The *Sifer Yévid* is the oldest Kabbalistic book. It was attributed to Abraham and also to *Aqiba*, but belongs in all probability to the 6th century. It deals with permutations of numbers and letters, and is the first source of the emuná and effráth. The *Yévid* is so widely read that *Saadya* wrote a commentary to it. It is the basis of the *Zohar*, and has been called the most important of all works for the study of the Kabbalah (see Abelson, *Jewish Mysticism*, p. 98, etc.).

(22) *Sifer ha-bah-Bahir*, a mystic commentary on the first chapters of Genesis, was originally attributed to Nchunya ha-k-Kanna. It is now regarded as the work of Isaac the Blind, with later additions. The *Bahir* believes in the eternity of matter; it knows the effráth. It is important as a precursor and type of the *Zohar*.

(3) The *Hikkaháth* (or *Halls*), Greater and Less, are Geonic mystical writings, bearing relation to the book of Enoch. They are attributed to Solomon b. Elisha. The works deal with the Merkáth, and, finally, with the seven heavenly *Halls*. The *Hikkaháth* influenced the liturgy, chiefly the Kudshaháthah.

(4) The *Zohar* is the most important of all Kabbalistic works. It was circulated by Moses b. Shem Tob de Leon and attributed by him to Simeon b. Joha; the forgery was discovered, after his death. Many Kabbalists still continue to believe in its authenticity, which was finally disproved by Elijah DeMédico and also by Leo of Modena. It is now agreed that the *Zohar* was not composed by one person. Some of the sections written in Aramaic contains various appendices. In form it is a mystic and allegorical commentary on the Pentateuch. No book, except the Bible and the Talmud, has
been so widely read by Jews. It is the centre of the Kabbala, and innumerable works and commentaries have been written round it. Christians as well as Jews have studied it (see act. Zohar).

The Kabbala was born as the work of Rabbi Isaac Luria. It describes the celestial organization, and gives directions for the preparation of amulets.

(6)  Sh'ar 'Rō'ah deals with the dimensions and numbers of the Deity. It is usually included in Rashi. The book was known to Solomon ben Jorobam (b. 886). Gaster’s *Monatschrift*, xxvii. (1893), 224, shows that it goes back as far as the last pre-Christian century.

(7)  *Gittallos* is the name given to lists of transmutations of souls. Many of these works were composed by the school of Luria.


**THE EPISTLE.**—The text, with commentary, of Densu's translation, has recently been published by M. Grossberg, London, 1898; parts are translated by W. W. Westcott, do. 1895. The edition of the French translation arranged by Jean de Bury has been published by *Joseph de L'Étranger*. *Le Livre des Mystères* (Paris, 1904). For other French versions, see L. MacGregor Mathers, *The Kabbala Unveiled*, London, 1895; contains parts of the Zohar translated into French. Some of these works must be used with caution;


**EMARATROU AND SEPTINOTH.**—M. Ehrenpreis, *Die Entwicklung der Konstantinopeler in der Kabbala des Mittelalters*, Frankfurt, 1896. Many references to the *Ephod* will be found in the *Sephardic Moshe Maimonides for Israel* by Rabinovitch; this work may be conveniently seen, with its references, in M. Gaster, *Book of Proverbs*, London, 1930, vol. 2; L. Tittel, *Die alexandrinische Lehre von den Mittelwesen*, *Judaica* (Cohen's Periodical), Berlin, 1912, pp. 177–182.

**PLATONIC.**—F. Dieterich, *A. Plato's Cosmos Briefly Explained* (p. 824). In connection with this reference, see namely to Bahya b. Paquita, whose Guide has been edited by A. S. Yahuda, London, 1897; cf. on the *Platonism of Christianity* by C. Rabin, Cambridge, 1938.


**H. LOEWE.**

**KABEIROI.**—The elucidation of the Kabeiroi-mysteries is one of the most perplexing problems of old Mediterranean religion; nor can it yet be said that modern problems have thrown full light upon them. The literary record is partly Greek and partly Latin; but the Latin is derived mainly from Greek sources. It does not begin before the 5th cent. B.C., by which time the mysteries had long been closed from their Samothracian centres to other centres, such as Lemnos and Thessaly. It cannot therefore speak with authority concerning the earliest period. Even the 5th cent. writers to whom we are indebted for the first statements have been silent and the later writers contradict each other at several important points. The record is sufficient, however, to establish two facts: that the original home of the mysteries was Samothrace, and that they were the invention of a pseudo-Mycenean people. As regards the latter point, the statement of Diodorus Siculus is of interest and importance that the aboriginal natives of Samothrace possessed a distinct dialect of their own, much of which is still preserved down to the present day in their religious rites. He is not likely to be speaking at random here. The word ‗Kabeiroi‘ itself has never been satisfactorily explained on any theory of Hel lenistic derivation; the personal names of the Samothracian divinities that have been recorded by Mnasessa of Patrae—Axieros, Axiokeros, and Axiokeros—though the forms have been semi-Hellenized, betray an alien speech.

Near every writer starts with the facts, and constructs on it a theory of the origin of the cult, that the word Kabeiroi must be equated with the Semite *غَرَبَ،* meaning ‗the mighty ones‘; the almost exact equivalence of the two sounds hardly have been accidental, especially in view of the term *θεός* μεγάλοι, the constant Hellenic synonym of the Kabeiroi. It appears also that every one who accepts this origin of the word has regarded as inevitable the corollary that the Kabeiroi-mysteries were an importation from Phoenicia, the nearest or most likely centre whence Semitic influence could reach Samothrace. Hence certain scholars have been led to interpret them in the light of the knowledge that can be gathered of Phoenician and Semite religion. But upon reflection the necessity of this corollary is by no means evident. We may indeed have found an aboriginal mystery-cult in this remote and inaccessible island; they may have attached their own descriptive title *Kabeiroi,* the mighty ones, to the divinities that painted their souls, because this corresponded to some local divine appellative that the later Greeks translated by the phrase of *μέγας θεός*; and they may have devoted the island, because this corresponded to some local divine personality that points clearly to Phoenicia. Finally, there is no evidence yet forthcoming that the Phoenicians ever attached the appellative Kabeiroi to any group of their own divinities. The legends, beginning in the 5th cent., that associate the Phoenicians with the Pygmae may be of some value for religious history, but contribute nothing to the question of ultimate origin. Certain general considerations and certain coincidences seem rather to point to Thrac as their source. The Thracian coast lies nearest to Samothrace, and the aboriginal settlers in the island could most easily have come over thence. We have fair evidence that the ministers of the mysteries were called *Seari* or *Sairi,* and Strabo mentions a Thracian tribe of that name, while the name *Son* is applied by *Lysophron* to some settlement of the Korybantes located by the scheliana in Thrace. Also, when we look critically at the evidence we may discern certain features in the Samothracian religion which would accord with the theory of its Thracian origin. We must begin with certain monumental evidence which is earlier than the literary. The 1. v. 2. See, e.g., D. M. Robinson’s attempts in *Am. Jottings*, xvii. (1925) 420. 3 *Phii* iii. 194, frag. 27. 4 See esp. E. Friedrich, *Kabern und Kusanekrisyn,* Leipzig, 1894, 51. 5 See Strabo, p. 472. 6 See _Archiv._, ii. 325; Strabo, p. 407; Festus, p. 274; *Lex. Graec._, 76, schol. 66 (the sacred title *Luo* might be connected with the Phrygo-Thracian *Kudos*).
explorations conducted in the island by A. Conze 1 in 1873 revealed the foundations of the original shrine that was constructed in the 6th cent. B.C.; and to a central temple precinct being excavated, in which were found offerings of every kind. We discern the architectural provision for a chthonian cult; and we discover something more definite and certain than all that the later literature can teach us concerning the nature of the god worshipped, even if, by the powers of the under world, having fructifying functions, no doubt, and probably associated with the ideas of birth and death and with the world of ghosts. For this reason alone the cult would be fenced with a mystery, as chthonian ritual would be too dangerous to be openly approached. 2 It is to be surmised that these Samothracian powers might originally have been spirits rather than deities and individualized 3 and that something of the vagueness and indefiniteness of the ghost-world might attach to them; this would account for the vague collective name applied to them. There is evidence that the hereditary priests (or the bewildered mixed of the later Greeks concerning the equation of them to their own clear-shaped divinities.

Other archaeological evidence of importance is found in a work undertaken by Dörpfeld and the German School of Archaeology on the site of the Kabeirion near Thebes in 1887. The architectural remnants pointed to three periods of the shrine, the earlier building being assigned by Dörpfeld to the 6th or 5th cent. B.C., which would accord with a record in Pausanias 4 that the shrine was violated in a time of the Persian invasion; and some of the objects of religious art found within or near the precincts, bronze-dedications and fragments of vases, are dated to the earlier half of the 5th century. 5 We must suppose, then, a migration of the cult from Samotrace to Lemnos into Boeotia in the 6th cent. B.C. or even earlier; 6 and we cannot assign its introduction to any known fact in the history of colonization and tribal movements. What concerns us chiefly is the question: how much light is thrown on the original Samothracian religion by the discoveries on the site of the Thelan Kabeirion. In one point at least the ritual of the transplanted cult remained true to the tradition of its home; behind the collar which was dug a double barrow, where the offerings were thrown, the chthonian ritual proper to the powers of the lower world. 7 As regards the personality and form of the divinities, we must turn to the inscriptions and the works of art. Among the latter the most important and striking is a broken vase of the 4th cent., which appears with a group of five inscribed figures 8 on the right rein a stately bearded person, half clad in sporting and holding out a cup, his name "Kabios" appearing above his head; in front of him stands a boy inscribed "Hian," turning his back on the elder god and drawing wine from a sparagel before him, also fronting to the left, is an ugly little dwarf figure clasping his hands below his chin, and preserved only as far as the middle of the body; he bears the singular name of "Parskasos," and good food for the earliest generation of men on the earth; he is gazing in excited wonder on a group that forms the left extremity of the scene, a male and female personage—only the upper parts of the body are deep sacrificed; on the other hand, she designated as Kabios, he by the enigmatical name Mires. All these are ideal beings of the Kabiores-circle, not represented, however, directly as such; in fact, the curtain, she assimilates to Dyonisos; this would be natural at Thebes, and all the more inevitable if there was lingering a tradition of a Thracian origin of the Samothracian mysteries. The Ion is represented by the boy-minister, the young god whom Minasian calls Kaiseros, and who was an important and essential figure in the cult, though here he appears in a trivial character; for the numerous inscriptions that have been found, in which the individual worshippers commemorated their association with the shrine, contain the mention of no other divinities save those of Kabiores and the "Son." 9 This evidence only can be interpreted to be part of the Samothracian tradition, which we shall find preserved also in the later literary records. But the vase-painter has added two other figures that have the air of divine divinities, "Krateria" and "Mitos." Naming the goddess the 'mighty one,' he probably intended her for the female counterpart of Kabios, the earth-goddess who in Greek hands was individualized and identified as Demeter-Kore; her figure has something in it of the Kore-type, and her name Krateria reminds us of Krateria, the 'almighty one,' a sobriquet of Kore at Selinus. As to "Mitos," the only clue to his name and significance has been found in a passage of Clement of Alexandria, who en good authority mentions mitos as a hieratic word of the Orphic sacred books, meaning 'seed.' 10 We are tempted, then, to interpret this mysterious figure as the divine nourisher of all life, possibly the procreative god of the earth; but we should be embarrassed in fixing his true relation to the other elder god Kabiores. As the vase-painter appears to have been an initiated priest, who offerings were thrown in the worship of Orphic ore, he is not a trusty exponent of genuine Samothracian religion. But his quaint little figure, "Pantokos," may have been suggested by real Kabiores legend, since, according to a passage in Hippolytus, 11 part of which may be derived from a lost ode of Pindar, it was claimed in both Samotrace and Lemnos that Kabiores was 'the first man Adam'; it is therefore not unlikely that the mystery teaching included some dogma concerning the origin of man.

Turning now to the literary record, we find it confusing and often contradictory, as we should expect from writers trying to define and describe what was indefinite and alien. For certain historic reasons, especially owing to the relations of Athens to Lemnos, the Lennian Kabeirioi-rites appear earlier in literature than the Samothracian, having attracted the attention of Eusebius, Plutarch, and Aelian. As the chief god of Lemnos was Hephaistos, we find, as we should expect, that the two last-mentioned authors mention Hephaistos in their genealogical account of the

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1 Archäologische Untersuchungen auf Samothrake, I, 20, II, 21.
2 "It has been pointed out that Greek mysteries generally are concerned with the 6th cent. B.C. but see: IG VII 3, 725.
3 "Athens, Myth. xiii. [1877] 270.
4 "It is not his personal account of the Kabiores, carries it back to pre-historic days (IX xxv. 7)."
5 "Athens, Myth. xiii. [1877] 90.
6 "It is in his personal account of the Kabiores, carries it back to pre-historic days (IX xxv. 7)."
7 Dittichenberg, Sylloge, II, Leipzig, 1801, p. 746 (cf. IG VII 3, 725).
9 "Philosoph. v. 7, 8 (PF xvi. 2137, 2143)."
Kabeiroi, and their authority may have influenced Herodotus's view and some later genealogical fictions. Yet, outside Lemnos, the Hellenic smith-god stood alone, though in the later art the Kabeiroi may have borrowed their hammer from him. We cannot, therefore, deduce anything concerning their aboriginal nature from this fact, though Lemnos, the Land of the Kabeiroi, may have been a Leumalian god. From the literary tangent one fact of some importance for our view of these divine personalities emerges: the more trustworthy records present the Kabeiroi not as a vague plurality like the Korybantes, but either as a triad or as a duality. The latter view of them is in accord with the evidence of the inscriptions from the Theban Kabeiroi, with the later identification of them with the Dioskouroi, and with the statement of Hippolytus — mainly confirmed by Varro — concerning the two ithyphallic statues that stood in the Samothracian shrine uplifting their hands towards heaven; and the scholiast on Apollonius Rhodius, who summarizes Hellenistic learning on the subject, mentions a current view that the Kabeiroi were originally a group of two — an elder and a younger god whom the learned Hellenist mistook for Apollo and Artemis. But the confusion indicated in this aspect of them is original; it could not have been a later Hellenic fiction, for it clashed with the prevalent craving to identify them with the deities of the old religion. The names, in any case, had been divinized, so it is likely that they were called gods, at least in embryo, already there in the island mystery-cult when they came to know it. We cannot lightly reject the statement of Mnaseas of Patrai (or Patara), an antiquarian of the latter part of the 5th century B.C. merely because this writer appears to have been usually reckless and futile; for, maintaining that the Kabeiroi were a triad, he actually gives us their names, as above mentioned — Aixeros, Aixokeros, and Aixokera — the last being evidently feminine, the other two being appellatives of the elder and younger gods. He can hardly have known where he got for forging this statement, nor is it likely that he would have forged so well. These names ring genuine, belonging not to Hellenic speech but to some language akin to it, such as Thracian. Another Samothracian cult-name, applied to Aixeros or Aixokeros to the young god of the trio, was Κάημιθος or Κήμαθος, meaning apparently ‘the minister’; and this name alone is sufficient to explain how the story of the wandering Kadmos and Harmonia came to be engrafted on the hieratic legend of the island.

But, if the existence of the female earth-spirit, conceived as earth-mother or earth-bride, within the original Samothracian trio can be accepted proved, she would seem to have been subordinate to the male principle of divinity. The later history not the least prepared to foment toward the Phyrigian Rhea-Cybele or the Hellenic Demeter a prominent place in the mysteries; but there is no sign that these alien goddesses were able to unseat the old ‘mighty ones’ who were predominantly male, and who were therefore capable, on this ground at least, of being fused with the Dioskouroi. This comparative subordination of the female power is of importance for our judgment concerning the ethnic origins of the religion. It makes against any theory that would regard this religion as a survival of Aegean, or derived from pre-Aryan Phrygia or Crete.

The history of the mysteries is part of the secular history of the Mediterranean. We do not know at what early period they had spread oftshoots of themselves in Lemnos, Imброс, and the Troas. Towards the close of the maritime empire of Athens, it was becoming not unusual for Athenians to be initiated. Macedon, perhaps owing to its enthusiasm for Dionysiac worship, was deeply interested in them; and the establishment of Macedonian supremacy gave them a leading position in the Mediterranean. Their connexion with the Troads brought them into relation with the Korybantes and the Phrygian mother at least as early as the 5th century B.C., and later, evoked the interest and devotion of Rome; the learning of Pergamos, Rome’s ally and front of old a Kabeiroi region, may have been the cradle of inspiration that the Roman Femates were deities taken originally from Samothrace to Troy by Dardanos and from Troy to Rome. With such patronage the mysteries were still not much widespread, but they gained throughout the latter days of paganism, and in the 4th century A.D. Libanius refers to them as still existing. In the course of so long a period, how much they absorbed of the religious ideas and formation of ritual and what contamination of divine legend they experienced, we cannot determine with detailed precision. At the time of their chief expansion, we may be sure that they borrowed much in the way of organization and even of doctrine from the greater mysteries of Eleusis; and it was probably due to Eleusinian influences that the female divinity of the Kabeiroi-group was frequently interpreted as Demeter, who was specially termed Kabeira in Boeotia.

Less natural and appropriate was the Hellenization of the two main Kabeiroi as the Dioskouroi, an interpretation which ignored the important difference of age between the elder and the younger Samothracian god, and in no way harmonized with their aboriginal ethos. The motive force for this transformation was probably the coincidence that the Hellenic Dioskouroi were also called Zorigers in their own right, and from the fact that the ancient visitors to Samothrace, who would be often thankful enough to effect a safe landing on that harbourless island, had come to regard the Kabeiroi no longer as ephorous deities of vegetation, but preeminently as savours from the perils of sea; and this was exactly the function of the Dioskouroi. The ‘Samothracian savours’ was a name of divine power for the Aegean mariner; but the later writers of the Roman learned world tended to identify the Kabeiroi-trinity with Jupiter, Minerva, and Mercury; and, in accord with a later trend of philosophic-religious expressions, to interpret the chief among them as Caelum and Terra, ‘Heaven’ and ‘Earth.’

1 Strabo, p. 473.
2 Aristoph, Pax, 273.
3 E.g., Theokritos, frag. 6.
4 Paus, v. 4, 6, 43; Harm. of Apollonius, Kabeiroi λογισμον Εσφαλμησις; of Aristides, p. 709 (Diodor).
5 Paus, x. 5, 2.
6 Paus, xii. 3, 8.
7 The earliest evidence is the coin-types of Bosphoros and Syros.
8 We find a name Σαμοθρακικος Ευρωπιτας in Rhodes (Ath. Mitt., xviii. [1899] 590).
9 Serv. ad Verg., Aen. iii. 304.
10 I. 11. 12.
The indefiniteness of the Kaberei-trinity opened the way to this confusion in the interpretation and especially to the caprices of the later fashion of the *Theopaisia*.

It remains to be seen what we can gather concerning the purport and ritual of the mysteries. To commence with, the first inscriptions and the architectural remains in Samothrace and the vicinity of Thebes supplement the meager literary evidence. The sacrifice must have been an essential, if not the central, part of the ritual. And, as has already been pointed out, the sacrifice was cithonian; the victim's head may have been held over the pit and its blood shed into it where the powers of the earth would receive it; or the animal may have been thrown alive into the pit; both these forms of service being Hellenic and not specially Kaberiioi. As regards the animal chosen, we find on a vase-fragment from the Theban Kabereioi a bull standing near the redlining Kaberiioi with worshippers approaching; but this animal might have been suggested by the fusion of Kaberiioi with the Theban Dionysios to whom it properly belongs. In the great mysteries of Aiolis, consecrated to Demeter and Kore, where the Kaberiioi under the name of μυραδος διος had gained a footing, young oxen were offered to the latter. Finally, a ram-sacrifice of a peculiar and mysterious kind may have been held, as a way to the Samothracian tradition. But we do not know that the idea of the god's incarnation in the victim, which might transform the sacrificial meal into a sacramental communion, was really present in the Samothracian ritual. Nor can we discover there any clear indication of that other idea, sometimes linked with the sacramental and so momentous in the history of the Mediterranean zone, of the periodic death and resurrection of the deity.

Lenormant has indeed drawn this conclusion from certain late and doubtful records and still more doubtful monuments. Clement of Alexandria narrates the legend of the murder of one of the Korybantes by his brethren, and seems to assert that this story was transferred to the Kaberiioi, which is not improbable in view of the general confusion in later literatures between Kaberiioi, Korybantes, and Korethai (see art. Kourothai and Korybantes); but Clement does not clearly state that it ever entered as a motive into the sacred mysteries of the Kaberiioi. The former authority is Firmicus Maternus, who also narrates the murder of Korybas, and then adds: 'This is the Kaberiioi to whom the men of Thessalonike used to offer prayers with blood-stained hands.' If there is anything real behind this, we may surmise that the worship of Kaberiioi, which we know was prevalent in this Macedonian State, had attracted to itself the actual legend of the murdered and dismembered Dionysos, which was rife in those regions. It would be hazardous to assert that this was an original Kaberiioi myth; the old Samothracian religion, being less personal and anthropomorphic than the Hellenic, may not have evolved any mythology of its own.

But the sacramental idea might have been expressed in the Samothracian ritual in other forms than communion with the blood of the divinity. In the early Christian literature the expression of the καραον—-the cereal drink sanctified by the goddess herself and offered by the priest to each of the μυρας—may be called a sacrament; and the Eleusinion service must have influenced the later Samothracian at many points. A similar action may have been performed in Bucharest referring to the Kaberiioi-mysteries, if we accept an attractive restoration, may indicate the mystic ritual of the administration of holy scriptures and the architecture of the temple of the great gods and were called Kaberiioi; for this would explain the inconsequent opinion that prevailed in some learned circles of later antiquity that the Kaberiioi, although the name obviously designated high gods, were only μυρας, the ministers of these, like the Korybantes or the Kourothai. One of the most important functions of the priest was that of the custodians of the cisternums, so as to decide if they were ceremonially 'pure' and therefore suitable for admission. In the ancient ritual code the gravest impurity was bloodshed; and we hear of a Kaberiioi official called κυρη or κυρος, whose function was the purification of hemicides. A text of Livy reveals to us a temple-council or synod, in which the chief magistrate was called κυρηδωρς, who tried cases of homicide to decide whether they had to be held as the temple to offer them asylum; for the rights of asylum were rigidly respected in Samothrace and might be abused. The powers of the lower world, to whom the μυρας were consecrated by wearing a purple band round their waists—perple being a 'cithonian' colour—were specially sensitive about bloodshed.

A special form of purification, unrecorded elsewhere in the ancient Mediterranean world but in vogue in Samothrace, is the confessional: and the record that attests it contains also the first reproduction of it by the spirit of Protestantism: the haughty Lysander refused to confess to mortal man, when the priest of the Kaberiioi asked him what was the greatest sin that he had committed.

As regards the actual διαφημα, or sacred action whereby the initiation was consummated, we have less evidence about the Samothracian than we have concerning the Eleusinion mysteries. There was a distinction here, as at Eleusis, between the cisternums and the consecrated pool being called μυρα διαφημα, as possessing a peculiar piety, or, as at Eleusis, ενάσπις, and this term implies that the central act of the mystery was the revelation of certain sacred things or shows to their eyes. The show might have included a solemn dance; for we have a literary reference to the religious dancing of the 'pious Samothracians,' and a relief found by Conze near the sanctuary showed a dance of nymphs. The dancing may have been dramatic or mimetic; if so, it is useless to try to guess at its purport; we have no records that the most credulous could believe, nor can we point to any hieratic legend that is genuinely Samothracian; we know far less about Samothrace, which was perhaps never wholly Hellenized, than about Eleusis, and it is merely futile to recount the various legends, Cretean, Thrygian, Tholian, that the initiates had in those regions.

1 Athen. Mixth. xiii. (1921) 421.
2 G S III. 356, ref. 346.
3 The evidence consists of certain monuments and inscriptions in which the religious interpretation is doubtful (e. g. Roschowehl, Jbchb. des arch. Inst. xxvii. [1915] 337) and a Pergamene inscription mentioning the Korybantes, which has no connexion with the initiation of the σφυρα in the mysteries of the mystai in Taunus by Kretzschmar earlier in the inscription Athen. Mixth. xxiv. (1904) 152.
4 Athen. Mixth. xiii. (1921) 771.
5 Protev. II. (PG viii. 81).
6 De Error. 11.
7 Athen. Mixth. xiii. (1921) 421.
8 Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 117.
9 J. f. Arch. ii. 92.
10 Korn, in Athen. Mixth. xvii. (1921) 363-365; Conze, Unter- sammelung, Ep. lxxix. 137.
11 Athen. Mixth. xiii. (1921) 157.
12 Op. cit. xii. 1, 2.
world tried to implant on this mysterious island. On discovering some passing attention. The scholiast on Euripides, who quoted from Euphoros, after giving the useless story that Kadmos carried off Harmonia from Samothen, adds words of greater importance: 'and even now in their foreign quarters, in Samothrace, they make search for Harmonia.' We know that the quest for the vanished deity of vegetation was part of an agrarian ritual in Greece; and Euphoros might have been referring to a country-pagan of the island, whether Hellenic or autochthonous. But, if we regard it as more probable that his vague phrases refer to the sacred drama of the mysteries themselves—the probability being strongly in favour that they had one—then we can draw some interesting conclusions: Harmonia was a Hellenic divine name attracted to Samothrace, because she was attached to Kadmos, and Kadmos was attracted there because Thebes had ancient communication with the island, and the native Kasmilos or Kadmis was identified with their Kadmos. Now, if Kasmilos in the mysteries carried off the earth-goddess, if there was the semblance of an abduction followed by a sorrowful search for the lost one, the Greek πάραν, misled by the name Kadmos, would interpret the Samothracian earth-bride as Harmonia, and the story of Kasmilos could be assimilated. If this was the case, and Kasmilos would be explained. If all this were certain, we should not feel convinced that this holy drama was autochthonous Samothracian; it is too local to what happened at Eleusis that we might naturally ascribe it to the reorganization under Eleusinian influences that the Kabeiroi mysteries underwent at the time when they were becoming Hellenic.

On the same analogies we must suppose that besides a sacred drama there was some ἱερός λόγος in them, some exegesis, accompanied probably with exaltation. And on a priori grounds we should believe that this would be connected with the doctrine of a future life and the promise of future happiness; for we could hardly understand how the Samothracian could compete so successfully throughout the later period of paganism with the other influential mystery-initiations, such as the Eleusinian, the Bacchic, the Phrygian, and the Egyptian, if it proffered to its μέρας no such message of eternal salvation as the others proclaimed. Moreover, the Kabeiroi, like the Eleusinian deities, were powers of the shadowy world, the ghost-realm; and the Greek mind would be sure to conclude that any communion with them would affect the lot of the departed spirit. Hence we may explain the growth of the legend that it was Demeter herself, the goddess who held the key of the Eleusinian Paradise, who instituted the Kabeiric rites. The belief in posthumous rewards and punishments may have a moralizing effect on conduct; and it is specially attested of the Samothracian mysteries, and of these alone, that those who had partaken in these mysteries became more pious and more just, and in every respect better than their past selves. A more intimate and more certain knowledge about these mysteries, Samothracian religion will perhaps never be attained. The evidence which has been used above is mainly indirect, incomplete, and vague. The Greeks themselves were confused in their view of these divinities, who for their measurements and the dimness of their personality resemble more the Roman minos, such as the Penates, than the clear Olympian figures of Hellen.


KABIR, KABIRPANTHIS. life of Kabir.

Kabir, an Indian teacher and religious reformer, flourished in N. India about A.D. 1440 to 1518. His origin is uncertain, and is the subject of various legends current among his followers. According to one account, he was a poor widow, the daughter of a Brahman. She accompanied her father, who was a follower of Rāmānand, the great teacher of S. India, on a visit to the spiritual guide. Rāmānand, while blessing her, offered her the usual wish that she might conceive a son, not knowing her state of widowhood. The sequel is variously reported. It was impossible to recall the blessing; but, while one version states that the mother abandoned the child to escape disgrace, another relates that Rāmānand contrived that the child should be miraculously born from his mother's hand. All stories agree that the child was brought up by a weaver named Nīnā and his wife Nīmā. The Kabirpanshis, or followers of Kabir, assert that the infant was an incarnation found by Nīmā floating on a lotus in a tank near Benares. Similar Samothracian dramas would be explained. If all this were certain, we should not feel convinced that this holy drama was autochthonous Samothracian; it is too local to what happened at Eleusis that we might naturally ascribe it to the reorganization under Eleusinian influences that the Kabeiroi mysteries underwent at the time when they were becoming Hellenic.

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KABIR, KABIRPANTHIS. life of Kabir.

Kabir, an Indian teacher and religious reformer, flourished in N. India about A.D. 1440 to 1518. His origin is uncertain, and is the subject of various legends current among his followers. According to one account, he was a poor widow, the daughter of a Brahman. She accompanied her father, who was a follower of Rāmānand, the great teacher of S. India, on a visit to the spiritual guide. Rāmānand, while blessing her, offered her the usual wish that she might conceive a son, not knowing her state of widowhood. The sequel is variously reported. It was impossible to recall the blessing; but, while one version states that the mother abandoned the child to escape disgrace, another relates that Rāmānand contrived that the child should be miraculously born from his mother's hand. All stories agree that the child was brought up by a weaver named Nīnā and his wife Nīmā. The Kabirpanshis, or followers of Kabir, assert that the infant was an incarnation found by Nīmā floating on a lotus in a tank near Benares. Similar Samothracian dramas would be explained. If all this were certain, we should not feel convinced that this holy drama was autochthonous Samothracian; it is too local to what happened at Eleusis that we might naturally ascribe it to the reorganization under Eleusinian influences that the Kabeiroi mysteries underwent at the time when they were becoming Hellenic.

On the same analogies we must suppose that besides a sacred drama there was some ἱερός λόγος in them, some exegesis, accompanied probably with exaltation. And on a priori grounds we should believe that this would be connected with the doctrine of a future life and the promise of future happiness; for we could hardly understand how the Samothracian could compete so successfully throughout the later period of paganism with the other influential mystery-initiations, such as the Eleusinian, the Bacchic, the Phrygian, and the Egyptian, if it proffered to its μέρας no such message of eternal salvation as the others proclaimed. Moreover, the Kabeiroi, like the Eleusinian deities, were powers of the shadowy world, the ghost-realm; and the Greek mind would be sure to conclude that any communion with them would affect the lot of the departed spirit. Hence we may explain the growth of the legend that it was Demeter herself, the goddess who held the key of the Eleusinian Paradise, who instituted the Kabeiric rites. The belief in posthumous rewards and punishments may have a moralizing effect on conduct; and it is specially attested of the Samothracian mysteries, and of these alone, that those who had partaken in these mysteries became more pious and more just, and in every respect better than their past selves. A more intimate and more certain knowledge about these mysteries, Samothracian religion will perhaps never be attained. The evidence which has been used above is mainly indirect, incomplete, and vague. The Greeks themselves were confused in their view of these divinities, who for their measurements and the dimness of their personality resemble more the Roman minos, such as the Penates, than the clear Olympian figures of Hellen.

Kabir’s teaching was purely oral, and throughout N. India thousands of villager couples are current which are ascribed to him. In addition, his immediate successors are responsible for a large number of hymns, odes, and doxological and argumentative poems. These have been collected, and a few have been published. Wilson gives a list of 29 works included in the Khalsa Granth, or the Sikh Bible. The Vaisnava tradition has obtained references to 82 in addition to eight of those mentioned by Wilson. The great majority are still in manuscript only. It is probable that the first collection of Kabir’s sayings was not compiled earlier than 50 years after his death. Of most authority is the Bhajak (literally ‘invocation- or account-book’), which has been printed with commentaries. It was compiled by Bhago Das, one of Kabir’s immediate disciples, and contains specimens of the various classes of poems referred to above. A number of sayings attributed to Kabir are included in the Adi Granth of the Sikhs (tr. Macauliffe). The Sikh Religion, vi. 142-316).

3. The Kabirpanthis. — The community has not escaped sectarian division. As already mentioned, Maghar is the headquarters of the Muhammadan followers of Kabir, and is situated on the west coast of the Hindus. The latter recognize the two main divisions: The Khamra, who are the core of the community, and the Banias, who are said to have been reconverted to Islam by Kabir himself. As in the case of other reforming movements in Hinduism, there is a tendency to relapse into ritualism and exclusiveness. Though Kabir preached against caste, the modern Kabirpanthis prefer that members of the unclean castes should join other sects, and should not wear the rosary of wooden beads which marks their own members. Members of the twice-born castes in ancient Sanskrit are called janas or sacred thread, of the Hindus. A woman may also wear the rosary, but not before marriage, and she may not become a disciple of her husband’s spiritual guide, for disciples of the same teacher are regarded as brother and sister. An elaborate ceremony of initiation is performed, which includes the consumption of water used for washing the feet of the head mahant, representing the master, and a betel leaf. Of the other religious practices, the name of God is inscribed with dew. It is called the parvatga, or passport, and is said to represent the body of Kabir. An important feature in the ceremony is the communication of a secret mantra, or text. In the Dharm Dasa section there are several mantras, and the ceremonies of initiation differ in a number of details. Every Sunday and on the last day of the lunar month a fast is observed, followed in the evening by a religious meal, at which a service is read, and an address delivered by a mahant, while hymns are also sung. A later ceremony follows, of even greater solemnity, and resembling the cabala in Christianity. When in extremis, the dying receive the holy water and betel leaf described in connexion with initiations. Monastic life is encouraged, and women may be admitted to the order, if found qualified, after a period of two years. They are usually widows or the wives of men who have joined the order. Branches of the community are ministered to by mahants who receive authority from the head mahant.

As a rule, at present the mahants are not men of great learning, though some are acquainted with Tulsi Das’s Raginiya and the Bhagavad-gita.
KACHHI—KAULISTAN

LITERATURE.—The best account of the sect is contained in G. H. Westcott, Kabir and the Kabir P aftermath, Cambridge, 1882. The comparison between the teaching of Kabir and Christianity was made by Professor E. F. C. Schurmann, a member of the Bible Presbyterian Church in the Kaira district, Gujarat. His conclusions were published in a book called Kabir Charitra (Gujarati), Surat, 1886. The sects of the Hindus, London, 1891, pp. 69-88, and especially to Allchin, K. A., The Silk Route to the East, Oxford, 1905, vol. ii, pp. 189-198: For a brief summary, see also R. G. Bhandarkar, Vaijapayani, Sarnus, etc. (OALP iii.), Strasbourg, 1915, pp. 67-72.

B. BURN.

KACHARIS.—See Bodos.

KACHHI.—An important agricultural tribe in N. India, an offshoot of the Kurni. At the Census of 1911 they numbered 1,304,296, the majority of whom are found in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Central India, and the Central Provinces. Their name is usually derived from Skr. kaka, 'flank,' enclosure,' or kupa, 'furrow'; but they claim connexion with the Kachhwahas, a sept of Rajputs, who assert totemic association with the tortoise (kachhekhapa). The Kachhi are among the best agriculturists in N. India, especially devoted to the growth of the more valuable crops, such as rice, opium, and opium. Practically all are Hindus; and, if they can be said to belong to any sect, they prefer the Sikhs, and worship the goddess Durga Devi, more especially in the Hol and Dhavil festivals, when they propitiate in March-April and June-July with offerings of cakes, sweetmeats, and money, which are received by the kumbhar, or potter-priest, who attends her shrines. Except when they make pilgrimages to the shrines of the greater gods, they pay little regard to the orthodox deities of the Hindu pantheon, and devote themselves to the cult of the group of minor local gods, who are supposed to protect them from trouble and cause the increase of their crops. Such in the United Provinces are Nagarsen, one of the deities controlling disease; Chamar, who, if he be not propitiated with gifts of sweetmeats, incense, and red lead at the Holt and Dhavil festivals, stops the milk of cows and buffaloes; Lali Manji, 'red jewel,' the household god, to whom cakes and sweetmeats are dedicated and subsequently eaten by the worshipper and his family; and Bhumiy, god of the soil, who is the patron of the village and its people, the male partner of Dharti Mata, Mother Earth. The malevolent deity most feared is Bisisri, 'the poisoner of life.' One impregnable is true of him; those who neglect her worship. It is believed that her priest can bring this disease on sinners by lighting a fire and throwing hot coals on her image. When a person is afflicted in this way, he leaves seven cowrie-shells, a piece of turmeric, and some charcoal, as a mark of his vow to make a pilgrimage to the shrine of the goddess at Sankisa in the Farrukhabad District, United Provinces. The presentation of a silver coin here ensures immunity from the disease. People who are too poor to undertake this journey endeavour to appease the angry goddess by going a mile or so farther and making an offering in a field which must be beyond the boundary of the village in which they live. With this cult of the minor gods is combined that of local Muslim shrines, a fact mentioned by the missionary at Mukampur, or that at the tomb of some martyr of the faith, as Shahid or Sayyid Mard. Among the Kachhi of the Deccan there are indications of a form of temple worship, and most powerful families have a guardian (devalk) of the union, which usually consists of an axe and leaves of four species of the sacred fig-tree and mango, which are tied to a post in the marriage halls at the houses of both bride and bridegroom.


KACHINS.—See Burma.

KAULISTAN.—Kapuristan, or the land of the infidel, almost certainly is no longer correctly described by that epithet. Since it was visited by the present writer, who left the country in 1891, the Amir of Kabul is believed effectually to have conquered every one of its numerous tribes who were continuously engaged in intertribal fighting. No doubt among the old people the ancient gods are worshiped secretly still; but the former picturesque ceremonial, the dancing, the feasting, the ontological invocation of favourite deities, must have given place now to the austere rites of the religion of Islam, the self-righteousness, and the dignified authority of its priests. Fanaticism will be prevalent among the younger men, taken away, many of them, as boys to Kabul and returned as zealots of the new creed; and even the smallpox, the smallpox, and the smallpox, the smallpox rank and file of the converts, for naturally it is among the most recent recruits of any religion that, on the average, the highest enthusiasm prevails. There is little probability that the Kapirs will ever come back to paganism. Mohammedanism has a singular attraction for Orientals, and, once accepted by a people, it rarely seems to lose its hold upon their consciences or its insistent influence upon their outlook upon life, their manners, and their ways of thought.

This country, Kapuristan, is pressed in between Afghanistan and Chitral, Badakhshan, and the Kunar Valley. More exactly it is situated between latitude 34° 30' and latitude 36°, and from about longitude 70° to latitude 71° 30'. It is one of the most difficult and intricate mountain places of the world, harsh, inhospitable, and full of peril, both from the physical dangers of cag, precipice, and howling torrent, and because of its superfluity of lurking-places for robbers and assassins, in the great sombre forests or the menacing deities; soil, who is the patron of the village and its people, the male partner of Dharti Mata, Mother Earth. The malevolent deity most feared is Bisuri, 'the poisoner of life.' One impregnable is true of him; those who neglect her worship. It is believed that her priest can bring this disease on sinners by lighting a fire and throwing hot coals on her image. When a person is afflicted in this way, he leaves seven cowrie-shells, a piece of turmeric, and some charcoal, as a mark of his vow to make a pilgrimage to the shrine of the goddess at Sankisa in the Farrukhabad District, United Provinces. The presentation of a silver coin here ensures immunity from the disease. People who are too poor to undertake this journey endeavour to appease the angry goddess by going a mile or so farther and making an offering in a field which must be beyond the boundary of the village in which they live. With this cult of the minor gods is combined that of local Muslim shrines, a fact mentioned by the missionary at Mukampur, or that at the tomb of some martyr of the faith, as Shahid or Sayyid Mard. Among the Kachhi of the Deccan there are indications of a form of temple worship, and most powerful families have a guardian (devak) of the union, which usually consists of an axe and leaves of four species of the sacred fig-tree and mango, which are tied to a post in the marriage halls at the houses of both bride and bridegroom.


KAFIRS.—See BANGALORE.

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Bashgul Valley one perceives the oddest differences between the children—a result no doubt of the indifferent selection of polygamous wives and the preference given to daughters. There is a larger number of heavy-featured clasmess of a remote valley, particularly difficult of access, seem curiously like another in form and feature; that, however, many, notably among the more prosperous section of the village, who is apt to identify the type while ignoring its variations. Usually the chief men and the priests are Aryan-looking, sometimes remarkably so; and it may be added, with something aproaching to certainty, that such a type never reveals itself among the poorer tribesmen or among the artisan, the field, or the domestic slaves. Difficult as it is to generalize concerning a congeries of peoples such as constitute the Khäfis of to-day, especially those living near the Eastern borders of the country, it may be stated broadly that in character they all display a curious lack of simplicity. With remarkable powers of secrecy and tenacity, they can persevere remorselessly in an intrigue or a plot decided upon many years previously. Possibly their most prominent general characteristics are an inordinate capacity, an easily aroused fierceness of temper, and a capacity for bitter, suicidal, inter-tribal hatred. They are ever ready to starve themselves for the sake of hoarding. Blackmailing they look upon as a virtue; in hereditary and immemorial itinerants, belief in the value of vague or pointed threats is deeply engrained in their nature. A head-man, whose little son lay very ill, once declared with a menacing growl, as long as there was breath in his body, he would turn Musalman. No one dreamt of accusing him of blasphemy; he was applauded for his wisdom and energy. Khäfs are untruthful. Always lie passive as the proof of a sagacious intellectual man. Obviously they hold the belief, common to so many wild peoples, that the truth merely because it is the truth must be harmful to a man. They are boastful and fond of admiration, which, added to a justifiable fear of the physical power of majorities, gives a remarkable sanction to public opinion. Khäfs have no fear of dying, although they cannot comprehend anyone committing suicide. Morality is unknown. They have a really wonderful sense of personal dignity; at all the religious festivals and sacrifices they strike the observer as equally cheerful and serene. In every way a Khäf is a model of politeness. At once and gracefully he yields precedence to a superior and unostentatiously takes his own proper position. In spite of his hauteur, which at times amounts almost to a disease, he is very hospitable. However grudgingly he may be so, he dare not disobey the unalterable laws on this subject. Family affection is not very strong. Some of the tribes are in the habit of selling little girls, sometimes even children nearly related to them, but as a rule it is the female offspring of their slaves that they dispose of in this way. Boys are rarely, if ever, thus treated. Nevertheless, Khäfs are kindly in family relationship. A man is fond of his old parents; his delight in a son is remarkable. They are never rough or cruel to animals. There is no special fondness shown for dogs, which are employed mainly for hunting and as houseguards. Goats are treated as domestic pets; but no reluctance is ever shown to kill them for food. Bulls and cows, accustomed to be handled gently, do not require to be bound when taking the animal by the horns, gently depressing the head, while a second, with the stroke of an ax, divides the cervical spine. Khäfs are wonder-fully benevolent. In case of illness, if a child, two or three, or even less, should be brought to them, they would immediately carry them up to a town, or they would bring them home; they would carry them, or, if they were too weak, would have him carried by some among themselves. It is a sign ofutility to take up a quarrel at the instant. But, if quarrelling is a manly virtue, peace-making is very sacred. Men, boys, and even dogs are separated at the first inkling of a quarrel, for one who will not help in stopping a village row at any moment is looked upon as unworthy. Nothing resembling religious intolerance exists. The men are extremely sociable, many possessing a sense of quiet humour. Their badinage with women is, of course, obscene to our way of thinking, and their jokes have much of the same nature, but they are highly amused at indolent remarks, and also at even the mildest attempt at repartee. It is as natural for a Khäf to thrive as it is for him to watch his flocks and herds. It is, in short, the business of his life. Little children are trained and encouraged to this end. Each individual, merely as a human being, is looked upon as a trivial affair except as the basis for boasting and vainglory, unless indeed the slain man happens to be a member of a Neighbouring tribe, friendly at the time, serious complications and difficulties would follow. In the opinion of an average tribesman, a man, mainly character, essentially a 'good' man, must be a successful huckster. He must also be an active hill-climber, one always ready to take up a quarrel, and known to be of an amorous disposition. If, besides possessing these popular qualities, he is an agile and untiring dancer at religious festivals, a sure shot with bow and arrows or with the matchlock, and a sound quoit player, he combines most of the characteristics of a really admirable person; but even with all these advantages he will possess no real influence in his tribe unless he is either wealthy himself or belongs to a family rich in flocks or herds.

The Khäf religion is a debased form of idolatry, with a certain admixture of ancestor-worship and perhaps traces of fire-worship also. Gods and goddesses are many in number, and in different villages and among different tribes hold varying positions in local estimation. Innur, the creator, Moni (commonly spoken of as 'the Prophet'), Gish (the war-god), Bagush, Dizans, Krumain, and Nimari are highly esteemed and popular everywhere. It is nearly certain that the same god, goddess, or inferior deity is called by a different name by different tribes, but, even allowing for this, there are many of the godlings who must be entirely disregarded except in particular villages. The difficulty in getting information from the Khäfs about their beliefs is extreme, although they are more inclined to open their hearts on such subjects to a Christian than to a Muhammadan, for they consider that a Christian is in some sense a relation because he is also always called approvingly a Khäf by the Musalman priests. A further difficulty is this—the people know seemingly little with anything like precision; sacrificed. The inquirer is constantly referred from one old man to another without final benefit. When it does bore him, cross-examination, if at all prolonged or tiresome, puts a Khäf in a good, or he jumps up and not infrequently rises from the inquirer. Prob-
ably as a result of mixing on the frontiers of their country with their Musalman neighbours, when at last, by a process of mutual contamination, the Kafrs, at any rate the younger portion, are inclined to treat it cynically and with scepticism. Frequently two or three waggish youths will burlesque the ceremonies of the faith. But everywhere where the war-god Gish is popular and respected, and in his worship at least there is remarkable sincerity, even among the light-hearted younger men. The older people, though undoubtedly devout, seem to abandon their faith without very poignant regret. In the inner valleys of Presungel the atmosphere is more distinctly religious. Devils' villages are continually met with. Old water-courses, long fallen to ruin, are universally believed to have been constructed by god or goddesses. Deep imprints of divine or demonic hands are shown on many a rock face. There, jealously guarded, is an iron pillar thrust in the ground by Imma himself, and likewise a sacred hole to look down which is certain death. Fertile lands consecrated to the Creator lie untouched by the plough, and the most famous temple in Kafristan, also dedicated to Imma, stands it to this day.

In Kafr theology there is both a heaven and a hell. The universe is divided into Urdesh, the upper world, the abode of the gods, Michdeh, the earth, and Ahrash, the lower world, but both heaven and hell are in Yurdesh, which is reached through a great pit guarded at its mouth by Maramalik, a custodian created for that purpose by Imma. Once passed into Yurdesh, no one ever returns to the upper world. At death a man's breath, his soul—the word shen has the double meaning—enters and becomes at once a vague shadowy form, such as we see in dreams. The elect wander about an area of paradise in Yurdesh termed Biash, while the wicked are always burning in fire. Worship consists in behaving in a dignified and cheerful manner at the sacrifices of animals, looked upon obviously as an entertainment, in dancing, in the singing of hymns, and in invocations to the gods. Fairies as well as deities have to be propitiated by offerings. The most common form of profane swearing is 'May the curse of Imma strike you.' Besides gods, goddesses, and goddesses and inferior deities, one hears much of demons, the chief of whom is Yash. The high priest of one of the Eastern tribes gave the present writer the following information:

Imma is the Creator of all things in heaven and earth. By the breath of his mouth he endowed with life his 'prophets' Moni, Gish, and Bish; by his blood he gave them existence from his right breast. Baghish alone among them all was born after the manner of men. In addition, Imma also created seven daughters whose special province it is to watch over agriculture. Thus the time for sewing approaches goats are sacrificed in their honour. The fairies and demons are created by Imma, but the latter gave so much trouble to the whole world that Moni with divine permission nearly exterminated them.

Most of the religious stories, told by this high authority and others, were bald, lengthy, and inconsequent, and of interest merely as showing the mental position at which the Kafrs had arrived—horses with swords concealed in their ears, women created out of golden goatskin churrs, the removal of the sun and the moon from the sky and their concealment for a time in the interior of a mountain, and so on. There were narratives of a sacred tree whose branches were seven families of brothers, each seven in number, while the trunk was Dizane, the goddess of harvests. And there were narratives of Baba Adam and his wife, who with their forty children once upon a time in Kashmir were all sleeping in pairs, and when they awoke in the morning no single couple understood how it was. The Cafrs ordered them to set forth and populate the whole world. With unfeigned reluctance, since everybody loves the country of Kashmir, they obeyed the divine order. And once existed: they were attacked and slain by a mighty god; the blood of one of these fabulous reptiles forms a tart pointed out to the traveller to the present day. Imra is sacrificed to frequently, but not more so than other gods. At the religious festivals and funeral dances he receives three rounds of stamping and shuffling by the quaintly dressed performers, but without any of the enthusiastic and inebriating exercises in honour of Gish, or the comicality of step and posturing which is necessary to please the goddesses Krumai. Every village has its temples. These are also to be found on the roadsides far away from any dwelling-houses. Usually these temples or shrines are small, mostly about 5 ft. square, and perhaps 6 ft. high. The lower two-thirds consist of nibble masonry built between frames of axe-squared timbers. The top is almost entirely of wood with small windows in front, through which the idol or sacred stone can be seen. They are very often ornamented with poles at the corners, upon which are hung fragments of iron resembling tongueless bells, iron scull-pieces, and other trophies placed there in memory of some successful raid. Occasionally a shrine is elaborately and prettily decorated, with Gish, the war-god, is the most devoutly admired of all the pantheon.

To liken a Kafr to Gish is to pay him the highest possible compliment, while nothing can be in better taste than to call a woman 'Gish istri,' i.e. 'the wife of Gish.' Gish killed false enemies—Hazar 'Ali, Hasan and Husain, in short, every famous Musalman the Kafrs ever heard of. Some Kafrs even say that Gish's earthly name was Yazdi. The most popular of the goddesses is Dizane. Any one having a son born to him in the preceding year offers a goat in sacrifice on the goddess's annual festival day. Dizane protects the growing wheat crop; Nirmali, the Kafr Lucia, takes care of lying-in women and watches over children. The special retreats for women are under her peculiar protection. Krumai is a popular goddess; she lives high up on the great snow mountains, but is chiefly remarkable by reason of the comical dance in her honour, which invariably ends the performances at the regular ceremonies after each of the chief gods has been danced to in turn.


GEORGE SCOTT ROBERTSON.

KAHAR (Skr. kシュndhakarva, 'one who carries loads on his shoulders').—A tribe of litter-bearers, cultivators, and labourers. At the Census of 1911 they numbered 1,388,608. In Bengal those who profess to be orthodox Hindus generally worship Siva and the Gokhi, or female element, the proportion of Vaishnavs being very small.

Members of the Khairi sub-caste observe a peculiar worship in honour of Ganesa on the seventh day of the waxing moon of Kartti (October-November) when, accompanied by children, they proceed to a wood and make offerings of vagha, dates, and sweetmeats under an oak tree (Phaladius emulion), but never sacrifice any animals. A feast is then given to the Brahmins, after which the Kharis drink and subsist in excess. The entertainment of Brahmins on this day is accounted as the most important after the gift of cow's milk on any other occasions. In addition to Duk, Karta, Baudh, Garaya, Dharam Raj, Soeka, Sanbarinath, and Rizk, the Khairis are numerous throughout Behar, the caste pay special reverence to a deified Kafr called Damolir, before whom offerings are made, and under whose auspices the interment of the dead is looked upon as a religious act. This practice is possibly connected with the Brahmans who are represented by the Kafrs. In the north they are represented by the members of the family, who share in the cult. In the south, such as in Bengal, however, the Matthil or Kasurni Brahman, who
KAILAS—KALAM

above the caves as priests of the greater gods, are called to
sacrifice to Dumah, and receive half of the offerings as their
perquisite. Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays are the days
set apart the worship of Dumah (Riley, To, 8. 1723).

In the United Provinces they are generally orthodox
Hindus, but are seldom initiated into any special sect.
They offer to Bhairor, an impersonation
of the male partner of the Earth-goddess, goat, pulse cakes, and spirits; to Mahābār
or Hanuṇā, the monkey-god, clothes, Brāhmaṇical
cords, and garlands of flowers; to the Pāfichor Tir (or a cow's ear) the offering is a kid and spirits.
In Jammu there is a curious combination of Hindu
and Musulmar usage. When a person worships Devi,
Mahāmād, and a butcher accompanies
him to the shrine. The Mahāmād pronounces the
invocation (kailas), and plunges the knife
into the throat of the victim, and the butcher
eats the carcass, which the worshipper and his friends cook and eat. They cultivate the water
nut (Trapa bispinosa) and melons. When planting
the former, they worship a local deity Siloman Bābā
and his brother Mādho Bābā; when sowing melons,
they add to these a third godling, Ghaṭauriyā Bābā.
In the sacred lake Kailas have platforms erected on
the banks of rivers and tanks, and are supposed to
protect crops sown near such places. When they
go out fishing or starting a carrying litter, they invoke Kailas, a deceased worthy of the tribe.
In the Deccan they are known as Bhot and in Madras
as Beṭhā.

LETTER-DATED.—H. H. Riley, TC, Calcuta, 1891, l. 870 ft.;
W. Crooke in the Meccan period and the first years of the migration he had
to argue with opponents, and certain fundamental
questions had been posed. One of these concerned
the freedom of the will, to which he could give
only an evasive answer (Qurʾān, vi. 149). According
to the tradition, he discouraged inquiries on
such subjects among his followers, and his Qurʾān
deprecates controversy with unbelievers.

The arrangement, however, whereby he permitted the
maintenance of certain non-Muslim cults rendered
a certain amount of controversy unavoidable,
though in the treatment of these tolerant laws a clause was inserted forbidding their members to
say anything against the Muslim faith. On the
other hand, sectarianism in Islam was an inevita-
ble consequence of the civil wars, and the
kailas is especially the abode of Śiva and his
consort. Its shape is roughly like that of a Hindu
temple, with a part of the conical summit removed;
this, with its resemblance to the phallic symbol
(linga), possibly was the cause of its sanctity. It
is a famous place of Hindu pilgrimage, the route
of which is prescribed in the Hindu scriptures
(Sherring, Western Tibet, p. 49 f.). Hitherto the
difficulty of the journey has prevented the assembly
of large bodies of pilgrims; but now that under
the treaty of Lhasa western Tibet is being opened
up by the treaty of Lhasa, the journey occurs
on an average three days. At one point is the
Gauri-kunda, the lake sacred to Gaurī, the 'yellow,
brilliant one,' the consort of Śiva. This
remains permanently frozen.

As some persons measure their length on the ground for
the entire distance, and others are ayed and accompanied
by worshipers, and others walk barefoot on the
road, either for contemplation or to bathe in the icy waters of the Gauri-kunda (though
the ordinary pilgrim merely breaks the ice and puts a little of
the water on his head, it is easy to see that the time occupied
by the journey varies very greatly. One and all condemn
the record-breaker, who harassed himself in so short a time as possible,
and they apply to him the opprobrious epithet of Asha-ka, the man who runs round like a dog" (ib. p. 270 f.).

LITERATURE.—The most recent account, with photographs,
is that of C. A. Sherring, Western Tibet, and the British
Borderland, London, 1906. For the Hindu legends of Mew see
E. T. Atkinson, Western Tibet, pp. 354, 369 ff., 896. The Tibetan Buddhist version is given by
W. CROOKE.

KALAM.—Kalam (lit. 'conversation') is ap-
parently a translation of the Greek kalērēō, used by Plato in a sense approaching that in which
'metaphysics' is ordinarily used, and contrasted
with ἐρωτήματα, of which the Arabic rendering
is modāl, occasionally employed as a synonym of kalām. The two are sometimes coupled with
falsafah, the Arabized form of the Greek physiologos.
The kalām is sometimes paraphrased as 'Fundamentals of Religion' (usul al-din), i.e. the study
of the ultimate concepts which religion involves.

That study, according to a manual of general
information compiled in the 4th Islamic century
(Maṭafī al-ulāma), deals with seven subjects:
metaphysical technicalities; the founders and dog-
mas of Islamic sects; Christian technicalities and sects; Jewish technicalities and sects; the
founders of the philosophical schools; paganism;
and the list of metaphysical questions. It is clear from
this statement that the matter included in the
kalām is mainly theological controversy—between Muslims and Jews, and between other religious
communities, philosophers and atheists, but also
between Muslims of different sects.

Before the end of the Prophet's life he had
covered that religious controversies could be best
settled by the sword; but during the Meccan
period and the first years of the migration he had
to argue with opponents, and certain fundamental
questions had been posed. One of these concerned
the freedom of the will, to which he could give
only an evasive answer (Qurʾān, vi. 149). According

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ble consequence of the civil wars, and the

For the first century and a half of Islam the
kailas actually took the form of public contro-
versy, theorists being browed by laymen who
came together in the mosques, where they were
compelled to answer objectors; at times the public
debate may have been supplemented by contro-
versial correspondence, of which we have what
may be a genuine example in the letters of Najda
and Naīf, leaders of Khārijite sects, preserved in
the Kāmil of Mabarrad. The public discussion
continued long after the writing of the first
books had become popular; so we read of the
historian Tabari (towards the end of the 3rd cent.)
publicly disputing with the founder of the Zahrīr
school, and taking to the pen only because of
the personalities in which his opponent indulged. Reports of such discussions have, in one or two cases, reached us—e.g., in the treatise Mukhtasif al-Mukhtar (Cairo, 1326) of Ibn Qutbah († 276 A.H.); the treatise of Ibn Khallikân († 332 A.H.)—how animosity sprang up among these disputants adhered to their opinions, even when they had been decidedly nonplussed, excusing themselves on the ground that, if they allowed the arguments to change their views many times a day. As early as 125 A.H., we hear of a heresarch being summoned to defend his thesis in the presence of the Umâyya Khalif Hishâm; he was nonplussed by the theologian employed to oppose him, and barbariously executed by the Khalif's order.

According to some authorities, the standard author on kalâm, who had provided the material for all later writers, was Abû'l-Hudâl al-Kalâf of Bagh († 236 A.H.; see Yaqût, Dictionary of Learned Men, London, 1913, vi. 74). His chief work was called 'The Five Fundamentals,' and dealt with justice, monothelitism, the promise of the Hereafter, the intermediate state; the first refers to the freedom of the will, without which the punishment of unbelievers, etc., would be unjust; the second, to the creation of the Qur'ân and of the dogmas; the third, to the dogma of God; and so forth, to the doctrine that ultimate fate was man cannot be altered; the fifth, to a theory that the Muslim original was something between a believer and an unbeliever. These doctrines have certainly embraced most of the matter in controversy between Muslims, since, if a man earned his title of 'believer,' there would be no interference, and the day of judgment, etc., would become superfluous. Though those who accepted these views or modifications of them (the Mu'tazilites) were only spasmodically in the ascendant, they had never been the least objectionable. Abû-l-Hasan al-Asfârî († c. 324 A.H.), who is supposed to have won the case for orthodoxy, was one of the Mu'tazilites, but (according to his biographer) was miraculously converted, and told to use the controversial ability which he had acquired to refute the doctrines of the Mu'tazilites, whom the orthodox had been allowing to gain the victory through unthinking to delude or even 'share a carpet' with them (see art. AL-ASFÂR ABÎ, vol. ii. p. 111 ff.).

The list of subjects treated by Abû'l-Hudâl keeps clear of politics, and indeed the name is neutral neutral, possibly with this reference; but most of the Islamic sects were political, whence the discussion of the lawful sovereignty could not easily be avoided: hence the question, 'Who is the best of mankind after Muhammad?' usually figures in the lists of kalâm questions. Moreover, fresh theories on this subject were constantly being formulated, and in consequence new chapters of kalâm introduced. Although it was rarely safe under Islamic rule for any member of the dominant community to question such fundamental notions as the two which form the Islamic creed and the infallibility of the Qurân, there was never an idea of mistreatment by our informants, went a long way in this direction. It was, therefore, desirable that there should be some recognized method of meeting those who suggested doubts on disputed subjects, and this was the kalâmism had been extinguished in Arabia, the spread of Muslim conquest brought the followers of the Prophet into fresh contact with it, and in India it was necessary to keep the toleration which the code elsewhere excluded. Conditions both internal and external thus combined to keep religious controversy alive, and encouraged speculation on those very subjects from which the Prophet and his chief companions are likely to have kept clear.

Of controversies with Jews, Christians, and Magians we have echoes rather than reports in the 'Ecology of Jahîz' with which the author of the treatise of Dhahab al-Qasim († 330 A.H.) identified himself. For the reason mentioned above such controversy was not unaccompanied with danger, and the 'unorthodox' appear to have been more open-minded in these debates than in the change of their views many times a day. As early as 125 A.H., we hear of a heresarch being summoned to defend his thesis in the presence of the Umâyya Khalif Hishâm; he was nonplussed by the theologian employed to oppose him, and barbariously executed by the Khalif's order.

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Refutation of anthropomorphism. (5) Refutation of those who deny the divine attributes. (6) Statement of the conditions of the things. (7) Question whether the non-existent is or is not a thing; on matter, and refutation of those who assert the existence of the non-existent. (8) Proof that the propositions connected with the divine attributes can be known. (9) Proof of the same with regard to the eternal attributes. (10) On the essence of the Creator. (11) On the divine will. (12) Proof that the Creator speaks with an eternal speech. (13) Proof that the Creator speaks with a human speech. (14) Reality of human speech and psychic utterance. (15) Proof that the Creator speaks by creating. (16) Proof of the intellectual admittance and the scriptural attestation of the visibility of the Creator. (17) Meaning of the terms 'commendable' and 'invisible.' (18) Nothing exists without a cause. (19) On the Creator or on man before the revelation of a code. (20) Proof that the act of the Creator are without purpose or cause. (21) Refutation of the doctrines of utility (as applied to those acts); meaning of various terms, such as 'divine guidance,' 'favor,' etc. (22) Proof of the reality of the prophetic office, of the genuineness of miracles, and of the infallibility of prophets. (23) Proof of the mission of Muhammad.

It will be found that these two lists cover nearly, though not quite, the same ground. Some of the questions were suggested by the civil wars (as we have seen) and their bearing on the interpretation of the Qur'an. Others may have arisen in the course of studying the Qur'an and endeavouring to reconcile its various utterances. It is noticeable that the chief seats of Islam arose before the end of the 7th century; and so before the philosophy of Aristotle can have had much direct influence on Islamic speculation; since, however, much of the thought of the philosopher had long before become the common property of the educated world, his individual influence may have been considerable. Indeed, where in the Qur'an itself (vii. 10 f., xv. 28-33, xxxvii. 71-77) Iblis (Satan) descends to bow down to Adam because Adam had been created of clay, who was he but Iblis? If the works of Iblis were destroyed by fire, the underlying proposition that fire is more honourable than earth is drawn from the Aristotelian hierarchy of the elements, though by no means directly from the de Celo. There is, however, no doubt that, when under the early Abbasids the works of the philosopher began to be translated into Arabic, they found many earnest readers; and Ibn Qatalah charges one sectarian, Muhammad b. al-Jahm b. al-Burmi, with making Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptuionibus serve as his Qur'an. Jahiz, a contemporary of this personage, refers to the 'author of the Logos' as a well-known writer, and speaks of persons who rely on the Meteorology, though he warns them against mistranslations and corruption of the text. The probability is that the decidedly Aristotelian clothing of some of the questions (as in the Shahrastani's list) is due to their having been suggested to the Muslim thinkers by the study of the philosopher's works; and, as those works became better known, the scope of the kalām had a tendency to enlarge, while ever increasing subtility was displayed by the disputants. In some treatises most of the subjects dealt with in the Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics are treated as kalāms (e.g., the theories of time, space, and motion), and some even define the word kalām, in the style of the Metaphysics, as 'the science of Being qua Being.'

The extent to which the Muslim kalām was influenced by Christian theological speculation cannot be easily determined. One question which at one time provided the shibboleth for the chief sects, whether the Qur'an was or was not created, appears to have had a very echo as an echo of the Christian controversy about the Spirit 'neither made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding'; and, since the teachers of Greek philosophy were called by the Christians Arians, the mention of the Arian doctrine of Christ may have had some influence. The influence of the pagans on his thought is also evident, as e.g. on his doctrine of prophecy.

The attitude adopted towards these studies by Islamic rulers varied greatly. The early Abbasids, especially Harun al-Rashid and Ma'mun, encouraged the study of Greek philosophy and invited to Bagdad a large number of philosophers to work into Arabic. In 757 A.H., after the Islamic world had been united and after the decline of the orthodox and the Mu'tazilites, the Khaliifa Mutamid forbade the sale in Bagdad of works dealing with kalām, eristic, or philosophy. Since it was impossible to refute a heresy, it was best to make no mention of it, and in some form of repetition of the arguments whereby it was defended, probably this was the surest mode of preventing the spread of heresy; and this motive was dominant when Ma'mun of Ghazna (806-833 A.H.) carried kalām?
KALEVALA

is the work of one author. Its component parts were produced by various singers at different periods; but sporadic traces of apparent Christian influence are noticeable in the last two decades of the 13th century. The story, as a whole, belongs to the pantheistic, or at least to the naturalistic, school of thought. It is a synthesis of the various types and themes—a process which, in many cases, had already been effected among the people themselves. It was possible because the whole mass was of a single metrical form, the octosyllabic trochaic.

I. THE EPIC POEMS.—These were composed partly among the Finns and partly among the Lapps, although it was among the Karelians of Ingrina (in the Government of St. Petersburg) that the majority of the poems were produced. The Karelians of Ingrina are the largest group of the Karelians in Finland, and in districts lying beyond the borders of Finland (the Governments of Olonetz and Archangel) the epics were moulded and links between them. That they could be combined into an epic whole. These epic poems may be classified as (a) songs of heroes, (b) legends, (c) ballads of chivalry, (d) imaginative songs, and (e) narrative poems.

(a) Songs of heroes.—These date from a period anterior to the official adoption of Christianity in the latter half of the 12th century. The names of the various heroes vary in many instances, but the theme is the same: the hero's conception of himself as a Christian knight or of his origin from Scandinavian heroes, as, e.g., Kaleva (cf. Cædric æulu Finn in Widesi) with Kylling Skilling; Vetra (Vetrivka, from which comes Vettila), ‘rogue,’ in the Kalevala; and Ultys (Utri) (from which perhaps Uutam) with Veters, Vetsgaristas in Beowulf; Osmon or Osmo with Osmund, Osmund; Reger or Reikowithrii; Hermannsdieron with Hermarik. Vuo dolmen means the Gethlnder. The name Ahit or Ahv, which, being noted the ‘water-dweller,’ has been derived from ahu, ‘water,’ is likewise a human name, to which are attached epithets signifying dignity and strength. Even Vaiminoine, ‘dweller in the narrow sea,’ is to be interpreted, not as a divine name (as the present writer assumed in art. FINNS [Ancient], vol. v. p. 24), but as a hero-name. The name of the smith, Ilmarinen, as confirmed by the sky-god Ilmari, was formed from that of a smith called Ismaro (from Osmaro). To this group of songs belong also those of Jouki- nen the ‘mythical’ (9), Lemminkainen ‘the beloved’ (7), and Kankaanmäen.

These heroes are represented as beautiful and strong, with long curling hair. They wear mantles of red or blue material, and always have a sword by their side. They travel on horseback or by boat. They are rich in lands and gold, and possess slaves. They drink home-brewed intoxicating ale, and seduce maids, yet they are less eager for gold, ale, or women than for feats of warlike prowess.

The heroes, however, are also capable workers in field and meadow, and they are skilled blacksmiths. Moreover, they are poets, singers, and musicians. As experts in medical arts they also healing the people, and they know how to fashion the magic runes. They are

1 Cf. the words of Lemminkäinen in Kalevala, xii. 74-106:
'But for house-brewed ale I care not,
I would drink from mana-water.
From the end of tarry rudder.
Nought I care for house-stored treasures;
On the pyrites won by far is better.'

Cf. also cxx (1-100) the fine lament of his ship of war, and his comrades' eager readiness to follow him, though those comrades had but recently married a young wife.

designated kings, holy ones, and gods. In popular usage some of their names still survive as designations of individuals belonging to a former race of heroes, and also of towns, such as, e.g., K.-Kron, Kaljanun and seisa Sippe in Journal Soc. Finno-ugric, xxx. [1914] 35.

(b) Legendary poems.—These consist mainly of stories about the ancient Karelians, and from Karelian popular poets in the Government of Archangel had compiled a legendary epic, ‘The Cycle of the Creator’ (J. and K. Kron, Kantelelaren tutkimus [‘Investigations of Kantelelars’], Helsinki, 1900-01, iii.). An important element in the Sampo myth of the Kalevala is the beautiful legend narrating the deliverance of the sun, which was brought by the Sampo (Finnish ‘boat’) to the land of the north (i.e. the sea), and set in a tree of gold—first of all among the lower branches, whence it shone only upon the rich and the wise, and then among the higher branches, from which it gave light to all without distinction. The song of Lemminkäinen’s death is the same version of Christ’s death which is reproduced in the Icelandic myth of Balder (Fins.-ugr. Forsk. v. [1905] 85-106). Part of the account of Väinämöinen’s voyage to Lapland belonged originally to this legend telling of the storm on the Lake of Gnessen—legend which also underlies the story of Thor and the Midgard serpent (ib. vii. [1907] 167-180). The dreadful rash of blood from the wound in Väinämöinen’s knee is taken from the narrative of the blood which flowed from Christ upon the Cross, and Väinämöinen’s journey to Tuonela is simply a transcript of Christ’s descent to Hades. The scene of Henry IV’s coronation under the canopy of the apostle of Finn, is, however, of purely Finnish origin.

(c) Ballads of chivalry.—These date from medieval times, and are mainly of Scandinavian origin. To this class belongs the song of Kulervo’s (originally Tum’s) sister in the Kalevala (Grundtvig, no. 338. Hr. Truesse Dötre; Child, no. 14, Babylon). The song of Ivana Kojojokopka was composed in Ingria in the model of a Russian byin by Ivan Golovitch; and it correspends the story of the second wooing of Ilmarinen in the Kalevala.

Elinna’s Death, the greatest Finnish ballad of real dramatic power, is, however, a genuinely Finnish folk-poem.

(d) Imaginative poems.—This class consists of poems ostensibly but not really mythical, such as those telling of the process of evolution. The myth of the eggs of the giant oak, of the huge ox, and of the courtship of the heavenly bodies. The genuinely mythical songs of Sänkap Leffervinen (cf. art. FINNS [Ancient], vol. vi. p. 239) is a ritual poem.

(e) Narrative poems of everyday life.—These are chiefly about wives and maidens.

ii. LYRIC POEMS.—This class is now represented in West Finland only by lullabies, nursery rhymes, and pastoral songs. These songs, as yet only slightly investigated, arose mainly in Estonia, these finding their way through Ingrina to Finnish and Russian Karelians, though it is probable enough that some of them took shape among the Eastern Finns themselves. The most important sub-group is that of the marriage-songs.

iii. MAGIC POEMS.—These were versified in West Finland from the Christian spells of the Scadinavians, and in East Finland were further elaborated and embellished with additions from the epic poems. The Christian appellations of the characters involved are in some cases retained; in others they are superseded by heathen designations, and in still larger numbers are transformed into names apparently heathen. The later Finnish mythology is dealt with in Suomalainen rauvon kanto (The Religion of the Finnish Race), i. 'The Religion of the
Finnish Poems'), the first part of which has just appeared (Borgo, 1914). Of these originally Christian, and the Kalevala, a few may be mentioned as examples:

Miedikki, the goddess of the forest, is formed from miedikus, 'pleasant,' an epitaph of St. Aune (Amkki); her other name, Miekka (Arno), is from the old Finnish, 'he is majestic, Holmstén ('Studies in Finnish Folklore', 'King of Beasts'); Kupansa (also Kuhina, Kussa, Klass), the name of the forest-god, is a folk etymological derivation from Hubertus, the late Latin saint of the hounds and hunting (with the air man, Hummokan, 'the cunning maiden,' and Seurta or Ekkela, 'the daughter of the South,' are all epithets of the Virgin Mary, as is also Kivistar, 'maidens of the forest,' on the Kipinä, 'the mountain', and Gogotha).

K. KOHN.}

2. Name and subject.—The word Kalevala (Kalevipoika) is derived from Kaleva, the progenitor of the Finnish heroes, and means 'the land of the heroes.' Kaleva himself does not appear in the epic; but Kalevat, his daughter, and Kalevalaik, his descendant, are mentioned. In the poem there are five main characters: Väinämöinen, the patriotic minstrel; Ilmarinen, the magic smith; Lemminkäinen, the reckless adventurer; Kullervo, a morose and violent slave; and Louhi, the mistress of the Woods.

Pohjola, the North country, is in the poem understood to be Lapland, or a dismal land to the north thereof; and Kalevala, of course, is Finland. The plot of the poem is a continual conflict between the Finns and the Lapps, representing the constant opposition between light and darkness, good and evil. The hero is always able to overcome an evil power if he can chink the origin of it, implying probably that we could exterminate evil if we only knew how or were able to do it. The conflict is carried on by means of magic arts, which generally presuppose tell of some kind, thus suggesting that the best magic consists in industry, skill, and perseverance. It is interesting to note how frequently humble instruments are enlisted for the attainment of great ends, and how high a moral tone pervades the epic from beginning to end.

3. Origin.—The Kalevala is unique in being the only example of a national epic compiled from songs actually existing among the people, independent of a larger national poem. The composer, Elias Lönnrot, visited the most remote districts of his beloved land, industriously and carefully reaping and gleaning from aged singers and reciters such songs as he could. Vainamöinen's harvest was rich, and it has a literary charm absolutely unknown in compilations, and only to be found in a work proceeding from one, and that a more usually gifted, author.

Finnish literature proper is not ancient in the sense of having come down in parchment or print from former centuries. It is traditional, and was handed on from sire to son until about a century ago. Nearly all the traditional poetry is anonymous and composed in unrhymed lines of eight syllables, in the versification with which Long-fellow has made us familiar in Hiawatha, the idea of which was derived from the Kalevala. At first the versification of the translation seems cramped, but the reader is quickly unacquainted; for the vigour and grace of the poetry compel his admiration. One of the distinctive features of this versification is rhythm and metre, and in some of the OT Psalms, the second line repeating the sense of the first, either in different words or giving a new shade of meaning. Many of the songs reflect the national spirit, the common life of the people through this poetic form. The other features of this poetry are more common in other literatures; alliteration and assonance, for example, are freely employed.

Lönnrot has issued two collections in addition to the Kalevala. These are Leirisaruojo, 'The Magic Songs of the Finnish People' (Helsingfors, 1896), consisting of some 200 magic spells, incantations, and other religious formulas, which help us to understand the superstitions and magic of the Finns; and Kanteletar, 'The Daughter of the Harp' (1st ed. 1853; 2nd ed. 1858; 3rd ed., 1837), consisting of lyrics and ballad poetry which reveal the customs, habits, and life of the people in all their phases.

As these traditional songs were collated, the students of literature noticed the frequency with which certain names and characters appeared; and it gradually dawned on them that these fragmentary incidents might belong to some complete tale. Efforts were therefore made to gather in from every quarter every song or verse in the Finnish tongue, and eventually, in 1835, Lönnrot published a collection of the episodes and verses that seemed to belong to one original epic, and to this compilation he gave the name Kalevala. He divided the work into 39 cantos or runes, the whole amounting to some 12,000 lines. But he was not satisfied; and he continued to gather material until, in 1848, he issued the Akateemi, having by that time, 50 cantos, containing, in all, 22,763 lines. Lönnrot alone is responsible for the selection and arrangement of the material. As the original fragments and the material from which they were compiled, and which are sources, have been carefully preserved, often in many variants, it is known that the compiler made only such trivial additions and alterations as were absolutely necessary to weld the fragments into a connected whole. Universal praise has been accorded to him for his self-restraint, his literary skill, and his loyalty to the unknown poets whose songs had survived until he rescued them from possible oblivion.

4. Scheme of the epic.—The great defect of the Kalevala as a work of art is its lack of unity and continuity. Much might be left out, and additional verses or even runes might be inserted, without attracting the attention or decreasing interest. For this reason it is difficult to indicate in few words what the subject of the Kalevala really is. In the poem there are at least four main cycles of songs; and, in addition, seven separate romances are woven into the epic. The four cycles are: (a) the Sampo Songs, in which, inter alia, we find the Finnish conception of the Creation; (b) the Lemminkäinen songs; (c) the Vainamöinen songs; and (d) the Kullervo cycle. Probably it would be right to say that the Sampo is the key to the Kalevala. For the story of the Sampo and its possession by the Finnish people—the origin, the hiding, the quest, the rape, and the loss of the Sampo—is the central fact that makes the poem an epic; and Lönnrot himself says that, without the Sampo, the Kalevala would fall into a number of independent cycles having very little connexion with each other.

5. The Sampo cycle.—

Immer, the daughter of the Air, tired of solitary, descended to the surface of the waters, and was brought to her by the boisterous waves. She was tossed about for 100 years before she reached the earth and could bring forth her son Väinämöinen. In due time this son cleared the land and sowed barley and other plants. He was a Lapland girl, Aino, but she would not marry him, and woe was told, and then, in some cases, he was driven out. His mother advised him to seek a bride in Pohjola, the North country; and, as he was riding over the water on his magic steed, Aino's brother shot him and killed him. Väinämöinen, however, was conveyed by an eagle to the castle of Pohjola, whose mistress of love for her son Väinämöinen. In due time this son cleared the land and sowed barley and other plants. He was a Lapland girl, Aino, but she would not marry him, and woe was told, and then, in some cases, he was driven out. His mother advised him to seek a bride in Pohjola, the North country; and, as he was riding over the water on his magic steed, Aino's brother shot him and killed him. Väinämöinen, however, was conveyed by an eagle to the castle of Pohjola, whose mistress of love for her son Väinämöinen. In due time this son cleared the land and sowed barley and other plants. He was a Lapland girl, Aino, but she would not marry him, and woe was told, and then, in some cases, he was driven out. His mother advised him to seek a bride in Pohjola, the North country; and, as he was riding over the water on his magic steed, Aino's brother shot him and killed him. Väinämöinen, however, was conveyed by an eagle to the castle of Pohjola, whose mistress of love for her son Väinämöinen. In due time this son cleared the land and sowed barley and other plants. He was a Lapland girl, Aino, but she would not marry him, and woe was told, and then, in some cases, he was driven out. His mother advised him to seek a bride in Pohjola, the North country; and, as he was riding over the water on his magic steed, Aino's brother shot him and killed him. Väinämöinen, however, was conveyed by an eagle to the castle of Pohjola, whose mistress of love for her son Väinämöinen. In due time this son cleared the land and sowed barley and other plants. He was a Lapland girl, Aino, but she would not marry him, and woe was told, and then, in some cases, he was driven out. His mother advised him to seek a bride in Pohjola, the North country; and, as he was riding over the water on his magic steed, Aino's brother shot him and killed him.
This is the natural close to the epic; but the last cantos of these lines has an interest of its own.

6. The Finnish Virgin Mary myth.—The fifthith and final canto of the Kalevala gives us the story of Marjatta.

She was a damsel who was rarely beautiful, and was always pure and holy, and was ever very modest.

One day on the mountains she saw a spruce and a caer.

She was discrusted by her knees and compelled to take refuge in the stable of Illis, the Evil One; and there warmed by the vapours of the fire-breathing steed, she found comfort.

And a little boy was born her, and a sinless child was given, and the hay was in horses' manger.

On the hay in horses' manger.

The child was spirited away whilst Marjatta slept. In her dream, a Corda, Tolvii, started and the child refused to reveal the hiding-place; but the sun directed the mother to search, and there she was concealed. "The child possesses beauty, increasing in strength and in wisdom; and in favour with men, so that 'All Suomi [Finland] saw and wondered.'

Marjatta sent for a priest to baptize him; but he desired proof that the boy was no son of some black wizard. Vainamoinen, being spoiled, incurred the matter, and suggested that, as the boy had sprang from a bear, he ought to be exposed on the mountains. But the forthright-old child spoke up for himself and his own. The priests immediately took the side of the boy, crossed him, and

"Quickly baptize the child with water, As the king of all Karelia,
And the lord of all the mighty."

Greatly offended,

"Then the aged Vainamoinen
Went upon his journey singing,
Sailed away to lottier regions.
To the land beneath the heavens,
Leaving behind his harp and his songs as a parting gift to his people."

7. Other cycles and separate romances.—In the course of the epic there are many songs and episodes in which Vainamoinen, the Finnish national hero, appears, and which national course are unoriginal and halite are delineated with minuteness and vigour. The Lomminkinon songs set forth the misadventures of this reckless adventurer. Time after time the various disavowals of his own magic skill or that of his mother, to whom he is devotedly attached.

The Kullervo cycle has hardy any connexion with the main subject of the Kalevala; and these songs, with one peculiarly sad episode, are introduced because Kullervo killed Ilmarinen's wife.

The separate romances include the strange and moving tale of Aba, the fishing for the Maiden of Vellamo, the wooing of the Virgin of the Air, the Golden Maiden, the Son of Kojonen's woeing, the deliverance of the sun and moon, and the story of Marjatta, already described.

LITERATURE.—A full bibliography up to the year 1910 is given in the last Finnish ed. of the Kalevala, published at Helsinki, in that year. Unfortunately most of the best books on the Kalevala are in foreign languages which is but little known by scholars of other lands; but translations of some of these are promised in more common tongue. The most important of these works are:

at the Kālighāṭ in the neighbourhood of her husband’s shrine in the adjoining suburb of Bhawanipur. To Kālighāṭ also, as has been said, the mythological account of the sanctity of the Calcutta shrines Kālighāṭ has been transferred, with further lost particulars added. In these additions we seem to see a ray of light cast upon the beginnings of the southern shrine.

In the neighbourhood where the temple now stands, so the Kālighāṭ legend runs, somewhere about the 15th cent. lived an ascetic, by name Jaigal Gir (‘god of the jungle’). To him perhaps the first body of the portuated town endeared itself for worship in a small wooden house (Wilson, l. c. 150). Jaigal Gir, a jungle devotee, the traditional founder of Kālighāṭ about the 15th cent. was himself probably, as a historical fact, the first attraction to draw worshippers thither. The reverence for holy men is an attractive feature of Hinduism.

Two centuries later than Bipro-das, in 1769, when Streeansah Master visited the Gangā on behalf of the East India Co., he referred in his description of the river to the shrine at Kālighāṭ, and made no reference whatever to Calcutta, whose secular era had not yet dawned (Wilson, l. c. 54). Finally, by the 17th cent. of the 18th cen. the repute of Kālighāṭ is apparent. Leading past the town of Calcutta, upon the east, lay a great pilgrim thoroughfare to Kālighāṭ, known as ‘the Road from the East’, now Bentinck St. and Chowringhi Road. The Gaṅga Bhakti Tarasāgi of about A.D. 1740 speaks of Kālighāṭ as a wonderful place, where the worship is celebrated with much pomp and sacrifice (Census of India, 1901, viii. 2. 8. 11, note). The author of the Census Report of 1901 gives good grounds for believing that the shrine and the Tāntic rites associated with Kālī-worship began to rise into prominence at the end of the 16th cent., when the well-known Hindu general Mār-shing ruled Bengal for the Muhammadan Emperor.

The buildings within the temple enclosure are not in themselves in any way distinctive or of architectural note. The features of Kālighāṭ are the packed crowds of worshippers and the great slaughter of young goats on the days of the annual celebrations of the Durgā Pājā and the Kālī Pājā (pājā = ‘worship’). Between seven and eight hundred goats are said to be sacrificed during the three days of the Durgā Pājā. The decapitation taking place within the temple enclosure, it becomes at such times a veritable sea of blood. The trodden earth and blood. From the place of decapitation the heads are carried to be piled up before the idol, and become thereafter temple pious objects. The worshippers carry away the body with him to furnish the family feast.

In this [sacrificing there is no idea of effacing guilt or making various offerings for sin’ (Moher-Williams, Sīkha. Womanism and Hinduism, London, 1901, p. 85). The great mass of the crowd, too poor to offer a goat, press eagerly into the passage before the eastern door of the shrine to enjoy the opportunity of saluting the goddess as they pass and of casting their copper coins at her feet.

Kālighāṭ is of special interest to the student of religions as the chief scene of bloody sacrifices within India, probably in the whole world. Such sacrifices are associated with the worship of certain goddesses—Kali, the mātās, or Mothers, of Western, and the amma, or Mothers, of Southern India, and others. At Kālighāṭ, probably upon an aboriginal basis, they illustrate the later Sāktā and Tāntic aspects of Hinduism.

The Durgā Pājā, supposed to be a festival of the autumnal equinox, falls within the sixth Bengali month, Āśvin, beginning on the first day of the second quarter of the moon (the eighth day of the new moon between 15th Sept. and 15th Oct.). Of the three days, the second is the chief day at Kālighāṭ. The date of the Kali Pājā (kali = black) is fixed by the darkest night, the night of no moon, of the seventh Bengali month, Kartik (the night of no moon between 15th Oct. and 15th Nov.).


KĀLMUKS.—See Mongols.

KALWAR (Skr. kālāpyāla, ‘a distiller’, kālā, ‘spiritsuous liquor’).—The tribe of distillers, liquor-sellers, and traders, the great majority claiming to be Hindu by religion, found in all parts of India, but most numerous in Bihar and Orissa and the United Provinces. Agra and Oudh. At the Census of 1911 they numbered 894,241. Like most of the trading classes of India, the Kalwārs, though probably including some non-Aryan elements, wish to rise in the social scale, and pose as orthodox Hindus, favouring in this way that system which is usually adopted by the mercantile classes. But in Bengal they are still on their promotion, and, though they employ Brahmins for their religious and social rites, these are deemed to be of inferior rank in the priestly order. In the same province with the cultus of the orthodox gods they combine the worship of various minor deities. Thus one sub-caste offers rice and milk to Sokhā on Mondays during the light half of Tārhn (July-August); goats and sweetmeats to Kālī and Bandē on Wednesdays and Thursdays; sucking pigs and spirits to Goralā on Tuesdays. Another sub-caste during the same period presents cakes and sweetmeats to the Pāchperiya; and another offers similar gifts to Barhān Deo in August—September and January—February. All these offerings are eaten by members of the worshipper’s family, except the smoking pigs, which, being lawful food only to the menial castes, are buried after dedication. In the United Provinces the Kalwārs seem to occupy a somewhat higher position than in Bengal, the Brahman and Vaiṣṇāv being received on an equality by their brethren. Here they combine the cult of the Mother-goddess Durgā in the form of Kālākī with that of lower deities like the Pāhlavīs, Pāmlīs, Pathans, and the hero of cholera, Hardaur Lālī, Madain, the god of spiritsuous liquor, though worshipped by the Kalwārs when distillation is going on, is more generally revered by the lower castes, like the Chumārs or carriers, who are addicted to drinking. These people regard an oath by Madain as more likely, if violated, to attract retribution than that by any other god in the pantheon. The Kalwārs specially venerate the amrudī tree (Phylanthus emblica) by feeding Brahmans and performing a fire sacrifice (homa) at its foot. They also revere the nim tree (Melia azedarach) and the pipal (Ficus religiosa), the former being regarded as the abode of the goddess Devī, to which women bow as they pass; the latter as the home of Vasudeva (Krṣṇa) and other gods. They fast on Sundays in honour of Śrīsūti Nārāyana, the sun-god, and pour spirits on the ground in honour ofŚrīś or Śrīyari, who seems to be a form of the earth-goddess. Each house has a family shrine at which the household deities are worshipped. This rite is specially performed at childbirth, and the devotee’s name label is usually Ghāzi Miyan, one of the Pāchhoī Fir, whose symbol, an iron spear, is kept near his shrine.

In the Central Provinces the Kalāra, who are de-
tically with the Kalvāra, worship the defied bridegroom, Dalhā Deo, who is said to have perished in a tragic way during his wedding rites (Crooke, PP, 1896, i. 119 ff.), and a goddess called Rātmā, who is associated with a flat piece of gold or silver. Some, however, have advanced so far in the direction of monotheism that they worship Bhāgavan, 'the glorious, prosperous one,' who is recognized as the Sūryavins. They also practise the cult of its worshipers burning lamps at the Holī, or spring festival, Bāhādur Kaliarāja and his son Susan Chābāri, who were said to be successful distillers, and the ruins of their factories are still pointed out. The assertion that the Halba of Central India worship a pantheon of glorious distillers lacks confirmation.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Risler, TC, Calcutta, 1901, i. 386; W. Crooke, TC, s. o. 1895, i. 114; for the Central Provinces see R. G. Gonda's Stele, 1870, vol. i., pl. 92; J. AS, hill pt. 1, 1892, 397.

W. Crooke

KANAKAMUNI.—Kanakamuni (Pāli Koṣāgamāna), according to the tradition, was the second of the four Buddhas of the present age, his predecessor being Kukuccehaorha (Pāli Kuçaśudda), and his successors Kassapa (Pāli Kassapa) and Sakyamuni himself. The three first are said to have been born in the neighbourhood of Kapilavastu (c.e.), the birthplace of Gautama, in the kingdom of Kāshāra. In the Brahmaputra, the time of Kanakamuni, men lived to the age of 40,000 years. Interest attaches to him, more than to the other predecessors of Gautama Buddha, on account of the discovery in the year 1896, in the course of a detailed archeological exploration undertaken on the border country of India and Nepal, of the pillar erected by the Emperor Aśoka in honour of Kanakamuni and in commemoration of his visit to the place where the sage was believed to have been born.

The Chinese pilgrims Fā-Hian and Huien Tsang both in turn visited the birthplace of Kanakamuni, and have recorded in a few words their journey thither and the condition of the buildings and site. Fā-Hian states that the town where Kanakamuni was born was less than a day's journey from the birthplace of his predecessor Kukucuschamahā, the latter place being twelve days' south-east of Sravasti. There was a stūpa, but no mention is made of the pillar. The narrative of Huien Tsang is as follows:

To the north-east of the town of Kukuccehaorha Buddha, going about 30 li, we came to an old capital (or, great city) in which there is a stūpa: this is to commemorate the spot where Buddha was born. The pillar, however, was not seen.

To the north-east of the city, not far, is a stūpa; it was here, having arrived at complete enlightenment, he met his father.

Further north there is a stūpa containing the relics of his bequahshed body; in front of it is a stone pillar with a line on the top, and about 50 feet high; on this is inscribed a record of the events connected with his Nirvāṇa; this was built by Aśoka.

The 'old town' where Kukuccehaorha was born is stated to have been about fifty 1 li south of Kapilavastu. In his human life human was prolonged to 60,000 years.

Of Kanakamuni, with relics seen by the Chinese monks, no trace appears actually existent. The broken parts of the pillar were found lying on the western bank of a large tank, the Nigila Sagar, south of and about a mile from the village of Nigila, not far from the spot where the pillar erected by Aśoka in commemoration of his visit to Gautama's birthplace was discovered. The tank is now almost dry. The pillar is broken, but the total length of the two fragments still in existence is stated to be about 25 feet. The capital also has disappeared, and with it the lion surmounting the pillar, to which Huien Tsang refers. There is, moreover, no trace of the inscription of which the pillar speaks, but four short lines of Tibetan script record the so-called Buddhist creed Om maṇi padme hūm. The more ancient inscription of Aśoka is imperfect; the pillar itself also has been removed from its original position, and now lies at the top and bottom of the high embankment of the tank.

The inscription is in four lines on the lower broken part of the pillar, which cover over 15 or 16 inches in the height of the stone. The rendering is as follows:

1 Hs. Majesty King Pandyas [i.e. Aśoka] in the fifteenth year of his reign enlarged for the second time the stūpa of Buddha Kusamamun, and (in the twenty-five years of his reign, having come in person, he did reverence, and set up (a stone pillar)."

The approximate position of the pillar is lat. 27° 46' N., long. 82° 10' E.

Of the numerous Buddhas whose names are recorded in the Buddhist books as predecessors of Gautama it would seem therefore historically probable that a real basis of fact underlies the name and personality of Kanakamuni; and also of his successor Kassapa. Nothing more, however, is known of him.

LITERATURE.—The available authorities are cited in the footnotes.

A. S. Gedén.

KANAUI (Skr. kanāj-a-kūpo, 'the crooked maiden,' in allusion to a legend of the hundred daughters of Kumarāha, king of the city, who were rendered deformed by the ascetic Yaśo because they refused to comply with his licentious desires [Rāmāyaṇa, i. 323].—A famous ancient city in the Farrukhabad District of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh; lat. 27° 55' 30" N., long. 80° 37' 45" E. It has been identified with the Kano- giza of Ptolemy, but this is disputed (J. W. McCrindle, Ancient Index as described by Ptolemy, Calcutta, 1855, pp. 194, 227 f.; V. A. Smith, JAS, 1898, p. 178). It was an important seat of Buddhism, as appears from the account by the Buddhist pilgrim Huien Tsang (S. Beal, Buddhist Records, London, 1896, i. 306 ff.); but later, under the Gupta dynasty, it became a centre of Brahmancial Hinduism. Its last king, Chādi Chandra, was defeated by Muhammad Ghori, A.D. 1194 (Smith, loc. cit. 705 ff., Early Hist. of India, Oxford, 1914, p. 385 ff.). As the capital of the great modern region of Oudh (306-645), and a centre of the two chief religions of N. India, it has been reared numerous religious buildings; but of these nothing now remains above the surface. Out of the materials of some of them the fine Jumā Masjid, or cathedral mosque, was built in A.D. 1460 by Ibrahim Shāh of Jaunpur; but the site is still called Sitā-Ka Raso, the 'kitchen of Sitā,' the heroine of the Rāmāyaṇa epic. There are many tombs of Muhammadan saints, the most important being those of Makhān Mahānā, Makhān Akhaś Jamshid, and Balā Pir and his son Shāik Mahādī, famous religious teachers who flourished in the reigns of Shah Jahlān and Aurangzeb. Other names for the city were Kusatsāla, Kana, Gāhidpurā, and Mahodaya (C. Lassen, Ind. Alter-thaneschundes, Leipzig, 1867, 157 ff.).


W. Crooke.

KÄNCHELIPURAM (Conjeeveram).—A city in the Chingleput District. Lying about 45 miles W.S.W. of Madras.

W. A. Smith, JOSA, Oxford, 1893, p. 142.


W. Crooke.
1. Name.—In Tamil literature the most usual form of the name is Kaâkshi, with or without a suffix signifying ‘place,’ and this is probably the original name. Regarding its derivation nothing is known. The name Kâkshi is probably Sanskritized form of the Tamil name, the form Kaâkshi, which is also found, being perhaps a connecting link between the two. The attempt to connect it with kâkhi (‘to shine’) is fanciful. To Kâkshi the Chola people gave the title of ‘Garudam.’ According to the Europeans this was corrupted into Conjeevaram or Conjeeveram. The older forms, however, are still used by the people and by Indian historical writers.

2. Significance.—Kâkshi is included by Sâivas and Vaishnavas alike among the seven cities in all India which are regarded as most sacred. How it first came to be so regarded we cannot tell, but that its fame as a sacred city goes back to ancient times is certain. The oldest buildings date from the 7th cent. of our era, but the place was famous at least eight hundred years earlier. As a home of learning its name has been known for nearly two thousand years. The city is of special interest to the student of architecture. In the oldest temples we can study to great advantage the transition from Buddhist to Hindu architecture, and mark the beginning of the fusion of the two (see Architecture and Art [Hindu], while in some of the temples we can trace the slow evolution of that style through the centuries, until it culminates in the huge structures that astonish the visitor. To the mystic of religion, too, the city offers a unique opportunity. Almost every religious movement that has affected the South for two thousand years and more has been connected in some way with Kâkshi and has left traces of its influence. One has the feeling that, if its story could be fully unravelled, much would be added to our knowledge of the history of South Indian religion. The epigraphical records are unusually numerous, and much valuable work has been done, especially during the last thirty years. But much remains to be done, and many problems remain unsolved. All that is possible in the following sketch is to give the outline of the story, so far as it has been made out with tolerable certainty, with the proviso that further research may lead to some modification in detail.

3. (1) Early period (to 4th cent. A.D.).—The earliest mention of Kâkshi occurs in Patañjali’s Commentary on the Grammar of Pâini; and Patañjali lived not later than the 2nd cent. a.c. The city then seems to have been thriving, and leads to the inference that the place had already been colonized by the Aryans. The Chinese traveler Huen Tsang, who visited the place c. A.D. 640, states that Tâthâgata [Buddha] in olden days, when living in the world, frequented this country much; he preached the law here and converted men. (Buddhist Records of the Western World, tr. S. Beal, ii. 229.) It is possible that an Aryan migration took place as early as Buddha’s day, but that Buddha himself came so far south is extremely improbable. When, however, Huen Tsiang goes on to say, ‘And therefore Asêkâ-nâjâ built the city Kâkshi,’ it the sense of the context, ‘we may accept the substance of the statement as probable, for the Mahâvasuvas—a Buddhist chronicle composed in Ceylon about the 3rd cent. A.D. (T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhas India, p. 86.) It was a result of the wars in which the monks of Kâkshi engaged among those to which Asêka sent missionaries. The fact that no trace remains of Buddhist buildings of any kind is not a fatal objection to this view, for many of the temples of Kâkshi seem to have been the work of the Aryan invaders of the land. If such a temple as the Sâravânsa, a temple of the Mahâanandha, was built in the 3rd cent. a.c., it may have been abandoned by the Buddhists, but would have been used by the Hindus. When Buddhism died, its buildings, like many others, would have been used for other purposes.

Regarding the date of the appearance of Jainism in the South nothing is known; but that it had obtained a footing before the end of this period may be taken for granted, since Huen Tsiang’s testimony shows its prevalence in the South. It may be sure that the Tamil epic, the Mânîmâkalâ, belonged to the 2nd cent. A.D. (see Dravidians [South India]), we would have in it an interesting glimpse of Kâkshi during this period, and testimony to the fact that early on those early days the votaries of the Brahmanical religion (doubtless considerably modified by contact with the Animism of the Dravidians) dwelt in a condition of mutual toleration, if not of actual harmony, with Buddhists and Jains; but regarding the date of this work there is considerable doubt, some recent writers putting it as late as the 8th century.

(2) Pallava period (4th to 8th cent.).—During the greater part of the early period Kâkshi belonged to the Chola empire. Before the end of the period a new power had arisen before which the Chola domination waned. The Pallava, of whose origin nothing can be affirmed with certainty, had established themselves in the Andhra country to the north of Kâkshi about the 2nd cent. A.D., and by the middle of the 4th, if not earlier, they had made Kâkshi their capital (see Architecture and Art [Hindu]). In 586 they were the dominant power in the South, though at times, more especially towards the end of this period, they had to defend themselves against the Chalukyas and the Râjasanukâsas of the North- West, and the reviving Chola power on the South. To this period belongs the visit of Huen Tsiang already mentioned. He describes the city, which he calls Kin-chi-pen-lo, as about 30 li (5 miles) round.

The climate is hot, the character of the people courageous. They are deeply attached to the principles of honesty and truth, and highly esteem learning. In respect of their language and written characters, they differ little but little from those of Mid-India. There are some hundred undevadrus and 10,000 priests. They all study the teaching of the Siddha (Changendrapal) school belonging to the Great Vehicle. There are some eighty Deva temples, and many heretics called Nirgranthas (loc. cit.).

Thus at the time of his visit (A.D. 640) Kâkshi was still a stronghold of the Buddhists. Huen Tsiang mentions Dharmapala, a renowned Buddhist teacher who is said to have flourished shortly before the time of his visit (H. Karm, Mianneum of Indian Buddhism, Strassburg, 1880), as a native of Kâkshi. The Jains (Nirgranthas) apparently lived side by side with the Buddhists. Under the head of ‘Deva temples’ he doubtless included the Seven Sanâkâtras of Kâkshi, and possibly the temples of the ammanas, or Mothers, whom the Dravidians worshipped before the advent of the Aryans. Thus several different forms of Hinduism were already strong; but just about this time began a remarkable revival of Hinduism, before which first Buddhism and then Jainism began to wane. Epigraphical evidence shows that the central shrine of the Kailâsanâtha temple was erected by the Pallava king Rajasîhâ (otherwise known as Narasîhavarman I.) about A.D. 670, and the Vaiâkûnta Perumâl temple a few years later by his son Paramesvaravarman II. (Venkayya, The Pallavas, pp. 199 and 302.) This is so similar in style that they may be placed about the same period, and the resemblance to the rock temples of Mânalipuram (the Seven Pagodas) is very striking. Apart from simple excavations, these temples are the work of the Cholas. The names of the central tower, of the Kailâsanâtha temple, for instance, is in the shape of a stdra, and consists of several storeys built up of imitation stdlas.
The gopuranam, or gate-tower (later), is in the form of a chalisa, and from such simple beginnings the evolution of the great gopuranams, which are such a notable feature of the Dravidian style, may be traced back to Prasanta Panji’s ‘Vijayan. Inst. of Ind. and East. Arch.’ i. 176-175, 392-392.

But the zeal of the Pallava kings, which showed itself in the building of these temples, was not the only factor in the triumph of Hinduism over its rivals in South India. The Pallava period, which is now remaining is alike, during the Pallava period, remarkable groups of poets arose, whose songs in praise of the gods did much to win the people over from Buddhism and Jainism. Appar and Tirumalaisamandhar in the 7th cent., and Sundaranar in the 8th or 9th, were the authors of the hymns in praise of Siva known as the Đivādana. The songs of the twelve Alvars, or Vaigēvva saints, who are placed in the 6th and three following centuries, are gathered up in the Nāalisāgrapattandham. How many of these poets actually lived in Kāché is we cannot say with certainty. Poyga Alvār is said to have been born there (though uncertain), and definite traditions connect Tiruījānasamandhar and Tirunāngai Alvār (9th cent.), among others, with the place. Be this as it may, the shrines of Kāché were well known to many of these singers, five Śiva shrines being mentioned in the Parthasarathy Kēśava shrines in the Nāalisāgrapattandham. These all remain to the present day, though only in cases where the local evidence is confirmed by the archeological can we be sure that the actual buildings which now exist can be traced so far back (K. V. Subrahmanya Aiyar, in Madras Chr. Coll, Mag., new ser. xiii. [1913] 264-267). Before the end of the Pallava period still another force took effect on the temple buildings. The great Śakara is said to have visited Kāché; and, if the usually accepted dates of his life are correct, the visit must have taken place early in the 9th century (66). Thus alongside of the Śaiva Siddhānta of the Đivādana poets, and the Vaigēvvaism of the Alvars, the Advaita (q.v.) system came to be taught.

An image of Śakara stands in the temple of Kāché’s saam for the wife of Śiva), and it is said that the goddess cannot sit beyond the temple precincts without getting permission from Śakara to attend to her business. The temple also boasts of a victory over the goddess, the local tradition being that in Śakara’s day Kāché was a ferocious goddess who could be satisfied with nothing less than human sacrifices, and that Śakara brought much pressure to bear on her as to lead her to abandon her evil ways. The latter part of the Śakara story is a marvelous episode which is no less touching. The temple of Śakara is surrounded by a cluster of the temples of Kāché, and may be of no more historic interest, but it may also interest. Yet it may be an attempt to depict the victory—only partial—of the philosophic idea of Śakara over the worship already mentioned, in which evil goddesses were sacrifices. As Tiruśiva being called to Śrīnāgara, (Saiglapalachāriyar, Vaivāhikē Reformer of India, pp. 97-135). The Chola king of the period was a king who was a kingly king (K. V. Subrahmanya Aiyar, Life of Rāmaṇāja, the poet).

According to local tradition, Śakara conducted a vigorous controversy with the Jains. The fact that nothing is said of the Buddhism in this connection may be an indication that, so far as Kāché was concerned, their day was past. In the 8th and 9th centuries Jainism still flourished, and two of its protagonists, Samantaśaadra and Akalaksa, are associated with Kāché. On the whole, however, Hinduism was gaining ground. Of definite persecution of Buddhism in the temple there is little decisive proof, but the combination of royal favour with the efforts of poets and sages led to the disappearance of the followers of these religions, making their gradual absorption into the Hindu community.

(3) Chola period (9th to 11th cent.).—During this period Kāché passed many times from hand to hand, but throughout the greater part of it the Chola kings were in close touch with the temple. When the capital moved to Thanjavur, the temple was regarded as their principal seat of worship. With this Kāché passed from Hindu to Muhammadan rule (Seewell, loc. cit.; Subrahmanya Aiyar, Madras Chr. Coll, Mag., new ser. xiii. [1814] ; for the Vijayanagara rule in general see Seewell, A Forgotten Empire).

(4) Vijayanagar period (15th to 17th cent.).—After a time of confusion Kāché became a part of the great Vijayanagara empire, which was the capital of a kingdom, it was still regarded as the capital of the province of Tōpanimandalam, and was the seat of a viceroy. Its sanctuaries were recognized by the Vijayanagara kings. Some of them frequented it, and at least one of them had his coronation ceremony performed there. It was in this period that the great temples attained their present huge dimensions, older buildings being added to and adorned, and in some cases surrounded by great courtyards with high walls and lofty gopuranams. The work of many of the kings can be definitely traced through the inscriptions on the temple. We learn that the temples were enriched with many royal gifts. Although the Vijayanagara empire received a severe shock in A.D. 1565, it lingered on as a small kingdom till 1646, when Chandragiri, capital, Chandragiri, was captured by the king of Golkonda. With this Kāché passed from Hindu to Muhammadan rule (Seewell, loc. cit.; Subrahmanya Aiyar, Madras Chr. Coll, Mag., new ser. xiii. [1814] ; for the Vijayanagara rule in general see Seewell, A Forgotten Empire).

(5) Modern period (middle of 17th cent. to the
present day).—During the first century of this period the Dravidian Hindus were in occupation of the place. This was not for their first appearance for in A.D. 1500 Kāñči was captured and plundered by Malik Kaflūr, a general of ‘Alā-ud-dīna of Delhi. A similar disaster befell it in 1481, when it was sacked by Mūḥammād Shāh of Bījāpur.

According to Fīrūzshāh, this conqueror was invited to the attack by what he had heard of the wealth of one of the temples and indeed it appears that the temple was so richly endowed with precious stones (Sewell, A Forgotten Empire, p. 101). Another conqueror, however, whose name is lost in history, invaded the city and the temples with the ground, and overawed all symbols of infidelity, and such a quantity of jewels, valuable pearls, slaves and lovely maidens and all kinds of rarities fell into their hands that they were beyond computation (quoted by Subrahmanyā Iyār, ibid.).

This statement must be regarded as an exaggeration. That great booty was carried off is probable, but, though some temples may have been plundered, others escaped with little damage, and the wealth of the place continued for many years. Such occupation was temporary, but from 1616 to 1731, when it was captured by Bidār, it seems to have been almost continuously under Muhammadan rule, first as part of the kingdom of Golconda, then conquered by generals of Aurangzib, and finally included in the dominions of the Mughal of the Deccan. During the Mysore wars it changed hands many times, the great temples being used as fortresses. Much damage was done, especially by Haidar Ali, who occupied the place in 1768 and again in 1790. In his time the terror of the Hindus was so great that many of the idols were removed to Tanjore and other places, and not till 1799 was confidence sufficiently restored to allow of the return of the deities. The temple had been granted by the Nawab to the East India Company in 1759, and, apart from Haidar’s occupation, it has remained British territory since that date. During the Muhammadan occupation there was much friction between Muhammadans and Hindus.

A number of mosques were erected, and one of the largest was originally a Hindu maṇḍapa (‘pillared hall’), the pillars of which remain, though many of the figures that may have been carved on them have been removed. This mosque bears the date A.H. 1106 (= A.D. 1700), and is said to have been the work of Ramānarkur Ali Khan, who came to take vengeance on the temple and to destroy the person of a Muhammadan who had dared to wash his hands in a sacred tank. The same general credit is given to the completion of the largest of the mosques, which commemorates a Muhammadan sage, Shāh ‘Aḥmad Anīlārāh, regarding whom and his contests with the representatives of Kānṣāli and other deities many wonderful stories are related (for this period see Crole, Manual of the Chingleput District, pp. 141-200).

4. Present condition.—Kāñči now measures nearly 4 miles from N.W. to S.E., with a maximum breadth of about a mile and a half. According to the census of 1811, the population was 53,884. Of these 17,468 were returned as Muhammadans, and 189 as Christians. Only a few families of Jains are left, and the only Jain temple is that already referred to as standing outside the city. A small Sikh monastery where the granth is worshipped forms a raling place for Sikhs pilgrims from the North, who, though not allowed by their creed to worship idols, have a remarkable fondness for visiting Hindu shrines. But, as has been mentioned, or sung gaining, a foothold, the city remains essentially Hindu. The visitor is astonished at the number and size of the temples. He finds, too, that almost everything that comes under the title ‘Hinduism’ is represented in the place.

The old Dravidian worship has survived the impact of all the other forces that have been at work, and the annamams are still worshipped, sometimes by themselves, sometimes in connexion with the Hindu pantheon. For instance, an obscure goddess called ‘Ełlgōli anamman’ is regarded as the mother of Pārvatī, and the latter repairs to her abode every year when her marriage is to be celebrated. In one of the smaller temples, where, among others, the five Pāṇḍavas are worshipped, the principal deity is the Kamakanta, who is identified with Mari, the Dravidian goddess of small-pox. The majority of the gods, however, are either the great gods of the pantheon under special aspects or deities of the city.

The principal divisions of the city are known as Siva Kāñči and Viṣṇu Kāñči. The nomenclature is not strictly accurate, for a number of ancient and important Viṣṇu-vaṁṣa shrines are in Siva Kāñči. The greater temples of this section, however, are connected with the worship of Siva. In the largest of all, Siva is worshipped as Ekāmrānath. Begun in the Pallava times, it was celebrated in the Dīrghun, and associated with the temple is a sanctuary which has been added to by succeeding dynasties till it now stands as one of the largest in India. Its great tower is 188 ft. in height, and the area enclosed within its outer wall is about 25 acres. Near the east end of the temple is the great temple of which Pārvatī is said to have done penance for putting her hands over Siva’s eyes. The principal object of worship is the purīta (‘earth’) Ṛṣṭipati. Among the other objects now worshipped are the sixty-three Saiva saints. During the last twenty years over 210,000 has been spent on the renovation of the temple by a few wealthy members of the Nayakkoṭal Čhēṭti caste. Second in size among the Saiva temples comes that of Kānṣāli, already mentioned more than once. Siva Kāñči contains seven tanks of special sanctity, each being specially sacred on one day of the week. The largest is the Sarvārtham, in which all the Indian rivers are believed to have gathered to witness the penance of Pārvatī. The temples which are shown by architectural evidence to belong to the Pallava period are all in Siva Kāñči, and all except one are Saiva temples.

In Viṣṇu Kāñči the greatest temple is that of Viṣṇu under the name of Varadarāja (i.e., the kindly giver of boons). It contains in its internal chambers the statues of the Chola and Vijayanagar periods (Sewell, Antiquities, where it is called the Arulal Perumal temple). Although it cannot be distinctly traced further back, it was already famous when Rāmānuja attached himself to it early in the 11th century. It measures about 190 ft. in length and 500 in breadth, being unsurpassed in size in the whole city except by the Ekāmrānath Temple. Its hall of 100 pillars is an excellent specimen of the carving of the Vijayanagar period. Although the temple is said to have been plundered by Haidar, it still has great wealth. It is said that a Brahman devotee vowed that he would not eat on any day till he had collected in all Rs.24,000, with which valuable ornaments were purchased. Rāmānuja and other great Śaiva (or Vaṁṣa, or Vaṁśa teachers), and several of the Alvars, are worshipped within the precincts. The comprehensive nature of Hinduism is illustrated by the fact that at one end of the temple the lofty philosophy of Rāmānuja is taught in a Sanskrit college, while nearer the outer end the Sastras are presented to a Saiva college. The great festival of this temple is by far the most important of all that are connected with the city. It takes place in the month of Vaiḍākī (May–June), and lasts nominally for ten days, but, as often happens, the great day, and seldom occupies less than three, the
festival usually continues at least twelve days. Except on the seventh day, when the idol is drawn in a huge chariot which takes about a thousand people to pull, the image, adorned with the temple peacock on morning and evening on different vehicles. The idol is carried along the narrow main street of Vipsa Kanchi, the broad street of Siva Kanchi (said to date from Chola times); and, after going round that portion of the city, it returns, the temple being distant about six miles. According to the local legends, Vipsa and Siva are brothers-in-law, and the Vaigaiva deity on the sixth day of the festival rests for a time in a mandapam in front of Siva's great temple. A strange relic of the Muhammadan domination is found in the fact that, when the daily procession reaches a mandapam near the tomb of Shah Amid Anilah, a representative of that stage receives tribute in the shape of two small cakes of different kinds, one in the morning, and the other in the evening. On the third day of the festival, when the image is carried on the garuda, or mythological kite, which is Vipsa's special vehicle, it has to submit to the doubtful compliment of receiving a garland from the representatives of a small shrine belonging to the Varaha. During these days large crowds, including many of the pilgrims, assemble from far and near, and men of wealth vie with one another in meeting the expense of the fireworks and other means of popular enjoyment. At times, and especially during the festival, the authorities have to be on their guard to prevent rioting between the two sects of the Vaigaivas, the Teikakais and the Vayakalais. The old feud between Hindus and Mahommedans is at an end, and Satish and Vayakai no longer manifest the rivalry of an earlier day. The controversy is now between these two sects into which Ramanuja's followers are divided, and, while the general majority of the sectarians know little or nothing of the points of difference, feeling always runs high, and law-suits dealing with the position of the two sects in connexion with the temple worship go up from court to court, occasionally even reaching the Privy Council. While the festival of Varadaraja far surpasses all others, there are probably not many days in the year when some temple or other is not on Féla; and quite apart from festivals a stream of pilgrims from the most distant parts of India pours unstoppably through the place. For their entertainment many choutories ('rest-houses') have been built and endowed.

KANCHULIYAS.—A class of Indian Sákkas (q.v.). The name is derived from the Skr. kañchula, 'a bodice.' They are found in Southern India. [Madras Manual of Administration, I, Madura, 1886, where they are called Kâńchuliyas (from kâñjula, the Tamil corruption of kañchula), and have also been noted in Bombay. They are adherents of the most extreme left-handed Sáka doctrines, their chief cult being cinnamal in the pernicious intercourse of the sexes. This ceremony is called ghatu-kañchula, 'jar and bodice.' The number of male and female celebrants must be equal. A jar is placed in the centre of the place of worship, into which each woman throws her bodice, leaving the upper part of her body exposed. An orgy of eating and drinking is followed by each man taking at random a bodice from the jar, perving with its owner, however near in kin to him she may be, for the rest of the night.

KANDH, KHOND (the derivation of the name is uncertain; G. Oppert, Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarga, 1853, p. 144), connects their title Koi, Ku, with ko, ku, 'a mountain'; Risley, TC 306, connects it with Khonds, 'a sword,' said to be the distinguishing mark of the Khonds. According to the Census found in Bengal and Madras, the bulk of those formerly residing in the Central Provinces having passed into Bengal on the transfer to that province of the States of Kálahandi and Patna and the Sambalpur District. According to the Census of 1911, they number 673,346, of whom 335,137 are found in Madras, 332,589 in Bihar and Orissa, and the remainder in Bengal, the Central Provinces and Berar, and Assam. The tribe has for a long time attracted the attention of anthropologists owing to their custom of human sacrifice, known as Merik. But, owing to their isolation, the information regarding them is still incomplete.

1 Much has been written about them: but from reports received it seems clear that observers have not yet been so well placed as to be too ready to attribute to the whole of the tribe customs which are only locally observed. Many people are split up, as they are, by hill and jungle intermixture, so that the Khonds cannot easily communicate with one another naturally develop considerable diversity in their ways (Madras Census Report, 1911, p. 161).

1. The tribe in Bengal.—The earliest and most generally accepted account of their beliefs is that of S. C. MacPherson (Memorials of Service in India, ch. vi. p. 84 f.).
KANDHE, KHOND

He represented them as believing in 'One Supreme Being, self-existing, the source of good, and Creator of the universe, of the ancient gods, of the sun and moon, of the waters and the earth, and of all the various things in heaven and earth and in the seas' (p. 293). He expresses wonder that such a pantheon as Macpherson founded on a collection of savages (p. 199), would exist among such ignorant people, 'and in the course of my long inquiries and researches, I found nothing in the hill districts resembling the array of deities held in veneration by them, and the sources of all evil.' Finding her wanting in worldly compliance, he determines to show her, without embarrassment, the 'true' or, to be sure, the 'pantheon,' of the Khonda people. He describes the Khonda as a 'most irreligious people' (p. 293). They have no idols more attached to the wood of log, sometimes rudely fashioned after the manner of some animal head, and usually used on the occasion of the immolation of a human victim; and he describes the sacrifice of a priest, corresponding to the elaborate system of idolatory provided for this semi-barbarous people (p. 293). Campbell, it is true, was, for official reasons, hostile to Macpherson. But he was too honest to trust his general conclusion that Macpherson, who knew little of the tribe, had, in a sense, fallen under any native sublimations. The whole story illustrates the danger of keeping with their own social organization, and in his account of the sacrifice of a priest, he himself he who has access to such a people. The Khondas recognize three principal gods—Dharna Pennu, Siru Pennu, and Dundu. Siru Pennu is the god of rain, while Dundu is the god of fire. The third class of inferior deities is again divided into two parts, the one being the period of 'chance' or 'chance', and the other being the period of 'chance' or 'chance', the two of which are maintained in the Khondas.}

2. Human sacrifice.—The chief interest in the religion of the Khondas rests in their system of human sacrifice, which has now, under the pressure of the British, been discontinued. A full account of these rites, based on the narratives already quoted—Macpherson, Campbell, Dalton, Jesuit, is given by J. G. Frazer in his *GFP*, vol. 1 (London, 1912) p. 245 ff. As Frazer's account of the Khondas is generally accepted, a bare summary is required. The *Merikas* (Oriya *meriki, from Kandi *meri, meri, meri, a human victim; * see Men, xi. [1911] 39) were sacrificed to Siru Pennu, the earth-goddess, to ensure good crops and immunity from disease and accidents. It was necessary that they should be bought for a price, and they were procured
through the agency of the menial Pān tribe from the plains of Bengal. The victim was well treated before the sacrifice, which was preceded by several days of feasting and dancing. The newlyweds were smeared with oil, butter, and turmeric. There was a struggle to secure relics of his person while he was tied to the sacrificial post. This post was often in the form of a peacock or elephant. The only supply of the body was preserved in the Madras Museum (E. Thurston, *Tastes and Tribes*, iii. 371, with photograph, p. 377). Before sacrificing the victim, he was sometimes led in procession, and he was finally killed by means of pins, knives, or clubs. His flesh was divided among the participants in the rite, who buried it in their fields. Frazer disputes the theory that the contemporaneous accounts of the rite, that the victims were offered to propitiate the earth-goddess. The custom, he thinks, cannot be explained merely as a propitiatory sacrifice. Part of the flesh was certainly offered to the goddess; but the rest was buried in the fields, or the ashes were scattered over them; some was laid in the form of paste in the granaries, or mixed with the new corn.

'These latter customs imply that to the body of the Merah the power of growing was imputed. Power of growing crops, quite independent of the instinct to eat which it might have as an offering to secure the good-will of the deity. In other words, the flesh and ashes of the victim were believed to imbibe the magical or physical power of fertility and growth. The body of the Merah was sacred to the blood and tears of the Merah, his blood causing the redness of the turnip and his tears producing rain. For it can hardly be denied that originally at least the tears were supposed to bring down the rains, not merely to propitiate it. Similarly the flesh of the Merah was believed to give rise to new life, for the flesh of the Merah was no doubt a rain-cult. Again, magical power as an attribute, the Merah appears in the sovereign virtue believed to reside in anything that came from his person, as his hair or spittle. The sacrifice of such power to the Merah indicates that the race had more respect for its gods than a mere man could be expected to propitiate a deity. Once more, the extremes reinforce each other, and the primitive tendency to regard a valued gift as a sacrifice to a divinity is thus suggested .... In short, the Merah seems to have been regarded as divine. As such, he may originally have represented the Earth Goddess or, perhaps, a deity of vegetation; though in later times he came to be regarded rather as a victim offered to a deity than as himself an immortal god' (GP, v. vol. i. p. 320).

3. Beliefs in the Central Provinces.—The following account refers to the tribe before its migration to Bengal. The belief in a future state is indicated by the death customs. A rupee or copper coin is tied in the shroud, so that the deceased may not go penniless to the other world. Sometimes his clothing and arrows are buried with him. On the tenth day the soul is brought back to his family. Outside the village, where two roads meet, rice is offered to a cock, and if it eats it is a sign that the soul has come. The soul is then asked to ride on a bow-stick covered with cloth, and this is brought to the house and placed in a corner with those of other relatives. The souls are fed annually with rice at the harvest and Dusserah festival. In Sambalpur a ball of powdered rice is placed under a tree with a lighted lamp near it, and the first insect that settles on the ball is supposed to be the soul, and it is brought back to the house and reverenced. The souls of infants who die before the umbilical cord has dropped off are not brought back, because they are considered scarcely to have come into existence. One cause of female infertility is said to be the death of the soul of the girl child who would not be born again. The souls of women who die during pregnancy, or after a miscarriage, or during the monthly period of impurity, are not brought back, but unless they are held to be malignant spirits (Etymological Survey Central Provinces, p. vii. [1911] p. 55).

'The Semi-jātrā, or frog festival, is held in Noor...
fasted all day, are obliged to eat; drinking and
dancing follow for two days, during which time
the manure is not removed from the shed. On
the third day a lump of manure is brought out
by each owner and thrown in a heap, over which
the procession passes four times. Behind this
there are taken before a basket containing a
blood-sucker (lizard), a bit of tiger's skin, a
peacock's feather, earth from an sat-hill, rice mixed
with paddy, and blood. Witchcraft is com-
mon, and various forms of ordeal are used,
such as holding the hand of the suspected
person in boiling water; if the hand is scalded,
the accused is condemned and has to pay a fine
to the tribe (ib. lll. 408 f.). From a still more recent
account it appears that the Hindu belief in karma
and reincarnation is not found, except in a vague
way, among those who have come in contact with
the people of the plains. They certainly believe
in the survival of the spirit after death, and in
its possible temporary transference during life, it
being commonly supposed that the spirit of a man
killed by a tiger takes the animal in its search
for other victims. But it is very difficult to dis-
tinguish their beliefs from those of the Hinduized
peasantry in their neighbourhood. Their gods are
Bra Penu, who with his wife Piti (probably the
Santhi) and the caste head, is not only the creator of
tigers, who controls a host of minor gods; Dondo
Penu, god of hunting, who lives in sacred trees
which no one dares to cut; Lohna Penu, god of
iron, who guides the arrows of his votaries
against the enemy and averts their counter-shafts;
Odu Penu, god of the outside, who is the village
warden, in which duty he is assisted by Dandere
Penu, the door-keeper, who watches the back
of the village, Dami Penu, who watches the inside
from beneath a heap of stones, beside which a
rotten egg is buried, Teki Penu, god of vessels,
who guards the house goods, and Goheen Penu,
god of the stable, who protects the animals from
tigers. Besides these are Mardo and Rugo, deities
of smallpox and cholera; another god whose ac-
activity is chiefly shown by his demanding tobacco;
and a god of proverbs and a hot spring at which
worship is offered. If there is no actual ancestor-
worship, tales are told of hero and giant fore-
 fathers (Maduras Census Report, 1911, p. 62 ff.).

KANDY.—Kandy is a modern town in
Ceylon, beautifully situated on the border of a lake
in a plain about 1713 ft. above sea level, and about
7 miles near NW. of Colombo. The moun-
tains, 3000 to 4000 ft. higher, rise around it; and
in the Sinhalese time the town was difficult to
approach, being surrounded by thick jungle. It
was the residence of the kings of Ceylon from
1632 to 1798. During this period the kingdom of
Ceylon had reached the lowest depth of disorder
and decay. Half its territory was lost; and the
half still remaining was harassed by frequent civil
wars between rival dynasties to the throne; and
when one or other of these claimants succeeded
in gaining the upper hand over his rivals, there
were recurring struggles against outside enemies—
Tamil, Portuguese, Dutch, and, finally, English.
These rival claimants to the throne were not
Sinhalese but South Indians by blood, and by re-
ligion, though nominally Buddhist, were as heart
Hindus. They built four devulas, Hindu temples,
in the town.

Kandy unfortunately gives no description of
Kandy. But we have a good one by John Pybus,
who was there in 1762. It is preserved in "Account
of Mr. Pybus's Mission to the King of Kandy,"
reprinted from the Madras Government records by the
Government printer in Ceylon in 1882. We read there
(p. 35) that the town then consisted of two
main streets (the one running north and south
being about a mile long) and covered quite 300
yards. Only a few of the houses were tiled. The streets
were not flat; but about 8 o'clock a bell was rung
along them, and after that no one was allowed
alone unless as watcher of the gate (ib. p. 35).
The Palace was a rambling pile to the south of
these streets with a large garden in front of it. This
is confirmed by J. Forbes,2 but in his time the lake
which Pybus does not mention was con-
structed 'by the late king' Raja Sinha in 1787.
J. E. Tennent, writing about 30 years later,3
describes the modern European town, and the
wonderful road to it up the Kadugannawa Pass.
It is now a prosperous little place of about 25,000
inhabitants, with a busy railway station, and many
villas on the slopes of the surrounding hills.

The English name, Kandy, is a corruption of
the old name, not of the town, but of the county or
province in which it was situated. This was
Kanda-uda ("Up in the Hills"). The Sinhalese
name of the town was Senkada-gala-nuwara.

Besides the four Hindu temples there are two
small viharas, or residences for members of the
Buddhist Order, named respectively Asgiriya
and Malwattie Vihara. No one, according to a regu-
lation issued by the vice-chancellor of the old Vinaya
(Rules of the Order), by the Sinhalese court,
can be received into the Order except at a chapter
held at one or other of these viharas.2 There is
also the well-known Daładā Mahāvīra, a pretty
little building containing the supposed tooth of the
Buddha—really not a human tooth at all, but
possibly the tooth of some pre-historic animal.
The history of this supposed relic is long and
complicated, and has been the subject of various
writings. In the 18th cent. Dhammad-kitti wrote a
Pali poem about it based on an older Sinhalese
work in prose.4 According to the tradition pre-
served in this poem, the tooth was brought to
Ceylon in the 4th cent. of our era, and had re-
mained there up to the time when the poem,
Dīṭhā Vāmas, was written. According to Portu-
guese accounts quoted by Tennent (loc. cit.),
the Portuguese captured the tooth, ground it to
powder, and threw the powder into the harbour
at Gona. The Sinhalese say that the tooth thus
destroyed was a Hindu relic seized by the Portu-
guese in the Tamil country at Jaffna, and that
the Buddhist relic now in Kandy is identical with
the one whose history was written by Dhammad-kitti.

3 See Forbes, op. cit. l. 292.
4 Edited by the present writer in Roman characters in JPTS, 1894.
Kandy was taken by the English in 1815, and the king of Kandy was deported to Vellore in S. India, where he subsequently died.

**LITERATURE.**—The authorities are given in the article.

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**KANHERI—KANJAR**

(Skr. कण्यपुरी, ‘hill of Kṛṣṇa’).

—one of the most important of the Buddhist cave temples in the island of Salsette, about 16 miles N. of Bombay; lat. 19° 19' N.; long. 72° 59' E.

The site, lovely, picturesque, and close to the great visting routes of the W. coast, combines the three leading characteristics of the chief groups of W. India temples. *But Kanheri is the only rock-cut monastery in W. India that has the feeling of having been, and of being ready again to be, a pleasant and popular dwelling-place. The rows of cells, water-cisterns, dining-halls, lecture-halls, and temples joined by worn flights of rock-cut steps, and the crowded burial gallery show what a huge brotherhood must have once lived in Kanheri.* (B.G xiv. [1882] 123). The caves were excavated at various periods, the great Chaitya cave bearing an inscription of Yajña Śrī Gautampitita Suryasena, the 4th king of the Andhra dynasty (A.D. 176-202) (V. A. Smith, *Early Hist.*, Oxford, 1914, p. 211). Not far off is the Darbār Cave, which is not a vihāra in the ordinary sense of the term, though it has cells, but a Dharānīśvara or place of assembly, and is the only cave now known that enables us to realize the arrangements of the great hall erected by Ajāta Śatru in front of the Sattapanni cave at Rājagṛha, to accommodate the first conversion held immediately after the death of Buddha (Fergusson-Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, London, 1880, p. 333).


**W. CROOKE.**

**KANISKA.**—Kaniska was an Indo-Scythian king of N. India and Afghanistan, who plays the part of a second Asoka in the traditions of the Buddhist school of N. India, Tibet, China, and Mongolia, especially as the convener of a council held in Kashmir, or, according to certain authorities, at Jalandhar (see Councils [Buddhist]). His name is sometimes spelt Kaniska in inscriptions on coins in Greek script as *Kanaši*, or in the genitive *Kanikōnum*, which some scholars read as *Kanisaki* and *Kanishka* respectively. Kashmir tradition gives the variant Kanisak, which becomes Kanjīka in Chinese.

He was a member of the Kuskāni (Kusāna, Gūsana, or, according to von Holsteiin, Koṣa) section of the great Yuechi nation of Central Asian nomads, and is mentioned in numerous Indian inscriptions bearing dates ranging from 3 to 41. Prolonged controversy has ranged round the interpretation of these dates, and general agreement has not yet been attained. In the opinion of the present writer, it is certain that Kanisaka was the immediate successor of Kāpkīṣhā II. (Wims, etc., of coins and inscriptions, Yen-kao-chhi, etc., of Chinese), and almost certain that his accession (overthrowing not being mentioned) coincides with A. D. 78, the epoch of the Saka era. That era appears to have been established by Kanisaka.

Kanisaka, who is often described as king of Gandhāra, had his capital at Puruṣapura, now the city of Peshawar, a powerful monarch, whose influence, as Huien Tsang (Yuan Chwang) testifies, extended to distant regions, even into the basin of the Tārān beyond the Pānār. He held all the countries now included in the kingdoms of Afghanistan, and was the lord paramount of the whole of N.W. India. His arms are said to have penetrated to Pātaliputra, and his dominions included Sind. His viceroy, called ‘satrapa’ after the Persian fashion, ruled W. India from Nāsk and Ujjain. He warred against the Parthians, and in his later years seems to have made an expedition from China the regions now known as Chinese Turkestan. It is said that he was murdered by discontented officers while he was engaged in a campaign. Vāsakā and Kuśika (Huśika), probably his sons, appear to have ruled the Indian provinces on his behalf, while he was absent on his distant wars. Vāsakā apparently preceeded him. Huśika certainly succeeded him in the rule of the entire empire, probably about A.D. 123. The father of Kanisaka was Vajraśaka (Vajrāsaka), presumably a near relation of Kadphises II.

During the long reign of Kanisaka his Indian subjects divided their allegiance among the three great indigenous religions—Buddhism in its various forms, Brahmanical Hinduism, and Jainism. Kadphises II. had favoured the Saiva form of Hinduism, but there is no evidence that Kanisaka took any interest in the doctrines of the Brahmans. The occurrence of numerous Persian deities on his coinage suggests that in early life he may have been a Zoroastrian, and that many of his subjects must have been adherents of the creed of Zoroaster. In his life the king became an active patron of Buddhism. He placed the image of Buddha on his coins, summoned a council of Buddhist theologians to prepare commentaries on the scriptures, and erected magnificent sacred buildings, notably the lofty stūpa of Peshawar, the foundations of which have recently been excavated. The explorers found a relic casket engraved with the names of Kanisaka and his Greek superintendent, Agesilaus, and adorned with images of the king. An inscribed portrait statue of him, unfortunately headless, has been discovered near Mathura. Tradition associates Kanisaka with Advaghaśa (q.v.), who was a pupil of Pārvā, by whom the council was summoned, according to some authorities. The president is said to have been Vasuki, Advaghaśa being content with the vice-presidency. The date of the council may be stated as ±A.D. 100, but, of course, it depends on the view taken of the chronology of the reign.

The powerful patronage doubtlessly promoted the cause of Buddhism in both India and Chinese Turkestan.

**LITERATURE.**—V. A. Smith, *The Early History of India*, Oxford, 1914, which gives abundant references. V. A. SMITH.

**KANJAR.**—One of the nomadic, gypsy-like tribes of N. India. At the Census of 1911 they numbered 22,932.

They are found in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh and the Panjāb, with smaller groups in other parts of N. India. They wander about in gangs, supporting themselves by the usual gypsy industries, but more especially by theft and high-way robbery. According to J. C. Nesfield (*Culcuta Repository*, xxxvii. [1882] 388 ff.), they possess no idols, temples, or priesthood. They are in constant dread of evil spirits, the souls of the malignant dead. To these they attribute all deaths, except those obviously due to old age. Hence they bury the dead in deep graves to prevent the ghost from ‘walking’; and they believe that such spirits are under the control of an exorcist (nāgavāja), who by means of shamanistic rites is supposed to be able to transport a goblin into the body of some living person, and make that person his mouthpiece for declaring its will. Their principal deity is a man-god, Mān, believed to be one of the ancient worthies of the tribe. He is worshipped chiefly in the rainy season, when the tribe is less migratory.
than at other times. No altar is erected, no image is worshipped; but his votaries collect under a tree, where they sacrifice a pig, goat, sheep, or fowl, and make an offering of roasted flesh and spiritual liquor. Formerly, it is said, they used to sacrifice a dog, but this has made it impossible by draughts of fermented palm-juice. At the feast which follows most of the worshippers get drunk, and occasionally one of them declares himself to be possessed by the tribal god, and then dances round the tree, singing songs commemorating the wisdom and valor of Māna. Mari, the goddess of death or epide- my, known also as the 'Queen goddess' (Mahārāṇī Devi), is supreme, and seems to be worshipped as the animating and sustaining force of nature. Parbhā or Parbhā, goddess of light, controls health, and more particularly the welfare of cattle. With her is worshipped Bhuyān or Bhavāṇi, the earth-god.

In other parts of the United Provinces they are specially devoted to the worship of deceased ancestors, who are regarded as more kindly than among other infidels, and are satisfied if at marriages and other festive occasions platters of food are laid on their graves. The chief deified worthies are Dāmīnī Devī, or Mānī, and Pahlīvān, or the wrestler. To their graves they make pilgrimage, make a pig and pour spirits on the ground. The offering of meat is eaten in secrecy and silence by the males of the tribe, no woman being allowed to be present or to share in the meal. When they have become more elaborate they worship Vindhyavāsinī Devī, the guardian goddess of the Vindhyahills, and the Pāshaṅ Bhīrā (see PACHPIRYA) with the sacrifice of a cock. They also revere many of the local gods of the villages through whom they want, and one clan in particular is specially devoted to the cult of Nānak, the guru of the Sikhs, to whom they make a special prayer: 'Praise be to thee, who hast preserved us in safety for a year! We hope for the same favour in the future!'

They are devoutly devoted to mononology, and a special medicine-man, known as the wise one (ṣyānā), is appointed to propitiate those spirits which are believed to be responsible for the evils which beset the tribe. When a person is attacked by some disease which indicates spirit possession, the ṣyānā makes an offering of treacle, butter, clove, imence, and red lead to the tribal Devī, by throwing these through the four sides of the fire. The Devī enters the ṣyānā who names the evil spirit which is afflicting the patient. He then places a cup of spirits on the sick man's head, and waves it round him. This causes the spirit to enter the cup, which the ṣyānā drinks, thus taking upon himself the dangerous influence which has caused the disease.

In more serious cases an offering is placed on the spot where four roads meet (cf. Westernarz, Mf. ii. 226, n. 2). The friend of the sick man sings and beats a brass tray over his head to scare the evil spirit, which is believed to enter the offering and thence be transferred to any passer-by who may accidentally touch it. The ṣyānā, or ghost of a woman dying in a state of impurity, is much dreaded. The ghosts of young children take the form of maśān, the evil spirit which haunts graveyards. Any one dying by sleight of some other abnormal way becomes an ātāt, i.e. one for whom there is none to make the water oblation which causes the repose of the soul. The tribal beliefs are thus a combination of the personal worship of the tribesman and of Hindoo beliefs and usage. There are some indications of totemism, but this is closely connected with tree-worship, the tamarind being regarded as the special abode of the gods, and a kind of root grass and the leaves of the mango being fixed upon the marriage shed.

LITERATURE.—W. Crooke, TV. Calcutta, 1896, iii. 136 ff.; H. A. Rose, Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province, Lahore, 1912, i. 47 ff.; W. CROOKE.

KANPHATA.—See YOGIS.

KANT.—1. Life and principal works. Immanuel Kant was born on 22nd April 1724 at Königsberg, in the province of Eastern Prussia. His father was a leather-worker in poor circumstances. Kant believed that his grandfather was a Scotch immigrant, and that the original form of the name had been Cant, the initial having been changed to avoid the pronunciation (Tsani); but there seems to be no documentary proof of this. He entered the University of Königsberg in 1740, registering himself as a student of theology; but the subjects of the preparatory ('philosophical') course, especially natural science and philosophy, soon claimed his interest. After completing his course he acted as a private tutor in several families in the neighbourhood. In 1755 he took his degree with honours, and was satisfied with private study and writing books, one year was like another. He never travelled beyond the borders of his native province; he never married; and he reduced the details of life to a clock-work regularity. Towards the close of his working days he was officially reprimanded for the breadth of his theological views, but he made his peace with the government. In personal character he was simple and reserved, generous and pious, and the reputation that ultimately came to him left him quite unspoiled. He ceased lecturing in 1786, and his increasing weakness of body and mind ended with his death on 12th Feb. 1804.

The development of Kant's thought is a very complex subject. Taken broadly, it consisted of two great periods, the pre-critical and the critical, with an interval between them of about ten years, when he was feeling his way to the position that was to prove so epoch-making. In the pre-critical period itself we can trace shorter stages. His doctrine of the sensibility or the 'pure' intuition of space, time, and causality, which may be added to the Thesaurus of Gottes Herren, erläutert durch Trümmer der Metaphysik (do. 1766), in his inaugural lecture as professor, De mundi sensibilis et intelligib. formulis (Göttingen, 1784), and Versuch den Begriff der negativen Griechen in die Weltanschauung eines deutschen Gelehrten (Berlin, 1785), to which he is indebted for the critical solution, and gave the first instalment of its exposition in the Versuch den Begriff der reinen Vernunft (Riga, 1781; 2nd ed., with important changes, do. 1787). Later, in his Gesammelte Werke (Adickes, Berlin, 1889, also in tr. of Max Müller, 1881). The great works of the critical period are named below; to them
may be added *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (d. i. 1773), and *Metaphysik der Sitten* (Königsberg, 1780-97), dealing with law and the virtues. His interest in the problems and principles of natural science can be traced all through his life, as, e. g., in his early work, *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* (Königsberg, 1755), and *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (Köln, 1786).

2. Kant in the history of philosophy.

(a) *His direct relation to Leibniz*.—Kantianism is the characteristically German philosophy just as the philosophy of France is to this day more or less determined by Cartesianism, and English philosophy is essentially characterized by the thought of Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. The Germans lagged behind the other European peoples in taking a place in the movement of modern philosophy, but at length they secured in Leibniz (q. v.) a thinker who combined the new conceptions of modern philosophy in one grand system, from which, again, in virtue of a profound transformation, the Kantian philosophy sprang the philosophy of Kant. The Kaatian teaching is certainly a radical metamorphosis of the Leibnizian system as far as regards the method by which *a priori* knowledge is discovered, established, and delimited, and yet it is at the same time an essentially unchanged continuation of Leibniz's views regarding the nature and meaning of reality. Even as regards method, indeed, Kant's advance upon his predecessor must not be exaggerated. The system of Leibniz belongs to the rationalistic, Platonic type of speculative philosophy, or, in other words, it is an *a priori* doctrine of ideas, and this holds good also of the system of Kant.

The only real difference is that in the latter the *a priori* forms of knowledge are deduced, and applied, and have their limits assigned, in a different way. In order to understand the system of Kant we must, therefore, first of all make a rapid survey of that of Leibniz.

(b) *The system of Leibniz*.—Leibniz, like the other pioneers of modern philosophy, started from the empirical-inductive and mathematically-mechanical science of nature, and, in point of fact, from physics, the only natural science that had at that time attained any adequate development. Having adopted the doctrine that nature is built up of infinitesimal elementary bodies, he followed up the idea of a substance that must be assumed for the interaction and orderly inter-relations of these. This force he regarded as something immaterial, and this immaterial constituent, again, he described as a thinking, perceptive, or quasi-conscious power, thus applying to it the only term that was then available to denote a non-material reality. In this way he made the transition from a materialistic and mechanical to a spiritualistic and dynamic mode of thought. If the elements of force be taken as in reality a thinking substance, however, its activities in relation to the other elements of force, as also the latter themselves, will appear as ideas or perceptions of the element of force. Such an element thus becomes the monad, which perceives itself and its orderly relations to the other monads. Now it would be irrational to speak of this monad and its imagery of perceptions as the sole existing object. There must be a plurality of monads, existing *rester* side by side. This hypothesis, however, is possible only on the ground of two presuppositions, viz. (1) that the coexisting monads have each the same ordered and logically articulated content of perceptions or a condition which is explained by the pre-established harmony of the monads with one another, and (2) that each single monad virtually holds within itself the whole universe, though it may bring only a part of it to clear consciousness. This position elucidated by Leibniz's theory of the unconscious, or of the conscious in an infinitely small degree. We are thus brought to a thoroughly spiritualistic system, in which, by an essential necessity of reason, the individual monads severally perceive themselves and the universe contained in them as organic wholes, and, notwithstanding their absolute isolation, are in harmony with one another in virtue of the aggregate perceived and articulated by them. The various monads are endowed in very different degrees with the consciousness of the self-perceptive power, but are nevertheless connected and unified through the identity of the content variously known to each. Thus knowledge—in cases where the monads really have knowledge—may be interpreted as a process of discerning the content of consciousness according to the *a priori* laws immanent therein. From the condition of the non-conscious, or the pre-conscious, Leibniz disengages the rationally necessary laws and concepts in order that he may by means of them construct the system of the world as a complete whole. The ultimate pre-condition of all, indeed, is a self-identical, perfectly and logically conceived cosmic content, i.e., the self-transformed nature of the divine universal substance, covered by the infinite multiplicity of different monads, each of which contains in its own individual way the divine world-substance, and, in the measure of its individual capacity of becoming conscious, brings that content to a logically ordered comprehension. Philosophy is thus simply the measure of completeness and clearness to which the human monad can attain in its perception of the cosmic content.

(c) *Kant's reconsideration of Leibniz under the stimulus of Hume*.—Kant adhered to the views of Leibniz for about twenty years of his mature life, making modifications of them only in detail, more especially on the physical, mathematical, and astronomical sides. To the starting-point of the monadology in general, however,—its analysis of consciousness and of the content of consciousness—as well as to its idea of the *a priori* validity of the national laws that regulate that content, Kant remained permanently faithful, and we shall never understand his position unless we make full allowance for this survival in time of the dominant point of view and tendency. He was at no time the pure phenomenalist, who acknowledges only subjective phenomena within what might be called the closed space of consciousness, but he has always dealt with the thinking subject as a central force working towards the logical unification of the manifold, and rejected the idealism or phenomenalism of Berkeley—what German philosophers now call 'psychological idealism.' Moreover, he never denied the a priori of the logical laws, or their being evolved from their pre-conscious self-activity. He was never a sceptic or an agnostic, never a pragmatist or a relativist. The point which marks his departure from the philosophy of Leibniz and from which he proceeded to construct his own system was quite apart from such considerations. It was simply this, that he could not permanently remain blind to the fact that, while a system like that of Leibniz might logically articulate the reality immanent in consciousness, it was essentially incapable of passing beyond that sphere of predication anything whatever that transcended reality, that which transcends consciousness. Leibniz's conception of God, his doctrine of the pre-established harmony, and of the individualization of the reality into countless monads, was in their capacity of thought, at length seemed too Kantian, as already to other disciples of Leibniz, to be mere philosophical myths—figments of the imagination.
From this standpoint Kant began to suspect all forms of metaphysical theory, as they did not permit of strict demonstration and showed no unanimity in their conclusions. Although he continued to attach the utmost significance to the practical everyday experience of the mind, he now came to doubt the possibility of developing and establishing them as realities of a transcendent metaphysics.

If, however, the Leibnizian mode of reaching the reality beyond consciousness from the content of consciousness itself and from the reflexion guided by a priori laws was thus invalid, philosophy was thrown back upon what is immanent in consciousness. But, if this were so, of what avail were the a priori laws which enable us to articulate in thought our conscious experience? They never carry us into the sphere beyond consciousness; can we, therefore, cognize anything at all by means of them? Are they not, with their a priori necessity, restricted exclusively to formal logic and the mere explication of concepts? Is not their necessary truth thus a pure analytical truth, i.e., do they not merely analyze a given thought into the consequences already contained and implied in it? Is it not possible, therefore, that, in particular, mathematics itself, the chief instrument of natural science, may not be more than the logical elucidation of thought already virtually contained in finite numerical and spatial magnitudes? It was at this stage that Kant became acquainted with the views of Hume—views which had been developed upon an entirely different foundation. Hume, working from the standpoint of pure phenomenology, had divided knowledge into two departments: first, an a priori formal logic (including mathematics) entirely without content and purely self-interpretative; and, secondly, a real knowledge, empirical and substantial, but having no logical necessity or a priori character. For Hume, knowledge of reality was constituted only by the principle of custom—by our becoming accustomed to certain associations of perceptions—and by the practical verification of such customary associations, and thus our reference of perceptions and their relations to a reality lying beyond consciousness has no real ground to rest upon, but is at most the object of an absolutely indispensable belief. Hume's reasonings affected Kant in the most profound way, as they appeared to undermine the whole fabric of a priori rationalism, and, in fact, to bring all philosophy of the Platonic type to an end. All that remained of rationalism seemed to be 'analytic judgments a priori,' i.e., the analysis of the logical content of certain propositions in formal logic and mathematics—a purely logical play of reason, but not a real knowledge of things by means of reason. Hume had apparently rendered it impossible, not only to pass beyond experience, but even to articulate experience itself by logically necessary principles; he seemed to have shown the futility of all a priori synthesis of the real, and, therefore, also of rational and rational ethics. Thus, if Kant found in Leibniz his positive foundation, he was on the negative side decisively influenced by Hume, both as a stimulus to his thought and as an antagonist to be overcome.

(d) Kant's discovery of the critical solution... The arguments of Hume, as has been said, wrought upon Kant with profound effect, not, however, in the thought of driving him into the sphere of the Scottish thinker's philosophy, but in the sense of forcing him to provide new foundations for, and set new limits to, the essentially Platonic doctrine which he had inherited from Leibniz. Hume's influence, therefore, was not such as to convert Kant to phenomenology. The idea of an experience limited to consciousness he had taken over from Leibniz, and all thought of transcending that experience by metaphysical arguments based upon it he had at length abandoned in view of the contradictions in which alone such attempts result. Hume certainly confirmed him in this position, but it was not Hume who brought him to it. The influence of Hume was in clarifying his mind with reference to the problem of elucidating and systematizing the contents of consciousness with a view to attaining a logically demonstrable, however, necessary, conception of the real. Kant formulates this problem very simply in the question whether we have only analytic judgments a priori, or also synthetic judgments a priori, as instruments for reducing the contents of consciousness, or of experience, to form and order. Or, to give the question a more direct expression: Is there a logically necessary connection in the real—an inherently necessary conception of nature which imposes a logical order upon the concrete? The 'real' that Kant seeks is attained not by reaching out towards a realm transcending consciousness, but by a synthetic articulation of the empirical data of consciousness or experience. He entirely ignores the question how this experience comes to be; it is simply given, and that is sufficient for us. As a matter of fact, Kant finds the real in the results of the logical elaboration of experience, and that process he distinguishes logically classified and abstractly necessary relations of phenomena from the chaotic state of the manifold prior to such elaboration, as also from relations wrongly appealed upon the facts; and for him the former is the real. In short, the real arises out of the valid and correct elaboration and elucidation of conscious experience, as contrasted with relations wrongly appealed upon the facts; and for him the former is the real. The problem before him was the possibility of a natural science which is at once empirical and rational, enabling the mind to unify the empirical data of consciousness by rational and a priori principles, and thus to transform the naive and confused representation of things into a representation that is scientifically clear and valid. Kant's aim was to establish a rationalism of pure experience, upon which might be constructed a conception of nature at once scientifically valid and embracing all experience. This is the fundamental principle from which we must interpret Kant's thought—his presupposition of the ego as the focus to which all thinking is related, of the content of experience as given to the mind in order that it may be brought to a fully realized clarity and completeness, of the a priori logical activity of the mind as moulding and combining the matter given to all according to the laws which cohere in the logical subject itself, and which come into consciousness and unfold themselves in the actual operation of thought. With these, again, is connected his refusal to recognize a supposed metaphysics which would urge a priori thought beyond its task of moulding and arranging the data of experience, since the a priori formal laws have to do with such data alone, and, if employed apart from and beyond them, remain altogether empty—a use of them which results in a futile metaphysical hypostasis, such as was fabricated by Locke and, in a more cautious and covert way, by Leibniz. Kant's presuppositions and his surrender of a transcendent metaphysics determined for him the only possible aim of knowledge and the safeguarding of the a priori and ideal character of our knowledge of nature by confining it to experience within consciousness. This line of thought, which in the first resort related only to the conception of nature, Kant subsequently extended to ethics, the philosophy of
religion, teleology, and aesthetics, his method of dealing with all of these being essentially determined by his principles of intellectual cognition. As treated by him, these other spheres of rational speculation were not merely not necessitated by the objective knowledge of reality lying beyond consciousness, but the proofs of a valid mode of reflection which issues from the nature of consciousness itself, and as such is to be applied to the criticism of experience. Non of this passagae beyond valid and necessary modes of thought and interpretation. The proof of their subjective necessity supplies the measure of all the objective knowledge which they can attain. A philosophy of this kind is in reality reason's knowledge of itself, and is indirectly a knowledge of facts only in so far as it reveals the necessary activities of reason, and arranges and interprets the data of consciousness by means of them. It sets out as a theory of the presuppositions, possibilities, and limits of science, and then proceeds by analogy to comprehend the other great activities of the mind, which likewise possess merely the knowledge and interpretation of experience by means of reason.

(c) The meaning of the various designations of Kant's philosophy. — From this point of view, again, we shall be able to judge of the various designations applied to the philosophy of Kant, whether by himself, or by others. It is Idealism—in a double sense, indeed, as it regards the mind not only as that which possesses experience, but also as the active subject of the necessary forms of thought through which alone experience gains order and meaning; in other words, it is a system which arranges and interprets experience within the limits of consciousness by means of them, and is thus directly opposed to materialism and sceptical relativism of every type. It is also criticism, since, in fixing by a critical investigation of principles the limits of the realm of formal ideas, it prevents these from transcending experience, and disengages the separate activities of that realm from its naive and pre-scientific state of nebulousity. The system is transcendentalism, because it recognizes the a priori validity of the ideas and asserts that they contain an element superior to experience, while, however, it uses the ideas, not as a means of reaching beyond experience, but simply as a means of moulding, classifying, and interpreting it. The word 'transcendentalism' signifies the demand that the ideas have no validity with reference to what lies beyond consciousness, and are accordingly not 'transcendent.' They are, in fact, immanent in experience, but have never been truly a priori, are not derived from experience, and are only to that extent above or beyond experience. Such is the implication of Kant's original and noteworthy use of the term 'transcendental.' In contrast to 'transcendent'—as meaning 'making experience possible by means of ideas.' Kantianism has also been called a formal intra-experiential rationalism. Sense, again, describe it simply as an epistemology—a designation which, however, must be received with circumspection, and which has given rise to much misconception. Since the days of the Sophists and Plato nearly all systems of philosophy have held that 'sensation' was merely the pre-condition of, or the preparation for, the system proper, which might vindicate or deny the metaphysical knowledge of things. In Kantianism, however, this distinction is already inverted in the system itself, since for it valid truth or reality lies in the necessary character which it proves to be inherent in the activities of thought. The subjective necessity of the functions of arrangement and interpretation yields the only objective knowledge of reality possible. The mark of such knowledge is, in virtue of its being grounded in that necessity, is indeed genuinely objective. For similar reasons Kant's teaching has been known since Fichte's day as a Wissenschaftslehre, i.e. a gnoseology or doctrine of science, since its aim is to determine the possibilities and restrictions of science—the knowledge of the real. So understood, it would be the development of cognition upon which is based the systematic development of knowledge in the special sciences. But, in view of Kant's extension of the a priori from the field of science proper to the field of epistemology, and aesthetics, the designation is undoubtedly too narrow. In point of fact, Kantianism is a theory of reason in all the aspects of its a priori functions; it is a Platonism without Plato's metaphysics.

3. The structure of the system.—Except in its most general features, the actual structure of Kant's philosophy could not be inferred from the foregoing account of it as a whole. It is the fruit of earnest and persevering reflection, and its most important sections are those devoted to the solution of intricate special problems. These cannot be dealt with here. Of peculiar importance are the movements by which Kant proceeds in his original interest in the scientific conception of nature to the consideration of ethics, religion, and aesthetics. He grapples with these various subjects, one after another, and deals with them according to the peculiar harmony of field of interest, viz. the conception of nature. But, as might be expected, the changes of the subject-matter involved also certain amplifications and modifications of the method. The doctrine of the pure analytic character of mathematics, the synthetic nature of the spatial and numerical judgments of mathematics. It also signifies, of course, that in their application to possible sensory experience, and that they have no function whatever outside such experience—a view in conformity with which the possibility of a supra-experimental metaphysics is at the very outset greatly attenuated, since a space-less and time-less reality is for us absolutely unimaginable and inconceivable. To his doctrine of time and space Kant gives the name 'transcendental aesthetic,' the word 'aesthetic' meaning here, of course, not a critique of art, but the science of the laws of sense-perception. From this significant opening Kant then proceeds to his most great theme, the 'transcendental analytic,' the theory of the categories. Here he shows that, just as sensibility involves a priori forms of perception, so too the mentalistic and empirical in the system itself, the a priori principles of combination and relation, and, above all, the concepts of substantiality and causality. These principles, already naively and unsystematically used in the most ordinary thinking, are simply discoverable in the all-embracing mathematico-mechanical science of nature, and so developed into the conception of
the rational articulation of nature as a whole. To the conception of nature, according to Kant, belong also psychical phenomena, the relations of which to physical facts and to one another must likewise be dealt with by the principles of this conception of nature. The consequence of such a view is, of course, determinism. Then, as with psychical phenomena, so with the process of history, this too being incorporated in the conception of nature, though it must be admitted that Kant did not know the doctrine of determinism either to psychology or to history. Another and very important consequence of his argument is that the categories have validity only when applied to experience within consciousness, and that they fall into sheer vacuity whenever we attempt to carry them beyond that field. Their function is confined to the relation of form and matter, and, where there are no data of experience for them to encompass, they become void. This brings us to the most significant result of all—positively, to a conception of nature as partly conditioned by a priori forms of reason, and, therefore, also to the comprehension of the entire manifold of experience under rational laws; and, negatively, to the rejection of every attempt to apply these forms and categories to anything that may lie beyond, anterior to, or other than experience—in other words, to the impossibility of all rational metaphysics. Nevertheless, the need for such a metaphysic constantly re-asserts itself, and with this Kant deals in the third great division of his Critique, viz. the 'transcendental dialectic.' Here he shows that, while the need of a rational metaphysic is perfectly warranted, and belongs, in fact, to the a priori function of reason, yet it cannot be satisfied by means of a rational investigation, as the conceptions employed for the purpose by ordinary metaphysic are simply the categories of substanti
tuality and causality used without application to experience, and so working in a mere void. That need, for which the theoretical reason can accordingly make no provision, can be satisfied only by the convictions of the moral will. Only in the sphere which we are compelled to think of as lying behind the moral will do we find that which the need for metaphysics has a right to demand. The theoretical reason can lend support to these moral conceptions only indirectly—in so far as its intra-experiential rationalism has the unknown behind all experience and behind the thinking subject, and because, by restricting the conception of nature to experience, it nullifies every attempt to find a basis for the conception of nature in the transcendent sphere. Kant could accordingly say that he had abolished (metaphysical) knowledge in order that he might make room for (moral) faith.

(b) The ethical and religious philosophy.—This subject—the moral judgment and the metaphysic of faith based upon it—is dealt with in Kant's second great work, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* ('Critique of Practical Reason'). In this he extends his peculiar and original method of deducing the a priori in experience to ethical judgments. These, in the first instance, elicited psychologically, and, in view of their peculiar nature, characterized as imperatives, i.e. judgments regarding what ought to be—imperatives, in fact, of absolute authority, the nature of which appears in the fact that they condition them uncondition-
ally, and regards them as universals of the will. And that they appeal to the dignity of man which is to be obtained in obedience to their 'ought.' They thus present themselves, like the a priori forms and categories of the transcendental character, as purely formal judgments. Their function, however, is not to apprehend the matter of experience, but to determine the motives of the will. They must all be brought under the Categorical Imperative, i.e. the moral judgment which is distinguished from all others by its being formally unconditional. Man's recognition of an unconditional 'ought' constitutes his true dignity and his true person-
ality, and forms also the limit between beings as persons. It is true that, so far, we have here only a moulding of the countless empirical motives of the will by a judgment that issues as a priori principle, which bids us act unconditionally upon the personal con-
vention of conscience. We are not yet, it would seem, within the domain of metaphysics at all. But, as a matter of fact, we are; for the Cate-
gorical Imperative, unlike the logical category, does not govern its matter wholly by its own might, but is conditioned by the resolve of a will which thereby rejects other possible alternatives. Here, indeed, we come into touch with the fact of freedom—the power of submitting or surrendering ourselves to a law felt to be of unconditional authority. The realm of theoretical reason con-
tains nothing analogous to this. In the fact of freedom, therefore, Kant sees the germ and man-
ifestation of an altogether different realm—the super

(c) The aesthetic and teleological philosophy.—There remains still another function of pure reason, viz. that which finds expression in the teleological conception of reality as subservient to the ends of spirit. As reality, in relation to the beholder, is felt to have meaning and purpose also in art and in aesthetic satisfaction, Kant deals with both the teleological and the aesthetic judgment in his third great work, *Kritik der Urteilskraft* ('Critique of the Faculty of Judging'). This work, following the method of his earlier *Critiques*, he shows that in our teleological conceptions like-

wise there is an a priori mode of judgment that emanates from the very nature of reason. The design, or purposive character (Zweckmaessigkeit) of the world cannot be metaphysically demon-
strated, but it asserts itself in an a priori type of judgment or interpretation as an irresistible conviction. We cannot fail to see how far apart this a priori lies from that of theoretical science, as also from that of the ethical-religious sphere. It implies no necessary, universal, imperative obligation, but a process of interpretation that plays freely upon things, making as if these subserved a kingdom of spiritual ends. The task of interpretation is to make the beautiful, the beautiful thus the symbol of the inner unity of the real — a unity which cannot be demonstrated by theoretical metaphysics. As such a symbol it has an essential function in the domain of reason, since it guarantees freedom to disturbance of the habitual, because knowledge and conception of reality which could otherwise be fabricated only by a teleological metaphysic, though, of course, never really attained by it.

(a) The metaphysical development. — In its view of consciousness and the a priori, the Kantian theory undoubtedly contains metaphysical elements which it took over from Leibniz, but did not recognize or define as metaphysical. If, however, we follow up Kant's idea of consciousness and its a priori, we are brought once more to metaphysical problems akin to those of Leibniz, and, in particular, to the idea of the absolute consciousness, or God, and the task is then to find a way back to the individual reason. A metaphysics of this kind — partly influenced, no doubt, by the ethical and literary tendencies of the time — was evolved from Kantianism by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer; and, just as each metaphysic sprang directly from Kant himself, so it is still drawn by many thinkers of to-day from the neo-Kantianism of recent times.

(b) The psychological development. — It was possible to proceed in a directly opposite way, and to emphasize and further develop the anti-metaphysical aspects of Kantianism. Those who took this course proposed to regard the a priori as assigning the final limits to specifically philosophical knowledge, and to conceive of reality which could otherwise be fabricated only by a teleological metaphysic, though, of course, never really attained by it.

With the Critique of Judgment Kant completed his discussion of the series of great philosophic problems which lay within his view. As was indicated above, his survey lacks a systematic psychology, while at the same time a psychologic basis is presupposed in the tripartite division of his critical work as well as in his exposition of the functions of reason to which he devotes his several Critiques; and this ambiguous attitude towards psychology has been much criticized. The system likewise lacks a properly developed logic — a want which is all the more felt because Kant carefully distinguishes his own transcendental logic from the formal logic of the Aristotelian type. He used the latter as the starting-point and guiding thread of his philosophy; the former, as a theory of an intra-experiential rationalism, constitutes the actual content of his system, which everywhere distinctly explains the relation between the two, and yet that relation is felt to be of the utmost importance whenever we ask upon what theory of knowledge his distinctively epistemological system is constructed. Nordit Kant give any special consideration to history; all that he provides in this field is a few short studies in which certain principles for an estimate of history are deduced from his ethical philosophy of religion.

The further development of the Kantian philosophy. — For a time the system of Kant in its original form seemed to German thinkers the only possible philosophy — philosophy, indeed, in its abstract, transcendent, unworldly expression. After the lapse of a decade or two, however, this attitude was abandoned, and the system has since been amended, supplemented, or transformed from many points of view. It has nevertheless maintained its position as the nucleus of German philosophy, and even to the present day all the great systems either emanate directly from it or define their position by critical reference to it. The development of philosophy partly from the system itself, in which lay the seeds of various germinative ideas and various possibilities of development, partly also from the influence of certain general movements of contemporary thought which the system had fostered, and mingled with it. We may distinguish three main lines of development.

(c) The epistemological development. — Finally, it may be regarded as Kant's great design to keep clear of both metaphysics and psychology, and to safeguard those presuppositions of all logic and all science which form the ground-work of pure thinking. Philosophy in that case is exclusively a doctrine of the a priori conditions of science, and of its vindication as an entirely independent and inwardly necessary activity in which the autonomous and ideal nature of the spirit finds expression. This view of the a priori is one that adheres rigidly to the Critique of Pure Reason, and altogether disregards the a priori of the other Critiques, which certainly cannot be brought under the conception of purely scientific theory. Philosophy is thus transformed into epistemology and logic. This is the theory held by Cohen, Natorp, Liebmann, Rieh, Windelband, Riecke, and Hahn. The a priori is the only real one brought within the sphere of the scientific consciousness. The method of philosophy produce and guarantee real objects by subjecting them to thought. The critical and logical analysis of consciousness must be much more rigidly separated from the psychological and genetic analysis than was done by Kant himself. The proper
subject-matter of philosophy is logic; metaphysics is abolished, or replaced with empirical convictions; psychology is a science of consciousness lying side by side with, but quite independent of, philosophy in the proper sense. We need not wonder that a thousand of this kind should be met with ever renewed criticism at the hands of both metaphysicians and psychologists.

LITERATURE. — Kant's works are collected in the ed. of G. H. Fleckenstein, 1875 (see under text). Kant's complete ed. is being issued by the Berlin Academy of Sciences. From the enormous mass of literature relating to Kant we may select the following works: K. Fleckenstein, Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre, Heidelberg, 1900 (= Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, iv. and v.); A. Riecke, Die metaphysischen Krise der Philosophie, Leipzlg, 1906; H. Cohen, Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung, Berlin, 1895; J. Völkle, Immanuel Kant's Erkenntnisslehre nach ihren Grundzügen (2 vols.), Leipzlg, 1879; G. Simmel, Kant, ed. do 194; F. Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: Leben und Lehre, Stuttgart, 1898; E. T. Zuckerkandl, Das Denken der neueren philosophischen Erlebnistheorie, Tübingen, 1912; W. Windelband, Praludien, do, 1913; Paul Naty, Plato, Ideenlehrer, Leipzig, 1903; E. Troeltsch, Das Hervorheben in Kant's Re- gelung der menschlichen Freiheit, Berlin, 1904; E. Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Kant, 2 vols., Glasgow, 1889.


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KAPALA-KRIYÀ.—Kapala-kriya (Skr., 'skull-rite') is the Indian ceremony of breaking the skull of the corpse, performed at the cremation or at the burial of a member of an ascetic Order.

We are told in the Garuda-purâna that when a man (who from his evil deeds during life or from some defect in the proper ceremonies at his decease, becomes subject to Yama's penalties) dies his spirit takes the form of a black bull, and emerges in the same manner as the excreta; whereas — because a man finds his way through the fourth aperture of the body, which is a suture at the top of the skull, called the Brahmananda, "Brahma's cleft" (M. Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Buddhism, London, 1890, p. 197), the excreta are thrown out of the fourth aperture, the suprarenals. The Chuvashes of E. Russia similarly believe that the soul leaves the body through the back of the head (J. G. Frazer, J.A.I.xi. [1886], 83 n.). It is remarkable that in the Neolithic Age and among some modern savages it was the custom, in cases of epilepsy or similar maladies believed to be the work of evil spirits, to trample the skull of the patient so as to give exit to the evil spirit (A. W. Buckland, J.A.I. xi. [1882], 7 f.; W. Johnson, British Archaeology, Cambridge, 1912, p. 321.) Among the Buddhists of Kashmir, it has been observed that when a man of the sacred order died, the spirit thus given vent to the spirit through the roots of these hairs; and it is generally believed that apsaras (heavenly nymphs) are born as Lamas (i.e., as he should be, a Lamas), of exceptional virtues, an actual perfection of nature, who were at this instant through which passes the liberated spirit (T. J. Waddell, in Notes on Buddhism, London, 1896, 579 of his Buddhist of Tibet, London, 1896, p. 489).

Hence arises the belief that the cutting of a lock of hair from the head facilitates the departure of the soul (Frazer, loc. cit.). In India the rite of smashing the skull is generally performed when the corpse is half burnt, the chief mourner using a piece of sacred wood or a bamboo for the purpose.

LITERATURE. — In addition to the authorities given for the Brahminical ceremonies, see H. Maclagan, Brahmanical and other Cremations, i. 1 (1901) 49; J. A. Paddfield, The Hindus at Home, Madras, 1906, p. 314; J. A. Dubois, Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies, i. 2 (1907), 458; H. A. Thoroson, Caste and Tribes of Southern India, Madras, 1897, p. 393; W. Crooke.

KAPILA. — The name of the founder of the Sâkhyâ system (see Sâkhyâ). Since all Indian tradition is unanimous in recognizing under this name the author of the Sâkhyâ school, we are unquestionably bound to see in Kapila a historical person, who, as is proved by the dependence of Buddhism on his teaching, must have lived before the middle of the 6th cent. B.C. All the accounts, however, which have been preserved in the literature of the Brahmans relating to the life of Kapila are so full of legends and contradictions that we are unable to attribute to them any historical value. The information given by the Buddhist authorities with regard to him deserves more serious consideration, since they connect Kapila with the name of the city of Kapilavastu, the birthplace of the Buddha, and ascribe to him therefore, a sphere of activity the geographical site of which agrees well with the internal relations which subsist between Buddhism and the Sâkhyâ philosophy.

No work by Kapila has been preserved. For that the Sâkhyâ-sutras are an entirely modern work, and have no claim to bear his famous name, has long been conceded; but the question, whether we have any real ground for supposing that any compositions at all are due to his authorship.


KAPILAVASTU.—Kapilavastu (vattu, nagara, -pura), interpreted either as 'tawny town' or as 'the town of Kapila' (a mythical sage), according as the first element of the word is taken to be an adjective or a proper name, is the name of a town famous in legend as the ancestral home of Gautama Sakyamuni, the Buddha, commonly called Buddha. The four great holy places of Buddhism from very early times were Kapilavastu, Gayâ, Benares, and Kusinagara, associated respectively with the birth, enlightenment, ministry, and death of the Master (see art. BUDDHA). The myths descriptive of the foundation of Kapilavastu, which assume diverse forms, all equally unhistorical, are summarized as follows by Watts ("Kapilavastu in the Buddhist Books," J.E.A.S., 1896, p. 533;)

This story, according to the mythical accounts of the Buddha's royal ancestors, had been founded by the sons of an Ikshvaku king of the solar race. The king who reigned at Patala, according to some, or at Saket, according to others, yielding to the entreaties of his wife or concubine, drove his four sons into exile. These princes, accompanied by their sisters, set out westwards, after a long journey halted at a pleasant suitable site near the hillside of a rich luxuriant forest. The rich wished the exiles, and with solemn rites gave over to them a piece of ground on which to settle and build their city. When the city was thus well set out and occupied, the settlers called it in gratitude Kapilavastu or Kapilapurâja, from the name of their kind patron. The city, regarded as a sacred place of remote antiquity. The city of Kapilavastu thus founds itself, according to the generally received accounts, situated near, or at the southern slope of the range of hills (Kapilavastudrâ) and in the kingdom of Kosala. ... It must be noticed, however, that in some of the Chinese texts it is placed in a district to the north of the Himalaya, the royal exile being represented as having crossed this range and settled on the south side of a mountain beyond. ... Hence it might be inferred that the majority of the texts is in favour of the supposition that the city was situated on or near the southern slope of the Himalaya. This position, which is indicated by the earliest Indian texts, ...
must be accepted as the correct one, because the town, notwithstanding the mythical tales of its origin, had a real existence to this date. Its site continued to be visited by a series of Chinese pilgrims for several centuries after a.d. 400, and even now, in spite of obscurities in detail, can be located. Two of the most important, in the 19th century, the Welchman, and not many miles distant from the outermost Himalayan range.

The Lollavistavara and other works which profess to tell the story of Buddha's infancy and early life are far from reliable, although they exalt the glories of Kapilavastu, and of the magnificence of the royal court supposed to have been held there by Rāja Suddhodana, father of Gāntana Buddha. But these tales are purely works of imagination without any basis of solid fact. The real life-story of Buddha is almost completely lost, and the romance which does duty in the books for his biography will not bear criticism. There is no sound reason for believing that either he or his father ever enjoyed the position of regal magnificence ascribed to them by the pious imagination of later ages. Even some of the Buddhist treatises, as Watters points out, describe Kapilavastu as a small insignificant town without any attractions, too small for the accommodation of the growing families of the legendary Bāsīval princes. The real Kapilavastu, although raised to a certain degree of importance and detailed account of the other religious buildings of the time of Asoka, could never have been a large and wealthy city.

Tradition placed the actual scene of the nativity, not at Kapilavastu itself, but at a grove or garden called Lumbini, some miles to the eastward. There the holy infant was fabled to have sprung from his mother's right side; as she stood under a tree, to have been caught, in the arms of the gods, and forthwith to have taken seven steps, and proclaimed himself Lord of the World. The legend of these and other supposed incidents of the nativity was well established by the beginning of the Christian era, and supplied subjects for long mythological narratives and numerous works of art. Writers and sculptors found equally welcome material in the many miracles with which the imagination of the faithful adorned the early life of the founder of their religion. All these marvels were closely associated with Kapilavastu. A specially favourite topic was the story of the demise of his father's garden, when the mischievous boys of the town, with the excuse of cutting away the grass, procured the stone which had hitherto been used as a boundary mark (L'Art grec et bouddhique du Gandhara, Paris, 1905, p. 280) exhibited the figure of a personification of Kapilavastu in the conventional garb and pose of a Greek city-god, lamenting the loss of her youthful lord. After he had obtained full enlightenment under the Bodhi-tree at Gayā (q.v.), Gautama was believed to have paid two visits to his Śākya relatives at Kapilavastu. The numerous words and deeds attributed to him on those occasions will be found detailed in all the works dealing with the legendary history of Buddhism. His final visit to his ancestral town is associated with many stories of destruction, by King Vīḍālaḥa (Vīḍālaḥaka, etc.). Like the connected fairy tales, this story is told in more ways than one, but all the narratives agree that Vīḍālaḥa either expelled or massacred almost all the monks of the town, who had gathered over the destruction of the place, which he had tried in vain to prevent, and departed, vowing that he would never return. From that time Kapilavastu passed almost out of existence, becoming the site of the first authentic record of the site at the beginning of the 5th cent. A.D. represents the town and its neighbourhood as a wilderness nearly uninhabited.

A curious group of seventeen small stupas discovered at Sāgarwā, two miles north of Tīlaurā Kūt, in Jan. 1898, by A. Führer, and destroyed by his excavations, may possibly mark the traditional scene of the massacre of the Sākya monks in the 6th cent. A.D. At the time of the foundations of each of these structures the lowest layer consisted of nine, seven, or five bricks, the central brick of each being carved with the design of the object on which the relics were placed. With the relic-caskets were placed embedded in the soil. The other bricks of the layer had figures of maces, tridents, axes, and other ancient weapons stamped upon them, which indicate that the monuments were erected in memory of a band of warriors regarded as sacred persons. If the massacre of the Śākyas by Vīḍālaḥa really occurred, it must be dated about 500 B.C. or a little earlier, the date of the death of Buddha being taken as 487 B.C.

In these legendary days the territory of Kapilavastu seems to have been a dependency of the kingdom of Kosala, which was equivalent approximately to the modern province of Oudh. The books enumerate a considerable number of towns and villages as situated within the borders of the Kapilavastu country, but none of them can be identified, and at the date of our first authentic records all literally the only known towns and villages had decayed. There is little reason to expect that the sites of most of the various settlements mentioned in the Buddhist treatises will ever be determined. A city designated variously by the names of Koli, Devadaha, and Vāgrāpara, which lay to the east, some miles beyond the Lumbini garden, was intimately associated with Kapilavastu by tradition, and there are some grounds for thinking that its position may be ascertained by local investigation. The introduction to the Kāvada Jātaka (no. 536 in tr. by H. T. Francis and E. B. Cowell, vol. iv., Cambridge, 1905) narrates a curious story about a threatened fight between the inhabitants of Devadaha and those of Kapilavastu concerning disputed claims to water for irrigation.

About 269 B.C. the emperor Asoka (q.v.), under the guidance of his preceptor, Upagupta, performed a pilgrimage in state to the spots sanctified by the sojourn of Buddha. The first place visited is said to have been the Lumbini garden, the scene of the nativity. The fact that Asoka actually came to that spot is placed beyond doubt by the inscribed pillar at Rummūn-dei, which was erected by the emperor in the twenty-first year after his coronation, to commemorate his visit to the spot. The inscription proceeds to Kapilavastu, and the inclusion in his tour of that locality, only a few miles distant from the Lumbini garden, is attested by another inscribed pillar now lying by the side of the Nīglī tank, but not exactly in its original position. The inscription, however, does not mention the name of Kapilavastu. The literary tradition (Adokavasthāna), which professes to give the details of the imperial pilgrimage, located at Kapilavastu a number of legends, which probably were not invented until after Asoka's time.

The earliest definite description of the town of Kapilavastu of the surrounding country is that given by the first of the Chinese pilgrims, Fa-hian (Fa-hsien) (Fa-hsien), who was shown round the reputed holy places at the beginning of the 5th cent. A.D., about six hundred and fifty years after the pilgrimage of Asoka. In or about A.D. 636, Hsin Tiang (Yuan Chwang), the most learned and eminent of the Chinese pilgrims, followed his predecessor's example, with the understanding that local monks thoroughly examined and carefully recorded the positions of the numerous localities at or near Kapilavastu associated by tradition with the legend of Buddha. All modern attempts
to identify existing ruins with Kapilavastu necessar-
ily because the descriptions recorded by the two pilgrims named, which are the only extant ancient detailed accounts of the town. The topographical and archaeological problems sug-
ggested by the pilgrims' narratives are far too compli-
cated to merit a brief notice which the travellers' observations is indispensable.

The visit of Fa-hian to Kapilavastu may be dated with
approximate accuracy in a.n. 438. He found there 'neither king nor people'. The site of the city was occupied only by destitute
ruined mounds, and was uninhabited save for a few monks and a solitary village. Immediately near the centre of the town, and
the road infected with wild elephants and tigers. The monks who clung to the dreary ruins and acted as guides to
pilgrims were not embarrassed by philosophical doubts, and had no
hesitation in pointing out the exact spots where Gautama sat under a tree, met his father, and so forth. Fa-hian, too,
was no more a believer, and it was difficult for him to accept the
scriptural truth all that was told him by his guides. Huen Tsang, not
withstanding his erudition, was equally credulous, and was
shown even more 'sights' than his predecessor. The country
turned out to be much the same as in Fa-hian's time, the
city of Kapilavastu being an utterly ruined that its limits
could not be ascertained. But the solid brick foundations of the
central 'palace city' were still visible, and were estimated to
measure nearly three miles in circumference. This walled town is not
mentioned by Fa-hian, who places Kapilavastu about nine miles
to the north of the Lumbini garden. Huen Tsang locates his
Kapilavastu some fifteen or sixteen miles from the same
point. Now the site of the Lumbini garden is determined
beyond a possibility of doubt, as already observed, by the Asoka
inscription, which, may be added, is supported by the second
in the matter of the distance from the fixed point, and
in sundry other particulars, show that different places must
have been pointed out to them as being Kapilavastu.

Local investigation, in which the present writer
took a share, makes it clear that the 'palace city'
of Huen Tsang is represented by the ruined
walled town now known as Tilaur Koth, while the
Kapilavastu of Fa-hian must be identified with the
group of ruins near the village of Piprawa, about ten miles S.S.E. from Tilaur Koth. This
conclusion, although in reality inevitable from the pre-
cedings, is as being indefinable, but a little consideration diminishes the apparent
improbability. The town, according to tradition,
had been utterly destroyed more than 900 years before the visit of the earlier pilgrim, and more
than 1100 years before that of his successor, and
both the pilgrims found the region in a state of
utter desolation. It is obvious that, if there is
any truth in the tale of the destruction of the
place by Veddahs and Kalingas, the latter was
of particular hot spots so gibly pointed out
by the local guides could not possibly have
survived, and that their identifications must
have been fanciful. As Watters observes (J.R.A.S., 1888, p. 543), they failed to show the Sakyas' assembly
hall and other objects frequently mentioned in
the books, the reason apparently being that the guides
either did not know where to place them or had
never read the books in which they are described.
The same inference may be drawn from their
silence respecting the new famous Piprawa stūpas
the most interesting building in the whole region,
which is not mentioned by either pilgrim. Evi-
dently it had been completely forgotten. The
whole of the 'identifications' recorded in detail by
the pilgrims have a fictitious and unverifiable
aspect and the mention of Tilaur Koth in the
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legend of the regal splendour of Kapilavastu, and
it does not seem incredible that the site associ-
ed with the legend should have been moved in
the course of many centuries. It may be the
cause for overlooking the possibility that the
ruins of Tilaur Koth extend for two or three miles. The
outmost range of hills is about 15 or 15 miles to the north
of the Koth.

The mound now known as Rummim-dëli, is the
most interesting building in the whole region,
which is not mentioned by either pilgrim. Evi-
dently it had been completely forgotten. The
whole of the 'identifications' recorded in detail by
the pilgrims have a fictitious and unverifiable
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outmost range of hills is about 15 or 15 miles to the north
of the Koth.
KARAITES.—The Karaites are a Jewish sect which took its rise in Babylon during the latter half of the 7th century A.D. Their Hebrew name is קראי (Karai), i.e., adherents, or בגדאוש (B. Makketh), meaning ‘sons of the writing,’ the watchdog of the sect being ‘Back to Scripture from Tradition,’ i.e., from ‘Talmud.’ The watchword, however, is ‘the word of God;’ i.e., the theoretical one, according to which the Karaites developed a tradition of their own, the only difference being that it was called not ‘tradition,’ but ‘the yoke of inheritance’ (םנש), and that they held as the doctrines and usages which, while not taught in the Bible, were recognized as obligatory by all (םנש, or קראי, corresponding to the Muslim ‘ijma’), i.e., by consensus, and of which a large number had come down from those who returned from the Exile, i.e., from ‘the good signs,’ as they are designated, with an allusion to Jer 24.

The designation ‘Karaite,’ however, was not applied to them until the 9th century A.D. Originally they were known as ‘Ananites, from the name of their founder, Anan b. David, of Baghdad. Our sources of information regarding the motives that prompted him to initiate the new movement are meagre and shrouded in obscurity; moreover, they are not altogether reliable, as, in the first place, the oldest of them are not of earlier date than the first half of the 10th century; and, secondly, they all show considerable bias, as emanating either from his adherents or from his opponents, the Rabbinists. They agree only in two points, viz., that Anan was descended from the exilarchs, i.e., that he was of the lineage of David, and that he was deeply versed in Rabbinic and Talmudic lore. The Karaites will not admit, however, that they are a sect of late origin, or that they separated from the integral organism of Judaism. On the contrary, according to the earliest extant Karaite account, viz., that of Aba Yasuf Ya‘qub al-Kirkasani (or Kirkasani), as given in his Kitab al-Jamal wa-l-Mamalik, written in A.D. 957, the first Jewish schism took place in the reign of Jeroboam; thereafter arose the first sect—the Samaritans—and then, at the foundation of the State of the Jews, the Rabbinists, whose leader was Simeon the Just, and who simply continued the evil work of Jeroboam. These, in turn, were opposed by the party of the Sadducees, which arose under the leadership of Zadok and Boethos. Zadok discovered a portion of the truth, but the finding of the whole truth was the achievement of the exilarch Anan, who reigned in the year of the Khalf al-Mansur (754-759). The Rabbinists tried to compass the death of Anan, but God saved him from their hands. This reading of history appears in all the Karaita chronicles, and at length, in the later of them—Domecq b. Nisan, Solomon ib. Reuben, and Abraham Frinkovitch—it assumes the most fantastic forms. But it is quite unhistorical, and, besides, it fails to explain the origin of the Karaite inscriptions. The reports of the Arab writers all show the influence of the Karaites sources.

2 Ed. P. Weiss, ZAR, xvi, 181 ff.
3 The Arabic authors who give more or less inaccurate information are: Domecq b. Nisan, Solomon ib. Reuben, and Abraham Frinkovitch.
4 Thabit al-Maqdisi (pseudo-Balbi), ed. C. Hauré, Paris, 1899-1907, lv (1906), lvii (1907) in Arabic, ed. E. Sachau, London, 1879, p. 136, and Shabbetai (pseudo-Abulafia), ed. A. J. Davidson, London, 1845, p. 137, and in S. de Sacy, Christenamathica arabe, Paris, 1826, 1, 91. That again, the earliest of which is that of Sa‘adya Gaon (892-949), the motive of Anan’s revolt was injured pride. In the election of the exilarch by the Geonim, who did not believe in his orthodoxy, he was set aside, his younger brother, Hananiah, a man of inferior learning but more staunch in the faith, chosen instead. Anan refused to accept this decision, proclaimed himself exilarch, and was in consequence thrown into prison. Here he made the acquaintance of a comrade in persecution—one other than the celebrated Aba Hanifa, the alleged founder of the Manifite School—who is said to have advised him to appeal to the Khalf as the champion of another religion. In this way Anan was induced to take the path that led to schism.

That personal motives played a part in the action of ‘Anan may well be the case, but in the light of religious history it is quite impossible to suppose that personal motives alone could have created a movement which maintained a vigorous life for centuries. The truth is that in the 7th and 8th centuries the foundations of Judaism in the East were most insecure. The rise of Islam and the religious conflicts within its pale, the influx of general knowledge, and other factors of the kind acted with revolution on the Jewish mind, and gave rise to various sects, as, e.g., that led by Abu ‘Isa al-Isfahani (end of the 7th cent.), who was partly a pseudo-Messiah and partly a sectarian, who acknowledged the prophetic character of both Jesus and Mohammad; that of his pupil Yudghan, and others. It is possible, moreover, that Sadduceism had not wholly died out, and in some form or another made itself felt as an underlying force in religious life; that the Sadducees and the Karaites were at one, above all, in their adherence to the written Word and their rejection of oral tradition; and then, secondly, in their acceptance of certain tenets which have been handed down as expressly Sadducean, as, e.g., the literal application of the וס תצוו (Ex 21:24), the interpretation of בְּנֵי (Lev 23:23) as meaning the Sabbath, so that the Feast of Weeks should always fall on the first day of the week, etc. The first to draw attention to this relationship was A. Gelzer, according to whom there was, in addition to the common Halakhah that was ultimately deposited in the Talmud, a third section, which is dimly traceable in the earlier Talmudic writings, and was common to the Samaritans, the Sadducees, and, subsequently, the Karaites. Other indications of the relationship are found in the statements of Kirkasani already referred to, in the writings of the many Rabbinists (Sa‘adya, Abraham b. Da‘ud, Judah Halevi, Abraham ib. Ezra, Maimonides, etc.) who simply identify the Karaites and the Sadducees, and, finally, in the fact that not only Sa‘adya, but also Karaite writers of the 10th cent., had ‘Sadducean writings’ in their hands. It was with these various elements, to which others were subsequently added, that Anan instituted his movement.

Anan is said to have expressed his distinctive tenets in the bipartite formula quoted in connection with his name by Japheth b. ‘Ali (end of 10th cent.): ‘Search thoroughly in the Scripture, and do not rely upon my opinion.’ The primary article of which they are all dependent upon Karaite writings is shown by the fact that they all speak of ‘Anan as an exilarch. 1

1 C. REJ xliv. 167, note 2.
his confession is accordingly the searching of the Scripture, and it signifies that Scripture is of itself sufficient, and requires no supplement of tradition. But this does not mean that merely the legal portion of the Pentateuch, but the whole Bible; even the narrative parts must be drawn upon for the deduction of legal ordinances. In practice, however, he adopted all the methods of the Talmudists, who were likewise at pains to base their oral teachings, i.e. tradition, upon the written Word, and he made extensive use of the thirteen canons of Rabbis in the Talmud. Above all, of the canon of analogy (םייח, ἀράμ. ἀγαθιά), perhaps under the influence of Abu Hanifa, but his great aim was to read the laws always in the sense carrying the heaviest obligation. This rigorous he applied very especially to the laws of the Sabbath and of marriage. With reference to the former, he extended the idea of forbidden work to such processes as, being begun on a Friday, would automatically continue on the Sabbath; thus it was unlawful to light on a Friday a candle that would keep burning till next day—Ex 35:3 being interpreted in that sense—whereas he advised his adherents to sit in darkness on Friday evenings; and similarly, reading Ex 16:4 literally and as binding for all time, he forbade them to leave their homes on the Sabbath, except to attend the worship of God. The marriage law he also rigorously interpreted in two ways: interpreting Gn 2:24 literally, he maintained that husband and wife were really one flesh, so that, e.g., the wife's brother was to be regarded not as the husband's brother-in-law, but as his brother; while again, applying the method of analogy here too, he extended the forbidden degrees to all collateral lines, whether ascending or descending. Thus, too, he brought his adherents to a state of mischievous confusion, as in different localities they celebrated the festivals on different days, and evil results followed also from his discarding the calendar, substituting for it the simple calculation of the full moons, and forbidding the recitation of psalms and verses from Scripture. Other regulations introduced by him relate to details of the laws about food and ceremonial purity, of feasts and fasts, of circumcision, and many other things. His injunctions, moreover, are pervaded by a strain of gloom. He forbade the Jews of the Diaspora to eat flesh, as, according to his interpretation of Dt 12:2, the use of such food was dependent upon the existence of a sanctuary and a sacrificial ritual. It should also be noted that notwithstanding his adherence to the literal meaning of Scripture, he interpreted many of the Biblical laws in an allegorical sense.

3 Cf. Pomsanski, Kaufmann-Geschichte, Breslau, 1900, p. 217.

4 According to the narrative of Sa'adya already cited, 'Anan specially urged upon the Hasid that his rejection of the fixed calendar was a distinction of a new religion. Generally, however, the calendar plays a great part in the history of Jewish sects.

3 Anan set forth his views in an Araamic writing entitled Sifro ha-Me'uhad ('Book of Commandments'), of which, however, only fragments survive. He also wrote a kind of encyclopaedia, the so-called 'Book of Commands,' which, according to the later Karaite writers, 'Anan migrated from Babylonia to Palestine, and founded the still surviving Karaite synagogue in Jerusalem. These statements, however, have no historians find notice in the talmudic works, and the scholars, who were nearly all honoured with the

1 Cf. REJ xiv. 194 ff.
2 Pomsanski, in Semitica Studia in Memory of Kohnh., p. 317 ff.
3 Sa'adya, Kiddush ha-Amamut, ed. B. Landauer, Leyden, 1861, p. 190.
4 Cf. REJ xv. 301.

6 Heiman, Die hebräischen Uberlieferungen, p. 323.
7 Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Uberlieferungen, p. 353.
8 Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Uberlieferungen, p. 353.
KARAITES

The title of "sallarch" or "prince," are found in Egypt. Of these descendants his immediate successors are said to have been his son Sanal and his grandson Josiah, in whom we know hardly more than their names. Josiah is said to have been the teacher of Benjamin Moses Nahawandi (i.e. of Nahawand in Persia who flourished c. 830), and with whom began a new era in the history of the sect: in fact, the Arabs speak of the Karaites as "the companions of Anan and Benjamin." 1

1. The Arabic writer makes Benjamin the head of a distinct sect, the Benymina. 2 Benjamin is the first of extant authors to speak of the Karaites as בֵּיתוֹן מִצְרָי (see p. 662); and, while Anan wrote in Aramaic, he used Hebrew. While he followed the Rabbinites in regard to many precepts of the Law, his method, especially with reference to the deduction of the Law from the Scripture, was more consistent and systematic than theirs. He laid greater stress than Anan upon the necessity of independent investigation of Scripture. He applied himself also to dogmatics, and affirmed, inter alia, that the personage who created the world, sent the prophets, performed miracles, revealed the law, etc., was not God Himself, but an angel whom He had created—a view which he based upon various passages of Scripture, especially Ex 23:4, where the angel also spoke to Moses says: "I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." In reality, however, we have here the Logos-doctrine of Philo, whose writings, translated into some Oriental language, circulated in the East, and may quite well have been known to Benjamin. Another of the latter doctrines, founded upon Ezk 32:26, was that divine penalties fall upon the bones of men. 3 He read an allegorical sense into many passages of Scripture. He enjoined that the months of Nisan and Tishri, alone should be determined by observation of the moon; the others, as was the practice among the Rabbinites for all months, by computation. He frequently differed from Anan in his applications of the Law. Of his writings only the Book of Laws 4 (Shefer Dinim, published under the title nezer yisroel, Eupatoria, 1836) has been preserved. He also wrote a work with the title of Twelve Commandments 5 (Shefer hetsahvot) and Biblical commentaries, of which, however, nothing is known beyond a few quotations by other writers. 6

Daniel b. Moses al-Kunisi, or al-Damaaghani, is said to have been a native of Damaghân, in the province of Kunisi (Tabaristan), where he flourished towards the end of the 9th century. A point of special interest is his attitude to Anan, whom at first he designated 'the head of the wise' (ברוחה), and afterwards 'the head of the fools' (רעה). 7 In contrast to Benjamin, he was hostile to secular knowledge, and rejected reason as a means of deciding questions of religious law; and his opposition to his teacher is seen also in his denial of the existence of angels. The angels mentioned in the Bible, as appears from Ps 78:30, 44, are beings transcending natural forces. He was also entirely opposed to the logical interpretation of the Commandments, since 'God did not ordain his commandments in allegorical form.' 8

In his interpretations of the religious law he tends to favour the more severe alternative. Daniel likewise composed a Book of Commentaries, preserved only in a few quotations, 9 and Biblical commentaries, of which only two small fragments (on Levitites) survive; 10 he is also referred to as the author of a work on annulment. 11

2. The Arabic period (9th and 11th centuries).

—This period is so named because most of the Karaites works dating from the centuries indicated were written in Arabic. It is the most brilliant age of Karaites literature—an age in which the sect produced theologians, grammarians, lexicographers, exegetes, teachers of the Law, contoversialists, etc., some of them writers of great and lasting importance. This illustrious advance was due in part to the influence of the Rabbinites and of their now active bent towards secular science and their desire to provide a scientific foundation for Judaism; while, in turn, the Karaites influenced the Rabbinites, and, in particular, constrained them to engage more profoundly in the investigation of the Hebrew language and the rational exegesis of Scripture. Modern Jewish historians (Pinsker, Graetz, Fischel) have characterized the earlier Jewish grammarians, Masoretics, and Biblical theologians as Karaites; 12 but, while this view has been completely refuted by critics, 13 there can be no doubt that the Karaites, whose very raison d'être was their literal view of the Bible, devoted themselves in a special degree to the branches of knowledge in question, and often gave the initiative to the Rabbinites. Another effective factor in the movement was polemics. The passive attitude of the Geônim had to give way before the impetus and the recruiting power of Karaitism; and now there arose the Geôn Saadyya, who as a youth of twenty-three had attacked Anan in a polemical work in the Arabic language (Kitâb al-radd 'alâ 'Anân), and who made it one of the great tasks of his life to fight against Karaitism. His challenge brought the Karaites into the field, and the contention inspired them with new life. While the struggle was of a purely literary character, it was sometimes conducted in no very becoming way on either side, and not infrequently with a biased deviation from truth. 14 The Karaites were not slow to retaliate upon their assailants, and directed their pointed but not always well-aimed shafts mainly against the anthropomorphism Hagghâdi of the Geônim, and also against the mystical writings of a kind that emanated in part from the schools of the Geônim. 15

The literary activity of the Karaites during this period under notice asserted itself in nearly all the more important Muslim lands, i.e., besides Babylon and Persia—the cradle and the nursery of Karaitism—in Egypt, N. Africa, and especially Palestine. In the last-named country an eager intellectual interest also prevailed amongst the Rabbinites during the 10th and 11th centuries; here arose, as a counterpart to the official school of Geônim in Babylon, a distinctively Palestinian Gâdim, and here the Karaites likewise conducted a zealous propaganda about the same time. 16

The most eminent representative of Karaitism in

1 Iadun, Ezekiel ha-Kofer, Eupatoria, 1836, § 460; et. Studies in Jewish Literature, pp. 243, 244.
4 Cf. Sandgau, no. 11; also Pomoer in Terenepayâa Emyalakrep, c. 3. Daniel b. Moses, vi. 176.
5 Cf. esp. Steinwender, Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums, viii. 291.
this period was undoubtedly the already mentioned Abū Yusuf Yākūb al-Kirībānī, or al-Kar-
kasānī (i.e. of Cirecenion on the Euphrates, or of Kar.
kasān; see the rejoinder), As it appears from his
writings, he travelled widely, visited Persia and
India, observed the customs of the heathen living
there, was in personal touch with the representa-
tives of the heathen religions, and was familiar
with Muslim theologians on various questions relating
to their religion, of which he had a thorough
knowledge. So far as we can estimate from his
works, he was an orthodox Muslim. He adhered loyal
ly to his ancestral faith, but neither assumed an uncritic
position towards the weaknesses of his own religious
community, nor set himself against the adherents of other re-
ligions (T. Friedländer, ZA xxxvi. [1919] 94).

In 997 he composed the first Kairite book of laws in
the Arabic language; it is entitled Kitāb al-
ʿAmīr wʾal-Mardāḥ (‘Book of Luminaries and
Outlook Towers’), and is divided into thirty-six
sections. It differs from all works of its kind in the
fact that its four first sections are devoted to items
of historical information and questions of dogmatic
theology. The next section is the first, which contains a survey of all the Jewish
writings down to the writer’s own day.1 Kūrīšīnī
gathered his information partly from his own observation and his investigations with others, partly from the writings of his predecessors, and, above all, from those of David b. Merwān al-Makānās, and from the
Kitab al-Maʿalāt of Abū ʿIsā al-Warrākī.
The book is invaluable as a storehouse of informa-
tion provided by no other source, as, e.g.,
respecting the Sadūdūz, which, it states, forbad divorce,
and reckoned by solar months of thirty days;2
regarding the sect of the Maḥāra, i.e., i.e.,
“severed damsels”3 are perhaps identical with the
Essenes;4 regarding the remnants of the Israēli,
Ochterites, and ‘Anāmites still surviving in his day,
etc. It is interesting to find that he includes the
Christians among the Jewish sects. In the opinion of
many Kairites, Jesus was a righteous and devout
man, but Pauline Christianity was sheer heresy
and a denial of God.5 The subjects of the
second section are the necessity of investigation and
speculation with reference to the injunctions of the
Torah, and the vindication of the proof ex
ratio et analogia.6 In the third section Kūrīšīnī
refutes the views of the sectaries, and in the fourth
inquiries regarding the Sabbath and the knowledge of
the Law. He was likewise the first to direct a
searching criticism upon the anthropomorphism of the
Haggālā, and to formulate a canon to deter-
mine when the requirements of the Law were to
be interpreted according to the inner, i.e., the
figurative, sense. His position in these matters
was influenced by his contemporary Saʿādya, whose
opinions he also cites and refutes in other writings.7
In his views of the religious Law his attitude is one
of independence.

1906, 119-125).
275 ff.
3 cf. Povazka, REJ ii. 147 ft.
4 cf. Povazka, REJ ii. 147 ft.
5 The Karaites were inclined to coexist with Christianity and
Islam, although they sometimes assimilated them vehemently, and
-9,10, it has often been written that Muhammed was a
musical(see p. 147) in his writings, at least, the best
favourably towards
the Karaites (cf. REJ xli. 180).
6 cf. Povazka, The Karaites Literary Opinions of Isaac Nachman,
Sec. II, Studies in Judaic Literature, p. 249.
7 cf. Povazka, The Karaites Literary Opinions of Saʿādya Gaon,
Sec. II, Studies in Judaic Literature, p. 249.
Hebrew a bitter and vulgar rhymed epistle against oral doctrine in general, and Sa'adya in particular; to which was added one portion of his Lamentations has been printed. 1 Said b. Masliha (end of the 10th cent.) was a man of kindred mould with Solomon, but superior to him in many respects. He too wrote Biblical commentaries in Arabic, which likewise composed a violent epistle against Jacob b. Samuel; but his horizon was wider than Solomon's, and he was a wonderful master of diction. In his epistle we find interesting data regarding the Karaites of Jerusalem, their ascetic manner of life, and their successful propaganda among the Rabbinists. These data he repeats in his Hebrew introduction to a 'Book of Commandments' which he wrote in Arabic; 2 in that work he urges his co-religionists to settle in the Holy City. He was likewise the first Karaita to pronounce canons for the determination of religious law. They are four in number: (1) reason or speculation (סנה דאכ), (2) the actual words of Scripture (כתוב בתר초), (3) analogy (שנין = Arab. حاسِد) [see above], and (4) the consensus of the ancients (עם = Arab. חכמים). He was also famous as the author of two commentaries upon the weekly Haga'a, the Alfa and the Eshkol ha-Kofa, 3 [see 168, 2]. Joseph b. Noah (c. 1000) seems to have played a great role among the Karaites scholars of Jerusalem. According to Ibn al-Hitti, 4 his seminary was always attended by seventy learned men—a doubtable and inflated figure, assimilated to the membership of the ancient Sahebdin. Of Sahl's four canon Joseph rejected the third, analogy, and he had a controversy with him on the question of fixing leap-year by the coming of spring (Abba). He wrote a commentary to the Pentateuch, which his pupil Abil Faraj Haftun b. Abil Faraj recast in an abbreviated form; 5 and also a work on grammar, dedicated to his master by the same pupil. This Abil Faraj was himself a distinguished grammarians, lexicographer, and Biblical exegete, and is referred to by Rabbinists writers as the 'grammarians of Jerusalem'. He was the author of a grammatical treatise, Kitab al-Muhammatamî (completed in August 1026), in eight books, of which the 7th and 8th are of special interest, the former being the nature of a lexic, giving the various meanings of each root; the latter the fresh significations it acquires by the transposition of its radicals, while the latter deals with Biblical Aramaic and its affinity to Hebrew. 6 He also wrote, in Arabic, Kitab al-Kafi, a grammatical work, Sharh al-AfAli, a book giving definitions of Biblical words, and a commentary to the Pentateuch.

A still more important scholar of the period was Joseph b. Abraham al-Manji (Bab ha-Kalil, euphemism for 'the Blind'), another pupil of Joseph b. Noah, and at once the first and the most renowned philosophical theologian among the Karaites. Even at an early date he was conformed with Kirkhinait, or else regarded as anterior to him; but it is now certain that he flourished in the first half of the 11th cent., and died probably c. 1040. 7 As a philisopher, al-Manji was dominated by the influence of the Mu'tazilite kalám, as was indeed the case with almost all the Karaita philosophers; 8 hence Jacob b. Samuel was referred to by Arabic writers as al-`alá`d al-wa`it-tawābīd, i.e. the people of the rightousness (i.e. equity) and the unity (of God). 9 Thus he too eulogizes five principles of the confession of the divine unity: (1) the necessary assumption of atoms and accidents, (2) the necessary assumption of a creator, (3) the necessary assumption of divine attributes, (4) the necessary rejection of attributes falsely ascribed to God, and (5) the assumption of the unity notwithstanding the plurality of His attributes—the attributes being elements of His nature, and not entities that exist outside of Him. Al-Basir was a believer in free will (�אַֽיָּד), and an opponent of `Anan's doctrine of metempsychosis though he uphold its as true in the case of the 'Abiyah—repudiating an idea current in many Mu'tazilite groups, viz. that God's dealings with the children and animals to which He allot's suffering are justified by that doctrine. He was likewise opposed to the theory of Benjami al-Nahawandi (see above). He expounded his philosophical views in two Arabic treatises. His chief work is the Kitab al-Mukhtasir, 10 the one surviving pattern of the whole Mu'tazilite kalâm; it might quite as well have been composed by a Muslim—just as in the introduction he maintains that revelation by the prophecets must necessarily be supplemented by speculative knowledge. For centuries the teaching was known only in the Hebrew translation by Tobiah b. Moses (below, 667), bearing the title Sifer ha-Nemaloth (םישר ועה), and it is only recently that certain chapters, both as a part of the original and of the translation, have seen the light in the form of graduation theses. A compendium of the al-Mukhtasir is found in the Kitab al-Tamgish or al-Munquz, 11 translated into Hebrew by Tobiah b. Moses as Mahzomoth Pethi (פתי סנה פאזו). 12 An analysis of both works has been published by P. F. Frankl. 13 The al-Mukhtasir exercised a vast influence upon the scholars of the age, and even the last Karaita philosophical theologian, the Aaron b. Elijah to be dealt with below (1364), owes everything to it. Al-Basir was likewise the author of other philosophical treatises, 14 for the most part now lost. He occupied an influential position at the court of the Law. He was the first to protest against the rigorous Karaita regulations concerning marriage, the so-called rikkub theory (above, p. 669). In A.B. 438 (A.D. 1035-37) he wrote in Arabic a 'Book of Commandments', entitled Kitab al-Isbair, sections of which, treating of legacies and ceremonial purity, are found in MS in the British Museum. It was no doubt from this work that his successors drew their numerous references to his views of religious law.

Joshua b. Judah (Arab. Abil Farah Par'kan b. Assad) was a pupil of al-Basir, and, like his teacher, a philisopher and a teacher of the Law, while he was also an exegete. He executed an Arabic translation of the Pentateuch, and composed two commentaries on it, one of which (al-Mas) was an exaxplanative work, the other (al-Manji) an epitome. 15 His work as an exegete was greatly esteemed by Abraham b. Ezra. As a philisopher 16

1 ed. S. Fenerstein, Cracow, 1865; cf. Pomonski, JRQ xiii. 290.
2 There is a MS fragment of his Deuteronomy in St. Petersburg.
4 JRQ, xi. 1165-1167; cf. S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
5 ed. in St. Petersburg; cf. Larkavy, ZAW 196, 230. 24. 33. 34. 40; Pomonski, id. xxxiii. 24-35. 29. 169-219. 115. 41-50.
7 See also S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
8 See also S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
9 See also S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
10 See also S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
11 See also S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
12 See also S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
13 See also S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
14 See also S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
15 See also S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
16 See also S. zehir, für hur, BIBL. ii. (1907) 76.
sophisticated theologian, he wrote philosophical homilies on Genesis and numerous dogmatic treatises, which survive, however, only in Hebrew translations. His philosophical position is exactly that of his master, and he was as much an exponent of the Mu'tazilite kalām. The only extant memorial of his activity as a teacher of the Law is a treatise on inexact in a Hebrew translation, Siffer ha-Kōfer, written in 750, in which he delivered a more decisive blow to the rikkab theory than even his teacher had done, with the result that it was completely discredited. The outstanding achievement of Joshua, however, consists in his having trained a group of pupils who carried the Karaites teaching to European countries.

Joshua was the last representative of Karait learning in Palestine, and after his day, i.e. from the last third of the 11th cent., the intellectual activity of Karaism disappears from the Holy Land, while the period of spontaneous and creative vigour comes likewise to an end. This collapse was probably due to political occurrences, viz. the capture of Jerusalem by the Seljuks in a.D. 1071, and by the Crusaders in a.D. 1099. It is recorded that a large number of the Karaites—or all of them—were, together with the Jews, forced into a synagogue by the army of the Crusaders, and there burned to death. In 1642 the Karaites traveller, Samuel b. David, found in Jerusalem only twenty-seven Karaites, occupying fifteen houses, while it is said that in 1749 there was not a single adherent of the sect in the Holy City. In 1912 the Karaites in Jerusalem numbered eighteen persons (five males and thirteen females), belonging to five families and living in three houses (in one of which was the synagogue). The centre of Karait life was now transferred to Eastern Europe, and this brings us to the beginning of a new period.

2. The Byzantine-Turkish period (12th-16th cent.).—This may be divided into three shorter stages, viz. (a) a time during which the Karaites, by translating the works of the Arabic period into Hebrew and gathering up the results of the past, simply maintained and consolidated what had already been attained (close of the 11th cent. and the 12th cent.) (b) a time of advance and quasi-reinvasions (15th-16th cent.); and (c) a time of complete decadence (16th cent.). The outstanding feature of the first of these three sub-periods was its activity in the work of translation. The Younger, who was in large numbers from Byzantium to study under Joshua at Jerusalem, and there learned Arabic. They then returned home, mainly to Constantinople, where in a relatively short time they translated all the more important Karait works that had been written in Arabic—a feat which Frankl characterizes as an achievement so great in respect of mere mass that we cannot wonder if its quality should be poor. Its defects of quality were due to the translators' inadequate grasp of the Arabic language. The translators were mostly of Byzantine origin, and were familiar with Byzantine culture; and in their translations, besides Arabic works which were taken over unchanged, we find large numbers of Greek words, and these, again, as we might expect, were subjected to great corruption by the copyists. The influence of the translations was nevertheless very great, as they alone, and not the originals, were studied. The translator was Tobiah b. Moses, who is sometimes indeed called Ha-Ma'atik (the translator). Being in a manner a pioneer, he had to construct a terminology, and this is harshly criticized in after years. Some of the Karaites regard all translations as those of the writings of al-Baqir and his teacher Joshua, and, while sometimes added to the matter of these works, he also now and then condensed it. Of Tobiah's own works the best known is his very full commentary on the Pentateuch, entitled Oẓar Nehamād, which, however, is for the most part a compilation from David b. Hezki and Japheth b. 'Alî. He also enjoyed a considerable reputation as a teacher of the Law, and reference is often made to his dictum that every tradition accepted by the Karaites is suggested in Holy Scripture, and that it was mere luck of understanding to assert that there were Karait traditions which had not the support of Scripture. Another greatly valued translator was Jacob b. Simeon; the names of the rest are unknown. Other Rabbis work of the 13th and 14th century found in his predecessors, especially from Japheth b. 'Alî.

This sub-period closes with the publication of one of the most notable productions of Karait literature, the Eshkol ha-Kōfer, written by Jacob b. Elijah Hadassi in 1148. Jost compares it to a sea, into which flow all the streams of Karait learning. Even on its formal side the work is remarkable. It consists of sections, written in a rhymed prose, and all its strophes, which, with few exceptions, are acrostically arranged under the Hebrew alphabet in the direct and inverse order (i.e. תגנ and גנ ת), end in י. This—so to say nothing of the affected language and the cumbersome diction—gives the work a character of tedious monotony. Moreover, Hadassi tabulates all the injunctions of the Law and his other data under the Ten Commandments of the Decalogue; and here, too, he has to resort to all manner of artifices. He claims to be no more than a compiler, and frequently emphasizes the fact (especially at the end of the twenty-third repetition of the alphabet), and, in point of fact, the Eshkol ha-Kōfer takes the form of an encyclopedia in which are accumulated the results of all previous Karait learning. In his attitude towards the Rabbis he is most spiteful and savage, and may in this respect be matched with Solomon b. Jeroham and Salhi b. Maḳlaṭ. He fastens, above all, upon the first, second, and ninth Commandments of the Decalogue, and reproaches the Talmudists for having in their grossly sensuous Haggadā obscured the unity of God, conjoined Him with other beings, and made false representations of the Biblical personages. He was also well versed in secular science, philosophy, and dogmatic theology. His views are dominated by Mu'tazilite influence;
but his information in the sphere of secular science is drawn in part from Byzantine sources, as appears from the numerous Greek glosses to his works. Nevertheless, such glosses are sometimes omitted and sometimes distorted in the published edition.1 Hadassai is likewise the first Karaita writer who formulated articles of faith. These are ten in number—to correspond, no doubt, with the Ten Commandments—(1) the creation of the world from nothing; (2) the creator is God; (3) God is one, formless, and different from all other beings; (4) God sent Moses and the Prophets; (5) through Moses, God revealed the Torah, which in its wording is of itself sufficient, and does not require to be supplemented by oral teaching (the specifically Karaita article); (6) the Torah must be learned by every Israelite in the original Hebrew; (7) God appointed a sanctuary; (8) the resurrection of the dead; (9) reward and punishment in the future life; and (10) the redemption of Israel by a Messiah of the posterity of David. These articles were set forth in a book reversed; as a later writer, Aaron b. Elijah,2 proudly affirmed, was composed twenty-nine years before the Sffer ha-Maddol of Maimonides. About this time, as we read, there were Karaites also in the western part of the province of Spaine. A certain al-Tajashi, a Jew of Seville, then at Jerusalem, where he embraced Karaimism and became a pupil of Joshua b. Judah, and then returned to his native place as a propagandist of his new faith. After his death his work was taken up by his wife, designated Mu'allima (the teacher) by her adherents, who seem to have been faithfully. By the intervention of Rabbinic authorities at the Spanish court, however, the Karaites in Spain were subjected to persecution, and it is stated that from 1178 they were completely lost sight of. There is evidence to show, nevertheless, that there were Karaites in Castile as late as the 15th century.5 In other West European countries the sect was known only by report, although a occasional Rabbinist scholar, as, e.g., Meshullam b. Kalonymus,6 thought it necessary to deal critically with its teachings.

In the East, and especially in Egypt, the Karaites at this time occupied a position of great respect, and perhaps used it domineeringly. In Egypt they numbered amongst them many physicians of eminence, as, for instance, Abul Bara' of Timgad, and Sa'id al-Din Abu'l Fadl, Mulla Abu-l Fadl, the author of several works. Here, too, lived the earliest and the only outstanding Karaita poet, Moses b. Abraham Dafa', whose un-critical historians assigned to the 11th cent., and regarded as the model of all the greater Hebrew poets, Gabirol, the two Ibn Ezra's, and Judah Halevi, while, as a matter of fact, the relation was exactly reversed.2

1 Cf. Penacli, in MGWJ xxiii. (1884) 44 ff.
2 Ibn Dib'ay ash-Shafi'i, ed. A. Müller, Königsberg, 1858, ii. 115-34; Steinschneider, Die arabischen Literatur der Juden, § 158 ff.
3 Ibn Moshe, ed. most recently, Ponszki, in Tzeragolay, Encyklopaedie, i. (1821 f.) and the literature cited there. Ibn Moshe says that Abul Bara' of Timgad, and Ibn Diba'l Fadl, were valuable scholars in the science of the Karaites.
4 Ibn Moshe ed. most recently, Ponszki, in Tzeragolay, Encyklopaedie, (1821 f.), and the literature cited there. Ibn Moshe says that Abul Bara' of Timgad, and Ibn Diba'l Fadl, were valuable scholars in the science of the Karaites.
5 A book which was prepared to do so (cf. MGWJ xiii. 250); but it is a question whether we can believe him.

As time went on, the Karaites came to be more and more affected by the influence of Rabbinism and the Rabbinical literature, and their power gradually waned. The Rabbinical intellectual gifts of Spain carried Judaism into the new world, and the Karaites were quite unable to cope. In Egypt their prestige was shattered by the advent of Maimonides. The latter certainly dealt gently with them, and the Karaitic usages and Karaita interpretations of the Law which had crept into Rabbinic communities were rooted out. From the end of the 13th cent. the vitality of Karaimism was all but completely spent. Attempts were made to revive it; strong personalities arose within its pale; there were conciliatory approaches to the Rabbinists; but the sect was no longer truly alive. Its unyielding insistence upon adherence to the past shut it off from the vitalizing springs of progress and doomed it to a fatal atrophy, and from this point onwards its fortunes require but brief narration.

At the beginning of the second portion of the Byzantian-Turkish period, i.e. in the opening years of the 13th cent., we hear with growing frequency of Karaites living in the land of Kedar (i.e. of the Tatares)—the Crimea. Why they came there, and whence they came it is not easy to answer. At a later date an attempt was made to show that they had migrated thither, as one might say, in pre-historic times; but this is a mere falsification of history, see below, § 5. It is possible that the Chazars who had been converted to Judaism had intermarried with the Karaites, and that this might explain the presence in the Crimea of a body of people exhibiting a somewhat impure Jewish type of religion. Our earliest information regarding this body is provided by the traveller Pethabyla of Regensburg (end of 13th cent.). He states that there were heresies in the land of Kedar who did not follow tradition—which of itself, indeed, they had never heard—who were accustomed to sit in the dark on Friday evenings, whose prayers consisted only of psalms, etc. Further, Solchait in the Crimea was the native place of the Aaron ben Joseph or Aaron the First (c. 1290-1320) who removed to Constantinople—one of the most sympathetic minds that the Karaites ever produced. He was a doctor by profession, but he wrote in (1294) a commentary on the 42 Laws of the Midrash and Sa'id al-Din Abu'l Fadl, b. Sulaiman (perhaps a son of the foregoing).6 It was in Egypt also that their princes, the descendents of Anan, reside. The book attributed to the prince is Solomon b. David (Arab. al-Ras' ibn Abu'l Fadl), the author of several works. Here, too, lived the earliest and the only outstanding Karaita poet, Moses b. Abraham Dafa', whose un-critical historians assigned to the 11th cent., and regarded as the model of all the greater Hebrew poets, Gabirol, the two Ibn Ezra's, and Judah Halevi, while, as a matter of fact, the relation was exactly reversed.2

2 The greater part of it was printed at Eupatoria in 1655.
3 Sprecher, ed. op. cit. p. 50.
4 In addition to the writings mentioned, he composed a small grammatical treatise entitled Kriton. A Krizza of Landesverzeichnisse, p. 73 was also written about this time. Nimra ibn Albo'a, who became a Muslim convert in 1153, says that some of the Karaites of Palestine were preparing to do so (cf. MGWJ xii. 250); but it is a question whether we can believe him.


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liturgical poets. It may be remarked here that the Karaites adopted many of their synagogue songs from the Rabbinists, and that in other parts of their liturgy as well they could not evade the influence of the later. Moreover, in different countries they instituted different ritual forms.\footnote{1}

A still more versatile, more fertile, and more learned writer was Aaron b. Elijah or Aaron the Second (Ephraim abbrev. 1380), who was at once a philosophical theologian, a teacher of the Law, and an exegete, and is designated by his co-religionists 'the Karaite Maimonides.' He expanded his philosophical and theological views in his De ha kol, \footnote{2} in which he is chiefly concerned to guard the Munzilite kulan against the Aristotelian teachings which had found their way into Judaism largely through the writings of Maimonides. A more significant work is his exposition of the religious law, the Gemar Eden, \footnote{3} in which he lays down the principle that belief in the unity and the other attributes of God, as also in His government of the world, is the final aim of the Law. In his commentary to the Pentateuch, Ketar Tora, \footnote{4} the influence of Ibn Ezra is clearly traceable.

In the early years of the Turkish domination the Karaites were frequently persecuted by the government; but, as of old, their relations with the Rabbinists became quite friendly, Mutual forbearance and tolerance helped to bring about the result. Elijah Mizrahi of Constantinople (c. 1455–1555), one of the greatest Rabbinical scholars in Turkey—in opposition to Moses Kapsali, the chief Rabbi of Turkey—allowed the Karaites to be instructed even in rabbinical traditions. Many Karaites sat as scholars at the feet of Enoch Sapaq and his pupil Mercedi Komito, a man of universal culture (middle of the 15th cent.), and received instruction in the philosophic, decisions, and general sciences. \footnote{5} Don Gedaliah, who had come to Constantinople from Lisbon (\footnote{6} before 1487), tried, with the acquiescence of the Karaites, to bring about a reunion with the Rabbinists. One of the pupils of Komito was Elijah b. Moses Bashiyazi, the most eminent Karaite scholar of the day, who resided first in Adrianople and then in Constantinople, and whom the Karaites call 'the last Decisor.' His most important work is his treatise on the Law, Adderet Eliazah, a monument of clear expression and arrangement. He favors, on the whole, the more rigorous application of the Law, and he contended that the ordinances require to be fulfilled only in accordance with human capacity. He was a man of the most varied culture, and was, e.g., an eager student of mathematics. He owed much to the writings of Maimonides. He died in 1469, leaving his Adderet unfinished; it was continued—though still left incomplete—by his brother-in-law and pupil, Caleb Afendopo (born 1455; \footnote{7} after 1509). He was a polymath, and his writings embrace treatises on jurisprudence, philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy, to say nothing of his poems, both secular and liturgical—over twenty works in all.

The other Karaites writers of Turkey during this and the middle division of the period under consideration (15th–17th cent.) are generally of little importance, being almost wholly wanting in creative power, and they merit no particular notice.

An exception should perhaps be made of Moses Bashiyazi, \footnote{8} a great-grandson of Elijah b. Moses, who was a youthful prodigy. He knew Arabic, Greek, and Spanish; he travelled widely in the East, where he became acquainted with the writings of the earlier Karaites; he had a leaning towards historical investigation, and wrote a number of works, of which only one, a treatise on incest, has been printed. \footnote{9} He died, probably in 1555, at the age of twenty.

The East was at this time the nursery of many other Karaites writers, but for the development of the sect as a whole it had no further significance. We are told that, through the efforts of Abraham Maimon II., a great-grandson of Maimonides, a fairly large Karaite community in Egypt was converted to Rabbinist teaching. \footnote{10} Cairo was the centre of nearly all the more eminent Karaites writers of the period, viz., Japheth b. Abraham (probably the middle of the 18th cent.), author of a medical work in Arabic and a refutation of the Rabbinists; \footnote{11} Israel ha-Ma'arab (first half of 18th cent.), the writer of numerous works in Arabic and Hebrew, including one (originally in Arabic, translated into Hebrew) treating of regulations for the slaughter of animals (1806; printed, Vienna, 1850), as also of many hymns for use in the synagogue; he was regius authority in marriage law, and was the first to assert that the intercalary cycle of nineteen years was instituted by those who returned from the Exile ("the good age, see above"); \footnote{12} Japheth b. Sagi, a pupil of Samuel b. Moses al-Maghribi, a physician, and the writer of another Book of Commandments entitled Kitab al-Marahid, which is a model of perspicuity but shows no independence. \footnote{13} Of writers not resident in Cairo mention may be made of Ibn al-Hitti (first half of 18th cent.), who wrote a valuable chronicle of Karaites scholars.

The Taurod–Lithuanian period (17th and 18th centuries).—Reference was made above to the presence of Karaites in the south of Russia, especially in Taurida (the Crimea), as early as the third quarter of the 13th century. They increased in number during the 13th century. Towards the close of the 14th century, the Grand Duke Witold of Lithuania carried away from the Crimea, among other Tatar exiles that the division of the time are more fabrications. Towards the end of the 15th cent., however, we hear of a correspondence between the Karaites in Lithuania and Treki and Elijah Bashiyazi in Constantinople, who recommended them to send him two pupils.

In the Crimea, where under the Tatar sway there was no intellectual life, the Karaites, too, failed to develop one; but in Lithuania, where the Rabbinists founded strong Talmudic schools in the latter half of the 16th century, they exerted themselves to cultivate the

\footnote{2}{Eupatoria, 1000.}
\footnote{3}{Eupatoria, 1055–67.}
\footnote{4}{Cl. Garland, Dict. Israël, p. iii.}
\footnote{5}{Cl. Garland, Dict. Israël, p. 617.}
\footnote{8}{Eupatoria, 1000.}
\footnote{9}{Eupatoria, 1055–67.}
\footnote{10}{Cl. Garland, Dict. Israël, p. iii.}
\footnote{12}{Eupatoria, 1000.}
\footnote{13}{Eupatoria, 1055–67.}
higher interests. Here about this time arose one very distinguished and interesting writer, viz. Isaac b. Solomon Delmedigo (1330-34), the author of an unfinished anti-Christian pamphlet called Ḥizzon Emanūel ('The Confirmation of Faith'). The book reveals a wide knowledge of Christian literature; but its author had also engaged in oral discussions with the heads of the Christian Reformers, who were at that time very numerous in Poland. It shows no distinctly Karaitic colouring, and the religious beliefs of its writer had to be elicited by literary criticism and by mathematical and astronomical arguments. Delmedigo responded, to begin with, in an epistle entitled Ḥizzon Emanūel, which contains also a sketch of the history of Hebrew literature; and subsequently in a series of mathematical writings. Zerah was likewise the author of a long list of liturgical poems.

The dreading massacres of the Jews at the hands of the Cossacks in 1648-49, and the combinations which followed in Poland, affected the Karaites also, whose destinies here, as generally elsewhere, were closely bound up with those of the Rabbinists. Indeed, the two religious groups were now, as a rule, on good terms with each other. At one of the so-called Synods of the Four Lands endeavours were made to unite the two groups, but were rendered vain by a capricious Rabbi who appealed to a Talmudic precedent.

The example of the Lithuanian Karaites acted as an incentive to those of the Crimean, who sustained a constant intercourse with the former, and, indeed, had already a link of connection with them in the Tatar language used colloquially by both. The Crimean Khans varied in their attitude towards them; they were often quite friendly, and they entrusted them with the coinage of their money. But the Crimean Karaites had little to do with the intellectual achievements of their northern brethren. In this period their only writer deserving of notice was Elijah b. Baruch Yerushalami (latter half of 17th cent.; originally from Constantinople), the author of various works; he also transcribed certain writings of the earlier Karaites scholars, principally such as were of an anti-Rabbinic tendency, to which he added bitter invectives of his own. Three Karaites who travelled from the Crimea to Palestine wrote interesting reports of their observations (1841-42, 1854-55, 1783-86), in which they gave a varied mass of statistical data. A notable original writer appears in Abraham b. Josiah Yerushalami, of Chu'rut-Kale, whose productions include one entitled Eẓ neve'ah Oẓam, dating from 1712 (ed. Eupatorias, 1840), and remarkable for its brevity of outlook, its extensive knowledge of Rabbinical

literature, its lenient attitude towards the Rabbinists, and its veneration for Maimonides.

The Karaites of the Crimea, however, poor as are their achievements in this period, are certainly superior to those of the Orient. Of the latter, mention should perhaps be made of Jacob Iskandarani, the Hakam of the Karaites in Cairo, who met the above-mentioned Delmedigo there in 1616; and of the family of Pirzis in Damascus, of whom the most eminent was the physician, Daniel b. Moses (i. 1665-1700).

From the middle of the 17th cent. Christian scholars began to take an interest in the Karaites. Some of them made visits to the centres of the sect, and especially to Troki, and opened a correspondence with its members. Of these Christian scholars we may name Johann Rittengel, who visited Troki in 1641, and Gustav Peringer, a professor in Upsala, who, at the instance of Charles x. of Sweden, travelled to Lithuania in 1690, and in the following year addressed to Ludolf his Epistolae de Karaitorum rebus in Lithuania. Reference should also be made to Johann Pfünder of Riiga, Lewin Warner, and his valuable collection of Karaita MSS in Leyden, Jacob Trigland, of Leyden, and his Dictionarium Karavorum (Delit., 1703), and Johanna C. Wolf, of Hamburg, and his Notitia Karavorum (Hamburg, 1721). These scholars were instrumental in arousing the historical sense among the Polish Karaites, though it must be confessed that the Karaites frequently tamper with the facts, sometimes in ignorance but sometimes of set purpose, and that they represent their sect as being the genuine Jews, and the Rabbinists as the seceders, while they deny all contact with the old Karaite literature. The earliest of these Karaita historians were Solomon b. Aaron, of Troki (1. 1680-1716), and his relative, Mordecai b. Nisan, of Kokov, near Lvov, who published a treatise on the origin and historical development of Karaitism, in addition to several other works, and numerous liturgical songs in the Hebrew and Tatar languages, wrote, at Pfünder's request, his Appiryon Zikhr, a short treatise on the differences of the Karaites from the Rabbinists, and the main legal differences between the two parties. Mordecai wrote, in answer to the questions put by Trigland, his Döö Mörökei, and also in response to the inquiry of Charles x. a short work called Döö Mörökei. In the composition of his Döö Mörökei he had the assistance of his relative, Joseph b. Samuel, known as Joseph ha-Masshiri, who had been a pupil of his father. He was a native of Lithuania, but removed about 1700 to Halicz in Galicia, and did much for the revival of an intellectual life among the Karaites there, who had been living outside the range of general culture. Of his many works, one in particular, Perit Yësëf, treating of grammar, is highly praised. His descendants were all leading figures among the Karaites of Halicz till well on in the following period.

The most prolific writer of the Taurid-Lithuanian period is Simha Isaac b. Moses. He belonged originally to Lutsk, but removed c. 1750 to Chufut-Kale in the Crimea, where he died in 1796. He was well versed in the writings of the Rabbinists, and held the Kabbalah in high honour. He wrote in all twenty-four works, of which only two have appeared in print, viz. the Or ha-Musken, already mentioned as a companion of the work of Aaron b. Elijah, and a historical treatise entitled Orach Saddatim, in which he gives the Karaite conception of the origin and historical development of Karaitism in its form.

1 First edited in J. C. Wagenseil's Tola Igne Satanat, Aldorf, 1802; it was translated into Yiddish, Spanish, German, English, and Russian.

2 Ed. in Isaac b. Solomon's Ḥizzon Pinnat Yibrut, Eupatorias, 1834, and in A. Gellor's Molo Hafignym, Breslin, 1840.

3 Or. 111; Ha-mahzor, eat. 368. At the top.

4 Yerushalami" denotes a Karaita who had made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, and is an imitation of the Arabic Ḥajj.

5 Ed. Gurei, Qa'ye Karte, p. 1.
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This work also contains the first bibliography of the sect. Simha Isaac's migration to the Crimea was no mere passing event. The Crimea now became the centre of Karaitism and there, in Chufut-Kale, the first Karaitse printing-press was established (1726), which published two political occurrences which served at once to draw the Karaites out of their isolation and to link them together by a common bond, viz., the annexation by Russia of the two districts in which they lived, and which were most numerous—the Crimea in 1783 and Lithuania in 1792. With these two events begins the final period of Karaitse history.

5. The modern period (19th cent.—the present day).—From the outset the Russian Government treated the Karaites with good-will. With this attitude there was associated, no doubt, a tendency to play them off against the Rabbinists, the adherents of the Talmud. The last representative of the Karaites at the court of the Khan in the Crimea, Benjamin b. Samuel Aga († 1824), continued to hold the position under Russian rule, though not officially. In 1785, Catherine II. had relieved them of the double tax imposed upon Jews, and in 1827 they were exempted from military service by Nicholas I. They now enjoyed the protection of the law, and they secured what might be called an internal constitution, according to which a non-spiritual official called the Hakam—who represents them publicly—presides over them with the assistance of a spiritual board, controlling the Karaites of the Crimea and the South of Russia. This board has its headquarters in Eupatoria; the first Hakam was the influential and energetic Simha Bobkovich (1794—1835).

The more eminent Karaites scholars of the first half of the 19th cent. were the following: Isaac b. Solomon (1755—1830), of Chufut-Kale, was the reformer of the Karaitic calendar (cf. art. CALENDARS [Jewish], vol. iii. p. 120), his views on that subject being set forth in his Šor ha-Dinšna (printed at Zhitomir, 1872); he was also the author of a work on the ten Karaitse articles of faith, entitled Iggeret Pinmat Yezira (Eupatoria, 1834; Zhitomir, 1873), numerous songs for use in the synagogue, etc. Joseph Solomon b. Moses Intotski, suraoned "Nefesh" (1770—1844), was a native of Kokiv, and lived for a long time among the Karaites; a work published in 1862 to Eupatoria; his most outstanding work is his supplementary commentary to the Miḥdrār of Aaron b. Joseph, issued as Tiferet Kasef (Eupatoria, 1835). David b. Joshua Bobkovich († 1855), a great-grandson of Mordecai b. Nisan, was an opponent of the foregoing, and among other works wrote a theological treatise called Semah Dovnai (St. Petersburg, 1897). Mordecai b. Joseph Sultanski (b. 1850—70), who had a reflective cast of mind, was the author of various grammatical, historical, and theological works. One of his pupils was the kindly-natured Solomon b. Abraham Bein (b. 1817; † before 1890), Hakam in Chufut-Kale and afterwards in Odessa, who was the first to introduce secular subjects into Karaitse schools; he wrote a little book on the antiquities of Chufut-Kale (i.e. the Kerem). A range of works the place formerly known as Kala's came to be called). All these works, however, were eclipsed by Abraham b. Samuel Firkovich (b. Lutsk, 1789; † Chufut-Kale, 1874), with whom begins a new epoch not only in Karaitse historiography, but also in the investigation of Hebrew history and literature. Firkovich's literary career began with the composition of supplementary commentaries and additions to Aaron b. Joseph's commentary to the Pentateuch (Eupatoria, 1836), and of a vigorous anti-Rabbinic work named Mosaḥ e-Miṭtah (do. 1838), which is written in rhyme and arranged in the order of the Ten Commandments, after the manner of the Eeḥōl ha-Kōfer of Hadassah described above. At the instance of the above-mentioned Hakam, Bobkovich, he made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land and the Hebr. countries, from 1839 onwards, to Canea, Egypt, Palestine, and other countries, with the object of discovering archaeological materials which might serve to demonstrate the authenticity of the Karaites. It seemed at first sight as if he had perfectly succeeded in his purpose. Both in the Crimea and elsewhere he discovered epigraphs in Torah rolls and other writings, tomestones, and the like, in which the most remarkable data were treasured up. These memorials included the famous inscription of Judah b. Moses ha-Nakad, dating from A.D. 604, and that of Abraham b. Simha, from A.D. 908; the tomestones of Isaac Sangari, who is said to have converted the king of the Chazars to Judaism, and Shabathai Donnolo, a Jewish scholar of Southern Italy in the 10th cent., etc. Firkovich contended that these various discoveries sufficed to prove that there were Jews in the Crimea as early as the 6th cent. B.C., having migrated thither in the reign of Cambyses, king of Persia; that the Karaites had persuaded the Chazars to embrace Judaism, and were the founders of the Massora, of Hebrew grammar, of the Biblical sciences, etc. Incredible as some of these inferences must appear, they were nevertheless believed, and were even incorporated in histories of the Jews. Firkovich's results were accepted, in particular, by a number of eminent Jewish scholars—Finsler, Fürst, Graetz, and Chevillon. Literary criticism, however, entered its protest, and pointed to various clumsy forgeries; we need only recall the strictures of Rapoport, Schorr, Steinhaider, Geiger (who vacillated, however), Neubauer, Strack, H. F. Frankl, and, above all, Harkavy, who showed that the above-mentioned data could not possibly serve as historical evidence. Firkovich, two years before his death, summed up the result of his discoveries in a work entitled Aḥem Zikhḳaron (Wilms, 1872), in which the epigraphs in question are reproduced. His finds were often assailed by mere hypercriticism, and facts and dates were rejected which in many cases were proved and accepted in Hebrew and Jewish literature, as was the case, e.g., with regard to the existence of many ancient Karaitse scholars and their works. An attempt to defend the genuineness of the suspected tomestones was made by a living Karaitse writer,1 and the final solution of many of the problems involved must be left to the future.2 When all is said, however, the work done by Firkovich was of an eminently serviceable kind. On his journeys, besides the inscriptions referred to, he discovered, and thus restored to science, numerous Rabbinical and Karaitse books that had been regarded as lost. He was also instrumental in creating an interest in the scientific investigation of Karaism, and to some extent supplied the materials for it.

The death of Firkovich ushers in a period of complete decadence among the Karaites that time they have produced not one single scholar of repute, but at best a few litterateurs, as, e.g., Samuel Pigit (1849—1911), Hakam in Elatynomoglo, who published a volume of some 800 pages, etc., bearing the title Iggeret Nafša (St. Petersburg, 1884), and a collection of Tatar popular works that still remained unprinted or had become rare, and Firkovich was one of the most zealous supporters of its efforts. To this society we owe the printed ed. of Karaitse works (cf. Geiger, Jüdisches Zeitschrift, ii. 144 ff.)

1 Judah Kokiv, li prophets uchipnei (St. Petersburg, 1910).
tales, Daður Daðirr (Warshaw, 1904); Elijah Kazaz (1832–1912), a man of wide and varied culture, who, inter alia, translated the works of several Pseudo-Dionysius and other early Christian philosophers into Hebrew; and the Judah Kokov, last mentioned, who, however, usually writes in Russian. Among the Karaites, indeed, the Russian language has gradually disappeared the Tataric.

In 1911 a number of Karaites students at the University of Moscow tried to initiate what might be termed a Neo-Karaite movement, and founded a Karaita monthly in the Russian language and bearing the title, Caraita, on 1 December, 1911, they have failed to find an eligible successor, and are thus in a most critical situation.

In 1897 the Karaites in Russia numbered 12,594–6572 males and 6252 females (ib. March 16 and April 16, 1911). Outside Russia, the sect may perhaps number some 3000 souls in all, living in Halicz (in Galicia), Constantinople, Calto, Jeru-
salem, and Damascus. Its one community of any size is that of Cairo. The future of Karaimism—the only Jewish sect in the proper sense of the term—is thus a rather gloomy one. Its vital element all through, its literature, and finally was exhausted by the death of its last great champion, Abraham Firkovitch.


III. CANON AND THE CANONIZATION OF THE MOVEMENT.—Harkavy, Zeitschrift für jüdische Geschichte, etc., 1910, where, e.g., Rapoport, in Zeitschrift für jüdische Geschichte, etc., 1910, p. 182, 189; and his articles in the Zeitung für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur, ii. (Berlin, 1891), 152–155. On the whole, the movement was, as it has been called, "d'Anon ben David," in J.E. 1936; 3, 1, 3–5. C. P. Poznanski, "Die Karaiten und der Zion," in the Zeitschrift für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur, ii. (Berlin, 1891), 152–155.

IV. WORKS DEALING WITH OTHER EMERITAE LITERAE,—These have not mostly been cited in the course of the article; of further, the relevant arts. By Poznanski, "Die Karaiten und der Zion," in the Zeitschrift für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur, ii. (Berlin, 1891), 152–155.


cage. This could never be opened, except with the consent of the head of his order, who kept the key.


KARAMNÁŚA, KARMNÁŚA (Skr. Karmanáśa, ‘that which destroys the merit of works’).—The accrued river of Hindu mythology, which rises in the hills behind the Râjâl, Bengal; Iat. 9° 26’ N., Long. 83° 20’ E.; forming in part of its course the boundary between the provinces of Bengal and the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and finally, after a course of about 146 miles, joining the Ganges. It has been identified with the Megasthenes (J. W. McCrellie, Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian, Calcutta, 1877, p. 136 f.). On the borders of the District of Mirzapur it hurrs itself over a sandstone precipice, forming, under the name of Châmpâpatra, ‘the stone-after’, one of the finest waterfalls in India.

In Hindu mythology the stream is connected with the legend of Sakayvaras or Tribhuvana, in M. Martin, Eastern India, do. 1909, i. 278–277; F. Legard, in M. Martin, Eastern India, do. 1853, i. 269 ff.; J. Dowson, Classical Dictionary, do. 1879, p. 236 f.; J. T. Chudde, Travels of a Hindu, do. 1858, i. 234 f.; Memoirs of the Rev. J. R. Oldham, J. Wright, and D. Enskine, do. 1854; Ainslie-Atharai, H. J. Leyden, and E. S. Jarrett, Calcutta, 1858, p. 191; 117, 137 (Belcher).

W. CROWE.

KARARIS. A sect of Indian Sâktas.(q.v.). The origin of the name is unknown. It may be an Indianized form of the Persian gurâr, ‘firm’, ‘established’, in the sense of ‘stanch’, or a derivative of the Skr. karâla, ‘terrible’, the Karâris being worshipers of Devi in her terrific form. According to Wilson, these Karâris are representatives of the Aghareghas and Kâpâlikas, who in former times sacrificed human beings to Kali, Chânana, Chinnamastâ, and other hideous personifications of the dakri of Siva. The modern Karâris inflict upon themselves bodily tortures, piercing the flesh with hooks or spits, running sharp-pointed instruments through the tongue and cheeks, gashing themselves with fire, lying upon beds with sharp-pointed spikes. This is usually done to extort money rather than for devotion.

Literature.—For the general question of this self-inflicted torture see J. A. Dubois, Hindu Manuscripts, Customs, and Ceremonies, ed. H. B. Beaman, Oxford, 1809, p. 207 ff. For the Karâris see St H. W. Wilson, Religion in India, London, 1861, i. 364, and K. Raghunâthâ, in IA x. 1881, 73. G. A. Grierson.

KARENS.—See BURMA.

KARLÉ, KARLI (also known as Vilhârgâv, ‘temple-village’).—A place on the road from Bombay to Poona; lat. 18° 49’ N., long. 78° 28’ E.; famous as the site of important Buddhist caves, excavated a little before the Christian era.

It is the largest as well as the most complete chaitya cave hitherto discovered in India, and was excavated at a time when the style was in its greatest purity. In it all the architectural defects of the previous examples are removed; the pillars of the nave are quite perpendicular. The screen is ornamented with sculpture—its first appearance apparently in such a position—and the style had reached a perfected stage of development.

(G. Ferguson, Hist. of Indian and Eastern Arch., i. 187.)

The building resembles, to a very great extent, an early Christian church in its arrangement, consisting of a nave and side-aisles, terminating in an apse or semi-dome, round which the aisle is carried. Its arrangement and dimensions are similar to those of the choir of Norwich Cathedral, or of the Abbaye aux Hommes at Caen, omitting the outer aisles in the latter building.

Of the interior we can judge perfectly, and it certainly is as solemn and grand as any interior can well be, and the mode of lighting the most perfect—one undivided column of light; coming through a single opening overhead, at a very favourable angle, and falling directly on the dâgâba or principal object in the building, leaving the rest in comparative obscurity. The effect is considerably heightened by the closely-set thick columns that divide the three aisles from one another, as they suffice to prevent the boundary walls from ever being seen; and as there are no openings in the walls, the view between the pillars is practically unlimited (p. 187).

Immediately under the semi-dome of the apse is a great dâgâba, or relic-chamber, which originally was probably painted and decorated, or adorned with hangings. This is surmounted by a潮湿 (Burmese kha) with the remains of a large umbrella which originally overhung it. The cave is entered from three doorways under a gallery like our roof-logs, forming one great window through which light is admitted to the interior. Near the great cave is a Hindu shrine dedicated to Ekâvara, the goddess of the Koli tribe, which is probably older than the Buddhist excavations.

Literature.—J. Ferguson, Hist. of Indian and Eastern Arch., London, 1861; Ferguson-Burgess, The Cave Temples of India, do. 1888; L. Rousselet, India and its Native Races, do. 1888, p. 64, with illustrations; 117, 137 (Belcher).

W. CROWE.

KARMA.—i. Importance of doctrine. The Indian solution of the great riddle of the origin of suffering and the diversity of human conditions is to be found in the word karma, which, through the tânavâshâkha, has become familiar to European ears. Hindus believe that what goes on in the life of an individual is the result of the karma or deeds of a former life. The solution of the riddle of life is not material, but spiritual, as we get no answer concerning the ’very beginning’, but it is a happy one, eminently moral, and to a large extent a true one.

The doctrine of karma lies at the basis of all religious conceptions, from the Vedânta, the spiritualism, the mystical, and the ethical, and is the basis of all popular notions of the deities of the mind. It also forms the basis of the highest religions of the oriental world.

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KARMA

1. Karma struck hard against the old belief in mortification, penance, and repentance as destroyers of sin" (K. W. Hopkins, 1918, p. 583).

It became formulated at an early stage in definite terms.

1 As man himself sows, so he himself reaps: no man inherits the good or evil act of another man. The fruit is of the same quality with the action, and, good or bad, there is no destruction of the act.

This doctrine might be called the essential element, not only of all moral theories in India, but also of popular belief. If a person is born diseased, it is generally said to be because his parents were so — because of sins committed in his former life. It is in Buddhism, however, that the doctrine of karma reaches its climax and assumes a unique character. Elsewhere it meets with corruptions; there are counteractions to human acts; but in Buddhism it may be said that karma explains everything, or ought to.

2. Ego and karma.—Other Indian philosophies admit the existence of a self-existent soul or an ego. In Buddhist philosophy the ego is merely a collection of various elements constantly renewed, which are combined into a pseudo-personality only as the result of actions. Therefore, being asserted that Buddhism does not admit transmigration: when a being dies, a new being is born and inherits his karma; what transmigrates is not a person, but his karma. This explanation is justified by some texts, but it would be more exact to put the matter in a different way: an existence is a section of the existence of a certain soul—or, to use Buddhist terms, of a 'series' composed of thoughts, sensations, volition, and material elements. This series never had a beginning. It has to 'eat' the fruits of a certain number of acts under certain conditions, and the experience of these acts constitutes the series (see DEATH [Buddhist]). When this existence comes to an end, there are still some acts to be 'eaten,' both new and old. The series, therefore, passes into another existence, and lives a new section of life, under new conditions. It cannot be said that acts are the sole material cause of this re-incarnation; for the physical elements of the new being, blood and seed, are not intelligent; karma (the possibilities of re-incarnation called karmas) is not intelligent either, while the new being is intelligent from the embryo. It is the 'series' as a whole, with all its moral and material elements, that is incarnerated. If the series does not dissolve at death, if it becomes re-incarnated, it is because its acts must entail retribution. The new being is what its acts have made it: all the pleasant and unpleasant experiences to which it has to submit are simply the retribution of acts. In fact, there is no agent (karter); there is nothing but the act and its fruit; organs, thoughts, and external things are all the fruit of acts, in the same way as pleasant and unpleasant sensations.

3. Karma and destiny.—Over and above human energy and free will Brahmanism placed destiny (daiva, from deva, 'god') To Buddhists destiny is merely past acts. The earlier Indian belief was that the world was re-created by Brahma at the end of each period of chaos. Buddhists hold that the whole universe, with all its variety, is the work of acts. But by acts we must here understand the combined mass of the acts of all beings; e.g., at the beginning of the re-creation of the world there rise in the vast void of the universe 'winds born of acts,' which heap up the clouds from which the clouds, in turn, give birth to acts, and so on (see COSMOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY [Buddhist]).

4. Nature of karma.—'Act' was variously interpreted by the Indian philosophers. The early thinkers attributed an importance to liturgical action and penance which Buddhists contest or even deny. For them an act is essentially a future retribution that can be morally qualified. It is (1) volition (chitam, mental or spiritual act (mânasa), and (2) what is born of volition, what is done by volition, what a person does after having willed, i.e., bodily or vocal act. Mental acts are considered as in the past, inasmuch as there is no act without mental action. We are what we think; we are what we will. No act is imputable, or, in Buddhist terminology, accumulated (samsâra), unless it be—so people say—because of sins committed in his former life. It is in Buddhism, however, that the doctrine of karma reaches its climax and assumes a unique character. Elsewhere it meets with corruptions; there are counteractions to human acts; but in Buddhism it may be said that karma explains everything, or ought to.

5. Sâtvâra and asâtvâra.—Here we must notice the important tenet of sâtvâra, moral restraint, and its opposite, asâtvâra. The man who, in accordance with the established rules of the community, undertakes to keep the Buddhist vows, or simply the five rules 'not to kill,' 'not to steal,' etc., creates by this solemn declaration (vîjayâpatti) an aûyâpatti of particular virtue. This aûyâpatti constitutes what might be compared—roughly, of course—to the merit attaching to religious vows in Christian theology. The merit of the man who has declared (vîjayâpatti) his intention of keeping the vows goes on as long as he continues abstention from murder, theft, etc., is reckoned a merit to him, though, as a rule, it is no special merit to the ordinary man to abstain from these crimes. The sâtvâra constituted by the acceptance of rules continues to exist until the rules are categorically renounced—until an act is committed which is in direct opposition to them.

The man who, on the other hand, devotes himself professionally to a certain sin—the murderer, butcher, judge, or king—lives in asâtvâra, and is vowed to perdition.

6. Pure and impure karma.—There are two kinds of acts: acts free from âravas, or pure acts, and acts accompanied by âravas, or impure acts. The meaning of ârava is not quite certain (deadly floods' according to R. D. Blackmore, Matter, etc., [Childers]), but it is right to say that it has something to do with desire and ignorance: 'pure' means free from passion (klesa). Being free from desire and ignorance, pure acts have no retribution; they do not grow from existence: they are, by their nature, the destroyer of existence; they prepare the way to nirvâna. Such are the 'volitions' by which one gets rid of human and transitory interests to contemplate and
mediate upon the four 'noble truths' by which one enters into the path of Arhatism.

All other acts are impure, and are further distinguished as bad, neutral, or demerit. The principle of distinction seems to be retribution: the act with pleasant retribution is good; that with unpleasant retribution is bad. It may also be said that acts performed with a view to happiness in this world are bad; acts performed with a view to happiness in the world beyond are good. We sometimes meet with the noteworthy statement that good and bad actions (metacinti and ushecinti) are characterized by their intention for the good or harm of others.

7. Roots of karma.—The good act (kusala) has three roots: the absence of harm (akusala), of hatred (advesa), and of error (amaka). All bad acts are in contradiction to good acts; but false doctrine alone (mithyadhati)—denial of good and bad, of fruit, of salvation—cuts the roots of the good act. It must, however, be strong.strong: there are nine categories: weak, weak, weak-medium, weak-strong, etc. Only men can cut the root; gods cannot, because they have no knowledge of the retribution of acts; women cannot, according to some teachers, owing to their instability of character. In order to cut the root, a man must be an 'intellectual' (dhyāna-mahāsiddhi), a being capable of a strong determination to sin: this excludes 'passionate men' (upāyabhikṣakam) and even animals. The roots are restored by doubt as to the existence of good and evil, and by recovery of belief in good and evil.

8. Classification of karma.—Acts are distinguished as of three kinds: good (kusala), bad (akusala), and indifferent (ayākṣa), i.e. benevolent, pernicious, and neither the one nor the other; i.e. acts protecting from suffering either temporarily (by assuring a happy lot) or finally (leading to nirvāna), acts followed by unpleasant retribution, and acts different from both of these—not to be 'enjoyed' pleasantly or painfully.

Acts may also be classified as meritorious (punya), demeritorious (apunya), and fixed (anitiya). The good act of the sphere of desire, i.e. bearing fruits which will be well rewarded in the sphere of desire (Kāmākhyā); see COSMOGONY AND COSMOCOSMOS [Buddhist], is called meritorious: when it attaches itself to a higher sphere, it is called 'fixed.' As a matter of fact, the retribution of a good act in the sphere of desire is not absolutely determined: an act originally good may bear a retribution of a lower sphere, beauty, and so on, may in fact be enjoyed in a divine, human, or animal birth. This is not the case with the good act to be rewarded in the higher sphere; here an act never gets retribution in one stage instead of another. The demeritorious act is the bad act. The act which is a final perfection from suffering, i.e. which leads to nirvāna, is good (kusala), since it is 'pure,' but not meritorious (punya).

9. Retribution (vipāka).—The fruit of retribution of acts includes not only the sensation, but also everything that determines the sensation—organs, etc. The three kinds of acts produce agreeable sensation (vukhalvedāniya), disagreeable sensation, and indifferent sensation. The first two are easily understood; the proper sphere of retribution for the third is the fourth; but it is also believed that the indifferent act produces the vital organ, etc., and other data henotheologically neutral. It is regarded as good, but not intense. Acts may be (a) determinate (vipata, and (b) indeterminate (adhikha), and the latter involve or do not involve a necessary retribution.

(a) Five kinds of acts are called anantarpaya, 'immediate,' because their retribution (hell) cannot be interrupted by an act allowing of fruit in another existence: malefic, patricide, murder of an Arhat, schism, and malicious wounding of a Buddha. Mother and father are benefactors in an eminent degree; the Arhat, the community, and the Buddha are 'fields of merit.' To kill one's father in the endeavour to kill flies is not anantarpaya; but to kill an Arhat without knowing that he is an Arhat is anantarpaya, because the intent to murder is determinate: 'I shall kill some one.'

Acts said to be similar to anantarpaya, and necessarily entailing hell, are violation of a mother who is an Arhat, murder of a Buddha, murder of a saint of the kālava class, theft from the community, and destruction of a stūpa.

(b) The retribution of all other acts may be arrested (1) by the acquisition of the spiritual stage called 'Patience' (kusala), which brings one past the stage of retribution of acts leading to evil destiny, just as a man may escape his creditors by emigrating; (2) by the acquisition of the quality of the saint 'who never returns' (āvocato), which surpasses beyond the sphere of desire; only those acts bear fruit which must bear fruit in this present existence; (3) by the acquisition of Arhatship; all karma is annulled, with the reservation already noted. When, by so-called 'worldly perfection' (laukika), i.e. not properly Buddhist, a man obtains birth into the higher spheres and detachment from all affection for the sphere of desire, the retribution of acts to be rewarded in the sphere of desire is suspended, since the lower sphere cannot be finally abandoned except by the 'noble path.'

Good acts of the body, voice, and thought are purification; they arrest, either temporarily or finally, soiling by the passions of bad acts.

A distinction is also drawn between (1) the act felt in the same life in which it is accomplished; (2) the act felt in the following life; and (3) the act felt later.

10. Projection of karma.—An existence is 'projected,' or caused, by an act; but a number of acts combine to condition an existence, and hence the variety of human fortune. Here the theory of the white-black act applies.

Every bad act is black: the act that is good in relation to the higher spheres is white; the act that is good in relation to the sphere of desire is white-black, because, being always weak, it is always mixed with evil. It is itself, but co-exists in the series (soul) along with bad acts.

A human existence cannot be projected except by a good act. But, supposing this existence follows an infernal existence, the latter having, in the course of the existence preceding it, by a bad act 'to be punished in a following existence'; the former has been projected, in the course of the same preceding existence, by a good act to be rewarded in an existence following the following. In a human existence following upon an infernal existence, a man may have a short life, or may suffer scarcity of food and property, or may wed an unfaithful wife, etc. All these misfortunes are the fruit of the stream (niyāṇa) of murder, theft, adultery, etc., which have had infernal existence as their fruit of retribution (niyāṇa).

A man causes suffering to the living being whom he kills, therefore he must suffer in hell (niyāṇa); he makes him die, therefore he must himself die soon (niyāṇa).

Acts have also a fruit of a general kind. Towards the end of the little cosmic period (antarākāla; see COSMOGONY AND COSMOCOSMOS [Buddhist]), the plants etiolate, are crushed by stones, and bear little fruit; this is the result of a superabundance of murder, theft, etc.—the fruit of karma as sovereign (mahāpāta). The creation of the universe is the result of the acts of all beings.
together; the hells are created by the acts that require to be punished in hell, and so on.

Karma-Marga. —A good and bad acts ten paths of acts (karmaphalapatha) are distinguished because of their gravity: (a) for the body: murder, theft, and forbidden love; (b) for the voice: lying, slander, insolence, and "unprofitable conversation" (chatana); (c) for the mind: covetousness, malice, and false doctrine. Their opposites are abstention from murder, etc.

False doctrine (mithapadrya) is the denial of good and evil, of restraint and salvation. It is bad because it is the pravil of the wise to hurt others.

The first seven, from murder to "stultiloquium," are physical and spacial acts (karma, and paths of acts (karmaphala), i.e., paths of mental action, i.e., volition (chatana); the last three, covetousness, malice, and false doctrine, are not acts, but simply paths of volition. Confusion of passions (kledas) with acts must be avoided.

We must further distinguish in an act the preparation, the act proper, and the "back" (praksha)—e.g., all the preparation for the murder of an animal by the beast hunt, etc.; the actual death-dealing blow, and the cutting up and selling of the meat. The act proper alone constitutes the "path of act"; and hence important consequesances arise from the point of view of responsibility.

It is also to be noted that the "path of act" presupposes accurate knowledge of what one is doing, and is incompatible with a mistake in the person. When one is in doubt whether the thing which he hits is alive or not, he is thinking of destruction, but not of murder. The Jains hold that the man who commits a murder without intent is none the less guilty, just as a man who takes fire is burned.

This is to lead to culpable absurdities. The Jain himself would be culpable for preacting terrible austeritys; the physical and spacial acts could be culpable for making each other suffer; the murderer being himself would be culpable, since he is the origin of the act of murder. Further, a man would not be guilty of murder if he got another person to commit it; for we are not burned if we touch fire by means of another.

All this is very well worked out, but in other things the school is not so wise.

If a man has intercourse with another man's wife, thinking that she is his own, he is not guilty of adultery. If he has intercourse with another's wife while thinking that she is the wife of a third man, opinions differ as to his guilt. Some hold him guilty, others that the act is the object of the preparation and the object of the indulgence. Others say that he is guilty of preadultery, for the object of the preparation and the object of the indulgence are different persons.

The somewhat mechanical and very scholastic character of the Buddhist theory of retribution may be illustrated by the subjective and objective elements in giving.

For a thorough valuation of the merit of giving, or charity (dāna), we must take into account: (1) the qualities of the giver (b bitmasking, learning, etc.); and the manner of giving (with respect, with the right hand; at the opportune moment, etc.); (2) the qualities of the object given (generosity; virtue; etc.); and (3) the qualities of the person who receives: (a) excellence in relation to his lot in life; a gift made to an immoral man has 100 times the value of one made to an animal; (b) excellence due to suffering; a gift is an invalid, a person who is cold, better than to the one received (parents, preacher of the True Law, etc.); and (d) excellence due to the qualities (morality, knowledge, etc.) of the winner.

Karma-Marga. —A good and bad acts e.g., whether one's destiny is human, or infernal, etc., is determined by morality (dāta, abstention from murder, etc.). Gifts are only a sort of extra, to assure riches and other enjoyments.

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If a man has intercourse with another man's wife, thinking that she is his own, he is not guilty of adultery. If he has intercourse with another's wife while thinking that she is the wife of a third man, opinions differ as to his guilt. Some hold him guilty, others that the act is the object of the preparation and the object of the indulgence. Others say that he is guilty of preadultery, for the object of the preparation and the object of the indulgence are different persons.

The somewhat mechanical and very scholastic character of the Buddhist theory of retribution may be illustrated by the subjective and objective elements in giving.

For a thorough valuation of the merit of giving, or charity (dāna), we must take into account: (1) the qualities of the giver (b bitmasking, learning, etc.); and the manner of giving (with respect, with the right hand; at the opportune moment, etc.); (2) the qualities of the object given (generosity; virtue; etc.); and (3) the qualities of the person who receives: (a) excellence in relation to his lot in life; a gift made to an immoral man has 100 times the value of one made to an animal; (b) excellence due to suffering; a gift is an invalid, a person who is cold, better than to the one received (parents, preacher of the True Law, etc.); and (d) excellence due to the qualities (morality, knowledge, etc.) of the winner.
and by it have obtained their present position. Henceforward, karma, as a way of salvation, always carries with it the connotation of sacrifice and ritual. The intention that accompanies the deed is of no importance, only the deed itself. At the same time the power of good actions is recognized. In the Brahmanas we meet with the phrase ‘man’s debts.’ These debts are, to the gods, sacrifice; to the seers, study of the Vedas; to the slaves, hospitality. Whoever pays them has discharged all his duties, and by him all is obtained, all is won.

(3) Meanwhile philosophic speculation had advanced. The universe was no longer an aggregation of separate material entities. Being was one uniform self-existent cause. \(^4\) Individual souls owe their self-consciousness to the action of ignorance on the primal non-conscious cause, Brahman; the whole material world is the result of illusion. Self-consciousness will continue as long as actions which lead to re-birth (samsāra) continue. \(^5\) The aim of religion or philosophy is to free the individual from re-birth and the continuation of self-consciousness. This result can be attained only by knowledge, jñāna, a recognition of the identity of the seeing individual with Brahman. This is the jñāna-ārtha, as opposed to the karma-ārtha, or path of works, which lead only to re-birth, in accordance with the truth that every action must be followed by its reaction. But, despite this necessity for desisting from action, the Vedantist recognizes that: such a course, at least at first, is not altogether possible. By a right sense of the Veda, the searcher after salvation may fit himself to proceed to the higher knowledge: the karma-ārtha leads into the jñāna-ārtha, by which alone is the goal to be reached. Rāmānuja, in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra, says:

1. Sat. Br. 1, 1, 3, 5; 3, 43.
2. See also, V. I. 22, 5; 5, 8. 23.
3. See also, V. I. 12.
4. G. S. 12, 23.
5. See also, V. I. 12.

But to make the Veda the final authority by no means solves all difficulties. The great bulk of the karma prescribed by the Veda consists of sacrifice. To begin with, there can be little doubt that before and during the time of the composition of the Brahmanas, among Brahmins belonging to different schools and different localities, different sacrificial customs had arisen, but that, after the Brahmanas had been composed and had acquired some sort of general recognition, it was necessary to reconcile these outside sacrificial practices with those prescribed by the Brahmanas. Further, even within the Veda itself was to be found a mass of bewildering inconsistencies—a fact not surprising, when we consider the different influences in time, authorship, and purpose. The difficulties thus arising were many. A few of the more typical may be menioned. It sometimes happened that the Brahmana-passage describing the action of a certain sacrifice was not always in harmony with the mantra to be recited during the performance:

The Brahmana-passage maintains that from out a series of sacrificial acts a certain one is to be performed in the sixth place, while in the section that contains the mantra accompanying the series of acts the mantra referring to the particular act occupies the tenth place.\(^7\)

Again, it may not be made quite clear who it is that must perform the sacrifice, or how exactly any one of the numerous modifications of the typical sacrifices, which the Veda describes in full detail, is to be performed. The necessity for clearing up all such obscure points led to the formation of a set of rules, in accordance with which it was possible to settle disputed points without impugning in any way the authority of the Veda.

(4) What a list, it is laid down that, whenever the place of the mantras accompanying a certain action and the place assigned to the action by a Brahmana-passage are in conflict, the mantra is to have greater weight than the Brahmana, because the former, being actually recited during the sacrifice, is connected with it more intimately than the latter, which is not directly used during the performance.\(^8\)

These rules, and the principles lying behind them, are collected in the stats of the Atharvaveda, like the Śatapatha Brahmana. The Atharvaveda, for example, distinguishes between the action of a sacrifice called the purvamahānakṣatra, or ‘Preparatory Investigation,’ as opposed to the uttaramahānakṣatra, or ‘Secondary Investigation’ (i.e. into the nature of Brahman); for every action of works comes before the necessity of knowledge, but the rules of works are not only used during the performance, but sometimes a sixth—non-existence. But of only one do they make usable—abda, or verbal information, i.e. Scripture. For duty must rest on human authority, which is to say that right must rest on some infallible authority, and this is found only in the Veda. Hence there follows the necessity of proving the infallibility and superhuman origin (pratimājñāna) of the Veda (for a discussion of the proofs see Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 279 ff.). For the rest the Mundākāy is occupied with the explanation and conciliation, in accordance with these principles of interpretation and authority, of apparently conflicting instructions and statements contained in the Veda.
his constant duty to help and care for. In return for this the teacher, called the guru, instructed the student, or brahmacārīn, in the knowledge of the Vedas. As a result of his time of study the brahmacārīn left the house of his guru, and with the title of snātaka, 'one who has bathed,' entered into the śramaṇa of a gṛhastha, 'household'. Now, in addition to the duties which he owed to the gods, he had to engage in a definite series of sacrifices addressed to the gods and the spirits of his ancestors. But, when his sons were grown up and could themselves found families, his duties to the world were fulfilled; and the end of the way of work was already in sight. With or without his wife he might now take refuge in the forest as a śramaṇa; freed from almost all duties and sacred rites, he was at liberty to spend his days in meditation. Last of all, renouncing every remaining duty, he was ready to enter the final stage of a śramaṇa, and to leave behind him for ever the karma-mūrga, free to travel along the path of knowledge nearer him from village to village, until death removed the last barrier that prevented his absorption into the universal Brahman. In this way the journey, taken by not a few, began upon the path of works and ended upon the path of knowledge.

(5) Lastly, we have to consider the doctrine of works as it appears in the Bhagavad-Gītā. Hitherto the works that have been included under the designation of karma have been chiefly the sacrifices and general religious duties laid down in the Brahmanas and the law-books, and they have been performed entirely for the sake of the performer. In the Bhagavad-Gītā we meet with a completely different conception. Knowledge is no longer the only way that leads to salvation; that may be reached also through bhakti (loving faith), or by works. But works, to be efficacious for salvation, must be disinterested. The karma-yoga, as this rule of works is called, has two phases. In the first the follower of the rule must discharge all his religious and social duties in utter indifference and unattachment to their fruits. He makes a sacrifice to the Lord of all his works, so that they no longer bind his soul to existence. Thus detached from all desires, he gains final redemption. The following verse is typical:

'And this world is a water, save in the work that has for its end the sacrifice. Work to this end do thou fulfill, O son of mine, that the world may flourish.' (In the words of the Gāthas.)

'Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.'

For a fuller discussion of this see art. Brahmanism.

The attitude of Buddhism differs little in this respect. In fact, one may reasonably surmise that the author of the Bhagavad-Gītā was influenced by Buddhist doctrines. Selflessness is the one thing that the Buddhist must avoid; acts performed with reference to self only bind the doer more firmly to the wheel of existence; but works of unselfish love are without effect, except in so far as they bring the worker nearer him from village to village, until death removed the last barrier that prevented his absorption into the universal Brahman.
KATMANDU, KATHMANDU (Hindi काठमाडू, Skr. काठमाडू, ‘wood’; माउण्डू, ‘a hut or shed’).—The capital of the kingdom of Nepal; lat. 27° 42’ N., long. 85° 12’ E., towards the W. side of the valley Bhave, the broad and deep gorge that is formed by the Bagmati and the Bouddha rivers. It has been known by many names—the earliest Maśīnā, ‘city of Maśīn’, after Maśīn, the Bodhisattva; Yindis; Kāntīpur; and Kāthmādū or Kāthmādhā; the last said to be derived from Maśīn, a dead or silent, and of vahā, wood, which stands in the heart of the city, near the Darbar palace. According to Brown (Pictureque Nepal, p. 63), a building still exists which is said to have been made from the wood of one monster tree. The city is oblong in form, and, according to the Buddhist Newār tradition, it was built in the shape of the sword of its founder, Maśīnī, while the Hindus profess that it resembles the semblait of their godness.

Kirkpatrick (Account, p. 159), who visited the city in 1853, suggests that the guardian of the place is derived from its numerous temples, which are, indeed, among the most striking objects it offers to the eye. Besides these, Kāthmādū contains several other temples on a large scale, and constructed of brick, with two, three, and four sloping roofs, crowned with the usual Linga, and terminating with an enormous bell, generally in pinnacles, which, as well as some of the superior roofs, are splendidly gilt and produce a very picturesque effect. For the style of the Newār temples the reader is referred to an article in the Architectural Journal (April 1877).

A notable feature of some of these temples is the profusion of indecent carvings, the intention being to scare evil spirits (Crooke, P.F.I. i. 68 L.). One of the most important Hindu temples is that dedicated to Tālējī, or Tallījī, the local form of Tālējī Bhavāni, the goddess of the holy basil plant (Ocimum sanctum), who, with the saint Gorakshānāth, is the patron deity of the royal family.

In front of several of the temples are tall monoliths, some surrounded by figures of old Bājās, others by the winged figures of monkeys, and a few by human figures in various attitudes. The figures are often in a kneeling posture, facing a temple, and generally overlook it by a broken arch, on whose head is perched a little bird. Not far from the palace, and close to one of the temples, is an enormous bell, suspended to two stone pillars; and in another building are two huge drums, about eight feet in diameter. Here, too, are several huge and hideous figures of Hindu gods and goddesses (J. H. S. i. 189). During his residence in Nepal, Wright twice heard of persons having committed suicide before these figures. The suicide always takes place before dawn, and the morning with its throat cut from ear to ear, and its limbs deviously arranged, gives the impression of the absurdity being that these were cases of human sacrifice (q.v. 101).

The temple known as Mahenklī (Mahākāla), of great antiquity, is the most popular ‘chapel-of-ease’ in the valley. Hindus regard it as dedicated to Śiva, and the Buddhists maintain that the sacred figure represents Padmapāṇi or Avalokita, and assert that this is proved by the little stone figure rising from the forehead of the idol, which is believed to represent Amītābha (Oldfield, Sketches from Nepal, p. 110). However this may be, this temple has become a sort of neutral ground at which Hindus and Buddhists meet to pray before one common god, the Siva of the former, the Padmapāṇi of the latter. Besides these the city abounds in temples of many kinds.

Many of these present a most repulsive appearance, being dabbled over with the blood of cocks, dogs, goats, and buffaloes, which are sacrificed before them (Wright, p. 11). Of the more modern temples, the chief are that erected by Sir Jung Bahadur in 1852 on the foundation laid by Bhim Sen, and dedicated to Jaganātha; that at Vajjī in the former kingdom of Kāntīpur; and several at the sacred junction of the rivers Bagmati and Vignuani. While the Hindu temples are generally placed near some of the main thoroughfares, all the Buddhist shrines are hidden away in squares or quadrangles in the parts of the city exclusively inhabited by the Buddhist Newārs.

The chief of these are the temple of Adhibuddha, known also as Buddhānagad, the older part of which is now enclosed within the roots of a sacred fig-tree. Nothing is known of its history prior to its restoration in A.D. 1579 (Oldfield, ii. 256 E.). The most important Buddhist monument, however, is that known as Rājānagad or Vignuani, which is a very fine specimen of a Buddhist chaitya, or mound-temple. It consists of a solid hemisphere of earth and brick, about forty feet in diameter and thirty feet in height, supporting a sixty conical spire, the top of which is crowned by a richly-carved pinnacle of copper gilt (Oldfield, ii. 254).

The same writer (ii. 219) gives a full account of this interesting edifice, which is one of the few existing great Buddhist ecclesiastical buildings of which only the ruins survive in India. It is traditionally attributed to a Rājā of Nepal named Goradeo, who is said to have flourished between 2000 and 3000 years ago; but there are no trustworthy records of it until its restoration in A.D. 1598. On the whole, Kāthmādū offers a most promising field for archaeological investigation; but excavation and surveys of the existing buildings will be impossible so long as the native Government maintains its present policy of jealous seclusion.

KAYASTH, KAYASTHA (said to be derived either from Skr. kāyāsthnāthi, ‘staying at home’ [H. T. Colebrooke, Etym. Lex. Lond., 1835, p. 275 B.], or from kāyā-sthā, ‘situated in the body, incorporated’, being sprung from the body of Brahmā).—The writer class of Hindustan, numbering, at the Census of 1911, 2,153,894, of whom the majority are found in Bengal and the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Practically all of them are Hindu by religion.

In Bengal, Kayasthes class them in two divisions: those of Benga, the proper and those of Bihar. Like all the literary and trading castes, the Kayasthes, since the British occupation of the country, have tried to assert a social status not admitted under native rule. One mark of theirs is that they usually affect extreme orthodoxy and are liberal in support of Brahmins, by whom they are barely tolerated. It is singular, as Colebrooke remarks, that, while the teaching of Chaitanya has united almost all the artisan and agricultural castes of Bengal proper in a common Vaishnava faith, the three highest and most intelligent classes adhere to the Sakta ritual, or the worship of the female principle. In E. Bengal all Kulin Kayasths, and something like three-fourths of the other sections, are believed to practise Saktism, and it is asserted that a large proportion of these follow the cult in its grosser development, known as the Vānāchārī, or ‘left-hand’, ritual of the Tantras. Every Kulin family has a domestic chapel in which the Ṭīgā of Siva is daily worshipped by the head of the household.

All Kayasthes, in addition, observe the Five Pūjās, or ‘sacred fifth’, the festival which occurs on the fifth day of the waxing moon in the month of Māgh (Jan.-Feb.), known also as the Dawāt Pūjā, or ‘worship of the infant god’; also the festival of Sarasvatī, goddess of learning and eloquence, whom they regard as their patron deity.

On this day the courts and all offices are closed, as no Hindu penman will see pen or ink, or set the pen to writing, except a perill, on that day. When work is resumed a new inkstand and pen must be used, and the penman must write
KEDARNATH—KENOSIS

nothing until he has several times transcribed the name of the goddess Durga, when all letters should begin "(J. W. Notes on the Ruins, Castles, and Trades of E. Bengal, p. 315).

On this day also the Kāyasth must eat a hired fish (dupeta), and if this price may be, while from the Śrī Pāshupati temple in the month of August to the Śrī Pāshupati temple in the month of September fish must be eaten daily; but from the last to the first month it may not be touched—a tabu probably founded on some hygienic considerations. The Kāyasths of Bihār follow one or other of the main Hindu sects: Vaishnava, Śaiva, Śākta, Kāśivān, Śāivātā and the like. The worship of Durgā and the Śaiva are the most popular. Chitragnā, the mythical ancestor of the caste, is honored once a year on the 17th day of the month of Kārtik (Oct.–Nov.), at the feast of the Dañvat Pājā, with offerings of sweetmeats and money, and the worship of the pen and ink, the implements of the trade. For religious and domestic rites the caste employs Bāhūnas, who are received on equal terms by other members of the priestly body. In the United Provinces they also follow the orthodox Hindu sects, of which the Śaiva, Śākta, and Aryan Samaj are most important. But the fact that belonging to different sects does not bar association and marriage; and, if a Śaiva marries a Śākta girl, the former may remain a vegetarian and abstain from meat and spirits, while his wife continues to indulge in them is the worship of the progenitor Chitragnā and of the Śaiva, Śākta, or family gods, is carried on side by side with the cults of the greater orthodox deities. While the domestic worship is generally conducted by the head of the household, the temple worship is performed by Bāhūnas, who do not suffer any social discredit by officiating for Kāyasths. In the Deccan the caste, known as Kāyasth-Trabhā, are generally followers of Śiva, while children are known as Deviputra, sons of Devi, because they worship the Devi or local Mother-goddess rather than the orthodox gods.

[Left margin:—J. Wise, Notes on the Ruins, Castes, and Trades of E. Bengal, 1887; H. H. Ridley, Castes and Tribes of Bengal, Calcutta, 1891; W. Crooke, Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh, Calcutta, 1891; A. Bates, Hibernia (= G.A.P.H. III), 1915, p. 231. For the branch in Bombay see B.G. H. 1911.]

KEDARNÁTH (Śrā. Keśāravatītā, 'lord of Kedar,' a title of Śiva, the derivation of which is unknown; it has been suggested by E. T. Atkinson, Himalayan Gazetteer, E. Tibet, 1884, 276, that Kedar is an ancient title of Śiva, that the temple and place of pilgrimage in the Garhwal District of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, lat. 30° 44′ N., long. 77° E. The twin peaks of Badarnāth (q.v.) and Kēdarātī lie at a distance of ten miles apart, and between these, at a height of more than 11,000 ft. above sea-level, is the temple situated. The sanctity of the Śiva lingas is extolled in the Vīrāvī Vījīnaviśesa. According to the local legend, Pāvīnvās aitās: 'What is Kēdar? What are the fruits of visiting its sacred places and bathing in its waters?' Śiva replies: 'The place that you have spoken of, O goddes: is so dear to me that I shall never forsake it. While the universe, Kēdarātī so pleased me, and I shall ever remain sacred to me. Brahmā and the other gods remained sacred to me, but this one with Śiva. The title of the deity is Śādāvās, 'always happy,' and he seems to be the successor of an older god, Paśupati, 'lord of animals.'

The temple ranks among the twelve famous lingas of India. The Pāshavas, it is said, came from the Himalayas and arrived at the river Mandakini to worship Śiva. In their eagerness they desired to touch the god, but he avoided them and plunged into the earth, offering to his votaries only the sight of the lower part of his body. The people are said to have come to the surface at Mūkhārīn, in Nepal, where he is worshipped as Paśupatīnāthā. The Pāshavas were cleansed of their sins and built five temples in honour of the god. In Buddhist times the place became a centre of the Baudhānāth cultus, which was overthrown after the beginning of the 8th cent. A.D. by the Saiva reformer, Śaṅkarāchārya, who died here at the age of 32. As is the case at Kēdarātī, the shrine is served by Nambūtiri Brāhmaṇa priests from S. India who were introduced by the great Saiva missionary. The sanctity of the place has been explained by the fact that pilgrims are overpowered by the strong scent of the roses and the white bush close to the border of the eternal snow. This, combined with the rarity of the air, produces a sense of faintness, which is naturally attributed to spirit agency, while the strange sounds produced by falling avalanches and renditions of the ice and snow doubtless contribute to the same belief. The existing buildings are of no architectural importance. Sacred places abound in the neighbourhood, the most important of which is Māhā Kēdārātī, where there is the famous linga, known as Bhairava Shaktam, from which pilgrims were accustomed to precipitate themselves as an offering to Śiva; as in other parts of the Himalayas, a human scapegoat slides down a rope which has its parallels in other places, the object being apparently to secure the fertility of the crops (J. G. Frazer, The Scapegoat, London, 1913, pp. 140 ff., 251, Pausanias, do. 1858, v. 401). A second form of purification, which instances are believed still to occur among fanatics, is to wander up the snowy slopes and court death by exposure.

KEDESHAH.—See Hierodoulou (Semitic and Egyptian).

KENOSIS.—1. The scriptural references.

The word 'Kenosis' is applied in Christian theology to that attitude or action of Jesus Christ, or of the Logos, referred to by St. Paul in Ph. 2:8, where he says of Jesus Christ: ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ἐκτίθετο ἀπὸ σωματοῦ ἄνθρωπου ἐκ τῆς σωματοῦ, μορφῇ δικαίου ἐκτίθετο. This is practically all that can be said with certainty on the subject. We cannot even say definitely what the Apostle intended to convey by the words quoted. No other passage in his writings casts any light upon them. There is certainly no doubt that by the phrase ἐκτίθετο he was expressing the same idea as he had in his mind when speaking of 'Jesus Christ' in 2 Co 8:9, εἰ μὴ ἐκτίθεντο πνεύματα σωμάτων. This passage, however, is no less ambiguous than the former. In both alike the grammatical connexion of the statement with the antecedent designation 'Jesus Christ' seems to indicate that the Apostle had in his mind an action of the historical Jesus. But, on the other hand, the ἐκτίθεντο and the ἐκτίθεντο authors of the first passage, and the 'being rich' and the 'becoming poor' of the second, are so pointedly antithetic as to suggest that St. Paul was thinking of a surrender of the one for the other, and that accordingly he is speaking here of an action effected by the pre-existent Christ at His incarnation. In 2 Co 8 the context does not help us, while in Ph 2, though the parenetic aim of the passage seems at first sight to point to the historical Jesus,
only as referring to a complete and plenary re-
entrance upon a glory which was in some sense veiled during the earthly life of Jesus, it also fails to help us in determining the sense of the Pauline phrase *kēnōsia*.

On the other hand, it is certainly right to assume that the Logos, in his being veiled was the result. Moreover, the exegesis of Jn 17 is rendered difficult by the fact that we cannot definitely say whether an appeal to the Logos-idea is here justified at all, or whether the truth lies with those who hold that St. John, in conformity with Jewish thought, usually as-

1. In place of the life-like impression which Ph 2:6f. gives of the historical Christ and His first public appearance at the baptism in the Jordan, the Johannine theory of Kēnōsia has been built up upon an ungrammatical and rather difficult passage in the Johannine text of ch. 3:1. But the Johannine text has moved further and further away from the original context.

But Resch fails to show even the probability—let alone the certainty—of the underlying assumption of his verdict, viz. the use of a primitive gospel by the Apostle.

The exegesis of the passage is thus thrown back upon the actual words. For, again, the clause ἐν ἐνωσείᾳ ἡμῶν ἤσθην τὰ ὀνόματα τῆς προσωποποίησεν enables us to decide whether St. Paul was referring to the historical or the pre-existent Christ. Even the so-called `interpretation' sense of ἐνωσείᾳ (merger, `unification', `association') is quite out of keeping with the theory of the pre-existent Christ, as far as has been made to fit in with either alternative, though the present writer is of opinion that its compatibility with the theory of the pre-existent Christ is far from obvious. The tenability of both interpretations is much less questionable if, with most modern scholars, we decide for the `passive', or rather the `concrete', sense of ἐνωσείᾳ (preference).  

The interpretation in that case would be: `He regarded the ἐνωσείᾳ not as a price to be held fast, or as a price that he might or must obtain, and the former rendering a fact quite in keeping with either interpretation. This may also be said of the ἐνωσείᾳ not so much. If we take the phrase as equivalent to *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ* then, it has no direct bearing upon the question as to the subject of ἐνωσείᾳ; if we feel it necessary, however, to make a distinction in meaning between the two phrases, the former accords very well with the theory that the whole passage refers to the historical Christ, while it harmonizes with the reference to the pre-existent Christ only if we assume—a supposition widely held, but the present writer thinks, untenable—that St. Paul regarded the pre-existent Christ as the `heavenly man'.

Now we can decide with confidence between the exegetical alternatives presented by Ph 2:6 even by an appeal to the only non-Pauline passage of the NT that perhaps rests on the same underlying ideas, viz. that verse of the high-priestly prayer which Origen (de Princ. III. v. 6) applied in the same way: καὶ ἐν ἐνωσείᾳ με ὑπέπεφτο, ἐν ἐνωσείᾳ τῷ νόμῳ ἐτύπωκεν καὶ ἐνωσείᾳ τῷ παθώματι (Jn 17:7). Not that we would contend that St. John should not be interpreted by St. John; as a matter of fact, if the Johannine writings contained an unambiguous passage which exactly agreed with any one of the possible interpretations of Ph 2:6, it would certainly be right to give that interpretation. But is Jn 17 unambiguous? Even if, in view of other passages in the Fourth Gospel (17:7, 10, 5:18, 25), we reject the interpretation of ἐνωσείᾳ as implying a presence in the ἐνωσείᾳ divine—an exegesis endorsed by the Sebastianists, the Rationalists, and Schleiermacher, and defended with new arguments by H. Wendt—we cannot venture to call it so. This view that Jn 17 refers to a glory regarded as a result of a pre-existent existence is not impossible, but it cannot be maintained in face of Jn 14:21 11:40. If Jn 17, accordingly, can be taken

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ereace upon a glory which was in some sense veiled during the earthly life of Jesus, it also fails to help us in determining the sense of the Pauline phrase *kēnōsia*.

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The exegesis of the passage is thus thrown back upon the actual words. For, again, the clause ἐν ἐνωσείᾳ ἡμῶν ἤσθην τὰ ὀνόματα τῆς προσωποποίησεν enables us to decide whether St. Paul was referring to the historical or the pre-existent Christ. Even the so-called `interpretation' sense of ἐνωσείᾳ (merger, `unification', `association') is quite out of keeping with the theory of the pre-existent Christ, as far as has been made to fit in with either alternative, though the present writer is of opinion that its compatibility with the theory of the pre-existent Christ is far from obvious. The tenability of both interpretations is much less questionable if, with most modern scholars, we decide for the `passive', or rather the `concrete', sense of ἐνωσείᾳ (preference).  

The interpretation in that case would be: `He regarded the ἐνωσείᾳ not as a price to be held fast, or as a price that he might or must obtain, and the former rendering a fact quite in keeping with either interpretation. This may also be said of the ἐνωσείᾳ not so much. If we take the phrase as equivalent to *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ* then, it has no direct bearing upon the question as to the subject of ἐνωσείᾳ; if we feel it necessary, however, to make a distinction in meaning between the two phrases, the former accords very well with the theory that the whole passage refers to the historical Christ, while it harmonizes with the reference to the pre-existent Christ only if we assume—a supposition widely held, but the present writer thinks, untenable—that St. Paul regarded the pre-existent Christ as the `heavenly man'.

Now we can decide with confidence between the exegetical alternatives presented by Ph 2:6 even by an appeal to the only non-Pauline passage of the NT that perhaps rests on the same underlying ideas, viz. that verse of the high-priestly prayer which Origen (de Princ. III. v. 6) applied in the same way: καὶ ἐν ἐνωσείᾳ με ὑπέπεφτο, ἐν ἐνωσείᾳ τῷ νόμῳ ἐτύπωκεν καὶ ἐνωσείᾳ τῷ παθώματι (Jn 17:7). Not that we would contend that St. John should not be interpreted by St. John; as a matter of fact, if the Johannine writings contained an unambiguous passage which exactly agreed with any one of the possible interpretations of Ph 2:6, it would certainly be right to give that interpretation. But is Jn 17 unambiguous? Even if, in view of other passages in the Fourth Gospel (17:7, 10, 5:18, 25), we reject the interpretation of ἐνωσείᾳ as implying a presence in the ἐνωσείᾳ divine—an exegesis endorsed by the Sebastianists, the Rationalists, and Schleiermacher, and defended with new arguments by H. Wendt—we cannot venture to call it so. This view that Jn 17 refers to a glory regarded as a result of a pre-existent existence is not impossible, but it cannot be maintained in face of Jn 14:21 11:40. If Jn 17, accordingly, can be taken


2. In the East, indeed, it came to be the prevailing view. Not only do we find it in Eusebius (e.g., de Eccles. Theol. I, x. 10) and Apollinaris of Laodicea, which was recognized as a standard of doctrine by the Council of Chalcedon: *καὶ ἐνωσείᾳ ἐστηκέντος ἐν ἐνωσείᾳ ἡμῶν, μορφῇ ἐνωσείᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, ὡς ἐνωσείᾳ τῶν ἐνωσείων (Ep. 39 [PG 38, 668 A.]).

(b) The Pelagian Exegesis.—A diametrically op-

pose interpretation of the passage is met with c. 400 in the West, viz. in the Commentary of Pelagius on St. Paul's Epistles. Pelagius finds the
subject of the expressions ἐκατέραν ἡγασαρν, ἡγασαρν, and ἐκατέραν ἡγασαρν in the human being in whom the sense incarnate. quod, as a consequence, homo humiliare dignatus est, divinitas quae in unum non potest enim qui humiliatus fuerat exaltavit' (PL xxx. 884 C).

Even 'secundum hominem' Christ was, according to Pelagius, 'in forma Dei', i.e. 'Dei', and therefore 'Dei' quod erat, and because he was the one 'in quo Deus erat', i.e. 'pleitudo deitatis' (loc. cit.; cf. pseudo-Primasius, PL. lxvii. 650); although 'quod erat, in parte sanctum, in parte sanctum, in parte sanctum', the glory of which is not possible 'in quae gloriem quae forsan non habemus' (PL xxx. 884 B).

The text of Pelagius—at this point probably not completely traceable in pseudo-Hieronymus—does not provide a particular exposition of ἐφαρμοσμένου or any other term. It cannot be assumed that pseudo-Primasius be used here as supplementing it, since he has manifestly interpolated something of his own; still, the excesses of Pelagius can be made out distinctly enough. In view of Col 2:9—a passage which he undoubtedly had in mind—the phrase και πρωτότοκον πρωτοτοκον πρωτοτοκον is adequately explained by the words 'quod erat, humiliare celavit', while the words 'dans nosse esse' in his glorium quae forsan non habemus' suggest the following explanation of και πρωτότοκον πρωτοτοκον, etc., 'non glorius est in suo quae habebat' (i.e. το θεό το θεός ο Θεός = 'το θεός το θεός'). The latter interpretation again, is further explained by what Pelagius says with reference to 'formam servi accipiant': 'ita ut pedes lavaret discipulorum; celavit quod erat, Adam vero et antiquae hosts suae usurpavint superbia quod non erant' (PL xxx. 884; H. Zimmer, Pelagius in Irland, Berlin, 1901, p. 377).

Thus, in dealing with Ph 2:6, Pelagius, like the recent expositor Lightfoot (op. cit.) and J. Weiss, has not provided a particular exposition of 3:25, and under the influence of this reminiscence applies the same phrase to Christ as the second Adam. It would seem that this interpretation was suggested to him by earlier tradition, as his older contemporaries, Phoebeinus and Aeginaeus, is also reminded by Ph 2:6 of the fact that the Logos 'induerat quod servum quod servum quod servum posset: hominem secliget ... ut [printed 'et'] secundum Adam per obedientiam restituens quod primus transgressiones perdiderat (contra Arrianon 21 [PL xx. 29 A]).

(c) The Antiochene-Occidental interpretation.—The third interpretation of Ph 2:6 takes a middle course between the two discussed above. It was known to Pelagius, who, however, rejected it in the interests of anti-Arianism:

'Allelui haec locum its intelligent quod secundum divinitatem quae humiliavit Christus, secundum formam secliget, secundum quum assuquatum Dei non rupinam usuvare quam naturale est, est eminens, etc., eximis diebus, non substitutum essent, ecclesiam, etc., de omnem munus, de ammunition, etc., de permissis ut humano tantummodo apparens atque humili illum obedientiam nec oratus mortem renascendo' (PL xxx. 884 A; cf. Zimmer, op. cit. p. 377, and pseudo-Primasius).

This interpretation was at that period widely current in the West. It was adopted by Ambrose (PL xvii. 409)—though with some points of resemblance to the view of Pelagius, as, e.g., with regard to the 'Dei' and also by Phoebeinus (ib. xx. 29 A) and his contemporary Gregory of Elvira; while, as regards Ambrose, Augustine, and even Hilary, it is obvious that they too form the basis of this interpretation, though with certain

1 In Religionen an Geschiechtte von Gegenwart 1, (Tbingen) have 179. 179. 179.


3 Ph. 2:8. 2:9. 2:10. 2:11. (PL xx. 29A). cf. A. Schott, Die Auseinandersetzung Augustae über Phil. 2:6, 8; Verla, De Philemonis et Philonociis, (PL xxii. 191.)


modifications due to Greek influence, i.e. to the view indicated under (a) above. Apart from these modifications, this current Western interpretation agrees with some of the important particulars. (1) It takes Ph 2:6 as referring to the historical Jesus Christ, though—diverging here from Pelagius—to Christ 'secundum divinitatem,' i.e. to the Ξηραντον Λόγον. Ambrosiaster is quite aware of his divergence at this point from the view noted under (a), and explicitly says: 'Non enim mihi scult quibusdam videtur, sic formam servi accipiant eum quem in carne sustinet in voce quod et in Christo Jesu, id est, Deo et homine' (PL xx. 423 A).

But, on the other hand, Phoebeinus, Gregory of Elvira, and, above all, the Grecizing Fathers (Hilarus, Ambrose, Augustine) include in the Kenoisis also the 'incarnatio' of the Logos, as the decisive conception of the process expressed by the words ἐκατέραν πρωτοτοκον and wrought out in the life of the historical Christ. (2) The current Western interpretation and that of Pelagius have in common the idea of the co-existence of the 'forma Dei' and the 'forma servi'—an idea very prominent also in Hilary, Ambrose, and Augustine (cf. Reuter, loc. cit.). (3) In connexion with that view, they agree also in regarding the και πρωτότοκον as a και πρωτότοκον ('celavit quod erat').

In all these three points, between the current Western interpretation coincides with the common Antiochene, though the latter, like the Grecizing Western Fathers, often inverts the και πρωτότοκον into the conception of the και πρωτότοκον. The correspondence is clearest in the case of Nestorius. While Nestorius recognizes the και πρωτότοκον as the essential starting-point of the και πρωτότοκον, he expressly says with reference to Ph 2:6, that 'Hoc autem πρωτότοκον του θεου θεου και εκ του θεου λογος' (Nestoriana, p. 254).

Moreover, the co-existence of the και πρωτότοκον and the και πρωτότοκον which we already find in the Fragments of Nestorius is shown by his Liber Heraclidio to have been one of his leading ideas, inasmuch as he identifies και πρωτότοκον and και πρωτότοκον, and the exchange of the και πρωτότοκον is the decisive factor in his conception of the 'unio personalis' of the two natures. Lastly, it has long been recognized that Nestorius attached great importance to the Christological και πρωτότοκον; thus, to take but a single instance, we quote him regarding the self-restraint of Jesus Christ at the Temptation: σεικε εκελέστω το και πρωτότοκον θεος ... αυτος δε ανθρωπος φιλατρευτηγαν (Nestoriana, p. 348).

Like Nestorius, Euthymius of Tyana, a writer of kindred views, emphatically asserts that Ph 2:6 ought not to be read as referring to the Logos; in opposition to the words of Cyril quoted above (a), he writes: 'Segwe apostol Paulum . . . non sit, Ipsi de coelo desc Spreadius Deus Venustum eximians semiintem, . . . sed quid dieci? Hos sensatur in voce quod et in Christo Jesu' (G. D. Mactar, SS. Concilia, Vol. 1793-95, v. 983 c-e; cf. G. Ficker, Euthymius von Tyana, Leipzig, 1905, p. 69 f). The views maintained by Nestorius and Euthymius in connexion with Ph 2:6 were, however, not distinctively Nestorian; they were rather in the line of the common Antiochene tradition. In fact, notwithstanding the fragmentary form in which the writings of the earlier Antiochenes survive, it seems certain that the teaching of Theodore of Mopsuestia regarding the και πρωτότοκον of the two natures in Christ has been very similar to that of Nestorius, and the former's exposition

1 Nestoriana, ed. F. Loofs, Halle, 1905, p. 175.

2 Ph. 2:6.

3 Liber Heraclidio, tr. F. Nau, Paris, 1910, p. 147: 'La forme est le pouvoir: de sorte qu'il est lun par l'essece et autre

4 Ph. 2:6.

of Ph Griffith shows that he too regarded the historical Christ (or the Logos Logoi) as the subject of ekeino and interpreted the kinesis as a person;

Theodotus, Clement, Tertullian, and the Western expositors, on the other hand, put away the idea of ekeino and took the kinesis as a divine essence (Theodotus ekeino as a palaion Theodosius, Clement, Tertullian, and the Western expositors) which of these three types of exegesis has the longer tradition behind it is a question not to be answered by a mere reference to the fact that Theodotus, Clement, Tertullian, and the Western expositors are earlier than the Pelagian and the Antiochian. For the circumstance that what is common to the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochian and the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appear...
of the orthodox Lutherans as the 'Extra Calvinisticum'—represents the settled belief of all the theologians of the early Church. Testimonies to God's currency might be adduced from the East and from the West. To the theologians of the early Church it was, in view of the inmutability of God, as obvious as it was unquestionable. Further, the Nicene Creed, in its anathemas, formulates a dogma the thesis that is ἐπίστασις and ἀπόλυτος. Of the theory that the Logos, in consequence of a mutation in His essential being, confined Himself to an existence in the historical Jesus, Baill the Great writes thus: τὸν οὖν ἐνθαμνήθην ἐκ τοῦ ἁμαρτίας ἐκ τῷ θεῷ ἀμαρτήσαι παρὰ τῷ ἀπόρρητον (Ep. cxxii. 2).

(d) The common doctrine of the Kenosis in the early Church.—On the assumption that the ideas discussed above were valid, there remained only one theologically intelligible view of εὐαγγέλιον πρεσβύτερων as applying an act of the Logos—the view, namely, to which Irenæus had given expression, though not in connexion with Ph & nbsp;

3 συνερχομένου τοῦ Θεοῦ τιμής, τό τε παράστατον τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, τοῦτο αὐτὸς τοῦ παράστατον τῆς ἁμαρτίας (Poly. iv. xxvii. 2; cf. 1).

This view was adopted by Novatian (cf. 2 (d) above), and also by Origen:

'Por ousi eu xροιστεωση σεντικτικος δεστω και πληθυνομενοι διδακτορεις" (de Princ. i. 11. 5)." Origen explains it by a figure, and his idea may be concisely expressed as follows:

Imagine a status of esse and esse being filled in the whole form; its very magnitude would preclude its being seen; a small copy of it in the same material, however, would give us some idea of it. Similarly, as we could not behold the pure light flowing from the Divine majesty of the Logos, by His kenosis He made it possible for us to see of this divine light: 'transcendentem insinuam humanorum corporum formae ex operum virtutum simulacris Dei Parvis was seen in immensam atque invisibilis magnitudinem designantem' (Iren. c. 3).

Here the Kenosis is that self-limitation of the Logos which was involved in His manifestation in a human form, though at the same time He is not in any way limited as to His cosmic position. This conception of the Kenosis may be regarded as the recognized view of the early Church. It is the view alike of the theologians who refer the εὐαγγέλιον πρεσβύτερων to the λόγον ἁμαρτίας, and so identify κόσμος with ἐνδυνάμωσις (2 (a)), and of those who find the subject of εὐαγγελίου with the λόγον ἁμαρτίας. For the theologians who identify κόσμος and ἐνδυνάμωσις firmly believe, like the other group, that the Logos, notwithstanding His immediate κοσμοπλοηγος and ἀπόλυτος, and, as regards His divine place in the universe, unconditioned—ἐνδυνάμωσις (as Apollinaris himself puts it; cf. 4 (b) below). In view of these conception of the Kenosis, however, the two modes are in reality co-existent, inasmuch as the θεὸς εὐαγγελία—a view even according to Apollinaris (cf. 4 (b))—was still retained by the λόγον ἁμαρτίας. Both groups were alike convinced that the 'be什'; i.e. the human vehicle of the manifestation, stood in the way of a complete revelation, or, what is the same thing, κόσμος and ἐνδυνάμωσις being here identical—made it impossible for the Deity to reveal His majesty fully within the limitations involved. Thus the two interpretations given respectively in 2 (a) and 2 (c) above might frequently merge in each other. Not indeed, does the kenosis (2 (b) above), to which that of the Antiochenes frequently approximates, rest upon any other conception of the Kenosis. The idea that the Logos in assuming human nature surrendered the universal operations of His deity, to be a very far removed from the idea that He became incarnate in a man who veiled the indwelling φάντασμα τῆς θεότητος, humbled Himself, etc. Yet, so long as the 'Extra Calvinisticum' (cf. 2 (c) above)
is adhered to, the Kenoisis is taken in a sense essentially the same in both cases.

1. Diverse aspects of the early Church theories.

Is the doctrine, it is needless to say, propounded by the early theologians seems very great from one another. The extreme poles of the variation are found in Augustine and Pelagius. But the differences do not arise from any essential disparity of view regarding the Kenoisis; they are due rather to the various degrees in which theological theory is mingled with popular doctrine.

(a) The influence of popular doctrine upon the orthodox theologians. — Although Clement of Alexandria held, as already noted, that the Logos COULD not possibly be described to the Logos, we nevertheless find him saying: "οὐκ ἡκύρικε Ἡσίων δίκαιος, xxxvii. 2." Origen often expresses himself in a similar fashion, and, indeed, no theologian of the following century ever quite discarded the formula and symbols of the popular conception of the ἐναθμώτης. Even the Nicene Creed, immediately before its anathema upon the ἀναθήματος ἡμῶν εἶπε τὸν θεόν τοῦ θεοῦ, speaks of τὸ θεοῦ κεφαλή (Orat. xxxviii. 21).

Yet he not only accepts, as was shown by these works of Tertullian and Irenaeus, the Aristotelianism, but still adheres to the essentially "Nestorian" view of Origen, viz. that the Incarnation was effected "Adamanta animae inter Deum carnemque mediatum":

ψιθυρίζε, καταγράφων, θεωρήτων τούτων μητρικούσιον δυνατόν καὶ ακατάκλιτον μνήσθαι (Orat. xxxviii. 12).

(b) Apollinarians of Laodicea. — Of all the theologians of the early Church it was Apollinarii of Laodicea who accorded most fully to popular dogmatism. His doctrine of the Incarnation, according to which the Logos is the son of the Logos, a new idea of Christ, perhaps even be described as a materially and formally ingenious attempt to moralize the popular views of the ἐναθμώτης into a theological theory. In Apollinarius, indeed, we find statements that seem to indicate a type of Kenoisis implying a real change in the Logos.

καθαρά (Lietmann, Apollinaris, 358, p. 297).

Yet he also says: καθαρά μὲν ἐναθμῶτη καὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν (Herm, 78, 11, p. 349). Still, ἁμαρτία = δεῖ να δώσαμεν αὐτῷ θάνατον ἡμῶν ἐν τούτῳ (65, 31, 2, 12).

Even in Apollinarius, therefore, notwithstanding his affinity to the popular doctrine, there is no place for a theory of the Kenoisis which diverges from the general tradition of the early Church (cf. 3 (d) above).

(c) The Antiochians. — It is true that the Christology which is furthest removed from Apollinarianism, i.e., that of Nestorius, and that of Pelagius (which coincides with the latter in many of its formulæ), does not merely "seem to differ." In so far as, in the divergence referred to, the question regarding the person of Christ was brought to discussion in the theorizations of the early theologians, the differences are profound. The Nestorian doctrine of the Kenoisis (cf. Lecoy de la Marche, 102) is a lucid development of the Nestorian views to which Ireneus and Novatian had already given expression, and which were never really discarded by the theology of the early Church — a development, one might say, as possible from popular dogmatism. The Apollinarian doctrine, on the other hand, tends unquestionably to pass beyond the earlier views and to advance towards a conception of the Kenoisis more akin to the popular idea. This tendency appears, though to a slighter degree, in the Lecoy de la Marche's theory of a θεοῦ καὶ ἐναθμώτης of the two natures in Christ which is not clearly distinguished from a θεοῦ φύσις, and also in the orthodox Chalcedonian doctrine of the θεοῦ καὶ ἐναθμώτης in Apollinarii. It was not forward as an "unio personarum," in the early Church, however — even in the hands of Apollinarius and the Monophysites — the tendency never attained its final development. This would have been secured only if the idea of the θεοῦ φύσις commer with which Apollinarius had at least attempted to deal in a serious fashion, the idea of the θεοῦ φύσις, to which Cyril sometimes attaches the same meaning, and that of the θεοῦ καὶ ἐναθμώτης had been fully wrought out in Greek theological thought. But the Apollinarian theory of the θεοῦ φύσις and the allied idea of a θεοῦ φύσις conflicted with that ἐναθμώτης of the Logos which was likewise maintained, and also with the accredited doctrine that the Logos had not forfeited His πρός θεόν ἐνεργεία, whilst, in the orthodox tradition, the idea of the θεοῦ καὶ ἐναθμώτης broke down in face of Ἰακώβου, since even the idea that εἰς τὴν θανάτον πάντων οὐκ ἀρκεῖ adds nothing to the-theologically unserviceable paradox of Athanasius: "οὐκ ἦν τὸ πάθεσι καὶ μὴ πάθεσι (Ep. ἀν Ἐπιφανίου 9)."

Nothing earns and respectful handling of the θεοῦ φύσις in an unreserved Theopneusticism could have yielded a real Kenoisis of the Logos. But could the Monophysite theologians, which attached great importance to the Trisagion in its monophysically expanded form, unreservedly maintain the idea expressed in the words εἰς τὸν θανάτον... συμπληρώμενος εἰς θανάτον?" (4, 100-179) can speak of the neo-Protestanttheology (see below).

5. The Kenoisis in the Middle Ages, and in the Roman Catholic Church. — Medieval theology, so far as it was concerned at all with the idea of the Kenoisis — the idea certainly never stands out prominently — continued to adhere to the consensus of the early Church in its Western form. The same may be said of Roman Catholic dogmas at the present day. Thus, according to Wetzer and Wiele (Kirchen-Lezionen, iii. (1884) 271) "suum ipsum exinanit" ('Ph. 2') is affirmed of Christ's assumption of human nature, the scholastic mystics and many Protestant theologians believe, of His divine nature and person per se. The Kirchen-Lezionen (xii. (1901) 179) can speak of the neo-Protestanttheology (see below) as "a complete kenoisis of the uncreated Christ.

6. The Kenoisis in the Reformed theology. — The Kenoisis was insisted upon more strongly by the so-called Reformed theology, which found the subject of ἐναθμώτης in the Logos — whether ἁμαρτία, as becoming man, or ἑθός — and connected the idea with its doctrine of the 'states' of Christ. In the earlier theologians of the Reformed Church, in fact, we occasionally find assertions which readily explain why certain Lutherans spoke of a special Reformed doctrine of the Kenoisis.


The sense in which such utterances are to be understood, however, is made clear by Zanchi (in the Zürich, 1847, p. 863).

2. Der Kenoisis, ed. 176. 1109 B. θεοῦ Χριστοῦ... εἰς τὸν θανάτον συμπληρώμενος.
It was the controversy between the Tübingen and the Gissel group (1616–27) — who were at one in their view of the *kratos* — that first set this Lutheran problem regarding the Kénosis into the field of serious debate. The Tübingen group, who thought of the *kratos* only as a *khrēstos* *khrēstos*, thereby fell into manifold confusions and a concealed Docetism. Of the Gissel group, Balthasar Meister († 1627) tried to establish the theory that the Kénosis was a *khrēstos khrēstos* by arguments* which must be regarded as an attempt to supplant the idea of a substance — that first to envelop this Lutheran problem through the Tübingen theologians, but the profounder thoughts by which he tried to establish it were soon forgotten.

8. The modern "Kénoticists" — Views forming a complete contrast to those of orthodox Lutheran — views, indeed, which the Formula of Concord banned with an anathema (Epitome, viii. 39) — are found among the modern "Kénoticists," theologians, who regard the *kratos* as a real surrender of the *forma Dei* for the *forma servi*, and thus assume that the Logos, in order to become man, actually renounced, either wholly or in part, His divine attributes. Such ideas, which are connected with the more popular dogmatists of earlier and later times (cf. above), soon emerged sporadically in Protestant theology. They crop out in Menno Simons († 1559);* N. L. Zinzendorf († 1709) developed them with all the self-confidence of a modern theologian, and, following the fresh line taken by F. C. Oetinger († 1782), P. M. Hain († 1790), and other Pietists, the Pietistic physician Samuel Collinhusen († 1803) published lengthy disquisitions on the same side. In the confessional theology of Neo-Lutheranism the first to advocate kindred views was E. W. Sartorius (1831 and 1832). It is possible that popular views supplied the incentive to some of these pioneers in the modern doctrine of the Kénosis. But the present writer thinks that this does not apply to the modern doctrine itself, which originated rather in the endeavour at once to maintain the Tübingen doctrine of the early Church and to do justice to the true humanity of Jesus Christ and the unity of His person. The writer who gave the doctrine its scientific foundations was the late Thomasius († 1875); and, in Germany, his views, with more or less modification, were adopted by many Lutherans — C. T. A. Liebner († 1871), C. K. Hofmann († 1877), W. F. Gies († 1881), C. F. A. Kahnis († 1888), Franz Delitzsch († 1890), F. Frank († 1894), C. E. Luthardt († 1902), and others — and by a few Reformed theologians, e.g. J. P. Lange (1884) and J. H. A. Elzard († 1888). In French Switzerland the new doctrine found an early adherent in F. Godet († 1900). It first gained a footing in Britain about 1889,* by which date fresh tendencies were already asserting themselves in Germany. As recently as 1903, Sweden had a convinced champion of the doctrine in O. Benson (see literature at end of art.). The views of these writers vary greatly in detail — appearing now in a purely Biblical (Godet) and now in a speculative light (Liebner, Hofmann, Frank) form, here showing great resemblance.


2 "Von der Mischung als ein *khrēstos khrēstos*," Opera Theologica Theol., Amsterdam, 1861, p. 261a.


4 Cf. PREB. V. 231.

5 Beiträge zur kirchlichen Christologie, Nürnberg, 1845, Christus Person und wort. Erlangen, 1859-61, Leipzig, 1860-68.

6 C. W. Sanday, Christology Ancient and Modern, Oxford, 1907, p. 74ff.
strait, there venturing upon the most daring conclusions (Genes)—and cannot be set forth here; we may simply refer the reader to Benson's historical introduction (pp. 42-127) and to the works of Dorner, Schultes, and Günther cited below.

One brief observation, however, should be made. The purely modern theory of the Kenosis is consistent only on condition that it surrender everything in the nature of an 'Extra-Calvinistic.' Thomasius, in fact, actually ventures to say in his Heitrelte (p. 228):

Logos reserved to Himself neither a special existence nor a special knowledge outside His humanity. He truly became man.

Such a view certainly secures the true humanity of Jesus and the unity of His person. But as certainly it traverses the immutability of God, and it is fraught with conclusions most incompatible with the conception of the Trinity. If, again, the 'Extra-Calvinistic' be in any degree retained—as it always is, when, say, the 'immanent' and the 'relative' attributes of God are distinguished in such a way that the latter alone are regarded as having been relinquished by the Logos—then (to say nothing of the logical difficulties) the theory does not secure what it aimed at securing, viz. the unity of the person of Christ. If, in order to obviate the logical difficulties, the Kenotists, in their statements regarding the divine nature and its 'idolatry,' seek to bring the ancient doctrine of substance more or less into conformity with that of the living reality, the result is a blurring of the distinction between their own theory and the Christology most repugnant to them, i.e. 'Nestorianism.'

Moreover, the modern theory of the Kenosis, in all its forms, still carries an air of presumption, insomuch as it ventures upon constructions which would have a meaning only if God's relation to the world, or, let us say, the relation of the Logos to God, and His divine and human self-consciousness, could be grasped—and analyzed—by the finite mind of man.

q. Estimate and conclusion. Does the foregoing discussion throw any light upon the kēnesis in Phl. 2:6,7? The present writer ventures to think that it does. The early Church exegesis of the passage and the early Church theory of the Kenosis would seem to throw us back upon an interpretation of St. Paul's words that starts from the integral personality of the historical Jesus. In the Jesus Christ of history there dwelt τὸ πάθημα τῆς θεότητος. Can we not therefore also say that He was ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ? This question more especially in consideration of Gn 12:1 (παρακλήσεις ἐνθρόνων καὶ ἐκσκόπων ζωντανών), 2 Co 4:8 (Χριστός, δεῖ ἑττήσει τοῦ θεοῦ), and 2 Co 3:3 (τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μετατρέπει τῷ ἐξωτερικῷ τῷ ἐσωτερικῷ), is, as we think, to be answered in the affirmative. Adam desired to grasp at equality with God (Gen 3:5); but He in whom dwelt τὸ πάθημα τῆς θεότητος, ὡς ἄργιλον κηλίδηθος τοῦ θεοῦ. No enge-""
Theophrastus, in his De Causis plant. v. x. 4, says that each locality has its own peculiar Kéres dangerous to plants, some coming from the soil, others from the air, and that the novice must be on his guard against the bewildering mutability of Nature before her "laws" were discovered.

From the swarm of minor ills, two emerge and impress the Greek mind most restlessly and most to be dreaded—Old Age and Death:

Kýres dé parástathen: meliá 1) ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν τότες γέρων ἄρτιον, ἐν δὲ ὅριον οὐδεὶς Μημήνιος, ἡ μία ἦδη συνεπάγεται. 2) Thucyd. 2:16, where the man who rends the calf destroys him, you too, if you are disposed to anger a genius or an evil genius which seems to us to be a catchword at the moment of transition 1) (J. E. Harrison, p. 174). In one passage only in the Iliad (xviii. 332. Shield of Achilles) is a Kér materialized, as it were, and exhibited as a demon of slaughter raging on the battlefield; but that is in a work of plastic art. This is further developed in Homeric Hymn to Heracles, 249f. a crowd of "black Kères" (κῆρες ἀνέβας) cf. Paus. v. x. 6: description of a female figure inscribed Kér on the chest of Kypselos at Olympia.

Kéres, as blessings, and especially of a Kér within a man as in somnambulism, or dialektikos, on which his life depends for good or evil, is almost completely overlaid by the more beneficent aspect (cf. the ἑξάψυχος κῆρες of Achilles in the Iliad, II. ix. 411; Hes. Thyg. 217. Probably this idea lies at the root of the curious Homeric epithet κηρητήρεια (Work and Days, 416), not 'nourished for death,' but 'Kér-nourished'—the word meaning 'to bring to a primitive doubleness of functions when the Kéres were demons of all work' (J. E. Harrison, p. 185), analogous to the Moirai which control human life and wool, and whose function was never developed to any precision, and whose raison d'etre in Homer, incoherent and self-contradictory (see B. Niehe, Entwickelung der hom. Poesie, Berlin, 1882, p. 34, note 1).

Something of what the Athenians thought about Kéres is discoverable from the customs connected with the Anthestheria, or Feast of All Souls—a festival overlaid in classical times with Dionysiac elements originally foreign and of more recent date. Its real meaning is indicated by the ritual command spoken apparently on the last day, called Chytroy.--"Out of the house, ye Kéres!" is no longer Anthestheria. (θρέψεις κήρεις, ὃν δὲ Ἀνθεστηρία--ἀν κτά με τὸν πόλει τὴν Ἀνθεστηρία τῶν ψυχῶν παρέχων: unity of spirit.)

The festival was a great one in which the Athenians spoke of as turning out for evil for mankind. Eros retained the last of his resemblance to Kér in being associated both with suicide and as a Feast of Revolutions of the dead. The Kér as a usual form of κήρεις, κέρας, this has a certain plausibility, as we know that the household servants were admitted to the festivities and licence of the Pithoiakia. Probably in classical times already and already an old.

placation of ancestral ghosts, who had been summoned from the tomb on the first day, the Pithoiakia (τίθος, 'burial-urn' or 'jar'), which can be understood as a festival of the opening of the wine-jar and first tasting of the new wine, when the three days of the Anthestheria became a revel of Dionysus (cf. O. Murray,. Fragments of Greek Religion. New York, 1915, p. 30; and Phot. s.v. μαρτυρία et τοῦ Χαλκοῦ Ἀνθεστηρίαν μνήμην αὐτόν ζητούσιν πρὸς ἄλλους ζητούσιν ἀνδρείαν).

Kér's, therefore, were also not to be dealt with, and on vases they appear as gnarl-like figures, winged, but in other respects human, fitting about the grave-mound, or enclosed within it (ref. in Roscher). A ghost (ψυχή) they are powerful for good, but more specially for evil, and quick to take offence (cf. schoi. in Aristoph. Ar. 490: ἐχθονικὴ κηρή καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τούτης ἐνδυόμενον ψυχήν —quoting in Rhede, Physik, p. 246, note 4). They become tyrants of physical death, and actually hold off living souls (cf. Hom. Od. xiv. 207; Apoll. Rhod. Argen. iv. 1695 ff. : Medea invaded the Death-spirits, devourers of life, the swift hounds of Hades, who, having thrown all the air, swoop down upon the living (H. C. Seaton, in Locs Class. Libr., London, 1912).

Most potent for evil is the vengeful ghost of a murdered man, which has gone to join the great company of malevolent elements ἡ μεγάλη αἴματος καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιθυμία τίτλοι (Men. x. 164 ff.).

The word Eriuys in this combination 1) Eriuys was originally simply a descriptive epithet meaning 'angry ones,' just as Eumaius is 'kindly ones.' So the 'idea of Eriuys as distinct from Kér is developed on a human relation to the animal. (J. E. Harrison, p. 214) as Pluto probably recognized (Laws, ii. 885 ff.)) Already in Homer, however, the Eriuys are no longer human souls, but avengers of souls upon the living (see H. ix. 571: τοις ἐφοροίσι: ἔρωτα ἐλεύθερον—When summoned from Althaea to avenge her two brothers). Abscription being pushed still further, the Eriuys become avengers of offences against all moral law, or even the laws of physical Nature:

τοις ἐφοροῖς ἐλεύθερον πατον ἤφει, ἄνω τῶν μαχεῖ Δίας ἐκείνης (Hes. Od. vi. 291) —compared with Od. ii. 280:

εἰς αὐτοῖς ἐλεύθερον ἀοίδας θεοὺς ἐδούβην; ἔρωτος ἀπώλεσιν (Hes. Iliad, ix. 414 and x. 418).

Formless in Homer, they were first differentiated from Kér's and analogous mythological figures, and portrayed in visible shape in drama, by *Eschylus (Etumos, 40 ff.). The more primitive view of them reappears later in literature at intervals, as, e.g., in Sophocles (Ed. Tyr. 471 and 481), as embodied Doomes (cf. Eur. I. 252). It would be hard to prove that the primitive conception ever died out completely.

LITERATURE.—A long art. by O. Cruxinn, in Roscher, ll. (1890—1897), gives the fullest collection of passages, chronologically arranged: see also O. Gruppe, Griechische Mythologie und Religionssitten, 2, Munich, 1896 (i. v. Müller, Nach- und blatt. Alterthumswiss). The fullest general treatment, apart from more accumulation of references, is J. E. Harrison, Fragmens to the Study of Greek Mythology, Cambridge, 1896.

W. J. WOODHOUSE.
Hindi khaire, Skr. khaire, the tree Azadirachta, the preparation of which is one of the bali ceremonies in some Kharias.

A non-Aryan tribe found in Bengal, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and the Central Provinces, numbering, at the Census of 1911, 147,231. As is the case with many similar tribes, they fall into two groups—the one is strictly a forest tribe, isolated, retaining animistic forms of belief, the other influenced by the Hindus in whose vicinity they live.

According to E. T. Bolton, the Chetos and Khawar are both observed, like the Kols, triennially. Every three years a buffalo and other animals are offered in the sacred grove, "karna," or on a rock near the village. They also have, like some of the Kols, a priest for each village, called jinn. He is always one of the poorer tribes—skr. khikriya, or Khawar, or Paraveya, and is also called baiya (see Batá, vol. ii. p. 333), and he only can offer this great sacrifice. No Brahmanical priests are allowed on these occasions to interfere. The deity honored is the tutelary god of the village, sometimes called Dvar Pahar, sometimes Dvar Shakti, sometimes Purushottam or Dakshin, a female, or Puran, a siva god, the same perhaps as the Dvar of the Kols (Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal, Calcutta, 1873, p. 129).

In one village of Khawar the same writer found that the Baiga priest was offering, in the name of the village, biennial sacrifices to Chadola, a male spirit, to Chanda, a female spirit, and to Purin.

Buffaloes, sheep, and goats are offered to these propitiously. They do not associate Chandas with Koll and Mak, and make no prayers to any Hindu gods. But when they are in great distress, they appeal to the sun. They have no particular name for the luminous, calling it "surya" (Skr. sunya), and any place on which he shines may be the altar. They go the same place, and retire to it. These villagers honored their ancestors by a yearly offering of a buffalo; this is strictly a family affair. The animal is killed and eaten at home (ib. p. 150). According to H. H. Baily, the "main body of the tribe, and particularly those who belong to the landholding class, keep up the old religion and employ Sáradwip Brahmanas as priests. Mahadeo and Sitaran are the popular deities: Harish and Ganesu being worshipped during marriages. In addition to these, the miscellaneous host of spirits feared by the Mundas and Oomas are still held in more or less reverence by the Khawar, and in some members of the tribe sometimes perform the duties of pahan or village priest" (ib., Calcutta, 1901, i. 470).

In the United Provinces they call themselves Hindus, but they do not regularly worship any of the orthodox gods, except Sura, the sun, to whom they appeal in time of trouble. Their chief deities are a local Jullundri (q. v.) Devi, who must not be confounded with the Tanjá goddess of the same name. They also worship a local deity called Raja Lakkhan or Lakhana Deva, who is one of their deified Hindu conquerors and is worshiped as the famous Raja Jai Chaud of Kanaj, who fell at Benares under the sword of Shihab-ud-din, the Musalmân invader, and became a popular hero (V. A. Smith, Early Hist. of India, 1898, p. 356). He is annually worshipped at the platform where the tribal dead are propitiated. As in Bengal, they also worship Raja Chandol, and Dharit, or Mother Earth, while those under Hindu influence employ Brahmanas to worship Siva on their behalf. Dallah Deo, said to be a deified bridegroom who died under tragic circumstances, is their marriage god. Darapát Deo and his spoue, Anjumati, are the tribal gods of war.

The most remarkable cult practised by the branch of the tribe in Chotá Nagpur, however, is that of Múchak Rani, who is said to belong to the Chámári caste (see CHAMÁS). A sacrifice in her honour is made at the village thriving-floor, and her marriage is performed with much ceremony.

The people, accompanied by musicians, ascend the hill where she is supposed to live, and there on the top of the hill, in front of the temple to which they have come, make their circumambulations, and in front of the temple the dancers, with the drum and the cymbals in their hands, dance on the temple steps, and while they dance sing this song: "Chána ne cha, bódh hi cha, dāna ne dór, rājya ṣātra, dārṇa ne dás, dārṇa ne dás, dārṇa ne dás; ná rítha dás, ná dás, ná dás, ná rítha dás, ná dás, ná dás, ná rítha dás, ná dás, ná dás; ná rítha dás, ná dás, ná dás, ná rítha dás, ná dás, ná dás, ná rítha dás, ná dás, ná dás."
KHASIS.

The Khasis are a hill tribe inhabiting Assam and Meghalaya, India. They are one of the many indigenous groups in the region.

1. Origin and affinities. The origin of the Khasis is a difficult question. In the opinion of the present writer, they are an offshoot of the Mon people of further India, but as to their ultimate source, apart from their fairly close approximation to the Malay type, all that we can guess now is that we are on the right track, originally pointed out by J. R. Logan as regards India and Further India, and it is to be hoped that the researches of scholars such as W. H. R. Rivers, in Melanesia, will help us very greatly (see Gurdon, pp. 19-18).

The use by the Khasis of a very peculiarly shaped spade (mokbi), which may perhaps be regarded as the prototype of the “sinular shoulder-seated cells” found in the Malayan Peninsula and Chota Nagpur and figured in the JASB of 1875, may be mentioned. These shoulder-headed cells are, according to E. Aymonier (Le Cambodge, Paris, 1906-41, III), noted in Assam, which is situated between 25° 11' and 29° 5' N., lat. and between 90° 47' and 92° 52' E. longitude. The District contains an area of 6175 sq. miles, and is mountainous. About half of it, including the capital, Shillong, is outside the limits of British India. It consists of a collection of small States in political relations, regulated by treaty, with the Government of India, by her paramountcy, and in the management of their local affairs. In the remainder, called the Jaintia Hills, the indigenous system of administration through officers called dolas has been maintained. The population of the Khasis residing in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills consisted of 161,865 at the last Census, exclusive of 25,245 Christians, the greater portion of whom are Khasis belonging to the Welsh Calvinistic mission. They are a linguistically allied to the Mon-Khmer family of Further India, and by their appearance are sharply differentiated from the Mongoloid tribes which surround them in Assam, the Khasi skull being mesocephalic, the eyes being brown and not like narrow slits, the base of the nose wide, the skin varying from dark to a light yellowish brown, according to locality (fainter in the upland than in the lowland), the hair black and straight, the stature short, and the males very muscular. These physical characteristics closely correspond with those of all speakers of Austronesian languages (as reported by Schmidt), of which the Mon-Khmer form an integral part. The calves are very highly developed—which is due probably to the Khasis, both males and females, being accustomed to carry very heavy burdens up and down the mountains. Of music, the hymn tunes which are taught them by the Welsh missionaries being rapidly learned and retained without difficulty. The most important and probably the most interesting characteristic of the Khasis is the system of matrilineage.

The social organization presents one of the most perfect examples of surviving matrilineal institutions, carried out with a logic and thoroughness which, to those accustomed to regard the status and authority of the mother as the foundation of society, are exceedingly remarkable. Not only is the mother the head and source, and only bond of union, of the family; in fact, the most primitive part of the marriage ceremony is the right of the woman to receive, as a gift from the man, all the valuables in the house and family of the woman when she marries. She is also the owner of all the lands and possessions in the family and is the only member of the family not subject to the authority of any male. She has the right to sell, exchange, or give away the property of the family, and this right is not in any way interfered with by the rights of the father or brothers. She is also the only person who has the right to inherit the property of the family. She is also the only person who has the right to inherit the property of the family. She is also the only person who has the right to inherit the property of the family. She is also the only person who has the right to inherit the property of the family. She is also the only person who has the right to inherit the property of the family. She is also the only person who has the right to inherit the property of the family.
cottages. The Khás make their villages a little below the tops of the hills, and seldom change their situation; they are situated in their present positions for many years, as is evidenced by the large number of memorial-stones and cromlechs which are to be seen near them. The Khás chief, or head of the family, is in the midst of his people. There is little furniture in the houses in the interior, although the more up-to-date Khás use furniture of European patterns. In every house are to be heard the noise of shield shingles, which are made of basket-work, and also the baskets, ki khol, of different sizes for carrying on the back. The Khás possess very few musical instruments, and those which they do have are of the Assamese or Bengali patterns. They are hard-working cultivators, and achieve very fair results, considering the unproductive nature of the hill-sides on the uplands. There is a considerable amount of wet paddy cultivation among the Syntengs of the Jowai subdivision. The most important crop in the uplands is the potato, the tuber having been introduced into the country by the British. The culture of rice on the plains in the Southern portion of the district is of equal importance with that of the potato in the Northern. Oranges grow best in the warm valleys lying on the Sylhet side of the hills. The Khás orange has always been famous for its excellence. According to Letters received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East, it was exported many years ago to Europe with the oranges of Garhwal and Sikikim.

Khás use bows and arrows for hunting, and spears for both casting and thrusting. Fishing is largely resorted to, the method employed being to poison the streams. The Khás eat practically all flesh, except that of the dog, which they consider to be 'the friend of man.' In this respect they differ from the Nagi, Garo, and Kuki tribes of Assam, all of whom eat the dog. The Khás, except some of the Christian community and some of the people of Mawphuk in Shillong, do not use milk or its compounds, following in this respect the Kacharis and Rákhas of the plains or the Garos of the hills. The Mongol race in its millions, as a rule, does not use milk for food; but the Tibetans and some of the Turkoman tribes are exceptions. The Khás are heavy drinkers of both rice-beer and rice-spirit. At a marriage may be said to be the national custom. Manufactures are few in number, and do not tend to increase. The iron industry in former days was an important one, but has now died out completely.

4. Tribal organization.—The people of the Khás and Jaintia Hills may be divided into Khás, Synteng, War, Bhoi, and Lyingh. These sections are subdivided, the Khás into the inhabitants of the central high plateau, Cherra and Nongstoin, Mataram, Mariah, Mongkhil, and the neighbouring Siemhlis; the Syntengs into Synteng proper, Nongtung, and Khryweng; the Wans into War proper, and Warr Poan; the Bhoi into Inthik, Myria, Rynkingh, and the Khás-Bhoi, i.e. Khás who inhabit the low country to the north of the district which is called generally 'the Bhoi.' The Lyingh are a separate division, being half Khás and half Bhoi. These tribes and sub-tribes are neither strictly endogamous nor strictly exogamous, but they are more endogamous than exogamous; e.g., Syntengs more often marry Syntengs than Khás, and vice versa, and it would be unsuitable to consider the two sects a Khás tribe of the uplands to marry a Bhoi or War woman, and a disgrace to marry a Lyingh.

These divisions are subdivided into a number of septs, taking Khás as the definition of 'sept' as the largest exogamous division of the tribe, and these septs may be called 'clans' for the purpose of this article. Many of the clans trace their descent from ancestors, or khus (grandmothers), who are greatly revered, indeed almost deified, and in some cases the clans have a supernatural ancestor, i.e. the Melia, the placid or the Melian poppy. The descendants of one ancestress of the clan, in the Syntengs, are called ki buri, or exogamous. The Syntengs have a division called the khol, or sub-clan, all the descendants of one great-grandmother (ki Buri Tymyan) being styled asi buri, or sub-clan. Then comes a mother of the khol, rayd, or young grandmother, to distinguish her from the two other grandmothers already mentioned, is the head of the way, or family. A prominent characteristic of the Khás clan is the common clan sejukh; another is strict endogamy. No Khás will ever marry into his own clan, the women of which are buried, or taken, to him, and the clan of the deceased's mother, or, in the case of the Bengi, a clan, a tree name; but the clan members apparently do not regard the trees as taboo, since they do not avoid them, nor is it considered a sin to kill, eat, or otherwise utilizing them.

5. Marriage and divorce.—The most remarkable feature of Khás marriage is that it is usual for the husband to live with his wife in his mother-in-law's house and not to take the bride to his own home, as in other communities. As far as the wife lives in her mother's house, all her earnings go to her mother, who spends them on the maintenance of the family. Among the Syntengs, however, and the people of Maosha, if the husband does not live in the mother-in-law's house, he visits his wife there only after dark, and does not take his meals in the house. Divorce is common and may occur for a variety of reasons, such as adultery, barrenness, incompatibility of temperament, etc. The essential act in a divorce is the giving or exchange of five cows or five pears. The wife gives five cows or pear to her husband, who places them in the ten paces in front of his house, and he again returns them to him. The husband then throws the cows or pigs on the ground, and the divorce is complete.

6. Inheritance.—The Khás saying is long sadi na ko khus (from the woman sprang the clan). When reckoning descent, they count from the mother only; the man is nobody. If he is a brother, or buri, he will be lost to the family or clan when he marries; if he is a husband, he is regarded merely as u shong kha, a begoteer (for further details see Gurdon, pp. 82-85).

7. Head-hunting.—The Khás are not head-hunters, like the Nagas of Assam, nor do they appear to have practiced such a custom at any time; since the period of the Jaintia rebellion they have settled down into a nation of peaceful cultivators. There is little crime among them, but many murders have been carried out by a curious superstition called uk tèn. The tèn is believed to be a gigantic snake which requires to be appeased periodically with human victims (Gurdon, pp. 86-104).

8. Religion.—The main religion of the Khás is the cult of ancestors, although the propitiation of spirits of evil by means of offerings is also al-
Khawarij

most universal. The propitiation of ancestors was formerly thought to be effected by offering food to them on the flat table stones, of maw-kythal, so that they might return and help in the work. This practice still obtains in the villages in the interior of the hills. The more popular practice, however, at the present time is to make the offering of food on the flat table stone at times when it is thought necessary to invoke the aid of the departed. As is the case in other countries, and among other people, it is possible that some of the Khāsī gods of to-day are merely the supposed spirit of men interred in the ground below the flat table stones at Jaintiāpur and the stone at Ieu Kish near the Kapilī river.

11. Folklore.—The Khāsī possess a considerable amount of folklore of old days when the signs of Indian or Aryan influence. The story of the thens, or fabulous snake, has already been referred to (for a detailed account see Gurdon, p. 98 ff.). This tale or superstition may possess counterparts in Assam or in the Morn country or among the Palamuge.

12. Language.—Khāsī has been placed by Grierson in the Mon-Khmer group. As far back as 1883 the Mon-Khmer family was recognized, when Logan in his paper on the ‘General Characters of the Burma-Tibetan, Gangeitic, and Dravidian Languages’ in the Journal of the Indian Archipelago, spoke of it as ‘solitary record that the Mon-Kamboyan formation once extended much further to the North-West than it now does.’

It was not, however, till 1889 that E. Kahn showed conclusively the true relationship of Khāsī to the Mon-Khmer family. W. Schmidt of Vienna not only confirms Kahn’s conclusions, but goes a step further and includes Khāsī in the Austro-Asiatic family of languages, a western branch of the family of languages stretching from the Panjāb in the West through Indonisia, Melanesia, and Polynesia, right across the Pacific to Easter Island in the East; from the Himalaya in the North to New Zealand in the South, which Schmidt names the ‘Austro’ field of languages.

‘We must confess that it is the most widely spread speech family of which the existence has yet been proved’ (Grierson, loc. cit.). Schmidt’s theory has thus been accepted by Grierson, our greatest living authority in Indian languages. For a description of Khāsī language, see the chapter on language in Gurdon, which is based chiefly on C. J. Lyall’s skeleton grammar contained in Linguistic Survey of India, ii.; cf. also the literature of Kahn and Schmidt.


Khawarij.—Khawarij, plural of khawārij, ‘a rebel,’ is used as the name of a group of Muslim sects, of which apparently only the Tābi‘is (q.v.) now survive. They are first heard of in connexion with the murder of the third Khādīj Uthaymīn—an event which, owing to the want of contemporary documents, is somewhat obscure. Of the offences with which this personage was charged the most serious appears to have been his ordering the destruction of all existing copies of the Holy Qur‘ān, in order that the recension which he introduced should be unchallenged; but, since this order was effectively carried out, the Muslim historians are compelled to express approval of the act, as

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1 For division by egg-breaking see Gurdon, App. C, p. 921.
otherwise they would be throwing doubt on the authenticity of the only surviving copy. It would appear that "Ali obtained the Khilafah by the sword", the insurgents who had killed Ummân, but afterwards was compelled to express abhorrence of that act; and, by accepting arbitration in the dispute which arose between the two parties, he secured the peace of the Umayyad dynasty. For the name skûrâd, said to mean "those who buy God's favour with their lives".

During the whole of the Umayyad period, persons who employed these names and formulæ gave the government trouble, sometimes being able to carry on protracted civil war, at other times being only able to obstruct ephemeral revolts. The greatest success which they attained was under the command of one Shâhid, who, in the reign of Abd al-Malik, repeatedly occupied the important city Kufa. The word of Allah, "Abû Saîf with the Khâtât bâtârî are recorded at length in the Kâmil of the grammairian Mubarrad († 825 A.H. = A.D. 908).

In the chronicles and popular literature the Khâtât bâtârî are represented as Puritans, driven to take up arms against a government which failed to satisfy their ideals of piety and asceticism. Familiarity with the Qurân is claimed for their warriors and students of the Qurân, and indeed the name qurra', literally 'readers', but often used for 'devotees', is sometimes given them. Besides these qualities they had a reputation for fanatical conduct. Thus they retained in the 3rd cent. of Islam, when, under 'Abbasîd rule, they played a less important part than under the Umayyads. Towards non-Muslims they are represented as scrupulous in their dealings; but towards Muslims who disagreed with them they were inordinate savages; they slaughtered women and children, though some of their number disapproved of this practice.

The author of Al-Dirâg bân al-Dirâg ("The Distinction between the Sects") († 829 A.H. = A.D. 1037) divides the Khwârîj into twenty branches. The doctrine common to them all was the obligation to resist an unjust sovereign; besides this they all applied the name kâfir ("infidel") to Ummân, "Affâ' the arbiters, all who approved of the Arbitration, and all who had taken part in the first Civil War (the Battle of the Camel). Some made their characteristic doctrine the application of this name to all who committed capital offences. It would appear, however, that their most important doctrine was that any traveller might be sovereign, whence they were in permanent opposition to the supporters of the hereditary dynasties.

It is not easy to fit the number 20 to the list of sects given by the author quoted; the main divisions come far below that number, whereas the subdivisions far exceed it. An artificial classification with the view of obtaining the number 20 was afterwards made by Shahbârînî (Religionsphilosophen, 2. T. Haarbrücker, Berlin, 1888, l. 135 [A.D. 1116]) reduces it to 15 divisions. One of the names meets us frequently in Arabic literature, viz. the Sharî'a; reference, however, to this occur. The differences between them were largely on the same doctrinal questions as divided the other communities, but, under the Moslem states, the use of cunning, to conduct, whether the infâns are Musulmân, etc. But there were also differences which escaped from their own special dogmas, e.g., whether an evildoer was to be called musârik ("pagan") or only kâfir ("infidel") and whether the latter word could be interchanged as well as "unbeliever". Certain other differences belonged to the details of Islamic jurisprudence, e.g., the minimum weight for the punishment of banditry was incurred, the amount of alms to be paid on the produce of land watered by rivers and springs, etc.

Although some of these sects were able to maintain themselves in various Islamic provinces for a time, and the Khâtâtîs have done so permanently, it is probable that the historians of the sects have in many cases exaggerated their importance, and represented the followers of some particular insur-gent as continuing in existence long after the movement had been defeated. As might be expected in the case of such warlike communities, their literature was rich in bâtâristîs, one of which the archæologists collected. Of their controversial and juristic treatises little has as yet come to light.


D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

KHIDR.—Khîdîr (pronounced by the Persians Khûdîr, and Turks as Khîdîr), the green one, is the name or, rather, the title of a Muhammadan saint who, according to the popular conception in Islam, is still alive to-day. The origin of the name is obscure, although different attempts have been made to explain it (see below). Whatever the origin of the name, it is certain that the figure of Khîdîr as conceived in Islam is not derived from one definite source, but is rather the composite of a large number of legends and myths of widely divergent origin and character, which were current in the lands of Islam prior to the Muhammadan occupation. It has been justly said that the product of Muhammadan syncretism (K. Völlers, AEW xii. [1909] 238), implying thereby that the whole Khîdîr figure, while a prominent feature of the religion of the Muhammadan masses, is yet entirely made up of non-Muhammadan elements, and owes to Islam only the amalgamation of all these heterogeneous elements into one whole. It is impossible here to enter into a discussion of the extremely complicated problem of the Khîdîr legend. We shall limit ourselves to a brief indication of the principal sources upon which it has drawn and the salient features now attributed to Khîdîr and originally derived from these sources.

Frequently in Muhammadan literature and innumerable times in Persian poetry Khîdîr is mentioned as one (or rather the only one) who has gained life immortal by drinking from the Fountain of Life. According to a more definite statement quoted by early Muhammadan historians, Khîdîr was the viceroy of Dha-l-karnain, the "two-horned" (the Syro-Arabic title of Alexander the Great), who discovered the Fountain of Life which his royal master had failed to find. This leads us unmistakably to the famous story of the Fountain of Life recorded in the Greek Alexander romance which goes under the name of pseudokhalil. This work is a work of a very complex literary character, which was finally completed about A.D. 300.

According to this account, which is recorded in several varying recensions, Alexander went in order to attain to life everlasting. By the merest chance his cook, who in some of the recensions is called Andrews, discovered the fountain. He was the first to taste the

\[1\] With a different vocalisation the name is also pronounced Khandîr and Khandîr.
or dried fish in the fountain in preparation for a meal, when the fish came to life again and disappeared in the water. The cook partook of the life-giving liquid and became immortal. Afterward, the cook never touched fish again, and became a sea-demon.

This story, which originally formed a separate legend and was transmitted orally long before, and long after pseudo-Callisthenes, came in this shape to the Syrians, and through them into Arabia. A reflection of it is found in the Qur’an (xviii. 59–63), in which, like so many other legends, it has been mutilated and distorted beyond recognition. Its obvious and indeed is expressly and circumstantially related in later Muhammadan sources, that Khidr is identified with Alexander’s cook who discovered the Fountain of Life by means of the salted fish. According to a conjecture put forward by several scholars and upheld by the present writer, Khidr, the ‘green one,’ is the original designation of the sea-demon into which the cook Andreas was transformed when thrown into the sea.

A far more important prototype of Khidr is the prophet Elijah. The Tishbite is, no doubt, the most prominent and the most popular figure in the legendary post-Biblical Judaism. The most striking attributes of this post-Biblical hero are eternal life and omnipresence. He attends every Circumcision ceremony performed in a Jewish family and is said to keep a special seat, the so-called ‘chair of Elijah,’ ready for his reception; and he visits every Jewish home on Passover eve, when a special cup of wine is set aside for him. In contrast to his vehement Biblical prototype, the post-Biblical Elijah figures essentially in the amiable role of an adviser and helper. He reveals himself to scholars, whom he enlightens on the ‘secrets of heaven’ and on different points of Jewish law. He is particularly to be met with on the road and in deserted places. The Kabbalists, or Jewish mystics of a later age, laid particular stress on this popular belief of gilgaly Elijahah (‘revelation of Elijah’), and many of them claimed to have derived their mystical Ideas, and even whole books, from their personal association with the prophet.

One Jewish story quoted by a Jewish authority of the 17th century, but undoubtedly of much older origin, must be singled out from among the rest. In this story Elijah is compared to the ‘man of law’ Khidr of the first cent. on his travels, and shows him several incidents which, on the surface, seem to militate against religion, but, when interpreted by the prophet, are revealed as wonderful instances of the wisdom and justice of Divine Providence.

This story, or rather some earlier variant of it, has found its way into the Qur’an (xviii. 64–81). The place of the Talmudic Rabbi is taken by Moses, while Elijah is designated anonymously as ‘one of our servants.’ This fact alone suffices to prove what is to be assumed a priori, that this most striking figure of post-Biblical Jewish legend was known in Arabia in the time of Muhammad. Since Khidr’s salient attribute was everlasting life, just like that of Elijah, it was natural to identify the two figures. Hence the exegeses and theologians of Islam declare with remarkable unanimity that the servant in the Qur’an (xviii. 64) is no other but Khidr. This is the first express reference to the name of Khidr in literature. As a result of this combination, the story of the Fountain of Life in the Qur’an (xviii. 59–63), on the one hand, and the Elijah legend (64–81), on the other, which originally had nothing in common with one another and are easily distinguishable by their different rhymes, were subsequently made to follow one another, and were in a most artificial way welded into one continuous narrative, which has been accepted as a unit not only by all Muhammadan theologians, but also, in spite of the obviousness of the underlying facts, by many European scholars. The combination has had the additional misfortune that it has suppressed the further development of the original, undeniably pagan, conception of Khidr as sea-demon in Islam, and transformed him into a sacred figure, who is classed among the archetypal Muhammadan theologians either as a prophet or as a saint (wali), and by some even as an angel. Whatever of the original Khidr myth was still known (and a great deal of it was still kept alive) to the legend-collectors and story-tellers in Islam was forced into a new channel. Khidr, the cook of Alexander, was raised to the rank of general and vizier, and in this capacity was made the leading figure in the Muhammadan Alexander romance, completely overshadowing his heathen master.

There can be no doubt that originally the Muhammadans themselves were conscious of the identity of the legendary character of Khidr with that of Elijah, for they declare—and this is generally accepted within Islam—that the real name of Khidr is Ilyah (afterwards corrupted into Balya), the Jewish form of Elijah. The Jews in Muhammadan countries took the same combination for granted, for whose name was Elijah called themselves Khidr, and the Turks still employ the same combination by calling our prophet Khidr (Khidr = Ilyah). What of far greater importance, the prevalent conception of Khidr is an exact reproduction of the Elijah figure, to a degree which is truly astonishing. Khidr, like Elijah, is the eternal prophet who is as well known to all, who ‘appears when his name is called.’ He is helper and adviser in the time of need; he reveals himself to those worthy of his companionship, to whom he transmits divine secrets; he appears, according to a story recorded in the canonical Muhammadan tradition (the so-called Hadith), at the death of Muhammad to offer his condolence to the bereaved companions of the founder of Islam. Like the Kabbalists in Judaism, the Sufis, or mystics, of Islam lay particular claim to intimate companionship with Khidr. Innumerable stories are told of the opinions, doctrines, and prayers entrusted by the prophet to particularly favoured Sufis, and many works are declared to have been composed to be the direct product of his personal instruction. The remarkable closeness between the Jewish Elijah legend and the Muhammadan Khidr belief may be gauged from the fact that, just as Elijah in Jewish sources is identified with Phineas, so is Khidr in Muhammadan writings, and that, just as Elijah in the Talmud, so does Khidr in the Muhammadan legend appear occasionally in the disguise of a Bedawi. Numerous details of a similar kind which can easily be supplied testify to the same relationship.

Owing to the fact that the prophet Elijah is mentioned in the Qur’an by name (in the Greek-Syrian form Ilyah), and is described in Biblical rather than in post-Biblical colours, the Muhammadan theologians saw themselves necessarily compelled to make of Khidr = Ilyah, on the one hand, and of Ilyah, on the other, two distinct personages. The primitive relationship, however, shows itself in the attempt to identify Khidr with Elisha, the disciple of Elijah, and many legends in which Khidr (or, more correctly, Ilyah) and Khidr appear as inseparable twins. The original distinctive function of both Elijah and Khidr is clearly revealed in the fact that they are universally accepted by Muhammadans and illustrated by
innumerable stories, that, while both prophets are entrusted with the task of protecting the travellers on their journeys, Eliezh is mukallaf fi'l-bar, 'the guardian of the dry land,' particularly of desolated places, while Khīr, mukallaf fi'l-bar, 'the guardian of the sea.' The maritime character of Khīr, which the Muhammadans accept as an unalterable fact without being able to explain it, is preserved throughout the whole field of Muhammadan history. This day Khīr is essentially the Khuwād al-buhārī, 'the one who traverses the seas'; he is the patron of sailors, who invoke his aid in time of need; a sacrifice is offered to him when a boat is launched (S. I. Curtiss, Primitive Semitic Edication Today, Germ. ed., Leipzig, 1903, p. xvi. and p. 111). This conception and the rites associating it are still current throughout the whole of Syria, and can even be traced as far as Northern India.

The combined figure of the sea-demon Khīr and the prophet Eliezh followed in the wake of the Muhammadan armies. It is now generally recognized that the conquered nations who were converted to Islam managed to carry with them into the new religion many of their former doctrines. In a similar way Khīr became the depository of all kinds of ancient myths and popular rites current in thelands occupied by Islam. The data on this aspect of the Khīr figure are not yet complete. As far as Syria is concerned, extremely valuable material has been collected by Curtiss (in the volume referred to above), and, in part prior to him, by C. Clermont-Ganneau (Horus et Saint Georges, Paris, 1877). From this material it is evident that Khīr, as now revered, indeed one may say worshipped, in Syria, embodies many conceptions of primitive Semitic religion, perhaps also including the ancient Babylonian Tammuz cult. The relation of Khīr to these ancient deities is doted with Khīr sanctuaries in which sacrifices and the first-born of animals are still offered to him. In the crude vagueness of the popular religion Khīr has become a divine being. As an unsophisticated Muhammadan innocently put it to Curtiss, 'Khīr is near, but God is far' (op. cit. p. 111). Through the identification with St. George (Mir Jerje), whose origin lay in the same country, new relations of the two created which made our versified prophet acceptable to the Christians, as he is also popular among the Jews.

The official theologians of Islam are, and always have been, sensitive to these excesses of the popular Khīr belief. Many of them have insisted—and, indeed, have made Muhammad himself declare—that Khīr, who, as they were compelled to admit (largely because of the canonical account of his appearance at the death of Muhammad), was a contemporary of the Prophet, died shortly after him. This attempt, however, which was directed against the extravagant Khīr cult, particularly as cherished by the Sufis, remained unsuccessful. On the other hand, the theologians had no hesitation in making Khīr a favourite object of their scholarly speculations. Muhammadan literature contains a large number of conjectures which identify Khīr with various figures of Biblical and Apocryphal legend. Of these conjectures, which are purely the product of unlettered speculative fancy, the following, with the accompanying sūras, may be mentioned: Melchizedek, Seth, Enoch, Zohar, Jeremiah, Lot, and the Messiah. Finally, it may be mentioned as a possibility that the sūratul-i-khānsā'ah of Khīr, his incessant wandering—'to wander like Khīr' is a current Arabic phrase—is responsible for the name of the Wandering Jew. Alasauerus may be a development of Khīr in its Persian-Turkish pronunciation as Khīr.


I. FRIEDLAENDER.

KHĪS.—A race inhabiting the Chitrál Valley and adjoining country south of the Panjir, on the N.W. frontier of British India. To the E. lies Yasin and Gilgit, where the language is Shina; to the W. is Kafiristan, where various Indian Kāf dialects are spoken; to the N., across the Hindu Kush, lie the Pamirs, where the language is Iran; and to the S. lies a number of small tribes, mainly of Shina origin, but partly also Pathan, separating them from India proper. The Khīs (properly Hīs), together with the Shins of Gilgit and the Kāfs of Kafiristan, are often classed together as 'Dards'; but this name is properly applied only to the Shins. The present writer looks upon all three as representing the ancient Pathachus. The habits and customs of the Khīs are in many respects much more resemble those of the true Dards, and in the present article the term 'Khīs' is applied to the Khīs, while the Khīn (properly Hīn), together with the Shins of Gilgit and the Kāfs of Kafiristan, are known as 'Erebözānās' (sons of possessors). The two grades intermarry. Above them are the later conquerors of the country—the Afgānūzās (sons of men). The origin of the last is uncertain, but some of them at least came from the north, across the Pamirs, in the 16th cent. A.D. The Khīs have imposed their language upon them.

According to tradition, the whole Chitrál Valley was once occupied by Khīs, and some Kāf tribes, e.g. the Kalāsh, still inhabit it. This tradition is borne out by the fact that the Kāf dialects are much more nearly related to the Shina dialects of Gilgit than either of the other groups to Khīs. The language of the Khīs. The last, although undoubtedly belonging to the same linguistic group, differs from the other two in some essential particulars, such, for example, as the forms of the pro-nouns, in regard to which they agree rather with the Iranian Ghalchah languages of the Pamirs.

It looks as if the whole tract composing the present Kafiristan, Chitral, and Gilgit was once occupied by one homogeneous race, which was subsequently split into two divisions by a wedge of Khīs invasion, representing members of a different, but related, tribe coming from the north (cf. Bédélph, p. 158 f., for a slightly different explanation).

According to Bédélph, (p. 73), the Khīs show certain physical peculiarities not shared by their Dard relations. In personal appearance they may be called Aryans of a high type, not unlike the Dards, but more handsome, with well-modelled features, and large beautiful eyes, so that they would compare favourably with the highest type of beauty in Europe. They are famous for their long hair, of which they are very proud, and in this they differ from their Kāf and Dard neighbours. 1

1 O'Briain, Gram. and Yauhah. of the Khāneh Dialect, p. vi.

2 Called by Leitner (Language and Races of Dardestan) Arnya, a name based on the Shina word for onus, which is employed to designate a portion of Yasin, where E, in the Khīs.

neighbours, whom they style 'bold' (p. 65). The women were formerly sought out for their beauty in the slave-markets of Kábal, Peshíwáw, and Badakshán.

The men wear caps bound round with a scantly turban, a common shirt,and trousers, slippers, cut-out stockings, and soft leather boots. The women wear a white silk ensemble, a head-piece, loose chemised coloured cotton stuff, fastening at the throat and reaching to the knees, and wide drawers. They wear boots and stockings like men, but, as a rule, each leg separately (ib. O'Brien, p. vi). It is a common practice (O'Brien, p. ix) for young women, just married, to blacken their faces with burnt powdered horn, which is supposed to soften the skin and to prevent sunburn.

Great stress is laid upon customary rules of politeness. Friends embrace on meeting. An inferior always dismounts on meeting a superior, and kisses his hand. The other then kisses him on the cheek (Biddulp, p. 75; O'Brien, p. viii). Excitable creatures of impulse, the Khós have been well described by G. S. Robertson (Chitrál, Lon- don, 1898, p. 5 f.):

'Sensuality of the grossest kind, and murder, abominable cruelty, treachery or violent death, are never long absent from the thoughts of a people than whom none in the world are more given to the indulgence of, or to simpler, gentler appearances. So happy seems everyone—the women are mostly secluded, — so lovely are the little children, so much natural politeness is manifest in the men and its kind in its exterior, that the gowned slaves living on fruit or dying of starvation when past their youth, a hurried traveller might almost imagine himself in a smiling dreamland.'

Polo-playing (ghol) is the national game, and is played with great dash. It is slightly different from the polo of Gilgit. The ground is long and narrow, with low walls at each side, off which the ball rebounds in play. A couple of large stones at each end mark the goal. The sticks in use are very short, and the players, going at full speed, reach almost to the ground. The losers have to do what the winners order—usually dance. Every village has its polo-ground, called jandání (Biddulp, p. 84; O'Brien, p. xi). Shooting at a popinjay from horseback is also a favourite pastime, and, considering the clumsiness of the weapons used, the marksmanship is sometimes wonderfully good (Biddulp, p. 85; O'Brien, p. xi). Other national amusements are music and dancing. Feast-day, birthday, wedding, or any occasion for a gathering serves as an excuse for the latter. Music is always played at the polo-matches, a goal being the signal for a wild flourish and a burst of drumming. So popular is the sport that are very taking (Biddulp, p. 85; O'Brien, p. xii f.).

In former times the religion of the country was Buddhism. 1 A Buddhist rock-cut figure, bearing a script or Pall inscription which is not older than the 3rd cent. A.D., and is probably later, has been found about 20 miles north of the town of Chitrál (Biddulp, p. 149). The Khós are now Musalmáns, mostly Sunnis, but in the northern valleys, as in northern Gilgit, they are generally members of the Máštá sect. 2 Islám was introduced about the 14th cent., and the present Musalmaín dynasty came from Khorásán in the 16th (ib. ib. 111). The Khós differ from the Dárús in not hating the cow and in not worshipping the chuñ, or juniper tree (ib. 113, 116; EEE iv. 401). As regards festivals, the Dárús Nás, in honour of the winter solstice, is called Dáshá, and is celebrated without bonfires (Biddulp, p. 101). The Dará Buxán, or spring festival, is not held, but the Gémóni, or festival of the wheat harvest, is observed under the name of Panjít (ib. 105). The Jastandikásh, or 'devil-driving,' in honour of the completion of the harvest, corresponding to the Dárús Domácrás, is celebrated by the firing of guns and shooting at a sheep's head, used as a mark of sport. (Ib. 105).

1 See EEE iv. 400. For the Mahál's see Biddulp, p. 119.

When a child is born, the mother is unclean, and no one will eat from her hand for seven days. North of the Hindrí Kúsh the menstruating mother leaves her son in the care of her sister, but the period is extended to forty days, and even the infant may not suck its mother's breast for seven days. In some of the higher Chitrál clans there is a custom that every infant is stilled in milk by every nursing mother of the clan, so that each becomes its foster-mother. There is thus a constant interchange of infants going on among the mothers, for the purpose of strengthening tribal unity (ib. 81). Marriage ceremonies are conducted much as among the neighbouring tribes, but the following customs are peculiar to Chitrál.

After the Múláh has read the marriage service, the bride is led out by her mother, who hands her over to the bridegroom, receiving a present in exchange. He starts at once for home, but, after leaving the bride, he deposits a present of a sword or a gun on the hearth. On the other hand, north of the Hindrí Kúsh he is taken to the bride, and does not go off with her till the next day. In Gilgit the custom is again different, as there is a formal ratification of the marriage on the third day (ib. 74). In the Hindrí Kúsh the levir is also common, although it is not compulsory on the widows. In Gilgit, on the other hand, it is compulsory (ib. 76). Marital infidelities are extremely common, and the men show little jealousy of their wives. In the neighbouring States of Bunsu, Nágár, where old traditions prevail, the husband not regarded as an offence, and custom requires that a man should place his wife at the disposal of his guest. The bridegroom's sister was also in force down to a comparatively late time, and even now a man considers himself as highly honoured if his wife has attracted the attention of the Thum, or tribal chief, of either of these two States. At the same time, in Chitrál, a husband has the right to slay the servant who is not kind to his wife; but he should kill one and not the other, he is told guilty of murder (ib. 77).

The common Musálmaín interment is now used. A piece of flat stone or slate, three or four feet long, is placed at each end of the grave, which is neatly plastered over (ib. 82). Superstitions are much as in Dárús, with the general belief in fairies (cf. EEE iv. 401). Tirich Mir, the highest peak (25,426 ft.) in the country, is said to swarm with them, and to them the Khós attribute the sounds coming from its glaciers (O'Brien, p. x; cf. Biddulp, p. 116).

LITERATURE.—Almost the only source of information regarding the Khós as a people is J. Biddulp, Tracts of the Hindú Kúsh, Calcutta, 1860, which contains a full description of the people and a grammar and vocabulary of their language. D. J. T. O'Brien, Grammar of theth and Vocabuláry of the Directors, London, 1866, gives a brief account of Chitrál and its inhabitants in the introduction. These two works have been freely utilised in the foregoing account, and are supported by much grammatical information contained in G. W. Leitner, The Languages and Races of Dáshán, London, 1857. G. A. Grinnell.

KHONDS. — See KANDOS.

KIERKEGAARD.—1. Relation to his father.

Søren Aabye Kierkegaard was born at Copenh-agen on the 5th of May 1813. He was the youngest child of Michael P. Kierkegaard, a retired woollen draper in good circumstances, another of whose sons, P. C. Kierkegaard (1805-88), rose to eminence as bishop of Aalborg. The life of Søren Kierkegaard has but few points of contact with the external world; but there were, in particular, three occurrences—a broken engagement, an attack by a comic paper, and the use of a word by H. L. Martensen—which must be referred to having wrought with extraordinary effect on his peculiarly sensitive and high-strung nature. The intensity of his inner life, again—which finds expression in his published works, and even more directly in his notebooks and diaries (so that it cannot be properly understood without some reference to his father. The latter came from a peasant home near Ringkøbing in Western Jütland, and, as it would seem, was, while a mere child, deeply influenced by a Pietistic movement in the
distract. It is probably to be read as a manifestation of his sincerity and earnest temperament, that on.He while tending sheep on the moors, the boy Michael, in hunger and endurance, mounted a hillside and solemnly cursed God as the disperser of so wretched a lot. Shortly afterwards he became a preacher in Copenhagen, where he soon began to prosper; but, with his natural tendency to mortal intemperance, strengthened by a stern religious feeling, he was later expelled as a sign that he had with his boyish curse committed the sin against the Holy Ghost; the sin of libel and God's name was taken unhallowed from denying God's care of him, and that the sin was too great to be punished as a less grave sin might have been, e.g., by a fine.

This idea further sustained his religious views and his religious life with gloom and melancholy, and thereby partly by inheritance and partly by training, upon both of his distinguished sons.

Sören, the child of his old age, came, even as a youth, to surmise that there was some dark secret gnawing at his father's heart, and at length, shortly before his father's death, learned the true facts about the curse. The discovery shook him, as he says, like an earthquake. He made a note of the circumstances, and put it among his private papers, where it was found a considerable time after his death; and, when H. P. Barfoed, the first editor of his posthumous papers, showed the note to Bishop Kierkegaard, the latter burst into tears with the cry: 'That is our father's history and ours also. It is evident that the father was a man of remarkable intellectual gifts, and that, with all his severity, he won the devoted affection of his sons.

2. His personality. — The fundamental and decisive element in Sören Kierkegaard's personality is found by George Brandes in his combined reverence and scorn; by H. Hoffding (more in accordance with the fact that he was his father's son) in his melancholy, and O. P. Mourad, his latest biographer, in emotion or passion. Certainly the emotional factor—as it forms the decisive element in personal character generally—best suggests the distinctive feature of Kierkegaard's personality.

In his published writings and in his journals we are in touch with a nature of unvonted intensity, with an inner life at white heat. This is seen in his abundant sensitiveness: he was touched by the quick by things that others might have ignored or easily forgotten. Again, while he was admittedly the most original mind that Denmark ever produced, his thoughts seldom operated in cool dialectics, but were represented in language "existenti," expressive of his whole personality; with amazing imaginative fertility he constructs, not chains of reasoning, but experiments in psychology, i.e., persons and situations depicting a real, a felt, an experienced life. Similarly, religion was for him, not a group of doctrines requiring merely to be believed, defended, or systematized, but a fact making a tremendous demand upon life; the joy of salvation was to be won in the most intense appropriation of the truth and the most impassioned submission to its claim. His natural melancholy was, as already said, partly an inheritance, strengthened by his early training, and doubtless also by the sickly and infirm body with which his impetuous spirit was united; but it was deepened by his sense of the awful imperative of Christianity and his failure to realize it. His peripatetic nature appears also in the iron realization with which he wrought out his ideas, as he thought, divinely appointed task; for he might claim, as few others, that in all his work he had striven for but one thing; and in prosecution he lost friends, means, health, was mocked by the crowd and denounced by the religious, but held on, if not serene, yet undismayed, to the end.

3. His purpose and method. — What, then, was the purpose of his thinking that he so ably? As he makes clear in "Our Miss Forsfater-Virk companions" ( "My Literary Activity," 1851), it was religion; or, more definitively, his one aim was to teach his age what it is to become a Christian. When he was about twenty-five years of age—after a period of irresponsible life—the discovery of his father's secret, and his father's death, combined and aided him in his efforts to grasp his self-made religious view of the world, this world included, the religious and religious life with gloom and melancholy, and thereby partly by his inherited and partly by training, upon both of his distinguished sons.

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religious attitude as one of continued penitence—
that we are always in the wrong in relation to
God—and ends with the undogmatic dogma that
'only the truth that edifies is true for thee.' The
negation of sin, of the absence of penitence, of
coming to oneself (what is actually decided
for is not so important)—such was the message
of Enten—Eller.

For the moment Kierkegaard thought that his
task was completed. But in his last "By" Papers he had
personally attained to a deeper grasp of Christi-
anity, and had come to feel that there was a
stage of life higher than the ethical-religious
stand-point of B. It was now, probably, that he became
more fully cognizant of his plan, and of what was
necessary to its development. The higher and
more distinctively Christian form of religion is set
forth in Frygt og Beven (Fear and Trembling,
Oct. 1843), the message of which is illustrated by
the fact that Abraham was commanded to do what
was ethically wrong, i.e., to kill Isaac, and obeyed
in virtue of a personal relation to God; he had
faith—by, in the earthly, and yet believed that
he should possess it still. Similarly death is no common
or easy thing; but is a relation to the Absolute
which baffles reason, and can be won and held only
in an infinite passion. In GjengtaDiglen (Repetition,
Oct. 1843) there is sketched an abortive transi-
tion to the religious sphere. 'Repetition' is one of
his characteristic ideas; it signifies persistence
in, and faithfulness to, a chosen course of life, and
is thus opposed to the aesthetic standpoint, with
constancy only in change. But Kierkegaard also
gives the word a more special meaning—that rather
of 'resumption' (Gjengtage), 'taking again'—im-
plying that each higher stage of life carries with it
the lower in a transformed form. GjengtaDiglen
tells of a young man who seeks to pass from the
esthetic to the religious sphere, but for want of
a true penitence becomes merely a romanticist; i.e.,
he simply resumes his old self; and his case is
contrasted with that of Job, who humbled himself
utterly before God, and at last regained all that
he had lost, and more—the true 'repetition.'

In Philosophisk Smalter ('Philosophical Bits,
June 1844, by 'Johannes Climacus,' with Kierk-
gegaard as editor) he comes closer to his real problem.
'How to become a Christian,' but so far discusses
only the general question, 'How can an eternal
soul be saved from a historical event?' As an
'experiment in thought' his pseudonymous argu-
ment that an appearance of God in time-relations
must be a 'paradox' for human reason. Thought must
first achieve an appearance in a stumbling-block,
and may seek either to reject it or to change it—both
equally in vain. The true procedure of the
intellect is to absorb itself before the 'paradox',
which can be grasped only in the passion of faith. Such is the condition of salvation, in regard to
which, accordingly the earliest and latest gener-
tations are essentially on the same ground. The next
step was to indicate what is at once the pre-
eminence of faith and the obstacle to the great work
of faith. This is done in Begrebet Angst ('The
Idea of Dread,' June 1844), a psychological inves-
tigation of the Fear, and of sin in general. Sin
is not to be explained scientifically; psychologic-
ally it is preceded by a vague, dim sense of someth-
ing that both attracts and repels, but this
do not bring us to sin itself, which, as an act
of the human personality, comes by a 'spring.'
In Stedetforlivets Livet ('Stages on the Way
of Life,' April 1845) is given a kind of résumé of
the foregoing books. This work exhibits the three
spheres of life—the aesthetic, the ethical, the
religious. It is essentially a developing of the ideas
in Frygt og Beven and Gjengta-
diglen. The most important section is the third,
entitled 'Guilty—Not Guilty' (based, as are also
in part Frygt og Beven and Gjengta-
diglen, on his personal experiences in connexion with his engage-
ment), a narrative of suffering—suffering resulting
from the break with the natural life and from the
sense of guilt on which drive the subject of the
narrative towards religion in its highest form.
Isolated from man, isolated before God, he does
not reach peace, for he represents only the approxi-
mation to religion. The full statement of what
is involved in becoming a Christian is to be found in
Afalettende videnskabelig Efterkr aft ('Concluding
Unscientific Postscript,' i.e., to 'Philosophical Bits,'
Feb. 1849, by the same pseudonym and editor).
The starting-point of the book is the individual's
passionate desire for his own salvation, and its
problem is not 'Is Christianity true?', but 'How
am I to become a Christian?' The passionate
desire rejects the proofs from Biblical theology, from
the existence of the Church, and from the philosophy
which, in identifying being and thought, distorts
Christianity and subverts individuality. Man may
construct a logical system; a system of existence is
for God alone true; but religion, viz., that the Absolute has entered into time-re-
relations, is a paradox for thought, and can be
appropriated only by an impassioned faith. Sub-
jectivity is truth; the essential thing is not what,
but how, we believe.

These works were produced within about four
years; but in addition to, and concomitantly with,
the pseudonymous books Kierkegaard had issued
a series of Opbyggede Taler ('Educated Di-
courses') designed for the 'individual' whom his
other works might have awakened. By these,
moreover, he intended not only to indicate his own
religious position, but also to show that—should
it ever be questioned—he was a religious writer
from the outset. These 'discourses' are marked by
the finest spiritual discernment.

(b) The portrait of ideal Christianity.—Once
more Kierkegaard believed that his special task
was finished, and actually thought of seeking a
rural charge. But now came the second event that
depicted his life and thought. In the early forties
the Konsor, a satirical journal edited by
M. A. Goldschmidt, a friend of Kierkegaard,
while holding up to ridicule everybody else of note
in Copenhagen, always spoke with something like
veneration of Kierkegaard's works. In 1846, Kier-
kegaard invited the paper to publish an article on
the challenge was accepted. The Konsor satirized
him—his person, his clothes, his pseudonyms—
with pen and pencil. The better class left him in
the lurch; the print was sold. All this struck
Kierkegaard to the heart; he saw in it a proof of
the awful depth to which a 'Christian' people had
dunk. His scorn for the multitude grew apace,
and the political ferment of the time at home and
abroad only served to intensify it. But in this
bitter experience he won, as he believed, a deeper
comprehension of Christianity. He began to work
at a series of distinctly Christian writings,
mainly in the form of discourses, and published
under his own name. Pre-eminent among these
are: Opbyggede Taler og forskellige Aænd ('Edify-
ing Discourses in various Forms'), Kjørbisesds
Gjerningen ('The Work of Love'), and Christelige Taler
('Christian Discourses')—all of them 'direct
messages.' The first develops the idea that the
Christian life necessarily involves suffering;
the second sets forth the Way of Christian-
ity ('Thou shalt love')—the inevitable suffer-
ing must not provoke to hate or scorn; in the
Christelige Taler, composed of four series of dis-
courses (one third volume), he develops a motto asserting that Christianity does not call for defense (in its function being to attack), Kierkegaard depicts the
Christian life as in its hope, its suffering, its earnestness, entirely unconformable to the world; and in this work we hear, in fact, the first clear note of the coming open challenge to conventional Christianity. Thereafter he wrote Sygdommen til Døden (‘The Sickness unto Death’) and Indvælende i Christendom (‘Residence in Christianity’), but delayed their publication for various reasons—his respect for J.P. Mynster, privateer of Denmark (‘my father’s priest’), his sympathies with simple-minded people, and perhaps also a desire not to arrogate to himself a higher Christian standing than he really had. In the meantime he published Tende ethik-religiøse Snaa-Afhandlinger (‘Two Short Ethico-religious Treatises,’ 1849); one of them arguing that none but an apostle may be permitted to let himself be martyred for the truth, the other setting forth the distinction between a genius and an apostle. Then at length followed Sygdommen til Døden (1848) and Indvælende i Christendom (1850)—by ‘Antichristian’ (indicating that they exhibit an ideal of Christianity which Kierkegaard himself, who is merely the editor, had not attained)—his most powerful works. In the former he analyzes sin as a state of conscious or unconscious despair, as the fatal disease which true Christianity alone can erase; in the latter he depicts reconciliation with Christ, but only through a personal approach to him, his humiliations and sufferings, and especially by becoming contemporary with him in spirit; He who said, ‘Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden,’ was in the form of a servant—a poor, despised man; and faith is precisely the resolve, produced by a consciousness of sin as the one bane of human life, to follow him in suffering and humiliation. In Til Selvopphøvede (‘For Self-examination,’ 1851) he sums up his whole Christianity in a popular form. The general conclusion of these works was that Christendom, existing Christianity, the Church, was in reality a travesty of true Christianity. Kierkegaard was deeply impressed—and from conversations with Bishop Mynster he believed that he had good grounds for hoping—that the priests would publicly and officially concede this; then would he gladly point the way of grace. But Mynster, on the contrary, was bitterly offended by the works, and kept silence. Kierkegaard still waited, however; and he too kept silence—for three years—must be regarded as a proof of the absolute sincerity of his hope.

(c) The direct attack upon the Church.—The final act in Kierkegaard’s life-drama—the dark and stormy close—turned upon a word used by H. L. Martensen. Bishop Mynster died in January 1854, and Martensen, in the funeral sermon, spoke of him as a ‘witness for the truth’ (Sandhedsviden)—as a link in the chain of witnesses that extends from the apostles’ days to our own. Kierkegaard had a profound respect for Mynster, but had latterly come to feel that the priest embodied in his own person that travesty of Christian thought and life which the whole series of books from Etern—Etter til Indvælde i Christendom had been designed to expose and impeach. That Mynster should now be designated a ‘witness for the truth’ demanded, therefore, a strong protest. Kierkegaard at once drafted an article in which he asserted that Mynster, far from being a Sandhedsviden, had, in fact, completely failed, alike in life and in word, to present the Christianity of the NT, one distinctive note of which is suffering. This article, however, was held over until Martensen was appointed to the vacant see, and was eventually published in Fædrelandet in December. It made a great sensation. Martensen replied, and Kierkegaard sat up night after night, evoking rejoinders from many hands, and kindling a controversy of such fierceness that Danish writers compare it with Pascal’s conflict with the Jesuits. Kierkegaard then issued successively the nine numbers of Ueblikket (‘The Moment’), in which the master of irony set forth his indictment of existing Christianity in language that none could mistake. His statements concerning the Christianity of the NT was now simply non-existent. His claim was, not that he was a Christian, but that he understood what Christianity was. His demand was that the church should avail on the Church’s part that it was not Christian, and he called upon every honest man to sever himself from it till that avowal was made.

The strain was too much for Kierkegaard’s sickly frame. The bitterness and ruthlessness of his language in these last days were doubtless partly due to the pain and weakness which now oppressed him. In September 1855 he fainted in the street and was taken to a public hospital. Here he was occasionally visited by Pastor Emil Boesen, a friend from childhood’s days, who found him very low, but looking for death with humble trust. On one occasion Boesen asked him if he trusted in the sacrament, and Kierkegaard, resolve to the last, answered, ‘Yes, but not from a dervigman.’ He died on 11th November 1855.

5. His achievement.—Kierkegaard had an extraordinary ability, a gift of poetic passion and keen dialectic power. Either alone might have sufficed to give him a place among the great figures of European literature or philosophy. In combination they produced the ‘indirect communication’ and the arraignment of the Church. The indirect message pulsates with emotion, but is rendered obscure by its dialectic structure; the attack upon the Church moves on logical lines, but was virtually a failure by reason of its violence. Kierkegaard’s critics have drawn attention to the fundamental anomaly in his literary production as a whole—his earlier insistence upon the subjectivity of truth, and his later demand for unconditional submission to an objective Christianity. Formally, no doubt, the contradiction is glaring; yet one may ask whether it is not inherent in Christianity itself. For the Apostle Paul, too, everything turns on the objective fact that God has become man, and yet all depends upon the subjective appropriation of that fact. It must certainly be admitted that the manner in which Kierkegaard developed the two sides of the antithesis has served to keep his distinctive views outside the main current of European thought, though, in substance—identified, it may be, with other minds—that we may have found their own place; we must remember, moreover, that what Kierkegaard had in view from first to last was not the universal idea, but the individual soul. Be this as it may, there remain in Kierkegaard’s achievement the keen psychological analyses with which he struck at the roots of the ‘system’; the searching presentation of the Christian life as the ideal in the light of which the existing Church shrivels to a mere travesty; the often tender and always impressive appeal of his ‘discourses’; and the profound suggestiveness of his doctrines of subjectivity, the paradox, repetition, the spring, and the necessity of our being contemporary with Jesus Christ—to say nothing of the brilliant style and the lyrical profusion which he brings to their expression. There remains also the pathos of his lonely life—that of a great sympathetic soul, like Isaiah or Dante—seeking the response that never came; and, last—perhaps greatest—of all, the absolute self-consecration and singleness of purpose in which he fought against suffering, and in the loss of all things, he strove, both in his personal life and in his work, to realize the ideal.
KIN, KINSHIP. — I. INTRODUCTION. — 1. Use of term. — At the present time the word 'kinship' is used by different writers on human society. In one of these senses, which corresponds with the ordinary usage of the English language, the word applies to the relationships set up by common descent, whether by direct or collateral lines, on the institution of the family. This term being used for the social group consisting of a man, his wife, and their children. When used in this way, the term may include cases in which the relationship depends on other forms of social or other than consanguinity, such as adoption. By many writers on sociology, on the other hand, the meaning of the word has been extended so as to include, or even apply primarily to, the 'kin' or other similar social group. In this sense, the meaning of the word is not dependent on the institution of the family, but is applied to all those with whom there is no tie of consanguinity, or of the equivalent conventional relationship. Every member of an American or African clan or of an Australian or Melanesian moiety stands in a social relation to every other member of his clan or moiety, a relation which involves definite social duties; and some sociologists use the words 'kin' and 'kinship' explicitly for this relationship, while still more use the words loosely so that there is a kind of relationship that is set up by consanguinity or conventional membership of the family. The use of the terms in these widely different senses is a source of confusion, and it is necessary to lay down rules as to the use of 'kinship' to one or other of the two senses. In this article both kinds of relationship are dealt with, but the first of the two senses will be implied when the words 'kin' and 'kinship' are used in the body of the article.

2. Definition. — The fact of kinship can be determined and defined in several different ways: by consanguinity, genealogy, terminology, or function.

(1) The least satisfactory is consanguinity. Among ourselves such a relationship as that which exists between parent and child, or between brother and sister, can also come into existence by social convention. The ties of consanguinity, however, are more permanent, and the fact that the two are not related by blood may result in the formation of a relationship between persons wholly devoid of any consanguineous tie. Thus, in the Banks Islands in Melanesia the relationship of parent and child is not special to the existence by the fact of procreation and parturition, but it is such as the payment of the midwife, the first feeding of the child, or the planting of a tree on the occasion of a birth that gives it this tie. In many cases the tie between the children and the parents of the child for all social purposes. Similarly, among a polyandrous people like the Todas, it may be the performance of a ceremony during pregnancy that determines which of the co-wives of the husband is to be regarded for all social purposes as the father of the child. Indeed, the fact of fatherhood is so strictly determined by this ceremony that a male who performs it becomes the 'father' of the child even if he is only a few years of age or has never seen the mother before he is called upon to take part in the ceremony. Kinship cannot be determined and defined by consanguinity even among ourselves, still less among other peoples.

(2) Genealogy. — Nearly all, if not all, peoples of the world preserve, either in writing or in their memories, a record of those with whom they are related by consanguinity or by those social conventions which, as we have seen, serve the same social purpose. Among many peoples, and especially among those of rude culture, the knowledge of relationship throws light even the most trifling event of carrying in his mind. Among such peoples it is the fact that recorded in the pedigrees of a person that largely determines his use of terms of relationship and regulates all the social functions which these terms may denote.

(3) If the use of terms is determined by pedigrees, it follows that the definition of kinship by the terminology of relationship must be less satisfactory than by genealogy; but this third mode of defining kinship is even less valuable for another reason: the terms used for relatives as determined genealogically are precisely the same as those used for the relationships set up by membership of the clan or other social group, and it is impossible by their means to define the tie of kinship in the strict sense.

(4) Function. — Two persons may be regarded as kin if their duties and obligations to one another are of the kind usually associated with ties of kinship. Thus, a number of social functions and psychological ties belong to the relationship of parent and child only, and cannot be used for membership of the group. Take a specific instance: if kinship were used exclusively


2 See Notes and Queries on Anthropology, London, 1912, p. 156.
for the clan-relationship, the father would not be kin
where there is matrilineal descent, nor would the
mother be kin where descent is patrilineal. If, on the other hand, kinship is used for
relationship determined genealogically, both father
and mother's brother will be kin, whereas the
father's or mother's sister and the father's or
mother's brother are remote that no genealogical con-
nection can be traced will not be kin.
The definition of kinship as genealogical relation-
ship will also exclude the metaphorical sense in
which terms of relationship are often used by
people at all stages of culture. This article deals
especially with kinship as thus defined, but the
relationships set up by common membership of
the social group are also considered, especially in
so far as those relationships are connected with kin-
ship proper.
II. THE TERMINOLOGY OF RELATIONSHIP.—
The collection of terms denoting relationship used
among peoples is usually spoken of as the system
of relationship of that people. Such systems com-
prise a definite body of social facts which can be
described, classified, and compared with one an-
other. Such comparison shows that the systems
used by different peoples vary greatly, and these
variations are found to depend on the application
of different principles of classification of relation-
ships. For instance, while we class together the
father's brother and the mother's brother under
the common denomination of 'uncle,' most peoples
of the world assign these two relatives to social
classes so distinct and with such different func-
tions that their social systems would be reduced
to chaos if they were driven to adopt our mode of
classification. On the other hand, two relatives
whom we class definitively, as the father and
the father's brother are by nearly all peoples of
rude culture put into one social category, and the
social life of these peoples is such that this mode of
classification leads to no confusion, but the common
nomenclature carries with it an organized system
of common social functions.

Two chief varieties of system of relationship are
usually distinguished, which, following Lewis
Morgan, are called the classificatory and the
descriptive. This distinction is not a happy one;
for all systems are classificatory in that they class
together certain relatives, while the terms descrip-
tive, or as many of the systems to
which it is usually applied, such as our own, are
not in any way descriptive, while descriptive
terms are often prominent in the systems called
classificatory. The classificatory principle is, how-
ever, so pronounced and shows itself so conspicu-
ously in a large group of systems used by peoples
of rude culture that it is a fairly appropriate term
and will probably long continue to be used.

The use of Morgan's other term cannot be so
readily justified. His 'descriptive' systems in-
eclude many which are wholly devoid of a descrip-
tive character. Thus, if our own system were
truly descriptive, we should not speak of systems of
a grand-
father or uncle, but should always distinguish
between the father's father and the mother's
father, and between the father's brother, the
mother's brother, the father's sister, and the
husband of the mother's sister.

Such descriptive nomenclature occurs in many
European and in some African systems of relation-
ship, and Morgan justified his inclusion of systems
like the descriptive category by the assumption
that they had formerly possessed a
truly descriptive character.

1. THE CLASSIFICATORY SYSTEM.—As already in-
dicated, the chief special feature of this system is the
application of its terms to large groups of persons
so that in its most complete form no single term
can be used as the means of distinguishing an
individual. Thus, the term 'brother' is not only
used for sons of the same father and mother, but is
also applied to all the sons of the father's brothers
and of the mother's sisters, the terms 'brother'
and 'sister' being used in a similar wide sense. In other varieties of the
classificatory system, the term is used even more
widely for all the sons of the father's clan, and
members of the father's or mother's clan who are
removed from the father's or mother's side by
the same number of degrees as the sons of the
father's or mother's brother, the 'brother' and 'sister'
being used in a similar wide sense. Similarly, the
term applied to the father is also used of all the
brothers of the father and of all the husbands of
the mother's sister, 'brother' and 'sister' being
again used in the classificatory sense. One result
of this usage—one which is a potent source
of misunderstanding and perplexity—is that the
language of a people who follow the classificatory
system possesses no equivalents for our European
terms of relationship, so that an accurate transla-
tion of those terms is impossible. Similarly,
European languages have no equivalents for the
terms of a classificatory system. It is, therefore,
necessary to state at the outset that, when an
English term of relationship is used in this article,
it is to be taken in its usual English meaning
except when definitely stated to be used in a
classificatory sense.

There are several classes of terms of relationship.
In the case of certain relatives, and especially the
father and mother, it is often the custom for a
term to be used in addressing such a relative, and
another term when speaking of him or her to
others. The terms used in address correspond to
our familiar terms, such as 'Papa' or 'Daddy,' but the distinction between the two terms
in classificatory systems is much more rigorous
than we are accustomed to.

Another variant is found in some places where
terms of relationship are used in a collective or
reciprocal sense. Thus, a Fijian highlander will
address his father's father as tii, but, when speak-
ing of himself and his father as a social group, he
will say that they are saumubus, using a word
tumbu, which in other parts of Fiji is a term by
which a grandfather is addressed.

A feature very widely present in classificatory
systems is a peculiar reciprocity in the use of
terms of relationship that they denote relationships rather than relatives. This
reciprocal usage, which among ourselves is limited
to relatives of the same generation, such as brother,
sister, and cousin, occurs between persons of dif-
gerations in the classificatory system, so that a
man and his mother's brother or a man and his
grandchild may use only one term between them;
there may be only one term for the relationship
between mother's brother and sister's son, or for
that between father's father and son's son. A
similar usage occurs between husband and wife so
that there is only one place in our two terms.
It is as if the word 'spouse' were for the partner in
a marriage.

It is probably a variation of this principle of
reciprocity that is seen in a very peculiar and
characteristic mode of terminology for brothers
and sisters. In most classificatory systems, two
brothers use one term, two sisters the same or
another often closely related term, while sister use a
wholly different term. A similar
custom is general in the nomenclature for brothers
and sisters-in-law: two men use one term, two
sisters the same or a different term, while a
woman use still another term or other terms.
This feature also characterizes the nomenclature
for cross-cousins in some Fijian systems. Looked
at from another point of view, this charac-
istic of classificatory systems means that the use of a term of relationship does not depend merely, as in the case of the lexicon of the person addressed, but also on that of the speaker. Thus a man may use one term for his sister and a woman another; similarly, a man may use one term for his sister's son and a woman a quite different term here, and so on. Women, too, use different terms for their grandchildren. In some cases, even, a father and mother may use different terms for their children.

This practice is very general in classificatory systems. The use of different terms for certain relatives according to age. This is especially frequent in the cases of the relationships between brothers and between sisters, while frequently the brothers of the father, and less frequently the sisters of the mother, are denoted differently according as they are older or younger than the father or mother. This practice occurs only very rarely, if at all, in the case of the relationship between brother and sister, and it is very exceptional in the case of the mother's brothers or the father's sisters. Thus, systems are and there is a term for elder brother (man speaking) and elder sister (woman speaking); another for younger brother (man speaking) and younger sister (woman speaking), but only one reciprocal term is used both for brothers and for sisters. This varied for sister (man speaking), irrespective of age.

Two varieties of this practice occur: in some cases the usage is determined by the relative ages of those who use the terms, while in other cases it is determined by the ages of the children of some more or less distant ancestor. In the latter case, a man will address a relative as older if the latter belongs to an elder branch of his pedigree, even if he (the speaker) is the elder in years. These usages may be distinguished as dependent on age and seniority respectively.

Still another feature very general in classificatory systems is the presence of a rigorous distinction between relatives through father and mother. This is especially frequent in the cases of those whom we call uncles and aunts, and less frequently applies also to grandparents and grandchildren.

One result of these various peculiarities of the classificatory system is that it usually possesses a far richer terminology than exists among ourselves or other European peoples. Thus, even when we are speaking in some system as many as eighteen different terms for the different varieties of the grandparent-grandchild relationship; two each for father's father, father's mother, mother's father, and mother's mother, one term of each pair being used by the grandchild of the other parent and the other by the granddaughter; and, similarly, two terms each for son's son, son's daughter, daughter's son, and daughter's daughter, one term of each pair being used by the grandfather and the other by the grandmother. There is no known system of relationship in which all these sixteen possible terms are present, but in some Malayan systems as many as eighteen are in use, the absent terms being those which depend on the difference in sex of the grandparents.

The rigid class of terminology of classificatory systems may also be increased by the presence of terms for relationships for which we have no special designation. Thus it is common to find special terms in some systems for married brothers or between women who have married brothers, and special terms may also be used between the parents, or even between the grandparents, of a married couple, marriage between two persons thus setting up a relationship between their parents or their grandparents which is of sufficient social importance to lead to the use of a special term.

If the principle of reciprocity is in full action, so that two persons of different generations use only one term for each other, the number of terms will be diminished; but, even so, most classificatory systems tend to make each person use different terms for their grandchildren. It is also common in the classificatory system to find relatives classed together whom we distinguish. Some of these classifications, such as the father's younger brother with the mother, and the father with the mother, are due to the working of the classificatory principle, and are found in nearly all classificatory systems, but there are others which occur only here and there. Thus, the mother's brother is frequently denoted by the same term as the father-in-law and the father's sister's husband, or the father's father may be classed with an elder brother, or the father's sister's son with the father.

Most of these correspondences in nomenclature can be shown to be due to special forms of marriage, and will be considered more fully in the various sections of art. MARRIAGE; all that need be noted here is that there is a kindred introduction of an element of complexity into classificatory systems of relationship which combines with their variations in richness of nomenclature to give these systems an immensely greater variety than is found in European systems. There are so many gradations, that many systematic grouping of classificatory systems is far from easy; but certain main distinctions are possible.

2. Varieties in the classificatory system. — In his great work on the Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family, Morgan considered three main varieties of the classificatory system — the Galvanian system found in N. America, the Turanian in Asia and some parts of Oceania, and the Malay in Polynesia — but the Galvanian and Turanian systems were found to be so similar that he regarded them as forming one variety, the Malay forming another. Though the name was badly chosen, the Malay system has much right to be regarded as a special variety. Morgan drew his chief example from the Hawaiian Islands, and hence we may call it the Hawaiian system. It occurs also among the Maoris of New Zealand and probably in other parts of Polynesia. It is a very simple system, in which the classificatory principle is carried to an extreme degree, so that all relatives of the same age to the speaker are classed with brothers or sisters, all of the previous generation with the father and mother, and all of the generation before that with the grandparents, so that in the Hawaiian Islands, excluding relatives by marriage, there are only fifteen terms of relationship altogether.

There is, however, no hard and fast line between this system and the more usual forms of the classificatory system. Thus the system of Eddystone Island in the British Solomons differs only in the fact that, while all relatives of the generation older than the speaker are classed with the father or mother, one relative in the generation following the speaker, viz., the sister's son, is distinguished from the rest.

A more definite principle of classification can be based upon the special features derived from different forms of marriage. Thus, the cross-cousin marriage (see MARRIAGE) produces a number of special features which enable the system of a place where this marriage is recognized at a glance. Similarly, other special forms of system dependent upon forms of marriage can be distinguished, though numerous gradations are possible owing to the fact that the special features dependent upon a form of marriage often
Persist after the marriage has ceased to be practiced, and their disappearance may be so gradual that there may be no trace of them. In the case of marriage, such systems being, as a rule, very complex.

If special varieties of the classificatory system are thus dependent on social institutions such as marriage, the question arises whether its generative classificatory system of relationship has been determined by some form of social organization, and there can be little doubt that it has been derived from the clan. Wherever the clan exists, classificatory terms of relationship are used, and they are not only applied to persons with whom definite genealogical relationship can be traced, but they are also used to denote membership of the clan. Thus, all the men of the clan of the speaker and of his own generation are classed in terminology with his brothers. If the clan is patrilineal, all men of the previous generation of his clan are classed with his father, and all of the succeeding generation with his sons. Similarly, all the men of his mother's clan and of her generation are classed with his mother's brother, and all the men of the succeeding generation with his mother's brother's children.

The most primitive forms of the classificatory system possess certain features which suggest that they may have arisen out of that special form of the clan system which may be called the dual organization, in which a tribe or other community consists of two exogamous moieties. The children of the father's brothers and of the mother's sisters are classed with brothers and sisters, while the children of mother's brothers and of father's sisters are classed together, but distinguished from brothers and sisters; this is a mode of classification which would be the natural result of the dual organization. If the term 'classificatory' is regarded as unsatisfactory, one would be justified in speaking of the group of systems to which this name is usually applied as 'clan systems.'

3. Morgan's descriptive system. The systems classed together by Morgan as descriptive show a number of varieties characterized by the different degrees in which the descriptive principle is in action. A fully descriptive system would contain a corresponding number of descriptive terms in small groups of persons, and all other relatives would be named by combinations of these primary denotive terms. The Celtic and Lutishian systems are the best examples of this descriptive usage, in which many relatives, including the grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins, are described by a relation to the father and mother.

At the other end of the scale come such languages as English, in which the systems are simple denotive terms for the grandparents and for the brothers and sisters of father and mother, while the wives and children of the latter are indicated by descriptive terms; thus, the great-grandfather is matr khal, his son khal, and his daughter bint khal.

Morgan classed such systems as our own with the descriptive variety, because he inferred that they had once had this character. It is, however, far from satisfactory to class together systems which differ so widely from one another. In spite of their differences, they are both classificatory systems, and in one sense denotive, such systems as our own might be classed together as 'denotive,' while the term 'descriptive' might be reserved for those systems in which the description is part of the system. Different systems might also be named by means of the forms of social structure from which they are derived. Our own system and those of most Teutonic and Romance languages contain a number of terms which are used of one person and of one person only, and the persons thus indicated are the members of the family (a social group consisting of a man, his wife, and their children). The more remote from the family the relationship is, the less definite becomes the nomenclature. Such systems are clearly founded on the social institution of the family. It is only for those persons who form part of the family that an exact system of nomenclature is necessary. Such systems might appropriately be called 'family' systems.

Such a system as that of the Arabic language, on the other hand, shows the past or present existence of a state of society in which some special motive exists for the clear distinction of brothers and sisters of the father and mother as well as of their wives and children. Such social motives are to be found in some form of the kindred or extended family, and it has been suggested that these systems might be called 'kindred' systems.

It is an interesting illustration of the subject of relationship by sociologists that only recently has any attempt been made to use European systems of relationships as instruments for the study of social organization. When the lesson taught by the study of the classificatory system has been learnt, much light will be thrown on the nature of Indogerian and Semitic social organization by means of the terminology of relationship.

4. Geographical distribution of relationship systems.—(1) Europe.—Most of the Romance and Teutonic languages possess systems of relationship in which denotive terms are prominent and from which descriptive terms are absent. The systems of these peoples are of a simple character, possessing relatively few terms; only in French is there any sign of distinctions according to age. In the past, however, European languages were richer in nomenclature, Anglo-Saxon, Middle High German, and Latin distinguishing the brothers and sisters of the father from those of the mother relatives now classed together. The Latin system was an extremely complex one, and the system of the Slavic or family system, but it is possible that it was largely a legal product, and that a less strictly scientific nomenclature was in use among the people. The Celtic languages present high development of the descriptive principle, and this principle also shows itself to some extent in the Scandinavian languages.

Slavic systems of relationship are in the main denotive, but some of them possess features of a classificatory kind. Thus, in Bulgaria the father's brother's son is called otisika brat, or 'brother through the paternal uncle,' being thus classed with, and at the same time distinguished from, a brother. Similarly, in Poland cousins are classed with brothers or sisters, but distinguished by terms referring to their relationship through an uncle or aunt.

In Poland also, the father's brother's son may be classed with the grandfather, and the terms used for the father's and mother's brothers are also applied to the cousins of the father or mother. These features suggest that Slavic systems are not very far removed from classificatory systems, that they are classificatory systems in which special denotive terms have come into use for the brothers and sisters of father or mother, but that their children still follow by their nomenclature that they were once definitely classed with brothers and
sisters. In this connexion it is interesting that some Slavic systems, such as the Bulgarian, show the distinction between elder and younger brothers which is so characteristic of the classic Eastern system, in Bulgaria there are special terms for the younger brother and younger sister of the husband.

The Magyar system has many features which distinguish it from the Eastern systems and from other systems, and many points of similarity with certain systems of N. America, and possibly also with those of northern Asia. Especially striking in this respect is the presence of definite terms for older and younger brother and for elder and younger sister, and the classification of uncles and aunts with elder brothers and sisters. Another feature of interest is the wide use of a term scoot in the designation of cousins and uncles, which seems to show the existence of a mode of social grouping in which descendants of a grandparent are classed together.

The Finnish system differs in the less from Indo-European systems, and the linguistic character of some of the terms suggests that this is the result of modification produced through the present environment of the people. According to the literature, the331 Finnish people, the Estonian system is characterized by a very high degree of development of the descriptive principle.

The Turkish system resembles the Magyar to some extent, the differences being probably due to Arabic influences.

The Basque language preserves the use of a single reciprocal term between brother and sister, a feature so characteristic of the classificatory system as to suggest that the whole system must once have had this character.

(2) Africa. Most of the peoples of the northern part of this continent have been influenced by the Arabic system, the special features of which have already been described. Closely similar systems are found among the Shilluks, Dinkas, and other Nilotic peoples. These systems are likewise characterized by the use of special distinctions for half-brothers and sisters, arising out of the practice of polygyny. This feature is also present in the systems of the Bantu peoples, which differ, however, from the Nilotic systems in being definitely classificatory in character and in having complexities dependent on certain forms of marriage.

In W. Africa, on the other hand, the available evidence points to the absence of the classificatory system, its mode of nomenclature being largely descriptive.

(3) Asia. Some of the peoples of Asiatic Turkey appear to use systems of relationship of the same kind as the Turks and Magyars, with decided traces of Arabic influence, while the Armenian system is descriptive.

The systems of northern Asia are definitely of a classificatory kind, approaching the Hawaiian type in the north-eastern part of the continent. The system of the Tungus classes the elder brothers of a man with his father's younger brothers—a feature similar to those characteristic of the Magyar system.

The Persian system is largely descriptive, and the use of terms borrowed from Arabic for uncles and aunts suggests that these relatives had origin...
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Oceania, there is a definite correlation between the presence of special terms for relatives and social functions. It is only when such a relative term as 'mother's husband' or the father of the woman's wife has definite social functions that a special term is applied to him, distinguishing him from other relatives. There is reason to believe that one relative is distinguished from another in nomenclature only if his society has introduced a need for this distinction. At present we have little information about the social functions of relationship in other parts of the world, but the rule which holds good of Oceania will probably be found to be of general application.

1. Parents and children.—In general, we have little definite knowledge concerning the social regulations connected with parent and child. Among peoples who use the classificatory system these relatives do not appear to be subject to such clear-cut regulations as occur with other relationships. It is possible, however, that this may be due only to lack of interest in this relationship on the part of the collector of ethnographical data. The presence of special regulations connected with such relatives as the mother's brother or the mother-in-law is apt to give to provide for his child up to a certain age, and it is very difficult to state in any exact way the social actions which are included under the term 'provide.' The duties of the father may be more definitely twofold: his legal obligations, and those which devolve upon him by custom, the latter differing greatly in different ranks of society. The duties of a child towards his father are even less definite and obligatory, and, when we pass to more distant relatives, their social functions become so indefinite that they can hardly be said to exist. Many regard it as a duty to help all those related to themselves by the exercise of social interest, if not in a more material way, but such duties are in no way obligatory, and are not even sufficiently habitual among all classes to allow them to be described and classified. If we study the past of our own society, however, we find that the social duties of relatives have been much more definite, the best known of these duties being that of assisting in the payment of sceold, or blood-money, the proportions of this payment due from relatives of different kinds being very strictly regulated.

In other European countries the duties of relatives are more definite and more strictly regulated than in England, one such function in France, for instance, being that of taking part in a family council.

Among such peoples as the Hindus and Chinese the social functions associated with relationship are very definite and strictly regulated, this regulation being especially obvious in those cases in which social institutions, such as marriage, are associated with much ceremonial.

It is, however, when we pass to peoples of ruder culture that the social functions of relationship reach their highest degree of definiteness and strictness of regulation, and among these peoples definite duties, privileges, and restrictions are not limited to the parents or other near relatives, but are present, and may even be more numerous and definite, in the case of other relatives, such as the husband of the father's sister or the son of the mother's brother. Sometimes the duties and privileges associated with relationship seem to have become the basis of important social distinctions. Restraints.

Before considering these social functions in detail, we may point out the definite relation between the presence of social functions and the terminology of relationship. In such a region as

3. Mother’s brother and sister’s son.—Special customs associated with this relationship are very frequent among those who use the classificatory system, and the importance of the distinction of the mother’s brother from the father’s brother is shown by the fact that such special functions are quite unknown in connexion with the latter relative. Among many peoples who use the classificatory system the mother’s brother is very likely responsible for the welfare of the child, for his upbringing and training for adult life. He may take the chief place, or at any rate a more important place than the father, in the ceremonies which accompany social events, such as naming, the assumption of the first clothing, circumcision, initiation, and marriage. The duty of obedience to the mother’s brother may be so strict that a boy will at once respond to any command, however contrary to his own wishes. A man and his sister’s son often share their property in common, and there is little doubt, even if the practice no longer occurs, that in Melanesia they once had their wives in common. In other cases a man’s sister’s son has the right to take the place, or even to take for his own use, any of the possessions of his uncle. This right has reached its highest development in Fiji, where the rights of the sister’s son, or even, of a chief over the property of his mother and his brother’s son, extend to the property of all the subjects of his uncle, so that the estate of a chief is able to take for his own use any of the property, as well as the women, of the district over which his uncle rules.

The close relation between a man and his mother’s brother is natural in a state of mother-right, in which these persons necessarily belong to the same social group. The relation is often found, however, in combination with patrilineal institutions, in which cases it is probably a survival of an older matrilineal condition (see Mother-Right). In other cases the special position of the mother’s brother may be the result of other social institutions (see Marriage).

4. Mother’s brother’s wife.—Sometimes there are special privileges or restrictions on conduct in connexion with this relative, but these are usually the result of her position as a potential wife (see Marriage).

5. Father’s sister.—Special privileges in connexion with this relative have been recorded only in Melanesia, among the Melanesians, and in India, but probably elsewhere. In Melanesia this relative is especially honoured, and with this honour rule of avoidance are sometimes associated, while the relationship resembles that between a man and his mother’s brother in that to some extent a woman and her brother’s child have their property in common. In India this relative is important chiefly in marriage ceremonies (see Marriage).

6. Father’s sister’s husband.—Special conduct towards this relative has been recorded only from Melanesia, where it forms an extreme example of the joking relation (see below), a man being the natural butt for the wit and practical jokes of his wife’s brother’s son.

7. Cousins.—Rules of conduct between cousins are best known in the case of those, often called cross-cousins, who are the children of brother and sister. The special rules of conduct exist between those of different sex, they are usually the outcome of the potential relationship of husband and wife.

8. Grandparents and grandchildren.—Sometimes the grandfather has a special position of authority, while in other cases definite ceremonial duties in connexion with his grandchild may be assigned to him.

For relatives by marriage see Marriage.

9. Avoidance.—Many of the restrictions on the conduct of relatives have in common the feature that relatives avoid one another or avoid certain modes of conduct, and these restrictions are often grouped together as customs of avoidance. These customs have attracted special attention from anthropologists in the case of relatives by marriage, and will be again considered in the art. Marriage, but their general character may be discussed here. They are very various in kind. In the most extreme cases relatives must never be in the presence of one another. The avoidance may be so strict that a person who has to avoid a relative will not even enter a village where this relative is living, and in the extreme case of Lepers in Melanesia the avoidance between brother and sister persists after death. In other cases the avoidance is less absolute. A person may leave a house into which a relative enters, or, if relatives who should avoid one another meet, they may get out of each other’s way sufficiently to ensure that they do not touch one another, or they may pass with averted eyes.

Sometimes avoidance includes the total prohibition of speech, or relatives may speak to one another only so long as they do not see each other. In other cases, relatives speak to one another at a distance, or conversation may be limited to strict matters of business, and it is only familiar conversation that is allowed. Another manifestation of avoidance is that relatives may not use certain words or expressions when speaking to one another.

A custom which seems to be related to these customs of avoidance is the prohibition of the personal name, not only when relatives speak to one another, but when one speaks of the other in his absence. This prohibition applies not only to relatives who avoid one another, but often to a much wider circle of relatives. In other cases, the avoidance may apply only to special acts, e.g., touching the head, taking a load from another, or approaching a relative when he is sitting.

Customs of avoidance are more frequent, and usually more strict and elaborate, between persons of different sex than between those of the same sex, and it is certain that they are often associated with the idea that sexual relations between those who avoid one another are liable to take place. In some parts of Melanesia certain relatives of different sex will practise avoidance only so long as sexual relations have not taken place between them, and the avoidance will be a sign to all of the nature of the relations existing between the persons in question. This association of avoidance with the possibility of sexual relations seems to be especially definite in the case of relatives by marriage, but there is little doubt that the association is also present in connexion with the avoidance between brother and sister, and that, where this avoidance is present, sexual relations between brother and sister are recognized as liable to occur. It would seem as if one of the functions of customs of avoidance is to ensure that sexual relations shall not occur between certain relatives. The presence of these regulations in connexion with certain relatives and not with others shows that a tendency towards sexual relations is present in the one case and not in the other. They suggest that the relations now so strictly forbidden that the persons concerned are not even allowed to see or speak to one another must once have occurred frequently, if not habitually, and as an organized practice, between those who now avoid one another. The fact that similar avoidance exists between persons of the same sex shows, however, that the prohibition of sexual relations is not the
only factor in the production and maintenance of these customs. In Melanesia the avoidance between male relatives is less pronounced than between relatives of different sex, and usually applies to actions as well as to approaching when the other is sitting down, or one taking a load from the shoulder of the other. There is much reason to believe that these customs are the result of the prohibition of any kind of familiarity between certain relatives, while the customs now to be considered enjoin such familiarity and make it a regular and habitual feature of conduct. In the Banks Islands, for instance, the relation of the custom to avoidance seems to be shown by the fact that one of the most frequent forms which avoidance takes is the prohibition of the custom of joking. In these islands, this either neutral or little joke occurs in the case of the husband of the father's sister. Whoever a person meets this relative, it is not merely his privilege, but it would seem almost his duty, to play practical jokes upon him. In the cases of other relatives, this mode of behaviour seems to be less habitual. It is possible in these islands to arrange relationships in a series, from the husband of the father's sister at one end to the wife's mother at the other, in which there is a gradual transition from a condition in which joking is habitual to one in which not only is it absolutely forbidden, but the social relations are of a kind which remove all opportunity for its occurrence.

The only other people among whom this organized system of joking has been recorded are the Crow and Hidatasa Indians of N. America, but in their case it would appear that the privileged joking is practised between members of certain clans rather than between certain relatives. It is possible that those belong to the same clan who are allowed to play practical jokes upon one another.

See also INHERITANCE (Hebrew) and INHERITANCE (Tentonie).

KINDNESS.—I. Etymology and usage. The etymology of the word 'kindness' (connected with A.S. cynnul or cunning, 'natural' or 'inborn,' O.E. sceyund, 'generation,' 'nation'; cf. Lat. genus) indicates the original meaning of the word as equivalent to 'kinship,' or near-relationship (see OED). It was probably derived from birth. Afterwards it came to be used of natural aptitude or inclination; and, finally, of (1) the quality of being kind, and (2) kind feeling or affection, e.g., S. J. J. Kcm. The English Poets, ed. G. F. Hill, Oxford, 1905, i. 89 ('Milton').

'He left the university with no kindness for its institution' (quoted in OED). The objective use of an act prompted by kind feeling (e.g., 'a kindness' or 'kindnesses') easily followed from the above usages. In general, kindness, whether viewed as a subjective quality or as manifested objectivity in outward behaviour, word, or act, carries with it varying shades of goodwill, which may be expressed in such terms as friendliness, mercifulness, generosity, thoughtfulness, and the like. It is opposed to the spirit of harshness, unrelenting anger, or hauteur, vengeance, callousness, etc.

2. Ethics. As a manifestation under special conditions of a fully developed justice, or benevolence (q.v.), or love (q.v.), the virtue of kindness occupies a high place in the ethical teaching of both (G. and N. (The works are in Latin, and it is associated with the character of God in such passages as 1 S 20:4, 2 S 2:9, Neh 9:1, Ps 31:11, and is 54:1-2, where 775, often used with the suggestion of hospitality, is applied to the love of God with men. Further, as connected with the Christian doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, it finds expression in Lk 15:2, Mt 6:1, Ac 14:23. In the teaching of our Lord the spirit of kindness is inculcated in various directions—e.g., as one with the forgiving disposition (Mt 18:35), as the love of enemies or persecutors (Mt 5:43), as an exhibition of the law of mercy overriding legal enactment (Lk 19:14-15), as a sign of the grace of God (Ro 10:16), the gift of the Spirit (Gal 5:21), the grace of the Spirit (Ro 1:4-5). We find kindness exemplified in the lives of the apostles, and the word is used to describe the kindnesses of God (Ps 145:13-15). The love of God is expressed in a more active type of goodwill, bonitas as compared with benignitas (R. C. Trench, Syn. of the NT, London, 1880, p. 231 f., who quotes Lightfoot on Gal 5:1 to that effect). We may add to the above list φιλανθρωπία (Rob 192) and φιλοθέτω (1 Th 3, Tit 1, 1 P 4) as indicating a form of kindness—hospitality to strangers—commanded by the apostles to the early Church.

The doctrine of the divine Fatherhood may lead, as has frequently been noted, to a one-sided conception of God's nature. God's φιλανθρωπία is a kindness that coexists with 'wrath,' the eternal hostility of perfect Holiness to evil. It is not to be interpreted as 'softness and sentimentalism.'

The mere ambiguity of 'is bon Dieu' of much modern criticism is but one of the errors of the most monstrous indifference of Guru Khayyam's 'Good Fellows' (W. H. M. Morton, London, 1923, pp. 279 ff., referring to the Rubáiyát, iv. 4: It's a Good Fellow, he'll tell all the world.)

The Christian conception of kindness marks a great advance on Greek ethics. Perhaps the highest conception of benevolence is to be found in Aristotle's portraiture of the Philosopher, or liberal-minded man, in Nic. Eth. iv. 161, where nevertheless 'we do not find a word about benevolence or love to others as prompting acts of liberality' (A. Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, London, 1866, i. 80). The activity of the mothers in the formation of the vices and vices in the activity of Aristotle's virtuous man, for whom 'the first requisite to nobleness seems to be self-respect' (40, 69). Kindness, like cortis, begins at home—i.e., as a virtue of kinship. In general, one touch of nature makes the whole world kin (Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, iii. iii. 175); but it is in the family that the virtue of kindness finds its earliest sphere of influence. The love of the mother for her child is the ethical source of the law of kindness in human life.

'Love for children is always a prior and stronger thing than love between a husband and mother' (Drummond, Accident of Men, London, 1869, p. 383).

Drummond finds in the struggle for the life of others the ethical principle which many observers eliminate from the cosmic process. The emergence
of affection or kindness from the circle of the house, in the growth of ethical conceptions which accompanied the moral progress of mankind. It was seen that kindness narrowed to a circle might readily become a vice.

'While the edicato, quasi indulgentia vocatus, nervos comes et mentis at corporis frangit' (Quintilian, Inst. II, 9, 5).

It may rightly be argued, as J. H. Muirhead has done (Elements of Ethics, London, 1904, p. 190) that it is a moral guarantee against the exclusiveness which turns family affection into a vice. It is the function of justice touched with emotion to extend the relationships of human beings from those of mere contracts to actual friendship or love. As a disposition of the character or as a practical outcome of the humanistic spirit, kindness of temper, of speech, and of act is a potent civilizer of human intercourse. To it belong the ideas of courtesy, cheerfulness, good humour, and hospitality, the desire to make the best of all, irrespective of social status, to behave so as to cause people to feel at home in the society to which they belong or have been introduced, to diffuse the spirit of radiant good will and sympathy, and to practise all the chivalries of the Christian gentleman.

The full ethical history of kindness would deal with the various motives and sanctions by which a primitive sentiment developed into a duty which embraced the realm of human and animal life. In Christian ethics the cup of cold water' (Mt 10:5) is the symbol of the everyday habit of the charitable, which is expressed with striking emphasis in contradistinction to the old law of revenge in the precept 'Give to him that asketh thee' (Mt 5:4). See C. Gore, Sermon on the Mount, London, 1898, ch. v. Even quixotic kindness may on occasion be justified as a Christian duty; the classic example is the bishop's treatment of Jean Valjean in Les Misérables.

Indiscriminate charity (see art. CHARYTAS) on the other hand, is not Christian, inasmuch as it is a mere indulgence of our feelings of compassion with little trouble to ourselves and at the expense of society (Gore, loc. cit.). Furthermore, the higher ethical demands a certain delicacy of method and manner in the doing of a kindness.

The truly kind man 'knows for how much the manner, because the heart itself, counts, in doing a kindness. He becometh gentle in his care for all weakly creatures; judging, instinctively, that to be but sentient is to possess rights' (Wordsworth, Intimations, 1807, II, 7).

If the kindness of the Christian ideal founds a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, it will likewise support a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and protest against unnecessary inhumanity in vivisection. Indeed, the rights of all damn creatures to kind treatment, as passages quoted above show, is an integral feature of Christ's teaching, besides being a certain corollary of His broad humanity. Browning is but expressing the Christian standpoint in this matter when he says:

'God made all the creatures and gave them our love and our tears.'

To give sign, we and they are his children, one family here'

(See, dx.)

3. Psychology.—To the psychologist kindness is subjective emotion owing its development and practical manifestations to the nature of the object or stimulus which acts on it. There is a difference of opinion among experts as to whether tender emotion is primary or otherwise; but the former opinion is now more generally held. The maternal instinct which compels a mother to protect and cherish her child is common to the higher ranges of animal life, and was probably transferred to members of the other sex. Infantilism among savages might seem to negative a female theory, but, in reply to this objection, W. MacDougall (Introduction to Social Psychology, London, 1912, p. 69) writes:

'There is no feature of savage life more nearly universal than the kindness and tenderness of savages, even of savage fathers, for their little children. All observers are agreed upon this point. I have met a time watched with interest a bloodthirsty head-hunter of borneo spending a day at home tenderly nursing his infant in his arms. And it is a rule, to which there are few exceptions among savage peoples, that an infant is only killed during the first few hours of its life. If the child is allowed to survive but a few days, then its life is safe; the tender emotion has been called out in fuller strength, and has begun to be organized into a sentiment of paternal love that is too strong to be overcome by prudential or purely selfish considerations.'

The same writer comments Bain's view that tender feeling is as purely self-seeking as any other pleasure, and pronounces it to be 'a gross libel on human nature.' The extensions of this primary impulse from the relationship of a mother and her child are almost endless. It has a marked association with the emotion of pity on the one hand and moral indignation on the other, especially in relation to the sight of suffering, the sounds or cries of pain or distress, and, imaginatively, to the woes depicted in some moving romance. Here disgust or aversion caused by the sight of blood or wounds is overcome by the impulse of kindness, as in the case of the Good Samaritan. With the priest and Levite of the story, neither pity nor disgust rips into the impulse to succour. Kindness is an element of the system of emotional dispositions that 'adapts the sentiments of loving' (MacDougall, op. cit., p. 129). In its active manifestations it is really a complex emotional state. The germ is tender emotion, but tender emotion implies pity, moral indignation, or sympathetically induced pain or pleasure, as the case may be. That such emotions appear to be innate in some people is a matter of experience. Cf. the Scots proverb:

'Kindness cometh all; it cannot in the end.'

On the other hand, it is also a psychological law that reciprocation intensifies sentiment. Some instincts die for want of satisfaction; the milk of human kindness' tends to foster a corresponding impulse in those to whom it is imparted; cf. Sophocles, A. J. 592:

'And kindness, never akin, than revenge' (Shakespeare, As You Like It, iv, iii. 130), is one of those altruistic impulses which bind the human family together and ennoble the social order.


KING.

Iranian (L. C. CASARELLI), p. 721.

Muslin (C. DE VAUX), p. 723.


Teutonic and Lithuanian (O. SCHRADER), p. 728.

complex; various lines of social evolution have produced it at different times and in different ways. The following definition may be accepted
as applying to modern times: 'king' is 'the usual title of the male sovereign ruler of an independent State, whose position is either purely hereditary, or hereditary under certain legal conditions, or, if elective, is considered to be given to the elected the same attributes and rank as those of a (purely or partly) hereditary one.' In English history the term 'king' first appeared as the name of chiefs of the Anglo-Saxon kings. The O.E. cyning, cyng, or cying seems to imply the 'representative' of the cymyn. Each tribe elected a chief from a 'royal' or cymyn. When Wessex rose to predominance in the 10th cent., these tribal kings disappeared, and the Wessex king was the representative of the Angle-cyn.

The Greek basileus, the Latin rex, the Persian shah, and the Hebrew melek present other aspects of the institution. The early Greek dēsē is an ethical rather than a political term. In basileus and rex there are proofs of priestly office and survivals of magical duties. The reasons for the abolition of the monarchy by the Romans remain somewhat obscure. It is a remarkable fact that the term rex was practically a tabooed word ever afterwards. To avoid it, the emperors adopted such designations as imperator and princeps. The Oriental idea of a divine king, as exemplified by Persia, China, and Japan, hardly escapes us in the idea of the Lord of the Universe. The religious aspect of kingship is to be seen in the Hebrew melek.

1. Origins.—Anthropological research has lately revolutionized opinion as to the origin of kingly office. Without excluding the elements of leadership, organization, and generalship in war, J. G. Frazer has established by a long array of facts the theory that monarchy presupposes that it was the medicine-man, the shaman, or public magician who laid the foundations, at least in part, of the kingly office. "Believing as little more than a simple conjurer, the medicine-man or magician tends to blossom out into a full-blown god and king in the kingly office."

K. H. Codrington observes of the Melanesian political system: "The power of chiefs has hitherto rested upon the belief in their supernatural power derived from the spirits or ghosts with which they had intercourse. As this belief has failed, in the Banks' Islands for example some time ago, the position of a chief has been lost, and as this belief is now being generally undermined a new kind of chief must needs arise to take the place of the old one."

Here the spiritual and temporal powers are combined in one person. In other cases there is a convergence of the two. Thus, in New Guinea, 'chiefs have not necessarily supernatural powers, but a sorcerer is looked upon as a chief.' 4 and in Matei Te Fe, the power of the witch doctors was as great as, if not greater than, the king. 5

It is true, in a logical sense, that the dual rule of the pope and the emperor in mediæval Europe is a case of division; historically it was a case of accidental competition, the spiritual power aiding at political ascendancy. This result had been anticipated in lower cultures. Centuries later in date, but ages earlier in evolution, the Polynesian islands provide an instructive example.

1. In some of the islands the god (a man possessed by a divinity) is political sovereign of the land; and ... is raised to the same high rank, and rules, as god and king, over all the other chiefs.

2. Two psychological tendencies may be traced in these elemental ideas about the divine king or human god: a veneration for authority and a belief in magic. The intense feeling of loyalty shown by...

3. ... the Jacobites is a modern instance of the former tendency; popular beliefs about the power of the pope and even the priest among Roman Catholic peasants are an instance of the latter.

The Siamese language has no word 'by which any creature of higher rank or greater dignity than a monarch can be described; and the missionaries, when they speak of God, are forced to use the native word for 'king.' 1 In India every king is regarded as a descendant from a royal family. Among the Batak of Sumatra there rules a king who is held to be a god. 2 The Sultan of Menangkabau was worshipped similarly. 3 In the South Sea region the same ideas prevailed. The king of Tahiti was identified with the gods of the land. 3 Frazer's view has its most luminous illustration in the Malay beliefs collected by W. W. Skeat.

"The theory," he concludes, 'of the real divinity of a king is said to be held strongly in the Malay region. Not only is the king's person considered sacred, but the sanctity of his body is supposed to communicate itself to his regalia and to stay those who break the royal taboos. Thus it is firmly believed that anyone who seriously offends the royal person, who imitates or touches even for a moment the chief's regalia, or who wrongfully makes use of the insignia or privileges of royalty, will be inflicted with a punishment that is, struck dead with the discharge of that divine power which the Maham supposes to reside in the king's person and to which they give the name of damal or sanctity. Under the name of every person or thing believed to be endowed with supernatural powers; and we are told that 'the extraordinary strength of the Malay belief in the supernatural powers of the regalia of their sovereigns can only be thoroughly realised after a study of their romances, in which their kings are credited with all the attributes of divinity, and have even the same birth, as indeed every subsequent act of their after-life, is attended by the most amazing privileges. Now it is highly significant that the Malay magician even certain insignia which are said to be exactly analogous to the regalia of the divine king, and even bear the same name, ... can only be a probable inference that in the Malay region the regalia of kings are only the conjuring apparatus of their predecessors the magicians.'

2. The supernatural aspect of kingship.—Turning to special aspects of the curious personal influence which is the prototype of the divinity that 'doth hedge a king,' and to some extent of his political power, we find the primitive king (or tribal or clan chief) to be very often not so much a representative of his people as a puppet responsible for their welfare and the course of nature determining it.

As Rome and in other cities of Latium there was a priest called the Sacraed King or King of the Sacred Rites, and his wife the title of Queen of the Sacred Rites. Athens the second annual magistrate of the state was called the King, and his wife the Queen; the functions of both were religious. More Greek democracies have had a king, whose duties, so far as they are known, seem to have been priestly. 7

Again, Asia Minor in historical times was 'the seat of various great religious cults peopled by thousands of sacred slaves, and ruled by priests who wielded at once temporal and spiritual authority, like the popes of mediæval Rome. Such priest-kings, hidden cities were Zela and Pessinus. Teutonic kings, again, in the old heathen days seem to have stood in the position, and to have exercised the powers, of high priests. The Emperor of China offer public sacrifices, the details of which are regulated by the ritual books. The King of Madagascar was high-priest of the realm. 8

Such cases are complete prototypes of priestly rule as it has occurred in Hebrew and European society, but they derive from the exactly analogous authority of the savage sorcerer, who establishes an unoficial, but impressive, influence through his personal credibility. The fact is interesting that, where the ruler, either in primitive or in modern times, has not combined religious duties with political office, the credulous people have often tried to turn the temporal priest or god into a god. The fact indicates a more or less...
permanent association between authority and supernatural power in the popular mind.

Some writers and primitive 'king,' his successor, were associated with the regulation of natural forces and the course of the seasons. Terms equivalent to 'god' or 'king' are regularly applied to the sorcerer of the seasons, just as his primitive predecessor, the political ruler. His responsibility for the social welfare is balanced by social veneration. "The king of Lango is honoured by his people as though he were a god. The rain has come to them; they can let it rain when they like; and once a year, in December, which is the time they want rain, they come to beg of him to give it to them." Among the Wangoro of Central Africa, "the great dispenser, he who has absolute and uncontrollable power over the rain, is the king; but he can divide his power with other persons, so that the benefit may be distributed over various persons by his will." The king he himself the destinies of the people, as the chief of a divinity in the domestic god. In Baban, the king is regarded as possessing magical powers for social welfare; in the Kamba of East Africa, remarked that the rains returned to the tribe, the chief immediately replied that they could not be otherwise, since Baban had never visited the tribe; "He is alleged that Mr. Brooks has never visited his tribe, and the effect of his visit is to make it fruitful in abundance; and when they violate his laws, that plague, famine, and indemnity of weather are the result."

The last case, among others, indicates that a social inertia has its effect in producing such dependence upon responsible persons. It is in the relations of people and priest, and of labour and care, that the social reference is yet unbroken, results metaxological are believed to be in the control of human rulers, on the same lines as are social happenings.

The power of the people against the 'king' is very rarely King's. Primitive folk dealing with a defaulting magic-king are not unlike the Commonwealth dealing with Charles I. The difference is one of education. When prayers and offerings presented to the king have failed to procure rain, his subjects bind him with ropes and take him by force to the grave of his forefathers, that he may there be removed when at which the king is deposed. "Fetish kings" are common in Africa, and numerous instances of the combination of religious and civil power. On the Grain Coast there was one who was regarded as 'responsible for the health of the community,' and if famine or pestilence overtook him, he was put to death. When the Chukchi suffered from a pestilence, the shamans persuaded the people that the chief must be slain.

3. Departmental kings. - The association of sacred or magical functions 'occurs,' says Fraser, "in the religious feelings of the people, and in many cases nominal, head is a king.

People have for failure to fulfill responsible functions has gone further. "In the time of the Swedish king of Norway a mighty famine broke out, which lasted several years, and could be stayed by the blood Neither of beings nor of men. Therefore, in a great popular assembly held at Upsala, the chiefs decided that King Dampert himself was the cause of the scarcity and must be sacrificed for good seasons. So they slew him and smeared with his blood over the altar of the gods." When the Chukchi suffered from a pestilence, the shamans persuaded the people that the chief must be slain.

4. Royal tabus. - Where royal tabus are connected with a ruler's daily life and action, the same magical or supernatural functions are to be inferred as existing or surviving. The tabus are intended to preserve not merely the life of the king as his mystic power and communion with the forces of nature—his 'virtue,' or mana. In the case of a special language employed when speaking to or of the king, it is not clear whether we have to deal with a mere ceremonial respect of royalty or a real tabu.

The sacred language devoted to the king of Siam includes special terms for his head, feet, and even his breath. Particular verbs are used for sleeping, eating, and other actions. The smallest detail of the life of a king is Lango was regulated by tabus. For the kings of Egypt 'everything was fixed' by law, not only their official duties, but even the details of their daily life. The hours, both of day and night, were arranged at which the king had to do, not what he pleased, but what was prescribed for him. A widely spread general tabu is that the king may not be seen when eating or drinking. Again, the king is confined to his palace when he is sick. The case of the Mikado was an extraordinary instance of tabus. The practice of killing the king is explained by Frazer as due to a desire to prevent his mystic power from decaying, but the subject is still obscure.

The continuity in European civilization of these ideas with the other aspects of kingship is shown by the case of the Athenian theocracy, the Roman, and others. In England and France the belief that the touch of the king cured scrofula lasted till comparatively modern times. The theory of the divine right of kings was a mere accretion of the same tendency, but not a

1. Fraser, op. cit., II, 2.
3. Fraser, op. cit., II, 32 ff.
5. Fidland, op. cit., III, 305.
6. Diodorus Siculus, I, 70.
7. Fraser, Table and the Philos of the Soul, London, 1911, P. 117 f.
9. Fraser suggests that the Roman was considered to be a descendant of the Etruscans, a Greek, art, ii, 1, 334.
11. Fraser, op. cit., II, 32 ff.
survival. It was a legal theory, chiefly due to Hobbes, and then exaggerated by Filmer.  

5. Division of political and religious kingdom.— The process and causes of the gradual separation of the civil and religious functions of the king has been traced by Frazer.  

1The burdensome observances attached to the royal or priestly office produced their natural effect. Either men refused to enter the office, which happened to fall into abeyance; or, accepting it, they sunk under its weight into spiritless creatures absolutely useless to their fellow men. As a result, the government slipped into the firmer grasp of men who were often content to wield the reality of sover- eignty in the name of the king. The power of the people in the supreme power deepened into a total and permanent separation of the spiritual and temporal powers. The old royal houses, by retaining their purely religious functions, while the civil government passed into the hands of a younger and more vigorous race.  

Typical examples are those of Japan, Mexico, and Athens. The W. African practice of having a 'fetish,' or religious, king, and a political king seems not to be due to the causes cited above.  

6. Evolutionary importance of the king.— An interesting aspect of the early evolution of the kingdom is its social importance. It has been argued that the institution of the king was essential to the emergence of the race from savagery. The development proceeds from the chief of a clan or tribe to the king, generally primus inter pares, but not aristoocratic, of various tribes federated or constituted as a nation. The case of Greece is typical. In the Roman world 'king' was a superior title to 'rex'; mediocrity revered the precedence. In medieval times also the nation was often in contrast with the kingdom, the latter being rather the domain of a lord.  

Apart from the advantages of organization under one sovereign, various social privileges follow from the institution. Thus the king serves as a general asylum and refuge for the poor, weak, and the wronged. The appeal to Caesar and the Hara of the Cassite Islands are two cases out of many. The king protects strangers and fatherless children. He is a focus of patriotic feeling.  

7. Intellectual aspect of the early kingdom.— With regard to the primitive religious or fetish king, Frazer observes that such men must have been the ablest. They were not mere fighting men, but medicine-men, dealing with the crudest elements of science and art. Carpenter has pointed out that the savage sorcerer, shaman, and medicine man were probably a type inter- mediate between the two sexes, and that such types are often credited, and justly, with unusual insight. But for the power exerted by these types, such social functions would have been broadened out, but such men would have remained hunters and fighters, and women agricul- tural workers and managers of the house.  

8. The modern attitude to kingdom.— Since the 17th cent. there has been a tendency to regard kingdom as a survival, unsuitable to a democratic political society. America and France have substituted a presidem of the republic. This involves once more the question of terminology. The president with a veto or casting vote is a king in effect; the king who may only advise is not a king in effect.  

9. Dramatic and mock kings.— The imitation of kingship in folk-drama and ritual may be a survival from the old religious office and its duties, or merely an assimilation. The extraordinary prevalence of this is illustrated by Mannhardt and Frazer.  


2 Frazer, *Thocb*, p. 17.  

3 *ib, p. 117.  


King Hop, King of the Dead, and others. The mock kings, suffering death as substitutes for the real, form a curious problem.  

1Literature—This is given in the article. For the legal status of primitive kings see A. H. Burn, *The Law of the Pharaohs*, Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1894-95, 1, 327-41.  

A. E. CRAWLEY.

KING (Egyptian).—A vast subject like kingship in Egypt demands delimitations and eliminations. The Pharaoh, in the Nile valley, was, in a sense, an epitome of the whole life of the nation, and the Egyptian religion and texts are full of his names and symbols. We need not discuss the historical or administrative aspect of the monarchic institution, or the material life of the king, but shall confine ourselves to a treatment of the kingship of classical Egypt in its religious and ethical bearings.  

1. The religious character of Egyptian kingdom.— From the very first the most striking characteristic revealed by the examination of the titles, names, and prerogatives of the king in Egypt has been the exclusively religious—or rather divine—origin of the title and functions of the Egyptian definition of monarchy. Even the references to functions or prerogatives of a feudal or military character are, in reality, simple deductions from the divine functions or nature of the divine character of the monarch. The idea of kingship at first sight seems to be survivals or reminiscences of historical or political events. Investigation shows that these survivals are purely metaphorical in character (e.g., the alleged proto- historic wars from which the king derives some of his titles, or whose anniversaries he celebrates). In fact, there is nothing in any of the attributes or denominations of the kingship (titles, costume, functions, etc.) which might be a survival or indication of the historic modes of formation or of the origins of the monarchy. Some material signs (such as the sceptre of *hikau* of the shepherd people, or the plaited lock, worn exclusively by gods and their royal heirs) enable archeology to outline hypothetical theories regarding the possible origin of the masters who imposed their rule upon the Nile valley; but the texts and monuments yield no information whatever regarding these beginnings; and, as far back as we can go, we find ourselves in the presence of a conception of monarchy which is contained in a text and based solely upon the assumption of the king to the gods who are the makers of the world and the mythical founders of Egyptian society. This explains the importance attached by the Egyptians to the power and to the exact utterance of the different names by which they designated the king. These names, taken together, form a kind of alibeg of the nature of the Pharaoh, and of the royal attributes.  

2. The divine lineage of the king.— The various names of the king prove, by all their elements, that the divine filiation of the master of Egypt is as ancient as Egyptian society. The earliest form of Egyptian proven which we can reach by the Pyramid texts and the funerary literature belongs to a period remotely pre-historic. We find here the old 'sky-god,' source of life and death, of birth and heavenly fire. Among his names, that of Horâ (symbolized conventionally by the hawk) has given rise to the so-called 'hawk names,' which appear among the most ancient forms of royal names. This shows us that the series of names from the monuments belonging to the Thinite period (1st and 1st dynasties) these show, when set in order, that the reigning
The king is a form or emanation upon this earth of the Sun-god, more exactly, one of the 'souls' of that Being. The 'hawk-name,' probably the most ancient of all those that have been borne by the sovereigns of the Nile valley, perhaps the oldest of all divinities, preserved by the subtlety of successive theologies at the periods when the original 'sky-god' had been replaced by the 'sun-god' as creator of the world. How this has taken place cannot be exactly determined, but it is clear that the ancient name had become, in historic times, what is still called in Egyptian archeology the 'Horus name,' or sometimes (very inaccurately, through the perpetuation of an old error) the 'standard-name' (see below).

The primitive conceptions of the pre-historic Egyptian religions later than the sky-god are found in the titles and epithets given to the king in the very ancient liturgies, and in the protocol of the Thinite monuments. There, where he is called, e.g., 'the two Hor, or the Horu-Setti,' we see a reminiscence of the system which divided the world into two halves and compared the monarch with its Supreme God, in heaven and on earth. Similarly, the religion of the sky-goddess Nut, who was believed to have produced the world, first by her own activity, and later by union with the earth-god Sibî, gave the king the title of 'the greater of the two gods,' Sibî. This prepared the way for the assimilation of the Pharaoh to Ra, then to Osiris, according as the successive theologies, reversing the order of the names of the gods, had Ra the son of Nut, or, on the other hand, the father of Sibî and Nut, and the grandfather of Osiris. In the last form, the Pharaoh is the successor of Osiris, as the direct descendant of Horus, son of the pair Isis-Osiris. These various assimilations have been justified by an examination of hundreds of Egyptian texts, and may be accepted here. The point which it is essential to keep in mind is that at all periods, and throughout all the cosmic religions of Egypt, the outstanding characteristic of the king has always been that he was either an incarnation of the god who made the world or his son (in the literal sense of the word, not symbolically, or by a mystic adoption, but by real filiation). The king of Egypt has thus never been merely a representative or interpreter of the Supreme God, or his 'vicear'; either he is the god himself, manifest under a form, or he is a son of a god, one of the souls of the god, or he is the god's own son.

The form of this affirmation best known to us is the title of Set-Ha or Se Ra, 'son of the sun,' which was inaugurated as early as the middle of the 1st dynasty, under the influence of the priesthood of Helopolis, and persisted as long as the Pharaonic protocol was in existence (see below). This precedent was, as a rule, proved by the ordinary genealogy. From ancestor to ancestor, the reigning king was able to trace back his lineage to the fabulous Menes, or Mini, the legendary first Pharaoh of the Egyptian dynasty, and from him he went back through the mythical reigns of the Menes as far as Horus, son of Isis, and son and avenger of his father Osiris, the first king-god of the valley of the Nile. But in certain exceptional cases (of which we possess three or four historical examples), in order to establish his legitimacy indisputably, the Pharaoh seems to have claimed the testimony of a man distinguished for his great wisdom, a statesman of the Supreme God. Thus (1) in the temple of Luxor for Amenhotep III., (2) in the temple of Deir-al-Bahri for Hatchepsut, and (3) at Ermont for Cessarion, the bas-reliefs that adorn the god himself descend to the earth, in order to have union with the queen and himself beget the little prince who should one day reign over Egypt. They also show the birth of the divine scion, the magic charms which accompanied him, and the benediction of the god upon the new-born child when it was presented to him.

To the priesthood of the Nile we are indebted, a little later, such a conception of the king appeared inadquate. They felt that the kingship must be the final result of all that legendary Egypt had known of divine domination; or, rather, that it meant the heritage of all that the world contained of the forces belonging to the beneficent gods. Hence the walls of the temples showed the king as heir and adopted son of all the great deities of the national pantheon in succession—the great feudal gods of the Nile valley and the chief elementary or stellar gods.

In the case of gods, the king is styled 'well-beloved son,' and he addresses all the gods by the name 'Father.' In the case of goddesses, they make the young king their veritable son by giving him milk from their breast in token of adoption (q.v.). Even this accumulation of divinity seemed insufficient to the Pharaoh, and the trinity of Horus, Ra, the sun-god, and Sibî became the holy god-king completely. The true Pharaoh does not exist, theologically speaking, until he has received, at Helopolis, all the magico-religious consecrations which transform him into a divine incarnation of the world. The elaborate series of ceremonies employed to accomplish that transformation is well known to us today through: (1) the historical inscriptions, such as that of the celebrated Ethiopian conqueror Piankhi, (2) the ritual published in the Pyramidal texts, (3) the bas-reliefs and special encomiations of the solar temples of Abûnair, (4) the extracts from the Louvre and ceramic papyri, unearthed in the great temples, chiefly at Thebes, (5) the statues and statuettes commemorating coronations (notably at Karnak), and (6) the descriptive scenes telling of the 'jubilee' feasts of hasekâdi (see below).

Finally, the Thinite monuments discovered at Abydos provide evidence that the whole of this ceremonial was already established, in its essential elements, at the Thinite period. Even under the 1st dynasty there appeared scenes of that distant epoch similar to those found in the Greek period upon the walls of the temple of Edfû or other sanctuaries built in Egypt by the Ptolemys.

3. The royal titles. The king that is being constituted by the Pharaoh, in this world, must be able to know of divine forces, governing powers, magic resources, and super-terrestrial science. The enumeration of the many virtues and heritages of the king naturally takes the form of a long protocol, which was practically an abrevi of all the historical and pre-historical sources that had contributed to form such a personage. A king of Egypt had at least five names in the classical period: (1) 'birth-name,' which is his human name, expressing the relation of the reigning dynasty to one or another of the great provincial gods of Egypt (e.g., Thothmes—'Thoth has fashioned him'); Amenhotep (he is united to Amen'); this is the name which is preceded by the epithet 'son of the sun' (Se Ra) in the inscriptions; (2) the coronation name, preceding the affirmation of Horus as the lord of the world north and world of the south by the heraldic figurines of the Reed and the Bee; this name (chosen by 1 This figuration of the king as heir of the crown of the north and crown of the south is purely historical, resting upon an astrological conception of the division of the world and its forces. It is a magic formula of a state of things which had actually existed in Egypt, and it has given rise to the idea that at the period anterior to history there had really been two kingship, one in the north and one of the south, and that they were united under Mentu. Most scholars seem to have adopted that view, somewhat insignificantly, perhaps, by the opinion of the first Egyptians,
the astrological colleges of priests according to human problems, and, somehow or other, the aspect and attributes of the particular solar soul that came to transform the young prince into a god on the day of his anointing; it was sometimes a long notto expressed, or a figure or the name, enclosed in a kind of panel or box, surrounded by a palace, and surmounted by the hawk, divine Horā; (4) a name called in archaeology 'name of the vulture and of Uraeus,' intended to express the king's authority, which reached to the extreme frontiers of Egypt, from El Kāb to Bālu; (5) a name, often incorrectly called 'golden hawk name,' which, preceded by the figure of a hawk perched on a sign of gold (nābb), declares in reality that the king is the heir to the stellar powers who share the two astrological houses of the universe.

This list, absolutely necessary for the complete title of a reigning king, etiquette usually added a number of almost imperative epithets intended to express aspects or important attributes of the king-god. Sometimes, as heir of the war-like gods, he was called 'Powerful Bull,' sometime 'Defender of everything' (Nīb ikrī haṭa), or 'Resplendent in his glorious appearances' (Nīb khaṭā). Some of these names expressing the virtues of the gods of kingship bear a curious resemblance to those which describe (or designate) the kings of certain monarchies in black Africa (e.g., the sovereigns of Dahomey or of Benin), and it would be worth while to draw up a list of the possible comparisons. None of these epithets should be regarded (as they too often are) as arising from vanity or grandiloquence, for each corresponds theologically to a very precise definition of a function or force belonging to one or other of the great gods of Egypt.

One of the most characteristic epithets, which, moreover, has not yet been found in any other African religion, is the epithet 'Good God (Notir Nfr), a name of constant occurrence, and it is one of the most manifest signs of the role which the earthly kingship filled in the ideas of the Egyptians (see below).

Besides regal titles and titles of etiquette imagined by the protocol (e.g., 'Double Palace,' 'Sablime Gate,' 'Sun of the two Earths') are too numerous to detail here. One of the secondary epithets of this official phraseology has had a singular fortune. It designates the king by the veiled expression 'Great Dwelling' (=the Royal Residence), the equivalent of which is found in the royal title-list of certain black monarchies of W. Africa. The Egyptian term sīr-šu becomes the word 'Pharaoh,' which served throughout the classical world to designate the king of Egypt.

4. The earthly counterpart of the gods. — The sovereign is thus a singularly complex person, whose body contains even more souls (biā), doubles (kānḥī), and 'shadows' (ḥabīt) than that of ordinary men (see BODY [Egyptian]). These are frequently figured being formed by the gods in heaven, or being suckled at birth by the females, or accompanying the king (but distinct from him) in coronation and procession scenes.

As the king of Egypt is a living epitome of all that is divine in the Nile valley, the explanation of his function is clear. First, he is in every function an earthly image of the various gods, and performs their legendary activity on the earth. In his judicature he is Thoth; in his power he is Ra; like the first divine masters of the divine valley, he destroys the enemies of the work done by the ancient gods when they assisted Ra in the conflict against darkness. He is the savior of the world (kērā). This view, the very beginning of dualism (g. r.), originated in the primitive cosmogony, and was later transformed by the Osirian legend into the myth of the conflict between the god of Horus and the bad spirits who were the friends of Set. The Pharaoh is thus heir to the powers and qualities of the good gods, whose powers are symbolized by, and materialized in, the various pieces of the royal costume (sceptres, crowns, necklaces, bracelets, pectorals, girdles, talismans, amulets, precious stones, magic jewels, etc.). These symbolic ornaments probably originated in the same way as the magical disguise worn by heathen fetish-chiefs; they were neither purely priestly tradition nor simply magical in character.

The organized theologies ascribed to the royal person a thousand different duties implying a thousand traditional and magical duties and magical powers. Some of these duties concern war, and perhaps may seem somewhat brutal for our taste; others are as noble as modern thought could desire. Some are really deifying the young, ardent, and irresistible, which trembles down under its hoods the enemies of Egypt (Hymn of Thothmes III), the 'rebels,' the 'asceneds,' the 'children of ruin;' as a 'governing lion;' as a Sudan leopard; or as a hawk which tears and rends the foreign nations with beak and claws (cf. the Thinite palettes). To each of these representations there is attached a role formerly played by the national gods, which the king assumed when he ascended the throne of Horus. The lion, the griffin, the bull, the hawk, and the sphinx are repetitions in painting and sculpture of statements made by hundreds of texts. The king 'treading the nine bows under his feet,' and 'placing his sandals on the head of his foes,' represents an essential side of the perpetual duty of the divine monarch—as essential as the side represented by the expression 'Lord of all order and truth,' or by the figuration, under his throne, of the Nile gods gathering into sheaves the heraldic flowers of the Neteru (the Lily of the South). Ra and his friends, the gods, organized the world; their final purpose was the reign of order and the triumph of good. Egypt and its people were the land and people chosen and beloved by the gods; it was, therefore, essential that the son of the gods should be able to bring the work to a successful issue, and this enterprise demanded that strangers, the ungodly, the enemies of Egypt, and all that was hostile to the ultimate triumph of the good should be destroyed or subdued.

That obligation presupposed that in the practice of those virtues by which the conflict for the good is maintained the king should be the pattern for his subjects. The Pharaoh was thus the living image and continuation of that 'Good Being,' called Osiris, who was the first god reigning on the earth in human form. He must maintain order in his kingdom, for administrative regularity is the first condition of material prosperity. He must ensure equal justice for all, protect the feeble, abhor iniquity, and be like a father to his children (as he himself communes with the god 'as a son talks to his father'). He must be Notir Nfr Shītu, the 'Good God.' That in practice the kings of Egypt were not adequate for so noble a task is of secondary importance; the kingship on which the reality was remote from the official ideal has little philosophic value. The fact of real importance is
KING (Egyptian)

The rise of a human society able at such an early date to express in these outlines the origins and obligations of the highest form of life is an event of immense import. The moral ideal of the nation was consequently, at every step of the social scale, the imitation of the type of perfection incarnate theoretically in the office of its king. But the actual results of the kingship idea. This ideal of kingship moulded all the manifestations of religious and public life in Egypt. As son and successor of all the divinities (national or local) of the kingdom, the Pharaoh is by right the chief servitor of the Supreme God (kemnet) and the chief pontiff of all the priesthods. In the bas-reliefs of the temples he is figured as the chief officiating priest, and everywhere he is represented in the dwellings of his divine fathers, celebrating sacrifice, offering incense or libations, or consecrating the offering, opening the tabernacle, adoring the divine image, and going in front of his retinue.

The satisfactions which the king reaped from his position lay in the interests of the gods and men; to him the divine will speaks in divination (q.w. or in dreams (q.v.). And he is the depository of the divinity for the private ends of the kingdom. The kingdom, in fact, is the embryo of the world; he who explains the invariable title of the °prosimea of the tombs; sultan du hopt (=(royal constitution of the offering).

For the living and the dead the assurance of the royal approval is the supreme recompense. The episode of a dignitary commanded to the palace, arriving at the royal audience, and receiving the salutation, or honorific distinctions (such as the ‘collar of gold’) from the lips of the monarch, is the culmination point of his whole career, and the crowning moment which he wished to have depicted on the walls of his ‘eternal abode.’ When he appears before the tribunal of Hn who is the ancestor of Pharaoh, that will be the decisive proof of his merit for worthy service of the gods. To his children it will be his last message, at once an example and a claim upon the Pharaoh’s goodwill. The highest reward which the dead may attain is to receive from the king, in recognition of their services, materials for the rich parts of the tomb (the stela, the sarcophagus, and rare supervision of its completion the corpse of the deceased). The Theban frescoes of Gurneh and Amarna, stelae, as those of Om, Ahmes, tales like the romance of Sinuhe, and the laudatory biographies of every period prove that such ideas existed at the earliest period known to us, and that they persisted throughout the whole duration of Egyptian society.

Finally, the ideal of the Pharaonic kingship explains the role of the Pharaoh as a god-kingship is not an independent system of worship, but is identical, as the only master or possessor of the earth, and the only person who can give valid investiture in any office, °or, of dignity (see Inheritance [Egyptian]).

6. The royal life.—Since so many divine principles are incarnate in the Pharaoh, the consequences are apparent in his life. He is at once god and man, and thus combines two groups of ‘souls’, which are generally separated in certain religious circumstances where the man king worships the god-king—himself. He builds and consecrates sanctuaries in his lifetime to his own ‘souls of millions of years’ (see, e.g., that of Amen-Ra at Luxor). He supervises the writing of the divine inscriptions at the temple of Ptah at Thebes; as king he publicly worships his own consecrated images in the temples of his fathers; and he is endowed (e.g., at Luxor) with the religious offices of the dead god by the act of ‘opening the mouth’, thus inaugurating his deification and making possible the divine re-investiture in the temple of the dead god. But the Pharaoh is the servitor of the god, and the god, as the ultimate source of power, does not deify the Pharaoh. When the god-kingship of the Pharaoh is worshiped in the temple of Ptah at Thebes, it is merely as an extension of the cult of Ptah, or as a divine manifestation of the god. The Pharaoh is thus the sultan du hopt, the serviceable servant of the god, who has given him power over men.

7. Death.—The destinies of the king, post mortem, were equally varied. His human principle received the usual burial honors reserved for men; his tomb, statues, funerary furnishings (at least in part), and sacrifices corresponded to the hypogees and mustabas of his subjects. Like the ‘deities’ of other nations, the ‘double’ of the king, his human principle goes to dwell in the fields of the Osirian paradise, there to work and harvest (see, e.g., the scenes of the temple of Ramses III, at Medinet Habu). His divine principles go in other directions. The corpse of the deceased attains to the sky, where they are mingled with the sun, and perhaps accompany it on its course through the air and in its conflicts during the twelve hours of its nocturnal journey through the inferna (see, e.g., the frescoes of the royal hypogees of the Bitam-el-Moila). Here we see the adaptation to the solar theology of the primitive religions of Egypt. Another divine principle survives on earth, in the temples, where it was worshipped as one of the living forms, or nhopirve, of Osiris which had occupied the throne of Egypt.

Finally, as a divine son of Rā (or, later, of Amun-Rā), the dead king became, in the funerary temples raised for his worship, a patron deity, theologically distinct from the ancestor-god, though one of his manifestations. Ignoring these difficulties, the Pharaoh is not a god-king in the popular sense, but a type of divinity in a sense intermediate between the anthropomorphic and the transcendent. Such has been the case at the sanctuary of Medinet Habu.
KING (Greek and Roman).

1. Evolution of the conception. — The Greeks themselves did not fail to observe the wide prevalence of monarchy during the early history of their races, or to speculate on its origin as an institution. Aristotle (Pol. iii. 14, 1253b 6), speaking of the monarchies of the heroic age, makes the suggestion that the founders of a dynasty were reprobated to their thrones by the gods, and performed for the people, either by their eminence in the arts of peace or by their achievements in war; and that the office became hereditary after their death. The view that success in war was a more important element than agricultural prosperity, for which the throne has been sometimes accounted, is a modern one, and is not to be identified with the opinion of the ancients. The elevation of a chieftain on account of his warlike prowess implies the existence of an organisation to which the royal dignity was already familiar, and the functions performed by the kings of the heroic age involved the fact that their authority was the result of a more complex development. In another passage (Pol. i. 12, 1253b 16), Aristotle draws a comparison between the position of a king in relation to his subjects and that of a father to his children, without attempting to conclude therefrom that the former was a historical product of the latter. The comparison is sound and can be extended. The heroic king actually exercised a wider sphere prerogatives similar in character to the authority which the father of the family wielded over the members of his household. It should be remembered, in particular, that the king in his priestly character was associated with the common hearth of the State in the Prytaneum (Æsch. Suppl. 376, etc.), which has been identified with the primitive residence of the royal family (J. G. Frazer, in J.P.A. xiv. [1889] 145 ff.). Although we cannot trace the process in history, it seems a reasonable inference that, when the separately organized families coalesced into the larger unity of the tribe, the chieftain took over from the patriarch the duties performed and the privileges enjoyed by the latter within his narrower circle; and that the same absorption was repeated on a larger scale when the tribal system in its turn grew into a commonwealth. In Pol. i. 1, 1252b 19, Aristotle declares that such was the case, and that the reason why States (ρωμαία) were at first governed by kings was that they were aggregates of households, which were accustomed to one kind of rule. Further, it seems natural to regard an institution so developed as essentially hereditary, and such was in fact the character of the office in the Homeric age. But recent investigations into the history of the family (see art. FAMILY [Greek]) have shown that the patriarchal system was by no means primitive, and traces of an earlier prevalence of mother-right have been discovered in Greek tradition (W. Rigby, in Cambridge Prolegomena, 1906, p. 148). Again, it is certain that the regular succession of the eldest son to his father's kingdom was not distinctly established in the Homeric age. 

2. Varieties in the kingly office. — The various kinds of monarchy with which we were familiar were thus classified by Aristotle (Pol. iii. 14, 1258b 1 ff.): (1) generality for life, typified in the authority of the Spartan kings; (2) the absolute monarchy of the barbarian type, distinguished from 'tyranny' by the permanence of its establishment; (3) 'elected tyranny' (αὐτοκράτορια), exemplified by the rule of Pittacus at Mytilene; (4) the monarchies of the heroic age; (5) an absolute monarchy (ρωμαία) after the pattern of domestic economy, in which the ruler is as supreme as the head of a household. The last is Aristotle's designation of the ideal type of kingship, and need not be considered further; nor is it necessary to discuss in detail the airup-
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3. Heroic monarchy.—Thucydides (I. 13), when speaking of the establishment of tyrannies, contrasts them with the earlier monarchies, which he describes as hereditary and as enjoying fixed privileges; and Aristotle uses language of an equally virulent character (Rhet. ii. 14, 1325b). The hereditary element implies a divine ancestor (cf. ἀναστατοῦντα, etc.), and may be taken to be a later expression of the traditional divinity of primitive kings (Frazier, The Magic Art, i. 36, 1901). The son of a king was generally taken as the symbol of office, and was originally the gift of Zeus (II. ii. 101 ff.). Agamemnon is described as 'most kingly' (μεγαλότερος, II. ii. 69); but neither this nor the title 'king of men' (ὁ θεατής ἄθρακτος), which is given most frequently to him, though not to him alone, signifies that he was other than primus inter pares as commander of the whole confederacy. On the other hand, the existence of thirteen kings is a fact (Od. viii. 390 ff.) and the protest against the evils of divided sway in II. ii. 204 ff. have been referred to a time when the growing power of the feudal nobility was outstripping the earlier supremacy of the heroic kings, though even here we are reminded that we shall see, diminished by its special circumstances. The cause assigned by the Greeks themselves for this remarkable revolution in government was that the occupants of the seat of power had become too wealthy, too luxurious, and were guilty of wanton violence towards their subjects (Plat. Legg. 690 D; Polyb. vi. vii. 6-9). The explanation is clearly superficial, and it is hardly more satisfactory to suppose that the kings extended their power beyond its legitimate limits (A. Holm, Hist. of Greece, Eng. tr., London, 1894-98, i. 298). Grote remarked (Hist. of Greece, iii. 7) that the need for a single ruler as a bond of union between outlying territories ceased to be felt owing to the smallness of the various Hellenic societies—which also explains why the monarchy continued to exist in the wider areas of Epirus and Macedonia. But Groote's suggestion may be supplemented and extended. The heroic monarchies had flourished in a period of national unrest. After the cessation of the migrations, an era of comparative quiet followed; and the nobles, with their attention concentrated on the local interests of their community, were able to extend their authority against the weakly-supported prerogatives of the king. The same period was marked by the change from city life, perhaps the deepest cause of all those which undermined the power of the monarchs (J. B. Bury, Hist. of Greece, London, 1902, i. 73). The course of events was naturally various; but the result was usually not the expulsion of the royal family, but the limitation of the royal power, and particularly its restriction to the sacred sphere, as in the case of the βασιλεύς at Athens. The immediate occasion for the change of government was often afforded by rivalries within the royal house, or by the minority or incapacity of the legitimate heir. The change itself was gradually effected. Thus the royal clan of Perseus at Corinth supplied the annual ἀρχονταὶ for at least a century (Paus. ii. iv. 4); and the Melissii at Athens alone enjoyed the decennial archepiskopeia (Paus. i. 214). A similar history may be assigned to the rule of the Basileis at Byzantium (Arist. Pol. v. 6, 1305 B) and of the Penthelides at Mytilene (I. v. 10, 1311 B).

4. Decay of monarchy.—Although there are traces of the earlier existence of the kingly power in almost every part of the Hellenic world, in Argos, Corinth, Elis, Arcadia, Messenia, Thebes, and Athens, as well as in the Ionian and Dorian colonies of Asia Minor and the islands, all these monarchies decayed and disappeared in the course of the period extending from the beginning of the 8th to the end of the 6th century. Spara was alone in the retention of her kings, but the importance of Panhellenic events is, as we shall see, diminished by its special circumstances. The cause assigned by the Greeks themselves for this remarkable revolution in government was that the occupants of the seat of power had become too wealthy, too luxurious, and were guilty of wanton violence towards their subjects (Plat. Legg. 690 D; Polyb. vi. vii. 6-9). The explanation is clearly superficial, and it is hardly more satisfactory to suppose that the kings extended their power beyond its legitimate limits (A. Holm, Hist. of Greece, Eng. tr., London, 1894-98, i. 298). Grote remarked (Hist. of Greece, iii. 7) that the need for a single ruler as a bond of union between outlying territories ceased to be felt owing to the smallness of the various Hellenic societies—which also explains why the monarchy continued to exist in the wider areas of Epirus and Macedonia. But Groote's suggestion may be supplemented and extended. The heroic monarchies had flourished in a period of national unrest. After the cessation of the migrations, an era of comparative quiet followed; and the nobles, with their attention concentrated on the local interests of their community, were able to extend their authority against the weakly-supported prerogatives of the king. The same period was marked by the change from city life, perhaps the deepest cause of all those which undermined the power of the monarchs (J. B. Bury, Hist. of Greece, London, 1902, i. 73). The course of events was naturally various; but the result was usually not the expulsion of the royal family, but the limitation of the royal power, and particularly its restriction to the sacred sphere, as in the case of the βασιλεύς at Athens. The immediate occasion for the change of government was often afforded by rivalries within the royal house, or by the minority or incapacity of the legitimate heir. The change itself was gradually effected. Thus the royal clan of Perseus at Corinth supplied the annual ἀρχονταὶ for at least a century (Paus. ii. iv. 4); and the Melissii at Athens alone enjoyed the decennial archepiskopeia (Paus. i. 214). A similar history may be assigned to the rule of the Basileis at Byzantium (Arist. Pol. v. 6, 1305 B) and of the Penthelides at Mytilene (I. v. 10, 1311 B).

5. The Spartan kingship.—This was distinguished from all others by the duplication of its tenure. The two kings belonging to the rival class of Agide and Eurypontide, of which the former was accounted the monarch, were the common representative, in virtue of his seniority, both claimed an Aeolian as
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distinguished from a Dorian origin. There was a curious provision respecting the royal inheritance, according to which the eldest son was not necessarily heir unless he was also born while his father occupied the throne; otherwise he was excluded in favour of the eldest of his brothers so born (Herod. vi. 5). The traditional account of the double kingship starts with a legend concerning the birth of twins in the royal family (ib. vi. 52); but modern scholars are inclined to reject it in favour of the theory that the double kingship arose from the double communities (Russol, Gr. Gesch. i. 2 546, n. 4; Gilbert, Gr. Staatenl., i. 4). However this may be, the duality probably contributed to the shirking of the royal power which is discernable in the historic as compared with the heroic age. The statement of Aristotle, that the Spartan kings were not much more than hereditary commanders-in-chief of the army during their lives (Pol. iii. 14, 1282a 27), is a sufficiently accurate definition of their office, so far as we are acquainted with it from the 6th cent. onwards. Even this power tended to be restricted. Originally capable of declaring war or concluding peace without interference, and possessed of absolute authority in the conduct of a campaign and in the maintenance of discipline (Herod. vi. 56; Thuc. v. 69, etc.), they were afterwards accompanied on all their expeditions by two envoys appointed to act as overseers of their conduct (Xen. Rep. Loc. xiii. 5), and from 418 a board of advisers was chosen to control the king's initiative (Thuc. v. 56). There are sufficient indications in their surviving privileges that the authority of the kings had been formerly more extensive than it afterwards became. Apart from complimentary precedence and other rights enjoyed at banquets, sacrifices, and games (Herod. vi. 56 1), and extraordinary honours paid to them after death (ib. 58), the kings possessed extensive domains in the occupation of the epheboi, from which they drew the revenues, so that they were accounted the richest individuals in the Greek world (Plat. Aeth. I. 123 A). The priestly functions of the king were of considerable importance, especially during war, when he conducted the sacrifice on every critical occasion (Xen. Rep. Loc. xiii. 3). He also possessed the sole right of consulting the Delphic oracle and of receiving its replies and was invested with the power of appointing two delegates called Python, who became the channel of communication (Herod. vi. 57). The greater share of the civil jurisdiction at Sparta belonged to the epheboi, while criminal trials were conducted before the council of elders, of which the king was president. He had, however, sole jurisdiction in claims for the hand of a hetaira, and probably in other cases of inheritance. Further, he was competent to deal with disputes concerning the public roads, that is to say, to decide questions of boundaries and rights of way (Herod. vi. 57). The political influence of the kings was largely diminished by the transference of executive authority to the epheboi. The king had a seat and vote in the council of elders, with the proviso that if he was absent his vote should be given by the elder most nearly related to him by blood (Herod. vi. 57; Thuc. i. 65). But, in spite of all the restrictions to which his office was subject, a king who possessed military ability was in a position to add to his venerable privileges the exercise of predominant political influence.

6. Various titular kingships.—In many other Greek States we find the kingly title assigned to priestly or judicial officers, who appear to be the representatives of the former ruling dynasty. For the present purpose the facts may be briefly stated. In most cases we have merely the record of the title, sometimes an indication of the character of the office, but only at Ephesus an express statement that the descendants of Androcles, the founder, continued to bear the title of king with such privileges as the presidency of the councils and the right to wear a crown of royal purple (Strabo, 625). The other evidence, which is largely derived from inscriptions, may be divided into two classes according as it refers to a college of kings or to a single official, the former occurring in connexion with States which had an aristocratic—or originally aristocratic—constitution, so that the 'kings' are the later representatives of the old heroic nobility. The States in question are Elis, Cyme, Mytilene and Cyzicus. On the other hand, a single 'king' appears as a municipal officer in States where the government of the nobles had been overthrown—a category which comprises Argos, Megara, Chios, Miletus, Olbia, and Siphnos (for the details see Gilbert, Gr. Staatenl., ii. 272, 325).

7. The sovereignty at Athens.—The history of the sovereignty at Athens is obscure. The traditional lists of the Attic kings bear the signs of various influences, and are clearly untrustworthy. This much alone is certain, that the powers of the king were greatly curtailed, until a member of the annually appointed college of nine archons, with definite sacerdotal and judicial functions assigned to him. For the tradition which identified the king-archon with the highest of the State is probably to be doubted. The earliest settlement, known as that of Ion, recognized the division into four tribes, each represented by its tribal king. These tribal kings (συγγενεῖς) were perhaps an auxiliary to the sovereignty of Ion. Times we find them still associated with the king-archon as judges in the court of the Prytaneum (Arist. Ath. Pol. iv. 3). The name of Theseus is connected merely with the unification of the whole of Attica and the centralization of its government under a single king (συνσυγγενεῖς, Thuc. ii. 15), but also with a limitation of despotic power which earned for him the title of founder of the democracy (Arist. Ath. Pol. xii. 2; Paus. i. iii. 3). The early chapters of Aristotle's Constitution of Athens are unfortunately lost, and we have no means of estimating the nature of these reforms, which, though deferred to an individual, may have been actually spread over a long period. The royal power was reduced by the participation of others in its functions and by its limitation in point of time. The exchange, traditionally ascribed to the feebleness of some of the kings, was the appointment of a war-chief (τριήματος), and the first holder of the new office was Ion, when he took part in the war against Eleusis (Paus. i. xxxi. 3; Arist. Ath. Pol. iii. 2). At a later date, variously assigned to the reigns of Medon and Acatus, the office of chief archon (τριήματος, as giving his name to the current year) was introduced. The reason for his appointment is unknown; Aristotle merely states that his administration was confined to additional (τριήματος) as distinguished from established (συγγενεῖς) functions, and that the sovereignty of the office was due to the increasing importance of the former (Arist. Pol. iii. 3). The archons were held at first for life, and subsequently for ten years (ib. iii. 1); at a later date (633 B.C.), they became annual. The king-archon was entrusted chiefly with religious duties, especially those of old inherited usage (συγγενεῖς). As a survival from primitive times may be mentioned the mystic marriage of his wife with the god Dionysus, which was celebrated during the festival of the Anthesteria in the βαδεμένα, the precinct of the god worshipped in bull-form (Arist. Ath. Pol. iii. 5; [Dem.] ii. 74 ff.). It should be
added that the Βυζαντινόν, which was also the residence of the king-archon, was in the immediate neighbourhood of the Prytaneum. The functions of the Prytanis may be classed as administrative or judicial. The former comprised the general superintendence of the State religion, and in particular the supervision of priestly appointments, the career of the archon for their term of office, the Eleusinian mysteries and the Lenaia, and the management, subject to various limitations, of sacred property. The chief of his judicial functions was the presidency of the court in all cases of homicide, in addition to those assigned to the heroic king; but it is clear that the responsibility must have been imposed before the abolition of the kingship, on the ground that the king was particularly concerned, as representative of the commonwealth, in removing the pernicious consequences of the blood-feud, and, as religious head of the State, in purifying it from the taint of homicide. For a more particular account of the judicial duties of the king-archon see CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Greek).

3. Epirus, Thrasy and Macedonia.It has already been remarked that monarchies continued to exist for a much longer time among the half-Hellenized States on the northern boundaries of Greece. Thus, the kings of the Molossi, who claimed descent from Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles, and before 400 B.C. had extended their sway over the whole of Epirus, maintained their power until the latter part of the 3rd century. Aristotle attributes the survival of the Molossian kingdom to the limitation of the royal authority, and compared it in that respect with the Macedonian (Pol. v. 11, 1313a 23). We have hardly any means of verifying his statement, but we know that king and people annually exchanged oaths, of submission to the laws on the one hand, and of loyalty on the other (Plut. Pyrrh. 5). Shortly before its final overthrow, the king's power was temporarily increased by Pyrrhus, who owed the enlargement of his authority to his popularity with the army. Thessaly never formed a united monarchy, although there is some evidence that in comparatively late times a chieftain was elected as general (regius) to represent the whole people. Such was the position occupied by Jason of Phere (Xen. Hell. vi. iv. 28), and possibly by Aelatus and Scopas at an earlier date. But Jason's ascendency was short-lived, and as a rule the Thessalian tribes were harassed with rival jealousies, especially those of the Aeacids of Larisa and the Scopids of Crammon. The kings of Macedonia traced their descent to Tenemus the Herscild. Their constitutional position, so far as it can be ascertained, was analogous to that of the Homerian king, when allowance has been made for the change of circumstances. The king received all taxes and tributes together with the rents of the domain lands, but his power depended upon custom only and upon the strength of his individual character. The nobility were always ready to put themselves in opposition, if the king failed to conciliate or to oblige them; and to this cause must be ascribed the constant struggles for the throne, and the risings of pretenders supported by a party of the nobility against a legitimate heir, if weak and unprotected (see F. Mair, Greek Life and Thought, London, 1899, p. 23 ff.).

9. Later Greek monarchies.—The career of Alexander opened a new chapter in the history of Greek monarchs, when he placed himself the successor of the Persian king, whose sovereignty was that of an absolute owner over his chattels (Arist. Pol. iii. 14, 1265a 18). On this model were founded the kingdoms which established themselves after the wars of the Diadochi—those of Egypt, Syria, Pergamus, and Macedonia. Of these the Syrian Seleucids came to follow the pattern of an Oriental monarchy, from which their rule was distinguished only by its dependence upon Greek resources. The Ptolemys in Egypt were less despotic, partly because they relied upon their Macedonian troupes mainly, and partly because their government was based upon the semi-Greek city of Alexandria. The Attalids at Pergamus, while retaining the chief power in their own hands, ruled along the lines of the forms of democracy. The condition of Macedonia remained much as it had been in former days, except that the power of the nobles, many of whom were dispersed in foreign lands, was less adequate for resistance to the encroachments of an ambitious monarch. The Macedonians were a race of soldiers, no less backward in culture than untrained in civil government; and they were always ready to follow a capable leader who understood how to humour them (Mahaffy, p. 291 f.).

10. Roman.—I. Nature of kingship.—The traditional history of early Rome begins with a period of monarchical government; and although the fragmentary details pertain only to the latter, there is no reason to doubt its general truth. In addition to a priori considerations, tradition is confirmed by the survival into republican times of traces of an earlier monarchy in the regia, or king's house, as the office of the pontifex maximus, and the continuance of the titles rex and rex aemurium. We must not, however, add the festival regioscum, although this was traditionally explained as a celebration in honour of the kings (Ov. Pasi, ii. 685 f.); for it has now been brought into connexion with other sacrificial lights on the occasion of a sacrifice, which, whatever their real nature, were certainly not the mimic representations of historical events (W. Warde Fowler, The Roman Festivals, London, 1896, p. 327 f.; Frazer, The Magic Art, ii. 308-310, and Lectures on Kingship, p. 264). On the other hand, it is unreasonable to doubt that the peculiar odium which attached to the title rex was inspired by a deep-rooted prejudice, springing from the recollection of the overthrow of a hated tyranny. The charge of aiming at the throne was the most baneous form of treason, and was as fatal to Sp. Cassius and Sp. Marcius in early times as to Tib. Gracchus and Julius Caesar in the days of the later Republic.

It will be remembered that the tyrant against whom Brutus conspired was the representative of a foreign dynasty which aspired to establish hereditary power. The native Roman kingship was of a different character. Its patriarchal and primitive origin is attested by the proximity of the king's residence to the hearth of the State, the perennial fire in the temple of Vesta, and to the store-houses under the protection of the Penates (di penates publici p. E. Q.), who were housed under the same roof (Tac. Ann. xvi. 41). Some modern scholars think that Vestals and Flamen were in the first instance the daughters and sons of the king, who by his direction undertook the duties of kindling and maintaining the sacred fire (Warde Fowler, op. cit., pp. 147, 288). But the king was more than the head of the clan. The genius of the Roman people asserted itself at an early date in the discovery that legal limitations upon the exercise of an authority otherwise uncontrolled (imperium legitimum, Sall. Cat. vi. 6). The king was during his life the sole repository of powers derived from the people, which he exercised subject to the condition that he must act,
not like a slave-owner, but as the mandatory of his free fellow-citizens. Thus the king, while free to follow his inclinations, was watched over by the conviction that he must act not contrary to, but in accordance with, the law. The people were the source of the law, which could not be altered by any singular act. Thus, as Mommesen has suggested, the constitution of Rome resembled, in some measure, constitutional monarchy inverted.

In the Roman constitution the community of the people exercised the same functions as belong to the king in England; the right of pardon, which in England is the prerogative of the crown, was in Rome the prerogative of the community; while the ordinary operations of government devolved entirely on the crown (Hist. of Rome, Eng. tr., i. 98).

This conception was undoubtedly the outcome of a period of growth, the various stages of which are lost to our view. Our evidence respecting the regal constitution comes from writers who relied entirely upon a tradition incapable of verification; and it is scarcely possible that their accounts have not been coloured by the introduction of features characteristic of a later age.

Our authorities agree in denying that the kingship was hereditary (Cic. Rep. ii. 24), and also in the assertion that the king was elected by the people on the proposal of the interrex, and with the previously expressed approval of the senate (Liv. i. 31, 59). The existence of the office of interrex, on the one hand, shows that the demise of the crown was not necessarily and immediately followed by the succession of the heir; but, on the other, the nomination of the royal censors and of the dictator in later times suggests that free election was not so primitive an institution as the authorities affirm. The view of Mommesen (Rom. Staatsrecht, ii. 7, and Hist. of Rome, i. 68) is generally accepted that the king was entitled, if not required, to nominate his successor; and that, if he failed to do so, the duty fell upon an interrex chosen from the senate. In either case, however, the approval of the senate was normally, if not necessarily, obtained; and the new king immediately submitted himself to the people, by himself proposing the adoption of a lex curiata as the ratification of his assumption of the supreme power (cf. Livy, i. 41). The entrance into office was incomplete until the assent of the gods had been obtained by a formal inauguration, in which the auspices and the augur were the principal, if not the principal, members of the priesthood other than the king himself (Liv. i. 18).

2. Insignia.—In virtue of his pre-eminent authority, the king was invested with various insignia of office. Thus, whenever he appeared in public, he was preceded by twelve lictors (Cic. Rep. ii. 20), bearing rods and axes as a mark of his continuous right to command (imperium) during peace as well as in war. He wore a purple robe known as trocha (Verg. Aen. vii. 612; Juv. viii. 250), so called because crossed by belts of scarlet (Mayor, on Juv. x. 30); but in general his official dress varied in accordance with the succession of his duties. He wielded the ivy sceptre surmounted by an eagle, wore a crown of oak-leaves fashioned with gold, and occupied an ivory throne (Dion. Hal. iii. 61). He alone rode in a State-chariot within the city walls; and from this custom the sella curiata of the republic was said to be derived ( Fest. p. 49). He was endowed with ample domain lands, which were occupied on sufferance (precatorio) and kept in cultivation by the royal clientela (Cic. Rep. ii. 34).

3. Functions.—(a) The king was the representative of the community in all its relations, including the superintendence of the State religion. For the first organization of the priestly dignity and its duties Numa was traditionally responsible (Liv. i. 29). Accordingly, he is represented as having instituted the appointments of the three chief Flamen (those of Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus), of the college of Salii, and of the Pontifex, while retaining for himself the administration of the chief religious ceremonies (Plat. Tib. Grune. 15). After the expiration of two years he was appointed to take over the sacred functions personally exercised by the monarch, while the pontifex maximus succeeded to the general presidency over the ecclesiastical bodies, which the king held as chief of the State (for the difficulties in details see Greenidge, Roman Public Life, p. 51 ff.).

(b) In secular as distinguished from religious functions the king was at once the highest civil authority and the supreme military commander. He had no colleague who could interpose a veto; he might, if he chose, delegate his powers, and subsequently resume them at will. The limitations of his authority were established by custom and precedent, followed or created by the holders of the office themselves (Tae. An. iii. 26). Thus, though the king completely controlled the division of booty and the disposal of the public land (Cic. Rep. ii. 29), he was accustomed to consult the senate, whenever it was practicable, on all matters of foreign policy (Liv. i. 32). An exception would be the making of war which closed a war; for on a foreign campaign it was impossible to postpone a decision until a reference was made to the authorities at home. On the question of a declaration of war it was even usual to obtain the ratification of the people (Dion. Hal. ii. 14).

4. Delegates.—Since it was impracticable for the king to perform in person all the duties required of his office, it was usual for him to appoint delegates to represent him, who exercised their functions during the king’s pleasure. Chief of these was the prefectus urbi, who was left behind in Rome to take over the government during the king’s absence in the field. The chief subordinate commands in war were those of the generals of infantry and cavalry (tribuni militum and laterum). With respect to criminal jurisdiction, we are informed that the more important cases were heard by the king in person, and the less important transferred to judges chosen from the senate (Dion. Hal. ii. 12). Further, it was made a charge against the kings that they tried to withdraw the king’s important office by employing a panel of advisors to assist him (Liv. i. 40). Some scholars hold that such a constitution is to be found in the duoviri perduellionum (commissioners of high treason), who were appointed by Tullus Hostilius to try the case of Horatius (Liv. i. 20). These, again, have been identified with the questores parricidi, who are supposed to have existed in the time of the kings (Tae. An. iii. 23), although Mommesen (Hist. of Rome, i. 159) regards the latter as office holders, whose primary duty was to search for and arrest murderers. It has been inferred from the brief account of the trial of Horatius that, though the king might allow an appeal to the people (præcario), he was not bound to do so. According to a statement of Dionsus (iv. 23), the king tried public causes himself, but remitted to others the adjudication of private suits, and in the latter case prescribed the formula by which the competence of the index was limited. This is the basis of the later distinction between proceedings in iure and in iudicio, when the prætor had succeeded to the office formerly occupied by the king. The power of legislation was theoretically vested in the people, who were the sole source of law (Dion. Hal. ii. 14); but the initiated and the king, who alone possessed the right of consulting the assembly.
whole [creation] (Manu, viii. 3), and it is for this reason that kings are always pure, 'lest their business be impeded' (Gautama DS, xxiv. 45), at least 'while they discharge of their dutes' (Vigusa DS, xxii. 45), for

as fire is not polluted even though it always burns the creatures of this world, even so a king is not polluted by the touch of the king's foot on those who deserve it (Narada DS, xvii. 15); and, moreover, he 'is seated on the throne of Indra . . . for the protection of his subjects' (Ma. t. vii. 13).

Another point of resemblance between the king and a god is that 'through his word an offender may become innocent, and an innocent man an offender in death' (Gautama DS, i. vi. ii. 52); and the king is named in connexion with the gods in the requirement that a non-Brahman must take his oath 'in the presence of the gods, of the king, and of Brāhmans' (Gautama DS, xiii. 13), as well as in the prohibition that a mātāka 'shall not speak evil of the gods or of the king' (Aptapama DS, i. xi. 31. 5).

The death of a king or an accident to him interrupts the study of the Veda (Gautama DS, xvi. 32; Bauddhayana DS, i. xi. 21. 4; Vigusa DS, xxx. 23); and a mātāka may not step on a king's shadow (Manu, iv. 130).

The transfer of guilt in case of royal pardon is a rather striking feature of the Indian kingship. If a thief or other criminal is pardoned by the king, the guilt of the original crime devolves on the monarch (Aptapama DS, i. vi. 19. 15 [quoting from an earlier text-book], ix. 25; xii. xxvi. 22; Gautama DS, xii. 45; Manu, viii. 316), because, if he kills the criminal, 'he destroys sin in accordance with the sacred law' (Vaiṣaṭha DS, xix. 46, quoting from an earlier text-book). If the king grants such a pardon, he must fast three days and a night; if he punishes an innocent man, the length of the fast must be tripled (ib. xix. 40, 43).

The association of the king with Indra, already noted, appears again in the statement that the king in whose realm are no criminals 'attains the world of Indra' (Vigusa DS, v. 196; cf. Bhikṣapati DS, ii. 38); and we may also note that Soma is the 'lord of kings' and Varuna 'lord of universal sovereigns' (chakravartin [q.v.], Sūtropaka Brāhmaṇa, xi. xv. 3. 9 f.).

There were, however, in India kings who by no means fulfilled the royal ideal. It is very bluntly declared that wicked kings go to hell (Quotations from Nārada, v. 10), and a mātāka must not accept gifts from a king who is wicked or a non-Kaṭriya, or, indeed, any king (Manu, iv. 77 f., 84, 91); yet such was the requirement that no official of an attack upon even a wicked king was deemed one hundred times worse than the extremely heinous offence of murdering a Brāhman (Nārada DS, xv. xvii. 31).

Specifically royal tabus were rare in India, practically the only instances being that a king might never stand bare-footed on the ground and might not shave his head for a year after his inauguration (Sūtropaka Brāhmaṇa, v. 3.1 f., 6f.).

The ceremony of inaugurating a king (Rāja-
say) was very elaborate (cf. especially A. Weber, 'Über die Kingsgewese', J.A.I. H. 1885, 18; Hillebrandt, Ritual-Litt. [=GLAP iii. 2, Strassburg, 1897], pp. 143-147); but in this, as in the Vaiṣaṭha (see also Weber, 'Über den Vaiṣaṭha', ZI. 1877, 752, p. 795), there is the very ancient custom of omitting Wind, Sun, and Varuna, is given in Nārada DS, xvii. 35-21.

The object of all this is, however, very explicitly stated to have been 'for the protection of this
as ill. 3 f. iv. 3, 22, and vi. 88 (cf. the series transla-
ted by my Lord Ashburnham, SEI xiii. [1867] 111–133).
Although the early Indian kingship was usually hereditary, there are clear indications that elec-
tion to royal office was not unknown (Rigveda, X. exxiv. 8: 'as subjects choosing for themselves a
kingship'); cf. vi. viii. 4; and with this may be connected an incident not uncommon in
modern Indian folk-tales, and repeated in the Indian stratum of The Thousand Nights and one
Night that every Friday at the Garni Akht, a
ritual has been unable to solve their perplexities (Hôchmônya
Upanisad, v. 11-24; cf. Sâvatapatha Brahmâyana, X.
vi. 1); Prâvâhâja Visali, prince of Prâchâla, takes
the name of Akhâs (ib. vi. 8.1), and also explains to Svetaketu, Uddâlaka's son, the
nature of metempsychosis (ib. v. 3-10, Brhad-
ârahyâya Upan. vi. 2; cf. also Kaukitsa Upan.
1.), and the great Vedic scholar Gâyâtreya Bâlakî,
after repeatedly failing to elucidate the nature of Brahman, receives the solution from King Ajita-
karat of Kûsh (Brahmâyâya Upan. ill. Kaukitsa
Upan. iv.). Considering this, it may well be that,
A. S. Geden, Edinburgh, 1906, p. 191.;
and also R. Garbe's little essay on the origin of Indian monism in his Philosophy of Ancient India, Chicago,
1917).
'the doctrine of the atman, standing as it did in such sharp
contrast to all the principles of the Vedo ritual, though
the original conception may have been due to Brahman, was taken
up and cultivated primarily not in Brahman but in Kshatriya
circles; this was first adopted by the former in later times';
and that this teaching 'was fostered and progressively develop-
ed by the Kshatriyas in opposition to the principles of the
Brahmanical ritual.'
We must also remember, in this connexion, that
the two great heterodoxies of India—Buddhism
and Vedanta—arose amongst Kshatriyas, and
that Buddha was himself an heir apparent
(yuvachâya), being the son of Sudhodana, king of
the Sâkyas clan in Kapilavatst.
Lamarcade: The chief references are given by M. Winter-
rutz, Jr. 'Kings (a) in India,' SRL I [1910] 322–324; cf. also H.
1895.
LOUIS H. GRAY.
KING (Iranian).—The kingly office has always
played a most important part in Iranian history
and religion from the earliest times, both in
the ancient Persian Empires and in the Mazdean
religion. Indeed, to the Greeks the Persian
monarch was known simply as bāuster, or Æhâster,
basucter, as constantly in Herodotus, Aeschylus,
and other classical writers. 'The Great Kings'
styled themselves Eshahyad, Æshahyad, Eshahyad, or 'Kings of Kings'—a title which has been
perpetuated through the centuries to the present
day, when the non-Iranian Persian sovereign still boasts the
pride, though empty, title of Shahân Shâh,
which is the modernized form of the ancient
title. Nowhere has royal power been more ever,
more exalted or more absolute than in successive
monarchies of both ancient and modern Iran. It is
certainly a problem at the same time exalted and
controversial, for with so many of the ancient religions, there is
certain traces of 'king-worship' or of divine
genealogies in any of the ancient Iranian dynasties,
whether historical or legendary (on 'king-worship'
see C. Lattey, Ancient King-Worship, London,
1910; also E. Kornemann, Zur Geschichte der
täkten Herrscherkultur, Leipzig, 1901). This is
a necessary result of the political monopoly of the
Mazdean religion, in all its various forms.
We have just indicated the distinction between
the 'historical' and the 'legendary' dynasties in
ancient Iran. By the former is meant, as we have
already seen, the well-known great Persian Achemenid mon-
archy of Cyrus, Darius, and their successors,
familiar to us from the Greek historians and, in
modern times, from their own famous rock inscrip-
tions, which have thrown a flood of light upon both
the political history of their reigns and the form
of Maximus which they professed (see art. BEHESTUN).
Small and monotonous as is this 'literature', it is
distinguished by the deeply religious note that
rings throughout, incessantly repeating the declara-
tion of a burning faith, in which we have evidence of
a sincere piety shewn towards the gods, the
one God of the king and of his people. To
question can be based as to the religion professed
by these kings, at least Darius and his successors,
for we find that Darius, in the great Behistun
inscription, adopts, with a sense of the deepest
satisfaction, the title of 'Aramazandad'—boldly
declaring: 'As an Aramazandad I swear (or proclaim) that this is true'
(Dar. Oh., col. 4, 47.)
There is no mistake in the attitude of these old
Persian kings; there is no claim to divine ancestry,
as in the case of the Egyptian monarchs or Alex-
ander the Great, nor to any apocryphal or divine
ancestry, as in that of the Roman Emperors, but the pure
expression of the most absolute dependence upon
Aramazand, the one God. By his will or divine
grace kings are allowed to reign ('per me reges
regnent'); thus Darius explains:
'By the will of Aramazand I am king' (Oh., col. 1, §§ 5, 6).
By the same will the nations are made subject to
him: 'By the will of Aramazand, these nations have become my
subjects and my tributaries' (Oh., § 7).
It is Aramazand who gives to kings all their
power:
'Aramazand has invested me the sovereign power' (Oh., § 3).
A true Lord of hosts, it is he that gives the victory
in battle:
'By the will of Aramazand I put to flight the army of xindun-
bel, 1, I took possession of the seven-horned bands of the rebels,' etc. (Oh., §§ 18-20; col. 2, § 28, etc.).
In a word, everything depends absolutely on the divine
will:
'Everything that I have done, I have done, without exception,
by the will of Aramazand' (Oh., col. 4, § 62).
In another place, referring to his conquests, the king says:
'That which has been done, I did it all by the will of Aramazand' (Nagsh- Rustam, 4, 48).
It is a remarkable fact that, when we turn to
that form of Mazdeism which is preserved in
the Avesta, the sacred book keeps nothing of
the great Persian monarchs, Cyrus, Darius, Artaxerxes,
and the others of the Achemenid dynasty, whose
names are so familiar in history. It knows, on the
contrary, other great dynasties—the Pithâdân
and the Kanyan—utterly unknown outside of the
Avestan literature and the folk-legends pre-
erved in the poetry of later Persia, especially
Firdausi. The legends of those dynasties are, of
course, largely mythical. The first royal house,
whose date, as usual, is thrown back to a fabulous
antiquity, began with Haoshyanga (the later
Hosân), said to have ruled over the davars, or
demons (probably the non-Iranian tribes), under
the name of Aramazand. As the Pithadân (I, 9).
1 But see Spiegel's view in Literature, which is not
ever, reason to believe that the Iranian kings were sometimes
put on a plane with the gods, as in A.D. Aug., L [1867] 332; see
also A. Bây, ZDMG xxi. [1866] 116 f.; E. Wâellen, Heil., xi. [1889]
106.
whose reigns were first discovered and worked. His successor, the warrior, prophet, and poet, Zoroastre ("strong fox", the later Tahmūrāf), taught his subjects how to use skins for clothing, to hunt, and to tame domestic animals, and caused them to be taught by the "demons" the art of building, the title the "king of the earth" and was slain by the evil spirit Aframī. His successor was the great hero Yina Khshahētā (the later Jamshīd, familiar to readers of Omar Khayyām), who played in the Avesta the part of both an Ahd, and a Who, and, as such, is connected with the "Great Winter" that so strikingly corresponds with the Neuchan Deluge. He was overthrown by the demonical monster Ashī Dahakā, the later Zahāk. After the latter's usurpation, the national revival took place under the most celebrated of these ancient heroes, Thraētaona (the later Farīdūn), who is spoken of as "king of the earth," and whose successor was Manuschchīra, the latter Minouhr. A later dynasty, that of the Kayanians—perhaps a Bactrian dynasty—derived their name and descent from Kai Kōdū (Av. Kava Kavātā), followed by Ka Kās (Av. Kava Uša, Siyāvāsi (Av. Siyāvar- shāh), Rehīm (Av. Rāhīm), Lehrtāp (Av. Arvāta-aspa), and, finally, Gushāstāp (Av. Vishtaspā), in whose reign appeared the great Prophet Zara- thushtra, who converted the king and his court.

Although these kings are no doubt largely legendary, although the accounts of their reigns contain much that is mythological—indeed some of the names suggest Vedic or, rather, Indo-Iranian prototypes—still it is not improbable that some degree of historical truth underlies many of their legends. It may very well be that some of these dynasties, whose names and exploits are preserved either in the Avesta or in popular tradition, were the result of a complex of different Iranian tribes, whether in Media, Bactria, or other regions outside of Persia proper; or that some of them may have been contemporaneous with one another, if not with the Achemenid Empire. It is a remarkable fact that the Avesta itself knows nothing of the last-mentioned great dynasty. The great national Persian poet, Ferdowsī, in his epic, the Shāh-nāma, ingeniously so-ordinates all these various dynasties from the earliest legendary hero to the historical Achemenid era down to Alexander the Great. This skilful manipulation of legend, folklore, and sober history was necessary for the unity of his epic, but, of course, cannot be regarded as corresponding to historical facts.

Although no divine character was attributed to Iranian royalty, still there is one peculiar attribute of a semi-natural character with which the Avesta endowed its kings, and also its prophets. This was the so-called khorārn, which was regarded as a kind of effulgence or bright glory that attached to the kings, but could be forfeited by moral evil. 1

1 It was a meditative talisman which belonged essentially to the royal house of Iran, though it vanished with Yina's fall, flying away in its three successive manifestations in the form of a bird. The Glory can be seized by no sinner (J. H. Moulton, Early Zoroastranism (BL), London, 1913, p. 578); we need not enter here into the author's discussion of the relation of the khorārn to the fravāshī.)

Under the Old Persian form farsnā, the word occurs in several well-known proper names, and even in Media, more than a century before Cyrus. The prophet Zarathushtra was also endowed with this quasi-divine splendor, and at the end of the world it also is to be the attribute of the Saviour Xoshyātān.

After the conversion of the monarch and the royal house to the Zoroastrian reform, the king of Iran was regarded in the religious system of the Avesta and the later Mazdean literature—in accordance with the favor of the Zoroastrianism, which throughout has characterized Iranian thought (see DUALISM (Iranian)—as supreme head of the material or civil world, while the prophet Zarathushtra (and his successors, who enjoyed the title the "king of royalty," and were called the "heroes of Zarathushtrēmē") was the corresponding supreme head in spiritual things. This is expressly laid down in the Dīnkhār, where it is said that the "spiritual and temporal rulers" are connected with the "Great Law" (i.e. the Mazdean religion) is rendered more exact by the rule of Master of the Worlds, the King, and of the Spiritual Director of the worlds, the Zarathushtrēmē (Dīnkhār, col. P. B. Peshon, Bombay, 1874 ff., vol. iv, ch. 157, § 4, tr. Castraceli, Louvain, 1880). This is of a piece with the frequent distinction between aha and rātu, when meaning respectively 'prince' (or temporal ruler) and 'spiritual guide' or 'priest' (though at times the terms have other significations). It also corresponds exactly with the positions assigned respectively to pālōkshahān (sovereignty) and daśā (religion), the one on the material side, the other on the spiritual (miskīt) side of the curious table of the Dīnkhār (vol. iv, ch. 137), cited in the art. DUALISM (Iranian). The Pahlavi translator of Yashō i deduces from this of the hymn that a man is not fit to be a king unless he possesses twelve virtues (quoted by J. Darmesteter, SEE xxiii. [1883]. 25). As to the relations of the subjects to their king, J. J. Moll has lately published an interesting little volume (Morel Estelle, Iran, Zoroastrian Books, Bombay, 1914), in which he has a section (pp. 8-10) on 'Obedience to the King' as one of the chief virtues inculcated by Zoroastrianism.

Referring to section xii. (135, on the duty of prayer for the king, and xiv. 119, for an instance of heroic loyalty), he quotes a striking prayer for the king from Yathāygin, x. 1-11; and of later authorities he cites: 'Be always true and obedient to your Kings' (Pāvastā-ndshān); 'O almighty God, give a long life, a happy life, and a happy life to the ruler of our land' (Tās-darstān); 'Commit no fault against Kings and chiefs'; and again, 'Speak no evil against the rulers of the land, for they are the guardians of the land and through them prosperity flows upon earthly beings' (Pāvastā-ndshān "Armāpti Marangandepān, §§ 60, 105, following de Harlez's version in Mouton, vi., 1867 69-77).

All this is quite in accordance with the ethics of the Achemenid inscriptions, for in them the chief of all evils that are stigmatized is 'falsehood' (draurā, the lie, whose personified, as Mouton surmises (op. cit. p. 1), and so equivalent to the Avestan noun of the evil spirit (abstract noun); and it is to this evil that rebellion against the king is attributed.

Darío tells us that during Cambyses' absence in Egypt the people became hostile, and lying became widespread in the land' (Darío, col. 1, § 39). In another place the same king, relating how a rebellion had taken place in many of the provinces of his vast empire, states that 'these provinces had broken into rebellion; it was lying that had made them rebellions' (ib., col. 4, § 54).

Every time that a usurper rises up against the lawful sovereign it is said, 'He is one that lies (odarurajn, from the root darvaj, drug)—a phrase that constantly recurs. On the other hand, despotism and cruelty on the part of the sovereign are also considered as great crimes. Thus does Darío breathe, with pride and contempt: 'Auramzah has brought me help . . . for I have been neither a liar nor a tyrant' (Darío, col. 4, § 601).

In spite of these severe regulations, however, the grimmer cruelties inflicted by the Iranian monarchs throughout the ages are only too well known, and it has been surmised, not without good reason, that it shocked the priests and the people alike. 2

1 Darmesteter, translation of Strabo, 1, 9, making Nārīysangā, the divine messenger of Ahura Mazda, to reside in the mount of the dead, seems quite inattention to Harlez, Avestrānkārt (Paris, 1883, ii. 597 n.).

2 Other translators, e.g. F. Wolf, Strassburg, 1910, take the suppliation as being in favour of the speaker himself.
ments detailed in the Inferno of Arišī-Virāz, the "Persian Dante," are but few. Of more importance is the Persian court (see Casartelli, 'The Persian Dante,' in Jamaspji Memorial Volume, Bombay, 1914).

Anyhow the Avesta itself draws a sharp distinction between kings and kings. 'May good kings rule over us, not bad kings, O Aramati' (Ys. xvili 5).

Especially those rulers who were hostile to the Prophet and his religion were deposed and even devoted to eternal perdition; amongst them is mentioned by name one Ghrēma (Ys. xlv. 11, xlv. 11, xxxii. 12-14).

A word must here be said of the relations between the royal dynasties and the national religion. As we have seen, there is no doubt about the religious convictions of the great Achemenid kings—at least after Cyrus, for his religious position is still doubtful. They were profoundly and devoutly Mazdeans—though the present writer is by no means yet convinced that they were Zoroastrians in any sense (see his The Religion of the Great Kings, London, 1910; per contra, the very striking arguments of Moulton, op. cit., especially p. 48 ff., are deserving of careful consideration). The Avestan legend represents the Vedic Rig-Veda as a secondary and alien royal house as converts of the Prophet, the king playing the part of a Constantine or an Ethelbert. Coming back again to later and historical times, the relations of the Arsacid or Parthian dynasty (A.D. 220-261) to the faith are unknown or obscure. The Sassanian kings (A.D. 226-631), however, were so fully and completely Zoroastrian that they made the Avestan system, in the greatly modified form in which it then existed, the State religion, and did not shrink from religious persecution in its defence or interests. It was under Shahpur II. (A.D. 350-383) that, according to the traditions, our present Avestan, i.e., whatever was left of the original scriptures after Alexander the Great's destruction of the greater part, was collected, revised, and corrected by the efforts of his great prime minister Ardašir-Maz-aspandian, whilst under his successor, Yazdagird II., the edict of his minister, Mir Marseh (A.D. 440), played an important part in the religious life of the country. In the Dinburt (vol. I. ch. 26) we find the assertion that 'the law of Islam is the Mazdean religion' (Airinm dito dina Mazdayasna), which, together with other indications, has always seemed to the present writer to point to the Dinburt as essentially of the Sassanian era.

Lukens: In addition to words quoted in text, W. Geiger, Ostasiatische Kultur im Altertum, Erklangen, 1882, p. 45 ff.; F. Spengel, Ertrutsche Alterthumskunde, Leipzig, 1871-78, ch. iii. 692 ff., where he endeavours at some length to prove that the ancient Iranian kings did claim divine parentage, probably from Mitra; E. Wilhelm, Königthum und Professor, der Astir, and L. Casartelli, KING (Muslim).—1. Sovereignty. Originally in Islam the conception of sovereignty was directly theocratic. There was no doubt on this point. Muhammad ruled in the religious order, the military order, and the judicial order; and in each of these he was accepted and without dispute. Neither he nor any of his adherents seems to have thought of analyzing or dissecting sovereignty. They regarded it as divine in its source; Muhammad possessed it not as elected by men, but as a prophetship by God, without dispute; and originating thus, it was both integral and absolute.

This conception continued during the period immediately after Muhammad, which is called 'the perfect Khalifate.' The first successors of the Prophet did not, indeed, regard themselves as real sovereigns, that position belonging to the Prophet alone. They called themselves 'lieutenants,' which is the word khalif, which in practice they preserved their sovereignty in the military order; but in the religious and judicial orders the Qur'an, which is regarded as perfect, had fixed the law, at least in general, at all points. The Khalif had nothing to add, and sovereignty in these matters passed into the hands of specialists, whose duty it was to criticize the texts, and to develop and apply the principles. After the Ameen Empire was immense; and, as it included regions and cities of advanced civilization, administration became complicated and difficult, and the Khalif had to delegate a large part of his sovereignty to ministers. These were known at first by the modest title of 'vizirs' (chargés d'affaires). They were of considerable importance in the Empire; it might even be said that some of them were the real sovereigns, until the day when they were crushed by a caprice of their master. Vizirs played an equally important rôle in the Osman Empire after the Turkish conquest.

Towards the end of the history of the Arab Khalifate, during its decline, the general state of the Empire was very unsettled, and the military element assumed predominance over the administrative. The Khalif, his palace, and all that the palace stood for, was the great power, and the actual authority was exercised by the chief guards, generally Turks and sometimes eunuchs.

In the fezud period authority was divided and subdivided just as in the West, but in a less systematic manner. The Khalif had now only a theoretical power; princes of various races formed kingdoms for themselves out of the dismembered Empire, and arrogated to themselves a sovereignty de facto, which was no longer of a theocratic character, but was based on strength of arms. The dynasties which they founded have been of comparatively short duration. The Osman Sultans constituted a stronger unity in Islam than that which existed under the Arab Khalifs. Their power was absolute, except that they were required to respect the law of the Qur'an and its interpreters (mufši, islamá, etc.), and were dependent on the fidelity of the troops. This despotic regime has lasted even to our day.

In Turkey at the present time the sovereignty resides in the Parliament, and the Sultan is only a constitutional monarch—a system which brings the Ottoman Empire into line with the other States of Europe, but which it is difficult to reconcile with the principles and the spirit of Islam.

2. Legitimacy.—The legitimacy of the Khalif does not exactly depend on the manner of his election or on a law of succession; it is derived from the proclamation of the people. This proclamation consists in naming the sovereign in the Friday sermon (khat'ta) in the mosques, and in praying for him. When mention of a Khalif has been thus made, without arousing protests, in the cathedral mosque of the capital of the Empire, this Khalif is regarded as legitimate. 2

1 The title Khalif was borne by the first four successors of Muhammad, as the Umayyads and 'Abbasids, among the 'Abbasids, among the 'Abbasids; and Khalif, the title of the "commander of the faithful," was given to the Arab Khalifat; it had been used, even during the life of the Prophet, to designate the Khalif's lieutenant in the year 2 A.H. As for the title 'Sultan,' it was in use among such secondary dynasties as the 'Abbasids, the 'Abd-al-Malik, and the 'Abd-al-Maliks. 2 The ceremony of proclamation is called bārāt. Among the Oman it is renewed every year, even that of the Sultan, on the 31st of July, the day notably the name of Musâôt. The khat'ta al-ulûm, in these ceremonies, kisses the front of the Sultan's robe, and, raising his eyes towards heaven, prays for the sovereignty of the Empire, and for the preservation of his Highness. The Sultan
A legitimate sovereign might be deposed. Among the Osamans deposition is regarded as just when it has been authorized by a fatsí, i.e., by a decision of the Sanadı-kâmil. The mode of succession of Muslim sovereigns varied. Muhammad had given no rule. Abú Bakr, his first successor, was chosen by the most influential party in the Muslim community. Othman was designated by Abú Bakr; Othman, by electors whom 'Omar had named; the election of 'Ali was contested, and led to civil war; with Mu'áwya the dynasty rule was restored and established, firm enough to assure a stability in the family of the Umayyads. Even within the dynasties the order of succession was not always constant. Sometimes the Khalif chose one of his sons as his heir apparent; e.g., the famous Harrún al-Rashid designated three of his sons with entail. The first of the three, Amïm, wished to out the second, Ma'mún; but the latter revolted and Amïm was beaten and killed. Among the Osman Sultans it is rather the brother who succeeds; and it has often happened that a Sultan, on his accession, has put his brothers and nephews to death. Formerly the Empire was divided among the brothers, especially in the Middle Ages. This was the case with the Bayids and Fatimids. In principle the Khalif, who was the president of the entire Muhammandan community, had to be of the Quraish race; but that was not the case with the Osman Sultans. In order to legitimize their rule it was admitted that they had inherited rights from the ancient Arab Khalfis when, in the time of Salïm I., they conquered the sacred cities Mecca and Medina.

Among the Shi'ites the idea of legitimacy presents a rather peculiar religious character. Founding their belief on certain traditions, they hold that Muhammad had designated 'Ali as his successor, and in their eyes all the Khalifs except 'Ali and his descendants are illegitimate. This belief has given rise to many troubles in the history of Islam. Secret societies have been formed and have long worked for the succession of the 'Ali dynasties; they succeeded in establishing the famous Fatimid dynasty in N. Africa and Egypt, thus named from Fátima, the daughter of the Prophet and the wife of 'Ali, from whom it claimed to descend.

The Mahdïs idea is developed in the sects which maintain the right of 'Ali. The Mahdï, a sort of king-prophet and expected Messiah, who is to perfect religion and to begin in the world an era of happiness, is to be of the sect of the 'Ali. The sect of the Imâmites had a curious idea about him: they believed that the Mahdï, also named 'imam, was to be the twelfth descendant of 'Ali. The latter being dead, having disappeared at an early age, this sect professes that he continued to live a mysterious and endless life, from which he will return with glory when his hour is come. The time during which the Mahdï is to remain hidde is called the period of 'occultation' (cf. Carra de Vaux, Le Mahométisme, Paris, 1886, p. 134).

3. The status of the sovereign.—The power of the Khalif is absolute within the limits of the religious law. Theoretically, he might dispose of the land and revenues of his Empire. The principle is that the soil belongs to God, and consequently to the Sultan, who is His mandataire. The Sultans, however, had a private estate, which was always of a considerable size. Thus under Sulaiman the Magnificent the private estate of the Sultan produced a revenue of five million ducats, while the general revenues of the Empire were only a little more than nine million ducats. The Sultan, in order to himself the right of granting the great fiefs; and, as a result of the same principle, confiscations were easy and remain so to this day. As regards taxes, some are prescribed by the Qur'an; such are the tithe for Muhammandans and the poll-tax for non-Muhammandans. Others are administrative taxes, which long ago acquired a certain regularity, and are therefore called 'a fard, i.e., 'regular'; such are taxes on marriages, law, dutees, transit and warehouse dues, and stampes. Besides these two kinds of taxes, the Sultan, under the old regime, reserved the right to impose as many as he pleased. Under Sulaiman, the Magnificent imperial offices were sold, but not military offices.

Until 1877 the Sultan drew as he pleased on the Treasury for the needs of his barím. At this time of eight million ducats produced, two-thirds passed to the palace. The Sultan published budget estimates, but he began by deducting his share of the receipts. He had, however, a civil list, which had been established since 1855; and the sum amounted to £1,200,000, but was reduced afterwards to £300,000. The property left to the mosques, as pious foundations, called waqf, property, escapes the sovereignty of the Sultan, and is independent. It forms an important part of the imperial territory.

Until the recent revolution, which made him a constitutional monarch, the Sultan naturally had the right of declaring peace or war, and that preserved the right of commander-in-chief of his armies. He had the right of life and death even over the greatest personages in his Empire. When one of his old favourites who had fallen into disgrace received the noose with which he had to strangle himself, he accepted it as an order legitimately given, and as one which his conscience commanded him to obey. The Sultan was recognized to have the right to make subjects 'disappear' and to dispose of the life of his wives within his palace, and even to order massacres. The religious system of Muhammandanism does not condemn the massacres either of the Janissaries of the Ottoman Empire or of the Imamites of Islam. It has a special law for the sovereign regarding his wives. According to the Qur'an (xxviii. 62), he might have nine legitimate wives, all other Muhammandans having only four.

4. The ethical of the sovereign.—There exist in Muhammandan literature several important treatises on the ethics of kings. One of the greatest philosophers of Islam, Fârâbî (1860), wrote a treatise on the 'Model City,' in which he represents the princes as wise men, whose principal thought must be to prepare their subjects for the happiness of the other life. This theory, devoid of any practical character, is only an adaptation of the Platonic doctrines (cf. Carra de Vaux, Avicenne, Paris, 1900, p. 104). Another very well known author who studied this question is the jurist. The idea that the waqf furnished a means by which a testator might save his fortune from confiscation. The Sultans very often confiscated the property of proscribed persons and public officials. The waqf might be bequeathed to the mosques and set aside for some charitable purpose. The founder designated the chief minister of a mosque or an inferior officer. But sometimes the choice of the administrator was left to the inspector general of the waqfs, or to the Grand Vizir,—e.g., Kouprula, Bâgîgâ, and Baraksta,—tried to secularize the substantial family endowments. This was a form of tax imposed on them a fixed law of transmission and an annual tax, regulated according to the estate (A. de la Jouquière, Histoire de l'Empire ottomane, Paris, 1891, p. 617).
Mawardi (†1058). He wrote a treatise entitled Kitāb al-aḍām al-sulṭānīyya (i.e. Constitutions politiques), a work edited by R. Enger at Bonn in 1835, and recently translated into French by Leon Ostrogorsky. It contains the theory of the Khilafah, a description of the qualities necessary for a Khilaf, a study of the different methods of election, and a definition of the power of the vizirs and provincial governors, with an indication of its limits. This treatise has been highly valued in Islam. The same author has also left a collection of 'Councils to Kings,' a work on the rules which ministers must follow, and still another on politics and government, entitled 'The Means of facilitating Reflection and of hastening Victory' (Tashq al-Najār wa-ta'līf al-Zafar; see C. Huart, Littérature arabe, Paris, 1902, p. 249, Eng. tr., London, 1905, p. 243 f.)

A celebrated Seljuk vizir, Nizām al-Mulk, the founder of the academies of Baghdaq, Nishapur, and Baṣra (†1092), wrote on the art of government, which he considered to be characterised in a very superfluous manner. His book, entitled Siyāsah al-Nasāb, 'A Treatise on Government,' and dedicated to the Sultan Malik Shah, has been edited and translated into French by C. Barbier de Meynard, Paris, 1908, is devoted to this subject. This vizir admits that kings are 'chosen by the most high God,' he allows them attributes which are not specifically moral. They must, according to him, respect the laws, defend the religion, and have a strong faith; but it is not their domain to govern religion. Their duty is rather to occupy themselves with economic interests: to drain the land, to build bridges, to attend to the cultivation of the soil, to build strongholds, caravanserais, and beautiful monuments. These works will gain for a prince the gratitude of his people, an eternal recompense. Nizām al-Mulk recommends kings to guard against the influence of women, and to have no trust in ministers of another religion. We know that from the time of the Arab conquest, Christians have been employed by the Khalifs in their administration, and have rendered them great service. This custom was followed also by the Osmans, and continues to this day (cf. Carra de Vaux, Gawārī, Paris, 1902, p. 140).

To the great Persian poet Saíd (†1264) we owe some very fine pages on the ethics of kings. The whole of the first chapter of his Bustan (translated into French by C. Barbier de Meynard, Paris, 1890) is devoted to this subject. Nizām al-Mulk writes, 'The defender of the weak, and sacrifice your rest to work for them, to the alleviation of poverty and misfortune. A king owes the crown to his subjects; avoid grieving the heart of your people; that would be to thoroughly destroy your own power. The people, the poet says further, 'is a fruitful tree which must be cared for if its fruits are to be enjoyed.'

He has recommendations for labourers: 'The labourer works with more energy when he can count upon peace and prosperity.'

He has also some for merchants: 'Preserve the merchants close to the people and to the army the sources of wealth.'

He also recommends that 'men of war' and 'men of advice' should be bountied and soldiers well paid. You in this great kindness which the poet wishes to find in the sovereign must be accompanied by mistrust and craft; he evidently prefers the latter to strength.

While clever negotiations may assure the success of a transaction, gentleness is preferable to the use of force. Instead of traps, sow gold under the steps: your benefactions will blind the eyes of the enemy. The empire of the world belongs to cleverness and craft; kiss the hand that you cannot bite; and drive away your enemies by the fear of your adversaries; it is the drops of water that make the torrents.'

LITERATURE.—See the works cited throughout the article and in the notes.

B. CARRA DE VAUX.

KING (Semitic).—In Semitic languages the usual word for 'king' comes from the root s-l-k; in Babylonian the meaning is 'advise'; this is common in Aramaic, and occurs in Hebrew. In Arabic and Ethiopic it means 'to possess,' 'have power over.' The king then would be the deydrer of conduct, the source of wisdom. It is best to take the subject in three divisions: Syriac (chiefly Hebrew), Babylonian, and Arabian.

1. Hebrew.—It is very seldom that a true kingdom develops among nomads, and the Hebrews are no exception. Indeed it was not till after many years of settled life (tradition says four hundred) that the government crystallized into kingship. This development was gradual—through the judges, men of mark who by force of character and religious enthusiasm supplanted the tribal chiefs and, for a time at least, usurped their authority. In the case of Ahimelech this authority became hereditary in the second generation, but this was largely due to the fusion of Israelites with the old settled population, the Canaanites. When the government was finally settled in the person of a king, it was in direct imitation of the nations round about (1 S 11:6), and in recognition of a fixed central authority. The older tradition believed that this change had the approval of God and was carried through by His instrument, the prophet Samuel. (Later tradition saw in this a postasy from God.) As in the case of the judges, Saul first proved his powers at the rescue of Jabesh-Gilead, and then the people ratified the position that he had won for himself. Possibly Samuel had looked to Benjamin for a king in the hope of thus avoiding the jealousy of the North and South. Saul the soldier, however, proved unequal as a politician to cope with the Philistines and David, the idol of the South, was shown by events to be necessary to the Hebrew nation, and as such was acclaimed king by all parties. But even his genius and personal attractiveness failed to create a national feeling. The kingdom which he had created by his resistance to the Philistines was kept together by the fear of a hostile neighbour, and split along the natural line of cleavage as soon as that fear was removed.

These early kings were little more than the tribal chiefs of nomad days. The main differences were their recognition by the whole people and their possession of a bodyguard, consisting largely of foreigners, well-armed and well-supplied than the tribal militia. At first there was very little organization. The vagueness of history suggests that Saul had no fixed capital. The king was judge (2 S 14:23), general, and priest, the officers set apart for these duties being only his deputies. There is no clear statement of the king being the chief priest, but there are many indications that he sometimes exercised priestly functions. In Shemaria, Tobit styles himself 'priest of Astarte, goddess of the Sidonians,' like his father. His son Eshmunazar calls his mother (she was his father's sister) 'priestess of Astarte' and 'queen,' though he himself does not bear the priestly title. The story of Agag shows that Saul saw nothing wrong in offering sacrifice (1 S 15). At the coming of the ark to Jerusalem David warned a linen ephod (2 S 6:14), a priestly garment such as an Aaron wore (1 S 23; cf. also 2 K 3:2). Both David and Solomon blessed the people (2 S 6:18 and 1 K 8:6, 7); the priests were the servants of the king, to be deposed or appointed as pleased the king. David's sons were split out on his friends, while waiting for an opportunity to slay him alive. David, the chief mourner of his adversaries; it is the tears of that make the torrents.'
was given to this army by the institution of the royal bodyguard of mercenaries. Under David the captain was apparently a Philistine, and loyalty to him was stronger than other motives. It was the fidelity of these hirelings that prevented Absalom from sweeping the country at the outset of his rebellion.

We have no certain information about the revenue of the kingdom of David. As tradition insists on the lovely origin of both Saul and David, we must suppose that from the first they had a regular revenue from taxation apart from the booty that they might win in war. 

The later part of Saul’s reign assumes a tax of 10 per cent. It is assumed on the strength of 1 S 17:2 that the king’s character, kings were frequently the recipients of presents; but probably these were, like gratitude, in expectation of favours to come. In Solomon’s reign an elaborate system of tax-collectors was set up—a system which was the instrument that a dynasty always adopted in order to divide its own territory into divisions still existing among the people. The king of David possessed certain agricultural privileges (Am 7:1), and in later times financial emergencies were met by special taxes (2 K 15:12 29). Solomon was credited with a large income from taxation apart from the profits of trade and foreign tribute. In addition he employed the cereus (cf. 1 S 3:3). David’s kingdom illustrates Ibn Khaldún’s theory that a dynasty always only three generations: one of comparative barbarism, one of organized government and developed luxury, and then the crash. Solomon asked too much from his subjects; the splendour of the court was bought by the impoverishment of the countryside, and, as the tribes had not had time to degenerate into serfs, they broke away from the government that pillaged instead of protecting them. The Phoenician kings were at first absolute, but later their power was limited by the nobles, and the government became an oligarchy. David’s successors were not equal to the task which almost enslaved him—that of welding Judah and Joseph into one nation. While in the North the throne was a prize for any adventurer, in Judah all revolutions left David’s family the crown—a tribute to the power of the king of Israel.

As a general rule the crown was hereditary, descending to the eldest son—the chief exception being Solomon. In this case a palace clique abused the prestige of the dying king and the authority of religion in favour of its nominee. The king was a sacred person appointed by God (1 S 24:7 and 2 K 9), and in him centred the hopes of the prophets. It is probable that anointing referred specially to the unifying side of the king’s character. Thus Eshnunna of Lagash (c. 2000) calls himself both patesi and king, while Eannatum I, who reigned a little later, uses only the title patesi. The early rulers of Assyria (c. 1800) call themselves Isakku (=priest-king). Whatever his title, the king ruled by divine right. Many inscriptions have been found in which a king boasts that he has made a pilgrimage to the temple of his god and of his land and shepherd of his people. ‘Thou hast created me and intrusted me with dominion over men’ (Nebuchadrezzar [Rawlinson, 129, col. 1, line 55 ff.]). In Assyria at least the king was an autocrat, however much his power may have been limited in practice.

The king is the agent of his country’s god; in the treaty between the cities of Lagaszi and Unma (before 3000) the patesi of the towns are not mentioned at all, but only the gods. They contended for their cities. Patesi ‘included the idea of priest, and it sometimes happened that one who assumed the style of king kept the older form, even putting the priestly rank first of his titles. It is not a very big step from regarding the sovereign as agent or representative of the god to considering him the manifestation of deity or as himself the god. This change took place very early. Perhaps it was helped by the rulers’ habit of putting statues of themselves in the temples which they built, to keep themselves fresh in the memory of the gods. To the kings of that time the temples meant not the statues, but for the persons whom they represented. It is specially noted that the offerings for the statue of Ur-nina (king of Lagash c. 3000) were continued during the reign of Lagaszi-ya, perhaps a hundred and fifty years later. The first kings to receive divine honours were the Semitic rulers of Akkad, northern Babylonia (c. 2900); Shargani-sharri is called the god of his land, and Naram-Sin’s name always has the determinative for ‘god’. Thence the custom spread to the Sumerian rulers of S. Babylonia; and Gudea, patesi of Lagash c. 2450, was deified after his death. About fifty years later, Dungi, the second king of the dynasty of Ur, always describes himself as god, and a temple is built in his honour. In later times Ashurbanipal calls himself offspring of Ashur and Belit. The suggestion that the deification of the king is due to Egyptian influence has not found favour. At first the ruler was supreme in both the secular and the religious sides of life, but in time the priesthood began to hold powers used for all religious actions. Yet the king remained priest in theory. God still spoke to him directly; Ishtar visited him in dreams to give him her commands. Lugal-ziggisi is proud to be called ‘priest of Nintu’, but he was the nominal head of the god, but also the representative of his people. This was never forgotten. The kings of Erech and Lagash are priests of Anu; another boasts himself ‘keeper of the temple of Bel’ at Nippur, and down to the latest times the Assyrian kings are priests of Ashur, sometimes giving the religious title the precedence. A son of Naram-Sin became a priest, and his daughter a priestess. The priests were always under the control of their chief, the king; their subservience appears in the attempts of the oracle priests to find in omens that were obviously unfavourable meanings pleasing to the king.

Another aspect of this is the national significance of the king’s person: a calmity to him is a national disaster; hence the elaborate rules that fence his person and his territory. Thus the ceremonies for the purification of a king are much longer and more complicated than in the case of a private person; royalty is so dangerous that the king has to be cleansed of the impurity of his motherhood. On five days in the month he must not touch animal food, nor change his garments, neither dare he bring an offering to the gods. Thus the
question whether certain of the penitential psalms are individual or national is beside the point; it is the king, the representative, who speaks for the nation. The law tells the same tale. The court sits in a temple, and the oath is taken in the name of a god or gods, and sometimes in the king's name also; yet he is the 'king of kings', 'ruler of the heavens', 'hearer of prayers', 'his decrees are published under divine auspices'. The series of oaths founded on the exploits (whether real or imaginary is material) of Sargon I can hardly be explained on the ground of the political importance of these exploits. It was the deeds of a hero peculiarly under divine protection that became normative for future ages.

Naturally the king was absolute, but he was the 'shepherd of his people', and the government was always rather patriarchal. The people had their rights, which the monarch could not outrage. The splendid title 'king of righteousness' was not borne by the tribal chief. In both Assyria and Urartu he bore a witness in the reforms of Urukkagan of Lagash (c. 2800) and the Code of Hammurabi. While in Assyria, even in the days of its greatest power, any person could make a written appeal to the king. Though the Assyrians are unpleasantly notorious for bloodthirsty cruelty, they devoted great care to the internal economy of their own land. Not only was Assyria plentifully supplied with cattle of all sorts, the booty of innumerable wars, but the kings introduced new trees, and in other ways encouraged agriculture. The system of irrigation was, of course, their constant care. From the first the throne was hereditary, though we do not know whether primogeniture was the rule. In Assyria it is claimed that for fifteen hundred years the crown descended from father to son. The king's material power rested on the army. The idea that the king owned his domain had long since died out, but part of the soil belonged specially to the State, being held on feudal tenure. The occupier was bound to military service, in payment for which he held his fief. This could not, of course, be alienated, and in default of heirs returned to the State. If the owner were summoned for service and had no one to leave in charge of his land, the State appointed a bailiff, who was charged with the protection of the owner's family. In addition, the feudatories had certain privileges, were of some extent, outside the jurisdiction of ordinary officials, and were not liable to the corvées. The Assyrian government appears to have lived often on the tribute of vassal States.

3. Arabian. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that no settled government has evolved among the nomads of Arabia. The dynasties of Hira and Ghassan are only apparent exceptions. All Arabian States have their centre in the cities that lie on the borders of the country, open to foreign influence by land or sea. Among the nomads the manorial system long survived, though he has only advisory authority and the weight of personal influence. Even among the settled tribes in the hinterland of Ailen it is often impossible to put a crimes to death, for the chief (the 'many' his servant', Sultan) would expose himself to the dangers of a blood-feud.

Among the fertile valleys of Yemen it was different, and at an early date settled States existed. Unfortunately, the materials for a study of this period are scanty and largely inaccessible. No agreement has yet been reached as to the date of many of the inscriptions, the two schools of interpretation differing by some six hundred years. Of the chief States were (1) the Yemen, ruled by two dynasties having their capitals at Sirwah and Ma'rib, and later by the H'myarite kings of Saba and Dhu Qais known to Arabia tradition as Tubba's; (2) Ma'an or Ma'in in the Jauf; and (3) Qataban; and (4) Huda. The date of the kings of Ma'an is uncertain. In Yemen the earliest rulers were the k. b. p. probably Makurris, the priest-kings of Sirwah. We have the names of thirteen princes who ruled between the fourth and sixth centuries, but their titles and functions and powers are unknown. The title seems to mean 'he who makes offerings.' Their rule probably extended well to the east, for Sargon (715 B.C.) mentions one I'tlamara the Sabean, probably one of the dynasty. The name occurs on the monuments. Next followed a line of kings ruling at Ma'rib, coming to an end about 135 B.C. and followed by the H'myarite kings, whose kingdom was finally destroyed by the Abyssinians in A.D. 225. It is probable that the kings of Ma'an were contemporaneous with the earlier rulers of Yemen (Saba), though Hommel and Glaser would put the first of them about 100 B.C.

The royal title was not restricted to the head of the State, but was shared by his sons. In one inscription a father and two sons bear the title, just as in a Stabul inscription to-day all members of the ruling house are called Sultan. Elsewhere Ablan of Saba, king of Saba, does not give himself that rank, though he gives it to his sons (CIS iv. 398). Besides kings we read of rulers, and it is probable that the people were divided into classes or castes; and the lords in their inaccessible castes may well have been as independent as the feudal barons in Europe. According to one tradition, the downfall of the land (4) Hadrmati was largely due to his lack of control over his barons. Women held an honourable position in the land; two together appear as 'lords,' and, like the king, receive the commands of their god through an oracle (CIS iv. 387). Occasionally the kings seem to be invoked along with the gods, though in a secondary place (CIS iv. 374)—reminding one of BABYLONIA.

Two other States rose in early Arabia, Hira and Ghassan, though they were native in part only, being due to outside influence. Rome and Persia were continually anoyed by the incursions of the Bedawin into the fertile lands of Mesopotamia; so one protective measure was to make friends with the nearest Arabs. Hira was a vassal of Persia, and in very close touch with its overlord; Arabs filled responsible posts at the court of the Bahram Gür, who afterwards became king, was educated at Hira. These States closely resemble the rule of the Rashids at Hail in the last century; the Sultan's power rested on the Bedawin, who were held to their allegiance by tribal honour and presents from the taxes contributed by towns and trade. History has preserved the memory of the mixed population at Hira—the tent-dwelling Arabs, the Christians of the town, and the semi-nomadic—mixed population which for various reasons settled under the government. There is no explicit evidence, but conditions must have been very similar in Ghassan, where the government had a large responsibility, and where the semi-nomadic had helped to uphold the loyalty of the Arabs. Tabari tells us that Gahima, the founder of the dynasty of Hira, was a prophet and soothsayer, suggesting that there was religion in its origin.

Muhammad founded a State where divine revelation was the supreme law, and after his time religion has played the greatest part in most States formed and ruled by Arabs. Had Khaldun's view that religion remains true, that religion alone will not make a
State; the feeling of nationality must also be present (Erfreunen, Beirat ed., p. 159). The
year, 1553, is claimed to be the successsion of the Prophet, and made this the chief prop
of their authority; yet their power depended on the
solidarity of their supporters, and, when the old
strife of Qais and Kaf, Mulear and Yemen, began, broke
out again. The settled life which had then
spread over the whole Bedouin area, and on whose
byrjig byrningame; and so cening and pa riecmest men drinoen myn mcdo (mare's milk), and pa insemen-pa & Pld verindaco mado. 25) Peter of Polusch, Chronica, iii. 223; "De latrunculis, qui
LXX regum turro Locathio Lutheriano.
(3) Scriptura rerum Locativarum, Riga, 1846-49, l. 597.
Here we read that, in a general rising of the Samleders for the purposes of the Messal forint, there was, first of all, an assembly of the 'wise' by themselves, whose decision was then to be submitted to the public assembly.
A. S. TRIGHTON.

KING (Teutonic and Litva-Slavic).—1. Sources relating to the Litva-Slav.—In seeking to trace the early historical tradition of kingship in Northern Europe, it will be well to deal first with the facts relating to the Litva-Slavic peoples, as these provide a basis also for a knowledge of the early Teutonic conditions. We begin, therefore, by quoting from the oldest available authorities a number of references to modes of government among the Litva-Slavic of Eastern Europe.

(a) The Chronicle of Nestor (ed. F. Miloslog, Vienna, 1850, ch. vi.). They lived each with his family and in his own locality (i.e. separate from one another) ruling over his own district.

(b) Procopius, de Bel. Goth. iii. 14: "..."..."... laqua dictatus Bogatini, qui simul congregavit nodulaverunt Sarbin, London, 1907; ULS, pr. iv.; scattered notices in native author.


(b) Procopius, de Bel. Goth. iii. 14: "..."... laqua dictatus Bogatini, qui simul congregavit nodulaverunt Sarbin, London, 1907; ULS, pr. iv.; scattered notices in native author.


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(b) Procopius, de Bel. Goth. iii. 14: "..."... laqua dictatus Bogatini, qui simul congregavit nodulaverunt Sarbin, London, 1907; ULS, pr. iv.; scattered notices in native author.
KING (Teutonic and Litu-Slavic)

...mode of government given above holds good to a remarkable extent also of the Southern Slavs, more particularly in Montenegro and Herzegovina, where we learn from the accounts of F.S. Krauss, *Sitze und Brauch der Sudalben*, Vienna, 1885, pp. 24 ff., 58 ff. etc., and P. A. Korinsky, *Geographical and ethnographical Description of Montenegro*, London, 1885, p. 158 ff. From the modern system of government among the Southern Slavs we may, accordingly, glean a wide and more precise knowledge of the state of matters among the ancient Slavs and Litu-Prussians. In Montenegro and Herzegovina likewise our starting-point must be the conception of the tribe or clan (pleme) based upon, or at least regarded as based upon, agnatic kinship, such clan or tribe, again, being subdivided into a number of brotherhoods (bratstvo) and villages (sela). Those who were chosen by their people to stand at the head of these plemena are designated in various ways, e.g. as *chiefs* (glavari), *elders* (starovice), *zupani*, and, most commonly, as *dukes* (voyevođa); certain other terms applied to them are easily borrowed from foreign usage, e.g., governor (gubernator, etc.) in Russian and Turkish; Mod. Pers. sar-tār, Pahl. sārāt, O. Pers. *sara-dār*; cf. Mod. Pers. nār, Arv. *sarah*—‘head’, knjaz (from *teuton*; see below), ban (bemokr in the Greek of chakass and voivod in Russian—‘rich’). A number of these titles are applied specially to the heads of the smaller groups.

The position of these chiefs of the *pleme*, if we may take that of the *voyevođa* as generally representative of the others, may be described as follows. The *voyevođa* was, above all, the leader of an army, and, would, of course, be chosen for the post as one who had specially distinguished himself in war. His appointment was for life, although he might be deposed if he failed to justify his people’s choice—i.e., if, e.g., he fell short in heroic qualities or judicial ability. He could bequest his position to his sons, though not without the consent of the people who might, if they regarded the nominated son as incapable of leading them, choose instead a nephew or some other relative; the right of succession, in fact, was retained solely to the former *voyevođa*. Among the Southern Slavs, accordingly, the families of the *zupani*, *bani*, and *voyevođa* now represent what we should call the oldest nobility. But the main consideration in the choice of a leader was always personal character. The *voyevođa* was at first a herdsmen like the rest, and it was only gradually, and mainly as a result of his military achievements, that he attained the position in which at length he controlled all the external and internal affairs of his *pleme*. Various honours were then accorded to him; in particular, he was assigned the place of honour at the top of the table. The present writer is unable to give any information regarding the revenues of the *voyevođa* (as regards the *zupan*, cf. Krauss, op. cit. p. 27). It was only the stronger *pleme*, however, that had their own *voyevođa*; the weaker *pleme* put themselves under the power of the stronger.

The power of the *voyevođa* was thus in some cases very great; nevertheless, the real authority was still in the hands of the people, who governed through their representatives in the public assembly (sbor, *shkupino*). Each *pleme*, accordingly, had certain favourite places—a shady grove, a null-flooming spring—at which it held its assembly. The as-
Of the development of kingly rule among Teutons as well as Slavs, accordingly, we are now in a position to form some such general impression as follows. Already in the remote primitive Aryan or Germanic period, the Teutonic races, from the linguistic group Goth. piudo, Irish tiath, Ocs. ripto, etc., noted above, certain clans combined at the call of special circumstances; and, just as among the Slavonic tribes which were placed under the leadership of a vojvoda, so among the Teutons they were directed by an 'army-leader' (O. Norse hertogi, A.S. keretgo, O.H.G. herzogo) — a fact distinctly attested by early writers; thus Caesar writes:

'Cum bellum civitatis aut illiusque defendendi aut inebri, magistratus, qui et bello praeest, etibus nescius habeant potestatem, delegat. In pace nullus communis est magistratus; sed principes regionum autque pagorum inter se hinc ducem etiam in locis controvestisque munici' [de bello Gall., vi, 29],

and Bede, speaking of the Saxons, says:

'Nos non habet regem item antiqui Saxones, sed satura (A.S. dena) in bonum alium — precisely like the Saxon stanirm stands amis genti plus patrocinii, quem ingruit bellorum militum sequitores, et quemcumque eorum confortet, hunc tempus bellorum omnium sequatur, hinc obtinens; patrocinium alium bellorum, rursum sequia potius omnium sint satura' [Ritu. c. 70].

But, while among the Slavs such combinations, formed for a special purpose, soon dissolved again into their component parts (the plenena, or clans) when that purpose had been effected, they must, among the Germans, have been of a more permanent kind; and, in point of fact, this important advance towards the formation of a political State (in place of the primitive family, or clan-State, which was longest maintained among the Slavs) must have been the result of influences emanating from the Celts, as the primitive Teutonic word denoting the domain of the piudo (civitas), viz. Goth. reddi, A.S. rice, O.H.G. rikhi, primitive Teut. *rik-jo, e-ruem, *kingdom (Germ. Reic), is on indisputable linguistic grounds (cf. Schrader, Reallexikon, p. 451) a derivative of the O. Irish rige (*rigyo,-m, *rigyo-m), and this, again, is derived from the Celtic term for 'king,' O. Irish rt, acc. rigt (cf. Oirgortox, Dummnu-rig).

As regards the form of government, the civitates, as they were called by the Romans, fell into two classes, viz. those which were governed by a single rex, and those which were governed by a number of principes from the several pagi. The Teut. term for the king of a nationality (i.e. rex civitas) appears in the series Goth. piuda, O.N. pjoðan, A.S. piode, all connected above. The chiefs of the several pagi ('clan-rulers,' or whatever we may call them) were, no doubt, originally called 'kings' (O.N. konungr, A.S. cyning, O.H.G. chonnin). This word is related to Goth. kuni, 'kin,' 'tribe'; it means, however, not, as was formerly supposed, one belonging to a family (i.e., a family of rank), but rather something like 'king's son,' 'prince,' being derived, in fact, by the addition of the patronymic suffix -ingo (cf. Wulung, Atheling, etc.), from a simple form *kuni-, 'king,' which is found in such compounds as O.H.G. kuni-richi, 'kingdom,' O.S. cynrheim, 'king's kingdom,' O.N. kuni- or *kunu, differs from kuni, *kuno, 'tribe,' O.H.G. chummi, 'people,' only as regards gender, the relation of the two being exactly the same as between A.S. leod (masc.), *princis, and leod (fem.), 'princes,' between Saxon Frankish, *dominus, and O.H.G. dodi, 'people' (cf. also Goth. kindins, *þynu, connected etymologically with Lat. gens, genitas). The *kuno-, one may say, was the *kuno-s of the Slavic *kun, being etymologically identical with Gr. géow, Lat. genus, denotes a tribe formed, or regarded as formed, upon a basis of kinship, the
Theological evidence, too, brings us to the result
that the 
must have been a group closely resembling in structure the Slavic pisme. Now the more frequently the 
wording governed by the 
to resemble the king in the position of a nationally, the more generally would the term 
come to bear the full significance of the latter, "the first," as between the two 
and became quite indeterminate—the more so, indeed, as the constitutional position of the 
and the princes among the Teutons was in principle the same, and in its main features virtually identical with, what it was among the Slavs and Lithuanians. As among the latter peoples, so among the Teutons, the 
and 
were elected by the people:

reges ex nobilitatis sansum (Tac. Germ. vii.); "eligitur in isleam concilis et principes" (ib. xii.).

Among the Teutons likewise, the kingship was to some extent hereditary—in so far, namely, as in the several States there were 
stirpes, i.e., powerful families of rank, or, as it might be put with reference to the Slavs, powerful 
who were able to procure the election of one of themselves (e.g., the son or other relative of the previous rex or princeps). As among the Slavs, moreover, the test of the people to "know" his election and might also depose, expel, or kill him—e.g., when under his rule it suffered a failure of crops or a disaster in war, or found him acting contrary to its will.

...hos (Burgundios) ... ex appellatur Hibernos (i.e. "the first," connected with Irish e. "primus," O. Gaul. Celtaignuo; cit. O.H.G. furtus, "princis," cit. "the first"), et ritu veteri posta delecta removetur, si sub eo fortuna titubaverit peli vel sequitur copiam regatas (Amm. Marc. xvm. v. 14).

Among the Germans, as among the Lithuanian Slavs, the rex or princeps had a very limited power in relation to his people:

Nec regibus infinita ant libera potestas (Tac. Germ. vii.); they were obeyed "non praecepio luro pertagel" (ib. xiv.).

...Morcelli et Malorici qui nationem eam (Prisonum) regabant, in quantum Germani regnaverant (Amm. xvm. xliii.).

In the royal as in the princely state of both races under their prince the real power was in the hands of the people, and its organ was the public assembly (Goth. mospt, O.N. modl, A.S. moedel, O.H.G. mahal), in which the rex or the princeps, or his deputy, spoke, expressed his will, not by the influence of his position, but by the personal prestige which he enjoyed:

Mox rex vel princeps, præst actas inique, præst nobilitias, præst decus belorum, præst fides amici, præst judiciis est, auduntur antelat- tate sedendi magis quam iubendi potestate (Tac. Germ. xi.).

Finally, the Teutons seem to have resembled the Slavs in providing no fixed revenues for their 
or princeps; as regards the Germans, at all events, we have the express statement of Tacitus:

...ets est civitas ultra ac virtutis conferre principibus vel armamentis vel frugum; quod pro honore acceptum illi necessitatis subveniat (ib. v.)

5. Features peculiar to the Teutons. — Thus there is the point of difference between the Teutons and the Slavs with regard to the position of their rulers. Among the Teutons a very prominent part of the duties that fell to the king or prince was his share in the administration of the law. So far as the rex is concerned, this may be inferred from the fact that he could claim a portion of the compensation paid by an offender (cf. Tac. Germ. xii. "pars multa regi").

The princes 

Principes regium de quo pagorum inter seus fuisse dicunt controversiam manentem (12. 23); and Tacitus says:

"Eligitur in isleam concilis et principes, qui lurs erit pagos vicicique reddunt" (Germ. xii.).

With this may be compared what was said regarding the Slavs with reference to the extract (n. p. 723f), though a German writer says the function of arbitration that belonged to the king (Czar) may not refer to real Slavs at all. It is true that, according to the Chronicle of the year 882, the Slavs, in appealing to the Varangian king, asked him: "Tell us, O Varangian prince, who will rule over us and judge according to law?" (undilæ po prveni); but in the first redaction of the Russian Pravda (L. 19) it is still a common law that the king (princeps [starei, elders]) that decides legal cases (on these questions cf. L. K. Goetz, op. cit. i. passim).

Another feature characteristic of the Teutonic kingship, even in primitive times, was its relation to the gods, which is clearly brought out by Tacitus in his description of the German practice of divination:

"Proprium gentis equorum quoque praestigia ac monitus exspectabat: publicos aluntur isideam memoriae ac laudis, candidi et nullo mortali opere contenebat; quos presso macro currus accedere, ac rex vel princeps [N.B. a single prince] cum consilium illustriisque ac fideiussimi observaret" (Germ. xii.).

Here, again, the present writer is unable to adduce any clear analogy from the Slavic-Lithuanian world.

Thus, on the whole, we may say that alike on Teutonic and Slavic soil the position of the king or prince was in a political sense a distinctly weak one, and it is only among the Eastern Teutons that Tacitus finds a more vigorous grasp of royal power:

"Trans Lygios Gotthones regnatur paulum adductus quin cetera Germanorum gentes, non omnem senem aequum libertatem, Protinus deinde ab Oceanae Rugi et Lemovici; omnique eorum gentium insigne ... ega reges obsqueum" (Germ. xiii.).

Siurom (Swedes) hinc civitates natae, folio et opibus honos; eque umius imperat ... (ib. xiv.).

It is perhaps no more coincidence that the Celtic term for 'king' survived only in the Eastern Teutonic dialect (Goth. reiks, from Irish rí[he]), while other derivatives from rí[he] denoting 'kingdom' (Goth. reiks) and 'powerful' (reiks) are found in all branches of the Teutonic family of languages.

6. General features of the Teutonic development. — We are now in a position to summarize the development of kingship in the Teutonic. Our first datum here, among Slavs, Lithuanians, and Prussians, is the existence of agnatic family-groups, which survive in the poset of the Roman writers (Text. *ga-uo-ya-ya*, 'village community of blood-relations.' Goth. *gumblia*, 'family,' *clan,' Goth. *kun*). At the head of such a group stood the clan-chiefstein, the *kuniyo-s (O.H.G. chinung; cf. kuni-reihi above), but the actual seat of communal authority was the public assembly (*maplam, Goth. mepdam*).

From the earliest times these family-groups had combined with one another for common action under a chosen leader (*kariug(e)*, O.H.G. heirozgo), so forming groups (*peoeh, Goth. pisula*), which, once their object had been attained, were as a rule soon broken up into their component parts. Such temporary combinations, however, tended more and more to follow the Celtic model and become permanent, even in times of peace, and at length resulted in the political structure which Roman writers call a civitas. The domain of a civitas again, was designated *rik-eo-m* (Goth. reiks), a Celtic loan-word, while the title of its chief might either be the Celtic term *rîks (Goth. reiks), or the Teut. *peoeh-s* (Goth. pisula), or, again, *kuniyo-s (O.H.G. chinung), the name applied originally to the head of the group. Frequently, however, the civitas itself had a plurality of heads; but, whether it had one or more, the real power was vested in the public assembly, and the government was, at least
originally, of an essentially democratic form. Now this Teutonic phase of kingly rule exerted an influence in very early times upon the East of Europe—upon Lithuanians, Prussians, and Slavs. This is shown in the clearest way by the evidence of language. From the Teutonic sphere come the O. Pruss. rikis, ‘kingdom,’ rike, ‘to rule,’ and rikata, ‘government,’ while in all the Slavic tongues—O. Bulg. kняз, Russ. князь, Czech knaz, Pol. kniaź, etc.—was bor-
rowed in primitive times from the Teut. * kyningaz. These derivatives seem to indicate that among the Lita-Slavs likewise royal authority was here and there being more effectively established, and that there were movements tending to pass away from the old family-State. When the Slavic chroniclers write of the first political government in a political State, as contrasted with a more management of affairs in a district, they have to resort to the borrowed words князь, князь, in place of the native власть, власт, (see above, p. 14). It was as was applied that the Scandinavian Varangians were invited by the Slavs:

"Our land," said the latter, "is large, good, and blessed with all things, but there is no order in it; come to be kings among us, and we shall be your subjects." (Cf. A.S. Schefe-
maker, Story of the Invasion of the Varangians [Russian], St. Petersburg 1894, passim.)

It is to be assumed, though we cannot follow up the subject here, that in an early epoch true cieviates were formed upon the Teutonic pattern both in the East and in the West of the Slavic areas—among Russians, Czechs, and Poles, and doubtless also in Prussia and Lithuania. Among the Southern Slavs, however, the primitive family-State, as was indicated above, survived until the political formations of the 18th and 19th centuries. It is interesting to note that in the Middle Ages the Slavs adopted a new term for 'king' from the proper name of Charlemagne, who came into hostile contact with them both in the East and in the South. This relative modern importation appears in O. Slav. князь, Russ. князь, etc. Here, accordingly, we have a phenomenon analogous to what had taken place about a century earlier among the Teutonic peoples when they adopted the term Kaiser (Goth. kaisar, A.S. cæsar, O.H.G. kaisar) from the name of the great Caesar, used as a title of the Emperors of Rome.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the article. There is as yet no special work in which ancient Teutonic and ancient Slavic modes of government are considered in their mutual relations.

KINGDOM OF GOD. I. THE OT.

1. Introduction. Behind the ideal Kingdom of God, which appears in the prophets and psalmists, there had doubtless been, as the author of Is 8:18 assumes, the conception that Jahweh was Israel's King. This is found in the ancient song of Balaam (Nu 23:11); it is perhaps reflected in the name Malchishua, given to Saul's third son; and the manner in which the term is applied to Jahweh by the earliest literary prophets (e.g., Is 6:1; Hos 10:11) indicates that it was an old practice. It was not peculiar to Israel; the Ammonites, e.g., called theirs—among Rod Môtôn (Isa 1:1; Jer 50:27, etc.). The Kingship of Jahweh was not thought to be lowered by the rise of an earthly kingship in Israel; at least such a feeling did not long persist. For the worship of Jahweh was manifestly promoted by the centraliza-
tion of the government under the kings, and the prophets of the 8th and 7th centuries thought of the government of Israel in the great future as vested in kings. If, then, the idea had ever been felt that the adoption of a kingly form of govern-
ment was equal to the rejection of Jahweh's rule, as the editor of Judges and Samuel supposed (Josh 14:5, 18:5), it must soon have become obsolete. The presence of two thrones in Jerusalem, that of Jahweh in the Holy of Holies and that of David, was regarded as normal for Israel. But Jahweh's earthly kingdom was divided, and the period of decline began which was to end in exile and foreign domination. It was in this period and against this dark background that visions of an ideal kingdom arose in Israel.

2. The data. Glimpses of the coming Kingdom of God, more or less vivid and detailed, are found from Amos onward, in the Psalms also, and to some extent in the Book of Daniel. The first literary prophets wrote in the days of the Warning, and the Psalms, after the rebuilding of the Temple (516 B.C.), in a time of national gloom and conflict with the remote past. Of these data none can claim to be much older than the age of the first literary prophets; some may be younger than the book of Daniel; the larger part, however, belongs to the period between Jeremiah and the Maccabees.

The section of this long period which seems to have been most fruitful in visions of the ideal Kingdom is that of the Babylonian Exile, and the most marked section the first century after the rebuilding of the Temple (516 B.C.), unless, with some scholars, we assign the last eleven chapters of Isaiah to the period of Ezra-Nehemiah. The three events that most occasioned the most clearly defined groups of data regarding the ideal Kingdom were the approach of the Assyrian power (722-701 B.C.), the fall of Jerusalem (586), and, the destruction of the Babylonian kingdom by Cyrus (538). In view of the first of these events, Amos and Hosea, Isaiah and Micah, spoke of a great future beyond the approaching day of evil; in view of the second, Jeremiah wrote; and, in view of the last, a part at least of Is 40-55 was composed. The Psalms which contain general features of an ideal future seem to presuppose such an acquaintance with the nations and with suffering as came to Israel with the Exile, and those Psalms that may concern an individual king of the Davidic line, as 2, 18, 21, 45, 61, 72, 80, and 110, are most easily understood as written after the fall of Jerusalem.

3. Jahweh and the ideal Kingdom. The invari-
able and supreme factor in the great future is Jahweh. On this all prophetic writings are at one. Whatever agents assume prominence now and again, it is always Jahweh who is the efficient cause of the new and more perfect age. It is Jahweh who brings back the remnant of His people (Am 9:14, Hos 11:11, Is 11:11, Mic 7:14, Jer 31:4, Ezk 11:10-12, etc.); Jahweh who gives material pros-
perity in the land of Israel (Hos 14, Jer 33, Ezk 33:20, etc.); Jahweh who makes a new people for His new land, washing away the filth of the daughters of Zion (Is 4:7), making a new covenant with His people (Jer 31:33-34), giving them a new heart (Ezk 36:24), and putting His spirit upon them for ever (Is 69:13); Jahweh who judges the nations (Am 1:7, etc.), brings foreigners to His temple (Is 43:5), and sends blessings on all flesh (Is 55:11). The ideal future presents itself as a time when Jahweh reigns in Zion over His people (Is 24:2, Mic 4:5), and teaches His ways to all nations (Is 59:20). This relation of Jahweh to Israel's ideal future is rooted in Israel's past. It is not something quite new, but a glorification of the old. The Mt. Zion of the ideal future is but the ancient mount made higher (Is 2:2), and the new people are people of a new covenant with Jahweh, more in-
ward than the old, in the same sense as at all times the ideal Kingdom is an idealization of the greatest facts of Israel's past.

4. Davidic rule and the ideal Kingdom. A common but not constant feature of Israel's ideal future, important but never supreme, is the element of a Davidic rule. Davidic 'rule,' or house, we
must say rather than Davidic 'king,' because it is a
relatively seldom that attention is fixed on a particu-
As God's kingdom is a "living reality" (Col. 1:13), its nature is to be found in its attributes and in the activities of its subjects. The kingdom of God is the rule of God in the heavens, embodied in the Son of Man (Matt. 6:10). It is the reign of righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit (Rom. 14:17). The kingdom of God is the rule of God in the hearts of his people (Matt. 5:3). It is a spiritual kingdom that is established by the preaching of the gospel (Acts 8:12). The kingdom of God is also a visible kingdom that is established by the rule of the Church over the world (Rev. 11:15). It is a kingdom of salvation (Acts 15:14), a kingdom of grace (Rom. 8:31), and a kingdom of love (1 John 4:17). The kingdom of God is the rule of God in the lives of his people (Col. 1:13). It is a kingdom that is to be desired (Ps. 45:2) and a kingdom that is to be feared (Ps. 45:6). The kingdom of God is a kingdom of peace (Isa. 14:6) and a kingdom of justice (Isa. 11:6). It is a kingdom of righteousness (Isa. 11:10) and a kingdom of love (Isa. 53:5). The kingdom of God is the rule of God in the church (Eph. 1:22) and a kingdom that is to be desired (Rev. 10:1). It is a kingdom of light (Rev. 21:23) and a kingdom of truth (Rev. 21:26). The kingdom of God is a kingdom of salvation (Acts 15:14) and a kingdom that is to be feared (Ps. 45:6). It is a kingdom of peace (Isa. 14:6) and a kingdom of justice (Isa. 11:6). It is a kingdom of righteousness (Isa. 11:10) and a kingdom of love (Isa. 53:5).
Jahweh makes a 'full end' of judgment in the land (Is 10:11). Thus the beginning of society in the ideal future was thought of as somewhat the new planting of the race after the Flood. The new stock is not sinless, but it is purified and ennobled. Each member will be given his share of men in the ideal future as needing priestly intercession, as making offerings and sacrifices, though the covenant with Jahweh is then written on the heart (Jer 31:33, 34). With Ezekiel the office of a temple and priesthood is conspicuous (40-48), though he thought of the people as having experienced a profound change (37:26).

No, did Isaiah, while declaring that every one who was left in Zion should be called holy (44), think of a sinless race of men. Like the post-Exilic Malachi (3:1-4), he thought rather of a people who were morally and spiritually quickened and exalted, but yet capable of sin (Is 33:14). The hopeful prophet of the Exile, though seeing by faith a city and land in which Jahweh would take delight (Is 63:17), a people whose children were all to be taught of God (54:10), and all righteous (61), nevertheless believed that the new Zion would have a temple (44:22), and seemed to admit the existence of sin when he says that the 'sinner' being a hundred years old shall be accounted (65:12). Thus, we believe the little company with whom the ideal future begins nor their descendants are thought of as sinless, their moral and spiritual state is indeed exalted. The prophets are fond of setting this forth in two closely related terms, that of knowing-Jahweh-and the affections of the messiah with Him. The new Israel shall add to Jahweh as hisi, 'my husband' (Hos 2:23), and Jahweh shall rejoice over His people as a bride rejoicing over her bridegroom (Is 62:4, Zeph 3:17). Much more frequently the happy state of the redeemed in the great future is summed up as 'knowing Jehovah.' That is the key to Isaiah's vision of peace (11), the fruit of Jerusalem's new covenant in the heart of all (31:14), and it is promised to all the children of the most-tossed Zion (Is 54:13). Of the depth and vital character of this knowledge we have indications in Hosea's sorrowful word, 'My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge' (4), in Jeremiah's connecting it with his new covenant (31:33-34), as well as in his thought that the shepherds who shall teach the new Israel will be according to Jahweh's heart (56:1), and clearly in the statement of the Exile that Jahweh Himself shall be the teacher (Is 54:5). This is a knowledge that permeates the entire man, the will and the heart as much as the understanding. In Ezekiel and certain post-Exilic writings the moral and spiritual state of restored Israel is conceived less profoundly. Ezekiel's New Jerusalem is dominated by ritual. He speaks indeed of a new heart, but it is to be manifested in keeping the old statutes and ordinances (36:26-27). In Joel and Zechariah the holiness of the redeemed Israel seems to be thought of as physical separation from everything that is ceremonially unclean. No stranger shall pass through Jerusalem, nor a Canaanite come into Jahweh's temple (Jl 3:19, Zec 14:18).

Such were the prophets' thoughts of the individual member of the ideal Kingdom. Other features of the society remain to be mentioned. Judah and Israel, which had been separated for three hundred years when Jeremiah wrote, are again to walk together (Jer 3:18, Ezk 37:15-19). Justice and righteousness are to prevail everywhere, in the wilderness as well as in the fruitful field (Is 25:10). Moreover, the new knowledge of Jahweh bears fruit not only in right relations between man and man, but also in great joy and abiding peace. The redeemed shall not see any more (Jer 31:20), but shall have a wreath of everlasting joy upon their heads (Is 35:2). Jahweh will create Jerusalem a rejoicing and her people a joy (Is 65:17). Such statements, since sin and death still exist in the ideal future, must be understood in a relative sense; not less so the announcement that a deep, universal, and abiding peace will characterize the new Israel (Is 29:11). Such statements, since sin and death still exist in the ideal future, must be understood in a relative sense; not less so the announcement that a deep, universal, and abiding peace will characterize the new Israel (Is 29:11). Such statements, since sin and death still exist in the ideal future, must be understood in a relative sense; not less so the announcement that a deep, universal, and abiding peace will characterize the new Israel (Is 29:11).

To the spiritual side of the ideal Kingdom belongs its religions relation to the nations. This is variously conceived by different prophets. It is not touched by Amos or Hosea. According to Is 26:7 all the nations flow under the house in Jerusalem, apparently ly a spontaneous movement. Jahweh's house is exalted so high that they see it and are attracted. They have confidence that Jahweh will teach them, and they come with a purpose to walk in His ways. Since peoples do not readily change their gods, this conception of Isaiah that all nations would be drawn to Jahweh's house implies that, in his view, the religion of the new Israel would be far more powerful in the lives of men than religion had ever been in the past.

There is no suggestion of missionary work on the part of Israel in the conversion of Egypt (Is 19). Jahveh sends a deliverer to Egypt in a time of crisis, and in consequence Egypt worships Jahweh. Not only not, but the prophet appears to teach that the Assyrians become worshipers of Jahweh through the influence of Egypt. This outlook of Isaiah has no parallel for a century and a half, but in the latter part of the Exile and in the post-Exilic age we hear again of Israel's religious relation to the Gentiles in the ideal future. In Oseero-Isaiah, exclusive of the Songs of the Servant, and in Ps 2 and Ps 72, the religious influence of Israel is associated with the idea of its political dominion, and owing to this a certain tone of severity (Is 41:20-44:28). In one of the late visions ascribed to Zechariah (14:16-20), the remnant of the nations are to go up to worship Jahweh and to keep the Feast of Tabernacles; if they do not, they are to be punished. Far different is the conception of Jehovah's purpose in Is 25, which may be larger than the return from Babylon: Jahweh is to give a great banquet in Zion to all nations, and is there to destroy the veil that is between all nations. There is no hint of political subjection to Israel. The nations come into the spiritual light and joy which Jehovah gives.

Still more significant is the conception of Israel's ideal religious service to the Gentiles which is found in the Song of the Servant. This is not now in Zion, but afar, in their respective homes, that they receive Jahweh's salvation (Is 49:1). It is not at a banquet given by Jahweh, but through the efforts of His faithful people, that the nations have the 'veil' removed. It is not here through the largess of the King that the Gentiles are blessed, but through the quiet and patient testimony of the Servant (Is 42:6). Through the bitter suffering and martyrdom of the Servant (Is 52:13), Israel's spiritual relation to the Gentiles is the deepest ethical thought of the OT on the subject.
to have immediately preceded it, that is, the breaking of Assyria's power; the mountain of Jahweh's house was not exalted above the hills, and the nations did not flow unto it; Egypt was not brought to Jahweh's house; the light of Egypt lead Assyria to Sennacherib in the God of Israel. The ideal future of which Jeremiah spoke did not dawn after seventy years (203), nor did the Davidic deliverer of Ezk 29:21 arise at the close of the forty years' desolation and captivity. The hopes associated with the return of the exiles whom Cyrus released (Is 41:2-4, 45:1-6) was not fulfilled; nor was Zerubbabel the Davidic king who was to bring in the long expected day (Hag 2:2, Zec 4:4). As with these hopes which contained an element of time, so with the others. The vision of Jahweh's glory in restored Israel and Zion—a city most splendid, a temple surpassing Solomon's, and the Shekinah rendering sun and moon unnecessary—did not find an embodiment when Jahweh brought back the captives; nor did the reign of peace among the nations and peace in Nature begin. The restored people were no matchless army, the temple was not built, and the land was not more fertile nor the hills and mountains more plentifully supplied with water, life was not prolonged so that a child died a hundred years old, the fact of a connection from one generation to another. Judah and Israel were not re-united on the return from Babylion; indeed, Israel never returned.

As for the people who had gone back to Jerusalem, they were not the men of the ideal future of whom Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah had spoken. They were doubtless a chosen remnant in respect of their loyalty to Jahweh and their patriotic devotion to Zion, but the literature that deals with the post-exilic history plainly shows that they were not a people in whom Jahweh's new covenant was realized, not a people taught of Jahweh in a unique manner and established in righteousness.

Another fact is to be noted in this connexion. The prophets themselves were well aware that the prophetic expectations have been fulfilled, but they did not cease to speak with confidence of God's purposes for Zion. In 734 B.C. Isaiah expected, within a little while, the Davidic prince who, the Assyrian power having been broken, would inaugurate the ideal Kingdom; and then, a generation later, in 702 B.C., though his earlier expectation had not been accomplished, he spoke again, with equal assurance, of the turning back of the inquirer and the dawn of a new age (Is 2:20). Sennacherib was indeed turned back, but the hoped-for age was not therewith inaugurated.

A century later, in the new crisis that had arisen with the approach of the Babylonians, the prophet Jeremiah speaks of the political uncertain hope, which had looked for in his own day, beyond an exile of long duration. Deutero-Isaiah foresees Israel's return in conjunction with the overthrow of Babylon as an event of the near future, and associated the ideal Kingdom with that return; and, though this hope was not realized, Zechiahiah, in those very days, declared that Jahweh had returned to Zion, and that He would gather His dispersed into the land a second time (Jer 31:2-12). The two hopes, then, could do good to the people (8). Later, perhaps much later, we hear an unknown prophet foretelling that after the distress which was to befall Jerusalem the new age would dawn, when Jahweh's name would be one in all the earth (Zec 14:4). Thus the vision of an ideal future which had arisen with Amos and Hosea did not fade away. Jahweh's name, undeterred by its failure to be embodied on earth, and baring no jot of heart or hope, looked for its realization in a future not too remote.

This persistence of hope, taken together with the fact of a considerable element of change in the visions of the ideal future, seems to show that the prophets were not greatly concerned with the particular details of their pictures, but were established in certain great principles of Jahweh's character and will. Their thoughts of times and seasons, of agents and methods of fulfilment, of fit material and political accomplishments of the coming ideal State, might vary from one another, and might all be very imperfect or quite wrong; they still held to an ideal perfecting of Jahweh's gracious will in a glorious Kingdom for His chosen people. Whether the vision of the prophets in its essential elements prospered according to the spirit of His work, or is yet to find it there, is a question that lies beyond the limits of this article.

II. In the NT.—1. Introductory note.—For the study of the Kingdom of God in the NT two points are of fundamental importance: (1) the use of the term 'by Jesus, and (2) the word 'Church' as used by the early disciples. The present article is limited to the former. In determining the content of the term 'Kingdom of God' in the thought of Jesus, the hope of progress lies in a more careful analysis and valuation of the various sources of His teaching.

The apocalyptic literature, beginning with Dan 7:14, influenced the form rather than the content of Jesus' teaching on the 'Kingdom of God', or, in particular, on the consummation of that Kingdom. Even this influence is often exaggerated. The Logia contain very little that presupposes an influence of apocalyptic literature (as Mt 19:28-29, 25-40, and Mk 13 cannot all be ascribed to Jesus. The thought of the nearness of the Kingdom of God and the bondage of the soul's consciousness of God's presence with Him, and was not at all due to the apocalypses. Moreover, what is most characteristic of Jesus, His supreme emphasis on the ethical-religion of the Kingdom, is found in much of the apocalyptic literature, for the authors of that literature lived in visions of the consummation.

2. The data—It is significant that the term 'Kingdom of God' (or 'Kingdom of heaven') occurs in the material which is peculiar to Matthew about three-quarters as many times as in the Logia, the oldest Gospel, and the matter peculiar to Luke taken together (Logia eight, oldest Gospel eleven, matter peculiar to Luke three, matter peculiar to Matthew seventeen). We infer that it was a favourite term with the editor of the First Gospel—such an inference that receives support from the fact that he has sometimes prefixed the term to parables where its use appears to be extremely vague (e.g., Mt 21). If, however, the term was a favourite one with this editor, we should form an impression regarding the proneness of the conception in the teaching of Jesus, not from his usage, but from the Logia and the oldest Gospel. Having regard to these sources, we must say that the term 'Kingdom' is used by Jesus with great frequency. The Logia may count slightly less than 200 verses, and the words of Jesus in the oldest Gospel a few more
than that, and, as was said above, the former source contains the term in question but eight times and the latter only eleven. The matter peculiar to Luke contains approximately 164 verses which are not in the other. In these the term 'Kingdom of God' occurs but three times, while in Matthew's peculiar material, which contains about 187 verses which are words of Jesus, the term is found six times. Furthermore, it may be noted here that no one is reported to have spoken of what He meant by 'Kingdom of God,' and that He never felt called upon to declare in what sense He used the term. His thought on the subject, like His thought on Messiaship, was left by Him to be inferred by those who had seen eyes and understanding hearts. His faithful disciples occupied His thought far more than did the coming of the Son of man with the clouds of heaven, and the least detail of their spiritual life was more important in His sight than all the computations of the apocalypticists regarding the day and hour of the 'end,' or how the 'end' was to be ushered in.

2. 'Kingdom of God' as used by Jesus.—(a) His agreement with the Prophets.—The word of the oldest King (Mt 1.static) and the first one that, when Jesus came into Galilee, He preached, saying, 'The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand; repent and believe in the Gospel.' This is the same as the consciousness of being in the prophetic line, a continuation of the prophetic hope of a divine Kingdom. But, when we hear what He said of the Kingdom at different times, it becomes plain that He was not a continuator of the prophetic hope in its entirety, and that His thought moved in line with what the great prophets had said of the spiritual side of the ideal Kingdom. He said nothing of the restoration of the Davidic throne, nothing of the glory and riches of Palestine in the day of fulfillment. The only kingship that He contemplated was the Kingship of God (Mt 26:50), which is regarded as unattainable. That this rule of God was regarded by Him as a teaching of the OT appears, e.g., in the manner in which it is introduced into the model for prayer which He gave His disciples. They are taught to pray: 'Thy kingdom come (Lk 11), and it is taken for granted that they will understand this term. The petition is, indeed, a petition for the fulfillment of such OT words as Is 28:20 and Mic 4:4.

(b) Penal elements in His usage.—(1) Jesus' thought of the Kingdom of God is not altogether identical with the spiritual side of that Kingdom as seen by the prophets. It is more inward and personal. That is, while the prophets pictured the Kingdom of God as like unto heaven (Lk 19:16), and in the oldest Gospel it is compared with the earth which, once the seed is deposited in it, carries forward its development until the corn is full (Mt 1.static-25), in both cases the Kingdom is a force working from within. It is self-propagating in the parable of the Leaven, and in that of the Automatic Earth it is a seed that the heart mysteriously germinates and matures. These parallels go further than the prophets in their implications regarding the nature of man and his relation to God.

(2) Again, it is peculiar to Jesus, in distinction from the prophets, that He thought of the Kingdom of God as having a lowly beginning. The heart of a child is the most favorable soil for it (Mt 19:14). The mustard seed is the fittest symbol of its opposition to its time. Furthermore, it is in the size of the plant which it produces (Mt 13).

(3) The use of Jesus differs from that of the prophets, further, in that He speaks of a Kingdom of God existing on earth in two spheres, an earthly and a heavenly. No difference between the earthly and the heavenly Kingdom of God is clearly marked in His words (Mt 4:25 is probably a Christian expansion of the last clause of Lk 9:11). The Logia have one saying, possibly two, in which the Kingdom of God is equivalent to the Son of man (Lk 1:33, Lk 17:20 = Mt 5:5), and the oldest Gospel has one such saying, possibly more (Mt 9:5; cf. 10:4.b-25 = 13:45).

(4) Finally, the usage of Jesus differs most widely from that of the prophets in that He thought of the Kingdom actually begun with Him and His disciples. In an important sense it was still future, but it was also present. This is clearly implied in a saying of the Logia, though it does not contain the term in question. Jesus said to His disciples (Lk 10:9-11): 'Blessed are the eyes which see the things that ye see: for I say unto you, that many prophets and kings desired to see the things which ye see, and saw them not; and to hear the things which ye hear, and heard them not.' This reference to the OT hope determines the meaning of the words 'what ye see' and 'what ye hear'; it is the fulfillment of the prophetic vision of a better future. Again, in the oldest Gospel there are at least four indications of Jesus that belong here. He said to His disciples: 'Unto you is given the mystery of the Kingdom of God' (Mt 13:11). The 'mystery' was something to be revealed to the disciples, and the disciples were learning it in that very hour. Secondly, a scribe who answered discreetly, Jesus said: 'Thou art not far from the kingdom of God' (Mt 12:35). It would seem a necessary inference from this word that His own disciples were nearer to the Kingdom as in the kingdom of God. Quite in accord with this is the saying preserved in Lk 17:20c: 'The kingdom of God cometh not with observation: neither shall they say, Lo, here! neither, There, there! for lo, the kingdom of God is within you.' The new age had begun; therefore that of the Law and the prophets had come to an end. On the other hand, it is equally clear in the oldest sources that Jesus looked for the coming of the Kingdom of God in some future day. He taught His disciples to pray for it (Lk 11), and He assured them that it would come with power within a generation (Mt 9:5). The reconciliation of these apparently discordant views lies in the nature of the Kingdom of God as Jesus conceived of it. Neither view can be ignored by the historical student. Both are contained in the conceptions of the Kingdom as a soot that develops and matures for the time of harvest for God's final act. JESUS CHRIST, III, B. C. 2, above, pp. 510-513.


G. H. Gillett.

KING'S EVIL.—This is the name given to scrofula, a disease which was supposed to be cured by the touch of the king of England. The same belief was held regarding the king of France. The Lat. regis morbus originally denoted jaundice, but, with comencesed (Mid. Dutch) and le mal de royn (Old Fr.), was applied to scrofulous affections, and especially glandular swellings of the neck and face (see OED, i.e.). Doubtless other ailments were at times popularly included in the phrase 'the Evil' or 'the King's Evil.' There was a belief that the seventh son could cure the malady (John 4:10; 2 Cor. 11:11, Body of Man, London, 1915, p. 340). This is sometimes extended to the seventh son of a seventh son, and even to the ninth son of a ninth son. This belief also was once the crux of many laws of public health. The method was by stroking. Fantastic medicines were prescribed for the curing of the Evil, such
as goose dung, viper’s flesh, and lion’s blood (Gulielmus van den Bossche, Historia Medic. Brussels, 1639, Index, e. v. ‘Scrophulis remedia’).

In medicine the sorcerer is said to have been the first to cure by touch those suffering from ulcers. William of Malmesbury states that some of these miracles happened in Normandy before he came to the throne (Gesta Regum, London, 1840, ii. 229).

It is clear that the king had a model to follow in the canonized king — whilst presenting an idyllic picture of England in his day and recording several of his miracles. The notion of an active touch continued, for Shakespeare in Macbeth (iv. iii. 140) expresses the view of a later age when he makes Malcolm say: ‘

'Tis call’d the evil:
A most miraculous work; / Which often, since my here-remain in Englt, / I have seen him do. / How he solicits heaven,
Comes best to know; but strangely-lusted people, / All sworn and aurochs, pitiful to the eye, / The more despair of surgery, he cures.

Hanging a golden stamp about their necks, / Put on with holy prayer: / and ‘tis spoken,
To the succeeding royalty he leaves
The healing benediction.’

The touch is not mentioned among the reasons for Edward II. being canonized by the German monarchs, but it appears to have been fairly continuous from Henry II. to Queen Anne.

There is a curious passage in Sir John Fortescue’s tract on the title of the House of York that is not mentioned in the recantation which he forced to make in 1471 as a condition of his restoration. Arguing that a queen regnant is not allowed by the laws, he says: ‘And altho’ the Kings of England ben encrusted in thayre hands, and by vertue and merite they have doen talke commonel health sickness, by putting and touching the maladies, by threnching sickness; and also goud and siluer ben slaved by them, and so offered on Good Friday, have ben the meanes and cause of great cures, as it is known, and therefore such gold and siluer is desired in all the world. Which good things must nedes cease for all the time that a woman were so Queene of that land because that a woman may not be envoysed in her hands’ (first printed in T. F. Clemert. Lit. Hist. Wek. and Family History of Sir John Fortescue, London, 1869, i. 498). In the corresponding Latin of the Deinastic Jarret Thomas Lancastere the name of the medal is given—regius morbus (ib. p. 533). Fortescue’s doctrine was not accepted either as to the throne or as to the power of healing.

Edward II. became so money as alms, but Henry VII. was the first to bestow the small gold medal, which Shakespeare assigns to the generosity of the Confessor. There are cases in which it is alleged that the evil was caused by the touching-piece originally given to another sufferer.

The healings were performed mostly in London (by Charles II, at the Banqueting Hall, Whitehall), but the ceremony was possible wherever the Court might be; and Langley, Newmarket, Chester, Bath, Salisbury, and Oxford are known to have witnessed such functions. Easter, Whitsun, and Michaelmas were the usual seasons, and the hot weather was avoided.

The first separate treatise on The King’s Evil is Chasimia (London, 1567), by William Tooker, who declares that Queen Elizabeth cured many thousands. In 1602 William Clowes, a famous surgeon, published A right fruittfull and profitable treatises for the artificial cures of the malady called in Latin Struma, and in English The Evil cured by Kings and Queens of England. He also mentions Thomas Fuller, who, when young had seen James I. touch in Salisbury Cathedral, also professes unwavering faith.

If any doubt of the truth thereof, they may be remitted to the times and places for further confidence. He further says: ‘
Shall we be so narrow-hearted as to conceive it possible that, amongst all the hosts of corporal creatures, kings are the eminents of all Christian men, kings of Britain, the first-fruits of all Christian kings; should receive the peculiar

privilege and sanative power, whereof daily instances are presented unto us?’ (Chast’s History, ed. J. S. Brewer, Oxford, 1845, i. 387-390).

As the finances of Charles I. contracted, he substituted silver for gold in the touch-pieces, and many received only the imposition of the royal hands. The monarch according whose healings we have the fullest information was Caroline whose touch of 627 persons was granted. It is said she touched 90,798 persons. Evelyn, in his Diary, ed. W. Bray, London, 1890 (6th July 1660), gives a detailed account of one, and also notes that on 28th March 1664 there was so great a concourse of people, with their names, that 2574 persons were killed in the crush at the office where the tickets had to be obtained. Each applicant had to bring a certificate from the clergyman of his parish, and signatures of the churchwardens also were required by a proclamation issued in 1683. The parishes were expected to keep a register of the certificates they issued. At the public healings the king sat in his chair uncovered and surrounded by members of his court. One of the chaplains read the Gospel from Mk 16, and at the latter part of v. 13, they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover,’ the chief surgeon brought up the sick persons in order. The wages were 5s. a day, 1s. 6d. per person. The king stroked the face or neck, where the disease was evident, with both hands, and a second surgeon then took charge of the patient. The reason seems to be that all the patients had been touched; and a second Gospel from the first chapter of John was commenced. At v. 5 the surgeons presented each patient a second time. The Clerk of the Closet kneeling, presented to the king the gold medal on a white silk ribbon, which he then placed round the neck of the patient as the chaplain read v. 6; the Gospel was continued to v. 8, and followed by prayers. At the close the Lord Chamberlain and two other noblemen brought linen, basin, and ewer for the king to wash his hands, and with this the ceremony ended. Such was the procedure under Charles II. The office for the healing appears to have been drawn up in the time of Henry VII. in Latin, and was in part a modification of the blessing for sore eyes, and the exorcism against evil spirits. This was sometimes modified. Elizabeth used the sign of the cross, which was omitted by her successors, but restored by James II., by whose authority the office was printed in English in 1686. It was reprinted along with the Office for consecrating censing vessels being printed by license of Deucrul, by F. G. Waldron (Literary Miscellany, 1789). The final modification was in the reign of Queen Anne, and was included in the Prayers Book, incorporating that of 1724, although George I. never performed the ceremony—a fact duly noted by his disaffected Jacobite subjects. The forms used by James II. and Queen Anne are given in the third and fourth editions of Hamon L’Estrange’s Alliance of Divine Offices (1699, 1646). Occasionally there were private healings, when the ceremonial was less elaborate.

Patients were occasionally sent from various parts of the country at the partial cost of the places to which they belonged. In 1682 the Corporation of Preston paid 10s. for a bricklayer’s son to go to London ‘in order to the procuring of His Majesty’s touch.’ In 1697, for two girls to go to Chester, where James II. then was (J. Harland and T. T. Wilkinson, Lancashire Folklore, London, 1887, p. 77). Similar payments from Ecclesfield, York, and Kirkby near York have been noted (W. Andrews, Lancashire, London, 1893, p. 19; H. Fishwick, History of the Parish of Kirkham, London, 1874, pp. 98, 106).

The Stuart pretenders as well as the Stuart kings claimed the healing power, and one of the charges
in the trial of the Duke of Monmouth was that he had touched children for the Evil. The last recorded instance of the rite occurred in the Jacobite rising of 1745, when Prince Charles Edward touched the sick. In the Holywood Palaestine the "Touch-pieces" were struck for James III. and Henry IX., i.e. the Old Pretender and Cardinal York. Thomas Carte, in the first volume of his History of England, gives us a touching picture of the healing power of the kings was not due to anointing, recited the case of Christopher Love, who went abroad to be touched by 'the eldest lineal descendant of a race of kings' who had not been crowned or anointed. This eloquent reference to the Old Pretender led to a controversy, and the Corporation of London withdrew their subscription from the History (see J. Nichols, Literary Anecdotes of the 18th Century, London, 1819-15, ii. 495, where many details are given).

The power of healing the King's Evil was also claimed by the kings of France, and was said to have been given to Clovis at his anointing. Amplan, in Scallenburg, says that Philip I. was the first to touch, and that he was deprived of the power on account of his absolute life. The ritual was settled by St. Louis. After coronation at Rheims, the King went along a pilgrimage to the shrine of St. Mardouf, who died in a battle, and who was said to be successful in curing scrofula that it was called St. Mardouf's Evil after him. The sick were ranged in the church, or, when the number was too large, in the cloisters or in the park, where they were touched by the king and received a gift from the Grand Almoner. Heals are recorded by Charles VII. (1422), Louis XI. (1451), and Charles VIII. (1483). Cardinal Wolsey was present in 1530, when Francis I. touched 200 people. When Henry IV. was crowned at Chartres in 1594, as many as 1500 were present as at a healing. His physician Laurentius asserts that 50 per cent were cured within a few days after being touched. Peter Lowe (Discourses of the Whole Art of Chyrurgie, London, 1612) mentions the touch as used in France: 'The diseased is first viewed by the Chyrurgions, who finds in it to be the kind of King's Evil, then the diseased is set on his knees, and presented to the king, who maketh a cross on his forehead with his hand, saying, Le roy te touche. Dieu te guérit. God knows thee whole.' (J. Finlayson, Account of the Life and Works of Master Leonard Leisue, 1596, p. 8.)

Louis XIV. is said to have touched 2000 persons two days after his coronation, and 1600 on the Easter Sunday of 1666. Every French patient received 15 sous, every foreigner 30 sous. When Louis XV. was crowned, the King of St. Mardouf was brought to Rheims, and over 2000 persons were touched. The custom continued until 1776, and the authorized programme of the coronation of the Louis XVI.

R. J. Dunglasen (History of Medicine, Philadelphia, 1872, p. 209) asserts that the healing touch was not restricted to the kings of England and France; it appears to have been not infrequently employed by Druids. He conjectures that it arose from Druidic practices—a theory for which there appears to be no evidence. The kings of Hungary were credited with the power of curing jaundice. He accompanied his operations by prayer. It may be noticed that in all these cures, whether by kings, seventh sons, or healers, the common feature is that of stroking with the hands. That many patients were apparently benefited by the touch need not be doubted. The change of air involved in a journey to the Royal Court, religious solemnity, the Holy familiar blessing, and the efficacy of the touch-piece as an amulet, would all tend to help the natural curative process. The history of the royal healing suggests that it is a fragmentary survival from primitive times, in which the divinity sometimes centred in the same person, and when, as disease was regarded mainly as demonic possession and medicine as exorcism and magic, the priest had often to exercise the function of the physician. It is noteworthy that in England the healings were most numerous in the reign of Charles II., when the 'patriarchal theory' of the origin of monarchy was held by the Royalists in an extreme form. But the materials at command are scarcely sufficient to warrant any broad generalization.


WILLIAM E. A. AXON.

KISMET.—Kismet is an Arabic word, meaning 'lot', 'distribution', 'fate'. It is not found in the Qur'an in this philosophical sense, the idea of fate being there expressed by comparison with a bird: 'Every man's augury (lit. bird) have we fastened on his neck' (xxviii. 14); 'your augury (bird) is in God's hands' (xxviii. 48); Zamakhshari interprets thus: 'The source of good and evil is in God; and this is your destiny (kindur) or your fate (kismet). If God wishes, He gives you; if He wishes, He denies you.' In Qur'an xxxvi. 18 we read: 'Your augury (bird) is with you,' i.e. 'Your evil destiny accompanies you.' The origin of this comparison is unknown.

The idea expressed by the word kismet relates to events of the earthly life; it is the share of good luck or of accidents, of fortune or of misery, which fails to each. The term is not used in a theological sense like the words *khotan* and *khozape* which refer to man's good or bad deeds and to his destiny in the hereafter (see art. FATE [Muslim]).

The belief that each one's fate is settled beforehand by God, and that whatever one may do, one can scarcely modify it, is popular in Muslim countries; and is often to be found in Muslim literature, especially among the poets and story-tellers. In the rich collection entitled Al-Mutanab (ed. Fr. tr. by G. R. Cat, Paris, 1899) there are several chapters on fate and destiny, on fortune and its vices and virtues.

A man said one day to the philosopher Bununmah: 'I have seen an ignorant person enjoying the name of a wise man being excluded from them; hence I have understood that man has not in his hands the disposition of his fate' (al-Mutanab, l. 711). A poet has written: 'I know very well that it is only God who can be helpful or hurtful' (ibid.).

Said, in his Bedd ten (tr. C. Barbier de Meynard, Paris, 1880, ch. v), groups several anecdotes in which he explains the idea of fate and the duty of resignation.

'Happiness,' he says, 'is a gift of the divine justice; it would be more exact to say of the divine arbitrariness,' adding, however, that man has never the right to regard this arbitrariness as unjust. A clever archer can never hit his target with his arrow, but, when fate deserts him, he cannot
even make a hole in a piece of felt or silk. A poor man loses a penny and searches for it vainly; an indifferent passer-by, on the other hand, is complacent in the loss of the penny unostentatiously.

What is the use, then," concludes the poet, "of struggling against the force of chance?"

The following quatrains are from Alā Saud from Khayyām:

1 If your situation is good, it is not the result of your clever managing or the favor of the gods; resign yourself to your lot (Hicayen-Azad, La Recie de l'amour, Paris, 1906, tr. p. 360). In the story entitled 'The Story of the Sheik with the generous Palm,' in the Thousand and One Nights, a rich man twice gives a purse to a poor rope-maker to help him to free himself from his poverty; but scarcely has he received it than he loses it. One then gives him a worthless piece of lead, and this lead becomes the source of his fortune (tr. J. C. Mandrus, Paris, 1890-1900, xiv. 64 ff.; R. Burton, Supplemental Nights, London, n.d., iv. 341-365).

This doctrine of chance, which conduces to idleness, is one of the causes which hinder the progress of Muslim peoples in matters of economics. It is, however, only a popular belief, and is not accepted in theology, as has already been indicated in the art. (Part of Muslim).

LITERATURE. This is given in the article.

B. CARRE DE VEAUX.

KISSING.—Kissing is a universal expression (in the social life of the higher civilizations) of the feelings of affection, love (sexual, parental, and filial), and veneration. In its general use it is more or less symbolic, but in maternal and in sexual love it has an essential value of its own as a form of physical affection, which not only expresses but stimulates.

1. General description.—A refinement of general bodily contact (the instinct to which is irrediscible), lovingly symbolizes a case, in the higher levels of physiological psychology, of the meeting and interaction of the two complementary primal impulses, hunger and love. It is remarkable that, though the act in its civilized form is very rare among the lower and semi-civilized races, it is fully established as instinctive in the higher societies. This is a case of an acquired character or of some corresponding process. Equally remarkable is the fact that a line can be drawn between the higher civilizations; thus, the kiss seems to have been unknown to ancient Egypt; in early Greece and Assyria it was firmly established, and probably its development in India was as early as the Aryans.

Touch is 'the mother of the senses,' and the kiss may be referred generally to a tactile basis, as a specialized form of contact. Animal life provides numerous analogies; the billowing of birds, the cataglotism of pigeons, and the antennal play of some insects are typical cases. Among the higher animals, such as the bear and the dog, there is a development which seems to lead up to those forms of the act most prevalent among the lower races of man and also characteristic of the peoples of Eastern Asia. Far more similar, however, to the civilized human kiss and the non-oilactory forms of a analogous kiss, is the cat's of pressing or squeezing another's nose. A

2. Forms of the kiss.—The lower types are incorrectly grouped by travellers under the term 'rubbing noses,' and various forms are often confused. The oilactory form occasionally includes mutual contact with the nose, as among the Maoris, Society and Sandwich Islanders, the Tongans, the Eskimos, and most of the Malayans. In bundles of noses, this 'Malay kiss,' as described by Darwin thus: the giver of the kiss places his nose at right angles on the nose of the other, and then rubs it; the process occupies no longer time than a handshake among Europeans. Cook and his companions found the South Sea Islands form a vigorous mutual rubbing with the end of the nose, omitting the oilactory element. Elsewhere, as among the Australians, the general contact of the nose only, the face open but resigned and content, since the good and evil of this world do not depend upon you (Hicayen-Azad, La Recie du sourire, Paris, 1906, tr. p. 360). In the story entitled 'The Story of the Sheik with the generous Palm,' in the Thousand and One Nights, a rich man twice gives a purse to a poor rope-maker to help him to free himself from his poverty; but scarcely has he received it than he loses it. One then gives him a worthless piece of lead, and this lead becomes the source of his fortune (tr. J. C. Mandrus, Paris, 1890-1900, xiv. 64 ff.; R. Burton, Supplemental Nights, London, n.d., iv. 341-365).

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like language, is a refinement of the nutritive processes of the mouth.

The kiss is a special case of tactile sensory pleasure; it is the lips (whose skin is the very sensitive variety between the ordinary cuticle and the mucous membrane) are alone concerned. The movement made is the initial movement of the physiologic catalysts. There is, no doubt, a true psychological nexus between affection and hunger, which is no less truly expressed in the mechanism of the kiss. The act is a secondary habit of the lips, just as speech is a secondary habit of the whole of the processes of eating. It is thus, the intimate connection between the development of language and the masticatory processes of man has been drawn out by E. J. Payne. The kiss, therefore, is not to be referred to the bite, or even to gustation, much less to mastication, suction, or olfactory processes. The primary movement of the lips is simply transferred to a metaphorical use, so to say, and their sensitiveness is applied to a secondary object. Warren still is not hunger, but the analogous emotions of love, affection, and veneration.

Lombroso has argued that the kiss of lovers is derived from the maternal kiss. It is true that the mother and brother still kiss among peoples who do not practise the former. The Japanese, for instance, are ignorant of the kiss, except as applied by a mother to her infant. In Africa and other uncivilized regions it is a common observation of travellers that husbands and wives, and lovers, do not kiss. But all mothers seem to caress and fondle their babes. Winwood Reade has described the horror shown by a young African girl when he kissed her in the European fashion. 4 The argument, however, of Lombroso is of the same order as that which derives sexual love from maternal, and in neither case can there be any derivation, precise, because the subject during adolescence comes into a new physical and psychological environment, which itself is sufficient to explain a new reaction.

Some variation in the kiss proper (which we identify with the European) may here be noted. The kiss of North American Indian women is described as consisting in laying the lips softly on the cheek, no sound or motion being made. 5 This would not come under the Christian criticism of the English kiss, for our language is extremely subject to various forms. 6 When Australian or negro women are mentioned as employing the kiss, 7 we may assume that it is of the olfactory variety. The former person (recently argued about) is relatively high in the scale of human development. They have one branch, the North Queenland tribes, where the kiss is well developed. It is not used between mother and child, and husband and wife. In the midst with many early languages, the Pitta-Pitta dialect has a word for kissing. 8 As for distinctions in the civilized Western kiss, that of the ancient Romans still applies, though modern languages do not employ three terms for the three forms in Latin, amantium was the kiss on the face or cheeks, as used between friends; basium was the kiss of affection, made with and on the lips; succinus (or saucium) was the kiss between the lips alone.

The modern French retain, and other continental peoples (to some extent the English also) follow them, the distinction between the kiss on the cheek and the kiss on the mouth, the latter being reserved for lovers alone. Both in social custom and in literature the erotic symbolism of the lovers’ kiss has assumed a remarkable importance among the French, who regard a kiss on the mouth, except in cases of love, as a real social sin.

It is interesting to note that Greco-Roman, Hebrew, and early Christian civilization have combined to form the modern European habit.

3 Social history of kissing. There is much stories about kissing habits. It is not known in any form among the Japanese, prior to European influence, among the Indians of Guiana, the ancient Celtic peoples, and the ancient Egyptians, each statement is probably too dogmatic. The general conclusion is that the habit is known in every form or another has been prevalent since primitive times, and has received its chief development in Western culture. Among the Greeks and Latins, parents kissed their children, lovers and married persons kissed one another, and so did friends of the same or different sexes. 1 The kiss was used in various ceremonial and religious acts. Very similar was the Hebrew practice, 2 with the exception that kissing between persons of different sex was disconveneanced, though a male cousin might kiss a female cousin. The Rabbits advised that all such kisses should be avoided, as leacings and suspicions among peoples of mixed race, and to kissing to greeting, farewell, and respect. 3 In Semitic life also there was more use of the ceremonial kiss than among the Greeks and Romans.

The early Christian habit of pouching kissing as a symbol of fellowship was an application of pagan social practice, and there are grounds for supposing that it offended the Hebrew element as it certainly shocked the Jewish Church. 4 This is St. Peter’s kiss of love; 5 and St. Paul frequently writes: ‘Salute one another with an holy kiss.’ It possessed a sacramental value.

The primitive usage was for the ‘holy kiss’ to be given promiscuously, without any restriction as to sexes or ranks, among those who were all Christ Jesus. 6 Later, owing to scandals, or rather to such feeling as Tertullian mentions, 7 the practice was limited, and it was ordered that men of the laity should salute men, and women women, separately. 8 The classical practice, rendered slightly more free by the early Christian exaction, prevailed throughout the Middle Ages, with the curious detail that English women had more liberty than continental in kissing male friends. Erasms in a famous passage describes how his friend at one occasion kissed in this matter by English girls. 9 In Catholic ritual the kiss dwindled to more or less of a survival. In court ceremonial it persisted with other details of etiquette; and there it was enhanced with ecclesiastical and legal formalities. Knights after being dubbed, persons elected to office, and brides on marriage were kissed. 10 After the Renaissance a change appeared in England, and kissing became more and more restricted to parental and sexual relations. Thus W. Congreve, at the end of the 17th cent., writes:

1 Tyrole, loc. cit.; Ellis, p. 7. Under the early Empire the practice assumed remarkable forms in social intercourse; it was fashionable, for instance, to kiss the mouth.

2 A. Grevius, ’Kiss’ in HDB II. 5.

3 J. Jacob, ’Kiss and Kissing’ in JB vii. 516; Nyrop, p. 90.

4 T. E. Chayton, ’Salutations’ in Ellis, p. 103.

5 E. Venable,’Kiss’ in DCA ii. 302.

6 Ad Usum Secundum et in pagan husband was reluctant that his Christian wife should greet one of the brethren with a kiss.

7 Apost. Const ii. 57, vill. 11.


9 Nyrop, p. 163 f.

10 Way of the World, Act iii. 11 Ellis, p. 7.

1 History of the New World called America, ii. (Oxford, 1896) 144.

2 Quoted by Ellis, p. 216.


5 Ling Roth, p. 170.

6 Ellis, p. 232.

7 Ellis, p. 314; W. E. Roth, ’Ethiopian Studies among the Peking Echoes, Times, Brisbane, 1897, p. 184.

8 W. E. Roth, loc. cit.
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cessing moral refinement, or perhaps the increase of restrictions necessitated by an extension of individualism, may be assigned as a cause.

In modern social life the kiss is confined to lovers, members of the family, and women-friends. Between fathers and sons, and between brothers it is to be found in surviving adolescence. In continental countries it still persists, especially in France, between male friends, and this fashion is preserved between sovereigns. The courtly use of kissing a lady's hand, common in classical times, was a courtly feature of the court life of Renaissance times. It is obsolete in common life, but clings to the etiquette of great personages. As already stated, the distinction is carefully preserved among continental peoples between the kiss of affection and the kiss of affianced love.

4. Social and religious usages.—(1) In the etiquette, natural or artificial, of salutation, the kiss is not in every case, but the relations involve tenderness or veneration, or where these emotions are supposed. Its importance is illustrated by various facts of language. The `embrace' and the `kiss' are synonyms with it. Where the fact is obsolete, language preserves its memory. The Spaniard says `I kiss your hands'; the Austrian describes an ordinary salutation by the phrase *Kuss d' Honneur*.

According to Rabbi Akiba, the Medes kissed the hand only. 2 Odysseus, on his return, was kissed by his friends on the head, hands, and shoulders. 3 In Greece generally inferiors kissed the hand, breast, or knees of superiors. 4 In Persia equals in rank kissed each other on the mouth, and those slightly unequal on the cheek, while one much inferior in rank prostrated himself. 5 Even *fall on the neck* of Jacob and kiss him. 6 Among the Hebrews the cheek, forehead, beard, hands, and feet were kissed; some deny the practice of kissing on the lips. The phrase in the Song of Songs does not prove its existence, but there is no a priori reason against it in the case of the lover's kiss. 7 The customary kiss in modern Palestine is thus described:

*Each in turn places his head, face downwards, upon the other's shoulder ("falling on the neck"), and afterwards kisses him upon the right cheek, and then reverses the action, by placing his head similarly upon the other's right shoulder, and kissing him upon the left cheek. . . . A man will place his right hand on his own left shoulder, and kiss his right cheek, and then by his left hand on his right shoulder, and kiss his left cheek. This is a second form. A third consists in the following: the giver of the kiss lays his right hand, under the head of his friend and supports it while he kisses it.* 8

The custom is still common among the Moslems. 9 It has been suggested that, when Abaelon to gain popularity kissed the people, he employed the second form. 10

In Morocco equals saluted one another: the cheek or head; so Samuel saluted Saul. Inferiors kissed the hands of superiors. If, in the betrayal of Jesus, Judas kissed his Master on the face, it was an act of presumption. 11 The fact that the kiss was passed over without remark seems to show that it was, as it should have been from disciple to master, a kiss on the hand. The Prodigal Son would kiss his father's hands before being embraced by him. 12 Homage may be assigned to the phrase of Ps 2:1, 'kiss the Son.' As an act of piety, the Pharisees practised kissing the feet, as did the pious general Hyrcanus. 13

(2) Besides the permanent objects of the kiss, in family and analogous relations, the relations of superior and inferior, lord and vassal, sovereign and subject, there are many others which, with more or less precision, have claimed the kiss as a religious service. It is very significant of the affectionate element in religion that the kiss should have played so large a part in its ritual. The meeting-point of feet. Similar homage may be assigned to the phrase of Ps 2:1, 'kiss the Son.' As an act of piety, the Pharisees practised kissing the feet, as did the pious general Hyrcanus.

But such is not the case. The kiss is symbolic of Christ in kissee the disciples' feet has been preserved till recent times by some religious orders, and even by European monarchs. The foot of the pope is kissed in ceremonial audiences. By the year A.D. 847 it was said to be an ancient custom.

There are grounds for supposing it to have been obtained from a usage in the Emperor-worship of Rome. 2 Prostration is an instinctive expression of fear, awe, or adoration; to clasp the knees, as was the custom with Greek suppliants, is equally instinctive. The act of kissing the feet is a refinement of these. The OT phrase 'licking the dust' is doubtfully referred to the kiss upon the feet. In ancient India it was a familiar salutation of respect. 3 The feudalistic aspect of the little court held by the old Roman *patronus* is illustrated by Martial's epigram, which complains of the burden-some civility of the kisses of clients. 4 In the court ceremonial of mediavalk and modern Europe, the kiss on the cheek obtains between sovereigns; subjects kiss the sovereign's hand. In medieval Europe the vassal thus saluted the lord, while it was not unusual for attendants and others to kiss him with a quick motion, separating the lips gently, and kissing each his own hand. 5 The Turk kisses his own hand, and then places it on his forehead. The Arab kisses his hand to the storm. 6 Such is the gesture of adoration to saints and men referred to in the OT, and also used by the Greeks to the sun. 7 It was the Greek and Roman method of adoration. In explanation of the gesture, Oriental folklore agrees with European in identifying life or soul with that which is kissed. In the Brithish East India Company a gentleman kissing the feet of a dead or living person was an act of adoration. A gentleman kissing the feet, as he should kiss by the mouth, in the presence of hisاستخدام كيس، was an act of adoration. A gentleman kissing the feet, as he should kiss by the mouth, in the presence of his...
aspet of the kiss is perhaps to be found in the application of the kiss to saints and religious heroes. Thus, Joseph kissed Jacob, and his disciples kissed Paul. Joseph kissed his dead father, and the custom is retained in our civilization of imprinting a farewell kiss on dead relatives. To suggest, however, that Joseph prays the worship of Jacob as a divine being is against psychology. All that can be said is that so fine a human sentiment is on the border-line between sacred and secular feelings. In medieval Europe there was a similar feeling about the kiss of state. This is shown by the instances of Henry II. and St. Thomas of Canterbury, and of Richard I. and St. Hugh. Similarly in social life generally; it is said that among the Welsh the kiss was used only on special occasions, and a husband could put away his wife for kissing another man, however innocently. The early Christians exploited the social value of the kiss. Though in strong contrast to the Welsh custom, this is equally sacramental. It has been argued that the ritualistic 'kiss of peace' alone obtained among the Christians, and that the social salute was not practised. But the evidence is wanting to prove the latter custom. For St. Ambrose this was 'pietatis et caritatis pignus.' The custom involved a peculiar sentiment, if we consider it in connexion with the Church; the expression of love, in which passion was encouraged, though chastity was enforced (see art. CHASTITY [Christian]).

In the early Church the baptized were kissed by the celebrant and the congregation after the ceremony. Roman Catholic ritual still includes the kiss bestowed on the newly ordained by the bishop. The bishop on consecration and the king when crowned received the kiss. The kiss bestowed on penitents after absolution was connected with the kiss received by the Prodigal Son. The practice of giving a farewell kiss to the dead is probably connected with the old Italian rite of receiving the soul of the dying in his last breath. In the 16th cent. the Council of Aixerre (A.D. 578) prohibited the kissing of the dead. Penitents were enjoined to kiss sacred objects.

5. The kiss of peace. — First mentioned in the Church, the kiss of peace was one of the most distinctive elements in the Christian ritual. To Clement of Alexandria it was a 'mystery.' The eclipse was a preliminary rite in the primitive Church. Eusebius has suggested that it was derived from an institution of the Persians. Philo speaks of a 'kiss of harmony' like that between the elements; the Word of God brings hostile things together in concord and the kiss of love. However that may be, the kiss is a feature of both Western and Eastern ritual, more conspicuously in the former. St. Cyril writes: 'This kiss is the sign that our souls are united, and that we have shed all remembrance of injury.' This kiss seems to have been given at the beginning of the offertory, between the washing of hands and the cursa corde. But, later, the kiss was in close connexion with the Communion. It has therefore been conjectured that the pass was twice given. In the modern Roman ritual it is given again by High Mass, and rarely to any of the congregation. The celebrant kisses the corporal, and presents his left cheek to the deacon, with the formula pass ferreus, answered by the deacon's hau. The deacon conveys the kiss to the subdeacon, and he to the other clergy. In the Greek liturgy the celebrant says, 'Peace be to all,' and kisses the givers of the kiss, and the deacon kisses his own stole. On Easter Sunday in the same church the congregation kiss one another. The fact that the Christians of the time of the younger Pliny were called upon, when arrested, to 'adore' the deity of the Emperor, is sufficient to emphasize the ritual importance of the kiss. Adoratio ('the act of carrying to the mouth'), the Roman form of homage and worship, consisted in raising the right hand to the lips, kissing it, and turning it in the direction of the adored object, after which the worshipper turned his body to the right. During the ceremony the head was covered, except when Saturn or Hercules was adored. Plutarch suggests fantastic reasons for exceptional uses in which the worshipper turned from right to left.

But both Greeks and Romans employed the kiss direct in worshipping the statues of gods, and the lips and beard of the statue of Hercules at Agrigentum were almost worn away by the kisses of the devout. The kiss indirect, or the kiss at a distance, may be described as a natural extension of the direct, capable of development by the imagination. It is not without reason that it can be traced from Greek-Roman civilization to that of modern Europe, where, however, it appears to be more instinctive in children. The adoration of the Roman Emperors was influenced by Oriental ceremonial. It consisted in bowing or kneeling, touching the robe, and putting the hand to the mouth and kissing the robe. A variation was the kissing of the feet or knee. It does not seem to have become the fashion before Diocletian.

The kiss of homage in the Middle Ages was so important a part of the ceremony that osculum became a synonym of homagium. The vassal kissed the lord's feet (rarely his thigh). Afterwards he offered a present for the privilege, a bone or bone-oven, a term which shows the connexion of confusion with the equally prevalent fashion of kissing the hand of the sovereign. It is said that Rolf the Ganger, the first Duke of Normandy, when receiving the province as a gift from Charles the Simple, kissed him, and afterwards put the bone in his mouth as he stood erect. When homage was paid in the lord's absence, the vassal kissed the door, lock, or bolt of his castle; this was hau. The kisses of the vassals made pretences of kissing the king's feet.

6. Death by kissing. — Rabbinical lore includes a unique fancy, explanatory of the death of the righteous. According to this, the death of a favourite of God is the result of a kiss from God (bi-neschif). Such a death was the easiest of all modes, and was reserved for the most pious. Thus died Abrahaam, Isaac, Jacob, Aaron, Moses, and Miriam. There is a legend that, as St. Monica lay dying, a child kissed her on the breast, and the saint at once passed away. Italian folklore preserves the Hebrew idea in one of its omens for death: 'addormentarsi nel bacio del Signore.'

1 Gf. 501, An. 3997. 2 Jacobus, loc. cit. 3 Thurston, loc. cit. 4 Ellis, p. 217. 5 See Thurston, loc. cit. 6 Hesychius, vi. 1. 68. 7 Cyprian, ad fil. Ep. iv. Carol. 4. Similarly in lower stages of culture, a girl after 'initiation' is kissed by her female relatives. 8 Du Cange, s.v. 'Aderaltos korarous,' l. 69. 9 'Apost. i. 66. 10 Du Cange, loc. cit. 11 'Apost. ii. 1. 12 'Apost. ii. 1. 13 Adamastos, c. 9. 14 'Apost. ii. 1. 15 Osuila, loc. cit. 16 Du Cange, s.v. 'Aderaltos.' 17 Nyrop, p. 124. 18 Nyrop, p. 102. 19 Jacobus, loc. cit.; Ror. Si. Beba bithra, 174; Desi. x. 1. 20 Nyrop, p. 96; 'to fall asleep in the Lord's kiss.' The kiss of a ghost (in other folklore) produces death (56. 171).
KISSING

7. Kissing sacred objects.—Kissing the image of a god was a recognized rite of adoration among both Greeks and Romans. The early Arabs had the same rite. On leaving and entering the house they kissed the house-gods.1 The kisses of sacred objects were kissed.2 The toe of St. Peter’s statue is kissed by Roman Catholics. The Muslim kissed the Ka’ba at Mecca. In the wall there is a black stone believed by Muslims to be from paradise. It was once white, but has been blackened by the kisses of sinful but believing lips.3 The Hebrews often lapsed into the idolatrous practice; Hosea speaks of ‘kissing calves’; the image of Baal was kissed.4 Together with kissing (p. 9), or with kissing, the kiss comprises belief and homage. The Hebrews kissed the floor of the Temple,5 and to this day, in the Hebrew ritual, it is the practice to kiss the sixth of the sabbath when putting on the sash and when entering or leaving, and the Scroll of the Law when about to read or to bless it.6 It is even customary among Jews, though not obligatory, when a Hebrew book is dropped, to kiss it. kissing the Book is a case, surviving (as a real living ceremony) in the highest civilization, of primitive conceptions of the oath. These were expressed in various forms.7

One method of ‘charging an oath with supernatural energy is to touch, or to establish some kind of contact with, a holy object on the condition that the oath be kept.8 The view of Westernmark, that mana or baraka is thus imparted to the oath, is further developed when the name of a supernatural being is introduced; thus the modern English ceremony runs, ‘God bless us!’ A complementary aspect is supplied by forms whose object is to prevent perjury.

The Angami Naga (in South India) has the custom of kissing the sacred object. This is an object placed on the head, and sitting on the resting back of an ox and eating a part of the ox’s heart.9 Hindus swear on a copy of the Sanskrit texts (Hiranyakasipu).10

The European ceremony of kissing the book of the New Testament after taking the oath in a law-court connects in its material form rather with the kiss of sacred objects than with the kiss of sacred objects. It is used in the ceremony of the kissing of relics and sacred objects generally. But in essence there is still some of the primitive sense of responsibility by contact, reinforced stronger by the invocation of the name of the deity. Derived indirectly from the Greek-Roman ritual kissing of sacred objects and the Hebrew reverence for the Scroll of the Law, it was early developed by the Christian Church into their characteristic ceremony of oath-taking. Chrysostom writes:

“But do thou, if nothing else, at least reverence the very book thou holdest out to be sworn by, open the gospel thou takes in thy hands, administer the oath, and, hearing what Christ saith, saith of oaths, tremble and despise.11

Inglutude is represented repeating the words:

‘These four Evangelists of Christ our God which I hold in my own hands and kiss with my mouth.’12

In the former quotation the act of kissing can only be inferred from the characteristic ceremony. The handling of the book is less than the Greek rite of placing the hands on the scroll when swearing. Even in the Middle Ages an oath was often taken merely by laying the hand on the Missal.13 The Lombards swore lesser oaths by consecrated weapons, the greater on the Gospel, but it is not certain whether they kissed the book of oath ratified by contact with a sacred object was a corporal oath’; the object was the holy book, the equivalent of the Greek book, or object being identified. No doubt, contact by waressing of the lips was an early date regarded as more efficacious than contact by means of the hand, and thus the mere notion of prohibition was superimposed on that of adoration. In Islam the rite is that usual in adoration of divinity, to include the kiss.10 In modern England a detail to be noted is that the hand holding the book must be ungloved. The book varies according to the creed; a Jew is sworn on the OT; a Roman Catholic on the Donatist Testament. The term ‘book,’ employed with special reference to the oath upon the NT, has been regular in England since the 14th cent. at least.4

Among Anglican clergy it is customary to kiss the cross of the stile before putting it on. The Catholic Church enjoins the duty of kissing relics, the Gospels, the Cross, consecrated candles and pithi, the hands of the clergy, and the vestments and utensils of the liturgy. It was formerly part of the Western use that the celebrant should kiss the host. He now kisses the corporal. The altar is regarded as typical of the relic taken by the oil of the coldbuer.15 In the Greek Church relics are kissed.

The ‘kiss of peace’ was in mediceal times the subject of a curious simplification of ritual, by which it became, as it were, a material object. In the 12th or 13th cent., for reasons of convenience, the instrumentum pacis, or osculatorium, was introduced.16 This was a plaque of metal, ivory, or wood, carried with various designs, and fitted with a handle. It was brought to the altar for the celebrant to kiss, and then to each of the congregation at the rails. This is the pas-board or pas-bredle of the missal.8

8. Metaphor and myth.—The metaphorical applications of the idea of the kiss are not numerous. In some phrases it expresses a light touch. Generally it implies close contact or absolute reconciliation or acquaintance;17 to kiss the dust is to be overthrown; to kiss the rod is to submit to chastisement;18 to kiss the cup is to drink. Philostratus inspired Ben Jonson’s image of the loved one leaving a kiss in the cup.19 A ‘butterfly kiss’ is a light one.

Folklore developed in interesting ways the connexion between the emotional gesture and the ideas of magic and charm. Relics were kissed. Conversely, the kiss of a sacred person, a specialized form of his touch, evokes the leper, as in the case of St. Martin. Some similar association of thought may attach to the nursery practice of ‘kissing the place to make it well’; gamesters used to kiss the cards in order to secure luck with them; an Alpine peasant kisses his hand before receiving a present. Pages in the French Court kissed the articles with which he was charged to carry. A famous instance of symbolism is the kiss bestowed by Brutus on his mother-earth—an application of the kiss of greeting. But in Germany...

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1. Nyrop, p. 135.
3. Nyrop.
folklore to kiss the ground is a synonym for to die. The privilege in English folk-custom known as 'kissing under the mistletoe' is a Christian festival connected by Frazer with the licence of the Saturnalia. It may have originated independently as an expression of festivity. Greek, Latin, and Teutonic mythology employed the motive of unbinding a spell by a kiss, as in the case of Alcestis and Persephone. In Arthurian romances, when beauty changes a dragon into the maiden who had been enchanted. The Sleeping Beauty awakened by the kiss of the lover is a widely-distributed motive. An analogy, without actual derivation, is to be found in many primitive cases of cancelling a taboo. Thus in Australian ceremony bodily contact, analogous to the kiss, in various forms, removes the tabu between two persons, such as the celebrant and the subject of a rite. This analogy may be seen between Teutonic and early Christian ritual in the conception drawn out by Grimm between mimicking and the kiss. He finds this both in sacrilege and in courtship. Closely parallel to the magical power of the kiss in breaking tabus and restoring to consciousness is the myth-motive in which a kiss produces both forgetfulness and remembrance. This capacity is evidently based on a sense of latency, and is significant in connexion with the practice of the kiss in religion. It brings to one focus the kiss of love and the kiss of adoration. In the psychology of adolescence the kiss produces a forgetfulness of old conditions and awakenings to a new life. The kiss appears to have no symbol in art. European children and adolescents express it in writing by a cross, perhaps merely an accidental choice. The Svetlana style an insinuate kiss as a 'kiss with dots.' Some Rabbis explain that Esau's kiss was insincere (Gn 33), and every letter of the word וְנָשָׁה is dotted by the Massoretes.

**KIZSTA**

(Stx. Къръша, 'the dark one'). One of the great rivers of S. India, which, like the Godavari (q.v.) and Kaveri, to which it is inferior in sanctity, flows nearly across the entire peninsula, and rises in the Mahâbaleswar plateau of the W. Ghâts, only 40 miles from the Arabian Sea. At its source is an ancient temple of Siva, inside which the infant stream pours out of a stone in the shape of a cow's mouth (gau-mukhâ). This place, known as Kṛpâbâh, 'the lady Kṛṣṇa,' is a favourite resort of pilgrims. Fifteen miles down stream is the old Buddhist town of Wal, one of the most sacred places in its course, with group of cave-temples and several later Hindu shrines (BG xix. 1885 610 ff.). Farther on it passes close by the town of Sâṭara, Karad, or Karad, at its junction with the Koyla and Mâhâral, where it is joined by the Yeon. In the Bijapur District, Sangam, at its junction with the Mahârâbâh, possesses a temple of some sanctity, dedicated to Siva under the title of Sângâmâvar, 'lord of the sacred meeting of the waters,' the site of an annual religious fair. Thence passing through the dominions of the Nizâm of Haidarâbâd, it reaches the bay of Bengal in the English Kistna District. Here Bezwâla contains some rock-caves of the Buddhist period and a few ancient Hindu temples.


W. CROCKETT

**KIZILA BASH.**—Kizil Bash, 'Red Heads,' the name by which are denoted the members of a sect distributed throughout the whole of Asia Minor. They call themselves 'Alevis;' their nick-name, which in Persia and Afghanistan was and is given to other peoples also, originates doubtless from the colour of their head-dress. Their total number is estimated at more than a million; they form an important section of the population of the vilayets of Sivas (about 305,000), Erzerum (107,000), Angora, and Manurete ul-Aziz (Kharput), and in certain districts constitute even the majority. Their language is Turkish or Kurdish. Though reckoned officially as Musulman Sunnites, in reality they are not in a state of communion with them: they profess Islamism only in a formal way to avoid persecution. They think they are in safety, they do not attend the mosques, read the Qur'an, to say the prayers, or perform the Muhammadan ablutions. Except in the presence of a Sunnite, they do not wash or veil. They drink wine, they do not observe Ramadân, and some of them do not practise circumcision or shave the head and other parts of the body as the Turks do. Moreover, they cherish a profound aversion to the Turks, and regard them as unclean; when they are obliged to entertain them, they even go so far as to pollute the dishes with which they serve them. On the other hand, they show great goodwill in their relations with the Christians. They have secret beliefs and practices which they reveal only with extreme reluctance, and no one has hitherto been able to penetrate, except very imperfectly, the mystery with which they are surrounded.

Their sect, like some Christian Churches, has a hierarchical organization. They have priests called dâdâ, whose dignity is hereditary from father to son, and who are the necessary intermediaries between God and the rest of the community. This ascetical caste is subject to a species of bishops. These themselves render obedience to two patriarchs, who are regarded as descendants of Ali, and who are invested with a sacrosanct authority. One of these is the Shâikh of Khânyâr (about 34 miles to the N. of Sivas), a popular place of pilgrimage. It is certain that the Kizil Bash possess a sacred mountain, partly liturgical in character, but as yet no part of it has been made public.

Three superimposed stratifications in the religion of the Kizil Bash may be distinguished.

(1) There is an old pagan foundation going back to the ancient Anatolian beliefs, tinged with Persian Mazdaism, which were practised in the country before its conversion to Christianity. The Kizil Bash regard certain heights or certain trees as sacred, e.g. near Kara Hisar (Taylor, *Journal Royal Geog. Society*, xxxvii. [1868] 297), and on holidays they sacrifice sheep and fowls on these summits. The trees which grow there—mostly pines—are surrounded with superstitions, and no one is allowed to carry an axe near them (cf. E. and E. Cumont, *Voyage dans le Font*, Brussels, 1903, p. 172 ff.). The ancient Mazdaans, worship streams and especially springs. They also venerate fire; when they build a house, they light a fire with great ceremony, and this must be kept burning as long as the house remains standing. The place of honour is near the hearth, and to spit there is sacrilege. A fire-
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altr hewn out in the rock is still the object of devotion. (Cf. p. 20.) They worship the sun at its rising and setting, and a day in which it does not appear is for them a day of mourning. They also worship the moon.

Everybody in the East accuses the Kızıl Bash, of giving themselves up to orgies in their nocturnal ceremonies (cf. below), when the lights out, each man has commerce with a woman taken by chance. This, however, is a universal custom in different forms in the East, as, for instance, the torah sonerous, 'extinguishers of the light.' It is difficult to know what degree of truth there is in this imputation. But it is remarkable that the same promiscuity was, during their feast of 1st January, laid to the reproach of the Pálacians in the 9th cent., who were distributed throughout the same regions as the Kızıl Bash of to-day (Manichean formula of abjuration, in P. G. I. 1499: μετά τῇ tē kταρᾱς μῆνην ἀπόστολους τὰ φῶτα, παρακότα τῇ ἄλλῃ ἁμαρτωλῇ, καὶ μετὰ τῶν ψευδοπροφητῶν φῶτας οἱ οὐρανοὶ τῇ φωτείᾳ). It is possible that those supposed acts of debauchery may be an indirect tirade against the Manichees. For the institution of the worship of Mī and Anāītīs. This would also be true of the custom, if it was well attested, of offering a young girl every year to the dēdēkh, with a kind of sausage, if one is born, becomes a priest, or whose daughter must remain a virgin and set herself apart for the cult (Cf. de Choisy, Arménie, Kurdistân et Méopotamie, Paris, 1892, p. 68).

(2) The influence of Christianity is evident both in the beliefs and in the rites of the sect. The Kızıl Bash teach that God is One in Three Persons, and that the principal incarnation of God, before the coming of Jesus Christ, was that of the Saviour of the world, who intercedes for God with humanity. They are devoted to Mary, who is, they believe, the Mother of God, and who conceived without ceasing to be a virgin. At the same time, they acknowledge the existence of five powers, lower than the Trinity, mediators between the Supreme Being and man, analogous to the yatin of the Nosairis, a kind of archangels which are perhaps derived from the Arabian Amēzēr Aṣūss (p. c.). Moreover, they assume the existence of twelve ministers of God, who correspond to the twelve apostles and the twelve magī of the Nosairis. I cannot follow, in the Verdis, the offer no worship to Satan whom they regard as the irreconcilable adversary of God. Like the Nosairis, they believe that at the end of the ages the spirit of evil will come to fight for the last incarnation of Jesus. Mazdean dualism is here combined with Christian ideas.

The Kızıl Bash have a ceremony which they celebrate by night on certain holidays—the 10th of the month of Muharram was mentioned in the present writer—and also at irregular intervals, when a dēdēkh visits their villages.

1 Accompanying himself with a musical instrument, the priest who officiates sings prayers in honour of Alī, Jesus, Moses, and David. . . . The priest has a willow cane which suggests the lance of the Avenger. He dips it in water while he is saying the prayers. The water thus consecrated is afterwards distributed throughout the houses. In the course of the ceremony those who take part set some of their sins, and the manner of the early Christians. The priest prescribes various mean princes, frequently in the form of a fine, is moneyed in kind. Then they put out the lights and engage in lamentations over the faults of which they have been guilty. When the lights are rekindled, the priest pronounces the absolution, then he takes some slices of bread and a cup of wine or some other beverage, and distributes it to those of the company who have obtained absolution. . . . Among the Kızıl Bash there is a rite which follows a public confession, and portions of it are distributed by the priest along with the bread and wine. The Kızıl Bash celebrate Good Friday on the same Sunday as the Armenians, and they pay homage to several Christian saints, as, for instance, St. Sergius (Grenard, in J. d. i. 111, 511).

(3) What the Kızıl Bash have borrowed from Islamism afflicts them with the same terror as with the Sunnites. They have adopted the legend of 'Ali, whom they regard as an incarnation of God the Father, while Jesus is an incarnation of the Son. Like the Shi'ites, they fast during the first twelve days of Muharram, and observe the death of Ḥasān and Ḥusain. Some say that they regard Muhammad as the hypostasis of the Spirit, the Paraclete, but the veneration which they show towards the tomb of 'Ali, in derision of the terah sonerous, 'extinguishers of the light,' they refuse to credit him with any divine inspiration.

To sum up: the religion of the Kızıl Bash is in many respects a survival of the ancient paganism of Anatolia, which in the case of the peninsula was deeply marked by the idea of Mazdeism (cf. F. Cumont, Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain, Paris, 1909, p. 213 ff.; Eng. tr., Chicago, 1911, p. 148 ff.). The country population of these regions was imperfectly and slowly converted to Christianity, and we know that colonies of Magi dwelt there until at least the end of the 6th cent. (cf. F. Cumont, Monumentes et textes relatifs aux mystères de Mithra, Brussels, 1895-99, l. 10), and perhaps until the Musulman conquest. Further, in the 12th cent., Nères Shnorhali gives interesting details regarding the 'sons of the Sun,' who worshipped the stars, and lived among trees, the poplar (F. C. Conybeare, The Key of Truth, Oxford, 1858, p. 159). In the 8th and 9th centuries it was in the country inhabited by the Kızıl Bash that the dualistic Persianism, which had become their most numerous adherents, and even after their extermination by the Byzantine emperors, and the last incarnation of Jesus. Mazdean dualism is here combined with Christian ideas.

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LITERATURE.—R. Oberhumer and H. Zimmerer, Durch Syrien und Kleinasien, Berlin, 1899, p. 363 ff., where citations will be found from the more ancient authors: F. Grenard (Consul of France at Rıva) has collected some new and accurate information in J. d. i. ill. [1904] 51-222. The writer of this article has added here some facts gathered by himself among the Kızıl Bash of the region of Anamis in 1900.

FRANZ CUMONT.

KNEELING.—Kneeling may be described as a natural reaction to the emotions of self-abasement and supplication. As such, it has been observed among unsophisticated peoples. In a less degree only than prostration, it symbolizes inferiority and dependence, by the abandonment of the erect posture of human active life. According to Tylor, kneeling as a ceremonial posture prevails in the 'middle stages of culture.' The same limitation, however, applies with equal force to Islam and Hinduism. Both in the middle and in the higher stages kneeling is more or less constantly associated with a third gesture—bowing, a symbolic expression of respect or reverence. It would be quite erroneous to attribute kneeling, as a sign of prostration, or bowing from kneeling. But certain forms of the bow, surviving in modern etiquette, include some bending of one or both knees; such are the Kızıl Bash ceremony at court, and the bow of ceremony in which one
foot is moved backward while the knee of the other leg is raised. 

PrIMITIVE people hardly developed kneeling as a ceremonial posture in either of the two spheres in which it obtains—social etiquette and religious ritual. What generally corresponds to kneeling in the Hindu system, or the grandees knees under the soles of the shoes, still the Muslim mode of kneeling and certainly a primitive posture, though originally expressing attention rather than reverence. It is employed largely by the Australian natives in their ceremony, and is seen in the kneeling. When the knees are reached, kneeling appears, developed from the natural supplicatory posture. In Central Africa it is a tribute paid to rank. When a chief passes, the native drops on his knees and bows his head. When two grandees meet, the junior lears forward, bends his knees, and places the palms of his hands on the ground. At higher stages prostration is usual among Oriental peoples, except the Chinese, who bow, or kneel and bow, according to the rank. To kings they kneel. It is chiefly in Semitic and Greco-Roman countries that kneeling has been prevalent as a ceremonial posture.

In Greek and Roman civilization much prominence was given to the suppliant and the act of supplication, just as was the case in the Middle Ages with the prayer of the laity. In both ceremonial customs of the kneeling, the natural posture of earnest entreaty and self-abandonment, was the constant attitude. Such phrases as "nuxen cultus" (Plaut. Truc. iii. iii. 200) and "buxen minor" (Horace, Ep. i. xii. 28), are common in metaphor. It seems that in the Assyrian States not only subjectation to kings but worship of gods was expressed by kneeling. In the later case it may be assumed as certain that the attitude has no essential connexion with prayer, as in the Christian use: the king and the god alike were it appears, pre-eminently despotic, and court and temple ceremonial had similar forms expressing similar functions, the chief of which was submission.

Among organized religions Christianity alone has given special significance to the posture of kneeling. During half its history the posture signified penitence; during the rest it signified prayer. At the change (marked by the Reformation) it was, by a curious association of ideas, identified with adoration or idolatry.

The process by which Christianity adopted kneeling as a ceremonial posture is somewhat uncertain in detail. The Hebrews, deriving many elements of their worship from Mesopotamian cults, may be supposed to have adopted kneeling from them: the temple of Solomon knelt on his knees with his hands spread up to heaven. Ezra fell upon his knees and spread out his hands unto the Lord. Daniel knelt upon his knees and prayed. The posture in these three cases seems identical with the Christian.

The Jews usually prayed standing, but knelt in prayer on special occasions of solemnity or distress.

1 See P. T. Bergb., in De, a. s., "Oecumenica.
3 R. L. Williams, The Middle Kingdom, New York, 1883, i. 501.
4 Hinckley, in J.E., a., "Adoration."
5 0 K 132. 6 De, 500. 7 1 K 150. 8 1 1 K 104.
9 R 944, Estdr, 944, 6 944. Joining the hands (contrary to the Jewish, Greco-Roman, and early Christian practice of outstretched arms, retained by the celebrant in the Consecration) seems derived from the medieval practice of homage.
10 The first Christians may be assumed to have, like the Founder, usually stood in prayer, following the practice common to both Hebraic and Greco-Roman ritual. The catacomb frescoes represent the orantes standing with outstretched arms. But earlier than this, at the period represented by the Acts, kneeling appears to have become a characteristic posture. When Stephen knelt just before his death, after the stoning, no posture of prayer can be assumed. It seems as if the posture were so regular a feature of the faith that it was applied indiscriminately on every occasion by the chroniclers. But there is no doubt that the attitude was a feature of the faith at this time. Peter knelt down and prayed; Paul knelt and prayed with them all; we knelt down on the shore and prayed. 9 For St. Paul kneeling and praying are synonymous. 4 In view of the catacomb evidence and of that of the next stage, it is clear that there was some prejudice in the evidence of Acts. But clearly there is a presumption in favour of the early adoption of kneeling for some aspect of Christian worship. The facts may perhaps be reconciled in this way: the pioneers of the faith probably emphasized the penitent and suppliant posture (which was familiar both to Jews and to Greeks and Romans) on all possible occasions; but, when the faith attained a secure position, the posture was relegated to its traditional use. The case would thus be a microcosm of the change of attitude shown by Christianity itself as a whole.

By the time of the Shepherd of Hermas (the middle of the 2nd cent.) kneeling had become familiar in Christian prayer and worship. The position has been summed up thus for the ante-Nicene period:

"The recognized attitude for prayer, liturgically speaking, was standing, but kneeling was early introduced for penitential, and perhaps ordinary, reasons, and was frequently, though not necessarily always, accompanied with certain postures of the hands. The attitude of our Lord in praying, and the attitude of the Apostle Peter when he was visited by the angel, and of the Apostle John when he saw the Lamb, are well known. And hence the kneeling posture, or postures in connexion with it, are an eminently Catholic practice. The strange thing is that in neither the pre nor the post-Pentecostal period has kneeling a penitential aspect. This may possibly have been a special development of 16th century Christianity, as in mourning, or of the Greek-Roman and Mesopotamian use in supplication or homage. However that may be, kneeling has an ever since in Roman Catholicism retained a primary connexion with penitence. In private prayer it is still, as it has been since the 2nd cent., usual but not obligatory. In public adoration it is regular, though prosecution may be used. But as the posture for public prayer kneeling has never been regular except in Protestantism. The subject requires some detail. Origin in the 3rd cent. is one of the earliest matters to emphasize the penitential meaning of kneeling; if forgiveness is required, he says, kneeling is essential. 9 St. Ambrose, in the 4th cent., writes:
"The knee is made flexible, by which the offence of the Lord is removed, and the congregation is gathered forth." 1

Pseudo-Alcin has the general explanation: 2

"By such posture of the body we show forth our humbleness of heart." 3

As early as Tertullian's time a distinction was marked; 4 he observes that on Sundays and during Temporal prayers, as such, no genuflexion is required. The implication that a divergence of use existed is proved by the ruling of the Council of Nicea, more than a century later: 5

The Synod decreed on the Lord's Day and on the days of Pentecost, that all things may be uniformly performed in every parish or diocese, it seems good to the Holy Synod, that the Synod of prayers be by all made to God, standing.

Standing was the attitude of praise and thanksgiving. Hence standing was obligatory during the psalms, hymns, and Eucharistic prayer. For a similar reason, perhaps, St. Benedict uttered his dying prayer standing, "erectis in calum manibus." 6

In his lifetime he had instructed his monks to kneel during private prayer, not to stand as when in choir. 7 There was, it is to be assumed, an inner meaning of penitence attaching to private prayer, and some importance here seems to have been given to the Gospel account of Christ's knelling in the Publican's prayer, public penitence made use of the attitude of kneeling. The custom of the early Church is clearly marked by St. Basil, who describes kneeling as the lesser penance (paradosmos) and prostration as the greater (episkelos). 8 A posture with such associations was a favourite one for anchorites and ascetics. Some such associations of thought may have inspired Eusebius's prayer that the knees of James, "the Lord's brother," became callous like a camel's, from continual kneeling. 9

The Canon Law emphasized still further the distinction between standing and kneeling. The latter was prohibited in public prayer at all the principal festivals. To be degraded into the class of genuflexentes or prostrati, who were obliged to kneel during public services even on Sundays and in paschal (Eastertide) time, was a severe punishment. 10 A gradation of posture appears in the two terms quoted, which still obtains in Roman Catholic adoration.

That kneeling is a posture characteristic of prayer as such, is a principle developed by the Reformation Churches, adoration, on the one hand, and penance, on the other, being disregarded. The 'Declaration on Kneeling' during the Lord's Supper, especially the avoidance of Roman Catholic adoration. The Presbyterians sat to receive the Communion. The originally threefold use of the attitude was perhaps assisted towards its Protestant simplification or reduction into one for prayer alone by the negative emphasis which it received from contrast with the Roman Catholic idea.

It is also remarkable that the practices of kneeling and genuflexion, or bowing of the knee, are relatively modern in their application to ideas of reverence or adoration. 11 Here, no doubt, religious and social ritual reacted upon one another. Genuflexion with one knee was developed in the Middle Ages, clearly showing a connexion with homage.

The Carthusians are noteworthy for a traditional objection to kneeling in worship; they bend the knee without touching the ground. 12

In Roman Catholic ritual the rules governing kneeling are the same. The congregation knelt throughout a Low Mass, except during the reading of the Gospel. At High Mass they kneel or prostrate themselves at the words 'et incarnatus'est' and 'verbum caro factum est'—a modern development. When adoring the Blessed Sacrament unveiled, the faithful genuflect with both knees, but with the right knee only when revering it in the tabernacle. In the old bidden prayers, as in the diocesan Liturgy of the Greek Church, the kneeling priest, asking the congregation to pray for some special 'intention,' said: 'Pleatamas genna.' 13 In penance and confirmation, and at the coronation of a king or queen, the blessing of a new knight, reconciliation, etc., kneeling is presented. The custom continues in the Roman, Greek, and Anglican Churches.

Kneeling adoration, still more, becomes the attitude in connection with the silk kneeling cloth, which is the vestment of the officiating prelate, and the cape, or dalmatic, worn by the other prelates of the ritual. The kneeling, as a gesture of duty, is not ancient. The kneeling of the Emperor in the presence of the Pope, however, is a feature of the papal Liturgy. The kneeling of the clergy is a feature of the Jewish rites, and it is also the custom of the Moslem and the Chinese.

Summary of the Various Kneeling Conventions

2. Kneeling as a Religious Sign.

In Biblical times, kneeling was largely a reversion to an ancient custom, and was not confined to the priest alone. It was a gesture of humility, and was used in the presence of royalty, but also by the people in the presence of God. In the Old Testament, kneeling was a sign of submission and obedience. In the New Testament, kneeling was a sign of reverence and respect.

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In the religious ceremonies of the Assyrians the god Marduk is directed to soothe the last moments of a dying man by knotting a woman’s kerchief with seven knots and tying it on his head, hands, and feet. The gods will then receive his dying spirit. The tying of knots provides the origin of the phylacteries of the Jews and their practice of binding holy texts around the limbs. The Jewish phylacteries, or ‘frontlets,’ are small leather boxes into which are strips of parchment with passages from Hebrew Scriptures, which is placed on the forehead and on the back of the right hand. That on the head is attached by having its strap tied at the back of the head into a knot of the shape of a ‘dáleth.’ The strap attached to the hand is formed into a noose by means of a knot of the shape of a ‘yodh.’ These knots, together with the letter ‘shin’ of the head phylactery, make up the letters of the sacred name ‘Shaddai’ (‘Almighty’). In Roman religious ceremonies the Flamen Dialis, the priest of Jupiter, was not allowed to have any knots in his clothing, the ring on his finger was broken, and any one coming to his house in such a state of sin would have no grims on the journey to Mecca also avoid having knots about their person when in a state of sanctity. The Qur’an contains a reference (ex. 4. 4) to ‘those who puff into knots,’ and these words are believed to refer to women who tie the knots round and blow and spit on them for magical purposes. It is even recorded that a Jew once bewitched the prophet Mohammad by tying nine knots on a string; Mohammad fell ill and recovered only when the baleful thing was found and its knots undone by the recitation of certain charms. In Biblical literature there are many references to the ceremony of ‘binding,’ the signification of the term being similar to that in the sacred region (tempulum) for the observation of birds, had to be made from wood containing no knot. In China the earliest means of communication, other than oral, is stated to have been by knotted cords. This is similar to the quipu of ancient Peru. The quipu was a cord about two feet long, composed of different-coloured threads tightly twisted together, from which a quantity of smaller threads were suspended in the manner of a book. The threads were enabled to make simultaneous revolt against the Spanish in 1809. The nautical ‘knot’ is another case in point. 5

2. Knots in religious ceremony. In the religious systems of the East the importance of the knot in various ceremonies is well recognized. At the initiation ceremony the sacred girdle with which the Brahman was invested was wound round the waist three times from left to right and tied with one, three, or five knots; at a later stage in the ceremony the initiate made a threefold knot in the girdle on the north side of the nave and drew this to the south side of it. Girdles with three knots are also worn by the Dervishes in S.W. Asia. In the miqveh, or initiation ceremony, of Zoroastrianism, the sacred kusti, or girdle, is wound round the waist three times and fastened with two knots, one in front and the other at the back, these knots symbolizing certain religious thoughts (see INITIATION [ Parsi].) 6

3. Knots in relation to love and the marriage ceremony. The magic of knots and the ceremony of binding and loosening had a particular reference in earlier times to women; in classical times, e.g., the unloosing of the girdle (g.v.) was symbolical of the loss of virginity, and by tying three knots on three strings of different colours a maid might seek to draw her lover to her side. Among the Arabs a gift, in order to attract the object of her affections, would tie knots in his whip. The true-love-knot is a symbol of plighted affection; the direct origin of its symbolism is uncertain, but from its form and signification it is possible that Thomas Browne’s suggestion 7 of its derivation from the modulus Hercules and the caduceus is correct. The symbolical use of the knot in the marriage ceremony is widely distributed and dates back to extremely ancient times. Among the Brahmins, towards the end of the marriage ceremony, the husband advances towards his young wife, who is seated facing the east, and, while reciting mantras, he fastens the tail—a little gold ornament which all married women wear—round her neck, securing it with three knots; before these knots are tied the father of the bride may refuse his consent, but after they are tied the marriage is indissoluble. 8

1 Tablet K. 819, 483 (Brit. Mus.); H. F. Talbot, TSBA II. (1878) 54.
2 W. H. Smith, JPA xiii. (1885) 290; Talbot, p. 55.
3 HDB, III. 375.
4 Aulus Gellius, x. xv. 6. 9; H. Nettesheim and J. E. Sandys, Dict. of Class. Ant., London, 1899, p. 338.
8 Vergili, Ed. vili. 77-79.
9 W. Wellhausen, Reze der arabischen Heidentum, Berlin, 1907, p. 163.
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is also tied round the bride's waist, and, when she departs from the house, the verse 'I loosen the knot of the marriage ceremony, a curtain is held up to screen the bride and groom from each other; under this they grasp each other's right hand, after which another piece of cloth is placed over them, the ends of the cloth are tied together by a double knot. In the same way, raw twist is taken and wound round the pair seven times. It is then tied seven times over the joined hands of the couple as well as round the double knot of the ends of the cloth around them. The Bhandaris tie the hands of the wedded pair together with a wisp of kula grass. The Karans of Bengal believe the essential part of the marriage ceremony to be the laying of the bride's right hand in that of the bridegroom and the tying of their two hands together with a piece of thread spun in a special way. In upper India the clothes of the bride and bridegroom are knotted together as they revolve round the sacred fire.

The greatest development of the symbolism was in classical times. At the Roman marriage ceremony the bride's garments were bound with a girdle knotted around her body with a Heraclean knot; after the marriage, the bride, on proceeding to her husband's house, tied the door-posts with woolen fillets, and later, in the bridal chamber, the knot was tied by her husband and the girdle removed; over this loosening ceremony Juno Cninix presided. Further details of the ceremony are given by Festus, who states that the application of the girdle symbolized the binding character of the marriage oath, while its unloosening was for a good omen, so that they might be as fortunate in rearing children as was Hercules, who had seventy offspring. On the other hand, Macrobius, in his description of the continuus, states that this represents the union of a male and female serpent as an offering to Mercury, and that they are united by a Heraclean knot, which symbolizes necessity; Athenagoras says that the wand of Mercury is a symbol of the union of Jupiter and Rhea, whom Jupiter, disguised as a dragon, bound to him in the form of a Hercalean knot. A. Rossbach suggested that the Hercalean knot was associated originally with the god Sancus, and that the latter, as god of light, protected men from illness and witchcraft—apotropic powers which the knot possessed, as being his signet. In the opinion of some writers, the symbolism of its tying was that of the binding character of the ceremony, and its unloosening the loss of virginity. From a physical standpoint the Hercalean knot was difficult to loosen.

A somewhat similar custom prevails among the natives of the East Indian island of Rotti. A cord is fastened round the waist of the bride, and nine knots are tied in it and smeared with wax in order to increase the difficulty of unloosening them; the bride and bridegroom are then secluded, and the latter has to untie the knots with the thumb and forefinger of his left hand. Not until this has been done may the man possess the woman as his wife. Frazer, in recording this case, suggests that the nine knots may refer to the months of pregnancy.

Before the wedding procession a Mexican bride has a girdle tied round her waist with three knots by one of her brothers; and among the Russians, during a marriage ceremony, a net, from which a number of knots, is thrown over the bride's head, and the attendants are girt with pieces of net or girdles, 'for before a wizard can begin to injure them he must undo all the knots in the net, or take off the girdle.' Not only was the knot important in the consummation of marriage and in the protection of the married couple from witchcraft; it was also a powerful amulet in the hands of a third person in preventing the wedding ceremony or preventing the union of the parties concerned. Thus in the Middle Ages a person could prevent a marriage by tying a knot in a cord or fastening a lock. The cord or lock had then to be thrown into water, and, until the charm was recovered and undone, no real marriage could take place. Such practices were punishable, and in 1705 two persons were condemned to death in Scotland for stealing marriage-knots which had been worn near the wedded bliss of Spalding of Ashintilly. The tying of these knots was known in Germany as Necht knupper and in France as moner l'alguidette. Those who made or used such spells were condemned to the galleys, directed to be excommunicated, and the Ritual of Paris of 1630 contains the statement:

'Nous denouons pour excommunicz tous magiciens et magiciennnes, sorcières et sorciers, devineurs et devinieres, nouers d'alguidettes et autres qui par figuratures et scurtigements empéchent l'unicité et consummation du saint Mariage.'

There are innumerable examples of this superstition in medieval literature, and the same ideas seem to have been prevalent among the Northern Semites in A.D. 700, since mention is made of persons who bend a needle and insert the head in the eye, or set seals on locks and throw them into a deep well or hide them in the ground that a man may be kept away from his wife.

In Perinthale, in 1763, knots were also tabbed at the marriage ceremonies, as is illustrated by the following custom, recorded by the minister of Logierait:

'Immediately before the celebration of the marriage ceremony every knot about the bride and bridegroom (carters, shoe-string, strings of petticoats, etc.) is carried knots. After leaving the church, the whole company walk round it, keeping the church walls always upon the right hand. The bridegroom, however, is required to remain among the women to tie the knots that were loosened about them, while the newly married woman in the same room retires somewhere else to adjust the dowry of her dress.'

For a similar reason it was a common practice for the bride and bridegroom to have one or both shoes united during the marriage ceremony. In Syria the bridegroom must have no knots or buttons fastened in his wedding garments; otherwise their magic will deprive him of his marriage rights. Similar beliefs exist among the North African races. A curious belief connected with marriage is that prevalent among the Pidhiresan, a Ruthenian people on the hem of the Carpathians,

1 Op. cit. p. 301
5 J. G. Dally, Darker Superstitions of Scotland, Glasgow, 1885, pp. 262, 300 f.
6 J. B. Thiels, Traité des superstitions, 4 vols., Avignon, 1777, iv. 219.
7 Ibid. p. 514; the whole subject is treated on pp. 293-295.
8 P. A. de Lange, Balanaiese jaren, en special Sgr., Leipzic, 1856, p. 133; W. R. Smith, JFA xiv (1885) 116, note.
11 Ritbi Adela, ZDDV v. (1884) 91 f.
12 Douhet, pp. 259-259.
where a widow who wishes to remarry unites the knots on her dead husband's garments; here again the magic is imitative and symbolizes her freedom from her bond. 3

4. Knots at child-birth.—The symbolism of the knot at birth is obvious, and its use is probably the most widespread amongst all such beliefs. Birth is associated in all countries with the idea of unloosing, and various peoples adopt different charms of a homozygous character to facilitate delivery. Hence arise such customs as opening doors and windows, undoing hair, buttons, and all knots in the clothing, preventing the husband and other persons from sitting with the legs crossed, setting free captive animals and even school children, etc. A few examples of these customs must suffice.

In ancient India it was a custom to unloose all knots at the time of child-birth, 4 and among the Romans and Greeks such beliefs were common. Thus Oriod states that the pregnant woman is to unbind her hair before praying to the goddess of child-birth, 5 and she must also avoid having knots in her clothing. 4 At the delivery of Alcmen, Eusorid is represented as having sat cross-legged before the house in order to delay matters. 6 The same superstition as that mentioned by Oriod occurs in Bilaspur, where the woman's hair is never allowed to remain knotted while the child is being born. In many Jewish girls under their hair if a difficult labour occurs in the house. 7 The prospective mother, among the Kayans of Borneo, must refrain from tying knots; 5 and in Persia, when the birth was imminent, the schoolmasters were asked to give liberty to the boys, whilst birds in cages were allowed to escape. 8 In Denmark knots had to be undone when a birth was about to occur, and in Sumatera, to render future parturition easier, the bride must untie the straps of her horse's saddle when returning from the church. Here also the bride did not tie her shoe-laces before the wedding, in order that 'she might bear children as easily as she could remove her shoe,' and she would have toothache at the birth of her child if anything were tied over her bridal crown. 9 Among the Hes of Toogoland, when a difficult confinement occurs, a magician is called, who spins a thread of the child is bound in the woman, that is why she cannot be delivered. 10 To lose the bonds he binds the hands and feet of the patient with a tough creaser and then, after calling the woman, he lets through the creaser with a knife, saying, 'I cut through to-day thy bonds and thy child's bonds.' The creaser is then cut up into small pieces and put in water, with which the woman is bathed. 11

Similar superstitions beliefs and customs may be traced in the folklore of ancient and modern India, Java, Sumatra, the Sea and Land Dayaks, Cochin China, Central Australia, Mecklenburg, Voigland, Russia, and even to the present day in Scotland. 12

5. Knots in the cure of diseases.—Knots were largely employed by the Assyrians in their spells on those who were ill; thus, for headache, the head of the sick person must be bound with a bundle of twigs, accompanied by the recitation of magic words, and at eventide the twigs are to be cut off and thrown into the street 'that the sickness of his head may be assuaged. 13 Another text recommends the use of the hair of a virgin kid, spun and wound with two threads over to the right, and limbs of the sufferer. 2 As a charm for ophthalmia, black and white threads or hairs are woven together, with seven and nine knots thereof, and during the knotting an incantation is said; the thread of black hair is then to be knotted to the sick eye, and the white one to the sound eye. 2 The Babylonian witches could strangle their victims or cut their mouths, etc., by tying knots in a cord, and by undoing these knots the sufferer could be relieved. 4 Similar customs have been found amongst the Persians 8 and Arabs 2 in modern times. Pliny, referring to wounds, remarks:

'It is quite surprising how much more speedily wounds will heal if they are bound up and tied with a Hercules' knot; indeed, it is said that, if the girdle which we wear every day is tied with a knot of this description, it will be protective of certain beneficial effects, Hercules having been the first to discover this fact.' He also states that in guinal tumours could be cured by taking a thread from a web, tying seven or nine knots on it, and then fastening it to the patient's groin, although it was also necessary to name some widow as each knot was tied. 8 Again, to cure swelling of the groins due to ulcers, the patient is directed to insert in the sores three horse hairs tied with as many knots. 8 In 1718 the Parliament of Bordeaux sentenced an individual to be banished alive for spreading desolation through a family by means of knotted cords; 8 and in Scotland, 11 Denmark, and Sweden 8 knotted cords are still in use to protect both men and beasts from illness, the number of knots being usually three or nine. In Russia a skein of red wool is wound about the arms and legs to protect the wearer from fever, and nine skeins tied round a child's neck protect it from scarlatina. 13 One of the most common of such beliefs is that warms may be cured by tying as many knots in a string as one has warms, and to obtain the ultimate cure either the knots are unloosed or the string is thrown away or placed under a stone, when the first person to pick up the string acquires the warms; 8 or each warm is to be touched by one of the knots. 12 In the days when the belief in the possibility of transferring diseases to inanimate objects was prevalent, knots were made in the branches or twigs of trees; the ceremony, being accompanied by spells, transferred the disease to the tree. 14 For protection against disease the Hos of Toogoland tie strings round the different parts of the body. 12 Knots are even believed to be a protection against death itself, and the soul cannot leave the body till they are loosed. 12

6. Other beliefs in knots as amulets.—Among the Assyrians the knot was used to prevent the spirits of the dead from annoying the living. To attain this end, the following directions are given: 3

'Spin a variegated and scarlet thread [a knot in it; thus shalt mix together oak of cedars, spirits of the
KNOX

man, the beavened dough, earth from an old grave, a tortoise's mouth, a thorn, earth from the roots of the paper, earth of ants; thou shalt sprinkle the knots with this. But when they have been sprinkled the knots are to be cut by the hands of Marduk, also the man from the tab. 2 Evidently a witch could cast a tab on a man by tying knots and chanting a spell, for we are told that her knot is loosed, her sorcery is brought to nought, and all her charms fill the desert.3 The ancient Hindus believed that knots tied in the garments of a traveller would protect him on a dangerous journey; 4 and in classical times spells were removed by knots, for Petronius mentions that, in removing a spell from Encopinus, 5 she then took from her bosom a web of twisted threads of various colours and bound it on my neck. 6 Charms of many coloured threads were tied on the necks of infants to protect them from fascination. 7 The same idea explains the wearing of the sacred thread, or janaati, by high-caste Hindus. The knots on it, known as a bati, 8 a krota, 9 or the knots of the Creator, 10 repel evil influences, and Muhammadans on their birthdays tie knots in a cord, which is known as the sadghraha, or 'year knot.' 11 To drive away rain, the Mirzapars native name twenty-one men blind of an eye (and, there, illomened), and make twenty-one knots in a cord, and tie it under the eaves of the house. 8 The tying of knots in a string and subsequently undoing them to raise and to bring good fortune and to bring good luck to a fishing people—e.g., Finlanders, Lapplanders, Shetlanders, and natives of the Hebrides and Isle of Man. 9 South African natives before starting on a journey will knot a few blades of grass so that the journey may be prosperous, 10 and the knotting of grass in a forest is supposed by Laoc hunters to prevent others from being successful there in the pursuit of game. 11 Russians have the belief that knots act as a protective against violent death from weapons, which, as it were, are 'tied' by the knots; and knots also prevent the death of cattle and people by 'binding up' the mouths of wolves and other dangerous animals. 12 Knox belief which is also current in Bulgaria 13 and Armenia. 14

LITERATURE. —References are given in the footnotes. Many other examples are cited in J. G. Frazer, Taboo and the Tabu, 1919, pp. 319-323, and also under arts. CHAINS AND AMULES. For Egyptian knotted cords (see unknotted) see F. Petrie, Ancient Egyptian Amulets, Edinburgh, 1898, vi, xvii), A. F. Mitchell (Scottish Reformation, do. 1900, p. 70), and D. Bay Fleming (Original Scottish Magus, 1899). The

KNOWLEDGE. —See Epistemology.

KNOX.—1. Birth and early life. —Neither the place nor the date of John Knox's birth is certain; but Giffordgate, a hamlet contiguous with Haddington, is the site for which most and against which least can be said; and a date between 24 Nov. 1513 and 24 Nov. 1514 (not 1505, as, and erroneously usually supposed) is most probable.

Local tradition in favour of Giffordgate was old in 1767 (G. Barclay, 1767, do. 1767, p. 69; and see H. J. Knox, Edinburgh, 1884, vii, xvii), A. F. Mitchell (Scottish Reformation, do. 1900, p. 29), and D. Bay Fleming (original Magus, 1899). The

ancient Register of Geneva and Knox's contemporary, Archibald Hamilton (De Confusione Calvinicurn, secta Paris, 1577), p. 8, describes him as a native of Haddington. 1

To remove a tab from a man, directions are given to bind his limbs with a double cord of black and white threads which has been sprinkled on a spit. 5 A cord then appears to be cut by the hands of Marduk, who also releases the man from the tab. 2 Evidently a witch could cast a tab on a man by tying knots and chanting a spell, for we are told that her knot is loosed, her sorcery is brought to nought, and all her charms fill the desert. The ancient Hindus believed that knots tied in the garments of a traveller would protect him on a dangerous journey; 4 and in classical times spells were removed by knots, for Petronius mentions that, in removing a spell from Encopinus, she then took from her bosom a web of twisted threads of various colours and bound it on my neck. Charms of many coloured threads were tied on the necks of infants to protect them from fascination. The same idea explains the wearing of the sacred thread, or janaati, by high-caste Hindus. The knots on it, known as a bati, a krota, or the knots of the Creator, repel evil influences, and Muhammadans on their birthdays tie knots in a cord, which is known as the sadghraha, or 'year knot.' To drive away rain, the Mirzapars native name twenty-one men blind of an eye (and, there, illomened), and make twenty-one knots in a cord, and tie it under the eaves of the house. The tying of knots in a string and subsequently undoing them to raise and to bring good fortune and to bring good luck to a fishing people—e.g., Finlanders, Lapplanders, Shetlanders, and natives of the Hebrides and Isle of Man. South African natives before starting on a journey will knot a few blades of grass so that the journey may be prosperous, and the knotting of grass in a forest is supposed by Laoc hunters to prevent others from being successful there in the pursuit of game. Russians have the belief that knots act as a protective against violent death from weapons, which, as it were, are 'tied' by the knots; and knots also prevent the death of cattle and people by 'binding up' the mouths of wolves and other dangerous animals. Knox belief which is also current in Bulgaria and Armenia.

Knox is stated to have been a student at St. Andrews under John Major, who was settled there in 1531. His student life must have begun not very long after Peace of the Martyrdom at St. Andrews in 1525, and the words in Knox's History (I. 56), 'when those cruel wolves had devoured their prey, there was none within St. Andrews who began not to enquire wherefore was Patrick Knox then to man's company.' 12

Knox was probably affected by the martyrdom; and this, along with the teaching of Gavin Logie, who fled from St. Andrews about 1524, in an account of Reformers and also the oath which graduates had to take against 'Lollardism,' may have led to Knox's non-graduation as Magister Artium. On the other hand, Major's influence and Knox's keenly patriotic spirit may have kept him from identifying himself with a cause which, in its earlier stages, came, justly or unjustly, under suspicion of being associated with unpatriotic subversion to the Compact, —Knox belief which is also current in Bulgaria and Armenia.

2. Call and ministry at St. Andrews. —The assassination of Beaton in May 1556 was combined by Knox as a godly fact justifying the failure of the civil authority to punish the Cardinal's illegal oppression. He had no scruple, therefore, about taking refuge from peril in the Castle of St. Andrews held by the enemies of the Roman Catholic religion. From the Castle congregation, led by John Roungh, an evangelical preacher, he accepted a solemn call to the Reformed ministry. On 5 May 1557, at the Parish Church he declared that the evil lives of the clergy (from popes downward), corrupt Roman doctrine, unscriptural enactments, and
blaspheinous papal pretensions proved that the Church of Rome was the whore of Babylon. 'A great number openly professed 'Reformed doctrine at St. Andrews; and Holy Communion was celebrated for the first time publicly in Scotland according to a Reformed ritual. Who had hitherto been mainbearers of the Protestant movement thus grew into a Reformed Church. Meanwhile, however, partly as a divine judgment (so Knox declared) on account of the evil doings of a portion of the Castle community, the garrison were commanded by the captain of the castle to surrender to the French fleet, and Knox, along with other prisoners, was consigned to the 'torment' of the galleries.

3. Ministry in England.—After eighteen months of toil and tribulation as a galley bondsman, Knox was released through the English Government's intervention. Gratitude to his liberators and the impracticability, then, of effective ministry in Scotland induced him to settle in England, where Archbishop Cranmer and Protector Somerset were accomplishing, under Edward vi., a more real Reformation than that of Henry vii. In Berwick (1549) he was received by the King and Queen, consisting of garrison and citizens, using a Puritan form of service. The Communion office was largely borrowed from Swiss sources, and the practice of kneeling was discontinued as a symbolical enunciation of the doctrine of the Supremacy of the Lord. During this Berwick ministry he publically testified against the ' idolatry' of the Mass before the ecclesiastical 'Council of the North,' and vindicated the Puritan position that 'all the body of Christ, not being by the brain of man, without God's express command, is idolatry.' Such action and testimony justified Carlyle's designation of Knox as 'the Chief Priest and Founder' of English Puritanism (Heroes and Hero-worship, London, 1872, p. 132). In 1551 he was promoted to Newcastle, and in 1562 he became one of six royal chaplains, who also itinerated on behalf of the Reform cause. He declined the bishopric of Rochester, not owing to any objection to episcopacy in itself, but because he disapproved of 'your proud prelates' great dominions and charge (impossible by one man to be discharged) (Laing, v. 518). As a patriotic Scot, moreover, he would be reluctant to undertake responsibilities which might debar him from eventual service to his native land. Partly through Knox's influence, sitting at Communion, he said: 'When this Second Prayer Book, while kneeling was retained, the existing rubric was inserted at Knox's instigation (J. Fyfe, Acts and Monuments, vi. 510; P. Lorimer, John Knox and the Church of England, London, 1875, pp. 99-107), declaring that by kneeling no adoration is intended either of the sacramental elements or of Christ's 'natural flesh and blood.' At Edward's death Knox not only took no part in the plot to enthronc Lady Jane Grey, but, as Royal Chaplain, prayed publicly for 'our Sovereign Lady Queen Mary,' and besought God to 'repress the pride of them that would rule.' When he was put on trial for heresy in Edward's reigned, however, became assured, Knox crossed over to Dieppe early in 1554. 'My prayer,' he writes, 'is that I may be restored to the battell again' (Laing, iii. 154 f.).

5. First return to Scotland.—The anxiety of the Regent Mary of Guise to secure the marriage of her daughter, Mary Stuart, to the Dauphin of France led her to courtish Protestant nobles, and to adopt a tolerant religious policy which encouraged Knox to visit Scotland in Sept. 1555. In districts where influential laymen gave him support, particularly West Lothian and Midlothian, Forfarshire, Ayrshire, and Strathclyde, he propagated Reformed doctrine and persuaded Protestant leaders to abstain from Mass and to celebrate Holy Communion with a Reformed ritual, thus enabling Protestants to consolidate. Knox even made a bold attempt to win the Regent by a conciliatory letter in which he praises her 'moderation and clemency.' In vain; she treated his elaborate address as a 'page and in Edward's reign, Knox to trial for heresy at Edinburgh in May 1556, and Knox arrived to meet his accusers; but they received no support from the Regent, and departed from the charge on the ground of some alleged informality. On the very day appointed for his trial Knox preached to a larger congregation than ever before had listened to him. An appeal, however, in midsummer, from his Geneva flock, and the conviction that the Reform cause, strengthened by his visit, might now be better served by his withdrawal for a time to prevent the resumption of persecution, led to his return to Geneva.

6. Final return to Scotland and establishment of the Reformation (1559-60).—In Dec. 1557 there was drawn up at Edinburgh, largely through the absent Reformer's stimulating influence, the first Scottish 'Covenant,' an organic league for defence against religious despotism and for the advancement of the Reform cause. This movement, along with Mary Stuart's marriage to the Dauphin in 1558, and consequent removal of the Regent's motive for toleration, led to renewed persecution; and the Scottish Reformers, realizing their need of Knox, invited him to return. He arrived at an opportune moment, on 2nd May 1559. Four notable preachers—

* This included his First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment (i.e. Rule of Women, his Appellation against the Scottish Hierarchy, a Brief Exhortation to England, and a magnum opus on Predestination. — KNOX
Harlaw, Willock, Christison, and Methven—had been cited to Stirling on 10th May to answer the accusations. A military commission was in rebellion of the Privy Council's proclamation. For non-appearance they were declared to be outlaws, and the raising of an army of 8000 (partly French) by the Regent provoked the gathering of the people at the burgh. The king himself had anticipated the conflict. On 11th May Knox preached in St. John's Church, Perth, against the 'idolatry' of the Mass. While the congregation were dispersed, a riot began which Knox, with whom had been present Knox had been denouncing. A lad protested loudly, was struck by the irritated celebrant, and retaliated by throwing a stone which broke an image. It was as if a lighted match had been applied to a heap of combustibles. Wide-spread 'surging' of churches and demolition of monasteries ensued. After temporary truces and fruitless attempts at compromise, the Regent, supported by France, and the Reformation, by England, carried on civil war which terminated only with the Regent's death in June 1560. Knox took a leading part in the conflict as preacher and counsellor. A significant sentence was that of A.D. 1556 on the 'Cleansing of the Temple'; another in St. Giles, 1559, where the Reformed aim as being not any alteration of authority, but the reformation of religion and suppression of idolatry; an extensive itinerary for the encouragement of the English and the establishment of a Reformed ministry in chief centres; an important share in the negotiations which issued in the alliance between the Scottish Reformers and the English Government; a signal service at Stirling after a defeat by the French army, when the depressed spirits of the Reformers were 'wondrously re-erected' by Knox's inspiring assurance that their cause was, and shall prevail because 'it is the eternal truth of the eternal God'—these are some of the Reformers' contributions to the Reformation movement during that critical time (Laing, l. c. 348, 355, 471, vi. 30, 56, 75). The Regent's dying counsel to both sides was to procure the withdrawal of both the English and the French armies. This was effected; and the settlement of Scottish ecclesiastical affairs was left to the Estates of the realm. The issue was the establishment of Protestantism as the national religion by the Convention (a virtual parliament) of Aug. 1560, so far at least as this was constitutionally possible in the absence of monarch and regent.

To Knox fell the efficacious composition of a Confession of Faith; the outcome was the 'Scots Confession,' which held the field until it was superseded by that of Westminster. Inferior in logical precision to its successor, the older Confession is superior in theological breadth and spiritual warmth (see art. Confessions, vol. iii. p. 575). Knox and his associates drew up a Church polity embodied in the First Book of Discipline. It recognizes five classes of office-bearers—superintendent, minister, elder, deacon, and reader. The first office was apparently a tentative arrangement, whose discontinuance or discontinuance might depend on its effectiveness or otherwise; gradually it persisted; the reader were a temporary institution until sufficient ministers became available. The Church courts were the Kirk Session, Synod, and General Assembly; the 'crown' of the Kirk was the General Assembly. Worship was regulated by his Book of Common Order. A school as well as a church was to be established in every parish, and a 'college' in every regality, but the whole preparation was to be provided for the University. The Book of Discipline anticipated modern legislation by advocating compulsory education. The patrimony of the Church, which, prior to the Reformation, included nearly half the property of the realm, was to be expended on the maintenance of the ministry, the educational establishment, and the relief of the poor; but unfortunately, notwithstanding Knox's indignant protest, the Scottish landowners 'greedily gripped to the possessions of the Kirk' (Laing, ii. 128), which had to be content with a settlement unsatisfactory to the Church. The establishment of the pulpit that 'one Messe was more fearful to him then gif ten thousand armed enemies war . . . in the Realme' (ib. 270). His first interview with Mary deepened his solicitude. The chief subject of conversation was the right of subjects to resist their princes, particularly in the religious spheres. 'God commandis subjectis to obey their Princes,' said Mary; 'I think ye that subjectis having power may resist their Princes?' Knox, long before, had learned from John Major the essence of constitutional monarchy, and he replied; 'If Princes exceed their bounds and do against that whersoever they should be obeyed, . . . the may be resisted.' 'I perceive that you disapprove the notion me,' said the Queen. 'My travell,' responded Knox, 'is, that bothy princes and subjectis obey God.' He closed the interview with the loyal corollar that Mary must be 'as blessed within the Communion of the Commonwealth of Scotland as ever Deborah was in the Commonwealth of Israel'; but he stated to friends his conviction, 'that, not in his a proud nyad, a crafty witt, and an indurart hearts against God and his truth, may my judgment with me' (ib. 277-286). This first encounter fairly exemplifies their relations. Knox in his bearing towards the Queen united on the whole the courtesy of a gentleman with the firm and sometimes stern maintenance of his right as a 'profitable member within the Commonwealth' publicly to criticize his sovereign's doings, especially in religious concerns. At their last recorded meeting, in Dec. 1563, when Knox appeared before the Queen and her Council to answer the charge of 'convinging the lieges' without her authority, he uttered the memorable manifesto: 'I am in the place quhair I am demandit of conscience to speik the truth; and thairfor I speik. The treath I spake impyting it quhill quhill' (ib. 286).

8. Knox and the Protestant statesmen.—Amid general agreement between Knox and lay Reformers on the vital question of dethroning the Roman Catholic and establishing the National Church, there was serious disagreement as to important details. The difference consisted chiefly in the familiar divergence between principle and expedient. Was Knox was against the toleration of the Mass even in the Queen's private chapel, Moray and Maitland thought this a cheap price to pay for Mary's acquiescence in Protestant supremacy. Knox emphasized the necessity of free Assemblies; 'Take from us the freedom of Assemblies, and you take from us the Evangel.' The Protestant statesmen, especially Maitland, saw in the freedom of convocation and enactment perilous impositions upon the Church. Knox demanded the legalizing of the Book of Discipline by royal and parliamentary endorsement; the lay leaders of the Reformation resisted the claim alike as an occasion of rancour between Church and landowners and as a dangerous aggrandizement of ecclesiastical wealth and power. There was never much love to lose between Knox and Maitland, but the rancour engendered between Knox and Moray (1564-65), the immediate result of which was the latter's unwillingness to press the Queen formally to recognize the Reformed as the National Church, caused a painful breach between two men.
who had regarded each other with esteem and affection. The breach was closed about the time of the Queen's marriage to Darley, when the state (as it became an exile, and the Reformer the leader of a depressed Church. Common misfortune helped to heal discord.

When Mary's mad marriage with her husband's murderer alienated the national sentiment and led to the commencement of Knox and the Reformed Moray co-operated loyally in securing the full establishment of Protestantism, a guarantee against the accession of any non-reformed secession, then the maintenance of a Protestant ministry. To Knox Moray's tragic death was not only a great public calamity, but a heavy personal bereavement; and his funeral sermon, from the significant text, 'Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord,' moved a vast congregation to tears (Calderwood, Hist. ii. 526).

9. Last years and death. — The eventide of Knox's life was clouded with trouble. Moray's removal strengthened the party which favoured Mary's restoration; and some influential men now seceded to it, including Maitland and Kirkcaldy of Grange. On the other hand, the Regent's party, to which Knox loyally adhered, strained the relations of the former and others by 'mean and baseless devouring' of the Church's patrimony and oppressive interference with her liberty. When to these troubles was added in 1570 a stroke of apoplexy, Knox was persuaded to leave Edinburgh for the more sheltered environment of St. Andrews, where he remained for half a year. He describes himself as there 'lying half-dead,' but he did not cease from preaching.

He had to be 'laid to the pulpit,' writes James Melville, his eye-witness (Memoir, p. 75), 'where he behaved to listen at his first entry; but ere he had done, he was like to sing that pulpit to the bloud of the out of it.'

During his residence in St. Andrews took place that introduction of a modified episcopate into the Reformed Scottish Church which became the fruitful source of discord, despotism, and rebellion. Knox did not protest against episcopacy in itself; but he warned the Church of the abuses to which it might lead, and suggested safeguards against the appointment of unqualified persons and the simoniacal alienation of ecclesiastical property to secular uses. When he returned to Edinburgh — to die; but two notable functions he lived to discharge: his sermon after the massacre of St. Bartholomew, when he denounced that 'seemly death'; the 'farewell to Kings and Reformation, the Reformation, the Reformation,' and to the Barmesta, where the white heads of righteous indignation, and his last pulpit service on 9th November, when James Lawson was inducted as his successor, and when Knox with 'weak voice but fervent heart' prayed that any gift which he had possessed 'might be bestowed on his successor '100 fold' (R. Bannatyne, Memorials, p. 281). A 'last good night' to the elders and deacons of St. Giles; a solemn and affectionate Godspeed to his colleague; farewell interviews and messages, in particular a meeting with Morton whom he supported but did not love, and an assurance of divine mercy to Kirkcaldy whom he loved but opposed to being prayed for 'the troubled Kirk,' a dying vision of the 'Delectable Land'; and a last request to his devoted young wife to read the 15th chapter of 1st Corinthians, 'where,' he said, 'I first cast anchor' — these are some of the chief incidents of the Reformer's latest hours (ib. p. 388f.). He was buried in what was then the churchyard of St. Giles, at or near the spot afterwards indicated by his initials between the churchyard wall and the church wall — 'this remains were laid in the grave, Morton uttered his disinterested witness: 'Here lyeth a man who in his life never feared the face of man' (J. Melville, Memoirs, p. 60). This panegyric indicates what in Knox's character most impressed his contemporaries. But beneath this fearlessness towards men was his steadfast faith in God, and in his own call to be God's servant. Knox was inspired by the same Romanists as well as Romanism; but we must remember the great difference between the Roman Church of Scotland in the 16th cent. and in the 20th. He was a stern man who demanded severity and intolerance. There was in him a vein of tenderness and sympathy of which life-long conflict did not deprive him. We catch a glimpse of this side of his character in the almost intolerable pain which (as e.g., John Knox, C. 1557-1579, do. (Bannatyne Club), 1597; D. Buchanan, Life and Death of John Knox, do. 1644; J. Fox, Acts and Monuments, London, 1559-1579, do. (Bannatyne Club), 1612; P. Hume Brown, John Knox, 2 vols., London, 1555; J. Innes, John Knox, Edinburgh, 1566; A. Lang, John Knox and the Reformation, London, 1655; J. Stalker, John Knox: his Life and Times, London, 1860; and J. S. Anderson, John Knox, a Biography, do. 1905; H. Cowan, John Knox, New York, 1905; P. Laronier, John Knox and the Church of England, London, 1573; C. Brown, Genealogy of the Knox Family, London, 1897, etc.; D. C. Fleming, The Reformation in Scotland, London, 1897; J. Challoner, Life of John Knox, do. 1707; R. Story, Church of Scotland, Past and Present, London, 1890; W. Stephen, History of the Scottish Church, Edinburgh, 1808; A. R. MacKean, A History of the Church in Scotland, London and New York, 1913; F. L. Stevenson, Men and Books, London, 1886; H. Cowan.

KODAS.—See Mýndas.

KOL, KOLARIAN.—'Kol' and 'Kolarian' are terms applied to a race and a group of languages spoken by people found on the Vindhya-Kaimur hill range, which slopes the Ganges valley to the south in N. India. The origin of these names presents many difficult questions. Skr. kola means 'a hog,' and, according to some authorities, the tribal designation is a term of contempt applied by the early Hindus to the dark-skinned aborigines. According to Jellinghams (ZE iii. 1871 ii. 326), the word means 'pig-killer'; but it is more probably, like Orion (q.v.), a variant of horda, the Mandya term for 'man.' (H. H. Rice, op. cit. p. 101; E. T. Dalton, Descrip. Ethnology of Bengal, do. 1872, p. 178). The term Kol was used in the Harivansha and other Puranas (J. Mair, Orig.
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Sir. Texts, ii. [1874] 492; H. H. Wilson, Vishnu Purana, London, 1864-77, iii. 293) is supposed to be applied to the Karna or Kanara people; but it seems more probable that it refers to the N. tribe (R. Caldwell, Comparative Grammar of Dravidian Languages, London, 1875, i. 243) in which the origin of the term Kolarian is more remarkable. F. Wilford tried to show (Asiatic Researches, ii. [1809] 92) that ‘Colar’ was the oldest name of India, his hypothesis being based on a passage in pseudo-Plutarch’s Life of Alexander, iv. 1 which speaks of a nymph Kalauria in connexion with the origin of the Ganges. The use of the term Kolarian to designate this people and their language is due to G. Campbell (JASBE xxxv, pt. ii. [1860], supplement, p. 27 f.), and was adopted by Dalton and other ethnologists, but was repudiated by Riley on anthropometric grounds:

Another theory of the origin of the Dravidians was adopted by Sir William Hunter in the account of the non-Aryan races of India given by him in The Indian Empire. According to this view there are two branches of the Dravidians—the Kolarian, speaking dialects allied to Mundari, and the Dravidians proper, whose languages belong to the Tamil family. The former entered India from the North-East and occupied the northern parts of the Indian sub-continent. The others were conquered and split into fragments by the main body of Dravidians who found their way into the Punjab through the North-West and thence towards the South India. The basis of this theory is obscure. Some of the isolated Dravidian dialects seem to rest upon a supposed affinity between the Dravidian dialects of the Kolarian and the languages of the Southern India; while the hypothesis of the North-Eastern origin of the Kolarian relies on the theory of a land connection between the peoples of Chota Nagpur. But in the first place the distinction between Kolarians and Dravidians is purely linguistic and does not correspond to any differences of physical type. Secondly, it is extremely improbable that a large body of people and continuously long-headed types should have come from the one region of the earth which is peopled exclusively by races with broad heads and yellow complexions. With this the theory in which the Dravidians are supposed to have emigrated from a trans-Himalyan origin to the Dravidians (Census Report of India, 1901, i. 506, The People of India, Calcutta, 1905, p. 461 f.).

The question has assumed another form as the result of linguistic researches. The original substratum of the type of languages now known as Môn-Khmer is found to have covered a wide area, larger than the area covered by many families of languages in India at the present day. Languages with this common substratum are now spoken, not only in the mountain Province of Assam, in Burma, Siam, Cambodia and Annam, but also over the whole of Central India as far west as the Berar. It is a far cry from Cochín China to Nínar, and the presence of the present day coincides between the language of the Korka or Korkas of the latter and the language of the former China is strikingly obvious to any student of language who turns his attention to them (G. A. Grierson, Linguistic Survey of India, ii. [Calcutta, 1901], p. iv. [1906] Môn and Dravidian Languages, p. 270 f.).

Further, many ethnologists are not prepared to accept the theory that the originality of the brahcycephalic type in trans-Himalyan (JRAI xliii. [1912] 450 ff.); and the origin of the Mundâ-speaking races is now attributed to the arrival of the first of three great invasions of Further India from the eastern uplands of Central Asia. It is improbable that the wide distribution in N. India of languages of the Môn-Khmer type could have occurred in any other way than by an emigration of the two races. The identification of physical type between the Kolarians and the Dravidians may be the result of contact metempsychosis and the control of a common environment. The status of this authority, A. Balme (Ethnography [=GJAP ii. 5], Krasnbus, 1912, p. 3), thus sums up the question:

"The other race, to which the title of Koll or Mônkh is generally assigned, is the Tseke, in the Kessel Belt, in which it is at the present time concentrated under its distinctive title of Tseke, formerly, however, it was spread over the whole of the great plains of Upper India, and, according to recent philological discoveries, it is akin, at least in language, to the Tseke of the present day, it was settled on the borders of Assam, and it passed to the east of the Bay of Bengal. Some investigators, indeed, even speak of former habitation over a still wider area. In the east and north-east of India, however, its identity has been obscured, if not obliterated, by the successive immigrations of people of Mongoloid race from eastern Tibet and the head waters of the great Chinese rivers, whose main streams of migration have sought the sea by two great courses, the valley of Salwin, and Mekong. In the Ganges plain the type is traceable through the population, slightly, indeed, along the Jumna, but more distinctively as the language is properly spoken, and almost everywhere more prevalent as the social position is lower. This graduation is due to the process by which the old Koll, who, as far as ethnography is concerned, may be considered the autochthonous inhabitants of these tracts, and a taller and fairer race, which entered India by the passage of the north-west or the plains of Baluchistan."

See also art. MUNĐAS AND ORÁÖNS.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities quoted in the article, see G. Oppert, Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarsha or India, Westmister, 1852, p. 10 g. f.; W. Crooke, CJ, no. 1850, 394 ff. On the Môn-Khmer question, W. W. Skeat and C. O. Bauden, English Races of the Malay Peninsula, London, 1906, ii. 484 ff.; Census Reports, 1911, Assam, L. 66; Burma, L. 207 f., 261 f.

KORAN.—See QUR'ân.

KOREA.—The Korean Peninsula, very mountainous and well watered, projects from the continent towards Japan. On the north-west the wooded mountains of Manchuria, and the plain of Liyao, which has always been a cause of contention to the Chinese, the hunters of the north-east, the shepherds of the north-west (the Manchus), and the Mongols (or Khalkhas) on the valley of the Irkoudi, Salwin, and Mekong. On the south-west side it stretches well into the vicinity of Shantung and Central China; the southern extremity comes close to Tsushima; but the north-eastern coast, on the Sea of Japan, is somewhat inhospitable.

I. History.—The history of Korea may be extracted from the above remarks: its neighbours, who are more advanced or stronger, have prevailed over it by virtue of their civilization and have often brought it under subjection by force of arms; at some rare intervals it has lived its own life. Its unity was brought about with difficulty. Its entrance into history was about the time when it was invaded first by Chinese and then by Japanese, while the natives settled down as independent kingdoms, Kokyore in the north-west, Paikchei in the south-west, Silla in the south-east, Koryor between the two latter—to say nothing of the tribes of the Ye in the Sea of Japan, and the kingdom of Puyre situated in the country which is now Manchuria. At last, through the assistance of China, a union was accomplished, the interest of Silla (668) and in opposition to Japan. To that southern kingdom succeeded the kingdom of Koryor (918), and then that of Chosen (1392); the latter was sovereign in the year 1910.

2. Nature-worship.—Numerous facts indicate that earlier than the Koryor dynasty there was a nature-religion whose traces are still visible to-day. Sacrifices to heaven were offered by the kings or the people in Silla, Paikchei, Kokyore, and Puyre, and among the Ye. Under the dynasty of Koryor the worship of heaven was celebrated by the king, although he was a vassal of the Emperor; the sacrifices had probably the identification of physical type between the Kolarians and the Dravidians may be the result of contact metempsychosis and the control of a common environment. The status of this authority, A. Balme (Ethnography [=GJAP ii. 5], Krasnbus, 1912, p. 3), thus sums up the question:

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KORAN.—See QUR'ân.
altars dedicated to the stars; at these altars offerings and prayers were burned. In the middle of the 15th cent., these ceremonies, though in character not very surprizing; like the sacrifices to heaven, they did not conform to the strict orthodoxy of Confucianism.

In the kingdom of Silla, at a period when the Chinese civilization had been spread, the sacrifices in connexion with agriculture kept their national character; they took place three times a year—in spring, summer, and autumn.

One of the most important points in the ancient religion of Silla was its attachment to mountains, rivers, and seas. The Sam kuk sa kwei gives a list of the holy places of the kingdom of Silla, classified into three groups, according to their importance. Under the dynasty of Choson, sacrifices were regularly offered, sometimes at the places consecrated by tradition, sometimes at a mountain- or river-altar (after 1406 the altars had official guardians). The regulations of 966 include ritual rules along with a kind of sacred geography. In spite of the intolerance of the Confucianists, who have gradually effaced so many traces of the ancient beliefs, this worship has survived. It is very deep-rooted among the people; there is a sacred mountain where the sanctuary is not to be found, dedicated to the spirit of the place or to a Buddha as its substitute. At every important or difficult pass there is a sacred tree, at the foot of which each passer-by lays a pebble; some travellers tear strips from their garments and tie them to the branches; the devout present rice. Similar offerings are made at the fords and at the eddies of the rivers. The great trees, the mirage (gigantic oaks), are usually Buddhist in origin, which occur in fairly large numbers, and the posts painted red, with the tops roughly representing a human head, are the objects of a similar devotion.

A last mark of the ancient religion has reference to the sacred trees. At the beginning of each year there were general sacrifices of propitiation and purification; these were offered also in time of war; and at such times all rejoicings were forbidden. Practices analogous to that great annual purification may be found in the feudal China of the Cheu and in ancient Japan. In the modern Chinese worship, fasting and the washing of hands which precedes every sacrifice have not a general significance. The use of purifications and of public prayers on the occasion of calamities, fires, and invasions is often noted even during the period of Korye, under names which recall the Japanese Otakaraki. The people observed a custom of the same nature; each year, on the 15th day of the moon, they went to wash their hair at the river in order to remove all misfortunes; then they gathered together to drink and make merry.

3. Ancestor-worship.—The Sam kuk sa kwei assigns a remote origin to the worship of the royal ancestors of Silla.

Under the king Nam-hal, the second reign, the 3rd year (A.D. 5) in spring, they set up for the first time the temple of Sibe (the heaven of the ancestors) in Dae-han-seong, the palace of Si-cho, founded a temple in order to offer sacrifice to him. His own younger sister, An, presided at the sacrifice. King Chilcheong, in the 10th reign, at Nam-ri, birthplace of the king, in the place of Si-cho, founded a temple in order to offer sacrifice to him. His own younger sister, An, presided at the sacrifice. King Chilcheong, in the 10th reign, at Nam-ri, birthplace of the king, in the place of Si-cho, founded a temple in order to offer sacrifice to him. His own younger sister, An, presided at the sacrifice. King Chilcheong, in the 10th reign, at Nam-ri, birthplace of the king, in the place of Si-cho, founded a temple in order to offer sacrifice to him. His own younger sister, An, presided at the sacrifice. King Chilcheong, in the 10th reign, at Nam-ri, birthplace of the king, in the place of Si-cho, founded a temple in order to offer sacrifice to him. His own younger sister, An, presided at the sacrifice.

Of the places where the official worship is celebrated, some—ayo, tuyen, sa—are covered buildings, separated by courts, and contained within an enclosing wall; and these buildings and sumptuous, are consecrated to the worship of the manes. The others, tan, are altars in the open air, formed of a levelled surface which is raised above the surrounding ground and is
reached by steps; these are encompassed by one or two enclosing walls, square or rectangular in form, often a Matter low, and built of stone; the altar and the walls are orientated. In the middle of each of the walls is an opening which serves as a passage; it is adorned with the Korean wooden gate, and is the entrance to the altars which are employed for the most part for the worship of the spirits of nature. Several other temples, called kung or myo, are dedicated to different members of the royal family, heirs to the throne, wives of the king, ancestors, and persons of the first degree of kinship. At a number of feasts, worship is celebrated at the tombs of the kings and other members of the royal family. The tombs of the kings and queens, sin yang, 47 or 45 in number, are situated mostly in the neighborhood of Se-ul; the tombs of the second and third class, wen and wo, number more than 10. There are also temples consecrated to Confucius and to various celebrated men and benefactors of the country.

Principal temples and altars.—Chung myo, at Se-ul, temple of the royal ancestors of Chosen; Yeung-kung, at Se-ul, where the portraits of several kings are honored; Kyung-sang kung, at Se-ul, built in 1744 for the manes of the crown-princes Chosun, Kyung, and Sun, in honor of the legendary Koo-chief, founder (A.D. 1120) of the second kingdom of Chosen; Sung-tei kung, at Kyung-chung, dedicated to the first king; Kyung-yo, temple of the sung myo, temple of Confucius at Se-ul, temple of the gods of war who fought with the Korean army against the Japanese in 1592 and 1597; Sun-sun kung, at Se-ul, in honor of two Chinese generals who fought for Korea in that war; Sun-yang kung, at Sung-yu, dedicated to several Chinese mandarins who took part in the war against the Japanese (1902-93); Chong-sun kung, at Sun-t’yon, where Hsu Sun-him is honored, the great Korean admiral who so often saved the Japanese; Se-ul, at Se-ul, an altar dedicated to three Ming Emperors—Thal-tou, Shen-taung, who died in 1656, and Yi-taun, the last of the dynasty; Se-huo kung, at Se-ul, altar of the gods of the harvest.

In theory ancestor-worship exists in every family, just as in the royal family: the eldest son inherits the sacrifices and presents offerings to his father, his grandfather, and great-grandfather, as well as to their wives, i.e., to one, two, or three generations of ancestors in the male line; the more remote ancestors have neither tablets nor special offerings. The ceremonies take place at the same periods and in connection with the same events as those of the worship of the royal ancestors and may be performed in the principal room of the house, in a room or chapel set apart for this purpose, or near the tomb.

For sacrifices performed by a man of the people (i.e., not an official) to his father and mother, the offerings are by right the following: a bowl of vegetables, a plate of fruits, a bowl of dried meat and of salted meat, a bowl of roasted rice, two bowls of cooked rice, two bowls of broth, a spoon and chopsticks for two persons, and six cups (of sake).

In practice the aristocracy of the ryung-pae and the semi-aristocracy of the chung-in seem to be the only people who celebrate this private worship. It is regulated by the ritual of Chu Hi and by many Korean commentaries, but it is not mentioned, even in a native form, earlier than 1015.

There are many buildings, more or less important, bearing the name of se, so-teum, or myo, which belong to the officials and not to the domestics. They are dedicated to celebrated men, Korean or Chinese, philosophers, officials, and soldiers, distinguished by their loyalty, their virtues, and the loftiness of their teaching. The little won of Ch’unghwa, the center of the administrative system, was situated 383 outside of Se-ul—i.e., on an average, more than one for each district. In some of the temples not more than one personage is adored, in others half a dozen. The Italians and the missionaries have not fewer than 110, in one locality, while the names of others are found in all the provinces, or in several districts of each province. If the terms were taken in their exact sense, the se and the myo would be essentially the places of worship; in the se-teum, the principal part would be the kung k’ung, where the disciples gather together, and where the learned gather to meditate on the works of their master, and to discuss and expound his teaching; as a matter of fact, the three expressions are not kept distinct. These chapels, by the piety of descendants, disciples, and adorers in order to honour the memory of their favorite master, received from their founders gifts of rice, plantations and slaves; and often the king bestowed similar benefits on them, exempted them from taxation, or granted them a tablet bearing characters written by his hand.

There is no doubt that the new international conditions of Korea will modify the religious customs.

4. Buddhism.—The formalities of Buddhism in Korea do not differ essentially from those in China, whence it has penetrated into the peninsula. The bonze Sun-to, carrying images and sacred texts, was sent to Kokurye by the king of Tsin in A.D. 372; in 384 the bonze Marananda coming from Tsin went to Paikchei; fifty years later some bonzes from Kokurye entered Silla, which practically adopted Buddhism. Before long it was forbidden in that kingdom to kill any animal; many people became monks and gave their goods to the monasteries; some kings took the bonze’s robe, and in 591 the dignity of patriarch of the kingdom was created. Under the dynasty Buddhist shone with incomparable radiance; the hokse so, preceptor of the kingdom, was often possessed of great power, while the bonzes, fortified in their monasteries, and owners of numerous slaves and extensive domains, traditional, pictured, and strove by force of arms against the ministers who displeased them. The dynasty of Chosen, however, treated the monks mainly with distrust; the chung, Buddhist Orders or sects, were, by decree, reduced to the number of two (1419), and then abolished (1512). The monastic profession was surrounded by many hindrances (1469); the monasteries of Se-ul were destroyed, and it was forbidden to build upon the others; the bonzes were prohibited from entering the capital and were ranked among the lowest castes. These persecuting laws have been suspended since the Japanese domination.

5. Confucianism.—The accession of the dynasty of Chosen had been, in fact, a reaction against the bonzes and against the Mongols. In opposition to that twofold tyranny, the nobles had become Confucian literati. In spite of the fact that they were given by several of the first kings of Korye, the teaching of the Chinese sage, scarcely approved of in Silla, had failed to find more adherents later on, and in the Middle of the 15th cent. An Ta complained that he saw the temple of Confucius in ruins and the Great School without pupils. After the fall of the Sung in China, many Confucian books were introduced, and literati came into the country. This was the beginning of a Confucian renaissance, of which the great names are those of Ri Saik and Cheng Mong-chu (second half of the 14th cent.). The triumph of the literati in Korea followed the fall of the Mongols and the accession of the Ming at Peking. The first king of Chosen, Sung-t’yon (1402-1408) and Sei-tou (1418-1460), organized their kingdom according to the principles of the School, revived the competitive examinations and the colleges, and surrounded themselves with literati, whom, however, they knew how to keep in subjection. In the following century, however, the Confucianists were once more in the official positions; the temples, and colleges around renowned monasteries, communicating from town to town, and represented at Se-ul by the literati of the temple of Confucius and often by the highest officials, spoke

KOURETES AND KORYBANTES

protectors of the holy child (Zeus), as παινομάκρος and φιάλαξ.

1. In the Kretan discourses the Kouretes are called the nurses and guardians of Zeus (Θεοτόκες) and that, by common consent the birthplace of the Kouretes, and, wherever Kretan civilization spread, the specialized Kouretes are apt to be found. Their particular geographical distribution is matter of the general history of the spread of Kretan civilization, and does not here concern us.

The great central worship of Krete was the worship of the Mother-goddess. In the bridal-chamber (θημενάμα) of Krete the young men, before they might win their earthly brides, were initiated to the Mountain-Mother, and became symbolically her consorts or husbands; by this ceremony her fertility was promted and their safeguarded. In natural sequence these potential fathers became the guardians of the Mother's child, re-born each year, on whose birth the fertility of nature and man alike depended. This marriage they initiated with the Queen or Mother underlies all the Kretan and Asia Minor mysteries. On an Orphic gold tablet the mystic αναφαίνεται δ'ετε κόσμων ένθε χωνίαι Βασιλείας, and one formula amongst the mysteries, δάκρων την αναφορά, where the παραστάτη corresponds exactly to the marriage-chamber (θημενάμα) of the Kretan Kouretes.

The functions of the Kouretes in the secondary and derivative sense as medicine-man, a member of a secret society, were not confined, any more than were those of the young tribal initiate, to that of marriage. It was the multiplicity of these functions that puzzled Strabo. He finds that the Kouretes are magicians, prophets, and armed dancers, as well as child-reapers, and always half-demonic. These manifold functions are natural enough if we regard the Kouretes as a blend of medicine-man and culture-hero. The medicine-man is always half-demonic, and often dressed up as a bogey—he is always a seer and a healer, always charged with magical power, and it is interesting to find that Ermeneides, the great magician-healer of Kretan who was summoned to Athens to purify the city, was hailed as the 'New Kouretes' (Kouretes, not Kouretes, as in the printed edition). Thucydides, in Pindar (Vita Sol. xii.), *an adept in religious matters dealing with the lore of orgiastic and initiatory rites, and his life, with its magical sleep, his Dictyle, its dream-tangling lore, reads like the tale of the initiation of a savage medicine-man.

Diodorus brings the Kouretes before us as culture-heroes, as the projections, half-historical, half-mythological, of man's primitive energies and discoveries. They dwelt, he tells us, on mountains and in wooded places and glens where there was natural shelter. They were distinguished by their ingenuity in inventing the devices of war and good. They taught men to collect four-footed beasts in flocks, to tame wild animals, the art of bee-keeping, how to hunt and shoot, and they taught men how to live together in societies, and were the originators of law and order and a certain good order. They also discovered swords and helmets and armed dances, and by means of these they made a great din and decorated Krones (v. 65).

Following Diodorus, modern mythologists have always explained the characteristics of the Kouretes as part of the tendance of the holy child. As such it appears in the reliefs and on the various coins where the birth is represented. The Mother and child, or sometimes the child only, are figured in the centre, and above them the Kouretes clash their shields. Rendel Harris has shown that the shield-o, rather, cymbal-clashing was connected with the child's sacred food, as much as or more than with the child. 'Butter and honey shall be eat.' His nursing mothers (μήλιτα) are Asia and Melissa, the honey-bee. It was 'a rude music meant to call the swarming bees to a new hive' (Boaerenga, p. 350). It finds its counterpart in the 'noise of tin pans and kettles which may be heard in the neighborhood of the bee蜂 in the country when the bees are swarming.' Virgil remembers the connexion between bees and the cymbals of the Mother. When the bees swarm, he says, 'they raised raised balm-leave and honeywort.'

'tamuisque cite, et Matris quae cymbala curant' (Georg. iv. 64).

and a little later he definitely connects the bees and the Kouretes, speaking of the bees as 'Curetum scutis crepitantisque aera secuta' (G. 151).

It is important to note that on our earliest monument representing the Kouretes—one of the votive bronze shields, found actually in the sacred cave on Mt. Ida and dating about the 8th cent. b.c.—the Kouretes are clashing not shields but cymbals or a sort of gong.

Though their aspect as culture-heroes was of great importance, the central function of the Kouretes remained that of husbands and potential fathers. On the symbolic performance in ritual of this function depended the fertility and, in general, the luck or fate of the whole tribe. Of this, happily, we are certain, owing to the discovery of a priceless monument, the Hymn of the Kouretes, recently found at Palalakastro in Eastern Crete. The Hymn dates from about the 7th cent. A.D., but it embodies a much older original. It opens with an invocation to the 'Kouros most great,' the mythical projection of the band of kouroi. He is addressed as 'Kronias, as 'Lord of all that is wet and gleaming' (vayepetos γυαλος), i.e. lord of moisture and of life begotten and nurtured by moisture. Moreover—an all-important point—he is bidden to come to Dikte 'for the year' (eις θιααρε). The birth and nurture of the holy child are then recounted—a birth which implied to the ears of the initiates the sacred ritual marriage. The Hymn text forms the basis of the following:

The Kouretes stand as salient examples of two fundamental principles in primitive Greek religions. (1) Mythological figures are the projection of (a) social-structure, and (b) human activities. The Kouretes reflect the matriarchal social structure, which centres in the Mother and Child, with accessory consort or consorts. Their religion was obscured and all the rites effaced by the later patriarchal system in which the Father dominates the Mother, and in which tribal initiation at puberty has ceased to be prominent; the human energies expressed by the Kouretes are the idealized, combined with early food-producing activities—the tending of flocks and herds and bees. (2) Primitive ritual is always magical in character; i.e., the woman who does what the Kouretes do only symbolically is a holy child that his own children may be nurtured.
KURKUS

Then, as the religious instinct develops, he projects a demon leader—a Greatest Kuruks, to whom he hands over the functions which he himself performed.

2. Korybantes.—The Korybantes are a specialized form of one function of the Kouroi: they are the embodiments or projections of the orgiastic rite. Their name is of interest: it means 'peacock.' Thus the Macedonian form of korybaste, 'peacock-headed,' is korybbas, a peacock-headed dress worn by, e.g., the Persian king and the Roman Satii, figures near to the Kouroi. The Korybantes, like the Kouroi, had initiation-business which seem to have emphasized death and burial rather than marriage and birth; but it must be borne in mind that death and burial rites, followed by resurrection, are equally effective 'medicinal' solutions for fertility with rites of marriage and birth. The Peacock Men were naturally, like the Kouroi, the satellites of the Mountain-Mother, and in her honour celebrated wild mountain dances (apalatea). Some said that they were the first men springing from the Earth in the form of bees. Their worship was connected with that of the Kabeiroi, and they were at home in Purgya rather than in Kretan. To Plato the Korybantes are the snowiest instance of orgiastic katharsis (Legg. 709 D: fr. Legg. 697 E).

This katharsis by dancing included for the ancient Kouroi and Korybantes, as for the modern savage, two elements apparently contrasted, but really closely inter-connected: the expulsion of evil, i.e. barrenness, sickness, madness, and the induction of good, i.e. fertility, health, growth, and sanity. To-day in French Gaëtane, while some of the natives are dead, a man armed with a musket dances, and the intent of this is explained as twofold: for exorcising the spirits and causing the grain to sprout; and in West Africa at a moment of the people go out armed for battle, the other half carry only farm tools.

LITERATURE.—For literary and monumental evidence see Roscher, K. 'Kurene,' Daremberg-Saglio, O. 'Kurene,' and O. Gruppe, Griech. Mythol. und Mythenpfl. Munich, 1904. The Korybantes are described as cult-infection-heroes by J. E. Harrison, discussing respectively the finding of the Iovus, the editing of the text, and its religious significance. For the Kouroi as initiates and culture-heroes see J. E. Harrison, Themis, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 6 ff., 51 ff.; for their relation to mountain worship see J. E. Harrison, 'B. A. Cook, Zeus, the Indo-European Upright God, Cambridge, 1914, pp. 600, and ib. 20, 24, note 6, for the interpretation of the Kouroi as those of the shore has been so many times as 1912, pp. 107. For the Korybantes as Peacock-Men, pp. 191 ff. Forymbal- clashing as bee-keepers see J. E. Harrison, Themis, Cambridge, 1915, pp. 348-367. For prophylactic and incantatory functions of armed dancing priests see J. G. Frazer, G.B., pp. 473 ff., 'The Scope of the Korybantes,' London, 1914, p. 321 ff. For foma shields of the Roman case see P. Fontaine, Der orient und die frühchristliche Kunst, Leipzig, 1914, pp. 10-11. 'Korybantes' is of the Korybantes.

J. E. HARRISON.

KRISHNA.—See INCARNATION (Indian).

KSHATRIYAS.—See CASTE.

KURDS.—See SUNNIS, KIZIL BASH.

KUKUS.—1. Race, habitat, and census. The Kukus belong to the Mundia family of India, and are closely akin to the Kols of Chotanagpur and the Santals of the Santal Parganas. 1 They inhabit the Singbhum hills and the contiguous plains in the Central Provinces, especially the Districts of Hoshangabad, Mirim, Betal, and the Melghat Taluk of Ellichpur. Their total number, as given in the Census of 1911, was 192,363, which marks an increase of 7,647 on that of 1901, 2 whereas the latter showed a decrease of 8 per cent on those of the previous decade, due to the famine years from 1897 onward.

2. Tribal organization. The Kukus are also known by the name Mana; but this, again, is used as a subdivisional name along with other terms, viz., Bawaria, Ruma, and Bondoyia. Thus the Kukus are divided into four sub-tribes, mainly on a territorial basis, but also with a marked traditional classification tending to caste distinction. The sub-tribes are further divided into totemic sets, named, for the most part, after trees, plants, animals, and other natural objects, animate or inanimate—e.g., Chilat (Catalpinia sepatoria), Jambha (Ecogynia pandolcana), Bori (Gmelina arborea, Roxb.), Takhir (cucumber), Sakom (leaf), Muririnah (peafowl), Dhapir (ass), Akhandi (mountain), Kask (earth), and Athok (wooden ladle). Accounts vary as to the correct number of these sets. According to one version, each sub-tribe has 36 sets. The writer of this article has been assured by Kukus that the number is properly 125, which is also the figure given by Driver; but the set names in actual use are found to exceed these limits, so that the statement is probably due to Gop and ultimately to Hinda—influence. The origin of these sept divisions is naturally hid in obscurity, though various stories are current which purport to give the explanation. The 'Korku' in the Ethnographic Survey of the Central Provinces (iii. 'Draft Articles on Forest Tribes' [1907] 54) records a tradition that the names are derived from trees and other articles in or behind which the ancestors of each sept took refuge after being defeated in a great battle.

A variant of this was told to the present writer to the effect that the names were given by Bhagwan on an occasion when he called the ancestors of the tribe into his presence and inquired whence they had come, and, as each one indicated the locality by reference to some special object, Bhagwan named him accordingly. Perhaps this version looks more in the direction of J. G. Frazer's theory that the ultimate explanation of totemic names is to be sought in connection with primitive ignorance regarding the processes of procreation, though it would be prepossessing to lay particular stress on any special interpretation of such unstable traditions. With the present version as common, the question of the meaning of the term 'Korku' is one of the most important in the Kukupe system and what Frazer ('Totemism and Ethnogamy, London, 1910, iii. 21) notes as characteristic where the 'classificatory system' prevails holds good among the Kukus, viz., that the language 'has separate terms for elder brother (adda or adda) and younger brother (badd), for elder sister (bati or jiti) and younger sister (baddi), but no terms for brother in general or for sister in general.'

The Kukus, like some sections of the Gond tribe, occasionally seek to establish a Rajaup ancestry, and various tales are current with the intent. The element of truth here seems to be that some measure of intercourse has taken place, resulting in the loss of caste on the part of individual Rajputs and their identification with the Kukupe people. The term Raj Korkus is no longer entertained as an honourable distinction and is usually reserved for the wealthier and more powerful members of the tribe.

3. Social and religious practices. The Kukus are animists, but their animism is modified by a considerable admixture of Hindu beliefs and practices. This is reflected in the 1911 Census, which

1. For an account of the distribution of this family, and discussion as to the propriety of the various terms by which it is designated, see J. G. Frazer, The Social Organization, Linguistic Survey of India, iv. [1906] 27 ff.; and cf. Census of India, 1901, i. 375.

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includes figures showing more than half the Kārkā people as Hinduized. But the figures cannot be relied on as an exact index of the change. The process is too gradual and imperceptible to admit of statistical treatment, especially at the hands of unskilled enumerators. The influence of Hinduism is distinctly noticeable in the current folklore of the Kārkās, the simpler substrata of which are not largely overlaid with names and notions foreign to the tribal tradition. Thus the horse, which to the Kārkā is the agent of malevolent spiritual powers—a notion which perhaps echoes some old-time terror aroused by the incursions of a warlike foe—has become associated with Indra; the crow, which fulfills a traditional function reminiscent of Noah's raven and dove, is transformed into Kāģeswar; and the spiritual powers, which, according to the limitations of the Kārkā language and the genius of their primitive animism, were expressed, in highest terms, for the names for the sun and the moon, are now resolved into a council of gods in which not only Bhagwan but also Mahādēva, Indra, and other deities and demi-gods find a place. But the more original elements can usually be distinguished and the crude fabric of a naive cosmology pieced together. This is their own interpretation, in which man is fashioned from red earth; stories to account for the origin of vegetation and of death; a story of a lost revelation in which a dog, the agent of the Dharmarṣya, becomes the enemy of the horse, appears with the message written in the numeration of a leaf of the Kēndē Nāṅgān creeper—these signs are still there, but are no longer legible! While the Kārkās are coming gradually to recognize Hindu gods and goddesses in some of the Hindu festivals, much of their religion is still peculiarly their own. Their everyday beliefs and practices are of the aboriginal order, their normal hopes and fears continuing to find common expression by means of animistic symbols and rites. Their more familiar objects of worship—Māttā Gōmāj (the village god), Dōngōr Gōmāj (the jungle god), and Hardhīl Gōmāj (the chelona god)—come under this category. They usually consist of mere heaps of stones, frequently with a lump of quartz crystal on top. Gōmāj is the Kārkā word for the sun, which, according to Kārkā conce, is the source of light in the universe. The Kārkā have their own priests (bhāsīnākṣas), and are in no way dependent on Brahmanical direction.

The customs observed at the birth of a child, and at death, are, as usual, peculiar to the people, though in the case of marriage customs in particular there is a tendency to copy their Hindu neighbours.

On the birth of a child, the father is excluded from the house for five days, and compelled to rest content with the shelter of a cattle-shed or similar building not used as an ordinary human habitation. Child-marriage is the exception among the Kārkā, though it is said to be increasing under Hindu influence. The seeta are exogamous; the sub-tribes normally endogamous. Usually a marriage is arranged through the mediation of friends of the prospective bridegroom's family. These wait upon the parents of the girl, who, as a matter of etiquette, reject the proposals and maintain their opposition thereto for a period which may extend from a few months to two years. But eventually the consent is gained, and the bride-price is agreed on—usually about sixty rupees. One peculiar custom observed at a Kārkā wedding may be noticed here, because of its probable relation to earlier polygamous practices: the bridegroom and his elder brother's wife are made to stand on a blanket and exchange words. Sometimes the father of the girl insists on the bridegroom's husband being a working man for a period of years in lieu of the payment of the bride-price; but not infrequently this is accepted, if not by the couple concerned in which case an indemnity may be demanded of the boy's parents. The main restriction being the practical one which arises from the very frequent absence of means to support a large household. The women-folk are well-educated in the arts with regard to herds and herds of cows and sheep, and also to animism and inheritance children belong to the seeta of the boy's family. The parcelling of the property is divided among the widowers and the unmarried sons. Kārkā may either burn or bury their dead. The latter is the more common method. The spirit of the deceased is set at rest at a subsequent ceremony called the jātikā, in connection with which elaborate rites are performed, extending over three days, and consummated by the cremation of a memorial post erected in the shade of the sun and the moon, facing the east, and other figures of men on horseback, dancers, apects, peacocks, bowls, crabs, spiders, trees, etc.

The Kārkās have many practices which give evidence of their belief in imitative and sympathetic magic.


JOHN DRAKE.

KURUKH.—See OROANS.

KUSINAGARA (Kusinagar, or Kusinārā [Bāli].)—The most ancient name is said to have been Kusavati, which is connected in Jātaka 531 with a legendary king Kusa, son of Okkaka (Ikṣvāku). Well-authenticated and credible tradition affirms that Gautama Buddha, Sakyamuni, died and was cremated close to Kusinārā, which consequently became one of the four most holy places of Buddhism, and one of the most frequented pilgrim shrines.

At the time of Buddha's death (c. 487 B.C., or, as others prefer, 438), Kusinārā was described as 'this sorry little town, this rough little town in this rough jungle, this little Vāsishthi town' (Jātaka 95, tr. E. S. Forster). It is evident that the town of Jātaka 95, tr. E. S. Forster; and the town of Jātaka 95, tr. W. B. Colwell and R. Chalmers, i. 231), and evidently was a place of no intrinsic importance. But its association with the last scene of the Buddha's life made it famous throughout the Buddhist world, and it was one of the principal shrines of pilgrims that the petty town became the centre of important religious establishments and grew in population and size. It was visited at the beginning of the 5th cent. after Christ by Fa-Hien (Fa-Hsien), the first Chinese pilgrim, who writes briefly as follows:

... East from here (Rāmagrāmā) four (three, Boal and Giles geojana) yojana, there is the place where the heir apparent (Gautama Buddha) sent back Chauḍhapata with his white horse, and there also a tope was erected. Four yojana to the east from this (the travellers) came to the Chacra tope, where there is also a monastery. Going on twelve yojanas, still to the east, they came to the city of Kusinārā, on the borders of which between two trees, on the bank of the Nāmañjā river (Hiranāyavati, or the Hārā), Buddha, Giljūn, Giljūn, Giljūn and one, with his head to the north, attained parinirvāna (and died) (Travers, ch. xxiv., Legge's version). The pilgrim mentions several topes [stūpas] and monasteries, and proceeds: 'In the city the inhabitants are few and far between, and at the entrance, across a long river, there are innumerable [stūpas] and monasteries belonging to the different [sects and] schools of monks.' He then traces the road in a south-easterly and easterly direction for 17 yojana (12-5, the being 10 in Legge's); he adds, the marking this path is (20 N. 50° 11' E.), which lies about 37 miles a little west of north from Patna.

The earlier Pāli account in the Parinibbāna Sutta gives the names of several villages lying between Vaissāli and Kusinārā (Kusinārā) which would settle the position of the place, if they could be identified, but, unfortunately, there is no clue to their identification. The next and only other detailed description of Kusinārā after that of Fa-Hiian is that recorded by Huen Tsang (Yuan Chwang), about A.D. 637. He enters into much detail concerning both the geographical position of the town and its topographical features. At first sight it would seem that his account should preclude all doubts, and yet, when it is critically considered, doubts remain as to the identification of the place.

The publications enumerated in the Literature below examine the question in all its bearings.

The later pilgrim agrees substantially with the earlier in all respects, though in the absence of the distance and direction of the Ashes (= Embers = Charcoal) stūpas from the fixed point of the Lumbini garden.
KUSINAGARA

with Huen Tsang’s description of a similar image at Kusinagara. But in other respects the remains do not agree with the pilgrim’s detailed account. He saw the remains of a walled town.

The city walls...begging for alms; the roads and villages were deserted. The brick foundations of the “old...that is, the city which had been fifteen li (5 miles) in circuit; there were very few inhabitants, the interior of the city being a wild waste” (Watters, II. 25).

It is difficult to believe that all trace of the old town should have disappeared, out of 15,000,000 that now there is no sign of them, although plenty of extremely ancient fortifications remain at numerous sites in the Gorakhpur District. In the neighbourhood of Kasia there is no considerable town, and the demand for bricks has never been large. Moreover, the pilgrim places the Ajitavati (al. Airavati, al. Hiranyavati) river to the N.W. of the town, but there is no river near Kasia. He also states that in his time the great stūpa, although ruined, was still above 200 ft. high. The existing great stūpa, re-constructed or repaired apparently in the 5th cent., prior to the pilgrim’s visit, never can have been more than half that height. These facts led the present writer in 1890 to reject decisively the identification of the remains near Kasia with Kusinagara. His finding to that effect was generally accepted for some years. The later excavations of the Archaeological Survey, however, have produced fresh evidence complicating the problem. Many hundreds of seals belonging to the Mahāparinirvāṇa monastery have been discovered, besides others belonging to the Makutabandha or Bandhana (‘Diadem’) monastery. Both those institutions undoubtedly were at Kusinagara. The fact that most of the seals were broken, as if torn from letters and parcels, seems to indicate the bearing that the sealed packets were sent from Kusinagara to the dependent institution near Kasia. The people at the latter place cannot have addressed letters to themselves. The inference thus deduced is confirmed by the discovery of one seal-die belonging to the Vethadipa or Vissudvipa monastery, which stood at one of the eight places among which the relics of Buddha were originally divided. So far as the seals go, they lead to the conclusion that the remains near Kasia mark the site of Vethadipa or Vissudvipa.

A still later discovery, however, throws doubt on that conclusion. The Survey found emshrined in the relic chamber of the great stūpa the colossal recumbent image of a copper plate distinctly inscribed as having been deposited ‘in the [Parnavinsa chaitya].” We know that a building called the Parinirvāṇa temple (‘temple of Parinirvāṇa’), corresponding to that of the Ta-ch‘eng-t’eng in Chavannes, Voyages de pélérins bouddhistes, p. 73). That discovery of the copper plate, consequently, seems to indicate that the remains near Kasia must be those of Vissudvipa.

The only other conceivable explanation is that the shrine at Vissudvipa also may have been called a Parinirvāṇa chaitya. The remark must be added that the bearings from Kusinagara to both Vissudvipa and Benares as girt by being executed in the 5th cent. A.D. Excavation has proved that the site was regarded as one of the highest sanctity continuously from the time of Asoka to the end of the 12th cent., during some four centuries. Several great monasteries of various dates have been revealed, besides other buildings and crowds of votive stūpas. The site unquestionably was one of the most venerable spots to Buddhist pilgrims, and no other colossal image of the Dying Buddha agrees well

(Kusinadā), the distance according to Fa-Hian being 12 yojana, and according to Huen Tsang about 480 or 490 li, at the rate of 40 li to the yojana. In direction the only difference is that Fa-Hian gives ascetic begging for alms on the stages, whereas Huen Tsang places the Ashes stūpa to the S.E. of the next preceding stage, namely, the stūpa of Chandaka’s return. He is habitatly more precise in the indication of distances. Huen Tsang states that Kusinagara lay 12 yojana (about 99 miles marching distance) to the east of the Ashes stūpa. Huen Tsang does not give the distance, but places Kusinagara to the N.E. of that stūpa, and notes that the road was a narrow and dangerous path, infested with wild oxen, wild elephants, and marauding robbers who haunted the great forest.

From these elements, combined with the statement that Kusinagara was close to the river Airavati (al. Ajitavati, al. Hiranyavati), the present writer deduced the conclusion that the site of Kusinagara must be sought in Nepāl beyond the passes, close to the Little Râpti or Airavati, semimely about 84" 52' E., 27" 52' N. General H.H. Prince Khadga Sunsher Jung Rana Bahadur, sometime Governor of West Nepal, in a letter to the Pioneer Mail, dated Feb. 25, 1904, declared the above conjecture to be correct. The name “Kusināra” was at the confluence of the Hiranyavati and Ashiravati, near Bhavasar Ghat, i.e., the confluence of the Little Râpti with the Gandak. That site seems best to satisfy the terms of both the pilgrims’ itineraries as traced from the Lambini garden, but the identification has not been verified by local examination. So far, the result of the investigation seems to be satisfactory enough; but when we come to the熊 the history of the Kusinagara in relation to two other fixed points, Benares and Vaśāli, fresh difficulties arise. Fa-Hian makes Vaśāli lie in a south-easterly direction from Kusinagara, at a distance of 17 yojana (about 127 miles), and those details do not at all suit the site indicated in Nepāl, while they suit the rival site near Kasia. Huen Tsang reckons about 700 li (say 130 miles marching distance) from Kusinagara to the kingdom of Benares, in a south-westerly direction. If he meant to reckon the distance to the city of Benares, the actual distance from the supposed Nepalese site is much greater; but, if we assume that the distance was reckoned from Benares to Gogra, the pilgrim’s estimate might be accepted. These remarks are enough to indicate the nature of the difficulties which exist in interpreting the detailed itineraries recorded by the Chinese pilgrims in the 5th and 7 centuries. Full statement and discussion of those difficulties is impossible in this place.

Kusinagara has usually been identified with the remarkable group of Buddhist ruins lying near Kasia (about 26° 45' N., 83° 55' E.), 55 miles due east from Gorakhpur city and in the Gorakhpur District. The principal remains, which lie in the lands of Bishanpur, to the west of Kasia, were formerly considered as a city by local people. They comprise many structures, including a great stūpa and a temple containing a colossal recumbent image of the Dying Buddha. These remains were fixed in India, not executed in the 5th cent. A.D. Excavation has proved that the site was regarded as one of the highest sanctity continuously from the time of Asoka to the end of the 12th cent., during some four centuries. Several great monasteries of various dates have been revealed, besides other buildings and crowds of votive stūpas. The site unquestionably was one of the most venerable spots to Buddhist pilgrims, and no other colossal image of the Dying Buddha agrees well...
Kwan-Yin

THE Kwan-yin is a bodhisattva, also known as Avalokitesvara, the, and is widely revered in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. The name Kwan-yin is a transliteration of the Sanskrit word ‘Avalokitesvara’ and means ‘one who looks (kuan) towards (yan) a suppliant (samyak)’.

1. History. (a) China. The earliest Chinese name was Kuang-chen-yan, ‘shining over the sound of the world,’ and the original name appears to have been recorded in a vague transcription, ‘A-lia-Lou-han,’ in a Sukhavatiyāya text translated into Chinese A.D. 147-189.1 The worship of Kwan-yin, however, does not seem to have been very popular until Kusunokijima translated the Sūktasamudgandrīkam (the ‘Lotus of the Good Law’), A.D. 402-412, in which he introduced the name Kwan-shi-yan, of which Kwan-yin is a curtained form. The text on the Sūktasamudgandrīkam (25th in Chin. and 24th in Skr.) of the text in question specially relates to the Bodhisattva, and has been widely read in China.2

The popularity of the belief was further increased when the famous Chi-la, the founder of the Tien-tai school in China, wrote several treatises on the Samantabhadra section (350-418),3 and since that time practically all the schools of Chinese Buddhism seem to have adopted the worship.

Avalokitesvara, who witnessed the worship of the saint in India also contributed much to the propagation of the belief in China. Fa-Hsien (399-414) says that all the followers of the Mahāyāna in India hold a Weekly Gala, when his home-bounds ship is in danger during a gale, he hastens to pray to him. Huien Tsang (629-645), who introduced a new translation of the name, viz. ‘Kwan-ts‘u-t‘sh‘an, ‘Self-existent who gazes’ or ‘Gazing Lord,’ records the presence of images of the saint almost everywhere in India, and mentions, moreover, that it is not credible that the road from Kasi to Benares can ever have been the narrow and difficult path, infested by wild beasts and robbers, described by Huien Tsang. His account suits well if applied to the route of the Someswar range.


III. MODERN ARCHAEOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS.—D. Liston, JAS (1887) 477. R. M. Martin (Bootham-Hamilton), Kathmandu, Bhubha (Kathmandu), London, 1892, ii. 327 (those two accounts are unimportant); A. Cunningham, Arch. Surv. Rep., 1, 1869, 156; id., id., Index IV; V. A. Smith, The Remains near Kasi, Allahabad, 1896; Kusunokijima and Kuisho, and other Buddhist Holy Books,” JAS, 1892, 324; J. P. Vogeli, Ann. Arch. Surv. India, Calcutta, 1905-06, pp. 44-55, 59-70, 1906-07, pp. 44-69, 1907-08, pp. 123-142. J. P. Vogeli, J. Arch. Surv. India, 1906-07, p. 252; Excerpts from Kasi.JAS, 1907, p. 255. A. Lapwood, Explorations in India, 1910-11, 16, 1912, p. 123-137 (description of copra-pottery of Y. E. Pagden, A Copperplate discovered at Allahabad, 1913, 16, 1914, 141). J. P. Vogeli, S. Konow, and J. P. Fleet, Veshadipa, Vajrapuruspa, 65, 1907, 104-105; J. P. Vogeli, Arch. Explor. in India, 1908-09, 45, 1907, 293-296; India Atlas, Sheet 103 (this sheet shows the Tikri Nadi at the site of Kusunokijima, which falls just outside the map). The writer of this article suggests that the ‘spatiqm’ named Visuddha in the legend of Sati reported by Tichà, mentioned in a Tibetan work as not one of the most ancient buildings in India, may be the jatastra chaitya near Kasi, which was dependent (of Brahmachas in Kusanagares (Qostasianische Zeitschrift., ii. (Berlin, 1894) 450).

V. A. SMITH.

Kwan-yin.—The Kwan-yin is a bodhisattva, also known as Avalokitesvara, and is usually called ‘Kuan-yin’ in popular speech. He is the savior of the world, and is particularly invoked in times of danger and sickness.

The worship of Kwan-yin was introduced into China by Kusunokijima in the 5th century, and has since become very popular, especially in the south and west of the country. The Kwan-yin cult is associated with the worship of the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra, who is said to have appeared to the Buddha in the form of a woman and to have given her a filial son named Avalokitesvara.

In China, Kwan-yin is usually represented as a beautiful young girl with a garland of flowers and a jewel on her head. She is often depicted holding a lotus flower in her hand, which is considered a symbol of purity and enlightenment.

In Japan, Kwan-yin is known as Kannon, and is one of the most worshiped deities in the Shinto religion. She is often depicted as a beautiful woman with a garland of flowers and a jewel on her head. She is often depicted holding a lotus flower in her hand, which is considered a symbol of purity and enlightenment.

Kwan-yin is considered a powerful protector and is revered by many people for her ability to grant wishes and help in times of need. She is often invoked for protection from natural disasters, sickness, and other illnesses.

In Japanese culture, Kwan-yin is associated with the concept of compassion and is often depicted as a mother who is always ready to help those in need. She is a symbol of protection and is often invoked for protection from natural disasters, sickness, and other illnesses.

Kwan-yin is also known for her ability to grant wishes and help in times of need. She is often invoked for protection from natural disasters, sickness, and other illnesses.

References:
1. In Chinese, Avalokitesvara is translated as ‘Kuan-yin’.
2. The worship of Kwan-yin was introduced into China by Kusunokijima in the 5th century.
3. The Kwan-yin cult is associated with the worship of the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra.
4. Kwan-yin is usually represented as a beautiful young girl with a garland of flowers and a jewel on her head.
5. Kwan-yin is considered a powerful protector and is revered by many people for her ability to grant wishes and help in times of need.
6. Kwan-yin is associated with the concept of compassion and is often depicted as a mother who is always ready to help those in need.
7. Kwan-yin is also known for her ability to grant wishes and help in times of need.
Brähman, a mendicant, a female mendicant, an āpāsaṅka (layman), an āpāsaṅka (laywoman), a boy, a girl, a deva, a nāga, a yakṣa (demon), a grandmaster (heavenly musician), an aṅgura, a gāruḍa, a kinnara, a maharāja (great serpent), or vaśī-pāra. That is the art or the image which was not originally intended, however, is obvious from the fact that the names enumerated often differ from one another. Actually thirty-three forms of Kwan-yin have been conceptualized often represented in art. In Japan there are thirty-three shrines of pilgrimage, whereasome of the seven Kwan-nons given below is enshrined and worshipped. The thirty-three shrines of the Western region (Saikoku) are the most famous, while those of the Eastern region (Ban-tō) and those of Chichibu are also renowned. Besides, there is in Kyoto a great hall of Kwan-non called the Thirty-three Partitioned Hall (San-ji-san-gan-do), which contains 1,000 images of the saint. There are smaller halls on the foreheads and haloes, or held in the hands of these images, altogether making up the number 33,333.

4. Activities. — Seven cases of distress are generally considered in which Kwan-yin is ready to extend his hand of mercy. These are: (1) He can save a sin from the thirteen cases of distress of the Samantabhadra section; they are dangers caused by a sword, fetters or chains, fire, water, demons (rakṣasas), goblins, serpents, any of which dangers may be magically transformed by storm is added to these to make four parts complete, and facilitate pictorial representation. In the so-called Buddhist litany represented in some sculptured reliefs of Ajanta (no. 4), Ellora (no. 3), Aurangâbâd (no. 7), and Kharwa (no. 4), we can trace several scenes of dangers more or less akin to the above seven. In the cave of Ajanta (no. 4) we see a representation of dangers from an elephant, a man with a sword, a spear, and a flame, a man with a sword, and a man with a bow; and a fire, a snake, a student, and a mountain lion. In Ellora (no. 3), fire, sword, and flood are noticeable, while the rest are quite distinct. In one of the eastern caves, Aurangâbâd (no. 7), we have a very good representation of the litany. The eight scenes are: (1) a woman with a sword, a thief, and a shipwreck on the right, and a lion, a snake, an elephant, and a man with a woman on the left. Kwan-yin is flying towards the centre of their rescue. The caves in Ajanta (no. 4) the scenes are ten instead: (1) a girl with a man; (2) a man in a striking attitude before a snake-king; (3) a man brandishing a sword against a female with a child; (4) a man with a stick before another who is prostrating himself; (5) a man squatting and one side invisible; (6) an elephant; (7) a lion; (8) a serpent; (9) a man lifting both hands over his head, his body invisible, probably drowning (10) a man — his hands raised, probably in a pushing attitude. Thus almost all the thirteen cases mentioned in the Lotus are to be found represented in these caves. Kwan-yin has been found in the 7th and 8th cent. and are certainly Mahayaniistic.

We can safely conclude from these facts, and from the records of eye-witnesses of the same period, that the text of the Samantabhadra section of the Lotus was the first to describe the deeds of Kwan-yin as the saviour of the distressed world, was in vogue and very popular among Buddhists during the same period as it was in China and Japan.

3. The school of Buddhism. — Six or seven Kwan-nons are enumerated and often represented in art in China and Japan, especially in the latter.

(1) Aryakulôkottëva (Shô-Kwan-non, 'Holy'), otherwise called Mahâkârma (Great Compassionate). This is the original Bodhisattva and the most distinguished of all Kwan-yins. He is always shown sitting with his right hand held up to his breast, and with or without an image of Amitâbha over his head.

(2) Sasa-râbûj (Sen-ju, 'Thousands-armed'), otherwise called Shishyanûra (Sen-ju, 'Thousands-eyed'), or Mahâpama-râja ('Great Lotus King'). This is the name of a Kwan-non with six hundred arms, of whom the name is common to Visnû, Indra, and Durag, and of which Kwan-yin is the most popular form. He is represented with three eyes (tri-chô), and forty or thirty-eight arms, the palm of each hand being marked with an eye. Among the things which he carries are a prostrate figure of Siva, an elephant, a horse, a dog, a rope, a skull, a banner, mostly common to Siva and Durag. He is Mahayaniistic, and at least in Japan, fifteen of the thirty-three shrines having him as the chief object of worship assume three in the case of his (1).

(3) Hâyâka (Hâyâka, 'Horse-bringing'). This is called Shinâbâháya (Shashits-ei, 'Lion-feared'). He is depicted as horse-headed, two-touched, and with eight arms, two of which hold a vajra and a lotus. He is a dâitya (demon), hostile to Visnû in the Hindu pantheon, probably converted into a Tantra deity by mystic Buddhists. Only one of the thirty-three temples gives the place of honour to him.

(4) Ekkatâsamâkha (Itô-shimene, 'Eleven-faced'). He has eleven faces, of which the three front are compassionate, the three left wrathful, and the three right adorning, while the one at the top and the proper face show equanimity. He has four arms which carry a rosary, a lotus, a sword, and a mark of chûgâ (chûgâ-basara) on his face (chûgâ-basara). He is an antithesis of Siva, and so is Chûbâkâ (Four-armed). Thus this Kwan-yin, tied by his tails to his throne, is derived from the thirty-three cases of distress of the Samantabhadra section; they are dangers caused by a sword, fetters or chains, fire, water, demons (rakṣasas), goblins, serpents, any of which dangers may be magically transformed by storm is added to these to make four parts complete, and facilitate pictorial representation.

(5) Chûdâ (Chûdâ, 'Shobrooki'), otherwise called Sâyakottôkushû (Mother of seven Kous of Buddha). Different from the rest of the Kwan-nons, this is the beginning of a female deity, but he is the greatest. He is always Chûn-ji in Chinese and Jin-ji in Japanese. She is represented with three eyes (tri-chô), and forty-five arms (sa-eppâjâkâ), and is no other than Chûdâ Mai-lei (Durgâ). She is also called the "Goddess of eighteen arms, who destroyed the demons Malâma. An auspicious dot (kâvia-basara) acts as a weapon of this Kwan-yin, a rope, a lotus, a vajra, etc., are among the articles carried by her. One only place honour on her.

(6) Chûkôtârâchânâniati, or sometimes Chûlîgâ (Chûgâ, 'Wishing-wheel'). He is generally two-armed, rarely four-armed, and is represented in a meditative attitude with his left hand on his knee, his head slightly turned to the right, and his left hand raised, a vajra. The vajra he carries a wishing gem (očitâmâra), a wheel (chûkô), a rosary, and a lotus. He occupies six places of worship.

(7) Amôgâhâ (Amôgâhâ, 'Indulging rope'), or sometimes simply Amôga (Unerring). The common feature of this Kwan-yin is that he has three faces and eight arms, and a rope in his hand. As Amôga is the name of Siva and a rope is often carried by Durgâ, this deity also is probably imported from the Hindu pantheon. One of the thirty-three shrines is sacred to him.

6. Kwan-yins known among Buddhists generally. — We shall name only five here, which are important for their artistic representations.

(1) Fû-yû (Fû-yû, 'Fish-bask'). He is another very popular deity who carries a basket with a fish in it. He is probably a counterpart of the fish-eater of Visnû, or a representation of Mâyâçvara, or of the same worshiped in India and Nepal.

(2) Koyâna (Easy-child-birth). This is a Kwan-yin like Târâ, and is often represented with a child in her arm or below her. Properly speaking, he is not a separate Kwan-yin, for any Kwan-yin who is celebrated as answering prayers for easy labour is called Koyâna. It was under this name that the Madonna of the Christian Church found her way among the worshippers of the Virgin, during the period of persecution in Japan under the Shogun government.

(3) Shôgô (Nishâkountâsîvâra, 'Blue-necked lord') seems to be another importation from the Hindu pantheon, for Nishâkountâ is the name of a form of Siva in his great head of churning the ocean. He is white and three-faced, with a lion's face on the right and a boar's on the left. The Buddha is standing on his proper head. He has four arms, which hold a stick, a lotus, a wheel, and a conical school of Buddhism.

7. The sacred resort of Kwan-yin. — As this article is in a way a continuation of that on Avalokiteshvara (p. 862), all the characteristics of the saint found there are omitted here. Only one

1 Nânjo, no. 73; Paraspasari seems to be an error.
Laissez-faire.—So great a part has this celebrated phrase played in economic and sociological, and even in religious, discussion during the past century that a whole book was published at Berne in 1898 upon the maxim.—A. Ockfen's Die Maxima Laissez faire et laissez passer. The occasion of its origin is perhaps best understood by a comparison of the policies of two great French Ministers of Finance—Colbert (1619-83) and Turgot (1727-81). The former, towards the end of the 17th cent., brought industry and commerce under a system of extreme regulation and coercion; his ideals were those of the Mercantilists—protection, subsidy, and privilege. A century later, we see a complete reversal of this policy in the financial administration of Turgot, who worked on the principle of commercial freedom. Between these two men stand the founders of scientific economics in France, whose school is usually known under the name of the Physiocrats. It is said, indeed, that the first authentic use of the phrase laissez-faire was a retort made by a merchant to Colbert himself. The names which are of chief importance are those of Gournay (1712-59) and Quesnay (1694-1774). Gournay was an administrator rather than an economist, but he had great influence on Turgot, who accompanied him on some of his official journeys. It is through Turgot that we know of his principles. In his Eloge de Gournay, Turgot attributes to him maxims of trade and welfare, based on the utmost liberty of personal competition, and on the view that private interest and general welfare were coincident, if this kind of freedom were given. The complete phrase laissez-faire, Laissez-faire (French), and Potala or Potalaka are the names of two demons living there (see SBE xix. [1862] 244). 2 See Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford, 1872, s. v. 'Potala'; Pothem, V. L. 69; Pomponius Mela, iii. 1; see also V. Smith, A. E. Smith, Early Hist. of India, Oxford, 1895, p. 102. 3 = L. [1874] 191 t. and especially V. A. Smith, Early Hist. of India, Oxford, 1995, pp. 105-122. 4 See S. Jolom, Memoires de Histoire, Thang, Paris, 1877-88, X. 123. by name, who was sent by an Imperial order to China as a Buddhist student, but remained there as the founder of the famous Pu-tho-lo (Potala) monastery (A.D. 888).

We are familiar with the existence of the Potala palace in the heart of Tibet as the residence of an incautrate Kwan-yin, viz. the Dalai Lâma; and in Japan we can trace two or three places which bear the Buddhist name Pu-da-la-ku as shrines of Kwan-nor.

8. The formula of invocation.—The famous six-syllable formula, Oh ma-yas padme hum, was once Indian, for it is often mentioned in the books of the Chinese Tripitaka translated from Sanskrit (see art. JEWEL [Buddhist]). At present, however, this formula is exclusively Tibetan or at least Lâmaistic. The non-Lâmaistic Buddhists use the old formula Name= 'vajra-ksentra rupa Bud- dhis-tattvāyagā (Nam-koCum-be-on-Bosatsu),  'Hail to the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara.'

spite of their natural selfishness and capacity, though they mean only their own convenience, they divide with the poor the property that they have got hold of by an irrevocable hand to make nearly the same distribution. . . . and if the earth has been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants.'

It is no wonder that, after the miseries of the Industrial Revolution, teaching of this kind brought some odium upon economic science; and it was overlooked that Smith had established his objections to excessive regulation by inductive, far more than by deductive, reasoning.

Smith's views must be judged in the light of his Natural Rights (London, 1895). Especially dangerous was the introduction of the word 'natural.' For the natural is taken to mean the ideal, or the original, or the non-human. As soon as we say that a certain system is a 'natural' system, we find a distinction and, then, by a trans- lation to another meaning of the word, we identify it with what is not of human device or with what is prior to human institution. Thus we slip into the position that a non-regulated system is an ideal one. But, in fact, nature in its broadest sense includes human life; and 'is made better by no means, but nature makes that means.'

Competition without control has not actually been taught by any English economist; but phrases have been seized on and misapplied. In spite of the opposition created to the idea of competition by stressing the words of early writers, an analysis of recent thought shows a desire not to suppress, but only to reorganize, this force. The claims of democracy are often, indeed, for greater freedom of industry, and of commerce (as e.g., in some cases, to remove privileges and monopolies, to extend education, etc.). It is possible for any one with ability to challenge any position in the State. And the greatest social benefits have been reaped by those who compete most with each other, as working with their Laissez-faire employer with worker, but between classes who do not compete, such as employer and employed, and often simply on the ground that effective competition is so limited across that line. The real objection that is summed up in the bitter use of the phrase laissez-faire is to the defects of a certain organization of industrial competition.

We may indeed say that, properly understood, laisser-faire is a maxim of both liberal and conservative minds. With the extension of State control, if the form of industry so changes as to require this. What is the word that we use? If Smith's time was the individual who was left out; then, said Smith, leave him free. In Mill's time it was the group; then let the group be free to work. In our time, for many purposes which only economic revolution could have touched, municipally or by the State; then let the State be free to do its proper work. The object of the verb can be the individual, the group, or the public authority; for we talk either of the form of industry, or force on modern conditions the meaning which any maxim had a hundred and thirty years ago. The law of the land should not suppress, or refuse to give scope for, any kind of social agreements. Improvements in the changing conditions of industrial life, it must guard the rights and watch the limits of each force and agency.


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not versed in the particular matter in hand, a sense in which he may be held guilty of the crime (see Liddon and Scott, etc.). The word is similarly used in 2 Co 11:18. In 1 Co 14:14 the 'place of the gospel' may hardly refer to the sacred ground of the church as indicated by laments in the Christian assembly (below, § 6). In an interpolation in Pr 6:9 cited in the Apost. Conformation, it means the 'mourners' department'; the corresponding passage of the older Didascalia, which the Constitutions incorporates, has 'sacrum' and 'mourners' department'. There is a classical use of the word 'lamentation' (nec privatia nec clericis, de Ecol. sign. 25).

Another name of the laity is 'the legionary' (di legiones). In the 1 Cor 16:57 (near the beginning) they are so called in contrast to the bishop and deacons (not in the parallel Didascalia). The 'legionary' means the 'whole community'. It is a little curious to note in this connexion that in Ac 15:24 the expression 'the church of the whole church' is used in contrast to 'the apostles and elders'.

2. Who is a layman?—Hitherto 'the laity' have been spoken of negatively, as being those Christians who are not ministers. But, owing to modern conditions, and especially owing to the divisions of Christendom, some further definition is necessary. For instance, in England, it has been maintained that every Englishman to whom residence is in the eye of the law a layman of the Church of England, unless he is a bishop, priest, or deacon. Apart from this, however, it is felt that with the laity of the Congregational church is bound to itself per accipere, not only from a negative, but also from a positive point of view. The first step in the definition has usually been made by saying that he must be a baptized person, or at least a catechumen; with regard to the latter qualification we may note—and this has a bearing on the practice of missionary Churches of the present day—that the Consistory of Hignampury, a style of churchmen 'Christian' (canon. x.; ed. H. Achelis, in TT, new ser., Leipzig, 1881, § 63).

But the question whether a baptized person is a layman belonging to a particular Christian community is not so easy to answer. A positive definition of 'laity' may perhaps be found in some such phrase as 'those who (not being ministers) from baptism or after baptism have been attached to' that community, and who have by not any overt act declared their dissent from it. This does not raise the question of 'full membership', by which is often meant the status of a communicant.

3. The priesthood of the laity.—This, which seems at first sight to be a contradiction in terms, is nevertheless asserted of Christians in 1 P 2:9 and Rev 1:6. They are a 'holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices', a 'priesthood, a holy nation', Christ made us [all Christians] to be a kingdom, to be priests unto his God and Father.' The same thing had been asserted with equal emphasis of the Jews in Ex 19:6; 'ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and a holy nation.' The NT asserts in the first place the priesthood of our Lord (e.g., in Hebrews, passim), and then, as derived therefrom, the priesthood of His people. In the highest sense of the word, Christianity is a sacerdotal system. But this must not be misunderstood. It does not mean that the Christian ministry is vicarious, and that its ministers take the place of the people in approaching God. When, therefore, J. B. Lightfoot says, perhaps rather hastily (Essay on 'The Christian Ministry,' Philippians, ed. London, 1863, p. 151, 185), that Christianity 'has no sacerdotal system of its own, as such', he must truly explain (ib.), that 'it interposes no sacrificial tribe or class between God and man, by whose intervention alone God is reconciled and man forgiven. Every individual may work his own salvation, as Christ (Philippians, 2:18), and its most wonderful (Philippians, 2:19; Colossians, 1:28; Hebrews, 7:24, 25, etc., etc.); and so on. Many other such passages might be cited. The teaching was common to all ages.

The doctrine that all Christian people are priests does not, it need hardly be said, mean that there is so much thing as personal or private priesthood. The whole nation of Israel were priests, and yet Aaron and his sons had a special or ministerial priesthood. And so, without discussing controverted questions, we may conclude that there is at least no contradiction in the phraseology of the Acts of the Apostles, London, 1871, p. 402f.). But it seems unnecessary to distinguish thus sharply between different parts of what was originally one rite.
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diction involved in the assertion of the same characteristic in Christianity. The confusion of minister and layman as to function is such ἄρσις ('want of order') as the author of the Apost. Const. so eloquently protests against (viii. 31, 46). Christian churches (c. A.D. 95) says that the Christian ministers are 'rulers' and 'presbyters' (ἡγούμενοι, προφυγούμενοι, πρεσβύτεροι), to whom the laity are to be subject (ὑποταγόμενοι) and to give reverence (κατιστάναι). (Cor. i. 1, 21). Hermas, a little later, calls the church's rulers (τοιχόφυλα, Vss. ii. 11, 9). The same nomenclature is found in 1 Th. H. 9, and also in 1 Th. 5, where the ministers are 'they are that are over you' (ὑγιείς τῶν ἀποστόλων). See further, § 5.

4. Election of bishops and clergy by laity.— Under this head we have to consider a very important part in the Church played by laymen. We note that in Ac. 6:7, the people choose, but the apostles appoint (εὐρᾳκορευεῖσθαι καὶ ἐκπολιτεύεσθαι). The laity elected the Seven and placed them before the apostles, who laid hands on them with prayer. And this was the ancient method of appointment, though the details might vary. In the Didache (§ 18, A.D. 130?), the writer bids the people to elect (Χριστόσκευόμενοι) for themselves bishops and deacons, i.e. the local ministry; nothing is said of the appointment of the apostles and the prophets.1 It must here be remembered that εὐραχορευτούν does not necessarily carry with it the idea of ordination by the people electing (see below). Early in the 4th century, the popular election is much insisted on by Athanasius (Apost. c. Arius. 6). A letter of the Egyptian bishops which says that he was elected (εὐραχορευτούν) by a majority of our body [the bishops] in the night and with the acclamation of all alike, in order to refute the calumny of the Arians that he was clandestinely consecrated by six or seven bishops unknown to the laity. Gregory of Nazianzus (Orat. xxii. 8) says that Athanasius was elected 'by the vote of the whole people, not in the evil fashion which has since prevailed, nor by means of bloodshed and opposition; but in an apostolic and spiritual manner, he is led up to the throne of St. Mark.' He means, no doubt, that this was the ancient method of election. The same practice is found in the Church Orders—e.g., in the Test. of our Lord (i. 29), which speaks very emphatically about the election of bishops ('being chosen by all the people according to the will of Holy Ghost'), and somewhat less so about presbyters ('testified to by all the people i. 29) and deacons ('chosen as has been said above,' i. 33). The other Church Orders make similar provisions (Canon. of Hippo, can. ii. [ed. Achelis, § 1], Verona Latins Fragments of Didascalia, etc., ed. F. Hauer, Leipzig, 1860, p. 108, Egyptian Church Order, § 31 [ed. H. Tattam, The Apostolic Constitutions, London, 1848, p. 323, Ethiopian Church Order, § 21, Apost. Const. viii. 49). We find the same regulations in the Gallican code known as the Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua, perhaps made by Cassarius of Aries, c. A.D. 500 (formerly cit. in the Canons of a supposed Fourth Council of Carthage, A.D. 398). In can. 22 it is directed that a bishop is not to ordain any one without the advice of his clergy, and that he is bound to seek the approval of Rome (οἰκουμηνία) and testimony of the citizens—a phrase which has a bearing on a well-known dictum of St. Cyril (see below, § 5; for a translation of the Statuta see C. J. Hefele, Christian Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1871-96, ii. 410 ff.). On the other hand, the personal rights of the laity are only at an early date deprived of this right. The Council of Laodicea (c. A.D. 388) says that 'the choice of those to be appointed to the priesthood shall not rest with the multitude' (can. 13). This move-ment may have been due in part to the encroach-ments of the State and its officials after the death of Constantine, and it may have been influenced by the interpretation placed in the East on the 4th canon of Nicaea (A.D. 325), which says that the bishop is to be appointed (εὐραχορευτός) by the comprovincial bishops; three of whom at least shall meet. The first of the Apostolic Canons, a collec-tion made c. A.D. 400, though some of them are doubtless older, has a similar provision, but with χοροθετέω. The Nicaean rule was understood by the second Council of Nicaea (7th Ecumenical) (A.D. 787, can. 3), as meaning that only the bishops could elect, and it forbids, with reference to Apost. Canon 31, the election of a bishop, priest, or deacon proceeding from a secular prince; but the Latin Church at first interpreted the Nican canon to refer to the confirmation of election and consecration to the episcopate by the comprovincial bishops (Hefele, op. cit, 1, 1864, 383 ff.). And this is probably the real meaning. A bishop, before being consecrated, must be approved by the people (and clergy) whom he is to serve, and also by the bishops of the province. This is the true reason (one can hardly doubt) of the ancient rule about the three bishops consecrating each bishop. A later date it was suggested that this was to remove all fear of invalidity in the position of any one of the consecrators; but this could hardly have been the true reason, as consideration does not necessarily carry with it the idea of ordination by the people electing (see below). Early in the 4th century, the popular election is much insisted on by Athanasius (Apost. c. Arius. 6). A letter of the Egyptian bishops which says that he was elected (εὐραχορευτούν) by a majority of our body [the bishops] in the night and with the acclamation of all alike, in order to refute the calumny of the Arians that he was clandestinely consecrated by six or seven bishops unknown to the laity. Gregory of Nazianzus (Orat. xxii. 8) says that Athanasius was elected 'by the vote of the whole people, not in the evil fashion which has since prevailed, nor by means of bloodshed and opposition; but in an apostolic and spiritual manner, he is led up to the throne of St. Mark.' He means, no doubt, that this was the ancient method of election. The same practice is found in the Church Orders—e.g., in the Test. of our Lord (i. 29), which speaks very emphatically about the election of bishops ('being chosen by all the people according to the will of Holy Ghost'), and somewhat less so about presbyters ('testified to by all the people i. 29) and deacons ('chosen as has been said above,' i. 33). 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1 This word, which often means 'elect, apparently in these canons means 'ordain,' as the first canon says that a presbyter and deacon and the other clergy (εὐραχορευτούν) by one bishop.
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majority must be one of two-thirds; in some cases the choice, or combinations of certain names, are made, as in the Constitution of the Church of Ireland, Dublin, 1909, vi. 5). In the early Church in Asia Minor, South America, Australia, and S. Africa the system is similar, with some variations of detail, especially as to the majority required in the different orders; in S. Africa the elected clergy form the Ecclesiastical Assembly, which elects the clergy elect, and the laity elect. In the United States of America the practice is in vogue for the ordinary diocesan bishops, but to the 'missionary bishops' the House of Bishops appoints. Each diocese a convention ('syndy') makes it own rules for its election. In all the new-established branches of the Anglican federation the assent of the laity is required to this system.

(b) Roman Communton. — The laity appear to have no official share in the election of bishops, but in countries where a concordat was in force, as was the case till recently in France, the sovereign or the State nominates.

(c) Eastern Orthodox Communton. — Here the laity usually have a voice in electing bishops, though the practice differs in different countries; for a detailed account see M. G. Dampier, The Eastern Churches, London, 1910 (which, however, does not give information about the patriarchates of Jerusalem and Alexandria). The latter two are the only ones of which there is any conjecture that Constantinople closely follows. In the patriarchate of Constantinople the House of Synod and the laity elect the patriarch; the whole assembly selects three names, and the bishops choose one of them. A mixed council of bishops and laity elects the temporal affairs of the patriarchate. A diocesan bishop is appointed by the Holy Synod, which consists of bishops only. The laity must be consulted before the bishop appoints a parish priest, or the parish priest appoints a deacon; and each parish has a lay committee for parochial welfare. In the patriarchate of the Holy Synod, which has consists of bishops, a few archimandrites (heads of monasteries), two representatives of the parish clergy, and the Tsars, constitutes the Chernomonsky Synod. The latter, in consequence of the connecting link between Church and State, consents to the appointment to the see, which is the layman. The Synod consists of bishops only, for managing all ecclesiastical affairs. In Jerusalem the archbishop is elected by the monks. There are five voting, the Holy Synod (consisting of bishops only) submits their names to the bishop, who selects one. Priests and deacons are appointed by the bishop after consulting their laymen. The king appoints a commissioner (bispop) to seine the Holy Synod, but he has no voice. The Armenian bishops are elected by the other bishops and by (lay) members of Parliament. In Sarov they are elected by the synod of bishops, but the metropolitan of Kharkov is elected by the bishops and the chief clergy and lay officials of the country. In Montenegro the metropolitan is nominated by the king, the priests are appointed by the metropolitan. There are no diocesan councils, whose resolutions have been transferred to a synod and to consistoryes made up of ecclesiastics (Orozianik, p. 151).

VII. The laity and the sacraments. — (a) The Eucharist. — No real instance has been found, except in some mystical or separated bodies, of laymen being allowed to celebrate the Eucharist, even in cases of emergency. In connection with this it is necessary to remind the reader that the Eucharist is sometimes used in Christian antiquity in the sense of 'saying grace' or 'asking a blessing' at a meal, and that it does not always mean 'to give thanks'.

The 18th canon of Nicæa (A.D. 325) asserts that even deacons have not the power of 'offering', i.e. of celebrating, the Eucharist (τότε Εὐχαριστεῖς τὸν Κυρίον, 1 Kings viii. 22), while prebishops are expressly expressed 'those who offer' (νομίζετε ὅσοι διαδοθήκην τοῦ ἐνθρόνου). The same thing is found in the Church Orders, where the bishop and the prebishops are expressly recognized as being capable of celebrating the Eucharist (The Presbyter, ed. S. L. Forster, p. 199). But, if a deacon could not celebrate the Eucharist, a fenti a layman could not do so.

The Eucharist was a prohibition invented in the 4th century. Not only is there no evidence of a layman inside the Church Orders, and in an incident in ante-Nicene times, but Tertullian, in a work written before his secession (de Prescr. adv. Haer. 41), by implication strongly repudiates such a theory. He condemns the heretical sects because they confused the functions of lay and ministry.

'to-day one man is their bishop, to-morrow another; to-day he is a presbyter who to-morrow is a layman. For even on laymen do they impose the functions of priesthood.'

With this it is necessary to compare the same writer's language after his secession. In de Exhort. 57, after saying that all laymen are priests (see above, § 3), he continues:

'it is the authority of the Church, and the honour which has accrued sanctity through the joint session (consensus) of the Order, which has established the difference between the Order and the laity. Accordingly, there is no joint session of the ecclesiastical Order, you offer (see above), and baptize (μνημογήγησις), and are priest, alone for yours: the Church has the right of a priest in your own person, in cases of necessity.'

In Tertullian, writing in his later days, claims for a layman, if necessity urges, the right inter alia to celebrate Holy Communion.

It might be suggested that in this respect Montanism was conservative of an old custom which had elsewhere died out, owing to the excessive increase of 'sacredotal' feeling in the Church. But, whatever Montanism was, it was not, and did not profess to be, conservative. Such, indeed, is not the characteristic of any movement which magnifies charismatic powers. Montanism professed to have received a new inspiration by the Holy Ghost, and rather despised than honoured old existing customs. See, further, a long investigation in More, Anecdote H and Appendix H on Montanism (pp. 335-339).

(b) Baptism. — Had we no history to guide us, we might have imagined that, if the laity could not celebrate the Eucharist, nor could they baptize. And yet, though Christian opinion has not been unanimous on the subject, the great majority have held that, in cases of necessity, a layman, and even a laywoman, may rightly baptize.

It is not quite conclusive that the apostles did not 1

1 For this meaning of προφήτης or αὐτοκράτορα see the present writer's The Ancient Church Orders (Cambridge, 1888), p. 145. These words sometimes mean 'to bring the oblation to the bishop' (ib. and Ascens. A.D. 314, can. 2), but the latter has 'to offer the bread and the cup'.
not, as a rule, themselves baptize, though they laid on hands after baptism. St. Paul says that it is St. Peter’s province (Acts 10:48). It is also not quite certain, though it is probable, that the apostles did not themselves baptize all the three thousand converts in the Acts of the Twelve. But, though the NT evidence is not quite conclusive, opinion from the early centuries is uniform, and it is said that the early Church followed Tertullian (De Bapt. 17) it allows it to deacons and laymen but not to women. In De Virg. Vel. 9, he also forbids it to women. But we may note that his argument in the former passage, that “what is equally received can be equally given,” if valid, should refer to women no less than to men. The older Didascalia (3rd cent.; iii. 12; Funk, i. 210) allows it to deacons, but (iii. 9; Funk, i. 193) forbids it to women; the permission to laymen in the Didascalia is parallel Apost. Const., which here incorporate the Didascalia. The Spanish Council of Elvira (c. A.D. 305) says that a catechumen on a sea voyage or in a place where no priest is present has the baptism of great illness by a layman who has not apostatized or been a bigamist (can. 83), and similarly allows a deacon on some occasions to “rule” a congregation—apparently in a country district—and to baptize (can. 77); but in all these cases confirmation by the bishop is to follow unless the baptized person dies. The Test. of our Lord (c. A.D. 330?) allows deacons to baptize (ii. 10). Jerome (c. Lord. 9) says that “it is necessary so be, even laymen may, and frequently do, baptize.” Augustine (c. Ep. Parmen. vii. xiii. 29) says that baptism by a layman, “if necessity urges, is either no sin or a venial one.” But he appears to be a little doubtful about the matter. The Statuta Eclesiae Antiquae (can. 100), by saying that “a woman may not baptize,” probably imply that a man, even if a layman, can do so. Isidore of Seville very grudgingly says that lay baptism is for the most part allowed, but only when a person is in extremis (De Eccl. off. ii. 25). A striking case, which brings in other considerations of importance, occurred in the 4th century. The famous Athanasian creed (c. 366) lays down that no laymen have administered baptism in the Church. This was observed by Alexander, the bishop of the diocese of Alexandria, who, on hearing that the proper word had been used, forbade re-baptism, but administered confirmation himself. The Eusebians (HE ii. 147) and Rufinus (HE i. 14); Socrates (HE i. 15) alludes to it without mentioning Alexander’s action. Whether the story is historic or not, it is instructive as showing that the history of the treatment of lay baptism is as an actual and not unusual fact. On the other question, that of “intention,” Alexander’s decision is much more doubtful.

We find that a contrary opinion as to lay baptism was not unknown in the 4th century. Even a deacon is forbidden to baptize in the Apost. Const. viii. 28, 46, and so are the laity and minor orders in iii. 101; and women in iii. 9 of baptism by women. It is said that there is no small peril in the hands of those who undertake it, for it is dangerous, or rather, wicked and impious. The Ethic of Didascalia (§ 13.1) also negatives lay baptism; this manual is largely derived from the Apost. Constitution, and as such, the idea here is no doubt right. But the testimony on this point is in later times. In the medieval west lay baptism was fully and officially recognized, and in cases of necessity, encouraged. Midwives were instructed how to baptize their charges in danger of death. This is the present attitude of the Roman Church. It was also the attitude of the Church of England in the Middle Ages and down to 1604. Lay baptism as a practice was not disapproved of, as it was when the English Prayer Book of 1549, 1552, and 1559. The rubrics before the Office of Private Baptism in these three books say that baptism is to be administered by laymen only when “great need shall compel,” but that, if so, they “shall be (1 Co 16:14). Laymen are thus permitted by God for his grace, and say the Lord’s prayer, if the time will suffer. And then one of them shall name the child, and dip him in the water, or pour water upon him, saying,” etc. After the Hampton Court Conference, however, as a concession to the Puritan feeling, a change was made in the Prayer Book, and since 1604 only an official minister has been explicitly recognized therein. Yet we notice that in the question lay baptism in the 17th century it was to be asked at private baptism there is a distinction. First they that bring the child are asked by whom he was baptized, and who was present; then because some things essential to this Sacrament may happen to be omitted, the persons are asked with what matter and words the child was baptized. The implication would seem to be that the status of the baptizer is not one of the “things essential.” Lay baptism has never been forbidden in England, and has been a continuous custom. Hooker has defended its validity, even if administered by women (Eccles. Polity, v, 61 f.; this book was first published in 1637), and his great influence has, through the centuries, found a parallel, to this day. The English law-courts (in 1609, Kemp v. Wickes, and in 1841, Mastin v. Escott; see J. H. Blunt and W. G. F. Phillimore, Book of Church Law, London, 1899) have upheld the same view centuries ago.

To the Eastern mind the matter has presented itself in a different way. A Western can distinguish between what is irregular and what is invalid, and is accustomed to the saying “filius debet, factum valet.” But an Eastern makes no such distinction; to him “irregular” and “invalid” mean the same thing. Quite irrespectively of the validity of the Western Orders, the question has arisen in the East whether Western baptisms are irregular, and therefore (to the Eastern) invalid. To this question the Russian Church has replied No, and has admitted Western, including Lutheran and Calvinist, baptisms since 1718; but the Constantinople Church has replied Yes. On this very complicated subject see W. J. Birkbeck, Russia and the English Church, London, 1895, p. 63 f.

The laity in the Church services: churchwardens.—From the earliest times, as it would appear, the laity had a place of their own in the Christian synax, or assembly. Putting aside Justin Martyr’s description of the “synaxis” as a school, the fact is not to our disadvantage that we do not help us here, the first account of the arrangements of the synaxis is in the older Didascalia (3rd cent.). In this description the presbyters sit on either side of the bishop, the laymen behind the presbyters, and the women behind them, all apparently facing east (ii. 57; Funk, i. 158, 160). In the corresponding passage of Apost. Const. (l. 57; Funk, 159 f.) the description is somewhat confused, but it would seem that the bishop and his presbyters here sit (at least at the beginning of the Eucharistic service) behind the altar, facing the west. In this account also the laity are seated by themselves, the men in one place and the women in another; the young people and the older people sit separately, the younger women, the mothers, the widows, the virgins, and the elder women all having their places. When the assembly is likened to a ship, the bishop being the commander, the deacons the mariners, the “brethren” (the laity, see above, § 17) the passengers—a metaphor still carried out in the word “navy” for the part of the Church which is the subject of the divine worship. In the Test. of our Lord (l. 19), and also in the derived chapters of the Arabic Didascalia (§ 35; Funk, ii. 124), the laymen and the
laywomen sit in separate places. For a somewhat later period see W. E. Scudamore, in *D.C.G.* ii. 915.

Now, in the Church Orders (e.g., *Didascalia* and *Apost. Const.*, lcc. cit.; *Test. of Our Lord*, i. 34) the deacons are represented as moving about rather than sitting, and, in the case of several of them, as keeping order in the assembly, watching the doors, and assigning seats to the different classes. But, as time went on, deacons, who, as the Church Orders show, were constantly pressing their claims for admission, *Ancient Church Orders* (p. 69), devolved their duties on sub-deacons and members of the minor orders. At a somewhat later date—though it is not easy to say when—lay officials took over these duties of deacons, and received the name of 'churchwardens.' But their duties were not and are not confined to keeping order in church. They are in the present day charged with the supervision of the church fabrics and churchyards, with seating the people, with parochial church finance, and with the relief of the poor. In Lyndwood's *Provinciale* (15th cent.) they are called *guardiani ecclesiae.* The English canons also use the name *à quodam also 'question-men.' Their assistants are called *sidesmen* (see below, § 8). In England there are ordinarily churchwardens in each parish, one usually nominated by the rector or vicar, and one by the parishioners, and these are admitted to the episcopal diaconate. For a full account see P. V. Smith in the *Prayer Book Dictionary,* p. 205f.

7. Lay preaching.—It was often discussed in the early ages of the Christian era how far a layman might be allowed to teach or preach in church. The case of the learned Origen (3rd cent.), who was, when still a layman, allowed to do so, caused some misgivings in certain quarters; and J. B. Lightfoot, in *St. Irenaeus*, pp. i. 'Clement of Rome,' ii. (1890) 195 n. remarks that the objections raised in his case show that the practice was rare. Eusebius (HE vi. 19), to whom we are indebted for the information, evidently approved of the invitation given to Origen. At the end of the 4th cent. the *Apost. Const.* (viii. 32, near the end) speaks approvingly of lay teachers, but the reference is perhaps not to public teaching in church. The *Statuta Eclesiast Antiqua* (can. 98) say that a layman may not teach in the presence of the clergy except at their command. The Quinisext or Trullan Council (A.D. 692) decrees that the laymen are to be excluded from being preaching publicly in religious services (can. 64).

We should gather from the gospel story that among the Jews any layman who had the capacity to give instruction in the synagogue might do so. From the Jewish point of view, our Lord, when He taught in the synagogue, was a 'lay preacher' (Lk 4:29-30). So Paul and Barnabas were invited by the Jewish authorities to speak in the synagogue at Pisidian Antioch (Ac 13:14) and elsewhere. And in the early ages of the Church, when charismatic gifts were common, it is probable that the same liberty was frequently allowed. These charismata included the 'word of wisdom,' the 'word of knowledge,' 'prophesy,' and 'interpretation of tongues' (1 Co 12:8-10). See, further, J. Wordsworth, *The Ministry of Grace*, London, 1861, pp. 153-166.

There was, however, except among the Montanists and some others, a great objection to women preaching. Tertullian, even after he became a Montanist, disliked it; he says:—

*It is not permitted to a woman to speak in the church, nor yet to teach (De Espos. Virg. Evang.)*

Even the *Test. of Our Lord,* which enthusiastically advances the claims of the order of widows, and admits them within the sanctuary in the Eucharistic Service, will not allow them to speak in church (i. 40; 'in the church let her be silent'), though it bids them teach women in private. So the *Apost. Const.* (iii. 6) strongly urges them to 'teach in church,' and bid them pray and listen to the teachers. The prohibition of St. Paul (1 Co 11:34; cf. 1 Ti 2:12) was considered conclusive.

8. The Lay in councils.—There is a considerable contrast between ancient and modern practice with regard to the position of laymen in ecclesiastical synods or councils. With the growth of the parliamentary conception in the civil State has arisen the organization of correspondence between Parliaments in which the various orders give a vote on the questions decided, and each has a veto on the decisions of the others. It will be of interest to watch the growth of this conception. In the NT we have the description of two 'councils,' one of which may be called the prototype of the general or ecumenical synods of later days, and the other of the diocesan synods. In Ac 15 we read of a meeting called to discuss a difficult question which had arisen in the Church, whether the Gentile converts to Christianity must keep the Law of Moses—whether, in fact, the only entrance to Christianity was through Judaism. Delegates, including Paul and Barnabas, were sent up to Jerusalem to discuss the question with the 'apostles and elders' (v. 2), who came together to consider the matter and decide. For a full account see P. V. Smith in the *Prayer Book Dictionary,* p. 205f.
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the clergy, and the concurring feeling (consensus) of the laity (Ep. xiv. [v.] 11) and modern ideas have been read into this saying. It has been interpreted as meaning that Cyprian disclaimed the power to take any action unless the laity gave their consent. The Laymen's resolution is not the same, being a sharply defined meaning as our 'consent'; it conveys no idea of voting or of vetoing. Cyprian very rightly determined to carry his people with him in his episcopal rule, and this is the meaning of his speech. The decision, to use the decision of the clergy or laymen, whether clergy or laymen, were brought or invited to the councils. At his was present at Nicaea, in attendance on Bishop Alexander, though only a deacon (Socrates, HE i. 8). Eusebius (Vita Const. iii. 14) says that the Bishop, in the land of Africa, an immense number of presbyters, deacons, acolytes, and other attendants. Yet there is no record in ancient times of any clergy or laity exercising a veto on the bishops' decisions. Their influence was of great, but it was an indirect influence, one wielded not as an exercise of right by a class or an order, but from the qualification of knowledge and experience. They were called in, e.g., to give advice about the lapsed in Cyprian's day (Ep. xvi. [xi.] 3, 'To the people'). See, further, art. COUNCILS AND SYNODS (Christian), vol. iv. p. 185 f.; and A. W. Haddan, in DCA, art. 'Council.' (i. 418 f.)

The authority of the latter writer is that, while 'bishops were the proper, ordinary, and essential members of a provincial council,' the presbyters 'as a body were consulted, as of right, down to the 9th century, and not only continuously, but were present, but were admitted to subscribe in several instances in later centuries.' But he doubts if 'they ever actually voted in a division'; while deacons and laity were often present and sometimes subscribed decrees, 'no proof at all exists that they ever actually voted in a division individually in actual divisions.'

This is not unnoticed. Hooker. He maintains (Ecc. Pol. viii. 451) that 'in all societies, companies, and corporations, whatever force such an opinion may have as regards the laws of a voluntary society, in matters of religion it is of very doubtful application; even to the laws of a State it can be applied only by somewhat unsatisfactory explanations. In this case it would appear that Hooker is less judicious than usual.'

A difficulty in the relation of laymen to synods arises from the fact that synods have so often had to deal with Christian doctrine. To legislate on doctrine is to exercise the office of teaching, and the laity have not, as a class, been commissioned, as the clergy have been commissioned, to teach, even though individual laymen may have been so commissioned (see § 7 above). Had the synods had to deal only with practical questions of Church organization, no doubt laymen would much sooner have been admitted to take a more active share in them. An early step towards the more modern idea of a Laity was the organization of English Convocations (also called synods), in which the clerical representatives of the Lower House have a vote or veto on the decisions of the bishops in the Upper House. For, without the concurrence of the laity, no decision is an Act of Convoca-

ition. It is true that the Convocations were first thus fully organized (in the 13th cent.) for fiscal purposes; but, whatever the purpose, the result has been as stated. The addition of Lay Houses of Convocation, as consultative only, is a quite recent experiment.

Since the Reformation there has been a great movement in the West towards giving the laity an equal voice with the clergy in ecclesiastical synods. In Ireland and the British Colonies the Anglican communities have, as a rule, done this. This is also the case in the Presbyterian Communion, in which ministers and 'elders' are admitted to the General Assemblies on equal terms. It has, indeed, been discussed whether these 'elders' are or are not properly laymen, inasmuch as they have received certain ordination or commission by laying on of hands. Neither the Church of England nor the Episcopal Church in Scotland has gone so far. The position of the laity in the former has been described above. In the latter the provincial synods are composed of the bishops and representatives of the clergy only; the clergy having a right to veto the findings of the bishops, and the bishops being also able to legislate. In the Synod of Canterbury, however, the laity have a right to sit where the bishops are; and in the Synod of York, they have a right to sit where the bishops are. In some of the Scottish synods, the laity have a right to sit where the bishops are.

In the Roman Catholic Communion the laity have no part, as of right, in synods; but they have sometimes been called in to give advice. In the Eastern Orthodox bodies, as will have been seen from what is stated above (§ 4), laymen have often a very considerable share in ecclesiastical councils of some kinds; but questions of doctrine are reserved for the bishops. In this connexion it may be observed that, which has so often been felt in the West, of distinguishing questions which are doctrinal from those which are not. In the same way, the laymen fall into both categories, according to the aspect in which they are viewed—do not seem to have troubled the more subtle but less logical East.

In connexion with the summoning of laymen to give evidence before synods, mention may be made of the interesting relic in England and Ireland of 'sidesmen' (in the 1603 canons 'sydemen' or 'side-
men'). It was the custom in the Middle Ages for the bishop to summon to his diocesan synod laymen as testes synodales, to bear witness to the moral condition of their parishes. The name 'sydemen' is thought to have been corrupted into 'sidesmen.' Since the Reformation, however, these lay officials have been merely assistants to the churchwardens, and help to keep order in the church (English canon 90).

LITERATURE.—On the general relation of laymen to clergy see J. B. Lightfoot, essay on 'The Christian Ministry' in Philipp. London, 1878, and many later editions (since reprinted in a volume of essays); C. Gore, The Church and the Ministry, etc. 1900; A. Barry, The Position of the Laity in the Church, etc. 1900, and W. H. Scudamore, art. 'Laymen' in DNB; J. Bingham, Scholasical History of English Laymen, London, 1812 (these two writers are in favour of the practice); W. Elwin, The Minister of Baptism, etc. 1889; D. Waterland, Letters on Lay-Baptism, new ed. London, 1824; the two writers deny or doubt the validity of lay-baptism; and T. Thompson, The Office of the Priest in modern times, Cambridge, 1854, pp. 2-28. On the laity in councils see B. B. Fasey, The Degree of the Church, Oxford, 1873; A. W. Haddan, art. 'Council,' DNB; an exhaustive treatise on the subject; and A. Barry, op. cit.

A. J. MACLEAN.
LAKE-DWELLINGS.—The term ‘lake-dwellings’ (Fr. habitations lacustres; Germ. Pfahlbauten; Ital. palafitte) is a generic expression to designate those singular habitations which certain peoples were formerly in the habit of constructing, chiefly on fresh-water lakes, and the remains of which are at the present time no infrequently disinterred from ancient lacustrine deposits, either in the shores of existing lakes or on the sites of some of the smaller lake-basins which, in the course of time, have been obliterated by the growth of peat. It is only in comparatively recent times that even the existence of such structures has come to the knowledge of archæologists, but practical researches have already abundantly shown that they were at one time common in many parts of the world, especially in Central Europe and in the British Isles. Herodotus (4th cent. B.C.) describes (v. 16) a lake-dwelling community in Lake Prasias, in Thrace, who lived in huts placed on a wooden platform, supported on tall piles, and connected with the shore by a wooden gangway. Each habitation had a trap-door which gave access to the water beneath; and the lake so abounded with fish that a man had only to open his trap-door and let down a basket by a rope into the water, and in a short time he would find it full of fish. But this, and a few other historical notices suggestive of the custom of constructing lake-habitations, failed to disclose the archæological treasures which have lain buried for so many centuries in the ancient lacustrine deposits of nearly all the lake-basins of Central Europe. Now the antiquarian materials collected on lake-dwelling sites are so vast and varied that they hold a prominent position in the principal archæological museums of Europe. To have rescued the evidence of so remarkable a phase of human civilization from oblivion is justly regarded as one of the greatest triumphs of pre-historic archæology. In 1890 the present writer described the terremera of the Po valley, the terpen of Holland and other analogous structures in Hungary and elsewhere, as mere variants of the lacustrine system of habitation, and, as so remarkable discoveries have since been made in these somewhat obscure fields of research, it is desirable to include a brief notice of them in this article as separate sections.

3. Lacustrine researches.—Although the discovery of the remains of pile-structures in Lake Zürich during the winter of 1853-54 is generally regarded as the starting-point of lacustrine archæology, with validity evidenced by the fact that such structures, though not so ancient, were known in Ireland fifteen years earlier. It seems that in 1839 curiosity was aroused at the Museum of the Royal Irish Academy by the frequency of the visits of a local dealer offering for sale objects of a miscellaneous character, many of which were of rare antiquarian value. These objects were said to have been found in a peat-bog in County Meath, and their assentment in such a picturesque and ancient county to the Museum authorities that G. Petrie and W. R. Wilde determined to visit the locality. On this expedition they were conducted to the peat-bog of Lagore, near the village of Durrow, by a man, within whose boundaries was a drained lake and under a thick covering of peat, was an artificial mound then partially exposed by peat-cutters. It seems that this mound had been worked upwards for upward of ten years; during that time they had dug out and exported to a factory of bone-manure in Scotland no fewer than 150 cart-loads of bones. The base and circumference of and along its margin were ‘upright posts of black oak, measuring from 6 to 8 feet in height; these were mortised into beams of a similar material making the Lent and sand between the bog, and lay if feet below the present surface. The upright posts were held together by connecting crossbeams, and (said to be) fastened by large iron nails.’

An abstract of a paper by Wilde on the Lagore find, from which the above extract is taken, was published in the Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy for 1840, and its contents were so suggestive to local antiquaries that almost immediately several other analogous peat-bogs, or cromagnos (the name given to such structures in the Irish annals). Moreover, during the workings of the Commission of the Arterial Drainage and Inland Navigation of Ireland, no fewer than 22 cromagnos were brought to light throughout the counties of Roscommon, Leitrim, Cavan, and Monaghan. Reports of these discoveries by the engineers of the Board of Works, with plans, maps, sections, and a large assortment of relics, were deposited at the time in the Museum of the Royal Irish Academy.

The fortuitous circumstances which led to the discovery of the pile-structures (Pfahlbauten) of Switzerland are so well known that it is hardly necessary to dwell on them here. It appears that, owing to the lowness of the water in Lake Zürich during the winter of 1853-54, two of the inhabitants of Ober-Meilen, who in ordinary times came close to the water in the lake, began to extend their limits by enclosing portions of the exposed shore with a stone wall and filling in the space with the adjacent mud. In course of these operations they came upon a decayed stump of wooden piles, stone axes, flint implements, and various worked objects of horn and bone, which excited some curiosity among the workmen. J. Staub (Die Pfahlbauten in den Schweizer-Seen, Finkenr. 1864, p. 8) informs us that the village schoolmaster, Herr Aeppli, having seen some of the objects with his pupils, went to inspect the locality, and was so impressed with the importance of the find that he sent a brief statement of the facts to the Antiquarian Society at Zürich. Within four hours of the dispatch of his epistle three representatives of the Society arrived at Ober-Meilen, among them being the president, Ferdinand Keller. After careful consideration of the fact, Keller came to the conclusion that originally the piles had supported a platform upon which huts had been erected; that these huts had been inhabited by an industrious population, who had superintended the laying of the stone axes and the other primitive relics disinterred from the mud; and that the lacustrine village had come to an untimely end by a conflagration which destroyed the entire structures down to the water edge.

News of the discoveries at Ober-Meilen spread rapidly among the Swiss people, with the result that an army of explorers immediately began to search for similar remains in other lakes. Guided partly by traditional stories of submerged cities long current among the fishing community, and partly by the knowledge of local fisheermen, who, from practical experience of disasters to their nets, could at once point to numberless fields of submerged woodwork, the efforts of these pioneer lacustreurs were speedily crowned with success. Keller's first report on the Swiss lake-dwellings, which appeared in 1854 under the title of ‘Die keltischen Pfahlbauten in den Schweizerseen,’ at once brought this singular mode of human habitation prominently before the scientific world.

To dredge the bed of a lake with hand-worked appliances in a small boat was a slow process, always expensive, and often unproductive. Yet such was the enthusiasm with which that kind of work was carried on year after year that the antiquaries that there is scarcely a Cantonal
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In the course of time, these procustic methods were successfully applied. Amongst the recession of various kinds of public works, such as drainage operations, the deepening of harbours, the construction of railways, jetties, etc., of exceptional impositions which such incidental works were the completion of the gigantic operation known as the "Correction des Eaux du Jura," which embraced the deepening of the entire waterway of the Jura valley, from the junction of the Lower Thieble with the Aar to the mouth of the same on Lake Maggiore. The result of which was to lower the surface of the lakes of Bienna, Neuchâtel, and Morat from 6 to 8 feet. The permanent effect of these works on the Jura lakes, especially Lake Neuchâtel, was very marked—harbours, jetties, and extensive tracts of bridge and dyke being left high and dry by the subsiding waters. This was the harvest time of archaeology. Many of the sites of lacustrine villages became dry land, and the pre-historic by cotswards, of eagles, and hunters; even fishermen forsaw their normal avocation, finding it more profitable to fish for pre-historic antiquities.

The reduction of how public works were utilized for the advancement of archaeology was the construction of the splendid bridge which now spans the Limmat at its outlet from Lake Zürich and the laying out of the adjacent promenades, gardens, and ornamental quays, which occupy what was formerly part of the lake. The filling up of this large area necessitated the use of dredgers, by means of which gravel and mud were raised from the most convenient shallows along the shore and transported to the site just referred to, for use in the operations were the 'Grosser Hafen,' and the outskirts of the Bauschanze. The rich loamy deposits of the 'Haunenmeister' at Wollishofen were found to be a suitable soil for the floral gardens. All these localities turned out to be the sites of lake-villages, and yielded an enormous amount of industrial remains of all ages. Indeed, the collection of Bronze Age relics from Wollishofen now deposited in the Antiquarian Museum at Zürich is one of the most valuable hitherto brought to light through lake-dwelling researches.

It is not necessary to notice the successive invasions which have been made throughout Europe in consequence of the publicity given to these discoveries in Switzerland. Suffice it to say that systematic explorations on an extensive scale have conclusively shown that lake-villages, generally in the form of pile-structures, had been prevalent during the Stone and Bronze Ages in the sheltered bays of nearly all the lakes of France, Switzerland, S. Germany, Austria, and N. Italy. More recently the area of their distribution has been extended to Bosnia, Greece, Asia Minor, and probably other localities.

The remarkable development of lake-dwellings during the prehistoric period of Europe seems to have come to a sudden end in the early Iron Age, and so completely had the system fallen into desuetude that scarcely a trace of it has survived in the local traditions of the districts in which such dwellings were most numerous. The habit of constructing houses built on platforms supported on piles is not, however, absolutely confined to pre-historic times, for we find from various sources that such constructions are still prevalent in various parts of the world—e.g., in the Gulf of Maracaibo, the mouths of the Orinoco and Amazon, on the Coasts of New Guinea and Borneo, at Singapore, along the Creeks and Barrage running into the Straits of Malacca, etc. V. L. Cameron (Across Africa, London, 1877, ii. 63) describes three villages in Lake Mohrya, in Central Africa, with drawings of their picturesque appearance as seen from the shore. A. Goering (in Illustrated Travels, London, 1869-75, ii. 19-21) gives an account of a visit which he paid to the lake-dwellers of a tribe of Goajiro Indians in the neighbourhood of the town of Maracaibo, from which the following extracts may be interesting:

In this way we reached the Goajiro village. Here a lively scene presented itself. The Indians, who are like so many little cock-lofts perched on high over the shallow waters, and they were constructed with such rude means of bridges, made of narrow planks, the split stems of palm trees ... Each house, or cock-loft, consisted of two parts, the pent-roof with the lower part of which the front apartment served the double purpose of entrance-hall and kitchen, the rear apartment as a reception and dwelling chamber, and I was not a little surprised to observe how clean it was kept. The floor was formed of split stems of trees, set close together and covered with mats. Weapons and utensils were placed in order in the corners. A house was got to these villages from the shore by dug-out canoes, the inhabitants mounting to their 'cock-lofts' by a notched tree-trunk, which served as a ladder. Goering states that such villages are numerous along the shores of the great 'Lake,' or Gulf, of Maracaibo. The piles on which they rest are driven deep into the sandy bottom, and so firmly do they hold that there is no likelihood of the lofty-pitched dwelling perceptible, even when crowded with people.

The structures are still more numerous in the east Indian islands. J. B. C. Dumont d'Urville (Voyage de découvertes autour du monde, Paris, 1839) describes the habitants of the bay of Dorell as living in four groups of pile-villages, each containing from eight to fifteen houses entirely constructed of timbers. Some of these houses have circular or oval forms, separated by a passage which runs from end to end, and give accommodation to several families.

As early as 1859, F. Trowy (Habitations lacustres) quotes from the books of a number of travellers recording the existence of pile-structures near all parts of the coasts of the East Indies, and adds that further information is to be derived from this class of evidence.

The discovery of an older lacustrine civilization in Switzerland was hailed by Irish antiquaries with the greatest enthusiasm and the belief that the significance of their own crannogs came to be fully realized; and henceforth crannog-hunting was pursued with renewed vigour. The Irish annals were now carefully searched for references to crannogs, and many of the localities thus indicated were identified and partly explored. In 1857 Wilde published the first part of his well-known catalogue of the antiquities in the Museum of the Royal Irish Academy for which he gave an excellent account of the crannogs. In it he states that 46 were known up to date, and predicts that many more would come to light as the drainage of the country advanced—a prediction which has been amply verified, as the number of these small islands has increased an increase to their number. Now the total number of Irish crannogs known and more or less explored is upwards of 260.

In 1857 Joseph Robertson read a paper on Scotch crannogs at the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland. The chief facts adduced by him consisted of historic references to island-forts, and submerged wooden structures exposed in the course of the drainage of lochs and marashes during the last two centuries. The first great discovery, however, which brought the subject on the field of practical research in Scotland, was made in the Loch of Dowalton, Wigtownshire, upwards of fifty years ago. In order to drain the extensive meadows occupying the western portion of the Dowalton valley the proprietor, William Maxwell, perceived and successfully carried out a project of draining the loch by cutting a new outlet through a narrow lip of rock which separated its waters from the lower grounds beyond. This excavation was completed during the summer of 1869, and, as the waters subsided, a group of five or six artificial islands gradually emerged from the bosom of the lake. The antiquarian remains collected on these islands ultimately rescued by the Duke of Northumberland (then...
2. Structure of lake-dwellings. — It will be understood from the foregoing remarks that the structural details of lake-dwellings have been gathered or less from different, and sometimes widely separated, settlements, and re-constructed on the principles of comparative archeology. As regards the pile-structure of the prehistoric houses at Badenoch, the same general form—huts, platforms, and even the submerged piles, except their lower ends—has disappeared ages ago, either from natural decay or by conflagrations. The complete lake-village by fire was by no means a rare catastrophe, and, strange to say, it was, from an archeological point of view, the most fortunate termination that could have happened to it. During the busiest and most successful of all the operations on the confagration of such combustible materials not only did many articles of value drop into the water beneath, but some of the most perishable commodities, such as the gins, fruits, and other parts of the clay mouldings which covered the cottage walls, etc., were more or less charred before being deposited in the lake-silt—a condition which rendered them less liable to decomposition. It is by collecting, as far as possible, such fragmentary materials that archeologists are enabled to form some idea of the appearance and internal structure of these lacustrine villages, as well as of the culture, civilization, and domestic economy of their inhabitants.

The preliminary problem which had to be solved before habitable huts of any kind could be erected was the construction of a level platform, sufficiently elevated above the surface of the lake and far enough from the edge to prevent the dwelling-huts beyond the action of the waves and floods. The methods adopted to secure this end may be briefly described.

(a) One method was by driving long piles of wood into the bed of the lake, leaving their tops projecting at a uniform height above the water, and then placing over them transverse mortised beams, into which the piles were fitted—thus forming a platform capable of supporting human habitations, and, of course, varying in size according to the requirements of the community. That the earliest lake-dwellers had the requisite skill to accomplish such work is established beyond doubt by the discovery among the débris of nearly all the stations of mortised beams, tenons, portions of wood containing both round and square holes, together with a various assortment of wooden implements, vessels, etc. A common method of studying the piles was to throw around them after being piled up to an intended large height and buried in the mud of the Île St. Pierre, in Lake Bienne, where it had evidently been swamped. These extensive collections of stones from the base of the original area of the village had been subsequently made by the addition of huts projecting from its sides. The huts were circular or slightly oval, and varied in size from 20 to 35 ft. in diameter. Each hut contained a central hearth, sometimes nearly made of flat stones embedded in the clay flooring which existed in all of them; and, as subsidence, due to the compression and decay of the under-structures, progressed, the occupants superadded new clay floors, which on section showed a well-marked stratified appearance. Several hearths, five or six not being an unknown number, were thus observed to have been superimposed one above the other—precisely as was the case on the Lochlee cromagnon.

The relics collected on the site of this remarkable lacustine village are so numerous and varied that they illustrate, with rare and singular completeness, the life-history of the community who inhabited it. The statuary, the pottery, the implements of 'Late Celt', as it existed prior to the spread of Roman civilization in that part of Britain; and it is this fact that gives the Glastonbury collection an exceptional interest. The antiquarian remains hitherto discovered within the British isles.¹

¹Within the last few years another lacustine village has been discovered at a place called Means, about two miles from

Glastonbury, and is now in the course of being excavated during each summer. So far, both the structural and cultural relics disclosed at this new site are precisely similar to those of the Glastonbury village.
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sometimes into four portions—a structural feature said to be characteristic of the Bronze Age. It may also be noted that when a Stone Age site continued in occupation during the Bronze Age, the standing or silted lay.inundation
on the outside of the former, showing that with the use of metal tools their constructors were enabled to plant the piles in deeper water. In the Stone Age the woodwork had been manipulated by stone implements—a fact which was clearly demonstrated when the first discovery was made by the kind at Ober-Melum. Here some of the piles, on being freshly pulled up, were observed to have their tops pointed by black iron. This was experimentally ascertained: if the cots on them could be closely imitated by using the stone and in the character of the surrounding mud.

(b) A second method by which lake-dwellers secured an adequate basis for their huts was to construct a series of round logs, which were used as a foundation for the house. A few feet apart, each beam was having its sides formed by a succession of horizontal beams lying one above the other, like the logs in a Swiss chalet. The ends of the beams overhanging for a few feet, and at the four crossings a few uprights were placed, apparently for the purpose of steadying the structure. The beams consisted varied in size from a few inches in diameter to as many yards. The lowest beams rested on the bed of the lake, when the reed or cane height above the water was reached. Transverse beams to form the habitable platform were laid across, thus covering up the empty spaces underneath. This plan, which was probably selected for the purpose of saving the structural materials, may be regarded as analogous to the vaulted foundations of modern houses. Examples of such structures have been found in Lake Pabius in France (Mesolithic period) and in the lakes of Persiun, Byzas, Danube and other places in the Iron Age in N. Germany.

(2) Gotland.‘Ever the prehistoric pile-structures are ready noticed, there existed throughout the same regions of Central Europe certain lake-dwellings which, instead of platforms, had solid sub-structures composed of closely set timbers arranged in horizontal layers and often alternating with beds of clay. Such structures were commonly erected in the smaller lakes, and their remains are now generally embedded in peat. Characteristic specimens of this kind have been found in eastern France and the district of a lengthy habitat. Another in Lake Nassau in, according to Morlot, surrounded by a circle of piles, after the manner of the Scottish and Irish carved, is the prehistoric architecture of which the prettiest is the wooded isola Virginia in Lake Varas, though now about three acres in extent, was originally a pile-structure. At present it contains several buildings, one of which is a valuable archaeological museum erected by the proprietor, Ehlert Post.

It is known that the Irish Isles that the artificial islands, or crannogs, acquired their greatest development. Precise information as regards their structure has been supplied by an extraordinary collection of a few Scottish specimens, notably those at Lochlee and Buxton, in the county of Ayr, the result of which may be briefly summarized as follows.

A suitable locality having been selected—the topographical requirements seem to have been a small mossy lake with its margins overgrown with water-plants—the next consideration was the materials for constructing the island. In a lake bed composed of many feet of decayed vegetable matter it is probable that such substances, as stones and earth, would be inadmissible, owing to their weight, so that solid logs of wood in the form of trunks of trees would be the best material that could be used. The island was to be made to rise in the first place a floating raft of tree-trunks, bridging, branches, etc., which were mingled stones and earth. On this basis they continued to add similar materials until the mass grounded. It was then surrounded with a stockade in the form of one or more circles of piles united by intertwining branches, or, in the more elaborately constructed specimens, by horizontal beams with mortised holes to receive the ends of the piles. These horizontal beams were arranged in two ways. One set ran along the circumference and the other at right angles to the first circle, while others took a radial direction and connected each circle together, so that the radial beams being long enough to bind the right in three circles together. The mechanical skill displayed in the construction of these structures probably decreased their ability to withstand the pressure of the water, and to prevent superincumbent pressure from causing the general mass to bulge out laterally.

The internal structure of the Lochlee island was carefully examined, by cutting a large rectangular hole near its centre down to the original silt of the lake—a depth of some 10 ft. from the lowest floor of the dwelling-house, or about 3 ft. above the original silt of the lake. The result of this was to show that nearly the entire mass was composed of the unbroken stems of various kinds of trees, from 6 to 12 ins. in diameter, laid in transverse layers one above the other. Interspersed here and there among the woodwork were some long slender carbonized branches, which had formed the binding framework between the central parts of the island and its margin. One such beam, on having its attachments traced out, was found to have had its first discovery at the end pinned to an adjacent large tree-trunk, while its outer end was pinned to another slender oak plank which extended outward and was similarly attached to the marginal structure above.

Some of these crannog islands in Scotland and Ireland had been constructed of stones with or without a wooden foundation. According to G. H. Kirkman, the largest and most typical example of the stone crannog in Ireland is Hag's Castle, Lough Mask, Co. Mayo. As a Scottish example may be cited a mound on the margin of the White Loch of Ravenstone, Wigtownshire, explored a few years ago by Lord Berwick and the present writer. It turned out to be a mass of stones, presenting a level surface of about 80 ft. in diameter and 6 or 7 ft. thick, resting on a foundation of large beams. On the surface of this mound were the foundations of stone buildings, consisting of bankings of the island.

Most of the pile-structures of Central Europe had been connected with the shore by one or more gangways, supported on a double row of piles, with dimensions varying according to the requirements of each village. E. von Poschel states (Keller, Lake-Dwellings, p. 181 f.) that the bridge leading from the shore to the Bronze Age settlement of Øber-Melum was about 200 yards in length, and nearly 20 ft. in width, while that to the Stone Age settlement in the same locality was considerably shorter, and only 5 to 8 ft. wide. The area occupied by piles at Rothenhausen extended to about 3 acres, and the nearest point of the old lake shore was some 800 ft. distant; but yet, from traces of piles found in the peat, it would appear that a wooden bridge traversed the whole of this distance.

Remains of similar approaches have occasionally been discovered in connexion with the later dwellings of the Iron Age, both in N. Germany and in the British Isles. Some of the Scottish and Irish crannogs were also accessible by a submerged stone causeway, the existence of which had become known in some instances only upon the drainage of the lake. It has been conjectured that such submerged approaches might have been intentionally constructed so as to supply to the initiated a secret means of escape in case of emergency, and strengthened by the zig-zag direction presented by some of them, such as a stone causeway in the Loch of Sangochar. Other crannogs, however, appear to have been completely concealed and accessible only by boats. The frequency with which canoes have been discovered in the debris of lake-dwellings of all ages shows how prevalent and widely distributed was their use as a means of communication with the shore. These primitive boats, whether emanating from a Swiss Pfahlbau or from a mediaeval crannog of the British Isles, were almost invariably dug-outs, and presented no appearance of the complicated structure by which their age or provenance could be determined.

The evidential data, on which our knowledge of the structure of the actual habitations of the lake-dwelle...
dwellers is founded, consist of portions of burnt clay mouldings, the position of hearths and culinary incisions on the traces of walls and partitions, the disposition of food refuse, etc. The inference from the clay castings is that the timbers which formed the walls of the huts had been placed close together in an upright position, then plastered over with well-fired clay. Burnt clay impressions found at Robenhansen indicated timbers about an inch and a half in diameter, but other fragments indicated merely a kind of wicker-work. It may be that the clay mouldings found in Lake Bourget, supposed to have been portions of the ceiling of a room, were ornamented with concentric circles and parallel lines. Other burnt fragments from the same locality were portions of the funnel of a small furnace or stove.

As to the form of the huts, the archaeologists are divided in opinion, some, in their ideal restorations, figuring them as circular, and others as rectangular. F. Troyen, judging from some clay casts found at Wangen, came to the conclusion that they were circular, and, accordingly, figures them as such in his Habitation Locutares. On the other hand, E. Platen of Schussenried, came upon the foundations and portions of the walls of a cottage embedded in peat. The structure was rectangular, measuring 33 ft. in length and 23 ft. in breadth, and was divided into two compartments by a partition. The walls and partitions were constructed of split stems of trees set upright, and plastered over with clay. On the south side there was a door, a little over 3 ft. wide, which opened into one of the chambers. The flooring of both of these chambers was composed of four layers of closely laid timbers separated by as many layers of clay. These repeated floorings may have been necessitated by the gradual rise of the surrounding peat, which ultimately compelled the inhabitants to abandon the dwelling altogether.

The diameter of the circular area enclosed by the stockades at Lochlee was about 60 ft., and in its central portion there was a space, measuring 50 ft. square, paved with closely laid beams like railway sleepers, and along each of its sides were the stumps of posts, apparently the remains of a wooden wall. A row of similar stumps divided the paved area into two compartments. Five or six superimposed hearths occupied the middle of the northern compartment, and the doorway, clearly defined by portions of two stout posts, was situated at the front of the chamber, facing it on the right. To the left was an immense refuse heap, beyond which were the remains of a gangway connecting the island with the shore. On the other hand, the structural remains on the Boston crossmog indiated one large circular dwelling-house, a form of habitation which was also disclosed by the excavation of the crossmog in Lochan Dughail. We have already seen that the huts of the Glastonbury lake-village were more or less circular. It may, therefore, be inferred that both forms were indiscriminately used by the lake-dwellers not only during the prehistoric period, but also during the subsequent ages in which such structures were in use.

On the other hand, the hearth proper of the hut floor was made of clay mixed with rushes, and over this was placed the hearth, which consisted of a few flat stones embedded in clay. From discoveries made at Niederwyl, Jacob Molin (p. 67) inferred that the roofs of the huts in that settlement were thatched with straw and rushes. That thatch of some kind was used in Western Europe in proto-historic times is supported by the corroborations in the writings of classical authors.

Thus, Strabo (v. iv. 3) writes that the Belgae lived in 'great houses, arched, constructed of planks and wicker-work, and covered with a heavy thatched roof'—a description which correctly applies to many of the Scottish crossmogs.

3. Culture and civilization of the lake-dwellers of Europe.—There is no class of antiquities which gives greater support to the general accuracy of the chronological sequence of the three ages of Stone, Bronze, and Iron than the various collections of lake-dwelling remains which are to be seen in the archaeological museums of Europe. Founded in the Stone Age, these pile-structures continued to be worked during the time of the Bronze Age, and even overlapped into the early Iron Age, so that the period of their duration entirely covers the introduction and development of bronze into Middle and Western Europe. It is beyond doubt that from the very start the lake-dwellers were acquainted with, and sedulously practised, various arts and industries, that they reared most of the ordinary domestic animals, and that they cultivated the growth of flax, fruits, and various kinds of cereals.

Several varieties of cloth, fringes, nets, cords, and ropes were brought to light by Messrs. and, from the very lowest relic-bed station of Robenhansen; and even specimens of embroidery were found at the adjoining station of Irgenhausen. Remains of linen cloth, thread, nets, basket-work, etc., have also been found on many other stations. Amongst the most notable finds are those at Lagozza, Laibach, etc. The absence of such fragile relics from other stations is not to be taken as evidence that their inhabitants were unacquainted with such industries, for it is only when fabrics are carbonized, or deposited in circumstances exceptionally favourable to their preservation, that they resist for a prolonged period the process of natural decay. Thus, at Schussenried, there was no actual specimen of cloth found amongst the impression of a well-woven fabric was clearly visible on a consolidated mass of wheat—probably that of the sack in which the grain had been stored. At Laibach, a similar impression was observed on a fragment of pottery. In the museum at Freiburg (Switzerland) there is a carbonized spindle from Lake Morat, which shows fine threads still coiled round it; and Gross figures a similar object from Lucca.

One of the stations at Moosseedorf-Sec, which was carefully investigated by the experienced archaeologists Jahn, Morlet, and Uhmann, yielded a large assortment of the remains of animals, among which the following were supposed to have been a part of domestication: dog, sheep, goat, pig, and various kinds of oxen. A few bones of the horse were also found, but these might have belonged to the wild species, as it is not agreed that this animal was domesticated till the Bronze Age. The cultivated plants recorded from this station were barley, two kinds of wheat, peas, poppy, and flax. At Wangen two varieties of wheat and the two-rowed barley were distinctly recognized both in whole ears and as detached grains—the latter in quantities that could be measured in bushels.

That the ceramic art was well known to, and practised by, the early lake-dwellers is amply proved by the quantity of pottery, mostly fragmentary, indicating bowls, plates, cups, jugs, spoons, and large vases, now considered as lacustrian relics (Keller, Lake-dwellers, p. 78). They concluded that the roofs of the huts in that settlement were thatched with straw and rushes. That thatch of some kind was used in Western Europe in proto-historic times is supported by the corroborations in the writings of classical authors.
were not unknown. The ornamentation consisted of fluted and string-marks, irregular scratches with a pointed tool raised, lines round the rim, together with dots and lines variously combined.

For the prosecution of the ordinary avocations of life, the lake-dwellers were in possession of a varied assortment of tools and implements, the precise function of some of them being, however, difficult to determine. They used axes, knives, saws, gravers, borers, etc., of flint and other hard stones. Carving tools, chisels, etc., were also made of horn, bone, and the tusks of the wild boar. With such tools they constructed wooden houses, scooped out canoes, and shaped wood into various kinds of dishes, clubs, and handles.

The food supply derived from agriculture and the rearing of domestic animals was supplemented by the produce of hunting, fishing, and gathering such seeds and fruits as nature produced in the vicinity. The weapons and tools used in these pursuits are abundantly met with. Arrow- and spear-points of flint, and sometimes of rock-crystal and horn, are common, as are also common lake-dwelling remains; and even a few of the bows made of yew wood, notwithstanding their liability to decay, have come to light—two from Robenhausen, and one from each of Tabus, Zeltweg, and Thun, respectively. The introduction of cutting implements of bronze into general use among the lake-dwellers gave a great impulse to the advancement of all the industries and occupations of life. In lieu of the primitive weapons and tools previously in use, we now meet with a splendid array of swords, daggers, lances, axes, knives, razors, chisels, gouges, sickles, etc., all made of the new material. The simple dagger of bone or flint, which could be used only by a thrusting blow, not only became more effective, but developed into a new weapon—the double-edged sword. Indeed, all weapons, implements, and ornaments underwent more or less evolutionary improvements, the various stages of which can be readily traced by a comparison of extant specimens. Thus, the primitive stone ax at first retained the same form in bronze, and, as such, had a wide distribution throughout Europe; but it gradually succumbed to the flanged type, with or without a loop, till finally all forms gave way to the socketed implement, which appears to have been the prevailing form of axe prevalent in the Bronze Age. It was only when iron superseded bronze in the manufacture of cutting implements that the modern type of axe, i.e., with a tang and a socket, came into general use.

In the category of ornaments and articles of the toilet there fails to be considered a large assortment of new and fanciful forms, such as bracelets, pendants, necklaces, fibulæ, pins, combs, bell-claps, finger-rings, batons, pins, ear-rings, chains, and a few trinkets of gold, silver, and glass.

That the horse was in a state of domestication among the dwellers of the Bronze Age we have very circumstantial evidence, in the discovery of bridle-bits and various ornaments for harness, as well as a wheel and other mountings of a carriage.

The progressive innovations in domestic and public life could hardly fail to influence the art of the potter. Accordingly, we meet with a better quality of paste, greater variety and elegance in the style and form of vessels, and some approach to systematic decoration. Ultimately colouring materials were utilized, which considerably enhanced the effect of the geometric style of ornamentation. Besides patterns of recurring figures, formed by impressions in the soft clay, we occasionally find similar patterns traced on the surface of vessels in thin and periodized form, made to adhere to the dish by means of a kind of gum or sapphire. Such vessels were made of fine black paste, with a smooth surface, and were extremely elegant in shape.

Lacustrine archaeology does not supply the materials requisite for a review of the civilization prevalent in the early Iron Age, as no lake-dwellings have been discovered showing a transition in the matter of implements and other objects. Iron appears in a few instances, towards the close of the Bronze Age, as in ornamental bands engraved on a few swords and bracelets, but there are no tools or weapons of the transition stage, such as was the case at Hallstatt, where iron is seen, as it were, competing with bronze in the manufacture of all kinds of objects. On the contrary, the few objects of iron found on the sites of one or two of the Swiss lake-dwellings are mostly La Tène types, which, of course, are very different, not only in material, but in form and technique, from those of the previous age. On these stations no once-used weapons of La Tène forms found, but also Roman tiles, pottery, and coins. The introduction of iron into general use in Europe seems, therefore, to have been the work of an alien people who subjugated the lake-dwellers and destroyed their villages about the 5th century. On the other hand, sporadic lake-dwellings found outside the area of these earlier habitations belong almost exclusively to the Iron Age, and their respective inhabitants had no common bonds of affinity. The vast majority of the Scottish and Irish cremations flourished from the Romano-British period down to the 17th century—a statement which, according to R. von Virchow ("Die Pflählbauten des nördlichen Deutschlands," Z E. I. (Berlin, 1869)), is applicable to their analogues in N. Germany.

The well-known station of La Tène, regarded by the earlier lacustrinae as a true lake-dwelling of the Iron Age, is now shown to have been an oppidum, or fort, of the Helvetians, erected at the outlet of the lake when its waters stood at a lower level than they did immediately before the 'Correction des Eaux du Jura.' The remarkable assortment of weapons, implements, and ornaments collected from this site gives a striking picture of the metallurgical skill to which their owners had attained prior to the influence of Roman civilization in Gaul. The style of art disclosed by them seems to be of Eastern origin, and known in Britain as 'Late Celtic,' as represented, e.g., by the reliques found on the Glastonbury lakes-village; and so important is this group considered by archaeologists that the name 'La Tène' has become a generic expression for those well-defined Marnian remains which are Celtic in origin, and are not to be confounded with those classified as Greek, Roman, Etroscam, or Phœnician.

4. Terremare.—Shortly after the middle of the 18th cent. certain artificial mounds of an earthy substance found scattered here and there over some of the eastern provinces of the Po valley became known to agriculturists as possessing great fertilizing power—a property which was henceforth turned to account by using their contents as a field manure. To such an extent has this practice been carried on that, out of a once unknown, few now remain. On the removal of a few feet of surface soil the fertilizing materials come to view in the form of stratified deposits of clay, sand, ashes, stones, leaves, and vegetable remains, brown, green, and black—shown conspicuously on section as parallel bands running across the mound. The finer materials, procured by riddling, are sold to the farmers under the name 'marma' or 'merne.'
and hence these mounds are now known in scientific literature as terramare. In course of time the stones and other objects were encountered by the workmen, such as fragments of pottery, Roman coins and tiles, implements of bronze, bone, and horn, the bones of domestic and wild animals and occasionally those of men. These discoveries for a long time failed to lead to any scientific investigation and, when the mysterious mounds happened to be noticed by the early writers of last century, they were left in great part unnoticed and unaccounted for them.

The celebrated naturalist G. Venturi (1822) assigned them partly to the Boii, a Celtic race who here cremated their dead warriors and ceremoniously threw their weapons and animals in war into the burning pile, and partly to the Romans who subsequently inhabited the country and selected these mounds as burial-places. Others supposed them to have been the sacred and traditional cemeteries of successive races, and hence their contents were called cemetery-earth (terra cinerimale); and it is a curious fact that many of these tumulus mounds are to this day crowned by a large number of trees and conventional Christian crosses have been in the habit of burying their dead. B. Castaldi thought the stratification of the deposits could be accounted for only by the intervention of floods of the Po, and he assigned the onset of the Po and the bursting of the numerous torrents which descend from the Apennines.

These and similar theories, based on the supposition that these terramare mounds were the abodes of the dead, were not, however, in harmony with the domestic character of the pottery and industrial implements which were turned up. The starting-point of a long series of researches which ultimately solved the problem was the announcement, in 1851, of P. Strobel that the remains of a palafette, analogous to those found in lakes and peat-bogs, were to be seen below the terramare beds at the station of Castione del Marchesi, near Borgo San Donnino, in the province of Parma. This discovery aroused much speculative interest, especially when correlated with the researches initiated by B. Castaldi regarding pile-dwellings in lakes and marshes, the existence of which, in Italy, had just then been proved by the discovery of their remains in the peat-bog of Mercargu and in Lake Garda.

According to these novel revelations, Strobel and Luigi Pigoini, both then residing at Parma, began a series of investigations regarding the terramare in their own vicinity, the outcome of which was a joint report, first published in 1852 as part of Castaldi's well-known work, Nuovi cenni sugli oggetti di antichità trovati nelle torbiere e nelle marne di' Italia.¹

Interest in the whole subject now rapidly increased, and extended to agriculturists and local observers. Yearly excavations were carefully scanned for antiquities, and special excavations in the interests of science were even undertaken by the State. The outcome of these elabo

¹ This work was translated into English by C. H. Chambers under the title of Lake Habitations and Pre-historic Remains in the Po Valley of Northern and Central Italy, and published in 1856 by the Anthropological Society of London.
found on it from time to time had not been care-
fully collected, but nevertheless a goodly number
had been sent to the museums of Parma and Rome.
They are similar to the ordinary relieves charac-
teristic of the terramara, such as pottery (including
the famous cinerary ware), ivory, and statuettes,
figurines of animals, and various objects of doar-
thorn, together with an assortment of Bronze Age
implements, weapons, and ornaments.
Certain Sigerini and other Italian authori-
ties is that the origin of the terramara came into
Italy from the great highway of the Danube by
way of Croatia, Carinthia, and Venetia. On
reaching the Po valley, they founded settlements in
the lakes of Garda, Pimòn, Arquà, and others
during the transition period between the Stone
and Bronze Ages. In the lake of Garda the settle-
ments were numerous, and some of them continued
to flourish down to the early Iron Age. In moving
westwards these immigrants followed the left bank
of the Po, founding settlements in the intermediate
lakes, until they reached the lakes of Vareso and
Maggiore, which henceforth became their head-
quarters. From the second part of the valley
while the early settlers who remained in the eastern
district began to found lake-dwellings (palafitte)
on swampy ground, the lakes here being too few to
afford suitable accommodation for their increasing
numbers. Subsequently they crossed to the south side of the Po,
where, the land being low-lying and subject to
inundations, they continued their inherited system of
inhabitations with the addition of housing them
fortified by a moat and a rampart. The crossing of the Po,
which doubtless was a great military achievement,
was supposed to have taken place at Visso and it is worthy of note that the great
camp of Castelvetrano, on the frontier of the Iberian and the
Ligurian, the original inhabitants of the country—a fact which
seems to the present writer to have been the raison d'etre for the exceptional defences of the terramara
villages of Western Emilia. On the east side, to-
wards Bologna, the hut-constructors of the Stone
Age were conquered and subjugated by the terras-
ravalli, who then installed themselves in their
huts, for which accounting for the remains of
two civilizations being met with in the stations
and habitable caves all along the coast of the
Adriatic. Gradually these terramara folk moved
southwards, according to Pignorini, because
the actual founders of Rome. At any rate, a
typical terramara station has been discovered as far south as Taranto.

5. Terpen.—We now proceed to inquire if struc-
tures analogous to the terramara are found else-
where in Europe. It is a remarkable fact that,
notwithstanding the striking appearance which
the Swiss lake-villages must have presented to
strangers, classical writers are absolutely silent
about them. Such reticence does not, however,
apply to the classic of remains now about to be
described. Before the construction of the great
sea-lake, the whole of West Friesland
would have been in that hybrid condition described
by Pliny (HN xvi. 1), in which it was difficult
to say whether it belonged to sea or land:

"Here a wretched race is found, inhabiting either the more
elevated spots of land, or else emerging artificially constructed
and of a height to which they know by experience that the
highest tide will never reach. Here they pitch their cabins
and, when the waves cover the surrounding country far and
wide, like so many mariners on board ship are they," etc.

At the present time this region is included with
certain other parts of the Netherlands in a series
from a map of their geographical distribution recently issued by
the Friesch Genootschap, it appears that their
number in Friesland alone amounts to 300,
of which 200 have already been excavated. Of the
remaining 300 many are not available for either
agricultural or archaeological purposes, the greater
number can be seen or visited by visitors
by villages, churches, ceme trayeties, etc. Like
the terramara, these terpen-mounds have for a long
time been excavated on account of their rich
monumental deposits, which are used by agriculturists
as guano; but, until they attracted the attention of archaelogists, no one
had given a thought to their origin. As their
excavation is prosecuted solely in the interests of agriculture, little attention is
paid to the position of the archeological treasures which they contain.

Either a canal or a railway siding is conducted to the
perpendicular facing of the excavation, and from it the transporting boats or wagons are
filled. Most of the larger antiquarian objects are
thus secured, but many of the smaller articles,
such as beads and ornaments, escape observation.

From the relieves thus collected the curator of the
Leeuwarden Museum has the privilege of selecting
any that he thinks necessary for the national collection,
but the rest may be sold or disposed of privately.

As to the origin of the terpen, they are now
proved to have been originally constructed as
lake-dwellings, at least as regards some parts of their
interior; and some of them are probably the actual
mounds described by Pliny. The modus operandi was to raise a circular
ring-mound of mud near ebb-tide. When this
mound was sufficiently elevated to keep the waves
outside, wooden platforms supported on short
stakes were erected in the interior, and on these
bunds were placed. As the rampart surrounded
the process was repeated until the interior became
a solid mound, precisely like what took place in
the terramara. The towns of Leeuwarden and
Leyden are said to be built over one or two terp-
mounds. The industrial remains collected in the
course of the excavations of the terpen, and care-
fully preserved in the museum of the Friesch
Genootschap at Leeuwarden, give a vivid picture
of the culture and civilization of their inhabitants
from pre-Roman times down to the 12th century.

Among the relics the following may be noted: egg-shells (hen
and goose), some of which were unbroken; a flute made of the
shank bone of an animal; Anglo-Saxon, Byzantine, and Roman
coins; wooden spades; large casks for storing water; cans;
iron swords; clay loom weights; occasionally comb-like
beads of amber and glass; quantities of the debris of flax;
while one with a piece of the thumb, etc. Also some
early bowls of La Tine types, Roman tiles and pottery (terra sigil-
ata)—some specimens of the latter having makers' marks on
them—bridle-bits of iron, bronze brooches, etc.

During the year 1905 a number of urns and
human skeletons were found in a localized spot
within a terp near Leeuwarden. Some of the
skulls were enclosed in coffins made of the
hollowed trunks of trees and some in wooden
boxes. The operatic urns were hand-made, and
are regarded as of Saxon origin, dating from the 5th or 6th cent. A.D.

There were, however, a few wheel-made urns, which are considered to be
the work of the Franks, as the wheel was not used
in Friesland, either by the Saxons or Frisians, till
the 10th or 11th century.

Dooms remains representing the following animals are
abundantly met with: horse, ox (several varieties), cat, dog,
sheep, wild boar, deer, fox, and foxes, etc. About
one of these animals are one or two of the four-horned sheep. It
may be of interest to note that the bones of this animal were
among those identified by R. Walsie come from the
crumney of Lurgan in Ireland.

Analogous structures, under the names 'Warfen'
and Wurzen,' have been discovered in the
low-lying regions of East Friesland, the fen district
of Holland, the embouchure of the Elbe, and, indeed,
in nearly all the marshes along this part of the
North Sea coast (see Munro Lectures for 1912,
p. 445 ff.).
6. Pile-structures in rivers.—Habitations erected over the margins of rivers, though possessing features common to both lake-dwellings and ferme-
more proper, yet differ in other respects so much
that they must be treated as a separate group.

(a) Butmir (Bosnia).—The fertile plain of Ilidzé,
occupying the bed of a wide basin, about 11
kilometres long by 7 broad, has been formed by
sedimentary materials imported by numerous
streams from the surrounding hills, which, by
their junction here, give rise to the river Bosna.
In early times this basin was more or less a lake,
and, indeed, in winter parts of it are still submerged.
Almost in its centre there is a portion of land
covering several acres, which, on careful inspec-
tion, is seen to be more solid, and elevation than
part of the plain in its immediate proximity. This eleva-
tion was selected by the Government as the site of
offices for a model farm; and, when, in 1898, exca-
vations for the foundations of buildings were begun, it was discovered that all this raised area
was composed of the refuse of early human occu-
pancy. This pre-historic settlement, or work-
shop, as some suppose it to have been, is now
known as the neolithic station of Butmir. Part of the area is now occupied by a
large dairy and other buildings, and the rest of it
has been excavated for scientific purposes. A per-
pendicular section, especially prepared to show the
position and nature of the materials of which the
elevation was composed, disclosed the following deposits in successive strata from above down-
wards:

On the surface were 13 to 18 inches of clayey soil; then a
blackish, starchy mixture of clay mould, charcoal, etc., arranged
in wavy and more or less parallel strata. The depth of this
decomposition layer was from 4 to 6 feet, and in it, dis-
covered apparently throughout its entire contents regardless of
depth, that all the relics were found. Beneath this again was
a natural deposit of fine yellowish clay, very adhesive and well
adapted for the manufacture of pottery. The discovery of
hollows, extremely variable both in size and in form, in this
underlying virgin clay, suggested to W. Radimsky, the super-
intendent of the excavations, the idea that they were the
foundations of the original huts of the inhabitants. The sub-
sequent discovery of a number of round holes in these hollows,
which were readily recognized as having been formed by
wooden posts, because, although the wood had entirely decayed,
the spaces had become filled up with debris, gave rise to the
thought that the settlement was really a pile-structure—a opinion which the present writer has supported on the following
grounds; (1) the general irregularity in form and size of the
called hut-foundations; (2) the occasional presence of pieces of charcoal, pottery, and other relics, on the surface of the very clay, thus showing that the deposition of the latter
had not entirely ceased when the settlement was founded;
(3) the discovery of a considerable number of idols and other relics among
the stuff which lay in these hollows, together with the entire
absence of hearths or evidence of fire in any of them; (4) the
resemblance of the strata within each section, were seen
to run across the margin of the hollows without any break in
continuity. (5) at various levels throughout the debris were
to see portions of burnt and beaten clay platforms, as well as
clay casts of the timbers which formed the walls of the huts.

A peculiarity of the Butmir station was the scarcity of organic materials; not even a bone or
wooden implement was found, although, from the
abundance of perforated stone implements, such
objects must have been largely used—all having
apparently disappeared by natural decomposition.
Quantities of charred corn were found in different
places throughout the debris. That grain and
seeds were largely used as food is inferred from
the fact that no fewer than 900 stone grinders, in-
cluding fragments, were found throughout the
station. The most usual remains consist of about
70 fragments of idols, mostly in human form,
quantities of broken pottery, including some with
beautiful spiral ornamentation, and a large assom-
plished of polished stone implements—knives, saws,
scrapers, arrowheads, hammer, mortars, axes, and adzes
—but no metal object is among the collection.

(b) Ribap.—The village of Ribap lies on the east
bank of the river Una, a tributary of the Save.
Here the stream widens into a kind of lake in
which are two small islands accessible by wooden
bridges supported on piles. Like other Bosnian
rivers, the water of the Una holds in solution a large
amount of calcareous matter which, on
exposure to the atmosphere, are deposited, causing
in some localities barriers across the stream. The
miniature falls and currents by which the waters
escape over these barriers are often utilized for
the motive-power of corn-mills. At Ripač there is
such an obstruction stretching from the larger
island to both shores, and along it may be seen a
row of these little mills, in the form of wooden
cabins planted on tall piles. In course of removing
some obstructive materials to the free escape of
the water from the small water-wheels, the work-
men encountered the stumps of thickly-set piles
in a blackish relic-bed containing fragments of
pottery, clay weights, broken bones, etc. This
discovery was recognized to be of so much impor-
tance that the Government gave orders to have
the locality investigated under W. Radimsky, the
chief inspector of mines. Excavations were carried on during the summers of 1893 and
1894, and it was then ascertained that a pre-
historic pile-structure not only occupied the whole
space between the islands, but also embraced
a considerable portion of the larger island and
the bank of the river. The upper deposits contained
only Roman and later remains, but in the true
culture-bed underneath were found burnt beams,
organic materials, portions of platforms and huts,
and a large assemblage of relics of the pre-historic
period. The piles were mostly made of oak stems,
sometimes split and perforated, but of these only
the stumps remained; and there were also two sets of
loops (or curwen) above, which suggest an earlier and a later structure. There was also
evidence that the settlement, or at least a portion of
it, had been destroyed by a conflagration; but
this catastrophe did not bring it to an end.

The objects collected were made of iron, copper,
bronze, silver, lead, stone, clay, glass, bone, wood,
and vegetable fibre. Among the relics were numer-
ous articles characteristic, not only of the Stone
and Bronze Ages, but of the well-defined periods of
Hallstatt and La Tène, thus proving that the
habitation was occupied continuously from the end
of the Neolithic Age till takes possession of by the
Romano-Dacians. During the Iron Ages the larger island
became a fortified castle.

Radimsky states that indications of similar pile-
structures are to be seen at several other localities
on the river Una, viz. at Gelubice, Ribič, Kralje,
and Brekovic. The kind of the river Save,
(a) Donja Dolina (Bosnia).—The site of this
pile-structure is on the south bank of the river
Save, a tributary of the Danube. Here an oval-
shaped terrace, some 500 paces in length and half
this in breadth, presents a steep front to the river,
but elsewhere falls away, except at the west end,
where the escarpment turns abruptly inland,
forming the bank of what was formerly a
river. The surface of this terrace is 3 or 4
metres higher than that of the surrounding land,
and is almost the only spot in the neighbourhood
that is not submerged during the heavy
floods of the Save. It is called 'Gradina,' i.e.
'start,' by the peasants; and here, during heavy
floods, they find shelter for themselves and their
cattle; and for the same reason it contains two
village cemeteries—one for the Catholics and one
for the Orthodox Protstants.

For several years, articles of antiquarian value
from the vicinity of Donja Dolina were now and
again presented to the Landesmuseum at Vienna—
a fact which last induced the Count Truhléka,
head of the archeological department, to visit the
locality. On walking along the river, at the foot of the 'Gradina,' he observed the tops of oak piles protruding through the river mud, while scattered around them were fragments of pottery, spindle-whorls, objects of burnt clay, worked portions of deer-bone, etc., from which he concluded that before him lay the débris of a pre-historic pile-structure. Excavations were begun in the following year (1900), and continued for several seasons when the water-level of the Save was favourable. The results are of great archeological importance from the wealth and variety of the relics discovered, and the ability with which they are recorded in two magnificently illustrated reports by Truhelka (Wissenschaft. Mitt. aus Bosnien und der Herzegovina, ix. [Vienna, 1904] and xi. [do. 1909]).

From the very beginning of the excavations it became evident that the structural details of this settlement deviated, in many respects, from the ordinary Pfahlbauten as hitherto known in Europe. The first interesting discovery was a row of piles running parallel to the river, which proved to have been the foundation of a palisade against the current, as the piles were bound together by inter- twining willow thongs. In continuing the excavations inwards, the excavators brought to light the remains of several houses supported on wooden posts. These posts were thickly set, no fewer than 978 having been counted over an area of 1160 square metres—nearly one for every square metre. Many of them, however, belonged to a later period, and were inserted to strengthen old timbers for the support of new houses. They were for the most part made of oak tree-stems, seldom split or squared, and well pointed with sharp metal tools. A little back from the river palisade there was a raised promenade from which a winding gangway gave access to the underground vaults containing the supporting piles, as well as to the platforms on which the houses had been erected. Little of the structural details of the dwelling-houses remained, except the foundations of the partition walls and some loose spars and boards, which crumbled into dust as soon as they were exposed to daylight. During the excavations the sites of eleven houses were exposed, all of different dimensions, one measuring 4.5 metres by 6 metres, and another 6 by 9 metres. By comparing the more perfect remains from different sites, a fairly correct idea of the external and internal arrangement was obtained. Each consisted of a large room, and one or two smaller compartments. The former was regarded as the kitchen, with a fire-place, a hearth, and an oven made of well-burnt clay.

It is difficult to determine the former extent of this singular settlement. Strong stumps of piles were met with over a large area of the adjacent river-bed. It has also been ascertained that during the digging of graves in the Catholic cemetery, the same class of relics were often thrown up. From these and other suggestive facts, it has been conjectured that the whole of the 'Gradina Hügel' consists of the débris of pile- dwellings—an area approximately amounting to 25,000 square metres.

That the underground vaults were sometimes utilized as cattle- pens was made evident by the large amount of animal dung that had accumulated in several of them. But this was not the only use to which they were put, as in several instances cinerary urns and wooden coffins (the latter containing human remains) were found. One coffin, that of a child, placed under the pelvis pierced by a supporting pile, showing that the burial was older than the reconstruction of the superincumbent dwelling-house. The urns contained the incinerated remains of bodies, charcoal, ashes, and an extraordinary wealth of grave-goods; but, unfortunately, the latter had been greatly damaged by the fire. It would appear, from the valuable nature of some of these offerings, that the cremated persons were of greater social distinction than those buried by inhumation. The objects consisted of fibule and spiral bracelets of bronze, beads of glass, amber, and jet, and other ornamental relics characteristic of the Hallstatt period. Of special interest was one urn, which contained a necklet composed of several hundred beads of amber, enameled and ground glass, seven cowrie shells, two perforated teeth, and a large clay bead without any ornamentation. Among the relics which supply a clue to the latest date of the settlement were five coins, one of bronze and the others of silver—all barbarous imitations of the tetradrachms of Philip of Macedon (356-336 B.C.).

A discovery which materially helped to define the chronological horizon of the pile-dwellings was the identification of the cemetery in which their inhabitants were buried. It was located on some ridges, not subject to submergence, at a distance of some 90 paces to the south-west of the Pfahlbau, and 200 from the present bed of the river. The necropolis contained both burnt and unburnt interments, and yielded an immense assemblage of relics which, from the standpoint of archeology, were probably more to be considered as of a period subsequent to those disinterred from the excavations in the river Thessalian.

(d) Pile-structures in Hungary.—On the right bank of the Theiss, a few miles from the railway station of Szolnok, near the village of Töszeg, there is an artificial mound to which, since the meeting of the International Congress of Pre-historic Archeology at Budapest, in 1876, much importance has been attached, on account of the opinion expressed by L. Pigorini that it is identical in structure with the terramare-deposits of Northern Italy. The mound, though considerably under- mined by the river Theiss during the great floods of 1876, is still of considerable extent, measuring 380 metres in length and 100 in breadth, and rising to a maximum height of 8 metres above the surrounding plain. It is only in times of flood that the waters reach the mound, its usual bed being a mile and a half distant. When the artificial nature of the mound became known in consequence of the section exposed by the floods, some extensive excavations were made to ascertain the archaeological character of its contents. An assortment of the objects collected during those operations was deposited at the Congress, among which were the following:

Perforated hammers of stag-horn, various pointed implements of bone and horn, perforated teeth and the leg-bone of a horse pierced in two places, probably a state, polished stone cells (some perforated), four flat flakes (one of obsidian), cora grinders, and various worked stones; a fragment of a bronze pin, a bronze knife, and a small ingot of this metal; pottery, in the form of a variety of dishes, some with handles; various objects of burnt clay—a whistle, buttons, spoons, and eighteen pyramidal and perforated clay weights; a considerable amount of food-refuse, such as bones of animals, scales of fish, land shells, charred grain, etc.

During the meeting of the Congress, L. Pigorini, R. von Virechow, and Miss J. Mestorfi visited the Töszeg excavations, and their further researches which enabled them to agree on the correctness of the following propositions, which were published in separate reports after their return home:

1. The existence of piles and wooden beams was satisfac- torily proved at three different levels; (2) the materials which contained the débris of human occupation were distinctly stratified, and formed undulating layers; (3) the archeologists worked beneath the surface of 4 metres; (4) the antiquities collected belonged to the three pre-historic ages of Stone, Bronze, and Iron.

F. Romer gave an account of his excavations at Töszeg and other localities to the members of the Congress in an article entitled 'Les Terramares en Hongrie.' It is worthy of note that in one of the
lake-dwellings and the terramara of Italy, it may be observed that the latter term was originally applied only to the fertilizing materials, and not, as at present, to the font ensemble of a settlement. From this point of view any orographic references to an inhabited site containing a sufficiently large amount of ammoniacal products to be used as fertilizers (as was the case with the contents of the Barna Grande cave at Mentone) might be not inappropriately so designated. On the other hand, the special features of Castellazzo—monte, dike, contraforte, canals, roadways, citadel, ritual pits, trapezoidal shape—must be regarded as essential characteristics of terramara stations in general, then it must be admitted that there are few such structures outside Western Emilia. If, however, the few known examples of the Castellazzo type be excluded on the ground that they were military forts, we can find in the Po valley parallels to all the settlements which we have described elsewhere in Europe. In pile-structures on the sea-shore, and on marshy ground liable to flooding, dikes were indispensable. The Butmir station belonged to the Summer Age, and it did not appear that a dike was necessary either for defence against enemies or to prevent flooding, as it was constructed over water.

Much significance has been assigned to the pottery known as ansa lunata or cornuta. Formerly the manufacture of this handle was supposed to be a monopoly of the terramara folk of Emilia, but now it has been shown to have a wider distribution—extending southwards along the coast of the Adriatic as far as Taranto and other localities in S. Italy. It is found in the lake-dwellings of the eastern district of the Po valley, but—what is very remarkable—it is entirely absent from those of Piedmont and Western Lombardy. Outside Italy it is common in the early Iron stations of Bosnia, as at Ripac and Donja Dolina, as well as in Bohemia, Lower Austria, Hungary, Styria (Bul.

1 For an elaborate and highly illustrated account of the terramara remains in Europe, readers may consult the present writer's recent book, *Paleolithikum Man and Terramara Settlements in Europe.*
of defense. Of the settlements in the Po valley the lake-dwellings of Lago Gada were the last to be abandoned, but the tombs ceased to be occupied at an earlier period, apparently having been found inadequate to supply the social comforts prevalent among the races who subsequently dominated the Italian peninsula.

In conclusion, we are justified, from a consideration of the archaeological phenomena hitherto disclosed by scientific research, in formulating the hypothesis that the primary sources of the lake-dwellings of Europe were brachycephalic immigrants, in the neolithic stage of culture, who, in successive waves, moved westwards by way of the Danubian valley, giving rise occasionally diversified from the main route into the numerous affluents of the Danube. The goal of all those shepherd farmers was the rich and well-watered pastures lands along the lakes, brooks, and streams of the Alpine regions, which constitute the primary sources of the great rivers of Central Europe and their tributaries. The Scottish and Irish *cranogos*, the Glastonbury lake-village, and other lacustrine habitations of the British Isles, are but sporadic remnants of the main system, which, like every dying art, passed through a stage of degeneration before final extinction.


**ROBERT MUNRO.**

**LALANGS.**—See Bodos.

**LĀMAISM.**—The term *Lāmaism* is now employed by many Europeans to designate the Buddhism of Tibet, and is intended to identify with that religion the Tibetan Buddhist monks, who are generally known as Lāmas, 'the superior ones.' It first appears to have been used by Kopp (and presumably coined by him) in his *Lamsche Hierarchie und Kirche,* 1859, which, as a pioneer work, gave way to the term, although it was employed by him only a few times and merely incidentally. It was not, however, adopted, though mentioned, by Emil Schliisseltwein in 1863, who was the first systematic writer on the subject, setting aside the antiquarian Asiatist and author of *A strife in the 18th cent.* (Alphabetum Tiberianum, Rome, 1762), which was little more than a literary curiosity. Altogether unknown to the Lāmas, the term 'Buddha's religion' (Sangs-rgyas-kyi chos) or 'the orthodox religion' (ngang-chos), this term is in many ways misleading, inappropriate, and undesirable. It conveys the implication that Tibetan Buddhism differs essentially from all other forms of that faith—which is not a fact, for its differences from mediaval Indian Buddhism are relatively trivial and mainly external.

The political ascendency by which one sect of the Lāmas has achieved secular power in modern times is in nowise an inherent part of the Buddhism professed by the Lāmas, nor is it shared by the other sects. It is not usual to designate different religious bodies by the generic name of their habitat. Lāmaism presents no real analogy, as that title is epymonic for the Supreme Creator in that faith, as well as descriptive of his ministers. One of the reasons why the term 'Lāmaism' is used is for the analogy of 'Buddhism' from Buddhist, it should be 'Lāmaism.' Alternatively, therefore, the term monastic designation for the Buddhism of Tibet, and is rightly dropping out of use.

As the Buddhism of Tibet is intrinsically identical with, and derived from, Indian Buddhism of the Mahāyāna, the following account will indicate chiefly those features in which the Tibetan differs from the Indian Mahāyāna (q.v. for the general Buddhist doctrine and practices).
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He certainly did little, if anything, in the way of Buddhist propaganda. He built a few temples, but nothing of the sort brought to him in dowry by his Buddhist wives. One of these was the nucleus of the present great cathedral-temple at Lhāsa, ‘the house of the lord’ (Jo-kang; cf. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, pp. 23, 28, 300, and *Lhase*, pp. 341, 361 f.). He built it as no monasteries, and, according to the vernacular histories, no order of monks was established till over a century later.

2. Establishment of the monastic Order.—After Strom-btsan’s death (A.D. 650), Buddhism made little headway against the indigenous Bon cult, and was resisted by the people until the accession of Khi-ri-Srong De-btsan, the fifth in succession after Strom-btsan. The son of an imperial Chinese princess, he was an ardent Buddhist and proselytizer. Desirous of establishing an Order of Buddhist monks among his people, on the advice of his family Buddhist priest, San-btar-skits, an Indian, he sent to India for the kissam of the latter. This was Pad-makara or Padmasambhava, of the then popular tantristic and mystical Yoga school at Nalanda college, and skilled in Sanskrit scriptures (dharani) as He was a native of Udayana (latterly known as Swat and Kafiristan) on the Peshawar frontier of N. India, and he arrived in Tibet in A.D. 747, with several other Indian monks, who were induced to settle in the country. The first foundation was the first monastery at Sam-yas in A.D. 749 on the left bank of the Brahmaputra river about thirty miles to the south-east of Lhāsa, and installed San-btar-skits as its abbot, with several Tibetan novices as the nucleus of the Order. Of these novices three were elderly; and the first of them, Dpal-baṅg, who succeeded thirteen years later to the abbotship, may be said to be the first ‘Lama.’ He appears to have studied in India also, and to be the same as Ska-ba-bha-po Dpal-brtsegs, who was one of the chief early translators of the Sanskrit Buddhist canon into the Tibetan language.

‘Lama’ is a Tibetan word meaning ‘supreme one,’ and is strictly applicable only to Tibetan abbots (g.ye) and the most learned among the ordained monks. By courtesy, however, it is generally extended in popular conversation to ordained monks in general.

3. Founder of the monastic Order.—Padmakara, the founder of the Order of Buddhist monks in Tibet, is commonly known as Padmasambhava, ‘the one who brought the image of the Buddha to Tibet,’ as the teacher treasure (Guru Rin-po-che’), and also as Lō-pön (slob-dpon), the Tibetan equivalent of the Indian guru, ‘teacher.’ It is not easy now to discover with certainty the details of his teaching, but from the remarkable high literary standard of the monks associated with him, as shown by their scholarly translations from the Sanskrit canon, it is difficult to believe that he was the quasi-shamanistic priest that he is represented to have been by the old unformed sects. There is no doubt that he was a believer in Tantrik mysticism with its prayers to various Buddhist gods and goddesses; but so were the greater Buddhist patriarchs of the country. (See Vasubandhu and Asanga, before his day). No canonical translations are found ascribed to him; but he is the reputed author of several manuals of works (būtan) for conferring the good services of certain deities by means of the repetition of spells (dharani) as the style of the Brahmanical *mantras*—a class of literature which was prevalent in Indian Buddhism at that period.

Translation of the Indian Buddhist canon.—Under the zealous patronage of King Khi-ri-Srong De-btsan, Padmakara initiated an era of great literary activity and scholarship of the Buddhist canon from the Indian Sanskrit. Several of the most intellectual youths were sent to India to learn Sanskrit and Buddhist philosophy in its home in mid-India, and some of the most learned monks of India were induced to proceed to Tibet and settle there for this evangelizing work. In a letter embedded in the great commentary, the *Tan-gyur* (xviii. 387 ff.), addressed to this king by the Indian monk Bulorgau, we read:

‘You did dispatch to India Vairochana, Skh-ba-dpal brtsegs, Kṣyā ṛgā mūstan, Ve-dos ade, Armanjdu, and others, to whom you did intrust much wealth of gold and silver, to get the Dharma, increase the little religion that was in thy realm, and open the window which would let in the light on the darkness of idol (Tibet), and bring in its midst the life-giving waters.’

This indicates clearly that in the middle of the 8th cent. A.D. Tibet was scarcely recognized as a Buddhist country at all. The young Tibetans named therein are some of the best known translators of the Tibetan scriptures.

4. Authenticity and historical value of Tibetan canon.—These texts of the Sanskrit Buddhist canon are now of great historical importance, as they preserve with remarkable accuracy the Indian texts, of which most of the originals have been lost in India. The Tibetan translations of these texts, as tested by the collated fragments and by isolated texts preserved in Nepal, display such scrupulous literary accuracy, even down to the smallest etymological detail, as to excite the admiration of all modern scholars who have examined them. Thus their authorship is placed beyond dispute.

These canonical texts thus afford, along with the less precise Chinese and Japanese translations of the same original, and the more recent Chinese works, a very complete and accurate basis for all our knowledge of the early stage of the development of the classical Tibetan style. The division of the Tibetan Buddhist canon will be indicated below.

5. Growth of the Brtag-gnas or the ‘Lama’ Order of Monks.—From this literary epoch, and the formation of the classical Tibetan style, the divisions of the Tibetan Buddhist canon will be indicated below.

6. Establishment of the institute of the indigenous Buddhism.—The establishment of the institute of the indigenous Order on these Indian lines was opposed by Chinese Buddhists, under a Mahāyāna monk named Hwa-shang (the Chinese term for a Buddhist monk corresponding to the Sanskrit upādhyāya, or ‘master’). These Chinese, who appear to have been itinerant priests, were defeated in argument by the Indian Kamalakāśi, and expelled from the country, leaving the Indian system to be developed unmolested. Many monasteries and Buddhist temples were established all over the country, and Buddhism became the State religion of the land.

A second development of literary activity and Buddhist propaganda occurred in the reign of Ralph Chan, the grandson of Khi-ri-Srong De-btsan, in the latter half of the 9th cent. A.D., when the work of translating the latter’s commentators by Ngāgjarāṇa, Aryadeva, Vasubandhu, etc., was actively prosecuted, and most of the remaining canonical books completed. Among the Indian translators employed by the Tibetan monks Jamnittra, Silenradobhi, Surendrabhi, Prajñāvarman, Dānasāla, and Bodhimitra, assisted by the Tibetan translators (or lo-text-rs) Pal-brtsegs
Ye-she-sde and Ch‘os-khyi-gyal-tsan. At least half of the two great Tibetan collections, canon and monastic, are in his hands.

Ral-pa-Chan endowed most of the monasteries with State lands and the right to collect tithes and taxes. His ardent devotion to Buddhism, indeed, led to his assassination. All the work of this monastery, which event paved the way for the eventual rise of a hierarchy. The murderer of Ral-pa-Chan was his brother Lang-darma, who was at the head of a Bon faction, on which some authentic light is shed in Lhāsā edict pillar inscription of A.D. 842, published by the writer (Jaś, 1909, p. 1267); on ascending the throne he actively persecuted the Buddhists, and did his utmost to uproot that religion. He desecrated and destroyed many temples and monasteries, burned the sacred books, and forced many of the monks to become butchers. He was in turn assassinated within three years by a Buddhist monk disguised as a Black Hat Bon devil-dancer, and this incident is now a favourite episode in the popular sacred plays.

7. Rise of the hierarchy.—Although on the downfall of the dynasty Tibet became subdivided into several petty states, the Mongol monasticism continued to grow steadily in popularity, and the priests became more and more influential, till eventually, in the 13th cent., a hierarchy was established with temporal sway. This was effected by the great Mongol Emperor Kublai Khan, whose grandfather Jenghiz Khan had conquered Tibet. Converted to Buddhism by the Tibetan abbot of the Sas-kyā monastery in Western Tibet near the Nepalese frontier, Kublai created the Sas-kyā abbot official head of the Buddhist Church in Tibet in return for the favour of formally crowning him as Emperor of China. He also conferred upon the learned Sas-kyā Lāma—‘Sas-kyā Pādotta’, as he is usually called—the temporal rulership of Western Tibet.

This first of the Tibetan hierarchies thus especially patronized by the Mongols achieved with a staff of his scholars the gigantic task of translating the bulky Tibetan canon into Mongolian, after revision and collation with Chinese texts, the Mongolian character being a form of Syriac introduced into Central Asia by Nestorian Christian missionaries.

The Sas-kyā primacy maintained much of its political supremacy for several generations, and used its power to oppress its less-favoured rival sects. It burned the great Sas-kyā monastery (Dikung) about A.D. 1329. But on the accession of the Ming dynasty in 1368 the Chinese Emperor deemed it politic, whilst conciliating the monks as a body, by gifts and titles, to strike at the Sas-kyā power by raising the heads of two other monasteries to equal rank with it (Dikung of the Kar-gyupa sect and Tshāl of the Kā-dam sect), and encouraged strife against it.

8. Rise of the priest-kings of Lhāsā.—At the beginning of the 15th cent. A.D., a Lāma named Teng-Kha-pa or Je-Rin-po-che re-organized the reformed Kā-dam sect which had been instituted by the Indian monk Atīśa in 1088, and altered its title to 'The Virtuous Order' or De-kung-pa. This sect, which arose at Gah-khan monastery near Lhāsā, were as a distinctive badge a yellow cap, and hence was known as the ‘Yellow Hat’ Order. It soon eclipsed all the others and in five generations achieved the highest-kingship of the whole of Tibet, which it retains to this day.

Its first Grand Lāma was Taung-Khan-pa’s nephew, Geden-ju, with his succession base on the town of Sakya. In 1640 the Yellow Hats leapt into temporal power under the fifth series of Grand Lāmas, the crafty prelate Lob-zang Gya-nts’s-o, also known as ‘the fifth Jina’ [a title of Buddha], Gya-bal-Na-pa. This Mongol prince, Gush-khan, conquered Tibet and made a present of it to him, and in 1650 he was confirmed in the sovereignty by the Manchu Chinese Emperor, and also in the title of Ta-lai, usually written by the Tibetans Dalai, which is merely the Mongolian word for Gya-nts’s-o (or ‘Ocean’), the surname of himself and his three predecessors.

This resourceful Dalai Lāma consolidated and extended his rule by inventing divine legends about himself, and by forcibly appropriating many of the monasteries of the older sects. He also built for himself the famous palace-monastery on the red hill at Lhāsā, the name of which he changed to ‘Potala’, after the mythic Indian residence of the most popular of all Buddhist divinities, Avalokiteśvara, or Lord of Mercy, of whom he posed as the incarnation, and whose special spell was the famous Om maṇī padme hūṃ formula.

9. Origin of the succession by re-incarnation.—The idea of re-incarnation, which is a fundamental element of belief in Buddhism, derived from its parent Brahmanism, does not appear to have had much influence of the hierarchial succession in India, although many cases are cited by Tarāntātha, from the Indian histories, of Indian Buddhist patriarchs and saints having been re-incarnated in other saints some generations afterwards.

The succession of the Sas-kyā hierarchs was clearly not based upon this system, but was by nomination of relatives. The Yellow Hat succession, however, indisputably shows by the dates of birth and death of the respective incumbents that the succession to the Grand Lāmaship was based upon the theory of direct re-incarnation. The spirit of the first abbot was supposed on his death to be re-incarnated in the world immediately as a new-born infant, and thus was re-born again and again for the good of his monastery and particular sect of Yellow Hats. This theory has latterly been adopted as a basis for succession to the leadership of several other sects as well.

Enlarging this theory, the fifth Grand Lāma introduced the fiction of a divine origin for himself and his predecessors. He declared that both himself and the first Yellow Hat abbot were re-incarnations of the most powerful and popular of all the kings of Tibet, namely Srong-bisga Gampo; and, further, that the latter in his turn was the eartly incarnation of one of the first kings, and the divine honours paid to the Dalai Lāma, who is believed to be the incarnation of this most powerful of all divinities.

10. Dual Grand-Lāmaship.—The only person whom this Grand Lāma of Lhāsā permitted to share to some extent his divine honours was the abbot of the large monastery at Tash-lhunpo, the Western capital of Tibet, belonging to his own Yellow Hat sect, and his successor. He raised his abbot to the dignity of a Grand Lāma, and gave him the divine pedigree of descent from the Buddha-god Amitābha, the ‘Buddha of Infinité
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Light,’ whose blissful paradise in the west is the popular heaven which was the goal of the majority of Western Bodhisattvas from the beginning of the Christian era, as it is to-day in Tibet, as well as in China and Japan. This point is generally known to Europeans, after his residence, as the ‘Tibetan Lama’ of Lhásá. To Tibetans, however, the formers of these is usually known as the ‘great treasure of learning,’ Pan-ch’en Rin-po-che, and the latter as the ‘protector-protector,’ Kyab-gson Rin-po-che, or the ‘victor Jina,’ a title of Buddhist himself.

Latterly, a third and a fourth Grand Lama of the dominant Yellow Hats were instituted for the two kingdoms outside Tibet, to which Tibetan Buddhism extended, namely Mongolia and China. The former of these at Urga is known as Je-bsnun Dam-pa, and possesses temporal sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, like the Dalai Lama in Tibet; but, although posing as the head of the collegiate monkhood, he is not himself celibate. The fourth was appointed by the Emperor Kang-Hsi about 1700, especially for Inner Mongolia, and has his special seat at Pào-su, or Jehol. He is known to Tibetans as Chang-skya-Hu-thuk-thun, and is considered to be an incarnation of Rol-pal Dorje, and his succession, as well as that of the Urga Grand Lama, is arranged by the Dalai Lama.

The jurisdiction of the trans-Paciﬁc Dalai Lama is not acknowledged outside Tibet and Mongolia, including the land of the Buruts (q.v.), bordering Lake Baikal in Siberia, the tracts in Western China which, formerly, belonged to Tibet, the isolated Tibetan monasteries in N. China, and the Himalayan States of Bhután, Sikkim, and Lādākh. Neither the Dalai nor the Tashi Llama exercises any ecclesiastical authority in Tibet over the other and elder sects, the Red Hats, whose relative laxity in Buddhist discipline, especially in the matter of asceticism, they despise.

11. Sects in Tibetan Buddhism.—No sects appear to have existed prior to Lang-dar-ma’s persecution in the 9th century, or till more than a century and a half later. The sectarian movement seems to date from the visit to Tibet of the great Indian Buddhist monk Atīśa in 958. Atīśa, while clinging to Vajrayana and theistic Tantrism, at once started a reformation on the lines of the higher Indian Mahāyāna system, enunciating celibacy and high morality, and depurating the Bon rites which had crept into the faith of the non-ascetic Buddhist monks. The time was ripe for such a reform, as the monks in Tibet had become a very large and inﬂuential body, and possessed a fairly full and scholarly translation of the bulk of Mahāyāna canon and commentaries.

The ﬁrst of the reformed sects, and the one with which Atīśa most intimately identiﬁed himself was the Kā dam, or ‘those bound by the Orders’; and it was in this sect that ultimately, three and a half centuries later, in Tsong-Kha-pa’s lands became the less ascetic and more highly ritualistic under the title of Ge-lug, or ‘Sacred Orders,’ the ‘Yellow Hats,’ now the dominant established sect in Tibet. A car or the ‘Lama’ (Je-po-chë), was the sole profound reformer of Tibetan Buddhism; for we find that the other parallel early reformation were initiated by his pupils. These were the Kar-gyu and Sas-kya sects, which were directly based on great Mahāyāna manuals. These two sects may be regarded as semi-reformations adapted for those individuals who found Atīśa’s high standard of morality and discipline too irksome.

TheIndian-Buddhism traces the gradual growth and weakening of the loss of their best and most intellectual members, were now called the ‘Old,’ or Nying-ma, as they adhered to the old corrupt practices. To legitimize some of their unorthodox practices borrowed from the Indian Buddhist masters, the Nying-ma Lamas began to discover hidden revelations (ter-ma), or fictitious gospels, ascribed to Guru Padmākara, authorizing these practices, just as, it is related, the Indian monk Nāgārjuna, to secure an answer to the ‘Dalai Lama’ of Lhásá, of Lhásá. To Tibetans, however, the former of these is usually known as the ‘great treasure of learning,’ Pan-ch’en Rin-po-che, and the latter as the ‘protector-protector,’ Kyab-gson Rin-po-che, or the ‘victor Jina,’ a title of Buddhist himself.

Latterly, a third and a fourth Grand Lama of the dominant Yellow Hats were instituted for the two kingdoms outside Tibet, to which Tibetan Buddhism extended, namely Mongolia and China. The former of these at Urga is known as Je-bsnun Dam-pa, and possesses temporal sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, like the Dalai Lama in Tibet; but, although posing as the head of the collegiate monkhood, he is not himself celibate. The fourth was appointed by the Emperor Kang-Hsi about 1700, especially for Inner Mongolia, and has his special seat at Pào-su, or Jehol. He is known to Tibetans as Chang-skya-Hu-thuk-thun, and is considered to be an incarnation of Rol-pal Dorje, and his succession, as well as that of the Urga Grand Lama, is arranged by the Dalai Lama.

The jurisdiction of the trans-Paciﬁc Dalai Lama is not acknowledged outside Tibet and Mongolia, including the land of the Buruts (q.v.), bordering Lake Baikal in Siberia, the tracts in Western China which, formerly, belonged to Tibet, the isolated Tibetan monasteries in N. China, and the Himalayan States of Bhután, Sikkim, and Lādākh. Neither the Dalai nor the Tashi Llama exercises any ecclesiastical authority in Tibet over the other and elder sects, the Red Hats, whose relative laxity in Buddhist discipline, especially in the matter of asceticism, they despise.

12. Sectarian distinctions.—The distinctions between the various sects are partly creedal, partly ascetic, and partly ritualistic, and are also usually expressed by some external difference in dress and symbolism. None of them relate to the personality or doctrine of the historical Buddha as expressed in the canon, as this is accepted intact by all. These differences may be classed as: (1) personality and title of the primordial deity or Adi-buddha (cf. Adi-Buddha); (2) special source of divine inspiration, (3) transmitters of this special inspiration; (4) meditative system of mystical insight (darśana, Tib. Ita-po); (5) special tantric revelation; and (6) personal tutelary (gi-dam) or Salve Indian protective demon; and (7) guardian demon (gharmpa, Tib. chos-skyong), sometimes of Tibetan type.

The Ge-lug, or dominant Yellow Hats, have as their primordial deity Vajradhāra (‘holder of the thunderbolt’), and they derive their divine inspiration mainly from the dual Dakinayam and Savitri, howver, as this is accepted intact by all. The Ge-lug mystical insight is in the Lom-rim, or ‘graded path,’ on which a commentary was written by Tsong-Kha-pa, a spiritual successor of Atīśa, or theistic manual, is Bṣa-gnyen-streng. Their tutelary Indian demon (gi-dam) is ‘the fearful thunderbolt’ Vajrabhairava (Tib. Dorje-jig-je), supported by Sansvara (Sambhora, Tib. Dem-chog) and Gūnyā-kā (Tib. Sang-dus); and their ‘guardian demon’ (gharmpa) is the ‘six-armed lord’ (Gon-po) or the ‘horse-necked’ (Hayagṛiva, Tib. Tam-ch’en), both of them Indian, not Tibetan.

In organizing the Ge-lug sect Tsong-Kha-pa collected the scattered members of the Kādam from their ascetic retreated and housed them in monasteries, together with his new followers, under rigid discipline, setting them to keep the 203 Vinaya rules of primitive Buddhism, including strict celibacy, and hence obtaining for them the title of ‘Vinaya-keepers’ (Dulba-Lama). He also made them carry a begging-bowl and wear patched robes of a yellow colour after the fashion of the Indian Buddhist masters’ teaching. This soon dropped out of use, as daily begging was not adapted to the sparse population of Tibet. He attracted followers also by instituting a highly ritualistic service in part borrowed in part borrowed from the Nestorian Christian missionaries who were undoubtedly settled at that time in Tsong-Kha, the locality of his early boyhood in W. China.
gave his monks the yellow hat which distinguished them from all the other sects, who wore red hats, in contradistinction to the black caps of the Bon people.

The Kar-gyud, the next great sect after the Ge-lug, was founded in the latter half of the 11th cent. by the Tibetan monk Mar-pa, who had visited India. The name means ‘follower of the sun’; another name for the sect is the ‘Black hat sect’. The names of the two great sects, as Mar-pa was the most important, is said to be the ruling of the later Buddhist sages, who were inspired by them. Its distinctive features are that its hermit practices—meditation in caves and other retired places—and the following peculiarities: its primordial Buddha is also Vajradhara, and its tutelary Samvara; but its mystical insight is Mahamudra (p-yag-rgya-chen) of the ‘Middle path’, its Tantra Sun-kar-lugs, its guardian ‘the lord of the black cloak’ (Bar-nag); its hat has a frontal badge like a St. Andrew’s cross (X), to symbolize that meditation with crossed knees is its special feature; with these is associated a stricter observance of the Indian monastic rules. One of its most famous monks was the hermit poet Mila-raspa.

The hermit feature of this sect rendered it so unattractive that several sub-sects arose out of it with distinctive characteristics. These were the Karma, Dikung-pa, To-lung-pa, and Dug-pa (the form dominant in Bhutan), which differ from each other in having adopted a different ‘revelation’ (ter-men) to allow of worship of an aboriginal spirit. An important image in their temples is that of the founder of their particular sect or sub-sect. In Ge-lug temples Tsong-Kha-pa’s image is prominent and receives worship as a canonical saint.

The third great reformed sect is the Sas-kya, or Sa-kya, taking its name from the monastery of that place, founded in A.D. 1072. As we have seen, it became under imperial Chinese patronage the first great hierarchy in Tibet, and in 1261 attained for a time the temporal sovereignty, until eclipsed by its later rival, the Ge-lug sect. Its special source of inspiration is the Bodhisattva Mahâkâya, through the Indian saints from Nâgrâjâ, to Vajrapani (Vasubandhu). Its mystic insight is ‘the deep path’ (gambhîra darâka), its tutelary Vajra-phurpa, and its ‘guardians’ are ‘the tent-lord’ and ‘the presence-lord’ (Gon-po-thing). Now, however, except in a few externals, it is practically indistinguishable from the unreformed Nying-ma, and celibacy is exceptional. From the Sas-kya two reforming sub-sects issued, the Ngor-pa and Jonang-pa, which differ merely in the founders. To the latter sect belonged the famous Tibetan hierarch Taranâtha.

The wholly unreformed sects of Tibetan Buddhists are not numerous in Tibet. They are priests rather than monks, and are freely tinged with quasi-Bon cults. They are found chiefly in the remote districts. They too have sub-sects, Urgyen-pa, Karok-pa, and Las-thun-pa. The monasteries of Sikkim chiefly belong to the last sect. The Bhutanese lamaseries are not Nying-ma, as is usually asserted by Dug-pa, a sub-sect of the Kar-gyud above noted.

13. Special features of Tibetan Buddhism.

Contrary to Western belief, there is nothing in the Buddhism professed by the monastic Order in Tibet which differs greatly from the type of the Indian Mahayana. They are of Vajrayâna teaching. The differences in discipline and clothing are mainly those enforced by different climatic conditions. In doctrinal beliefs and practice the Ge-lug monks, who form the great majority of the Order, differ little from the Indian Buddhist monks in the early centuries of our era. The use of sacred sentences as protective charms or spells has been shown by the present writer to have been a feature of Buddhism in India from its commencement, and on the evidence of the Pali canon it has been practiced even by Buddha himself (cf. JEWEL (Buddhist)), and the mechanical repetition of such spells (dharani or paritapt) was extensively practiced about the 5th cent. A.D. by Asanga and his brother VasubANDHA. The following important records quoted by Taranâtha, and supported by an early sâdhanâ bearing Asanga’s name. The greater priestly theistic and demonstrative rites, the practice of which is restricted almost entirely to the unreformed sects which form a minority, are also largely of Indian Saivite origin. Those which are borrowed from the indigenous Bon will be indicated in art. TIBET. The self-immolation by entombment is an extreme and revolting instance of asceticism, having its parallel in the self-torture of Indian yogis, but it is of altogether exceptional occurrence and never practised by orthodox monks.

14. Grades in the Order.—The monks are of two chief grades—the novice and the ordained, as in Indian Buddhism; to these may be added at the lower end the neophyte and at the top the abbot, or head of the monastic hierarchy.

(1) The neophyte, or probationer-pupil, usually a child of about eight years of age, is called nel-mi, i.e. the equivalent of the Indian sannyâsa, or ‘vicious disciple’. He receives instruction as in a school under a tutor, and is called gel-pa (great-pa), ‘pupil.’ (2) The novice, or go-pa, is a formally admitted candidate for the order. He has gone through the ceremony of ‘going forth from home and becoming a monk’ (uparâja-yajñâs), or having his head shaved and vowing to keep thirty-six of the precepts. He is now permitted to join in the religious services in the monastery. The great majority of the monks, even the old and infirm, are only on occasion allowed to attain the grade of full initiation. (3) The fullyordained monk is called gel-sang (dyo-dang), the equivalent of the Indian Mâdhyâ, or ‘vicious mendicant.’ He is usually over twenty-five years of age, and comparatively few ever reach this high stage. He now has to vow to keep the 253 precepts. (4) The abbot is called kash-po (cf. Assemb Tibet).

Names are given corresponding titles. They are not numerous, are very literate, as a rule, and are allotted an interior position, scarcely higher than the ordinary lay devotees.

15. Excessive numbers of the monks.—In Tibet we see Buddhism at the extreme limit of its inevitable development when unfettered. For the monastic state is an essential condition for the attainment of Buddhist salvation; and in Tibet this condition has been realized more fully than in any other Buddhist country. The religiously minded, no one can despair of ever having reached such vast proportions. This has been the result of the exceptionally favourable circumstances for its establishment and development, under the fostering care of a temporal government which for several centuries has been entirely in the hands of the monks themselves.

As a consequence, there have arisen swarming armies of State-supported celibate monks who live parasitically upon the people and decimate them. Since Buddhism was introduced as the State-religion in the 8th cent. A.D., the Tibetan nation, which formerly was one of the most virile in Eastern Asia, and overran and even conquered China more than once, has steadily declined in power and numbers until it has lost about tenth part of its former population. The only general census of the population hitherto taken appears to be one made by the Chinese, so long ago as 1757; but the proportion probably still holds good, though the rapid decline through the population having died off, presumably in the main as a result of the wide-


spread monasticism, for polyandry is far from common.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Lamas</th>
<th>No. of Layi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Province (Dhok)</td>
<td>322,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western (Tsang)</td>
<td>15,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322,900</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This gives one monk for every three of the entire lay community, including the women and children.

The shrinking of the population is evident everywhere in Central and Western Tibet, where once there was a thriving network of monasteries and the ruins of former cultivation and the ruins of former villages and homesteads. The population is, presumably as a consequence of over-monasticism, steadily drifting towards extinction.

15. Excessive monasticism an inevitable result of Buddhism.—Yet this widespread devastation worked by unfettered monasticism must inevitably be the outcome everywhere of Buddhism when that religion is free to develop without restraint. Buddhism, with its inevitable note of pessimism, reproaching the wholesome instinct for living and for the development and enjoyment of nature’s resources, is itself in direct antagonism to all worldly progress, whilst it restricts its goal to Nirvāṇa expressly to those who have entered its celibate monastic Order. This is clearly the teaching everywhere of Buddha himself, and of all orthodox professing Buddhists of all sections of Buddhism, both North and South, poes the modernizing theories of popular Western writers. No prospect whatever of attaining salvation or Nirvāṇa in this life is held out by Buddhism to any one except those who actually enter its celibate Order of monks.

This is manifestly the reason, in the opinion of the present writer, why heaven and not Nirvāṇa is the popular goal of lay Buddhists—India’s heaven in the company of the coming Buddha, Maitreya, according to the ‘Southern’ Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam; or Amitābha’s paradise in the West in the company of Avalokiteśvara, according to the Mahāyānists. It is obvious, therefore, in the first place, these respective heavens are the old traditional paradieses of the layman’s ancestors, and, in the second place, and certainly again, that there is no other goal of his life to open him to his death; for, being a layman and forced to work for his living, or bound by family ties, he cannot afford to enter the monastic Order, which is the sole avenue to Nirvāṇa.

17. Tibetan Buddhist scriptures.—The scriptures of the Tibetan Buddhists are translations from the Sanskrit texts of Indian Buddhism by the most scholarly monks of mediaeval India, assisted by learned Lamas. A few books in the last volume of the sūtras were translated from the Pālī, and a very few from the Chinese. The whole forms a series of over three hundred volumes, each of which with its wooden covers makes a package about 26 ins. long, 8 ins. broad, 8 ins. deep, and weighing about 10 pounds. The volumes generally are in the form of xylographs, or prints from carved wooden blocks, as with the ancient Chinese books, no attempt having been employed; occasionally MS sets of the entire canon are to be found—as, e.g., the set obtained by the present writer and now in the British Museum, MSS no. Oriental 672 ff.

The canon, or Ka-gyur (vulgarly Kanjur), translated word, forms a series of one hundred, or, in some editions, one hundred and eight, volumes and so on, dividing the books. It is divided into seven great sections, as compared with the three divisions of the Pāli canonical scriptures, or Tripitaka. This difference in number is due to the subdivision of the sūtras (narrowly in the subjoined list), and the addition of the mystical Šaivism śūtras or tantra. The divisions are as follows (the constituent volumes being indicated by the letters of the alphabet, in the order of the Sanskrit alphabet):

1. Discipline, Duk-ha (Skr. Vinaya), in 12 volumes (K-P).
2. Metaphysics and transcendental wisdom, Ser-b'yin (Skr. Pratyakśapramanam), corresponding generally to the Abhidharma of the Pālī, in the following recensions: (a) in 100,000 verses, Bassa (Skr. Sattashāstra), 10 volumes (K-30); (b) in 15,000 verses, ‘Kri-sen’ (Skr. Asadāthasastra), 3 volumes (K-4); (c) in 15,000 verses, Kri-sen (Skr. Asadāthasastra), 3 volumes (K-4); (d) in 10,000 verses, Kri-sen (Skr. Asadāthasastra), 1 volume (K); (e) in 8000 verses, or Kri-sen (Skr. Asadāthasastra), 1 volume (K); (f) various alleged abstrations, Na-teng (Skr. Pātisa), 18 tracts in 1 volume.
5. Discourses of Buddha, Bod-e-do (Skr. Sūtras), 30 volumes (G-A).
6. Paramitās, or Deliverance from Misery, Yung-tsha, 8 volumes (K-8).
7. Mystical theosophy, Ngyug (Skr. Tantra), 11 volumes (K-Ch).

To these are added:
8. Prayers, Mon-lam (Skr. Prāṇībodhana), 3 leaves.
9. Index, Kār-thog (Skr. Stūchāgā), 1 leaf.

The commentary Tsin-gyur (vulgarly Tanjur) is a great encyclopedic library of ancient Indian lore on metaphysics, logic, composition, arts, alchemy, etc., including the commentaries of ancient Indian Buddhist writers, Nāgārjuna, among others, also some texts by Tsang-Kü-pa and other Tibetan sages. Its contents have not yet been fully examined.


L. A. WADDELL.

LANDMARKS AND BOUNDARIES.—I. Introduction.—A frequent subject of dispute is the boundary-line—between nations, that of their respective territories, between tribes, that of their hunting or fishing grounds, between individuals, that of their holdings. An excellent example of this is found in Gn 13.10. It is true that in some instances land disputes are rare because there is a large area available for the needs of all, but in general this is not the case; hence the need of the boundaries being carefully defined by landmarks. We must here distinguish between natural and artificial landmarks. The former mainly mark the bounds of public territories; the latter mainly those of private lands. On the other hand, sometimes carved pillars are set up on the boundaries of States, while natural landmarks—table-trees having been employed—occasionally MS sets of the entire canon are to be found—as, e.g., the set obtained by the present writer and now in the British Museum, MSS no. Oriental 672 ff.

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1 Cf. C. A. Soppitt, Short Account of the British Museum (in Tibet, 1912, p. 86.
themselves a kind of landmark. Caesar says of the Tartons:

"If their greatest glory to have around them as extensive deserts as possible, with their confined wai,' 1

Such boundaries or tracts of waste land formed near the sea, to which once removed the fear of a sudden incursion, 2 and often in the same zone where the arrangements—political, commercial, and the like—might be effected.

As an example may be taken that primitive form of commerce called the 'silent trade' (Echange à l'aise), in which members of a distant tribe or foreign merchants lay out their goods at a certain point on the sea-shore or on the coast. The natives then approach and take them, leaving the equivalent value of their own produce. This is frequently done at the boundaries, or on the seashore, itself a frontier-line. Such places being regarded as neutral ground, in course of time regular markets or trade are held there. It was for this reason that Hernes, whose images (tupa) stood on boundaries, became the god of merchants, and as certain markets held on the frontiers of some Greek States were protected by deities 3.

To such waste territory forming a boundary the name 'mark' was given, and an officer was charged with its defence—the lord of the mark, the marquis—which while the dwellers by the frontier were the macaroms. 4

That the boundary was often a forest is shown in the connection between the words for 'boundary' and 'wood.' Cf Old Norse 'bjartra' and Low German 'bahrte,' wood, 'bzw.' Dr. R. Pohl, 'Frere, motion, wood,' O. Ch. Siar.melna, 'boundary.' The words for 'wood' each bear the meaning of 'boundary.' This was also the case with words denoting fish or marine animals. The names of fishes or marine animals at the boundaries of provinces or of private property are given. Thus in the provinces of Oran there are heaps of stones at the frontiers of several tribes, where oaths are taken by parties in cases of litigation. 5

As will be seen later, stones with or without inscriptions were often set up on the frontier-line of States, on mountains, water-sheds, the sea-coast, etc. Private lands were marked by bays or unshaped, stones, posts, or trees, the last sometimes having ownership marks cut upon them.

2. Boundaries and landmarks in the lower cylinder. The Australians have well-defined areas with well-known boundaries, over which the different tribes wander, and from which strangers are expelled. 6 This was also true of the Tasmanians, who seldom moved beyond their boundaries. The tracks through the thickness were marked by small heaped-up bushes, broken and left hanging. 7 Among the Torres Straits people natural objects constituted landmarks, or such objects as a felled tree, a branch thrown down, and the like. 8

In New Britain the territorial divisions were those of the sections, and the boundaries of these were the customary fighting places when any dispute between districts occurred. The boundaries of the lands of which each family was possessed were marked by cues or markers of two kinds. In Banks Island the exact limits of property are not known. Each piece of land is divided by boundaries drawn from tree to tree. 9 In Fiji the boundaries are to contract or expand with the strength of the tribe. Where two tribes were nearly equal, disputes regarding boundaries were submitted to a kind of arbitration. To appropriate a patch of forest was a palty offence, but to claim another man's plantation was legal. Hence, when once a cultivated bound of a tribe wished to claim a boundary enclosed in a piece of debatable land, men were sent to plant it with gardens. Thus it became theirs and their heirs. 10 In Samoa the boundary-marks were pathways, rivers, trees, stones, and stone fences. The mark-line between two villages stood two stones representing two youths who, after a fight, had been changed to stone. Any quarrel had to be settled at these stones. In Tahiti there were well-known landmarks at the boundary-line, taking the form of carved images, or tiia. To remove these landmarks was a grave offence. 11 In New Zealand the kumara and tara contours were continuous and divided into portions, carefully marked by stones over which incantations had been said. This rendered them so sacred that to move one brought death to the remover. Streams, trees, rocks, or posts marked the bounds of the hunting areas, which was of great consequence. In New Zealand and elsewhere in Polynesia fields were protected by hedges, walls of unhewn stones, or fences, the making and repairing of which occupied much time. 12

In Africa generally it is taken to define the boundaries of provinces or of private property. There is a piece of the province of Oran where heaps of stones are set at the frontiers of several tribes, where oaths are taken by parties in cases of litigation. 13

R. H. Nassa, writing of W. Africa, says that, when a family settles on land, the place is marked out by trees and stones as boundary-lines. Among the Washambala, Banana, etc., pathways, trees, rivers, rocks, etc. are the landmarks of parcels of land and plantations; though in some cases the boundary-lines are imaginary, they are usually respected. 14 Among the Waskagga, sacrifices are made at the boundaries when war threatens, and also at other times when a road leaves the territory, to prevent the entrance of an enemy. Among the Yoruba the boundaries of farms are marked by heaps of earth in which certain trees are planted. One of these, the akoko, is a common boundary-mark, and is sacred to the god Ogun. Koia trees growing in the forest often mark the site of old farms and afford proof of ownership. 15 E. E. Denne says that mounds of earth and leaves in the fields are the chief marks of two provinces. Natives add to the heap, so that they may not be accused of bringing anything evil into the next chief's country. 16 The Asiatic Equatorial Africa indicates the boundaries of property by planting trees in line, by hedges, or by stones sunk deep out of sight. The njima, or executive power, decides in disputes as to boundaries. Village boundaries of trees and stones throughout this region are sacred. In S. Africa with the Bantu the bounds of fields were carefully marked, and disputes were settled by the chief. Among the Barongs, rivers, trees, and other natural objects mark the boundaries of different clans. To defile those of gardens, a ditch a foot deep is dug all round the field, and is traced

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1 de Bell. Gall. vi. 35; cf. 25 for the great Hercynian forest as a boundary, and iv. 3: 'They consider it their highest glory as a nation that the lands on their borders lie to the wildest extent.'

2 C. vi. 35.


In Jeypsor the arbitrator had to eat earth. If he died within six days, this proved that his decision was wrong, and that the earth-goddess had punished him. In some parts of India a goat is led along a disputed boundary, and the place where it shivers is the true limit. Among the Abaru, the boundary stones are marked by stones set up in presence of the abbas, or patriarchs. They are sacred to the Nandi Pennu, god of boundaries.

A prayer to him asks that disease be kept from the boundaries, that hostile gods and tigers may not cross them, that waters from the higher lands may be attracted to them, that cattle may not stray beyond them, etc. A fowl or goat is sacrificed by the priest at a point on the boundary fixed by ancient usage. The god is common to two parties whose lands join, and is supposed to help the one whose cause is just when a flight takes place between them.

The flesh of human sacrifices to the boundary-god as well as to the sun and war-gods is strewn along the boundary-line. A boundary-god also exists among the Gonds. The Veddas had well-defined boundaries to the hunting grounds of each group in the forest, and these were seldom trespassed on. Where it was not possible for natural features—stream or hill—to mark the boundary, definite marks were made on the trees along the line.

3. Landmarks in the higher culture.—(a) Among the Semites the landmark was of supreme importance both for the State and for the individual owner. The Babylonians called boundary-stones bugdaru, though the name was also applied to the land within the boundary. They were sacred to certain divinities, but not themselves representatives of divinity like the Greek Hermes, though the divinity exercised power, the power of the curse, through them. Among gods to whom boundaries and landmarks were peculiarly sacred were Nabû (‘Nabû preserves the limits of the fields’), Pāpū (‘lord of the boundary,’ period of Hammurabi), Ninīh and Nusku (‘the name of this stone is Ninīh and Nusku establish the bounds’), and Samaš (‘Samaš liates those who falsify boundaries and weights’). The importance of the just boundary is also seen in the incantation texts used by the exorciser as he tries to discover whether evil has been done by the sufferer. ‘Has he fixed a false boundary, Not fixed a just boundary, Has he removed a boundary, a limit, a territory?’

The kudurrus, which probably had some phallic significance, varies in height from one to several feet. The inscription begins with the name of the stone—e.g., ‘Ninīh and Nusku establish the bounds.’ Then follow the measurements of the field and a description of the occasion of the gift of it by a king to its owner. To this succeeds the appeal to the gods—e.g., ‘Whoever overthrows the grant of this field or causes it to be seized, may Anu overthrow him.’ Other gods—Eššu, Ea, Sin, Samaš, Damu-an—are asked to do him various evils: ‘Ninīh, lord of boundaries and boundary-stones, tear out his boundary-stone. Whoever removes this stone, in the dust hides it, bums it with fire, casts it into water, shuts it up in an enclosure, causes a fool, a deaf man, an idiot, to take it, places it in an invisible place; may the great gods who upon this stone are mentioned by their names curse him with an evil curse, tear out his foundation, and let him be torn apart,’ p. 167; H. A. Jarabak, The History of the Witnessers at the Seal of the Tablet. 6. On the kudurrus are usually representations of serpents, scorpions, and lions and griffons. These vary in size and are drawn in the solid.

6. H. T. Reew, p. 44; 1 Reew, pl. 1, 1880, 1, 128.
10. H. M. Crichton, Men and Manners on the Rink, of the Races of N.W. Provinces of India, 1869, p. 229, 327.

6. H. T. Reew, p. 44; 1 Reew, pl. 1, 1880, 1, 128.
10. H. M. Crichton, Men and Manners on the Rink, of the Races of N.W. Provinces of India, 1869, p. 229, 327.
LANDMARKS AND BOUNDARIES

belong, and who would presumably resent trespass or removal of the landmark after the owner had duly propitiated them. Clearly these are in them representations of the signs of the zodiac—a theory which receives some support in the idea of representation of heavenly bodies and shrines (7 houses of the heavens) on the horizon. They were then to have reference to the time at which the grant was made.

Stones were also set up at the frontiers by kings who had acquired territories or restored the boundaries of earlier times. Such landmarks are still found in situ. The well-known 'stelae of the vultures' delimited the respective territories of two city-states.

Among the Hebrews, as among other Semitic peoples, stones, whether monoliths, circles, or cairns, were sacred, and were used to mark places where certain events had taken place, burial-sites, and sacred places. Whatever the origin of the *mazagādha*, or upright stone, may have been, boundary-stones were included under this title, though a heap of stones might also form a boundary-mark. In Gn 21:32 E's narrative shows that a *mazagādha* was erected as a witness to the covenant between Jacob and Laban on the Aramean frontier, but J speaks of a heap of stones. Both had the same purpose (v.32), as a reminder that there was to be no transgression beyond the limit thus marked out (v.33).

Boundary-stones were also used to mark private property in land, and were not to be removed (Dt 19:14, Pr 22:29). The sacredness of landmarks was enforced by a curse on the removal of them (Dt 27:17), and such removal was regarded as a particularly wicked action (He 5:3, Job 24).

Such landmarks are still common in the East to-day, and are regarded as sacred.

(b) In India, besides the instances from present-day tribes already cited, the evidence from the older law-books is suggestive. The sections regarding landmarks and boundary disputes are full of detail. Such disputes were to be settled by neighbours, by people from neighbouring villages, by the elders, by men of a variety of occupations, or by the king. Witnesses were called and duly sworn. They were to have earth on their head and to wear chaplets. False witnesses were punished by a fine.

The boundary-line was to be marked by stones of specified shape, ant-hills, artificial mounds, hills, thickets, gardens, roads, dikes, tanks, wells, cisterns, temples, etc. In the ground were buried objects which would not decay—human bones, stones, bricks, enclosed in vessels. These were pointed out to youths and children, who were to show them to their children in after years. The destroyer of a boundary-mark was to be punished by mutilation.

(c) In Egypt, where the encroachments of the Nile caused the effacing of boundaries, there were continual governmental surveys of territories, and careful records were kept in each district. Herodotus, Plato, Strabo, and others ascribe the origin of geometry to this need of adjusting the measurements of the land after inundation. Boundary-stones were set up along the limits of estates, and were inscribed with the name of the tenant at the date of their erection, and other notices—a.g., the nature of the soil, the situation, etc., or the name of the reigning Pharaoh. Such stones also received a name, which, once given, never altered for all time. Boundary-stones with inscriptions also marked the frontiers of the land, and were set up by the kings after each new conquest. One of these says that all who maintain the boundaries will be called 'my son.' Temples occasionally stood on the frontier line. The Negative Confession in the Book of the Dead makes nothing of removing landmarks, but the equivalent, 'I have not falsified the cubit of land,' occurs.

(d) In early Greece heaps of stones (εραυνα λάφυα, εραυνά) or cairns (phallices, phalakes) represented Hermes, god of commerce, of merchants, of travellers, etc., and were placed to mark paths, as well as frontier-limits and bounds of private lands. These gave place in many cases to quadrangular stones, surmounted by the head of Hermes and with an erect φαλέα, which were set up at street-corners, houses, etc. Pausanias describes the territorial boundary-stones, or ραγού, marking the frontiers on Mt. Parnon. Pintarch records how Theseus set up a pillar between Pelo-

poines and Attica, on one side of which were the words: 'This is not Peloponnesos but Ionia,' on the other: 'This is Peloponnesos, not Ionia.'

Boundary-markers may still be seen on the protection of Laconia. Altars or grave-mounds occasionally marked boundary-lines. Boundary-stones also separated public from private lands, marked off roads, temple-precincts, burial-places, as well as private lands. They were under the protection not only of Hermes (Εράυνα Ερέση γραμματίαν), but also of Zeus 'Opaš, or, as among the Derians, Αρώμεν Αυγείρα, protector of streets and roads,' and in Greece, as elsewhere, it was dangerous to remove a landmark. Plato says that 'one should be more willing to move the largest rock which is not a landmark than the least stone which is the sworn mark of friendship and hatred between neighbours.' The consequences will be doubly fatal—a penalty coming from the gods and one coming from the law.

(e) Among the Romans the poets looked back to a golden age when there was no private property in land and hence no boundary-stones. To Numà was ascribed the first law regarding landmarks (cippî termini). Stones sacred to Jupiter Ter-

minalis or Terminus were to mark the limits of property, and any sacrilege would be to be offered to them at the Terminali. Any one removing such stones might be slain without any guilt being incurred by the slayer. He, as well as his cattle, was declared to be the god who gave the orcurrant boundary. The earliest form of the boundary-mark was a post or stone; later the Greek form of the Hermes was adopted. This landmark represented Terminus, god of boundaries, and as Ovid says, possessed divinity. Where it was set up, a trench was dug and the blood of a sacrificial victim poured into it. Then the body of the victim, along with incense, honey, wine, corn, etc., was consumed by


3 H. p. xxvii. 7; for other instances see iv. xxviii. 3, viii. xxiv. 6, xxv. 2.

4 *Thesp. 25.*


6 Pauv. vi. xi. 1, xxvi 2.

7 See inscription on the *Oktavius*, H. v. *Oktavius, der starke altertumswissenschaftler*, i. 4 (Munich, 1892) 321 f.


9 s. v. *εραυνα λάφυα*; also see K. F. Hermann, *Diagnost ein terminale Verwandschaften eines späten Griechenlandes*, Berlin, 1894.


12 *Plut.* Paus. vii. 600.
Landmarks and Boundaries

The Irish Celts are said in the Leabhar na hUidhre to have had no distinct boundaries for land, and therefore no land marks, except the stones at which sacrifices were made. The Brehon Laws define a large variety of boundary marks—e.g., stones of worship, memorial stones, trees, stakes, wounds, ditches, rivers, lakes, wells, and roads—and give details of the fines for unlawful possession of land.

In Wales the laws speak of the three 'stays of boundaries'—privilege, proprietary title, and prior occupancy—but elsewhere there are, in the chief towns, a lawful road, and a dwelling. Three things preserve a memorial of lands and stand as witness—a fire-back stone, stones of a kiln, and a mounting stone, because the mark of the kindred remains on them. An action for theft arises against the man who removes these, a forfeit of life attaching to all who destroy a strong testimony.

Trees, stones, ditches, and rivers are also mentioned as marks. A fine is levied against any one who ploughs up a ditch or removes a stone cross, or timber, or anything else preserving a boundary, and he must restore it to its former estate. In disputes the churchwarden summoned to the court, the court to the country, and, in cases of lands belonging to those co-equal in privilege, the oldest men are to assign the boundary after inquiry of witnesses. The judge and the king in such cases receive fees.

In ancient Mexico each domain was carefully measured out, marked, and its limits shown on a register kept by an officer in each district. Separate fields were enclosed with hedges or walls. Those who changed the limits of private lands or removed landmarks were put to death. Similarly in Peru the lands were carefully divided and marked out, and the removal of a landmark was punished severely.

4. Landmarks and the curse. As many examples cited above have shown, a curse is invoked on the remover of the landmark, and, as in the Babylonian instances, the gods are said to bring it about. The gods are, in fact, frequently associated with boundary marks, and protect the owners of land against those who would take some of it.

In the Finish Kalela, Väinämöinen himself divides the land into arable patches. The boundary-stones between Sweden and Russia were believed to have been heaved by a wood-spirit.

It is probable, however, that in earlier times the curse was not brought about by a god, but was inherent in the landmark itself and transferred to a trespasser upon it.

Thus among many savage tribes not only articles of property, but fruit-trees, growing crops, etc., are protected by charms, fetishes, and the like, placed on or about them. These are recognized as tabu signs; but, if any one disregarded them, some terrible result would follow. In effect, a curse is inherent in them and works automatically. In many instances the charm is hung from a pole, post, or fence, or the fence itself is tabu. These are then a species of primitive landmarks, to disregard which produces an automatic curse, as in New Britain, where a spell said over a fence produces serious trouble to the tiller of the ground.

Among the natives of the Congo, rows of stakes are set round fields, and on them the medicine-man ties bundles of herbs, which cause death to the trespasser or any one who cuts them. The Euromantamela to long sticks, placed in a conspicuous position among

1 Ancient Laws of Ireland, Dublin, 1865-1903, IV. 143 ff. ; cf. iii. 149, iv. 102.
2 Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales, ed. A. Owen, London, 1854, ii. 41, 403, 143 ff.
3 1, 455, 6, 229.
4 1, 554, 6, 922. 4, 229.
5 L. 765.
6 J. Grinn, Kleine Schriften, ii. 54.
the crops. Among the Bagel people sticks with charms attached mark the boundary between separate owners' fields, and the charms are protective. Among the Kotta of British Nigeria, the boundary between fields is marked by a fence. In a garden with the consent of the older men has no magical power, but especially if, and if violated, would bring the full force of public opinion against the offender.

In India, fences are marked by posts, and the posts are usually round, made of stone, and have a top in the shape of a human head or a bull's head. These posts are often covered with ivy or other climbing plants.

10. Trees are used as markers in many parts of the world. In Japan, for instance, groves of bamboo are used to mark boundaries.

11. The custom of using trees as markers is found in many cultures. In the United States, cairns of stones are used to mark trails, while in Europe, ancient stones are used to mark boundaries.

6. Superstitions regarding landmarks. Besides the general belief that to remove a landmark is dangerous, other superstitions are sporadically connected with them. In the Tartar steppes, for instance, it is said that removing a landmark will cause a drought.

7. Landmarks other than boundary markers. In different parts of the world, landmarks are used to mark significant events. In Italy, for instance, the site of the Battle of Tours is marked by a large rock.

8. The use of landmarks in European history. The Battle of Trafalgar, for instance, is marked by a lighthouse.

9. The use of landmarks in modern times. The site of the Battle of Gettysburg, for instance, is marked by a monument.

10. The use of landmarks in Native American culture. The site of the Battle of Little Bighorn, for instance, is marked by a monument.

11. The use of landmarks in African history. The site of the Battle of Isandlwana, for instance, is marked by a monument.

12. The use of landmarks in Asian history. The site of the Battle of Kosovo, for instance, is marked by a monument.

13. The use of landmarks in Middle Eastern history. The site of the Battle of Hastings, for instance, is marked by a monument.

14. The use of landmarks in South American history. The site of the Battle of Puebla, for instance, is marked by a monument.

15. The use of landmarks in Oceania history. The site of the Battle of Midway, for instance, is marked by a monument.

16. The use of landmarks in Australian history. The site of the Battle of Gallipoli, for instance, is marked by a monument.

17. The use of landmarks in New Zealand history. The site of the Battle of Parihaka, for instance, is marked by a monument.

18. The use of landmarks in African American history. The site of the Battle of Shiloh, for instance, is marked by a monument.

19. The use of landmarks in European American history. The site of the Battle of Bunker Hill, for instance, is marked by a monument.

20. The use of landmarks in Asian American history. The site of the Battle of Fushan, for instance, is marked by a monument.

21. The use of landmarks in Middle Eastern American history. The site of the Battle of Poipet, for instance, is marked by a monument.

22. The use of landmarks in South American American history. The site of the Battle of Agua Caliente, for instance, is marked by a monument.

23. The use of landmarks in African American American history. The site of the Battle of Chickamauga, for instance, is marked by a monument.

24. The use of landmarks in Asian American American history. The site of the Battle of Lai Khe, for instance, is marked by a monument.

25. The use of landmarks in Middle Eastern American American history. The site of the Battle of El Alamein, for instance, is marked by a monument.

26. The use of landmarks in South American American American history. The site of the Battle of Guadalcanal, for instance, is marked by a monument.

27. The use of landmarks in African American American American history. The site of the Battle of Iwo Jima, for instance, is marked by a monument.

28. The use of landmarks in Asian American American American history. The site of the Battle of Okinawa, for instance, is marked by a monument.

29. The use of landmarks in Middle Eastern American American American history. The site of the Battle of Normandy, for instance, is marked by a monument.

30. The use of landmarks in South American American American American history. The site of the Battle of the Bulge, for instance, is marked by a monument.

31. The use of landmarks in African American American American American history. The site of the Battle of Stalingrad, for instance, is marked by a monument.
of all kinds are made at them. In the Hindukush region they are carved in wood, in Asia they are in wood, Buddhaists, and Mohammedans, and offerings are made at them. Heaps of stones were known among the Hebrews (Ps. 39:11), and were also used to mark burial places, and there is a common custom in many places where they are well known all over the world. In N. Asia they are found on pass places, often where the tomb of a saint is first seen, or they are regarded as the tomb of a saint. Other are commemorative, or mark routes. To the former, and to those latter are found where a man has been killed, the passer-by adds a stone. In the W. Highlands a cairn is erected where a saint has been killed, or where the body of a saint has taken place out-of-doors, but in earlier times the cairn was erected as a burial mound, and each passer-by added a stone. Hence the saying: I will add a stone to your cairn.

Although the added stone is an offering for good luck and the like, it is not improbable that its primary intention, whatever the origin of the cairn may have been, was that of a rite of exorcism of danger or the contagion of evil.

(b) In many parts of the world stone circles serve a variety of purposes, and must form conspicuous landmarks. The circles dating from prehistoric times and found in large numbers in Great Britain and elsewhere—e.g., N. Africa, Syria, India, etc.—are generally burial-sites. In the Cross River district circles of stones carved in human form occur, and are said to be deities. Among the Massim stone circles mark the places where the men of the village meet for talk, and circles called galana were used for cannibal feasts. Circles also occur in India and in Melanesia.

(c) In many cases stones represent divinities, or a regular cult is paid to sacred stones. These stones are landmarks in the sense of being rallying-places for worship.

(d) The great megalithic monuments (apart from circles) which are found in Europe, Asia, and Africa—menhirs, alignments, dolmens, etc., set up as memorials of events, as marking burial-places, or for rallying (e.g., among the Gaores and the Todas)—whether the work of one or of many races, must have been noticeable landmarks through the ages, and many curious superstitions show the reverence in which they were held.

(e) Burial mounds (e.g., the tumuli of prehistoric times, Babylonian burial-mounds, the Hilda dolopes or stelae), tombs (e.g., the pyramids, or seracs, chumbors, churches, and the like, standing out conspicuously from the surrounding landscape, often form landmarks or guides to travellers.

(f) In many cases races rocks, trees, and the like, often mark the scene of traditional or mythical events—e.g., among the Arunta, where they mark events of the Alchemigers (e.g., period, or in Guiana, where engravings on conspicuous rock faces may commemorate striking events. Such engraved rocks are also common over the Semitic areas, and as landmarks.

LAOS.

LAOS.—I. Introductory.—French Laos, which embraces only about a third of Laos proper (Muang Lao), was constituted by the treaty concluded between France and Siam in 1893. It is bounded on the N. by China, on the E. by Tongking, on the S. by Cambodia, and on the W. by the Mekong, which separates it from the Shan and Burman States. This is the true Laos, the Siamese Laos. French Laos is inhabited by the Thai race, the most important group of whom are called Laotians; and by the half-civilized tribes called Mois by the Annamites, Khams by the Laotians (for these tribes see art. Indo-China).

The Laotians are akin to the Thais of S. Tongking and the Siamese. Their origin and history are very obscure; they are of a race of which are often not above suspicion, mention a first king of Laos who came from India, another who came from Cambodia, then four Khâ kings, and, finally, the intrusion and decisive seizure by the Laotians, who claimed to have come from the valley of Nam-bou. These immigrants, or conquerors, acquired several independent principalities, the two greatest of which seem to have been the kingdoms of Vien-chang and Luang-prabang.

Constantly at war, and attacked at the same time by Siam and Cambodia, they lived a tribulated and precarious life. In the 19th century the Laotian kings destroyed the kingdom of Vien-chang, in order to annex it, and left only a nominal independence to the kingdom of Luang-prabang, which, continuing in the same status under the French, is to-day the centre of the Laotian race.

II. Habitat.—The Laotians settled by preference along the river-banks and in the neighbourhood of rice-plains. They built huts on piles 3 to 6 ft. high, the huts measuring 20 to 40 ft. by 12 to 20 ft. The door, which nearly always faces the east, and to which they mount a ladder, has a sort of balcony-verandah in front of it. The roof is made of palm leaves, straw, or bamboo tiles. The furniture consists of kitchen utensils, tables, mattresses, mats, and chests for keeping clothes. Under the house are the weaving-loom, the domestic animals, and the pottery yard; a little shelter at the side serves as a kitchen; the rice-granary is quite close, and always built on piles for fear of rodents.

3. Appearance and character.—The Laotians are well esteemed as regards physical type; they have well-proportioned figures, and frank, open faces; and the young women especially have a graceful, supple carriage. They are of a lively and often refined intellect, with a certain aptitude for poetry. They are extremely pleasant and sociable, gay and happy-go-lucky, but extraordinarily indolent and sensual. To the Laotian a man is a matter both of principle and of temperament; once he has got the means of living and assures himself, he considers every kind of exertion not only useless but blameworthy. It is useless to look to him for the economic or intellectual transformation of Indo-China.

Religious beliefs.—The Laotians, like the Cambodians, profess Sinhalese Buddhism. Although their pagodas are well supported and their bonzes well paid, their worship seems less fervent, and the morals of their clergy much less pure, than is the case in Cambodia. The boxes mix freely with the laity in the festivities, eat and joke with them, smoke in public, breathe with impunity the flowers that abound in all Laotian solemnities, sometimes drink fermented liquids, accept objects directly from the hands of women, and even go to cut wood with them. They are polygamists, and are also granted more indulgence in their failings: for fornication, they are expelled from the pagoda, sentenced to pay a fine, and can then marry their accusers. In Cambodia, such an offence would entail death or penal servitude for life.
The Laotians are Buddhists by tradition; but their most devoted worship is given to the good or bad spirits (phi, phai), who animate all objects and beings and decide all the vicissitudes of human life. Hence spring innumerable beliefs and rites which have nothing in common with Buddhism.

When a man is building a house in Laos, he must fasten strings from the pillars before the gable to the pillars behind the foot of the bed, and a red and some silk of white to the head of the bed. Before setting down in his house the proprietor lays the gable-end and also erects a small altar with a written appeal and some sticks. When Laos is to go to work a rice-plantation, he before the traces are made, and after he has his bundles packed, he makes libations of limular water, and offers a hen’s egg, a tray of sweetmeats, and two betel-pellets to the spirits protecting the soil.

At the transplanting of the rice, he selects a little trestle in the middle of his field to serve as an altar; this remains until the close of the harvest—hence in any dangerous voyage, the canoe, cakes, and four betel-pellets, and plants seven stems in front of it; then, after a libation of alcohol, he invokes the deities as follows: 'This propitious day I transplant my rice. Make it grow in abundance and full of grain, let it not be devoured or broken.' When the rice is matured, he dejects a little of it to offer to the deities in order that they may protect the harvest from robbers. When the harvest is gathered and the rice put in stacks, the Laoan sets up a pole at the top of the stacks, fastening on the end of it a seven-stemmed plant that has been planted in front of the trestle. A sacrifice is also made to the threshold-god, and in like manner for other more solemn sacrifices is made before storing the rice in the granary: the phi receive an offering of alcohol, rice, various dishes, and cakes. The offerings to the religious and the consuming afterwards, tying their wrists together with cotton threads.

Like the Cambodians, the Laotians believe in the existence of a water-spirit Nok (cf. Annamese, Nong), a huge water-dragon, with a human head according to some, a cock’s or ox’s head according to others, which watches for all who cross the water, makes them fall, paralyzes them, and, after sucking their blood through them on the shore some days after, bloodless and lifeless. Even elephants cannot resist it unless the elephant-driver himself gives them a wound, the blood of which appeases the dragon. At the end of any dangerous voyage, the Laotians sacrifice a live hen or goat to Nok. They also sacrifice ‘to the boat-heads,’ or spirits of the jungles (yo nang). Laotian sailors preserve a presence of a cock or cat or water-fall; any cry, crack, gunshot, or sound of an instrument would offend the spirit by appearing to rile its voice.

For festivals, for sacrifices, or for water-fall; any cry, crack, gunshot, or sound of an instrument would offend the spirit by appearing to rile its voice.

As a rule, if they want to be successful they must fight with each other in the presence of the spirits, and reconcile each among the worst of evil spirits. Women who have died a violent death—who have been drowned, burned, assassinated, have committed suicide, or have been accidentally killed or devoured by wild animals—consider themselves as descendants of the spirits. Hence spring innumerable beliefs and rites which have nothing in common with Buddhism.

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and ages of the couple, those of their parents, and the money and presents given on the occasion of the wedding are put in writing, and this constitutes a sort of marriage contract. The marriage ceremony includes a rich banquet, with obligations to ancestors, the tying of the bride's head-threads over the left wrist of the bridegroom and the right wrist of the bride, and the drinking of a mouthful of alcohol by both of them from the same cup. Next day it is repeated identically at the parents' house. At Luang-Prabang the question of dowry and presents is discussed directly by the girl and the young man. The new couple usually live near the girl's parents, sometimes with them; in the latter case, the dowry to be given by the youth is reduced because of the work that the young couple will do.

Polygamy exists in Laos, but is practised only by the wealthy. Divorce is common and easy; it takes place almost always by mutual consent, the wife claiming her own personal belongings and the share of the acquisitions after marriage which comes to her by right, and the husband not interfering unless unlawfully carrying off anything. The woman has full right to divorce if her husband leaves her for three years without news of him.

Adultery, which is rare, is punished by death in the case of a woman, by a fine paid by the wife and her lover to the husband.

8. Disposal of the dead.—The Lao are generally burn their dead; only the poor bury them. Before the French occupation women dying in childbirth and persons dying a violent death or from an internal complaint used to be abandoned on a current of water; but to-day only a pretense of this practice is still observed, and they are buried. Cremation takes place some days, or some months, or even a whole year after the death, according to the means of the heirs. In cases of a long interval, the corpse is often buried until the appointed ceremony; among the rich, it is put in a coffin hermetically sealed except for a small opening through which a long bamboo tube carries the putrid vapors beyond the roof; the coffin is placed under a special canopy on a rich catafalque, and the bones stand round it to pray in turn. During the whole time that the coffin is exposed there are friends and relatives in attendance at the house of the deceased, in holiday garb and provided with musical instruments. Large banquets take place, with dances, songs, games, dramatic performances, etc. The guests must, in fact, cheer the spirit of the dead man as much as possible and prevent his heirs from abandoning themselves to grief both useless and dangerous. This accounts for the very joyous character of Lao funerals. The placing on the pyre and the cremation are performed as in Cambodia (see CAMBODIA, 9 (5)). When it is the custom of an important personage, the fire for lighting the pile, which used to be provided by the court of Bangkok in the form of a tinder-box, comes to-day from Hanoi from the French Governor-General of Indo-China, under the form of an electric spark.

9. Political and administrative organisation.—Laos was once divided into independent principalities, the most important of which were the kingdom of Luang-Prabang (now demolished) and the kingdom of Luang-Prabang. France has preserved these divisions as provinces, each under the control of one of her envoys. Each principality, or muong, was administered by a muong, whom the Lao call a muang, a latsabong, or a latsabut. The title of king has been preserved by the French Government only in the single case of the king of Luang-Prabang, but the uphibit, Iatsabong, and Iatsabuts have been retained. These dignified offices are the privilege of a hereditary nobility, who make recruits by election under the control of the protecting Power. These functions generally pass from father to son. All the other offices may be filled by the common people. As in Cambodian, the Lao functionaries 'drink the oat water' before entering on the exercise of their duties. When a mandarin sends a delegate to another province, he generally gives him a case of ivory or copper handle, which serves him as a passport. Judgment in serious affairs is administered in the capital of the muong, or provinces; the decisions may be revised by the chao. Laos is regulated by the codes and customs of Vien-chang as much as by those of Luang-Prabang. This code of laws is clear and well-arranged, and evidently related to the laws of Cambodia. It is among the most lenient of Asiatic codes. The death penalty is rare, extenuating circumstances being admitted: e.g., theft of food or fruit in case of dire necessity is sometimes, according to the necessity, even pardoned. The French Power has made only slight modifications in the code in order to further the progress of Laos and foster peace in its borders.


ANTONIE CARATON.

LAPPS.—The religious conceptions of the Lapps come down to us from various periods. As in the religions of other Arctic hunting peoples, the primitive belief was a worship of the dead and the allied bear-worship.

1. Worship of the dead.—The Lapps worshipped their deceased relatives as guardian spirits. They believed that those spirits stood in the closest relation to their surviving kindred and protected them and their children from calamities, assisted them on their hunting and fishing expeditions, and watched over their reindeer in the forests. Moreover, if for any reason the dead were dissatisfied, they could injure their kinsmen—e.g., by affecting them with sickness. Alongside of the primitive worship of the dead there might also be found a more developed ancestor-worship, evident traces of which appear in sacrifices made by a certain family or clan in their special holy place. As a result of the different conditions under which the Lapps lived, the sacrificial places of the family or clan were situated on high mountains or on the shores or islands of lakes rich in fish. Such holy places (passo) were recognized by figures in stone or wood (seiide). We know little about the shape of the wooden figures; but the stone figures, many examples of which have been preserved until the present day, are either natural rocks or strangely shaped blocks, often in the form of a bird. The saga tell us that the figures had life, and originally were men turned into stone. In the Lapp districts of Pite and Lule, the figures were set up by a special Swedish name, storjunkare ('grand youngers').

In the religion of the Lapps, even in its most primitive forms, an element of foreign influence can be traced. The belief of the Scandinavian Lapps, that the dead took up their quarters in the mountains, where they had the same occupations and lived under the same kind of conditions as in their previous life, recalls the conception of the Norsemen, that the dead continued their post-mortem life within the mountains; and the belief that the dead roamed about at Yule (jouo-gudar = 'Yule train') under the name of monster-galles ('the man of Yule') or Joule-herra ('the
LAPPS

Lord of Yule') is Scandinavian. To the spirits roaming about at Yule the Lapps offered food in a boat-shaped birch-bark basket which was placed on a tree. The word *svae* may also be foreign. In the more southern Lapps it means both a sacred mountain and a subterranean spirit living in it. In the latter sense they spoke also of *Savo-olmai* ('the snow man') and of *Savo-nejda* (*the snow maid*). The later conception, that the dead dwell in one subterranean abode, *jäbne-aihno* ('the world of the dead') or *muku-aihno* ('the other world'), under the authority of *Jabn-taik* ('the old woman of the dead'), corresponds to the Scandinavian conception of Hel, in the sense both of the kingdom of the dead end of a being ruling there. During the Roman Catholic period *jäbne-aihno* was transformed into an intermediate state, from which the dead, according to their deeds, proceeded either to *rúmtáhno* ('the ruler's world'), which corresponded to heaven in the Christian sense, or to *Ruto-aihno* ('the world of Ruto'), where the dreaded blue-robed Ruto reigned and plagued men and beasts with sickness. He was considered to be the *vahva* ('the one who is strong') of the Finns. As an offering to him it was usual to bury a horse, on which he could ride away, and by the side of the horse the wooden image of a man. Some scholars believe that in Ruto they can recognize Odin, the Scandinavian god of death, who was likewise clad in blue and mounted on a horse. In any case, the horse, as a victim of sacrifice, proves that such an offering cannot be of Lappon origin. The *kalri* or *kari* ('spectre', 'ghost') of the Finns has passed over to the *kwevri* or *kwevu* of the Russian Lapps.

2. Bear-worship.—Of all the ceremonies of the Lapps perhaps the most interesting is bear-worship, which is known from all parts of the North. To the Lapps, as to many other nature-folk, the object of their hunting was in a certain degree sacred. Both in hunting and in fishing the men alone took part, and the booty had to be carried into the kota (the everyday tent) by a private door (posejo) at the back of the tent. In general they had to see that the bones were kept and buried, in order that the slain animal might come to life again. Nothing was of more importance than to be careful of this rule in the case of the largest of the forest animals, the bear. Women might not be present at the bear-feast; but they were permitted to eat bear flesh in the kota only when the bear was killed in such a manner that the head and the neck was not in front of the mouth. The men alone might consume the heart of the animal (*biss bierga*, 'the sacred flesh'). There were all kinds of magical hunting usages associated with the bear ceremonies. It was the custom, e.g., when the hunters came back from the forest, for the wives to paint their husbands by spitting the juice of chewed alder-bark in their faces, and for a certain period after a successful hunt a man was not permitted to have intercourse with his wife. It is worth mention that a woman might not drive a reindeer that had drawn a bear home from the forest, but the bear had to be taken home on a path which any woman had trodden. Of the utmost importance, too, was the burial of the bear; all its bones were carefully collected and arranged in their natural position in the grave.

2. Tota-l spirits.—I have some doubt as to whether the tutelary spirits of the Lapps were originally Lapish. The forest-spirit among the Norse Lapps, to whom attention should first be directed (*the alder-man*), who ruled over all wild animals; but he was especially the tutelary spirit of the bear. To him, among other things, offerings of bows and arrows were made. This being was known only in a very restricted region, and he appears occasionally depicted on the Lapp drum in the shape of a bear, which one may conclude that his origin may be assigned to the bear-worship itself. The name also points to this conclusion; for the juice of the alder-bark played a large part in the bear-worship ceremonies. *Jidne* reminds us of the Scandinavian forest-maiden, a charmingly beautiful creature, who could be recognized by her long tail. From the neighbouring lands spring also *virkwa* (*Virkwa* or *Virkwa* in *Gudbrandsdalen* and *Ulda* (*Ulda*) of the western Lapps. We can compare *Virkwa* (*virkva* = 'trap') of the Finnish Lapps with *Vyrakommuo* of the Finns, and the Russian Lapps' *Tevajj* with *Teynju* of the Finns. There is also mention of a female, *Tuva-ajik* (*tava* = 'mother'). The Russian Lapps had a spirit, *Mehets-Chozjijn* ('the master of the wood'), who shirked and misled people in the forest; he seems to have come over from the Russians. A similar woodland spirit was *Vare-Jiel* ('the one who lives in the woods'). A female divinity among the eastern Lapps was *Lootj-Chozjijn* ('the reindeer guardian'), who protected the reindeer when the snow covered the forests. She did not, however, protect them from men. *Pots-Chozjijn* ('the reindeer master') had the same task of caring for the reindeer.

The water-spirit of the Russian Lapps was *Tahadzo-ollma* ('the water man'), to whom offerings were made in order that he might not cause any damage when men were journeying by water, or that he might drive fish into the nets of the fisherman. A corresponding spirit among the Russian Lapps was *Tahadzo-jiel* ('the one who lives in the water'), the sight of whom predicted disaster. A female deity in the western Lapp district was *Tahadzo-nejda* (tutelary spirits of the water), who corresponded to the Scandinavian *Sjofangur* (Lady of the Sea) and *Tahadzo-ennone* (the water mother) of the eastern district, who was usually seen sitting on a rock, combing her hair, and who enticed people to come to her, seems to be identical with the Russian *rozwalka*. In the sea lived *Akkruva* or *Avrugruva* (Scandinavian *Akravru* or *Norravru*, 'mermaid'), who up to the hips had the body of a fish and above that the body of a girl, and there were water-spirits who predicted misfortune, such as *Nekka* ('nixie') and *Braega* (Norwegian *dragon*) or *Tahadzo-rennoga* (waterspirit), the spirit of a drowned person. The water giant *Vassavurserss* was borrowed from the Finns. The tutelary spirits connected with certain districts by a common designation, *hales*, borrowed from the Finnish *hallet* ('ruling').

The bear also had a home. The Russian Lapps gave this spirit the names *Kyiddle-jiel* ('the one who lives in the kota') and *Pivl-chozjijn* ('the master of the kiln'); the latter, who corresponded to the Russian *duminogov*, lived in the house by the hearth, and not, like the original Finno-Ugric domestic deities, in the back part of the kota; this part was also deemed sacred by the Lapps, and no woman set foot on it. They spoke of a deity living there, *Posejo-akk* ('the old woman of Posejo'). The Scandinavian Lapps had, in addition, some borrowed domestic deities, such as *Tonti* ('the site') and *Svinjar-gatto* ('the better cat') corresponding to the Scandinavian *Bira*, which stole better for its master.

Nature-gods.—In addition to the dead and the spirits derived from the deceased, the Lapps had powerful nature-gods whom they worshipped. On the drums of the southern type the sun (*sviin*) occupies a very prominent place. Its home was apparently not originally Lapish, as is very evident from the oblations made by the Lapps. Like the Scandinavians, they offered white animals to the sun.
The symbol of the sun for sacrificial purposes was a ring. Scandinavian influence can also be traced in the summer offering of the Lapps, viz. a porrige set out in honour of the sun. A personification of the sun was Beice-neida ('the sun maiden'), and the moon (Manno), which in winter is an important light-giver in Lapland, seems also to have been worshipped. The Yule moon, bissnanno ('the holy moon'), was specially dangerous, possibly because the dead were then free to roam.

When the new moon appeared, all girls had to avoid all women were not even allowed to spin in the kota. A brass ring was placed in the chimney for the moon. Attention was also paid to kwoona-manno (the joy month, February), a borrowing from a Scandinavian source. The Northern lights—aurora borealis—were regarded as living beings; and these lights were not to be irritated by noises. Among the Russian Lapps there is a tradition that the Northern lights are the evil spirits of dead men. The thunder was thought to be a living being, Diernes or Tiernes; but it is uncertain whether the Lapps made offerings to him before they came in contact with tilling of the soil.

A Lapp revered the thunder-god was represented exactly like Thor and was called by his name, Toragelles ('old man Thor') or Torat-uros ('champion Thor'). He was supposed to be an old man (Ajja) who killed goblins with a hammer; and the special symbol was a hammer held in his hand. From foreign sources also was derived the thunder-god's wife, Akko ('the old woman'), or, as she is sometimes called, Bovéina (Bovina of the Finns), to whom the rowan-tree was sacred; indeed, in her name may be recognized the Icelandic regnir, 'rowan.'

By the side of the thunder-god on the Lapp drum may also be seen depicted another Scandinavian deity, viz. the god of fertility, whom the Lapps called Váralden-olmai ('the world man'). He is pictured with a mattock in his hand, which proves, better than anything else, his southern origin. When the Lapps made offerings to him, they fastened to his sacrificial symbol a reindeer stag's genitals, to induce him to increase the reindeer herd. In addition to animal sacrifices, they offered in his honour agricultural implements, mattock, and spades. All these features of the cult point to the Scandinavian Freyr, who was also called Véraldagaró ('the god of the world'). At the sacrificial altars of Váralden-olmai, a 'world man', who stood head-spangled, was set up, a pillar with which he was to support the world. This was another borrowing from the Scandinavians, and it is seen in their sacred high-seat pillars, and in the sacred pillar (terminus) of the early Saxons.

There was a third important Scandinavian nature-god whom the Lapps worshiped, viz. Bogg-galles ('the old man of the wind'), or Bogg-olmai ('the wind man'), who drove out the wind with a club, and scopped it in again with a shove when it had stormed enough. To this deity, who was also known in Finnish Lappmark, they offered, among other things, small boxes, in which they also placed small stones, borrowed from the Finnish Ilmarinen, one of the heroes of the Kalevala. Like the Ilmarinen of the Finns, Bogg-olmai showed features which were most certainly derived from the mid-northern Lapland. In like manner the Lapp method of conjuring forth wind and storm, by undoing three magic knots, is of Scandinavian origin. From their agricultural neighbours the southern Lapps may have derived Huts ('the old man') and Rana-neida (significance of Rana unknown), the former being a frost spirit and the latter a goddess of verdure or growth, who ruled over the mountains that become green earliest in the spring. It is probable that Ras-ajku ('the grass mother') of the Russian Lapps is of later origin, for grass is comparatively unimportant in the keeping of reindeer.

5. Other deities and mediators.—The goddess of birth was Mudar-akka ('the old woman of the earth'); and her three daughters were Sar-akka or Sar-aces (from sarrat, which, according to K. B. Vilklund, means 'to clean sinews asender for threads'; cf. the spinning of Nerv, the old woman of the bow'), who was identical with Sivuk-akke ('the gun mother'); and Uks-akka ('the door woman'). Sar-akka was most favoured, for she gave needs and aid at child-birth and calving. The task of Juku-akka was to protect the child from falling and hurting itself; and with her Uks-akka, who lived under the door and changed girl children into boys in the mother's womb, was often confounded. All three lived under the kota. The goddesses of birth, who were unknown to the eastern Lapps and to whom they offered spinning-wheels and alien sacrificial animals, corresponded to the Scandinavian Norns, just as the Lapps' porridge feast, which was often eaten by women in bed in honour of the goddess, corresponded to the Faroe normagræpetur. During the Roman Catholic period Sar-akka was confounded with the Virgin Mary, who was also called Sørgga-akke (significance unknown). Two strange ceremonies dated from the same period, viz. Sar-akka baptism and Sar-akka eucharist, which were simply imitations of the Christian sacraments. Roman Catholic tenets can also be recognized in the trinity of the Lapps—Radis-atthe ('the ruler's father'), Radis-akka ('the ruler's wife'), and Radis-bardae ('the ruler's child'), who are all depicted on the Lapp drum of the later periods. It was the duty of Atlakes-olmai ('the holiday man') to see that the week-end days, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, were properly observed; and Fasta-olmai ('the fast-man') had to see that the fats were observed. Atlakes-olmai also furthered prayers presented to the god whom the Lapps called Juhnelh or Dønel—a name borrowed from the Finnish Jumala.

The mediators between mankind and the spiritual world were noide, noite, noide (Finnish nosti), shamans of the same kind as those of the Samoyeds and the northern Asiatic folk. Usually they were extremely nervous individuals whose characteristic troubles passed down from generation to generation. Yet the natural skill and dexterity had to be cultivated by means of an old shaman. The noide could enter into touch with the spirit world when in a ecstatic state, a trance, during which his soul went to the kingdom of death in order to ask the advice of the dead about such things as the cause of the sickness of men or animals, the prospects of hunting, and so on. For the purpose of assisting him, the noide had one or more tutelary spirits (nuoje, originally 'shadow', 'phantom'), which he could inherit, or buy, or obtain as a marriage portion. Often the spirit placed itself at the disposal of the noide. This spirit could be the north wind called noide-gaddac ('shaman reinitus')—a name which is often given to certain animals who helped the shaman during his spirit journey. From the close connection in which such animals stood to the master he had probably that it was the shaman's own soul that, severed from the body, could put on different shapes: as a reindeer (saivo-soro) it hastened over the hills; as a bird (saivo-tööde) it went through the air space; as a fire (Jousma-olmai) it plunged through the subterranean waters; and as a snake (saivo-gurma) it undulated on the earth.

6. The Lapp drum.—As a means of producing an ecstatic trance noide employed yelling, wild
dances, and unnatural food and drink, but above all an instrument of exaltation, the so-called Lapp drum (gure in the south, kobdes in the north). There were two distinct types of Lapp drums. The most common had a narrow or broad wooden frame bent in a circle with a tanned reindeer skin stretched taut on it. The upper side of the drum was provided with a handle. The other type, the shell-drum, had a frame resembling an oblong shell, and coulomegales lies in the bottom by which to grasp it. The latter was not nearly so large as the former. In order to get the drum to sound as loudly as possible, the shaman warmed its surface at the fire before he began to beat it with the drum-stick—a hammer-shaped implement elegantly carved from a horn. In order still further to increase the sound, the drum was often provided with various kinds of rattling objects; and in order to live up to the shaman’s fantasy the Lappa painted figures and signs with blood or elder-bark juice on the drum-skin. In the later days these figures were multiplied and became perfect microcosmos, representing the whole range of ideas of the Lapps. It was the increase of these figures or a new art of divination that had come from the south with a riddle that had the effect of changing the use of the Lapp drum so that it was employed more as a means of divination than of exaltation. The drums kept hoppiti, a song about on the drum-skin as the drum-stick rose and fell; and from the movement of the rings and on off the different signs the shaman predicted good or ill. The branch of rings stopped at any symbol of a deity, it might be concluded that the god desired a gift. The Lapp drum was quite common as an implement of divination, and it survived in secret in certain districts almost down to our own day.

Sacred offerings. — Sacrifices were offered by the head of the family or by the shaman. In certain districts in the south of Lappmark the sacrifice was a special dress; on his back a white linen robe, on the left arm a brake ring, and on the breast a badge resembling the riband of an order. When he sacrificed to the female divinities, he wore a white linen cap. He was often bedecked with flowers, while a garland was placed on the forehead of the victim. The sacrificial cut in the skin means that the victim, according to Southern lands. The images of the gods, which were set up on special pedestals or altars, undoubtedly indicated a Scandinavian influence. The Lapps anointed their gods with blood and grease, and the god whom they sacrificed to, was set up by the door, was called luotte-muorra (‘sacrifice wood’). A fence, made of horns (tjoreg-yrdit), was placed round the image. Besides reindeer, which were the proper sacrificial animals, the Lapps, on occasion, when they made sacrifices to gods belonging to alien religions, offered horses, cattle, sheep, poultry, etc., which they bought from the natives. In the custom of the Lapps that the bones of the victim should not be broken, except to be placed at the disposal of the god with pieces of all the more important limbs, we find an ancient idea which was common among the Finno-Ugrian peoples. The Fins, also, strewed the meal used for the sacrifice with the ashes of the sacrificed animal, of which a great quantity was scattered around. This was also the way in which the Samoyed determined the disposition of his kahre. Finally, the caution with which women made way for the sacrifice itself to the altar, in the same manner as from all sacrificial feasts, can be traced far back into the childhood of the human race.

LATIN CHURCH. — See Western Church.

LATTER-DAY SAINTS. — See Mormonism.

LAUD. — William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, and chief minister of Charles I., was born, according to his diary (Works, iii. [1853] 151), on the 7th of October 1573, in the town of Reading. His father was a clothier by trade, and in later years, his Puritan opponents did not allow him to forget the fact that he had not ‘the good fortune to be born a gentleman.’ Indeed, his unexcelled origin was made the foundation of many malicious and exaggerated libels, which sound so dear in these democratic times. Had Laud lived under happier auspices, the ability and persistent energy with which he fought his way step by step to high position, and on the way gained the esteem of his superiors, would have won him more praise. As it was, he experienced the full the disadvantages which belong to the lot of the novus homo, and to this circumstance some of the harshnesses and defects of his character may be traced. Laud went to school at Reading, where he won the appreciation of ‘a very severe schoolmaster,’ who predicted that one day he would be a great man. In 1589, at the age of sixteen, he entered St. John’s College, Oxford, and the following year became a Scholar. In 1593 he was admitted Fellow of St. John’s, and a year later he became a Bachelor of Arts; his M.A. degree followed in 1598. In his diary he records various ‘great sickesses’ which befell him both in infancy and during his University career. Indeed, throughout his life he was seldom free from ill-health for any long period, and in his anatomical examination of the instance of the triumph of an indomitable will over a weak constitution. At the time that Laud entered Oxford, and for many years afterwards wrote poetry among a company within its walls. The tide of extreme Puritanism which had set in after the reign of Queen Mary was running deep and strong. If the Puritans were in a minority in the country, they were very

LITERATURE.—The most important sources of our knowledge of the religion of the Lapps are the reports of the missionaries from the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries.
resolute in holding to their ideals, and for those ideals they desired not toleration but martyr. Thus the 39 Articles, the foundation of the Church's system, and for that end they steadily worked within the Church itself. Their objections to ceremonies, surplices, and liturgy were only steps towards the hoped for institution of the Genevan form of discipline. They were in the broad and ancient path. For the time being, it is true, this particular hope was in abeyance, and it was mainly as a doctrinal system that Calvinism now showed its strength. The leaders of that movement were in the ranks of the clergy, and the Universities were their strongholds.

To this system Laud soon showed himself a strong and dangerous opponent. He belonged to the school of Richard Hooker and Bishop Lancelot Andrewes, and the pious aspirations of men like George Herbert and Nicholas Ferrar were very precious in his sight. His ideal for the Church of England was that which in modern times is called Anglican. He saw in the English Church a great mediating communion, neither Roman on the one side nor Genevan on the other, prismatic, ditchless, and Catholic, purged from superstition yet reverencing antiquity, loyal to the truth once delivered and yet large-hearted in its welcome to new knowledge and fresh thought. Whatever grievous mistakes he made in furtherance of this ideal were due to the limitations of his mind and his learning; and when, after everything is said against Laud that can be said, the truth remains that his conception has been justified in the subsequent history of the English Church. To him in a large degree is due the settling of the character of that Church's system.

In setting himself against the Calvinism of Oxford, however, Laud entered upon a long and one-sided contest with authority. In an academical exercise delivered soon after his ordination he gave great offence to Abbot, Master of University College and Vice-Chancellor and afterwards Archbishops, by tracing the authority of the Church, through the Roman Catholic hierarchy, up to the Apostles and the Primitive Church, and an outcry was raised later in 1694 when, in his exercises for the B.D. degree, he maintained the necessity of Episcopacy and the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. Two years later Laud was attacked by the Vice-Chancellor, Henry Airy, for publishing 'popish opinions' in a sermon delivered in the pulpit of St. Mary's. He followed the Vice-Chancellor's Court, from which Laud emerged scot-free. Amidst these and similar attacks Laud's coolness, courage, and ability served him in good stead. For a time he seemed to stand almost alone. In his own words, 'it was almost made a heresy for any one to be seen in his company, and a misprision of heresy to give him a civil salutation as he walked the streets.' (Heylyn, Cryptarius Anglicus, p. 54). On one occasion he was set in St. Mary's and heard himself abused for almost an hour together, being pointed at as he sat (ib. p. 66). The preacher on this occasion was Abbot, brother of the Archbishop, and Divinity Professor, who certainly castigated in trenchant style the supposed schismatic leanings of this unruly member of the University.

Yet Laud was not without friends who sympathised with his views and were burning with fire. Bishop Young of Rochester, who ordained him as deacon in 1600 and priest in 1601, praised his study of the Fathers, Councils, and the ecclesiastical historians, and declared that if he lived, he would be 'one instrument of restoring the Church from the narrow and private principles of modern times.' (Mozley, Hist. and Thoel. Essays, i. 116). Rapid preference fell to his lot. He became chaplain to}

the Earl of Devonshire in 1603, and in 1607 he was made Vicar of Stamford in Northamptonshire. The following year the advowson of N. Kilton in Leicestershire was given to him. He took his degree of D.D., and became chaplain to Bishop Nelle of Rochester. His first sermon before King James was preached in 1609, and shortly afterwards he was made Archdeacon of Chelmsford and Vicar of Tilbury in Essex. Caxton in Kent next fell to his care in 1610, but a few months later he left it to take charge of Norton. The same year the Presidency of St. John's College became vacant, and Laud became a candidate. Naturally the whole strength of the Puritan party was put forth to prevent his appointment, Abbot, the Archbishop-Elect, and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere being indefatigable in their efforts. Yet, although Laud was disabled by sickness, and unable personally to take part in the contest, he was elected. An appeal was made to the Crown, which James in person disposed of by declaring Laud President of St. John's.

As head of a College, Laud was in his proper element, and his rule seems to have been a happy and beneficent one. In dealing with those Fellows of the College who were not within the circle of his friends, he showed a proper spirit of conciliation. As a patron of literature and sound learning he was wholly admirable, and his love of order and discipline found congenial ground in dealing with academic life and affairs. When he became Chancellor of the University in 1633, his opportunities for usefulness in this direction were much widened, and he used them to the full. The reforms which he instituted resulted in a large increase of students and in greater efficiency of teaching, and their effect remained long after Laud was dead.

It may be convenient here to summarize in anticipation the valuable results of Laud's connexion with Oxford. The codification of the University Statutes was perhaps his most important work, and his code still remains as the basis of the Statute-book of the University. Among its provisions were the institution of public examinations for University degrees, the revival of the College system with its moral and religious discipline and the academical dress, and an improved method of selecting preceptors. Laud's benefactions to the University were many and important. He founded the Laudian Professorship of Arabic, increased the endowment of the Chair of Music, and similarly augmented the emoluments of the Public Orator. He encouraged scholars like Gerhard Vossius, and helped to promote native men of learning like Jeremy Taylor, Selden, Lindesay, and Bedell. In 1633 Laud procured a royal patent for the foundation of the University Press—an institution in which he took the greatest interest. His munificence towards the then recently founded Bodleian Library was also great. He presented to this institution over 1300 MSS in various languages, besides a collection of coins, and built an extra wing to accommodate his gifts. His claim that no Chancellor had ever loved the University as he is well borne out by the recent annals of the College and its gifts, and, when it is remembered that his educational work was carried out in intervals of his ecclesiastical and political labours as Archbishop and Prime Minister, it seems all the more remarkable. Mention should also be made of the fact that, as Chancellor of Dublin University, Laud provided a Charter and Code for Trinity College, one of the features of the latter being the provision that the fellows, originally only for a term of two years' duration, should be tenable for life. The Colleges of Eton and Winchester also came within the Archbishop's care as visitor, and we find him.
providing statutes for the Cathedral School of Canterbury. To the town of Reading and to the grammar-school where his instruction began he was a benefactor, and to his own College of St. John's he gave a new quadrangle and valuable presents of books.

One turns with less satisfaction to the record of Laud. He was called of politiques, the Countess of Buckingham, mother of George Villiers, the King's favourite. In the earlier stages of the conference, Francis White, afterwards Bishop of Ely, was the English champion, but after two meetings Laud was called of politicians. Although the King refused the full time of four and twenty hours to bethink himself (J. Dowden, Paddock Lectures, p. 115), his learning and acuteness stood him in good stead. Denying that there is Scriptural warrant for an infallible pope, he proceeded to deal with Roman errors. Yet he conceded that Rome with its errors is a true Church, but not the true Church. Against the exclusive claims of Rome he appealed to the authority of a general Council, and to the witness of Scripture. The English Church as reformed, he declared, is also a true Church, holding the Catholic doctrines of Baptism and the Eucharist. In the Enchiridion Laud saw a threefold sacrifice: (1) the memorial of the sacrifice of Calvary, (2) the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, (3) the sacrifice of ourselves, our souls and bodies.

One result of this controversy was the beginning of a close friendship and intimacy between Laud and Buckingham. Whatever may be said as to the strangeness of such an alliance, its sincerity was unquestionable. Laud became the confessor of the Court favourite, and undoubtedly exercised a real religious influence over him. In matters political also he was Buckingham's devoted ally, helping him with his advice and influence in times of trouble, and working to maintain his influence at Court. In 1632 King James died, and a new era of influence opened up for Laud. Charles gave him a fullness of confidence which his father had withheld. A schedule of the clergy was prepared by him at Buckingham's request, and laid before the King. Each name was marked O or P, the orthodox being listed for promotion, while the Puritans were to be left out in the cold. We find him defending Richard Montague against the Parliament's wrath incurred by his pamphlet against Calvinism, assisting Buckingham in his defence, and preaching up the King's prerogative before Charles's second Parliament. In 1635 he became Bishop of Bath and Wells, and a year later, shortly before the assassination of Buckingham, he became Bishop of London. Buckingham's death opened the way still further to Laud's promotion, and he became the chief prelate in England. In 1638 he was translated to the Archbishops of Canterbury, and became, under Charles, all-powerful in Church and State. In his diary (Works, iii. 219) he relates that the month before he became Archbishop he was twice approached by an emissary of Rome with the offer of a Cardinal's hat. Whatever may be thought of the sincerity of this offer, it had no effect upon Laud, who was thoroughly convinced of the strength of the Anglican position. The character of Laud's administration in Church and State has already been briefly described. In matters ecclesiastical he put the care of souls first and foremost, both because he believed that worship is the best form of teaching, and because he desired that Rome should not point the finger at Anglican slovenliness. He enforced uniformity of doctrine and practice, and was unwilling to condone any deviation of thought. As a statesman he has incurred the odium of the severities practised by the Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission. But it must at least be remembered that humanitarian sentiments of the present day did not exist in Laud's time, and that the cruelties of the Commonwealth far exceeded anything that
can justly be laid to his charge. He was not revengeful, and often treated his fallen enemies with pity and love. He was kind to the poor, and strove in various ways for social betterment.

Laud's connexion with Scotland was a fateful one. He had accompanied King James in his visit to that country as Jean of Gloueseet, and again in 1633, as the governor of London, he had been one of the companions of Charles I. in a visit that produced an unfavourable impression among the Scots. The climax came in 1637, when the attempt to introduce the "Prayer Book" and disestablish the Church of Scotland brought about ecclesiastical and political revolution in both countries. In spite of its name, however, the Prayer Book was in the main the work of two Scottish Bishops, Maxwell of Ross and Wedderburn of Dunblane, Laud's share being confined to preliminary suggestion and subsequent revision. Both Charles and Laud, indeed, had wished the English book then in use to be adopted in Scotland, but gave way in the face of the patriotic representations of the Scottish Bishops. The real offence of the book lay in the arbitrary method of its introduction, regarded as the culmination of a series of despotic acts.

Laud met his fall with pathetic dignity, and bore his long imprisonment with all its trials very patiently. On 15th December 1640 he was impeached by Parliament, and the following March, at the third session, he and his friend and colleague Strafford was executed on 12th May, and the Archbishop found at the window of his cell when attempting to give him his blessing on the way to the scaffold. In May 1645 Pryme was commissioned to rifle his papers, and to seize his diary, a mutilated edition of which was shortly afterwards published. His trial for high treason began on 12th March 1644. Laud showed the same coolness and ability in defending himself that he had exhibited many years ago in the Court of the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, and the prosecution failed. But his enemies were not to be balked of their prey, and a special bill of attaint was passed by Parliament. On 10th January 1645 the Archbishop paid for his policy and his mistakes with his life. He was executed on Tower Hill in the presence of a large multitude, declaring that he had always belonged, in heart and soul, to the Church of England, and that he had never encouraged the subversion either of law or of religion. His body was deposited in the churchyard of All Hallows, Barking, whence it was removed in 1663 to St. John's College, Oxford.


A. MITCHELL.

LAUGHTER.—When we seek to assign to laughter a place and a function in social life, it is clear that we have in view the laughter of embodied persons. Even the idea of laughter itself is based on the benefit of the lungs' has undergone repression and refinement under the touch of civilization, there remains a more chastened expression which may then be experienced without which fellowship in feeling is inexpressible. There is, indeed, when refinement and restraint have reached their limit, a hidden and silent laughter of the soul which might be enjoyed by a disembodied spirit—though even here for embodied mortals there are, no doubt, more subtle physiological effects which, by purely inward reverberation, give heightened tone to the enjoyment. But such silent and unexpressed laughter has, on one side at least, lost touch with social life. Apart from some form of telepathic influence, it can call forth no echo in others. It may bring with it an access of glee—a touch of 'sudden glory'; it remains, however, unshared; there can be none of that beneficent contagion which, through the interaction of man's spirit with man's spirit, gives one form of social value to laughter—a real value, though in its more primitive stages it may as yet afford little evidence of that progress in the art of good manners which, according to Bergson, it is its function to promote.

On its physical and expressive side, then, laughter is, among other things, a means of intercommunication, though it may not be consciously employed to that end. Like other such means, it implies as a basis a common mode of expression, inherited or acquired; and, in large measure in cooperation with language, it affords to others an index of the presence of a specific and probably indefinable mode of affective feeling which accompanies man's outlook on his fellows. For amid much divergence of opinion as to the essential characteristics of that which is provocative of laughter, there seems to be fairly general agreement that it is the situations of, or in close relation to, human life that afford the natural objective of laughter when it comes to maturity. On the one hand, therefore, the laugh which invites others to join in the social chorus; on the other hand, the laughable, which is a property of some sort that characterizes a social situation; and between them stands laughter, in the sense in which the word will here be used, as that which, however yet distinctly qualifies some one's consciousness.

Of the laugh and the smile as bodily expressions little need be said. It is probable that for both there are hereditary foundations, and that the behaviour involved is, in the narrower and biological sense, instinctive. But whether the smile is, in the infant, an expression of satisfaction, and whether the laugh is at the outset the reflex outcome of physical tickling; how far they are independent modes of response, or how far they have common factors; whether they have in themselves some element of survival value, or whether the muscles concerned are, from the habits of our race, the readiest and therefore the first to receive an overflow of 'nervous energy'; how the facial, thoracic, and respiratory co-ordinations are brought about, and why in the very body come to be an expression of specific and somewhat varying mental states—these are matters beyond our present concern. They are questions of genetic origin which we can afford to pass by. It is to laughter and the laughable that we must restrict our attention, merely noting that the nervous laugh, the irritable laugh, the laugh of scorn, though the same organic mechanism of response is employed, do not seem to express the sunny laughter of the mind. The laughter of the Bible is nearly always an expression of scorn and not of mirth (see, however, Ps. 126 and Job 8). Genial laughter is the joyful roar to which the benefit of the lungs' has undergone repression and refinement under the touch of civilization, there remains a more chastened expression which may then be enjoyed without which fellowship in feeling is inexpressible. There is, indeed, when refinement and restraint have reached their limit, a hidden and silent laughter of the soul which might be enjoyed by a disembodied spirit—though even here for embodied mortals there are, no doubt, more subtle physiological effects which, by purely inward reverberation, give heightened tone to the enjoyment. But such
Hobbes's 'sudden glory' shows an emphasis on the latter. Men experience the passion of sudden glory 'either by some sudden act of their own, that pleases them; or by the apprehension of some deformel thing in another, by impressions whereby they generally applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewestabilities in themsevles; which is not to be explained... By observing the imperfections of other men' (Levitation, p. 1, ch. vi.).

The stress in Hobbes is on the sudden conception of some deformel in ourselves by comparison with the inferiority of others or with our own formery. So self-centred is this form of laughter that the correelative laughable almost fades out of view, though the inferiority of others is presumably in some degree ridiculok. A factor in a particular type of laughter, this exultation over others and the accompanying self-exultation may be accepted; as a comprehensive theory of laughter, it can hardly pass muster. Not all exultation over inferiority is of the order of laughter; not all laughter is of the order of self-exultation.

In Schopenhauer's doctrine of the incoornguities, the question of the laughter spirit is relatively unimportant. His is predominantly a doctrine of the laughable, though this must, of course, be apprehended as such.

"The cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought through it in some relation" (Par Sylph and Ideals, Tr. Hallam, 1736).

There is an element of the unexpected or of expectation baulked. A situation presented, or described, diverges from the course of its customary development, or we are swiftly transferred into a world of simultaneous and different situations. But not all incongruity is laughable. The situations of social life teem with incongruities; and many of them are provocative of sighs and tears rather than laughter and smiles. Spenser, therefore, distinguished between ascending and descending incongruity.

"Laughter naturally results only when consciousness is unavowed transferred from great things to small—only when there is what we call a descending incongruity" (Physiological of Laughter, Essays, 1326).

In accordance with his physiological interpretation, the prior condition involves a volume of brain-excitement which, on the sudden descent, is too great for the occasion, and overflows; through habitual channels, into the contractions of the satin or the larger muscles of the heart laugh. But, unless, in line with the well-known thesis of W. James and C. Lange, the bodily laugh begets the laughter of the mind, the mental affection is not such as to cause the descending incongruity is translated into physiological terms; but we are left with that as determining the laugh and the laugh. Doubt in its application is of many cases; but whether descents is in all cases necessary, is to say the least of it, doubtful. A man's hat on a child's head, and a child's hat on a man's head, may both make us laugh. Is this because in the one case we come down from the nobel hat to the ridiculous child, and in the other from the dignity of the man to his absurd headgear? Or is there in each case a descent from normal to the abnormal (cf. J. Sully, Essay on Laughter, p. 18).

Bergson reduces all forms of descending incongruity to one, and traces the genesis of laughter to the perception of some intrusion of a mechanical mode of action or general reaction which should not reach the higher vital plane. For him there can be no descent more serious than that from life to mechanism. One would suppose that so fatal a fall would move Bergson to tears. But he supposes that we derive, from these deep emotions, and even the experience that 'absence of feeling' is the usual accompaniment of laughter. One must look upon life as a disinterested spectator. To produce the whole of its effect, the comic demands something like a monotonous anesthetism of the mind. Its appeal is to the intelligence pure and simple. Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion. Under these conditions the attitudes, gestures, and movements of the human being are laughable only when matched in that same fashion as thought is in us, with the making up of the comic in character. Such is his main thesis (H. Bergson, Laughter, Eng. tr., pp. 4, 5, 20, 130, 147).

But, whereas for the most part serious discussions of the comic are dull enough, save for the welcome jokes and anecdotes which one enjoys all the more if one forgets all about the principles which they are supposed to illustrate, Bergson's book on Laughter is worthy to be placed on the same shelf with such as Meredith's Essay on Comedy.

In both there is real distinction in matter and style. In both the sympathy of the artist is combined with philosophic insight. In both one is perhaps impelled by the loss of comic taste or scientific formulation to hold in the bondage of clearly defined concepts the elusive spirit of laughter. One cannot but feel that Bergson's wide outlook on the laughable in life and in comedy overlapped the constraints of his theory.

He tells us that laughter is begotten of real life and akin to art. It is in the selective products of that the thoughtful laughter of the mind seeks its fullest development. If, as he argues, there may be comic elements alike in situations, in words, and in character, the business of the artistic creator of the laughable is to combine all of these ingredients into one synthesis which shall be provocative of laughter at its highest pitch of refinement. Witty dialogue, good in itself, must afford also a revelation of the comic in character, and must be organic to laughable situations presented. But how many and varied are the factors; how subtle is the harmonious synthesis! Here one sees portrayed the sudden glory of exultation, but it is not the sympathetic sharing of that alone that produces the thoughtfull laugh. Or one may see cases of Kierkegaard's "new" humor, or of "situations" in which the emotion of the heart is the thing in the void; but that does not cover the whole ground. There is, no doubt, much incongruity, but not always descending; but episodic incongruity is subject to the merely nongenuine conceptions of light from one universe of regard to another; but they are related, and each illuminates the other. This is seen in detail, and gives piquancy to the play upon words. If the after-dinner orator explains life as success due to his adoption of the principle that, if he does not strike oil in three minutes, he stops boring, two universes of discourse are related, and a sudden laughter-span bridges the interval between them. Incongruity implies some measure of separation, and there must be the subtle integration of some perceived congruity to produce the synthetic whole which the artistry of the comic seeks to create. There is, however, often, no doubt, some element of the mechanical, in a rather strained interpretation, but notwithstanding Bergson's brilliant advocacy of a theory dictated by his philosophy, one feels that it is the free life of comic rather than the comic stage that has to be seen in that stage to be brought to the analytic man of science. And it is questionable whether the total exclusion of emotion (by which we must understand that which is in affective
antithesis to the laughing mood) is characteristic of the best comedy. If, as is generally held, humour is a blend of the playful and the serious, owing its timbre to overtones of something akin to pity, then, so far as humour is an ingredient of comedy, emotion is present. We have 'the richer laugh of heart and mind in one.' Meredith says that the humorist of high order has an embrace of contrasts beyond the reach of the comic poet. But this is a matter of degree, and there is no reason to consider the richer kind of laughter, and characterizes the higher comedy as distinguished from farce; for 'the test of true comedy is that it shall awaken thoughtful laughter' (G. Meredith, Essay on Comedy, pp. 88, 89).

It is not the primary business of comedy to correct men's manners. That is one of the functions of laughter in social life; but it is introduced into comedy only as an ideal representation of that life. This disciplinary function of laughter is regarded by Bergson as the mark of its social utility (op. cit. pp. 17, 170, 197 f.). Laughter is above all a corrective. By laughter, which would fail in its object if it bore the stamp of sympathy or kindness, society avenges itself for the liberties taken with it. Its function is to intimidate by humiliating. Ridicule, we may say, is the whip with which society corrects the smaller faults of its children, and satire is the lash which is applied to corporate abuses when they have been stripped bare of their fine garments. In both there is something of self-centred superiority, even when it is felt to be the superiority of society embodied in the smirter. But, though the derisive smile or the scornful laugh may be there, it is not an expression of the true spirit of laughter, which is happy and genial. It is rather the lineal descendant of the exultant laugh of the savage over his vanquished foe. And it not infrequently fails in attaining its end, while the kindly good-humoured laugh has far greater efficacy in correcting the manners of boys and men.

It is questionable, however, whether this form of social utility is that which has given to laughter its chief evolutionary value in social life. This is rather a secondary utility like that of the insect's sting, which is derived from an organ of different ancestral value. There is a more genial form of utility. According to W. McDougall, laughter has been evolved in man as an antidote to sympathy with sufferings (Brit. Assoc., 1918, reported in Nature, xxvii. [1914]). He contends that laughter arises only in situations which are mildly unpleasant except in so far as they are redeemed by laughter itself; or in presence of those things which would excite a feeble degree of sympathetic pain if we did not actually laugh at them. But are these conditions universal? Is it the comic situation, or the joke, at which we laugh, always in some degree painful? Should we not substitute 'sometimes' for 'always'? There is, however, probably an element of truth (if not the whole truth) in the view that laughter is a protective reaction which shields us from the depressing influence of the shortcomings of our fellow-men—often when they jest. As pity softens the primitive callousness of laughter, so does laughter in turn relieve us from the depression which stupidity, for example, engenders. And it may have a wider influence.

How many men in our highly civilised communities to-day may have learned to keep their heads above water by the practice of gentle laughter, no one knows' (Sully, Essay on Laughter, p. 499). In any case, 'he who produces a laugh of pure gladness brightens the world for those who hear him' (Sully, op. cit. p. 477). Laughter is a tonic which braces both body and mind, and thus benefits both the individual and society.


C. LLOYD MORGAN.

LAW (Natural).—The idea of 'law' has a long and varied history. It has passed through important changes, and has occasioned manifold disputes. It took its rise as something relating to human society, and then the world external nature and the universe, whence, after undergoing a peculiar metamorphosis, it was brought back to the sphere of its origin, in order to shed light upon human life and action.

The development of the idea of natural law. —The development of the concept began in the ancient world, but it was not until the modern epoch that 'law' came to occupy a central position in all scientific procedure. The explanation of natural law is a theme of great interest in the classical age of Greece, was originally used with reference, not to the external world, but to human nature itself. It denoted the unwritten as contrasted with the written law. This unwritten law, however, was at first simply the standard which, in usual, and was determined by a number of traditional usage and custom, and it was only later that it came to be taken in the sense of a law written by the deity in the human heart. The term 'law of nature,' in its modern acceptation, is seldom

2 The historical origin of the phrase 'law of nature' is discussed by E. Zeller, Uber Begriff und Begrundung der sittlichen Gesetze,' reprint from AbbLW, 1888, and with such caution and thoroughness by R. Hirschl, 'Ueber das gree. favourite primary mean traditional usage and custom, and retained this sense for centuries; from the time of Thucydides, however, it came to bear another meaning as well, viz. that of the divine law written in the human heart. Of course Hirschl is still more exhaustive work, Themis, Duke and Vervendeke, Leipzig, 1897, pp. 366-411.
used by Plato and Aristotle; it was especially among the Stoics that it took a more prominent place, and here the idea of divine laws led to that of natural law. The expression 'natural law' was first brought into the Roman law, and from them again it passed to medieval writers.

As yet, however, the expression was used without real precision; it denoted merely a certain regularity of actions. In this way, for instance, the idea of the Roman laws and in particular Augustinian, could regard natural laws no more than the customary modes of divine action—modes of action which might quite well be departed from in exceptional circumstances. Thus the belief in natural laws was not quite conflated with the belief in miracles. The conception first acquired a more precise significance in modern times, especially since the time of Descartes, and in close connection with the whole character of modern investigation. The great object of modern scientific inquiry is to analyze an existing state of things into its simple elements, and to interpret the whole by means of the parts. The laws of nature thus came to be regarded as but the simplest forms of motion among the elements. The discovery of these laws seemed to give man the power of interpreting nature intellectually, and at the same time of controlling it by practical and technical application. We were led to believe that the whole tendency of modern thought, i.e. to regard nature not as the work of a Higher Power, but as something to be interpreted by its own concatenations. It was felt, however, that, if the laws of nature were to have a precise content, a mathematical formulation of them was indispensable; and in this way an ancient problem found at last a happy solution. The Pythagoreans had taught that nature could be reduced to the simple sum-forms, and this theory had all along been maintained by a relatively small group of thinkers. But it was found impossible to formulate definite laws, and even as late as the 16th cent. Nicholas of Cusa had declared the task to be beyond human capacity. The first to construct mathematical laws of nature was Kepler, in his famous three laws of planetary motion, which thus marked a profound revolution in the investigation of nature. Thereafter Newton proposed the idea of reducing all the phenomena of nature to mathematical laws, and Kant even ventured to say that 'in every sphere of science, on every subject as much knowledge as there is mathematics.'

Side by side with this precise modern formulation of natural law, however, the ancient and more indefinite conception still survives, and even at the present day the discovery of a mere order in phenomena is often hailed as a law. This is especially the case in modern biology, in which, e.g., a peculiarly intricate complex of facts, if it only recurs, is often summarily designated as a law, so that what purports to be a solution is, in point of fact, simply a problem. In other ways also the term law has been the cause of much confusion. Laws are often discussed as if they were living forces, and one natural power is put in opposition to another. It has frequently been forgotten that they are merely the forms of natural processes, and that they in no sense explain the processes themselves. The mere naming of similarity in the law is not seldom thought of as an entity lying beyond and controlling the concrete facts. Thus even within the sphere of nature itself the employment of the idea of law is attended with grave difficulties and dangers, and the dangers are greatly increased when we pass from the Roman to the modern sphere, and used as a means of transferring the methods of natural science to other provinces of human interest.

2. The application of 'natural law' to other provinces. The extension of the idea of law to extra-natural data began as early as the 17th cent., when, in particular, the idea was employed in psychology. The procedure was continued in the 18th cent., being now applied to the fields of politics and history, but it was in the course of the 19th cent. that the tendency reached its highest development, and the idea of law became the subject of numerous disputes regarding method.

(a) Psychology. The application of natural law to the soul was carried out in a most imposing manner by Spinoza. For him the entire inward life of man was but a texture of single and particular occurrences, which work and interlink exactly like external things. Psychological laws in the stricter sense—e.g., the laws of Association—were set forth in particular by English thinkers. In Germany, Leibniz had spoken of the ethico-logical laws of the soul and of the world which are on the same lines, while Herbart, again, sought to carry mathematical formulae into the innermost life of the soul. Modern psychophysicists has attempted with no small success to give a mathematical formulation to the relation between bodily and psychological processes, and especially between stimuli and sensation. Greater difficulties were encountered in the endeavour to interpret not merely the fundamental forms, but also the special results of psychical life on the analogy of natural laws. A special theme of controversy here was the relation between natural and moral law, some thinkers endeavouring to bring the two into the closest possible relation, while others insisted upon the unmistakable difference between ethical principles and the laws of nature. The pre-eminent representative of the latter position was Kant, who regarded the moral law, with its imperative of duty, as something spontaneous, unique, and superior to all experience, and who uncompromisingly opposed the freedom which it involves to the necessity of nature. The Schellingian school contended for a close connection between natural law and moral law, but in trying to universalize the scope of morality he incurred the danger of attenuating its distinctive character. The problem is not yet solved, and is still being ceaselessly discussed.

(b) Sociology. In a somewhat different sphere a fruitful theme of discussion was introduced by the attempt of modern sociology to reduce the social life of man to simple laws. The main factor in this movement was the known fact that by taking sufficiently large numbers of human beings the fortuitous element of the individual phenomenon may be eliminated, and relatively constant averages ascertained, and that thereby the phenomena of the social sphere are found to be much more regular than appears at first sight. Thus the attempt of sociologists to establish a statistical science has discovered a mass of interesting

1 Of more recent works W. Windelband's essay on 'Normen und Naturgesetze' in his Prüfungen, Tübingen, 1911, is specially worthy of notice. In the city of Tübingen, in Mendeleu's earlier works, in Democritus, Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle, is also dealt with.

2 This is the beginning of his Philosophiae naturae principia mathematicae: "His formos substantiales et qualitatis emendationem et eam parvissimae sequitur." W. Windelband, W. Windelband, "Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen über die Psychologie," in Zeitschrift für die Geschichette der Philosophie, 1873.


4 The pioneer in this field was the Belgian statistician L. A. J. Quetelet (1796-1874), especially in his Sur l'Homme et le développement de ses facultés. En basse de physique sociale, Paris, 1826, 2nd ed., Brussels, 1829.
facts. It is no doubt true that here certain uniformities have rather prematurely resolved into laws, and that the categories of facts have not always been sufficiently broken up into their simple elements; but, when all is said, the movement has opened fresh avenues of knowledge, and given effective incentives to inquiry.

(c) Economics.—The movement has assumed a more intense and incisive phase upon the narrower field of economics proper. Here we find two modes of interpretation and investigation in conflict with each other. The advocates of one school try to resolve the economic process into a mere tissue of self-regulating elementary movements, and so to explain them in accordance with natural laws, and they repudiated all interference in the political and social order as a derangement of natural processes. The most prominent representative of this view is Adam Smith. It was maintained on the other side that, if the economic life of mankind was not to degenerate into a ruthless struggle of each against all, it must be ethically regulated. As representing this position the name of Thomas Carlyle will suffice. It is indisputable that in recent times this ethical view of economics has assumed more and more effectively in opposition to the purely scientific interpretation, and that, accordingly, the State has interfered more and more actively with economic conditions. Moreover, with its huge manufactories, the State has been the main factor in this development.

(d) History.—There has been in recent times a considerable amount of discussion regarding the problem of historical laws. The abandonment of a religious reading of history has given rise to an attempt to interpret the historical process by its own movement, and this again has led thinkers to construct a philosophy of history, and to search for the laws that control the process. In the 19th cent. attempts to understand the movement of history as an ordered and articulate process were made—from opposite points of view, indeed, though not without a certain correspondence in results—by Hegel and Comte. Hegel regarded history as a self-evolution of the Spirit, which advances by means of antithesis, while Comte, by way of the three stages in ceaseless progress, arrived finally at an interpretation of phenomena which provides a rational comprehension of human life as a whole.

In Germany, within recent years, a subject of much discussion and controversy has been the relation between history and natural science. Certain writers insist strongly upon the profound difference between the two, emphasizing the individual or particular character of historical processes, and seeing in them pre-eminently valuable element of history. Windelband and Rickert are prominent champions of this view, and they are supported by the majority of German historians. A leading representative of the other

1 The history of the question see I. Nennemann, Jahrhücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 3rd ser., Tübingen, 1904, Rich. (p. 153 ft.) writes: *Even in antiquity men sought for economic and social laws, and next, more especially from the latter half of the 17th cent. on from the days of Locke and Hobbes, they applied the term *law* to the facts of the former (i.e. economic), while the physicists themselves, in following these precursors, cannot be altogether exonerated from the charge of having been so influenced by the then all-powerful idea of the laws of nature to keep such laws events sufficiently distinct from those of the *couthc, or ethical laws* of the *Naturalgesetz* und *Wirtschaftsgezetz* in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft. Ill. [1922], and H. Windelband, Geschichte der natürlichen und politischen Geisteswissenschaften in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, xxii-xxvii [1910-11].

2 The expression "philosophie de l'histoire" was first used by Voltaire, and was defined by him as a science able to account for the history of the world (see his *Histoire philosophique*, 1757, p. 392). It was also used by D. Hume, *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary* (1741).

3 W. Windelband, *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1906), p. 492. (For more also in *Prinzipien der Geschichtswissenschaft*, Tübingen, 1918.)


5 The school is Lamprecht, who puts forward the hypothesis of socio-psychical stages of development proceeding in the manner in which a general tendency works its way into all the various fields of human experience, and is used to mould them into conformity with the laws of nature. But we also see here how the distinctive character of the several fields forms an obstacle to the tendency, and how this distinctive character is clearly revealed in the one mode of thought and the other into correspondence with the laws of nature. It may be said, in general, that, if we are to speak of the laws of the spiritual sphere at all, the conception of law must have quite a different meaning from that which it bears in the realm of nature. It is in particular the ideas of freedom and individuality that prohibit a simple extension of the laws of nature to other provinces.


R. EUKEN.

LAW (Primitive).—The definition of law, like that of religion, is by no means so easy as it looks. That framed by the great jurist, John Austin, so long dominant in English political philosophy, was derived from Hobbes, who in the 17th cent. elaborated the theory of paternal government. According to Austin, the authority of government as constituted by the people, or the sovereign, did he place the authority of the ruler that he made the king the arbiter, not merely of political and social conduct, but even of religion and morals. Austin, of course, did not so far as this. When he formulated his theory, the dead monarch, the crowning the Divine Right of Kings was dead, theological and political passion on the question had cooled down, and the British Constitution, as settled at the Revolution, had been accepted by all parties. It was, therefore, necessary only to posit a supreme political authority, without theorizing as to its origin or dogmatizing on its proper form. According to Austin, positive law (as distinguished from the divine law, the moral law, the laws of nature, and other laws so called by way of analogy, and in his sense not really laws at all) is a rule of conduct prescribed by a sovereign, whether an individual or a definite body, that is the member or members of the independent political society wherein its author is supreme (Lectures on Jurisprudence, London, 1861, i. 316). Laws are a species of command addressed by a political superior to those on whom he has the power and the will to inflict evil if his desire expressed in the command be disregarded. A sanction, or penalty for disobedience, is, therefore, annexed to, or implied in, every command of the sovereign—that is to say, in this connexion, every law.

'Command, duty, and sanction are inseparably connected ideas. Each employs the same idea to the other, and each denotes those ideas in a peculiar order or series' (ib., pp. 5f., 9).

This definition has the merit of avoiding all antiquarian questions and all theological dogma and philosophical speculation as to the origin of the supreme authority. It takes the facts as they are in modern civilized States, and as they were in imperial Rome, and deduces from them. Nothing else was possible to that generation. Archiological inquiry into origins had hardly begun in 1832, when Austin's work was

1 The controversy as to the existence of laws in history is analyzed and explained by E. Bornhardt, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Leipzig, 1898; cf. also E. Euler, "Die geistige Geschichte der Geschichtsphilosophie" ("Historische Gesetze"), in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, xxxv, 1913, and art. Historiographie.
first published; or, if it had, it did not interest him; while the science of anthropology had not penetrated there. But during the last eight or ninety years the extension and necessities of the Indian Empire, and the colonial, missionary, commercial, and scientific enterprises of every civilized nation have brought us into more and more intimate contact with the world and every variety of political, economic, and social constitution. To all thoughtful persons and to most civilized governments it has become obvious that the first step for good government is, as well as for missionary and commercial policy, a right comprehension of the ideas and social order of nations thus brought under the sway, or at least the influence, of the white man. The scientific interest of the study has been quickened by these practical considerations, and has resulted in the accumulation of a vast amount of material unknown to our grandparents. It has become clear that the social and political relations of a people, however wild or barbarous backward in culture it cannot, and in fact do not, subsist without governing rules, and that such rules are equivalent to what on a higher plane is called law.

Researches in this field, simultaneously with these into the early history of the various European nations have emphasized the similarity of their original condition to that of many barbarous tribes in the present day. They have shown not only that the formation of codes of written law was gradual, but also that, side by side with them, a great body of unwritten but binding customs continued for ages, and possessed a vitality and authority of its own. That authority antedated any formal prescription by a discoverable sovereign. It was recognized and enforced from time to time, but not created, by the sovereign's courts. In short, the customs were to all intents and purposes law equally with the written codes. Jurists have thus been compelled to reconsider the conception of law, and to take into account its historical origins. They could no longer content themselves with the a priori dogmatism that satisfied Hobbes and Austin. The problem how the conception of law may be so widened that its definition shall include the rules obeyed by all societies of men, whether savage or civilized, in their social and political intercourse became pressing in the latter part of the 19th century. Various solutions have been attempted, of which it will be necessary here to consider only two of the most recent.

P. Vinogradoff (Common Sense in Law, London, 1914, p. 35 ff.) argues that the notions of sovereignty and command are not necessary to the conception of law, that the term 'law' cannot be confined to a rule of conduct prescribed by the head of an independent political society, but extends to the rules to which the members of any society as such are required to conform, and, finally, the law does not rest ultimately on the physical sanction of force, but on recognition or agreement.

This every part of Austin's definition is traversed; his argument for confining the term 'law' to the command of a political superior is set aside; and the sanction to which he attached so much importance is abandoned as a test of law, so far at least as it is an appeal to force.

A sanction of some kind must indeed be implied, but it need not be of a material kind, like death, imprisonment, or the forfeiture of goods. It need not be inflicted by any person; it may be nothing more than the hostility of public opinion, or the contempt of all honourable men. Beyond this, law is often obeyed for reasons indicated above, quite apart from even such vague external sanctions.

Vinogradoff's own definition is 'a set of rules imposed and enforced by a society with regard to the attribution and exercise of power over persons and things' (ib. p. 29). The only observation for any further discussion is the object and purpose of the rules. Put in another way, laws may be said to be aimed at the delimitation of wills. No society could hold together unless the wills of the individual members were limited and restrained; without this it would be a mere struggling mob; it would be chaos. It is by means of the limitation and direction of wills that it becomes an organized community. The rules effecting such limitation and direction are the laws of the society. But every limitation of one human will gives power to other human wills. It defines the scope within which they may move; it checks the free play, and the conditions under which they must move to give effect to their intentions either of the individual or of the society, alike as regards persons and things. Within that scope and subject to those conditions, it facilitates the exercise of power by other human wills.

B. Malinowski in his recent work on The Family among the Australian Aborigines (London, 1913, pp. 10–15), applying the concept of law to a very archaic type of society, revert to the test of sanction.

All social organization, he argues, implies a series of norms, which extend over the whole social life and regulate more or less strictly all the social relations. These norms are of different kinds and enforced by different forms of social sanction. He enumerates three. The first kind owes its validity to the evil results which are intrinsically connected with their violation. The norms included under the second head are observed because any departure from them would bring general contempt and ridicule upon the culprit: a form of chastisement to which the (Australian) natives are said to be extremely sensitive. It is only to the third kind, sanctioned by a more direct collective action, that he applies the term 'law,' because such norms 'enjoy an organized, more or less regulated, active social sanction,' involving violent or magical proceedings for the purpose of corporal coercion or punishment.

Let us examine this classification. The first kind of norm includes the Arrutta prohibition against eating meat which has been killed or even seen by certain relatives; the others disagree with him [who infringes the rule], and he would sicken and suffer severely' (Spencer-Gillen, p. 469).

Similar rules enforced by similar sanctions prevent boys after initiation from partaking of certain food before their wounds have healed, and women from eating meat during pregnancy (ib. 471). So among the Jajaryung, 'whenever a female child was promised in marriage to any man, from that very hour neither he nor the child's mother were permitted to look upon or hear each other speak, nor hear their names mentioned by others; for if they did, they would immediately grow prematurely old and instincively diseased' (ib. 471). Among the Aborigines of Victoria, 1878, ii. 156).

Such penalties are what we call supernatural. But they are not the only supernatural penalties known to the Australian natives. If a man among the Arrunta, during the early stages of his wife's pregnancy, attempts to throw a spear or boomerang at any animal, the spirit of the unborn child, 'he will cause the weapon to take a crooked course, and the man will know that he has lost his skill' (ib. 471). Or on a death certain female relatives of the deceased must not utter uncleaned and cataractated lamentations on their own bodies, but only on the dead man's, unless he has wounds on themselves or one another, as if in agony of
Thus supernatural penalties are not, even among the Blackfellows, simply evil results 'inextricably connected with' the violation of the norm, if by that phrase be meant an automatic operation of the sanction. They are often attributed to the action of ghosts and other imaginary or superhuman beings. On higher planes of culture we are familiar with offences against the gods, and innumerable tales are told of the vengeance of an outraged divinity. In this class of trespasses we have to do with violations of a social rule that are so alien from ordinary conduct that they entail religious horror, expressed in the fear of a special kind of punishment. It is this horror that makes a supernatural sanction effective. When the misfortune looked upon as the penalty overtakes a man, it is regarded as evidence of the trespass. The horror then fastens upon the guilty person and segregates him from his fellows. On the other hand, the consciousness of guilt often operates with overwhelming effect on the mind: men have been known to die from sheer terror when they have recognized their offence, though committed unconsciously.

Moari chiefs were fisced about with a very strict tabu. Not merely their persons, but everything which had come into contact with them, was tabooed. If everything that had once belonged to the dead man was tabooed. If everything that had once belonged to the dead man was sacred. If an inferior made use of any such object, the tabu would kill him. Tanoa, a high chief, once lost his tinder-box. Several persons who were so unfortunate as to find it and light their pipes from it, without knowing that it belonged to him, actually died from fright when they learned who the owner was (W. B. T. T. i. 235; T. C. V. i. 236). This was considered to be the penalty.

Punishment, when directly inflicted by society, is the expression of society's reprobation; and its severity roughly corresponds to the intensity of the feeling aroused by the offence. The mildest form in which public opinion thus declares itself against the offender is ridicule and contempt. These are a very real sanction—most of all in relatively primitive societies, where numbers are small and the individual members are brought into close contact, for escape is difficult, if not impossible. When active measures are taken, it is because the feeling aroused by the trespass is more intense, amounting to indignation, abhorrence, or fear. But, where measures are appropriate, they are not always taken by the community as a whole; they may be left to the group more directly aggrieved. When a man is slain, an offence in a community of several thousand, the community at large; but over and above this his kin is the sufferer by the loss of a member, and by the injury to its prestige, so that it devolves on the kindred to obtain reparation by slaying in turn the criminal or some member of his clan. The avengers are supported in such a case by public opinion. They are in effect the instruments of society: and the knowledge that they are thus acting in accordance with the major sanction and the tacit concurrence of the community strengthens their hands, and tends to be a powerful deterrent from wanton violation of the peace. When, however, death is imputed to witchcraft, active concurrence of the community in retaliation is apt to occur. Witchcraft—hostile magic—is forbidden by all relatively primitive societies. It is a secret treason from which no one feels safe, a subtle danger threatening to sink the individual in an agony of apprehension, fury, and abhorrence, and everybody joins in the hue and cry after the suspected criminal.

This is true even among a people so peaceful and little disposed to violence as the Eskimos. Nor do they limit public interference to cases of witchcraft; for, when a man has rendered himself generally disagreeable, he is sometimes expelled from the village. In any other way, some one is deputed to put him to death.
LAW (Primitive)

(O. Crantz, Hist. of Greenland, London, 1767, i. 154; P. Boas, Ethn., Hist. xiv, (New York, 1906-07) 117, (1908).) The weak point here, as a more recent writer on the Eskimos remarks, is to an externality (V. Stephens, My Life with the Eskimos, London, 1912, p. 365). On the other hand, so far from being the vicious a serious fault—often one that may be followed up by death. But to fix attention on the sanctions—and that sanctions—can be to test the law in a community relatively primitive is to limit the definition of law to that which concerns us as the whole provinces of law. The religious side of life, so far as it is enforced by sanctions not involving the organized and regulated action of the community, is entirely excluded from consideration. No one who knows how profoundly what we in our contemplation are apt to call 'superstition' dominates savage life can fail to appreciate the seriousness of the omission. So constant and deeply rooted the one ecclesiastical law is part of the law of the land in some highly civilized countries. In the oaths of office, in our courts we have a perpetual witness to the same instruction, once and again. The administration of the law. Oaths are an appeal to the divinity to attest the truth of the evidence. They are a relic of the ordeals once held conclusively to determine on which side justice lay. Ordeals are still in use in the lower culture. Courts of law are there often held as they were in classic times, in the temples of the gods and under the presidency of priests and medicine-men; nor had such practices ceased in Europe until the Middle Ages came to a close.

Equally, no account is taken of the class of rights enforceable by civil procedure, which has attained so remarkable a development among the black races of Africa. Among those rights the property to property, directly or indirectly, occupy an important place. Private property is but feebly represented in the social institutions of the Australian natives; and the complaints that constitute offenses and the criminal law, are in more than one way a danger to the society than of what we should call the civil position. Hence it may not have been necessary for Malinowski to take into account this class of rights. When, however, we come to inquire whether his definition can be applied to social conditions elsewhere, we cannot overlook them.

No less serious is the omission of constitutional law. Enough they are in the scale of civilization, the Australian savages are not quite ignorant of constitutional law. The population is composed of a number of tribes, each of which occupies exclusively a tract of country. The boundaries of this tract are recognized by the adjacent tribes. The members of the tribe are bound together by a common language and common institutions, differing in more or less from those of their neighbors, and by a feeling of solidarity, if not a definite alliance. Each tribe is divided into local groups. There is no chief of a whole tribe; but each local group, speaking generally, has its headman, whose authority is exercised by the council of elders. He is assisted by a council of the elders, which deals with the internal affairs of the group and its external relations, and whose decision is the same as that of the group. The office of headman is sometimes hereditary, though even then it is frequently conditioned by ability. The local group is made up of families, each of them ruled by the husband and father with large powers over his wife and children, and often of his brothers. Local groups are independent of one another, but frequently unite for the purposes of war and of religious rites and festivals. The tribe is, moreover, with rare exceptions, divided into clans, descendants of a group of clans, descendent sometimes only through females, in other cases only through males. In the latter case the clan tends to be coincident with the local group, for the wife usually goes to reside in the husband's clan. The organization is thus rudimentary; it is none the less real on that account. That of the Andaman islanders is in most respects even more rudimentary, except in that there are few, if any, of a chief of the tribe over the various local groups.

A type of constitution, very interesting because it clearly shows how the social and political relations of a people are dependent upon economic conditions, is that of the Yakuts. They inhabit the steppes of north-eastern Siberia. In former times they were simple nomads deeply dependent on their horses, which found pastureage on the steppe and supplied their owners with food and the material for their houses and sledges. The minimum drove on which a family of four persons could live consisted of ten heads, that is to say, five mares, one stallion, one two-year-old colt, and one three-year-old colt. This would hardly keep such a family from distress. A maximum, on the other hand, of from three hundred to five hundred heads would allow a community of fifty persons to live in comparative ease. This community, whether large or small, would be composed of individuals who seem to have regarded one another as related, and may be referred to as the kindred, or as the tribe. Between the members of the sib there was community of goods. Kindred seems formerly to have been termed exclusively by the female, but is now traced in the male, line. The number of persons comprised in the sib is thus dependent upon the number of a head that can be pasturage at any given station, and the number of persons who can be found to manage and be maintained by it. Every sib is divided into two halves, called uye, and sub-tribe, or nasled. The land of each tribe is appropriated, and from time to time re-appropriated, between the sub-tribes, and that of the sub-tribe is still more frequently re-appropriated between the uye-mass, or kindreds. Every kindred chooses a chief for this purpose, and every nasled an officer to superintend the distribution. But these officials do not appear to have any other authority. The sib (and, so far as can be gathered, the nasled) is governed by a mass-meeting or general assembly of the sib (or nasled), at which the common affairs are settled by the oldest and most influential members, but subject to the general opinion. The sub-tribes were divided into lighter as the head, and the women to the more the criminal than of what we should call the civil position. Hence it may not have been necessary for Malinowski to take into account this class of rights. When, however, we come to inquire whether his definition can be applied to social conditions elsewhere, we cannot overlook them.

On the whole, in a wide but poor and thinly peopled land the life of the Yakuts, occupied with the care of their herds and the occasional diversions of hunting and fishing, was externally one of peace.
ancestry. The topoi that encircled them was derived not merely from their own personal behavior, but from the divine forefathers of both, to whom the children and priests. A curious conse- quence of the view thus attached to heredity was that the children of the father were held to be more kinsmen than his father. On the birth of a son the prestige of the father, or at least some portion of it, was automatically transferred to the child. He was made a partner in the ancestral ladder, with a longer array of forefathers. Within the family the paternal authority was nearly absolute; slavery was common; and the head of the family could put his slaves to death with impunity. If he ve- nured, however, to go the length of taking the life of wives or children, his case would be considered as if the courts were liable to a claim for compensation or to vengeance at the hands of the kindest of the multitude. In the latter case he would be held to be accountable by the tribe. The power of a chief also was nominally absolute within his genes or tribe, as the case might be. Both domestic and foreign affairs, however, were debated by the principal chiefs in open assembly, at which the warriors, women, and even children were allowed to speak. The chiefs were thus made amenable to public opinion, though the final decision apparently rested with them. Public quarrels between chiefs are referred to the magistrates and, or head of the tribe, and his flat is generally conclusive. His authority is much respected; yet subordination is scarcely known, as, provided a chief had seen with his people, they may be said to any other party, independent of his authority; the people supporting them. This is a state of things, it is obvious, would give abundance of preven- tion to the wars to which the people were addicted. The head- chief of the tribe was not necessarily the leader in war; the war- chief was elected (J. S. Folsch, Manners and Customs of the Natives of the New South Wales, 34 ft.; Taylor's op. cit. p. 350 fl.; E. Tregear, JAI X. 1899113). The Bantu and Negro populations of Africa are also all more or less warlike. Without going into details, which would be tedious as well as unnecessary, in view of the different types of society already presented, it may be said that among them a still higher organization has been developed, culminating in kingdoms ruled by hereditary monarchs subject to certain forms observed; otherwise the enforcement is law- less violence or individual caprice; it has not the consent and the power of the collectivity behind it. These forms are frequently, in the early stages of culture, crude enough; but they are forms rec- ognized as the proper means of obtaining repaira- tion for wrong. The sentence of death passed by a band of Eskimos on an obnoxious person, though passed in his absence and without his knowledge, is the sentence of the community, given in a manner more or less formal. In Australia such a decision would be arrived at by consultations of the governing elders. In either case it would carry the weight of the community. When the duty of reparation for the death or injury of a man is left to his kin, it is because this is the recognized means of restraining lawless aggression. Stigma and conse- nment would follow their neglect of vengeance; but for others to exact the blood-feud of the new offence, to arouse a new blood-feud; it would be outside their duty; it would not be in pursu- ance of the law. The fends resulting from this method of enforcing the norm against bloodshed within the community are, however, in time perceived to lead to new dangers. To obviate these more than one method is available. The rule of a life for a life is commuted for a pecuniary compen- sation, agreed on between the parties concerned. This compensation is generally applied to a recognized tribunal. With the advance of culture this is often, as among the ancient in- habitants of the British Isles, both Celtic and Teutonic, elaborated into a regular scale of pay- ments in accordance with the rank of the offended and is applied to other injuries—to those against property as well as against the person. The beg- innings of the practice of referring outrages for redress to a recognized tribunal appear very low down in culture.

Among the tribes of south-western Victoria 'persons accused of wrong-doing get one month's notice to appear before the assembled tribes—trials—sent—imprisoned and en- forced by society, whether or not a definite external sation be annexed to it. For public opinion and the individual conscience will co-operate to ensure its observance. We may then define law as a set of rules imposed and enforced by a society, for the conduct of social and political relations. To a large extent it is derived from the same ground. The law of every community is an index to its morals; and especially is it so with relatively primitive peoples. Among them the standard of the idea of motive as affecting the value of an act has not yet been fully evolved. To such peoples, for instance, the unconscious violation of a tabu entails the same guilt as the most deliberate; it is equally heinous to slay a man by accident and with malice aforesight. The distinction drawn by our morality between the different classes of horri- cite, and adopted by our law, matters nothing to them; bloodshed even in self-defence demands atonement. Until the individual conscience has been cultivated by the reflexion of generations on the social norms and their adaptation to the changing environment, and until the emotions have been disciplined by law, a serious effort, if not to the general wellbeing, at all events to the maintenance of the existing customs and constitution of society, morality cannot emerge as distinct from law. The process is slow. It is indispensable to the growth of civilization. It is one of the most important dynamic forces con- tributory to that growth. But its operation is slow.

On the other side, law is concerned with pro- cedure. Actively to enforce compliance with the rules governing a society, or to punish non-com- pliance, certain steps have to be taken, and certain forms observed; otherwise the enforcement is law- less violence or individual caprice; it has not the consent and the power of the collectivity behind it. These forms are frequently, in the early stages of culture, crude enough; but they are forms rec- ognized as the proper means of obtaining repaira- tion for wrong. The sentence of death passed by a band of Eskimos on an obnoxious person, though passed in his absence and without his knowledge, is the sentence of the community, given in a manner more or less formal. In Australia such a decision would be arrived at by consultations of the governing elders. In either case it would carry the weight of the community. When the duty of reparation for the death or injury of a man is left to his kin, it is because this is the recognized means of restraining lawless aggression. Stigma and conse- nment would follow their neglect of vengeance; but for others to exact the blood-feud of the new offence, to arouse a new blood-feud; it would be outside their duty; it would not be in pursu- ance of the law. The fends resulting from this method of enforcing the norm against bloodshed within the community are, however, in time perceived to lead to new dangers. To obviate these more than one method is available. The rule of a life for a life is commuted for a pecuniary compen- sation, agreed on between the parties concerned. This compensation is generally applied to a recognized tribunal. With the advance of culture this is often, as among the ancient in- habitants of the British Isles, both Celtic and Teutonic, elaborated into a regular scale of pay- ments in accordance with the rank of the offended and is applied to other injuries—to those against property as well as against the person. The beg- innings of the practice of referring outrages for redress to a recognized tribunal appear very low down in culture.

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If a member of one clan had been in time of peace killed by one of another clan, the clan which had just committed the murder would send to the friends of the murderer, and invite them to bring him for trial before the entire tribe. If, after trial, they were found guilty of committing the crime, the clan that established their guilt (Howitt, 341). It is a very widespread practice of the North American Indians to have a council to pronounce a sentence on the offender or the person liable on the claim. In certain cases, such as an accusation of witchcraft, the matter is decided by means of an ordeal by which the accused has to pass. The doctrine that a sinner is made an object of ridicule in the presence of the tribunal that judges him has indeed been observed, and in the background, indeed, to at least one tribe in the Congo basin, recent scientific explorers have been unable to discover a trace of it (cf. Torday and T. A. Joyce, Les Bushongo, Brussels, 1910, p. 76).

With procedure morals have little directly to do. It is sufficient that its rules are part of the law, and as such must be observed. How far any modification of those rules has in relatively primitive communities arisen out of moral considerations is a question to determine which the data do not at present exist.

The question must be answered: Whence does a law derive that recognizes what determines its validity as a rule imposed and enforced by society? Even in highly organized and civilized communities the answer given by Austin is incomplete and unsatisfactory. For, though the written law emerging from the specific act of legislation is a rule definitely formulated and prescribed by the sovereign power, we are still left without any account of the source of that large body of rules equally binding on the community and known as the 'unwritten law.' In England called the 'common law.' In many modern States the law is wholly contained in a code supplemented and amended by subsequent legislation. Where there is no code, legislation preempts, and is ultimately founded on, the unwritten law. This unwritten law is found expressed in judicial decisions given upon the cases brought before the courts from time to time. This was a process well known in ancient Roman jurisprudence. Decisions merely profess to declare the pre-existing law, and apply it to the relations of the parties in litigation. They may, in effect, formulate and make binding a new rule. If so, this is done by adopting and applying some principle already held by the community to be morally binding. When the result is generally accepted, the decision becomes law; and, though not the product of legislation, it has the same consequences. Otherwise it is overruled by a subsequent decision, or by the sovereign power.

In a relatively primitive society there is not always an authority capable of formulating a legislative act. All laws are unwritten. They depend for their validity, like the decisions of English judges, on acceptance and recognition. To a large extent they come down from remote and unrecorded antiquity; and on that plane of culture the forces of conservatism, influential as they are with us, wield immensely greater power. The custom of the fathers acquires a religious sanctity and apart from its appropriateness to the circumstances and condition of the people. The feeling was accurately if not completely expressed by the Bucotic who told an inquisitive and supercilious foreigner that he knew only one thing, namely, that it was right to maintain the customs of one's ancestors, and that it was not right to apologize for them to foreigners. The answer was incomplete because it did not give adequate place to the religious feelings of the devotion—in short, the complex of emotions that guard and preserve the institutions of savage society.

Theosaic Fang, we are informed, are not only not quick to adopt reforms or to introduce new methods; they are more or less the slaves of custom, and have a superstitious dread of departing from the unaltered usages of the 'heirs of life' (Jaffé xxi. [1899] 80). The inhabitants of the island of Serang, one of the Mombasas, are reported to have an aversion to novelties, and all the inhabitants of the islands have an insult to the forefathers from whom the old customs have descended (J. G. F. Roullet, La souk- en brocherige resan tamasho Solde, Coquillette, 1888, p. 191). The olum of the Bantus is told almost everywhere. To such lengths did a Bhumara chief carry his obstinacy against the effects of the Christian faith that he had obtained some paint and planted it, although he allowed him to reap and eat of it, he would not allow him to plant it a second time. Such is the collective opinion and the ancient usages. Custom is the law for them, and not to follow it is in line with that in which we abuse the use of our arms. It is an insult to the forefathers from whom the old customs have descended.

The circumstances and condition of a people, however, are never quite steadfast; they are always changing, although slowly and insensibly, with everything else in the world. Appropriate customs arise gradually and unmarked, and are adapted from time to time to these slow changes with the same gradual and imperceptible progress. Hence to the numerability of their frequent appearance to be unchanging from the beginning, the unaltering bequest of the wisdom of the primeval ancestors, or a necessary part of the scheme of things with which they cannot conceive of the existence of society. Yet it is evident that both the original customs themselves and the changes that they undergo, however gradually and imperceptibly, must have been initiated by individuals. The collective opinion and the collective will are merely the concurrence of individual opinions and individual wills. Perception of this individual action is indicated in the traditions of many peoples; and the institution of individual legislation may not in any specific case be trustworthy as history, it assuredly points to a consciousness of the fact of change and of change by individual initiation. Sometimes, no doubt, a Lycurgus might arise, and by force of his personality and genius impress his countrymen with his opinions and will to the extent of legislation. More usually a change, when recognized as such, is the result of long suggestions among the leaders of the tribe. Spencer and Gillen give sound reasons for thinking that this is a course from time to time adopted by the aborigines of Central Australia (op. cit., p. 12). If they are right, the conclusion cannot be limited to the tribes described by them. Such a change would not be ventured upon unless the elders were satisfied that the tribe was ripe for it. When announced, it would have to run the gauntlet of criticism by the whole tribe, and its validity would ultimately rest on general acceptance. In the lapse of time the superseded law might sink out of memory; the new law would then be regarded as of primeval authority.

At a somewhat later stage in civilization the lawgiver invokes the authority of the gods for his legislation. The Mosaic Law is ascribed to Jahveh; Hammurabi receives his famous code from Shamash; Minos is instructed by Zeus. In this way the general acceptance and permanence of the law would be secured by investing it with the sanctity of religion. The same method is adopted in the legislation of King Alfred the Great, who, in collecting and adapting the laws of his predecessors, placed at the head of the compilation the divinely inspired Decalogue and other Mosaic concepts. Acceptance is facilitated by the institution still characteristic of the institutions of such a society. We may analyze them under the
heads of law, religion, medicine, morals, and so forth, appear to distinguish between different kinds of law; we may sever religion from medicine and medicine from magic; the members of the community itself do none of these things; no such analysis is possible to them. 

The distinction is for them bound together into one equally authoritative and homogeneous whole. Each is part of all the rest, and cannot be severed from them. They see nothing extravagant in putting a man to death in the name of a god, nothing incongruous in combining in the same code ritual, moral, agricultural, and medical with what we understand by strictly juridical prescriptions, prohibitions of homicide, rape, theft, and fraud with meticulous directions as to food—what must be avoided, what may be eaten, and how it must be prepared—the treatment of disease, the method of tillage, and the garb in mourning. The same code in the same divine name and with equal authority may make regulations for the conduct of commercial transactions and of the most intimate conjugal relations, as well as for a complex and splendid ceremonial of divin worship: power, in other words, is vested in all these, and in the hands of the same source. 

The same distinction thus found has always been one of the chief hindrances to missionary enterprise. To break with one custom is to break with all; to renounce the religious ideas of the ancestors is to renounce the entire scheme of culture within which they are bound up. The same indistinguish has retarded scientific inquiry into the jurisprudence of the lower culture. Observers have been apt to record practices, not laws. Striking as cultural differences between savage culture and ours have riveted the attention, to the neglect of the principles underlying all social organization. Consequently the meaning of those differences has too frequently been missed, and their place in the development of civilization has been misunderstood. 

Thus in a scientific periodical we are told by a writer who has lived and laboured among the tribe that the Fang have no system of law, no judge or tribunal for punishment of crime. Yet he immediately goes on to say: "Then murder, robbery against native custom;" and he describes the procedure for the purpose (JAF xiv. 76). 

A definite procedure for the purpose of settling claims made in open warfare may not be literally a system of law; it is at all events a long step in the evolution of jurisprudence. But the observation quoted shows that what the writer has is a highly civilized judicial system, such as he has been familiar with in his native land. He must be aware that the Fang, like all other tribes, have a body of customs having the force of law. They are the rules generally recognized and habitually observed, by means of which Fang society is held together. The particular procedure which he describes, if it discloses the want of a factorized armed with judicial authority, is not a picturesque but unjustifiable practice without sanction or recognition; it is a real juridical process. The author exhibits it by means of an example, thus: 

A Fang of the Edulis can steal goods or a woman from a Fang of the Nge clan. The Nge who has been wronged does not go to the offender for settlement, he goes to another near town and shoots the first gun he sees in the street, or, if it comes to open anger, he may shoot a woman. The owner of the goat or woman demands of the Nge his reason for doing so. The Nge replies, "The Fang living in your village have wronged me; I paid the palaver (his offence) on you." The third party then goes to the Nge and says, "Nge (giving the man's name) has shot my goat (or woman) because you have made trouble with him; he has put your palaver (trouble) on me. You must pay me the loss of the goat." The first man is now responsible and liable to the second party. Two wrongs have been done, and the second party has a right of redress. 

These steps are thus the formal and regular preliminary to a palaver, and are as well understood over a considerable area of the continent of Africa as the king's writ or a police-court summonus in Great Britain. So far from starting with an explosion of random rage, they are ingeniously calculated to enlist the active interest of the third party, and to render the wrong-doer liable in a double penalty—to the person injured by himself in respect of the original wrong, and to the third party in respect of the loss suffered by him at the hands of the letter. The palaver is likely 'talked' by the representatives of the respective parties before the representatives of their respective clans. Though it does not appear that these have any direct power to impose a fine or order payment of the claims, such a discussion must in most cases tend to compose the differences, for it informs the public fully on the merits of the dispute. And the aggressor knows that, if he fails to 'cut' the palaver, by paying a reasonable compensation to the satisfaction of the aggrieved parties and their clans, he and his clan will have to run the certain risk of hostilities by two clans with public opinion behind them. The palaver therefore offers powerful incentives to peace, doubtless actively assisted by the representatives of the clans involved. 

It is, of course, perfectly true that the laws of the Fang, and all other relatively primitive societies, extend (as has been pointed out above) to many subjects that in the progress of civilization have dropped out of legislation. The use of the term 'law' in common parlance limits it to acts of the legislature and such other rules as are recognized by the courts of justice. It obscures for us the fact that many of the rules which we observe in daily life, though they are not amenable to the king's court or to parliaments or legislatures, are as much sanctions, and breach of which will subject us to penalties tending to exclude us from the society of our fellows and make life burdensome in other ways. By virtue of the indistinctness which we have already noted, savage mentality, though admitting a difference in the penalties, heeps all these rules together as customs. As such they are sacred. All alike they rest on a traditional basis; together they constitute the ethos of the society, which is not likely to be infringed. The variance of the point of view from that of the savage, the indifference or the comparative leniency with which we regard some acts or omissions which are of the greatest importance to him, and the emphasis which we lay on other acts or omissions that he treats as trivial are a measure of the distance of our civilization from his, and should not blind us to the fact that what we call the customs of a tribe are as much a body of laws as the Code Napoléon.
sections of the laws of the Herero, a very interesting tribe in Germany S.W. Africa, have been published by Eduard Dannert (Zentralbl. f. Volkskunde, 22, 1897, 1900). These might be expected from these compilations, from their practical purpose, contain little beyond the native laws so far as they are administered by the chiefs. Felix Meyer's "Wirtschafts- und Recht der Herero" (Berlin, 1905) comprises somewhat more. A more general work is "Recht der indigenen Völker in Afrika" by E. H. Pesch, 2 vols., Oldenburg (1907). The best and most comprehensive of the whole subject with abundant bibliographical references, is the same author's "Jurisprudenza" (2 vols., 1894-95), to which may be added S. R. Steinmetz, "Rechtsverhältnisse von indigenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien," Berlin, 1905.

Articles devoted to jurisprudence, articles on the subject are occasionally found. Such articles are frequent in the "J.F.R.W.," Stuttgart, 1897 to date. One of the editors, Josef Kohler, devotes special attention to it. Accessible works on the general subject are those of Henry J. Sumner Maine, esp. his "Leçons sur l'Étude des Institutions," London, 1876. But it must be borne in mind in reading them that a generation of further research has resulted in conclusions widely differing from his on several important points.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

LAW (American).—In so vast a culture-area as the two Americas, with their wide range of stages of civilization, from savages tribes of S. California or the Amazonians, through Aztecs and Peruvians, the concept and the scope of law necessarily present extreme diversities; and the difficulty of the task of preparing a Corpus juris Americana—a work urgently needed by all students of comparative ethnology and sociology—is enhanced by the scantiness of the records which have been preserved of extinct or obsolente American Indian stocks, as well as by our almost utter ignorance of many living peoples, particularly in S. America, while scarcely any of the earlier observers studied from a juristic point of view the tribes with whom they came in contact.

It would be wrong to conclude that the American Indian, even of the most undeveloped stock, is a lawless being. In a very real sense he may be essentially more law-abiding than those who are commonly regarded as highly civilized; for to him the law is well-nigh synonymous with custom (q.v.); it is not something imposed from without, or supported by pleas of the greatest good of the greatest number, or exercised by a class who would be regarded with antipathy by many members of the community, or a body whose judgements, ingeniously and sophistically to be eluded or circumvented by clever legal ingenuity, or a purely human convention to be flouted and broken by an inlawless individual of sufficient strength to do so.

1. NORTH AMERICA.—The general basis of N. American Indian government was the family—on a totemistic foundation—which formed a part of the gens, and this, in turn, of the tribe. Matriarchy was the rule, and the women possessed much influence in the election of the chiefs, of whom there might be more than one, so that separate chiefs presided over military and civil affairs among the Iroquois, Muskogeeans, Chippewa, Dakota, and Pomo, and sometimes, as among the Caribs, there were chiefs only in time of war. The position and the privileges of the chieftainship varied among the different stocks, and the great problem here is connected with that of the origin of the kingship (see the series of artt. on KING). Among many tribes, such as the Iroquois, Cadto, Omaha, Chippewa, Arapaho, Comanche, the Hidatsas, the Chippewas, generally, Maidu, Yurok, Mikwok, Kutchin, Tlingit, and Kaniagmint, the chieftainship was elective, depending on the women or the shaman, often passed only to certain families, but conditioned in great part by wealth, by personal ability. Elsewhere the office was hereditary, unless grave obstacles forbade, as among the Natchez, the Carolina tribes, Pomo, Pomo, Gallinagues, Guadalu, Utah, and, under certain conditions, the Dakota. Other and other tribes both systems were in simultaneous use, as among the Abenaki, with whom the sachem, or supreme ruler of a number of tribes, held office by hereditary right, while the individual tribal heads, or saqamoues were elected.

The power of the American Indian chief is restricted, sometimes by more elaborate tribal councils, as among the Comanche, sometimes—and more effectually—by law. Only rarely, as among the Natchez and the Santa (Kosch), is the power which might become tyrannical. Frequently he is little more than primus inter pares, being especially the case in the less organized forms of government, such as the Maidu, Karok, and Californians generally. Much, however, depended on a chief's personal ability, notable instances of wielders of wide power being the Wampaagog Massaoget and the Powhatan Wahunoseok.

The territorial scope of the chief's power also varies widely. In a few regions in N. America—most notably the Iroquois (q.v.)—real states and confederacies were established, but elsewhere—as on the west coast and among the Apache, Comanche, Shoshoni, and Eskimo—each chief was head only of a village. The Iroquois had developed the elements of international law, having a regular system of sending envoys, whose persons were sacred, to adjudicate disputes, make peace, and tribes less advanced politically possess the rudiments of similar institutions.

In very few instances the chieftainship is traced back to a divine origin, the most notable example being the Natchez chief, who was descended from the sun, although occasionally, as among the Nutka, the chief is at the same time a 'medicine-man,' or, as among the Calusa, he was believed to possess supernatural power, and was deported or killed if he did not use this for the welfare of his people.

Among the Iroquois an insolvent debtor was tied to a tree and flogged, but among the Oregon tribes he became a slave. Death usually cancelled debt, as among the Eskimos. As regards contracts, the same general rules held as among ourselves, although the Tingit and, with some reservations, the Easterners, were permitted to make the other party might withdraw from a contract upon which he had agreed. For the American Indian laws regarding property see art. PROPERTY.

American Indian criminal law is concerned mainly with murder and theft. For murder have been considered in art. BLOOD-FEUD (Primitive). The normal punishment for witchcraft was death, which was also the penalty for incest among some of the Carolina tribes, for robbing a grave, as among the Chinook, for cowardice, as among the Kansa, and for desertion by an adopted prisoner of war, as among the Mis- souri tribes, this being regarded as treason to his new tribe. As regards theft, the chief was generally bound to make simple restitution; but the Huron required double restitution; and among some of the Carolina tribes, as also among the Tingit, the thief was made to pay twice what the damage required, became a slave. Among the Comanche, murder, adultery, theft, and failure to cure the sick were punished by death. As a rule, however, even the gravest crimes might be commuted by fines (cf. art. BLOOD-FEUD). Legal procedure naturally varied according to the stage of civilization attained by each tribe. In the most primitive strata the punishment for non-capital offenses was usually inflicted by the tribal head of capital crime the persons injured—or their kin—themselves acted as executioners. Anything approximating a formal court was, however, ex-
tremely rare; the tribal councils normally took cognizance only of personal matters; other matters affecting the tribe as a whole. Nevertheless, totem and tribal courts were found among the Huron, which acted especially on charges of murder, treason, and witchcraft. Any error in the form of process and original papers quashed the whole case. Certain Missouri tribes had courts of arbitration, whose decisions it was an obligation of honour to fulfill, while elsewhere considerable influence is exercised by the tribal councils, as among the Forti and the Iroquois.

2. Mexico and Central America.—The Aztec sovereignty was regarded as the earthly representative of the gods, whence implicit obedience was due, and his power was absolute. Like the Peruvian Inca, he was assisted by many officials, and there seems to have been a special department of justice, while in each large city there was a viceroy (cizacuahuitl) controlling both the general administration and justice, and constituting the final court of appeal in criminal cases. The rules as to the succession of the Mexican kingship differed in various times and places. In Tezcuco, Tetzcoc, Tlaxcala, and other parts, the eldest son was normally the heir to the throne; but in Mexico it was usually the eldest brother or the eldest brother's eldest son who succeeded, though there seems to have been no rigid rule of succession. Ability and character being more potent in the eyes of the electors than mere kinship to a deceased ruler. Over the Zapotec city of Yopaa a hereditary priest-king reigned.

In the smaller cities there were judges who decided minor cases, referring others to the higher courts, e.g., to those consisting of three judges, who sat under the control of each cizacuahuitl. Both Mexico and Tezcuco seem to have been divided into six circuits, each represented at the capital by two judges, who formed the lower court for important cases, the court of last resort consisting of twelve or thirteen judges appointed by the sovereign, apparently for life, and required to assemble, under the presidency of the king or his representative, for ten or twelve days every four months (80 days). Any bribery, negligence, or partiality exposed them to vagaries, and, if repeated, to degradation or even death; and the entire court system was worked in minute detail. Besides the regular courts, there were special courts for marriage, for oratory affairs.

The Mexican laws, which recognized circumstantial evidence, seem to have been codified, and were administered strictly, though some leniency was shown to first offenders. The stern impartiality with which the judges acted was most admirable, and a high rank or kinship to the king was of no avail to the criminal; indeed, Nettahualpili put his own wife to death for immorality, and Nettahualpoyotl had his only legitimate son executed for high treason.

The best known portions of Mexican law are those relating to criminal procedure. Here the evidence of witnesses was requisite, and in the absence of witnesses, testimony should be given. Evidence was not always essential to begin prosecution, common reputation, as in cases of adultery, sometimes forming sufficient ground for legal proceedings. All grave crimes were punished by death, the mode of death varying according to circumstances, rank, etc. The death penalty was prescribed for murder (even of a slave), kidnapping, adultery, incest, rape, unnatural vice, pandering, whores, and interfering land grabbers, but the death penalty was also imposed on those expropriating others' property or the royal insignia, selling land already sold, selling stolen goods, falsifying weights, slander, drunkenness or other excesses of priests and royal retainers, military insubordination, flight from the enemy, permitting an enemy to escape, selling or releasing a prisoner of war, treason (involving slavery or banishment for kinmen to the fourth degree), and in Texascal the death of kindred to the seventh degree, murder as accusation before the king, false guardianship, striking or insulting a parent, squandering property, challenge to a duel, perjury, harboring an enemy of the State, and, according to some authorities, abortion and witchcraft of the opposite sex. A thief must not only make restitution, but also pay a fine to the treasury; under aggravating circumstances (as in the marketplace) or for repetition of the offence, he suffered death, but in Cuzeo he was blinded. Slavery was often a punishment for crime—e.g., for theft (apparently when the thief was unable to make the reparation demanded) and stealing another's child, as well as for debts arising from negligence, if the delinquent was unable to make compensation otherwise, failure to lodge information of high treason, unauthorized sale of property, obtaining goods on false credit, embezzlement, failure to pay imposts and taxes, etc.; mutiny, as well as the lips of a calumniator were pierced or partly cut off; and degrading punishments were inflicted in Anahuac for pandering. Drunkenness was an object of legislation, the person being shaved, his house torn down, and all public office denied him; in some instances he even suffered the death penalty. Imprisonment as a punishment was rare, the usual use of the prison being restricted to those condemned to death or sacrifice. The particula criminis in abortion was as severely punished as the principal, but received a milder penalty in cases of theft. Pardon might, however, be granted by the monarch, and certain festivals carried amnesty with them, while forgiveness by the injured party or his kinsman might mitigate a penalty.

All possible provision was made for the poor from the State treasury; and the laws of Tezcuco sought to protect the forests as well as agriculture, besides forbidding undue luxury—e.g., gold and silver vessels for the wealthy nobles. There was also among the Aztec a law of contracts which must be made public, and gambling debts were valid so far as they came within the law of contracts. Another form of contract was farming on shares. Interest on loans was unknown, but commissions on sale and deposits in pledge were common.

The Mayan sovereignty was hereditary in the male line, and the power of the king was absolute, though he was constantly advised by his nobles; among the Quiche the king seems to have been succeeded by his brother, the heir-presumptive being the king's eldest son. Among the Lacandones and Nicaranus the chiefship was elective, and among the latter the chief was practically subject to the council; in Darien and among the Mosquito, on the other hand, hereditary chiefs ruled; while in Chichen (in Yucatan) a priest-king held power, in which connexion it should be noted that the hereditary nobility of Maya civilization, such as Voton, Zamani, and Kakulcan, were both priests and kings.

The system of courts was elaborate, and it is noteworthy that both here and among the Quiche advocates (though probably not with a special legal training) were appointed to aid both the judges and the parties to the case. Inspectors seem to have traversed the country to see that justice was properly administered. There had been no power of appeal after a decision had once been rendered. In cases of grave crime, torture is said to have been employed at Vera Paz to elicit
testimony. The Maya punishments were death, enslavement, and fine; any detente, except for detention, was rare, though inflicted at Coban for non-payment of taxes. The death penalty usually involved confiscation of property and enslavement of the family; it was inflicted for murder (although in Yucatan and Nicaragua, in a case of extreme provocation or other extenuating circumstances only a fine was inflicted, while, if a man killed another's slave, he was required to pay damages. Stealing large amounts (San Salvador—full theft in Darier was from a temple, adultery (Darien, Yucatan, Izta, and Guatemala), rape (Guatemala), incest and seduction (Yucatan), sodomy (Nicaragua), treason, desertion, intercourse with payment of tribute to the king, kidnapping, killing the quetzal bird (Guatemala), disrespect for religion, lying in time of war (Pipile), sorcery, sexual relations with a foreigner (Carib), false testimony (Darien), and fornication between slaves (Vera Pac). Sometimes the choice between death and fine lay with the injured party, as for fornication and for poaching. Enslavement was the penalty for murder by a man whose wife was a slave (if the thief was unable to make restitution and also pay a fine to the royal treasury) or attempted robbery, continued unchanged in a woman, unsuccessful rape, and owning goods on false credit (Guatemala), repeated adultery (Vera Pac), cohabitation with another's female slave (Pipile). Small thefts and improper advances to a woman were punished by banishment in San Salvador, as was bigamy in Nicaragua, but thieving was penalized by mutilation in Darien; a degrading punishment was flagging for falsehood (Pipile), theft by a noble (Yucatan), and adultery (Honduras and Nicaragua). All but the most heinous offences could, however, be compounded by fines. Strict fulfilment of contracts was required, and they were made valid by the parties drinking in the presence of witnesses.

3. South America.—The general level of civilization is far lower in S. America than in the northern continent; indeed, the conditions are, broadly speaking, very little superior to those of the California tribes. The usual centre of government in S. America is the village, each village having its own chief. Succession to the chieftainship seems generally to be by inheritance, as among the Bororo, Uaupes, western Tupi, Araucanians, and the tribes along the Xingu; but sometimes, as among the Caribs, Chiquito, Guahibo, Cren, Coroeado, and Paraguaris, the eldest brother elected, though among some tribes, as the Tupiinambaras, only from a special family. Only rarely does he claim divine power, as when a chief near Coro asserted that he was creator and lord of earth. Unlike N. America, which is matriarchal, both matriarchy and patriarchy are found in S. America; hence succession is sometimes matriarchal, as in British Guiana and among the Warrarn, and sometimes patriarchal, as among the Uaees, Arhuacians, and the tribes along the upper Xinga, although among the latter, in default of a son, a sister's son becomes chief. In time of peace, the functions of the S. American chief are mainly conditioned by his personal ability, though in any event he is a squirellar rather than a ruler. He controls, in great measure, agricultural operations, the organization for hunting and fishing, determines on places of settlement, and, at least sometimes, settles disputes that may arise. Among the Karaya he protects orphans and illegitimate children, and among the Macusi he worships the river god. The importance of function he enjoys which is strikingly alien to his N. American fellow—his control of barter with neighbouring tribes and his duties as representative of his own village and as host to strangers. But the village, in N. America, is more democratic, although important to the Indian, than among the Arhuacians; commercial relations between different stocks lead to a greater development of the rudiments of international law than is the case in the northern forest. So it is carried that, among the Karaya, skill in conducting mercantile transactions is a more important qualification for chieftainship than ability in war, and even adopted prisoners of war may become chiefs if their business capacity is sufficient. In time of war the chief is greatly increased, as among the Caribs, Arhuacians, Mocho, and Puechho. If a chief is absent, he may be represented by a vice-chief, e.g., his sister; and in some cases his kinsman, e.g., his widow's brother, may act until another chief assumes formal office. Among the Panpeus tribes, on the contrary, the chief is authoritative only in time of peace. Village councils deliberate on affairs of general importance; and sometimes, as among the Arhuacians, sale of any part of the settlement is dependent on their approval, or, as among the Macusi, competing parties submit to their decision, while among the Panpeus tribes matters of religion come within their purview.

A further point of difference between S. and N. American governments is the greater power of the 'medicine-man' among the former. The functions of the medicine-man are not in matters that fringe upon the sphere of religion, e.g., in making war to revenge a murdered tribesman. However, great influence of the 'medicine-man' in N. America, he does not limit or circumscribe the power of the chief as he does in S. America.

The execution of justice usually depends upon the wronged individual or his friends or kin, although the functions of the Macusi council, just mentioned, form an exception to this general rule. Where a crime affects the whole community, as in cases of witchcraft, all seek to punish the offender. Death, often at the instance of the pojo, is the penalty for sorcery and treason, as among the Arhuacians, or for a woman who is unlawfully present at dances or in the men's house, as among the Chambira and some of the tribes along the upper Xinga, as well as among the Arhuacians. Minor punishments are flogging or blinding, or for theft among the Brazilian. Among the Arhuacians, torture may be used to extort a confession of guilt.

Occasionally legal responsibility is highly developed, as among the Goa-jure, where one who lends an animal is responsible for any damage which it may do, and who sells intoxicants for any mishap that may result. The Brazilians are acquainted with a system of deposits in pledge.

4. Peru and the Chibchas.—The culture of Peru stands quite isolated in S. America, where a high degree of civilization has been secured by no other people except the Chibchas (q.v.). The Peruvian government was essentially a socialistic despotism. Like the N. American Natchez, the Peruvians believed that their Inca was descended from the sun, whence he united within his system all the religious power, and was regarded as perfect. He was aided by a host of officials, themselves under strict inspectors, and everything was regulated to the minutest detail; in the giving of tribute, for instance, the natives of Pasto, being decrease, stupid and dirty, were required to contribute at least some quota in the form of a levy of vermin. Poverty and idleness were as impossible as avarice; but, on the other hand, in the southern part of the State stilled all initiative and all personal endeavour, placing everything on one dead, though relatively lofty, level. Land, for instance, was
apportioned by the State to the individual in proportion to the size of his family, and the allotment was changed annually according to the change of his family size. The allotment was also of similar size elsewhere, as among the Brazilians and Huron. Labour was required of all—even children of five had their appointed tasks—and this labour was as meticulously regulated as were clothing, food, the care of animals, the gathering of the sick, the poor, and orphans and widows. The succession to the kingship, as well as to the principal offices of State, was in general—though there were exceptions, and the authorities stood most of the time in agreement—by inheritance in the male line.

Obedience to law was a marked characteristic of the Peruvians, particularly as law was of divine origin, and violation of it was believed to bring the wrath of the gods upon the land. The judges, who were supervised by inspectors and obliged to give an account of their administration, were bound by definite laws, and from their decisions there was no appeal. Important cases were tried before the higher officials, e.g. provincial governors. The severity of punishment was mitigated by alleviating circumstances, such as a first offense, physical disability of the offender, and necessity. Parents shared in punishment for offenses committed by their children, and sometimes the superior was made a co-defendant with his inferior. On the other hand, men of rank were punished more severely than the ordinary citizen; e.g., if one of the Inca's retainers committed the smallest theft, he suffered death.

The death penalty was frequently inflicted, as for abortion, immorality, adultery, murder, ordinary theft, sorcery, the injury of crops or persons extirpated, fornication by a vestal of the sun (her lover and her whole kindred suffering with her), blasphemy of the sun, cursing the Inca, bridge-burning, etc.; lesser offenses were punished with imprisonment; idlers were flogged; and even lying and slyness of housekeeping were visited with legal penalties.

The Chibcha ruler possessed despotic power. Succession passed first to the sister's son, or, in default of him, to the deceased ruler's brother. The laws were severe, and are remarkable for the number of fines which they levied, thereby enriching the State. It was also a capital crime to murder, rape (if the culprit was married, his wife might be exposed to double the outrage which he had committed), incest, sodomy, and cowardice in war. In some cases the event that might instead be forced to wear women's clothing. The thief was blinded; and other forms of mutilation are also mentioned as penalties. The nobles usually suffered degrading punishments, such as shaving off of the hair or lugging by their wives.


LAW (Babylonian).—Babylonian law naturally was based upon ancient custom. The origin of such custom, however, is often hidden from us in their writings, because the laws argue back from historic conditions to the pre-historic implications, but the methods usually adopted are guess in the dark. The invention of writing and the use of clay as the material have combined to preserve documentary evidence of the methods also of observation, the law of Babylonia to a very remarkable degree. The disputes which arose among the ancient Babylonia were settled by a court consisting of judges and a group of assessors. The law of Babylonia was thus a very remarkable code. The disputes which arose among the ancient Babylonia were settled by a court consisting of judges and a group of assessors. The law of Babylonia was thus a very remarkable code. The disputes which arose among the ancient Babylonia were settled by a court consisting of judges and a group of assessors...

1 This we shall usually quote as 'the Code.'
We must therefore bear in mind that Babylonian law has its roots in Sumerian soil; and, while Semitic customs were retained where race prejudice or religious considerations prohibited, the regulations that the law had set up to govern the settled civilization of the community were due to economic necessity rather than to racial characteristics. They had been elaborated by the Semites, but Sumer had assimilated them as too valuable to alter or discard. The Code of Hammurabi embodies the judgments of a long series of judges acquainted with an already formulated system of law which had considered most of the questions involved in the social system of Sumer, and the need for any further enactments arose from the conflict between ancient law as found in the land and a recent custom due to the modifications introduced by the new race. For the dynasty to which Hammurabi belonged rose to power as the result of a fresh immigration of a Semitic folk called 'Amorites.' The Semitic speech already in use in Babylonia was known as Akkadian, but that of the new-comers showed marked differences from it and affinities with the Western dialects. We may assume that customs marked by similar affinities came in with it.

Hence we cannot claim even racial purity for Babylon; it is the product of the interplay of many peoples. It would be a task outside our limits to attempt to unravel the threads which are easily discernible in its texture — even if the materials for judging of their composition were available.

Curiously enough, the Semitic scribes who adopted the Sumerian methods of writing compiled extensive lists of words and phrases, such as would occur in legal documents, and attached Semitic renderings. These lists have naturally proved of great assistance in reading the Sumerian portions of the many thousands of legal documents, such as conveyances, deeds of sale, leases, bonds, marriage settlements, receipts, and other memoranda, which have come down to us. They were obviously drawn up to assist young lawyers, who were to become notaries. By a happy accident one scribe has preserved what looks like an extract from a code and has been called the 'Sumerian Family Laws' (see E.E. iv. 257, v. 447).

The great Code of Hammurabi was often copied even at the time when promulgated, and copies went as a living model in the cuneiform schools of Assyria (688–626 B.C.), which reproduce its decrees with marvellous fidelity 1200 years later. Copies, made in Babylonia, of even later times, exist. They were divided into books, or chapters, and read and commented upon almost to the end of Babylonian power. But copies of other later laws also exist, which show marked changes. The legal documents of the Chaldean period of Nebuchadnezzar and his successors also show changes. We may, for want of a more precise term, call this Neo-Babylonian law.

With the details of a citizen's rights and obligations we are not well acquainted. Much is assumed in the Code as well known which we would gladly be told explicitly. The Code recognizes the amelu, a free-born person of high birth and standing, the maskabu, a free born person of low birth, and the seredu, slave. These three great classes were separately treated. A slave could be sold or pledged, and had no wage for his services. If injured by a third person, his injury was assessed, though he received no compensation from the one who had done the injury to his master. The master seems to have had the power to punish him, but not to kill him, though he might brand him. The master clothed and fed him, and paid him wages. A slave's property, or wages, from a month, at any rate in some cases. He might acquire property and even marry a free woman. He could buy his freedom and sometimes was freed by adoption. The slave girl often bore children to her master, but acquired rights only thereby, so that she would not be sold outright, and even when insolent to her mistress could only be reduced to slave rank again, and was free in any case on her master's death. The slave went freely about the city without a district, but was strictly guarded against flight. Any one who captured a runaway slave and restored him to his master was entitled to a fixed reward. To harbour a slave or convey him at his flight was severely punished. To obliterate the slave's brand was a capital crime.

Some slaves, possibly captives in war, were owned subject to a fixed period of State service, extending to four or five yearly terms, either for war or for public works.

The status of the maskabu was that of a plebeian. It may well have embraced the whole population, not of noble birth, who yet were free. The legal documents rarely refer to such members of the community except to name the quarter of the city where they dwelt. Injury done to them was punished more severely than injury done to a slave, but less severely than injury to an amelu. But the maskabu had less to pay for his crimes than a noble would, just as his offences lessen.

In all other respects he was free, and in many laws he is included among the amelu, being named solely when treated as distinct.

The amelu was properly a man of family, his genealogy being enrolled, his birth, marriage, and death being subjects of registration, and he was by strict interpretation an aristocrat — a title borne by the king himself. His status covered not only the rich proprietors, but all his military, religious, and professional classes. Gilds of artisans existed, and had special quarters in which they usually dwelt. They were inter-connected by family relations, but admitted as apprentices both slaves and freemen. Nevertheless, they ranked as amelu.

The king was in theory a benevolent despot, and the prosperity of his land depended to an extraordinary degree on his powers of hard work and organization. He took cognizance of all sorts of affairs throughout his kingdom — oppression, distress, neglect of officials, building, sheep-shearings, and movements of military measures. Above all, he was the source of justice and the fount of honour. He had long ceased to be owner of all land, though conquest made him owner of much territory, especially the land of those killed in battle. He had his own estates as a private person as well as entailable endowments, as also had the great officers of State. But he had to buy like a private individual if he wished for more, or at any rate compensate at market price those whom he displaced. In most cities there was a palace which was usually occupied by his viceroys, or by a local magnate. Thus the ribudu, or city mayor, had his palace. It was a hereditary office subject to royal approval.

Under the 1st dynasty a great many military or feudal retainers were settled in the land. To each was assigned a private holding of land, house, and garden, together with some stock, for which he owed service. The service was 'the king's errand,' whether for war, garrison duty, postal duty, or command of troops or of gangs of workmen. The holding was liable, but refusal to go on the king's errand forfeited it and life together. It was carefully protected from oppression or the encroachments of higher officials, and was reserved for his son, who returned from foreign service within three years. If he had a son able to manage it in his father's
absence, it was entrusted to him; if not, the duty was delegated to a fœcium tenens, one-third being reserved to the holder's family. Neglect on his part, however, was punishable with a fine. If the tenant was not supplied with his portion and became ransomed at his own expense, but, in default of means to ransom himself, his city was bound to ransom him if he paid the equivalent. If the land became private property, much was always entailed, or subject to redemption by next of kin. The temple also always retained much in its own possession, and the State did so.

Such feudal tenants were captains, or at least sergeants, in the army and taskmasters on the corvée. All able-bodied men were liable to serve on both accounts, with the exception of temple servants, shepherds, stewards on estates, palace servants, and those whose service was essential at home. In the course of time military service was commuted for payment, or a group of families was called upon to provide and maintain a soldier, while the State found him arms. As early as the 8th cent. B.C., a definite area of land was required to furnish a bowman and his attendant pikeman, and was known as a 'bow' of land. These were grouped in tens and hundreds. Later, a horseman, with his equipment was due from certain estates.

Closely allied with this military tenure was that of a dinkhas, whose office is not entirely clear. He was a fisher, but whether it was fish or men is not certain. If the former, fisheries were State property; if the latter, he was a sort of policeman. Subject to his service, whatever it was, he held lands on the same terms from the king. Other lands were held on condition of paying rent or tribute. The latter was due from holders of conquered lands. The king often rewarded his faithful subjects by grants of lands, and might further exempt such lands from State obligations.

Riparian owners had liabilities to turn off their work to keep open or repair the canals, bridges, quays, etc. These public works were carried out at the expense of a king, a temple, or some public benefactor, but the beneficiaries were responsible for their upkeep.

The State claimed also fixed rates of all crops, stock, etc. Every city had its own oenocrit, customs, ferry dues, and highway and water rates, levied on all but its own citizens. Each city claimed some special rights; thus a burgher of Nippur could not be pressed for the army; Assur was exempt from the corvée; and every citizen of Babylon was right to have his land tilled, even if caught as a burglar. We happen to know of these facts accidentally, but probably most cities preserved laws distinct from the Code.

The temple, for its own peace and prosperity, had a peace, and a general, or levy-master in time of war, could commandeer horses, fodder, cattle, grain, vehicles, etc., giving a receipt to the victim who ensured their return or compensation. Apparently the temple treasuries, which received a share of the spoil taken in war, were called upon to furnish means for war, the king borrowing of them and sometimes returning the loan. Later we find the palace acting as treasurer and arsenal also.

The temple was a most important factor in Babylonian city life. The god, in theory, owned all the land, and every holder paid a tribute or rent to the city-god. The holders were, of course, members of the clan of the temple. Each tribe, however, had settled the city and built the temple. These and their descendants also had the right to furnish its priests, who inherited shares of the right to minister in the temple; and profit by its revenues became vested. In the event of the temple being sold or leased, but entailed to certain lines of succession. The tribute to the temple from those who held its lands was early committed to a tithe of all produce, and in many places it furnished the right to share this revenue. Private ownership of land may have arisen from the fact that a man inherited land on which he paid tithe ultimately to himself. Conquest and commercial arrangements gradually dissolved old obligations, and estates were left in holding. If such a feudal tenant was taken captive abroad, he was ransomed at his own expense, but, in default of means to ransom himself, his city was bound to ransom him if he paid the equivalent. If the land became private property, much was always entailed, or subject to redemption by next of kin. The temple also always retained much in its own possession, and the State did so. The monasteries owned great herds of cattle and flocks of sheep and goats; it made up raw stuff, especially into garments; and it lent freely to those in necessity and on security, both with and without interest. Naturally the temple grew rich and employed large numbers of servants. The convents or cloisters of vowed women made the same progress, till the temples and allied institutions became much like the monasteries in mediaeval towns.

Doubtless the concentration of power in the hands of the monarch and consequent centralization, coupled with incessant intercourse, gradually tended to break down local and city custom and make for uniformity. But there were other important factors.

A principle which had established itself through ages of commercial activity was that of contract. If parties could agree, they made a contract. Their deed of agreement was drawn up in a public, confirmed by an oath taken in the temple, and duly sealed by the parties in the presence of witnesses, who often affixed their own seals also. These witnesses, if necessary, were trusted to the interests of the parties and the futurity of the decision of the king. The Code constituted such a decision in all the cases with which it dealt.

In case of a breach of contract, the injured party brought a suit before a court consisting of one or more judges, together with the elders of the city as assessors. A most important feature of procedure was the production of the contract and the witnesses to it. The contract was usually executed in duplicate, each party taking a copy, while the note was held a further draft or third copy. To secure the deed from being tampered with, it was usually enclosed in a cover or envelope, also of clay. The envelope was inscribed with a copy of the document and fully sealed. While it would have been easy to falsify either deed or envelope, both being often of unburnt but sun-dried clay, it was impossible to reproduce both with their seals. The envelope might be tampered with, but the interior could not be. The judge in delivering, if caught as a burglar, was entitled to his share, and inspected the contract, and only rarely set it aside, and then only on grounds of mistake in fact. In some cases, suit was made to certify a fresh copy where the original was lost, in which case the original was declared invalid, and ordered to be destroyed if found. After the copy had been filed, as when a loan was repaid, both copies were destroyed; and if, for any cause, one was not producible, an order was issued and recorded that whenever found it was to be destroyed.

The Code recognizes this practically universal habit of contract and the use of writing to embody agreements. It even insists on it, as when it declares that without marriage bonds a woman is no wife, or that no money or goods can be brought into account for which written receipt had not been given and was now produced. It was seldom that a contract was repudiated on the ground that it had been originally illegal.

On the other hand, the Code lays down that a man who is in debt shall not hand over his land and crops to his creditor unconditionally, even if the creditor is willing to speculate on the future yield, but must himself husband the crop and pay off his debt from the produce. This was intended to check the ruinous habit of borrowing on security of future crops, by freely the man who was in debt for temporary accommodation or a lender lose his money through a failure in crop.

Consequently, it must not be assumed that the Code merely embodied these, or other, established precedents. It constituted a standard appeal. It did not prevent contracts (many of
which have come down to us), which were voluntarily entered upon, from being sustained by the court and carried out. It did set up a standard when punishment practice gradually accepted. Even its original clauses were not at once enforced. In many cases they really define a maximum penalty or minimum wage, but the judges used their discretion as to its actual application. Such natural language was not enforced. In many cases it was left to this 'fear of God' or 'conscience' to secure justice between men; but the written specification of the form which justice should take was a great step in advance. 

In early times an oath 'by the king' alone is quite frequent. In all cases the oath 'by the local god to god is usual. When Babylon became the metropolis, Marduk, the city-god of Babylon, was usually associated with the local god and the king in oaths. The form of the oath is usually 'he, or they, singly or collectively, shall not or they, collectively, if they, take the name of such and such god or king. Rarely is the purport of the oath given. It was 'not to repudiate the contract,' whether by default or by raising a plea on its terms. What form the divine vengeance on the faithless would take is not clear, but it is 'the god's evil.' When kings called down the curses of the gods on the malefactor who should contravene their orders, or deface their monuments, they were extra-legal penalties, but, on the whole, not as exhausterative as the evil consequences to follow; but this was to deter from wrong any who should purpose its commission. The oath was a personal acceptance of obligation, not a fulmination against unknown wrong-doers. The agent who was robbed was put on oath as to his loss. The buyer of a slave abroad had to take oath as to his price.

Crimes and their punishments are dealt with in a separate article by T. G. Pinches (vol. iv. pp. 257-300), to which reference should be made. Very little evidence of crime beyond breach of contract can be expected from the deeds or bonds, but a number of legal documents, lease, pledge, deposition in special cases, have been preserved. For the most part, these do not state the nature of the suit, only the result and verdict of the court. The plaintiff seems always to have brought his complaint, 'captured' his defendant, and forced judges, and each then conducted his own case. Written pleas and answers were put in, but advocates are not mentioned. We find orders given to defendants to appear and answer the charge. As the decisions are drawn, the plaintiff usually wins. This is deceptive, for both parties were regarded as plaintiffs; each party brought the other into court. The decision as stated thus makes the winner appear to have been plaintiff. The parties could demand the cause to be changed so that the case should be tried in their own city. In any case we hear of many local courts. The unsuccessful suitor was not always in the same city, but, except that he had lied or borne false witness, no ground for this punishment is stated, and he paid damages also.

In the Code no punishment is assigned to murder. We may assume that this was left to the avenger of blood, but can only argue from silence. We are also left in doubt as to the agency for the execution of punishment. As, however, a man was to be taken for a fine and not to be freed, we may assume a general responsibility on the part of the local assembly for execution. In two cases the Code specifies that the punishment shall be executed on the scene of the crime: a thief at a fire shall be thrown into it, and a burglar in the house shall be gibbeted opposite the house that he made in the house which he broke into.

The power of the king to over-ride the decision of the local court is implied by the Letters of Hammurabi summoning the parties to his judgment-seat. But the Code mentions the royal pardon only in the case of an adulterer when the injured husband has already condemned the offence by pardoning his wife. Wives were not produced. 

Corporate responsibility is seen in the fine inflicted on a brough or parish for murder or robbery within its confines, and as compensation to the sufferer or his family. This was imposed in cases where the malefactor was not produced.

Private property in land was the rule, but subject to the State dues and obligations. There were usually a number of consent and pre-emption to be considered of the landholder's sphere and so be a detriment to the previous owner. Here is a statute making the king, of the land, or parish, so to speak, the levy-master or recruiting sergeant, all might have claims. Sometimes governors of a district enforced its transfer to a different land-group, or alienated land from a temple, or deeded it in their own subdivision. The king was usually regarded as a wrong, and the king was appealed to for reversal of the transfer. A new owner was usually bound to pay for the State obligation. The holder of the land was given exomes for services to the State generally, and was given exemption in perpetuity from State obligations.

A very interesting form of property was the right to receive for the receipt of the a certain door of the temple, or to exercise certain functions in the temple itself. The right was entailed, and so often came into possession of a woman or other person who could hold but not exercise it, or merely did not see fit to do so. The right was then pledged, sold, to others, but reverted to local heirs on the death of the beneficiary.

The Code recognizes many ways of disposal of property: sale, barter, gift, dedication, lease, loan, pledge, deposit under a special law, and the like, of which were primarily matters of contract. Sale was the delivery of the purchase in exchange for the price agreed upon. In the case of real estate, delivery was symbolized by handing over, or the key of a house, or later the deed of conveyance. Estates were often exchanged, the difference in value, if any, being paid in money. Money payments might be made in silver, or its equivalent in corn or other natural produce. Credit was given for the remainder of a price not paid in full, but was treated as a loan from the seller to the purchaser, who gave a bond for it. The Code allows no claim unsubstantiated by a duly executed deed. The buyer had to convince himself of the seller's title. He might demand guarantees against State obligations or against a creditor who had taken money on the estate. He should himself discharge the State liabilities. Certain feudal holdings could not be sold or exchanged, and, if a purchaser claimed to have acquired such, he had to return the estate, and in addition forfeit the consideration which he had given for it. The next of kin might exercise his right of redemption, if it came under the head of bit abisu, lit. 'his father's house,' i.e. if the seller had inherited or received the property. The property was again vested in its original owner, or in the minor without written power of attorney to dispose of the property, it was by the Code fraudulent
LAW (Babylonian)

be let to make into a garden, orchard, or palm plantation, the tenant paying no rent for a period fixed according to the nature of the crop and the time it needed to become productive. The Code set an average term of four years after the fifth year tenant and owner divided the crop. After that it was the owner's. If he let it, he let it as a garden. If the gardener left any part unplanted, he went into his share. The division of the area, not of produce. The tenant took first choice. Another system has been called metayer. It was specially common with temple lands. Here the landlord found seed, oxen to plough and to harvest, agricultural implements, and in some cases even money. The tenant was a sort of bailiff or steward.

The Code lays down regulations of a more stringent character than those usual in the few contracts concerned with this system. For theft of the seed, of fodder supplied for the oxen, or rations for the workmen, the tenant had his fingers cut off. For stealing the implements or overworking the oxen he was fined, a still heavier penalty being levied for sub-letting the oxen or for entire neglect to cultivate. As he was likely to be poor, it was laid down that, if unable to pay his fines, he should be torn limb from limb by the oxen on the field.

The Code allows sub-letting as a condition, and if the landlord suffers no damage. But the contract, whatever its terms, must be kept. From accident or circumstances over which he had no control the cultivator might get no crop. A flood might carry away the produce, or a drought impoverish the crop or utterly destroy it. The Code rules that in such cases the tenant may carry over and pay the year following. The phrase is peculiar: 'to wet his tablet' may refer to an obvious custom of damping the slate itself. The seller, however, usually guarded against all claim to repudiate purchase by a clause in the sale contract that the buyer was satisfied and took his risk in entering any claim against him. In return he guaranteed the buyer against defect in title. In the great majority of cases an owner cultivates his own land, but the principle of hire was well understood and clearly worked out.

Lease of fields, gardens, or houses was made for a term of years, usually one or two, rarely longer. The average corn-land was often stated, and sometimes the date of expiry of lease. The rent was usually stated, and a portion, often a half or a third, paid at once in advance. The rent was not made less than half of the produce. In practice it is often specified as so much per acre. The case of share-rent raised difficulties which this avoided. If the landlord, c.g., was to receive half and was paid in advance, a storm might ruin the tenant's share, but the Code ruled that he must stand the loss. If the storm came before payment was made, both shared equally in the loss.

In many cases, along with a field in full yield another area was leased to reclaim. This appears usually to have been part of the pasture land, or open field, which lay outside the ring of irrigated land or water meadows surrounding the city. If the reclaim was to full cultivation became the private property of whoever reclaimed it. Some convention must have obviated the gradual reduction of grazing land. Sometimes it appears that the land had simply gone out of cultivation. In all these cases the area to be reclaimed was allotted free of rent, on condition that at expiry of the term it should, usually in the third year, pay an annual rental to the landlord, interest. If the reclaimed land went with it at average rent, so ensuring the maintenance of both landlord and tenant, the latter making what he could out of the reclaimed land.

In slightly different case, a plot of land might
The Code enacted that, if the landlord wished to recover possession before the end of the lease, a fair proportion of the rent should be remitted. The tenant, who had full possession and could pledge the house.

A common plan was to lease a piece of land to a man to build upon. After a somewhat longer lease than usual the house came into possession of the landlord. The Code fixed the cost of building a house per area.

Boundary or common walls were often the cause of dispute, usually as to which neighbour should repair as to the right to fix beams. The condition that one might build it if the other might fix beams in it, e.g., was matter of contract. Most of the sections relating to houses have disappeared from our copies of the Code.

Labourers were often specifically hired, the most common cases being to get in the harvest, for building, and to transport goods by road or canal. The wage was a matter of contract, but the Code fixed minimum rates. Cattle for ploughing, carting, and working the irrigation machines, etc., and the associated agricultural machines, chariots for journeys, and ships for voyages as well as for freight, were often hired.

Cattle were highly developed. The kings and many rich land-owners, and, above all, the temples, owned large flocks and herds. As a rule, these were committed to shepherds, who gave a receipt for the animals entrusted to their care, and were required to return the flock or herd undiminished and with proper increase after breeding, or to answer for them. A shepherd had to make good any loss due to his neglect. He was frequently a foreigner, belonging to one or other of the nomad races who roamed the deserts or open pasture.

Questions of currency arose. The standard by which the precious metals were weighed varied from city to city, and there is often a clause specifying the standard in which money should be repaid. The Code enacted that this could not be enforced. Payment in kind was to be accepted, and a creditor was bound to accept even goods at fair value.

Debt was secured on the person of the debtor, and in default of means must be worked off. But the father of a family could name a substitute—wage slave—to work off his debt. To mitigate the hardships of this custom, the Code protected the hostage for debt from ill treatment, and fixed the term of servitude at three years as a maximum, whatever the debt. If the hostage died a natural death, the creditor had no further claim; but, if he contributed by cruelty, he had to restore son for son or pay for the slave. He could sell the slave hostage, but not if it was a slave-girl who had borne children to her master. She had to be redeemed by her owner, i.e., replaced by a different pledge.

Pledges were often taken as security for debt, but could not be sold without consent of the real owner, and frequently when possession of the cattle was given, its value was taken by the creditor in lieu of interest. Pledges were often left with the debtor and served merely as security. Personal guarantee on the part of friends that the debtor would pay at the proper time was often given, and the debtor sometimes had to pay for this assistance.

Trade was thriving, and Babylonian merchants conducted a considerable overland commerce to distant lands. The foreign products in their markets were numerous and brought from afar. Palestine, Cappadocia, Elam, and the lands beyond these countries were conspicuous sources. Many who stayed at home took shares in enterprises conducted by travellers. Merchants received money or goods to be traded away. The Code regularized this practice, enacting that the parties should exchange receipts, and that demands should be based on documentary evidence. The agent had to deposit an inventory and receipt for what was entrusted him, and no claim could be substantiated except by such receipt. Profits were split in half; the agent must pay 100 per cent, whatever he won.

He was not responsible if he was robbed on his travels, but had to be put on oath as to the extent of his loss. Profits were usually divided equally by contract on the termination of the business.

These trade journeys afforded the opportunity for transport. A considerable amount of forwarding was done. Debts were paid abroad by travelling merchants and purchases executed at a distance. The Code enacts that the merchant shall give a receipt for the consignment, take all responsibility, and exact a receipt on delivery. If he should default in any respect, he was penalized five-fold. Deposit was a common transaction, especially the warehousing of grain. The Code fixed a substantial rate of one-sixtieth for warehousing. The warehouseman took all risks, and paid double for all shortage, but only if he had given a proper receipt. If the goods were stolen from him, he had to recover as best he could; but he had no relief against the depositor.

The network of canals supported a vast amount of water traffic. Ships, whose passage was estimated by the amount of corn that they could carry, were incessantly plying for hire between the great cities. The contract specified the goods and their destinations, and named the charges. These were for carriage solely, but, when a whole ship was employed, the rations for the crew were charged specifically. The Code fixes the price for building, navigating, etc., and insists on a year's guarantee with a new boat. The captain was responsible for ship and freight, and bore all risks. If he sank a ship, he was fined half its value, even if he floated it. In the case of collision the boat under way was responsible for damage to a boat at anchor.

The Code regulated traffic in liquor, fixing a fair price for beer, and severely punishing a tavernkeeper for allowing disorderly conduct or treasonable assembly. The hostess was to hale offenders to the court—which seems to have been the access of police officers, or perhaps the command of able-bodied slaves.

Payment through the banker, or by written draft against account, was usual. Bonds to pay were treated as negotiable. A man could usually borrow without interest from the temple treasury of his city, for a fixed term, but paid interest if his debt was left overdue. It is not quite clear, however, whether this privilege did not imply some relationship to the temple, possibly only full citizenship. Merchants, and temples in other cases, charged interest at varying rates, usually high, commonly 100 per cent. As a rule, the rate of interest on a loan to pay reapers; so much corn produce of a peculiar field is lent to buy oil, or to pay a tax. The exact purpose of such specification is not clear, and, so long as the loan was for a household use, there seems no reason to restrict its use. No penalty is named for using the accommodation for a different purpose from that for which it was taken. Possibly there lurks in this specification an analogy to our 'for value received,' or it was
an acknowledgment of the moral claim of the borrower on the lender for accommodation.  

The prehistoric past and represented the crude beginnings of law. Some of them were based on social observation, experience, inheritance, etc., see 'Semitic' sections of art. MARRIAGE, ADOPTION, ARBITRATION, FAMILY (ASYRIO-BABYLONIAN), and INHERITANCE (BABYLONIAN). The custom of the ownership of land among the Semitic and non-Semitic peoples of the ancient Near East has been noted above (p. 200). The Code of Hammurabi, in BDB, v. 584, as well as Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters, Edinburgh, 1869, 2d ed., affords an almost complete text-book for the study of Babylonian law.

C. H. W. JOHNS.

**LAW** (Biblical, Old Testament).—Ancient peoples, almost without exception, regarded their laws as divine origin. At the top of the front side of the stele containing the famous code of Hammurabi, the sun-god Shamash is pictured in a bas-relief seated on his throne and presenting to the king the laws which follow. In ancient Egypt the laws were attributed to the gods (1. E. Breasted, Hist. of Egypt, London, 1906, p. 242). Ex 34:26-27 (J) represents Jehovah as dictating the primitive decalogue to Moses, who acts as his mouthpiece. At the later tradition of Ex 24:4 states that Jehovah Himself "wrote down the Ten Words" (cf. Ex 34:27). Dt 6:19 implies that all the commands contained in that law-book were given directly to Moses by Jehovah. The late priestly tradition (c. 400 B.C.) of Ex 20:19-26 and 34:27 states that all the laws found in Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers were a direct revelation from God through Moses. Demosthenes asserted that "every law is a discovery and gift of God" (Aristop. A. 16, ed. F. Büsser, 1898). Even Cicero declared: "Lex niki aliud nisi recta et unum deum sciam trahere ratio" (Phil. xi. 12). The belief that underlying all man-made laws was a perfect law, emanating from divine mind, was the foundation of Roman law. It is reaffirmed by W. Blackstone, who says: "This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God Himself, is of course superior to obligation to any other. It is binding over the globe, in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediate or immediately, from this origin" (Commentaries, 1837, p. 27). Thus it is that each age has expressed the conviction that law is not a mere human convention, but is conditioned by the eternal nature of things, and that behind nature is Intelligence and Will.

A more careful study of the ancient sources and the contributions of anthropology and sociology have shed new light upon the origins and growth of law. The ancients were not wholly ignorant of man's part in its development. In the epilogue to his great code Hammurabi declares: "If a man heed my words which I have written upon my monument, do not efface my words, do not alter my monument, so may Shamash prolong his reign." Recent discoveries have brought to light some of the laws of the Superintendant which was incorporated into the code (cf. OLZ xiii. [Leipzig, 1914]). Egyptian kings, like Horemheb of the XIXth dynasty, freely enacted new laws and gave them equal authority with other laws which had been in use, and this practice accords to the gods (Breasted, op. cit., p. 249).

Notwithstanding the late traditions which represent all Israel's laws as being directly dictated by Jehovah, the OT contains some of the best existing illustrations of the different stages by which law evolved. The custom of blood-revenge is a survival of the primitive stage of self-help, when, in the absence of an organized government, the wronged party had to declare his grievances (see, further, art. BLOOD-FEUD). It is typical of customs that were inherited from the
Ex 21:23-27, are the result of an attempt to embody the import of the principles of God's early law and customs in systematic, compact form (cf. C. F. Kent, *The Founders and Rulers of United Israel [= Historical Bible, ii.], London, 1909, pp. 209-219). Each decalogue deals with a distinct subject and is merely stated, not discussed; the thing that they were first intended to be committed to memory—each law being associated with a finger or thumb of the two hands—rather than to writing. Thus, e.g., the decalogue in Ex 21:23-27 deals with the rights of slaves (the first decalogue [21:1-20] with male slaves, the second [21:21-27] with female slaves. The first five decalouges contain civil laws and are very explicit. They clearly represent earlier customs and precedents—e.g., *'Thou shalt not wrong nor oppress a resident alien, for ye were resident aliens in the land of Egypt' (22:23). In time these primitive Hebrew decalouges were committed to writing. They may at first have been engraved on tables and set up in the Israelite sanctuaries. They represent the same stage in the development of Hebrew law as the more elaborate Code of Hamurabi, which was inscribed on stone and originally set up in order that (as is definitely stated) its provisions might be learned and read and understood; and these laws and learn how to secure justice (C. H. W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws*, Edinburgh, 1904, p. 393). Typical western analogues are the Code of Gortyn, set up in the market-town of that ancient Cretean town, and the Twelve Tables of the Romans.

The next step in the development of law was the modification, expansion, and codification of the earlier laws to meet the needs of a more advanced civilization and to embody the higher ideals of the later age. Again the OT contains excellent illustrations of this process. The Hebrews and most Oriental nations failed to develop an authoritative, legislative body. Even the Romans for centuries kept alive the legal fiction that the Twelve Tables were the sole foundation of all Roman law. During the latter half of the 7th century B.C.E. it became customary to legislate not by laws, but by acts and decrees. Judah that the primitive laws of Ex 21:23-27 (which were probably formulated as early as the 9th century B.C.E.) were inadequate. Many questions not contemplated by these earlier laws had arisen. Under the influence of the great ethical and social philosophers of the 8th century, many new moral and religious principles had been proclaimed and accepted by the leaders of the nation. The spirit of reform that was at work called for a definite programme, if it was to be a permanent fixture. A detailed comparison of the primitive codes and of the laws embodied in Deuteronomy reveals the methods, as well as the work, of those self-appointed lawgivers. The four of the older laws are represented in the later code: some are simply reaffirmed, others are abrogated, the major are modified or expanded in accordance with the principles of justice, human rights, and social and religious usages of the heathens, and the prophet's ideal of a lawgiver who would have no aversion to people who are not His people, and we never find Him boasting, as does the Jew of Ro 2:28, of the superiority which the possession of the Law gave to the Jews. Yet He regarded the Law with profound respect; He considered it to be the way of life that God had given to His people, and He experienced little reaction against it. He regarded it chiefly as a moral code; as a system of ritual, He was less impressed by it, and the tradition which the scribes had built up around it He must from early times have regarded with indifference, as being apart from the way of life that God had given to His people, and in some points inconsistent with it. He regarded it as containing, so far as it went, all God's will and all man's duty, through those who sought for perfection had some aims which transcended its precepts: and He was able to say (Lk 16:17, Mt 5:19) that it was easy for less than for one tittle of the Law to fail. The passage, Mt 5:21-22, in which Jesus appears as definitely superseding commands of the Law by more ethical commandments of His own, belongs certainly in its arrangement, and also in much of its detail, to a later state of things; the Law is made ruder than it was as practised, in order to set as a foil to the more elevated injunctions set over
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against it, and some of the sayings (e.g., vv. 12-29) reflect the controversy of the Church of Palestine with the synagogues. Jesus upheld the religious system of His country, and encouraged others to do the same.

He did not, however, treat all the commandments of the Law as being on the same level. To the widow, a parable recorded in Mk. 12:38-40 gives a striking illustration of this. The woman gave a poor offering of two mites, while the rich man put in his full tithe. This parable is also referred to in Mt. 23:23, where Jesus says to the Pharisees, "You tithe the mint and the rue and every herb of all kinds, and neglect the weightier matters of the law, justice and mercy and faith. But these you ought to have done, without neglecting the others."

The words of Jesus were not only understood by His disciples, but also by the crowd that followed Him. In Mt. 5:17-19, Jesus states, "Nor do men light a lamp and put it under a bushel, but on a stand, and it gives light to all in the house. For nothing is secret that will not be revealed, nor anything hidden that will not be known. Therefore whatever you have said in the dark shall be heard in the light, and whatever you have whispered in the ear shall be proclaimed on the housetop."

The next verse, 20, presents a fascinating case of Jesus' maturity in teaching. He declares: "Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have come not to abolish but to fulfill. For truly, I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not an inch will pass from the Law until all is accomplished. Whoever therefore relaxes one of the least of these commandments and teaches men so, will be called least in the kingdom of heaven; but whoever does them and teaches them will be called great in the kingdom of heaven."

The Law, then, is not to be abolished, but fulfilled. This challenge establishes Jesus' role as the Great Teacher and the One who is to be worshiped as the mediator of the Law. The question of the Law's authority is addressed by Jesus, who states that the Law has not been just abolished, but fulfilled. This is a vital point in understanding Jesus' teaching on the Law, as it sets the stage for the rest of His teachings. He is not against the Law, but is against the false teachings about it. He is pointing out that the Law is not just a set of rules, but a way of life that is to be fulfilled in its entirety.

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attitude of Christian missions to the Law must have occupied Paul's mind as soon as he became convinced of his own call to carry the gospel to the Gentiles, i.e., if we are to accept his own statement in Gal 1:16, from the time of his conversion. Ro 7, with its incisive definition of the character of the Law and its relation to those wearing human nature, was probably in Paul's mind in the demand of the Gentiles to obedience to a Law which brought so little comfort to himself. In that chapter he arrives at a different conclusion as to the Law from that of the Old Testament. It is idealised as a servant, as Jesus idealized it, and regarded as a searching standard of entire perfection, dealing not with acts but with motives and springs of conduct, and holding up to man all that he ought to be. It is holy and just and good; to keep it would be to find the promises fulfilled that one should live by it (Gal 3:10). But, alas, it is too good for man to live at peace with it. The Law is spiritual, but man is carnal and cannot love the standard of ineffable goodness. It acts as an irritant, it brings to the surface his innate weakness and reacon, and so, while his reason approves of it, he cannot keep it, and is driven by it to despair.

The Lord and King of the Law is Christ. The mind of Christ is the supreme authority, where the Apostles' own authority does not suffice (1 Co 7:10 etc.). When disputes break out among believers, the Apostle advises that recourse should not be had to the beaten courts, but that an arbitrator should be found among their own number. The OT Law has completely disappeared as law for the Gentile converts.

The arguments by which Paul sought to account for the Law, which in his missionary practice he had deprived of all authority, are of various kinds. Some consist of bold speculations on the divine economy of salvation, some are Rabbinical devices, bringing a new meaning out of a text of the OT. Of the former kind the most powerful and impressive is that of Gal 3:4-7, where he speaks of the Law as the tutor placed over the growing heir to check his freedom till the day arrives when he attains his majority, which had been the case with mankind when Christ came, and in Him the spirit of adoption took possession of the human race now entering on its inheritance, so that the guardian is no longer needed. The Law is placed in chapter 4 as being on a level with those constraining influences, or spirits of the world, under which the Gentiles also were confined, to be prepared for Christ. A great thought also is contained in the argument that the promise was antecedent to the Law, which could not set it aside, and that the promise to Abraham, made to him before circumcision was instituted, is fulfilled directly to the Gentiles who, like him, take faith and not works for their guiding principle and, therefore, are Abraham's true children (Gal 3:29, Ro 4).

Another calibre are the arguments that the seed, in the singular, to whom, with Abraham, the promise was addressed, must indicate an individual person, and that Christ is that person, faith in whom now saves (Gal 3:25), and the argument that the dispensation of salvation for the first covenant was to Jew and Gentile alike he proclaimed that salvation did not come through the Law, but only through faith in Jesus Christ (Gal 2:15-16). To those who sought to make his Gentile converts Jew-fearing and observe Jewish festivals and Jewish restrictions in diet, he offered, as the champion of the liberty of these converts, an uncompromising opposition.

6. Conclusion.—The controversy about the Law subsided in Paul's life-time. In Galatians it is acute; in Romans the argument is free from passion; in the Corinthian Epistles there is little of it; in the later Epistles only a few phrases are found to show that he still stands where he stood (Ph 3:4, Col 2:17). On the other hand, the com-
LAW (Buddhist).—In the strict sense of the word there is no Buddhist law; there is only an influence exercised by Buddhist ethics on conduct that has taken place in customs. No Buddhist authority, whether local or central, whether lay or clerical, has ever enacted or promulgated any law. Sometimes a law has been administered in countries ruled over by Buddhism, but it has been custom rather than law; and the custom has been in the main pre-Buddhist, fixed and established before the people became Buddhist. There have been changes in custom. But the changes have not been the result of any enactment from above. They have been brought about by change of opinion among the people themselves. And in order to ascertain whether such change of opinion was as a result of the influences of Buddhism it would be necessary, in each case, to ascertain what the custom had been before the introduction of Buddhism, in what degree or manner it had changed, and what had been the probable cause of the difference shown. Unfortunately our knowledge of the history of social conditions in Eastern Asia, whether before or after the 6th cent. B.C., is at present much too meagre to enable us to deal with the subject in so thorough a manner. Nothing has yet been written on the subject, and only a slight beginning may yet be made.

The Buddhist, for instance, had from the beginning no system of his own as such. They had their canon law, what they called Vinaya, i.e. "Guidance." It consists of 227 rules to regulate the conduct of the members in outward affairs, and some supplementary chapters on special subjects. These "articles of association" are quite apart from the Buddhist religion, and indeed law is little or nothing that is specifically either Buddhist or religious. No religious community could avoid quarrels and disputation without the assistance of rules of the kind. Now, just before the rise of Buddhism there were quite a number of such Orders. The names of ten of them are preserved in the Abottavara. Unfortunately, the records of a number of the ten have perished. They had no writing; and, as each Order died out, both its doctrine and its canon law, kept alive only in the memory of its members, died out also. Only one of these pre-Buddhist communities has survived—that of the Ajonavas and the last recorded regulations of the Jain Order have not yet been published. It was inevitable that the early Buddhists should have adopted in many details the customs already followed by these other wanderers. But in the main and as a rule the rules were Indian in origin, the common inheritance of all the schools.

There is nothing in the 227 rules of the Vinaya which would be included under the English term 'law' in its modern sense. In the explanations and applications, however, of the rules, as interpreted in the centuries that followed, there arose a case for law. For example, Rule No. 3 is as follows:

Whatsoever Bodhisattva shall knowingly deprive of life a human being, or shall deny (and in the case of a human being, or shall utter the praises of death, or incite another to self-destruction, saying, 'If I only die, I shall be saved from this sinful, wretched life; death is better to you than life!—it is, so thinking, and with such an aim, by various means, utter the praises of death or incite another to self-destruction—he, too, is fallen into deceit, he is no longer in communion.'

In the elucidation and discussion of this rule a very large number of all possible cases of alleged infringement of it are given. The cases are not real ones that actually happened, but hypothetical. The offences, or alleged offences, are sorted into grades, which are distinguished one from another as modern English law-books distinguish between assault, aggravated assault, manslaughter, and murder. The penalty for the gravest kind is exclusion from the Order; for the lesser kind suspension in varying degrees, and for varying duration.

For instance, a man digs a pit; that is no offence. He digs it in the hope that it will fall in to it; that is a dakkha (evil deed). The man who digs the pit is guilty of a grave offence (vinaya-karma). The man who allows it to happen by design is guilty of a minor offence (dakkha-karma). The man who allows it to happen by design is guilty of a minor offence (dakkha-karma), involving expulsion.

This is not criminal law. It is intended only to keep the Order pure; and the penalties are very mild. But it is interesting to find in these discussions the doctrine of malice aforethought, or necessary or (after the fact, used much as a modern jurist would use it, and leading up to decisions which are very much what a modern jurist would give.

H. Oldenberg, in his introduction to his edition of the text, has carefully considered the manner in which these documents enshrining the Buddhist Vinaya were gradually built up, and their approximate date. He concludes that the whole text, as we now have it, was in existence within a century of the Buddha's death; and that much of it—for instance, the 227 rules referred to above—is older, and may go back to the generation in which Buddhism arose. It will be seen at once that this is quite modern compared with the Thammaratik Code of customary law of Siam. But as these Buddhist documents have in the history of law depends upon their being the oldest legal texts which apply the principles of equity to the problems to be solved. They do not pretend to set forward any code of law. They belong to a stage beyond that, and only attempt to utilize for the practical requirements of an association of co-workers the results of previous thought on legal points. We shall probably never know how far these results may have been modified or softened by the Buddhists for the purpose of application to the new problems to be met.

The administration of this law (if law it can be called) was very simple. The decision lay with the Chapter, which was composed of all members of the Order resident within a certain boundary. The boundary, also fixed by the Chapter, was so arranged as to secure the presence of from a dozen to a score of members. All the members were equal, and the senior member presided. If the matter came to a vote—which seldom happened—the voting was by ticket. Complicated matters were referred to a special committee, and the decisions in most cases were unanimous. The Chapters had no authority to

5. J. H. Oldenberg, 68-70; not yet translated.
6. J. H. Oldenberg, 76.
settled any matters not included in the *Vinega*, or to deal with property not the property of the Order. All such matters were the province of the State, to be settled according to the customs of each locality. They were regarded as secular, not religious. Thus customs as to marriage and divorce, the inheritance and division of real and personal estate, the law of contract and criminal law, were all purely secular matters to be determined by the same of the lay community. This continued to be the attitude of mind of the Bud- dhist class, and as long as they were not forced to do otherwise, they did not change it. The expression ‘Buddhist law,’ as used of law administered in English courts in Ceylon and Burma, has a very different meaning. When the English, in their judgment of appeal, decided to reduce English law except on certain matters, which, they, imagined, would or might offend the religious feelings of some of the inhabitants. Thus, with regard to marriage and inheritance, they granted to the Dutch the Roman-Dutch law on these points, and to the Hindus and the Muhammadans the Hindu and Muhammadan law respectively. Taking for granted, in their ignorance of Buddhism, that the relation between law and religion on these points must be the same in either country as on the other, they decided to incorporate into the law of the Island the customs prevalent there among the majority, the Buddhism, on the same points. For this purpose they made customs current at the beginning of the 19th cent. valid for ever, and deprived the lay community of any power of change or adjustment which they possessed. On the other hand, they soon began, and have continued, to change the customs by two methods, one by arrogating to itself decisions, the other by legislative enactment. By the latter they have introduced the registration of marriages, and conferred upon the laity the power of making wills.

The original report on Kandian customs has been recently discovered and a translation of it published by C. J. R. Le Mesurier and T. B. Pannabokka, under the title *Niti Vigandu* (Colombo, 1880). The course of events in Burma, since it was taken over by the British has been very different. We know nothing or next to nothing of Sinhalese law before the conquest, we have for Burma a most valuable summary of the gradual growth of the customary law in E. Forthhammer's *Jardine Price Essay* (Bagoon, 1883). He shows how the customary law, originally introduced there from S. India in the 10th cent. A.D., has been constantly but slowly modified by the influence of the Buddhist laity. He mentions also the numerous codes in which such alterations have been incorporated. D. Richardson has translated one of the latest of these codes under the title *The Dhamat, or Laws of Memon, Bagoon*, 1906.

**Literature.—The authorities are given in the course of the article.**

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

**LAW (Celtic).—I. Law.**—Of the legal institutions of the Scalds we have no knowledge beyond the evidence of philology and the statements of Cæsar with regard to Gaul. Both the Goddelic and the Brythonic branches of the Celtic languages contain a term for law cognate with the Latin *lex*, while the word for judgment (Ir. *brith*; Welsh, *broneg*) also correspond in these branches. Similarly, we have in both branches the same word for 'duity' or 're- spectability,' the same word for 'friendship,' the same expression for 'right,' and the same term for 'law.' Throughout the Celtic world, too, the organization of society had a tribal basis, and the legal institutions of the Celts were, consequently, in their origin tribal in character. This tribal character, though in a greater or less degree modified, survived unmistakably in Irish and Welsh law, as we know it in historic times. The evidence of Cæsar as to Celtic law (de Bell. Gall. vi. 13) relates to the Druids, of whom he speaks as 'a sort of lawgivers, judges and accusers. They held that all public and private disputes and assessed the fines and penalties in the case of any crime, as, for instance, homicide, while it was they also who gave their decision in the case of any dispute regarded as inequitable. They punished by a fine, with a view to make the party to abide by their judgment. They had recourse to excommunication from religious ceremonies—a punishment which, in practice, involved the loss of all civil rights, and which became so outlawry in Irish and Welsh law. The Druids, according to Cæsar, formed an organized community, at whose head was a chief druid. It is, however, from the surviving Irish and Welsh legal literature that we derive most information concerning actual Celtic law. In Breton and Cornish there are no legal documents in existence, but we may surmise that ancient Breton and Cornish law was substantially the same as that of Wales, while the clan-system of the Gaels as of the others, they decided to incorporate into the law of the Island the customs prevalent there among the majority, the Buddhism, on the same points. For this purpose they made customs current at the beginning of the 19th cent. valid for ever, and deprived the lay community of any power of change or adjustment which they possessed. On the other hand, they soon began, and have continued, to change the customs by two methods, one by arrogating to itself decisions, the other by legislative enactment. By the latter they have introduced the registration of marriages, and conferred upon the laity the power of making wills. The original report on Kandian customs has been recently discovered and a translation of it published by C. J. R. Le Mesurier and T. B. Pannabokka, under the title *Niti Vigandu* (Colombo, 1880). The course of events in Burma, since it was taken over by the British has been very different. We know nothing or next to nothing of Sinhalese law before the conquest, we have for Burma a most valuable summary of the gradual growth of the customary law in E. Forthhammer's *Jardine Price Essay* (Bagoon, 1883). He shows how the customary law, originally introduced there from S. India in the 10th cent. A.D., has been constantly but slowly modified by the influence of the Buddhist laity. He mentions also the numerous codes in which such alterations have been incorporated. D. Richardson has translated one of the latest of these codes under the title *The Dhamat, or Laws of Memon, Bagoon*, 1906.

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T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.
This part of the Senchas Mór is of interest as containing an account of the conditions of marriage among the ancient Irish. Vol. ii. contains a valuable introduction on the general principles of Irish jurisprudence, and completes the description of Irish law with a treatise called Corús Búína, or 'The Customary Law.' This treatise also deals with contracts, and lays stress on the importance of keeping oral contracts. The following is the nature which the Irish had made on the way described by Maine as from 'status to contract.' We have here a discussion of a wide range of topics, including the regulation of banquets, gifts to the Church, and the like. Throughout the Senchas Mór the Church is treated with the highest respect. The next treatise in vol. iii. is the 'Book of Aeiill,' said to have been so named after Aeiill near Tarri, and attributed to Cormac, the author of the well-known glossary. It deals very largely with what we should now call criminal law, and it is interesting to note that one of its dicta is 'Fines are doubled by malice aforethought.' In this treatise the commentary is remarkably clear, and if compared with the text. Other dicta are:

'Every judge is punishable for his neglect'; 'every king is entitled to compensation for injury to his road'; 'what is cast into the property of the owner of the shore'; 'the shall not kill a captive, unless he be thine.'

Numerous topics are touched upon, and the wrongs and injuries discussed are not confined to crimes, while one of its most interesting features is the discussion of responsibility. Vol. iv. contains first a treatise entitled 'Of taking Legal Possession,' and treats of the symbolic ceremonial that was necessary in Ireland (as in other ancient countries) for the institution of a right to the recovery of land and tenure. One part of the treatise is called 'The Beginning of Customary Law,' and deals with matters other than the main topic of the treatise. The treatise which follows is called 'Judgments of Co-tenancy,' and discusses problems arising from this aspect of Irish law. It deals with the trespasses of lands, fences, and other trespasses by cattle, bees, hens, and dogs, and gives rules as to the relations between landlord and tenant. We have clearly the growth in Ireland of the individual ownership of land. This treatise even considers the trespasses of pet hens and pet hens, pet deer and pet wolves, pet old birds and pet foxes. Another treatise which resorts to definitions of life is called Bech broth, or Bech judgments,' which deals with various contingencies arising from the keeping of bees, a very important phase of country life at the time when mead was drunk and sugar was unknown. The next treatise, Coisínus Úisc, or 'The Right of Water,' deals, among other subjects, with the right to construct water-courses and mills. The next treatise, called Managile ('Precincts'), deals with such topics as the violation of precincts, the position of fugitives, and the like. In this document is to be found a very interesting account of sanctuary among the Irish. The treatises which follow are as follows: 'Out of the Judgment of Life' (a more fragment), 'Of the Divisions of the Tribe of a Territory,' ' containing a valuable account of the Irish tribal system,' and the document called Crith Gablach, giving mainly an account of the rights and emoluments of the higher classes of Ireland. This treatise, however, frequently describes an ideal rather than an actual state of things. To this treatise is appended a sequel to Crith Gablach, and also a fragment on 'Succession.' The treatises given in vol. v. are of a miscellaneous character. The first and second are called respectively 'Small Primer' and 'Heptads,' and they were evidently intended as a text-book for the lower classes of Ireland. The former shows some trace of the
influence of the Civil Law, and of an attempt on the part of the writer to show his familiarity with Latin. The substance of the work, however, deals with Irish custom, notably in connexion with the Scribe and gives a summary of the Irish legal system. The Leiptads arrange the different legal maxims in groups of seven, as may be seen from the following example:

1. *Din idrath* (i.e. the fines imposed for the breach of certain laws) seven re-bondings that shed blood, which incur not debts nor sickness: the rebonding of a branch from the chipping of firewood the chipping of a branch from a natural fork; the rebonding of a branch backwards; the rebonding of a branch by the rebonding of a forge; the rebonding from horses' shade to another rebonding of a stone off another.

Then follows a treatise called 'Judgments on Pledge-Interests,' in which all the various rules given by men and women are dealt with in detail. The next treatise, 'On the Confirmation of Right and Law,' consists in its earlier part of tracts on various topics, while the latter part is of a miscellaneous character. This series of legal documents ends with a brief tract called 'On the Removal of Covenants,' which deals with the rights of property.

The law Yokes of Wales are not legal treatises like the codes of Ireland; but consist of a code attributed to Hywel Dda (Howel the Good), a Welsh prince of the 9th century, together with one or two amendments attributed to Rhodri ap Ermot, a Welsh king of the 10th century. The propriety of the term 'Gwentian' has been disputed, and some at any rate of the MSS of this group may belong to Powys (East Central Wales), Herefordshire and Shropshire, and was in touch with the English Court, and it is not improbable that he signified his reign by means of a code after the manner of other kings of his epoch. Tradition, as embodied in the introduction to the code, regards Whitland, in Carmarthenshire, called in Welsh *Y Ty Gwyr ar Daf* ('The White House on the Tit'), as the place where the code was drawn up at an assembly consisting of the leading men in Church and State. As the bishops being present in order to prevent any interference with the law of the Church. A purview of the laws themselves, however, brings to view much that is not Christian and that must have been derived from the same sources, and, ethically, this pre-Christian matter is of great value. Still, to distinguish ancient tribal usage from positive enactment in the Welsh laws is no easy task. The oldest known copy of the Welsh Laws is in Latin, and dates from the last quarter of the 12th century. The next MS in point of age is a Welsh one, giving the Venedotian version of the code, which bears the name *Llyfr Daiv Wales* ('The Black Book of Chirch'), now in the National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth. This MS was written about A.D. 1200 and was probably copied from a pre-Norman archetype. The oldest MS of the Dinidion version of the code was written about A.D. 1252, and there are in existence several other MSS of Howell's Laws. These Laws deal with various topics, such as the royal household and the officers of the king and queen, the sulthry or court of law, the judges, the king's privy council, the law of succession of women; the execution of justice and the surety-system. Further, there are important laws relating to women, to trespass, to the values of animals, tame and wild, and of buildings, trees, utensils, etc. The Welsh Laws show clearly the advance of a territorial system represented by the *argyveds* (lord), as the king's viceroy in each district, as compared with the earlier tribal system, wherein the *penwenedd* (chief) was supreme in each tribe. In addition to the medieval legal triads, which are given in the MSS, there are published in the *Myrghryian Archaeologia* certain triads called the 'Trions of Dyfnwal Moelmu' (an imaginary Welsh lawyer), which were first brought to view (and probably invented) by a certain Tomnas ab Ifan of Glamorgan in 1885. In the Laws of Howell reference is sometimes made in the conventional way to the 'Law of Hore,' as evidence for a given legal doctrine; but, in spite of the unhistorical character of these references, the very prominence of the royal court in the code makes it highly probable that it had a royal origin. The two Welsh princes whose amendments of the law are quoted, in addition to Howell, are Bledir ab Cynwyn (1063–75) and Rhys ab Gruffudd (1155–97). The Welsh Laws in their several versions, like those of Ireland, deserve a careful study, especially in connexion with the history of the general advance in Celtic countries from a tribal to a territorial system, and the consequent legal evolution.


**E. ANWYL.**

**LAW (Chinese).—** The first mention of Chinese law in the classics is the institution of the Five Punishments by Emperer Yao twenty-four centuries before the Christian era. In the next reign, that of Shen, the Five Punishments could be commuted into transportation and deportation, and even, if there were extenuating circumstances, into fines. Mistake and misadventure were pardoned, while aggravated crime and recidivism found no mercy. In cases of doubt, the judge was given the benefit of the doubt. These institutions and principles, couched in quaint language, are to be found in the *Tso King* ("Book of Records"), the oldest book extant in Chinese literature. Embodying, as they do, some of the principles underlying the most enlightened of modern legal systems, they testify to the progress already achieved by Chinese jurisprudence at that remote period. Merefulness in administration and brevity in legislation were the aims which ancient Chinese statesmen and jurists always had in view.

The codification was attempted about the time of Confucius, the laws being inscribed in bamboo or in metal, reminding one of the nearly contemporaneous Twelve Tables of that other legal system which, after moulding Western jurisprudence, is destined, perhaps, to mould that of the Chinese also. Unfortunately, practically nothing is now known of those early codes. During the period of the 'Warring States' (7th cent. B.C.), a code was compiled by Li Kwei which remains the basis of Chinese jurisprudence. The laws of Ts'in (240–210 B.C.) were severe and complex, and were one of the causes of the early downfall of the dynasty. When Liu Pang, the founder of the
Han dynasty, captured the Ta' in capital, he abol-ished all the harsh laws and substituted for them
the famous Three Articles, undoubtedly the short-est and simplest code in history, punishing murder, robbery, and robbery with violence. This abbre-viated code could not serve the needs of the Empire, and another code was enacted later, based mainly
on that of Li Kwei, with the addition of three
books. Hereafter each dynasty had its code of
codes, until the Code of Kuang-ming, written
with its Ta Ting Lu Li, which, founded on those
of the previous dynasties, in particular that of the
Mings, was published in 1647, three years after
the Manchus dynasty was established in China.
This body of laws, together with the subsequent
amendments, held sway until the latter days of
the dynasty, when, under pressure of circum-
stances and influenced by Western ideas, the
Emperor established a bureau for the revision of
laws, which had among its members many who
had knowledge of Western laws, particularly
Japanese law. It had also Japanese advisers
who exercised considerable influence. It drafted
several codes—criminal law, civil law, criminal
procedure, and civil procedure, besides other laws,
some of which have been enacted, including a
temporary criminal code which takes the place of
the Ta Ting Lu Li. But property law, and to a
large extent, the code of military law, were left
under the Republic. While the draftsmen of
the new laws displayed considerable knowledge of
comparative law, Japanese ideas were, naturally,
predominant. The Japanese modelled their legal
system upon that of the Germans, who in turn
inherited from the Romans. Thus the two sys-
tems of law, which were each inscribed in bronze
at about the same time, are, after the lapse of
a century, the remaining six are named
after the former six ministries of the government—
civil, fiscal, ritual, military, criminal, and public
works. The language is clear and concise, com-
paring favourably with the productions of modern
Western legislation. In Japan, too, there is only
a penal code, what in foreign countries
would be civil law being left to local and trade
customs and usages. In a sense this is true
because everything in the code is punishable as
a crime, but there are many things in it which
would be described in other countries as civil law.

(1) The first part deals with general definitions
and principles, in some cases with great minute-
ness and precision. There are also descriptions
of the Five Punishments (different from and lighter
than the Five Punishments of the ancients), defini-tions of various crimes, of heinous crimes, statement of the
eight privileges, lists of crimes which are not
pardonable by a general amnesty, etc. (2) The
civil part, deals with the conduct of officials, and
corresponds to a certain extent with the droit
public administratif of the central and regional
powers of Europe. (3) The fiscal part contains largely what
would be civil law. Among its topics are regis-
tration of census, real property, marriage, public
granaries, audiencias, smuggling, usury, treasure-
trove, and weights and measures. The family law
is strikingly like that of the Romans, though rather
after it had been tempered by Pretorian edicts and
Imperial constitutions than at the time of its primi-tive severity. The notion of what constitutes a
family is similar in both laws. Agetric relation-
ship is more important than conjugal; hence
'Mulier est finis familiae' is to a certain extent
applicable to China. 'Patria potestas' there is, but
for the power of life, a substitute, the paterfamilias is lacking. It is also tempered by
paternal love and filial piety, for which the Chinese
are justly noted. Marriage is an all-important
institution for the continuation of the family.
Divorce is very rare and is carried out by the code
or carried into practice. If polygamy, or rather
polygyny, means marriage with more than one
wife at the same time, then Chinese law does not
permit it; in fact, the code punishes bigamy. One
and only one wife is permitted. However, as
Mencius teaches, 'there are three things which
are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the great-
est of them'; to ensure against this calamity it
is permitted to have concubines, who are in no
sense wives. They are frequently chosen by
the wife, and occupy a subordinate position, while
their children are considered the children of the
wife. (4) The ritual part deals with sacrificial,
court, and official rites and ceremonies. The
military part is not altogether a code of mili-
tary law, since it contains, inter alia, provisions
for the guarding of palaces, guarding of passes
and fords, keeping order in the capital, injuries
inflicted by animals to persons and property (the
'damage fessant'), and carrying of dispatches by
couriers. The articles more particularly applicable
to the army provide for mobilization of troops,
arming the people, compulsion of draftsmen, lack of discipline, etc. (6) The criminal part is
the criminal code par excellence. The aphorism
'Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea' is
religiously observed throughout the articles: a man
is not punished for a criminal act unless he intends
be also criminal. In homicide, e.g., no fewer than
six different degrees are distinguished, varying
from culpable to excusable. Most of the crimes
found in Western law are also in the code.

The use of abusive language is a crime: likewise
adultery, which, though in England only a cause
for divorce and action for damages, is a crime in
France, Germany, and other European countries,
as well as in some of the States of the American
Union. Gambling is another offence; and so is
cashing a 'cheque in one's house, which is culpable
because of the element of carelessness and the
dangerous consequences. It is said that China
has only civil law, and that the Ta Ting Lu Li is only a penal code, what in foreign countries
would be civil law being left to local and trade
customs and usages. In a sense this is true
because everything in the code is punishable as
a crime, but there are many things in it which
would be described in other countries as civil law.

Before and since Confucius, this has been the
maxim of Chinese rulers and the first principle
of government. Law occupies but a secondary place;
morality comes first. Law is intended to reach
only where morality fails. The family law is
supplementary to moral; it may be said that
this is true of every civilized society, and
that no society can live with only law to guide

1 Confucian Analects, tr. J. Legge, Hong-kong, 1862.
it. But the difference between China and other civilized societies is that in China this is a principle of government, a maxim recognized by law itself. From this arise some curious results. Precisely as citizens are held to be responsible for the consequences of their acts, so must the law find an explanation of the violation of the law, and they are thus punished as is the case in the West. Nevertheless, in China these things are also governed by rules. Some of these rules are local, customary, or professional. Some of them are to be found in the code, which, however, instead of giving the complainant monetary compensation, punishes the defendant with the ordinary criminal punishments. While the distinction between criminal and civil law, a crime and a tort, is a fruitful source of difference among jurists, seeing that even in Western law many acts are at the same time both a crime and a tort, the fact remains that China treats every act as a crime, and the reason being that the legislators have upheld the doctrine of the rule of morality. Western legislators say that a breach of promise of marriage is only an infringement of a private right, giving rise to an action for damages, whereas, in China, it is considered that it is something more than that; it is a matter which concerns the community at large, and should be punished as a crime. The Chinese law allows the marriage by polygamy, but also punishes the father who has broken his promise to give his daughter in marriage (the nearest Chinese equivalent to a breach of promise of marriage in English), and considers that if the father has broken the moral code, and therefore deserves punishment as a criminal. Chinese officials and judges encourage arbitration and private settlement in every way; but, when the parties refer their differences to the court, unless there has been bona fide mistake, the man who breaks a promise is as much a criminal as a murderer, though, of course, the penalty and the consequences are very different. To those who disagree with the Chinese view, and, in view of the impending radical changes to be made in Chinese law in this respect, it will be interesting to quote the words of T. E. Holland:

"The consequences of acts become more and more visible with the advance of civilization, and the State tends more and more to recognize as offences against the community those which formerly only saw to be injuries to individuals."

There is in Chinese law the doctrine of vicarious responsibility. When a particularly heinous offence is committed—e.g., high treason—not only is the criminal punished, but relatives up to a certain degree are also punished. While doubtless the principal motive for this provision, as it is not otherwise easy in such a large country and with inadequate police supervision to prevent the commission of crime, yet, in theory at least, these relatives are responsible because they have not exercised a moral and benign influence on the culprit. This is the principle under which the law presumes they are, on account of their relationship and intimacy, in a position to excuse. Similarly, when a child has committed a crime, particularly a heinous act, the parents are held responsible. Thus the officials of the jurisdiction, from the district magistrate up to the Governor and Viceroy, all receive more or less punishment. The theory is the same; these officials have charge, among other things, of the nurture of the people under their jurisdiction; and, when such a horrible crime as the murder of a person's parents is permitted to come to pass, there has been a breach of duty on the part of the officials. In no other way can the doctrine of vicarious responsibility in Chinese law be explained than by the principle of the rule of morality. Considerations of policy do, of course, influence the law, but in theory and origin it is because the Chinese government is essentially a government by morality.

As already stated, the code is no longer in force, and another penal code has taken its place. Drafts of other codes and laws were in course of preparation even before the fall of the Manchus. The legal revolution preceded the political revolution. In the admiration for Western laws, there is danger of a slavish imitation without ascertaining whether the new tree is suited to this ancient soil. This danger is particularly evident in the law of persons. As J. Bryce has pointed out, 1 the law of persons in all countries is the most difficult and the last to change, since it touches most nearly the question of status, the family relations, the very foundation of the social structure of the community. The drafts prepared in the last days of the Manchu regime are to be submitted to another body of select men for consideration. It is, therefore, premature and unprofitable to prophesy as to the future. That Japanese, and hence German, influence will make itself felt is no doubt. Anglo-Saxon legal principles also have admirers, so that they too will probably be adopted to a certain extent. But Chinese law and custom should form the foundation of the new structure, so that the law of persons may still be an institution which is the product of the genius of the people, and that, while useful and suitable principles may be borrowed from the West, there may be a mistake in assuming that, in a word, the law may still be Chinese law.


CHAO-CHU WU.

LAW (Christian, Western).—I. INTRODUCTION.

There are, first of all, certain distinctions to be made. The first distinction is between jus and lex (law, Gesetz, lois) in the sense of right authority, which the subject of that authority is morally bound to obey. This is our 'law' in one sense. Jus (droit, Recht, lex or leges) may be understood either subjectively or objectively. Subjectively, it is defined as the moral power of doing, omitting, or demanding anything, so that another be obliged to do or omit something. It includes much of what we call 'right' or 'authority.' 1 Jus habere may be rendered 'I have the right.' Objectively, in the sense in which it is studied by jurists, it is the complex of norms by which the actions of individual members of a society are regulated in regard to other members or to the whole society, so that the society may be preserved and may attain its end. The English word 'law' is used in this sense too; thus we speak of State law, Church law, and canon law, as distinct from a particular law (lex). Starting from the fact that all jus comes ultimately from the will of God, canonists distinguish the following kinds. Jus naturale is the eternal law of God, imprinted in our conscience by Him himself, and is known, or may be known, what is essentially right or wrong, by the light of their own conscience. This is the sense in which St. Paul says the Gentiles, who have not the Law (sc. of Moses), do by nature the things of the law (the things in their jurisdiction; and, when such a horrible crime as the murder of a person's parents is permitted to come to pass, 1 2 We may preserve here from the difference between a public lex and a private praeceptum.


2 We may preserve here from the difference between a public lex and a private praeceptum.
This natural law is promulgated by God in making human nature. No power can abrogate it or dispense from it. Different from this is *ius positum*, that is, law made by a legislator about things not in themselves necessary, which become necessary as the result of his legislation. Things forbidden by natural law are *prohibita quia malia*; these forbidden by positive law are *mala quia prohibita*.

Positive law may be divine or human. Divine positive law is that promulgated by God Himself, as the Law of Moses, or laws made by Christ in the NT. This is not the same as natural law. Many commandments of the old Jewish Law are about things in themselves indifferent. It differs also in binding only the subjects to whom it is given (as does all positive law), whereas natural law binds all men. No man can abrogate or dispense from divine positive law. Human positive law is that promulgated by a human authority. Indirectly this too comes from God (or it would not be binding law at all), but only in the sense that God has delegated authority to him who makes it. Positive human law can be abrogated, modified, or dispensed by the authority that laid it down. It is divided into civil law and ecclesiastical law. The *ius ecclesiasticum* is called also by other names. It is *ius sacramentarium* as opposed to *ius pontificale* (civil law); in old days it was often called *ius pontificium*, as opposed to the civil *ius canonarium*; and, opposed to *ius civile*, it is not infrequently called *ius canonium*, though there is a more accurate sense in which *ius canonarium* is a part of ecclesiastical law. Another distinction which crosses this, and so may lead to confusion, is between *ius divinum*, in the sense of all Church law, whether promulgated immediately by Christ or by the authority of the Church, and *ius humanum*, meaning all secular law. This distinction is better avoided. The distinctions of ecclesiastical law are *ius generalis* and *ius speciale*. *Ius generalis* is a law which applies to all cases in which the circumstances for which it provides are found; *ius speciale* is a law made for a particular case, which does not apply to another case, even if the circumstances are the same. From Roman civil law the Church has taken the distinction between *ius commune* and *ius singularum*. *Ius commune* is that which flows from general principles and so applies normally to all subjects; *ius singularum* is law made for a particular person or persons. This distinction has much in common with that of *ius generalis* and *ius speciale*, but is not quite the same. From the point of view of the legislative authority we distinguish *ius universale* and *ius particularium*. Universal law is that which is made by the universal authority of the whole Church; particular law is made by limited authority, as by a bishop for his own diocese. So we have the principle that *ius particularium* may enforce and add to the universal law, but may never contradict it. Lastly comes the much discussed distinction between *ius publicum* and *ius privatum*. This regards the matter of the law. *Ius publicum* contains laws for the whole Church and for its public authorities; *ius privatum* is concerned with the rights and duties of private members of the Church. Several modern canonists of the German school (e.g., Phillips) reject this distinction as absurd. It is contested by most others (cf. C. Tarquinii, Iuris eccleg. publici instituionem, Rome, 1886, p. 1 ff.). *Ius publicum* is either *externum*, if it regards the relation of the Church to other societies (e.g., the State), or *internum*, if it regards the internal affairs of the Church.

'Canon' is the Greek *kanon*, a rule or measure. Already in the 4th cent. Church synods began to call the rules laid down by them canons (so the Synod of Ancyra in A.D. 914, the Nicene Synod in

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Section II: Roman Catholic Canon Law

1. Written and unwritten law. Roman Catholic canon law distinguishes first between two sources of law, *ius scriptum* and *ius non scriptum*. The *ius scriptum* consists of laws which are formally laid down by authority in an authentic document; *ius non scriptum* is the law which arises from practical application on the part of the community, without any such formal promulgation. It does not cease to be *ius non scriptum* when it is written down, but only when it is promulgated anew by authority under the conditions which make a written law.

(a) The *fontes iuris canonici scripti* are: (1) The NT. The OT is not considered a source of Christian law at all, but at most an *admixtium*. The positive old law was abolished by the preaching of the gospel, and its moral precepts are contained in natural law. So the OT, as such, does not occur as a *fontis iuris* at all. On the other hand, the NT and the laws therein contained constitute the foundation of Christian positive law. From the NT we have three principles—the power of legislation given by Christ to His Church, the constitution of the Church as an organism with a hierarchy, and the social character of Christianity, from which we conclude that the Church is a perfect society, having the rights of society, and these are the foundation of all positive Church law. (2) The decrees of synods. Before the Council of Trent decrees about faith were called dogmas, and those about positive law were called canons. The Council of Trent changed these terms, calling its decrees about faith *canones*, and its disciplinary laws *decreta*. The Vatican Council followed this new terminology. Only the decrees of ecumenical councils have force for all Catholics; those of particular councils oblige only those for whom they are promulgated, over whom the council has jurisdiction. But many decrees of particular synods have since become universal by virtue of a new promulgation of universal authority extending them. Disciplinary decrees of ecumenical councils oblige until they are repealed by universal authority. The Church has the power of abrogating or modifying her own decrees by Constitutions of popes. The pope, by virtue of his universal jurisdiction, has the power of making laws for the whole Church. He does this in two forms—in a more solemn form called *bullae* (bulls) and less solemnly by briefs (breves). There is no difficulty in the binding force of bulls and briefs; the greater or less solemnity concerns only the
importance of the matter. Bulls are regularly issued
from the papal Chancellerly before Leo XIII. They
were written in Gothic characters and had attached
a leaden seal tied to the parchment by silk threads.
Leo XIII., in 1878, ordained that in future bulls
should be written in Roman capitals and sealed with
the signature of St. Peter and St. Paul and
bearing the name of the pope. Only in bulls of
special importance is the old leaden seal to be re-
tained. Bulls always begin with the name of the
pope and the year. The principal bulls begin with a
title and are sealed in red with the seal of the Fisherman.
They are prepared at the Secretariate of Briefs. The use
of bulls or briefs is not easy to account for. Fre-
quently matters of great importance are determined
not by bulls but by briefs (see, further, ART. BULLS
AND BRIEFS). According to the matter and the
force of obligation, papal constitutions are vari-
ously distinguished. General laws for the whole
Church are called by the generic name constitui-
tiones, and decreta are those which are issued
‘motu proprio’; littera decretales generally come
from a consultation and are answers to questions.
Enquiries may be directed to either the pope or the
whole Church or to those of some province. With
regard to the extension of their binding force, we
distinguish between constituciones genera-
tes and all other rescripta for special cases, to which
alone formally they apply. All Roman Catholics are
bound by general constitutions, and also by epis-
tola decretales if they are expressly extended to
all. Otherwise, they do not constitute a general
law, from defect of promulgation. Immediately
therefore they apply only to those to whom they are addressed. But
whether they have the force of authentic interpretations of law, and are often published
with the purpose of constituting a precedent. Rescripts have no legal force except for those
to whom they are addressed. Rescripts may be
justiciae, containing an obligation, or gratia,
confering a favour, or mixtis.

So far we have considered the fontes iuris
generalis. Ius particular is made by the decrees
of provincial councils, diocesan laws, or statutes
of corporations, such as chapters for their own
body. It is obvious that a particular authority
cannot lend only those whose law is included as a particular law; not that the Church recognizes the right of a civic
authority to legislate in ecclesiastical matters, but
either because they are the civil sanction of already
existing laws, or because the Church authorities
have given them the force of canonic law. Connected
with civil law are concordats. These began in the
Middle Ages, e.g., the Concordatul Calixtinum
of 1123, between Pope Calixtus II. and the
Emperor Henry V., which put an end to the dispute
about investitures (see art. INVESTITURE
CONTRAVERSIA). A concordat is defined as ‘a treaty
between Ecclesiastical and Civil authorities, by
which the connexion between both societies con-
cerning mixed affairs is regulated.’ According
to modern principles, only the pope makes the
concordat on the side of the Church. For the
State its governing authorities. The matters
treated in concordats are all the ‘mixed’ questions
in which both Church and State have an interest,
such as questions of property, marriage, presenta-
tions to benefices, and so on. Concordats are now
given in the form of a Royal Charter for true
bilateral contracts, which oblige both sides in
justice, being binding on the subjects of both
powers as particular Church law and civil law
(see, further, art. CONCORDAT).

The basis of positive law is the principles of
natural law; nor can positive authority make any
law which contradicts that of nature. (2) Tra-
dition, which affects principles of discipline as
well as those of faith. So we distinguish divine,
representative law, and ecclesiastical tradition of
which bind conduct. (3) Custom (constutudo).
This plays a great part in Catholic canon law. It
is defined as: ‘A law introduced by the repetition
of similar actions on the part of the community,
with the consent of the Dei only permitted to
breathe the name of the pope. In the case of
consonantia and traditio is that in the
case of a law coming through tradition it is
presumed that it was originally formally promulgated
by authority, although knowledge of that pro-
mulgation is to be had only through tradition.
In the case of custom there is no promulgation
at the beginning; the law gradually acquires its
force through repeated acts. Custom is, in fact,
the same principle as prescription, except that
prescription usually connotes a right, and constu-
tudo a duty. It may be universal for the
whole Church, special in the case of a particular
though perfect society in its own order, or
specialissimo, if it affects an imperfect society, such as a family
or parish.

Custom may be according to law, in which case
it only makes the force of the law more clear, and
perhaps interprets it (hence the proverb, ‘Con-
sutudo est optima legis interpretis’); or it may
be beside the law (‘prae legem’), adding to, but
not contradicting, the lex scripta; or it may be
against the law (‘contra legem’), which abrogates
or abolishes a law. This is the most important
case. It is called desmotudo when custom simply
abolishes a law by continual non-observance, constutudo contraria when by repeated acts a new
law is introduced which abrogates a former one.

There are many precautions in canon law against
the too easy admittance of custom. First, it must
be introduced by a perfect community, i.e., by one
which has the power of making or receiving a true
law, as distinct from a particular precept. Hence
one man can never obtain a right for himself by
repeated acts. The custom must be introduced
by repeated, free, and public acts on the part of
the community. Most canonists require that these acts should not be made through
an erroneous opinion (e.g., ignorance that the law exists); they must certainly be free, in
the sense of not being made through force.
Nor is a new law introduced by custom when the
people who practise the custom do so with the
deliberate consciousness that they are merely per-
ferring a free work of piety. There must be, at
least eventually, some signs of an intention (not
necessarily explicit) to prescribe a custom ‘preter
legem.’ The object of a constutudo may be any-
thing which is not opposed to natural law, or
opposed to rights reason, or an immediate occasion
of sin, or injurious in itself to the whole system
of Church discipline. The only general and certain
principle that can be laid down with regard to the
time required for a custom to obtain the force of
law is that there must be a sufficiently repeated
number of acts, extending over a sufficient time,
for a reasonable person to be able to say that the
custom is already in firm possession. Generally
3 Alichron, Constitutiones iuris ecc. Ebor. 1300, p. 38.
4 Alchiner, op. cit. p. 31.
migrated. The last condition for a consuetudo, and the most important, is the consent of the legislator. This really does away with all that otherwise would be anomalous in the principle of consuetudo, and makes it consistent with the normal principle of canon law. For in this case also the rule obtains that ultimately the only source of law is the act of the legislator in some form. The consent of the legislator may be expressed, or tacit, or merely legal, when he is ignorant of the custom, but tends in general to apply always the canonical principles affecting custom. In such a case he has an implicit intention with regard to each particular custom, even if he does not know of it. In this case, too, the real source of the obligation of the consuetudo is the will of the legislator. When the legislator knows of the custom and could put a stop to it but does not do so, we have a case of tacit consent. Custom may be abolished by abrogation, which simply puts an end to the one which now exists, but in no way prevents a new custom of the same kind from arising; or by prohibition, which not only ends the custom but forbids a new one to arise; and, finally, by reprobation, which declares the custom to be in itself pernicious and incapable of ever obtaining the force of law. But the formulas which are often appended to positive laws (such as "non obstetetur quid libere" or "non scriptum") do not always mean as much as they would seem to mean. Often such formulas are intended only to make the beginning of a consuetudo contraria morae. A new positive law is always supposed to abrogate general customs contrary to it, but not local customs, unless a clause to that effect is added. A custom may be abolished by a new custom opposed to it, or by simple desuetudo.

Other fonts canonici non scripti are enumerated in the textbooks. There are the opinions of learned canonists. These are not strictly a source of law; but the responsa prudentium, as in Roman civil law, so also in canon law, are considered a safe guide as to the meaning of laws whose form is ambiguous; they furnish a precedent according to which authentic declarations are made; as in moral theology, the consent of a number of canonists of recent constitutions constitutes a probability which may be followed safely. In much the same way the Fathers of the Church, though each one has no more authority than the rest, may form a witness of a wider tradition which is often of great importance. Moreover, many sayings and decisions of Fathers have afterwards been incorporated into authentic collections of laws, and from this incorporation receive the force of law in the strict sense. In matters concerning which there is yet no positive law, it is probable that the judgment of illustrious Fathers will be considered when a law is framed. Many early texts of canon law include answers of Fathers and their sentences in test cases. This non scriptum also occurs in connexion with ius non scriptum. Thus a repeated number of decisions in special cases, which all show agreement with the same general principle, form a precedent which may be of great importance for general law. Here it is probable that, if a new law be drawn up, it will be in accordance with the precedent set by the usual fonts. Meanwhile this use gives a greater or less probability to custom. Among the Roman tribunals which make the usus foresatus the Rota Romana is of chief importance. Formerly disputed cases from all parts of the world were sent to the Rota for judgment. Its jurisdiction is now limited, but by this of other tribunals; but it still remains the most important one.

The stylos curies also occurs among the fonts non scripti. This means the use of certain conventional or technical terms and the method of procedure, which the student of canon law should understand, since they affect the meaning of the decisions.

History of the sources of canon law. Canonists distinguish three main periods of canon law—the ius antiquum from the foundation of the Church to the publication of Gratian’s Decretum, ius novum from Gratian to the Council of Trent, and ius nonnullium from the Council of Trent to our own time.

(1) Ius antiquum. After the NT there is but little canon law extant down to the Council of Nicaea (325). The modern canonist in practice does not refer much to this time, but in theory the same rules apply to it as to later times. A law made during the first three centuries by proper authority binds the subjects of that authority till it be repealed or fall into desuetude. But there are hardly any such documents now extant. There are a few papal letters, letters of other bishops, such as St. Cyprian, and the decrees of one or two councils, such as the two held at Carthage in 256. Moreover, since later legislation has occupied the whole field of possible Church law, it is unlikely that any law of the first three centuries would be cited. It will have been either re-enacted or abrogated at a later period. After the Council of Nicaea we have a large collection of canons, chiefly papal, apostolic, such as the Canons of Hippolytus, the various Church Orders, etc. The most important of these are the so-called Apostolic Constitutions and Canons. When it was believed that these were the work of the apostles, naturally they seemed of enormous importance. The Quinisextum Synod (‘in Trullo,’ at Constantinople, 682) recognizes the 95 Apostolic Canons as an authentic source of canon law, whereas in the West a Roman synod under Pope Gelasius I. rejected them as spurious as early as 495. Eventually fifty of these canons, by their reception in the Corpus iuris, obtained a certain recognition, though not technically authority, in the West. Now that every knows that they are spurious, they have only an archaeological interest. Some of them, however, are really repetitions of authentic canons of Nicaea and the Synod of Antioch in 441. From the Council of Nicaea (325) there are decrees of ecumenical synods, which have the full force of law for the whole Church, and those of particular synods, which are authentic for the provinces concerned. The other source of this ius antiquum consists of papal letters and decrees. There are literae synodi (treating chiefly of matters of faith) and papal decrees in various forms from the time of Damasus I. (366–384). These are collected in Repetita, and still have full force, unless they have been repealed by later legislation.

Long before the famous Decretum Gratiani attempts had been made to put and arrange the growing mass of sources of canon law. The first collection of this kind is the so-called Versio Hispanica, long supposed to be the work of St. Isidore of Seville. Really it is a Greek collection, to which a Latin translation was added in Italy. Its first edition, composed and translated not long after the 4th cent., contained only the decrees of Nicaea; to these the Latin version added those of Sardica, then supposed in the West to be Nicene. Later the decrees of Amiens, Novo-Cesarea, and Gaeta were added. Such a collection would naturally constantly be brought up to date, and new canons would be added by copyists. Finally, in Spanish and Gallican traditions, new canons were added. From the 5th to the 9th centuries there is a number of such collections. The so-called Versio prava is an Italian translation of a Greek
collection made in the early 6th century. In Gaul a great but disordered collection of canons of councils, and of papal and episcopal letters, was made in the beginning of the 6th century. This was the work of Pope Siricius, who thought it to be the oldest official Roman collection. F. Massens counts thirteen earlier Gallican collections of the kind. 2 In Italy Dionysius Exiguus (507-554?), a large collection, one of canons and one of decretals (papal letters) is known to Augustine II. (496-498). These were then joined together, and became the official Roman text-book, practically displacing all others. Later canons were added to the collection. Pope Adrian I, in 774 sent a copy of this to Charles the Great (with additions down to his own time). This became the official Codex Canonum of the Church of Gaul. It was made State law in Charlemagne’s empire in 802. In Africa the chief collections are the Bibliotheca Canonum of Fulgentius Ferrandus in the first half of the 6th cent., and the Concordia Canonum of Cresentius about the year 690. Spain had a number of such collections. In the end of the 8th cent. Martín, Bishop of Braga, made a Collectio Canonum (also known as Liber Capitolorum). About the same time appeared an Epitome from Martin of Braga and other sources; from this further Epitomes were collected. It was the 9th cent. that the great Hispana Collectio was composed. The preface of this is taken for the chief part from the Etymologias of St. Isidore of Seville († 636). This is the main source of pseudo-Isidore. In the 9th cent. the number of forged decretals and was ascribed by the forger to St. Isidore. Ireland had a collection of canons, chiefly taken from Dionysius, about the end of the 7th cent. In the 9th cent. appeared three collections in the Frankish kingdom which consisted largely of forged documents. These are the Collection of Canones of Benedictus, the famous forged Decretals (pseudo-Isidore), and the Capitula Anglorum. The forged Decretals especially had a disastrous effect on later canon law. They contain so great a mass of documents, touching all kinds of matter, that for centuries canisants took their material from them. It is not clear who was the author of these. Additional collections were compiled between the years 847 and 853, in Gaul. They were probably begun at Mainz and completed at Rheims. The compiler calls himself Isidore (in the Mainzer Catalog or Mercator). Various persons have been suggested as the compiler (Benedictus Levita, Rothad of Soissons, etc.). The forgeries consist for the most part in ascribing authentic documents of a later age to an earlier one. In the 15th cent. Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa and John Turrecarnata first doubted their authenticity. Since then this has been so established that no one any longer quotes them. Other collections are those of Beatus of Prum (c. 906), Berhard of Worms († 1019), Alcuin of Lucca († 868), Cardinal Deusdedit (1068-87), and the Decretum and Pannomia of Ivo of Chartres († 1117).

The sext novum begins with the Decretum of Gratian, which superseded all earlier ones and became the universally accepted collection of the Middle Ages in the West. Gratian (Magister Gratiani) was a Benedictine monk at Bologna. He lectured on canon law, and, feeling the need of a text-book, he composed his Decretum about the year 1150. He intended this to be not so much a collection of canons as a textbook of liturgical and canon law. He was one of the first to state the law and to prove the law by quotations. In each case he states a thesis (these statements are the 'dicta Gratiani,' which come first); then, as proof, he quotes documents, canons of synods, papal decrees, and even civil laws. His idea was also to harmonise apparently discordant canons; hence the name, given either by himself or by others, 'dictum solum ad concordiam.' Gratian's book was, in comparison with all that had gone before it, so well arranged, and contained so much matter, that it soon became the official textbook in the Church. No other text-book could come into the work, each under the special heading 'Pales' (for Paucares); then the notes of other commentators were added with the same heading, so that 'Pales' became a general title for notes at the end of Gratian's work. A mass of longer commentaries and glosses gathered around the text. The 'Glossa ordinaria' printed at the foot of modern editions is by Johannes Tentonicus (Johann Zemek) Canon of Halberstadt († 1235), and Bartholomew of Brescia († 1258). After the work had passed through innumerable hands and had received all manner of additional notes and corruptions of the text, Pope Pius IV, appointed a special commission to compile a new edition of the Decretum, which was continued their work under Pius V. These are the 'Correctores Romani,' whose corrections are added beneath the text. Finally, Gregory XIII, in 1582 issued an authentic printed edition of the Decretum. It consists of three parts. Part I (containing the 'Declarato ordinario') treats of the sources of canon law and of ecclesiastical persons and offices. It is divided into seven Distinctiones, of which begins with a dictum headed 'Gratianus.' This is his thesis. It is then proved by a number of cases. At the end often comes the 'Pales,' in which originally these Distinctiones and canons were not numbered, and were quoted by their first words. The edition of Charles Demouilla (Paris, in 1497) shows that the Le Conte (Paris, 1559) numbered the Pales also. Part II contains solutions of disputed questions. It is divided into 36 'Conses.' Each begins with a statement of the case by Gratian, followed by a number of 'Questions,' each having a proposition by Gratian, which is then proved by a number of canons. Among these is one question which amounts to a complete treatise or excursus by itself. This is the third Distincion of Gaius (xxxvii). It begins with the 'Pales' ('De Pectinemia') and is divided into seven Distinctiones and these again into canons. 'De Pectinemia' is quoted as a separate treatment. Part III, is headed 'Textus Gratiani' and contains a number of canons, especially of the Mass. This part has five Distinctiones, each beginning with a 'dictum Gratiani,' and subdivided into series of canons. The second and third parts also have Pales.

There is a recognized manner of quoting the Decretum Gratiani which sometimes differs very much from the modern. It is not necessary to go into this at length. But the following may be of interest. The 'Decretum Gratiani' is divided into twenty Distinctiones, each beginning with a 'dictum Gratiani,' and subdivided into series of canons. The second and third parts also have Pales.

Gratian's Decretum then became the nucleus of the Corpus iuris canonici, of which it is still the first (about half in length). To the other parts were added. Gratian had used canons down to Innocent II; the latest quoted by him is of 1193. As time went on, and further material accumulated, it became necessary to add to the work. Notably the third and fourth Lateran councils (1179 and 1215) added considerably to the material of canon law in the West. During this period, when the papacy reached its greatest power in civil life, a great number of papal decrees were issued. After Gratian about seventeen different compilations of this new material were made, when Pope Gregory IX thought of publishing an authentic addition to the Decretum Gratiani, this was prepared by St. Raymond of Pennafort, the

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1 In the opera Leonis Magni, II. (Paris, 1675).
2 Gesetze der Quellen und der Lit. des M. Rom., pp. 821-873.
pope's penitentiary, Gregory published this collection in 1234 by the bull *Rex pacificus*, sent it to the Universities of Paris and Bologna, and ordered that it should be accepted as authentic. This is the Corpus juris canonici.

The work is divided into five books, treating of the matters described in the verse "Index, judicium, cursor, canonicum, canonum," namely of ecclesiastical officials and judges, of procedures in canon law, of the rights, duties, and property of clerics, of laws about marriage, of criminal cases and their procedures, and finally into "Capituli." This division already existed in the compilation of Bernard of Pavia (Papalnia) about 1191, which is the basis of that of Gregory IX.

The sign by which a quotation from this part of the Corpus juris canonici is introduced in the work is either the letter *X* or the letter *O*, meaning that it is outside the *Decretum Gratiani*. Thus: "...etc., etc." means that the author of the *Decretum Gratiani* (which is about clerks who do not reside) of book *X*, or extra, namely, in the *Decretals of Gregory IX*. The addition of the heading of the Titulus is now no longer necessary, since in later editions they are numbered.

The work has been enlarged since it was first published. Raymond, with the idea of maintaining brevity, did not write out the statement of the case, but only the solution. Nor did he quote the whole *Decretal*, but only fragments of it. The result of this was that it was often impossible to understand his text unless one went to the original source. To remedy this Le Conte in his edition (Paris, 1556) added what Raymond had omitted. These are the "parts decesis," printed in italics in modern editions. The *Decretals* are arranged in chronological order; in some cases Raymond, when the matter did not seem sufficiently clear, obtained from the pope a special decree made to be inserted here. These are put at the end of the Titulus. There is a "Glossa ordinaria" made by Bernabò da Bottone of Parma (1253).

The third part of the *Corpus juris canonici* consists of the *Liber Sextus Decretalium*, added by Boniface VIII. It is the sixth book after the five of Gregory IX. This became necessary in the same way as those of Gregory IX. In 1245 and 1274 the first and second Councils of Lyons had been held. From the decrees of these, of popes since Gregory IX. and of his own, Boniface VIII. in 1268 published his *Liber Sextus*, by the bull *Streutnotsede*. In this he expressly forbids any decrees to be accepted as valid except those contained in this collection. John X. made the "Glossa ordinaria" to this part of the *Decretals* in 1286. At the end the pope added rather "Regulae iuris," short maxims about procedure. The *Liber Sextus* is divided in the same way as the *Decretals of Gregory IX*. Although the whole is the *Liber Sextus*, it has itself five books, divided into Tituli and Chapters. It is quoted as in Gregory IX., except that, instead of X, we write "in vi."

The fourth part of the *Corpus juris canonici* is the *Constitutiones Clementine*. In 1314, Clement v. published a collection of his own Constitutions, including those of the Council of Vienne (1311-12); but he died before his work had been received by the Universities of Orleans and Paris, to which it was addressed. His successor, John xxii., in 1317 sent the collection to the University of Bologna with the bull *Quoniam nulla*, ordering its use by schools of canon law and in courts. Clement meant to call his collection the Seventh Book of *Decretals*; but, since it contains only his own, not all those which had been issued since Boniface VIII., the commentators refused to give it this title and called it the *Constitutiones Clementine*.

It is divided, like the *Decretals of Gregory IX.*, into five books, and chapters. It is copied in the same way, with the special rubric "Clem." instead of "X." It has a Glossary by John Andreae (1230), improved by Francis Zanarella (1417).

These collections, those of Gratian, Gregory IX., Boniface VIII., and Clement v., constitute the *Corpus juris canonici clausum*, a name which begins with a misunderstanding of a phrase in the acts of the Council of Basel.1 The *Corpus juris canonici*, however, received yet two appendices. Decrees made later, and, therefore, not in the *Corpus*, were called "Extravagantes," as being outside the official book. Then they began to be numbered and copied of the *Corpus* as an appendix. Finally, Jean Chappuis in his edition (Paris, 1500) printed two such appendices of "Extravagantes," which, although collected only by his private authority, are now always included in "Extravagantes" of Pope John xxii. (1316-34), which had already been edited with a Glossa by Zenzelius de Cassanis in 1325. They are distributed in 14 Tituli. The other appendix contains "Extravagantes communes," decrees of various popes from Boniface VIII. (1304-1303) to Sixtus IV. (1471-84). Chappuis published seventy of these; later (in 1603) five more were added. These are arranged in five books on the same principle as those of Gregory IX. But the fourth book ("Communia") is wanting, because there had been no new decrees about marriage. The whole work is considered one *Corpus*, including the "Extravagantes.

Matthew of Lyons in 1590 published a so-called "Liber Septimus" containing constitutions of popes from Sixtus IV. to Sixtus V. (1585-90); and Paul Lancellotti in 1593 wrote a compendium of canon law which he called *Institutiones iuris canonici*. These also had the approval of Paul v., having been added to the *Corpus juris canonici* since 1605. They can hardly be considered in any sense part of it, though they are authentic collections which may be used in canonical processes.

This is the end of the *Corpus juris canonici*. Its historical importance is enormous. For centuries it has been the one official collection of the Roman Catholic Church; it is the most important book of canon law ever published. It is, in spite of the reverence with which it is still regarded, it has ceased to have more than a historical interest. There has been far-reaching legislation since, notably by the Councils of Trent and the Vatican. Moreover, the *Corpus* has many errors of various kinds. Gratian's decree, its nucleus, is not on the level of modern erudition. He quotes a number of spurious papal decrees, including many from pseudo-bishops. It is not likely that any further additions will be made to a work which would need rather complete re-casting. At the Vatican Council one of the Postulata was for a new *Corpus*, to be made by a special commission. Meanwhile the modern canonist refers rather to a modern *Codex juris canonici*. The *Corpus juris canonici* has not the same authority throughout. Although it is an official collection, this does not mean that in it must be accepted as authentic. The *Decretum Gratiani* has never been made a 'codex legalis' in the strict sense. Therefore it remains, in itself, a private collection, which confers no new force on the decrees which it quotes. Each of these has no more value than it had before Gratian quoted it. His Dicta and the Palese have no juridical value. But the *Decretals of Gregory IX.*, Boniface VIII., and Clement v. were published as a 'codex legalis.' This means that the publication, apart from their origin, was promulgation of a new law. All that is in them thereby obtained the value of common law, even when the original decree was addressed to some particular person only. But this law is subject to the usual conditions. It may be abrogated, prescribed against, etc., as may all common law. According to the opinion of canonists, the constitutions among the 'Extravagantes' do not receive any new authority from their insertion here.
(3) Lex nonnulla. — The lex nonnulla begins with the Council of Trent (1545-83). Of the twenty-five sessions of the Council, thirteen made decrees affecting law. These decrees were to have force as soon as they were promulgated. This was done by the bull Benedictus Deus of Pius V. in 1564. The pope fixed 1st May of that year as the date from which the decrees should be in force. The question now is whether it is possible lawfully for a custom to abrogate any Trinitarian Reorganization of the possibility of this has often been denied, so that there is an axiom often quoted: ‘Contra concilium Tridinium non uaelet consecutum.’ This axiom has no authority behind it. It is true that the Council of Trent has the gravest authority; but there is no reason to suppose an exception to the common principle about consuetudo in this case either. In fact, a number of customs have arisen against its decrees in various parts of the Church, which, supposing the usual conditions, are admitted as lawful. In order that there might be a permanent body capable of giving authentic interpretation of those decrees, Pius IV. founded the ‘Congregatio concilii Tridentini laici pres’ (commonly called the ‘Sacra congregatio concilii,’ ‘S.C.C.’). This congregation still exists; it has acquired extended functions regarding other matters also.

Since the Council of Trent there has been a considerable increase in the sources of canon law. The immense number of papal constitutions is edited in the Bullarium Romanum, of which several different editions have appeared. Pius IV. began the most important being the Magna Bullarium Romanae of Luxemburg (1726-58) and Rome (1733-58). There is also a Bullarium Romani Continuato (Rome, 1758-1814) by Gregorius, and a Gregory regis (1831-45). These are in themselves only private collections. But Benedict XIV. (1740-58) published a collection of his own bulls (1743-58). The publication of this work is considered equivalent to a new promulgation; so that Benedict XIV. ’s Bullarium has the same authority, as a collection, as the Decretals of Gregory IX., etc., in the Corpus iuris canonici. The disciplinary decrees of the Council (1870) form a part of the great importance. The laws of Pius IX. (1846-73), including the Syllabus of 1864, and of Leo XIII. (1878-1903)4 have been published in special collections. Since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) the concordats were made with various States and provincial synods. During the late pontificate there has been considerable legislation. The Holy See functions through the Roman Congregations.

According to the reform of Pius IX. (Sessantina consilia, 1939), there are now twelve Congregations of Cardinals: (1) 'S. Cong. Sancti Officii' (the Inquisition), which looks after matters of faith and morals, indulgences, matters affecting the theology of the sacraments, and it is always present in the sessions; (2) 'S. Cong. Consistorialis,' which has to do with consistorialities, and with the affairs of dioceses not under papal jurisdiction; (3) ‘S. Cong. de disciplina Sacramentorum,’ for disciplinary matters affecting sacramentary; (4) ‘S. Cong. Consist. et Sacrae Congregarum,’ (i.e. ‘Sacred Congregations’), the affairs of religious Orders; (5) ‘S. Cong. de Propaganda fide,’ for missions, with two divisions, one for the Roman rite and one for Eastern rites; (6) ‘S. Cong. Indicii, which forbids dangerous books; (7) ‘S. Cong. sacrorum rituum, for rites and ceremonies; (8) ‘S. Cong. Cerimoniarii, for non-liturgical ceremonies; (9) ‘S. Cong. Missarum,’ for matters relating to the Church’s worship; (10) ‘S. Cong. pro negotii ecc. extraordinarii, for concordats and other affairs of special importance; (11) ‘S. Cong. Studiorum, for schools, seminaries, and universities; (12) ‘S. Cong. reformanda fabrici, which looks after the property and building of St. Peter’s at Rome.

There are three Roman ‘Officia,’ the ‘Cancellation apostolica,’ which prepares and sends bulls concerning the erection of new dioceeses, chapters, and other important matters; the ‘Datai apostolici, to do ordinations to minor benefices;

2 Leoni XIII. encyclopaedia, constitutiones et epistolas, 2 vols., Milan, 1867.

and the ‘Camera apostolica,’ which looks after the property of the Holy See, especially ‘sede vacante,’ and gives jurisdiction to the Camerlengo for that time. There are three Tribunals: the ‘S. Pio V. Roman Pontifical,’ which deals with causes of officiaries and others in foro interno; only; the ‘S. Romana Rota,’ the highest tribunal for all canonical cases; and the ‘Signatura apostolica,’ which is the court of appeal that may reverse the judgment of the Roman Rota. Among the commissions instituted by Pius X. the most important for our purpose is the Commission pro codificationis iuris canonici. This has undertaken the task of revising, simplifying, and codifying the whole body of Roman Catholic canon law.

The position of the Uniates (Christians of Eastern rites in union with Rome) has nothing abnormal in principle, though practically they have many points of canon law special to themselves. They are bound, as are all Catholics, by ecumenical laws, but not by all papal constitutions, since many of these are interdicts, and not decrees. The sources of canon law for Uniates are the canons of synods held before the great schism of the 10th cent., except such as have been abrogated since; their liturgical books approved by the Holy See; and their local synods according to their way. There have been several of these, some of greater importance, e.g. the Ruthenian Synod of Zamosis in 1732, the Maronite Synod of Mount Lebanon, held at the monastery of Deir el-Latrun in 1736, and Rome in 1792. They are bound by special papal constitutions for Eastern Churches and by decrees of propaganda addressed to them. In 1631 Urban VIII. declared that Uniates are bound by general papal decrees in three cases only: when the decree concerns a matter of faith, when they are expressly named, and when something is decreed which implicitly affects them. The local law of one Uniate church does not affect the others, unless it is explicitly extended to them; nor has the authority of one jurisdiction over the others, unless it is received by delegation from the Holy See.


LAW (Christian, Eastern).—I. Canon Law in the Orthodox Church. — In general principles the Orthodox Church agrees with the Church of Rome as to canon law. She too recognizes the NT, 1 Syn. proc. Ruthenorum hab. in univ. Szatmarisecie, Rome, 1870. 2 Syn. proc. R.D. Patr. Antichonce., 1870; nationis Syrorum Maronitarum, Rome, 1870. E. Encyclical Quassemi, 22 Dec. 1870.
tradition (τραdition), custom (παράδοσις), and positive ecclesiastical legislation (τό θεόκριτον νόμον) as the source of its laws, but it takes a different attitude towards civil law. As the result of the long Byzantine period, during which emperors made laws for the Church which were accepted by Eastern bishops, the Orthodox Church gives more importance to the State law (for all other laws than those the Church makes). The Orthodox canons explain this. They urge that, as the Christian State accepted canon law in its province, and as the imposition of the canon law was an obligation under pain of excommunication and civil sanctions, so the Church accepts all State law, even that of heathen emperors, as hers, so long as this does not contradict the canons. By this acceptance the Church "canonizes" State law and gives it promulgation from herself... John Scholasticius (6th cent.), in his collection of canons, includes as an appendix a number of the Nomocanon of Justinian I. which affect Church matters. The Nomocanon contains the rule: 'In cases where there are no canons we must follow the laws of the State.' 1 Theodore Balsamon (13th cent.), however, ascribes greater authority to the canons than to civil laws. In a case of conflict the canons always prevail, and the Orthodox Church also ascribes canonical authority to the responsa prudential (τα βουλευτήρια των εισαγωγίων), i.e. the opinions of learned canonists given in the form of expositions of questions or as statements. In this, like the Latin Church, she follows a principle of Roman civil law.

With regard to positive Church law (ἐκ νόμων the strict sense) the Orthodox admit, as binding the whole Church, the Omologismos (τό τον εκ νόμων), to which they still give apostolic and ecumenical authority, as containing principles derived from the Apostles, and as being confirmed by the Trullan Synod of 692) and the decrees of ecumenical synods. Of these they acknowledge seven, including the second of Nicea (787) as the last. Although they hold their Church to be the whole Church of Christ on earth (so that she should have the same power of convoking an ecumenical synod as had the Church before the great schism), as a matter of fact they have held no synod claiming to be ecumenical since that schism. These are in theory the only authorities that can legislate for the whole Church, though the decrees of many particular synods and even canons of individual Fathers are considered to have acquired ecumenical authority by the later acceptance of the whole (Orthodox) Church. A Patriarch can legislate for his Patriarchate only; since the formation of permanent synods to govern national Churches, they give to these the same authority as a Patriarch has. In no case can the particular authority legislate against the universal canons. In theory each bishop has the right to legislate for his own Eparchy, within the bounds of general law. He can summon diocesan synods, and promulgate laws for his people in the form of pastoral letters. In practice, however, this right is now much circumscribed. Each national Orthodox Church is considerably centralized under its Patriarch or Holy Synod. The Orthodox Church is balanced by a very complete dependence of each bishop within it. In the Orthodox States the government has much to say in the matter of the legislation of ecclesiastical authority.

The book most useful to the Church in the matter of the liturgy and the Liturgical orders is the Syntagma (Συντάγμα), a collection of the Canons of the Apostles and the Canons of the Churches, of the second and third centuries. After the destruction of the ancient Canons, this work was compiled by the Patriarch of Alexandria, Nysa, Theophylact of Alexandria, Cyril of Alexandria, Gennadius of Constantinople, and Tamsius of Constantinople. These constitute the fundamental canon law of the Church. They contain the Canons of the Apostles (Συντάγμα τού Αποστόλου καὶ ἐπίσκοπων κ.τ.λ.), the Canons of the Church of Athens, the Canons of the Church of Alexandria, the Canons of the Church of Jerusalem, the Canons of the Church of Antioch, and the Canons of the Church of Rome. The Canons of the Apostles contain the canons of the Apostles themselves, those of the first ecumenical synod, and those of ten other synods, namely Antioch (314), Neo-Caesarea (between 314 and 325), Gangra (c. 340), Antioch (341), Laodicea (c. 343), Sardeis (c. 343), Constantinople (344), Carthage (419), Constantinople (671), and Constantinople (879). The Nomocanon of 1090 contains the canons of thirteen Fathers, namely Dionysius of Alexandria, Gregory of Neo-Caesarea, Peter of Antioch, Athanasius, Basil, Timothy of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Anianus, Church matters, to show how the Church does the work of Christ. The Orthodox canons explain this. They urge that, as the Christian State accepted canon law in its province, and as the imposition of the canon law was an obligation under pain of excommunication and civil sanctions, so the Church accepts all State law, even that of heathen emperors, as hers, so long as this does not contradict the canons. By this acceptance the Church "canonizes" State law and gives it promulgation from herself... John Scholasticius (6th cent.), in his collection of canons, includes an appendix a number of the Nomocanon of Justinian I. which affect Church matters. The Nomocanon contains the rule: 'In cases where there are no canons we must follow the laws of the State.' 1 Theodore Balsamon (13th cent.), however, ascribes greater authority to the canons than to civil laws. In a case of conflict the canons always prevail, and the Orthodox Church also ascribes canonical authority to the responsa prudential (τα βουλευτήρια των εισαγωγίων), i.e. the opinions of learned canonists given in the form of expositions of questions or as statements. In this, like the Latin Church, she follows a principle of Roman civil law.

With regard to positive Church law (ἐκ νόμων the strict sense) the Orthodox admit, as binding the whole Church, the Omologismos (τό τον εκ νόμων), to which they still give apostolic and ecumenical authority, as containing principles derived from the Apostles, and as being confirmed by the Trullan Synod of 692) and the decrees of ecumenical synods. Of these they acknowledge seven, including the second of Nicea (787) as the last. Although they hold their Church to be the whole Church of Christ on earth (so that she should have the same power of convoking an ecumenical synod as had the Church before the great schism), as a matter of fact they have held no synod claiming to be ecumenical since that schism. These are in theory the only authorities that can legislate for the whole Church, though the decrees of many particular synods and even canons of individual Fathers are considered to have acquired ecumenical authority by the later acceptance of the whole (Orthodox) Church. A Patriarch can legislate for his Patriarchate only; since the formation of permanent synods to govern national Churches, they give to these the same authority as a Patriarch has. In no case can the particular authority legislate against the universal canons. In theory each bishop has the right to legislate for his own Eparchy, within the bounds of general law. He can summon diocesan synods, and promulgate laws for his people in the form of pastoral letters. In practice, however, this right is now much circumscribed. Each national Orthodox Church is considerably centralized under its Patriarch or Holy Synod. The Orthodox Church is balanced by a very complete dependence of each bishop within it. In the Orthodox States the government has much to say in the matter of the legislation of ecclesiastical authority.

The book most useful to the Church in the matter of the liturgy and the Liturgical orders is the Syntagma (Συντάγμα), a collection of the Canons of the Apostles and the Canons of the Churches, of the second and third centuries. After the destruction of the ancient Canons, this work was compiled by the Patriarch of Alexandria, Nysa, Theophylact of Alexandria, Cyril of Alexandria, Gennadius of Constantinople, and Tamsius of Constantinople. These constitute the fundamental canon law of the Church. They contain the Canons of the Apostles (Συντάγμα τού Αποστόλου καὶ ἐπίσκοπων κ.τ.λ.), the Canons of the Church of Athens, the Canons of the Church of Alexandria, the Canons of the Church of Jerusalem, the Canons of the Church of Antioch, and the Canons of the Church of Rome. The Canons of the Apostles contain the canons of the Apostles themselves, those of the first ecumenical synod, and those of ten other synods, namely Antioch (314), Neo-Caesarea (between 314 and 325), Gangra (c. 340), Antioch (341), Laodicea (c. 343), Sardeis (c. 343), Constantinople (344), Carthage (419), Constantinople (671), and Constantinople (879). The Nomocanon of 1090 contains the canons of thirteen Fathers, namely Dionysius of Alexandria, Gregory of Neo-Caesarea, Peter of Antioch, Athana-
gives the Canons of the Apocalypse and those of the ecumenical synods. In the 5th century the particular synods with commentaries. iv. the Canons of the Patriarchs, viz. of Emperor Constantine (those which affect Church matters, resp. synagoge praedicanum, and a number of dispositions by various canons; lists of sees and of the various Eastern Churches (the Byzantine Patriarchate), the Greek civil laws of 1212 regulating the organization of the Church. The Holy Synod which governs it; and vi. the Synagoge of Matthew Bistases and an alphabetical index of the whole work.

The Athenian Synagoge is the most complete code of the Eastern canon law. It has been officially recognized, as an authentic codex, by the ecumenical Patriarchate and by most of the national Churches. For this reason N. Milasch judges that all canons contained in it must be regarded as having ecumenical authority. The Slav and Rumanian Churches have for the most part translations of Greek collections, with additions and commentaries.

In modern times laws are made for each Church by its central authority. The tendency is now strongly in favor of synods and councils of various kinds, instead of the old rule of one Patriarch or Primate. Even the Patriarchs now have their synods, met in council, and so on. The latter national Churches are governed by the Holy Synod, formed after the model of the Russian one (formed in 1721). These synods, under considerable influence from the governments, make laws regulating all the affairs of their Church.

2. The lesser Eastern Churches.—Each of the Nestorian and Monophysite Churches has its own system of canon law, evolved from the general principles of Eastern Church law with the necessary special modifications. They do not seem to have a clear concept of the difference between ecumenical and local law. As each is an Ekklesium to itself, the two concepts naturally are confused. They admit in their canon law the decrees of certain councils, which they recognize, and have then their own rules, made by their special synods and Patriarchs. In the Middle Ages these Churches evolved schools of canon law of some importance. They have great canonists among their writers. In modern times, at least among the Nestorians and Jacobites, there is a tendency to replace the old canons by new decisions made for each case by the Patriarch, in agreement with the other bishops or notables.

Nestorian canon law is derived from three main sources. First come the Western Synods, i.e. such synods held in the Empire before their schism in the 5th century. These include many particular synods, such as those of Antioch (341) and Ancyra (358). There is a collection of these made by Marutha of Maxerchat in 410, to which the disciplinary canons of Chalcedon (451) were added later. The second source is the Eastern Synods, namely, those held by Nestorian Katholikoi down to the 8th century. The old rule was that each Katholikos should hold a synod as soon as he was appointed. An unknown Nestorian collected these in the Book of the Synods (775 and 790). The Sunhaddus begins with the Synod of Mazis in 410 and ends with that of Mar Hnunehii in 757 in an appendix to the Synod of Mar Timothy I. in 790. The Sunhaddus also contains a selection of canons of Western synods. This is the chief Nestorian canonical authority. The third source consists of all laws made since the 8th century. These have not been completely codified. In the 16th century Ebedyeses' Bar Barka, Metropolitan of Paphlagonia, compiled some of them from three sources. This is the Nomocanon of Ebedyeses, the most complete collection of their laws.

The chief sources of Coptic canon law are the 31 canons of the Holy Synod (1830), the 20 canons of Gabriel II. (1151-14), and the canons of Cyril III. (1233-43). Cyril III. not only made canons himself, but ordered that a complete collection of all those existing should be drawn up. The Abyssinian Church recognizes and obeys Coptic canon law.

The Jacobite Church once had a considerable school of canonists. Bar-Hebraeus, their greatest theologian, was also one of the most important of all Eastern canonists. His Nomocanon (Ktibd diHuddde) remains their classical collection.

The Armenian Church recognizes the first three General Councils, but even before she was separated from the rest of Christendom she began to have her own canon laws. The most famous particular Armenian canons of antiquity are the 21 canons of the Katholikos Isaac issued about the year 406. Then from the time of the Synod of Torin (Duin), about the year 534, which completes the Gentile Code, the Armenians have had a long series of national synods, each of which added to their canon law. The acts of these synods have been collected and translated by Angelo Mai. Russian laws affecting the supreme Katholikos of Etchmiadzin, the virtual separation of Armenia from Turkey by their jurisdiction, and the formation of the National Assembly and diocesan councils have completely modified the old law, and Etchmiadzin has a theocratic authority over the whole Armenian Church, which he exercises in conjunction with his permanent synod of seven auxiliary bishops. In affairs of the greatest importance he would, no doubt, take the lead in forming a new law; otherwise he has little real authority beyond his own Patriarchate. The practical head of the Armenian Church in Turkey is its Patriarch of Constantinople. He is assisted by a National Assembly, composed for the most part of laymen. With these rules and laws. In each diocese there is also a council of laymen, and in each parish a body of lay administrators, who look after the property and have charge of all Church affairs. The modern Armenian Church is ruled practically by the decisions of these assemblies.


Adrian Fortescue.

Law (Christian, Anglican).—I. Nature of the present Anglican Church law. The Anglican Communion is a federation of more than 100 autonomous Churches; hence its ecclesiastical law varies in different countries. It consists partly of the written law which is now universally acknowledged to be in force, and partly of the customary law resulting in a large degree on the ancient and mediæval canon
law of Western Christendom. In England and Wales (also in Man, Berwick-on-Tweed, and the Channel Islands) complications arise owing to the existing laws of the Irish, or, as it is called, the Irish Church, which involves the result that the Church's law cannot become binding unless the State assents to it. This is the case also in India, where the relations of the Church and State are very various. But in most of the other branches of the Anglican Federation the Church is free to make its own laws, which become binding on the basis of a voluntary contract (see below, § 6).

We are not here entering into the vexed question of later Acts of Parliament affecting the Church, in which the Church as such had no voice. Thirty-nine Articles of 1662, and the canons of 1609 (1604), as slightly amended in later years. The Prayer Book and the Ordinal, after being agreed upon by the Conventions, were enacted as part of the statutory law of the realm by being inserted as a schedule in an Act of Parliament known as the Act of Uniformity of 1662. We need not here enter into the vexed question of later Acts of Parliament affecting the Church, in which the Church as such had no voice. Thirty-nine Articles have also the authority both of Church and of State. Thus the Prayer Book and Articles are certainly binding on both clergy and laity. The canons of 1603, as also those of 1540, 1563, 1588, which added to or amended them, were agreed upon by the Conventions and published by the sovereign's authority under the Great Seal (Blunt-Philimore, Church Law, pp. 171, 371 ff.; in the latter place they are given in full amended).

There was an irregularity in that the Royal Letters Patent were given for the 1603 canons before the York Convocation had sat, although after the Canterbury Convocation had passed them. The York Convocation, however, obtained the king's licence to discuss them afterwards, and then passed them (J. H. Overton, The Church in England, London, 1897, II. 11). The validity of the 1603 canons, which were passed before the fall of Land, was disputed (see Overton, II. 771, 80). The preachers of the 1603 canons, those of 1601, hold good only in Elizabeth's reign. They are given in English and Latin by W. E. Collins in the Church Historical Society's publications, no. xl. (London, 1899).

The canons of 1603 as amended undoubtedly bind the clergy, but it is uncertain (seeing that they have not been sanctioned by Parliament) how far they bind the laity.

Lord Hardwicke (in Middleton v. Creft [Blunt-Philimore, Para. 276]) argued that they do not 'proprio signo bind the laity, but only the clergy,' adding: 'I say proprio signo, by their own force and authority, for there are many provisions concerning the administration of the sacred offices and the usage of the Church of England which have been in effect in that respect, and by virtue of such ancient allowances will bind the laity.'

The Prayer Book and canons as at present in force have been somewhat influenced by royal and episcopal injunctions from the Reformation onwards.

Besides the laws mentioned above, the great canons of the 18th cent., such as Gibson, mention numerous Acts of Parliament which deal with crimes against the moral law, and with marriage and other matters which affect the Church. With these we are not here concerned.

(b) Church of Ireland.—The present written laws of the Church, known as the 'Constitution agreed upon in 1870 by the archbishops, bishops, and representatives of clergy and clergy in a General Convention assembled in Dublin, and of 'constitutions and canons ecclesiastical' decreed by General Synods in 1836 and 1840 and confirmed, are the 'Constitution and the 'constitutions and canons ecclesiastical' have since 1809 been consolidated in a single Constitution, the 'constitutions and canons ecclesiastical' became part of the Thirty-nine Articles and the (revised) Book of Common Prayer and the Ordinal, approved in the Constitution. We must here notice the difference between the ancient and modern use of the word 'constitution.' Originally a 'constitutio' was a much the same as a 'canon,' and so it is in the titles of the English and Irish codes of canons. But the word 'constitution' as now used often means a more fundamental document than the canons, one quite apart from the organization of the Church (see below (d)).

(c) Episcopal Church in Scotland.—The constitution here is contained in the canons, and is not a separate document. The written law consists of a code of canons passed in 1114, built up on the basis of canons of previous Provincial Synods in 1743, 1811, 1828-39, 1858, 1863-64, 1875-76, 1890, and 1903. The present code authorizes the services of the Prayer Book, with certain modifications, and also of the 'Scottish Liturgy or Communion Office,' and forbids departure from them in public prayer and administration of the Sacraments or in the performance of the other services, except as the code provides. In this branch of the Federation the word 'constitution' is used for a document subsidiary to the canons. Each incumbency must have such a 'constitution' regulating matters not dealt with in the canons and subservient to the patronage of that charge. Such a constitution is an agreement between the bishop of the dioce and the clergy and laymen of that congregation. The constitutions of different incumbencies vary considerably.

(d) United States of America.—The 'Protestant Episcopal Church' revised the Prayer Book in 1790, soon after the War of Independence, and again in 1829. The American Constitution was adopted at Philadelphia in 1789, and since modified; canons have been passed at various dates.

In Scotland the canons, and in Ireland and the United States the constitution and canons, are primary, and the Prayer Book has authority only because these documents prescribe it.

(e) British colonies.—In the Colonial Churches of the Anglican Federation the process seems to have been as a rule different from that which has just been described. The Prayer Book has descended to them, being daughters of the Church of England, as a primary authority, and in some cases they have bound themselves to make no alterations in it until the mother Church takes a like action, or have limited themselves in some degree in this direction. Most or all of them, however, have also made canons to regulate their internal affairs, and these are in the nature of Provincial Constitutions (see above ; and, for further details, cf. § 4). In some branches of the Federation, as in S. Africa, dioceses are also permitted to make canons for themselves on purely local matters, in submission, however, to the provincial canons. This is not allowed in Scotland or in Ireland, where the resolutions of diocesan synods have not the nature of canons, and have no binding power as such.

2. The legislative bodies of the Anglican Churches.—In England there are two provinces, of Canterbury and York, and each has two Houses of Convocation, the Upper House consisting of the diocesan bishops, and the Lower House of the deans, the archdeacons, and the proctors (or representatives) of the clergy. Two consultative Houses of Laymen are also appointed—one to assist each Convocation; but this is a voluntary and modern arrangement, having no recognition in law. The Convocation of the Church of Ireland and the 'constitutions and canons ecclesiastical' have been passed the Civil Legislature as Acts of Parliament.
In the non-established branches of the Anglican Federation there are General (or Provincial) Synods—i.e., a national assembly of bishops—required for the purpose of legislating. In the Episcopal Church in Scotland, which now has one province only (the metropolitan powers being held in commission by the seven bishops), the Provincial Synod consists of two bishops, one of whom is the senior, and the second of the deans of the seven dioceses, about 35 representatives of the clergy, and one or two clerical officials. Each chamber must assent by a simple majority to any change in the canons before it becomes effective; and, though the canons may be altered, only when legislation is required; but, before any changes provisionally made by the Synod have been confirmed at a subsequent meeting of Synod, such proposed alternations must be submitted to a mixed Consultative Council, consisting of the bishops, about 40 clergy, and the same number of laymen, who meet all together (but may, if desired, vote or debate by orders), and may, if they think it, express any opinion on the changes or other alterations. The Consultative Council may also suggest legislation in the first instance, and this was the course adopted in 1911, when it carefully discussed the whole code and noted the changes desired.

In the Church of Ireland, where there are two provinces (of Armagh and Dublin), there is a single General Synod which legislates, consisting of two Houses, the one of bishops, and the other of representatives of clergy and laity, who normally sit all together. According to the present Constitution, the representatives of the clergy number 208, and those of the laity 416. Voting by the bishops is by vote and ballot, and an attempt is made in exceptional cases, each House must assent to any change, and, if the laymen and the clergy vote by orders, each order.

In the United States the General Convention consists of two Houses, the one of the bishops, the other of 'deputies' or representatives, not more than four presbyters and four laymen from each diocese. Both Houses must agree to any change in the law before it becomes valid. A vote by dioceses and by orders is provided for if desired, under the regulation that the dioceses are in that case equalized by only one clerical vote and only one lay vote being allowed for each; and a majority of each House is required for the approval of legislation. The General Convention meets once every three years.

In most of the Colonial Churches of the Federation, legislation (which, however, as we have seen, is somewhat limited) is effected by synods consisting of bishops, and clerical and lay representatives. It is usually enacted that voting and debating may be by orders, and, if so, that a majority of each order is necessary for carrying any alteration.

3. The older canon law and customary law.—
(a) Origin and growth.—The written law, except the law of God, or the Moral Law, which has been universally regarded as unalterable—has gradually grown up, coming from decisions of 'individual great bishops, but later on in the shape, usually, of canons of councils' (Collins, Nature and Force of the Canon Law, p. 12). Such councils were either ecclesiastical (general) or local (see art. Councils and Synods [Christian]). As time went on, their regulations increased greatly in number, and collections of such were by the middle of the 15th century, among these may be mentioned those of Dionysius Exiguus (c. A.D. 500), Isidore of Seville (early 7th cent.), whose work was supplemented in the 9th cent. by 'pseudo-Isidore,' the compiler of the greater collection of the 9th cent. called the 'Forged Decretals,' and Gratian (12th cent.), whose Decretum was the corner-stone of medieval canon law, and is sometimes called the Corpus iuris canonici (Collins, p. 19; see, further, above, p. 885 f.). The medieval system of canon law and not at first meant to be more than something to be aimed at, and it was never fully carried out, any more than the liturgical regulations which set forth the elaborate ceremonial in the great cathedral of Salisbury were thought to be practicable in every little parish church of England. In this respect the older canon law differs from civil law, especially from modern civil law, which is much more rigid, though only what is fully systematized. This fact has a great bearing on the binding nature of the canon law in later times (see below (d)). In the Middle Ages the more rigid view of law gradually grew up, and, at least since the Reformation, an ecclesiastical canon is as much and as literally obligatory on those who are bound by it as any civil law.

(b) How far it was accepted in England in medieval times.—On this point there has been some controversy. According to one view, it was held to be valid in England only when accepted by Act of Parliament or by custom. This is the opinion of Gibson (Codex, ii. 945–947), who quotes Acts of Parliament of the 16th and 17th centuries, asserting that the old canons were accepted only if not contrary to the laws (of England) and the royal prerogative. Only those laws which were made by the realm, or were acknowledged by common assent or established custom were received. Gibson illustrates this by citing the proposal to legitimate in England children born before marriage.

Pope Alexander III. had published a canon to provide for this, but if it was accepted by the realm it was not accepted in England. If it was accepted, it was not included in the lists of the 14th and 16th centuries, and the canon law as a whole did run in England then (English Historical Review, July and Oct. 1896, Oct. 1897). He is here followed by Eves (Prayer Book Dictionary, p. 128) and, apparently with some hesitation, by Collins (op. cit. p. 35 f.). There is perhaps not really any great difference between these two views. Everything depends on what is meant by 'accepted.' The one view holds that the 'canonists'—ecclesiastical writers who compiled codes of canons—considered that the complete Western canon law (with some local reservations) was accepted, but that the State would not allow parts of it to be put in force. On the other hand, much of the old canon law had, as a matter of fact, no practical effect in England. And, if we bear in mind the difference between canon and civil law (below (d)), this is still all that practically counts in this respect. On the general subject Ayiffe (Parergon, p. xxxiii) expresses a similar view. On the other hand, F. W. Maitland, a high authority, has maintained that, as any canon not then required by the legislation of the State.

(c) Collections of English ecclesiastical laws.—A very early collection of religious 'constitutions' was made by William Lyndwood or Linwood (who in 1442 became bishop of St. David's), under the name of 'Provisions'; among these the Archbishops of Canterbury from Stephen Langton (1207–29) to Chichele, which was brought down to the middle of the 15th century. But the greatest activity in this respect of the 15th century was at the time of John Ayiffe's Parergon (new edition published in 1734) was, as its second title states, a 'commentary
by way of supplement to the canons and constitutions of the Church of England. 1 John Johnson (the famous vicar of Cranbrook) published in 1720 his (English) Laws and Canons (up to the Reformation of 1534). His work was followed by a number of other general works. Wilkins' Concilia, first published in 1737, carries the collection down to 1717; and Edmund Gibson, bishop of London, 1723-48, whose famous Codes was brought out in a second and considerably enlarged edition in 1789, gives the canons and the Acts of Parliament which relate to the Church, arranged according to subject instead of chronologically. No one in the older days did much for Scotland what Lyttwood did for England; but in our own time Joseph Robertson has collected the Scottish provincial constitutions under the title of Statuta Ecclesiae Scoticae.
(d) How far the older canon law is now binding.
—The opinion has been expressed that the whole of the Corpus iuris canonici is now binding, unless explicitly repealed by an authority equal to or higher than that which enacted it. It has been maintained that a council of inferior status cannot repeal the canons of one of higher status, or a local council those of a larger one. The result would be that the Anglican Church of to-day would be bound by those regulations which had little or no relation to the mores of the time. Such a view, however, looks at canon law from the point of view of the civil law. In the case of an Act of Parliament, laws remain in force (at any rate in England) unless they are expressly declared to be void. This was not meant to be the case with canon law, in which desuetude could repeal. A contrary custom invalidated it, and canons have debated how a jurisprudence of habitus could be formulated. In some cases, in others, there is a conflict over the period of time.
4. Contents of the canons, etc.—(a) English canons of 1603 as since amended.—These deal (1, 2) with the king's supremacy, and (3-12) with the consecration of bishops and clergy. The Canons 13-30 deal with the due celebration of divine worship, the keeping of Sundays and Holy Days, and the use of the litany, with rules for the service of Holy Communion to do so, and the reception of that sacrament, and the distribution of the elements. Canons 31-70 deal with the ministry, and give rules about ordinations, subscriptions, installations of clergy, the conduct of divine service, simony, pluralities, residence of clergy, strange preachers, the bidding prayer before sermons, vestures, catechizing, confirmation, marriages, visiting the sick, burials, private confessions, and marriage out of season. Canons 71-79 deal with church and school masters, canons 80-88 with churches and their furniture, glebe-lands, etc., canons 89-91 with churchwards and their assistants, and with church clerks. Canons 92-138 deal with canonical courts, both those of an archbishop (including matters of marriage and divorce) and those of a bishop, and give rules as to ecclesiastical judges, surrogates, provosts, registrars, and apparitors. Canons 139-141 deal with synods.
(b) Church of Ireland.—The 'constitution' of 1609 is divided into fifteen chapters. The first five give the functions and organization of general and diocesan synods, and deal with parochial machinery and the appointment to curates of souls; the 6th with the election of archbishops and bishops; the 7th with canons; the 8th with ecclesiastical tribunals and offences; the 9th with the canons of the Church; the 10th and 11th deal with the representative body which holds Church property and with certain funds; the 12th and 13th with burial-grounds, glebes, and parochial buildings; the 14th and 15th with provision for a vicar and chancellor of clergy and with superannuation. The canons have in the main the same antiquated appearance as the English canons, being the older code with some quite modern additions. They are divided into two parts, the one dealing directly with ecclesiastical service, (i-16) preaching, catechizing, baptisms, burials, marriages, confirmation, private communications, etc., and deal with (17) archdeacons, (18-22) ordinaries, (23) patronage of benefices and simony, (29-33) the work and life of ministers and their assistants, (34-40) the
furniture and ornaments of churches, Holy Communion, and other services, (41) the consecration of churchwardens and 'select vestries,' (44-46) repair and furnishing of churches, etc., (47, 51) appeals, (48) the General Synod, and (49, 50, 52-54) repelling from and re-association to Holy Communion.

(c) The Episcopate Church of Scotland has gradually built up its canons since 1511, and the code has a more modern appearance. It is now arranged as follows: canons 1-10 deal with the Prinums (bishops), canons 11-20 with the ordination and licensing of deacons, and canons 21-29 with the ordination and licences of deacons and deacons, subscriptions of assent and institution to benefices, and with lay readers; canons 21-29 with the services of the Church; canon 30 f. with vestiges, and with the structure and ornaments of churches; canons 32-33 with congregational organization; canons 34-45 with diocesan and provincial officials; canons 46-50 with synod, and canons 51-53 with judicial proceedings and disputes, notices, and interpretation. A bulky set of appendices not only gives the forms of deeds, but also the various legislation in one place, the list of additions to and deviations from the Book of Common Prayer, as canonically sanctioned.

(d) United States. The constitution is divided into eleven heads dealing with (1) the General Convention, (2) the election of bishops, (3) bishops for foreign lands, (4) standing committees in each diocese as the bishop's advisory council, (5, 6) admission of new dioceses and missionary districts, (7) provinces, ordination and admission of ministers, (8) the use of the Prayer Book, and arrangements for the same, and (11) alterations in the constitution. The canons (1692) are much more detailed, and are of great length. They are divided into four titles, each with many subdivisions. The first deals with the ministry and church services, the second with discipline (including marriage and divorce), the third with organized bodies and officers of the Church, and the fourth with the enactment and repeal of canons.

(e) South Africa. This province has one or two peculiarities. Its constitution, as made in 1870 and since modified, accords with the Prayer Book of the Church of England, and disclaims any right of altering them proprio motu, but with the proviso that the province is not bound by the interpretations of them by any ecclesiastical or other tribunal except its own (this famous proviso has since been altered). The constitution makes the provincial synod the legislative body, and says that it can adapt, abridge, and add to the Church Services if such alterations are consistent with the spirit and teaching of the Prayer Book. It can also review and revise any diocesan canons, (above, §4), and can alter its own constitution and its canons. The canons of this province have been frequently amended. Besides legislating, the provincial synod frequently passes resolutions. It is understood that these are only expressions of opinion, and are not legally binding on members of the Church.

(f) It is not necessary to do more than refer to two other examples of the law of the colonial branches of the Anglican Federation as, having originated in somewhat different circumstances. The Church of the Province of Canada, having the usual constitution, clergy, and clergy, in the province to make a constitution, and regulations, and the meeting of those in each diocese to make diocesan regulations. Another Act of 1858 explains some details. The Anglican Church in New Zealand has a constitution first made in 1857, as a 'voluntary compact' of the members of the Church in the colony; it has the same limitation of powers as the provinces of S. Africa has in the matter of altering formularies. The whole question of the nature of the relationship between the daughter and the mother Church is being keenly discussed in this colony, as is also the case in Australia, especially since all the dioceses of that continent have been federated in one organization.

6. Church law and State law when divergent.—When a voluntary club or society makes laws which are consistent with the laws of the State, and the latter afterwards alters its laws so as to be inconsistent with those of the club or society, the laws of the club or society in the ordinary course must go by the board. When, however, the society is a religious community, the question of moral obligation may arise, and the individual has then to ask himself whether he ought to obey the law of his Church and break the law of the State, taking the consequences of such action. Whether he is morally justified in doing so must depend on circumstances. If a heathen State commands one of its Christian subjects to sacrifice to a heathen god, the Church forbids him to do so, he must necessarily choose between the two, and few at the present day would fail to think him justified in determining to break the State law, even though he had to face martyrdom. Such contradictions between Church law and State law are less likely to arise in times and in States which tolerate diverse religions, and which have determined more clearly than in older days what is the role of the State and the Church. But divergences may often arise. It is proper to observe, however, that this means merely that the State allows what the Church as a whole, or a part of the Church in particular, forbids. To take an example from recent legislation: in Great Britain and in some other countries a man is now allowed by the State to marry his deceased wife's sister. But this does not mean that every Church must allow its own members to do so; each Church has the right, if it sees fit, to say that any of its members who use the liberty given by the State shall not be married by one of its ministers or in its buildings, or shall not be considered any longer a member, or shall be expelled from communion for a longer or a shorter time. There is no real contradiction here between the Church law and the State law; it is not as if the State had enacted that every widower must marry his sister-in-law, if he has one. This has been taken as an example only. The general principle is that a particular society may limit for its own members a liberty allowed or not forbidden by the State.

6. Interpretation of ecclesiastical law.—In the Church of England a great controversy has gone on for more than a generation as to the validity of the courts which interpret the ecclesiastical law. Into this controversy we cannot enter here, except to say that it turns on the question whether the State can erect ecclesiastical courts (the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and that of the judge under the Public Worship Regulation Act) as the ascents of the Church. The controversy appears to be no nearer a solution now than it was when it arose; and it has practically paralyzed the actions of the ecclesiastical courts with regard to questions of validity, etc., and led to many nullities, but the difficulties have been great, and are enhanced by the close connexion between the Church and the State. It may be said, however, that the controversy does not turn on the question whether the
judges, the interpreters of the law, are—whether bishops or laymen—but on the question by whom their court has been appointed, and whether an ecclesiastical or quasi-eclesiastical court is bound by the decision of the inferior court (the Judicial Committee) which does not possess to be anything but a State court.

It may be useful to consider how the Church law is administered in the various branches of the Anglican Federation. In these each Church has set up its own courts, and there is no dispute as to their validity. They may give an erroneous or foolish decision, but their power of deciding has not been questioned; it is explicitly acknowledged by those who make the subscriptions required of them before receiving an office. In the Church of Ireland the supreme court consists of three bishops and four lay judges, and, though the latter are in a majority, the spiritual character of the court has never been questioned. In the Episcopal Church in Scotland the supreme court (which is the court of appeal from the bishops on disciplinary, and the court of first instance in the trial of a bishop) consists of all the diocesan bishops only, though they may (and, as a matter of fact, always do) have a lay assessor learned in the law to advise them, without being a member. In the American and Colonial branches have each set up their own court, variously constituted, but on more or less similar lines.

But the question arises, What is the relation of such voluntary ecclesiastical courts to the State courts? The former can command obedience to their interpretation of the law only by virtue of the contract entered into by those who come before them. Every clergyman, before being ordained or receiving any office, makes a subscription, not only of doctrinal agreement with the Church, but promising obedience to its canons and tribunals. It is, therefore, instructive to see what view the State would take of the decisions of such Church courts. We may take the position of the Episcopal Church in Scotland as a good example of this attitude, since two or three cases in which that Church has been concurred (one of primary importance) have arisen to illustrate it.

In the case of Forbes v. Eden and others (Leading Ecclesiastical Cases decided in the Court of Session, 1853-1871, Edinburgh, 1872), the question involved was, what the legal status of the church was in the Synod of 1639-43, and maintaining that he was not bound by them, as he had promised obedience to his ordination to the body of the Church of England. The case was given against him by the unanimous decisions of the Court of Session in 1859 and of the House of Lords in 1857, on the ground that the code of canons which he had subscribed provided for alterations being made, and that the said synod had fulfilled all necessary requirements for making alterations. The new canons then enacted were, therefore, binding on all.

In the Inner House—the Court of Appeal—Lord Cowan said that it was the province of the civil courts to redress civil wrongs. It was not their province, and it had not been their practice, to interfere as a court of review with the theological dogma or the internal regulations of religious sects or denominations. In the House of Lords the Lord Chancellor said that no civil court could take cognizance of the rules of a voluntary religious society made for the regulation of its own affairs, except so far as they related to civil questions affecting the civil property. This judgment, then, makes it clear that an autonomous Church can alter its laws, if its code contains provisions to that effect.

In a more recent case, which was taken to the House of Lords (Scottish Guardian, Edinburgh, 1880, pp. 445, 450), it was remitted to the Court of Session by Lord Young that the civil courts could not entertain an action concerning merely the government of the Church unless it involved a breach of contract; and this principle is affirmed in the argument before the civil courts, namely, if the plaintiff had in fact some grounds of which he knew, and if he refused to pay him. To this extent the civil courts intervene in ecclesiastical disputes.

The civil courts might be called in if a clergyman deprived or suspended by the Church courts declined to recognize their sentence. The Church, having no power in itself to enforce its decrees, must invoke the help of the civil courts, if necessary, to ensure the carrying out of its mandate. This might happen if the clergyman in question refused to give up his parsonage or church; or, if costs were given in the ecclesiastical courts against a certain party, and payment was refused, the civil courts would have to be applied to. In such cases the State tribunal would treat the case purely as a matter of contract, and they would investigate whether the procedure in the Church court had been regular and in accordance with the current canons. In the Forbes case (see above), where Forbes sued for damages because he was refused an assistant curate, Lord Benholme remarked that 'this exercise of ecclesiastical disciplinary power' could not be made the subject of a civil claim for damages in the Court of Session (Leading Eccles. Cases, p. 490).

From what has been said it would appear that, if a clergyman deposed for heresy by the Church courts appealed to the civil courts, the latter would not determine whether or not the doctrine in question was orthodox in the Church of the Church, but would ask whether the Church courts to which the clergyman had promised obedience had proceeded regularly. In the discussions it is quite possible that doctrinal questions might be touched on, as, in fact, was done in Forbes v. Eden, when the Eucharistic Controversy was referred to, and (as might be expected when men go outside their own line of study) some curious obiter dicta in theology and ecclesiastical history were uttered. But this would happen only incidentally. An important question of Church law was touched on in Forbes v. Eden, which illustrates the recent case of the Free Church of Scotland.

In the latter case, as the present writer understands it, it was ruled by the House of Lords that the Free Church had not in its constitution explicit powers of complete alteration, but was subject to the limitation that certain things were inalterable. Something of this sort was the case in the Episcopal Church in Scotland from 1838 to 1890, when the codes of canons limited the alterations to those of a certain class, and provided for the recognized constitution of the Church (until 1863 also with its 'acknowledged practice'). In the Forbes case in 1865 the Lord Ordinary observed that the 'civil courts' could not interfere to protect Churches or individual members of Churches from the influx of new doctrines. They only interfere to prevent the use of property being perverted through its being retained by a majority who only keep the name which they have abandoned to the principles of the Church to which it was devoted' (Leading Eccles. Cases, p. 401 n.). In the Inner House Lord Inglis said that a majority may be restrained on the application of a minority from carrying on an alteration of a fundamental article of the constitution, and as an illustration said that a proposal to abolish the Thirty-nine Articles and to substitute Knox's Confession of Faith of 1567 would require unanimity in the Free Church (ibid., p. 404). In the Provincial Synod of 1890 the limitation on the power of alteration contained in the vague phrase 'recognized constitution' was removed.

Experience, then, tends to show that a non-established Church may make, interpret, and administer its law, in the existing civil conditions of this country, without any undue interference from the State. But the machinery must be carefully prepared, so that its autonomous powers are clearly laid down in the documents that govern it.
LAW (Egyptian).—No body of Egyptian laws has come down to us, but some body of written code is probably to be recognized in the forty leather rolls laid before the waatir judgment-seat in the XVIIIth dynasty (J. H. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, Vol. I, ii, 670, 7125). We have to depend for our knowledge of Egyptian law and its procedure almost entirely on the few royal decrees, business documents, or the like, that happened to survive among the papyri to represent the varying practices of several thousands of years. It is impossible to give even a meagre sketch of Egyptian law from these materials; a brief enumeration of the documents or groups of documents in order of date may be of service.

1. Old Kingdom.—For the Old Kingdom there is an interesting series of royal decrees containing immunity from taxation and services of different kinds to particular temples, their personnel, lands, and villages (Breasted, p. 705), and in the tombs we find concise records of the conditions under which the tomb entrances are entrusted to the ka-priests (cf. Breasted, i, §§ 201, 232, etc.).

The papyri which a group of scholars has briefly states a claim made in regard to the property of a deceased man involving guardianship and its denial by the opposing party, together with directions as to how the question should be settled (A. Erman and P. Krehl, Aus den Papyri der Königlichen Museen, Berlin, 1899, p. 833). A stele records the sale of a house in the presence of witnesses for goods the value of which is reckoned by a fixed standard (H. Ewald, Enquête sur un acte de vente immobilière, Paris, 1913).

2. Middle Kingdom.—From the Middle Kingdom comes a remarkable record of a tomb entrance in the shape of ten contracts made with the priests and others of the nome of the nomarch's tomb, and the directions given to the single well-endowed ka-priest to whom the whole care of the tomb and its services was confided (Breasted, i, § 556). It shows that the Old Kingdom practice of the hereditary tomb priests had failed. A group of papyri from house ruins give two examples of testamentary dispositions (quit-per), census-lists (comparably to the modern notaire), and others about the hire of services and payment to be made, and a statement of a claim before the courts (F. Ll. Griffith, Nahun Papyri, London, 1899), and a memorandum in support of the claim to an inheritance (PSBA xiv, [1922] 328). The inscription of Chennehopt (Breasted, i, § 619) shows the laws regulating the boundaries of and succession to nomarch's province. A royal decree (ib. § 773) deposes a nomarch for sheltering an enemy, and exclaims his descendants from the oaths for ever.

3. New Kingdom (dynasties XVIII—XX.).—From the XVIIIth dynasty we have the difficult and fragmentary inscriptions of the duties of the officials (cf. Breasted, i, § 606); the latest treatise on the writing of the scribes of the First Intermediate Period is by K. Sethe (Die Einsetzung des Vezier unter der 28. Dynastie, Leipzig, 1909). There is also the brief proclamation of a king's accession (Breasted, ii, § 54), the dedication of the city Askhetaton to the Sun-god by the heretic king Akhenaton (ib. § 949), a royal gift of lands to an official (ib. §§ 1042, and the edict of Horenbek, being a series of enactments to punish the unjust impositions of tax-gatherers and royal officers (ib. iii, § 45). Of documents on papyri we have group of two sunt (hirings of female slaves) and two other documents connecting these with a law suit (A. H. Gardner, in ZA xliii. [1907] 27). Ostracon records, who dispose of a dispute about the payment of for the year 17, which is made in the interval since the last reaping are incorporated.

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in the early contract papyri, an oath by the king and Ammon was customarily recorded.

All documents of this time which had been published or were accessible to him in original or paper form, were translated by the present writer in his Catalogue of the Demotic Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester, 1906, vol. iii., where the papyri of that collection are also fully translated. They comprise sales of land, houses, temples, personal property, law cases, leases of farms; also contracts of marriage and divorce, of sonship (adoption), and of servitude. A large and complete papyrus in the Rylands Collection contains an elaborate petition presented to the scribe by a mutilated priest seeking redress and restoration of hereditary rights.

5. Ptolemaic period.—After the Macedonian conquest sales of lands and houses and of mummies with their funerary services, mortgages, leases, loans, marriage-contracts, and exculpatory oaths are common, but contracts of divorce, adoption, and servitude are not to be found, nor wills in any form. The native forms are modelled on those that preceded them, and are quite distinct from the flood of Greek contracts being produced in Egypt at the same time (see the above-mentioned *Rylands Catalogue* and numerous publications of papyri by Spiegelberg). The temple of Canopus and of Memphis (the Rosetta stone) may also be mentioned here.

6. Roman period.—The native legal documents are practically confined to house-sales and mortgages in the Fayyum of the 1st cent. A.D. See also ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 12.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works specified above, the most recent and therefore best publications of documents include W. Spiegelberg, *Die demotischen Verträge der Papyri Herm- und Nectanebus mit einem rechtgeschichtlichen Beitrag von Josef Farinich, Leipzig, 1915; O. Graevenitz, F. Pretzlik, and W. Spiegelberg, *Ein Erbleit aus dem ptolemäischen Ägypten,* Strassburg, 1912. The numerous works of E. Revillo on Egyptian law are too fanciful to be recommended.

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LAW (Greek).—I. UNITY OF GREEK LAW.—Although the Greek world was made up of a great number of commonwealths, each possessing independent laws of its own, and although every allowance must be made for local peculiarities, the leading conceptions of Greek law as a whole may still be considered as a unity. Most of our modern concepts and institutions, e.g., Athens, as 'the school of Hellas,' is in a great measure representative of Greece. The Greeks felt very strongly that their customs and laws were peculiar to themselves as a nation, and presented a marked contrast to those of other people (Ernst. *Anthr. and Dem. in Locc. v. 40*).

II. PERIODS.—The history of Greek law falls into three principal periods, which may be called the archaic, the classical, and the Hellenistic. In the first, the rules of Greek legal lore are one of the varieties of Aryan tribal customs, which must be studied by the method of comparative jurisprudence, i.e., a close connexion with Indian, Italic, Celtic, Germanic, and other systems. The archaic covers roughly the 6th, 5th, and 4th centuries b.c., and is concerned chiefly with the laws and institutions of the autonomous city-states. The third corresponds to the time when the Greek concepts were acting as a kind of leaven in the vast tracts of the East—Asia Minor, Pontus, Syria, and Egypt—through which the Greek population had been dispersed by emigration and the Macedonian conquests.

1. The archaic period. In archaic Greece, e.g., Ionian, in Lcrete, not a technical, body of rules. It represents the most striking experiment in history to administer law according to the standards of the 'average man,' to whom every contract (φιλανθρωπία), while each party was supposed to consist of thirty kindreds (φιλανθρωπία). The chief contribution of this period to Greek law consists in the principles of family law and succession. The community of family interests is symbolized by the hearth (χώρα) as the center of the household; the estate (εσώρος), which forms the basis of the material existence of the household, is the ανάγκη, and even in Athens of classical times certain rights and duties were considered as peculiarly attached to this estate (φροντίδα, i.e., 1000 florins, as the estate of the criminal prosecution, corresponding to rights of succession to the ιδιοκτήτης). For this reason the practice of adoption was as well developed in Athens as in Rome (see art. ADOPTION [Greek]). A special case arose when a person died leaving a daughter to succeed him. She was emphatically 'joined to the estate' (σύζυγος), and destined to marry the nearest agnate in order to preserve it. Instances from Athenian practice are quite common, but the custom is also well illustrated by examples from Sparta and Crete (Herod. vi. 57; Code of Gortyn, as to the παρατατότητα, i. 302 ff.; Dareste, *Rec. des inscr. jur. gr.,* i. 372 ff.; further, art. INHERITANCE [Greek]). The wider kindreds were constituted on the agnatic principle, as units organized under a chief (πατριαρχία ἄνδρων); but in many respects relationship through females was also recognized, and, through the narrower circle of kindred, included all relatives down to the degree of first cousins once removed. The admission of relatives through females by the side of agnates may be explained to some extent by tradition from a period of matrilinear organization, which, according to a popular legend, existed in Athens at the time of Akhrem (Athenaeus, xili. 2 [565]); but it is also connected with alliances by marriage, and, in Kleisthenes the Alkmoneid. The influence of kinship on legal rules is well exemplified by the extensive rights of kinsmen in respect to criminal prosecutions. In cases of homicide, an action (Νέκτος) had to be brought by relatives of the deceased, and, if the offence amounted to manslaughter, it might be condoned by the relatives (εσώρος) (Law of Draco; Dareste, *Inschr.,* i. 71) and compensation given by the slayer to the kindred. The family authority of the father of the children and of the husband over the wife appears in Greek as well as in other Aryan laws; but it is not so drawn out, by the law, as in the Roman system. The father is not the absolute ruler of the household, but, as it were, a party to an implied compact, providing protection and education for his children, and entitled to support from them in return (εισόρος).

2. The classical period.—(a) General characteristics.—In this period we must be careful to distinguish between oligarchic and democratic political principles. Aristotle (e.g., *Pol. vii. 1309a*) often calls attention to the fact that the laws assumed a different aspect according to the system of government which was in force. The ideal of oligarchy is government by a small number of equals (επίσημος), the state properly covers roughly the 6th, 5th, and 4th centuries B.C., and is concerned chiefly with the laws and institutions of the autonomous city-states. The third corresponds to the time when the Greek concepts were acting as a kind of leaven in the vast tracts of the East—Asia Minor, Pontus, Syria, and Egypt—through which the Greek population had been dispersed by emigration and the Macedonian conquests.

1. THE CLASSICAL PERIOD. In archaic Greece, e.g., in Lcrete, not a technical, body of rules. It represents the most striking experiment in history to administer law according to the standards of the 'average man,' to whom every contract (φιλανθρωπία), while each party was supposed to consist of
numbered some 200, 500, or 1000 citizens, who had to decide by vote after hearing the pleadings, but without previous deliberation. In these circumstances, no doubt the action of the tribunals was often extremely capricious and swayed by merely emotional considerations (e.g., Herakleitos, in Lyc. 75 c; cf. Wyss's Iasius, passim). But the real reason was not that these defects existed, but that in spite of them the administration of justice was of such a kind as to produce not only fine oratory, but remarkable judicial decisions.

(c) Nature of law.—The Greeks set a very high ideal to the State; its aim was not merely negative—to provide order and security for its members' peaceful life—to ensure the welfare of the individual. The policy might be called a cultural socialism—one μιᾷ τῷ τῆς ἔθνους, ἀλλά διὰ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ ἔθνους (cf. Plato, Legg. xiii. 923 A). Thus the State was regarded as being primarily an educational and cultural instrument. To the attainment of its ideal, the laws were the chief instrument; the Greek provided a πατεία τῆς τοῦ κοινῆς (Arist. Eth. Nic. vi. 11). Their object was to embody the eternal justice (δικαίους) and it is characteristic of the Greek conception that there is no term in the language equivalent to the Latin justus, the adjective ἸΔεῖα, meaning not only 'the lawfully', but 'the just'. Hence the archaic conception of law was that it was essentially sacred in its origin, being the gift of the gods to men (see passage from Dem. adv. Aristotelianorum, quoted Dig. i. 3. 11), the concrete expression of a universal and immutable δικαίους (cf. Herakleitos, fr. 114; H. Diels, Herakleitos von Ephesos, Berlin, 1909, p. 44); and hence the view, which freed law from the hands of the judges, that the most ancient law is the best (e.g. Isok. ἔριπτι τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος, 82). In the classical period, however, this ancient idealistic view was subjected to searching criticism. The 6th cent. was a time of great fermentation, when, as Thucydides says, 'men believed nothing but what nothing was secure' (ii. 53); a growing acquaintance with new countries and peoples impressed the Greeks vividly with the diversity of national ideas and customs (Herod. iii. 35); the great catastrophes of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars produced a distrust of settled institutions; and the development of philosophical theories led to a marked assertion of individualism. The general result was an acute realization of the relativity of all human affairs, which in practical life acted as a powerful social dissolvent. It is not the case that only by means of the product of force, or an arbitrary and artificial arrangement which superior persons were entitled to disregard (Thrasymachos and Glaukon in the Republic, Kallikles in the Gorgias). In the domain of jurisprudence the great problem was to determine how far the fundamental laws could be considered as ingrained in the nature of man, and how far they were merely subjective and fictitious. It was the Sophists who chiefly canvassed this question, but the inquiry did not by any means originate with them; it appears as early as Demokritos, who first sets up the antithesis between 'true' or that which exists by nature, and τέχνη, or that which exists by convention (fr. 1; cf. Archelaus, op. Diog. Laert. ii. 4; and Hippolytus, op. H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin, 1879, p. 594). This principle of relativism nurtured the idea of an individual law

(d) Sources of law.—Let us now consider how these jurisprudential principles were embodied in the practice of law. (1) Enacted law.—The most important source of written law was the constitution. The sovereign people did not care to entrust the administration of justice to the independent judgment of magistrates and officers: the 'rule of law' was fully recognized by Athenian democracy (cf. the S. P.hilipp., § 113). As soon as the authority of τέχνη was usurped by popular decree (ὑφηγημένη), democracy, said Aristotle, was undermined (Pol. vi. 4, 1292 b, 27 H.). Elaborate procedures against anyone who attempted to violate the means of the ἀρχές τῆς ἡπονίμης, oaths and penalties (Hyperides, Philipp. §§ 8, 6; Dem. adv. Aristoc.)
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86. (2) Customary law.—Nevertheless, there was also a vast body of customary law, which was mainly based on democratic by the preceding perioikia, since only a few of the rules as to procedure and substantive law were actually promulgated, &sigma; (Arist. Ath. Pol. iii. 4). Sacral law in general remained uncodified; ancestral customs (tyrpa) were recognized as a definite and sacred element of the law, and as such were interpreted by the exegete (Dem. in Euthym. p. 1160, § 86 f.). The ancient jurisdiction of the archons, and that of the Areopagus, until the reforms of Perikles and his successors, were also largely concerned with traditional usages. (3) President.—President was never regarded as being on the Athenian courts, but various kinds of non-litigious custom—e.g., dowry, commercial practice, maritime law, and forms of pleading and conveyance employed by the professional scribes (γραμματεις) of the courts together with various forms of exegetical agreements (cf. Dareste, Inscr. jur. gr., i. 318)—tenaely be raised by the archon; and, in general, existing decisions had at least a symptomatic value, as showing the prevailing views and tendencies of popular courts (cf. Dem. in Dism. 48). (4) Natural law.—Though in the orators and philosophers there are many indications of an unwritten law (νόμος ἄρασις) which is founded on instincts of human nature (Arist. Eth. i. 1. x. 3), the theory of a transcendent law of nature was not erected into a positive juridical doctrine. It appears most forcibly in the poets (e.g., Soph. Antig. 454), though it was sometimes appealed to in actual litigation (Lyseis, in Erotosthenem, § 3). (5) Equity.—A common juridical theory of the law of nature was rendered unnecessary by the conception of ἐξίσωσις, which gives a peculiar colouring to the whole system of Greek law. It amounted in practice to a liberal interpretation and application of the rules. Although the oath of the helots enjoined them to frame their decisions according to their consciousness of justice (ἀρετάργαν καὶ ἀρετωρίαν) only where there was no definite law to go by, in practice popular tribunals took great liberties in the application of existing laws. To some extent this was made necessary by the archon's origin and obscure expression of many fundamental laws (Arist. Ath. Pol. ix.). Wills and contracts provided fraternal material for such discretionary justice.

(c) Distribution justice.—The principle of the distribution of rights and duties, so characteristic of the Athenian legal system, was by no means confined to theory, but was very definitely asserted in practice. Privileges and burdens were dispensed according to what the individual did and could contribute to the common stock. Military service, taxation, and the liturgies, i.e., public services such as the fitting out of ships, providing choirs for dramatic performances, etc.—were all regulated upon this basis. Those who considered themselves unfairly burdened by the very heavy requirements of the liturgies might resort to the ἀριστοκρατία. A citizen who had been called upon to perform a liturgy might claim that another was better able to undertake it than himself, and demand that he should either do so or exchange properties (Dem. in Phem.; Isok. Περὶ τῆς Ἀριστοκρατίας). Similarly, if a citizen had been exempted from public burdens or granted a subsidy, he might be called upon to defend his liturgies (Lyseis, Or. xiv., § 6 ff.). The law of property in Athens never developed on such rigid lines as in Rome. There was no theory of absolute ownership. The ἄνευ was primarily the thing which was 'allotted' to the individual, but a kind of 'eminent domain' was reserved to the commonwealth. Therefore the typical action for the recovery of property was the ἀποκαλυπτικος, which was not a claim for absolute title, but only for guaranteed possession. Expropriation and interference with contracts were practised with a disregard for private right which is startling to modern notions (e.g., legislation in Ephesus at the time of the Mithridatic war [Dareses, Inscr. jur. gr., i. 22]).

(f) Wrong and crime.—We distinguish in the Greek theory of wrong and crime three elements which call for juridical treatment. (1) The first is that of redress. 'Damages,' in Athenian law, are not merely compensation, as in modern theory, but an equation of the loss to the party wronged (ἀμοιβα) and the gain to the wrongdoer (κατὰ τίνος). All wrongs are considered chiefly from the personal point of view. There is no sharp cleavage between the private action (δικαίωσις) and the public action (γραφή); i.e., a transitional form, the δικαίωσις τὸν, a private action for crime, is distinguished from the δικαίωσις τίνος, a purely private suit. As for the assessment of damages, the contending parties presented rival valuations between which the court had to decide. (2) The element of public retribution assumes a religious form. After a sacrifice had been offered, e.g., was a pollution which excited the wrath of the Erinyes and the Olympian gods, and must be cleansed by religious purification. Hence even in classical times all actions of homicide were tried in temples, and even an inanimate object which caused the death of a human being was solemnly judged and sentenced before the hearth of the government (Pyrtaneum). Hence also the importance which was attached to orthodoxy: impurity, which was taken to include professions of free thought, was inadmissible by the γραφή (δικαίωσις) (e.g., the case of Sokrates). (3) How far was it recognized that in every crime there is a revol of the individual will against the supremacy of the community? There are many indications that the Greeks were conscious of this element in crime, e.g., Isok. c. Leckitem, § 7). They were not concerned with problems of individual free will in the theory of punishment. In view of the predominance of the commonwealth over the individual, punishment itself often took the terroristic form of actual extermination and intimidation. Demokritos puts the criminal on the same plane as a wild beast (fraga. ap. Stob. Flor. xiv. 16, 18, 19), and Plato unequivocally states the necessity of removing obnoxious members of the body politic by means of capital punishment (Lego.). The social effect of intimidation was one of the leading principles of Protagoras's theory of law, and Plato fully endorses the view of the great Sophist that the object of punishment is not revenge for what, after all, cannot be undone, but the prevention of similar offences in the future (Protag. 324 B).

3. The Hellenistic period.—It is impossible to enter in detail upon the discoveries which the recent researches of papyrologists and epigraphists have made in the Greek law of this period, especially which prevailed in Egypt. One of its most remarkable features was the personification of the State in the king (the Pharao, the king of Egypt), and the subjection of all relations to the fiscal point of view. Under the rule of the Ptolemies, dominium was vested in the monarchy, and private property in land amounted only to a species of leasehold (τείχος) to the crown. The cultivation of State domains (γῆ βασιλικῆς, and, later, on, of all taxed land, was ensured by every means, including a compulsory distribution of plots (σμίδος) among peasant farmers. In the interests of the peasantry (γηδονες γεωργον) to the crown lands we find the germ of the doctrine of local origin which played such a large part in the later Roman Empire. In Asia Minor, under the Seleucids, there was even a class of tenants, called
show that the arable land was already held in
severalty.
In the Hindu law, the institution of marriage is
improved by prohibiting purchase of a wife, and
declaring a contract of marriage, if once concluded,
to be irrevocable. Nevertheless, the position of
women is one of absolute inferiority to the male
sex. Thus a wife is liable to be chasted by her
husband; and, even when she is unfaithful to her
husband, she must worship him like a god. A woman
is declared to be never fit for independence, and
has to live under the perpetual tutelage of her
father, husband, and sons. Polygamy is allowed,
and seems to have been very common in rich and
noble families. Infant-marriage is recommended,
and the re-marriage of widows prohibited or dis-
couraged. As regards proprietary right (stridhana),
women are said to be incapable of holding any prop-
erty (except their stridhana, or peculiar property); nor
can they inherit, under the early law of suc-
cession at least, which was subsequently modified
so as to let the widow in as an heir, with certain
restrictions, on failure of male posterity. All
family property is supposed to be held in common
by a sort of joint ownership (joint family), the father
or manager being regarded as a head
partner. The family members are kept together
by the sacred obligations offered in common by its
living head to his deceased members (see Inher-
tance (Hindu)). After the father's death the
sons divide his property equally, or with a
special speciation for the eldest son; or the eldest
son succeeds to the whole estate, the others living under
him as under their father. Twelve different kinds
of succession are recognized, each of the secondary
sons succeeding in default of his superior in rank;
whilst the real legitimate son excludes them all
from inheriting. The passages in the law-books
telling the possession of a son for spiritual pur-
pes, as saying his father from hell, generally
related to the real legitimate son. The gross usages
relating to the affiliation of the subsidiary sons
were discouraged by the legal writers, and no
doubt the existence of these usages throws an un-
favorable light on the constitution of the family
in ancient India. Thus there is the kyatrana, or
son begotten by levirate (nigona); the gudhaja, or
secretly born son of an adulterous woman; the
shukra, or son of the pregnant bride; the ksema,
the unmarried damsel's son; the krita, or purchased
son; the apaviddha, or deserted son. The more
recent writers do not acknowledge as legitimate in
the present age of sin (Kaliyuga) any but the true
son, procreated in lawful marriage (saurn), and the
adopted son (dakshana) (see Adoption (Hindu)).
There is diversity of opinion as to whether a
widow may be allowed to adopt, with the assent
of her husband given shortly before his death, this
being the only case in which a sort of testamentary
power of the owner of property is recognized.
A father may, indeed, distribute his property among
his sons during his lifetime; but, in doing so, he
can exercise discretion only so as to his self-acquired
property, the ancestral property being held by
father and sons in common, according to the joint-
family principle.

Punishment is the divinity of god (see Crimes, Crimes and Punish-
ments (Hindu)). A king in whose dominions there
are no thieves, adulterers, calumniators, rogers,
murderers, (after death) attains the world of Indra.
Abuse, assault, theft, violence, including man-
slaughter and robbery, and sexual crimes, such as
adultery, rape, seduction, and fornication, are
regarded as the five principal crimes. Theft
and robbery seem to obtain special attention. A
thief appearing before the king with flying hair,
holding a club in his hand, and proclaiming his
deed, is judged of his guilt, which, if unpardoned,
but, if the king does not strike, the guilt falls on him. Cattle-lifting appears to have
been specially common, and the village to which
the robbers were tracked was made answerable.
The principle thus laid down has remained in
effective part of the law down to our day, and
elaborate rules are still in force in Kâthiawar for
pursuing up the track from village to village, the
Talukdar of the last being held primarily respon-
sible. Stolen property in general must be restored
by a king to its owner, according to Manus; and
a ruler is even bound to make good the loss occasioned
by his negligence. The king is required to cause
taverns, shops, competitive assemblies, oil
forests, and other places of retreat to be guarded by
companies of soldiers, in order to keep away thieves,
and to find out thieves with the aid of clever re-
formed thieves, and destroy them. The notion of
theft and robbery is extended very far, so as to
include cheating of every sort, forgery, bribery,
judical, dishonest dealing in judicial proceedings,
falsé gambling, etc. To steal gold belonging to a
Brahman is regarded as particularly punishable;
but it is in the law of abuse and assault, of morn-
cide, and of adultery, that the gradation of pun-
ishments according to the caste of the offender and
of the offended comes out most clearly. Thus a
low-caste man must suffer death for an intrigue
with a guarded Brahman woman, as a safeguard of
caste purity, whereas adultery with a woman of
inferior caste is punishable only with a fine. Fines
are inflicted equally on Katriyas and Vaishyas
who defame one of a higher caste, while the Sudra
offender incurs corporal punishment. Fines are
the most common form of punishment, but there
are many other forms (see Crimes and Punish-
ments (Hindu)). Barbarous cruelty, the prevalence of the lex talionis, and want of system characterize the
Indian as well as other primitive codes. Death
is prescribed by Manus for aggravated theft, for
harbouring robbers, swindling, kidnapping, for certain acts of adultery and immor-
tality, for a great many more crimes than under more
balanced systems. Death by torture was the
punishment of a dishonest goldsmith, and mutila-
tion that of the destroyer of a boundary-mark—
which shows how great was the alarm at their
defences. When we find that a red-hot iron spike
ten fingers long is to be thrust into the mouth of a
low-born wretch for reviling a Brahman, we are
reminded that the composers of these law-books
were Brahmins. Although the judges, like the
judges, were generally Brahmins, it appears doubt-
ful whether the privileges claimed by the sacer-
dotal class and incorporated with legal rules were
actually accorded to them. Many of the privileges
belong to the moral sphere, and go beyond what we
recognize as the proper province of the penal
law. Excessive drinking is punished as a crime
in itself, not only as a breach of the tabu. Gambling is viewed in the same light. There are
rules for securing chastity and sexual purity.
Hospitality is considered a duty to be enforced by
law in certain cases. The prohibition of sati,
sacred cremation, and the disposal of boors and
incantations meant to destroy life is punishable
by a fine. Every one must be strictly kept to
the employment of his own caste. Matrimonial
duties and family relations are elaborately regu-
lated. The proper province of moral obligations and delinquencies, however, is the ecclesiastical law, with its delicate penances and austerities (see Expiation and Atonement [Hindu]). Punishment and penance may be combined, as when the slayer of a milch-cow or of a bull (these being sacred animals) has to pay an atonement in the case of his guilt. In cases of sexual criminality, the king inflicts punishment and the sin committed is expiated by a penance. Should an offender fail to perform the penance prescribed for his offence, he is at once caste by the ceremonies of ghosanghapha, 'the breaking of the water-pot'—a ceremony which is performed down to the present day in such cases. Punishment by itself is also supposed to have a purifying effect, as in the above-mentioned case of a thief who appears before the king of his own accord and is struck down by him.

Judicial procedure is simple and patriarchal. It presents the open court method of investigating accusations for crime, the king, attended by his Brahmans, entering his court of justice every morning, and there, after having seated himself on the judgment-seat and having worshipped the gods, undertaking the trial of the causes brought before him. If in haste, his trial is to last for one whole day if a criminal deserving punishment is allowed to go free, and for three days if an innocent man is punished. The more recent law-books mention a number of other members of a caste of justice besides the king—the king's domestic priest, his chief judge, who may also represent him if absent, his ministers of State, the assessors of the court, who are required to state their opinion of the case unreservedly and in accordance with the dictates of justice, the accountant, the scribe, the beadle. Gold and fire are used in the administration of oaths and ordeals, and water for refreshment. In giving a decision, the king must attend to local usage, written law, and the practice of the virtuous, if not opposed to local, family, or caste usages. Villages, tribes, and castes have also tribunals of their own, corresponding to the modern Palichaevats; but from these an appeal to the king is possible. There is no essential difference between the trial of civil and criminal suits, except perhaps that the character and other qualifications of a reliable witness are not examined so strictly in civil cases as in criminal ones, where the defendant in a criminal case cannot be represented by a substitute. The litigants must always be heard in person, and the king or the judge watches their countenances and their conduct carefully. Witnesses are watched in the same way, the depositions of witnesses being regarded as the most important part of the evidence. Certain persons are not admissible as witnesses on account of their personal relations with the litigant parties, or on account of age, dignity, sex, devotion to religion, moral or personal defects. There are also some provisions as to the number of witnesses, as that there shall not be less than three. In the event of a conflict of testimony, that of the majority generally prevails. The witnesses are solemnly adjured to speak the truth; and, if they should happen to meet with a calamity within seven days after making their deposition, this is held to prove its falsehood. Perjured witnesses are severely punished, and have to endure fearful pangs in a future existence, and destroy their own relatives through their wickedness. Perjury, however, is tolerated where an accused man may be saved from death by it.

The latter law-books give special prominence to documents, and make written prevale over oral evidence, the plaintiff and the answer of the defendant having, likewise, to be stated in writing. The trial is to be conducted discreetly and skillfully, for liars may have the appearance of various men and veracious men may resemble liars, or documents may be bad religious penances and austerities (see Expiation and Atonement [Hindu]). Punishment and penance may be combined, as when the slayer of a milch-cow or of a bull (these being sacred animals) has to pay an atonement in the case of his guilt. In cases of sexual criminality, the king inflicts punishment and the sin committed is expiated by a penance. Should an offender fail to perform the penance prescribed for his offence, he is at once caste by the ceremonies of ghosanghapha, 'the breaking of the water-pot'—a ceremony which is performed down to the present day in such cases. Punishment by itself is also supposed to have a purifying effect, as in the above-mentioned case of a thief who appears before the king of his own accord and is struck down by him.

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The sources of the Veda, according to Manu (li. 6, 12), consist of the whole Veda, the Smṛti, or tradition, the customs of holy men, and self-satisfaction (where there is no other guide). The four Vedas, together with auxiliaries, literature, all of which is believed to be eternal and inspired, are confined to the consideration of religious rites, and contain very little about secular law, though they are considered the fountainhead of the whole law. Dharmasastra or Smṛti are the real sources of law from a legal point of view. The term Smṛti means literally 'recollection,' and is used to denote a work or the whole body of Sanskrit works in which the sages of antiquity set down their reflections of the divine precepts regarding the duty of man. In reality, the earliest law-books were composed in and for the Brāhmanical schools studying the various parts of the Veda, and have been preserved as portions of the Vedas, used in schools, or as independent works. Such compositions are the Dharmasastras or Dharmasastras of Apastamba, Baudhâyana, Gántama, Vasiṣṭha, Viṣṇu, and some others, composed in the aphoristic Sūtra style, either entirely in prose or, more usually, in mixed prose and verse. Some of these works are supposed to have been written in the 6th or 6th century B.C., or earlier, but they may have undergone many changes since then. Their contents are mainly religious, but the positive law is also treated in them, and they are very useful for tracing the gradual development of legal institutions in India.

From these aphoristic treatises we pass to the versified works, composed in the ādhyātma metre, such as the celebrated Code of Manu, the Maga Charta of Brāhmanism; the Code of Yājñavalkya, distinguished for its conciseness and systematic treatment of the whole law, in three books, on ādhyātma, i.e. religious rites and duties, āyātavād, i.e. jurisprudence, and prāyaścittas, i.e. sins and atonements; and the Code of Nārāyaṇa, not being confined to jurisprudence alone, which it treats with great fullness of detail. The opening verses of the Code of Manu narrate how Manu, the descendant of Brāhman, gave the great later law-books, and afterwards transmitted the task of expounding the Institutes of the Sacred Law, which he had learned from Brāhma,
to Bûrgu, one of his ten mind-born sons. There is a gloss to the line that 'at that' Manu said is medicinal and another maxim stating that 'a smruti or rule of law that is opposed to the sense of Manu's Institutes is not approved.' The great number of learned Commentaries composed on the Code of Manu, from Mitakshara to the later school of law, is a testimony to the very particular authority early assigned to this codification of the religious and secular law, which may have originated in the first centuries A.D., if not earlier. There are also many Smritis which have not been preserved in a separate text and complete form, and are known to us only from the passages of law cited in the Sanskrit Commentaries and Digests; but the authenticity of these texts is somewhat doubtful. The mythological poems called Purâṇas and also cited a great deal, particularly on the subject of vows, gifts, and other parts of the religious law, though they are said to be inferior in authority to the Smritis. The Commentaries and systematic works on law, being posterior in time to the Smritis and Purâṇas, have gradually come to supersede them in authority, especially the celebrated Mitakshāra, a Commentary on the Śûta of Vaiṣṇava (or Vaiṣṇava) composed by the ascetic Vaiṣṇavaśāstrī, c. A.D. 1100, at Kālare, in the Deccan. The Śrutickārīkā of Dvānla-bhāṭa, the Sarvaśrīśāstra of King Kudradeva, the Vairāntika of Mitraśāstra, the Mahākāraka of Nīlakaṇṭha, and other learned compositions are used concurrently with the Mitakshāra in several provinces; in Bengal alone the Dāikyākhyā of Jivataraśana has superseded the Mitakshāra as far as the law of inheritance is concerned. Customs which are, like written codes, considered a source of law have to a certain extent been embodied in the codes. Recent collections of customs were instituted by the British Government—e.g., A. Steele, The Laws and Customs of Hindu Caste, London, 1898; C. L. Tupper, Punjab Customary Law, Calcutta, 1881; C. Bouillon and W. H. Rattigan, Notes on Customary Law as administered in the Courts of the Punjab, Lahore, 1876.

LAW (Iranian).—The term daenā, the later dina, which is commonly and conveniently translated 'law,' is perhaps the most characteristic and best known term in the Avestic system. It also indicates the religion itself; in fact, in accord with the entire mentality of the ancient Iranians, of so many other Eastern peoples, there was no distinction between religious and civil law. Another term which may be translated 'law' is dätā, and in the Pahlavi treatise, the Dinkar, we read the assertion, Arvāna dādto hino Māzdhra, (Dinkar, ed. Peschot B. Sanjana, Bombay, 1874ff, ch. 28), which we may render, 'the Mazdean religion is the law of Iran.' As without further remarks, it is highly probable that with the ancient Iranians, as with other Indo-European peoples, the early form of judicial process was the simple one of a village council of elders. His name, or at least the word vicēra (the origin of the modern Persian word vaṣa), say, 'viceroy,' is one we have a Gāthic term for 'judge,' does not seem to be tenable, although vicēra certainly bears the meaning of 'deciding.' In the later Avesta the term dērāsi, a Gāthic term still preserved, used in the qualifying sense, dērāsi, 'giving or administering law' (Ys. ix. 10), certainly indicates the judge. In the passage just quoted it is especially applied to Urvakhshaya, the son of Turta, who is considered apparently as a kind of Iranian Numa. According to Geiger's view, the pāṭraka code, which we know from the Vendidad, represents only that portion of legislation 'in which the priesthood reserved for themselves jurisdiction, or else added ecclesiastical penalties to those of the secular tribunals; orders to the priests, in a word, in the Avesta of blood, rendettā, and, still more, of smrūdī, indeed, the prescriptions for the latter are fairly full (see Vend. iv. 44). Such usages were not doubt pre-Zoroastrian. The law legislation contained in the Vendidad, agreed with the modern rules of the system, does not make any real distinction between what we should call civil jurisprudence and religious or ritual law. If we accept J. H. Moulton's theory of the Magian element in later Zoroastrianism (Early Zoroastrianism, London, 1913, lectures vi, vii), then the whole ritual legislation must be attributed to this, as he maintains, non-Aryan race. In the code, however, moral, ritual, and civic, even hygienic, crimes and their respective punishments are mingled together. As we should expect from the fundamental and traditional love of truth and hatred of falsehood which, even by the testimony of their Greek foes, always characterized the ancient Iranian people, the hitherto unexplained reference of the observance of contracts (mitvra), and breach of contract is severely condemned, even when towards unbelievers. Contracts are said to be confirmed in six ways, sealed by mouth, by hand, grasp, or by the pledging of a sheep, an ox, a man, or a piece of land, respectively (Vend. iv. 2 ff.). Crimes of personal violence are carefully understood according to the seriousness of the injuries done and the number of times permitted, the penalties being fixed on a sliding scale of (apparently) semicircular gradings. Capital punishment, curiously enough, is prescribed, not for taking life, but for performing irregularly and without sufficient knowledge certain priestly functions. The ordinary unit, so to speak, of corporal chastisement for all kinds of crimes is upavāna, which is generally translated 'strokes' or 'blow' with a horsewhip or scourge. A difficulty arises from the enormous number of these units which are prescribed for certain crimes, rising to hundreds and even thousands, which it would be quite impossible for any human being to bear. As, however, there was apparently a scale of monetary equivalents for corporal punishment, it may be that these impossible numbers are simply meant as a guide to fix the amount of such wergeld. As a matter of fact, far more serious punishments are assigned to what we should consider slight ritual or ceremonial transgression than to crimes of violence. In the opinion of Spiegel and Geiger, these upavānas may possibly mean simply blows with an instrument for the slaying of noxious insects and other creatures of the Evil Spirit, whose destruction was supposed to atone for a certain degree of crime.

As the Vendidad was exclusively a priestly code of the Magians, it is self-evident why transgressions of religious precepts are most severely punished. If the penalty consisted only in the delivery of slain karmākshya, it might of course reach very high sums. It is probable that, quite early, persons could be relieved of their obligation by making a substantial compensation to the priest. The scourge could never have assumed such dimensions without provoking opposition (Geiger, Oorder, Kultur, p. 459).

Be this as it may, the system of an equivalent fine in money for successive degrees of corporal punishment seems to the Christianist, and to the Sassanian times, inasmuch as in the Pahlavi treatise, Shāhāyast šā-Shāhāyast (lit. 'licent non-licent'), which is the standard text of later Mazdean jurisprudence, in its comment on the above-quoted 4th marginal of the Vendidad, that a scale of fines for various degrees of violence, rising from five to two hundred, is given with equivalents in dīrāzi.
2. The oldest code mentioned in Japanese history is the constitution formed by the reign of Prince Umayado (Shotoku Taishi), in the 12th year of Empress Suiko (A.D. 604). This consisted of seventeen articles, and is commonly known as The Seventeen Article Constitution. Whether, however, this constitution should be called a positive law or merely a political principle is a question discussed but not settled by Japanese historians, since it was issued in the name of the Prince and not of the Empress.

In the tenth year of Emperor Tenchū (A.D. 671) a code of laws, said to have consisted of twenty-two volumes, was formed; but the entire code was lost, and its contents are unknown. In the fourth year of Emperor Mommu, Prince Osakabe and Fujiwara Fuhito were charged with the duty of codification; and in the following year, the first of Taiho (701), the work was completed. This entire code, consisting of eleven volumes of general law concerning government organization, administration, and private relations, and six volumes of criminal laws, was promulgated and enforced the same year, and is known as the Taiho Code. It has also been lost.

In the second year of Yoro, in the reign of Emperor Genko (718), Fujiwara Fuhito and others were again ordered to revise the statutes. This revision consisted of ten volumes of general law and an equal number devoted to criminal law. Though called by the name 'Yoro,' this was nothing more than a revision and supplement of the Taiho Code, and is, therefore, commonly known by the latter name. This general code on general law has been perfectly preserved, but the part on criminal laws has been lost, with the exception of four chapters. This is the oldest lawbook in Japan.

These laws were marked by Chinese influence—not that Chinese law was adopted as a whole, but the best Chinese principles were added to Japanese laws already existing. The Taiho laws, with many revisions and supplements, governed the nation for about five hundred years, until 1190. There are many commentators, chief among them being Ryo-no-Giye, Ryo-no-Shugo, and Ryo-Sho. The first of these was officially edited in the tenth year of Tencio in the reign of Emperor Ninna (833), and is recognized as of the highest authority.

3. With the establishment of the feudal system, the individual Shoguns issued laws for the government of their vassals; and as the authority of the Shoguns increased, the territory within which the Taiho laws were enforced decreased until, with the establishment of the Shogunate government at Kamakura under Minamoto Yoritomo (mabuse of 12th cent.), it was limited to places directly under the control of the court. A remarkably simple code of feudal laws consisting of only fifty-one articles was formed by Hoya, the executive head of the Shogunate, on the 8th of August, in the first year of Teiei, in the reign of Emperor Gohorikawa. It is known as the Teiei-Shihoimokun, and accorded so well with the spirit of feudalism that it remained effective until the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1867).

The characteristic of this code is its rejection of Chinese influence and its adaptation to the maintenance and development of a unique Japanese feudalism. In the days of the Taiho laws, the whole country was under direct government supervision; but during the feudal period only a little territory remained under such control, by far the larger part being held as 'arriere pays.' In the earlier period, the children of a family shared equally in the inheritance of property, but under feudalism the eldest son took precedence.

4. With the fall of the Kamakura Shogunate
(1394) its successor, the Ashikaga, continued to enforce the principles of the Yesei-Shikimoku; but the laws were revised from time to time until the articles numbered two hundred and ten. The Kenbo-Shikimoku, of seventeen articles, was issued during the Ashikaga Shogunate; but the affairs of the country became disorderly, and neither the law of the court nor the will of the Shogunate was executed. Many feudal lords declared that this division be made among these; they issued their own regulations or family laws, of which those of the Saingen, Ouchi, Chosokabe, Hojo, and Asakura families remain intact. For two hundred years, until the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603), the country passed through what is known as the dark ages, and no new laws of permanent value were enacted.

5. In the eighth year of Keicho in the reign of Emperor Goyouen (1660), Tokugawa Ieyasu pacified the whole country and established his government as Shogun in Yedo (now Tokyo). Two hundred and sixty-five years of peace followed. The Tokugawa family tried to govern the country according to this law. An expression of far as possible avoided the making of written laws. But, as time passed, the number of simple statutes increased, and they were codified in what is known as the Kenko-Eoten. This code was divided into two parts, the first dealing with matters of administrative, and of personal relations, while the second contained the criminal laws. As the criminal law comprised a hundred articles, the people of the time placed the emphasis on the Hundred Prohibitions. Secrecy was a governing principle of the Tokugawa Shogunate; these articles, therefore, were not published, but privately distributed among feudal officers for information and guidance. As a result, though the Shogunate was in power for over a century, it is not in all points clearly understood.

6. The uncertainty concerning these laws of the Shogunate is increased by the fact that at the time of the Restoration in 1867, when the authority which had been exercised by the Shogunate was restored to the Imperial House, they were entirely inapplicable, being in reality family and not national in their nature, and they were, accordingly, completely set aside. During a period of some seven hundred years the Imperial House had had no real voice in the government, and possessed no laws which could at once be enforced. As a temporary measure, certain Chinese laws were revised and lines drawn very closely to the Chinese laws. Contact with Western nations and a study of their civilization showed the necessity of laws in harmony with the modern world; and in the fifteenth year of Meiji (1882) the criminal code was promulgated. This was followed, in the twenty-second year (1889), by the proclamation of the Constitution, and, in the thirty-third year, (1900), by the civil code. Auxiliary laws of procedure have been issued on the models of Western nations; but all these, together with the standard codes, recognize and enforce the two fundamental principles which from the first have characterized Japanese law: the sovereignty of the Imperial House, and the family system. It has been revised.

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LAW (Jewish). — The important signification which Judaism from earliest times has attached to the observance of the law; the religious vocabulary of the Jews presents no fewer than seven synonyms for this conception: ḫq (also ḫqg), the most comprehensive expression for law, the laws of nature being also indicated by it, mishpāt, ṭvāh, mishpāt, piggōd, tōrāh, and the term dāth, which is borrowed from Persian.

The legal portions of the Pentateuch are: Ex 11, 39-23, 52, 34; Is 1-3, 11, 25, 27; Nu 5-10, λp, 77-79, 28-30, 35 f.; Dt 4-57.

The usual division of the laws into legal, ritual, and moral is not supported by the sources; such a distinction is nowhere expressed, nor can such a division be made among the laws. On the contrary, one and the same law is often both legal and moral—e.g., the numerous social laws; and just as often the basis added for the legal and ritual laws elevates them to moral laws. An outward distinction is impossible because all laws without distinction are regarded as divine commands. All commands are of divine origin, since God represents law and morality in idea. This conception is the constant element in Jewish religion at all stages of its evolution, which we can still partly trace in the original documents. However much law may have varied in its connotation at different times, it was always regarded as in accordance with the religious life of the people, and each generation confessed to belong to the Jewish community must not only acknowledge the one God, but also conform to all His laws unconditionally. Disobedience to the commands of God was equal to heresy, just like idolatry, murder, or whatever they may be called as 'profanation of the divine name.' Judaism was from the beginning a religion of doing than of believing, and, therefore, it has laid the main emphasis on the ethical, rather than on the mystical, element. The constitution of Judaism, accordingly, is not a number of articles of belief, but ten commandments; and the revelation at Sinai is presented not as a communication of secret doctrines, but as a proclamation of the divine will; Moses is not a metaphysician, but a lawyer.

The Pentateuch, as we have it to-day, does not present one uniform system of legislation, but a composite body of laws from several sources of very different times; and, in spite of all their work, critics have not entirely succeeded in assigning the single laws to a particular source or even to a particular time. The oldest laws (esp. Ex 21-23) exhibit a considerable retrospection with the old Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, but a dependence of the one on the other must not be assumed. In comparing the two systems of law, apart from the great progress in single laws, we are struck by the difference in spirit: that of the Pentateuch is law and morality which characterizes Jewish legislation (cf. e.g. Ex 22:25-26 23:12 and esp. Dt, e.g. 5:10-12 15:11-21).

The discourses of the prophets from the middle of the 5th cent. onwards already presuppose a law, which they recognize as binding and whose nonfulfilment they censure. Frequently, however, they polemize against the law; they declare the whole system of worship worthless and even hated of God, when the nation does not practise justice and morality. But the elevated moral exhortation of the prophets was little understood and still less followed. It was too abstract to exercise a decisive influence on the life of the people. It had first to be made practicable in a social legislation, adapted to different cases and circumstances, and transformed into a rule of conduct for the individual. In this way Deuteronomy took its rise; it is the product of the prophetic teaching, and placed the individual justice at the heart of religion, while it restricts the sphere of worship to a great extent, and, in particular, recognizes only one place of worship. After the return from the captivity, the Second Temple, the order of worship in its details was appointed in the 'Priests' Code,' although its constituent parts are, it is true, of an
earlier date. The different law-books were now combined into one book along with the traditions of primeval history and the history of the nation which also occupied the most exalted position (up to the death of Moses). Moses was regarded as the author of this book, every word of which was supposed to be inspired, and was designated by the name of tōrah, 'teaching', and to its divine origin and recognition of its whole contents became the basis of Judaism under Ezra. This book was by no means a law-book; half of its contents were of the nature of narrative, so that it appealed to the understanding and imagination as much as to the will; and it was those narrative portions that had the greatest influence on the religious education of the people. The I.XX made a great and most momentous error when, for want of an exactly corresponding Greek expression, they translated tōrah by νόμος ('law'), giving rise to an utterly false conception of the nature of Judaism, and making possible, at a later date, the historically important attack of the Pauline letters upon the Law. The fact that the Jews regarded the book as 'teaching' is indicated by the Aramaic translation τουδεθέ, which can mean only 'teaching' and never 'law'. This is especially shown by the wide-spread demand of learning and teaching of the Torah, and by the fact that the occupation of the intellect with it was regarded as the loftiest and most delightful of tasks.

A classical proof of this is afforded in Ps. 119, which, following the succession of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, has an endless variation on the same theme: the Torah is the chief good, chief happiness, pleasure, entertainment, and comfort. The law was only the framework upon which the pure religion, which forms the substance of the Jewish teaching, could establish itself, work itself up, and become the religion of the people.

Simultaneously with the elevation of the Torah to the religious book of the community, the synagogue was established with the reading, translation, and explanation of the Torah as its first object. As soon as it was introduced, the Torah, like every other law-book, required explanation by experts, and the sifrat (from sfrā, 'book'), became the religious authorities in Judaism from that time onwards. The expositions of the Torah laid down in their lectures soon became quite as binding as the written teaching; and thus there was developed an oral teaching, which did not, however, interfere with the validity of the Torah, being at first only an application of it. But it soon went beyond the written teaching, and, in particular, it was supposed to create a hedge round the teaching, on the one hand to preserve the essentials of the religion from corruption and evaporation, and on the other hand to secure the observance of the religious laws by means of provisions, sometimes lightening, sometimes increasing, their burden. The oral teaching varied with the custom and common law of each period, adapted the written word to the changed outward circumstances and new views, and even directly created new provisions, which could not possibly have been foreseen in the Torah. Thus, for instance, the whole synagogue service with its order of prayer was gradually introduced by the scribes; and dates for all the different period, feasts like Pārim and Hanukkah were introduced and made religiously binding. The collision of Judaism with Greek civilization raised a very difficult problem for the scribes; and, if the victorius elevation of the Hellenistic period, Judaism from the danger of the moment, the newly founded Jewish State nevertheless had, from the necessity of the case, to come forward in opposition to the scribes, who wished to regard Judaism as merely a religious community. Thus arose the parties of the Pharisees and the Sadducees. The former, led by the scribes, were the representatives of the religious principle and emphasized the value and necessity of oral teaching in addition to the Torah. The latter, worldly-minded throughout, wished to recognize the Torah alone. The Sadducees, accordingly, luke-warm in their attitude towards the oral teaching, exerted their influence towards petrifying religion, while the pious Pharisees sought its progress and development. Under the compulsion of this contest, the Pharisees extended the oral teaching more and more and had to find a basis for it, and, in particular, to prove its agreement with the Torah. About the last century before Christ an attempt was made by Hillel and Shammai to fix the oral teaching in writing; this had previously been avoided, partly to preserve intact the authority of the Torah as the only valid religious document, and partly to leave the tradition free and flowing. Here, too, it is incorrect and one-sided to speak of an oral law. For from the very beginning the oral no less than the written teaching contained narrative, instructive, and edifying portions as well as the legal elements; the legal portion was designated Ḥalakot, the narrative Ḥaggada. Jewish thought, feelings, and hopes, as expressed in the proverbs, parables, and stories of the Ḥaggadā, which for this reason is just as important a source for the customs and religious views of the Jews as the Halaқā. The Halakot, i.e., the religious norm, was in the different schools subjected to great differences of opinion, which the scribes sought to clear up in public discussions. A definite system of logical and exegetical principles gradually formed itself in connection with the law as derived from the written text. The wider the circle within which the life of the Jews moved, and the wider their circle of knowledge and opinions became, the more the sphere of the Ḥalakot had to be extended. It embraces temple rites and synagogue worship, land laws, civil and criminal law, poor laws, laws regarding marriage, laws about foods, and laws of health.

The oral law, which now only became written law, also recognized the existence and necessity of an unwritten law, controlling matters left to the moral feeling of the individual—the finer demands of morality which did not admit of formulation and classification, which did not appear in the written code, but, however, interwove with the validity of the Torah, being at first only an application of it. But it soon went beyond the written teaching, and, in particular, it was supposed to create a hedge round the teaching, on the one hand to preserve the essentials of the religion from corruption and evaporation, and on the other hand to secure the observance of the religious laws by means of provisions, sometimeslightening, sometimes increasing, their burden. The oral teaching varied with the custom and common law of each period, adapted the written word to the changed outward circumstances and new views, and even directly created new provisions, which could not possibly have been foreseen in the Torah. Thus, for instance, the whole synagogue service with its order of prayer was gradually introduced by the scribes; and dates for all the different period, feasts like Pārim and Hanukkah were introduced and made religiously binding. The collision of Judaism with Greek civilization raised a very difficult problem for the scribes; and, if the victorius elevation of the Hellenistic period, Judaism from the danger of the moment, the newly founded Jewish State nevertheless had, from the necessity of the case, to come forward in opposition to the scribes, who wished to regard Judaism as merely a religious community. Thus arose the parties of the Pharisees and the Sadducees. The former, led by the scribes, were the representatives of the religious principle and emphasized the value and necessity of oral teaching in addition to the Torah. The latter, worldly-minded throughout, wished to recognize the Torah alone. The Sadducees, accordingly, luke-warm in their attitude towards the oral teaching, exerted their influence towards petrifying religion, while the pious Pharisees sought its progress and development. Under the compulsion of this contest, the Pharisees extended the oral teaching more and more and had to find a basis for it, and, in particular, to prove its agreement with the Torah. About the last century before Christ an attempt was made by Hillel and Shammai to fix the oral teaching in writing; this had previously been avoided, partly to preserve intact the authority of the Torah as the only valid religious document, and partly to leave the tradition free and flowing. Here, too, it is incorrect and one-sided to speak of an oral law. For from the very beginning the oral no less than the written teaching contained narrative, instructive, and edifying portions as well as the legal elements; the legal portion was designated Ḥalakot, the narrative Ḥaggada. Jewish thought, feelings, and hopes, as expressed in the proverbs, parables, and stories of the Ḥaggadā, which for this reason is just as important a source for the customs and religious views of the Jews as the Ḥalakot. The Halakot, i.e., the religious norm, was in the different schools subjected to great differences of opinion, which the scribes sought to clear up in public discussions. A definite system of logical and exegetical principles gradually formed itself in connection with the law as derived from the written text. The wider the circle within which the life of the Jews moved, and the wider their circle of knowledge and opinions became, the more the sphere of the Halakot had to be extended. It embraces temple rites and synagogue worship, land laws, civil and criminal law, poor laws, laws regarding marriage, laws about foods, and laws of health.

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the object of all additions to and burdens on the law was to preserve the teaching of Judaism intact, the law now had the further task of preserving the very existence of the Jews as a people at all. The study of the law was now regarded as the highest religious duty and an equally valuable, in fact a more valuable, substitute for the earlier sacrifice. If the traditions of the Haggadah played an important part in the consciousness of the populace, this had lost the high position that the study of the high schools in Palestine. They carefully sought not only to fix all the single provisions, but in particular to preserve all those laws and customs which had been gathered together for a time—out of time, they hoped only for a time—fallen into disuse. 'Aḥiḳa ben Joseph (q.e.r.), who died as a martyr after the fatal issue of the rising of Bar Kokhba (A.D. 135), brought the recording of the oral teaching to a temporary end. He sought to arrange the immense amount of material from two points of view: according to the matter in the form of a book of law (Mishna) and according to Bible verses in the form of a running commentary to the legal books of the Torah (Midrash). After his death his pupils tried with all possible speed to close the record finally, so that the tradition might not be lost by the violent death of other scholars. 'Aḥiḳa's Mishnah, so it is said, was further improved, and after his death R. Yehudah, the patriarch (†c. 200), closed the record, and created the Mishnah as a generally received book of law. Soon after, the Midrashim, which in their main contents went back to 'Aḥiḳa and his contemporaries, were completed.

Their names (with the exception of a few which are preserved only in fragments) are: 'Abbaḳo (on Exodus), Sifre on Leviticus, and Sifre on Numbers and Deuteronomy. These Mishnah have not, however, been any more officially recognized than has the Mishnah preserved to us under the name of Tosefta. In attitude and aim the Tosefta is similar to the Mishnah, but it originated in other schools and had accepted many traditions which are wanting or rejected in the latter. It is, therefore, a priceless source for the scientific investigation of the Halakah. The Mishnah and the Tosefta are divided into six portions: (1) synagogal worship and agriculture; (2) law of Sabbath and fast days; (3) law of marriage; (4) civil and criminal law; (6) temple rites; and (6) laws of purity.

The completed Mishnah, which was composed in the Hebrew language, was taken by Rabb and Samuel to Babylonia, and taught and explained in the institutions of formal study of both countries. The Palestinian schools also sought to explain the Mishnah, which, owing to its condensed method of expression, was often difficult to understand. The explanation of the Mishnah, which in the Talmud are called G'mara, and which have been written down and collected, furnish more than a bare commentary to the Mishnah. In their outward form they are records of the discussions which took place in the schools during three centuries, and they preserve these in all their original vividness. In their contents, particularly in the Haggadah portions, they are a repertory of everything that the most distinguished representatives of Judaism during the period spoke, thought, felt, experienced, and knew. While the explanation of the Mishnah was not finished in Palestine, the Babylonian G'mara was completed about A.D. 600. The collection of the two Talmuds, the Babylonian, and the Talmud of the two Talmuds, the Babylonian became in practice the only authoritative one; the Palestinian (incorrectly called the Jerusalem Talmud) was not recognized, and was always much less studied.

The Talmud as a whole is not, strictly speaking, a law-book like the Mishnah; it places the opposite opinions with their reasons beside each other and often leaves the individual to conclude. In spite of that, it brought Jewish law to a fixed system, and thus lent to Judaism the necessary inner unity. By means of it Judaism was re-moulded into the homogeneous mass which it presented during the whole of the Middle Ages. The Talmud allows a sphere of action to the freedom of thought altogether out of proportion to that which is granted to the freedom of world action. It does not demand blind obedience to the law, but would recognize as valid only what is rationally deduced from the word of Scripture, and asks time and again in regard even to Biblical commands: Why if it is not commanded? It thus adds a logical or moral reason. Only in the case of very few laws, for which a rational explanation could not be found (e.g., the red heifer [Nu 19]), is there a command of God added, as the ground of obligation.

The Jewish law, as it found its final expression in the Talmud, has often been represented as an unbearable yoke. This designation, however, which is played upon as early as Sirach, indicates only the impression which the law made on non-Jews, and not the emotions with which the people themselves regarded it. The Jew ever found joy and satisfaction in the fulfilment of it, and coined for it the special expression dinaḳḳer deī misrap, 'joy in the commandment.'

The recognized benediction on occasions of fulfilling all the more important religious provisions ran as follows: 'Blessed be thou, 0 God, who hath given us life and in the daily evening prayer they said: 'We rejoice in the words of thy teaching and the words of thy commandments now and evermore, for they are our life and the length of our days.'

It was not freedom from the law, but freedom in the law, that was the religious ideal of the Jews. They felt themselves morally free through the fact that they subjected themselves joyfully to the law, and recognized that it must be obeyed even when it was not there. The patriarchs they regarded as especially virtuous because they had kept the law even before it was given. It was not Kant, therefore, who was the first to teach the autonomy of morality. In one place we are told that he who keeps the commandments stands as high in God's sight as if he had produced them out of himself (cf. F. Perles, 'Die Autonomie der Sittlichkeit im jüd. Schriftum,' in Festschrift für Hermann Cohen, Berlin, 1912, pp. 103-108).

It is true that the frequent use of petty casuistry, and especially the frequent exercise of the Talmud, repels us, but the Talmud ought not to be judged in this light alone. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the morality of the Jews did not degenerate under the pressure of the law, but became more rigorous. For the casuistry had almost always the tendency to make the law more exacting, and did not, as a rule, deal with moral so much as with legal and ritual questions, while morality was often appealed to as a supplement to the law. On the other hand, it was important that certain moral requirements, such as care for the poor, the sick, and unburied dead, and even kindness to animals, were made laws in the Talmud. It is often alleged that all the laws for the sake of the well-being of the individual and of society, but it is quite as frequently emphasized that only the unselfish fulfilment of the law has moral value, and that the embodiment of humanity is the highest aim. Specially peculiar to the Judaism of the Talmud is the conception of the gIDDAS kIAH-SEM, 'hallowing of the divine name,' according to which every Jew ought to witness for God by an exemplary life, and contribute towards His recognition among men.

In spite of the fact that the divine legislation as a whole was regarded as eternal and unchangeable, the individual cases were dealt with. With the individual cases concluded, the judicial exposition and even the annulling of a law was recognized as justifiable and necessary. Sufficient ground for putting aside even Biblical commands was found
by the lawyers not only in danger to life or impossibility of carrying out the law owing to a vis major, but also in intolerable inconvenience to the community, danger to the existence or repeal of the law. It must be therefore that collision with the laws of the State. The 'dignity of man' is also repeatedly given as a reason for temporary suspension of a law.

When it was completed, the Talmud was adopted as the only authority in matters of religious law, and became, like the Mishnah 300 years previously, the subject of study and exposition. Since it was not, of course, a law-book in the strict sense of the term, definitive rules had to be laid down for judging in cases where the Talmud presented unsolved differences of opinion. The need of codifying the extensive contents of the Talmud came more and more to the fore. When the Karaites (q.v.) rejected the whole Talmud, and, in fact, the oral teaching altogether, and recognized the Torah alone as binding in matters of religious law, a code had to be formed which set forth plainly what was to be regarded as law in the Talmud and what only as individual opinion. Hence arose, from the 9th to the 9th cent., the so-called Halakah Gedolah, compendium of the Talmud, which in outward form follows the Mishnah in attempts to make a better arrangement of the material according to subjects. This work, which originated from the Geonim, the heads of the Babylonian schools of the time, did not attain such an extensive circulation as the Halakah Shel al-Fast, which was composed two centuries later. Al-Fasi makes use of the Palestinian Talmud also to decide questions of religious law, and is much more independent than that of Geonim, laying down general rules, as well as in using them to obtain concrete results from the discussions of the Talmud. The most original and important code of Rabbinic Judaism is the Mishnah Torah of Moses Maimonides. Absolutely abandoning the dialectics and the order of the materials of the Talmud, he gives a strictly systematic exposition of the laws and the teaching of Judaism in fourteen books. In opposition to all his predecessors, he specifies neither his sources nor opposed opinions, and gives no reasons for his own decisions. On this account his work was very sharply attacked from many sides, although his opponents could not free themselves from his influence and borrow from the first work to obtain a far-reaching influence was the Tur of Jacob ben Asher of the 14th cent., who, in fact, used Maimonides as his model, but produced a new and unique book of law, stating and discussing the contradictory opinions of the authorities after the Talmud. This work remained the undisputed authority for more than two centuries. It was only after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain and Portugal that the need for a new code more suited to the changed conditions made itself felt. To meet this need Joseph Caro produced the Shulhan Arukh, basing his work on the Tur, but also consulting the rest of his predecessors. Joseph Caro often proceeds very independently in his code, and his work on this account met with energetic opposition before it was generally accepted. The Polish Talmudists especially opposed it, and even, when, much later, provided it with continuous glosses, which were then printed along with the work. A century later, however, the Shulhan Arukh was the only authoritative code of Rabbinic Judaism, and it has remained as the halakhic authority till the present day. It had, in fact, contributed largely to the consolidation of Judaism, and was at the time of its production, when the Jewish communion threatened to break up, a historical necessity. Gradually, however, it became more and more a hindrance to free religious development, and, on the whole, its influence upon the culture, particularly of the Jews of eastern Europe, has been disadvantageous to the modern Jewish cent.; therefore, towards the culture and reform of Judaism have aimed at destroying the unrivaled authority of this work.


FELIX PERLES.

LAW (Muhammadan).—I. INTRODUCTION.—1. Muslim law code (shar'jah or shar) and the sacred texts: Qur'an and tradition.—A Muslim is bound by religious regulations not only in the performance of his daily ritual prayers, the fast, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and other religious acts, but also in the contract and payment of his marriage, in commercial contracts, and, indeed, in all events of any importance in his domestic and social life. All these religious regulations form together a code of law which in Arabic is called the shar'jah or shar, i.e. the 'law' that which faithful Muslims must follow according to Allah's will. Muslims believe that the regulations of this code depend not on human judgment, but entirely on Allah's inscrutable will. Originally the only sources from which the knowledge of Allah's law could be gained were the Qur'an and the sunnah.

The Qur'an contains few regulations of a legislative character. It is true that in certain verses instructions are given as to how a Muslim must generally distinguish himself from an unbeliever, as to his chief duties, and some sins which he must especially avoid; but these regulations do not form a complete system. From the beginning Muhammad's sunnah 1 was an indispensable supplement to the regulations of the Qur'an. In the Qur'an, e.g., it is enjoined that a Muslim must perform his salat (i.e. the daily ritual prayer, which consists principally of praise of Allah, prostration, etc.), but not how he must fulfil this religious duty. In such a case Muhammad's sunnah gave an explanation of the Qur'an. All Muslims have always performed the salat in the same way, and those who had done before them, for Muhammad's position as a preacher of the new religion and as the head of the Muslim community entitled his followers should observe not only the regulations which he gave as Allah's will in the form of the Qur'an, but also his personal commands and example.

After the death of Muhammad the traditions concerning the deeds and sayings of the Prophet and his companions, as well as the Qur'an, were held in great respect; and the sunnah of these was an example worthy of following for the later Muslims, at least in so far as the Prophet had approved either implicitly or expressly of their acts or sayings. A tradition is called in Arabic hadith, which commonly means 'story,' 'communication;' in a special sense, the hadith means the whole sacred tradition.

1 The word sunnah is often wrongly taken to mean 'tradition' (viz. regarding the deeds and sayings of the Prophets); but it actually means the method. I.e. the way in which the Prophet had: the sunnah of a person means the ordinary line of conduct of the person, and the sunnah of a people means the manners and customs of the people. O. G. G. A. 641. 641-642.

1 Le Droit musulman, in RHR xxviii. (1898) 641; I. Goldzeller, Muslim Studies, Halle, 1909-90, ii. 1. 67, 112 ff.
Originally the oral traditions were handed on from one generation to another. Many undertook long journeys in order to hear the recitations of tradition in different lands and places, and to hear them relate their traditions. Besides the text (masā'a) of a tradition, the name of the narrator and, in the latest narrators to the Prophet, were accurately learned by heart. The trustworthiness of these sources are evidence of their correctness in the narrative, and therefore the portion of the tradition containing the names of the narrators was called ṭabātarka and its authenticity was vouched for by the well-known scholars for the credibility of the traditions. Still, many of the Muslim traditions concerning Muhammad’s sunnah are based on the Arabic writer of the story and the critical examination leaves no possibility of doubt. Decisions were sacrified to the Prophet on questions of all kinds which could determine the traditions till long after his death. Moreover, there are in currency numerous contradictory traditions. Agreement between each of the traditions with another means just what they held to be the true conception. In the first century of Islam there was serious controversy as to the trustworthiness of many traditions. Every one knew that there were many true and untrue traditions as to the Sunnah of the Prophet, and the opposing teachers of tradition accused each other of lying. But, when the ritual, doctrine, and the most important social and political institutions had become definitely fixed, agreement was reached in widespread circles as to the trustworthiness of most traditions. When a tradition could not be brought into harmony with the generally current concept of the Sunnah, it was regarded as false. Moreover, many successful attempts were made to harmonize contradictory traditions with the purpose of correcting the preference for any or any other explanation. Consequently, there is no official and exclusively authoritative collection of Muslim traditions, there are six collections commonly recognized in the orthodox world, viz. the six books of the ṭabā‘i and six of the six authentic collections. Two of these—the collection of traditions of al-Wahabi (hence the title); and that of Mālik (mainly the ṭabā‘i), the six authentic, the six sunnah, but differ in opinion from the orthodox Muslims as to the authenticity of traditions.2 They have their own collections of traditions.1

2. The fīqh and the fīqh-schools. The term fīqh (science of the fīqh) is meant the science of law, its interpretation and its application to sacred texts. It was not enough to know only the literal contents of the Qur’ān and the traditions; it was also necessary to know in what sense these texts were to be understood, held the contents and prohibitions which they contained to be applied in different circumstances. The scholars who occupied themselves with this study of the fīqh (the fāqih) have given an extraordinary extension to the original meaning of the fīqh. They could find answers in the sacred texts to all possible questions of the law, and in this way the study of the fīqh has produced a vast system of legal casuistry worked out in every detail.

Since the opinions of scholars as regards the rules to be deduced from the Qur’ān and the traditions disagreed in many respects, there grew up in a short time different fīqh-schools, each having its own views as to questions of detail. Such a school was called madhhab (‘party’). There were at first a great many of these schools; each fāqih of any importance had his own madhhab. The rise, development, and ultimate fate of the different madhhab were dependent to a great extent on accidental circumstances; and the favour of the Government often had a special influence on their reputation. If the judge and ruler, for instance, had to choose between the norm of the Madhhab of the religious school or the fāqih, he would naturally have to choose the one that was predominant in the population of the place. Thus the Madhhab and the Government were often connected. The fāqih and the Government exercised fresh influence in an opposite direction. In the course of time most of the old schools lost their significance.


5 The differences of opinion between the fīqh-schools did not妨碍 translation and interpretation. The madhhab and its adherents have arrived at their conclusions in the course of the sacred texts. An unprejudiced comparison of the traditions, and to hear them relate their traditions.
the various systems of fiqh shows, however, that this view is exaggerated, and that in general all Muslim fiqh schools following very much the same methods of establishing the fiqh-rules. Difference of opinion existed only on questions of detail.

Even the controversy between the earlier scholars on the question whether the giyâs was permissible or not, to which very little attention was paid at first, and on which the earlier masters of the tradition were given only with reference to special circumstances. An example of giyâs is the following. A Muslim is forbidden in the Qur'an (qur'an 4, 235; 83, 100; 89, 20; 41, 57) to make himself indelible for ribâ, i.e., not only interest, but every demand of interest. In the traditions in which the prohibition of the Qur'an is explained in more detail, ribâ is forbidden only if a Muslim carries on a business with gold, silver, and some kinds of merchandize which were formerly the usual objects of the trade. Again, the same right to hold strictly to the letter of these traditions: "reIf, they said, is forbidden only to any one engaged in the trade expressly mentioned in these sacred texts; for, if the demanding of interest was not permitted in other cases as well, this would have been true. Others thought that here ribâ (anology) must be applied, and that ribâ must be regarded as forbidden even in cases where there is no trade. Those who rejected the giyâs accused their opponents of misrepresenting and derogating from the laws of Allah by following their own fallible human "insight" (re'râ). The enemies of Abu Hanîfah, e.g., thus established the fiqh-rules solely on the basis of re'râ and giyâs, and with neglecting the study of the tradition. 'Iblis' (Satan), they said, was the first who had been guilty of such arbitrary arguments. An appeal was made to the Prophet, and it was maintained that he himself had already expressly forbidden the giyâs and all such kinds of reasoning. Still, the giyâs was in the end generally recognized as a general fiqh which all communities generally recognize. As a matter of fact, it had never been possible to exclude analogy, and even those who had most prided themselves on keeping exclusively to the literal sense of the texts, such as the Zâhirites, had been themselves compelled, in many cases, to draw conclusions from the holy texts by means of argument (they then used to maintain that their conclusion was already included in [nayâhim] the text, and, therefore, had not to be deduced from it by means of argument.

There are some special methods of argument which have not found general favour among orthodox fiqhis, viz. the isti'dâlah (lit. the introduction of some other examples), the Umarîs and Abu Hanîfah and his school, and a similar method of reasoning of the Zâhirites. The isti'dâlah (lit. judgment that something is otherwise for general good). Both methods had apparently as their object the establishment of fiqh-rules by the abandonment of analogy, thus departing from the regulations of the holy texts. Both Abu Hanîfah and Malik thought this sometimes necessary, if holding fast to the letter of the law gave rise in exceptional cases to injustice, or was even quite impossible. But most fiqhis rejected these isti'dâlah and istâlîlah, and thought none qualified to depart in so arbitrary a manner from the usual rules, even though it might appear to be for the general good. Another method which was not generally favoured was the isti'dâlah (lit. "seek connexion with"), which was especially practised by al-Shafi'i, and with certain restrictions also by Abu Hanîfah. This isti'dâlah meant that a doubtful situation was connected with a previous positive circumstances, and that the regulations of the holy texts of the latter case were regarded as applicable in the former case. Such a position of doubt may arise if any one remains absent so long that his existence becomes uncertain. The Hanîfîs apply the isti'dâlah only when the question arises of the retention of rights which have been already obtained. But they do so even with regard to the acquisition of new rights. If, e.g., any one dies after the existence of his blood-relation has become uncertain, then, according to the Hanîfîs, the latter has no right to his estate, but the Shafi'ites do not recognize this limitation, and, according to them, the usual rules of inheritance obtain in such a case. Just as the existence of the absent party was certain.

1 C. L. Goldscheider, Die Zähiriten, p. 411.
3 For isti'dâlah, istâlîlah, and isti'dab of L. Goldscheider, "Das Prinzip des isti'dâlah in der musul. Gesetzeswissenschaft", in WZG, L (1887), 255-256.

Fundamental departures from the doctrine of the four fiqh-schools are not found even among the Shi'ites and other heretical sects. Although each of these sects has its own double meaning of fiqh, and this differs in many points from the opinions of the orthodox schools, the points of difference are generally limited to the same kind of details as those on which even the four orthodox fiqh-schools differ. The controversy which induced the heretical parties in Islam was not concerned with the fiqh, but rather with questions of the faith (kalâm [q.v.]) and with the political question who should be the legal ruler of the Muslim community as the direct successor of the Prophet.

Originally each faqi of any importance could consider himself qualified to deduce the fiqh from the Qur'an and tradition, but after the rise of the fiqh-schools independent criticism of the sacred texts gradually ceased, and it became more and more usual to join the madkhâl which was locally recognized as authoritative.

Nevertheless, for a long time some very learned faqihs maintained their own judgment on matters of fiqh. In the 3rd cent. there arose some more or less independent madkhâl; and several schisms and heretical sects developed in general with the opinions of an already established school, still considered themselves qualified to deduce fiqh-rules, and to claim a secondary importance from the views of its founder. Abu Yâsif and Muhammad ibn Hami as-Shadrî, e.g., who belonged to the followers of Abu Hanîfah, had a madkhâl which was independent of the shi'as. Even al-Mukâbî and ibn al-Muqâwîd in the All might be regarded as independent and as establishing the fiqh-rules solely on the basis of re'râ and giyâs, and with neglecting the study of the tradition. 'Iblis' (Satan), they said, was the first who had been guilty of such arbitrary arguments. An appeal was made to the Prophet, and it was maintained that he himself had already expressly forbidden the giyâs and all such kinds of reasoning. Still, the giyâs was in the end generally recognized as a general fiqh which all communities generally recognize. As a matter of fact, it had never been possible to exclude analogy, and even those who had most prided themselves on keeping exclusively to the literal sense of the texts, such as the Zâhirites, had been themselves compelled, in many cases, to draw conclusions from the holy texts by means of argument (they then used to maintain that their conclusion was already included in [nayâhim] the text, and, therefore, had not to be deduced from it by means of argument).

Later it became the general conviction in the orthodox Muslim world that scholars as well as laymen were bound to tashîh (lit. 'to invest with authority,' i.e. to acknowledge that the rules of the fiqh had already been established in an authoritative manner). Such a conviction was based on the assumption that the rules of a fiqh-school had binding authority, was called mutâlîlah (i.e. one who held others in authority). The earlier scholars, on the contrary, who had themselves deduced the fiqh from the holy texts, were afterwards called mujtâhid (lit. 'people who had toiled strenuously'), and the search for the true sense of the sources to which they had applied themselves was called tâjîh (i.e. lit. 'to be zealous and take trouble,' here in the special sense of 'exercising themselves in order to determine the rules of the fiqh').

Muslim writers generally distinguish three kinds of mujtâhid, because they think that not every one may submit himself to the absolute rule of independent judgment on matters of the fiqh: (1) 'Till the third century after the death of the Prophet, no one was permitted to be a mujtâhid (i.e. judgment that something is otherwise for general good). Both methods had apparently as their object the establishment of fiqh-rules by the abandonment of analogy, thus departing from the regulations of the holy texts. Both Abu Hanîfah and Malik thought this sometimes necessary, if holding fast to the letter of the law gave rise in exceptional cases to injustice, or was even quite impossible. But most fiqhis rejected these isti'dâlah and istâlîlah, and thought none qualified to depart in so arbitrary a manner from the usual rules, even though it might appear to be for the general good. Another method which was not generally favoured was the isti'dâlah (lit. "seek connexion with"), which was especially practised by al-Shafi'i, and with certain restrictions also by Abu Hanîfah. This isti'dâlah meant that a doubtful situation was connected with a previous positive circumstances, and that the regulations of the holy texts of the latter case were regarded as applicable in the former case. Such a position of doubt may arise if any one remains absent so long that his existence becomes uncertain. The Hanîfîs apply the isti'dâlah only when the question arises of the retention of rights which have been already obtained. But they do so even with regard to the acquisition of new rights. If, e.g., any one dies after the existence of his blood-relation has become uncertain, then, according to the Hanîfîs, the latter has no right to his estate, but the Shafi'ites do not recognize this limitation, and, according to them, the usual rules of inheritance obtain in such a case. Just as the existence of the absent party was certain.

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consider themselves still constantly bound by the duty of independent study of the sacred texts. Among the Shi'ites also ṣafātibīs are still found who are qualified to judge in matters of religion on their own authority.

Every orthodox Muslim is, therefore, bound by the regulations of his fiqh-school, and the fiqh-books have become the law-books for later generations. The collections of this tradition are, it is true, always held in high honour as holy texts, but it is not possible to know what doctrine may be deduced from these sacred sources except by means of the fiqh-books. The fiqh-books are still studied in all Muslim lands. In later times Mecca has, in a special degree, become the centre of the study of the fiqh, and in the great mosque of Mecca instruction in the fiqh according to the method of the Middle Ages, is given almost uninterruptedly by various scholars.

The great majority of Muslims cannot consult the fiqh-books for themselves, and must, therefore, use the explanation of a fiqh, who is qualified to give a fatwā, when they wish to know what the law prescribes in cases which are not of daily occurrence. A fatwā is a professional opinion on fiqh-matters, generally orally given and without formal question and answer. A scholar who gives such a fatwā is in consequence called muftī, and any one who is recognized as a competent fiqhi, so that his legal advice is asked when occasion arises, may be regarded as a muftī. Besides this, there are in Muslim lands official muftīs paid by the Government to advise the public, and, when necessary, also the Government itself, as to the law. In some places, where adherents of different fiqh-schools live, the Government even appoints a separate muftī for each madhhab. The contents of the fatwās are obtained from the fiqh-books, since the muftīs, like all other scholars, are only maqāsidīs. Sometimes, among the questions submitted to a muftī, are found situations which are new in Muslim society, and subjects which have become important for the Muslims only under the later influence of Western civilization; in each case the muftī must decide how the old rules are to be applied in the changed circumstances. In the fiqh-books of later date consideration is given, so far as is necessary, to the fatwās which relate to the general conception of orthodox Muslims nowadays. It is the doctrine of each of the four fiqh-schools which represents a correct view of the canon law. At first the scholars disputed hotly on the fiqh, and their adherents often showed signs of great intolerance. For a long time bitter animosity existed between the teachers in the holy towns in Arabia and the ṣafātīs in the conquered territory (especially in Iraq). Those who lived at Mecca and Medina would have liked to keep the monopoly of the sacred sciences in their own hands. They tried in every possible way to throw ridicule and suspicion on their rivals, who were frequently not even of pure Arabian descent (Arabic: Ḥaram). Party leaders deluged each other with a flood of abusive phrases. Although the majority of the people were not entirely acquainted with the details of the problem of scholarship, nevertheless, in places where the followers of different schools came into contact with each other, collisions sometimes resulted between which gave rise to street fights and mutual persecution.

In spite of this, the question concerning the fiqh did not cease to be of importance in Islam. On the contrary, the conviction gradually arose in orthodox circles that the difference of opinion between the fiqh-schools must be regarded not as a misfortune, but rather as a situation willed by God. It is, they thought, apparently possible and permissible to hold different opinions as to various fiqh-rules of secondary importance. Thus, if one school cherished a less rigorous opinion concerning a command or prohibition than the other schools, it was proper for the faithful to regard this as in some degree a blessing, since the less rigorous opinion could apparently also be defended with good reason. A tradition says that the Prophet himself declared: 'The difference of opinion in my community is a proof of God's mercy.'

Each Muslim has to give the preference to the observance of the regulations of his fiqh-school, and only the Shāfīīs have an appeal made to the divergent doctrine of another madhhab. This appeal is also called taqfīl (in this case the recognition that the rules of another school are authoritative on a special point), and is held permissible under certain conditions for laymen.

The following is an example. According to the Shāfīīs, children under age are able to give marriage only by their father or grandfather. In Acheb, where the Shāfīī fiqh-school is usually followed, it was the custom to allow children to remarry their first wife even when only under age. If it happens that the father or grandfather of children under age are dead, the difficulty is solved by means of taqfīl, appealing to the Hanafis, who declare that even distant blood-relations are also competent to give children marriage during their minority.

Passing from one madhhab to another is not always approved of. There are Turkish scholars who permit those who follow the Shāfīīs or another madhhab to become Ḥanafis, but forbid Ḥanafis to go over to another madhhab. Each of these transference to another madhhab is scarcely ever found except when there is some exceptional reason for it—e.g., when any one leaves his native country and wishes to live in a country in which the majority of the inhabitants belong to another fiqh-school. In places such as Mecca, where the adherents of the different fiqh-schools constantly come in contact with each other, transference to another madhhab is found, if, e.g., a man and woman who belong to different fiqh-schools wish to marry.

3. The 'uṣūl al-fiqh (i.e., the sources or foundations of the fiqh).—The fiqh is based on four invariable foundations: (1) Ḍā'irat al-ʿulūm; (2) the words and deeds of the Prophet—ṣunnat al-nabi; (3) the general agreement of feeling among orthodox scholars—ijma'; and (4) the analogy—qiyas. Each of these foundations supplies a guarantee that the doctrine of the fiqh-schools is really in agreement with the will of Allah. They are called the 'uṣūl al-ḥukm (lit. 'roots of the fiqh'). The name fatwā (branches) is used to designate the rules of the fiqh based on these 'uṣūl.

(1) The Qur'ān.—As has been stated above, the qiyas was originally not generally recognized as a permissible foundation of establishing the fiqh, nor had the invariable qiyas been recognized from the beginning. But none could contest the authority of the Qur'ān, which, accord-


2 For the fatwās and their contents, which are often important, see C. Snoonck Hurgonje, Mecca, ii. 335, 340, also Ehe achar. Beleg vom heutigen Säkularhandel in Singapour, in ZDMG 1898. 241ff.; listed in the veiling in Steinschen, recht, in Tiefébruck, Batavische Genootsch. xxxxi. (1897), 171 ff., and in Islam und Photographie, 2d. Aus., (1900), 283-287; i. Godzic, etc., in The Fard in der Fud. Rezpon, zettlerud und in den muh. Felsis, in ZDMG III. (1889) 256 ff.
ing to Muslim opinion, contained Allah's own words, was never allowed by any doubt that Muhammad had accurately delivered God's word. According to tradition, the Prophet had, with the help of the scribe Gabriel, repeatedly collated the sacred text with the original preserved in heaven, and thus been regarded as a completely trustworthy source of Allah's will. It is said that this text never once appeared to contradict another, but generally appeared possible to give an interpretation of the contradictory texts which brought them into harmony; and, if this was not possible, it was assumed that the one verse of the Quran was cancelled by the other.

(2) The sunnah.—From the very beginning the sunnah of the Prophet passed in general as a guide for all Muslims. But Muhammad was not regarded by his contemporaries as infallible. He was often subjected to severe opposition, even from his most loyal adherents, and, indeed, did himself make any claim to infallibility. On the contrary, he often took pains to declare expressly that he was only a fallible man like every one else; he could achieve only one miracle which none else could accomplish—the communication of Allah's will. After the death of the Prophet, also, it occasionally happened that customs which he had expressly permitted to his followers, or which were regarded as such, were given up and regarded as contrary to the true spirit of Islamic religion. The mu'ah marriage is an example. According to several traditions, the Prophet himself married ten women, but only for temporary marriages—e.g., on the occasion of expeditions. For this purpose, a man gave his women a certain sum of money or merchandise to be given to a woman, and a marriage was contracted with her for a defined period, after the expiration of which the marriage was again dissolved. It is known that the Prophet himself withdrew his permission. Orthodox Muslims regard mu'ah marriages as forbidden; the Shi'ites still continue to regard them as permissible.

But later Muslims began to idealize the Prophet. They could not admit that he had been subject to mistakes and weaknesses just like other men, and that any donis existed on this point. It was necessary to have full security that men were not following an erroneous line when they accepted the sunnah of the Prophet. An attempt was made to find proofs for the infallibility of the Prophet, and it was thought that this could be discovered in many verses of the Qur'an—e.g., in those in which God enjoins obedience not only to Himself, but also to Muhammad, His Apostle. There was also a tradition which made the Prophet declare expressly: "My community shall not err when they hold fast in everything to Allah's book and to my sunnah." According to Muslim theory, the sunnah of the Prophet consists of three elements: (1) his gha'ib (decisions); (2) his fi'l (manner of conduct); and (3) his subūt or tağrīr (tacit approval of the deeds and words of others).

generally behaviour according to the sunnah of the Prophet is as indispensable a duty for a Muslim as obedience to the regulations of the Qur'an. The only exception to the general rule is formed by those cases in which God had permitted exceptional freedom to His messenger—e.g., Muhammad had more than the number of wives permitted by the law, and in such exceptional cases was literally regarded as forbidden to follow the example of the Prophet. Some European writers have erroneously assumed that the sunnah prescribes a life having power in the same degree as a command in the Qur'an. On the contrary, Muslim scholars even assume that some regulations of the Qur'an are altered or cancelled by later decisions of the Prophet which contradict them. In the Qur'an, ii, 176, e.g., it is ordained that legacies may always be left to parents and near blood-relations; but this rule is regarded as cancelled, because, later on, according to tradition, after the regulation of inheritance was altered. Muhammad is said: "No will may be made for the benefit of heirs whose share in the estate is fixed." Although the Qur'an, xxiv, 2, e.g., forbids usury, only usurers are mentioned as the punishment for fornication; all others who commit fornication are sentenced, according to the sunnah. Muhammad saw, in no case the same treated with death. This last punishment is based solely on the sunnah of the Prophet, which in this case has altered the law of the regulation of inheritance.

(3) The ijma. — By the time that a firm conviction had been formed in the schools as to the main rules of the faith, the Koran began to be regarded as a new argument for the interpretation of the word. The doctrine was declared to be impossible that rules as to which all fuṣūls had the same opinion could be based on error, and thus the ijma ("general agreement on opinion") of the schools became an incontrovertible proof of the correctness of their views. There could, so men thought, no longer be any doubt, even as to subjects on which there was originally a difference of opinion, so soon as all the scholars were agreed on them. The validity of the ijma must for the future be reverenced by every one as the truth.

The doctrine of the infallibility of the ijma' at first met with much opposition. Many refused to concede binding authority in religious matters to the opinions of fallible men, even when they were in agreement in their judgment. Nevertheless a tradition arose later, according to which the Prophet is said to have declared: "My people shall never be unanimity in error." It was also thought possible to find arguments for this opinion in some verses of the quran. In iv, 115, e.g., punishment is threatened on those who separate themselves from the Prophet and do not follow the way of the sufis, and, in ii, 186, it is said, was obviously nothing else than that for which unanimity had been made indispensable in error. Later on, Malik ibn Anas laid special stress on the rule that the ijma of the scholars is opinion of the scholars of Medina. In that holy city, he thought, the ijma of the scholars of Medina had been preserved in its purest form. Thus, when all the scholars in the city of Medina were agreed in their opinion, this could not be erroneous. Others applied the same reasoning to the scholars in both the holy towns—Medina and Mecca. In the end, however, consideration was given to also the fuṣūls in other places. There was no sufficient reason for limiting the authority of the ijma' exclusively to the opinion of the sunnah and the scholars in the holy cities. Thus the ijma' came to mean in Islam the agreement of all the scholars who could be regarded as competent to judge in matters of religion.

The ijma' must be regarded as the most important of the usul. It became the end of the basis for the whole doctrine of Islam. It gave Muslims security also that the fiqh was correctly derived from the sacred texts. It is true that, with regard to many details of the religious laws, there remained a difference of opinion between the four fiqh schools; but, as has already been noticed, all orthodox Muslims came later to recognize that as to these questions, different opinions were possible. It was agreed that the doctrine of each of the four madhahib gave a correct view of the canon law, and, in consequence, it was possible to say that the ijma' itself had sanctioned even those regulations as to which the four fiqh schools cherished different opinions. Moreover, everything which afterwards, under changed circumstances, became a rule was held to be justified when all were agreed about it. Customs and doctrines cannot be heresies for the true Muslim, provided that all orthodox fuṣūls sanction them, even if they are not based on the Qur'an or the sunnah. Those who do not observe customs sanctioned by the ijma', such as the Walīhātes, are regarded by the orthodox Muslim as heretics.

(4) The qiyas. — Of the different kinds of argument according to which some rules of the fiqh were established only later, the qiyas was regarded as a fourth infallible foundation for the fiqh. The other methods, such as istihsān, istiṣbāḥ, and istiṣbah, were not approved by the majority of Muslim scholars.

1 On the so-called ma'ūfah see G. A. Wilken, Das Mutterrecht (das Mutterrecht) bei den alten Arabern, Leipzig, 1884, pp. 9-16; and J. Weihenried, "Die Ehe bei den Arabern," in GGN, 1890, p. 404 ff.
To prove that the fjih might really be based on analogy, an appeal was made to various texts of the Qu’ran and tradition. Among these, the Prophet had instructed the Meccans to call their governor Muhammad, his governor of Yaman, to keep in general to the Qu’ran and the Sunnah, but, in cases in which this was not possible, to behave according to the analogy of these sacred texts. Since, later on, all orthodox scholars were agreed that Al-Wahabi and other doubts on the point were possible. Thus, for later generations in the orthodox Muslim world, the command that the Qu’ran is a fourth infallible foundation of the fjih is based on sunnah.

Some orthodox scholars were of opinion that the general command to flee to the Qu’ran and the Sunnah should also be regarded as a basis for the fjih. As a matter of fact, many faṣūla, from ancient times, had been careful, in every case of using the Qu’ran, to, take into consideration the general customs of Muslims; but it has never become a rule to regard the sunnah as a fifth infallible foundation of the Sunnah.

Muslim writers have written extensive works about the sunnah, faṣūla, which treat of the different methods by means of which the rules of the Sunnah may be established. Most faṣūla make no special study of this science, but content themselves with the conclusion or statements to the sunnah which may be found in the Sunnah.

4. Summary of the contents of Muslim canon law.—The chief regulations of Muslim canon law may be divided into two classes—(1) those regarding religious worship and ritual duties; and (2) those regarding civil, penal, and public law.

The regulations belonging to the first class deal in the main with the ritual actions by which Allah is to be worshipped. They are (i.) the ṣalāt (the ritual prayer, mainly consisting of prostrations, praises of the Creator, etc.); (ii.) the ṣāḥiḥ (the ritual purification, which must be performed spatially before the salāt is performed, but which is also required in other cases in which a believer must be in a ritually pure condition); (iii.) the zakāt (originally almsgiving, which was afterwards ordered by definite rules and became a kind of religious tax); (iv.) the ḍhund (fasting, especially in the month of Ramaḍān); and (v.) the ḥaḍj (the annual pilgrimage to Mecca).

These five ‘ṭābi’ are always treated in the first five chapters of the Sunnah-books, according to the usual division of these works which has obtained since ancient times. They belong at the same time to the ‘pillars’ of Islam, i.e., to the principal duties of a Muslim. Originally also the jihād (the ‘sacred war’ against unbelievers) was regarded by many Muslims as a ‘pillar’ of Islam. This opinion is still held by the Ḳairijjites, who are, however, regarded as heretics. According to orthodox Sunna, the Ḳairijjites, and the muḥaḍarah (the ‘pillars’ of Islam). One of these is the salāt, including the ṣāḥiḥ connected with it. The zakāt, the ḍhund, and fasting belong also to them, and the fifth ‘pillar’ is the confession of faith (shahādah), consisting of the well-known ‘two words’: ‘I confess that there is no god but Allah, and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.’ For it is repertory tradition that the Prophet said: ‘Islam is built on five (or otherwise referred to as the shahādah, the salāt, the zakāt, the ḍhund, and fasting in the month of Ramaḍān.’

The subjects connected with the belief in Allah are so numerous and the controvertibles of manifest heresies on this point cause in time to extend so far, that the doctrine regarding the first ‘pillar’ (the šahih) developed into a separate branch of science, the ʿilm al-taṣawwuf or ʿilm al-bidʿah (knowledge of the unity of God or doctrine of faith). In the Sunnah-books only the four other pillars are discussed. In connection with the daily salāt, the Sunnah-books also deal with the whole worship in the mosque, the service on Friday and on the two ‘fils’ (i.e., the two ‘fils’ on the tenth of the last month, Dār-ul-Qisas, and the ‘fils’ from on the first of the last month), Salat. Subsequently, the ritual purity of persons and objects, the ritual slaughter, the lawful food and drink, etc. These regulations are by various others—e.g., concerning the prohibition of blood of living beings, of supernaturally luxurious (the use of gold and silver dishes, the wearing of silk clothes by men, etc.), the games and pleasures connected with it, the use of permissible and forbidden music. The Sunnah-books deal with some of those regulations in the chapter on the ṣawāmah (the religious meal at the marriage-feast and on other occasions) and, if any of the rules mentioned in this, the Sunnah-books infringe, the religious character of this meal is lost.

The regulations of the second division chiefly concern marriage, divorce, relationship and the rights and duties connected with them, inheritance, and slaves and freedmen; also contracts (sale, hire, partnership, commission, etc.), wills, the obtaining of property and other rights, the prohibition of taking interest (Muslim law regards this as ‘maur’); oaths and vows and all connected with them; testamentary dispositions and testamentary disposition (dispositions by which certain goods are withdrawn from trade in order to be reserved for definite religious aims or for a special number of persons); further, the right of retaliation and the redemption of it by payment of a ransom; legal procedure, and the law of evidence; finally, the duty of believers to take part in the jihād, the rights and duties of the ruler, the protection of the lands, and the appointment of an umāmah (chief of the Muslim community), his rights and duties. It is not the aim all of the regulations of the law to give absolute commands or prohibitions; in many cases it is qiyās; the meaning is beyond doubt; and the Sunnah to that which, in case of doubt, is obligatory only according to the most probable view. Duties to be observed by every Muslim individually are called fard al-muḥsin (or fard’ ala’ ʿain); duties to be observed by a certain number of Muslims collectively are called fard al-kifayah (or fard’ ala’ kifayah)—e.g., the daily salāt in the mosque and the sacred war against unbelievers. (i) A deed may be obligatory (waṣūf, ‘necessary,’ or fard, ‘prescribed’). Only the Ḳairijjites recognize a difference between waṣūf and fard. They apply the term fard to all that is prescribed by the Qu’ran or by the tradition, if the meaning is beyond doubt; and waṣūf to that which, in case of doubt, is obligatory only according to the most probable view. Duties to be observed by every Muslim individually are called fard al-muḥsin (or fard’ ala’ ʿain); duties to be observed by a certain number of Muslims collectively are called fard al-kifayah (or fard’ ala’ kifayah)—e.g., the daily salāt in the mosque and the sacred war against unbelievers. (ii) A deed may be recommendable or meritorious (ṣunnah). A Muslim will be rewarded if he observes these regulations, but he will not be punished if he neglects them.

It has been supposed by some scholars that the actions belonging to this class were called sunnah as being derived from the sunnah of the Prophet. But this is incorrect. It is indifferent for what reason an action is recommended in canon law. Muslim jurists of one fjih-school sometimes call a deed sunnah, in order not to disagree wholly with the doctrine of another sect, which calls the same deed obligatory. A deed may also be sunnah because it was recommended in a verse of the Qu’ran; on the other hand, the imitation of a deed of the Prophet is often ‘obligatory.’ Other words that are used in the same sense as sunnah are mubāṣbāṣ (‘desirable’), and mubāṣbāṣ (‘commended’). An ‘invalid’ action is a deed which is not called fard.

Notwithstanding the great lack of knowledge and the negligence of most Muslims, in all Sunnahman ships, in all parts of the Arabian peninsula which deals with religious duties and with the justice of men, the Sunnah is less faithfully observed. According to the popular conscience, some actions are even regarded as
II. MARRIAGE, KINSHIP, LAW OF INHERITANCE, SLAVES — 5. Marriage. — (a) The marriage contract. — In ancient times in Arabia the husband used to buy his wife from her nearest kinsman (se'f, *nearest*). He could give her in marriage to whom he liked, and he received the dowry, which was regarded as a kind of sale. Therefore this sale price the bridegroom became the owner of the bride. In some Arabic Bedawin tribes we find these customs even at the present time, with very little modification.

In some parts of Arabia, however, the original form of marriage by sale and the patriarchal family customs connected with it were already so far modified in the time of Muhammad that it was customary to pay the bridegroom the price of her marriage. It is regarded as objectionable if her wife desired to keep this gift wholly or partly for herself. So, according to the Qur'an (e.g. iv. 28), the Muslims had to regard the dowry as a reward for the wife, and no one was allowed to withhold it. It seems, however, that the nearest kinsman in Muslim's days was entitled to give a girl in marriage to whom he liked, even against her will. As several women complained of this to the Prophet, he is said to have issued a decree that in future in ordinary cases every wife must ask the agreement of the bride to her marriage.

No marriage is valid without being preceded by the making of the marriage contract (al-nikah). Even at the present day, the wife usually is the only person entitled to make this marriage contract with the bridegroom.

The Hāfitites allow a woman to make the marriage contract herself, or to appoint someone else to do so in her name, if she is of age and is not under guardianship. The Shafi'i, on the other hand, hold that neither a minor woman nor even a woman of full age is entitled to do this; only her wife has the right to marry her to any one; but she is at the same time generally bound to give his co-operation if she desires it of him. Malikites, like the Hāfitites, consider that the woman who is of age is entitled to make her own marriage contract, unless she belongs to a distinguished family, or, in consequence of her beauty or other qualities, is an exceptionally desirable match; in the latter case she is to be united in marriage only through her wife. The only case in which the wife has the right to oppose a marriage is when the woman desires to marry a man who is not her 'equal' (Abū Hanīfah also allowed him his right if he is the 'equal' of the wife). No emancipated slaves can be considered as the 'equal' of a freewoman, any more than a *fiqhi* is that of a woman who is 'add. On the other hand, it is

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2 *Ib. ii. 270 ff.*
3 *Ib. ii. 305 ff.*
4 *Ib. ii. 305 ff.*
5 *Ib. ii. 305 ff.*
6 *Ib. ii. 305 ff.*
7 *Cf. C. Slocum Hurd, 'Le Droit musulman,' in *RHR* xxxvi.
8 *Cf. C. Slocum Hurd, 'Le Droit musulman,' in *RHR* lix.
9 *C. Slocum Hurd, *La Religion des Arabes.*
10 *C. Slocum Hurd, 'La Droit musulman,' in *RHR* lix.*
13 *C. Slocum Hurd, *La Religion des Arabes.*
14 Everybody that is not *add* is called *fiqhi*. When a person is *add* he is not bound to marry even if the woman is not *add* and that he does not usually infringe the less important regulations of canon law. Even although he has infringed these less important regulations, it is a person still not to be considered as the greater part of his other religious duties devoutly. This stone
wholly indifferent for this purpose whether the bridgroom is equal in wealth to the father of the bride or not. In matters of bridgroomship also, according to the or profession of the bridgroom, but exclusively by his conduct and faith. As a rule, the various regulations of canon law concerning the kaf`ah are of no practical importance for the present-day Muslims. Marriages which would be considered "illégitime" by the law of the land are very often considered by the wife and her relatives as legitimate. An example of this rule is made by the ayyadu or sharjah, the descendants of the Prophet, who in some countries (e.g., the Dutch Indies) refuse to marry their daughters to men who are not related to them by blood in order to avoid their dishonour.

The various religious schools differ as to the cases in which the wali has still in Islam the right of making a marriage contract without the permission of the parties.

The Shi`ites hold that the wali as a rule has no right to give the bride in marriage without her permission. A minor girl, therefore, cannot be given in marriage by her wali, for she is not able to give a valid permission. According to the Shi`ites, only the father or, failing him, the paternal grandfather is entitled to compel his daughter (or granddaughter) to a marriage, if she is still a virgin, whether she be a minor or of age. For this reason they call the father and the grandfather wali maqbul (i.e., 'accepting' or 'deciding'). Nevertheless the doctrine even of the Shi`ites always regarded it as commendable (ta'mualah) that the three conditions of the wali are required. In other religious schools these questions are partly decided in another way.

The wali must be not only the 'nearest' kinsman, but also an adult and a free Muslim in full possession of his intellectual powers and (at least according to the Majority school) not a minor. If he does not satisfy these conditions, his right passes to the next kinsman. If none of the persons just mentioned is qualified to become wali, or if there is no kinsman, or the kinsman is under the age of puberty, he must be a proper person who by the law of Islam is allowed to marry, which is not the case of a minor under the age of puberty. In the latter case the Hamb dryer person there is entitled to demand marriage (hakim) of the bride when they come of age.

According to the Hamb dryer, wali of full age cannot be compelled to marry by any person. According to the Majority school, however, the wali may be compelled only by their father (not by the grandfather), and at that time the wali should make the marriage (hakim) of the bride when they come of age. According to the Hamb dryer, females of full age cannot be compelled to marry by any person. According to the Minority school, however, the wali may be compelled only by their father (not by the grandfather), and at that time the wali should make the marriage (hakim) of the bride when they come of age. In such a case the wali has no wali, the hakim is regarded as the wali of the bride. According to Qadi, the Prophet said: 'The hakim is called wali of her who has no wali.' The figh books do not indicate which of the hakim is the hakim of the hakim. In many Muslim countries in this case the marriage contract is made by the Qadi. If the Qadi is not residing in the place where the marriage is to be contracted, the bride and bridgroom are allowed to hand over this function to some proper person. Such a man is called hakim (which is also the title of an arbiter in a lawsuit). Parties are entitled to choose another person as hakim even if the hakim is living in the place, but in this case the hakim who is chosen is allowed to act as a substitute for the hakim. The hakim only if the hakim satisfies the conditions of the wali in all respects. If he does not satisfy these conditions, the hakim is entitled to take the place of the wali. The hakim is not generally represented by a wali in the making of a marriage contract—he does it himself. The contract is made by his wali only if his wali is under the age of puberty as a minor. According to the Hamb dryer, boys under age can be married only by their wali maqbul (their father or paternal grandfather), for they are supposed to be able to assume responsibility for the marriage. The Hamb dryer and the Majority school, however, allow other relatives also to do this, for his small sins. But, if he confesses heretic opinions, he cannot be a wali maqbul. The opinions of the different religious schools agree as to the order in which the kinsmen of the bride are entitled to be regarded as wali (Muhammadan ed. 870) (3).

If the bridgroom lives under guardianship for other reasons (e.g., he is still a minor), he cannot be married only by the mediation of his guardian. By the marriage contract the wali or other representative of the bride declares her to be given in marriage to the bridgroom (this declaration is called jibab, 'the offer'); and the bridgroom declares that he takes her as his wife (this declaration is called qabul, 'acceptance'), and that he will pay a certain sum as dowry. Jibab and qabul must follow each other immediately, as in all other contracts.

According to the Shi`ites, in the making of the marriage contract the parties are not allowed to make the legal rights and duties of married couples. Either husband or wife, indeed, is allowed to rescind later on the rights to which they are entitled by the law, but it is not permitted to bind oneself to this beforehand; e.g., if the man bound himself beforehand not to marry a second wife, or if the wife renounced her right of being supported by her husband, then these conditions would be null and void. In this case the marriage contract remains valid, unless conditions were made which would be contrary to the aim of the marriage (i.e., not to have children); in that case both the condition and the marriage are considered void. In other religious schools these questions are partly decided in another way.

According to the Hamb dryer, the wali of the bride is called wali maqbul (i.e., 'accepting' or 'deciding'). This declaration is made in Arabic, and must satisfy God, the Prophet, give piety (sadaqah), and be made in the presence of trustworthy witnesses, who must satisfy certain demands of the law. In the Hamb dryer, only demand that the marriage shall not be nullified (thereby over-definite anil). Assistance of a clergyman is not required in Islam for the making of a marriage contract, but usually the aid of a person who has a special knowledge of the regulations concerning marriage is invoked. Only in this way do Muslims feel that the marriage is guaranteed not to be null and void. Thus we find in Egypt and all other Muslim countries persons who make a profession of assisting marriage, and who make contracts. In different countries these men are called by various names (e.g., mu`nawak in Mecca). Sometimes such a person dictates to the parties the words that are to be pronounced by them, but in most cases he appears exclusively as a representative (wali maqbul) of the wali of the bride. Then he need only dictate to the bridgroom the required formula. If the bridgroom and the wali of the bride possess a sufficient knowledge of the regulations of the canon law, they may make the marriage contract themselves without the assistance of a professional officiant.

In the art. Wusul (Muslim) the religious ceremonies connected with marriage will be dealt with, such as the usul (i.e., the marriage law, which originally was probably a sacramental meal).

It remains to mention only that bride and bridgroom are not allowed to contract a marriage if they are not in accordance with the law, i.e., the state of religious consecration and abstinence which the law makes obligatory for those joining in the yearly pilgrimage (hajj). (6) The dowry.—The dowry given by the bridgroom to the bride has still its old Arabic name mahr (cf. Heb. spher). By this word was originally meant the price which was paid to the wali of the bride. Another name for the dowry is sadaq. Because of the general meaning of the Arab verb sadaqa and its derivatives, we may assume that the sadaq was originally the amount paid by the bridgroom as a guarantee of his trustworthiness, and held by the wali of the bride if the bridgroom broke his promise. Later on no distinction was made between mahr and sadaq, and Muslim scholars generally regard these words as synonymous in every respect.

It is expressly stated that the fixing of the amount of the present to the bride is left to the discretion of the parties as to the amount of the mahr. (2) It is expressly stated that the fixing of the amount of the present to the bride is left to the discretion of the parties as to the amount of the mahr.
pleasure of the bridegroom. (3) A fixed sum is mentioned. In the first case a bridegroom is obliged to give his bride a mahar al-mithli, i.e. a dowry suitable to her position and also dependent on her descent, age, intelligence, beauty, and other qualities of the bride, for which she may be reckoned as a more or less desirable match. The agreement by which the mahar is expressly left to the pleasure of the bridegroom calls for "leaves over to somebody". The gift of the bride can leave the fixing of the amount of the dowry to the bridegroom only if the bride has expressly empowered him to do so, and she must do this only if she is of age and has the free disposal of her fortune. In the third case the amount of the dowry is precisely stated in the contract. Then the dowry is called mahar musammam.

According to the Shafi'ites, it is sufficient to fix the amount of the dowry in this way, the parties not being bound by legal regulations concerning the amount, except that it is necessary that the amount of dowry desired by the wife should not exceed the amount of the dowry to be at least equal to a mahar al-mithli. The Hanafites and Malikites hold that the dowry must always represent a certain minimum in money or its equivalent, however, as to the exact amount of this minimum. The Hanafites say that it is not allowed to give the bride the ulam-din or 10 silver dirhams. The Malikites hold that the minimum is one quarter of a golden dinar or 3 silver dirhams (cf. the same difference between these two schools of law concerning dowry). The question is discussed at length in various works on Matrimony and Marriage (Muhammadan), § 30.

It is obligatory for all the parties to pay the dowry at the time when the marriage contract is made. Usually only a portion (e.g., the half of the mahar) is paid before the marriage; but the customs vary in different lands. The remainder is paid later in case of divorce or separation of the couple. According to the Shafi'ites, it is usual to pay to the bride before the marriage two-thirds or at least half of the dowry.

This is because the halal is only a part of the dowry before the marriage probably dates back to the pre-Islamic period. We may assume that the original purpose was to prevent the loss of all connection between the wife and her family. In many countries, in which the custom of buying a wife exists, if she is ill-treated by her husband, the relatives of the wife do not lose the right to protect her until the full dowry is paid.

The bridegroom is now paying only half the dowry to the bride as damages in case of breach of the marriage contract by afterwards refusing to take her as his wife. If the amount of the dowry was due from the bridegroom by reason of his marriage to another woman, he is obliged, according to the Shafi'ites and the Hanafites, to give a "purchased" wife or child to the rejected woman. The present is called musta'na because of the name given to this compensation in Qur'an, ii, 297-300 and 237-238. The Malikites also hold that the nullity of the contract is not obligatory, but they regard it as sunna for the bridegroom.

(c) The lawful obstacles to marriage.

The principal circumstances which can prevent the conclusion of a marriage are the following five.

(1) An already existing marriage. A free Muslim may not contract a new marriage so long as he has already four wives; a woman may be married to only one man at once. Polygamy is permitted in Islam only within these limits; it existed in Arabia from antiquity and was not done away with by the Prophet. In Qur'an, iv, 3, in which believers who had embezzled the property of orphans entrusted to them are enjoined to live in a simple manner, the following words are found:

'If ye fear that ye will be unable to give the orphans what is theirs, marry so many wives as is good for you—two, three, or four; if ye fear (in spite of that) that ye will be unable to act justly, marry only one wife or take slaves: that is better, that ye may not act unjustly.'

These words were interpreted by the later Muslim faqih in the sense that no Muslim may possess more than four wives at once. And there was a tradition that the Prophet had expressly authorized this interpretation. It was, indeed, known from the condition that Muhammad himself had more than four wives at once, but men explained this later as one of the special privileges which God had given only to His messenger.

(2) Too close relationship. A Muslim is forbidden to marry his female relatives in the direct line (ascending and descending), his sisters and the female descendants of his brothers and sisters, and his aunts and great-aunts on both the paternal and maternal sides. A relative (man or woman) whom it is forbidden to marry is called mahram; e.g., a man is his daughter's mahram. Relationship-in-law (the relation between a married person and the relatives of his or her consort in consequence of marriage) is not forbidden. A Muslim may not marry his female relations-in-law in the direct (ascending and descending) line—e.g., his mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, step-daughter, etc. —nor can he have two or more wives as wives at the same time. In the fourth place, foster-relationship is also a hindrance to marriage, on the ground of Qur'an, iv, 27.

No one may marry either a woman who has sucked him or he has helped to suck; the foster-sisters of a man or of a woman who gave him suck, the foster-sister of a man and the woman who has sucked him, all her relations (either blood-kin or foster-sister), her husband, the husband of her husband (both blood-kin and foster-kin) on the other side. This foster-relationship, on the ground of a decision of the Prophet, is an obstacle to marriage within the same degree of relationship as blood-relatedness. On the other hand, there is no foster-relationship (a) between the woman who suckled the child and the ancestors or side-relations of that child; or (b) between the child and the ancestors or side-relations of children who were suckled by the same woman.

These regulations concerning the obstacles to marriage caused by kinship are in general deduced from the passage quoted from Qur'an, iv, 20 (and see xxiv, 30-31). The ordinances made in these two verses of the Qur'an were at least partly new to the Muslims, as may be seen from the words found at the end of Qur'an, iv, 27, in which permission is expressly given to regard as lawful the marriages which had been previously contracted contrary to these restrictions.

(3) Difference of religion. In Qur'an, ii, 290-291, it is forbidden for Muslims to contract a marriage with unbelievers. To that prohibition there were originally no exceptions:

'Marry no heterodox woman before they have become believers; a believing slave is better than an unbelieving free woman, even though she please you. Give also your female relations in marriage to no unbelievers before they have become believers; a believing slave is better than an unbelieving one, though he please you, because of the sense which they (the unbelievers) take you to hell, but God takes you to paradise and forgiveness.'

Later on, one exception was admitted, and Muslim men were allowed to marry women who belonged to a so-called people 'of the book' (ahl al-kitāb). By the ahl al-kitāb must be understood people, such as Jews and Christians, to whom, according to Muhammad's view, the same religion had previously been announced as he made known to his own people, the Arabsians.

See Qur'an, v, 7: 'Now are all free women permitted to you, both among the Muslims and among those who have received sacred books before you.'

In distinction from the other faiths of the world, the Shafi'ites regard marriage of women of the ahl al-kitāb as permitted only if these ahl al-kitāb had accepted their religion before the Qur'an was revealed, and also had not corrupted it. So, according to the Shafi'ites, a Muslim may not marry an English woman, because the English, though they belong to the ahl al-kitāb, accepted Christianity after Muhammad's time.

(4) A man and woman who are separated from each other cannot as a rule contract a new marriage with each other if the former marriage was dissolved either because the husband repudiated his wife, or because he had accused her of adultery by means of the li'ān (the swearing of a solemn oath). As to these two cases see § 6 (o) and (b), in which the exceptions to the general rule are also discussed elsewhere.

(5) Women may not contract a new marriage
within a certain period after the dissolution of a former one. This period is called 'iddah, i.e., properly 'the number' (viz. the number of days). If the marriage was dissolved by the decease of the husband, according to Qur'an, ii. 229, the wife must mourn for four months; and if she was married, or remarried, or secludes herself in a small tent for a full year after the death of the husband; during this time she might not purify herself. The 'iddah after divorce was, on the other hand, probably first introduced by Muhammad. According to Qur'an, bxv, 4, the wife may not marry again within the limit of three 'qur'as, if her marriage was dissolved by divorce. According to Abu Qatada, 'qurra' must be taken to mean menstruation; according to the Shafi'ites, Malikites, and others, it is the period of a woman's cleanness between the periods of menstruation. If the woman has no menstruation, the 'iddah is reckoned at three months. When a woman is pregnant at the dissolution of her marriage, she may in no case marry again before her confinement.

Difference in position is, as a rule, no obstacle to the contraction of a marriage, since it is in no case required to solicit the permission of the bridegroom to marry a woman of lower rank; and even a woman may contract a valid marriage with a man who is not her kuf, if neither her wali nor she herself has any objection.

Youth is usually no hindrance according to Muslim law. Child-marriages were not forbidden in Muhammad's day, and even the Prophet married 'Aishah, the daughter of Abu Bakr, when she was only six years old. But, according to the Shafi'ites, only the wali muhiri (the father, or failing him, the paternal grandfather) is qualified to give his children (or grandchildren) in marriage before their majority. According to the other four schools, more distant relations have the same right if the ancestors of the children under age are deceased. Children under age, therefore, cannot marry, according to the Shafi'ites, if they have no father or grandfather. But, according to the Shaybani, she who (at the end) as to the taqjud which is applied in such a case.

(d) Mutual rights and duties of married people during marriage: 'iddah and nikah. No community of the married couple is brought into existence by marriage. Each keeps the ownership of that which was possessed at marriage, and of that obtained during marriage by labour, endowment, inheritance, or in any other way. The wife keeps the right, during her married life, of disposing of her possessions and of making contracts. She does not in that respect come under the guardianship of her husband. The husband is obliged to support his wife according to her position, and give her food as well as clothing, residence, and service consistently with the appropriate customs. This legal and obligatory support is called nasf-nasqah. If the husband is not able to give the legal support to his wife, he is in default (fisikh), but in that case she has to prove that her husband is really not able to give her nasf-nasqah. If the husband is able to support her, but refuses to do so, the wife must try to force the husband to fulfill his duty, if the wife requires him to do so.

A husband who is married to more than one wife must not spend more time in the houses of one wife than in that of the other. The husband is also particularly forbidden in the law-books to swear an oath to abstain from sexual intercourse. The taking of such a vow of abstinence was called 'iddah ('to swear'). In the pre-Islamic period the Arabs regarded this 'iddah as a kind of divorce, by which, however, the marriage was not fully dissolved. Although the woman was thus neglected, she could not contract a new marriage before her husband had definitely repudiated her, and this he generally refused to do before he had been paid a certain sum as ransom.

This 'iddah was forbidden in Qur'an, ii. 229. One who had taken such a vow of abstinence was for the future obliged to repudiate his wife after the expiration of four months, if he had not already done so. According to the Shafi'ites, after the expiration of four months the husband must dissolve his marriage legally; if not, he be dissolved by the Shafi'ites and Malikites, if the woman refuses to repudiate his wife of his own accord. If the husband desires to be reconciled again with his wife, he is, according to the unanimous opinions of Muslim scholars, obliged to make a 'guilt-offering' (kafris' or, 'that which covers the sin') because of his vow. The legal regulations concerning the 'iddah are applicable only if the husband has vowed to abstain from conjugal relations with his wife for longer than four months.

Another vow of abstinence was the 'zahir (from zaahir, 'back'). In this case the husband declared that 'his wife should be to him even (untouched) as the back of his mother.' This was apparently a customary vow of abstinence by the heathen Arabs, which, according to tradition, was also taken by some Muslims in the month of fasting, when they proposed to abstain from conjugal relations with their wives. This vow was expressly condemned in Qur'an, ivi, 15.

Appropriately the original meaning of this revelation was that every Muslim who 'turned again' to the heathen customs should have to pay a heavy penalty (kafris'), consisting of the emancipation of a Muslim slave, for seven months, or the feeding of sixty poor persons, before he again permitted to have intercourse with his wife. The Muslim Lega, however, have explained these verses of the Qur'an in a different sense. According to the Shafi'ites, the husband is legally bound to this kafris' unless he repudiates his wife immediately after pronouncing the 'iddah. If he does not do this at once, they say, 'then he 'turns back,' i.e. breaks his vow of abstinence, and must then give the kafris,' and, according to the other four schools, he breaks his promise only if he actually behaves contrary to his vow, and is only then obliged to give the kafris'. Thus these three explanations draw in the sense of changing opinion and breaking the vow of abstinence.

Both the 'iddah and the 'zahir soon became obsolete in Islam.

If the husband fulfills his duties, he has the right to demand obedience from his wife, and is even entitled to change an unwilling (naskiz); in this case she loses her right to nasf-nasqah. The husband and wife, according to the Shafi'ites, can make no change in their mutual rights and duties as established in canon law. Any agreement of that nature which they may make by the marriage contract has no binding power. Nevertheless, it is usual, in some Muslim lands, even among the Shafi'ites, for the husband to undertake certain exceptional obligations with regard to his wife, to which he is not bound by the law. He promises, for instance, not to take a second wife, though he has the right to do so. In order to give a binding force to such promises the bridegroom, immediately after the conclusion of the marriage contract, pronounces a repudiation of his wife conditional on the non-fulfilment of his vows. He declares, after making the marriage contract: 'If I take a second wife or if I neglect my duties to my wife, etc., then she is repudiated by me.' This custom is called talq (lit. 'to hang up' the divorce to a condition).
possible to imagine that he will treat his wife otherwise than well, is the *talq* not applied.1

6. Divorce.—(a) Repudiation (talq).—According to Muslim canon law, marriage may be dissolved by divorce in four ways, besides the death of one of the parties or their apostasy from Islam. The common form of divorce is the repudiation (talq) pronounced by the husband. Among the other forms of repudiation are also divorce by *isti‘ad*, repudiation of a slave, followed by divorce, and *iddah*. Over a period of three months, the woman is held to be chaste and pure; after this period she is pronounced divorced. If she happens to be pregnant, however, her husband, who could return to her and contract a new marriage with another husband, her marriage was immediately dissolved by the talq, the effect of which was the same as that of the *isti‘ad* or emancipation of slaves. But, according to the new law of Islam, the wife might not marry again during a certain period (*iddah*; cf. §5(e)(5)) after the repudiation. During the *iddah* it had to be seen whether she was pregnant, in which case her former husband would have the right of claiming the child. Further, the husband gained the right of reconciling himself with his wife during the *iddah*, and of revoking the *talq*. The revocation of the repudiation is called *raj‘ah* (also *raj‘ah* or *rak‘ah*).

According to Muslim tradition, this new right of the revocation of the *talq* was at first abused. It was evidently given to the husband in order to put him in a position to retrieve his fault if he had repudiated his wife in a fit of passion; but a wife complained to the Prophet of her husband, who repeatedly repudiated her and as often revoked his repudiation. The husband was reported to the Prophet by the wife. By means of the woman was practically repudiated, but could not contract a new marriage with another husband. Obviously her husband was trying in this way to compel her to ransom herself by a dowry that she had formerly received from him. The Prophet forbade this practice in Quran, ii. 231:

> "When you have repudiated your wife and she has waited for you, keep her with you and treat her well, otherwise let her go free, but do not take her back with evil intent. He who does that sins, and does not mend, God shall doom him to the Fire for ever."

Moreover, the right of revoking the *talq* was now limited in Quran, ii. 229 f.:

> "If the *talq* has twice (taken place, then it may only be revoked with good intentions or you must let go (your wife) with kindness; (for) it is not permissible to take back from her that which you have (formerly) given her . . . but if the husband repudiates his wife (once more), then she is no longer lawful for him."

On the ground of these verses of the Quran, a husband may repudiate his wife only three times. After each talq an *iddah*-period begins, during which the wife may not marry again. During the *iddah* after the first and second repudiations the marriage is not yet dissolved. If, e.g., the husband or wife dies during this period, the survivor shares in the inheritance. Moreover, the husband is entitled to revoke his repudiation during this period. If he allows the term to expire, the marriage is then dissolved. The divorced parties may contract a new marriage with each other if they wish; but in this case a new marriage contract must be made and a dowry again paid by the husband.

The third talq, however, the marriage is immediately dissolved. An *iddah*-period also follows, during which the wife may not marry again; but the man has no further right to revoke his repudiation, and the divorced pair cannot ever contract a new marriage with each other.

To the last rule there is one exception based on the Quran itself. A woman at Medina who was three times repudiated by her husband and afterwards married to another man wished afterwards to marry her first husband again. When she explained her wish to the Prophet, he declared that this was not possible, even if she were repudiated a fourth time; later, however, he took pity on her, and altered the regulation quoted above in Quran, ii. 229. After the words before the third talq the woman is no longer permitted to marry another husband; a following regulation was added: 'Unless the woman afterwards has married another husband and was also repudiated by him; in such a case it is no sin for them both (i.e., the wife and her first husband) to return to each other, if they think that they will in future be able to observe his requirements better.'

On the ground of this regulation, the law allows married people to contract a new marriage with each other even after the third *talq*, if the wife was in the meantime married a second time and had been repudiated by him. In Muslim countries repudiation is very often pronounced three times for insignificant reasons, and the divorced persons often desire to be joined together again. In order to make this possible, the wife contrives to contract a mock-marriage with another husband, who is ready to repudiate her immediately after the marriage. He who declares himself willing to do this is called mutalib (because he makes the wife by this mock-marriage once more halal, i.e., permissible for her first husband). Such a mock-marriage may be employed only twice, for, if the husband has three times pronounced the thrice-repeated *talq*, he cannot contract a new marriage with his repudiated wife.

(b) Other forms of divorce.—Besides *talq* there are three other ways in which marriage may be dissolved: *khul*, *fisah*, and *fit‘a*. After each of these, a period of *iddah* begins for the woman in which she may not marry again. During this time she is entitled to *nafaqah*, if she has not neglected her duties towards her husband.

(i) *Khul* was customary among the Arabs. Generally speaking, it consisted in the ransoming of the wife by her relatives, usually for a sum of money proportionate to that which they had received from the bridegroom as *mahr* at the time of the marriage. In consideration of this sum, the husband was induced to renounce his wife and lease her free to marry another husband. *Khul* means literally 'to put off.' The use of *khul* in this context is derived from the symbolic act (the throwing away of a cloak, a shoe, or a similar piece of clothing) by which the husband shows that he renounced his claim on his wife.1

As has already been mentioned, the Prophet originally forbade the husband to divorce his wife's dowry at the dissolution of marriage, as this custom often gave rise to the deliberate neglect and otherwise vexations treatment of the wife (see the words of Quran, ii. 229 quoted above; cf. also iv. 24-25). But later on the ancient custom of *khul* was again permitted.

The reason of this was the request of a woman at Medina, who declared that she had such an aversion to her husband that she no longer wished to stay with him. She asked permission to buy her freedom in order to be released from her husband, and the following addition was then made to the words of Quran, ii. 231: 'It is not lawful for you to take back anything which you have given to your wives, except if you are free to give it again, and you will transgress the laws of Allah; when you are afraid of this, then is (the ransom) with which the wife redeems herself no sin for either (of the married couple), that is the law of Allah, etc.'

On the authority of these words the *khul* remained even in Islam a legal method of divorce. The wife by this means buys her repudiation; her former husband can never revoke it. If the husband and wife both wish it, they may again join in marriage.

(ii) *Fisah* is the annulment of marriage with the co-operation of the magistrates. Among the Hanafites, a minor who has been married in marriage, not by her father or grandfather, but by a more distant relative, may demand dissolution of this 1 Cf. Be 47a. and J. L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahhabits, f. 115.
marriage on the attainment of her majority (see § 5 (a)). Other reasons for the fasakh may be found in certain diseases or bodily infirmities mentioned in the fiqh-books. This method of divorce is possible also when, after the completion of the marriage, it appears that the bride or bridegroom does not fulfill certain qualifications (e.g., with regard to birth, position, virginity, etc.) which had been expressly insisted on as conditions at the making of the marriage contract. According to the Shafiites, a wife may also demand fasakh if she proves that her husband is not able to give her lawful maintenance (nafqah). In these cases the sentence of dissolution of marriage is pronounced by the magistrate at the request of the parties.

(3) The dissolution of marriage by means of 'Ilân (‘imprecation’) is based on Qur’an, xxvii, 6-9. As a rule, any one who accuses a free Muslim woman of fornication, without being able to prove his accusation, is punished by scourging. If, however, a husband suspects his own wife of infidelity, the law allows him to accuse her of adultery without any farther proof, and to contest the legitimacy of her child born after the period of six months. A husband may invoke Allah in the manner prescribed in Qur’an, xxiv, 6-9:

‘Those who accuse their wives of infidelity and have no other witnesses, let them produce four witnesses of what they have spoken: the truth, and a fifth time, calling down the wrath of Allah upon her who has lied. The wife may aver the punishment (for adultery) if she swears by Allah four times that her husband has lied, and a fifth time, declaring that God’s wrath may fall upon her if her husband has spoken the truth.’

If a husband, after accusing his wife of adultery, refuses to pronounce the 'Ilân, he must be scourged forthunder if he cannot produce witnesses; but the Hanafites consider that the husband ought to be imprisoned until he pronounces the 'Ilân or admits that he has lied. According to the Shafiites and the Malikiyyah, not only is the marriage legally dissolved by the 'Ilân, but the married couple may never marry each other again. According to the Hanafites, even after the 'Ilân the marriage must still be dissolved by a decision of the magistrate, and the reunion of the parties is permitted if the husband has afterwards revoked his accusation and been scourged for his slanderous imputation.

7. Relationship, and the rights and duties based on it.—(a) The relationship between a child and his father.—In ancient Arabia, on account of the nature of the marriage by sale, the husband (ba‘al, lit. ‘master’, of the woman) was regarded as the father of all children borne by his wife during the marriage, even if he did not beget them. Thus he was also regarded as the father of the children borne by his wife if he had married a pregnant woman, or if he had given up his wife for a certain time to another man in order to raise up noble children for him.

In Islam this rule was altered. According to Muslim canon law, only the man who has begetten the children in a legal marriage is regarded as their father; a woman must wait for the expiration of the 'iddah period, if she wishes to marry another husband after the dissolution of her marriage, in order that it may be seen whether she is pregnant. If she is, she may marry again only after her confinement and the first husband is regarded as the father of the children born during the 'iddah. Thus in Islam the first and second husbands cannot quarrel about the children born after the dissolution of the marriage; such quarrels were very common in the pre-Islamic period.

Muslim canon law generally recognizes a child born in wedlock as begotten by the husband and

thus as legitimate when the birth takes place not earlier than six months after the consummation of marriage. A child born within a certain period after the dissolution of marriage (whether by divorce or through the death of the husband) is also regarded as legitimate. It has to be assumed that pregnancy may last two years if it appears that the mother had no menstruation during that time. According to the Shafiites and the Malikiyyah, pregnancy may even last much longer (four or seven years), and the children born so long after the dissolution of the marriage may still pass as legitimate. Further, the children which the master begets from his slaves are regarded as legitimate offspring, and are placed on a complete equality with those begotten in lawful marriage (see § 9 (c)). When it appears that a marriage is invalid, or that any one has been wrong in thinking that he was the owner of a slave, the children are, nevertheless, regarded as legitimate, provided the parents acted mistakenly in good faith, so that there can be no question of zinā (‘fornication’).

All other children are illegitimate (sulh ad zinā‘), begotten in fornication). There is no relationship between such illegitimate children and their father, even though the father expressly recognizes that they were begotten by him. From such an acknowledgment he cannot derive any rights for the child, either for the child or for the father (neither right of inheritance, nor guardianship, nor duty of maintenance). The Shafiites even allow a father to marry the daughter whom he begets in fornication, though they regard it as blameworthy (makruh). The Hanafites forbid this. On the other hand, the relationship between the mother and her illegitimate children is legally precisely the same as that between her and her legitimate children. She is not allowed to marry her illegitimate son, and she inherits from him, etc. A child is also illegitimate if the husband by means of 'Ilân accuses his wife of adultery (see § 6 (b) (3)), and declares that the child borne by her is not his. If, on the other hand, it is uncertain whether a child was really begotten by the husband during wedlock (or by the master, during the time that he was the owner of the slave), it is then regarded as legitimate without further proof, if the father recognizes it as his. Such an acknowledgment is called Ir ād. Adoption is forbidden, and has no legal force (see Adoption [Muhammadan]).

Blood-relations in the direct line are obliged to support each other (by means of nafqah) in case of necessity; according to the Hanafites, this duty rests on all blood-relations that are not allowed to marry each other (thus on all makram; see § 5 (c) (2)).

(6) Other kinds of relationship.—Another result of marriage by sale among the ancient Arabians was that after marriage the wife ceased to belong to her family, so that there was family-relationship only between the child and the family of its father, and not between it and the family of the mother. It is true that for philological reasons it may be assumed that even in Arabia the patriarchal family-system was preceded by the matrilarcal, but in historical times no clear traces of the latter system can be found.


2. For further particulars about this so-called mishk al-thabdt‘ cf. G. Wulff, Das Matriarchat, in Hausmann, De Vere, 4, 1905, p. 110 (9th ed. 1903, p. 129).
Law (Muhammadan)

As already pointed out, even before Muhammad marriage ceased to be generally regarded as a purchase. So also it was customary in Arabia before Islam not to limit relationship entirely to the family of the bride, but in many cases to take into consideration the relatives on the mother's side, although the maternal relatives are never placed on an equality with the paternal by the Shafites. It is also true that maternal relationship is an obstacle to marriage according to Qur'an, iv, 28 f. (the maternal aunt is a mahram, just as is the paternal aunt, and the hadithanah (i.e. the care of children) is in certain cases equally a right of maternal relatives), but, in general, attention is paid only to the rights and duties of the 'asabat, i.e. the male relatives on the paternal side.

Rights which are based on relationship (nastaib) and which are usually conceded to the 'asabat are: (1) the right of giving female relatives in marriage or of opposing the marriage of female relatives who wish to marry below their rank; (2) the right of inheritance; (3) the right of managing the property of blood-relations who are under age or insane; (4) the right of retaliation or of demanding the price of blood if a blood-relation has been killed; and (5) the right to succeed a blood-relation who has settled his rights as a result of the freedom. According to the majority of Muslim faqih, if a blood-relation has unilaterally killed any one, the duty of paying the satisfaction money also falls entirely on the 'asabat.

In order to indicate the nearest relative among any one's 'asabat, Muslim scholars divide the male relatives on the paternal side into classes. The first class consists of the descendants, the second of the ancestors; the third class is formed by the descendants of the father, and the fourth class by the descendants of the paternal grandfather. Among the descendants the son is the nearest, then the son's son, etc.; among the ancestors the father is the nearest, then to him his father, etc.; the next of kin in the third class is the brother, then follows his son, etc.; the next of kin in the fourth class is the paternal uncle, then follows his son, afterwards his son's son, etc. He who is under age or insane on the maternal side precedes a blood-relation of the same rank who is related to him only on the paternal side; so, e.g., in the third class the full brother and the half-brother on the maternal side, the son of the full brother precedes the son of the paternal half-brother, etc.

Thus, as a rule, not only the son but also the grandson, etc., has precedence over the father, and the grandfather on the paternal side ranks above the brother. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. (1) The nearest 'asabat of a woman who have the right to give her in marriage are, according to the Shafites, not her descendants but her ancestors, and after them her relatives in the lateral line; but, according to the Hanifites and Malikites, the ordinary rules obtain in this case also, and the descendants have the right in the first place to be 'asabat of the wife. (2) The brother of a deceased man inherit equally with his paternal grandfather, and are thus not excluded by him; but the grandfather has always the right to at least a third of their common share, so that, if he inherits one or two brothers, each obtains an equal part; but, if he inherits with three or more brothers, the latter divide two-thirds of the whole among themselves in equal parts, while the grandfather obtains one-third. (3) The rights which can be exercised over a freed slave pass by the death of his emancipator to the nearest of the 'asabat of the emancipator, but in this case the brothers take precedence of the grandfather.

(4) According to the Shafites, the obligation of the nearest 'asabat to pay the 'agl (the atonement money), when one of their blood-relations has committed unintentional manslaughter, falls only on the direct (ascending and descending) line (cf. art. Crimes and Punishments [Muhammadan], vol. iv. p. 292).

The blood-relations on the maternal side and those on the father's side, so far as they do not belong to the 'asabat, are called dawul-ar-rahim. They have in general no rights and duties based on relationship. According to the Hanifites, however, they take their place among the 'asabat if they do not exist. In such a case the right to be 'asabat and to give the bride in marriage passes to the mother and to her next of kin; and the inheritance also passes to the next relatives among the dawul-ar-rahim. According to the Shafites and Malikites, on the other hand, the 'asabat in such a case are not succeeded by the dawul-ar-rahim but by the Muslim community; thus, if there are no 'asabat, the treasury (bad al-mal) inherits; and the falim, i.e. the magistrate, must take the place of the 'asabat of the bride.

(c) Guardianship.—Minors are legally under the guardianship of their parents or nearest blood-relations. They are subject to all attendant contracts, or to undertake other legal transactions. Minority ceases generally, according to Muslim law, when the children are really adult and the signs of puberty can be observed. According to the Shafites, minority ends in any case after the completion of the fifteenth year; according to the Hanifites, only after the eighteenth year. Besides the so-called waliyyat al-nukh (i.e. the guardianship which gives the minor the right to give a female relative in marriage, or to prevent her marrying below her rank), which has already been discussed in § 5 (a), Muslim lawyers distinguish two other kinds of guardianship, namely, the hadithanah and the waliyyat al-nukh.

(1) The purpose of the hadithanah is to care for the physical well-being of the minors and also for their education and training for a profession. During the marriage, life of the parents and guardianship, the child is subject to the authority; in cases of separation of the parents, the mother has the right to retain the children so long as they have need of her help, i.e., according to the Shafites, until they are able to take care of themselves; but the child may entrust itself to the care of the father, if it prefers to do so; according to the Hanifites, a boy always comes at that age under the guardianship of the father, but a girl remains under the guardianship of her mother, while, according to the Malikites, both boys and girls remain under the guardianship of the mother until they are of full age (girls even until they marry). If the mother contracts a fresh marriage, she loses the hadithanah, unless her new husband is at the same time one of the blood-relations of the children. In this case she keeps the hadithanah, according to the Shafites, if the husband belongs to the 'asabat of the children; according to the Hanifites, if he is a mahram of them; and, according to the Malikites, if he is either a mahram of them or a relative who would himself have the right to be guardian over the children if he were not excluded by nearer relatives.

If, after the divorce, one of the parents removes to another place, the child remains as a rule with the parent who deserts it. However, the father establishes himself permanently in another place, he has the right to take his children there with him; but the rules of the
different fiqh-schools with regard to this subject vary in details.

If the mother is dead, Muslim lawyers generally consider the female relatives the most suitable for the hadânah. According to the Hanifites, the father and the other parents (qabîbat; the maternal aunt has a preference above other female relatives. They base this opinion on the tradition that, when Habiba and her husband were dead, three of her 'aqabat questioned the question which of them had the best right to look after Hannah's young daughter. One of them said to the Prophet: 'She is not only the daughter of my uncle, but my wife is, moreover, her maternal aunt.' On this Muhammad decided that the child must be entrusted to this man and his wife, saying: 'The maternal aunt is as good as the mother.' According to the Shâfîites, if the mother dies or is not qualified for the hadânah, she is succeeded by her mother, or, if necessary, by the mother of her mother. Only after them the father, and, after him, his mother, or, if necessary, his maternal grandmother succeeds to the hadânah. If the father and his female ancestor (and, after them, the grandchild and his female ancestors) are dead or disqualified, the nearest of the male relatives to the collateral line has the right to the hadânah. The male relatives are ruled by the paternal side, and since the male relatives cannot exclude the female relatives of the deceased, even if they are of the same age, it may appear that they could be excluded from the right to inherit. However, the female relatives are not excluded from the right to inherit, even if they are of the same age and the male relatives are not, and if the female relatives are the closest relatives to the deceased, they have the right to inherit. Therefore, the female relatives are not excluded from the inheritance, and the male relatives are not entitled to the inheritance. If there are no 'aqabat, and there is nothing left to inherit, the hadânah is due to the nearest relative of the deceased, and the male relatives have the right to inherit the hadânah.

(2) The wilâyât al-mâl is the guardianship which has for its purpose the management of the property of minors. According to the Shâfîites, only the father (and, failing him, the paternal grandfather) can be legally appointed as the guardian. In the case of the father or, if necessary, the grandfather has, however, the right to appoint by testamentary disposition a guardian over his children (or grandchildren) who are under age. A guardian appointed by the will must be able to manage the property of the child. Girls, in this case, can be entrusted with the care of the property of a child under age, and the mother is in the first place taken into consideration for this purpose, although she has no legal claim to the position. Failing both the father and grandfather, or a guardian appointed by them, the magistrate (hâkim), or a person appointed by the magistrate, must take the place of guardian. The Malikites recognize the qualification of the father only (not that of the paternal grandfather) to set up a legal claim to be guardian and to appoint a wilâyât.

The guardian manages the property of the minor, and makes any necessary agreements for him, etc. When the child is of the age of the guardian has to inquire whether his ward is râshîd, i.e., able to manage his property for himself. This regulation is based on Qur'an, iv. 5:

"Encumber the minors, and put them in possession of their property, when you find that they are râshîd." If it appears that the ward, though of age, is not yet capable of managing his own property, the guardianship continues. The opinion of Abu 'Abd Allah, that the guardianship in any case ceased as soon as the ward was twenty-five years old, has found no favour with other Muslim scholars. The hadânah of the insane, and the care of their property, must be entrusted as a rule to the female relatives as guardianship over minors. The wife of an insane person has, however, the first claim to the hadânah, and his daughter has in this respect the preference above all other female relatives with the exception of the mother.

3 Law of inheritance. (a) Introduction. Muslim canon law distinguishes various groups of persons, of whom the Qur'an allows a definite share (§ 2, 3, 4, or 5) in the estate. Such a share is called farîdah, and the heirs belonging to this group are therefore called the dawâni'l-farîdî' id, i.e., those who have a right to such definite shares.

When the heirs of this first group have received their share, the residue of the estate falls to the share of the relatives of the deceased in the male line (the so-called 'aqabat). These 'aqabat, who in Islam thus form a second group of heirs, were in pre-Islamic times the only female relatives who had a right to the estate, however, in the battles at Badr and Uhud and on other occasions, many Muslims had perished, qarrels arose among the members of their families as to the division of the estates which they left. Some examples of this are reported in Muslim tradition. The widow of Awâ ibn Thâbit seems to have complained to the Prophet that the male relatives of her dead husband had taken possession of his estate, while she and her children had obtained nothing of it. Other women came with similar complaints to Muhammad. This gave him occasion to decide that for the future the widow and some of the nearest female relatives of the deceased have a right to a certain share in his estate. These regulations are to be found in Qur'an, iv. 8, 12-15, and 175. It is not quite clear on what principles Muhammad based these regulations. It is, however, certain that he did not mean to regulate the right of inheritance of the 'aqabat. This continued to form the foundation also of the Muslim law of inheritance; and the new regulations, according to which some of the nearest relatives of the deceased obtained a right to a fixed share (farîdah) of his estate, were, therefore, only supplementary to the old Arabian law of inheritance.

If there are no 'aqabat, and there is nothing left to inherit, the farîdâh is hazîd to the nearest relative of the deceased obtained a right to a fixed share (farîdah) of his estate, were, therefore, only supplementary to the old Arabian law of inheritance.

The blood-relations of the deceased do not belong to the 'aqabat and to whom no farîdah is assigned in the Qur'an—the so-called dawâni'l-askâm—are divided into classes, and the descendants of the deceased take precedence over his ancestors, the latter over the descendants of his father, these again over the descendants of his grandfather, and in each class only the next of kin inherits. But, as has already been noted, the grandfather does not exclude the brothers of the deceased; he inherits together with them, and has a right to at least a share of their common share. If there are at the same time dawâni'l-farîdî' id among the heirs, the grandfather has, moreover, a claim to at least a share of the estate.
have received their share, or a share equal to that inherited by a brother of the deceased.

If the deceased be a freed slave and dies without leaving ‘asbāt, the person (man or woman) who has given him his freedom (the so-called masā‘ul) takes the place of the ‘asbāt, and this person is succeeded by the nearest of his ‘asbāt if he has a person designated as a half-brother.

In consequence of the regulation in Qur‘ān, iv. 12-15 and 175, that women have a right to the half of what men in the same grade of blood-relatedness inherit, some female blood-relations on the father's side, by the same law of inheritance as ‘asbāt in addition to the male relations. If, e.g., the deceased has left both sons and daughters, they inherit together, and the daughters count as ‘asbāt, but a daughter receives only half the share of a son. In such a case the daughter is called ‘asbāt bi‘l-qhārāi, i.e. ‘asbāt through another—she is ‘asbāt because the son (her brother) inherits. In the case the son himself is described as ‘asbāt bi-nafṣāhi (i.e. ‘asbāt by himself). The same rule and nomenclature also obtain for the daughter of a son of the deceased who inherits together with the son of a son of the deceased; also for the full brother of a deceased who inherits together with his full brother; and for the half-brother on the paternal side who inherits together with a half-brother on the paternal side. The full sister and the half-sister on the paternal side are called ‘asbāt when they inherit together with a daughter of the deceased or his son; i.e., they have in that case, like the male ‘asbāt, a claim to the residue of the inheritance after the dhawul-fardār id have received their share. In such a case, therefore, they are called ‘asbāt ma‘nāt al-‘aj mahāfira, i.e. ‘asbāt together with another because they inherited ‘together with another.

(c) The law of inheritance of the dhawul-

dhawul-fardār id.—The regulations concerning the shares to which the heirs belonging to this group have a claim are based upon the legal designation of or the so-called ‘inheritance verses’ in Qur‘ān, iv. 12-15:

Allah commands you to give to your children: to a man child, the tenth of inheritance; and to a woman child the same amount; and if there be only female children (two or more), then they receive two-thirds of the estate; and, if there be only one female child, then she receives half of the estate; if the father leaves children (two or more), each receives one-sixth, if he leaves a child; if, however, there are no children and the mother receives a third, except when there are surviving brothers of the deceased, for then the mother receives only a sixth. You (men) receive the half of the estate of your wives if they have no children, otherwise you receive only a fourth. They (the widows) receive a fourth of the estate if you have no children, otherwise (they receive only) an eighth. If a person dies without leaving blood-relations in the direct line, and there is a brother or sister of him, then these each receive a sixth; if there are more, then they receive together one-third.

A supplement to these ‘inheritance verses’ is given in Qur‘ān, iv. 175:

They ask you for a decision, say: “Allah decides for you concerning the case in which a man dies without leaving blood-relations in the direct line as follows: If a man dies without leaving children and there is a sister of him, then she receives the half of his estate . . . if there are two sisters, then they receive two-thirds between them; if they are brothers, however, they inherit together with their brothers, one brother receives as much as two sisters. Thus in these verses fixed shares are assigned to the daughter, the two parents, the husband (and wife), and the brothers and sisters of the deceased. But, according to the Muslim lawyers, Qur‘ān, iv. 15 refers only to half-sisters or half-brothers of the deceased; whereas Qur‘ān, iv. 175, on the other hand, to full sisters or half-sisters on the paternal side. Moreover, according to their explanation of the text, the rules for the daughter of the deceased equally apply to the daughter of his son; and the rules for his parents also apply to his grandparents. The heirs who have a claim to a fixed share of the inheritance can thus be reduced to the following twelve classes: (a) in the direct line: the father, the mother, the deceased, the daughter of the deceased, and the daughter of his son; (b) in the rising line: the father, the mother, the grandfather, and the grandmother; (c) in the side line: the full-sister, the half-sister on the father's side, and the half-sister and half-brother on the mother's side; (d) the widow and the widower.

The shares to which these twelve classes of heirs have a claim are (1) (2) the daughter receives 2, or two or more daughters together 3 of the estate; if sons also inherit, the daughter does not receive a fixed share, but then becomes ‘asbāt bi‘l-qhārāi, and receives 4 of the share of a son.

(2) The same rules obtain for the daughter of a son. She receives 5, or two or more daughters of a son together 3 of the estate; if the daughter of a son inherits together with the son of a son, she receives 4 of his share. She is excluded by the son of the deceased if he inherits, but not by the daughter of the deceased. If, e.g., there is one daughter of the deceased, she receives 5, and the son receives 6, but if two or more daughters of the deceased are allotted to the daughters and son's daughters together. But, if there are two or more daughters, their share remains further residue of the faridāh for the daughter of a son may, however, still inherit if there is a son's son, for he makes them ‘asbāt bi‘l-qhārāi, and in this case he is, therefore, called the 'blessed' son's son.

(3) The father has a claim to 3 of the estate; besides this, he inherits as an ‘asbāt if there are no other heirs. If there is a son, he receives 6 of the estate, if he has a son, then 3 of the estate is allotted to the son and son's daughters together. But, if there are two or more sons, then their share remains further residue of the faridāh, for the father may, however, still inherit if there is a son's son, for he makes them ‘asbāt bi‘l-qhārāi, and in this case he is, therefore, called the 'blessed' son's son.

(4) The paternal grandfather has also a claim to 3 of the estate, if the father of the deceased is without sons. In such a case, he inherits as an ‘asbāt if he has left neither father nor offspring. If there are surviving brothers of the deceased, the grandfather inherits together with them (see § 6). (5) The mother inherits 6 of the estate; if, however, there survive either, in the first place, children or son's children or, in the second, two or more brothers or sisters of the deceased, she inherits 1/2.

(6) The grandmother inherits 6 of the estate. According to the Shāf‘īites and Hanafites, the same applies also to the mother of the paternal grandfather of the deceased; i.e., by grandmother they understand every female ancestor of the deceased with the exception of those who are related to him by means of a grandfather who does not belong to his ‘asbāt.

(7) A full sister receives 3; or two or more full sisters inherit 3 of the estate; they have, however, this right only when the deceased has not survived descendants or ancestors. If, however, a daughter of the deceased dies without leaving blood-relations in the direct line, and there is a brother or sister of the deceased, she becomes ‘asbāt bi‘l-qhārāi, similarly, if a full brother of the deceased shares the inheritance.

(8) Practically the same rules obtain for a half-sister on the father's side. If there is one half-sister, she receives 1/2; if there are two or more, they each receive 1/4. If there is one half-brother on the father's side, the half-sister on the father's side becomes ‘asbāt bi‘l-qhārāi and receives 1/4 of her brother's share. Like the full sister, she loses her claim to a faridāh if there are offspring or male ancestors of the deceased, or if his full brother survives. Inheriting together with the grandmother, she becomes ‘asbāt bi‘l-qhārāi; if, on the other hand, she inherits with the daughter or son's daughter, she becomes ‘asbāt bi‘l-qhārāi. If there are two or more full sisters on the deceased, they receive together 3 of the estate, and there remains no residue of the faridāh for the half-sister on the father's side; if, however, the latter inherits together with one full sister of the deceased, the two have together a claim on 3 of the estate; the full sister then receives 1, and the half-sister 2.

This is the same rule as in the case of the inheritance of daughters together with son's daughters: the is in both cases called by Muslim lawyers masā‘ul, i.e., the ‘filling up’ (oc. of the which the daughter or a full sister receives).

(9) The half-brother on the mother's side rules the cases of the next case.

(10) The half-sister on the mother's side has a claim to 3 of the estate. Two or more half-brothers or half-sisters receive together 3. They have, however, a claim to a faridāh only if the deceased died without surviving brothers or ancestors.

(11) The widow receives 6 of the estate of her husband. If, however, she has left children or son's children, she receives only 1, whether the children are his own offspring or those of his other husband.

(12) The widow receives 6 of the estate of her husband: if, however, he has left children or son's children, she receives only 1, both when they are her offspring and when they are those of another wife of the deceased. If there are several widows, they must divide their faridāh. It may happen that, when the various dhawul-
fā'ūdā' inherit together, the sum of the fixed shares to which they have a claim is more than the whole estate. In such a case the share of each must be proportionately diminished.

With regard to the case in which the deceased has left four sons and four daughters, the latter have a claim to ½ of the estate, the father and mother to 1/4 each. If the deceased left only two sons and two daughters, his father has a claim to ½ the estate and the sum of the fā'ūdā' is 1½+1½+1+1=4+4+4+4=16; in this case the estate must be divided into twenty-seven equal shares, two of which belong to the two sons, nineteen of the others are divided between the two parents, the husband gets twelve and the widow, eight; sixty years ago the widower received the half of the residue is so divided between the two parents that the father receives 3½ and the mother 3½. If the deceased left a husband and a widow, the husband has a claim to 1/2 of the estate and the widow to 1/4. The widow widows have a claim to 1/2 of the estate. If the deceased left a husband and a widow, the husband has a claim to 1/2 of the estate and the widow to 1/4. The widow widows have a claim to 1/2 of the estate.

(d) Special cases. — There are still some special cases — the so-called masāʾ il-muṣaqūţ (i.e. cases which are known under special names) — in which, owing to the simultaneous inheritance of various beneficiaries, the rule which was described above is regarded as necessary in order to prevent relatives who usually receive more than others from receiving in a special instance less than them. It is impossible here to enumerate all these; the following are examples of them:

If a woman is deceased and her estate has to be shared between herself and her husband, the latter has a claim to 1/2 and the mother to 1/4 of the estate, so that there would remain over for the father only 1/4 of the mother’s share. In this case, however, the widower has received the half of the residue is so divided between the two parents that the father receives 3½ and the mother 3½. If the deceased left a husband and a widow, the husband has a claim to 1/2 of the estate and the widow to 1/4. The widow widows have a claim to 1/2 of the estate. If the deceased left a husband and a widow, the husband has a claim to 1/2 of the estate and the widow to 1/4. The widow widows have a claim to 1/2 of the estate.

Another case is the akhdariyya. The origin of this name is not certain. According to some Muslim writers, Akbar was the name of a king whom Khālid Abū al-Malik consults about the following problem. When a woman is deceased and her heirs consist of (1) her husband, (2) her mother, (3) her paternal grandmother, (4) her sister or her paternal half-sister, then these have together a claim to 1/2 of the estate (the father or the mother to 1/4, the sister or the half-sister to 1/4). According to the rule mentioned above (the so-called ‘and’), the estate must, therefore, be divided into nine shares, so that the widower would receive three shares, the mother two, the grandfather one, and the sister three. To prevent the division into nine unequal shares, the deceased herself, or, failing her, the husband, or, failing the husband, the widow, or, failing all these, the sister of the deceased, or, failing all these, the sister of the son or daughter of the deceased, has a claim to 1/8 of the estate. When the deceased has left a husband and a widow, the husband has a claim to 1/2 of the estate and the widow to 1/4. The widow widows have a claim to 1/2 of the estate.

As to the division of the estate among the dhanveis-l-arthām, if they inherit, there are three possibilities:

According to some lawyers, the right of these persons to inherit depends on the principle that only he who is nearest in blood has a claim to an estate, and that he excludes the more distant relatives. Others think that the dhanveis-l-arthām take their share from the one-third which the more distant relatives of the first and second grade through whose intermediacy they are related to the deceased. Thus, if the estate must be divided between two persons A and B, of whom A is the daughter of the daughter of the deceased, and B the daughter of the daughter of his son, then, according to the first theory, B would be excluded by A, who is more closely related to the deceased; but, according to the second theory, A would take the place of the daughter of the deceased and thus inherit 1/3, and B would take the place of the daughter of the son and thus inherit 1/3 (see § 8 (c)). Moreover, according to the second theory, the residue of the estate also must be divided in the same proportion between the dhanveis-l-arthām, so that in this case A inherits 1/3, and B only 1/9. The latter theory is endorsed by the Shāfi‘ites, the former by the Hanabites.

He who deliberately and illegally has compassed the death of the deceased is unworthy to inherit, like the mumtāz (i.e. he who is an apostate from Islam). The estate of the mumtāz passes, according to the Shāfi‘ites and the Malikīts, to the treasury; according to the Hanabites scholars Abū Yūsuf and Mūsa‘ib ibn Ḥasan, on the other hand, the heirs of the mumtāz have a right to his estate. In the opinion of the Hanabites and the Malikīts, opinion of the schools, there is no difference in general between believers and unbelievers in the law of inheritance.

No one can be regarded as an heir if it is certain that he was still alive at the moment when the deceased died. If, therefore, various persons lose their lives by flood, conflagration, or other disasters without its appearing which perished first, there can be no inheritance between those persons.

With regard to the case in which the heir or heirs have not yet been appointed, the law prescribes a rule of thumb, that is, in the absence of that his existence is doubtful, see § 2, p. 869. An exception to the general rule is found in the case of a child who was not born at the moment of the death of his father; as soon as such a child comes into existence the law, it is regarded as an heir of his deceased father. 1

9. Slaves and freedmen. — (a) The rights and duties of slaves. — In Muhammad’s time there were many slaves in Arabia. It would have been impossible for him to abolish slavery. Islam, however, so far changed the position of affairs that for the future no Muslim might make a slave of a fellow-believer. According to Muslim canon law, slavery can arise only 1 through captivity, if a non-Muslim prisoner be taken by a Muslim; or (2) by birth, if the mother is a married slave.

Slaves are the property of their master (ṣayid). He can dispose of them as of the rest of his possessions. He can, for instance, part with them by sale, gift, or testamentary disposition, hire them out, lend them, mortgage them, etc. A child, however, may not be separated from the mother so long as she is capable of bringing up the child. If the mother is taken away by death or by leaving the country, the master may make his slave work beyond his power, and must give him the necessary rest after his work. Slaves have also a right to sana'ah (maintenance, i.e. food, clothing, housing). The legal punishments for the misdemeanours of slaves are, generally speaking, less severe than for those of free persons.

Slaves have no right of property, nor can they, as a rule, make their will or testament. The master may give him authority to carry out the necessary legal transactions (sale and purchase, etc.). The contracts which the slave then makes are binding and valid, so far as he remains within the limits of the power given him, and the goods which the master has entrusted to him to carry out the business serve as guarantee for the engagements made by the slave. If, on the other hand, the slave goes beyond his powers, he is himself alone responsible; and the creditors can obtain satisfaction from him after he has been set free. If slaves injure one another by a punishable act, the slave is liable to make good the damage, but he can free himself from this liability by giving up the guilty slave to the injured person.

The master has the right to live in concubinage with all his unmarried female slaves, if they confess Islam or belong to the so-called ‘people of the book’ — in the last case, however, according to the Shi‘ites, only if the slaves belong to the true alex-ah al-khitab (see § 5 (c) (3)). If any one has become an owner of the female slave of another person by means of sale, donation, or otherwise, he is not permitted immediately to have her in concubine,

Children born from the concubinage of the owner with his female slave are free (see § 7 (a), and are

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in all respects equal with children born from marriage with a free wife. Among the Old Arabians a different rule obtained: no children of female slaves were regarded as free. The slave who has given her master a child is called umm wasilad (lit. 'mother of children,' viz. mother of one or more children of her master). After the death of her master, the slave becomes legally free, and, therefore, after her confinement, may no longer be alienated or mortgaged.

Slaves male and female may contract a legal marriage with both free and unfree persons, so long as they are of the same time their own owner. According to Muslim law, the master may marry only a female slave of another owner and not one of his own; and the same rule applies also to the Malikites.

According to the Malikites, slaves may have four wives (free or not free); but, according to the other Shāfī-ites, only two. A female slave is given in marriage by her master, who then acts as owner, not as wife, and need not ask her consent for the marriage. He also has the right to refuse to give her in marriage, though she ask him to do so. But, according to the Shāfī-ites, the master has not the right of forcing his male slave to a marriage but he must only secure consent to a marriage, whereas, according to the Hanafites and Malikites, the master has the right of giving even his male slaves in marriage against their will.

Just as a free man, the slave is obliged to give his wife a dowry in whatever disposition. Even if his master does not pay the mahār for him. The dowry which a female slave receives becomes the property of her saysid. A slave has the right of rejection, and the second tālāq has the same consequence in law for the slave as the third tālāq for a free man (cf. p. 908). The 'iddah after the dissolution of marriage by death or divorce is also prescribed for female slaves, and lasts a shorter time than the tālāq of a free woman. Instead of the 'iddah of four months and ten days, the female slave has one of two months and five days; the 'iddah of three gurus' is replaced by one of two gurus, and that of three months by one of a month and a half; in common with the slave, the female slave does not end her confinement before her marriage.

Children born of marriages in which one or both of the parents are slaves are not the property of the master. Children of a married female slave are thus always slaves, and become the property of the master of their mother, independently of the question whether a free or unfree slave. Some of them is it is regarded as undesirable for the children of a free man to become the slaves of the master of the slave, even though the law condemns marriage between free and unfree slaves. The law for a free man and a female slave of another, except under the four following conditions: (1) that he has not sufficient means to pay the dowry of a free woman, (3) that he is not in a position to have conjugal intercourse with a free woman, (3) that the female slave whom he desires is a slave in Islam, and (4) that there is a risk that he will fall into immorality, so that the proposed marriage with a slave is, as it were, the last means of preserving him from that sin (cf. Qur'ān, iv. 29-30). The Hanafites, however, regard it as permissible for a free man to marry a female slave of another, without the first three conditions, provided she belongs to the ahi al-khitab (cf. § 5 (6)).

(6) Emancipation ('īq) of slaves.—The setting free of slaves is regarded as a highly meritorious act for Muslims and well-pleasing to God. Muhammad had said, according to a tradition: 'The setting free of a believing slave shall preserve the liberator from hell at the day of resurrection.' It is also one of the means by which a believer who has transgressed the law can in some cases make a preparation for his fault.

Every one who has the right of disposing of his property has also the right to set free his slaves, unless, e.g., he has mortgaged them. If a slave belongs to a person owned by his freedom is given, him by one of them, he becomes free if the liberator has at the same time made good to his partners the value of their share; otherwise, the liberation is valid only for the share of the liberator, and the slave becomes a musālā'ad (i.e. partly free and partly not free).

The umm wasilad is legally free after the death of her master; if she has been previously married and has children of that marriage, these children may become the rank of their mother, and become legally free at the death of the owner of their mother. A male or female slave who becomes the property of a blood-relation obtains a legal free status by operation of law according to the Shāfī-ites, this rule obtains only when the owner is one of those in the direct line of ascent or descent of the slave; but, according to the Malikites, also if the slave becomes the property of his own brother or sister; and, according to the Hanafites, even if the owner is a mahār of the slave, i.e. one who is related to him within the limits of kin which form an obstacle to marriage.

The master may also limit the liberation by certain conditions—e.g., by the tadbīr and the kitābah.

(1) The tadbīr is a liberation by which the master declares that at his death his slave shall be free. So long as the said slave lives, such a slave (muṣālā'ad) is not different from others. According to the Shāfī-ites, the master even retains the right of parting with him and then revoking his liberation; according to the Malikites and Hanafites, such a slave may not be parted with and the master may not revoke his tadbīr. The tadbīr, according to the unanimous opinion of Muslim lawyers, must be classed with a testamentary disposition.

Since the heirs of one who dies intestate have a claim to at least a third of his estate, the tadbīr is valid only if the value of a muṣālā'ad is not more than a third of the estate. If the value of the slave is greater, he becomes only partially free, unless the heirs sanction the contrary.

(2) The kitābah (or muṣālā'ah) is a liberation by virtue of an agreement with a slave. The name seems to be derived from the document (kitāb) in which the conditions of the contract were originally set out. This kind of liberation was customary among the Arabs before Muhammad. At that time slaves who were not ransomed by their relations sometimes obtained the permission of their master to earn their ransom by work. In Qur'ān, xxiv. 33, Muslims were recommended, if their slaves asked to redeem themselves in this way, to grant their request and to help them in its furtherance, e.g., by giving them money or omitting part of the price.

The muṣālā'ah (i.e. the slave who makes this contract of liberation with his master) must bind himself to pay a definite sum of money to his master (the mukātab) as ransom (according to the Shāfī-ites, in at least two or more instalments). By the kitābah he obtains the right for the future of acquiring property for himself and of making contracts even without the express permission of his master. In other respects the mukātab remains in the same position as other slaves; his master, however, may no longer mortgage him or part with him, and, when he has paid his debt, he is free.

The master may make another contract of liberation with his slave (the 'qd al-ndīqah, i.e. the liberation contract). This consists of the purchase of the slave by himself; he becomes free immediately, but is obliged to pay the ransom to the liberator as quickly as possible, or within a period agreed upon.

Between the liberator and his freed slave there continues to exist a certain relationship (wastā', i.e. patronage). The liberator becomes the muṣālā (i.e. patronus) of the freed slave, and, if the latter has no qasād, the muṣālā takes his place. To the liberator then is owed the respect and services which are usually depend on blood-relationship, such as the right of inheritance, the right to give in marriage his liberated female slaves, the right of retaliation, and others.
The usura' exists not only between the liberator and his freed slave personally, but also between the liberator and the descendants (and even the freed slave) in the latter case, even after the death of the liberator. The patronage passes to the next of kin of the 'usura' [see § 7 (6)]. The same rules are also applied to a woman who has liberated a slave (mandātī, i.e. liberatrix).

10. General rules. — The ḥaqīq books contain many special regulations for various contracts, but scarcely any general principles as to the responsibility of the parties, the establishment of the rights and obligations, etc. They expressly forbid only agreements which are not precise or which depend upon accidental chances (e.g., all assurance contracts), and these they declare invalid because of the possibility that one of the parties thereby binds himself to something which he cannot see in advance. The Muslim jurists call such an undesirable chance gharar. No definite form for the making of a contract (agā'ī) is prescribed. In consequence of Qur'ān, ii. 282, many of the earlier ḥaqīqīs thought that, when an agreement has not to be immediately fulfilled on either side, since the parties have agreed on the terms of delay, the contract must be in writing, and concluded in the presence of witnesses. This was considered necessary, e.g., for the so-called sallān or salāf; this contract meant that a future harvest was bought and the price paid in advance. But this did not become the general opinion. The law-books insist only that the parties who make an agreement must make their intentions plain to each other. The legal form of an agreement is called its ṣafīn. The mutual declarations of the parties are called jāb (offer) and qabūl (acceptance). Only exceptionally is it permitted to make contracts without such a jāb and qabūl in matters of very little importance.

When two parties transfer to each other rights or claims, these must refer to matters which, according to the shari'ah, have a real value for Muslims. Thus, regarded from a legal standpoint, all contracts are invalid which refer to forbidden musical instruments, to books which treat of philosophy, astrology, and other forbidden sciences, to grapes, which must serve for the preparation of wine, to dogs, pigs, and other ritually unclean things, etc. If such affairs are treated, it is not strictly a change of real ownership (tansik), according to the Muslim law-books, but rather a mode of securing a de facto possession (istith). The ḥaqīq books contain numerous precise regulations concerning the most common contracts and transactions, such as purchase, sale, hire, mortgage, gift, deposit, partnership, security and loan, etc. These transactions have the general name of mu'tameṣāt. But this part of the law has only a theoretical and no practical value for the Muslim (see above, § 4). Principles different from those of the shari'ah generally obtain in commercial life; and it is usually impossible even for the most pious Muslims to regulate their lives in this matter precisely according to the law-books. There is no further discussion in detail need be given here.

The remarkable regulation of the Muslim law which forbids the charging of interest in trade must, however, not remain unnoticed. Not only usury in the strict sense, but the charging of interest at all is regarded as a great sin (kobūrah); and, although this prohibition has always been transgressed by numbers of Muslims, the pious try as far as possible to avoid direct offence against it.

11. The prohibition against charging interest (riḍā). — (a) Introduction. — In Muhammad's surroundings the practice of usury seems to have taken the form of arrear payments and annuities, and the rights and obligations, etc. They expressly forbid only agreements which are not precise or which depend upon accidental chances (e.g., all assurance contracts), and these they declare invalid because of the possibility that one of the parties thereby binds himself to something which he cannot see in advance. The Muslim jurists call such an undesirable chance gharar. No definite form for the making of a contract (agā'ī) is prescribed. In consequence of Qur'ān, ii. 282, many of the earlier ḥaqīqīs thought that, when an agreement has not to be immediately fulfilled on either side, since the parties have agreed on the terms of delay, the contract must be in writing, and concluded in the presence of witnesses. This was considered necessary, e.g., for the so-called sallān or salāf; this contract meant that a future harvest was bought and the price paid in advance. But this did not become the general opinion. The law-books insist only that the parties who make an agreement must make their intentions plain to each other. The legal form of an agreement is called its ṣafīn. The mutual declarations of the parties are called jāb (offer) and qabūl (acceptance). Only exceptionally is it permitted to make contracts without such a jāb and qabūl in matters of very little importance.

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The money-lender gave money or articles of commerce (e.g., dates or barley) on condition that after a certain period a larger sum of money or a greater quantity of the articles received should be returned. If the debtor could not fulfill his obligation on the day when it fell due, the creditor gave him a post-pomption of payment, but doubled the amount of his debt. Such contracts of exchange were regarded as a sort of sale and purchase (bāqī) and the post-pomption of payment was called nasi'ah. This usurious trade is strictly forbidden in various verses of the Qur'ān; see, e.g., ii. 276: 'They say that there is no difference between bāq and riḍī, but Allah permits bāq and forbids riḍī . . . They who in future are guilty of riḍī are destined for hell; they shall remain there for ever.' Cf. also ii. 276-279, v. 9. This is the classical view. Thus no Muslim could doubt that usury was strictly forbidden in Islam, but in the earliest times there were many, and among them well-known companions of the Prophet, such as Ali and Umar, who maintained that Islam prohibited only the abuse of the poverty of the debtor by constantly doubling his debt and ruining him. They regarded usury as forbidden only in a restricted sense; the nasi'ah was particularly deprecated. Overall, it is permitted only that by riḍī (lit. 'multiplication') the Prophet had meant not only usury, but all charging of interest. Later on this opinion became general. Thus, if a Muslim wishes to lend money or articles of commerce to any one, he can do so only on condition that the debtor, after the expiration of a certain period, shall pay him back the same sum of money or the same quantity of articles lent him. No profit may be made out of him, but if the creditor receives the same as that which he has given. If the purpose is not to give a temporary convenience to the other party, but only to exchange goods, this is permitted. If both parties receive goods of the same value and at the same time. One who does not observe these rules is guilty of riḍī. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish two kinds of riḍī: (1) riḍī by contract of exchange, (2) riḍī by loan (mutūn).

(b) Riḍī by contract of exchange.—The regulations of the law-books concerning the first kind of riḍī are based on traditions, according to which the Prophet had expressly declared that it was prohibited to a Muslim to exchange gold for gold, silver for silver, dates for dates, etc., unless both parties simultaneously made the same payment to each other. These words of the Prophet are handed down in various recensions, in which gold, silver, barley, wheat, and dates (sometimes also raisins are mentioned) are exchanged. See further, for contracts in general, G. Rassow, Die allgemeinen Lehren des Obligationsschriftstils nach der Lehre von den Rechterhalten nach der Rechtsetzung des Inschr. Schäft.; Ein Beihafz zum Shak Ḥaṣṣa Alī Ibn gahār, as above.

and salt] are especially mentioned as the objects of the forbidden contracts of exchange.

2. Obligations arising from oaths and vows.—Oaths and vows have always played a great part in the various Muslim lands. The obligations which spring from them have a religious character in the eyes of Muslims. The ancient Arabs were accustomed to enforce by oaths not only their alliances and other important agreements, but even every sort of promise and statement in ordinary life; and vows of abstinence were often binding preparation for the holding of religious ceremonies, the prosecution of blood-feuds, and other important acts. No one lightly decided to break the oath or vow which he had once made, for he feared to be punished for such a sin by the wrath of God.

The Prophet himself often strengthened his words, according to the custom of the time, by oaths and vows. He did not, however, consider himself as unconditionally bound by them, but thought that it was in some cases better to appease God's wrath for the breaking of an oath by means of an atomizing sacrifice (kaffarah) than to hold obstinately to the oath. ‘When I have sworn an oath that I will do something, but later on perceive that it is better to act differently, I offer an atomizing sacrifice and break my oath,’ was Muhammad's customary statement, according to tradition.

In Qur’an, v. 91, the regulations are given as to the religious acts by which a Muslim who acts contrary to his oath can turn aside God's wrath. The penance (kaffarah) must then consist in feeding or clothing ten poor persons, in manumitting a slave, or, in the case of a person who has no means, in fasting for three days (cf. also lxvi. 2).

The jurists have worked out these rules in still fuller details—e.g., fixing the minimum amount of money or clothing which must be given; they differ in their opinions as to the particulars; according to the Shafites, the manumitting of a slave can serve for kaffarah only if the slave is a believer.

An oath is called yamin and a vow nadhr. The rules concerning oaths and vows differ in various points. A vow is binding only when a Muslim who is qualified according to the legal regulations to make an independent agreement has voluntarily taken upon himself to carry out an act which is meritorious, regarded from a religious standpoint, and to which he was not bound apart from his vow. In this way it is possible to make a vow to set free slaves, to give alms to the poor, to make a pilgrimage, and so on. He who has bound himself by a vow remains permanently obliged to fulfill it, and cannot free himself from it by a kaffarah. If, however, the vow has been made dependent on a condition (e.g., ‘If I recover from my illness, I will fast for a certain number of days’), he is bound to fulfill his oath only when the condition has really been fulfilled. A vow to do something which is forbidden or to omit something which is obligatory may not be regarded as binding. Muslim jurists also consider that no one can bind himself by a vow to do or to omit what is merely permitted but not mandatory, and that this is particularly true in the case of an act which has already been forbidden (e.g., to drink water). In such cases there is no obligation to a kaffarah even if the vow be not fulfilled.

Oaths, on the other hand, are subjected to another rule; for he who has sworn by an oath to do or not to do anything is always bound to a

1 Cf. R. Docy and W. H. Engelmann, Glosario des mots espagnols et portugais dérivés de l'arabe, Leyden, 1889, p. 216; du Cange, Glossaire des Scriptor, med. et inf. Latinisatis, in Nationale; for the mistranslation the translators, the Arab word musākhfara. This Arabic name proves that the custom did not arise in Europe, but was taken over from the traditions.

2 See, further, W. Cohn, Der Wucher (Zdch) in Qur'än, Chalilith.

3 See, further, W. Cohn, Der Wucher (Zdch) in Qur'än, Chalilith.
If he breaks his oath, even though he has pleaded himself to do something which is forbidden, or to emit something which is obligatory.

Moreover, Muslim jurists deal at length with various special oaths and vows and the questions connected with them; even the very speakers (muqaddimah) are namely fully detailed as to this subject. The following cases, e.g., are mentioned in particular. When a man has declared, if I do such and such and is done, I will apostasy from Islam, if the conditions are fulfilled, he may not, it is true, give up his faith, but must necessarily, according to the Hanafis, on the ground of the hadith, if a man has declared, if I do such and such, or if such and such happens, my wife to return, or my slave is set free, he is actually bound by his words; and, on the fulfiling of the conditions, his wife must be regarded as repudiated and his slave as free.

When it has been taken either in the name of Allah (or that of one of His attributes) or by the Qur'an. Other oaths, e.g., by calling on the Prophet, are not binding.

13. Wills. — Muslim law only partially recognizes the right to make a will. When the debts of the deceased have been paid, his legal heirs (see § 8) have a claim to the residue of the estate. The testator may dispose by will (wasiyyah) of only the remaining 1/4 of the estate. If he has disposed of more than 1/4, his arrangements and legacies are valid up to 1/4, and as far as, they are sanctioned by his heirs.

As to this rule, there is no difference of opinion among the fiqh-schools. It is based on the following traditions. In the time of the Prophet, once the companions of the Prophet, had decided to devote the whole of his property after his death to the poor. One day, when he lay dangerously ill, he explained his plan to the Prophet, who, he thought, would value his pious deed. This was, however, not the case; on the contrary, the Prophet scolded him for his notice. It is better to leave them rich," said he, "than to force them to beg or to die." Finally, the Prophet consented to Be’s petition to dispose of 1/4 of his estate.

From this tradition the Muslim jurists have deduced another principle. Every Muslim may dispose of his property as he pleases during his life, and thus may even give everything away if he wishes; but this right ceases if he is seriously ill. In that case only 1/4 of the property may be disposed of by gift, the manumitting of slaves, etc. The property of a slave may be disposed of in this manner, and thus treated as in some degree similar to an estate to which the heirs have a claim.

This rule is also applicable to persons who in other ways are in danger of their lives, e.g., in the act of taking part in a battle, to a woman during childbirth, to the inhabitants of a district which is suffering severely from plague, etc.; if, during a serious illness, or while he was in other respects insane, or if the person has given away more than 1/4 of his property, his arrangements are valid only if his heirs offer no opposition to them, or if he has recovered from his illness or escaped the danger in which he was.

Further, the legality of a wasiyyah depends principally on (1) the right of the person who makes the will (al-nāẓir), (2) the right of the one who benefits by the will (al-must-lahh), (3) the property which is disposed of (al-nāẓir-lahu), and (4) the form of the will. The law-books contain the following regulations as to these four subjects.

(1) Only those who have the power of independent disposition over their property have the right to make a will; minors are not qualified. Moreover, the wasiyyah is valid only if the testator had the right to dispose of what he left, and if he acted without compulsion. The testator remains qualified if the disposition of his wealth is made either after his death (2) The beneficiary under a will must at the moment at which the will is made be qualified and in a position to become the owner of what is left him. A will made in favour of an unqualified person is not valid, if the child is born within the next six months. Those who already inherit by the enactment of the law have no right to receive further legacies by will. According to tradition, the Prophet forbade the alteration, by means of testamentary disposition, of the shares fixed for them by law (see above, p. 382); if the will is not made in favour of a definite person, but for a hospital, a mosque, or similar institution, then such purpose must be made by a special and written law; e.g. a will in favour of a Christian church or a Catholic religious order is invalid. (3) The objects which are left to any one in the will must be described in the will; in other words, to take possession of them. The testator may, for instance, leave any forbidden musical instruments or dogs to any one; or a copy of the Qur’an, or a Christian slave, to a Jewish unbeliever. (4) No special form of will is prescribed; the law directs only that the testator should make his will clearly known in the presence of persons who can bear witness that he has really made such a testament. It need not be reduced to writing. Besides the allotment of property, the will may contain certain other dispositions, e.g., the appointment of an executor who is charged with the care of the payment of debts, and the division of the estate; further, the appointment of a guardian for the children of the testator who are under age, etc.

The beneficiary of the will first receives possession of the property left him when he has accepted the arrangements of the testator (by means of qabul; see § 10). If he should predecease the testator, his heirs are qualified to accept the will in his favour.

14. Regulations concerning the waqfs. — By a waqf Muslim law means something which is withdrawn from commerce, in order to reserve it for religious purposes or for the benefit of definite persons. To the question whether such disposition is lawful in the eyes of Muslim scholars originally gave various answers. Some considered that the rights of the heir were injured by such dispositions. Others declared that the heirs had no claims on any man’s property so long as he still lived, and, therefore, a man might withdraw his goods from commerce, just as he had the right to contract debts, to set free slaves, and to give away property, to the injury of his heirs. According to Abu Hanifah, a waqf was, to any legal extent, only like a guardian, to a woman during childbirth, to the inhabitants of a district which is suffering severely from plague, etc.; if, during a serious illness, or while he was in other respects insane, or if the person has given away more than 1/4 of his property. If the testator had the right to dispose of what he left, and if he acted without compulsion. If the testator had the right to dispose of what he left, and if he acted without compulsion. The beneficiary under a will must at the moment at which the will is made be qualified and in a position to become the owner of what is left him. A will made in favour of an unqualified person is not valid, if the child is born within the next six months. Those who already inherit by the enactment of the law have no right to receive further legacies by will. According to tradition, the Prophet forbade the alteration, by means of testamentary disposition, of the shares fixed for them by law (see above, p. 382); if the will is not made in favour of a definite person, but for a hospital, a mosque, or similar institution, then such purpose must be made by a special and written law; e.g. a will in favour of a Christian church or a Jewish religious order is invalid. (3) The objects which are left to any one in the will must be described in the will; in other words, to take possession of them. The testator may, for instance, leave any forbidden musical instruments or dogs to any one; or a copy of the Qur’an, or a Christian slave, to a Jewish unbeliever. (4) No special form of will is prescribed; the law directs only that the testator should make his will clearly known in the presence of persons who can bear witness that he has really made such a testament. It need not be reduced to writing. Besides the allotment of property, the will may contain certain other dispositions, e.g., the appointment of an executor who is charged with the care of the payment of debts, and the division of the estate; further, the appointment of a guardian for the children of the testator who are under age, etc.

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withdrawn from commerce; in the latter sense the plural of waqf and ḥāla are waqafa and ḥalās.

The Muslim law-books contain the following regulations concerning waqf. (1) The waqf, i.e. the giving away of a waqf of anything,—No one is qualified to make such a disposition unless he has the independent right of alienating his property. He who withdraws anything from commerce must at the same time be the owner of it; otherwise the disposition is invalid. Unbelievers have the right of making their property a waqf if the purpose of it is not contrary to Islam; e.g., a Christian in a Muslim land is forbidden to make himself dwelling a waqf in order to have it turned into a church.

(2) The maṣūq, or waqf, i.e. that which is made a waqf.—According to the Shi'ites, it is permissible to make a waqf of moveable as well as of immovable property, at least so far as the move-
ables are not immediately destroyed by use (e.g., food, or wax candles which are designed for the illumination of a mosque). Forbidden instruments, books whose contents give signs of unbelief, and those which are too valuable in any case may be made waqf. Many other Muslim scholars regard the regulations concerning waqf as applicable only to immovable property, and recognize only a few exceptions to this rule. According to the Hāțifites, books which may be devotional waqf. Books are also often withdrawn from commerce in all Muslim lands, and especially devoted to an appointed library or mosque.

(3) The maṣūq al-ḥalās, i.e. he who receives benefit from the waqf.—This person must be qualified to make use of the property; e.g., it would not be permissible to make a copy of the Qurʾān waqf, and a believing slave could not make a waqf in favor of unbelievers. Altogether, the person who derived benefit from a waqf must be so indicated that the institution may remain for ever, a difference of opinion exists. Some think that it is necessary for the waqf to indicate an unending fonnt, for he who receives benefit from the waqf is destined; others hold that a waqf has a permanently valid continuation even if this is not specially indicated by the founder; 'if there are no surviving persons who, according to the disposition of the waqf, have a claim to the income of a waqf,' they say, 'then the income is intended for the poor.'

Waqfs need not be exclusively intended for religious or philanthropical purposes; according to the Hāțifites it is expressly stated that the purpose of a waqf is merely permissible. In the Shi'ite law-books it is expressly stated that a waqf may even extend to the advantage of the rich. Many waqfs, such as mosques, cemeteries, and water supplies, are intended for the rich as well as for the poor. The law-books especially recognize the validity of a waqf in favor of one's family. In this case, if any one has decided that property belonging to him shall be a waqf for his children and further descendants, and these become extinct, then, according to the majority of Muslim lawyers, his further relatives have a right to the income of the waqf, and after them the public.

(4) The ṣiyāhah, i.e. the form in which the waqf makes his will known, is not generally subjected to special regulations. It is sufficient if the founder makes his will known by pointing out why property shall be waqf, and to what purpose it must be given. It is, however, not permissible to make the existence of a waqf dependent on a condition or a period of time. Therefore a person cannot say, 'If I get a son, then is my house a waqf,' or if he made his property a waqf for ten years. According to many Muslim writers, one may, however, distin-
guish between waqfs which have a general purpose (e.g., for philanthropical purposes) and those which are intended only for definite persons (e.g., for the descendants of the founder). In the first case the disposition of the waqf must be preserved as far as possible, and thus on the condition of the continu-
ation of a period must be declared invalid, and not the institution itself; in the latter case there is no opening for this, and the waqf itself is invalid.

An exception to this rule is that the waqf may make the existence of a waqf dependent on his own death. He may decide that property shall become a waqf after his death. Such a disposition is, however, subject to the general regulations concerning wills, and may be withdrawn by the owner up to his death: moreover, only ⅓ of the estate may thus be made a waqf, since the heirs have a right to the other ⅔.

IV. PUBLIC LAW. 15. The iḥām. (a) The election of an iḥām.—According to the legal theory, the Muslim community must be guided by an iḥām, who is to be regarded as the Khalīfah (i.e. substitute) of the Prophet. The quarrels as to the iḥām had in the first centuries of Islam divided the Muslims into various religious-political parties, which partially continue to the present day. To them belong especially the Shi'ites and Ḥanafites, who are here accounted for as Muslim. The opinions of these parties differ in many respects—as to political questions, as to who must be regarded as the legitimate iḥām, and as to the requirements which he must fulfill. We cannot at present limit ourselves to a sketch of the regulations which obtain in this matter among the orthodox.

All questions regarding the iḥām must be decided according to the position of affairs during the first thirty years after Muhammad. That period, in which the Muslim community was led by Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān, and 'Abbās—so-called 'rightly guided Khalīfahs' (al-khalīfah al-ṣaḥīḥ) with the help and co-operation of the most faithful comrades of the Prophet, is regarded among orthodox Muslims as the 'Golden Age' of Islam; and, according to them, the principles followed at that time must be regarded as the only correct ones. The iḥām, therefore, like the four immediate successors of the Prophet, must belong to his tribe, and thus be a Qurašī. The Shi'ite doctrine is that the iḥām must be chosen from the descendants of the Prophet. The iḥām is rejected by the orthodox. Moreover, (1) the iḥām must be a free, male Muslim of full age, recognized as 'ādil (see p. 854); (2) he must be competent to manage the business of the State, and, above all, have the spirit and courage to fight against the unbelievers and to protect Muslim territory. (3) The iḥām ought also, properly speaking, to be a Muslim (see p. 808), competent, if necessary, to settle difficult religious
situations on his own authority, just as the immediate successors of Muhammad were held to have been perfect scholars. Since, however, such ijārah was regarded as beyond the reach of later generations, such learning can no longer be demanded even of an imām. (4) An imām may have no physical infirmity, or defect of intellect; serious defects, such as blindness, deafness, or insanity, disqualify a candidate for the office of imāmat. A second successor of the khalīfah was often made blind after his deposition, in order to prevent him from attempting to recover his position.

At the election of an imām it is necessary to follow the principles preserved in the 'Golden Age.' Inheritance, according to the law, gives no claim to the imāmat. Each khalīfah must be elected, and his election is valid only if (1) he, like the first khalīfah Abū Bakr, receives the homage of a certain number of Muslims of high rank ('those who are qualified to bind and loose'); or if, (2) like the second khalīfah Umar, he is appointed by the former imām as his successor. Those who are qualified to bind and loose have the right of electing an imām consist of Muslims of full age, of the male sex, free men who are recognized as 'add, and can judge what persons have the necessary qualifications to be elected as imām, and upon whose nomination the matter is most suitable for the position under existing circumstances.

The election of an imām is a fard al-ḥammah; i.e., as soon as this task is fulfilled by some qualified person, all others are relieved from the duty (see p. 863). 'The election of an imām,' say the Muslim scholars, 'is true, is usually carried out by the leading circles in the capital, and is acquiesced in by the other parts of the land and has the election of Abū Bakr), but the electors in the capital have no right of preference above those in other places.' If different persons are elected as imām in different places, a new election must be held between these candidates. The fāqih are not agreed as to the number of electors which must be demanded for a valid election. Some of them require at least five electors, and in support of this opinion appeal to the third khalīfah 'Uthmān, but others regard the election by even one elector as valid if he is a universally respected and influential man.

If the imām himself nominates his successor, the choice is binding on all Muslims, if the chosen person has the qualities necessary for an imām and expressly accepts his nomination. In appointing his successor the imām need not consult the electors; he may also indicate several persons to succeed him in a definite order after the other. But Muslim lawyers consider that a father has no right to appoint his son as his successor, since they regard no one as capable of forming an unprejudiced judgment as to whether his son is fitted for this high dignity.

(b) The rights and duties of the imām.—The imām is not only the spiritual head of the Muslims, as has been said, but is also regarded as the legal head of the state, and his decisions are regarded as binding on all Muslims. The law forbids the qādi to accept presents, except from his relatives in the direct line (because, according to the law, he can never give a decision in their favour). For the same reason, according to the law, the qādis and judges are forbidden to engage in commerce, because it would be possible to give them exceptional advantages in trade, in order to obtain their favour.

In order to secure the independence of the judge, the law forbids the qādi to accept presents, except from his relatives in the direct line (because, according to the law, he can never give a decision in their favour). For the same reason, according to the law, the qādis and judges are forbidden to engage in commerce, because it would be possible to give them exceptional advantages in trade, in order to obtain their favour.

The judge controls the trial, and is not generally bound by legal regulations for this purpose. He is obliged only to give sufficient opportunity both
to plaintiff and to defendant (al-mudda’si and al-
mudda’a ‘alaiha) to present their declaration and
arguments. He must treat both parties equally;
provided they are both believers; he must also
refrain from exercising influence on the witnesses.
He is permitted to endeavour to bring about
friendly relations between the parties, and to re-
commence the cause of one party to the good will
of the other.

If the defendant admits that the plaintiff is
right, the latter is not obliged to prove his con-
tention. Such an ittir (‘acknowledgment’) may,
however, be considered as valid only if it has been
made before the judge by a defendant of full
age, in full possession of his intellectual faculties,
without any compulsion. If the contention con-
cerns the payment of a debt or other questions
concerning property, he who makes the acknowled-
gement must also be rashid (see p. 871)

If, on the other hand, the defendant contests the
contention of the plaintiff, he cannot lose his ease
until the plaintiff has proved his claim by evidence.
If, however, the matter in hand is so essentially
known to the judge that he can himself give evi-
dence, he may, according to the Shāfī‘ites and
Hanifites, give sentence without further proof on
the sole ground of his personal knowledge; ac-
cording to the Mālikites, he has not this right.
All Muslim schools are agreed that the judge is
never obliged to give sentence on the ground of
formally valid proof, against his better knowledge.

(2) Regarding evidence.-Written documents cannot be regarded as valid evidence
unless their contents are confirmed by trustworthy
witnesses; the force of the proof, however, is then
no longer in the document, but in the oral evidence.
An exception is formalized by rules of domicile,
sent from one judge to another. In practice it is
frequently necessary to recognize exceptions to this
rule.

Legally recognized evidence consists principally
in (1) proof borne by witnesses, and (2) the sworn
testimony of the parties before the judge.

(1) Testimony (shahādah) has the force of proof
only if it is borne by a Muslim of full age, who is
not under guardianship, and is recognized as adād
(see p. 884). If the judge knows a witness per-
sonally, he need not inquire whether he is adād;
otherwise, according to the Shāfī‘ites and Mālik-
ites, he may give no credence to the testimony
till he has received a formal written certificate
that the witness is adād, even though the other
party in the case make no objection to his credi-
bility; according to the Hanifites, such an inquiry
is called for only in the case of adād and qaddā
(see art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Muham-
dan], §§ 2, 5), and if the other party throws
doubt on the credibility of the witness.

Inquiry into the credibility of the witnesses is
usually handed over by the judge to two of his
officers who bear the title of muwāzki, i.e., one who
declares the witness to be sāki (‘without sin,’
‘pure’). In many Muslim lands there are also
persons with the title of adād or shahād, who fill
numerous offices as a notary. They are ap-
pointed by the qādī. If two parties wish to make
an important contract or safe, or to set on foot
other transactions, they may go to such an adād
that he will write the contract. If, later on,
there is litigation between the parties as a result
of this transaction, the ‘adād may be heard by
the judge as a trustworthy witness.

When it is established that a witness is adād, his
evidence is accepted; however, the judge may, without
his having to swear on oath that he will speak the
truth. Only in a few cases may the judge attach
the evidence of an adād no value as proof—e.g.,
when the witness is related in the direct line to
one of the parties and testifies in his favour, or if
he is an enemy of one of the parties and testifies
against him. According to the Hanifites and
Mālikites, husband and wife cannot give valid evi-
dence against each other, though the Shāfī‘ites allow
this.

Since only a few Muslims live so strictly according
with the regulations of the canon law that they may
really be regarded as adād, the judges in
Muslim lands must very often consult witnesses
with the declarations of witnesses who do not fulfil
the legal requirements. In such cases their decla-
rations are not legal testimony in the strict sense.

The testimony of Christians, Jews, and other
unbelievers must be regarded as worthless; the
judge may attach no credence to the declarations
of persons who deny the most important truths
in the sphere of Muhammadanism.

The number of witnesses by whom either of the
cases can prove a declaration depends on the
subject in hand. If the parties are disputing as
to debt or property, then, according to Qur’an, ii.
282, the evidence of at least two men, of one
man and two women, is required; according to
the Shāfī‘ites and Mālikites, one male witness
is in such a case sufficient, if the party who calls
him as a witness is of such a nature that he has spoken the truth
and, according to the Mālikites, even two women in
this case may take the place of the male
witness).

If the case is not concerned with money, the law
demands (a) that the witness of two men, if they
must testify as to subjects which are generally
known only to men—e.g., retaliation and the price
of blood; (b) the testimony of a definite number
of women, if the point has to be proved which are
usually known only to women—e.g., the physical
infirmities of women, foster-relation, child-
birth, etc. As to the number of female witnesses
required in the latter case, the opinion of the
bālāf-scholars differ; the Shāfī‘ites demand four
women or two women and one man, the Māli-
kites two women, and the Hanifites one only. If
the case concerns a hadd, the witness of women
must be regarded as worthless; in this case proof
can usually be given only by two male witnesses
and in cases of adultery only by four male
witnesses.

(2) The oath (gamin), according to the Shāfī‘ites
and Mālikites, may be administered by the judge
to one of the parties in order to prove that
one of his male witness or of two female witnesses
a sufficient proof. The defendant is obliged to take
an oath that the plaintiff is in the wrong, if the
latter cannot prove his claims legally. If the
defendant refuses to take this oath, the plaintiff,
according to the Shāfī‘ites, must be given the
verdict if he is ready to swear to the truth of
his contention; according to the Hanifites, this
oath of the plaintiff is not necessary, and the judge
must immediately condemn the defendant if he
refuses to swear that the plaintiff was in the
wrong; according to the Mālikites, the oath of
the plaintiff is required only in some special cases.

The expiration of a long time is not properly
cognized in Muslim law as a means of acquiring property or gaining
freedom from debt, but, when it appears that the
debtor has neglected to institute a suit for an exceptionally long
time without good reason, this must be regarded as a proof
that he knows himself that he had no case. As to the length of this
term of limitation the opinions of Muslim scholars differ.
In practice an ordinance of the Turkish Sultan is commonly
used, under which the term is fifteen years (see O. Snouck Hurgronje,
‘Iets over verjaring in het Moesmaat recht,’ in Tijdschrift Batavisch Geschtschap,
xiii. [1903] 305-427).

17. The holy war (jihād).—(a) The duty of
believers to take part in the holy war (jihād).—


Another important religious duty of the *inām* and the Muslim community is the holy war against unbelievers—the *jihād* (i.e. 'to take trouble, to contest, engage in the fight'; *fard al-aʿzām* of Allāh)—in order violently to convert the heathen to the true faith, or at least to subject them to the yoke of Islam.

In the earliest period of Islam, Muslims were compelled to take the offensive against the unbelieving inhabitants of Mecca who persecuted and ill-treated them, but after the Hijrāth the position was altered. In Qurān, xxii. 39-42, Allāh declared that in the Muslim community (i.e. the Muslims abroad) he permitted the unbelievers to defend themselves if they were attacked, and that in so doing they could count on God's support.

"When they strive against your persecutors," it is stated in these verses of the Qurān, "it is permissible: Allāh is powerful enough to help those who are driven out of their homes unrighteously, merely because they said, "Allāh is our Lord." If God did not help men against each other, hermitages, churches, synagogues, and all places of prayer where God's name is often glorified would be rendered desolate, etc.

This permission to offer defence against attacks was soon afterwards changed into a command to attack the unbelievers, and, since the various expeditions for robbery and pillage on both sides brought about a state of perpetual war between the inhabitants of Mecca and the Muslims at Medina, the *jihād* gradually became one of the most important religious duties of Muhammad's adherents.

Of Qurān, ii. 218-219: "The strife is prescribed for you; you have, it is true, an antipathy to it, but it is possible that you have an antipathy to that which nevertheless is good for you. Those who could personally take part in the campaign must at least pay the Muslims by payments of money according to their means. Even after Mecca was taken, and the inhabitants had been converted to Islam, the *jihād* against unbelievers remained a religious duty. Though the Prophet at that time did not persecute the heathen for their unbelief alone, the *jihād* against many tribes of the heathen Arabs was necessary because they frequently broke their treaty and otherwise showed signs of their untrustworthiness and dangerous disposition. The doctrine that all heathen must be subjected to Islam because of their unbelief first arose in the time of the first Conquests, after the death of the Prophet, when Meḥdi ruled. He had conquered an extensive territory outside Arabia, and in making tributaries of many unbelievers. At that time the Prophet is said to have declared: 'I am commanded to fight against men until they bear witness that there is no God but Allāh, and that Muhammad is God's messenger; only by pronouncing these words can they make their property and blood secure from me.'

The *jihād* is a duty for every male Muslim who is free, of full age, and not only in the full possession of his intellectual powers, but also physically fit for service and able to obtain the necessary weapons. A son, however, may not go to war without the permission of his parents (if they are Muslims), or a debtor without the permission of his creditor.

According to the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī, no one is bound to the *jihād* unless he has previously committed any disloyalty towards the Prophet. To the Sunnīs of the various schools by the sustenance of believers must be maintained. Only in case of an attack by unbelievers and the invasion of a Muslim land is participation in the *jihād* an individual duty (fard al-aʿzām) for all Muslims, and for all threatened districts and for all believers living in the neighbourhood. If the land is conquered by unbelievers, according to the *ṣūrah* of the later scholars, every Muslim who is in a position to leave the land is then obliged to do so. It is equally possible, at least if he is hindered in the practice of his religious duties.

All lands not belonging to the 'territory of Islam' (dar al-šarīʿa) must gradually be conquered by the Muslims, and are therefore called 'territory of the war' (dar al-harb). The *inām* has to settle when the attack shall be begun. According to theory, one campaign at least must be undertaken against the unbelievers every year; but this became impossible in the later periods, and, according to several Muslim scholars, at present it may be regarded as sufficient if the *inām* keeps the army in good condition and trains it for carrying on the *jihād*.

The many regulations concerning the ways in which Muslims must wage the *jihād* cannot be treated in detail here; they have no practical importance for the later generations. Speaking generally, the war must be carried on as humanely as possible, the helpless must not be killed, and the property of the enemy must not be needlessly destroyed. Before the *inām* invades territory inhabited by unbelievers, he must urge the inhabitants to be converted to Islam. If he neglects this, according to the Shāfiʿīs (but not the other *fāqhi* schools), the *dīya* must be paid for every believer who is killed by payments of money according to their means. Even after Mecca was taken, and the inhabitants had been converted to Islam, the *jihād* against unbelievers remained a religious duty. Though the Prophet at that time did not persecute the unbelievers for their unbelief alone, the *jihād* against many tribes of the heathen Arabs was necessary because they frequently broke their treaty and otherwise showed signs of their untrustworthiness and dangerous disposition.

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(6) Regulations concerning booty.—The sharing of the *ghānī* by those among whom they have a claim to it is correctly regulated in the *fāqhi-*books. The regulations on this subject depend on Qurān, viii. 42. This verse was revealed when the Muslims had obtained great booty in the battle of Badr, and it was necessary to establish rules for its division. Among the ancient Arabians the head of the tribe usually received a fixed proportion (e.g., a quarter) of the booty, while the rest was divided among the fighting men of the tribe. The head of the tribe received the largest share, but was bound to heavy expenditure in the interests of the tribe. He had, above all, to maintain the honour of the tribe, by hospitality and kindness not only to his relations but to all who had need of help, such as the old, widows, orphans, the poor, and the guests of the tribe. He was expected to share this wealth with this old Arabian custom, Qurān, viii. 42, regulated the division of the *ghānī* in the following words: 'Know that of that which you make booty a fifth part belongs to Allāh— to His messenger, his family, the orphans, the poor, and travellers—if you believe in Allāh,' etc. Thus the head of the Muslim community, i.e. Allāh or His messenger, for the future took the place of the former head of the tribe, and had to use the fifth part of the booty for the same purposes as the Arabian heads of the tribes had formerly been accustomed to use it. According to Muslim law, § of the booty of war must be divided among the troops which have taken part in the battle. If a Muslim kills an unbeliever in battle, according to the Shāfiʿīs, he has a right to his weapons (waṣab; but, according to the Ḥanafī and Maliki, the Muslim has not expressly made this condition with the *inām* beforehand. The remaining fifth part (khums), according to the Shāfiʿī system, based on the words of Qurān, viii. 42, must be divided into five equal parts. One of these is to be given to the Prophet, and the other four to the various calling by which the sustenance of
death be used for the common good of the general Muslim community, and the four remaining parts are to be given respectively to (1) the relatives of the deceased, (2) the orphans, (3) the poor, and (4) travelers, at least so far as they have need of help. According to the Hanafites, the share of the Prophet has lapsed since his death, and so also has that of his family, so that the khums must be divided among the relatives, the poor, and travelers.

To the booty belong not only the weapons and mounts which have been captured in battle, but all moveable property of the enemy; on the other hand, the land and all immovable property in conquered territory is not divided as booty (see below, § 13 (a)). Prisoners are also part of the booty. If unbelievers are converted to Islam before they fall into the hands of the conquerors, they and their children must be regarded by the Muslims as fellow-believers, and they also keep their property. In the opposite case they become slaves (the men as well as the women and children) and are divided among the persons who have a right to a share in the booty. The former are considered prisoners of war, according to the Shāfīites and Malikites, they may spare them and set them free, either in exchange for ransom or for Muslim prisoners of war, or even without compensation.

Right and duties of unbelievers in Muslim lands.—(a) Tribute.—The population of the lands conquered by Muhammad after Muhammad’s death originally retained their old faith. They were allowed to retain their old dwellings in both the towns and in the country; but they had to pay tribute to their conquerors. The tribute consisted chiefly of payment of part of the harvest. Villages and sometimes whole districts were commanded by the magistrates to deliver definite quantities of crops, which were afterwards converted into money by the Muslim officials. The forms of government existing in the ancient times in the different districts were preserved in many respects.

The tribute is called both jizyah and khārij; both names have originally the same meaning. The word jizyah is taken from Qur’an, ix, 29: ‘Strive against them till they shall declare the faith in Allah and the Last Day, and do not regard as forbidden what Allah and His messenger forbid, until they pay you jizyah in abatement.’ Muslim writers are accustomed to explain jizyah as that which is paid as compensation by the pople of the Book because the Muslims allow them to keep both their faith and their life and give them protection. Khārij, on the other hand, is borrowed from the language of the conquered, especially in Iraq, where the word is used in the general sense of taxation. Later on, however, a difference was made between the two words, khārij being taken to mean—probably because it was originally understood in the sense of produce of the field—connection with the occupation of land, in distinction from jizyah, which came to be used exclusively in the sense of poll-tax.

The land in the conquered territories was declared by Muhammad’s successors to be a national domain, in agreement with the opinions of the companions of the Prophet. They would not divide the land among the troops, but kept it as a permanent source of income for all future generations of Muslims. The conquered nations were allowed to cultivate the land as they had formerly done, but they had to pay part of the produce as tribute (khārij).

The Prophet himself had acted in some respects in the same way at the conquest of certain districts inhabited by Jews to the north of Medina. When these places fell into the hands of the Muslims without much fighting, the Prophet decreed that the captured land should not be divided among the Muslim troops, but, like the khums of the generations, share of his personal disposition. See Qur’an, lit. 7: ‘What God allows to fall to His messenger as faṣr belongs to God—to His messenger, his family, his orphans, his poor, and travelers; accept what God’s messenger gives you, but refrain from that which he forbids you; fear God, for His punishment is severe.’

Applying the intention was that property which could not be regarded as booty should be managed by the Prophet, in order that the income might be used in the same way as the fifth part of the booty.

The land which was declared to belong to the State dominion in conquered countries was also called faṣr, and to secure the use of the income of the faṣr-land to the Muslim community it was arranged that khārij should be for ever attached to the possession of that land. Even if the population which cultivated the land went over to Islam, they were considered to pay khārij. This rule has proved unworkable in practice, since the payment of the khārij was regarded as an act of submission to which only unbelievers could submit. The new converts rejected this obligation, in spite of all measures taken by the magistrate. After their conversion they refused to pay more than the tithe which the Arabic Muslims were also obliged to pay from the product of their harvests.

In the second century after the Hijrah several separate works were written by Muslim scholars about the khārij. Among these is the well-known book written by Abū Yusuf at the instance of the ‘Abd Allāh Khalīf Al-Musārī. In these works it is accurately established which lands belonged to the faṣr-territory and were thus the State’s dominion, and how much their inhabitants must pay as tribute. But, after the whole population had gradually accepted the faith of the Arabian conquerors, and the sharp distinction between them and the latter was becoming less and less marked, the payment of the khārij passed completely out of use. Both the Arabs who had joined the State dominion as new converts refused to submit to such a tribute, and in the end the land was no longer regarded as faṣr-land.

(b) Poll-tax, and other obliterations of the dhimmis.—In the later law-books there is usually no longer an exhaustive discussion of the khārij, but only of the jizyah. By this it was understood in later times, as has already been noted, a fixed sum of money which was to be paid per head by unbelievers as tribute (on the ground of Qur’an, ix, 29). According to the Shāfīites, only the akhl al-khitāb, i.e. possessors of a revelation (esp. Christians and Jews who already confessed their faith before Muhammad had preached Islam [see above, p. 569]), are allowed to submit to the Muslims on condition that they shall pay the jizyah. Other believers must, acc. 1

1. See O. H. Becker, Papyri Schott-Reinhardt, i. (Heidelberg, 1900) 37 ff.
cording to them, be fought against until they have accepted Islam. According to the other figh-schools, the regulations concerning the jizyah and dhimmis are not the same. The latter may be permitted to submit to the Muslims and at the same time to retain their faith. According to the Hanafites, the heathen Arabs were the only exception to this rule; and, according to the Hanbali, the heathen Quraishites, that only these had to choose between death and conversion to Islam.

The submission of unbelievers must take the form of a statement by which the rights and duties of both parties are accurately described. The unbelievers must bind themselves to pay the jizyah, and to fulfill the other duties that Islam enjoins on them. The Muslims in exchange for this must bind themselves for the future not only to leave them in peace, but also to protect them. The subjugated unbelievers who are thus under the protection (dhimmisah, i.e. responsibility) of the Muslims are therefore called dhimmis in the law-books.

Only those dhimmis who are of full age, free, male, and in full possession of their intellectual faculties are obliged to pay jizyah. According to the Shafiites, the amount of this payment depends on the agreement made at the drawing-up of the set of submission; the imam or his deputy must demand at least one dinar per head, but, if it is provided, preferably more; according to the Malikites, the Imam has the right to set in the interests of the Muslims according to his own judgment; according to the Hanafites, he has no choice, but must demand from every poor dhimmis one dinar, from each who is well to two dinars, and from each who has four dinars. According to the conviction of Muslims, however, at the 'end of the days' Jesus will once more come back to the earth and show to Christians as well as to Jews that Islam is the only true religion. In the ideal period, which will begin at His coming, all unbelievers must be converted, and the jizyah can no longer be accepted from any one.

Like other taxes which unbelievers have to pay (e.g., the customs which they must pay for their goods if they trade in Muslim lands), the jizyah belongs to the fas. As to the question how the imam must use the money belonging to the fas, there is a difference of opinion among the figh-schools.

According to the Shafiites, the rules concerning the division of the fas must be divided between the same five categories of persons who have a right to the musma of the body, while the remaining four are destined for the general interests of Muslims. According to the Hanafites and Malikites, the rules concerning the distribution of the body are not applicable to the fas, but the whole fas must be used in the interests of all Muslims (e.g., for the payment of judges, troops, and officials, for the building of forts, roads, bridges, mosques, etc.). Unbelievers in Muslim lands not only have to pay tribute, but are also subjected to other regulations which involve indignities; e.g., they have to fasten a coloured piece of cloth (ghiydr) on their clothes, and wear a special kind of girdle (sumurud), in order that they may readily be distinguishable from Muslims. Christians must preferably wear a blue, Jews a yellow ghiydr. They may not ride on horseback, their head must not be as high as, or higher than, those of their Muslim Mahometan neighbours, and they must carry no weapons. They must not give offence to Muslims—e.g., by ringing their church-bells, or by openly alighting Islam, their Qur'an, by drinking wine, eating pork, etc. On the other hand, they may practise their own religious observances. In the towns in which at the conquest of the land there were war churches or synagogues, they may not be built later; Christians and Jews may restore these buildings only if they are in danger of ruin; according to Abu Hanifah, even this was permitted only in those lands which had not been conquered but had voluntarily submitted to the approach of the Muslim army. As a matter of fact, however, in the first centuries of Islam the Muslims conceded to Christians much greater freedom as to the building of churches and synagogues, as is shown in ZDMG xxxviii. [1884] 674. Otherwise, the dhimmis are in many respects on an equality with their Muslim fellow-citizens: they may acquire property in the lands of Islam and carry on trade; the last is usually not permitted even to unbelievers who have not submitted.

Livres de la face des musulmans, Fr. tr. by M. A. Perron, Algiers, 1889; Joanny-Pharaon and T. Dulas, Droit musulman, Paris, 1840.


JURISPRUDENCE LAW.—N. B. E. Basille, A Digest of Mohammedan Law, ii. (containing the doctrines of the Imamite code of jurisprudence), London, 1869, 1889; A. Querry, Droit musulman, (suivi du texte concernant les musulmanes skhoutis, Paris, 1877-78; N. von Tornau, Das musulmische Recht aus den Quellen dargestellt, Leipzig, 1890.

LAW (Roman).—1. Fas and ius.—According to Roman ideas, had a double foundation, being based partly upon divine revelation and partly upon human ordinances. Hence the distinction of the distinction between fas and ius, and this again corresponds to the division of the law into ius divinum and ius humanum: 1

Fas ex iure divino, ius ex humananeque iuris peruasit: nam ad religiones fas, ad homines iuris pertinent (Serv. Georg. 1. 299); the explanatory clause, however, fails to hit the mark, as the distinctive character of the fas lay, not in its relation to religious things—there were also secular laws ('jus humanum)—but in its divine origin (cf. Cic. Orig. ii. ii. 2; 'fas iuris divinae, ius lex humanae'); Cl. de Haenep. Resp. 34, 'exercet fas contra ius humanum intersecutur... ius legatum cum hominis praestido munitum sit, tum iusto divino luce esse valutatum'; Livy, xxvii. xiv. 15, 'ubi ius fas crederent coeli...'; ibid. 16, 'ubi nec divini quicquam nec humani sanctum semper'; ius humanum semper posterius; ius sanctissimum semper ius humanum.

On the other hand, the later division of the law into ius sacrarium, ius publicum, and ius privatum—i.e., a distinction unknown in professional jurisprudence—does not rest upon diversity of origin, but is based upon the division of affairs into ius sacrum, ius publicum, and ius privateum. The groups the rae sacrum (and re religionis) come under ius divinum, and the other two under ius humanum. The fact that the term fas is neuter and undeclinable shows that the concept was a pure abstraction; the attempts to personify it were of relatively late date, and never quite 1 Quintil. Inst. Or. iv. iii. 33; Auson. Erpich. terr. num. 61.

2 Mommsen, Staatsrecht, ii. 82.

3 Gaius, Inst. ii. 2, 'Summa iurisque romani divisa in duo articulos diductorit: nam aliue sunt divini iuris, aliue humani; divini iuris sunt vel sancti vel profani; vel sancti sunt aut humani sunt aut privati' (cf. Mommsen, loc. cit.).
succeeded, for the prayer which Livy (I. xxxii. 6) puts into the mouth of the Pater potiusrat at the Foes of the Foes and which begins with the invocation, "aud iudicium, audite fines, audiat Fas," (cf. VIII. v. 8, "audite Iuso Fasque"), shows traces of extensive adulteration by annalistic tradition, while the deity when later poets designate Fas as the "Fates of Dirce," Hero. Eur. 658; Valer. Place. I. 796) is in reality the Greek Themis. This view of fas never found admission into the cultus, while, on the other hand, the divine personification of ius—i.e. Instit—was in the Augustan Age not merely represented as the polity as the counterpart of the Greek Dike, but even honored by the erection of a special temple.

To the Romans fas was by no means simply an eternal and universal law, just as equally required for all peoples and for all times, and naturally and therefore traceable to a divine source—a jus naturale or caro fidei Theos—an authority, in the later period and under the influence of Greek philosophy it was certainly not a law in an indefinite abstraction of this kind, for, in the sense of a natural or customary law, even without written formulation, fas was conjoined with the mos maiorum, or with folias, and the classical jurists sometimes criticized this for an illegitimity of action, and the frequent expression fas est came to be a maxim of Roman law of higher authority; it was from this point of view, in fact, that the phrase "contra fas" was often simply a rather severe characterization of the illegality of an action, and the frequent expression fas est came to be used as a maxim of higher authority: "Hic fas est!" Hence, "fier potes!" Originally, however, the scope of the fas did not extend beyond the Roman people. Nor had the fas existed from eternity: it was believed that the founders of the Roman State had made a pact with certain deities, to whom therefore became the national gods, and, while this pact secured for the Roman people the protection and favour of these gods, and therefore also all good fortune and prosperity, it was likewise required from them the strict fulfilment of certain clearly defined duties and commandments.

These divine laws were all included under the one term, fas, which, accordingly, was not confined to the above-mentioned law, but, as e.g., those referring to the relation of children to parents, etc., but comprehended also the extensive and irrelative ritual law in its entirety. We have the clearest example of this in the ancient document which makes mention of fas and its opposite nefas, viz. the Roman Calendar of festivals. That the abbreviations Q:R:G:F and Q:ST:D:F found there are to read as "quando rex comitavit fas" and "quando sternen delatum dicebat fas", as was already proved on adequate grounds; moreover, the symbol F and N attached to the majority of the days in the calendar meant originally, not fastus and nefastus, as was assumed, but fastum and nefastum, as is shown by the symbol N:F:P, subsequently contracted to FP, and signifying "fas feriae publicae." In these phrases fas may be construed grammatically only as the predicative noun of a clause which would run: "hoc die leges agere fas est:" "fas est" signifies "is in accordance with fas," just as "iust est" was employed in an analogous sense. Thus the distinctively Roman practice of dividing the year into the two classes of "holy days" and "working days," belonging respectively to the gods and to men, comes under the fas. As bearing a like sense, and with express reference to the ordinances of sacred law, the word fas is frequently used not only in the technical phraseology of sacred things, but also in the literature generally, as, e.g., with reference to dedication (Cic. de Domino subs. 138), the legal position of "locas sacra" (Paul. Dig. XXX. iii. ii. 17. 3), questions of fas as of religious authority; fas was from this point of view, in fact, something more than a legal maxim: it was a law which enjoined the observance of the religious commandments, and gave binding force to the observance of them, as it were, by a divine imperative. Thus, "contra fas" still bears the pregnant sense of a violation of divine law, and passages of like tenor are of frequent occurrence down to the later literary period.

It is a widely prevalent view that the ius was disengaged from the fas in relatively late times, and was indeed developed from it, and that in a broad sense the whole public and private law of the Romans rested upon the basis of the religious law. This theory, however, requires considerable qualification, as has recently been most efficiently shown by L. Mittels (op. cit. p. 22f). Mittels (p. 28) rightly emphasizes the circumstance that there is hardly a single significant trace of the influence of the fas in the law of property as relating to living persons, while the occasional occurrence of fas and ius in family law and the law of inheritance for earlier centuries of the religious law is connected with the fact that marriage was regarded as a "divini humanique iuris communicatio" (Modestinus, Dig. XXXIII. ii. 11), and all the questions relating to the sacri of family and clan came as decisively within the province of the fas as questions relating purely to property within that of the ius. In criminal jurisprudence a religious penal law of earlier origin maintained a place beside a later secular one, and the provisions of each are clearly distinguished by the form of the punishment imposed (sanctio); thus, while the secular law regulates the execution of the penalty to the authorities, and attaches definite penalties in person or property to particular crimes, the religious law knows nothing whatever of penalties inflicted by human means, but either declares that the trespass against a sacred ordinance can be made good by the proper expiation, offering (plicatio) or else, by the voluntary consent of the infractor and his friends (plicatio).
nouncing the formula 'sacer esto,' devotes the offender to the death for such punishment as the latter may decree. The lex sacrae with which the inviolability of the plebanian magistracy was guaranteed, at the same time, as purely simple law, which pronounced the sentence (sanctio) 'sacer esto,' just as, in fact, the penalty imposed on one who violated the privileges of the plebs was, according to the literary tradition, 'as carcere, familia ad edem Cereris, Liberis, Liberaeque venenum iet.' What we have here, accordingly, is not a secular ordinance in the forms of public law, but a contract under the protection of the fas. The person declared to be sacer was a proscribed outlaw, and any one had the right to execute the divine sentence under which he lay, and might kill him with impunity. The same consequences were incurred by one who committed an act of violence upon a tribune of the people, though at a later period the State itself saw to the due infliction of the penalty by secular law, viz., by bringing the crime before the magistrates in the form of a process of peremunition. A much later development of the sentence 'sacer esto' by a secular penalty is authorized also by the Law of the XII Tables as given by Pliny, 

Hence the term 'sacramanum,' the implications of which A. Rosenberg (Hermes, xcviii. [1913] 369 ff.), whose arguments so frequently carry conviction, has failed to grasp with sufficient clearness. 

2 Livy, iv. 57; cf. Dion. Hal. vi. 1, xvi. 3, xlii. 3. 
3 Fest. p. 318; Macr. Sat. iii. 7; Dion. Hal. i. x. 3; cf. also W. W. Fowler, Journal of Roman Studies, i. (1911) 57 ff. 
4 Cic. pro Tullio, 67, *legem antiquam de legibus sacraulis, quae supinam impune occisi cum, qui tribunum plebis pulexverit,* 
6 Mommsen, Röm. Strassflekt, Leipzig, 1890, p. 621. 
7 Festus, *persequendis.* 
8 Vaticanum, Torquem. Hagiogr., 207. 
10 The sequence in Verg. Georg. i. 269 ('fas et iura simul') and Cic. de legibus ('fas legis est') is due no doubt to the writers' conscious purpose; in Livy, xvi. 3, in the ideas of his author, a regular use has been made of *fas legis est* from the traditional reading. 
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reach, as, e.g., affairs of international law, which regulated the relations of war and peace among the nations; thus Tacitus speaks of the 'fas gentium' 1 and the 'fas armorum et ius hostium.' 2 Codification of the 'fas' was greatly simplified in the belief that there could be no complete or public codification of the ordinances of the ius divinum, as, although the latter was traced back to a definite common stock with the gods, the gods themselves did not develop as a result of a gradual development. The duty of preserving this sacred law was committed to the State priests, who had, as required, to give their professional opinions for the enlightenment and instruction both of the authorities and of private individuals. There was, however—apart from the penal authority of the Pontifex Maximus in relation to his subordinate priests—no official administration of sacred law, and no official infliction of its penalties. In general, offences against the fas were regarded as falling under the maxim 'deorum injuria dis curae' (Tac. Ann. i. 73), and the piaula assigned to particular ritual misdeeds were not specified, but were designed simply to show the delinquent how he might propitiate the offended deity. A person who did not avail himself of this opportunity, and who refused to offer the required piaulaem, or one who violated the fas in so flagrant a manner that expiation was deemed impossible, was inspissus, was excluded from the pax deorum, even if neither the sacred nor the secular authorities took proceedings against him; 3 the only thing that could affect such an offender, indeed, was the reformulary of the Censor. Those who violated the ordinance regarding holy days, or did not fulfil a vow that they had made, or broke an oath made by appealing to the gods, did not thereby become liable to human retribution as at all on the part of the magistrates; and even with regard to those provisions of the sacred law which, by means of the formula 'sacer esto,' committed the defender to the divine retribution, the intervention of the State in the infliction of punishment was, as noted above, a later development. Likewise, in cases which did not relate to penal offences at all, but involved civil matters falling within the scope of the fas, such as marriage, all violations were supposed to fall under the required fulfilment of a vow, the inheritance of the sacra familia, etc., the priests did not deliver a judgment that could be enforced by law, but merely gave an opinion regarding the legal position, and its invalidation would be almost always accepted by the parties concerned.

Corresponding to the respective spheres of the several colleges of priests, the codification of the ius divinum is found in three distinct forms, viz. the ius pontificio, the ius augurale, and the ius fetale. The ius fetale contained the articles relating to matters of international law which could not be consummated without religious ceremonies, and also the form of such ritual; the vital element in the ius augurale was the widely ramified and imposing doctrine of the auspices; the ius pontificio embraced not only the ritual ordinances designed for the guidance of the priests, i.e. the ceremonial law in the proper sense, but also all the essential principles of the legal and other relations between the Roman citizen or the Roman nation and the State gods; and in a certain sense, all alike as individuals and as a people, attached the utmost significance to the maintenance of the ius deum, and as 'religiississimi mortales' (Sallust, Cat. xii. 3) applied themselves to their religious duties. 

1 Mommsen, Ius Pontificum et ius gentium juristi. 
2 Hist. iv. 45; cf. Ann. i. 10, 'contra ius disciplinum' Justin, xxxvii. iii. 8, 'praeter communem bellantium fas.' 
3 Mommsen, Strassflekt, p. 36f.
concerns with the most painful conscientiousness, this pontifical law bore upon every phase of private and public life, so that the Pontifex Maximus was actually designated as "indux atque arbitror rerum divinarum maximus" (Pempta, p. 85). This certainly does not in the least imply that the jurisdiction of the Pontifices, as of all other priests, was wholly confined to the province of the ius divinum; nevertheless those invested with this dignity officiously pronounced and administered the fas, had, on the one hand, the opportunity of acquiring great experience in the application and interpretation of law, and thus also great acuteness in juridical thinking and reasoning; while, on the other hand, in view of the numerous points at which the fas came into touch with questions of secular life and secular law, they required to have a thorough knowledge of the ius civile also, so that the Pontifices were the earliest jurists of Rome, and in virtue of their responses exercised no small influence upon the development of the civil law as well. It should be noted, however, that these responses, so far as they transcended the ordinary practice of the college, were not official deliverances, and thus were never given by the collegium as a whole, but were pronounced by individual Pontifices, who in such things had no higher authority than a private person learned in the art of the civil law. The body of consulting lawyers was largely recruited from among the Pontifices the ancient reading of the history, to which modern scholars have attached too much importance, wisely assumed that the Pontifical college as such was chiefly concerned in the preservation and application of the civil law, and asserted that the form of words necessary to the institution of a suit (the legis actiones) was officially pronounced by O. Faber and F. Pictor, the comprehensive treatises of M. Antistius Labeo and C. Atius Capito may be singled out for special mention.

An important step in the publication of the sacred law was taken when the register of court-days and holy days, the Fasti, was made accessible to the public—an event brought about, as Mommsen rightly infers from Cie. ad Att. vi. 8, by the promulgation of the Code of the XII Tables; while the well-known disclosure of Cn. Flavins, the protector of the revolutionary Apius Claudius, Censor in 312 B.C., marks the earliest issue of the calendar in a codified form. Another extensive collection of articles from the sacred law, the publication of which cannot be precisely dated, was current among the jurists of the later period under the title of Jus Papirianum, and was annotated by Granius Flaccus, a contemporary of Cæsar. The meaning of the name 'Papirianum' had been forgotten by the ancients themselves, but was believed to have gone back to an editor called Papirius (the papirium or papyrus) said to have been the first Pontifex Maximus after the expulsion of the kings, while a rather unconvincing modern theory would assign the compilation to Sextus Papirius, the author of a jurist of Cicero's time, who was also a pupil of Q. Mucius Scévola. While the collection as a whole may be of fairly late date, there can be no doubt that its individual statutes go back to a very remote period and were drawn from the writings of the Pontifices. They are called Leges Regiae, and were arranged in the order of the kings to whom—somewhat arbitrarily, it is clear—they were ascribed. As regards their matter, they lie wholly within the range of the ius divinum, and, in cases where they prohibit something, the penalties imposed are exclusively of a religious kind—the offering of a pecuniarium for less serious offences, and, for more serious, condemnation by the formula 'ex commisso regibus, etc.' (dies de ritu sacrificii) (cf. also Macr. Sat. iii. xii. 5). In all cases where the code seems to encroach upon the sphere of secular law, it deals with matters which originally were regulated by the fas alone, but were subsequently concerned in the ordinary criminal law, as appears to have been the case even with paricidium. The ordinances of the fas formulated in the Leges Regiae bore with special frequencies in which private law was palpably defective, as, e.g., the unintentional slaying of a human being, and many questions of family law: thus we find ordinances concerning the punishment of children who ill-treat their parents, the exposure of children, the repudiation and selling of wives, the period of a widow's mourning and her re-marriage, etc.; the protection of clients and landmarks also fell within the scope of the sacred law. When the extreme penalty of death ('sacer esto') is imposed, the delinquent to whom the criminal is delivered are always those of the earliest Roman cultus, and above all Jupiter, Vĕdovis, and the divi parentum or divi sacerdotum.

1 Macr. Sat. ii. xi. 5; Paul. Dip. i. xvi. 144; in Pompon. Dip. i. ii. 23, it is wrongly designated as "ius papirianum"; in Serv. En. xii. 360, it is called "lex Papiria." 2 Paul. Dip., loc. cit. 3 Mommi. Hist. xxvi. 4; cf. further A. Schweiger, Römische Geschichten, Hall, 1876, i. 54. 4 F. F. Bremer, Jurisprudentia antehistorica quae superstant, Leipzig, 1856-1861, i. 333 f. 5 Pompon. Dip. i. ii. 23. 6 Cf. esp. O. Hirschfeld, Études sur les lois sacrées, Berlin, 1812, p. 229 f. 7 Pompon. Dip. i. ii. 23; Livy, vi. 10. 8 This appears from Fest. p. 238, "in regis Romuli et Tatii legitimis;" in Serv. Ænilii haeco esse. 9 E.g. Paedicum armum funereum: si tuncis, funebre cum dei essentiam agnanti funerem cadaver; (Paul. p. 232; cf. Aus. Gell. iv. 3, 3.) 10 E.g. quisqueam alliae facit, ipsum iovi sacer est (Paul, p. 6). 11 As, etc., in the presentation of the spolia opima (Fest. p. 188).

11 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
12 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
13 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
14 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
15 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
16 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
17 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
18 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
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37 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
38 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
39 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
40 (O. Pliny, HN xiv. 88, "vino rogum ne regartio.")
ancestral spirits. The Aspera to whom one half of the husband's property was assigned when he unjustly repudiated his wife must undoubtedly have been the ancient Roman goddess Tellus, of whom we read as the goddess of marriage; and to her husband, brother of the wolf of Latium ("fossa bos"), which, according to Plut. Nero, 12, was demanded from a widow who married again during her period of mourning. The Ceres to whom the spoiler of crops was delivered was without doubt the Greek Demeter; it was the latter, however, to whom, as Ceres Liber and Ceres Liberina, the statues of the Leges Sacrae (a reproduction of the Leges Regiae) assigned the property of one who infringed the privileges of the plica.

As the sentence of 'sacer esto' was attached only to the statutes derived from the sphere of the ancient fas, we must not, with Mommsen (Strafrecht, p. 900 ff.), regard the formula as equivalent to the capital penalty of the secular law; in reality it simply handed the offender over to divine retribution, nor did it ever signify more than this except so far as the State supplemented the religious idea by a civil one. The youth who beat his father, and thereby became 'divis parentum sacer' was not called to account by the civil magistrates, though in legislating for certain other offences the State fixed definite penalties and so furnished them with the means to enforce them. As we saw above (p. 885), the peculiarity of the penalty imposed by the XII Tables upon the injurer of crops ('suspensum Cereri necari' [Pliny, HN xvii. 12]) clearly shows that the secular penalty of crucifixion was an addition to the older religious penalty of 'Cereri sacer esto.' The like holds good with regard to another offence: if a patron wilfully injured his client, he was, by a lex regia ascribed to Romulus, delivered, as sacer, to Vedovis (Dion. Hal. II. x. 5), and the XII Tables formulated this ordinance as 'patronus si clienti fraudem fecerit, sacer esto' (Serv. Aen. vi. 608); the fact that the deity's name is omitted in the latter formulation shows that the phrase 'sacer esto' had lost its original meaning, for it was necessary that the sentence of sacratio should always specify a particular deity. That the whole procedure of consecratio bonorum lay outside the sphere of secular justice, and belonged exclusively to that of religious law, to which all formal judicial procedure was alien, appears from the fact that the consecratio bonorum, which was still inflicted in his day, and manifestly on the ground of the Leges Sacrae, by the tribunes of the people upon those who resisted them, was carried out in purely religious forms, and neither required a forensic process nor permitted of an appeal.

As the jus divinum was believed to have come into being at the foundation of the city, it could of course be developed indirectly by the expositions of the priests, but could not be added to by the creation of fresh laws. From the institution of the Republic, accordingly, there was no specific sacred legislation, and the ius sacrum was a division of the ius publicum, as finds clear expression in the formula with which the magistrate rejected private claims to property, 'ant sacramum aut publicum esse,' i.e., 'the property of the gods and that of the State are one in relation to private property.' In the so-called Lex de imperio Vespasiani the two great divisions of divinae res and publicae res (the publicae res embracing also the sacrae res) are not conjoined in such a way as to imply that the latter pair is a subdivision of the humanae res; and Ulpian's definition of secular jurisdiction as 'divinamque jurisprudemiam rerum notitias, iustaeque atque instiustae scientiam' (Dig. 1. 1. 10. 2) no longer recognizes any distinction between sacred and secular law.

LAW (Teutoonic and Slavonic).—Terms denoting 'law.'—As the conceptions of justice and law are everywhere of higher antiquity than the knowledge and use of writing, we may assume that among the Teutons and the Slavs the idea of the 'law' was one time only θέσων τα πάντα, 'unwritten laws.' The nature of such unwritten laws can be discovered only by an analysis of the general terms used to designate them. Among the Slavs the first typical terms for the idea of law is zakonu, a word found in all the Slavic tongues, and the word pokonu was employed in the same sense. As both of these words are etymologically akin to the O. Russ. polina, 'law,' lit. 'the past,' and starina, 'law,' lit. 'antiquity,' cf. such phrases as polya starina pokolina Novgorodskiy, 'by ancient Novgorod law,' direciti vui starine, 'to observe the laws,' na wej starine, 'in retention of all previous laws.' An essentially similar idea lies at the root of the term for 'law' common to the West Teutonic dialects, O.H.G. ðóuwa, O.S. ðówa, O.S. æw, æw. It is true that some philologists regard this Teutonic word as cognate with the Lat. aequum, so that it would mean originally 'fairness,' 'equity,' and this is fairly maintained by phonetic laws (O.H.G. ðówa from *aðuara = Lat. aequum from *aúgus); but the Slavic data just noted seem to make it much more probable that O.H.G. ðóuwa is related to Lat. æquum, 'eternity,' öv, âov, 'long space of time,' æođ, 'ever,' and that, like the Slavic zakonu, polina, starina, will mean 'the law which has been in force from eternity, from the beginning, from of old.' A second concept, denoting 'law' and 'equity,' and common to both Teutons and Slavs—though found also in other branches of the Indogermanic stock—is that of 'straightness' as contrasted with 'crookedness. Thus Goth. rakith, O. Norse rift, rik, O. Sax. rieht (cf. also O. Sl. and Alt. 'justice'), are philologically equivalent to Lat. rectus, 'straight,' 'right,' Avest. rita, 'straight,' 'right,' 'correct;' and similarly the Slav. providea, pravo, 'law,' 'justice,' is derived from the root prav, 'straight.' We cannot doubt that this 'straight' signifies 'running in the same line with something else,' i.e., 'in accordance with it.' This, however, raises the question as to what 'something else' was. According to Zwick, 'this straight line is...

1 Dig. iv. 49, 446; cf. Plaut. Truc. 1044; Livy, xvi. 1. 12, xl. 8.
2 Ovid, i. 680, line 17, 'quaequecumque ex usu reliquiae maxime naturalis et divinae, publicaeque rerum esse consuetutis.'
length movements were made towards reducing the laws to writing, must have played a part also among the other Teutonic peoples from remote times. In references to the documentary formulation of ancient popular laws, we often hear of sapientes, i.e. ‘the learned’ (cf. sapan, ‘legal decision’), as those to whom the work was committed. Thus Charlemagne (Capit. ann. 782, cap. 62) says: ‘lex a sapientibus populo composita.’ From a prologue to a collection of popular laws we learn that Theodoric, king of the Franks, when at Chalons, selected a number of men learned in the laws (viros sapientes qui in regno suo legibus antiquis erudit erant) with a view to recording the usages of the Franks, Alamans, and Bavarians. The law of the Fririans contains supplements by the sapientes Wlemarss and Saxinoxund, and that of the Thuringians by the former. With reference to the ordinances of the Lee Salicae, a prologue dating from the 8th cent. states that is the days when the people were still heathens four men selected by the ‘rectores’ of the people had expounded the Salic law in three assemblies (cf. O. Stoibe, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, Leipzig, 1860–64, i. 16 f.; H. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Leipzig, 1906, p. 298). These sapientes, whose legal formulae are referred to in the sources as iudices (‘opinions’), may be compared to the Scandinavian ‘men of law’, and we may safely assume that among the Teutons there had existed from time immemorial a class of ‘erudite men’ who carried in their minds the ancient law of custom in fixed formule, and publicly recited it on given occasions. From traces still found in Scandinavia (cf. K. von Amira, Grundriss der germanischen Rechtsgeschichte, Strassburg, 1901, p. 50 ff.), it may be inferred that these fixed formule were at first metrically; and with this we may compare the ‘epics’ of the Agathyrions, a Transylvanian people, viz. that before they had a knowledge of writing they expressed their laws in song, so that they might not forget them.

3. The beginnings of codification.—Whether, like the Teutons, the Slavs had among them in pre-historic times a special class of learned men who carried in their memories the ancient law of use and wont, and on given occasions communicated it to the people, we have no definite means of knowing. The two races, however, are certainly so far alike that their first attempts to reduce their laws to writing (and it is only with such beginnings that the present article can be made due to their contact with the civilized peoples of the South, and to the need of having their relations with these regulated by law, the movement, in the case of the Teutons, being a result of their coming into touch with the Romans, while the Slavs (Russians) were similarly influenced by their intercourse with Byzantium. In the Romanic area are the Lex Salicae and the Lex Ripuaria; the two West Gothic law-books and the Edict of Theodoric, king of the Eastern Goths; the two Burgundian codes and the Edicts of the Longobards. These, as well as the Lex Alamannorum, the Lex Thuringiensis, and the three sets of popular laws (Thurignian, Fririan, Saxonic) reduced to writing at the instance of Charlemagne, were all in Latin, while the Anglo-Saxon code, which is closely connected with the Lex Salicae, is written in Anglo-Saxon law-books which used the native language.²


Such ‘men of law,’ as official guardians and preachers of primitive legal tradition, who in Scandinavia were preferably resort to even when at length their ancestors or chieftains were called upon to judge, were also found in the West areas. Even the Teutonic Gulf peoples this was the case with the Scandinavians. The highest civic position was that of the ‘man of law’ (sigurðr, bygjavorsu). He was the living code and the custodian of the law for the province and the diocese; he was the director of the Thing, he announced its decisions to the public, and in cases of conflict he was its arbiter. It was his duty to keep a knowledge of law alive among the people, and, as is prescribed by the Icelandic lawbooks and recommended by the Scandinavian statutes, he was ‘called upon to stand upon the “cliff of the law” to recite intelligibly to the whole civil law, and once a year the people heard him recite the laws (Tryggvahlähljof)’ (K. Weinhold, Althochdeutsches Leben, Berlin, 1856, p. 400).
LEAVEN

On Slavic soil, again, it was the relations between the Russians and the Greeks that gave occasion to the earliest written formulations of legal enactments. These were the treaties of peace (dagovorny) between Prince Oleg and the Greeks (A.D. 912), and between Prince Igor and the Byzantines (879). The investigation of Ewer's seem to show that Oleg's document is the main treaty, and that Igor's contains later supplements. The purpose of each was to bring the relations between Russians and Greeks under legal regulations; etc., e.g., § 3 of Oleg's treaty, referring to homicide:

"If a Russian kills a Christian, or a Christian a Russian, he shall die at the place where he committed the homicide. If, however, he who committed the homicide lives, then, if he possesses property, the nearest kinsman of the slain man shall take his portion. According to the law (p za zakon), but the wife of the slayer shall take as much as falls to her according to the law," etc.

As may be inferred from this extract, the treaty makes frequent reference to the Russian law (zakonos), which, in view of what has already been said, would be no more than an unwritten law of custom, and which we have the earliest written deposit in the treaties of Oleg and Igor designed to regulate the intercourse of Greeks and Russians. As was shown above, similar considerations, mutatis mutandis, underlie the various lex pannonica in the legal codes of Eastern Europe.

The earliest codification of the Russian law of custom, or of part of it, for the Russians themselves, will then be found in the first form of the Russkaja Pravda, which, according to the D. J. D. J. Evseyev, (St. Petersburg, 1897, pp. 1019-54) presented a gift to his allies, the Novgorodians, "... and gave them a law (pravda), and caused a statute to be written, saying, "Walk according to this document." As Ewers remarks, "So arose the earliest codified law of the Russians, intended primarily for Novgorod, but it must soon have become operative throughout Russia, as there was no other written law in its way."

It is to be noted, however, that L. K. Goetz takes quite a different view from the foregoing. He is of opinion (p. 238) that the references to 'Russian law' found in the treaties of Oleg and Igor really presuppose the existence of a document — the Pravda in its original form (as in Goetz, pp. 6-11; Jirešek, i. 1-17; Ewers, pp. 284-270) — since, he believes, that earliest formulation of the Russian law of custom was free from all extraneous (Greek or Teutonic) influence, and dates from the reign of Igor or from the reign of Prince Vladimir—from the first half of the 9th, if not indeed from the 8th century. He certainly admits that it was in no sense an official document, and supposes that it was written for purely private purposes by, say, a judge of the local law-court (see King [Teut. und Litou-Slav.], who 'made these notes to serve as a guide in cases where he might have to pronounce a legal decision regarding the amount of compensation' (p. 230). It is hardly possible to arrive at certain conclusions regarding these matters, although the theory that the Russkaja Pravda had a private origin such as Goetz conjectures does not appear to the present writer to be very probable.

LEAVEN.—Leaven is that which produces fermentation in a mass of dough. The Hebrew word s'dor was the designation of the piece of dough already infected by the leaven which was put into the flour to communicate the leaven to the entire mass before it was baked. Dough that had risen through the influence of this leaven was called hamēnē. Leaven might either be communicated by contagion, by mixing yeast with water, or spring up spontaneously, especially in a warm climate like Palestine. Bread that was made from this leaven was called masēsh, 'unleavened bread.' Ordinarily in the warm climate of Syria twenty-four hours was sufficient for a mass of dough to become thoroughly leavened. Pliny (HN, viii. 28) states that the best unleavened bread was made by the Romans by kneading millet or a fine brand of wheat with must at vintage time. The early Hebrews, however, appear to have depended entirely upon the s'dor, or leavened piece of dough, to preserve and transmit the leaven. The later Jews probably used the lees of wine as yeast.

Leaven, like all striking forms of germ growth, made a profound impression upon the thought and institutions of the Hebrews. Ignorant as they were of its real nature, they interpreted it as it appealed to their senses. The fact that it soured the dough in which it was placed led them to classify it as a type of corruption. Therefore everything infected with leaven was in time regarded as impure in certain parts of the sacrificial ritual. Pirute has most clearly voiced this widely held belief:

"Now leaven is itself the offspring of corruption and corrupts the mass of dough with which it has been mixed." (Quedest. Rom. 109.)

Am 4' indicates, however, that leaven offerings, either in principle or in practice, were not wholly forbidden in the ritual of northern Israel. LV 7 and 29 also provide that the bread eaten by the priest might contain leaven, and indicate that leavened cakes were presented in connexion with the Feast of Weeks. Here the early use of wine (Lv 25:2); cf. also Ex 29:8, Nu 16:28-29), which must in many cases have been fermented, in connexion with sacrifices presents a suggestive analogy and indicates that the provision against which contained evidence of corruption was not primitive or absolute. W. Robertson Smith (Rel. Sem., London, 1894, p. 221) has suggested that in its earliest form the legal prohibition of leaven applied only to the Passover, and in the oldest code (J) of Ex 34:22 and 238 the prohibition is thus limited. The extension of the prohibition to all sacrifices and then to all cereal offerings (Lv 22:11; 718:8, Nu 6:18) evidently represents a later stage of development, under the influence of the popular idea that leaven represented corruption, and from the desire (so manifest in the Holiness law) to absolutely exclude from the ritual everything inconsistent with the idea of Jahweh's perfect holiness. The original reason for the use of unleavened bread in connexion with the Passover meal appears to have been simpler. In primitive times, and still among the Arabs on a low stage of civilization, bread was made and cooked at once. The Passover, in its latest Jewish form, evidently represented a blending of the older nomadic spring festival and the first of the three great Canaanite harvest festivals. After the Hebrews passed over to the agricultural stage, it marked the time when the sickle was first put in the standing grain and the peck brought to the Deity the first sheaves gathered from their fields (cf. C. F. Kent, Israel's Laws and Legal Precedents, London, 1897, p. 238 f.). During this busy first week of harvest the people had no time to wait for the slow working of the leavened bread; the bread made hastily from the unleavened dough. Thus the custom grew into an institution confirmed by the earliest Hebrew laws. In later times it presented such a marked contrast to the Passover itself that the Passover itself was frequently designated as the Feast of Unleavened Bread. The tendency to regard leaven as a type of putrefaction doubtless
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fortified this earlier custom and explains the tendency, already noted, to extend the prohibition to all cereal offerings. It is paralleled by the extension of a similar prohibition so as to include all fermented liquors.

Because of its peculiar characteristics leaven was used figuratively in early literature in two very different senses. In Mt 13:21 and its parallel, Lk 13:21, it is used by Jesus as a symbol of the quick, pervasive, and rapid extension of the principles of the kingdom or kingdom of God in human society. Its more common use is illustrated by Mt 10:12 (cf. Mk 8:13, Lk 12), where Jesus warns His disciples against the leaven of the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Herodians. It is a potent, concrete figure, which well describes the secret, persistent, corrupting influence of Jesus' foes, who were seeking in an underhand way to pervert the loyalty even of His immediate followers. The Rabbinical writers also used leaven as a symbol of sin and corruption. St. Paul, in 1 Co 5:6 and Gal 5, evidently quotes a familiar proverb which graphically reflects this current idea: 'A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump.' In 1 Co 5:6 he goes on to develop a figure based on the well-known Jewish custom of thoroughly cleansing their house of all leaven in preparation for the joyous Passover feast: 'Know ye not that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump? Purge out the old leaven, that ye may be new creatures in Christ Jesus.' This verse was applied to believers and consequently to the church. Indeed, the leaven symbol is a key to the understanding of the entire book of 1 Corinthians. It is a means of distinguishing the true from the false, the genuine from the counterfeit. The Roman Flamen Dialis was forbidden to touch 'farinam fermentum imbutam' (Asul. Gall. x. xv. 19). In other ethnic religious leaven plays little part.

Literature.—There is no literature beyond what is cited in the text.

C. P. Kent.

LEGALISM.—See NOMISM.

LEIBNIZ.—1. Life.—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, or Leibnitz, was born at Leipzig on 1 July 1646. His father, a professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of the same town, died in 1652, leaving his son under the care of his young widow (his third wife), who immediately remarried and discharged her duties with admirable skill. The family was well-connected, of the official class, with considerable means, and the mother, a religious woman, impressed on her children the importance of maintaining the good name and traditions of their family. Leibniz became in great measure his own teacher, and even in his earliest days his love of study was extraordinary. He learned Latin by himself at the age of eight, and at ten, by the advice of a neighbour, his father's library was to his great joy opened to him, with the words, 'Tolle, lege.' One study succeeded another in the case of this extraordinary boy, who, after mastering Latin and Greek, devoted himself to the learning of the Schools. At the age of fifteen, in 1661, he became a student at the University of Leipzig. But the teaching there was not such as to satisfy him, and it was through his private study that he became acquainted with the works of Descartes. He also read PASCAL, Barrow, CARLITZ, Campanella, Kepler, and Galileo, and he soon realized the distinction between the new and the old methods of science. The summer of 1663 was spent at Jena under Wiegell, a mathematician as well as a philosopher, and his interest in mathematics developed from this time, though it was not until later in life that he reached the deeper study of the science. The years 1663-66 were occupied in legal studies, and in the last of those years he obtained his doctorate of law at Aldorf (not having already received it at his own University of Leipzig), and the brilliance of his dissertation procured him the offer of a professorial chair. This, however, he declined, having, as he said, different ends in view. His mother died in 1664, and he never visited his native town again except in passing. Although not yet twenty-one, he had already written several remarkable papers, which showed the trend of his later work. One of them dealt with the importance of the historical method in law. Nuremberg was Leibniz's next place of abode, and there he became a protégé of his immediate predecessor, Descartes (acquainted with the Order of the Jesuits), to which he was accepted, indeed, a member. What was more important, he also became acquainted with J. C. von Boimeburg, who had been first minister to the Elector of Mainz, and by whose advice he both printed his Nova Methodus in 1667 and dedicated and presented it to the Elector. This act determined the young man's future life, for he entered the Elector's service in consequence of the acquaintance thus made. Leibniz now took up political writing; he defended (unsuccessfully) the claims of the German candidate to the crown of Poland in 1668, and in 1670, in his Thoughts of Public Order, he advocated a new league ('Rheinbund') for the protection of Germany. He also brought forward the proposal that the French king, Louis XIV., instead of marching on Holland (a step then imminent), should make an expedition to Egypt. Letters referring to this scheme were sent to Louis by Boineburg, and in 1672 Leibniz, as the author of the memorial, was requested to go to Paris. This he did, but he was never given the interview which he desired. The history of this scheme was hidden in the archives of the Hanoverian Library until Napoleon learnt of it on taking possession of Hanover in 1803.

In Paris Leibniz became acquainted with Descartes's successors Arnauld and Malebranche, and also with physicists such as Christian Huygens, and he was soon immersed in the study of the philosophical and scientific questions on which he proceeded to write. As early as 1663 he had written Hypothesis physica nova, an essay on physics, and more especially on the subject of gravitation, so that he was already known in the scientific world. His tour was extended to London, where he became acquainted with both Barrow, Oldenbourg, and Newton. A calculating machine (an improvement on that of Pascal), which was one of his many scientific inventions, was exhibited at the Royal Societies. Leibniz became in great measure his own teacher, and even in his earliest days his love of study was extraordinary. He learned Latin by himself at the age of eight, and at ten, by the advice of a neighbour, his father's library was to his great joy opened to him, with the words, 'Tolle, lege.' One study succeeded another in the case of this extraordinary boy, who, after mastering Latin and Greek, devoted himself to the learning of the Schools. At the age of fifteen, in 1661, he became a student at the University of Leipzig. But the teaching there was not such as to satisfy him, and it was through his private study that he became acquainted with the works of Descartes. He also read PASCAL, Barrow, CARLITZ, Campanella, Kepler, and Galileo, and he soon realized the distinction between the new and the old methods of science. The summer of 1663 was spent at Jena under Wiegell, a mathematician as well as a philosopher, and his interest in mathematics developed from this time, though it was not until later in life that he reached the deeper study of the science. The years 1663-66 were occupied in legal studies, and in the last of those years he obtained his doctorate of law at
Vatican Library by the pope, but one of the conditions was that he should become a Roman Catholic, and to this Leibniz would not consent. He was, however, deeply interested in a scheme which was then being mooted for the reunion of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches, and it was in connexion with this discussion that he wrote, in 1688, Systema theologicum, in which he endeavoured to find a common ground of agreement between the two religions. The letters to Leibniz from Bossuet and others show that the writers hoped to convert him to Roman Catholicism; and, when it was clear that they could not succeed, they gave up the attempt. He later attempted to reconcile the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, also without success. In addition to his literary pursuits, Leibniz interested himself in the mining operations carried on in the Harz Mountains and in the coinage of silver found there.

In 1690 Leibniz was appointed librarian at Wolfenbüttel, and some years later he formed a friendship with the Electress Sophia Charlotte of Brandenburg and her mother Princess Sophia of Hanover. It was through this friendship that his connexion with Berlin arose, and he was invited thither in 1700. In this year the Academy which he had been invited to found, took its place in Prussia with Leibniz as President for life. He proceeded to suggest the establishment of similar societies in St. Petersburg, Dresden, and Vienna, with various degrees of success. In recognition of this work Leibniz was made privy councillor of justice by the Elector of Brandenburg; the same honour was given him by the Elector of Hanover and by Peter the Great of Russia. He likewise had the distinction of being granted an imperial privy seal and an audience at Vienna in 1712, while he was also made a baron of the Empire (Reichsfreiherren). While in Berlin he had much pleasant intercourse at Charlottenburg with his royal pupil the Electress Sophia Charlotte, and her death in 1705 was a severe blow to him. Indeed subsequently to that event his visits to Berlin became less frequent, and that which took place in 1711 was the last. After the visit to Vienna in 1712 he returned to Hanover in 1714, but the Elector George had by that time gone to England to assume the crown, and Leibniz was disappointed at not being asked to accompany him, since he had supported the interest of the Elector's lady. He was directed instead to remain in Hanover and finish his history of Brunswick. This was the last work of his life. He died on November 14th, 1716, and his last years were far from happy. He was ill, neglected after his royal friend's death by those who should have helped him, and embittered by many controversies; and, when the end came, hardly any notice was taken of it either in Berlin or in London, whither his sovereign had gone. His only mourner in Hanover was Eckhart, his secretary, and not till 1787 was a monument erected to his memory. To the last he showed a marvellous power of work in very many directions; indeed his attainments were those of an almost unlimited faculty, and such as have seldom been equalled. As he was naturally ambitious, the neglect from which he suffered pained him greatly.

It is matter for regret that Leibniz's teaching has to be derived from a scheme which, however, emanated from Isaac Newton, and for which no fuller evidence is accessible. In 1703-04 he wrote his Opuscules on Locke's Essay, but the author's death prevented their publication. In 1710 appeared his most important philosophical work, his Théodicè sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal. In 1714 he wrote La Monadologie, and in that year there also appeared the Principes de la nature et de la grace. During his latter years he corre-

2. Philosophy.—Leibniz's philosophical doctrines are mainly concerned with the mode in which substance is to be conceived. They represent a distinct advance on the Cartesian view, which granted that there were two substances, connected only, if indeed they were connected at all, by the power of God. Thus Cartesianism showed itself to be a dualism which successive philosophers have in different ways done their best to solve. So far as it is possible to absorb them into one Divine Substance. For him 'determination is negation,' and so far did he carry this doctrine that in his case unity is preserved only at the expense of the reality of the parts; the Substance, that is to say, is self-existent and unconditional, requiring no other thing from which it is formed, or part which may determine it. This development of the Cartesian doctrine, no doubt, a consistent one, and one which carried the principle to its logical conclusion, but it ends in something which much resembles the Oriental theory of absolute self-identity. Leibniz, on the other hand, accepts the multiplicity of substance (the ultimate reality), which makes the monads (an expression originally perhaps adopted from the Pythagoreans, but more directly from Giordano Bruno), and these monads he proceeds to determine. Assuming that substance can only be conceived as |really as a unity, he states that the metaphysical view of monads is that they are simple substances without parts, and, as there are no parts, there can be 'neither extension, form, nor divisibility.' No dissolution of these elements need be feared, for each monad can be destroyed by natural means. Nor can they by these means come into being. Thus a monad can become existent or come to an end only all at once, i.e. by creation in the one instance or annihilation in the other.

These monads are therefore, so to speak, centres of force, as distinguished from manifestations of world-force. They are not to be confused with the atoms of Descartes or the materialists, inasmuch as they have within them the power of action; indeed it is their nature to act, and they also have what might be called a spiritual nature. In his Monadology, Leibniz states that the monad likewise has 'perception and apperception.' Perception is, however, not necessarily conscious perception, since conscious perception represents another stage, which he calls 'apperception.' In perception we have a unity which has a multiplicity of relations, and is thus variously modified. Likewise the appetite is not necessarily conscious desire or will; it represents change within the identity of a simple substance. Hence we must conceive the monad as possessed of spontaneity and as capable of evolving its nature and experience from itself. It is not inert and passive, but is a microcosm, 'the universe in little'; indeed Leibniz goes so far as to make use of the Aristotelian term, and say that the monads are entelechies because they have a 'certain perfection which makes them the sources of their internal activities, so to speak, incorporeal automata' (§ 19).

They are not, however, pure entelechies, as is shown by the difference from isolation, paper, sketch, and letter. In 1703-04 he worked out his criticisms on Locke's Essay, but the author's death prevented their publication. In 1710 appeared his most important philosophical work, his Théodicè sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal. In 1714 he wrote La Monadologie, and in that year there also appeared the Principes de la nature et de la grace. During his latter years he corre-
balanced minds in the opinion that souls are mortal," (§14).

Leibniz did not give the name 'soul' to everything that has perception and desires; for such, he says, the general name monads or entelechies should suffice.

Such 'monads' be considered, should be reserved for those 'in which perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory,' (§19). 'Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness which copies (inside) reality, which is to be distinguished from it,' (§18). 'It is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that distinguishes us from the animals and gives us reason and the Sapiuntia, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God. And it is this reason that is called the rational soul or mind (spiritus).'

This knowledge makes us conscious of ourselves, of substance, and of God; it teaches us what is limited and what is unlimited.

Reasoning is founded by Leibniz on two great principles: (1) that of Contradiction, by which we judge that to be false which involves a contradiction and that true which is contradictory to the false, and (2) the principle of Sufficient Reason, whereby we hold that there can be no fact, real or existent, unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be so and not otherwise, even although these reasons usually cannot be known to us. There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and fact.

'Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible; truths of fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible,' (§23).

Then, again, the organic body of each living thing is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, 'which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata,' For a machine made of the skill of man is not a machine in each of its parts. 'But the machines of nature, namely living bodies, are machines in their smallest parts ad infinitum,' (§23).

Each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible but also actually subdivided without end. The smallest particle of matter has in it a living being, animals, entelechies, souls—and nothing is sterile, or fallow, or dead, or confused in appearance. Each living body has a dominant entelechy (in the animal the soul), but the members of this body are all living beings, and animals, each of which has its dominant entelechy or soul. There is never absolute birth (nécesation) nor complete death consisting in the separation of soul from body.

'Vegetation is that which is growing, whereas what we call death is envelopments and diminutions,' (§73). Organic bodies do not really proceed from chaos, but always from seeds in which there was some pre-formation.

'The organic body was already here before conception, but also a soul in this body, and in short the animal itself,' (§74).

The animal is merely prepared for the great transformation of becoming another kind of animal.

The fact that the soul and the animal itself are alike indestructible makes it easier for Leibniz to explain his theory of the union of soul and matter, agreement between soul and organic body. Both soul and body follow their own laws, and they agree with each other in virtue of the pre-established harmonious arrangement of each, which is often misrepresented, since it is said to be arbitrarily dependent on the will of God, whereas in reality it proceeds from the very nature of the monads themselves, as perceptible, spontaneous beings. Leibniz believes that Descartes was not far off from his doctrine, and that he would have arrived at it had he known that there was a law of nature affirming the conservation of the same total direction in matters,' (§80).

The Leibnizian and Cartesian theories of mechanical physics were the subject of much controversy. For Descartes' theory of the constancy of the quantity of motion in the world, Leibniz substitutes the principle of the conservation of motion or "vis viva," but the long controversy was probably due in great measure to the ambiguity of the terms employed. It really concerns the conservation of motion, not the conversion of one kind of energy into another. Leibniz maintains. For Leibniz, motion is simply a change of position. It is not a positive quality belonging to the moving of a body, but a relative one, and rest itself is merely an infinitely small degree of motion.

Leibniz illustrates his theory of pre-established harmony by the well-known example of the two clocks. There are three alternative methods by which they may be made to keep perfect time with one another: (1) the machinery of the one may actually move the other, being connected, e.g., by a piece of wood, which represents Locke's theory of mutual influence; (2) whenever one of these moves the mechanism, a similar alteration may be made in the other by a skilful workman, which is the doctrine of the Occasionalists; or (3) the clocks may have been so perfectly constructed at the first as to continue to coincide in the same instant without any further influence or assistance, which is Leibniz's view of a pre-established harmony. Another simile that he uses is, however, a more adequate one: he compares the monads to two independent bands of musicians playing in perfect harmony.

As regards our knowledge, it is all developed by the soul's own activity, and senescent perception is but a confused sort of knowledge. Leibniz denied that there were any innate ideas, and held that all our knowledge must reach us from outside, and through the senses. Descartes believed that it came from pure thought and independently of the senses. Leibniz held that his theory harmonized the two. The soul of man as monad is an active spontaneous force, and its ideas are innate, but they are not clear and distinct, as Descartes would have us believe. To begin with, they are confused and imperfect, and it is the function of a developing force that they reach clearness and self-evidence. Locke's sensation is really confused perception, and it is made clear only by the result of an internal experience. Human knowledge is both a priori and a posteriori.

As there is a perfect harmony between the two realms in nature, one of efficient and the other of final causes, there is another harmony between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, i.e., between God, as Architect of the universe, and God as Monarch of the Divine City of spirits (spirito), (§87).

Thus Leibniz justifies the ways of God to man, the punishment of some, and the reward of others, as being in accordance with the divine harmony. Could we sufficiently understand the order of the universe, we should find that it is impossible to make it better than it is. Leibniz therefore makes God the necessary postulate of morality, and in his Theodicies he works out his theology and defends his view of the universe. God is the best possible world, and shows how faith and reason may be found to coincide and harmonize. God must either exist as a self-existent Being or be impossible. The will is an effort towards that which one finds good, and is freely in the sense of being exempt from external control, and, as it has a sufficient reason for its action, determined by what seems good to it. Freedom consists in following reason, while servitude arises from following the passions which proceed from confused perceptions.

Probably few philosophers have suffered more
LESSING

than Leibniz from misrepresentation of their systems. We have Voltaire's stinging satire of the 'best possible world' in his
Candide, but that was a satire more than a mis-
representation. The doctrine of the pre-established
harmony, however, lent itself to easy caricature, as
did that of the 'inductive philosophy' of Newton's
writings, which were published during his lifetime, and he
left masses of MSS in detached papers and little
treatises, difficult to sort out. His two principles of
contradiction and sufficient reason were
chosen to oppose one another, and existed, so to
speak, side by side in independence. Newton's
physics did not altogether accord with Leibniz's
metaphysics, and Newton's triumph meant cor-
responding discredit for Leibniz. Christian Wolf,
thought he systematized his philosophy, was not a true follower, or at least
he followed him in a pedantic way. Perhaps Kant
understood his position better, although he ad-
vanced far beyond it. Hegel terms it an 'artificial
system,' but he appreciates its worth as showing
forth the principle of individuality. Goethe
adopted the Leibnizian conception of monads and
souls. Later on Leibnizism was transferred to
the philosophy of Leibniz on his revolt as a man
of science against the idealism of Pichte, Schelling,
and Hegel, though he was influenced by Kantian
doctrines and rejected much of Leibniz's teaching.

[3] KANT.

[3.4] Dutens, Geneva, 1789, which was held to be
collected and published in the years 1788-9. The de
Avro Combinatoria, which he wrote in 1785, is of logical rather than
mathematical interest. In 1768, when in London, he told Fultall
that he had obtained the summation of infinite
series by differences, but in this he had been antici-
pated. After this he studied under Huygens in
Paris. Among other results at this period, he ob-
tained the important result
\[ f = 1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{4} + \cdots \]

He now began his great work on the infinitesimal

He started with the conception, pre-
viously employed by Barrow, Newton's teacher,
of the characteristic of any power on the
curve. This consists of the chord joining
two adjacent points, together with parallels to the
axes of co-ordinates drawn through these points.
In the case of the points come to coincide
with the given point, the chord becomes the
tangent at that point. With the aid of this concep-
tion he attacked the problems of tangency, showing that the so-called
inverse problems of tangents could be reduced to
quadratures, or, in modern terminology, integra-
tions. He regarded integration as a summation of
infinitesimals. His original notation for \( f(x) \)
was \( \text{omn} \ y \), own standing for omnima. Later he intro-
duced the symbols \( f_1 \) standing for \( S \), or \( \Sigma \)
and \( d \) for differentiat, which are still used in the
calculus. By 1675 he had applied the new methods to
the direct problems of tangents and to solid
geometry, and in the following year he gave cor-
rect rules for the differentiation of sums, products,
powers, and other functions.

In 1684 he published his first paper on the differen-
tial calculus in the Leipzig Acta Eruditorum.
Besides tangency, maxima and minima and refraction,
one of which results are still apparently
taken as finite, though small.

Two years later he gave a sketch of the integral
calculus in the same journal. Here \( dy \) and \( dx \)
are regarded as being defined from that definite
infinite integral.

His last position appears to have been that they are 'quantitates assignabiles' which spring from
"quantitates inassignabiles" by the law of con-

In the minds of both, however, there was probably enough confusion to justify Berkeley's
declaration of an error.

Some idea of the variety and magnitude of Leib-

niz's mathematical achievements can be gathered
from the fact that, besides the notation of the
calculus, we owe to him the words 'co-ordinate'
and 'axis of co-ordinates' in geometry, the
beginnings of the theories of determinants, osculation, and envelopes, and the method of partial
fractions. 'Leibniz's theorem' deals with the re-
presented differential of a product. In mechanics
his work, though fruitful, contains many errors. He
regarded \( \frac{dy}{dx} \), which varies as the square of the
velocity, as the proper measure of the force in a
moving body, whilst Descartes had used momenta,
yielding directly 'inertial forces.' Though the attack on Descartes was unjustified,
yet this view ultimately led to the fundamental
modern concept of energy. —J. B. S. Haldane.

LITERATURE. — None of the many editions of Leibniz's works
are complete. There are three: the first, by
Jena in 1783, the second, by Dutens, Geneva, 1789,
which was held to be complete when publica-
ted. In 1843 G. H. Pertz began an edition of his
works (4th ser. 'History,' 4 vols. Hanover, 1843-47, 2nd ed. 'Philoso-
phical,' 7 vols. incomplete, Berlin, 1846). The only
complete edition of his mathematical works is that of
G. W. Leibniz, 7 vols., Berlin, 1857-90. There are also Leibniz's
Foucher de Careil, Oeuvres de Leibniz, 7 vols. (planned in
20 vols.), Paris, 1909-75. Oeno Klop, Mythical geometry, 10 vols.,
Hanover, London, and Paris, 1864-77, containing the
historical and political works; and A. Jacques, Oeuvres de
Leibnitz, 2 vols. Paris, 1847. There is an edition (not complete)
of his philosophical works by J. E. Ehrmann, Berlin, 1848-49, and
one by F. Janet, 3 vols., Paris, 1869.

For the life and teaching of Leibniz we have Robert Latta,
The Monodontology and other Philosophical Writings, Oxford, 1856
(gives a translation of the Monodontology and other philosophical
works); J. T. Meur, Leibniz in Blackwood's Philosophical
Classics, Edinburgh, 1894; W. R. Schinkel, Kritik de
Kritik, E. Boutron, Le Monodontology; accompagnée d'esta-
ctions, Paris, 1831; cf. also Le Boisier de Fontenelle, Essay
(2 vols. of the Opera Omnia), in the Acta Eruditorum, and L. Grote, Leibniz und seine
Zelt, Hanover, 1839; E. Pfeiderer, Leibniz, Undervisnings-
studenten und Bildungsträger, Leipzig, 1870; F. Kirchner,
G. W. Leibniz: sein Leben und Denken, Ketschen, 1878.
There are countless monographs on Leibniz, of which
the most important is that by Kurt Fischer, 'G. W. Leibniz, Leben, Werke, und
Lehre,' in Gesch. der neuen Philosophie, Heidelberg, 1897;
E. Zeller, Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie, Munich, 1875.
Among the critical works may be mentioned Bertrand Russell,
Critical Expositions of the Philosophy of Leibnitz, Cambridge, 1903.
Further literature is cited in DAP III. (1903) 390-398.

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LEPROSY. — See Disease and Medicine.

LESSING. —1. Life and times. — It is easy for
us to see in retrospect that the achievement of
Lessing lay in preparing the way for the complex
creative movement associated with the names of
Goethe and Schiller; Lessing himself, however,
looked forward to a future only dimly illumined
by rays of hope, and he went out perforce 'not
knowing whither he went.' The century follow-
ing the close of the Hundred Years' War saw a
very slow and partial recovery of the German
national life from the utter barbarism, the
degeneration of morals, of manners, and of
educational and political institutions. But even
so...

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being founded, and the latent national genius was re-asserting itself in the varied interests which we should comprise under the term 'culture.'

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was born at Kamenz, in the Saxon province of Upper Lusatia, on 22nd Jan., 1729, the second son and fourth child of a Lutheran clergyman, afterwards head-pastor of the town, and his worthy but not wealthy father. His childhood was spent in simple circumstances and in a very orthodox family circle. In 1741 he was sent to the Klosterschule of St. Aafa at Meissen, in which the family was associated with a thorough classical education, a strict discipline, and a healthy intermixture of religious instruction. In spare hours he supplemented his vigorous pursued studies by intensive reading of his favourite authors—Theophrastus, Plautus, and Terence—and in the last-mentioned, in consequence of the disturbed condition of the town after the battle of Kesselsdorf, it was with a thorough mastery of Latin and Greek, some knowledge of modern languages, and well-developed mathematical powers, his farewell caution was on 'Mathematics among the Ancients.'

He next entered Leipzig University, where he came under the influence of J. A. Ernesti and J. P. Christ in classics and of A. O. Köstner in mathematics. Fearful lest he should study only and without aiming at any other accomplishment suited to a man of the world. Introduced into dramatic circles, he completed his first play, which he had commenced at school, and it was performed at Frau Neunheer's theatre. His new interests gave his good father much anxiety, for it was already known that he had been designed for the Church; he had to promise to study medicine before his parents' condescension in his studies could be removed.

Leaving Leipzig in consequence of debts which he had contracted by standing security for some actor-friends, he was in London, where his acquaintanceship with S. G. Lee and other actors led him to the study of drama. Here, in London and Paris, he had an opportunity of studying drama as a whole, of acquiring a knowledge of the history of the drama, and of attempting to translate classical and foreign drama into German. His 'Escribano' ceased to appear in the following year, since Musius had made a statement in it with which Lessing refused to be associated. Another periodical appeared, 'Der Bevollk.' (now 'Die Zeitschriften'), and entered into controversy with a certain pasteur, S. O. Lange, utterly destroying the latter's claims to be 'the great universal scholar,' by exposing his shallow and uncritical attitude toward all criticisms which he might care to publish. Once again in Berlin, Lessing became the friend of the learned Moses Mendelssohn and the publisher F. Nicolaus. His literary activity was now great, and, apart from his dramatic interests, he kept up a large correspondence with the literary circles of Berlin, he wrote for a time to Brentano, acting as secretary to the governor, General Tsontz, developing a strong love of the gaming table, collecting a large and valuable library, working at his Lacocon, and sketching out his play 'Naissa von Earbnhelm.' After an illness due to overwork, he gave up his post in 1768, and, refusing a professorship which involved certain duties unconnected with his own, he left for a visit to Russia in 1755. After a short stay at the court of Peter the Great, he returned to his duties at the Hoftheater, but his life at Wolfenbüttel was dull in the extreme. He wasimported by his family for sickness, and, upon his return, met with congenial companions. He was married in 1771 to Eva König, but was unhappily without issue till five years later. In the meantime he published his 'Eiadalia Galotti' and afterwards some 'fragments' by his friend H. H. Reinhart, which aroused another controversy. He went to Austria, and, when pressed about marriage, felt compelled to accept an invitation to accompany his friend F. H. von Schurmann on a journey to Italy. The journey lasted nine months, but involved Lessing in unconveniency and left him few opportunities of studying Italian works of art. In 1776 he was a man of a happy life with his cultured and refined wife; but their joy was short-lived, for in 1778 a son died in the prime of life, and his wife died a fortuitous death. Lessing wrote:

'Perhaps the greatest service which Lessing rendered to his age lay in his devotion to truth even more than in his influence in changing the direction of creative literary work, in revolutionizing the principles of criticism, and in maturing theological study. In his person,' said D. F. Strauss, 'allegiance to truth and love of truth personified guard the portals of our literature.' ('Lessing's Nachlese der Weisheit,' Berlin, 1860). It was righteous indignation rather than cynical irony that gave point to his most acute criticisms. Sham and the worship of mere appearances were hateful in his eyes. 'Not the truth which a man possesses or believes himself to possess, but the sincere attempt which he has made to reach the truth, constitutes his worth. For not through the possession of truth, but through inquiry and study, does man develop those powers in which his ever-increasing perfection consists. Possession makes for a passive, proud, and often a destructive, and not an active, proud. If God held in His right hand all truth, and in His left only the ever-active impulse to search for truth, even with the condition that I must for the time being choose one,' said Lessing. 'Choose?' I should humbly bow before His left hand and say, 'Father, give! Pure truth belongs to Thee. Verstehende Menschen durchstreichen Lebens- schriften, ed. L. M. Altenmacher, Berlin, 1831 (6th ed. 1840).

Though Lessing's mind sought creative expression, his bent was in the long run predominantly critical. While he could not create, he was holding up a mirror stimulating his own critical faculty, and could not arrive at critical conclusions without desiring to apply them, we owe more to his insight as a critic than to his genius as a creative artist. Our debt has found strikingly well-known expression in which give an illuminating estimate of the critic as well as a testimony to his influence on subsequent authors. Macaulay once said that the reading of Lessing's Laocoön formed an epoch in his mental history, and that he had learned more from it than he had ever learned elsewhere (G. H. Lowes, Life of Goethe, London, 1864, p. 87). Carlyle said in his 'Essay on the State of German Literature' (Works of T. Carlyle, London, 1857, ii. 26): 'It is to Lessing that an English man would turn with readiest affection. . . . As a poet, as a critic, as a philosopher, or controversialist, his style will be found precisely such as would surprise us least. It is he who most: brief, nervous, vivid; yet quiet, without glitter or show; satisfactory in rhythm, and in expression, transparently full of character and reflex hues of meaning.'

2. Contributions to aesthetics. — Aesthetics has always occupied an important place in modern German philosophy. It is reasonable and probable whether Kant or Schelling, Hegel or Schopenhauer, exercised so potent or so far-reaching an influence as Lessing, whose Laocoön (written between 1760 and 1765 and published in 1766) gathered together in a suggestive form the results of previous critical theory and handed them on to a dawning new age along with an arresting presentation of several new problems. The book deals only by way of illustration with the sculptured group which gives it its title. Its chief point of departure is an essay on the one hand and painting and plastic art on the other; it attacks the current but uncritically held view summed up in Plutarch's quotation from Simonides referring to poetry as a speaking picture and painting as a dumb poem, that peculiar laws govern these different arts, and, in particular, that the choice of a 'pregnant moment,' essential to the artist, is not the task of the poet. Thus Lessing assigns a moment at which the object of his art is so acting that the representation of it shall be most suggestive to the imagination—suggestive both of past and of prospective action; the poet, however, is able to prepare the imagination of his hearer or reader beforehand and even to influence it subsequently;
in other words, he is able to lead up to his critical moment and to tone down the effects of his presentation, as the sculptor shows him to us as emitting deep sighs.

This choice which allows free play to the imagination is alone happy one. The more we gaze, the more must our imagination add; and the more our imagination adds, the nearer we come to a realization of the whole course of an emotion there is no moment which offers this so little advantage as its climax. There is nothing higher beyond the love to present the extreme to the eye is to clip the wings of fancy and to compel her; since she cannot get beyond the importance of the artist. To seek lower and weaker images where with to occupy herself, shaming, as her limit, the visible fulness of expression. Thus, if the Laocoön shows the imagination of Homer, in fact, each statue, it will be, is a single material object, and consequently description of it, according to its parts is juxtaposition, would not form a suitable subject for poetic representation: yet this very shield that of Achilles has been described by Homer, in over a hundred magnificent lines, with such minuteness and exactitude as regards its material, its form, and all the figures which filled its vast surfaces, that modern artists have experienced difficulty in reproducing it in its entirely. My reply to this particular objection is that I have already replied to it. What Homer has written to describe the shield as it is when finished and complete, but as it is being wrought. Here again, therefore, he has sketched of what actual device of transfiguring the divine craftsman in the act of making it. He steps, with hammer and tongs, before his avul, and, after the plates have been forged one upon another, the figures destined by him to adorn the shield rise from the bronze one by one before our eyes, beneath the finer strokes of his hammer. We do not lose sight of him until the work is completed. At length it is finished, and we marvel at it with the confiding astonishment of the eye-witness who has beheld the actual operation (60, ch. xviii.)

IncidentallyLessing discusses a number of special topics of interest to the student of art from the contemplative point of view. The book, as we have it, is but a fragment of Lessing's projected work, but its charm lies in the skill with which the main themes are relieved, and at the same time illustrated, by digressions which stimulate the imagination instead of wearying the critical faculties.

We are plunged at once into the midst of his argument, then he draws back, alternately approaching and receding from his goal, taking occasionally a side-gance at objects he meets on his way. We see him in the very act of conquering the truth he intends to express, witness his hesitancy while they are still uncertain, share his pleasures as they burst upon him in their full significance. If we except the best of Piso's dialogue, it would be difficult to name any book which gives opportunity for so much of the most valuable kind of mental gymnastics. (Lessing, L. 251.)

3. Dramatic writings.—Lessing's dramatic works interest us here only in so far as they reflect his social and religious ideas. Miss Sara Sampson, the scene of which is laid in England, is a tragedy of life represented as a hint of the new day about to dawn on the German drama. Minna von Barnhelm is a charming study in human character, full of local colour and contemplative. Lessing presents its characters before a background of political significance.

The Seven Years' War ended for political reasons, and harmony of national sentiment did not immediately take the place of the bitterness which accompanied the conflagration. Minna von Barnhelm made for true peace, whether Goethe was right or wrong in saying that it was the design of the play to effect at once by the method of art a result which could not be achieved by objects of its presumption and as soaring with anguish; but the sculptor shows him to us as emitting deep sighs.

Wuthering Heights is an exaggeration of an advocate, Lessing inveighs against descriptive poetry; action is the widest sense of the word, we might say 'the dramatic,' that which changes, moves, and progresses (including feeling), is to him of the highest value. So far as poetry represents things co-existing in time, it must do so by representation of things in succession. A fruitful illustration of this, as of so many of his theses, is drawn from Homer. When the noblest of all the Greek epic poets was not at his height, it will be, is a single material object, and consequently description of it, according to its parts is juxtaposition, would not form a suitable subject for poetic representation: yet this very shield that of Achilles has been described by Homer, in over a hundred magnificent lines, with such minuteness and exactitude as regards its material, its form, and all the figures which filled its vast surfaces, that modern artists have experienced difficulty in reproducing it in its entirety. My reply to this particular objection is that I have already replied to it. What Homer has written to describe the shield as it is when finished and complete, but as it is being wrought. Here again, therefore, he has sketched of what actual device of transfiguring the divine craftsman in the act of making it. He steps, with hammer and tongs, before his avul, and, after the plates have been forged one upon another, the figures destined by him to adorn the shield rise from the bronze one by one before our eyes, beneath the finer strokes of his hammer. We do not lose sight of him until the work is completed. At length it is finished, and we marvel at it with the confiding astonishment of the eye-witness who has beheld the actual operation (60, ch. xviii.).

Nathan the Wise is a dramatic poem rather than a drama, secured Lessing's European fame. It saw the light first in 1779, but had long been planned. While Lessing declined to admit that his play contained allusions to the controversies in which he had been engaged with a Hamburg pastor, J. M. Götze, he declared that he would have nothing to say against the surmise that his purpose was to show how in olden time and in many lands, as among modern peoples, there have lived individuals who, though holding aloof from the religious systems of their age, were yet respectable and good; or against the conclusion that he intended to present such persons in a light that was hitherto regarded in Christian communities. So far as it could be is the idea of the play—and there is more idea than action—controversial. Not the three rings in the possession of three sons of a dead man, one of them being the true heirloom, the others fraudulent imitations. The central characters of the play are a German Jew, and a Muslim. Nathan, the Jew, teaches what Lessing admitted was his own conviction, not, as some have assumed, that all three religions are true, and, if the others false, the true to be discovered by observation of the results of each in the lives of its adherents, but rather the deep truth that, so long as Christians, Muslims, and Jews quarrel about their systems, the truth of religion lies in each of them. When the power of the true ring has shown itself acting from within the owner of it, there will be nothing left to quarrel about. Creeds are accidents of birth and circumstances, but true religion is seen in character and action and must be the achievement of those who profess it.

Nathan the Wise was produced in Berlin in 1783, but by indifferent actors. Only when Goethe and Schiller produced it at Weimar in 1801 did it take the place that it holds to-day in the repertory of the best German theatres. In it Lessing still teaches his lessons of tolerance and broad-minded sympathy.

4. Literary and dramatic criticism.—In literary and dramatic criticism Lessing occupied an original standpoint and maintained it throughout his learning. His various contributions to periodicals and his Literaturbriefe ('Letters upon Current Literature') carried him into the arena already occupied, on the one side, by J. C. Gottsched, who blindly imitated the still refined classicism of French, and therefore gave supremacy to formal standards, and, on the other, by the Swiss writers J. J. Bodmer and J. J. J. Reitinger, who insisted on the supreme importance of creative imagination. Lessing took up an independent position, criticizing both schools, though championing the main thesis of the anti-French school. From the frankest criticism of Gottsched, a renowned Leipzig professor, the young critic proceeded to still more daring venture of criticising Rousseau and Voltaire. In his Hamburgische Dramaturgie (published while he was 'critic' at the Hamburg Theatre and collected in 1769) he urged that the Greek dramatists and Shakespeare are regarded as models, and he succeeded in securing the tie between German literature and the classic French school. In a brief but striking essay on 'How the Ancients represented Human Characters' (Attai den Tod gebuhlet, 1769), Lessing maintained in reply to Klotz, who had criticized a remark in Laocoon, that the ancients represented the god of Death, not by the symbol of a skeleton, but by that of a boy, twin-brother of the god Mars, which shows that skeletons represented the departed souls of evil men.
5. Theological opinions. — Lessing was always most powerful in the expression of his opinions which he was compelled to defend them against the traditionalist, who made the victory of the literal or literalistic world. In addition to early Essays, "The Origin of Revealed Religion" and "Contributions to History and Literature" (containing essays on the theories of Leibniz), controversies in which he was engaged led to the publication of the following tracts: "The Demonstration of the Spirit and of Power," "The Testament of John," "A Rejoinder" (Ein Duplik), and "The Religion of Christ." His chief theological controversy arose over papers that he published anonymously which were the work of H. S. Reimarus, who died at Hamburg while Lessing was there. These papers, which were reprints from an essay left by Reimarus entitled "An Argument for Rational Worshippers of God," dealt with the questions of revelation, immortality in the OT, and the inconsistencies in the accounts of Christ's Resurrection. That they did not reflect adequately his personal views may be judged by his own words:

"What has the Christian to do with the hypotheses, the explanations, the proofs of the theologian? The letter is not the spirit, and the Bible is not religion." (Sämmtliche Schriften, x. 10.)

The foremost critic of these papers was Götze, head-pastor of Hamburg, whose utterances were the occasion of some of Lessing's most brilliant controversial writings. Lessing strenuously upheld the right of the intellect to discuss with pens and freedom all subjects, whether their nature, which are of deep concern to mankind.

"If you could bring it about that our Lutheran pastors should become our popes; that they should have power to prescribe to us where we must cease to investigate Scripture, to put limits to our investigation and to our right of publishing the results of our investigations, that would be the first to exchange the popes for the pope." (ib. p. 181.)

Lessing insisted on the distinction between Christian love and the religion of Christ:

"that which He Himself as a man conceived and practised, which every man may have in common with Him, which every man may wish to have in common with Him in properties and the character ascribed to Christ simply as a man and sublime and soberly.

In the dialogue entitled "The Testament of John," Lessing asks, "Are not Christian love and the Christian religion the same thing?" (ib. x. 46.) In his treatment of Biblical questions Lessing was very frank. He left it to others to write appreciations of the Bible, taking their results for granted. He himself set out to show that the Bible is not the only sustenance for man's spiritual life, and the suggestions which he threw out in the course of this and other controversial writings (which belong chiefly to the year 1778) led to those inquiries and researches which were only much later recognized as the legitimate studies of NT Canon and Early Christian History. Indeed, it was Lessing who first drew to the attention of the world the essential difference between the first three and the fourth Gospels (see the fragment, "New Hypothesis concerning the Evangelists," Sämmtliche Schriften, x. 10.)

Lessing's contributions to theological study were vividly summarized in a work consisting of a hundred propositions and entitled "The Education of the Human Race" (Die Erziehung des Menschengeistes, 1780). Humanity is represented as passing through three stages of education:

The first is that reflected in its school-book, the OT. We see there the gradual development from the worship of a God of all and local deities to that of one God, and the transition from the worship of a virtue which is dependent on rewards and punishments in this life to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, to learn which the Hebrew people had been "sent abroad" to Babylon. The second is that in which Christ taught the eternal sanctions of righteousness in place of immediate retribution, and the NT is the school-book of this stage. Before the third stage is reached, revealed truths are to be transformed into the use of the school of the theological world.

It will come, the time of consummation, when man, however firmly his mind is convinced of an ever better future, will have no need to seek reward for his conduct now, for he will do what is right because it is right, and not because arbitrary rewards are attached to it, which were merely intended to attract and strengthen his wandering attention, so that he might recognize its inward and better rewards. It will certainly come to a new Gospel, which is promised us already in the elementary books of the New Covenant (Proposition 85.)

After remarking that each individual human being must first traverse the ground along which the race advances towards its perfection, he meets the objection that in one and the same life-time a man cannot pass through the three stages of the school of the theological world, making the interesting, and at that time novel, suggestion of pre-existence (see Propositions 93-100). This little treatise is closely related to Lessing's "The Wise in its teaching of the relative worth of different religions, and in that each is fitted for a particular race and epoch and that none can claim supremacy over all the others.

6. Political opinions. — In Ernst und Falk, Dialogues for Freemasons (Gespräche für Freimüther), published without his permission in 1780, Lessing expresses his views of society, devoting but little space to freemasonry, which should, he says, overcome all distinctions of caste and fortune, of nationality and religion. He admits a preference for natural life as opposed to the social state.

Speaking of art, he says: "What activity and yet what order! Everyone carries, drags, and pushes, and nobody is a hindrance to the rest. See, they even help one another; they have no member that holds them together and rules them; each individual is able to govern himself." (Sämmtliche Schriften, x. 257.)

But at the same time he recognizes that the good of individuals depends at present on a certain degree of organization. With no uncertain courage, considering the circumstances of the age, Lessing insists on the basis of social life in the needs and satisfactions of individuals.

"States unite men that through and in this union every individual man may the better and more surely enjoy his share of welfare. The total of the welfare of all its members is the welfare of the state; besides this there is none. Every other kind of welfare of the state, whereby individuals suffer and must suffer, is a cloak for tyranny. . . . As nature could have intended the welfare of an abstract idea, State, Fatherland, and the like rather than that of each individual." (Ibid.)


LETTERS CELESTIAL AND INFERNAL

—With the development of writing the belief arose that the gods themselves kept records of their proceedings, and thus among the Egyptians Thoth was the scribe of the gods (A. Wissmann, Religion der anci. Egyptians, London, 1897, pp. 227 f., 248), while the Indians believed Brahman to be a writer of (cf. Vaisvanardita, tr. L. H. Gray, New York, 1913, p. 115), particularly the deity who writes the fate of each mortal on the individual’s forehead (brahmachakir.

As a natural corollary it was thought that the gods could communicate their will to man by written as well as by spoken words.

In the Egyptian Book of the Dead, the rubric of ch. xxx. b. states that “this chapter was found in the city of Hermopolis (Hermopolis Major), under the feet of the statue of this god.” It was inscribed upon a slab of iron south of the writing of the king and his queen in the “house of the dead...” by the royal son Heru-Habu (the son of Cheops, the builder of the Great Pyramid). (Book of the Dead, tr. E. A. W. Budge, London, 1894, p. 151; cf. 223 f.)

In some forms of revelation the document is written in heaven, in the Bible it is written as (see Ezek. 12:24). The sacred book of the Elkisaites was believed to have been given to them by the god Kok, who also gave the book of Kay IV, 38, and, according to another version, to have been brought from heaven to Elkisai by a gigantic angel (Hippol. Refut. ix. 8; see ERE v. 269).

The belief may, however, be traced much farther back. Towards the end of the 3rd or during the 2nd b.c., a native of Syria, a Greek named Menippus, a Syrian from Gada, inaugurated the genre of the Menippe satiric. Among his productions were the adventus of a person, who suggests that the non-Greek phrase ἀρα τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον may be a reminiscence of a Heb. 2:7-9. It may have been these compositions that gave rise to the tradition of the Samosata, the inspiration for his “Letters of the Gods.” Servius (ad Æn. vi. 332) mentions a certain Tiberianus who “invented epistolario vento allata ab antiquis lapsus superi infernus salutem,” and Pausanias (X. xxxvIII. 7) records that “Esclapinus sent the poetess Anyte to Naupactus, bearing a sealed tablet given her by the god, to heal Phylus, who was well-nigh blind, but who, obeying the divine command, was cured and given a full vision again. Other instances of more doubtful interpretation might be cited, as, e.g., Juvenal’s phrase (xi. 27), ‘æ caelo descendit γραφα ἐκατον,’ although here the most obvious meaning is that Chilon was divinely inspired with a prophecy, and he passed down that which a master inscribed; ‘ἐκαίναλα ἐκατον’ was waited to him from the sky.

Within Christianity one of the earliest mentions of a celestial letter occurs in the 23rd Ode of Solomon (tr. J. H. Bernard, Psalms, iii. 112) if the second half of the 2nd cent. A.D.), in which the decree of the Most High descends in a letter ‘like an arrow which is violently shot from the bow.’ It was ‘a great Tablet, which was wholly written by the Finger of God.’ The contents of this letter were apparently Mt 16:19. In the Ethiopic Acts of Peter the apostle receives from Christ books written with His own hand... wherein were written the mysteries which the tongues of the children of men are neither able to utter nor to understand with their hearts, except those whose hearts are arrayed in the strength of the gracious gift of baptism’ (tr. E. A. W. Budge, Contendings of the Apostles, London, 1895, p. 151; cf. 223 f.).


To the category of celestial letters belongs the very interesting letter of the hallowing Sunday, whose history may be traced back at least to the 6th cent., and which has spread, despite many efforts to check it, throughout both Western and Eastern Christendom. Although much study has already been devoted to this letter, its history is by no means clear. Its general character is thus summarized by Delahaye (op. cit. infra, p. 174).

The principal specimens of this letter are as follows:


(b) Anglo-Saxon: Four homilies are edited by A. S. Napier in Wulfstan, Berlin, 1889, a fifth by him in Eng. Miscellany presented to Dr. Furnivall, Oxford, 1901, pp. 255-332, and a sixth has been published by R. Priebe in Owe Missaria, i. (Liverpool, 1900) 129 ff.

(c) Middle English: John Audley’s poem is edited by R. Priebe in Engl. Miscellany, 247-450.

(d) German: Delahaye, 191-195; Dieterich, 234-237, 243 f.; A. Wuttke, Deutsch. Vom Ministerspfarrer, Berlin, 1894, 505 f.; F. Struckjer, Aberglaube und Sagen aus dem Herzogtum Oldenburg, Oldenburg, 1895, i. 239 ff.; R. Bartz, Sagen, Märchen und Geschichten aus Mecklenburg, Vienna, 1875-90, x. 341 ff.; J. Jahn, Herzmenschen und Zauberer in Pommern, Breslau, 1887, p. 82 f.; F. Gosser, Strasburger Strafgeschichten, Strasbourg, 1842, pp. 92-95; Chroniken der oberösterreichischen Städte, Strabach, 1870, i. 111-116; M. Haupt, Äiweldt, Bütter, u. (Leipzig, 1870) 241-257.

(e) Icelandic: J. Arnason, Islandskt 8fólgar og afáfnitir, Reykjavik, 1863-64, II. 15-35.


(g) Celtic: E. O’C. O’Clair, Lectures on the Material of the Irish Hist., Dublin, 1891, p. 605 (referring to Lebor Leinse, do. 1893, coll. 217); F. W. Joyce, Soc. Hist. of I., Ireland,
LEVI BEN GERSHON.

nal gods are known from classic times (Dieterich, 251). In the 14th and 15th centuries a number of epitaphs were ascribed to Satan, but these were solely satirical in purpose (see W. Wattensbach, 'Über erfundene Briefe in Handschriften des Mittelalters,' SBA W, 1892, pp. 91–133, and for an admirable specimen ib. 104–122). LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned in the art. See I. F. Kurmann, Die Asiaten in Status, and epistolario del señor el menor de los descartes, Salamanca, 1785; H. Delaheye, Bull. de la classe des lettres ... académ. roy. de Belgique, iii. xxxvii. (1890) 171–211; F. Dieterich, Kleine Schriften, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 234–41; A. Abt, 'Von den Himmelsbriefen,' Historische Blätter für Volks- und Quellenbest. d. Kirche, 1899; T. O. Radice, 'Die Himmelsbriefe,' Zeitschr. des Vereins für Kirchengesch. in der Provinz Schlesien (v. 1906) 228–245; R. Priesch, Die Briefe des Dieterich, Graz, 1856; V. G. Kermer, Werke d. Himmelsbriefe, Leipzig, 1938; W. Köhler, 'Himmels- und Todtführer,' Religion in Gesch. und Gegenwart, iii. (1913), 29–38. Many German specimens are given in such periodicals as Schweiz. Archiv für Volkskunde, Historische Blätter für Volkskunde, etc.; see also above, p. 709.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

LETTIS. — See LITHUANIANS AND LETTS.

LEUCIPPUS. — See DEMOCRITUS.

LEVI BEN GERSHON.—1. Life and influence. — Levi ben Gershon, familiarly known in Hebrew literature as Ralbag, from the initials of his name, called also Gesonkos, Leon de Bagnoles, Magister Leo de Bannolis, and Magister Leo Ibe- ruen, Jewish philosopher, exegete, mathematician, and astronomer, was born in Bagnoles (S. Francia) in 1288, and died on April 29th, 1344. Levi lived at Orange and at Avignon, where it is supposed that he practised as a physician. His life fell in a period when discussion raged furiously between the followers of tradition and those who read their philosophical conceptions into the text of Scripture. Levi belonged to the latter class, and, though under the influence of the great Stagyrite and his Arabic interpreter, Averroes, he was not afraid to criticize them—just as he was sufficiently open-minded to differ from Ptolemy in matters of astronomy.

He was, like most of the great scholars in the Middle Ages, a polyhist; but his interest in Jewish theology, as well as his studies in metaphysics, accentuated his occupation with many of the exact sciences. Just as Aristotelian theories regarding the spheres and the stars as the virtual intermedium between the Deity and man made a study of astronomy necessary, so did occupation with questions concerning the Jewish calendar necessitate a knowledge of both mathematics and astronomy. Of Levi's life we know very little; but its end must have been darkened by the clouds that hung over his people and led him to compute the Year of Redemption to be 1338, and to write horoscopes for the years 1343 and 1344.

In Hebrew literature Levi's chief influence was as a philosopher and Bible commentator. He was the first after Maimonides to present to his fellow Jews a complete system of philosophy; and, while he found many followers, his course of freedom from the fetters of tradition evoked strong opposition. Hasdai b. Abraham Crescas († 1410) severely criticized his philosophical deductions; and he was decried as unorthodox by such writers as Isaac b. Sheshet († 1408), Abrahal (1450), Shem Tob b. Shem Tob (1461), Messer Leon (1475), Elias Delmedigo († 1497), and Manasseh b. Israel (1627). Indeed, in 1546 it was dangerous to print his chief work on philosophy. But the opposition which he aroused is proof that he was widely read. His influence extended outside his own circle. Spinoza adopted his theories regarding miracles; Pico de Mirandola praised his astronomical treatise,
part of which Pope Clement VI (1342) ordered to be translated into Latin; and he is mentioned by Reuchlin and Kepler. Further, he was the real discoverer of the 'heavens,' or 'Jacob's Staff,' an instrument for measuring angles and distances on the earth and in the spheres—a discovery which has been attributed to Regiomontanus. He also invented the "camera obscura," in order to be able to arrange the relation of the caditi of the sun and the moon to the radius of a circle, to measure the size of the eclipse of these two bodies, and to ascertain the relation of the diameter of the whole body to the diameter of the part obscured. He laid down these results in his "Lukhot ha-Pehinnah ("Astronomical Tables"), incorporated in the fifth part of the Milhämah. This was 200 years before Leonardo da Vinci and Porta.

2. Philosophy.—Levi's philosophical system is contained in his Milhämah Adhōni ("War of the Lord," Riva di Trento, 1590, Leipzig, 1836). His controversy with Maimonides centred about the creation of matter and the immortality of the soul. In order to posit God's intercessions in natural phenomena and to form a basis for the existence of miracles, Maimonides had denied the eternity of matter, while he had not proved the possibility of an individual's immortality. Levi held opposite views; but, in order to justify his standpoint, he found it necessary to explain the physical and metaphysical theories upon which his idea of the co-eternity of matter with God was based. The Milhämah, which is in six parts, covers the whole ground of natural philosophy, metaphysics, and theology in the following order: theory of the soul; prophecy; God's omniscience; providence; astronomy, physics, and metaphysics; Creation and miracles.

According to Levi, the basis of human intellect is in reality the imaginative soul, something akin to the animal soul. This human intellect is moved to action by the universal intellect; when joined to the acquired ideas and conceptions, it becomes the acquired intellect. This acquired intellect is made up of universals; and Levi holds, with the realists, that such universals have a real existence. It is thus possible that the acquired intellect may continue to exist after death, thus affording us a philosophical basis for the theological doctrine of the immortality of man. In a similar way he develops his fundamental belief in prophecy by connecting the rational faculty in man, which then comes into play, with the universal intellect. Prophecy is thus differentiated from divination, in which the imaginative power in man is, so to speak, the receiving instrument, and to whose workings no certainty can be attached. Maimonides had based his theory upon the imaginative side of the human mind and upon the will of God, without attempting to explain the psychological process. Levi, on the other hand, demands moral as well as intellectual perfection in the prophet.

There are three grades of superhuman forces—the planetary intelligences, the active intellect, and the primary cause of all. God's existence is proved by the phenomena of creation; and His oneness is deducible from the evident hierarchy in the forces that move the universe. The planetary intelligences are made up of the spirits of the stars, which are to be thought of as immaterial bodies swinging in recurring periods in the world harmony. There are forty-eight such spirit intelligences made up of eight astral ones, corresponding to the forty-eight constellations and the eight planets. No one of the sphere intelligences can be—as Averroes supposed—the primary cause, since they affect a part of the universe and not the whole. In contra-distinction to Aristotle, Levi holds that the world had a beginning, since neither matter nor motion is infinite; but, like the heavenly bodies, it has no end. At creation, matter was inert and undetermined. Form and various attributes were given to it by God, but the diverse separate intelligences proceeded directly from the Divine Being. Miracles do not proceed from the Deity, but from the active intellect. Natural laws are of two kinds: one in governing the heavens, upon which sublunar phenomena are dependent; and those governing the active intellect. Miracles are natural events, and are meant to act as a counter-poise to the inflexibility of the celestial bodies. According to Levi, there is a definite analogy between the knowledge of God and that of man; but there is a clear distinction to be made between them. God's knowledge extends over all the cosmic laws of the universe, and over the influence exerted upon sublunar things by the celestial bodies; but He does not know the details of what happens in the sublunar world. This explains the possibility of the freedom of the will, which does not in any way derogate from God's omniscience or imply any imperfection in Him, as He knows all that is essential.

God's providence does not extend to every individual, as Maimonides had supposed; nor does it deal only with mankind, a view which is contrary to the theory of Aristotle. Levi strikes a middle course, and holds that some human beings are under a general providence, others under a special, and that the quantity of special providence meted out to any individual is in direct relation to the period of creation which he has reached,—i.e., to the degree of nearness to the active intellect attained by him. The solicitude of this special providence, appreciated only by beings of the highest perfection, manifests itself in a warning to regard evil influences emanating from the celestial bodies, all of which are regulated by eternal laws known to the Deity.

These philosophical and metaphysical doctrines are found again in Levi's commentaries on various books of the Bible, written between the years 1338 and 1338—notably in those on the Pentateuch and the Former Prophets—and they have been excerpted and published in separate form under the title of To'adiah (Riva di Trento, 1500-64). In addition to these he wrote comments on Job, Daniel, Proverbs, Canticles, Esther, Ecclesiastes, and Ruth. Levi's explanations are quite consciously two-faced. He is partial to the literal meaning of the text, which he explains with lucidity and clearness, following in many cases Ibn Ezra; even miracles, e.g., he explains in a natural sense. But behind this literal meaning he sees a philosophical and historic sense, which he deduces out of the text with great skill. He also finds his scientific principles rooted in the Bible—on the theory that all knowledge is one, the separate parts of which cannot contradict each other.

This philosophic bent of mind is likewise seen in his works on pure science. He believed himself to be an absolute rationalist, and held that no problem was insoluble to man. He dared to explain geometric axioms. His work on arithmetic (Ma'dah Heshabb) differs from that of Ibn Ezra, which may be said to be dogmatic and mechanical, in that it attempts a systematic system founded upon an algebraic basis taken from the elements of Euclid. The same spirit is shown in his tract de Numeri harmonici, dealing with a question in algebra put to him by Philip of Vitry, Bishop of Meaux. Levi was also one of the first writers in Europe to study trigonometry, and he worked out a commentary on the first five books of Euclid.
His views on astronomy are, of course, the integral part of his general system of philosophy, and are largely contained in the fifth section of his Mithraism. Here again he shows his keen love for the exact sciences. He is not afraid to criticize both Alpetragius (al-Butriji) and Ptolemy. He takes into consideration a system akin to that of Copernicus, but only to reject it as quite impossible. According to Levi, the various movements of the sun depend upon more than one sphere, so that the number of the heaven-circles equals the number of all these movements. Each planet also belongs to several spheres—which accounts for the complex courses of the stars. Yet he is not satisfied with so simple a statement, the current mysticism of his day leading him to seek a deeper meaning in these movements. The object of the stars, he says, is to exercise an influence here on earth in order to make good the evident incompleteness of earthly things. This influence, however, is not plenary; man's freedom of will can break through the causal nexus of the dominion of stars, and the higher a man ascends in the scale the greater his power to overcome this influence. Levi is thus a firm believer in astrology, the existence of which, he says, 'no one can doubt.' The light of the sun warms the earth because there is some secret connection between the sun and the element of fire, which is not possessed by the other heavenly lights.

3. Appreciation. — Levi's method is, in all cases, to set out the opinions of his predecessors, to criticize these opinions, and then to state his own view. It is significant that the first work that he wrote was one on logic, in which he reviews Averroes' interpretation of the Analytic of Aristotle. His general position can be stated best in his own words:

'It thought carried us to a conclusion which does not seem to result from the simple wording of Holy Writ, we would still have no scruples to speak the truth; for to do this would not run counter to biblical ethics, which cannot ask us to believe that which is false.

He must not in any way be considered as a sceptic; he found means to harmonize the truth, as he saw it, with received tradition. Nor did he in any way care for the applause of the multitude, though he did insist that some subjects were not fit for discussion. Indeed, by God, is the intention of the author to hide his words from the crowd, in order to be understood only of the few, and to do no harm to others.

In view of this, it seems impossible to hold, as some have done, including Curtze, Cantor, and Günther, that, very late in life, Levi became a convert to Christianity. The basis for this view is found in some expressions in the dedication (in 1842 to Pope Clement VI.) of the Latin translation of a part of the chapters on astronomy contained in his Mishnaith. But there was no need to adopt such a course in Avignon, where the Jews were treated by the pope with conspicuous kindness. All Levi's writings exhibit a strong Jewish feeling, and none of his literary and philosophical opponents mentions the charge. Carlebach suggests rightly that this dedication must have been composed for him by some one else, who wrote what he pleased, as Levi was unacquainted with Latin.


RICHARD GOTHEIL.

LIBERAL JUDAISM. — The changes in thought which marked the close of the 18th cent. and so powerfully affected the course of the 19th did not pass without influencing Judaism. Moreover, the external barriers between the Jews and the rest of the world were broken down by the changes which preceded and followed the French Revolution, and the problem arose as to the Jews' new social life with the old religious institutions. These two causes, the intellectual and the social, have not always had the same relative importance; sometimes the one, sometimes the other, has predominated. But they have not been isolated, because the two are essentially related. The social changes in the position of the Jews were bound up with the modification of the European intellectual outlook. Those who have led the liberal Jewish cause have mostly been the intellectually and socially emancipated—that is, who have most deeply felt the consequences of the altered attitude of men in general towards the problems of thought and of intercourse.

There has been nothing in the nature of schism, because, on the one hand, there has been no established synagogue (see Hebrew), and, on the other, the leaders of the new movements have invariably been animated with a strong loyalty to the common cause of Judaism. But from time to time these new movements have been distinctly marked off from the older Judaism by less reliance on tradition. The earlier Reform represented an attempt to re-state Judaism in the light of the new Jewish learning, which did so much to promote the 'higher criticism' of the Talmud. It was seen that the Rabbinic Codes were the result of growth, that they had a history which, while it made them more interesting as expressions of the progressive life of Jewry, necessarily undermined their authority as unalterable norms. The older Rabbinic Judaism had made far fewer claims to the permanent validity of traditional forms than did the conservative Judaism of the 18th, 17th, and 18th centuries. In the Jewish life of the 18th cent. there were many customs—ritualistic and social—which, in the light of historical criticism, were seen to be of very various date and significance. Reform, accepting this criticism, busied itself with the valuation of traditions, establishing or accepting the validity of some and not of all. More and more, the customs began to be considered as a national institution, though there are at the present day some 'liberals' who are also 'Zionists'—that the Jews were a nation but a religious community, and that, while the maintenance of the synagogue as an independent organization was absolutely essential for the vitality and continued existence of Judaism, yet it was imperative to find as a basis for the maintenance of independence other means than the retention of separate customs.

The course of Reform in Judaism thus became in part a matter of detail. Some of these details were of small significance, such as the question whether to pray with covered or uncovered heads. But others were of greater importance. One of these was the position of women. Woman always occupied a high position in Jewish esteem (see I. Abrahams, Jewish Life in the Middle Ages, London, 1896, ch. v.). But the Reform movement tended to express this esteem of woman by admitting her more fully to congregational equality with men. Another detail was the question of language. The first effective Reform movement occurred in Germany; Moses Moellendorff's book on the history of Reform only in a special sense—wrote three sermons in German in 1757 on the occasion of the victories of Frederick the Great. Vernacular sermons had been in regular vogue much earlier (I. Zunz, Die gesellschaftlichen Vorträge der
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Juden', Berlin, 1892, pp. 454–496). But, in the centuries preceding the age of Reform, sermons were given in synagogues, being usual only twice a year, and then the language employed by the preacher was either some form of Hebrew or a dialect, such as Yiddish. The establishment of regular sermons in the pure vernacular and the fuller organization of religious education for the young, especially as regards girls, are among the most important changes which the modern conservative synagogue owes to the liberals. Again, the liturgical prayer book and the employment of vernacular prayers and hymns were further stages in the Reform movement (1810), which, on the whole, sought to 'estheticize,' or, as some have impliedly expressed it, to 'de-orientalize,' the synagogue services.

But there was a deeper principle at work and, as time went on, the Reform movement, attaching itself to such views as that of Maimonides that the Pentateuchal sacrificial system was a concession to the weakness of early Israel, sought to remove the liturgical prayers for the restoration of the sacrifices and also for the physical resurrection and return to Palestine, without, however, surrendering the fundamental idea of immortality and in the Messianic Age. Liberal Judaism has always tended to a firm grasp of Messianism, in the form of a belief in the perfectibility of human nature, of a steady advance toward the coming of the Messiah, and toward the ultimate conversion of the world to monotheism, and the establishment of the universal Kingdom of God.

Much anxiety was presented by the Saturday Sabbath, and since the beginnings of Reform the problem has grown in difficulty as economic pressure among the working and professional classes, as well as laxity and assimilation among the more wealthy and leisureed circles, has led to a weakening of the seventh day Sabbath rule among conservatives as well as among liberals. No real solution has been found, for, while Sunday services have been established in some liberal Jewish congregations of Germany and America, there has been very little desire or attempt to transfer the Sabbath from Saturday to Sunday.

Reform in Judaism entered on a new and more fertile phase under the inspiration of Abraham Geiger (1810–74). He was one of the leading representatives of the middle way of the Reform movement in Judaism, to use the phrase often applied to it. His writings were of great significance; indeed, his "Urscrift" (Breslau, 1857) is a work which is regarded as having been a most appreciated contribution to Biblical and historical criticism. But, though Geiger was possessed of a historical temper—to use E. G. Hirsch's phrase—he did not, as the Breslau school of Jewish thought tended to do, separate his criticism from his creed. Just because he conceived of Judaism not as a given quantity but as a process (JE v. 859), Geiger recognized the necessity of making that process harmonious. His whole struggle for Reform was based on his sense that thought and religion must be systematized, not put into separate compartments. Some very sincere and very great Jews of the Breslau School were able to discriminate between intellectual and practical freedom, but Geiger could not. This is a criticism of his study and goes on to religious conformity as though nothing had happened to compromise the sanctions on which conformity was based. The same attitude towards assimilation in its own time is as the root of the liberal Judaism of our own time.

Parallel with this was the conviction among certain Reformers that it was necessary to return to the Bible in order to purge Judaism from Rabbinism. This tendency was shown in the discussions of the French Synod at Bordeaux, summoned by Napoleon in 1808. So, too, when the first Reform synagogue was opened in England (1849), the authority of the 'Oral Law' was repudiated, while, as D. W. Marks, the minister of the new congregation, put it, in his sermon published on the occasion, 'for Israelites there is but one immutable law, that which is written in the book of the scriptures, commanded by God to be written down for the unerring guidance of his people until the end of time.' Similarly, Isaac M. Wise (1819–1900), the great organizer of Jewish Reform in the States, was the founder of the famous Hebrew Union College of Cincinnati, strenuously maintaining the older view of Biblical inspiration; to the end of his life he upheld the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, as in his "Promises to Holy Writ" (Cincinnati, 1891). But this easy discrimination between 'Mosaism' and 'Rabbinism' was not tenable when the newer Biblical criticism affected the synagogue. Geiger had been a 'higher critic' not only of Rabbinism but also of Mosaism. Similarly, Zunz (1794–1886) was not only a pioneer in the criticism of the Midrash; he was also a leader in the criticism of the Biblical text which, of course, extended back. He was therefore opposed, a half-house was built by those who, while firmly holding by the authority of the Bible, denied the authority of tradition. But the house constructed with so much care proved an ephemeral lodging for the ultimate conversion of the world to monotheism, and the establishment of the universal Kingdom of God.

Mystical theories, not always consciously recognized as mystical, have involved all forms of religion and Judaism at present is much infected by mystical conceptions. Liberal Judaism, feeling itself bound to assert that not all the Bible is of God, became equally assured that not all the tradition is of man. It believes in a spiritual continuity of the ages, and regards the whole of the Jewish revelation as a spiritual experience, which links together all generations of Jews, including the present generation. It is not, however, necessary to insist on this way of describing what has happened. It can be expressed rationally by the assertion that criticism has tended to prove that, just as documents grew up from traditions, so traditions may be given validity by criticism. Hence it is becoming usual now to speak of 'liberal Judaism,' whereas in former generations the favoured term was 'Reform Judaism.' Liberal Judaism is a kind of syncretism, without the superstructure. It may be described in general terms as a direct resumption of the prophetic Judaism. But it regards the Talmud as often a real advance in religious and ethical teaching, and therefore has the warmest affection for the Talmud as the expression of certain important aspects of the Jewish genius. Thus liberal Judaism, though necessarily denying the validity of any book whatever as a final authority in religion, is strongly placed by its very power of eclecticism. It has not yet formulated a precise theory as to its relation to the idea of Law. But it is coming to accept the theory of progressive revelation in a manner which must eventually become interpretable in the biblical, communal, and therefore more or less legalistic, terms.

It is unnecessary to discuss more fully the tenets of liberal Judaism, because in most fundamental principles it is in agreement with other liberal schools. Liberal Judaism shares the belief in the absolute unity of God, in the revelation of God to man, in human responsibility, in immortality, in the call of Israel to teach the universal Fatherhood of God, in the practical and spiritual salvation of all men despite differences of creed,
LIBERTARIANISM AND NECESSITARIANISM

I. ABRAHAM.

LIBERTARIANISM AND NECESSITARIANISM. — The controversy between the two views of causality is often obscured by the use of terms like 'cause', 'necessity', 'free will', which are not always defined with precision. It is therefore necessary to analyze terms like 'cause', 'necessity', 'free will', which play such an important role in this discussion; for we must make sure that the question is not a logomachy, but a genuine problem.

Thus the term 'causality' is allowed by custom, 'the arbiter of language', to embrace many meanings. The scientific means by it uniformly of sequence, and objects to any other meaning. Now it is clear that, if this is a full account of causation, libertarianism in any sense is meaningless. For to seek the cause of a moral action in the past is to desert the moral standpoint, and is vetoed by the moral consciousness. The uniform sequence seems to be full of contradictions. There are uniform sequences which are not causally connected, as the conjunction of night and day. Again, the uniform sequence, as such, is not in any degree. It is because we have purposes which we wish to realize, ideals by which we guide our actions. It may be possible to explain 'how we act, because activity is an ultimate element in our experience, just as we cannot say how we think, but cogito ergo sum. 

Man, then, appears to himself the principle of his own movements; here the cause is immanent and efficient. And he guides himself by ideas; here the cause is final. At first men applied 'cause' in this full sense to the world of nature, as we still do in ordinary speech.

As time went on, this rich view of causality as applied to nature became more and more limited to events which were fruitful, efficient cause was useless, the regularity of sequences sufficed. No one can deny that this was a gain, that superstition and magic thus received a death-blow, and that nature was examined with greater impartiality by the patient student. It is, however, questionable whether this view is rightly termed causality at all, for what is it but an attempt to understand a change without beginning or end, which succeeds only because it has the instinct to stop somewhere and to take just as much of the change as it pleases? A change, however, can never explain itself, and it certainly cannot explain the subject who is conscious of it or the moral agent who thinks—rightly or wrongly—that he can direct it in accordance with his aims.

In discussing freedom we must ask which view of causation is the most satisfactory. It will not do to foreclose the question off-hand by adherence to uniformity of sequence as alone possible or exhaustive. If we remember this looseness in the use of the term 'cause,' we are saved from initial confusion and from the arrogance of gratuitous assumptions. To say that a human action is 'caused' does not in any way inform us as to the kind of causation implied. The nearest libertarian may use the term without committing himself to determinism.

The circulation of the blood is not the cause of life in the same sense that a blow with the hammer may be the cause of death, nor is virtue the cause of happiness in precisely the same sense that the circulation of the blood is the cause of life. Everywhere as we ascend in the scale of creation from chemical to chemical to physiology and human action, the relative notion is more difficult and subtle, the cause becoming inextricably involved with the effect and the effect with the cause, every means being an end and every end a means. Hence no one who examines our ideas of cause and effect will believe that they imply anything on the will. They are an imperfect mode in which the mind imagines the sequence of natural or moral actions; being a play of words only. The chain which we are weaving is loose and when shaken will drop off. External circumstances are not the cause of which circumstances are the effect, but the phenomenon intended to be caused is itself the will whose actions are analysed in language borrowed from physical nature (Jowett, op. cit., p. 620).

Occam's razor is no doubt a useful instrument 1

1) Etia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.
for certain purposes, it can be abused, and it is abused when causality is born till nothing is left but uniform sequence.

Furher, in our use of the term 'motive,' we ought not to think of motives as acting on a person as forces act on a body. While it is true that in deliberation, which is mainly intellectual, we have something metaphorically similar to the placing of weights in a balance, yet this is a metaphysical process, involving motives only, and in real action the decisive elements are preference and value, and these emerge from the living person himself. Motives are movements of the subject as well as movements on the subject. The subject acts on its own affection.

"We must reject also the idea that our motives are fixed and given quantities which operate within the soul like weights on a pair of scales, thus effecting a decision. Must all conduct result from given motives—cannot new motives arise from inner transformations of life? And, moreover, must not the soul continually assign fresh values to the motives?" (Eucken, Mein Currents of Modern Thought, p. 439, footnote).

If moral activity is real, then we cannot speak as if a decision was the result of the deliaration of many different factors acting on one centre; we find rather that one course of action is preferred by a person and acted on. The rejected proposals do not enter into the action as in the case of mechanical resultsants. In fact they may even strengthen the original activity—by resisting the subject to greater effort. It is often said that the strongest motive always prevails, but, if this means that the motive which prevails is always strongest, we have here a new and unproved proposition. If it means, as most ordinary people take it to mean, that our reason always obeys our passions, that, in Bentham's phrase, 'nature has placed man under the empire of pleasure and pain' (Principles of Legislation, London, 1789, ch. 3), then it is not true. While men set largely from passion, they need not do so; and, indeed, to most people, as Lecky points out, 'the reality of all moral freedom ultimately depends on the distinction between our will and our desires, on what Reid in his able discussion on this point calls our animal and our rational natures (W. E. H. Lecky, Eur. Morals, London, 1888, ii. 125; Reid, Essays, iv. ch. 4). It is just this reality which we are tacitly assumed as true as that so much confusion arises. J. S. Mill failed to distinguish properly between desire and will for this reason (see A. C. Pigou, The Problem of Theism, London, 1910, ch. 1)."

In regard to the past there is a very true sense in which a determination to the subject, may be said to create it. He selects from it, and reacts upon it. If the self is treated as fixed, i.e. if its future determinations are calculable, if any duality on this head is held to be owing to our imperfect knowledge, then we are unconscious of falling back on a biological view of the self. This may be done in the interests of our ideal freedom, as by certain Hegelians; but there is the danger that by so doing we are destroying the very possibility of the ideal freedom itself. In discussing the question of freedom, the phrase 'self-determination' or 'determination by character' may be used in a way that ignores the very possibility of freedom. We must not solve the question in this way until we have examined what this self is, and what is the nature of the determination.

We are thus led to the conclusion that the misunderstanding between the two parties is deeper than language, that it is inherent in the problem itself. The question of freedom is but a specific way in which different theories of life conflict. The controversy is like a combat between two representative champions, on the issue of which the fate of armies depends. That is what gives the problem its perennial interest and importance, and makes it so difficult of solution. It is true, as Eucken points out, that in recent times more than in the past the solution of the problem is attempted through an analysis of experience (op. cit. p. 433), but the problem cannot be solved on that arena alone; it is mainly a philosophical and not an empirical question. The wider issues emerge sooner or later on whatever plane we attempt a solution. Freedom may be taken as the touchstone of every philosophical system. To explicate a theory from this standpoint is to come face to face with its real implications.

"* If there be anything obscure and difficult in philosophy we are sure to find it in that part which treats of Elections and
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Liberty' (W. King, Origin of Evil', Cambridge, 1785, ch. v. n. 4).

This is the reason why in actual discussions we find the battle raging not round a single point, but over a wide area of consequences, and horrid is the danger that we may attribute to thinkers consequences which they repudiate, because we think these consequences follow from admitted premises. We can accuse men of bad logic; we must not falsely report them.

For example, necessitarianism is often identified with fatalism.

'It is supposed to imply the existence of a Fate which forces people, whether they like it or not, to commit so many murders in proportion to their population, or forces a sober person to take to drink because his grandfather was a drunkard' (Leslie Stephen, Hobbes, London, 1894, p. 157f).

J. S. Mill protested against this identification, and rightfully, for his own view and such a view as that of Robert Owen, according to whom our characters were made for us and not in any sense by us. We must allow the distinction. It is not necessary to start with the conviction that determinism in every form destroys morality and paralyses conduct. Many determinists, even of what William James calls the 'hard' school, endeavour to show that morality is impossible save on their theory. Probably the ordinary man will always mean by determinism a catastrophic, probably his instinctive logic is right in so doing; in discussion, however, it is necessary to distinguish them, unless the force of argument compels us to identify them.

And the most libertarian view is identified with caprice, with a liberty of equilibrium according to which the power of the will is not influenced in any way by education, experience, or training. The ordinary view, however, has been so many and so obvious, and has been so often entertained by libertarians themselves, that it is truly frivolous on the part of determinists to attack this view of liberty. What A. S. Pringle-Pattison says of H. M. E. MacIntyre is true of many more.

'He attacks a freedom of indetermination for which I do not think any champion would enter the lists. What upholder of freedom, for example, would accept the statement: 'According to the indeterminist theory our choices between motives is not determined by anything at all?' (Phil. Radicale, London, 1897, p. 307 f.).

The problem will not be solved, but rather shelved, if libertarianism is identified with an exploded myth, or determinism answered by the story of Buridan's ass dying between two equally attractive hays. Utility fails to meet the problem. The method of carrying on this discussion, it is necessary for us to examine the various types of necessitarian doctrine, leaving out the theological aspects of the problem, which more properly fall under the title of DEPROPENSION.

II. DIFFERENT TYPES.—When we try to classify various theories of necessity and freedom, we are tempted to neglect the historical elements, to eliminate epocheal and personal particularities, and so to identify views that differ widely in their ultimate assumptions and aims. To do this is to do violence to facts and to confuse the problem itself. No one can justly treat Augustine and H. M. E. MacIntyre as being in the same category. Yet it is possible and desirable to examine certain specific ways in which this problem has been discussed.

1. The common man's position.—Perhaps the most prevalent view is to regard freedom and necessity as both true although apparently contradictory. We do not refer to the high-idealistic way of identifying opposites, but to what may be called the common man's position. W. Hamilton is usually given as the formulator of the view to use either exclusively is to land oneself in confusion; but, while each alone is false, both together are true. Hamilton's position, however, is so dependent on his peculiar theory of knowledge and ignorance that it has now only an historical interest. It is clear that he and Mill held practically the same views on freedom when they both admitted and censured are taken into account. The fundamental assumptions of their systems are, however, very different.

Theologians often take up this position. They speak of predestination and free will as concentric circles; thus they appear inconsistent, but in reality they are compatible with each other. It may be the case that for practical purposes it is best to regard the problem as on a par with Zeno's famous paradoxes and to say: 'Sollicitus amabilis,' the value of this view seems to lie in its recognition of facts and its faithfulness to experience. Its weakness consists in its theoretic helplessness. For we find too often that freedom is confined to a realm which is swiftly being conquered by necessity, or else that it is raised to a pre-temporal or supra-temporal region while experience as we know it is rigidly determined. Or, again, freedom is viewed simply as a datum of consciousness which is not in any way brought into line with the rest of experience. Human life is thus divided into two spheres which contradict each other—one side freedom, on the other necessity.

It is very doubtful, however, if the problem can be thus solved. There are distinctions in experience, but they are not meant to be contradictory, nor are the limitations of our knowledge to be used to discredit knowledge itself. It is a gain to recognize that both freedom and necessity have a meaning, and that both are implicitly taken for granted in all systems. The most rigid determinists suppose that freedom is essentially preordained, and that necessity is accidentally preordained.

Moreover determinists have never been completely and logically carried out at any period. When the Stoic philosophers converted the whole cosmos into a necessary mechanism and placed the destinies of men entirely within its framework, man's power of personal decision still remained; . . . The possibility of such decision (the very core of Stoic morality) is obviously in direct opposition to the determinist doctrine . . . and in Spinoza's case, although he so strongly maintained that man is entirely within a flawless network of causal connections, the fact remains that man has to be won over to a recognition of his position, and this recognition involves quite a new complexion to the whole of life' (Bucke, op. cit. p. 425).

Naturam expellas furca tacentis, et usque recurrit' (Horace, Ep. i. v. 24).

So also theologians like Augustine, Calvin, and Chalmers, in the interests of morality, appeal to the conceptions of necessity and the power of choice. The Stoic admitted the possibility both of action and of choice. Can, then, determinism alone or freedom alone be taken as true or must both be recognized? Attempts have been made to carry necessity all through reality—with some show of plausibility.

2. Physical determinism.—Huxley, for instance, revived the view of Descartes that animals were simply automatons, and man was explained in a similar fashion. Consciousness had no more inherent relation to the movements of a creature than the steam-whistle has to the movements of a railway train. Few, if any, biologists would agree with this theory in detail, but Huxley's assumptions and aims are still widely and implicitly acted on by matter. Hence the theory of the conservation of energy is
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held to explain everything, and the scientific concept of cause and effect are, it is taken for granted, operative everywhere just as in physics. All apparent differences are levelled down under this theory. So consciousness arises, it is said, out of momentary nerve currents, and companies them with the phosphorescent line which results from the rubbing of a match. No efficiency can originate in consciousness; otherwise there would be the intolerable fact that something came from nothing. This, for itself, or, as is, the unity of energy is so fixed that we could accurately predict if we knew the state of things at any moment. We do not, of course, have accurate knowledge at any time; but, if we had, then the future would be open to us. This is not the divine foreknowledge of which theologians speak, for many of them admit the greatest freedom (as King in his famous sermon on Predestination, published with notes by R. Whately in his Use and Abuse of Party Feeling in Religion, London, 1822) as consistent with the divine foreknowledge. It is really our ordinary physical knowledge infinitely enlarged. Now this view, conveniently known as naturalism, has no place for anything but matter and motion. This determinism is totally different from theological determinism, and should not be identified with it, as it so often is.

The libertarian can leave to the biologist the refutation of this view. He can leave it even to the physicist himself. It may be pointed out that the advance of science does not depend on extending these assumptions to cover all reality. Indeed, to do so is to make science itself chaotic and indeterminate, for the value of the principle of the conservation of energy depends on its limitation to those fields where the amount of energy is calculable. It does not in the least show how the energy whose working is calculable is related to all the energy in existence. If it tried to do so, it would be useless. Its strict delimitation is the very condition of its success. Nor does it allow for different kinds of energy; it must confine itself to quantitative relations. Hence the pretense of foretelling the future is simply a logical conclusion from the principle itself.

It is that biology needs new categories. The lowest organism possessing spontaneity must not be factorized into general conditions, far less reduced to a single principle. It is doubtful if anything that can be called a 'thing' can be so easily factorized; but it is not another, and living being has an even more obtrusive individuality. Was this the reason why even Epicurus attributed to each atom an 'exiguum climamen peculiar to itself'? In the higher animals at least, consciousness is a real factor whose presence helps towards preservation and propagation; it would otherwise be unintelligible. When, again, we come to explain man, we must recognize the existence of a new problem. Are we to regard history and civilization, ideas and achievements, as shadows of matter? The unsatisfactoriness of this theory is perhaps best shown by its own advocates. For they forget their own assumptions dealing with knowledge and social life. They make morality to consist in warfare with the cosmic process (as Huxley). They regard consciousness as flowing alongside of neurotic processes, but related to them. We are both more or less manifestations of an unknown energy. Some of them (Clifford, Haeckel, etc.) make matter conscious. Further, they seem to make all reality to be somehow in consciousness, and so the realm of education of naturalism is divided into two causes. In the first place, every theory must recognize the enormous influence which the physical organism has on the inner life, the intimate relationship between the higher phases of spiritual existence and material conditions. This naturalism does, and it is therefore valuable. Again, there is a close connexion between this view and the results of the higher mathematics. If there is one thing we can nowadays prevail, but these results are not dependent on naturalistic assumptions. The weakness of this view is revealed when it tries to explain itself; then it either forgets itself or confines itself to a consciousness as a reality and tries to explain it on deterministic grounds. It leads thus to psychological determinism.

3. Psychological determinism.—The basis of this determinism is the theory of association. Consciousness is recognized as 'sui generis,' but any existing phase of it is said to be caused by the preceding. Great stress is laid also on physiological processes, often in such a way as to suggest that these are the ultimate causes. Now there is always a relation between states of consciousness even when these are qualitatively different, but to explain this relation is just the problem. The fact that the same experiences are always subject-consciousness is not enough. Even the simplest case of memory is tinged with personal qualities that raise it above a mere association of ideas, and, as Bergson points out (op. cit. p. 126), many such associations are post facto attempts to unify experience. The main objection to the theory is its defective view of the 'self.' What we find is a bundle of impressions not one of which or all of which could be the self. As Bergson points out (op. cit. p. 126), many such associations are post facto attempts to unify experience. The main objection to this theory is its defective view of the 'self.' What we find is a bundle of impressions not one of which or all of which could be the self. As Bergson insists, in space. Consciousness is a stream, or a display in a theatre at which no one is looking. What we have here pictured for us is a conflict of motives acting nowhere ... and this is what happens when the self is recognized, it is only as a desire or aversion or a point in which motives meet, but it has neither position nor magnitude.

4. Self-determination.—Can we then regard the reality of freedom as a common platform for every system that admits an activity of the subject.
which issues from itself, and which cannot be reduced wholly to the influence of conditions? There is a sense in which this is true of all things —of chemical reaction, of biological growth, and of human activity. Everything—man included—has its own life that is independent of the acting out of this nature according to its own laws. Is this a sufficient account of freedom? If it is, freedom means freedom from compulsion, and it could be simply, metaphorically at least, to everything. This might mean free as the immortal gods; the flower that grows without being trampled, the lion in the jungle, the man out of fetters, are all free in this negative sense. Of it might mean free as the man was able to fulfill the distinctive laws of his being without internal interruption, i.e., interruption arising from the man himself as distinct from external compulsion.

Schopenhauer understood Kant's view of freedom in this sense as the working out of the 'esse' according to its own character, conditions giving the occasions to this nature to reveal itself in time and space. Freedom here means the evolution in acts of the inner nature of the subject. The acts of freedom are therefore rigidly determined. Whether this be a true representation of Kant we do not need to inquire. At any rate freedom here seems to be the bare knowledge that we act as we act. Curiously enough, Schopenhauer could accept Kant and the Stoicism, but only as a mystery. It is now generally acknowledged that this is determinism of a very 'hard' type.

But, leaving aside Schopenhauer's clumsy apparatus of a noumenal ego and phenomenal acts, it may still be held that freedom is simply determination by oneself.

To be free means that one is determined by nothing but oneself. It is this that Schopenhauer sees as Kant and the Stoics did, but only as a mystery. It is now generally acknowledged that this is determinism of a very 'hard' type.

The false awareness of the activity of the subject either into a perfect absolute or into social customs. For, while a perfect absolute would explain perfect freedom, it does not explain sin and error, which are the roots of all our difficulties, nor does society give us any relief, because we find all the perplexing difficulties of our life repeated in it.

Conclusion.—The freedom which we desiderate is a moral power that can make the world better. While knowledge may be content to unfold its object and work on it, moral freedom attempts to create it. We must admit also that it is the correlative, freedom to make things worse and to destroy. Is not this what we actually find in experience? We have in man a spiritual being rising above nature to the heights of ideals, but also falling into nature, disobeying ideals, and refusing to realize them. We find new individuals appearing who were never there before, a fact which no bare singularity can ever explain. If reality were subordinated into a static whole, then absolute thought would have the happy task of quiet contemplation; but reality is always active, and so living thought and living action are never satisfied with the past, nor is morality ever satisfied with the present itself good, and, on the Kantian dictum that every 'ought' implies a 'can,' which Mackenzie accepts, this is possible. Is the difficulty here not due to our present capacity to grasp the whole of the given, in morality we make the object.

'Action breaks the circle' (Creative Evolution, London, 1912, p. 305). But, if we admit this freedom to make things worse and indeed to create, then we must admit also that it is the correlative, freedom to make things worse and to destroy. Is not this what we actually find in experience? We have in man a spiritual being rising above nature to the heights of ideals, but also falling into nature, disobeying ideals, and refusing to realize them. We find new individuals appearing who were never there before, a fact which no bare singularity can ever explain. If reality were subordinated into a static whole, then absolute thought would have the happy task of quiet contemplation; but reality is always active, and so living thought and living action are never satisfied with the past, nor is morality ever satisfied with the present itself good, and, on the Kantian dictum that every 'ought' implies a 'can,' which Mackenzie accepts, this is possible. Is the difficulty here not due to our present capacity to grasp the whole of the given, in morality we make the object.

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i. Christian liberty as a religious experience.—
The religious life in our Lord's interpretation is a filial relationship with a Heavenly Father, and therefore a life of liberty. It consists in love to God and to man. When hatred, rancour, and resentment, on the one side (Mt 5:46), and needless anxiety in relation to material things, on the other (Mt 6:25-26), have been expelled from the soul, we are then truly the sons of our Father. The submission of children to the Father above is not a surrender of liberty, but a happy freedom, for in fact, freedom in the Christian sense is simply obedience to that which we most truly and deeply love and venerate. Freedom is attained by self-conquest, by victory over unrighteousness, and the penalty is self-contempt and unness. 'Come unto me, and ye shall find rest unto your souls' (Mt 11:28-29) is a promise of freedom. Self-denial, therefore, to Jesus is a privilege, not a loss; the taking up of the cross (Mt 10:39; Mk 8:34; Lk 14:27), which looks like the loss of liberty, issues in moral emancipation.

This general view of religion explains our Lord's attitude towards the Mosaic Law, which is a dispensational law (see also Synoptic and Johannine narratives. He does not, of course, countenance an antinomian contempt of moral restriction, nor does He proclaim exemption from the Moral Law. In so far as the Mosaic Law abridges man's liberty it is worthy of all reverence; it is not superseded, but only consummated, by the 'New Commandment' of our Lord's teaching. On the other hand, in the course of time the Law was interpreted by acceptions of interpretation which tended to lay the emphasis on vexatious minutiae of custom and usage, and elevated practices of cleanliness and health to an unnecessary prominence, with the result that trivial and secondary regulations which were deemed as sacred as the original enactments. The letter of the Law was punctually observed by the pious Jew in the hope of propitiating God. Obedience to the outward regulation tended to produce a distorted sense of the relative value of given acts. Hence our Lord's pronouncements on the unwashed hands of the disciples (Mt 15:2), Mk 7) and on the proper view of the 'man for man' (Mk 25) are to be regarded as examples of His method of interpreting the nature of Christian freedom. He substituted great principles of action for minute and arbitrary regulations which were additional, not indispensable, in all circumstances. He superseded definitions of duty—e.g., our duty to our neighbour in the parable of the good Samaritan—by a commandment 'exceeding broad,' namely, the law of love.

It is obvious that this view of liberty receives its crowning illustration and its binding force from His own manhood. If we take such statements as Jn 4:9-10 (the idea of irresponsibility as a deduction from human frailty); and Mt 18:24 ('the soul that sineth shall die.' Man, who is created in the Divine image, is a partaker of the Divine nature, and his freedom is the reflex of God's. When we pass into the atmosphere of the NT, we discover that personal freedom will find its justification in the teachings of our Lord and His apostles. We may therefore sufficiently consider the following aspects of the subject.

[Further discussion on the nature of Christian liberty and its implications for the Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount, as well as the correlation between liberty and self-surrender, and the role of freedom in moral emancipation.]
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truth which is to set men free is 'perfect conformity to the absolute, that which is' (see B. F. Westcott, *Gospel according to St. John*, London, 1898, on Jn 8, and the relation of this conception to some Modern American and Jewish ethics. Again, in Jn 15, our Lord speaks as the 'true impacter of freedom; He communicates to others what is His own (γεγονός ὦ παράστας μου); and this self-communication is the basis of a friendship between Himself and His disciples in which the doing of His will is not a service but a joy.

These conceptions of Christian liberty as a religious experience find further illustration in the writings of St. Paul, to whom ἐλευθερία is a vivid and real characteristic of the Christian life; this word, with its connected epithet and verb, 'free' and 'set free,' occurs 11 times in Gal., 7 in Rom., 3 in the Corinthian Epistles, and twice in other letters of St. Paul (see W. M. Ramsey, *Cities of St. Paul*, London, 1907, p. 36 ff.), who argues that this is one of the ideas which became familiar to St. Paul from his Hellenic environment in Tarsus and elsewhere. In the Galatian Epistle in particular he sets out with great emphasis the freedom which the gospel confers 'in Christ Jesus' (see Gal 29). The Christian ἐλευθερία destroys distinctions of sex, social status, and race (32); cf. also Col 3, Eph 68. By an allegory which recalls our Lord's words in Jn 5 it differentiates (48-9) between the 'children of a handmaid' and those of a 'free woman,' indicating that the real freedom is that of the spirit imparted to us by Christ (5), which involves a complete abrogation of the outward conventional laws as a means of personal and universal salvation. He protests against submission to the rite of circumcision, which, while it had a religious significance to the Jew, had none to the Gentile, ending with 'the impatient, perhaps half-blind, wish that the Jews be circumcised which the Galatians might be subjected to a severer operation themselves' (W. R. Inge, *St. Paul,* Quarterly Review, no. 438 [1914], p. 331). But, while glorying in the liberty to which the Christian has been called, he is careful to throw any misunderstanding as to its nature: liberty is not licence (5).

But to St. Paul Christian liberty has an even deeper significance: it involves a real emancipation from sin (Ro 628, 829, 2 Co 37); and hereina he carries on the teaching of our Lord. His own personal experience is: 'the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free from the law of sin and of death' (Ro 8). This constitutes the true Christian sonship (Gal 4), 'the liberty of the glory of the children of God' (Ro 8); and we note that 'glory' here is an aspect of our present earthly existence. Sin, which is a bondage and carries with it a sense of guilt and condemnation, has been defeated by Christ, who is thus qualified to be the liberator of the soul (Gal 5).

To early Christian writers the promise of freedom (2 P 29) from any other source is an illusion. It is from this experience of inward liberty that the fruits of the spirit—joy, peace, and hope—are developed. To be spiritually-minded is *life and peace* (Ro 8) is a saying which recites the serene and gentle teaching of the Son of the Son of Man, and may be illustrated by the testimony of Christian experience in all ages.

St. Paul is indeed the great apostle of liberty. He regards the Christian life as one of unrestricted access to Christ, and as such much emphasis is put on the Christian duty of *obedience*, or boldness of utterance, in proclaiming the principles of the gospel (see art. 'Boldness of Speech,' *Expository Quarterly* [1909-10] 236 ff., for an elucidation of this duty). His opposition to the moral influence of *Skepticism* (Gal 2) and made it a world-faith. He was the advocate of liberty of thought, action, and judgment. His pronounced views on original sin and the eternal, supreme power and grace of God never weakened his sense of human accountability (Ro 118).

As J. Weiss (Paul and Jesus, Eng. tr., London, 1900, p. 113) remarks, 'the ethical sense of responsibility, the energy for struggle and the discipline of will was not paralysed or absorbed in Paul's case by his consciousness of redemption and his profound spiritual experiences.'

He believed in Divine election, pre-knowledge, and predestination; and, without attempting to resolve the antithesis, places human duty as the complement or by side these. Man co-operates with Divine grace, which is a power 'appropriated by man's moral nature and conditioned by his free action' (Alexander, *The Ethics of Paul*, p. 144, who quotes Ph 1 29, 2 Co 11, 1 Th 5, and the statements of Weiss just cited).

It may also be noted that St. James' royal 'law of freedom' (29-34) is practically identical with St. Paul's 'law of the Spirit,' consisting, as Haeckel (op. cit., p. 162) remarks, in 'freedom from the multiplicity of single precepts,' while the epistle 'royal' appears to imply that 'Christ's law is not addressed to slaves, who must obey whether they will or not, but to the heirs of God, who voluntarily embrace the law as their guide; cf. the Stoic paradox in I Cor., 1 106' (see note in J. B. Mayor's commentary ad loc.).

2. Christian liberty in relation to the problems of ethical and social life.—It is clear from what has already been said that Christian liberty as an experience of the inner life has a direct relationship with outward practice, and has created ethical problems in the conduct of life. These have been agitated in the conflict of duties arising within the early Christian Church as the result of the accession of converts from paganism to its ranks. For example, St. Paul was faced at Corinth with a difference of opinion regarding the practice of eating 'things offered to idols.' Evidently the peril lay in the one-sided and over-emphasized interpretation of Christian liberty, which offended the conscience of the more cautious and self-restrained Christians. There were, in fact, two opposing tendencies represented by those who stained their newfound Christian liberty to the breaking-point—the strong of I Cor. (see ch. 8, *passim*) and Christians of a narrower type, who were concerned about preserving personal sanctity than about exercising their Christian privileges. The claim that 'all things are lawful to me' (1 Co 610)—the watchword of the strong,' quoted out of their mouth by the Apostle—had become abuses not only to the extent of participation in heathen sacrificial feasts, but to the extent of advocating grave licence and immorality in sexual relationships.

As E. von Dobschütz points out, such Christians were self-deceived, mistaking outward freedom for the inner freedom proclaimed by the gospel.

'The stray, instead of joying in the freedom which Christ gave him, basked after outward liberty. The Jew, instead of grateful recognising his freedom from the constraint of law, exerted himself to secure release from circumcision; others sought also and found the freedom only by becoming ceremonially unclean (Christians); thereby destroying Christian unity and morally impermissible' (*Christian Liberty in the Primitive Church*, Eng. tr., London, 1904, p. 65).

The strong might therefore take on their shoulders the infirmities of the weak (Ro 15); they must spare sensitive minds the pain of witnessing practices which appear to them to be wrong; as Christians, they are to refrain where the exercise of liberty is a stumbling-block to the weak (Ro 14).

Finally, the strong might lead others into sin by encouraging them to eat against conscience for mere self-gratification, and thus sin not only against their brethren but against Christ (1 Co 10). Such was the ruling of the Apostles (Gal 5), and it made it a world-faith. He was
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an exaggerated asceticism which in some sections of the Church resulted in the advocacy of celibacy, in aversion to mixed marriages (1 Co 7:24), and even in hostility to all spiritual manifestations as "speaking with tongues," which recalled the excitements of pagan cults. In holding the balance between such opposing tendencies, neither of which did justice to the gospel as a whole, St. Paul had a difficult task. He sympathized with the moral vigour of the one and the moral earnestness of the other, and resolved the antimony by the proclamation of Christian love as the supreme law of conduct and the sovereign charisma (1 Co 13). Christian liberty is always to be humanized, corrected in its exercise even where legitimate, and modified in the doing of what is morally indifferent by the spirit of love, which teaches the Christian not too much to stand upon his rights as to consider the interest of others. Such "freedom" (1 Th 4), or "sweet reasonableness," is not a weak concession to human infirmity, but a virtuous demonstration of tenderness and charity. It was in this sense that the Apostle himself "bids all things to all men" (1 Co 8:9) that he might save some. He was ready to sacrifice liberty to the claims of brotherhood and to make a new contribution which Christianity made to the ethics of the ancient world: it superseded or (perhaps it would be more correct to say) consummated the ethics of self-realization by the ethics of self-sacrifice.

Christianity therefore condemned libertinism as an offence against the common life of humanity. The liberty of indifference—of doing what one likes—is rejected by the Christian ethic as an illustration of the Kantian spirit which creates liberty as reason itself. Unhappily the interpretation of liberty against which St. Paul and later teachers protested (cf. Ireneaus, adv. Haer. I. vi. 3, quoted by von Dobschutz, p. 270, for an account of the practices of Valentine, curiously paralleled to those of the Corinthian Church) was a mark of immaturity in the early Christian communities, due to an exultant sense of a new unrestricted life; but the influence of Gnosticism, with its dualistic separation of spirit and matter, must also be taken into account as explanatory of the repeated appearances of libertinism in the primitive Church. On the other hand, the antagonism between flesh and spirit is inherent in the manna; even when mutilated into the convenient distinction of Hebraism and Hellenism, the one standing for righteousness, the other for freedom, the two tendencies represent a fixed duality in the moral and intellectual development of the race. Now one element and every other holds the sway in the life of the individual and of the community; and no one who reads the history of the Church can be blind to the fact that in given periods one of the two has exercised the greater influence and created the type of religious witness which is associated with particular epochs. After the dark ages the Renaissance represents the revival of Hellenism; and to medieval laxity in religious and social life succeeds the Reformation, which is the triumph of Hebraism. The swing of the pendulum from Puritanism to the excesses of the Restoration in England illustrates the fact that there are recurring reactions in national life which inevitably affect the ethical standard alike of Church and society. It is clear also that the conception of Christian liberty, always subject to the enlargements of a virtuous intellectual or rationalistic consciousness, and limitation during a reaction to Puritanism of life and morals; and, when the Puritan wave has spent itself, human nature re-asserts itself in a desire to regain its lost or curtailed liberty of acts and all ages of the Church the question of accommodation to the habits, customs, and recreations of secular society has to be faced by the individual Christian, and in the solution of the difficulty two opposite tendencies, parallel with those in the Corinthian Church, have always made themselves felt: we should now call the broad and the narrow view. In the present age, when we have reached a pitch of civilization in which the resources of the natural universe are placed at the disposal of mankind to an extraordinary extent and the facilities for its manipulation, luxury, and amusement are multiplied for all sections of society, Christianity is still represented by the double ideal—the one proclaiming the width of the Christian freedom, the other its self-restraint and self-denial. Take, e.g., the attitude of the modern Christian to the theatre. This is but a repetition, under another set of conditions, of the problem which the early teacher of Christianity had to face. With all our advance in moral insight, our larger views of life and destiny, we have not yet superseded the ethical principles which served as a guide to St. Paul. The individual conscience still has to weigh over against the undoubted fact of Christian liberty the influence of the personal support of certain customs or institutions not wholly moralized, and, under certain circumstances, actually immoral, still has to take into account the effect of the exercise of liberty, in matters morally indifferent, upon the clearness of their moral vision or sufficiently strong to meet the demands of a new temptation, as well as upon those belonging to the same community whose conscience is sensitive. At the same time, it is clear that a policy of self-sacrifice on the part of the Christian in regard to the defective and degrading tendencies of given recreations leaves the latter as they are, and to many Christians who interpret liberty in the wider sense consideration of the public good is paramount in determining their attitude in the matter of supporting the drama or otherwise. The law of love is not less binding to-day than in the earlier ages of the Church. It may even be argued that the developed sense of human solidarity and brotherhood, in itself the offspring of Christianity, is educating the Christian conscience to solve all such questions of conscience by a reference to the good of the community as a whole. Yet even this attitude, which is but another aspect of the love of God, is determined in practice by our ethical conception of the summum bonum for humanity; and here the Christian ideal, more especially in relation to art, differs toto orbe from all the cult of realism popular in many quarters to-day, which is based on the theory of "art for art's sake," regardless of the effect on public morality. Art enriches the common life only when regarded as "a revelation of a deeper truth in things."

'If it is taken merely as art, merely as a beautiful dream, it sinks into play, becomes a mere refined amusement, and loses all its real power over the human spirit. There could hardly be any worse sign of an age than that it regards art as a mere amusement, as a mere escape from the gravest problems of life." (J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, London, 1900, p. 443.)

"All things are yours" (1 Co 3:21) is indeed the noblest charter of Christian freedom, but only when interpreted in the light of the succeeding words, 'ye are Christ's.' The possession of worldly treasure—literary, scientific, commercial, territorial—invokes for the Christian in personal union with a Divine life a clear perception of the eternal amid the transitory, the unseen in the seen; and his citizenship is in heaven; his real life lies in that ideal world which gives meaning, beauty, and power to the world of phenomena. Hence "liberty in the Christian sense" is neither literal nor the sanctions of 'the mind of Christ'; in other words, by a reference to the ethical ideal for which Christ stands.
Less need be said as to the relation of Christian freedom to the institutions of the State, the laws of the State, and the established regulations and customs of organized communities, as this has been treated in the art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Christian), vol. v, p. 474. It is well known that neither Christ nor the apostles encouraged revolt against the State, even when, as in the case of slavery, a national institution contradicted the essential teaching of the gospel, being content to lay down universal principles rather than directions for particular nations and phases of social evolution (cf. Mt 22:21, Mk 12:17, Lk 20:24, Ro 13:1-7, 1 P 2:17). St. Paul, in dealing with the mutual obligations of masters and servants, bases his relationship on the fact that both are slaves of a common Master (Eph 6:9; Col 3:22). But the Christian ideas of human equality and brotherhood, with which they a revolutionary force which inevitably tended in the direction of overthrowing social custom, legislation, and practice. As an ideal, brotherhood has yet to be realized, and the process of realization involves a perpetual conflict of interests. The rights of conscience are imperative, and these conscience, is a foundation of Christian faith, and cannot be ignored in the interests either of despotism or of democracy (see art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Christian), loc. cit.). The pages of Christian history are crowded with the records of attempts to assert these rights in the name of religion, State edicts, and repressive measures, and the annals of religious liberty are glorious with heroisms and martyrdoms, cheerfully endured for conscience' sake. How far passive resistance to State legislation, when the latter conflicts with conscience, may be justified is a subtle ethical problem which is settled variously according as the case exalts the sacredness of a particular issue above regard to the general well-being of society as a whole, or vice versa. On the other hand, the Church exists to promote State legislation and to enlighten national institutions; it guards the great ideal of human brotherhood, which involves an equal opportunity for all, and it advocates and supports laws to alleviate human misery and to remedy imperfect social conditions and to defeat social injustices. In the ideal of liberty, equality, and fraternity the last stands first in the order of Christian thought (cf. Murray, Modern Ethics [Christian Ethics], Ch. 2). Equality flows from brotherhood—the Christian conception of a common family and one eternal Father.

And this equality can have no meaning except as an equal right to liberty, there is an equal right for all, which does not allow every individual liberty to act as he pleases. But every individual can enjoy this freedom in reality only when such is restricted from interfering with the freedom of the rest (p. 252). Co-operation in industrial struggles such as those which the present generation is witnessing between capital and labour imposes restrictions upon liberty. Trade unions break down when the principle of Christian liberty is ignored and the will of the individual is not subordinated to a common purpose. And as legislative restrictions tend more and more to curtail the liberties of individuals, and, in other words, as the laws of the State become more socialized, the obligations of Christian liberty to seek not its own, but the things of others' are proportionately less binding.

3. Christian liberty in relation to the intellect.—Overs against the authority of the State, with which the individual conscience has often found itself in opposition, there is the authority of the Church, to which the individual conscience is supposed to subordinate his will and judgment. Limits of space prevent a full treatment of the subject of authority in relation to the individual judgment in matters of faith. Sufficient it is to say that the opponents of Christianity are in the habit of urging from a review of Church history that Christian freedom of thought has never been received with anything but stern measures of repression, that the heretic has frequently been treated as an immoral person, and that on the whole Catholicism has been the foe of human enlightenment and progress (see J. H. Merry, History of Freedom of Thought, Lond., 1914). The fact that the Church has often transgressed the spirit and example of its founder in its hostility to new thought and in the repression of rationalism, forgetting that orthodoxy and Christianity are not synonymous terms, the Church's general attitude towards heterodoxy was that of tolerance; this is shown by His permission of Jews and by His tolerance of Gnosticism by implication than by actual condemnation in such references as we find to the Samaritans in St. Luke's Gospel (10:25-26), the reading: "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of in the last days is with strong consolation and in sure confidence, but the fact of His rebuke is recorded in v. 26, His spurious rejection of narrowness in the passage Lk 9:9, "Forbid him not: for he that is not against you is for you," and His emphasis on the ethical rather than the intellectual side of the Christian witness in Jn 7:22, To Him "faith" was not assent to an intellectual proposition or formula, but the spirit of receptiveness in relation to Himself and His teaching.

The convenient distinction between a religion of authority and a religion of the spirit tends to break down in practice. The Society of Friends, without a ministry and without sacraments, yet becomes an organized fellowship with recognized principles ethical and spiritual, which are binding on its members. Authority runs into every sphere of thought as well as into religion. The invariable church of Catholicism is superseded by the invariable book of Protestantism, but, when both are authority are discredited, it does not follow that pure subjectivity is the only possible issue. In Christianity there must be a synthesis of the principle of inspiration with that of authority. The day of inspiration, so long as we believe in a Spirit that guides into all truth, is never at an end, while at the same time the corporate witness of the Christian Church in all epochs of its history cannot be ignored. The progress of Christianity depends, therefore, on an adequate recognition of both these factors—the consensum sanctorum and the openness of the reason to the light that lighteth every man. In a striking essay on "The Principle of Authority" by A. E. J. Rawlinson (The Foundations, London, 1912) it is stated that there are three stages in the life of the educated Christian: (a) bondage to authority, the stage proper to childhood; (b) the stage of "abstract freedom," i.e. the assertion of the right to criticize; and, if necessary, to doubt; (c) the stage of concrete freedom, which is defined as voluntary assent on grounds of reason to what was formerly believed on authority. Many Christians never pass the second stage; intellectually they remain unenlightened, but their religious experience is unaffected. The second stage is that in which Christian liberty comes into play as a factor in our moral and intellectual development. To repress the spirit of inquiry is to
let 'that capability and godlike reason fuest in us used' (Shakespeare, Hamlet, iv, iv, 36 f.), to imperil our moral and spiritual health, and to foreclose the possibility of a larger equipment for Christian influence. If the issue on the intellectual side is rejection of the doctrines hitherto accepted on authority, there still remains the witness of life and the experience of the saints. It is no doubt true that Christian experience is bound up with a conviction of the truth of certain doctrines, such as the existence of God, immortality, the divinity of Our Lord, and the persistent activity of His spirit; but its moral earnestness and beauty remain as a perpetual challenge to those who reject doctrinal Christianity and thereupon feel justified in belittling its contribution to the ethical progress of humanity. On the one hand, it is possible to combine intellectual suspense and even scepticism with a high-minded allegiance to the moral teaching of Christ, and such inquirers after truth are not to be excluded from the fellowship either of individual Christians or of the organized Christian community in its various forms. On the other hand, the Church may legitimately demand from those to whom it does not refuse the right of private judgment that such judgment shall be exercised with becoming humility.

"He who would teach a new truth or reject an old (and to do so is a vocation to which is every generation some men are called) must both expect to meet in practice with the persecutions by which true prophets are assailed, and must also face the prime fact that his own prophecy may turn out false" (ib. p. 280).

Hence in actual practice within the limits of the Christian fellowship liberty of thought is restricted by the collective witness of the saints, by consideration of human fallibility, by the avoidance of arrogance, intolerance, and impatience, and by respect for simple faith which moves on traditional lines. If one may adapt a saying of T. H. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics, Oxford, 1884, p. 262), the Church is 'a society of which the members owe reciprocal services to each other,' simply as Christian to Christian. There must be no attempt to frown on the mind that is open to the sewer light when ethically and intellectually equipped for the re-interpretation of ancient doctrine, nor is it to be forgotten that those who have been affected in spiritual outlook by the critical spirit which has modified the value of time-honoured creeds and formularies may yet be qualified to bring out of the treasury of their wisdom and devotion 'things both new and old.' It is a function of Christian liberty to harmonize nova et vetera, as giving their respective witness to the realization in humanity of the ever-developing Christian ideal. But, if the modernist as a reverent seeker after truth is tolerated, he in turn must exercise the grace of patience towards the traditionalist. Christian liberty is a great gift, but Christian charity is a greater.


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